#### BUTLER AND VALE v. THE UNITED STATES.

[No. 29526.

Decided May 25, 1908.]

*On the Proofs.*

The Colville Indians cede half of their reservation to the United States, estimated at 1,500,000 acres, pursuant to an agreement authorized by Congress whereby the United States are to pay the Indians $1,500,000. The United States accept the land and by act of Congress throw it open to public settlement, but Congress do not appropriate the purchase money. The Indians wait four years and then enter into a contract with two lawyers to collect this debt. The contract is approved by the Secretary of the Interior with a reduction of the compensation to 10 per cent and a limitation to ten years. The lawyers accomplish nothing. The act 21 June, 1906, confers jurisdiction on this court to hear and determine “ *in the name of Butler & Yale*” the claims of lawyers “ *who have performed, services as counsel on behalf of said*Indians,” and directs the court to “ *consider all contracts and agreements heretofore entered into by said Indians with their*attorneys.” But “ *before any money is paid to any attorney having an agreement with Butler*c6 *Yale as to the distribution of said fees ”*he must “ *execute and deliver to the Secretary of the Interior a satisfaction and*discharge.”

I. The language of the jurisdictional *Act 21 June, 1906*(34 Stat. L„ p. 378), indicates that its enactment is in pursuance of a supposed preexisting state of affairs between the attorneys who have rendered services to the Colville Indians whereby the amount recovered by Butler and Vale would be distributed pursuant to an agreement between all the attorneys.

II. But Congress never intended to confer upon the nominal claimants judicial power to distribute a judgment of this court upon their own discretion.

*498III. The portion of the statute which authorizes suit to be brought for the benefit of all the attorneys in the names of two of them is directory. Its object was to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to conclude the rights of the attorneys under presupposed agreements.

IV. Courts will not deny redress to suitors because a portion of a statute may fail, but will exercise jurisdiction if sufficient remains upon which to predicate the relief intended.

V.Special statutory jurisdiction is not to be extended by construction, yet doubts may be solved in favor of jurisdiction where no established law is violated.

VI.Where a statute simply recites a supposed agreement, the language being “ *as agreed, among themselves,”*it is indefinite as to what the agreements are. To so construe the act as to require the court to so place a judgment for $225,000 that it will be distributed according to unknown agreements would be at variance with well-recognized rules of legal procedure.

VII.Where a jurisdictional act clearly embraces the claims of “ *all attorneys who have rendered services*” the court can not limit its judgment to those who have entered into an agreement among themselves.

VIII.A statute conferring jurisdiction upon a court to hear and determine the claims of all attorneys who have rendered services in a certain matter to a designated tribe of Indians is not controlled by a prior statute (Rev. Stat., § 2103) requiring that contracts with Indians must be executed in a certain way and be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The manifest intent of the jurisdictional act is that the attorneys shall be compensated *in quantum meruit*irrespective of express agreements.

IX.Where a court is estimating the relief the parties are entitled to *in quantum meruit*an agreement between the claimants themselves may be resorted to for certain purposes but is not evidence against the Indian defendants.

X.Where an Indian tribe entered into a valid contract with two attorneys for the prosecution of a claim and the attorneys brought in other attorneys to assist in prosecuting it for a share of what might be obtained, the court will not for that reason increase the liability of the Indians.

XI.Where attorneys not employed by the Indians pushed themselves into the prosecution of the claim at a time when their services were not indispensable and did not materially assist in the final disposition of the case, the court will regard their actions as voluntary and will award nothing to them out of the fund.

*499*The Reporters'*statement of the case:

This case was tried on its merits, and on April 6, 1908, the court- made an order fixing the attorneys’ fees at $60,000, the distribution of same to be agreed upon by said attorneys on or before the first Monday in May, 1908, otherwise to be determined by the court.

Motions to amend the order of April 6, 1908, and for increase of compensation to attorneys were filed, and on May 18, 1908, the court made an order overruling said motions and naming the persons who shall participate in said judgment.

On May 25, 1908, the court made its findings of fact, and, the distribution of the judgment not having been agreed upon as required by the order of April 6, 1908, the court apportioned same among the several attorneys.

The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:

I. By authority of the act of Congress approved June 21, 1906 (84 Stat. L., pp. 377-378), the claimants herein were authorized to bring suit in the Court of Claims for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation which shall be paid to the attorneys who have performed services as counsel on behalf of the Indians residing on the Colville Reservation in the prosecution of the claim of said Indians for payment for said land.

II. The Colville Indian Reservation was originally created by executive order dated July 2, 1872, by the terms of which “ the country bounded on the east and south by the Columbia River, on the west by the Okanogan River, and on the north by the British possessions, be, and the same is hereby, set apart as a reservation for said Indians, and for such other Indians as the Department of the Interior may see fit to locate thereon.” The records of the Indian Office show that the Colville, Lake, San Poel, Okinagan, Spokane, and Coeur d’Alene and other tribes of Indians occupied and used, according to the Indian custom, the territory which may be roughly described as bounded by the Bitter Root Mountains and the Kootenai River on the east, the Palouse River on the south, the Cascade Mountains on the west, and the British possessions on the north, from time dating, at least, as far back as 1857, and probably for gener*500ations back of that time. No treaty of cession had, however, been negotiated with said Indians for the territory described, and no diminished reservation had been provided for them until the date of said executive order of July 2, 1872. The records of that office further show that the Okinagans, Lakes, and Colvilles occupied and claimed, according to Indian custom, different portions of the Colville Reservation as established by said executive order.

By a clause contained in the Indian appropriation act approved August 19, 1890 (26 Stats., page 355), the President was authorized to appoint a commission to “ negotiate with said Colville and other bands of Indians on said reservation for the cession of such portion of said reservation as said Indians may be willing to dispose of, that the same may be opened to white settlement.”

In accordance with the aforesaid provision a commission was appointed which visited the Colville Indians and negotiated an agreement with them, dated May 9, 1891, which provided for the cession of the north half of their reservation, estimated to contain about 1,500,000 acres of land. For this cession it was agreed that the Indians should be paid $1,500,000, to be paid to them in cash in five equal annual installments of $300,000'each.

