Enhanced Security Controls Needed For 

US-VISIT’s System Using RFID 

Technology 

(Redacted) 

1

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Information Technology 

OIG-06-39 June 2006

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, has redacted 

this report for public release. The redactions are identified as (b)(2), comparable to 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). A review under the Freedom of Information Act will be conducted 

upon request.
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

June 16, 2006 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared by our office as 

part of our oversight responsibility to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the 

department. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of controls over systems using Radio Frequency 

Identification (RFID) at the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

(US-VISIT) program. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies 

and institutions, direct observations, technical scans, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 

 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Enhanced Security Controls Needed For US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1 

Background ................................................................................................ 3 

Results of Audit........................................................................................... 5 

Enhanced Security Controls are Needed to Limit Unauthorized Access to the AIDMS 

Database ..............................................................................................................................5 

Recommendations................................................................................................................7 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ........................................................................8 

RFID Policy and Procedures Not Developed and Issued ....................................................8 

Recommendation .................................................................................................................9 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ........................................................................9 

AIDMS Contingency Plan .................................................................................................10 

Recommendation ...............................................................................................................10

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................................11 

Appendices 

 Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .................................................................12 

 Appendix B: Management Response To Draft Report ........................................................13 

 Appendix C: Types of RFID Tags and Common RFID Operating Frequencies.................17 

 Appendix D: Photographs of US-VISIT Entry and Exit Lanes ...........................................18 

 Appendix E: Example of an RFID-enabled Form I-94 .......................................................19 

 Appendix F: AIDMS Topology...........................................................................................20 

 Appendix G: Major Contributors to this Report ..................................................................21 

 Appendix H: Report Distribution.........................................................................................22 

Abbreviations 

 AIDMS Automated Identification Management System 

 CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

 CIO Chief Information Officer 

 DHS Department of Homeland Security 

 DML Device Management Layer 

 FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act 

 GAO Government Accountability Office 

 Gen2 Generation 2 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Enhanced Security Controls Needed For US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

 POE Port of Entry 

 RFID Radio Frequency Identification 

 US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General

Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

Page 1 

Executive Summary 

We audited the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and select 

organizational components’ security programs to evaluate the 

effectiveness of controls implemented on Radio Frequency Identification 

(RFID) systems. Systems employing RFID technology include a tag and 

reader on the front end and an application and database on the back end. 

RFID is a wireless technology that stores and retrieves data remotely from 

devices. The technology allows sensitive information to be read and 

written to tags and for numerous tags to be scanned simultaneously from a 

greater distance. The flexibility and portability of RFID technology and 

devices, as well as the information that resides on the tags, increase the 

need for security and privacy controls. 

Our objective was to determine whether the United States Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program has 

implemented effective controls to protect critical data processed by its 

RFID system from unauthorized access. To address our objective 

we: (1) interviewed US-VISIT’s technical staff; (2) reviewed applicable 

DHS and US-VISIT policies and procedures; (3) conducted vulnerability 

assessments of the databases and servers that collect and process 

information; and (4) evaluated the effectiveness of physical security and 

assessed the security controls over the RFID-enabled Form I-94s and 

readers at selected ports of entry (POEs) in ------------ -- and 

--------------- .1 

Overall, information security controls have been implemented to provide 

an effective level of security on the Automated Identification Management 

System (AIDMS). US-VISIT has implemented effective physical security 

controls over the RFID tags, readers, computer equipment, and database 

supporting the RFID system at the POEs visited. No personal information 

is stored on the tags used for US-VISIT. Travelers’ personal information 

is maintained in and can be obtained only with access to the system’s 

database. Additional security controls would need to be implemented if 

US-VISIT decides to store travelers’ personal information on 

 

1

 Form I-94, Arrival-Departure Record, issued at the POE, records the visitor’s biographic information; date the 

visitor arrived in the U.S., and the date when the authorized period of stay expires. 
Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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RFID-enabled forms or migrates to universally readable Generation 2 

(Gen2) products. 

