a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Honorable Charles E. 

Grassley, Chairman, Caucus on 

International Narcotics Control, U.S. 

Senate

July 2004 DRUG CONTROL

Aviation Program 

Safety Concerns in 

Colombia Are Being 

Addressed, but State’s 

Planning and 

Budgeting Process 

Can Be Improved

GAO-04-918
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-918.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-918, a report to the

Honorable Charles E. Grassley, 

Chairman, Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate 

July 2004

DRUG CONTROL

Aviation Program Safety Concerns in 

Colombia Are Being Addressed, but 

State's Planning and Budgeting Process 

Can Be Improved 

In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft 

averaged fewer than 10 per month. But in late 2002 and during 2003, the 

number of hits increased—peaking at 73 in January 2003 and averaging more 

than 26 per month—and, in 2003, two spray aircraft crashed and two were 

forced to land because of ground fire. Moreover, the number of flying hours 

for spray aircraft more than doubled—from about 5,450 hours in 2001 to 

over 11,300 hours in 2003. In general, this meant the aircraft were exposed 

more frequently to the threat of ground fire, although other factors came into

play. 

In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits, the Colombian 

National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each 

eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation 

gunships that already accompanied every mission. Also, since January 2003, 

State has taken several actions to help reduce exposure to the threat of 

ground fire by making greater use of information about armed insurgents’ 

proximity to spray targets. 

Since fiscal year 2001, State has significantly increased resources for the 

aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding for the program doubled 

from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001 to $100 million for fiscal year 2003. 

In addition, from fiscal year 2001 to May 2004, personnel in Colombia who 

were directly involved with the program increased from 179 to 298, and the 

number of aerial eradication aircraft increased from 22 to 35. However, 

State does not prepare budgets that address all of the Office of Aviation’s 

program requirements. Consequently, State often moves funds from one 

program to another, which may adversely affect those programs. In 

addition, State does not plan for the long-term costs of the aerial eradication 

program, such as aircraft replacement. As a result, State has postponed 

requesting funds for new aircraft. 

Number of Ground-Fire Hits Incurred by Spray Aircraft per Month, January 2001 through May 

2004 

The Department of State supports 

foreign governments’ efforts to 

eradicate illicit drug crops. In 

recent years, State’s Office of 

Aviation has maintained aircraft 

and provided support for the aerial 

eradication program of the 

Colombian National Police. 

However, eradication aircraft are 

often shot at from the ground 

requiring helicopter gunships and a 

search and rescue helicopter to 

accompany each mission. In 2003, 

the Office of Aviation fumigated 

more than 132,000 hectares of coca, 

a record amount. GAO examined 

(1) how the threat to the spray 

planes has changed since 2001, (2) 

what actions State has taken to 

address any operational safety 

concerns, and (3) what resources 

State provided for the expanding 

program during fiscal years 2001-04 

and how it planned and budgeted 

for the program’s growth. 

To help ensure that the aerial 

eradication program in Colombia 

and other State aviation programs 

have the resources needed, GAO is 

recommending that the Secretary 

of State develop a strategic 

planning and budgeting process 

that accounts for all of the Office of 

Aviation’s program requirements. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, State agreed that a more 

comprehensive long-term planning 

and budgeting process is needed 

and has taken some initial steps to 

this end. 
Page i GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Ground-Fire Hits on Spray Aircraft Increased Significantly in 2003 8

State Has Taken Several Actions to Address Operational Safety 

Concerns 11

Resources for Aerial Eradication Increased, but State’s Planning and 

Budgeting Process Does Not Provide for All Needs 14

Conclusions 20

Recommendation for Executive Action 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 26

Tables Table 1: U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program in 

Colombia, Fiscal Years 2001-05 15

Table 2: Office of Aviation Staffing by Location, Fiscal Years 

2001-04 16

Table 3: DynCorp Personnel in Colombia Who Support the Aerial 

Eradication Program, Fiscal Years 2001-04 17

Table 4: Total Aircraft Supporting Office of Aviation Aerial 

Eradication Program, Fiscal Years 2001-04 18

Figures Figure 1: Coca- and Poppy-Growing Areas in Colombia, 2003 6

Figure 2: Number of Ground-Fire Hits Incurred by Spray Aircraft 

per Month, January 2001 through May 2004 9

Figure 3: Number of Flying Hours by Spray Aircraft Per Month, 

January 2001 through May 2004 10

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Page 1 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 29, 2004 Letr

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since the early 1970s, the United States has supported Colombia’s efforts to 

reduce drug trafficking activities and stem the flow of illegal drugs, 

principally cocaine and heroin, entering the United States. Recognizing the 

severity of illicit drug activities and the links between drug trafficking, the 

cultivation of coca and opium poppy,1

 and the violence affecting Colombia, 

the Colombian government announced a $7.5 billion plan in October 1999, 

known as Plan Colombia. This plan proposed, among other things, to 

reduce the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 

50 percent over 6 years.2

 To assist Colombia’s efforts, the United States has 

substantially increased funding and material support to Colombia since 

2000, providing more than $3.3 billion through fiscal year 2004.3

The Department of State supports foreign governments’ efforts to locate 

and eradicate illicit drug crops through its Bureau for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL); its Narcotics Affairs 

Sections (NAS) in particular countries; and the Office of Aviation, which 

oversees a contract with DynCorp Aerospace Technology. In recent years, 

the Office of Aviation, with DynCorp’s assistance, has maintained and 

1

The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine, and opium poppy is used to 

produce heroin.

2

Although the government of Colombia announced Plan Colombia in 1999, U.S. funding for 

counternarcotics purposes was not approved until July 2000, leading to some uncertainty 

about when the 6-year goal was to be achieved. The current Colombian government has 

announced that it intends to eliminate coca cultivation by August 2006.

