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EDDIE RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF

CORRECTION

(SC 18940)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued February 11—officially released July 1, 2014

April E. Brodeur, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s

attorney, and David Clifton, assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The dispositive issue in this habeas

corpus appeal is whether the petitioner, Eddie Rodriguez, was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel because there was a constitutionally impermissible risk that the jury would impute to him the

alleged improprieties of his attorney, who had been

prosecuted but acquitted of a nonviolent and dissimilar

crime in the same judicial districtin which the petitioner

was prosecuted. The petitioner appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the habeas court’s

denial of his second amended petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction, 131 Conn. App. 336, 338, 27 A.3d 404 (2011). On

appeal, the petitioner claims that the Appellate Court

improperly applied this court’s precedent in Phillips

v. Warden, 220 Conn. 112, 595 A.2d 1356 (1991), in

concluding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate an

actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his

attorney’s performance. We conclude that the Appellate

Court properly applied Phillips, and, accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following

facts and procedural background. ‘‘In connection with

an incident involving the petitioner’s estranged girlfriend, which occurred in October, 1990, the petitioner

was charged with burglary in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 53a-101 (a) (1),

attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] §§ 53a-49 (a) and 53a59 (a) (1), robbery in the third degree in violation of

General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-136 (a), interfering

with an officer in violation of General Statutes [Rev. to

1989] § 53a-167a (a) and carrying a dangerous weapon

in violation of General Statutes [Rev. to 1989] § 53-206.

On May 29, 1991, [A]ttorney Frank Cannatelli filed an

appearance on behalf of the petitioner.

‘‘Prior to representing the petitioner, Cannatelli had

been charged with two counts of bribery of a witness

in an unrelated case. Cannatelli pleaded not guilty to

both charges and elected a jury trial. In October, 1991,

a jury trial was conducted in Meriden. On October 29,

1991, the jury acquitted Cannatelli of both charges.

‘‘Jury selection for the petitioner’s criminal trial in

New Haven commenced on November 26, 1991. On the

first day of jury selection, the petitioner voiced concern

to the trial court that Cannatelli’s recent criminal prosecution created a conflict of interest. After inquiring into

the petitioner’s claim, the court was not persuaded that

cause existed to delay the proceedings. Thereafter, a

jury was selected and the presentation of evidence

began on December 2, 1991. The jury returned a verdict

of guilty on all counts, and the petitioner was sentenced

on March 6, 1992, to a term of imprisonment of sixteen
years, execution suspended after nine years, and five

years of probation. The petitioner appealed from his

conviction to [the Appellate Court], which affirmed the

judgment. State v. Rodriguez, 61 Conn. App. 700, 767

A.2d 756 (2001).

‘‘In 2002, after he had commenced his probation, the

petitioner was arrested and charged with violating the

terms of his probation in violation of General Statutes

[Rev. to 2001] § 53a-32. In 2003, the petitioner was found

to have violated his probation, and the court sentenced

him to serve the remaining seven years of his unexecuted sentence.

‘‘On December 16, 2008, the petitioner filed his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that Cannatelli had rendered ineffective assistance

due to an actual conflict of interest. The petitioner

alleged that Cannatelli’s criminal prosecution shortly

before the petitioner’s criminal trial had created an

inherent conflict of interest that adversely affected Cannatelli’s ability to represent the petitionerin his criminal

trial. In his pretrial brief, the petitioner explained that

Cannatelli’s criminal prosecution constituted a conflict

of interest because it prevented him from preparing for

the petitioner’s criminal trial. Additionally, the petitioner contended that Cannatelli’s criminal prosecution

constituted a conflict of interest pursuant to . . . Phillips v. Warden, [supra, 220 Conn. 112].

‘‘On April 29, 2009, the habeas court conducted an

evidentiary hearing, at which Cannatelli, the petitioner

and George Gray, an investigator with the [O]ffice of

the [C]hief [P]ublic [D]efender, testified, and the court

received exhibits. After considering the evidence, the

court found that Cannatelli was prepared and ready to

go to trial on [the petitioner’s] case. The court also

found that the media coverage of Cannatelli’s prosecution was minimal, and that Cannatelli, during [individual] voir dire in the petitioner’s criminal trial, had asked

each venireperson generally whether he or she had any

prior knowledge of Cannatelli and that no venireperson

indicated that he or she had any such knowledge.

‘‘On the basis of these findings, the habeas court

concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish

that Cannatelli was actively representing conflicting

interests at the time that he represented the petitioner.