Although these controls provide overall system security, US-VISIT has 

not properly configured its AIDMS database to ensure that data captured 

and stored is properly protected. Furthermore, while AIDMS is operating 

with an Authority to Operate, US-VISIT had not tested its contingency 

plan to ensure that critical operations could be restored in the event of a 

disruption. In addition, US-VISIT has not developed its own RFID policy 

or ensured that the standard operating procedures are properly distributed 

and followed at all POEs. 

Subsequent to the completion of our audit work, US-VISIT personnel 

stated that they had taken or planned to take corrective action to address 

the vulnerabilities identified during our vulnerability assessment. As 

fieldwork had already been completed, we did not verify that the 

vulnerabilities had been remedied. 

For systems utilizing RFID technology, we are recommending that the 

Director, US-VISIT direct its Chief Information Officer (CIO) to: 

• Develop and implement procedures to strengthen user account and 

password management processes relating to the AIDMS database. 

Procedures should include periodic vulnerability assessments and 

reviews of all user access. 

• Ensure that all vulnerabilities identified for which risks have not been 

assumed be remedied. 

• ------------ --------- ---- ------------ ----------------------------------------- 

-- ------------ 

• Test contingency plans, at least annually. 

• Develop and implement its own policy that addresses security controls 

over all components of an RFID system and ensures that policies and 

procedures are being followed at all affected POEs. 

Fieldwork was conducted from November 2005 through February 2006 at 

selected locations. See Appendix A for our purpose, scope, and 

methodology. 

In response to our draft report, US-VISIT agreed and has already taken 

steps to implement each of the recommendations. US-VISIT’s response is 

summarized and evaluated in the body of this report and included, in its 

entirety, as Appendix B. 
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Background

RFID is a wireless technology that stores and retrieves data remotely from 

devices called RFID tags. RFID can be used almost anywhere -- from 

clothing tags to missiles. Technology components of an RFID system 

consist of a tag, reader, and database (see Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Components of an RFID System 

In a typical RFID system, individual objects are equipped with a small, 

inexpensive tag that contains a transponder with a digital memory chip 

and unique electronic product code. The RFID reader, which is an 

antenna packaged with a transceiver and decoder, emits a signal activating 

the tag so it can read or write data to the tag. The reader decodes the data 

in the tag’s integrated circuit, and that data is then passed to a host 

computer’s database for processing. 

The tags are small objects that can be attached to or incorporated into a 

product, much like the standard bar code tags on products in the 

supermarket. The difference is that while it takes a laser to scan a 

standard bar code and read its information, an RFID tag stores its 

identifying code on a tiny microchip and transmits it wirelessly to a reader 

device. RFID technology allows more tags to be scanned simultaneously 

from a greater distance, and it allows individual items - not just types of 

items - to be assigned unique identifying codes. There are three types of 

tags in use today: 

• Active tags can store large amounts of information using a power 

source within the tag. 

• Passive tags do not use a separate external power source. They 

obtain operating power from the tag reader. 

• Semi-passive tags use an internal power source to monitor 

environmental conditions, but require radio frequency energy 

transferred from the reader to power a tag’s response (similar to 

passive tags). 
Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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Generation 1 tags use proprietary technology, which means that if 

Company A puts an RFID tag on a product it cannot be read by Company 

B unless both use the same RFID system supplied from the same vendor. 

In addition, a new RFID standard, Gen2, was ratified in December 2004 

by the RFID international standards organization EPCglobal. The purpose 

of the Gen2 standard is to improve the interoperability among different 

RFID products and systems from various manufacturers and different 

frequencies used in different countries worldwide. Gen2 compliant 

products feature enhanced security controls, too. 

There are four main frequencies used for RFID systems: low, high, 

ultrahigh, and microwave. Generally, the higher the frequency, the greater 

the distance from which tags can be read. See Appendix C for a summary 

of the typical characteristics of RFID tags and the operating frequencies 

for passive tags. 

