[Cite as In re G.S., 2011-Ohio-2158.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

Nos. 96158, 96159, and 96160

IN RE: G.S., ET AL. 

Minor Children

[APPEAL BY: L.F., MOTHER]

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case Nos. AD 09912146, AD 09912147, and AD 09912149 

BEFORE: Sweeney, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Cooney, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 5, 2011 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Dale M. Hartman, Esq. 

2195 South Green Road 

University Heights, Ohio 44121 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 

FOR C.C.D.C.F.S.

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Gina S. Lowe, Esq. 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

C.C.D.C.F.S. 

4261 Fulton Parkway 

Cleveland, Ohio 44144 

ATTORNEY FOR CHILDREN 

Mark Witt, Esq. 

6209 Barton Road 

North Olmsted, Ohio 44070 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM

Paul Berman, Esq. 

Guardian Ad Litem for Child 

24105 Duffield Road 

Cleveland, Ohio 44122 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, J.: 
{¶ 1} Appellant L.F.1 (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment 

that granted permanent custody of three of her children, G.S. (born 

September 24, 1999), J.S. (born December 14, 2000), and D.F. (born December 

28, 2004), to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family 

Services (“CCDCFS”). 

{¶ 2} On July 6, 2009, CCDCFS sought permanent custody of G.S., J.S., 

and D.F. alleging they were neglected and dependent as defined in R.C. 

2151.03 and R.C. 2151.04. It was alleged that Gregory S. (“Gregory”) was 

the father of G.S. and J.S. and that Wayne W. or “John Doe” was the alleged 

father of D.F. None of the fathers or alleged fathers have appealed from the 

judgment that granted permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS. The 

record documents several unsuccessful attempts to serve Gregory, after which 

service was made by publication with regard to the custody proceedings 

involving G.S. and J.S. 

{¶ 3} The record contains transcripts of proceedings that took place on 

the following dates: July 6, 2009; July 22, 2009; April 13, 2010; June 22, 2010; 

and December 2, 2010. 

 1 The parties are referred to herein by their initials or title in accordance 

with this court’s established policy regarding non-disclosure of identities in juvenile 

cases.
{¶ 4} On April 13, 2010, the court held a hearing on CCDCFS’s 

complaint for neglect, dependency, and permanent custody. Mother attended 

the hearing with her counsel. The parties stipulated to various amendments 

to the original complaint, which were placed on the record. These 

amendments included: 

· Allegation 1 altered the second sentence to read that 

Mother “was convicted of three counts of attempted child 

endangering on November 4, 2009.” 

· Allegation 2 was removed. 

· Allegation 3 was altered to provide that “Mother has a 

substance abuse problem, specifically alcohol, which 

interferes with her ability to provide appropriate care and a 

permanent home for the children. She participated in a 

substance abuse program in 2008, but relapsed.” 

· Allegation 4 was altered to provide, “Mother has been 

diagnosed with depression and was receiving counseling 

with her children through Berea Children’s Home.” 

· Previous Allegation 5 was omitted in its entirety. 

{¶ 5} All of the remaining allegations of the original complaint 

remained unchanged. Based on the stipulations of the parties, including the 

above agreed amendments to the original complaint, Mother admitted the 

second half of allegation 1 as well as allegations 2 through 5. Due to the 

above-stipulations, allegation 5 became, “The children have been removed 

from the mother’s care twice in the past due to her substance abuse issues. 
See case numbers AD02903397-98 and AD06901434-36.” Mother’s counsel 

confirmed that Mother agreed to the amendments and would enter an 

admission to the amended complaint. Mother independently advised the 

court that she understood the amendments and intended to enter an 

admission as stated. Mother confirmed that she had a copy of the amended 

complaint in front of her. The court then advised Mother of her right to have 

a trial on the complaint as well as her rights to counsel, to subpoena and 

cross-examine witnesses, her right to remain silent, and that the CCDCFS 

bore the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. 

Mother indicated that she was not under the influence of anything that would 

affect her ability to understand the proceedings. Mother was advised that if 

CCDCFS proves the allegations of the complaint by clear and convincing 

evidence “all parental rights would be severed and the children would be free 

to be placed for adoption.” The court then heard testimony of a CCDCFS 

intake worker, Phyllis Richardson (“Richardson”), and Officer Keith Sanicky 

(“Sanicky”). 