The court also concluded that the facts of the petitioner’s case did not establish a conflict of interest pursuant

to Phillips v. Warden, supra, 220 Conn. 112. The court

then denied the petitioner’s second amended petition.

Subsequently, the petitionerfiled a petition for certification to appeal, which the court denied on August 19,

2009.’’ (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 131 Conn. App. 338–41. The petitioner appealed

from the habeas court’s denial of certification to the

Appellate Court.
TheAppellate Court determined thatthe habeas court

abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request

for certification to appeal. Id., 344. Specifically, the

Appellate Court concluded that the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim deserved to proceed

further because it presented the novel question of

whether there was a constitutionally impermissible risk

that a jury would attribute an attorney’s conduct to

his client, when the attorney had been acquitted of a

nonviolent and dissimilar crime in the same judicial

district in which his client faced criminal prosecution.

Id., 347; see Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616,

646 A.2d 126 (1994) (petitioner may establish abuse

of discretion by demonstrating that ‘‘the questions are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]). Nonetheless, the

Appellate Court concluded that the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed on its merits,

and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the habeas

court. Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 131 Conn. App. 349. This certified appeal

followed.1

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the Appellate

Court improperly concluded that he failed to demonstrate a conflict of interest pursuant to Phillips that

deprived him of his right to the effective assistance of

counsel. In response, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, claims that the Appellate Court

properly distinguished Phillips from the present case

and correctly determined that there was not a constitutionally impermissible risk that the jury would impute

to the petitioner the alleged improprieties of his trial

attorney. We conclude thatthe AppellateCourt properly

applied Phillips in concluding that the petitioner failed

to demonstrate a conflict of interest of constitutional

magnitude. We therefore affirm the judgment of the

Appellate Court.

We begin with the well settled standard of review

governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

‘‘When reviewing the decision of a habeas court, the

facts found by the habeas court may not be disturbed

unless the findings were clearly erroneous. . . . The

issue, however, of [w]hether the representation [that]

a defendant received at trial was constitutionally inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland

v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80

L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. As such, that question requires

plenary review by this court unfettered by the clearly

erroneous standard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 288

Conn. 53, 62, 951 A.2d 520 (2008).

We next set forth the legal principles that inform our

disposition of the present appeal. ‘‘[I]t is well established that [a] criminal defendant is constitutionally

entitled to adequate and effective assistance of counsel
at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. Strickland

v. Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 686]. This right arises

under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the

United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the

Connecticut constitution. . . . It is axiomatic that the

right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance

of counsel.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306

Conn. 664, 677–78, 51 A.3d 948 (2012). ‘‘As an adjunct

to this right, a criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by an attorney free from conflicts of interest.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phillips v. Warden,

supra, 220 Conn. 132.

‘‘In a case of a claimed conflict of interest . . . in

order to establish a violation of the [right to counsel]

the [petitioner] has a two-pronged task. He must establish (1) that counsel actively represented conflicting

interests and (2) that an actual conflict of interest

adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 133. Although ordinarily

a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel

must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was

deficient, and that the deficient performance resulted

in actual prejudice to the defense; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 687; a petitioner who claims

that his counsel was burdened by a conflict of interest

does not need to establish prejudice. Phillips v. Warden, supra, 220 Conn. 132–33. ‘‘Where there is an actual

conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed because

counsel [has] breach[ed] the duty of loyalty, perhaps the

most basic of counsel’s duties. Moreover, it is difficult to

measure the precise effect on the defense ofrepresentation corrupted by conflicting interests.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 133; see Strickland v.

Washington, supra, 692 (‘‘[p]rejudice is presumed . . .

if the [petitioner] demonstrates that counsel actively

represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Before we turn to the merits of the petitioner’s claim,

a brief overview of this court’s decision in Phillips is

essential to our resolution of the present appeal. In

Phillips, the petitioner, John M. Phillips, was convicted

by a jury of sexual assault in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-70, unlawful restraint in the

first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95,

and burglary in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-101 for an incident that occurred in 1981.

Phillips v. Warden, supra, 220 Conn. 114. Throughout

his criminal trial, Phillips was represented by Bernard

L. Avcollie, an attorney who was in the process of

appealing his own murder conviction resulting from a

widely publicized trial in the same judicial district in

which Phillips faced criminal prosecution. Id., 117, 122.

During his general introductory remarks to the panel
of venirepersons, Avcollie advised the panel as follows:

‘‘If you know anything about any of the people that I

have mentioned that work in my office or particularly

about me, if there is anything that you know or feel

about me that will inhibit your ability to judge this

man fairly, then you should so indicate.’’ (Emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 125. Subsequently, Avcollie did not inquire during individual voir

dire as to whether the venirepersons had any prior

knowledge of him despite his belief that most of the

venirepersons were aware of his murder conviction.2

Id.