The use of RFID technology has introduced new security risks to agency 

systems. The flexibility and portability of RFID technology and devices 

increase the need for security. Without effective security controls, data on 

a tag can be read by any compliant reader; data transmitted through the air 

can be intercepted and read by unauthorized devices; and data stored in the 

system databases can be accessed by unauthorized users. In addition, a 

May 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report raised privacy 

concerns related to the use of tags and databases. Among the privacy 

issues is notifying individuals of the existence or use of the technology.2

US-VISIT is a program established by DHS to: (1) implement an 

integrated entry and exit data system to record travelers’ arrival to and 

departure from the U.S.; (2) verify the identity of travelers; and 

(3) confirm the travelers’ compliance with the terms of admission to the 

United States. Currently, US-VISIT is testing RFID technology as a proof 

of concept to verify that RFID technology best satisfies its requirements of 

the program at five land POEs: Alexandria Bay, NY; Nogales East and 

West, AZ; and the Peace Arch and Pacific Highway sites in Blaine, WA. 

The test began in August 2005. If successful, RFID will be deployed to 

the 50 busiest land ports by December 31, 2007. 

The purpose of US-VISIT’s RFID testing is to evaluate the capability to 

record automatically, passively, and remotely the entry and exit of selected 

travelers with RFID tags that are embedded in the Form I-94s. US-VISIT 

has created a new automated system, AIDMS, to link the unique and 

2 Radio Frequency Identification Technology in the Federal Government (GAO-05-551, May 2005). 
Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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individually-assigned RFID tag number to existing biographic information 

received from the Treasury Enforcement Communication System as well 

as the entry and exit event information for each covered individual 

crossing a land border.3

 A centralized AIDMS database is located in a 

secure data center in Ashburn, VA, and Device Management Layer 

(DML) servers are located --------------- 4

A unique ID number is embedded in the RFID tag, which associates the 

I-94 holders with the tag. After the RFID-enabled I-94 is issued to an 

individual, the unique tag ID number will be used as a record identifier to 

retrieve individual travelers’ biographic information that is stored in other 

law enforcement databases. When the traveler passes through the entry 

and exit lanes at a POE, the RFID tag ID number will be read and used to 

retrieve the traveler’s immigration information for use in the inspection 

processes by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers.5

 As of 

December 31, 2005, US-VISIT issued 149,414 RFID-enabled Form I-94s 

to travelers (See Appendix E for an example of RFID-enabled Form I-94, 

and Appendix F for AIDMS topology). 

DHS issued policy and procedures in its DHS Sensitive Systems Policy 

Publication 4300A (DHS Policy) and its companion, DHS Sensitive 

Systems Handbook (DHS Handbook), to provide direction to its 

components regarding the management and protection of sensitive 

systems. Additionally, the policy outlines management, operational, and 

technical controls including wireless communications, identification, 

authorization, and access controls necessary to ensure confidentiality, 

integrity, availability, and authenticity within the DHS information 

technology infrastructure and operations. DHS has not developed a 

specific policy associated with the use of RFID technology. 

Results of Audit

Enhanced Security Controls are Needed to Limit Unauthorized 

Access to the AIDMS Database 

US-VISIT needs to enhance its security controls over the AIDMS 

database. We performed vulnerability assessments on the AIDMS 

database and selected DML servers located at ------------------------- 

 

3

 AIDMS is a new system and is separate from the other databases used in the US-VISIT process. 

4

 DML servers are used to transmit RFID information captured from the tags at the POEs to the centralized AIDMS 

database. 

5

 Appendix D contains photographs of US-VISIT entry and exit lanes. 
Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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------------ -- --------------------- ; to evaluate the effectiveness of security 

controls implemented. In addition, we evaluated the physical security 

over RFID-enabled Form I-94s, RFID readers, and computer equipment; 

and tested for wireless signals at selected POEs --------------------------- 

Overall, information security controls have been implemented to provide 

an effective level of security on the AIDMS. US-VISIT is ensuring that 

effective physical controls were implemented over the RFID tags, readers, 

computer equipment, and database supporting the RFID portion of the USVISIT program at the sites visited. We used two easily obtainable RFID 

readers to assess whether unauthorized users could obtain information 

stored on the tags.6 We were unable to communicate or read the Form 

I-94s at the POEs visited. However, when we performed additional 

testing in a laboratory environment with a more sophisticated reader,7 we 

were able to read and verify that only the unique identification number 

was on the Form I-94. While data on the RFID-enabled Form I-94s are 

not encrypted and could be subject to interception, RFID tags on the Form 

I-94s contain no personal information and can be used only to obtain 

travelers’ personal information when combined with the data stored in the 

AIDMS database. US-VISIT has no plans to store personal data on the 

tag. Additional controls should be implemented if US-VISIT decides to 

store travelers’ personal information on the RFID-enabled Form I-94 or 

migrate to universally readable Gen2 products. 

