COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton

AARON GRUSS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2649-04-2 PER CURIAM SEPTEMBER 6, 2005 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF HENRICO COUNTY L. A. Harris, Jr., Judge (David R. Lett, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Judith Williams Jagdmann, Atto rney General; Ali ce T. Armstrong, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
The trial judge convicted Aaron Gruss of the felony of failure to give information at the scene of an accident in violatio n of Code § 46.2-894. Gruss conten ds the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the information he gave satisfied the statutory requirements. We disagree and affirm the conviction.
I. “On appeal, ‘we review the ev idence in the light most fa vorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). Applying this principle, the evidence proved Aaron Gruss was drivi ng a van that struck a car at an intersection. The driver of the car was injured. When Officers Blakey and R onson arrived at the accident, paramedics were assisting the injured driver.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - As Officer Ronson aided the paramedics, Officer Blakey approached Gruss, who appeared to be upset and was pacing. Officer Blakey asked for identification, asked Gruss whether he was hurt, and inquired about the circ umstances of the accident. Gruss described the collision and said he had no identification. O fficer Blakey testified that Gruss’s lack of identification “put up a red flag” but that he did not then ask Gr uss’s name. Instead, he obtained Gruss’s social security number, his telephone nu mber, and the telephone number of the owner of the van. Officer Blakey told Gruss to stay besi de the van until he returned, and he went to another officer who was moving traffic at the intersection. Officer Ronson testified that he asked Gruss about insurance and that Gruss indicated he would make a telephone call at a nearby business to get insurance information. A few minutes later, Officer Ronson asked Officer Blakey about Gruss. The officers looked for Gruss but could not locate him. After driving around the area, and not seeing Gruss, they returned to the accident site and remained there until the vehicles were towed. Gruss never returned. Later that day, Officer Gordon called the numbe r Gruss had given to Officer Blakey, and he left a telephone message for Gruss “to call . . . ASAP in regards to the crash.” Gruss did not return the call. Officer Gordon processed the social security nu mber through the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles and retrieved a name and address. He went to that address but did not locate Gruss. Later, he processed a “n ame check” and got another address for Gruss. Officer Gordon left a business card at that a ddress and a message, advising Gruss to call him “immediately” about the accident. When Gruss fa iled to contact Officer Gordon, Officer Gordon obtained an arrest warrant and re turned to the address a few days later. He found Gruss sitting on the front steps, and he arrested Gruss.- 3 - After the arrest, Gruss said he had returned to the accident scene and sat in a friend’s car near the intersection. He told Officer Gordon he should have returned to speak to the officers but “was very scared.” He also said he intende d to return Officer Go rdon’s call that evening. The trial judge found that Gruss failed to give the officers his name and address at the scene of the accident. He also found that Gruss left the accident site, despite being told to remain, before the officers completed their inve stigation. He convicted Gruss of leaving the accident scene without giving the st atutorily required information.
II. Code § 46.2-894 provides, in part, as follows: The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident in which a person is killed or injured . . . shall immediately stop as close to the scene of the accident as possibl e without obstructing traffic, as provided in [Code] § 46.2-888, a nd report his name, address, driver’s license number, and vehi cle registration number forthwith to the State Police or local law-enforcement agency, to the person struck and injured if such pe rson appears to be capable of understanding and retaining the info rmation, or to the driver or some other occupant of the ve hicle collided with or to the custodian of other damaged property. In other words, when a person is injured, “C ode § 46.2-894 requires the involved driver [to stop and then] (1) to report the require d information to a law enforcement agency, or (2) to report that information to the person struck, or (3) to report that information to the driver or some other occupant.” Eubanks v. Commonwealth , 18 Va. App. 537, 541, 445 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1994). The evidence proved that although Gruss stopped at the scene of the accident, he failed to give the officers all of the information required by statute, including hi s name. He left the accident scene after the officer told him to rema in there and before the officers completed their investigation. Moreover, he later failed to return telephone calls from the investigating officer. The trial judge, acting as fact finder, believed th is evidence and rejected Gruss’s statements to Officer Gordon as an excuse for failing to give th e information. “The cred ibility of the witnesses- 4 - and the weight accorded the evidence are matte rs solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth , 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). From this evidence, the trial judge specifi cally found that Gruss failed to provide the officers with the required info rmation enumerated in Code § 46.2-894 and thereby violated the statute. We hold that the record supports the findings and that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the charged offense. For these reasons, we affirm the conviction. Affirmed.