After Phillips was convicted, he filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was denied his

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because Avcollie had a conflict of interest. Id., 114.

The habeas court denied his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, and on appeal to the Appellate Court, Phillips

argued that it was a violation of Avcollie’s duty of loyalty

to represent him in the same judicial district in which

Avcollie had been convicted of murder, and that, as a

result of this conflict of interest, he was denied his right

to the effective assistance of counsel. Id., 114, 128–29.

The Appellate Court rejected Phillips’ claim and

affirmed the judgment of the habeas court. Phillips v.

Warden, 23 Conn. App. 63, 68, 579 A.2d 1092 (1990),

rev’d, 220 Conn. 112, 595 A.2d 1356 (1991).

On appeal, this court reversed the judgment of the

Appellate Court. Phillips v. Warden, supra, 220 Conn.

147. The court concluded that, under the unique factual

circumstances in that case, Avcollie was indeed burdened by an actual conflict of interest that deprived

Phillips of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id., 139–40. The court’s analysis in Phillips began

by observing that, ‘‘[w]hile the right to conflict-free representation typically is implicated in cases involving

representation of criminal codefendants by a single

attorney . . . it is equally applicable in other cases

where a conflict of interest may impair an attorney’s

ability to represent his client effectively.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 134–35.

Accordingly, the court observed that a conflict of interest may arise when ‘‘the intrinsic situation of the [attorney], when viewed in the context of his client’s cause,

requires that he withdraw from representing the client

because of the impermissible risk that the jury will

identify his conduct with that of his client. . . . Thus,

an attorney may be considered to be laboring under

an impaired duty of loyalty, and thereby be subject

to conflicting interests, because of interests or factors

personal to him that are inconsistent, diverse or otherwise discordant with [the interests] of his client . . . .’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 138–39.

Applying these principles to the situation in Phillips,

this court concluded that ‘‘Avcollie’s representation of
[Phillips] was fatally flawed by an inherent conflict of

interest because Avcollie’s duties of undivided loyalty

and independent exercise of professional judgment

demanded that he withdraw from representing [Phillips] on the serious charges that [Phillips] faced in that

place and at that time.’’ Id., 139. The court further concluded that the violation of Avcollie’s duty of loyalty

in failing to withdraw from Phillips’ criminal case

adversely affected Avcollie’s performance as his attorney. Id., 139–40. ‘‘[A]s a direct result of his violation of

those duties, Avcollie was required to make the tactical

choice of choosing between two options—inquiring of

the venirepersons during individual voir dire whether

they knew about his murder conviction, or forgoing

such inquiry—either of which was fraught with peril

for [Phillips’] right to a fair trial before an impartial

jury . . . .’’ Id. ‘‘Either choice was harmful to [Phillips’]

interest, because either course of conduct created the

impermissible risk that the jurors who were to judge

[Phillips] would do so infected by their view of Avcollie.’’ Id., 145. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court. Id., 147.

Against the backdrop of this court’s holding in Phillips, we now turn to the merits of the petitioner’s claim

in the present case. The petitioner makes two primary

arguments on appeal. First, the petitioner contends that

the Appellate Court improperly distinguished the factual circumstances in the present case from Phillips.

Second, the petitioner contends that this court’s precedent in Phillips required that Cannatelli conduct a probing individual voir dire as to each venireperson’s

knowledge of Cannatelli’s criminal case. We disagree

with each of the petitioner’s claims.

We begin with the petitioner’s claim that the Appellate Court inappropriately distinguished the facts in

the present case from Phillips. Despite the petitioner’s

argument to the contrary, we agree with the Appellate

Court that the circumstances surrounding Cannatelli’s

criminal prosecution differed in several criticalrespects

from Avcollie’s criminal prosecution in Phillips.

First and foremost, unlike Avcollie, Cannatelli was

acquitted, not convicted, of the criminal charges against

him priorto the petitioner’s criminal trial. The petitioner

attempts to trivialize the distinction between an acquittal and a conviction by arguing that the reputational

damage attendant to a criminal prosecution, no less

than the stigma of a conviction, creates a risk that

a jury might impute the attorney’s misconduct to the

criminal defendant. We are not persuaded by the petitioner’s argument. The fact that Cannatelli’s alleged misconduct had not been proven mitigated any concern

that the jury would be biased toward the petitioner. In

contrast, the fact that Avcollie had not only been

charged, but also convicted of murder enhanced the

risk that the jury’s evaluation of Phillips’ criminal case
would be tainted by the jury’s repugnance toward his

attorney.