During our vulnerability assessment on selected DML servers, we 

discovered no high or medium security vulnerabilities. However, our 

assessment results on the AIDMS database revealed some security 

vulnerabilities that could be exploited to gain unauthorized or undetected 

access to sensitive data. Specifically, we identified deficiencies in user 

account and password management, user access permissions, ----------------- 

For example, our vulnerability assessment on the AIDMS database 

identified the following: 

• -------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 

----------------------------------------------------------------------- 

-- - ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------- 

---------------------------------------- ------------ --------- --------- ----- 

--------------------------------------------------------------- 

 ----------------------------------- 

6

---------- -- --------- - -------- - --- --------- ---- ------------------- ---- - ------------ ----------- 7

----------- ----- --- - --------- -- - - ---- --- ---- - -- 
Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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• ----------------------------- ------------- -------------------------------- 

------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------- 

--------------------- 

• -------------- -- ------------------------ ----------------------------------- 

------------------------------------------ ------------------------------- 

----------- 

• ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------- ----- 

--------- ---- --------- ------------- ------------------------------------------- 

--------- ----- ------------- - --- ------- ---------------------------------------- 

---------------- 

Subsequent to the completion of our audit work, US-VISIT personnel 

stated that they had taken or planned to take corrective action to address 

the vulnerabilities identified during our vulnerability assessment. As 

fieldwork had already been completed, we did not verify that the 

vulnerabilities had been remedied. 

Passwords are important - they are often the first line of defense against 

hackers or insiders who try to obtain unauthorized access to a computer 

system. Weaknesses in user accounts and passwords may result in 

inappropriate access to US-VISIT’s sensitive data. Unauthorized access to 

the AIDMS database could occur due to inappropriate user and password 

settings. Periodic reviews of security settings would identify security 

weaknesses in user and password management. In addition, without 

prompt and appropriate review and responses to security events or 

incidents, violations could occur continuously and cause damage to an 

entity’s resources without detection. As a result, increased risks exist that 

the US-VISIT may not detect unauthorized activity or determine the users 

who are responsible. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, US-VISIT, direct its CIO to: 

1. Develop and implement procedures to strengthen user account and 

password management processes relating to the AIDMS database. 

Procedures should include periodic vulnerability assessments and 

reviews of all user access. 

2. Ensure that all vulnerabilities identified for which risks have not been 

assumed be remedied. 
Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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3. --------- ---------------------------------- -------------------------------------- 

-------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- 

-- ------------ 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

US-VISIT agreed with recommendation 1. US-VISIT has implemented 

procedures to strengthen its account management process and plans to 

perform vulnerability scans on AIDMS periodically. US-VISIT may 

delay the development of some account management procedures until the 

proof of concept testing is completed on AIDMS. 

We agree that the steps that US-VISIT has taken, and plans to take, begin 

to satisfy this recommendation. 

US-VISIT agreed with recommendation 2. US-VISIT has taken actions to 

mitigate the vulnerabilities identified. Corrective action plans have been 

developed to mitigate and monitor the progress of the remaining 

vulnerabilities identified for which risks have not been assumed. 

We agree that the steps that US-VISIT has taken, and plans to take, begin 

to satisfy this recommendation. 

US-VISIT agreed with recommendation 3. US-VISIT is in the process of 

developing procedures for ---------- -------------------------------- . 

We agree that the steps that US-VISIT has taken, and plans to take, begin 

to satisfy this recommendation. 

RFID Policy and Procedures Not Developed and Issued 

US-VISIT has not developed a policy to ensure that security controls are 

implemented to protect its systems using RFID technology. US-VISIT 

performed a risk assessment and Privacy Impact Assessment to address 

the security and privacy of travelers’ personal data during the systems 

design process. In addition, while US-VISIT has developed procedures 

for issuing and destroying RFID-enabled Form I-94s, at the time of our 

POE visits the procedures were not being followed consistently. 

