Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1610-PL-2342 | May 31, 2017 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Benjamin D. Fryman 

Valparaiso, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Paula E. Neff 

William J. Emerson 

Lucas, Holcomb & Medrea LLP 

Merrillville, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA 

The Catholic Diocese of Gary 

and St. Joseph Catholic School, 

Appellants-Defendants, 

v. 

Douglas N. Crawley and Patricia 

Crawley, 

Appellees-Plaintiffs 

May 31, 2017 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

45A04-1610-PL-2342 

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Diane Kavadias 

Schneider, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

45D11-1207-PL-64 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1610-PL-2342 | May 31, 2017 Page 2 of 12

Case Summary 

[1] Douglas Crawley was hired by the Catholic Diocese of Gary to work at St. 

Joseph Catholic School in August 2005. He was hired as a part-time worker 

but became a full-time employee before the end of 2005. The Diocese offered 

health-insurance benefits to full-time employees, but Douglas was not made 

aware that he was eligible. In late 2006 Douglas was hospitalized. At the time, 

he was listed on his wife’s insurance plan. After he was released from the 

hospital, his wife’s insurance company denied payment of Douglas’s medical 

and hospital bills, claiming that Douglas was eligible for health insurance 

through the Diocese. 

[2] A health-care-collection agency sued the Crawleys for payment of Douglas’s 

medical bills, and the Crawleys filed a third-party complaint against the 

Diocese. The Crawleys asserted four claims: breach of contract, actual fraud, 

constructive fraud, and violations of the Employment Retirement Income 

Safety Act (ERISA). Five years later, the Diocese moved for summary 

judgment. The trial court granted the Diocese’s motion only on the ERISA 

claim. The Diocese was granted an interlocutory appeal and challenges the 

trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the three remaining claims. 

Concluding that the Diocese was entitled to summary judgment on the 

remaining claims, we reverse. 
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Facts and Procedural History 

[3] Douglas began working for the Diocese at St. Joseph Catholic School in August 

2005. At the time, Douglas worked part-time and was not eligible for the 

Diocese’s health-insurance plan. Eventually, Douglas began working forty 

hours or more each week at the school and became a full-time employee eligible 

for health-insurance coverage. However, Douglas was not informed that he 

was eligible to participate in the Diocese’s plan. Douglas was listed as an 

insured person through his wife’s employer’s insurance plan. His wife, Patricia, 

was employed at St. Catherine Hospital. The hospital’s plan required spouses 

of employees to participate in their own employers’ insurance plans, if offered, 

as the primary insurer and then to use the hospital’s insurance as secondary 

coverage. If coverage was not available to spouses through their employers, 

then the hospital’s plan would serve as the sole insurer for them. 

[4] In October 2006, Douglas was hospitalized, and the costs of his medical 

procedures were billed to St. Catherine Hospital’s insurance provider. Six 

months later, in April 2007, Pat Mason, a human-resources representative with 

St. Catherine Hospital, contacted the Diocese regarding Douglas’s healthinsurance coverage. After her conversation with the Diocese, Mason and the 

hospital’s insurer determined that Douglas was, in fact, eligible for insurance 

through the Diocese. Accordingly, the hospital’s insurance provider denied 

Douglas’s claims, and Mason notified the Crawleys that Douglas’s claims were 

denied. 
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[5] Shortly thereafter, Douglas was approached by the principal of St. Joseph 

Catholic School. The principal presented Douglas with a form titled 

“Voluntary Waiver of Health Insurance Benefits.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 

64. The form stipulated that Douglas had been notified that he was eligible for 

health-insurance coverage through the Diocese but waived that coverage. The 

form was back-dated to January 3, 2006. Douglas kept the form and never 

signed it. 