{¶ 6} Richardson testified that Gregory is the father of G.S. and J.S. 

According to Richardson, CCDCFS had concerns over Gregory’s ability to 

parent the children due to his substance abuse problem. During 

Richardson’s investigation, Gregory was reportedly in rehab for alcohol and 
marijuana abuse. Mother reported to Richardson that Gregory did not have 

any contact with the children. Richardson identified Wayne W. as the father 

of D.F. but indicated he had not established paternity. Richardson had no 

contact with Wayne W. and was told that he had no contact with D.F. 

Mother did not cross-examine this witness. 

{¶ 7} Sanicky testified that on June 2, 2009, he was working as a 

Parma police officer and responded to a call involving Mother. A daycare 

facility was uncomfortable releasing the children to Mother due to her being 

disoriented. Sanicky observed Mother staggering as she walked and she 

appeared to not know where she was. Mother’s car had severe front-end 

damage. When Sanicky attempted to speak with Mother, she kept repeating 

that she exchanged information with the other driver and that her insurance 

was current. She was otherwise non-responsive to Sanicky’s inquiries. 

Sanicky contacted the fire department to examine her in case of a medical 

emergency. Sanicky also attempted to administer a field sobriety test due to 

Mother’s behavior and an odor of alcohol on her breath; however, she refused 

all field sobriety testing. Mother was arrested for child endangering due to 

her intoxication. Because Sanicky and the daycare were unable to reach any 

family members, the children were taken to children services. 

{¶ 8} Based on Mother’s stipulations and admissions to allegations 2 
through 5 and the second half of allegation 1 of the complaint as amended, as 

well as the testimony from the social worker and the arresting officer, the 

court found that CCDCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that the 

children were neglected and dependent and they were adjudicated as such. 

The children were committed to the temporary custody of CCDCFS pending 

disposition. 

{¶ 9} The proceedings from June 22, 2010 reflect that Gregory 

appeared in court, was appointed counsel, and advised of the proceedings. 

At that time, the matters were continued for disposition and also to allow the 

court to conduct an in camera discussion with the children. Gregory was 

notified of the trial date and instructed to keep in touch with his assigned 

counsel. 

{¶ 10} The court held the dispositional hearing on December 2, 2010, 

which was attended by mother, her counsel, Gregory’s counsel, the 

prosecuting attorney, counsel for the children, the guardian ad litem for the 

children, the guardian ad litem for mother, and the social worker. 

{¶ 11} The testimony from the April adjudicatory hearing was 

incorporated without objection. There were no objections or concerns placed 

on the record by any party. Mother requested that she be granted legal 

custody of the children. Gregory’s counsel indicated that Gregory was not 
present but requested that legal custody be granted to one of the parents. 

{¶ 12} Ramona Miller, a CCDCFS social worker, testified first. Miller 

stated there was a case plan filed with the court that required substance 

abuse treatment for Gregory and Mother, mental health treatment for 

Mother, basic needs for parents to be able to demonstrate their ability to meet 

the basic needs of the children, and parenting education for Mother. Gregory 

is the father of G.S. and J.S., and Miller indicated that D.F.’s father was 

unknown. Miller further testified that Kevin M. was the alleged father of 

D.F., but paternity had not been established. By that time, two prior alleged 

fathers of D.F., namely Wayne W. and Sheridan L., had been genetically 

excluded. 

{¶ 13} Gregory was referred for a substance abuse assessment and had 

engaged in services in July 2010. No treatment was recommended because 

Gregory had recently completed treatment and agreed to random urine 

screens. In September, he tested positive for opiates. He was then 

scheduled for an updated assessment but failed to appear. Miller’s 

attempts to contact him since that time were unsuccessful. To her 

knowledge, he was not able to complete the terms of the case plan due to his 

last known residence in a transitional shelter. Gregory’s last known visit 

with the children was September 24, 2010, and he had not seen the children 
for at least two months at the time of the hearing. 

{¶ 14} Kevin M. did not respond to Miller’s attempts to engage him in 

services and have genetic testing. 

{¶ 15} Miller testified that Mother was able to meet the basic needs 

component of the case plan at the time of the hearing. She completed a 

parenting class and domestic violence education. She had stable housing, 

completed parenting education, and completed a psychological evaluation. 