Although DHS has not developed a specific RFID policy, US-VISIT 

should develop its own policy. The policy should address the risks 

associated with the use of RFID and to ensure that adequate and effective 

controls are implemented to protect the integrity of data stored and 
Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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processed by the RFID system. For example, other federal agencies and 

the private sector have identified security vulnerabilities and issued 

notices related to the use of RFID technology, such as counterfeiting or 

cloning,8

 replay,9 and eavesdropping. The introduction of these 

vulnerabilities increase the need to develop adequate policies and 

procedures to mitigate risks associated with the use of RFID technology. 

Issuing a sound RFID policy is the first step to ensure that security 

controls are developed and implemented to protect the data on systems or 

mitigate risks associated with the use of RFID. Without a specific RFID 

policy and implementation procedures that are being followed, US-VISIT 

cannot ensure that effective controls are put into practice at all locations 

using RFID. Furthermore, RFID systems operating without specific 

policy and implementation procedures increase the possibility that security 

controls protecting DHS systems can be circumvented. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Director, US-VISIT, direct its CIO to: 

4. Develop and implement a policy that addresses security controls over 

all components of an RFID system and ensure that policies and 

procedures are being followed at all affected POEs. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

US-VISIT partially agreed with recommendation 4. US-VISIT will assist 

DHS in developing the RFID policy for the department. Once it is 

finalized, US-VISIT plans to adhere to DHS’ RFID policy. US-VISIT 

will assist CBP in the development and dissemination of training materials 

to the POEs. 

We agree that the steps US-VISIT’s has taken, and plans to take, begin to 

satisfy this recommendation. However, we maintain that due to the lack 

of department-wide RFID guidance, US-VISIT should develop and 

implement its own RFID policy that supports its mission and operations. 

8

 Cloning a RFID tag occurs when an attacker produces an unauthorized copy of a legitimate tag. 9

 A replay is an attack when a legitimate data transmission is fraudulently repeated, either by the originator or by an 

adversary who intercepts the data and retransmits it. 
Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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AIDMS Contingency Plan 

US-VISIT certified and accredited AIDMS in January 2006. However, at 

the time of our review, the AIDMS contingency plan had not been tested 

to ensure that critical operations could be restored in the event of an 

emergency. US-VISIT management acknowledged at the time the system 

was accredited that an untested contingency plan is a security weakness 

and that testing was scheduled to be completed in April 2006. 

Contingency planning is designed to maintain or restore business 

operations, including computer operations, possibly at an alternate 

location, in the event of an emergency, system failure, or disaster. 

Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130 Appendix III requires 

that contingency plans be developed and tested periodically. The Federal 

Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requires that agencies’ 

information security programs include plans and procedures to ensure the 

continuity of operations for information systems that support the 

operations and assets of the agency. DHS requires the contingency plans 

be developed and tested annually, too. Testing of contingency plans is 

performed to validate specific aspects of the plan, policies, procedures, 

systems, and facilities that will be used in the event of an emergency. 

Testing the plan is also a training exercise to prepare recovery personnel 

for plan activation, which can improve plan effectiveness and overall 

agency preparedness. 

 

When a contingency plan for a critical system is not tested, even 

seemingly minor interruptions can result in the loss of sensitive or 

mission-critical data. Since AIDMS’ contingency plan has not been 

tested, US-VISIT cannot ensure that it will be able to promptly recover 

essential operations if an unexpected interruption occurs. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Director, US-VISIT, direct its CIO to: 

5. Test the contingency plan for AIDMS, at least annually. 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

US-VISIT agreed with recommendation 5. US-VISIT indicated that, after 

our fieldwork was completed, the AIDMS contingency plan was tested in 

March 2006, and it will be tested annually. 