[6] The Crawleys were unable to pay Douglas’s hospital bills, and in March 2009, a 

collection agency, Argent Healthcare Financial Services, Inc., filed suit against 

them. A year later, the Crawleys filed a third-party complaint against the 

Diocese, alleging four claims: breach of contract, actual fraud, constructive 

fraud, and ERISA violations. They also sought recovery for their attorney’s 

fees. As part of their fraud allegations, the Crawleys claimed that the Diocese 

misrepresented that Douglas “was not eligible” for coverage under the 

Diocese’s insurance plan at the time of his hospitalization, when in fact he was 

eligible at that time. Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 43-45. 

[7] The Diocese later obtained copies of Douglas’s unpaid medical bills. It paid 

out all the claims to “healthcare providers and their assignees for balances owed 

for medical services provided to Douglas Crawley” for the time that he worked 

for the Diocese but was not on its health insurance. Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 

4. The total amount paid was $48,914.45. Id. Argent’s suit against the 

Crawleys was dismissed. 
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[8] In October 2015, five years after the third-party complaint was filed, the 

Diocese moved for summary judgment on all claims. In their response to the 

Diocese’s motion, the Crawleys offered the affidavit of Pat Mason, which stated 

that she spoke with an unidentified employee at the Diocese in April 2007. 

According to Mason, the Diocese employee informed Mason that Douglas was 

eligible for health insurance but had declined coverage. The Crawleys 

contended that the misrepresentation underlying their fraud claims was not that 

Mason was told that Douglas “was not eligible” for health insurance but that 

Mason was falsely told that Douglas had declined his health insurance through 

the Diocese. Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 45 (“The essence of the Crawleys’ 

complaint is that the Diocese falsely represented to Mrs. Crawley’s employer that 

Mr. Crawley was offered and declined benefits from the Diocese.”). The 

Diocese responded, stating that the Crawleys introduced a different theory for 

their fraud claims than what was alleged in their complaint. It argued that this 

different theory was the exact opposite of what was pled in the Crawleys’ 

complaint. In other words, the complaint alleged that the Diocese had 

misrepresented that Douglas was not eligible for health insurance, but the 

Crawleys’ response to the motion for summary judgment claimed that the 

Diocese had misrepresented that Douglas was eligible but had declined 

coverage. 

[9] The trial court granted summary judgment for the Diocese on the ERISA claim 

because both parties agreed that the Diocese’s plan was a “church plan” and 

not covered by ERISA’s provisions. See id. at 87; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) 
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(stating that church plans are not covered under ERISA); 29 U.S.C. § 

1002(33)(A) (defining church plan). The court denied the Diocese’s motion on 

the remaining claims, stating that the Diocese had failed to show that no 

genuine issue of material fact existed. Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 87. The trial 

court then granted the Diocese’s request that this issue be certified for 

interlocutory appeal. We accepted jurisdiction, and this appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision 

[10] The Diocese contends that there are no genuine issues of material fact on the 

remaining claims—breach of contract, actual fraud, and constructive fraud1

—

and that the trial court erred when it did not grant summary judgment in its 

favor. We review a trial court’s summary-judgment decision de novo. Hughley 

v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). All reasonable inferences are drawn 

in favor of the non-moving party. Id. “The moving party bears the burden of 

making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact 

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]” Doe v. Adams, 

53 N.E.3d 483, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. If the moving party 

establishes its prima facie case, “the burden then shifts to the non-moving party 

to designate and produce evidence of facts showing the existence of a genuine 

 

1

 In their response to the Diocese’s appeal, the Crawleys introduce three new theories of recovery—

counterfeiting, forgery, and insurance fraud. Because the Crawleys did not raise these issues to the trial 

court, they are waived. See Celadon Trucking Srvs., Inc. v. Wilmoth, 70 N.E.3d 883, 840-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2017). 
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issue of material fact.” Id. The party appealing “has the burden of persuading 

this Court that the grant or denial of summary judgment was erroneous.” Id. 

