1998 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-10-1998

Edwards v. California Univ PA

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 97-3285

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Recommended Citation

"Edwards v. California Univ PA" (1998). 1998 Decisions. Paper 191.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/191
Filed August 10, 1998 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 97-3285 

DILAWAR M. EDWARDS, Ph.D. 

Appellant 

v. 

CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA; 

JOHN PIERCE WATKINS, Ph.D., President; 

NANCY Z. NELSON, Ed.D., Vice President for Academic

Affairs; WILLIAM BENEDETTI, Ed.D., Dean in their 

official capacities; DAVID CAMPBELL, Chairperson, 

Educational Studies Dept. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

(D.C. Civil No. 91-01668) 

Argued: March 13, 1998 

Before: STAPLETON and ALITO, Circuit Judges, 

and O'KELLEY, District Judge* 

(Opinion Filed: August 10, 1998) 

_________________________________________________________________ 

* Hon. William C. O'Kelley, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Georgia, sitting by designation. 
 CRAIG L. PARSHALL (Argued) 

 Suite 202 

 910 Princess Anne Street 

 Fredericksburg, VA 22401 

 EUGENE ORLANDO, JR. 

 Orlando & Strahn 

 5341 Perkiomen Avenue 

 Reading, PA 19606 

 Counsel for Appellant 

 THOMAS F. HALLORAN, JR. 

 (Argued) 

 6th Floor 

 Office of Attorney General of 

 Pennsylvania 

 564 Forbes Avenue 

 Manor Complex 

 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

 Counsel for Appellees 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

ALITO, Circuit Judge: 

Appellant Dilawar M. Edwards, a tenured professor at the 

California University of Pennsylvania, brought this action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that the University 

and its officers ("the University") violated several of his 

constitutional rights. Specifically, Edwards claimed that the 

University deprived him of his rights to free speech, due 

process, and equal protection by restricting his choice of 

classroom materials, criticizing his teaching performance, 

and suspending him with pay for a portion of one academic 

term. In addition, Edwards alleged that the University 

retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit. 

Prior to trial, the district court dismissed Edwards's equal 

protection claim and granted summary judgment in favor of 

the University on Edwards's due process claim. The case 

then went to trial on Edwards's First Amendment and

retaliation claims, and a jury returned a verdict for the 

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University. On appeal, Edwards assigns as error: 1) the 

district court's First Amendment jury instruction; 2) the 

district court's grant of summary judgment on his due 

process claim; 3) the district court's dismissal of his equal 

protection claim; 4) the district court's ruling that the 

verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence; 

and 5) the district court's decision not to permit a third 

amended complaint. We affirm. 

I. 

During the time-period at issue in this case, Professor 

Edwards taught a course at the University entitled 

"Introduction to Educational Media" (IEM). Syllabi from the 

early 1980s indicate that the IEM course initially focused 

on how teachers can effectively use various classroom tools, 

such as projection equipment, chalkboards, photographs, 

and films. See App. I at 299-306. Later syllabi prepared by 

Edwards, however, included a new emphasis on issues of 

bias, censorship, religion, and humanism, and Edwards 

listed numerous publications concerning these issues as 

required or suggested reading. Id. at 307-37. 

In May 1989, one of Edwards's students complained to 

University officials that Edwards had used the IEM class to 

advance religious ideas. On August 14, 1989, the 

University's Vice President for Academic Affairs, Nancy 

Nelson, wrote a letter to Edwards in which she outlined the 

student's concerns and indicated that a meeting on the 

issue would be held in the fall. Nelson met with Edwards 

and other school officials to discuss the complaint and, on 

November 28, 1989, Nelson wrote to Edwards and directed 

that he "cease and desist" from using "doctrinaire 

material[s]" of a religious nature. App. I at 366. Edwards 

appealed this decision to the President of the University, 

John Pierce Watkins, and the two exchanged letters 

through July 1990. Watkins expressed his approval of 

Nelson's actions and directed Edwards to avoid advancing 

religious beliefs through his lectures and handouts. Dr. 

Edwards continued to teach the IEM course during the 

1991 and 1992 school years. 