We agree that the steps that US-VISIT has taken satisfy this 

recommendation. 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

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Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of this audit was to determine whether US-VISIT has 

implemented effective controls to protect its mission critical data 

processed by its RFID systems from unauthorized access. Specifically, we 

determined whether: (1) US-VISIT developed adequate policies and 

procedures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data 

contained on its RFID system; (2) adequate physical and logical security 

controls are implemented on its RFID system; (3) controls implemented to 

protect the privacy of personal data collected and processed by RFID 

devices were adequate; and, (4) systems using RFID technology are in 

compliance with FISMA requirements. 

To accomplish our audit, we conducted fieldwork at selected POEs 

located at -- ---------------------------------- We interviewed US-VISIT 

personnel at its Headquarters and CBP personnel at selected POEs. In 

addition, we reviewed and evaluated applicable DHS and US-VISIT 

security policies, procedures, and other appropriate documentation. 

During the audit, we reviewed database settings and used a software tool 

(Internet Security Systems’ Database Scanner) to detect and analyze 

vulnerabilities on databases servers. Also, we used two RFID tools 

(spectrum analyzer, card reader) to attempt to gain information about the 

RFID usage at the POEs. Upon completion of the assessments, we 

provided US-VISIT the technical reports detailing the specific 

vulnerabilities detected on their databases and the actions needed for 

remediation. 

We conducted our audit between November 2005 and February 2006 

under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Major 

OIG contributors to the audit are identified in Appendix G. 

The principal OIG points of contact for the audit are Frank Deffer, 

Assistant Inspector General, Office of Information Technology at 

(202) 254-4100 and Edward G. Coleman, Director, Information Security 

Audits Division at (202) 254-5444. 
Appendix B 

Management Response To Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Response To Draft Report 

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Page 13 
Appendix B 

Management Response To Draft Report 

Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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Appendix B 

Management Response To Draft Report 

Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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Appendix B 

Management Response To Draft Report 

Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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Appendix C 

Types of RFID Tags and Common RFID Operating Frequencies 

Enhanced Security Controls Needed for US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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Typical Characteristics of RFID Tags

Types of Tags Power Supply Read Range Type of Memory

Active Internal battery Up to 750 feet Read-write 

Semi-passive Internal battery Up to 100 feet Read-write 

Passive External (from reader) Up to 20 feet Mostly read-only 

Common RFID Operating Frequencies for Passive Tags 

Frequency Typical read 

range and rate 

Examples of use 

Low 

frequency 

125 KHz 1.5 feet; low 

reading speed 

Access control, animal tracking, point of 

sale application. 

High 

frequency 

13.56 MHz 3 feet; medium 

reading speed 

Access control, smart cards, item level 

tracking. 

Ultrahigh 

frequency 

860-930 

MHz 

Up to 15 feet; high 

reading speed 

Pallet tracking, supply chain 

management. 

Microwave 

frequency 

2.45/5.8 

GHz 

3 feet; high 

reading speed 

Supply chain management. 
Appendix D 

Photographs of US-VISIT Entry and Exit Lanes 

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Picture 1 – US-VISIT Entry Lane, - -- -- -- --- - - - - -- - - 

Picture 2 – US-VISIT Exit Lane - -- -- ---- ----- - - -- - - 
Appendix E 

Example of an RFID-enabled Form I-94 

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Appendix F 

AIDMS Topology

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Appendix G 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Enhanced Security Controls Needed For US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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Information Security Audits Division

Edward G. Coleman, Director 

Jeff Arman, Audit Manager 

Chiu-Tong Tsang, Audit Team Leader 

Charles Twitty, Auditor 

Swati Mahajan, Information Technology Specialist 

Steven Staats, Referencer 

Advanced Technology Division

Lane Melton, Senior Security Engineer 

Michael Goodman, Security Engineer 
Appendix H 

Report Distribution 

Enhanced Security Controls Needed For US-VISIT’s System Using RFID Technology 

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Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Assistant Secretary, Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Assistant Secretary, Policy 

Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs 

US-VISIT, Program Director 

US-VISIT, Chief Information Officer 

US-VISIT, Audit Liaison 

Chief Information Officer 

Chief Information Security Officer 

Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Director, Compliance and Oversight Program, Office of CIO 

Chief Information Officer Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov/oig.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of 

Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations – 

Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, Washington, DC 20528; fax 

the complaint to (202) 254-4292; or email DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. The 

OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.