Mother engaged in services at Berea Children’s Home and the Free Clinic, 

but was not taking her medications in April. Mother also did not appear for 

a follow-up in June. To Miller’s knowledge, Mother did not maintain mental 

health services at the Free Clinic between November and April, but did 

obtain services from an in-home therapist during that time. Mother 

re-engaged in outpatient therapy with the Berea Children’s Home in 

September 2010. 

{¶ 16} Mother has a long history of substance abuse dating back to 2002. 

 Mother completed the substance abuse component of the case plan by April 

2010. In September 2009, Mother tested positive three times and remained 

clean until May 2010 when she tested positive for cocaine. Mother denied 

use, but hair testing resulted in a finding of chronic use. 

{¶ 17} Miller expressed a concern that the children had been in agency 
care three times. G.S. and J.S. had been in CCDCFS care since they were 

one and two years old. Over the course of eight years, the children would 

only remain in Mother’s care for about a year until she would relapse, use, 

and fail to keep the children safe. The agency’s involvement with the 

children resulted primarily from Mother’s continued substance abuse. 

Mother has completed treatment on at least three occasions, but failed to 

remain sober. 

{¶ 18} J.S. was diagnosed with ADHD, for which medication is required. 

 J.S. has an Individualized Education Plan and is placed in a special class 

due to mental health concerns. Mom did attend visits with the children and 

had a bond with them. 

{¶ 19} Mother tested positive for cocaine in May 2010. Miller believed 

Mother had maintained sobriety between June 8, 2010 through the hearing 

on December 1, 2010. 

{¶ 20} Mother was diagnosed with depressive disorder and alcohol 

dependence. According to Miller, Mother was noncompliant with her 

medications for a few months around April 2010. 

{¶ 21} Miller indicated that D.F and J.S. said they wanted to live with 

Mother, while G.S. expressed a desire to reside with his grandmother. Other 

professionals had advised Miller that G.S. was concerned with Mother 
relapsing. 

{¶ 22} Gregory’s counsel also cross-examined Miller and established that 

Gregory had completed treatment at Fresh Start in March 2010. Gregory’s 

last visit with his children was September 24, 2010. Gregory had ceased 

contact with Miller, and his last known address was a men’s shelter. 

Although Gregory was scheduled to meet with CCDCFS in October, he failed 

to attend the meeting. He tested positive for opiates on at least two occasions 

in July and August 2010. 

{¶ 23} Miller expressed concerns over Mother’s history of relapsing over 

the course of an eight-year period, with the consequence of the children being 

placed in and out of CCDCFS care. 

{¶ 24} This concluded the submission of evidence. The children’s GAL 

advised the court that, since his report in June, Gregory had become 

somewhat involved but had not done so in the past. Historically, Mother was 

compliant with the case plans but “always relapses nearly every year, and it 

happened yet again.” Although the children love their mother, their 

placement in foster homes has exacerbated their problems. G.S. has 

expressed concerns about Mother’s ability to maintain sobriety. The 

children’s preference, as expressed to the GAL, has always been to return to 

their grandmother. CCDCFS was re-examining the possibility of placement 
with the grandmother in the event permanent custody was granted. The 

GAL indicated his belief that it was in the best interest of the children for 

permanent custody to be granted in light of Mother’s continual relapses and 

the need to establish stability and permanence for the children. 

{¶ 25} CCDCFS, as well as counsel for the children, petitioned the court 

to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS, while Mother’s and Gregory’s 

counsel maintained it should be denied in favor of Mother being the legal 

guardian. The children’s counsel indicated that he wanted Mother’s parental 

rights to be terminated so that they could be adopted and have stability. 

Counsel for the children argued that Mother had not completed the case plan 

or had exhibited factors indicative of another relapse, i.e., testing positive and 

failing to cooperate. 

{¶ 26} The trial court indicated that Mother’s approximate six months of 

sobriety was not enough to overcome her history of continual relapse, and 

there was too great of a risk to place the three young children with Mother. 

The trial court granted CCDCFS’s complaint for permanent custody. The 

court issued a journal entry in which it found clear and convincing evidence 

that the children cannot be placed with the parents within a reasonable time 

or should not be placed with the parents for reasons contained in R.C. 