I. Breach of Contract 

[11] The Crawleys contend that the Diocese had “a contractual obligation to 

inform” Douglas that he was eligible for health insurance and that the Diocese 

breached this obligation. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 46. The Diocese contends 

that no contract ever existed, and, therefore, the Crawleys’ breach-of-contract 

claim fails. To have a legally binding contract there must be an offer, 

acceptance, and consideration. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue v. Belterra Resort Ind., 

LLC, 935 N.E.2d 174, 179 (Ind. 2010). If the contract is in writing, Indiana 

Trial Rule 9.2(A) requires the plaintiff to attach the original or a copy to his 

pleading. 

[12] The only document the Crawleys attached to their third-party complaint is the 

Anthem Benefit Booklet. See Ex. A; Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 51-136. At 

the close of discovery, the booklet remained as the only alleged source of a 

contract. Section five of the booklet discusses eligibility for enrollment in an 

Anthem health-insurance plan, but it clearly states, “For more specific eligibility 

information you should see your Human Resources or benefits department.” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 85. The booklet makes no offer of benefits but 

rather serves as an educational tool; it is not the source of a contract between 

the Diocese and Douglas. 
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[13] On appeal, the Crawleys claim that they will “offer evidence at trial to show 

[the Diocese’s] policy provision of health insurance benefits to its employees.” 

Appellees’ Br. p. 35. They continue that at trial they will bring “documents, 

including policies and forms of documentation” to support their claim of breach 

of contract. Id. at 36. But this is precisely why we have summary judgment; it 

provides the court an opportunity to review the evidence that is to be presented 

at trial in support of each party’s case to determine what, if any, claims proceed 

to trial. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to make a 

prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doe, 53 N.E.3d at 494. The burden 

then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate and produce evidence of facts 

showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. Regardless of 

whether the alleged contract was written or oral, the Crawleys must do more 

than generically state that they will present evidence of a contract at trial. They 

have failed to meet their burden. We therefore conclude that the trial court 

erred when it denied summary judgment for the Diocese on the Crawleys’ 

breach-of-contract claim. 

II. Fraud2

[14] The Diocese next contends that the Crawleys have failed to prove that there is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to their claims of actual and constructive fraud. 

 

2

 The Crawleys’ complaint asserts claims of actual and constructive fraud. Both claims allege the same set of 

facts, so we will address these arguments together. 
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To prevail on a claim of actual fraud (also referred to as common-law fraud), 

the plaintiff must show: 

(1) a material misrepresentation of past or existing fact which (2) 

was untrue, (3) was made with knowledge of or in reckless 

ignorance of its falsity, (4) was made with the intent to deceive, 

(5) was rightfully relied upon by the complaining party, and (6) 

which proximately caused the injury or damage complained of. 

Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 327, 335 (Ind. 2013). The elements of 

constructive fraud vary slightly from those of actual fraud: 

(1) a duty owing by the party to be charged to the complaining 

party due to their relationship; (2) violation of that duty by the 

making of deceptive material misrepresentations of past or 

existing facts or remaining silent when a duty to speak exists; (3) 

reliance thereon by the complaining party; (4) injury to the 

complaining party as a proximate result thereof; and (5) the 

gaining of an advantage by the party to be charged at the expense 

of the complaining party. 

Sheaff Brock Inv. Advisors, LLC v. Morton, 7 N.E.3d 278, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), 

trans. denied. 

[15] The Crawleys claimed that the Diocese engaged in fraudulent activity because: 

(1) the Diocese had a duty to disclose to Douglas that he was eligible for healthinsurance benefits; (2) the Diocese attempted to have Douglas sign a back-dated 

form that waived his health-insurance benefits; and (3) the Diocese told Pat 

Mason, who worked for St. Catherine Hospital, that Douglas was not eligible 

for health-insurance benefits. Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 41-46. 
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[16] The Diocese first disputes that it committed fraud by not informing Douglas 

that he was eligible for health insurance. The Diocese argues that this 

allegation is a “repackaging” of the breach-of-contract claim. Appellants’ Br. p. 