In 1992, Professor David Campbell was named chair of 

the Education Department at the University. Upon 

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assuming this position, Campbell became concerned that 

Edwards had "interjected something that didn't belong in 

the [IEM] course[:] A distinct bias on religion and religious 

questions." App. II, Trial Tr. 2/13/97, at 38. After 

concluding that Edwards was teaching from a nonapproved syllabus, Campbell brought the issue to the 

department faculty during the Spring 1993 term, and the 

faculty voted to reinstate an earlier version of the IEM 

syllabus. Relying on the earlier syllabus, Campbell revoked 

certain book orders that Edwards had made for the Fall 

1993 semester and, when Edwards objected, Campbell told 

him that he could put the matter on the agenda for the 

September 1993 faculty meeting. Campbell testified that 

Edwards never asked that the matter be placed on the 

meeting's agenda. 

In the weeks prior to the Fall 1993 term, Professor

Edwards's schedule was rearranged, and he was assigned 

to teach an additional course -- "Educational Tests and 

Measurements" (ETM) -- that he had never taught. 

Edwards was dissatisfied with the change, and Campbell 

received complaints that Edwards failed to attend some of 

his ETM classes and walked out of others. At the 

September 1993 faculty meeting, Campbell and Edwards 

engaged in an exchange in which Campbell called Edwards 

an "embarrassment to the department" and made 

comments to the effect that Edwards might be better suited 

to a "fundamentalist college[ ]" than a "public university." 

App. I at 391, 400. A non-verbatim account of the meeting 

was distributed to all members of the Education 

Department. 

In response to the student complaints about Edwards's 

ETM class, school administrators put together a packet of 

materials that they wished to discuss with Edwards. The 

administration scheduled a meeting for Monday, October 

25, 1993, but apparently did not mail the packet to

Edwards until Friday, October 22, 1993. Upon arriving at 

the meeting, Edwards stated that he had not received any 

materials in the mail and he asked for additional time to 

prepare. App. I at 408-10. At this point, Nancy Nelson 

relieved Edwards of his duties, with pay, until he was ready 

to discuss the University's concerns. Id. at 411. Edwards 

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remained suspended with pay for the remainder of the 

semester but returned to the classroom for the Spring 1994 

term to teach two ETM courses and one IEM course. 

Edwards initially brought suit against the University in 

September 1991, alleging violations of his First Amendment 

free speech rights, his Fourteenth Amendment due process 

rights, and his rights under the Establishment Clause. In 

October 1991, Edwards filed an amended complaint which 

included an equal protection claim. After his suspension in 

1993, Edwards filed a second amended complaint which 

contained a free speech claim, a retaliation claim, a due 

process claim, and an equal protection claim. The district 

court granted summary judgment on Edwards's due 

process claim in January 1997, and the court denied

Edwards's motion for reconsideration in February 1997. On 

February 11, 1997, the first day of trial, the district sua 

sponte dismissed Edwards's equal protection claim for 

failure to state a claim and denied Edwards's motion to file 

a third amended complaint. The case then went to trial on 

Edwards's First Amendment and retaliation claims. 

Before submitting the case to the jury, the district court 

held a conference on jury instructions and rejected much of 

Edwards's proposed First Amendment instruction. After the 

jury returned a verdict for the University, Edwards moved 

for a new trial. The district court denied Edwards's motion, 

and Edwards appealed. 

II. 

A. 

Edwards first contends that the district court 

inadequately instructed the jury on the issue of whether 

the University violated his First Amendment rights by 

restricting his "choice of curriculum materials and the 

content and subjects of his classes." Appellant's Br. at 27. 

Although Edwards agrees with the standard given by the 

district court -- that the University had to show that its 

actions were "reasonably related to a legitimate educational 

interest," App. IV, Trial Tr. Feb. 25, 1997, at 26 -- Edwards 

argues that the district court did not adequately explain 

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this standard and, thus, "permitted the jury to speculate on 

the parameters of freedom of speech." Appellant's Br. at 24. 