Congress, however, refused to accept and ratify said agreement and in lieu thereof passed the act of July 1,1892, supra, which provided for the restoration of the north half of the reservation to the public domain “ notwithstanding any executive order or other proceeding whereby the same was set apart as a reservation for any Indians or bands of Indians,” and it was further provided that “ the same shall be open to settlement and entry by the proclamation of the President of the United States and shall be disposed of under the general laws applicable to the disposition of the public lands in the State of Washington.”

The eighth section of said act declares “ that nothing herein contained shall be construed as recognizing the title or ownership of said Indians to any part of the said Colville Reservation, whether that hereby restored to the public domain or that still reserved by the Government for their use and occupancy.”

*501By the act of Congress approved February 20, 1896 (29 Stats., page 9), the north half of said reservation was opened to mineral entry and the same has been open under the mineral land laws since that date.

Under the provisions of a clause contained in the Indian appropriation act approved July 1, 1898 (80 Stats., page 593), “the mineral lands only in the Colville Indian Reservation in the State of Washington shall be subject to entry under the laws of the United States in relation to the entry of mineral lands.” The effect of this provision, it will be observed, was to extend the mineral land laws over the south half, or the reserved portion, of the Colville Indian Reservation and to permit mineral locations to be made thereon.

The Colville Indians protested against the action of Congress in passing said act of July 1, 1892, and claimed that their lands should not be taken from them without the payment of the compensation stipulated for in the agreement referred to.

III. On May 12, 1894, the defendant Indians entered into a contract with Levi Maish and Hugh H. Gordon as follows:

“ *Contract between the several tribes of Indians resident upon the Colville Indian Reservation and Levi*Maish, *of Penn*sylvania, *and Hugh E.*Gordon, *of Georgia.*

“ This agreement made and entered into by and between the San Puell Indians, through and by their agent, attorney, and representative, duly authorized and empowered by letters of attorney hereto attached and made part hereof; the Columbia Indians or Moses band, through and by Moses, their agent, attorney, and representative, duly authorized and empowered by letters of attorney hereto attached and made part hereof; the Nez Perces Indians or Joseph’s band, through and by Joseph, their agent, attorney, and representative, duly authorized and empowered by letters of attorney hereto attached and made part hereof; the Okinagan Indians, through and by Martin Tonasket, their agent, attorney, and representative, duly authorized and empowered by letters of attorney hereto attached and made part hereof; the Colville Indians, through and by Barnaby, their agent, attorney, and representative, duly authorized and empowered by letters of attorney hereto attached and made part hereor, and the Lake Indians, through and by Bernard, their agent, attorney, and representative, duly authorized and empowered by *502letters of attorney hereto attached and made part hereof, parties of the first part, and Levi Maish, of Pennsylvania, and Hugh H. Gordon, of Georgia, attorney at law, parties of the second part, witnesseth that: Whereas on the 9th day of May, 1891, an agreement was made and entered into by and between the United States Government, through its duly authorized commissioners, on the one part and the Indians resident upon the said Colville Reservation, through their chiefs and a majority of the male Indians above the age of eighteen (18) years, on the other part; by which agreement the northern portion of said reservation was, upon certain terms and conditions, ceded, surrendered, and relinquished to the United States;

“And whereas the principal consideration to said Indians for the cession and surrender of said portion of the reservation was the express agreement upon the part of the United States Government to pay to said Indians ‘ the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000) in five annual installments of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) each, with interest thereon at five per centum (5%);5

“And whereas the United States Government has failed to comply with the terms of said agreement, and no provision has been made to pay said Indians the amount stipulated in the said agreement for the cession of said lands;

“And whereas the said Indians entered into said agreement with an implicit trust in the good faith of the United States Government, and now most earnestly protest that their lands should not be taken from them without the payment of the just compensation stipulated in said agreement ;

“And whereas the said Indians, resident upon said reservation, are desirous of having their interests in said claim properly represented by counsel;

“ Now, therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, and in further consideration of the mutual covenants hereinafter specified, the said Indians, through their duly authorized agents, attorneys, and representatives, parties of the first part, and Levi Maish, of Pennsylvania, and Hugh H. Gordon, of Georgia, attorneys at law, parties of the second part, do hereby covenant and agree as follows:

“ First. The purpose of this agreement is to secure the presentation and prosecution of the claims of said Indians for payment for their interest in said ceded lands and to secure the services of said Maish and Gordon as counsel and attorneys for the prosecution and collection of said claims.

“ Second. The said Indians hereby employ and engage the said Maish and Gordon as their counsel and attorneys for *503the prosecution and collection of said claims against the United States Government; and the said Maish and Gordon hereby agree to act as attorneys and counsel for said Indians, and covenant that they will faithfully and diligently represent and urge the claims of said Indians before the courts, the departments of the Government, the Congress of the United States, or before any other tribunal which may take cognizance of said claims, and will do all in their power to see that justice is done to said Indians.

“ Third. In consideration of the foregoing covenants, and in consideration of the services to be rendered by said Maish and Gordon, the said Indians hereby agree to pay to said Maish and Gordon a sum equal to fifteen per centum (15%) of any money or sums of money which may be collected for said Indians under the provisions of this contract; and the said Indians hereby agree that the said Maish and Gordon shall be paid as compensation for their services the sum of fifteen per centum (15%) of any appropriation which may be made for the payment of said claims.

“ Fourth. In consideration of the compensation herein specified, the said Maish and Gordon are to take sole and absolute charge, direction, and control of the prosecution of said claims, and they are to pay all expenses which may be incurred by them in the prosecution of said claims; but they are not to be liable for any expenses incurred by said Indians, or by anyone claiming to represent them, unless such expenses .have been incurred under or in pursuance of the written directions or consent of said Maish and Gordon; nor shall any additional counsel be employed in this case without the written consent of said Maish and Gordon.

“Fifth. It is hereby expressly agreed that the fee of fifteen per centum (15%) hereinbefore stipulated as the compensation of said Maish and Gordon for their services is to be paid to them in a separate and special warrant out of any appropriation which may be' made for the payment of said claims or any part thereof, and the balance of said appropriation or appropriations is to be distributed *per capita*to the Indians who may be entitled thereto or expended for their'benefit in such maimer as Congress may direct.