20. A plaintiff who brings “both a breach of contract and a fraud claim must 

prove that (1) the breaching party committed the separate and independent tort 

of fraud; and (2) the fraud resulted in injury distinct from that resulting from the 

breach.” Sheaff Brock, 7 N.E.3d at 288. 

[17] This fraud allegation relies on the same facts underlying the breach-of-contract 

claim: the Diocese owed Douglas a duty to disclose his eligibility for health 

insurance and failed to make such a disclosure. These allegations amount to a 

claim for breach of contract and nothing more. See Tobin v. Ruman, 819 N.E.2d 

78, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he allegations making up his fraud claim 

amount to a series of misrepresentations stemming from and about the contract 

itself. At best, such evidence merely establishes that Ruman and RCH 

breached the oral contract . . . .”). Additionally, the prayers for relief under 

these claims are almost verbatim; they seek payment for Douglas’s medical 

services while he worked for the Diocese and was eligible for its insurance plan 

but was not informed of his eligibility. The Crawleys have not offered any 

proof as to how they suffered distinct injuries from the alleged fraud. We agree 

with the Diocese: this fraud allegation is a repackaged version of the breach-ofcontract claim. The alleged duty to disclose, if any, would arise from the 

alleged contractual relationship between the Diocese and Douglas. But, as 
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already discussed, the Crawleys have failed to present any evidence that a 

contract existed between Douglas and the Diocese. 

[18] The second allegation that the Diocese challenges is that in April 2007, six 

months after Douglas was hospitalized and a few days after Mason contacted 

the Diocese regarding Douglas’s health-insurance eligibility, the Diocese tried 

to get him to sign a back-dated form that said he had waived his benefits 

election in January 2006—after he was employed full-time but before he was 

hospitalized. But Douglas never signed the form. To establish a prima facie 

case under both actual and constructive fraud, the Crawleys are required to 

prove that they relied on a material misrepresentation and that reliance caused 

them some type of injury. The Crawleys have not satisfied this burden. 

Douglas’s injury—his medical and hospital bills—occurred six months before 

the Diocese approached him with the back-dated form. The Crawleys cannot 

claim that they detrimentally relied on the Diocese’s request to sign the backdated form. The Diocese’s actions do not amount to actual or constructive 

fraud. 

[19] The Diocese also challenges the Crawleys’ third allegation that it fraudulently 

misrepresented Douglas’s benefits eligibility to Pat Mason. The Crawleys 

present two different theories of what was told to Mason—either Douglas was 

not eligible for health-insurance coverage, or Douglas waived his coverage. 

Regardless of the statement that was actually made to Mason, the Diocese did 

not engage in actual or constructive fraud for the same reasons the back-dated 

form did not constitute fraud. In her affidavit, Mason stated that she spoke to 
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the Diocese in April 2007 about Douglas’s benefits eligibility. She further 

stated that based on this conversation, St. Catherine Hospital determined that 

Douglas was not eligible for health-insurance coverage through the hospital, 

and his claims from October 2006 were ultimately denied. The Crawleys, 

again, have failed to establish a prima facie case for actual or constructive fraud. 

The undisputed facts are clear: Mason did not speak with the Diocese until six 

months after Douglas’s injury. The Crawleys cannot now claim detrimental 

reliance on a statement made after the medical and hospital bills began 

accruing. We conclude that the trial court erred when it denied the Diocese’s 

motion for summary judgment on the Crawleys’ fraud claims.3

 

[20] Reversed. 

Bailey, J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs in result without opinion. 

 

3

 Count I of the Crawleys’ complaint was captioned “Claim for Damages.” Appellant’s App. Vol II. p. 40. 

Because recovery of damages is contingent upon the breach-of-contract or fraud counts surviving summary 

judgment, the Diocese is also entitled to summary judgment on Count I.