Specifically, Edwards contends that the district court failed 

to provide guidance in the following four areas: 1) the 

necessity of avoiding viewpoint discrimination; 2) the 

strength of a professor's academic freedom rights; 3) the 

correct legal standard regarding the discussion of religious 

issues in public classrooms; and 4) the existence of a 

professor's right to choose his curriculum materials absent 

an official school policy. 

We do not find it necessary to determine whether the 

district court's instruction adequately defined the

"reasonably related to a legitimate educational interest" 

standard because, as a threshold matter, we conclude that 

a public university professor does not have a First

Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the 

classroom. This conclusion is compelled by our decision in 

Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 

1990), where we explained that "no court has found that 

teachers' First Amendment rights extend to choosing their 

own curriculum or classroom management techniques in 

contravention of school policy or dictates." Id. at 1176. 

Consistent with this observation, we concluded that

"[a]lthough a teacher's out-of-class conduct, including her 

advocacy of particular teaching methods, is protected, her 

in-class conduct is not." Id. (citation omitted).1 Therefore, 

although Edwards has a right to advocate outside of the 

classroom for the use of certain curriculum materials, he 

does not have a right to use those materials in the

classroom. Accord Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. Edwards interprets Bradley as holding that "in the absence of an 

official existing school policy prohibiting" a professor from selecting 

certain classroom materials, a professor has a First Amendment right to 

choose his curriculum materials. See Appellant's Br. at 28. This 

interpretation ignores: 1) the Bradley court's instruction that public 

school teachers must abide by "school policy or dictates" when choosing 

their curriculum, 910 F.2d at 1176 (emphasis added); 2) the court's 

broad conclusion that a public school teacher's"in class conduct is not" 

protected by the First Amendment, id.; and 3) the fact that the school in 

Bradley, like the University here, took action without establishing an 

official policy. Id. at 1174. 

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136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) (in banc) ("We agree . . . 

that the school, not the teacher, has the right tofix the 

curriculum."); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 

F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Although the concept of 

academic freedom has been recognized in our 

jurisprudence, the doctrine has never conferred upon 

teachers the control of public school curricula."). But see 

Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) 

(finding that a public university's restrictions on a 

professor's in-class speech "implicate[d] First Amendment 

freedoms"). 

Our conclusion that the First Amendment does not place 

restrictions on a public university's ability to control its 

curriculum is consistent with the Supreme Court's 

jurisprudence concerning the state's ability to say what it 

wishes when it is the speaker. The following passage from 

Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), 

addresses this issue in the university context: 

 [W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content- 

 based choices. When the University determines the 

 content of the education it provides, it is the University 

 speaking, and we have permitted the government to 

 regulate the content of what is or is not expressed 

 when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities 

 to convey its own message. . . . It does not follow, 

 however, . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are 

 proper when the University does not speak itself or 

 subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead 

 expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from 

 private speakers. A holding that the University may not 

 discriminate based on viewpoint of private persons 

 whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the 

 University's own speech, which is controlled by 

 different principles. 

Id. at 833-34. Since the University's actions in the instant 

case concerned the "content of the education it provides," 

id. at 833, we find that the University was acting as 

speaker and was entitled to make content-based choices in 

restricting Edwards's syllabus. 

Edwards's reliance on the principle of academic freedom 

 7 
does not affect our conclusion that the University can make 

content-based decisions when shaping its curriculum. The 

Supreme Court has explained that "[a]cademic freedom 

thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited

exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, 

and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous 

decisionmaking by the academy itself." Regents of Univ. of 

Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (citations 

omitted). The "four essential freedoms" that constitute 

academic freedom have been described as a university's 

freedom to choose "who may teach, what may be taught, 

how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 

Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 

(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quotations omitted). 2 In sum, 

caselaw from the Supreme Court and this court on 

academic freedom and the First Amendment compel the

conclusion that Edwards does not have a constitutional 

right to choose curriculum materials in contravention of the 

University's dictates. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court's decision not to grant a new trial on this issue. 

B. 