2151.414(E). Specifically, the court cited: Mother’s chemical dependency and 
the inability to provide an adequate permanent home from the present time 

and within one year. With respect to J.S. and G.S., the court found that 

Gregory demonstrated a lack of commitment and failed to support, visit, or 

communicate with the children, and his other actions displayed an 

unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the children. 

With respect to D.F., the alleged fathers had also demonstrated a lack of 

commitment, failed to support, visit, or communicate with the child and 

additionally found that they had abandoned the child. 

{¶ 27} The court noted that Mother completed the plan but continued to 

relapse, failed random urine screens and hair sample tests, and reflected 

continued substance abuse. Gregory failed random urine screens and failed to 

attend follow-up substance abuse treatment, failed to provide for the basic 

physical needs of the children and had infrequent visits. The alleged fathers 

of D.F. had no contact with the child. Accordingly, the trial court determined 

that continued residence or return to the home would be contrary to the best 

interest of the children. The court granted permanent custody of each child 

to CCDCFS, and mother has appealed these orders. 

{¶ 28} In her first assignment of error, Mother asserts that she was 

denied due process, alleging that Gregory was not served with notice of the 

adjudicatory hearing and amendments to the complaint. 
{¶ 29} This assignment of error pertains to service of notice on Gregory, 

who is the father of J.S. and G.S. Gregory is not the father or an alleged 

father of D.F. Therefore, this assignment of error has no bearing on the trial 

court’s order of permanent custody rendered with regard to D.F. 

{¶ 30} This court has held that “one parent has standing on appeal to 

challenge the permanent custody order as void for failing to serve the other 

parent.” In re E.S.B., Cuyahoga App. No. 87673, 2006-Ohio-5002, ¶5, citing, 

In re Call (Apr. 12, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78376. However, a party must 

establish prejudice before it can proceed to challenge an alleged error 

committed against a non-appealing party. Id., citing, In re Hiatt (1993), 86 

Ohio App.3d 716, 721, 621 N.E.2d 1222. In this case, Mother has not 

established the requisite prejudice. Additionally, the parties waived this 

error by failing to assert it in the court below despite making court 

appearances and being represented by counsel. 

{¶ 31} The record reflects that Gregory was served with notice of the 

proceedings by publication. Further, he appeared in court during the course 

of the custody proceedings as reflected by the June 22, 2010 transcript. At 

that time, he did not assert any objections and did not claim failure of service. 

Gregory was appointed counsel and advised to stay in touch with his 

attorney. His attorney appeared at the dispositional hearing and indicated 
that Gregory had not appeared. Gregory’s attorney did not object to the 

proceedings for a lack of notice, nor is there any indication that Gregory was 

unaware of the proceedings. His attorney participated in the proceedings, 

cross-examined witnesses, and requested that Mother be granted custody of 

the children. Mother did not assert any objection concerning the service of 

notice on Gregory at any point throughout the custody proceedings. The 

amendments to the complaint all pertained to allegations concerning Mother 

and did not relate to Gregory. Mother was fully advised of the amendments, 

which were placed in their entirety upon the record. Mother expressed her 

understanding and agreement to the amendments, indicated that she had 

received a copy of them, and entered admissions accordingly. 

{¶ 32} The court considered evidence concerning Gregory’s limited 

involvement with the children and participation in treatment. However, the 

record also contains evidence that he had not seen the children since 

September, he did not have stable housing, and he expressed no interest in 

gaining custody of his children. At the dispositional hearing, Gregory’s 

attorney requested that Mother be given custody of the children. 

Accordingly, the record reflects that the parties waived this issue and, 

alternatively, Mother has failed to establish how the lack of service on the 

non-appealing father resulted in any prejudice to her. This assignment of 
error is overruled. 

{¶ 33} In her second assignment of error, Mother again relies on 

inaction by Gregory in attempting to obtain reversal of the permanent 

custody awards. Mother asserts that without Gregory’s waiver of the 

statutory 90-day time limit set by R.C. 2151.35(B)(1), her voluntary waiver of 

the time limit was somehow invalid. Again, Gregory has not appealed the 

permanent custody order, nor did he raise any objection to the proceedings 

based on the 90-day time limit. 