Second, and relatedly, Avcollie was convicted of murdering his wife by strangulation, ‘‘a crime of violence

of the first order of seriousness’’; id., 140; and his client,

Phillips, was charged with similarly reprehensible

crimes of ‘‘sexual assault, unlawful restraint and burglary, arising out of a factual scenario of terrible violence against an elderly woman.’’ Id. In the present case,

by contrast, Cannatelli was acquitted of the nonviolent

integrity based crime of bribery of a witness, whereas

the petitioner was charged with violent offenses including, inter alia, burglary, robbery, attempted assault, and

carrying a dangerous weapon. While bribery is undoubtedly a serious offense, it was the similarly violent nature

of the serious offenses in Phillips that enhanced the

potential for juror bias in that case. See id., 141 (identifying risk that ‘‘jurors would identify Avcollie’s status

as a convicted murderer with his client’s status as an

accused rapist, kidnapper, and burglar’’); id., 140 (identifying potential for bias because Phillips ‘‘had to face

a jury in a trial for serious and violent criminal offenses,

while represented by a convicted murderer’’).

Third, Avcollie was ‘‘a prominent [political] figure’’

in the judicial district in which both he and his client

were prosecuted; id., 117; and, consequently, Avcollie’s

prosecution and ensuing appeals ‘‘had been the subject

of widespread publicity in that area . . . .’’ Id., 140.

Unlike Avcollie, there is nothing in the record to suggest

thatCannatelli was a notable figure who garnered significant public interest in his criminal case by virtue of

his prominence in the community. Accordingly, despite

the petitioner’s production of a ‘‘number of news clippings and articles which referenced the Cannatelli prosecution and/or acquittal,’’ we conclude that the

evidence supported the habeas court’s findings that

‘‘[t]he coverage was minimal’’ and that Cannatelli’s

criminal case was ‘‘much lower profile’’ than Avcollie’s

criminal case.

Fourth, unlike Cannatelli, ‘‘Avcollie believed that

most of the venirepersons knew of his murder conviction . . . .’’ Phillips v. Warden, supra, 220 Conn. 125.

Avcollie’s belief was indeed substantiated given the

widespread publicity surrounding his murder conviction in the judicial district from which Phillips’ jury

panel was culled. As the court in Phillips observed,

there was a ‘‘real and substantial risk that one or more

of [Phillips’] jurors may well have known of Avcollie’s

murder conviction and viewed [Phillips’] defense

through a lens corrupted by that knowledge. Avcollie

believed that risk to be a reality. That risk, which was

all too apparent to Avcollie . . . demanded no less

than that Avcollie . . . simply refrain from representing [Phillips] . . . .’’ Id., 141. In the present case, by

contrast, Cannatelli testified credibly that ‘‘he had no
concerns about any of the jurors’ ability to serve on

the petitioner’s case.’’ Nothing in the record supports

the petitioner’s claim that there was a substantial risk

that the jury was aware of Cannatelli’s prosecution and

would impute his alleged improprieties to the petitioner.

Fifth and finally, the present case is distinguishable

from Phillips because the jury voir dire conducted by

each respective attorney differed regarding the jury’s

knowledge of the attorney’s criminal prosecution. At

the petitioner’s criminal trial, Cannatelli individually

inquired whether each venireperson was familiar, for

any reason, with Cannatelli or anyone at his law firm.

None of the venirepersons responded affirmatively to

this inquiry despite being individually asked and having

the opportunity to do so. In Phillips, by contrast, Avcollie did not inquire during individual voir dire as to

whether each venireperson was familiar with Avcollie

for any reason. Rather, the extent of this inquiry in

Phillips was limited to Avcollie’s introductory remarks

to the entire panel of venirepersons, when he stated ‘‘if

there is anything that you know or feel about me that

will inhibit your ability to judge this man fairly, then you

should so indicate.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Phillips v. Warden, supra, 220 Conn. 125.

The petitioner denies that there is any meaningful

distinction between Cannatelli’s inquiry during individual voir dire and Avcollie’s introductory comments to

the entire panel of venirepersons. Specifically, the petitioner argues that Phillips requires that an attorney

who has been prosecuted in the same judicial district

as his client must specifically inquire during individual

voir dire as to each venireperson’s knowledge of the

attorney’s criminal prosecution. Put another way, the

petitioner argues that a general inquiry as to whether

the venireperson is familiar with the attorney for any

reason is inadequate. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim,

however, Phillips does not require that an attorney

specifically inquire about the attorney’s criminal prosecution during individual voir dire. In fact, we acknowledged in Phillips the inherent flaws of a specific inquiry,

namely, the risk that the attorney will inform previously

unaware jurors of the fact of the attorney’s criminal

prosecution and, in so doing, create bias where none

may have existed. See id., 144–45.