Edwards's second contention is that the district court 

erred when it granted summary judgment for the University 

on his procedural due process claim. The district court 

initially ruled on this issue prior to trial, concluding that, 

"because Edwards was suspended with pay, he cannot 

prove that he was deprived of a property interest deserving 

due process guarantees." App. I at 138. Edwards moved for 

reconsideration on the ground that the district court's 

opinion did not adequately consider whether he had been 

deprived of a liberty interest. The district court denied 

_________________________________________________________________ 

2. Edwards's contention that the Supreme Court has elsewhere defined 

academic freedom as the "principle that individual instructors are at 

liberty to teach that which they deem to be appropriate," Appellant's Br. 

at 31, is incorrect. The case cited for this proposition, Edwards v. 

Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), reaches no such conclusion. Rather, the 

passage relied upon by Edwards simply describes the conclusion of the 

court of appeals in that case. Id. 586 n.6. At no point in Aguillard, 

which 

is an Establishment Clause case, does the Court define academic 

freedom for purposes of the Free Speech Clause. 

 8 
Edwards's motion, explaining that he had not "pleaded 

facts sufficient to make out a liberty interest claim 

regarding reputation." App. II, Feb. 12, 1997 Trial Tr. at 12. 

We agree. 

This court has previously held that "[s]tigma to 

reputation alone, absent some accompanying deprivation of 

present or future employment, is not a liberty interest 

protected by the fourteenth amendment." Robb v. City of 

Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 1984). See also 

Strum v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1987) 

(explaining that the Supreme Court has required"both 

damage to reputation and the extinguishment of 

government employment as a predicate for due process 

protection."). Since it is undisputed that Edwards remained 

employed with pay at all times relevant to this case, his 

claim is barred by our decisions in Robb and Strum. While 

Edwards's temporary removal from class duties may have 

further stigmatized him, this action does not constitute a 

deprivation of employment. Therefore, we will affirm the 

district court's grant of summary judgment on Edwards's 

due process claim. 

C. 

Edwards next contends that the district court improperly 

dismissed his equal protection claim. In making this 

argument, Edwards places considerable reliance on facts 

that came out at trial. See Appellant's Br. at 42; Appellant's 

Reply Br. at 18. However, the district court dismissed 

Edwards's equal protection claim prior to trial because 

Edwards's counsel admitted that the second amended 

complaint did not adequately allege an equal protection 

violation. See App. II, Feb. 11, 1997 Trial Tr. at 9-10, 74-75.3 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. The relevant exchange between the district court and Edwards's trial 

counsel, Jack Parson, proceeded as follows: 

 The Court: What do you think you need to do to make out an 

 equal protection claim, don't you have to show 

 persons similarly situated were treated in a different 

 manner because of participation in a protected class? 

 Mr. Carson: That's the criteria. 

 9 
Under these circumstances, Edwards is not entitled to 

revive his equal protection claim on appeal. 

D. 

Edwards's final two contentions -- that the verdict was 

against the great weight of the evidence and that he should 

have been allowed to file a third amended complaint on the 

first day of trial -- are both without merit. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court's resolution of both issues. 

III. 

In sum, we conclude: 1) that Professor Edwards does not 

have a First Amendment right to choose classroom 

materials and subjects in contravention of the University's 

dictates; 2) that Edwards failed to state a procedural due 

process liberty claim because he did not allege a 

deprivation of employment; and 3) that the district court 

properly dismissed Edwards's equal protection claim after 

Edwards's own counsel conceded that the complaint failed 

to adequately state such a claim. We find Edwards's

remaining arguments on appeal to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we affirm. We emphasize that we only pass on 

the narrow legal issues presented to us. Nothing in our 

opinion should be read to mean that we condone all of the 

conduct of the University officials that was revealed at trial. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 The Court: Where's that allegation? 

 Mr. Carson: In this amended complaint, it is not there, not 

 specifically set out. 

 The Court: This is the complaint. Okay. You are saying no equal 

 protection argument in the second amended 

 complaint? 

 Mr. Carson: No, Your Honor. 

 The Court: There is none? 

 Mr. Carson: No. 

App. II, Feb. 11, 1997 Trial Tr. at 9-10. 

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A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

 11