“ It is distinctly understood and agreed that the payment of said fee to said Maish and Gordon is not to be delayed until the distribution of said appropriation or appropriations to the Indians who may be entitled thereto, but the disbursing officers of the United States Government are hereby authorized to issue said separate and special warrant and pay to said Maish and Gordon the said fee of fifteen per centum (15%) as soon as any appropriation or appropriations for the payment of said claims are available.

*504“ It is further agreed that said Maisb and Gordon are to be in no way responsible for or connected with the distribution of the balance of any funds which may be due and payable to said Indians, it being distinctly understood that the duties and obligations of said Maish and Gordon under this contract will be fully met and discharged, and their said compensation will be due and payable when and as soon as said appropriation or appropriations for the payment of said claims have been made.

“ Sixth. This contract is to continue in force for and during the term of ten (10) years from the date of its final execution and approval by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior.

“ In witness whereof the said Indians, parties of the first part, through and by their said agents, attorneys, and representatives, have hereunto affixed their handstand seals at Colville Agency, Miles P. O., in the State of Washington, on the 12th day of May, A. D. 1894, and Levi Maish and Hugh H. Gordon, parties of the second part, have hereunto affixed their hands and seals at Washington, I). C., this-day of -, A. D. 1893.

“ The Columbia Indians, or Moses Band, [seal.]

“ By Moses (his x mark),

“Representative, Agent, *and Attorney.*

“ The Nez Perce Indians, or Joseph Band, [seal.]

“ By Joseph (his x mark),

“Representative, Agent, *and Attorney.*

“The Okanagan Indians, [seal.]

“ By Martin Tonasket (his x mark),

“Representative, Agent, *and Attorney.*

“ The Colville Indians, [seal.]

“ By Barnaby (his x mark),

*“Representative,*Agent, *and Attorney.*

“The Lake Indians, [seal.]

“ By Bernard-,

“Representative, Agent, *and Attorney.*

“ Levi Maish,

“Hugh H. Gordon.”

Said contract was duly approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on July 17,1894, “ on condition that the attorneys shall accept as full compensation for the services to be rendered thereunder the sum of 10 per cent of the amount or amounts they shall recover to the Indians thereunder,” and on July 25, 1894, it was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior on the same condition. As thus approved the *505contract was accepted by said Maish & Gordon on January 20, 1899.

IV. Levi Maish. After the approval of the Maish-Gordon contract said Maish, together with Hugh H. Gordon, began to confer with leading Members of Congress and furnished them with facts and decisions of the courts in relation to the matter. The first attorney employed by them was Heber J. May, of Washington, D. C., whose services are hereinafter set forth, and with him prepared the first brief in the case. Said Maish died in February, 1899, and the record does not show what specific services he performed for the Indians other than those stated above.

Y. Hugh H. Gordon. In the years 1895, 1896, after the' approval of the Maish-Gordon contract, said Gordon conferred with leading Members of Congress and furnished' them with facts and decisions of the court in relation to the matter, verbally employed Heber J. May, esq., of Washington, D. C., and together with him and said Maish prepared the first brief in the case. When the war with Spain was declared said Hugh H. Gordon was commissioned major and engineer ofiicer and served as such in the United States and Cuba until after the close of hostilities, when he was discharged at his own request. In 1899 he made a contract with Heber J. May and Daniel B. Henderson, who subsequently brought in Marion Butler in the case. Afterwards said Gordon made an additional contract with said Butler. It appears that he had his father, the late ex-Senator Gordon, go to Washington and make an appeal in behalf of said Indians by interviewing a number of Senators and Bepre-sentatives. Said Hugh H. Gordon again went to Washington just before the close of the session in which the appropriation was made and did effective service in securing that appropriation.

VI. Heber J. May. In the year 1895 or 1896 said Maish and Gordon employed Heber J. May, attorney at law, Washington, D. C., to aid them in the prosecution of the claim. No written contract was made between them, but it was understood that he would be paid for his services in the matter. Afterwards a written agreement was entered into *506between said Maish and Gordon and said May; on the subject of compensation.

It appears that said May prepared a bill for the relief of the Indians to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to determine the rights of Indians, but no action was taken on same.

VII. Daniel B. Henderson. Said Henderson was general counsel for the Indian Protective Association. He entered into a contract with Hugh H. Gordon in the year 1900, in which it was agreed that he, together with Pleber J. May, should become associate attorneys of record for said Indians.

After frequent conferences with said May, extended through a period of the first two or three years, he familiarized himself with the history of the claim and the title of the Indians. He investigated the matter through the Indian Office, and in 1901 prepared a bill which was introduced in Congress, one or two bills having been by others previously presented. He entered into correspondence with the agent of the Colville Indians, Mr. A. M. Anderson, who, in 1902 or the early part of 1903, brought a delegation of the said Indians to Washington and learned through them a great deal about the history of the claim. Up to the year 1905 or 1906 he had representatives of the Colville Indians at his office during each session of Congress. In 1902 or 1903 Gen. J. B. Gordon came to Washington at his request and spent a week or ten days with said Henderson in the prosecution of the matter of the claim. In 1903 he became associated with Marion Butler, and from that time prosecuted the work of advancing the claim of the Indians jointly with him.

It appears that their efforts were directed up to the year 1905 to secure an act authorizing the Court of Claims to adjudicate the claim, after which they endeavored to secure a direct appropriation to the Indians.

VIII. Frederick C. Robertson, an attorney at law of Spokane, Wash., became interested in the matter of the claim of said Indians through the solicitation of Hugh H. Gordon under the Maish-Gordon contract in the latter part of 1903 or 1904, and when in the latter part of 1904 the Indians made a contract with E. C. McDonald he communicated said *507fact to said Gordon. In the early part of March, 1906, he went to Washington, D. C. He paid the expense of having Mr. Hugh Gordon come to Washington, and then for the first time met Yale and Butler and discussed the case with them, and with them undertook to map out such line of action as would conduce to establishing the rights of the Indians. He prepared a brief on the subject and saw the members of the conference committee and laid before them his views on the rights of said Indians. That he supplied Marion Butler from time to time with facts upon the matter.

It does not appear that said Robertson entered into any contract with anyone as to compensation for his services.

It appears that besides the services rendered in the month of March, 1906, in Washington, D. 0., as aforesaid, said Robertson worked on the matter a year or more at Spokane.

