Office of Inspector General 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

REVIEW OF ALLEGED ACTIONS BY 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

TO DISCIPLINE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS FOR 

TALKING TO THE PRESS, CONGRESS, 

OR THE PUBLIC 

OIG-05-01 November 2004 

Office of Audits 

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Offi ce of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the program or operation under review. It 

is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein, if any, have been developed to the best knowledge available to the 

OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

Contents

Introduction ...̀ 3

Results in Brief 4

Background ...̀ 4

FAMS and TSA Investigations of Air Marshals ..............................................................................6

Retaliation or Threats of Retaliation................................................................................................8

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology............................................................................9

Appendix B: Major Contributors to This Report..........................................................................10

Appendix C: Report Distribution..................................................................................................11

Abbreviations 

ASAC Assistant Special Agent In Charge 

USA PATRIOT Act Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Public Law 107-56) 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOT Department of Transportation 

FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SAC Special Agent In Charge 

SSI Sensitive Security Information 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 Page 1
Contents

Page 2 TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 
OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Introduction 

The Office of Inspector General (OIG), at the request of Congressman Jim Turner, 

ranking member of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, reviewed 

allegations that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was conducting 

a “witch hunt” to ferret out and discipline employees in the federal air marshal 

program who talked to the media about a TSA decision to remove air marshals 

from certain long distance flights to save overnight lodging costs. The allegations 

included a charge that some air marshals had been threatened with having the 

USA PATRIOT Act1

 used against them. 

The objectives of the audit were to determine whether employees in the federal air 

marshal program, as a result of disclosing sensitive information to the press, the 

Congress, or the public: 

• Have been investigated, and if so, under what authority; 

• Have suffered retaliation or were threatened with retaliation; or 

• Have had actions taken or threatened against them under authority of the 

USA PATRIOT Act. 

We performed audit fieldwork from November 2003 to March 2004. We 

interviewed TSA and Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) officials at 

headquarters, System Operation Control Division, and Human Resource 

Management Branch. We visited 8 of 21 FAMS field offices and interviewed 

Special Agents in Charge (SAC), Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASAC), and 

157 air marshals at these locations. 

1

 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act; Public Law 107-56 

TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 Page 3 
Results in Brief 

The FAMS and TSA conducted nine investigations of air marshals for allegedly 

talking to the press or public. These investigations, and actions taken by 

FAMS and TSA against air marshals as a result of these investigations, were 

appropriate under the circumstances. We found no evidence that air marshals 

were investigated or retaliated against for talking to Congress, or were threatened 

with or had action taken against them under authority of the USA PATRIOT 

Act. However, air marshals from two locations said that they were threatened 

with arrest and prosecution if they were found to have released sensitive security 

information (SSI), even though release of SSI is not a prosecutable offense. TSA, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and FAMS provided technical 

comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

Background 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act empowered TSA to deploy air 

marshals on all passenger airline flights. It required that TSA deploy air marshals 

on all high-risk flights and give priority to long distance non-stop flights, such as 

those used on September 11, 2001, when determining risk. 

On July 30, 2003, two articles discussing FAMS issues appeared on the MSNBC 

website, an online news service. The first article alleged that TSA planned to 

remove air marshals from some long distance flights because of budget shortfalls, 

leaving many high-risk flights unprotected. A second article later that day 

reported that TSA reversed the decision to remove the air marshals. 

The FAMS’ plan to limit air marshal missions on cross-country and international 

flights was the result of reprogramming actions by TSA. According to a 

Government Accountability Office report, reprogramming actions reduced FY 

2003 FAMS program funding from $545 million to approximately $450 million, 

a difference of $95 million.2 While the GAO report concluded that the impact 

of the budget reduction on FAMS operations was not as significant as FAMS 

officials estimated, FAMS officials thought the reduction in cross country and 

international flights was necessary to meet budgetary requirements. The FAMS 

Director began to reduce scheduled air marshal coverage on cross-country and 

international flights at the end of July 2003, to be effective August 3, 2003. On 

2

 Government Accountability Office report number GAO-04-577R, Air Marshal Reprogramming 

Page 4 TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 
July 30, 2003, the scheduled reduction was reported on the MSNBC website. On 

July 31, 2003, TSA allocated an additional $9 million to the FAMS and the full 

schedule of cross-country and international flights was resumed. 

There was a temporary decline in the number of flights that air marshals flew 

beginning on August 1, 2003. Flights decreased by as much as 17% before 

returning to normal on August 6, 2003. Although the air marshal schedule was 

reinstated prior to August 2, previously scheduled flights could not be restored 

due to the complexity of the scheduling process. 