3

For a more complete explanation of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, see our reports 

titled Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, GAO01-26 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2000); Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and 

Long-Term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed, GAO-03-783

(Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003); and Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to 

Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended Results but Programs Are Not Readily 

Sustainable, GAO-04-726 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004).
Page 2 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

operated aircraft and provided logistical and training support for the aerial 

eradication program of the Colombian National Police.4

In 2003, the Office of Aviation fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of 

coca, a record amount, and 2,987 hectares of opium poppy. Largely as the 

result of these efforts, the estimated number of hectares under coca or 

opium poppy cultivation in Colombia has declined by about one-third over 

the past 2 years. However, the program operates in a hostile environment—

eradication aircraft are often shot at from the ground—that requires 

helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each 

eradication mission. In August 2003, the Director of the Office of Aviation 

expressed his concern that the increased operational tempo had strained 

the resources and staffing available and he could not continue to ensure the 

operational safety of the aerial eradication program.5

You requested that we determine (1) how the threat to the aerial 

eradication spray planes has changed since 2001, (2) what actions State has 

taken to address any operational safety concerns, and (3) what resources 

State provided for the expanding program during fiscal years 2001-04 

(through May 2004) and how it planned and budgeted for the program’s 

growth. To address these objectives, we reviewed overall program and 

budgeting documents and interviewed cognizant officials at State/INL in 

Washington, D.C. We also interviewed Office of Aviation and DynCorp 

officials about operational procedures and reviewed relevant documents, 

including site inspections and accident reports, at the Office of Aviation’s 

main operating base, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; the U.S. Embassy in 

Bogotá, Colombia; and the Office of Aviation and DynCorp office at El 

Dorado Airport in Bogotá. We also discussed operational procedures with 

NAS, Office of Aviation, and DynCorp personnel in Bogotá and met with 

managers, pilots, and mechanics and observed eradication operations at 

three sites in Colombia. We also reviewed how the data provided to us by 

State and DynCorp were compiled and determined that they were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our 

review from November 2003 through June 2004 in accordance with 

generally accepted government accounting standards. (See app. I for a 

more complete discussion of our scope and methodology.) 

4

The aerial eradication program involves spraying the coca and poppy plants from low-flying 

airplanes with an herbicide that attacks the root system and kills the plant.

5

The Director has since retired from government service.
Page 3 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Results in Brief In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft 

averaged fewer than 10 per month.6

 But in late 2002 and during 2003, the 

number of ground-fire hits reported increased significantly—averaging 

more than 26 per month—and in 2003, for the first time, two spray aircraft 

crashed and two were forced to land because of ground fire. Moreover, the 

operational tempo more than doubled—from about 5,450 flying hours for 

spray aircraft in 2001 to over 11,300 hours in 2003. In general, this meant 

the spray aircraft and accompanying helicopters were exposed more 

frequently to the threat of ground fire; although other factors also came 

into play, such as the proximity of eradication target areas to insurgent 

locations. According to U.S. Embassy/Bogotá officials, the increased 

number of ground-fire hits occurred, at least in part, because the illicit drug 

producers were responding more vigorously to the success of the increased 

aerial eradication program.

In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits, the Colombian 

National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each 

eradication mission, which were in addition to the two Office of Aviation 

gunships that already accompanied every mission. In addition, since 

January 2003, State/INL and NAS have taken several actions to help reduce 

eradication aircraft exposure to the threat of ground fire by making greater 

use of information regarding insurgent locations and their proximity to 

spray targets. These actions have included the following:

• In January 2003, State/INL approved two additional personnel positions 

for NAS to collect and share intelligence information with NAS, Office of 

Aviation, DynCorp, and appropriate Colombian military and police 

officials to plan aerial eradication operations. They began work in 

August 2003. 

• In early 2003, the U.S. Embassy began reviewing its protocol for sharing 

intelligence information to help ensure that aerial eradication mission 

planners have the best available. The revised protocol was approved in 

June 2003. 

6

The number of ground-fire hits is the total number of bullet holes in an aircraft. For 

example, if an aircraft receives two or more bullet holes on a mission, the Office of Aviation 

reports that the aircraft received two or more ground-fire hits.
Page 4 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

• In September 2003, in accordance with the revised intelligence protocol, 

the NAS Director began requiring that all eradication missions have her 

prior approval. 

In addition, the eradication aircraft have always had armor to help protect 

the pilots and vulnerable fuel and oil lines from ground fire. Some of the 

newer spray planes are undergoing additional modifications to further 

protect the pilot.

During fiscal years 2001-03, State/INL significantly increased resources for 

the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding more than doubled 

from $49.1 million in fiscal year 2001 to $100.4 million for fiscal year 2003; 

funding estimated and proposed for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, 

respectively, continue this upward trend. In addition, from the end of fiscal 

year 2001 through May 2004, Office of Aviation and DynCorp personnel in 

Colombia who were directly involved with aerial eradication increased 

from 179 to 298, and the number of aerial eradication aircraft increased 

from 22 to 35. However, State/INL and the Office of Aviation do not plan for 

or prepare budgets that address all of the Office of Aviation’s program 

requirements. Consequently, State/INL often moves funds from one 

program to another to support the aerial eradication program, which may 

adversely affect those programs. In fiscal year 2003, for example, State/INL 

reprogrammed more than $5 million from counternarcotics programs in 

Bolivia, Peru, and Pakistan for Office of Aviation activities in Colombia. In 

addition, State/INL does not plan for the long-term costs of maintaining the 

aerial eradication program, such as preparing an aircraft replacement and 

acquisition plan. As a result, State/INL has delayed requesting funding for 

additional spray aircraft until it develops the supporting documentation. 

State/INL acknowledges the weaknesses in its planning and budgeting 

process and recently initiated an internal study to address the problems. 