IX. E. O. McDonald. On the 5th and 12th days of November, 1904, E. C. McDonald presented an alleged agreement with certain Indians by which it was agreed that said attorney was to be paid 10 per cent of any money or sums of money which might be collected for said Indians. Said agreement was not approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and it is not shown to have been with the defendant Indians.

Thereafter said McDonald associated with him for the purposes of carrying out said agreement Messrs. M. J. Gordon and R. W. Nuzum, attorneys of Spokane, assigning to them one-quarter interest each in the compensation mentioned in the aforesaid agreement and authorizing said associate counsel to employ additional counsel.

After a study of the history and law of the claim, and after conferring with Judge Fullerton and frequent consultations with said associates, he and his associates sent a delegation of three Indians in charge of A. M. Anderson to Washington, early in the year 1905, which delegation, together with said Gordon and Nuzum, remained at said place about three weeks conferring daily with Marion Butler and urging the matter before Congress.

With the exception of frequent consultations and interviews with Messrs. Gordon, Nuzum, and Robertson it does *508not appear that said McDonald rendered any further service in the case.

X. Merrit J. Gordon, an attorney at law of Spokane, Wash., in the early fall of 1904 was called in consultation with E. C. McDonald and N. W. Nuzum in Spokane and was asked by E. C. McDonald to cooperate with them in trying to secure an adjustment of the claim. He had some knowledge of the general situation of the matter growing out of his association when on the supreme bench of the State of ' Washington with the then Chief Justice Fullerton, who was the chairman of the commission which had been appointed by the President, pursuant to the Indian appropriation act of 1892, to deal with said Indians with reference to the ceding of such of their lands as might be wanted by the Government and agreeing upon a price, and naturally learned considerable from him as to the merits of the claim. Shortly after said consultation he went to Olympia, which resulted in Judge Fullerton writing a letter setting forth his views in the matter and also such facts and circumstances pertinent to the subject. He went thereafter to Washington, D. C., with E. W. Nuzum, together with a delegation of three of said Indians, the expenses of said Indians being paid by said Gordon and Nuzum, where they remained about three weeks conferring with Marion Butler and presenting the matter to Congress. They prepared a brief on the claim which they furnished to the various members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. On different occasions he called the attention of different members of that committee to specific decisions and to certain references as to records in the office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs or the Secretary of the Interior. Considerable effort was made by them to get a hearing before the committee and finally, on February 8, 1905, they got a hearing before the full committee of the Senate on the Indian appropriation bill, after which he left Washington and returned to Spokane.

In December, 1905, said Gordon again went to Washington, D. C., where he remained four weeks, during which time he conferred with different Senators, but was unable to get a hearing before the committee, and since which time he has *509rendered no further service to said Indians other than advising with his associates from time to time.

The services so rendered were cumulative, the information furnished and labor performed had all been anticipated, and full argument and presentation of them fully made to the committee as aforesaid.

XI. Bichard W. Nuzum. In December, 1904, or January, 1905, said Bichard W. Nuzum, attorney at law, of Spokane, Wash., became associated with said McDonald in the prosecution of the claim of said Indians, said McDonald assigning to him one-fourth interest in the compensation mentioned in the alleged agreement with the Indians of November 5 and 12, 1904.

After an investigation to some extent of the law of the case said Nuzum, together with M. J. Gordon, went to Washington, D. C., in January, 1905, where arrangements were made with the firm of Butler & Yale to cooperate with them in presenting the matter to Congress. After consultations with said Butler and Yale and interviews with various Senators, furnishing them with copies of a brief, a hearing was had before the Senate committee on February 8, 1905, at which M. J. Gordon and Marion Butler made the arguments, said hearing lasting two hours. Said Nuzum returned to Spokane, leaving Washington February 15, 1905. •

In March, 1906, said Nuzum, in company with F. C.-Bobertson, again went to Washington, where he remained about three weeks, consulting with Messrs. Butler and Yale and interviewing various Senators and Bepresentatives, making effort to get a hearing before the committee, and while there it appears he entered into a contract with said Butler as to compensation. Said contract was only partly in writing.

The time consumed by said Nuzum in going to and returning from Washington, together with the time he remained at said place, was four or five weeks each trip.

Claimant was never employed by defendant Indians; had no connection with the prosecution of the claim under the Maish and Gordon contract, and the services rendered were cumulative.

*510XII. A. M. Anderson, by occupation a right of way agent, arranged the agreement of November 5 and 12, 1901, with said McDonald, and thereafter at the request of said McDonald accompanied a delegation consisting of three Indians to Washington, D. C., remaining there about one month. The expenses of said Anderson and the Indians of said trip were paid by Messrs. Gordon, McDonald, and Nuzum.

It does not appear that said Anderson had any agreement with said McDonald or the defendant Indians for his services, in writing or otherwise, nor does it appear that he rendered any services with respect to the prosecution of said claim.

XIII. Marion Butler, attorney at law, first came into said, case through employment by Henderson, May, and Hugh H. Gordon about the year 1902 or 1903. He at once proceeded to prepare a bill for the relief of said Indians, which was introduced in the Senate in a modified form. The Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate held the view that the Indians had no title in said lands, and said Butler prepared a brief on the question of such title, which was presented to said committee, but no action was taken at that session of Congress.

At the next session said. Butler prepared another bill providing for conferring upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim of the said Indians and appeared before said Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate several times and made arguments in support of same, but no action was taken.

In 1904 another bill substantially the same was introduced in the Senate and Butler appeared before the committee and made one or more arguments on the question of the title of the Indians, but failed to get a favorable report on same.

After the expiration of the Maish-Gordon contract in 1904 said Butler again appeared before said committee and stated that he wished to continue in the prosecution of the claim on a quantum meruit, and at the same time made an argument on the question as to whether the decision in the Lone Wolf case, that the Indians had no redress in the courts, was applicable to this claim, but no action was taken at that session of Congress.

*511In 1905, Fifty-eighth Congress, third session, said Butler had introduced in the Senate a bill for the relief of the Indians, providing for the recognition of their title and setting aside to their credit in the Treasury of the United States the sum of $1,500,000, as provided by agreement. This bill or provision was introduced in the form of a proposed amendment to the Indian appropriation bill and he appeared before the subcommittee in support of said amendment and made arguments on several occasions. Said amendment, slightly modified, was placed upon the appropriation bill and passed by the Senate, but the House of Representatives failed to concur in the amendment.