The FAMS Director sent memoranda to all FAMS employees on July 30 and 

August 1, 2003, concerning disclosure of sensitive information. In his first 

memorandum, the FAMS Director said that each air marshal had a critical role 

to play to ensure operational integrity and that public discussion of strategic 

deployment of air marshals was not in the best interest of operational security. In 

his second memorandum, the Director said that some air marshals had chosen to 

disclose and disseminate sensitive information, which was a violation of FAMS 

policy. He also said that this conduct could jeopardize the FAMS mission, FAMS 

personnel, and the security of our country. According to the memorandum, the 

policy would be strictly enforced. 

SACs were instructed to make sure that all air marshals received, read, and 

understood the second memorandum relating to FAMS policies on the release 

of SSI and classified information. At all field offices that we visited, the SAC, 

ASAC, or a front line supervisor had addressed air marshals about operational 

security. Some field offices required the air marshals sign a document attesting to 

the fact that they had read and understood the memorandum’s contents. 

On August 21, 2003, a third MSNBC article reported that TSA was conducting a 

“witch hunt” to ferret out and discipline employees in the FAMS who had talked 

to the media. This article further alleged that air marshals were told that TSA 

planned to use the USA PATRIOT Act authority to determine who talked to the 

media. 

Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act following the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks. The law gave federal officials greater authority to track and 

intercept communications for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering 

purposes. It provided enhanced surveillance procedures in order to counter 

terrorism. 

TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 Page 5 
In November 2003, FAMS was transferred from TSA to ICE. Department 

officials said that the move increased DHS’ ability to respond to air security 

threats by creating a larger number of trained federal agents who can respond 

during times of crisis. 

FAMS and TSA Investigations of Air Marshals 

FAMS conducted seven investigations and TSA conducted two investigations of 

air marshals for allegedly disclosing sensitive information to the press or public. 

There were no investigations of air marshals for allegedly disclosing information 

to the Congress. FAMS policy prohibits the disclosure of information concerning 

the FAMS, TSA, or Department of Transportation (DOT) to the press without the 

permission of the FAMS Director.3 This policy also restricts the disclosure of SSI, 

which includes information concerning the number of air marshals, air marshal 

deployments or missions, and the methods involved in FAMS operations. The 

nine investigations are discussed below. 

FAMS Investigations 

Two air marshal investigations concerned the release of information to a third 

party, and were resolved with counseling. Two other investigations concerned 

air marshals disclosing their identities while on missions. One of these cases 

was resolved by counseling, and the other resulted in a suspension because it 

was a second offense. The other three investigations resulted in air marshals 

being terminated, resigning, or being placed on administrative leave. They are 

discussed below. 

• An air marshal was terminated for divulging SSI in a newspaper 

article. The air marshal disclosed specific information about operations, 

including flight seat location, work schedule, workforce size, and a 

description of training equipment. The article also included the air 

marshal’s picture. 

• An air marshal was investigated for providing an article for a 

professional association newsletter without obtaining prior authorization. 

The association is comprised of law enforcement personnel, firefighters, 

3 According to FAM Administrative Directive Manual 3700, Employee Responsibility and Conduct, “Only the Director FAMS, or his 

designee, may authorize any public statements concerning the FAMS, TSA, or DOT. Unless designated by the Director FAMS, employees 

shall not address public gatherings, appear on radio or television, prepare any articles for publication, act as correspondents to a newspaper 

or periodical, release or divulge investigative information or any other matters pertaining to the FAMS, TSA, or DOT.” 

Page 6 TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 
military personnel, and other related professionals. The air marshal 

resigned before the investigation was completed. 

• An air marshal was investigated for participating in an unofficial internet 

website. The air marshal allegedly made disparaging statements about 

the SAC. The air marshal was placed on administrative leave and was 

ultimately returned to normal duties. 

TSA Investigations 

Two TSA Office of Internal Affairs investigations involved air marshals allegedly 

disclosing SSI. The first case involved a FAMS employee, not an air marshal, 

who was believed to have disclosed SSI to a reporter for MSNBC. This employee 

resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and the case was closed. 

The second investigation involved a person, believed to be an air marshal, 

who may have disclosed SSI on an unofficial internet website. Participation in 

any such unofficial internet websites is against FAMS policy. TSA focused its 

investigation, however, only on air marshals who posted SSI on the website. 

There were two incidents where someone, using an internet alias, had disclosed 

SSI on an internet website. TSA was unable to determine the person’s identity 

and the case was closed. 

According to FAMS policy, employees are prohibited from releasing sensitive 

or classified information unless authorized by the FAMS Classified Documents 

Custodian. Violators of this policy are subject to disciplinary action. Air 

marshals are required to sign a statement annually that requires them not to 

disclose SSI. 