To help ensure that the Office of Aviation has the resources needed to carry 

out its programs, including the aerial eradication program in Colombia, we 

are recommending that the Secretary of State direct the Assistant Secretary 

for State/INL to develop a strategic planning and budgeting process that 

accounts for all of the Office of Aviation’s program requirements. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, State noted that a more 

comprehensive long-term planning and budgeting process for the Office of 

Aviation is needed and has taken some initial steps to this end. 
Page 5 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Background Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine and 40 percent of the 

heroin entering the United States. To assist the Colombian government in 

its efforts to implement Plan Colombia and reduce the cultivation and 

trafficking of illegal drugs, the United States has pursued a strategy 

emphasizing interdiction, aerial eradication, and alternative development. 

The strategy has resulted in a 33 percent reduction in the amount of coca 

cultivated in Colombia over the last 2 years—from 169,800 hectares in 2001 

to 113,850 hectares in 2003; similarly, opium poppy cultivated also declined 

by 33 percent—from 6,540 hectares in 2001 to 4,400 hectares in 2003.7

Nevertheless, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration, cocaine 

prices nationwide have remained relatively stable—indicating that cocaine 

is still readily available—and Colombia dominates the market for heroin in 

the northeastern United States.

Despite improvements in Colombia’s security situation in 2003—for 

example, according to statistics compiled by the Colombian government, 

the murder rate declined 20 percent that year—insurgent and paramilitary 

groups still control large parts of the countryside. According to State, the 

insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s 

territory east and south of the Andes. As illustrated in figure 1, this area 

includes the primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. These groups—

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation 

Army, and paramilitary forces such as the United Self Defense Forces of 

Colombia—are involved in every facet of narcotics trafficking and are on 

State’s list of terrorist organizations. 

7

In 2003, the Office of Aviation sprayed over 132,000 hectares of coca—a record number.
Page 6 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Figure 1: Coca- and Poppy-Growing Areas in Colombia, 2003

Panama

Bogotá

San José del Guaviare

Miraflores

Puerto Asís Tres Esquinas

Medellín

Barranquilla

Cali

Brazil

Peru

Ecuador

Venezuela

Poppy cultivation

Coca cultivation

Source: Created by GAO from information provided by the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center.

Larandia

Villa Garzón
Page 7 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

State has supported foreign governments throughout the world to locate 

and eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, State’s efforts have focused 

on the aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police, 

although it provides logistical support to Bolivia and Peru and may be 

called upon to support drug eradication efforts in Afghanistan. 

NAS at the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá oversees and manages the Colombian 

program. The Office of Aviation, which has a main operating base at Patrick 

Air Force Base, Florida, implements the program with contractor 

assistance from DynCorp. DynCorp personnel at Patrick provide 

administrative support, perform major maintenance on aircraft, and give 

initial pilot training. In Colombia, the Office of Aviation and DynCorp 

maintain a headquarters office at El Dorado International Airport in Bogotá 

and up to three operational sites at various Colombian police or military 

bases around the country. From these sites, three types of spray aircraft—

the OV-10, the T-65, and the AT-802—fly missions to fumigate the coca and 

poppy fields in Colombia. DynCorp provides pilots, mechanics, and other 

operations and maintenance personnel. 

The aerial eradication program operates in an often-hostile environment 

that requires helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to 

accompany each aerial eradication mission. Eradication spray planes and 

the supporting helicopters are often shot at from the ground. Missions have 

been canceled or redirected because NAS, Office of Aviation, or 

government of Colombia officials considered the targeted locations too 

dangerous.

U.S. officials have had long-standing concerns about the threat posed to 

aerial eradication activities and, in particular, the safety of operations in 

Colombia. In August 2000, the Office of Aviation requested an independent 

evaluation of its aviation operations and safety by the Inter-Agency 

Committee for Aviation Policy.8

 Based on its review of operations at two 

forward operating locations in Colombia and the offices in Bogotá and at 

Patrick Air Force Base, the committee concluded that the Office of 

Aviation program was safe but made numerous suggestions and 

recommendations to enhance safety and security. In September 2001, we 

8

This committee is under the aegis of the General Services Administration. The committee 

formulates aviation policies for the various civilian federal departments and agencies that 

maintain aircraft. The committee also helps to ensure that agency aircraft fleets are 

maintained properly and are operationally safe through on-site reviews. The committee 

appoints a team of aviation experts from various federal agencies to perform these reviews.
Page 8 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

reported that the Office of Aviation had taken action on or implemented 

most of the committee’s suggestions and recommendations.9

 We also made 

recommendations for improvement, which State acted on. 

Nevertheless, in March 2002, the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá reported that in 

spite of all of the embassy’s precautions, a contractor, possibly an 

American, will inevitably be hurt or killed.10 In June 2003, the Director of 

the Office of Aviation noted that the Office of Aviation was performing a 

very difficult mission in an increasingly hostile environment. In September 

2003, a spray aircraft crashed because of ground fire and, for the first time, 

the pilot was killed. In total during 2003, one helicopter and four spray 

aircraft either crashed or were severely damaged because of ground fire. In 

an October 2003 report, DynCorp noted that the threat to the program’s 

aircraft and pilots was causing increasing concern about pilot safety and 

personnel morale. 

Another key component of the Colombian-U.S. counternarcotics strategy 

was forming a Colombian Army Counternarcotics Brigade. Although the 

brigade’s primary mission is to plan and conduct interdiction operations 

against cocaine producers and traffickers, the brigade also is supposed to 

provide security for the eradication program in some of the insurgentcontrolled areas of the country. As part of its contract, DynCorp trains 

pilots and mechanics and helps maintain and operate the U.S.-provided 

helicopters for the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, which supplies the 

airlift capability for the counternarcotics brigade. 