At the next session said Butler prepared another amendment to the same effect, which was introduced in the Senate, after which he appeared before the committee several times in support of same, filing a printed brief reviewing the case, explaining objections, and giving information to the committee, resulting in a favorable report and adoption in the Senate and passed, biff was again disagreed to in the House.-

Thereafter said Butler appeared before the committees of the House and Senate in conference on said measure, presenting the two briefs heretofore mentioned, making three oral arguments, and furnishing other information, after which a favorable report was made and the provision became a law.

XIV. Josiah M. Vale. Said Vale became associated with Marion Butler in the case in the year 1903, after which said attorneys formed a copartnership. Said Vale appeared before the subcommittee having charge of the matter and made an argument in support of same and since the time when said partnership was formed has constantly conferred with Butler with reference to the case, and his services have been of the same continuous nature up to the time of the passage of the act of June 21, 1906.

XV. Richard D. Gwydir, J. W. Edwards, and Wendell Hall on the 15th day of June, 1894, entered into a written contract with said Maish and Gordon for services in attending to the signing and execution of a contract between said Maish and Gordon and the Indians resident on the Colville Reservation in which it was agreed that said Gwydir, Edwards, *512and Hall should have $30,000 ($10,000 each), provided that said Maish and Gordon should recover the full amount of the claim and receive as their compensation 15 per cent thereof. It was further agreed that in case they should not recover the full amount of the claim, or in case the commission paid them should be reduced below 15 per cent, the amount to be paid to said Gwydir, Edwards, and Hall should be reduced in the same proportion, but in any event they should receive six forty-fifths of the fee paid to said Maish and Gordon to be divided equally between them.

It does not appear that said contract was ever presented to, or approved by, the Secretary of the Interior.

Said Gwydir, Edwards, and Hall rendered certain services to said Maish and Gordon in procuring signatures of the Indians to the contract of May 12, 1894, but it does not appear that they rendered service to the Indians.

XYI. Samuel L. Magee. On March 21,1894, said Samuel L. Magee entered into a written contract with Wendell Hall, representing said Maish and Gordon, as follows:

“ Daisx, *March 1894.*

*“*On behalf of Maish and Gordon I hereby agree that said Samuel L. Magee shall receive $1,000 from money that, they may receive as contingent fee for obtaining for the Colville Indians money due them for ceding their reservation.

“ WeNdell Hall.”

Said contract was never presented to the Secretary of the Interior for approval.

Said Magee rendered no service to said Indians and what service he rendered to Maish and Gordon, if any, does not appear.

XVII. In the year 1872, at the time the President was considering the propriety of setting aside said reservation, the Department of the Interior forwarded to him the map prepared by Governor Stevens, verified and confirmed by the superintendent of Indians affairs for Washington, showing that the defendant Indians possessed the ordinary Indian title to the lands out of which the Colville Reservation was afterwards carved by executive order of July 2, 1872.

*513March 25, 1899, in answer to a request from the Attorney-General, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs made a report which enters into the question of the title of the Indians to the lands embraced in the Colville Reservation, and cites as authority the Stevens map above referred to, the case of *In re Wilson*(140 U. S., 575), and numerous other authorities. It also discusses the unfavorable report of Senator Manderson, and endeavors to show that the Indians had a valid title to the lands which they occupied. This report was transmitted to the Attorney-General, with two copies of the Stevens map, by a letter of the Secretary of the Interior, dated March 28,1897, for use in the case of the *United States*v. *Four Bottles of Whisky.*There were afterwards numerous reports by the Indian Office to the Secretary of the Interior upon the question of the title of the Indians to these lands.

The Department of the Interior, on Senate bill No. 5293, introduced in the Senate March 28, 1904, reported favorably and again reviewed the title of the Indians to the lands embraced in the Colville Reservation, and inclosed a copy of the letter of March 25, 1899, above referred to.

On December 16, 1905, an agreement was entered into between the United States and the Colville and other bands of Indians residing on the Colville Reservation by which the Indians agreed to the opening up of the south half of their reservation for settlement, and the United States agreed, as a part consideration therefor, that the Indians should also be paid for the north half of their reservation $1,500,000, opened up for settlement under agreement of May 9, 1891. The cession of the lands for settlement was accepted by the Government by the act of March 22, 1906 (84 Stat. L., 80-82), but instead of ratifying that part of the agreement which proposed payment for the north half of their reservation Congress ratified the agreement of May 9, 1891, by the act of June 21, 1906.

The report of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs states that their action was taken in consequence of the efforts of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior in behalf of the defendant Indians,

*514*Mr. J. M. Vale*and *Mr. Marion Butler*for Butler & Yale, *Mr. Andrew Lipscomb*for Hugh Gordon, *Mr. Daniel B. Henderson*on his own behalf, *Mr. Heber J. May*on his own behalf, and *Mr. 8. M. Stockslager*for Samuel L. Magee.

*Mr. George M. Anderson*(with whom was *Mr. Assistant Attorney-General John Q. Thompson)*for the defendants.

Booth, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit under a special jurisdictional act to recover attorney fees. The services alleged were performed in the prosecution of the claim of the Colville Indians against the United States, and were confined exclusively to the committees of Congress. The Colville Indians occupied a reservation set aside to them by executive order in the northeastern part of the State of Washington. By an act of Congress approved August 19, 1890 (26 Stat. L., 355), the President appointed a commission to treat with said Indians respecting the cession of a portion of said reservation to the United States. On May 9, 1891, the commission consummated an agreement with the' Indians; it provided for the cession of the entire north half of their reservation to the United States. The area of lands so ceded was estimated at 1,500,000 acres, and as a part consideration therefor the United States agreed to place as a trust fund to their credit in the Treasury the sum of $1,500,000, bearing interest annually at the rate of 5 per cent.

In pursuance of the above agreement the lands so ceded were by act of Congress thrown open to public settlement; but no appropriation of money was made, and that part of the agreement providing for its payment was never complied with until the passage of the act of June 21, 1906. The Indians became anxious and, justly, quite solicitous. Their appeals to the Congress subsequent to their agreement was met in 1892 by an adverse report from the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, in which their right to compensation as per agreement was directly challenged by a most positive denial of their title to the lands in question.