Federal regulations4 prohibit disclosure of sensitive information obtained or 

developed in carrying out security activities. According to the regulations, SSI 

includes security directives and information circulars, information that may reveal 

a systemic vulnerability of the aviation system, and specific details of aviation 

security measures. This included the numbers of air marshals, their deployments 

or missions, and the methods involved in FAMS operations. 

The actions taken by FAMS and TSA in the nine cases discussed above were 

consistent with current guidelines and regulations. Section 17.a. of TSA’s 

4 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulation, Part 1520 

TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 Page 7 
directive on Employee Responsibilities and Conduct instructs employees not 

to “...criticize or ridicule FAMS, TSA, or DOT policy or other employees by 

speech, writing or other expressions that is defamatory, obscene, unlawful, 

impairs the operation or efficiency of the FAMS, TSA, or DOT, or is made with 

reckless disregard for the truth.” Section 5.b.5. of the directive warns that “... 

violation of this directive...may be cause for appropriate corrective or disciplinary 

action in addition to any action or penalty prescribed by law.” 

Retaliation or Threats of Retaliation 

We interviewed 157 air marshals, 120 of whom did not believe that FAMS 

management had threatened them, and seven of whom refused to comment on this 

issue. The remaining 30 air marshals believed they had been threatened about 

disclosing information to the press or public. Many of those 30 air marshals 

provided no details on alleged threats, other than saying that FAMS management 

said they would take action against anyone found to be disclosing information 

improperly. FAMS policy prohibits the disclosure of SSI and is punishable 

by disciplinary actions. Disclosure of SSI is also a violation of 49 CFR and is 

punishable by civil penalty and other enforcement or corrective actions. 

Five air marshals, from two field offices, said they were threatened with 

prosecution for disclosing information to the press or public. They said their 

supervisors’ threats included being led away in handcuffs, being fired and 

prosecuted, or being subjected to polygraph exams if the leaks continued. 

Neither FAMS policy nor current regulations mention criminal penalties for 

leaking SSI. However, according to the FAMS policy, employees who release 

classified information or records in any form without authority from the Classified 

Documents Custodian are in violation of United States Code and are subject to 

arrest and prosecution.5 While the alleged threats made to the air marshals may 

have been excessive, based on current guidelines, it should be noted that some 

information considered SSI prior to September 11, 2001, is now being classified 

as secret. 

We found no evidence that TSA or FAMS had taken or threatened to take any 

action against any air marshal under authority of the USA PATRIOT Act. 

5 We question the legal accuracy of this policy statement, which seems to criminalize all releases of classified information. However, 

analyzing the FAMS Directives System is outside the scope of this audit. 

Page 8 TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

At the request of Congressman Jim Turner, ranking member of the House 

of Representatives, Select Committee on Homeland Security, we reviewed 

allegations that TSA was conducting a “witch hunt” to ferret out and discipline 

employees in the federal air marshal program who have talked to the media. The 

allegations include a charge that some air marshals have been threatened with 

having the USA PATRIOT Act used against them. The objectives of the audit 

were to determine whether FAMS employees, as a result of disclosing sensitive 

information to the press, the Congress, or the public: 

• Have been investigated, and if so, under what authority; 

• Have suffered retaliation or were threatened with retaliation; or 

• Have had actions taken or threatened against them under authority of the 

USA PATRIOT Act. 

We interviewed TSA and FAMS officials at headquarters, the System Operation 

Control Division in Virginia, and the Human Resource Management Branch in 

New Jersey. We also visited 8 of 21 FAMS field offices where we interviewed 

SACs, ASACs, and 157 air marshals. 

We reviewed FAMS conduct incident reports from March 2002 through 

December 2003, internal investigation reports, TSA records of congressional 

correspondence, budget requests, budget planning documents, and actual 

expenditures for FY 2003. 

The audit fieldwork was performed between November 2003 and March 2004. 

We conducted this review pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to generally accepted government auditing standards. 

TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 Page 9 
Appendix B 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Roberta N. Rickey, Field Audit Director 

Bradley Mosher, Audit Manager 

Larry Fugate, Auditor-in-Charge 

Gary Wilk, Auditor 

Page 10 TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 
Appendix C 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

The Secretary

Deputy Secretary

Chief of Staff

General Counsel

Under Secretary, Border and Transportation Security

DHS OIG Liaison

DHS Public Affairs

Transportation Security Administration 

Assistant Secretary

Audit Liaison

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Assistant Secretary

Audit Liaison

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress 

House Select Committee on Homeland Security 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

TSA - Federal Air Marshals – OIG-05-01 Page 11 
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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.