Ground-Fire Hits on 

Spray Aircraft 

Increased Significantly 

in 2003

Although the Office of Aviation has reported ground fire on its aerial 

eradication aircraft for years, the number of ground-fire hits began to 

increase in late 2002. In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire 

hits on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month. But the number of 

ground-fire hits reported from October 2002 through 2003 increased 

significantly to an average of more than 26 per month. The number of hits 

9

U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: State Department Provides Required 

Aviation Program Oversight, but Safety and Security Should Be Enhanced, GAO-01-1021

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2001).

10Furthermore, in August of 2002, a DynCorp contract employee was killed in an accident on 

the tarmac of an operational site. At the time, based on on-site inspections by his staff, the 

Director of the Office of Aviation reported that he had full confidence in the contractor’s 

ability to meet State/INL-mandated safety commitments.
Page 9 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

peaked at 73 in January 2003, and 46 hits were reported in March 2003. 

Although the number of monthly ground-fire hits generally declined after 

March 2003, the total number for 2003 was more than the previous 2 years 

combined—313 versus 288 in 2001 and 2002. During the first 5 months of 

2004, the total number of hits declined considerably to 48 compared with 

168 during the same period in 2003. Figure 2 shows the number of groundfire hits on spray aircraft from January 2001 through May 2004. 

Figure 2: Number of Ground-Fire Hits Incurred by Spray Aircraft per Month, January 2001 through May 2004 

In addition, during the period 2001-03, the operational tempo of the aerial 

eradication program more than doubled in terms of flying hours for the 

spray aircraft. In general, this meant the spray aircraft and accompanying 

helicopters were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire; 

although other factors also came into play, such as the proximity of 

eradication areas to insurgent locations. According to the Office of 

Aviation, spray aircraft flew about 5,450 hours in 2001, nearly 9,400 hours in 

2002, and more than 11,300 in 2003. The increase in flying hours in 2002 and 

2003 largely occurred as the Colombian government, headed by President 

Uribe, took a more aggressive approach to aerial eradication. In the 

Ground-fire hits

Sources: NAS and Office of Aviation (data), GAO (analysis).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

.

Oct.

Aug.

Sept.

July

May

June

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

.

Aug

Sept.

Oct.

.

July

Jun

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

e

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

Year

2001 2002 2003 2004
Page 10 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

19 months prior to President Uribe’s inauguration in August 2002, spray 

aircraft flew about 9,700 hours or 510 hours per month. From August 2002 

through May 2004, the eradication program’s spray aircraft flew more than 

18,450 hours, or about 839 hours a month—during 2003 alone, the program 

averaged more than 940 flying hours a month. During the first 5 months of 

2004, the pace slowed—spray aircraft flew about 2,000 hours compared 

with about 4,900 hours during the same period in 2003. Nevertheless, Office 

of Aviation officials report that the number of hectares of coca sprayed in 

2004 remains high—62,000 through mid-June—because the spray aircraft 

are based close to large coca fields and the AT-802 spray planes, which are 

capable of carrying more herbicide than the OV-10,11 have flown more 

frequently than during the first 5 months of 2003. Figure 3 illustrates the 

spray aircraft’s monthly flying hours for January 2001 through May 2004.

Figure 3: Number of Flying Hours by Spray Aircraft Per Month, January 2001 through May 2004 

11The AT-802 standard load is 300 to 400 gallons of herbicide versus a maximum of 300 

gallons for the OV-10.

Flying hours

Sources: NAS and Office of Aviation (data), GAO (analysis).

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

.

Oct.

Aug.

Sept.

July

May

June

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

.

Aug

Sept.

Oct.

.

July

Jun

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

e

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

Year

2001 2002 2003 2004
Page 11 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

According to U.S. Embassy/Bogotá and Colombian officials, the primary 

reason for the increase in ground-fire hits in late 2002 was the aerial 

eradication program’s success in reducing the illicit drug producers’ ability 

to cultivate coca and opium poppy. To combat this success, U.S. 

Embassy/Bogotá officials reported that the insurgents began 

• organizing and massing ground fire in front of the spray aircraft’s flight 

path to force the planes to fly though a barrage of bullets and 

• using a greater variety of weapons against aerial eradication aircraft, 

including some larger caliber weapons capable of penetrating armor and 

hitting the aircraft at higher altitudes.12

State Has Taken 

Several Actions to 

Address Operational 

Safety Concerns

State/INL and NAS have taken several actions to reduce the risk to the 

aircraft on aerial eradication missions. Since January 2003, these actions 

have primarily focused on improving the processes and procedures for 

collecting and analyzing intelligence information that the U.S. Embassy 

collects on insurgent locations and capabilities. Other actions include 

coordinating spray operations more closely with the Colombian Army and 

the Colombian National Police and ensuring that eradication aircraft are 

protected to the extent possible from ground fire. 

In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits on aerial 

eradication aircraft in late 2002 and early 2003, the Colombian National 

Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each 

eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation 

gunships that already accompanied every mission,13 and the NAS Director 

directed spray operations away from areas where the hits were occurring. 

In addition, throughout 2003 and early 2004, State/INL and NAS took 

several actions to make greater use of intelligence information regarding 

the ground threats to the eradication aircraft. 

• In January 2003, State/INL approved a NAS request to hire two 

personnel as intelligence/security advisors. Their duties include 

12According to the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá, insurgents were using 7.62 automatic weapons 

and, for the first time, .50 caliber machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, and aerial mines 

to fire on eradication aircraft.

13Colombian National Police personnel man and control the guns. 
Page 12 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

collecting and sharing threat information with U.S. Embassy, DynCorp, 

and appropriate Colombian National Police and military officials to plan 

aerial eradication operations. These two individuals began work in 

August 2003. However, they did not have all the necessary security 

clearances to handle certain U.S. Embassy intelligence information. 