In May, 1894, the said Colville Indians entered into a contract with Levi Maish, of Pennsylvania, and Hugh H. Gor*515don, of Georgia, attorneys and counselors at law, by the terms of which the said attorneys were to prosecute their said claim against the United States and receive as compensation therefor 15 per cent of whatever amount they might recover. This contract was subsequently approved for 10 per cent, as the law required, by the- Secretary of the Interior, and extended for a period of ten j^ears only. It is the sole and only contract ever executed by said Indians respecting said claim. It is likewise the only legal authority whereby any attorney appeared for said Indians during its operation'; in fact, all with the possible exception of two claimants herein rendered services under this contract, and those who did not appear thereunder were without any authority whatever to appear for.said Indians at any time or place. Nothing was accomplished for the Indians under the Maish-Gordon contract. Notwithstanding its expiration, however, a number of attorneys claim to have rendered efficient services and to have accomplished, by the permission and authority of the Congress and the committees thereof, the final compliance with the agreement of 1891 and secured by the act of June 21, 1906, an appropriation covering the money consideration mentioned in said agreement. In the same act making said appropriation appears the jurisdictional statute whereby said claimants appeared and filed their petitions in this court. The language of the act is as follows:

> “ Jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render final judgment in the name of Butler and Vale (Marion Butler and Josiah M. Yale), attorneys and counselors at law, of the city of Washington, District of Columbia, for the amount of compensation which shall be paid to the attorneys who have performed services as counsel on behalf of said Indians in the prosecution of the claim of said Indians for payment for said land, and in determining the amount of compensation for such services the court may consider all contracts or agreements heretofore entered into by said Indians with attorneys who have represented them in the prosecution of said claim, and also all services rendered by said attorneys for said Indians in the matter of said claim. Petition hereunder shall be filed in said court, by the said attorneys (Butler and Vale), within thirty days from the passage of this act, and the Attorney-General shall appear on behalf of the defendants, *516and said cause shall be given preference for immediate hearing in said court, and the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed to pay the sum of money so awarded by said court to the said attorneys (Butler and Vale), upon the rendition of final judgment, out of the said sum herein set apart or appropriated for the benefit of said Indians, and payment of said judgments shall be in full compensation to all attorneys who have rendered services to said Indians in the matter of their said claim, the same to be apportioned among said attorneys by said Butler and Yale as agreed among themselves: Provided, That before any money is paid to any attorney having an agreement with Butler and Vale as to the distribution of said fees, each of the same shall execute and deliver to the Secretary of the Interior a satisfaction and discharge of all claims and demands for services rendered said Indians in the matter of their said claims.”

On June 26, 1906, Butler and Yale filed in this court, in pursuance of the foregoing statute, their petition herein, seeking to recover the sum of $225,000. The allegations of the petition follow the jurisdictional act and especially assert the right of prosecution and recovery of judgment to be in said petitioners in strict accordance therewith. Subsequent to the filing of said petition, six intervening petitions were filed, in each of which there appears an express disclaimer of any valid agreement respecting the distribution of any sum recoverable under the statute, and asserting the right of prosecution and recovery herein, alleging the performance of professional services as contemplated by the statute, and expressly praying for the rendition of individual judgments as respects the distribution of any fund recovered under the law. Motions to dismiss said intervening petitions were duly filed by Butler and Vale, and the entire controversy, including said motions, was, by order of court, consolidated, heard together, and will be disposed of as one cause.

The language of the jurisdictional statute indicates its enactment in pursuance of a preexisting state of affairs between the claimants, and especially as concerns a previous agreement among the attorneys concerned, as to the distribution of any fees recovered thereunder. The words “the same to be apportioned among said attorneys by said Butler and Yale as agreed among themselves” can have no other import. The statute was undoubtedly enacted with these *517special limitations and conditions upon information then before the Congress that some arrangement existed whereby the total sum recoverable under the law should be distributed by a fixed and determined agreement, leaving no discretion to the distributers, and limiting the court to the ascertainment of the amount only. It is apparent that the Congress was not endeavoring to deprive this court of its power and authority over its own judgments and decrees. The Congress never intended to confer upon Butler and Yale that degree of judicial authority and power which would enable them to distribute a judgment of this court in which they were interested as parties litigant upon their own discretion; to have so enacted would have been a senseless and meaningless proceeding, obnoxious to the law, and devoid of justice. *(Pam To Pee*v. *United*States, 187 U. S., 371-382-383.)

This portion of the statute is directory; it was designed for convenience and simplicity; to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and purposed to conclude the rights of the claimants under presupposed agreement with respect to the same. This construction of the statute is sustained by reference to the context of the whole act. The proviso likewise circumscribes the authority of Butler and Yale as to distribution of the funds, and expressly withholds payment of any sum so directed by them until final receipts by the distributees have been executed and filed with the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with a supposed valid and existing agreement with respect to the same. Courts being exceedingly reluctant to withhold jurisdiction where the same can be reasonably inferred to exist from the language and intent of a jurisdictional statute will not deny redress to suitors because a portion of the statute may fail, if sufficient remains upon which to predicate the relief intended. *(Supervisors*v. *Stanley,*105 U. S., 305.)

While it is true special statutory jurisdiction and remedies are not to be extended by construction beyond a fair import of the legislative grant, yet it has long been the law that doubts may be solved in favor of jurisdiction unless some established law is violated. We are not unmindful of the authority of the Congress to prescribe rules by which a par*518ticular case or class of cases over which this court is given jurisdiction shall be determined. No doubt exists that jurisdiction is strictly limited to the prescribed terms of the statute. This court has never held otherwise. There is nothing, however, in the special jurisdictional statute now under consideration which by express language curtails the judicial functions of the court, and proscribes an exercise of that inherent power lodged in all judicial tribunals to give effect to the legislative intent, and otherwise construe a statute ambiguous upon its face, and by the very existence of which the machinery of the court is set in motion. *(Enlich, on Statutory*Construction, sec. 430.)

The objection does not extend to the subject-matter of the statute, or in anywise affect the substantive rights of the parties. It can at most simply affect a mode of procedure, a subject secondary in importance to the real object, purpose, and scope of the act. *(Liverpool Bank*v. Turner, 30 L. J. Ch., 380.)