In light of our holding in Phillips, Cannatelli’s general

inquiry during individual voir dire was entirely appropriate in the present case. Cannatelli asked each venireperson whether he or she was familiar with Cannatelli

for any reason, which necessarily was broad enough

to include his criminal prosecution. The individual voir

dire thus provided each venireperson the opportunity to

disclose any knowledge or recollection of Cannatelli’s

criminal case, and, in turn, it provided Cannatelli and

the trial court an opportunity to evaluate each venire-
person’s individual response to the general inquiry.

Therefore, Cannatelli did not ‘‘[dispense] with [the]

unique and valuable right’’ of individual voir dire, which

facilitates ‘‘the discovery of factors that may predispose

a prospective juror to decide a case on legally irrelevant

grounds . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 146. At the same time, the inquiry

did not inform prospective jurors who were otherwise

unaware of Cannatelli’s circumstances that he had been

prosecuted and acquitted of bribery charges. Accordingly, we reject the petitioner’s claim that Phillips

required that Cannatelli specifically inquire about his

criminal prosecution during individual voir dire.3

In sum, the Appellate Court appropriately distinguished Phillips from the present case and properly

concluded that the petitioner failed to demonstrate an

actual conflict of interest that adversely affected Cannatelli’s performance as the petitioner’s trial attorney.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate

Court.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The court granted the petition for certification to appeal, limited to the

following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly apply Phillips v. Warden,

[supra, 220 Conn. 112], and conclude that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the trial attorney had a conflict of interest of constitutional

magnitude?’’ Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction, 304 Conn. 911,

911–12, 40 A.3d 318 (2012).

2

Insofar as the Appellate Court opinion incorrectly states that ‘‘Avcollie

never made any such inquiry [as to whether any venireperson had any prior

knowledge of him]’’; Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 131

Conn. App. 349; we take this opportunity to clarify that Avcollie did state

during his general introductory remarks to the panel that any venireperson

having prior knowledge of Avcollie should so indicate. Phillips v. Warden,

23 Conn. App. 63, 68, 579 A.2d 1092 (1990), rev’d, 220 Conn. 112, 595 A.2d

1356 (1991). Avcollie did not, however, pursue this line of questioning during

individual voir dire.

3 To the extent that the petitioner relies upon Phillips to suggest that

neither a specific nor a general inquiry during individual voir dire would

alleviate the risk that the jury would impute Cannatelli’s alleged misconduct

to the petitioner, we reject this claim and distinguish Phillips on its facts.

The petitioner relies on our discussion in Phillips of the ‘‘classic ‘no win’

situation’’; Phillips v. Warden, supra, 220 Conn. 144; that resulted from

Avcollie’s failure to withdraw from Phillips’ criminal case. We explained

the situation as follows: ‘‘Having opted to remain as [Phillips’] lawyer in

violation of his duty to withdraw, Avcollie was faced with the insoluble

dilemma of whether to raise the fact of his own notorious conviction during

the individual voir dire . . . . This was, from [Phillips’] viewpoint, a classic

‘no win’ situation. If Avcollie did not raise the issue, he exposed his client

to the risk that such biased venirepersons would find their way on to the

jury. If he did raise the issue, he created the risk that he would inform—

or remind—otherwise ignorant or forgetful venirepersons that they were to

hear a case in which a convicted murderer would be representing an accused

rapist.’’ Id., 144–45.

The petitioner fails to acknowledge that the no win situation we identified

in Phillips resulted from the unique factual circumstances in that case. As

we explained, ‘‘[t]his dilemma was inherent in Avcollie’s personal situation,

and was the inevitable result of the violation of his duty of loyalty to [Phillips].’’ Id., 145. ‘‘It was only because of Avcollie’s antecedent violation of

his constitutional and ethical duties to [Phillips] that he was confronted

with a strategic choice that carried with it only adverse consequences for

his client.’’ Id., 147.

In the present case, by contrast, there was no conflict of interest that
required Cannatelli to withdraw from the petitioner’s case in the first

instance. Cannatelli thus did not confront the strategic dilemma that Avcollie

faced in Phillips as the result of his failure to withdraw. Accordingly, we

reject the petitioner’s suggestion that an individual voir dire in any capacity

was insufficient to ferret out potentially biased jurors.