Nevertheless, they collected information from a variety of Colombian 

military and police sources that was used in planning operations. To 

address their lack of security clearances, in September 2003, the NAS 

Director tasked another NAS employee to coordinate intelligence within 

the U.S. Embassy until the two individuals receive their security 

clearances. 

• In early 2003, the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá began reviewing its protocol for 

gathering, utilizing, and sharing intelligence information to help ensure 

that aerial eradication mission planners have the best available threat 

assessment information. A revised protocol was approved in June 2003. 

It defines intelligence requirements and sources, frequency of 

intelligence updates, intelligence dissemination, and the use of 

intelligence in planning missions at forward operating locations. 

According to NAS and other U.S. Embassy personnel, the revised 

protocol improved information sharing within the embassy and among 

the embassy, DynCorp, and the Colombian military and police. 

• In September 2003, in accordance with the revised intelligence protocol, 

the NAS Director began approving the areas where eradication missions 

are planned. She reviews the intelligence information available and will 

not allow missions in areas where insurgents are thought to be or where 

large caliber weapons have been reported. Missions are not flown in 

those areas until intelligence information reports that the areas are 

relatively safe. 

• In October 2003, the Office of Aviation authorized DynCorp to hire six 

personnel to gather and analyze intelligence for use in planning 

eradication missions. According to DynCorp officials, they experienced 

delays in filling these positions because of uncertainties regarding its 

contract with State/INL.14 The first position was filled in March 2004, 

and, as of June 2004, all six positions had been filled. 

14State/INL is in the process of awarding a new contract and does not expect to make a 

decision until later this year. 
Page 13 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

• In November 2003, Colombian military and police at one operational site 

instituted daily threat briefings before the next day’s aerial eradication 

missions. According to U.S. Embassy and DynCorp officials, DynCorp 

obtained the briefings primarily because the eradication unit was 

collocated with the Colombian military. At the time of our visit in 

January 2004, the DynCorp site manager said that eradication aircraft 

flying missions from this site had not incurred any ground-fire hits for

2 months.

In addition, in late 2003, the NAS Director also approved an annual 

eradication program plan showing when and where eradication missions 

will occur throughout 2004 and what aircraft will be used on each of the 

missions. For each target area, the plan details when intelligence on the 

threat posed by insurgents and others should be collected, and when the 

Colombian Army Counternarcotics Brigade may be needed to conduct 

ground operations in support of eradication missions. According to NAS 

and other U.S. Embassy officials, the plan was coordinated with the 

Colombian military to complement its planned military actions for 2004 

and, as a result, has strengthened the Colombian Army’s commitment to 

support the aerial eradication program.15

Moreover, to enhance the spray airplanes’ ability to withstand ground fire, 

the Office of Aviation has ensured that the aircraft are protected to the 

extent possible. All the spray aircraft have always had protective armor 

around the cockpit and covering vulnerable fuel and oil lines. In addition, 

State activated the ejection seats in the OV-10 when it acquired the aircraft 

from the Department of Defense.16 The AT-802 spray planes are undergoing 

additional modifications to further protect the pilot. Finally, the helicopters 

also have added armaments to better protect them from ground fire.

To further reduce risks, NAS, Office of Aviation, and DynCorp officials told 

us that eradication mission planners, site managers, or individual pilots can 

cancel flights at any time without fear of reprisal if they feel the particular 

15According to the current NAS Director and the most recent former Director, the 

Colombian Army has never turned down a request to assist with the eradication program. 

The assistance usually consists of establishing a presence in a targeted eradication area to 

keep the insurgents from operating freely and possibly targeting eradication aircraft.

16The T-65 and AT-802 do not have ejection seats. Rather, the cockpit is designed to protect 

the pilot in the event of a crash.
Page 14 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

mission may not be safe because of possible ground fire, maintenance 

problems, or other safety concerns. During our visits to three operational 

sites, we attended meetings with DynCorp pilots and mechanics where 

NAS and Office of Aviation officials emphasized this point. Further, in 

separate discussions with some of the pilots and mechanics, they 

confirmed to us that they could opt out of a flight at any time without fear 

of reprisal.17

Resources for Aerial 

Eradication Increased, 

but State’s Planning 

and Budgeting Process 

Does Not Provide for 

All Needs

As the aerial eradication program in Colombia grew, State/INL substantially 

increased the resources it provided. Funding for the aerial eradication 

program in Colombia increased from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001 

to over $100 million in fiscal year 2003. Estimated funding for fiscal year 

2004 and proposed funding for fiscal year 2005 continue this upward trend. 

In addition, the number of personnel directly associated with the program, 

particularly in Colombia, increased; and the number of available spray 

aircraft and helicopters also increased. However, State/INL does not plan 

for the long-term costs of maintaining the aerial eradication program and 

does not prepare a specific budget for the Office of Aviation that accounts 

for all of its program needs. Nevertheless, Office of Aviation and DynCorp 

managers said that the resources for day-to-day operations provided during 

the period were sufficient, and that safety was never compromised. 

Program Funding Increased Funding provided through the Office of Aviation and NAS for the aerial 

eradication program in Colombia has risen every year since 2001. As shown 

in table 1, funding provided through the Office of Aviation increased 

10 percent from 2001 to 2003, from $38 million to $41.8 million, and is 

planned to increase an additional 20 percent for fiscal year 2005. Overall, 

the Office of Aviation funds are used for the direct costs of DynCorp, which 

provides aircraft maintenance and logistical support and many of the pilots 

for the eradication program. NAS funds for the aerial eradication program 

increased more than fivefold, from about $11 million in fiscal year 2001 to 

more than $58 million in fiscal year 2003. NAS provides funds to support 

DynCorp operations and for aircraft fuel, herbicide, and related support. 