The statute having simply recited a supposed agreement, the language being “as agreed among themselves,” is of itself quite indefinite. Whether it was oral or under seal likewise failed to appear, until the same was produced in this court, by its special order, and only then under protest. The parties thereto, the terms thereof, were never revealed to certain of the interveners until the production of the instrument in this court at the trial of this cause. To require of this court the adjudication and determination of a cause involving a claim of $225,000, and place whatever judgment it might render, to be distributed according to an alleged agreement which it might never have seen, would entail results so absurd in their consequences, so at variance with well-recognized rules of legal procedure and established precedents as to render such an act, standing alone, absolutely void. The Congress never intended such results, and even if so intended subsequent events have proven that the information attending the enactment of the statute did not fully embrace the entire history of the subject-matter of the legislation, and that the Congress so anticipated will appear hereafter.

*519If it were otherwise, this case must fail. The intervening petitions expressly repudiate the existence of an agreement of distribution. The findings show that some at least of the interveners were not parties to the alleged agreement at all. The court’s conclusion shows the absence of any such agreement as the statute contemplated to exist.

That particular direction contained in the statute is incapable of enforcement and, unless we can find authority to proceed aside from it, the petition would be dismissed. The Congress had before it at the time of the enactment of the statute a claim against the Colville Indians for services rendered by certain attorneys. It recognized the justice of such a claim. The legal authority under which said attorneys had previously appeared had expired; they were relegated entirely to special legislation for relief. The Congress granted the relief, the special statute was passed, and notwithstanding the reference to an agreement as to distribution of the judgment the general language of the whole statute is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace, as it was clearly intended to do, the claims of “ all attorneys who have rendered services to said Indians in the matter of their said claim.” No attention appears to limit the adjudication to persons signatory to the agreement mentioned. The adjudication intended was to include and cover the whole transaction. The jurisdiction granted extended to the entire scope of the subject-matter referred, and to all parties interested therein.

While the jurisdictional statute contains many inconsistencies and upon its face is decidedly ambiguous, still it is not so worded as to prevent the elimination of meaningless and nonenforceable clauses and leave sufficient authority upon which the court can adjudicate and determine the real controversy. However, in following the conclusions set forth above, we are confronted with another contention, put forth by the defendants. The findings disclose that the only valid contract between the Indians and any attorney or attorneys had expired. The prosecution of their claim subsequent to May 12, 1904, was entirely without authority; claimants were volunteers, and the question arises, Does the jurisdictional statute repeal *pro tanto*section 2103, E. S.; or, is the *520question of a legal liability to pay attorney’s fees relegated by the act to this court ? In any event, can there be a recovery in the absence of a valid contract of employment? In the case of *Lone Wolf*v. *Hitchcock*(187 U. S., 553) the plenary power of the Congress over Indian tribes and Indian property was decided. The question of authority to create a liability for the payment of an obligation upon the part of Indian tribes by the Congress is now at rest. While the jurisdictional act does not create a positive liability, it does confer judicial power and authority upon this court to ascertain the question of liability, and enforce the same, if any such is found to exist. The court is vested with discretion as to consideration of contracts of employment in ascertaining the extent of compensation, and the silence of the statute with respect to any statutory agreements clearly indicates a legislative intention to refer the whole matter to this court for adjudication and determination, irrespective of section 2103, E. S. If it were not intended to repeal *fro tanto*section 2103, E. S., the passage of the jurisdictional statute was unnecessary. Section 2103 provides as follows:

> “ Sec. 2103. No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians, or individual Indians not citizens of the United States, for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other person in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands, or to any claims growing out of, or in reference to, annuities, installments, or other moneys, claims, demands, or thing, under laws or treaties with the United States, or official acts of any officers thereof, or in any way connected with or due from the United States, unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved as follows:

> *“*‘ First. Such agreement shall be in writing, and a duplicate of it delivered to each party.

> “ ‘ Second. It shall be executed before a judge of a court of record, and bear the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed upon it.

> *“*‘ Third. It shall contain the names of all parties in interest, their residence and occupation; and if made with a tribe, by their tribal authorities, the scope of authority and the reason for exercising that authority .shall be given specifically.

> *521“ ‘ Fourth. It shall state the time when and place where made, the particular purpose for which made, the special thing or things to be done under it, and, if for the collection of money, the basis of the claim, the source from which it is to be collected, the disposition to be made of it when collected, the amount or rate per centum of the fee in all cases; and if any contingent matter or condition constitutes a part of the contract or agreement, it shall be specifically set forth.

> “ ‘ Fifth. It shall have a fixed limited time to run, which shall be distinctly stated.

> *“ 1*Sixth. The judge before whom such contract or agreement is executed shall certify officially the time when and place where such contract or agreement was executed, and that it was in his presence, and who are the interested parties thereto, as stated to him at the time; the parties present making the same; the source and extent of authority claimed at the time by the contracting parties to make the contract or agreement, and whether made in person or by agent or attorney of either party or parties.’

> “ All contracts or agreements made in violation of this section shall be null and void, and all money or other thing of value paid to any person by any Indian or tribe, or any one else, for or on his or their behalf, on account of such services, in excess of the amount approved by the Commissioner and Secretary for such services, may be recovered by suit in the name of the United States in any court of the United States, regardless of the amount in controversy; and one-half thereof shall be paid to the person suing for the same, and the other half shall be paid into the Treasury for the use of the Indian or tribe by or for whom it was so paid.”

It will be observed that under the provisions of this statute resort to the courts and further legislation is unnecessary to obtain payment of fees as therein provided. In *United States*v. *Crawford*(47 Fed. Rep., 569) the court in construing a statute directly contrary to section 2103, R. S., and wherein the question of compensation for services to an Indian tribe was involved, held, that as to the special matter embraced within the jurisdictional statute, it was a repeal *pro tanto*of section 2103, R. S. It is quite true that repeals by implication are not favored in law. Yet absolute inconsistent provisions in two statutes wherein the later covers the whole subject-matter of the earlier statute and is repugnant thereto, must be intended to repeal the earlier statute. In view of the facts and circumstances surrounding the en*522actment of the jurisdictional statute here questioned, we can not hold otherwise than that the Congress intended to reward claimants, if entitled to reward, upon the basis of a *quantum meruit.*(9 Decisions of the Comptroller, 264.) The legislative body, vested with supreme and absolute authority in the premises, recognized the existence of a claim against the defendants, and, sweeping aside all legal impediments to its assertion, afforded them a forum and a jurisdiction to hear, adjudicate, and determine their cause. The Congress have frequently so legislated; very recently, in the *Watson Stewart case*(43 C. Cls. R., —).