{¶ 34} Mother admits that the law recognizes as valid a party’s waiver of 

the time limits set by the statute, and she further admits that she executed 

such a waiver in these cases. Mother presents no law that would support her 

argument that her waiver was invalid without a similar written waiver from 

all the fathers and alleged fathers. That proposition is not reasonable; 

especially given that some parents, such as D.F.’s father, never established 

paternity. Finally, Gregory was specifically advised of a hearing date 

scheduled beyond the 90-day time limit to which he did not object, thereby 

implicitly waiving the 90-day time limit. This assignment of error is 

overruled. 

{¶ 35} The third assignment of error challenges the amendments to the 

complaint in the absence of a written motion being filed. Mother asserts that 
the trial court committed plain error by accepting the amendments despite 

her stipulation and agreement to them on the record. 

{¶ 36} Juv.R. 22(B) states: 

{¶ 37} “Any pleading may be amended at any time prior to the 

adjudicatory hearing. After the commencement of the adjudicatory hearing, a 

pleading may be amended upon agreement of the parties or, if the interests of 

justice require, upon order of the court. * * * Where requested, a court order 

shall grant a party reasonable time in which to respond to an amendment. 

See, also, Juv.R. 19, which authorizes oral motions with permission of the 

court and states: 

{¶ 38} “An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A 

motion other than one made during trial or hearing shall be in writing unless 

the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state with particularity the 

grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought. It 

shall be supported by a memorandum containing citations of authority and 

may be supported by an affidavit.” 

{¶ 39} The amendments to the complaint were made by agreement of 

the parties at the April 13, 2010 hearing and were not required to be in 

writing. Nonetheless, the record contains Mother’s acknowledgment that she 

had been given a copy of the amendments, which were set forth in detail on 
the record. Accordingly, Mother has failed to establish any plain error 

regarding the trial court’s acceptance of the amendments that were proposed 

pursuant to her agreement. This assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 40} In her fourth assignment of error, Mother essentially asserts that 

she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney did not 

object to the matters set forth in the previous assignments of error. 

{¶ 41} In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Mother must demonstrate that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient 

and that the deficient performance was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington 

(1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley (1989), 

42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, certiorari denied (1990), 497 U.S. 1011, 

110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d 768. Prejudice is demonstrated when appellant 

proves that, but for counsel’s actions, there is a reasonable probability that 

the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, supra at 

694. 

{¶ 42} Because we found that Mother failed to allege or establish any 

prejudicial effect of the alleged lack of service on Gregory and because he 

himself waived the issue, Mother’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

object on that ground. Similarly, our resolution of Mother’s previous 

assignments of error renders her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
relating to them moot. To the extent Mother generally claims her counsel 

was ineffective for allowing her to sign a waiver of the time limit and for 

agreeing to the amendments, she offers no basis to support it, nor does she 

explain how the outcome of the proceedings would have been different in the 

event that she had not executed the waiver or had not made the admissions. 

Stated differently, there is no evidence to suggest that the court would have 

set a hearing outside the statutory time limit if she had not executed the 

waiver or that the evidence would have been any different or more favorable 

to her in the absence of the waiver or her admissions. In fact, waiving the 

time limit allowed her more time to complete her case plan. 

{¶ 43} The fifth assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred by 

failing to record all of the proceedings. 

{¶ 44} App.R. 10 imposes a duty on the appellant to ensure the 

transmission of a complete record to the appellate court for review. 

Loc.App.R. 10 also requires the appellant to “cause timely transmission of the 

record or seek an extension of time to do so from this court.” 

{¶ 45} R.C. 2151.35(A)(2) states: 

{¶ 46} “A record of all testimony and other oral proceedings in juvenile 

court shall be made in all proceedings that are held pursuant to section 

2151.414 of the Revised Code or in which an order of disposition may be made 
pursuant to division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code, and shall 

be made upon request in any other proceedings. The record shall be made as 

provided in section 2301.20 of the Revised Code.” 

{¶ 47} Juv.R. 37(A) states: 

{¶ 48} “The juvenile court shall make a record of adjudicatory and 

dispositional proceedings in abuse, neglect, dependent, unruly, and 

delinquent cases; permanent custody cases; and proceedings before 

magistrates. In all other proceedings governed by these rules, a record shall 

be made upon request of a party or upon motion of the court. The record shall 

be taken in shorthand, stenotype, or by any other adequate mechanical, 

electronic, or video recording device.” 