Most of this increase occurred to support the increased flying hours, 

additional eradication aircraft, and multiple operating sites. Such increases 

17In connection with our prior report regarding the Office of Aviation (GAO-01-1021), pilots 

and mechanics told us the same thing in April 2001.
Page 15 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

are planned to continue in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, as funding proposed 

for fiscal year 2005 rises to more than $70 million. 

Table 1: U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program in Colombia, Fiscal Years 

2001-05 

Source: State/INL.

a

In 2003, NAS began paying a contractor $38.8 million a year to support the Colombian National Police 

Aviation Service. NAS could not readily identify the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial 

eradication. NAS officials stated they expect this expenditure to continue through fiscal year 2004 and 

possibly through fiscal year 2006.

Program Staffing Increased Office of Aviation and DynCorp staff in Colombia directly associated with 

the aerial eradication program increased from 179 at the end of fiscal year 

2001 to 298 at the end of fiscal year 2003. The former NAS Director told us 

that he supported increasing the number of Office of Aviation staff in 

Colombia because doing so allowed more direct oversight of the program 

as operations significantly expanded. The Office of Aviation Director also 

stated that increasing the staff in Colombia allowed the office to better 

ensure the safety and security of program operations and enhanced its 

ability to oversee contractor operations. Table 2 illustrates the number of 

staff assigned to the Office of Aviation by location.

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

Department of 

State office 2001 2002 2003

2004

(estimated) 

2005

(proposed) Total

Office of 

Aviation $38.0 $38.2 $41.8 $48.0 $50.4 $216.4

NASa 11.1 17.6 58.6 67.4 70.7 225.4

Total $49.1 $55.8 $100.4 $115.4 $121.1 $441.8
Page 16 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Table 2: Office of Aviation Staffing by Location, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Source: Office of Aviation.

a

Includes staff at Patrick Air Force Base and two or three staff in Washington, D.C., who provide 

administrative support. These staff support aerial eradication and other programs in Colombia, as well 

as other Office of Aviation programs in Bolivia, Peru, and Pakistan.

During fiscal years 2001-03, the number of DynCorp personnel supporting 

the Office of Aviation at Patrick Air Force Base increased from 159 to about 

190. DynCorp officials were unable to provide exact numbers of staff who 

were part of the eradication program versus those who supported other 

Office of Aviation programs because many personnel are involved in more 

than one program. 

As illustrated in table 3, the number of DynCorp staff in Colombia directly 

supporting the aerial eradication program increased from 176 in 2001 to 281 

staff in 2003 and has further increased to 287 staff as of May 31, 2004. These 

numbers include pilots and mechanics who rotate in and out of Colombia. 

These personnel work 15 days in Colombia and then are relieved for 

13 days by another group of pilots18 and mechanics who work 15 days. This 

rotation overlap allows time for departing pilots and mechanics to brief the 

newly arrived personnel. 

Staffing by fiscal year (as of September 30)

Location 2001 2002 2003

Staffing as of 

May 31, 2004

Patrick Air Force 

Basea 15 21 14 18

Colombia 3 5 10 11

Total 18 26 24 29

18Fixed-wing aircraft pilots are provided by a subcontractor to DynCorp.
Page 17 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Table 3: DynCorp Personnel in Colombia Who Support the Aerial Eradication 

Program, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Source: DynCorp.

Number of Aircraft 

Increased

From the end of fiscal year 2001 through May 2004, the number of spray 

aircraft and helicopters supporting aerial eradication in Colombia 

increased from 22 to 35, with 12 additional spray aircraft and 1 additional 

helicopter assigned. The Office of Aviation uses three types of aircraft to 

spray coca and poppy fields in Colombia—the OV-10, the T-65, and the AT802. The OV-10 is a Vietnam-era observation plane that was retrofitted to 

carry herbicide and fly eradication missions.19 The T-65 and AT-802 are 

newer aircraft designed for crop dusting and are widely used in the United 

States. Although the Office of Aviation has 24 spray aircraft for use in 

Colombia—11 OV-10s, 5 T-65s, and 8 AT-802s, some are usually at Patrick 

Air Force Base for scheduled maintenance or training and at Kirtland Air 

Force Base, New Mexico, for mountain-flying training. The exact number 

of aircraft in Colombia varies throughout the year depending on 

maintenance and training requirements.

The Office of Aviation also uses helicopters to support eradication 

missions. On any given mission, spray aircraft are accompanied by at least 

5 helicopters. Two Office of Aviation helicopter gunships and 2 or 3 

Colombian National Police gunships provide protection from insurgent 

fire, and 1 search and rescue helicopter is available to rescue 

crewmembers in the event of an emergency. Table 4 illustrates the number 

of Office of Aviation aircraft available for the aerial eradication program.

Personnel by fiscal year (as of September 30)

Personnel 

assigned 2001 2002 2003

Personnel as of 

May 31, 2004

Permanent 58 69 116 112

Rotational 118 150 165 175

Total 176 219 281 287

19The OV-10 has two engines while the other spray aircraft have one. Office of Aviation 

officials stated that the two engines give an extra measure of safety. However, the OV-10 is 

old and increasingly expensive to operate and maintain.
Page 18 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Table 4: Total Aircraft Supporting Office of Aviation Aerial Eradication Program, 

Fiscal Years 2001-04

Source: Office of Aviation.

Note: In addition, the Office of Aviation operates three other fixed-wing aircraft. Two are used for 

transportation support throughout the Andean region, and the third is used to locate illicit drug crops.

State/INL’s Planning and 

Budgeting Process Does Not 

Provide for All of the Office 

of Aviation’s Needs

State/INL does not develop a specific budget for the Office of Aviation 

addressing all of its programs and does not plan for the long-term costs of 

the Office of Aviation’s programs, such as providing for replacement 

aircraft. As a result, State/INL sometimes uses funds from other programs 

to pay for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Although Office of 

Aviation and DynCorp managers said that the resources provided in fiscal 

years 2001-04 (through May) were sufficient to carry out the increased 

eradication activities safely, they noted that they did not always know how 

much funding would be available or when, and that this has led to lastminute decisions and informal workarounds to avoid suspending or 

curtailing eradication operations. 

This situation is not new. In 1998, we reported that State and the U.S. 

Embassy/Bogotá were not adequately prepared to manage increases in 

aerial eradication.20 Specifically, when U.S. support for aerial eradication 

increased in 1997, the unanticipated costs associated with the increase led 

to the reallocation of funds from other NAS programs. At the time, 

NAS/Bogotá reported that it reallocated $11 million from other activities, 

including interdiction, demand reduction, and efforts designed to 

strengthen law enforcement institutions in Colombia. 

The situation continues. DynCorp officials told us that it nearly suspended 

the eradication program because of a shortage of funds in 2002. But 

Aircraft by fiscal year (as of September 30)

Aircraft type 2001 2002 2003

Aircraft as of 

May 31, 2004

Spray planes 12 17 20 24

Helicopters 10 11 12 11

Total 22 28 32 35

20U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia 

Face Continuing Challenges, GAO/NSIAD-98-60 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 1998).
Page 19 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

because of delays in training Colombian Army helicopter mechanics and 

pilots, DynCorp used funds allocated for that program to continue the 

aerial eradication program. Further, DynCorp officials told us they also 

have had to delay ordering needed parts because of the lack of funds. Some 

of these parts—especially those for the older aircraft, such as the OV-10 

spray planes and UH-1N helicopters that accompany the spray planes—are 

in short supply and could be difficult to acquire. If the parts are not 

available when needed, the aircraft cannot operate.

Office of Aviation’s funding comes from several State/INL sources, 

including the Andean Counterdrug Initiative account, the International 

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, and supplemental 

appropriations. However, although some of the Andean Counterdrug 

Initiative funds are designated for the Office of Aviation, the funds are 

divided among multiple country budgets and managed by each country’s 

NAS. As a result, the Office of Aviation has to request those funds from the 

respective NAS Director, which may adversely affect those programs. In 

fiscal year 2003, State/INL reprogrammed more than $5 million from 

programs in Bolivia, Peru, and Pakistan to fund the Office of Aviation 

program in Colombia. In addition, the NAS Director in Colombia told us 

that sometimes other funding priorities—such as the narcotics interdiction 

program—conflicted with Office of Aviation program needs and delayed 

funding for the aerial eradication program. 

Furthermore, State/INL often does not receive funds for its programs, 

including the aerial eradication program, until months after the start of the 

fiscal year. For instance, fiscal year 2004 funds were not available until midJune 2004 because of the time needed to address congressional inquiries 

about how State/INL proposed to use the funding. State/INL officials said 

they have used prior year funds or moved funds from one project to 

another to satisfy the most critical needs until all funds are available. These 

officials stated that the safety of their operations has not been 

compromised but added that the uncertainty over funding availability has 

caused an administrative burden. 

In June 2004, our report on federal aircraft fleet management also noted 

weaknesses in State/INL’s planning process.21 We reported that State/INL 

21U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Aircraft: Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses 

in Fleet Management Planning Hamper Cost Effective Operations, GAO-04-645

(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004).
Page 20 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

had not developed a long-term fleet acquisition plan or performed a costbenefit analysis that considered long-range aircraft replacement, mission 

support, and other related costs. In addition, INL had not performed a lifecycle cost analysis of its aircraft, estimated future long-term mission 

requirements, or identified the aircraft best-suited to meet those 

requirements. As a result, according to State/INL officials, State has 

delayed requesting funding for additional aircraft. 

Finally, in October 2003, a State/INL internal review team began examining 

the Office of Aviation’s programs.22 The review team has noted that the 

Office of Aviation has operated effectively in five countries with high safety 

and operational success rates. Given its aged aircraft, complex logistics 

requirements, and aggressive flight schedule, the team commended Office 

of Aviation staff for their professionalism and continued success under 

trying circumstances. However, the team also has identified many of the 

same concerns that we have raised—from generally poor strategic planning 

to inadequate management and financial tools. The team has noted that 

State/INL focuses on short-term planning to meet new missions and 

changing requirements, with little input from the Office of Aviation. 

State/INL officials have begun to address the shortcomings. For example, 

State/INL and the Office of Aviation are preparing a strategic plan to 

identify long-term mission costs for all of the Office of Aviation programs. 

As part of this strategy, State/INL and the Office of Aviation have developed 

a critical flight safety plan that includes projected costs to maintain the 

Office of Aviation’s current aircraft and acquire additional aircraft to 

sustain the program. State/INL also intends to enhance the Office of 

Aviation’s contract oversight capability through training and the hiring of 

additional contract administrators and budget specialists. 

Conclusions The aerial eradication program in Colombia is a difficult mission in a 

hostile environment. Since 2001, the demands on the program have 

increased significantly and the Office of Aviation’s resources for the 

program have more than doubled. However, State/INL’s planning and 

budgeting process for the Office of Aviation did not keep pace with the 

growth of the Office of Aviation and the increasing complexity of its 

22This review is the first of a series of planned reviews of State/INL programs. The reviews 

are intended to assess INL’s strengths and weaknesses to better prepare for future 

operations.
Page 21 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

mission. The current process does not fully serve State/INL’s or the Office 

of Aviation’s present-day needs. As a result, the Office of Aviation’s shortand long-term funding requirements have often been addressed through ad 

hoc decisions. In particular, not having a strategic plan that identifies longrange needs, mission support, and other costs has prevented State/INL 

from assessing future requirements and planning and budgeting for them. 

The Office of Aviation will likely continue its operations in Colombia for 

the foreseeable future. Further, it may be called on to extend its operations 

to other parts of the world as illicit drugs continue to provide income to 

insurgents and terrorists who pose a security threat to the United States 

and its allies. However, without a planning and budgeting process that 

systematically addresses the short- and long-term requirements of the 

Office of Aviation’s programs, State/INL cannot ensure that the Office of 

Aviation’s requirements are appropriately prioritized, long-term resource 

needs are addressed, and funding is sufficient. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

To improve State/INL’s process for providing resources to the Office of 

Aviation, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Assistant 

Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

to develop and implement a strategic planning and budgeting process that 

addresses all of the program requirements for the Office of Aviation, 

including the aerial eradication program in Colombia. The strategic plan 

and budget should address the day-to-day operational needs of the Office of 

Aviation’s programs, aircraft fleet refurbishment and eventual replacement, 

and the resources needed to meet these requirements. The plan should also 

be systematically updated as part of State’s annual budget cycle.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II). It 

stated that the report provides a useful summary of the technical, planning, 

and budgeting issues that may affect the Office of Aviation’s programs in 

Colombia. State also expressed concern that the report suggests that 

State/INL does not manage and plan for its aviation program requirements. 

However, it agreed that a more comprehensive long-term planning and 

budgeting process is needed and has taken some initial steps to this end.

We did not say that State/INL does not manage and plan for the Office of 

Aviation’s programs. Rather, we stated that State/INL does not prepare a 

specific budget for the Office of Aviation that accounts for all of its 
Page 22 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

program needs. In fact, State notes that State/INL is beginning to 

institutionalize a more formal planning and budgeting process for the 

Office of Aviation to address this shortcoming. According to State, 

State/INL completed an “initial cut” of an Office of Aviation Strategic Plan 

in April 2004, and also recently prepared a Critical Flight Safety Program to 

extend the life of its aircraft fleet and an Office of Aviation Reorganization 

Plan to hire more staff for strategic planning, budgeting, and financial 

analysis. State adds that it has incorporated the safety program and 

reorganization plan in State/INL’s fiscal year 2006 performance plan and 

budget request. 

These are critical components of a more systematic planning and budgeting 

process. We believe that if State/INL follows through with its approach that 

it will allow the Office of Aviation to prioritize its programs and, when 

funding is limited or not readily available, make systematic decisions about 

how to proceed. 

In addition, State/INL and Office of Aviation officials provided technical 

comments that we have incorporated into this report, as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

interested congressional committees and the Secretary of State. We will 

also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report 

will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 23 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov, or contact Al Huntington, Assistant 

Director, at (202) 512-4140 or HuntingtonA@gao.gov. Other key 

contributors to this report were Ron Hughes, Reid Lowe, and Jim Strus.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 24 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To determine how the threat to the aerial eradication program changed 

since 2001, we reviewed cables, memorandums, and reports prepared by 

the Department of State/Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), the Office of Aviation, and the U.S. 

Embassy/Bogotá, Colombia. We also discussed the threat issue with 

officials responsible for program oversight and implementation from 

State/INL; State’s Narcotics Affairs Sections (NAS), the Office of Aviation, 

and other offices at the U.S. Embassy; and DynCorp Aerospace Technology.

To determine what actions State had taken to address any operational 

safety concerns, we examined cables; memorandums; and related 

documents, including site inspections and accident reports, prepared by 

State/INL, the Office of Aviation, and the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá. We also 

interviewed officials from State/INL, the Office of Aviation, DynCorp, and 

the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá (including the current NAS Director and her 

predecessor) to obtain their views on the actions taken. 

Similarly, to determine the resources provided by State/INL to support the 

aerial eradication program in Colombia during fiscal years 2001-04 

(through May 2004), we reviewed and analyzed various cables, 

memorandums, and other relevant documents related to budget, staffing, 

and aircraft prepared by State/INL in Washington, D.C.; the Office of 

Aviation and DynCorp at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; and the U.S. 

Embassy/Bogotá. We interviewed cognizant U.S. officials in Washington, 

D.C., and Colombia and at Patrick Air Force Base about the adequacy of 

the resources provided to meet aerial eradication missions. We also 

discussed resource availability with the DynCorp project manager at 

Patrick Air Force Base.

We traveled to Colombia in January 2004. In Colombia, we met with NAS 

and other cognizant U.S. Embassy officials and with Office of Aviation and 

DynCorp managers at their offices at El Dorado International Airport, 

Bogotá. We also visited three operational sites—Popayan, San Jose del 

Guaviare, and Tumaco—where spray operations were occurring. We 

interviewed DynCorp site managers, pilots, and mechanics at each 

location. At Tumaco, we also interviewed Colombian Marine Corps officers 

who coordinated eradication activities with U.S., DynCorp, and Colombian 

police officials.

To determine the reliability of the data provided, we interviewed officials at 

State/INL, the Office of Aviation, the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá, and DynCorp to 

determine how they collected and verified the data. To check the reliability 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

of data on the number of ground-fire hits and flying hours, we compared 

information from two different sources at the U.S. Embassy and found it 

similar. Further, to determine the reliability of the funding data used in this 

report, we examined State financial management activity reports and 

compared some of these data with similar information from our prior 

reports addressing Office of Aviation activities. However, we did not audit 

the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them. Finally, to 

satisfy ourselves that the numbers of personnel and aircraft were reliable, 

we examined monthly reports prepared by the Office of Aviation and 

DynCorp. We discussed how the reports were compiled and resolved a few 

discrepancies concerning the numbers of personnel with cognizant 

officials at Patrick Air Force Base and in Bogotá. Based on our examination 

of the documents we received and our discussions with State and DynCorp 

officials, we concluded that these data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. 
Page 26 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 27 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program

Now on pp. 18-20.
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 28 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

(320231) Page 29 GAO-04-918 State’s Aviation Program
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