The contracts in the record, both those dealing with employment of attorneys, and the one respecting the division and distribution of any sum recovered among claimants, have been used as evidence. The contention so earnestly urged by a portion of the claimants respecting the binding force of the contract of distribution can not be sustained; the instrument is valuable as indicating the amount counsel signatory thereto were willing to accept, and likewise their proportionate share thereof; but it can not conclude the court in either respect, much less the defendant Indians who were never parties thereto. The instrument upon its face indicates its execution in anticipation of immediate appropriation by the Congress of the sum claimed as attorney fees, and does not embrace the claims of certain interveners under the jurisdictional statute. The court is at present considering a claim asserted against the Colville Indians. Any sum allowed is deducted from their trust funds and decreases proportionately their distributive share thereof. In arriving at the amount due and the distribution thereof the defendant Indians are entitled to consideration, and to know by what authority and in what manner their property has been disposed of. Congress could not have intended to limit and constrain, thereby prejudging the value of services to individuals, by requiring us to give certain claimants under the jurisdictional act a fixed pro rata share of the judgment of this court irrespective of the testimony in the record. The Attorney-General is by the express terms of the statute directed to appear for the Indian defendants; and if the defense so commanded is to be circumscribed in its extent and *523embraces no right to challenge the justice of the claim, both in respect to the total amount claimed and individual distribution of the same, it would be perfunctory in character, and impose the performance of a well-nigh meaningless act. If the court should find some one party to this agreement entitled to no allowance, it would necessarily increase the amount to those allowed. If the testimony indicatéd the justness of a decreased allowance to one of the parties thereto, it would deprive the court of power to execute its judgment. In fact, the instrument invades the judicial power of the court. It submits an issue in nowise justiciable, is *ex parte*as respects the defendants, and, however extensive in morals as respects the assertion of claims in contravention thereto, has no standing in the present controversy which this court is obliged to respect.

No positive rule can be invoked as to the amount allowable to attorneys as fees for professional services; the quantum depends in each case upon the particular circumstances surrounding the transaction. Courts are not in anywise loath to decree ample compensation to those engaged in the prosecution and management of important controversies involving personal rights and private property. With respect to Indian rights and Indian property courts would be exceedingly reluctant in their duty if they failed to guard with jealous scrutiny the property of these dependent people. Claims asserted against their trust funds will not be unduly extended beyond the preponderance of testimony establishing the same; and while valid contracts are always enforceable both in law and equity, the court, in the absence of any such contracts, will predicate its judgment under the jurisdictional statute upon what the testimony in the record shows to be a fair and reasonable compensation for the services performed, keeping in mind the results accomplished and the quantum of property restored. Of course, contingent contracts of employment are entitled to full consideration where, as in this case, they are properly entered into, and the court will not fail to consider this feature of the case at bar.

It appears from the findings that the defendant Indians employed two attorneys to prosecute their claim; they fully expected, in the event of success, to reward said attorneys as *524the contract expressed, and had the subject-matter of employment terminated successfully during the existence of the contract, the expense incident thereto would have been fixed and determined. Nothing appears in this record to show that had the same degree of labor and vigilance beeen continuously manifested during the earlier period of the contract’s existence, the results finally accomplished might not have been accomplished without the appearance of numerous additional attorneys and the incurrence of increased expense. It is apparent from the record that the claim now asserted, except as to a few claimants, had its inception in the Maish and Gordon contract, claimants agreeing with said attorneys to the contract to assist them in the prosecution of the claim therein mentioned, for a certain percentage of the fee allowed by its terms. We have now, as a result of the expiration of the Maish and Gordon contract, the claims of fourteen petitioners, each of whom alleges the performance of extensive labor and important contributions to the final result. The compensation asked for has increased to $225,000. That the defendant Indians ever contemplated such expense is incredible. That the prosecution of their claim required such an array of counsel is equally as incredible.

Much of the labor was coextensive and cumulative, especially so after the preparation of the brief by Marion Butler and his oral presentation of the cause to the committees of the Senate. The claimants who first appeared under the so-called McDonald contract added little that had not already been said and done prior to their appearance; their services were wholly cumulative and in most respects unnecessary. The issue involved, while quite momentous, .was equally as simple; it was direct and apparent, and when the history of the case had been fully brought forth and the law applicable thereto stated in brief and arguments, it is inconceivable how its repetition by numerous attorneys could materially aid in the final determination of the cause. That they performed some service will not be denied; the service contemplated, however, is not mere manual labor, but effective and resultant service, that which did or tended toward the accomplishment of the appropriation. Their coming into the case, and the circumstances under which they *525came, not having been employed by the Indian defendants, and claiming a right to appear by virtue of contract never approved by the Secretary of the Interior, all suggest a voluntary projection of themselves upon the defendants at a time when their services were not indispensable and could not have materially assisted in the final disposition of the claim. The preparation of the case had been concluded, the briefs filed, the law examined, arguments made, and nearly, if not quite, all steps necessary to secure congressional action been taken prior to their appearance. The court under these circumstances is not disposed to appropriate any portion of the defendants’ property in payment of fees to these claimants.

The claims of Eichard D. Gwyir, James W. Edwards, A. M. Anderson, Samuel L. Magee, and Wendell Hall have likewise been dismissed; they have absolutely no claim against the defendants. What, if any, service was rendered by the Indian Protective Association does not appear, and no allowance is made therefor.

The court, after full consideration of the subject-matter, taking into account the attitude of and the valuable assistance rendered by the Department of the Interior, makes the following allowances:

To Benjamin Miller, administrator of the estate of Levi Maish, deceased-$6,000

To Hugh H. Gordon_14, 000

To Marion Butler- 20,000

To Josiah Vale_10, 000

To Daniel B. Henderson- 5, 000

To Heber J. May- 3,000

To Frederick G. Robertson- 2,000