{¶ 49} The Ohio Supreme Court has observed, “a juvenile court must 

take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that it records its proceedings. 

However, in the event that the proceedings are not recorded properly, the 

question that arises, * * * is whether an appellant has the obligation to 

attempt to correct an insufficient record by using one of the options available 

under App.R. 9 or whether the juvenile court’s failure to record the 

proceedings in and of itself necessitates reversal.” In re B.E., 102 Ohio St.3d 

388, 2004-Ohio-3361, 811 N.E.2d 76, ¶12. The court held “that when a 

juvenile court fails to comply with the recording requirements of Juv.R. 37(A) 
and an appellant attempts but is unable to submit an App.R. 9(C) statement 

to correct or supplement the record, the matter must be remanded to the 

juvenile court for a rehearing.” Id. at ¶16. 

{¶ 50} CCDCFS argues that the recording requirement applies only to 

adjudicatory and dispositional hearings, which in this case are a part of the 

record. We note that there was critical testimony missing from the record in 

In re B.E., and that the missing proceedings in this case relate to pretrial 

hearings. Even assuming, without deciding, that the recording requirement 

applies to all parental rights proceedings, there does not appear to be any 

effort to correct or supplement this record pursuant to App.R. 9; nor is there 

any indication that the missing pretrial proceedings contain anything that 

would have affected the outcome of these cases. Accordingly, this 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 51} The final assignment of error asserts that the trial court’s verdict 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 52} In this assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial court 

erred when it granted permanent custody of her children to CCDCFS in the 

absence of clear and convincing evidence. CCDCFS maintains the court did 

not abuse its discretion when it determined the best interest of the children 

would be served by granting CCDCFS permanent custody. The issue 
presented here concerns the permanent custody of the children. 

{¶ 53} In considering an award of permanent custody, the court must 

first determine whether, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best 

interest of the child to grant permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(D). In 

determining the best interest of the child during the permanent custody 

hearing, the court must consider the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D), which 

include the reasonable probability the child will be adopted; the interaction of 

the child with parents, siblings, and foster parents; the wishes of the child; 

the custodial history of the child; and the child’s need for a legally secure 

permanent placement. 

{¶ 54} In addition to determining the child’s best interest, the court 

must make a second determination before granting permanent custody: it 

must determine whether the child can be placed with a parent within a 

reasonable time or should not be placed with the parent. R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a). The court is required to enter a finding that the child 

cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time if any factors set 

forth in R.C. 2151.414(E) apply. 

{¶ 55} Judgments supported by competent, credible evidence going to all 

the essential elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 
{¶ 56} R.C. 2151.414(E) includes the following factors: 

{¶ 57} “(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home 

and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the 

agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the 

child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be 

placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have 

substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the 

parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume 

and maintain parental duties; 

{¶ 58} “(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, mental 

retardation, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is 

so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent 

home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year 

after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or for 

the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 [2151.35.3] of the Revised 

Code; 

{¶ 59} “* * * 
{¶ 60} “(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward 

the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child 

when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide 

an adequate permanent home for the child; 

{¶ 61} “* * * 

{¶ 62} “(14) The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, 

clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the 

child from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, 

emotional, or mental neglect.” 

{¶ 63} The trial court found that the children could not be placed with 

mother within a reasonable time due to her severe chemical dependency and 

her inability to provide an adequate permanent home for the children at the 

present time and within one year from the time the court holds the hearing. 

The court further found that fathers and alleged fathers of G.S., J.S., and 

D.F. demonstrated a lack of commitment to the children, failed to regularly 

support, visit, or communicate with them, and displayed an unwillingness to 

provide adequate homes for the children. With respect to the alleged fathers 

of D.F., the court found they had abandoned the child. The existence of any 

one of the factors can be sufficient grounds for the trial court to determine 

that the children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable 
time. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶50. 

{¶ 64} Further, the court properly determined that placement with any 

of the parents was not in the best interest of the children. 

{¶ 65} The trial court’s judgment was not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. 

Judgments affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR