alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
‘
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#### The Village of Sheldon, in the County of Iroquois and State of Illinois, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph Max Zeitchick, Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 68-51.

Third District.

April 1, 1969.

Milo J. Fleming, of Watseka, for appellant.

Lapping, Niederman & Factor, of Chicago, for appellee.

STOUDER, P. J.

This is an appeal by the Village of Sheldon, Plaintiff, from an order of the Circuit Court of Iroquois County dismissing charges brought against Joseph Zeitchick, Defendant, for violation of a Village ordinance. The ordinance alleged to have been violated is an ordinance declaring that going in or on private residences for the purpose of peddling, soliciting, etc. goods without the prior request of the resident is a nuisance. It is undisputed from defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges that the defendant was soliciting orders for the sale of encyclopedias and did go on the property of private residences for that purpose.

In seeking to reverse the judgment of the trial court, the Village argues that the ordinance was a valid and constitutional exercise of the police powers of the Vil*48lage. However, we have recently had occasion to consider this question in Field Enterprises Educational Corp. v. Village of Wheeling (Appellate Court, First District) 109 Ill App2d 77, and in that case it was our opinion that a similar ordinance having the same legal effect was invalid as applied to the solicitation of orders for books, etc. because the legislature had not granted such power to municipalities. On the authority of Field Enterprises Educational Corp. v. Village of Wheeling, supra, and the cases cited therein, we hold that the ordinance in question is invalid as applied to the activities of defendant.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court of Iroquois County is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

ALLOY and SCHEINEMAN, JJ., concur.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD P. GREEN,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

J. E. THOMAS, Warden,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 12-35013

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01009-JE

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 9, 2012** 

Before: RAWLINSON, MURGUIA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Ronald P. Green appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

FILED

OCT 16 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 12-35013

Green contends that he is actually innocent of being a career offender under

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and therefore he should be allowed to proceed with his section

2241 petition under the “escape hatch” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). This contention is

foreclosed. See Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he

purely legal argument that a petitioner was wrongly classified as a career offender

under the Sentencing Guidelines is not cognizable as a claim of actual innocence

under the escape hatch.”). The district court correctly dismissed his petition. See

id.

We construe Green’s additional arguments as a motion to expand the

certificate of appealability. So construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 22-

1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 31.1



Certification of the Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



I, Michael Levy, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of SportsLine.com, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; and



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.



|                       |  |  |  |                                      
|---------------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------
|                       |  | 
|Date: November 8, 2004 |  |  |  | /S/    MICHAEL
LEVY                  
|                       |  |  |  | Michael Levy                         
|                       |  |  |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
|                       |  |  |  | (Principal Executive Officer)
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 11


Statement Regarding Computation of Earnings Per Share

(in 000's, except per share amounts)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                           Three Months Ended          Nine Months Ended

                                         Sept. 29,    Sept. 30,      Sept. 29,     Sept. 30,
                                           2001         2000           2001          2000

<S>                                      <C>          <C>            <C>           <C>
SHARES FOR EPS CALCULATIONS

Weighted average shares outstanding       47,957       47,248        47,767        47,250
   (shares for basic EPS)

Effect of dilutive securities:

  Convertible preferred stock              1,255         --            --            --

  Stock options                            1,730         --            --              86

Shares for diluted EPS                    50,942       47,248        47,767        47,336


BASIC EARNINGS PER SHARE

Net income (loss)                       $  2,516     $ (3,973)     $(23,077)     $    150

Less:  Dividend on preferred stock           250         --             250          --

Income (loss) available
  to common shareholders                $  2,266     $ (3,973)     $(23,327)     $    150

Weighted average shares outstanding       47,957       47,248        47,767        47,250

Basic earnings per share                $   0.05     $  (0.08)     $  (0.49)     $   0.00



DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE

Net income (loss)                       $  2,516     $ (3,973)     $(23,077)     $    150

Shares for diluted EPS                    50,942       47,248        47,767        47,336

Diluted earnings per share              $   0.05     $  (0.08)     $  (0.48)     $   0.00
</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on
Form S-8 (No. 333-40121) pertaining to the Amended and Restated 1996 Stock
Option Plan and related Prospectus of WFS Financial Inc of our reports dated
March 8, 2005 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of WFS
Financial Inc, WFS Financial Inc management's assessment of the effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting of WFS Financial Inc, in this Annual Report
(Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2004.




                                                /s/ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Los Angeles, California
March 8, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

CARL DEAN EDWARDS, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 69746 

FILED 

MAR 17 2016 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This is a pro se petition for extraordinary relief. Petitioner 

challenges the validity of his judgment of conviction and sentence. We 

have reviewed the documents submitted in this matter, and without 

deciding upon the merits of any claims raised therein, we decline to 

exercise original jurisdiction in this matter. A challenge to the validity of 

the judgment of conviction must be raised in a postconviction petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus filed in the district court in the first instance.' NRS 

34.724(2)(b); NRS 34.738(1). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

J. 

Hardesty 

, J. 

Saitta 

'We express no opinion as to whether petitioner could meet the 

procedural requirements of NRS chapter 34. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A '40° _Nal() 
cc: Carl Dean Edwards 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A
Exhibit 32.0



CERTIFICATION AS REQUIRED BY RULE 13a-14(b) AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS

ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of 1stIndependence Financial Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), we, Arthur L. Freeman, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, N. William White, President, and R. Michael Wilbourn, Executive Vice President and CFO, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350,
as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                     |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |                                                     
|------------------------------------ |  |  |  | -------------------- |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|                                     |  |  |  |                     
|/s/ Arthur L. Freeman                |  |  |  | /s/ N. William White |  |  |  | /s/ R. Michael Wilbourn                             
|Arthur L Freeman                     |  |  |  | N. William White     |  |  |  | R. Michael Wilbourn                                 
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |  |  |  | President            |  |  |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                                     |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  | (Chief Financial and Accounting Officer)            



December 29, 2004
#### Sugarloaf Township School District v. Conyngham Borough

(No. 1)

Before Valentine, P. J., Aponick and Pinola, JJ.

*Leroy Long,*for petitioner.

*John E. Cotsack,*for defendant.

September 18, 1950.

Pinola, J.,

— On July 7, 1950, Conyngham Borough filed to the above term and number a certified copy of an ordinance adopted by the borough council annexing certain lands in Sugarloaf Township.

On August 4, 1950, the School District of Sugarloaf Township filed an appeal from the ordinance.

Thereafter, to wit, on August 18, 1950, counsel for Conyngham Borough filed a motion to quash the appeal on the ground that the School District of Sugar-loaf Township “is not a person aggrieved . . . and therefore, not a proper party”.

Then, on August 24, 1950, the school district filed a petition in which it asserts that John E. Cotsack was not the borough solicitor and was not authorized to act for Conyngham Borough and therefore, asked that the *45motion to quash the appeal presented by him, be dismissed. The rule granted on that petition is now before us.

At argument Mr. Cotsack presented a certified copy of the resolution adopted by the borough council on July 5, 1950, under the terms of which he is “authorized, directed and empowered to act as counsel, solicitor or attorney for the Borough of Conyngham in connection with the annexation of territory owned by William C. Butler, Jr., and wife”.

This resolution is sufficient authority for Mr. Cot-sack to represent the borough and that authority is in no way limited or impaired by the fact that the resolution expressly provides that he is not to be paid by the borough but must look for his compensation to the Butlers.

There is no merit in the contention of the school district that the borough council can act only by and through its solicitor.

Under section 36 of the Borough Code of July 10, 1947, P. L. 1621, 53 PS §13183:

> “The law matters of the borough shall be under the superintendence, discretion, and control of the borough solicitor, and no department or officer of the borough, except as herein otherwise provided, shall employ an additional counsel without the assent or ratification of the council.”

Certainly, if the council may authorize the employment of additional counsel for any department or officer of the borough, it may employ such additional counsel to represent it.

In any event, the school district has no standing to challenge the authority of the council in this matter.

Accordingly, we enter the following

*Order*

Now, September 18, 1950, the rule heretofore *46granted to show cause why the motion to quash the appeal should not be dismissed, is discharged.
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.



# United States Court of Appeals

**for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

IN RE FINJAN, INC.

______________________

2011

- 1542

(Reexamination No. 90/008,684)

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark

Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

P AUL J. A NDRE , Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel

LLP, of Menlo Park, California, argued for appellant.

With him on the bri ef were L ISA K OBIALKA and J AMES R.

H ANNAH

.

N ATHAN K. K ELLEY , Associate Solicitor, United States

Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia,

argued for Director of the United States Patent and

Trademark Office. On the brief were R AYMOND T. C HEN

, Solicitor, and C OKE M ORGAN S TEWART and R OBERT J.

M CMANUS , Associate Solicitors.

______________________T HIS CAUSE HAVING BEEN HEARD AN D CONSIDERED

, IT IS

O RDERED AND A DJUDGED :

P ER C URIAM (M OORE

, B RYSON

, AND O’M ALLEY

, Circuit

Judges ).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

January 11, 2013 /s/ Jan Horbaly

Date Jan Horbaly

Clerk
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Balance
Sheet, Statement of operations, Statement of Cash Flows and Notes thereto
incorporated in Part I, Item 1 of this Form 10-QSB and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         368,596
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  702,956
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (5,547)
<INVENTORY>                                    134,241
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,378,389
<PP&E>                                       1,212,180
<DEPRECIATION>                               (645,403)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,578,625
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,087,262
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           21,914
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       150,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,079,449
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,578,625
<SALES>                                        209,328
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               209,328
<CGS>                                          217,818
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  217,818
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,614,993
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              20,527
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,636,809)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,625
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,638,434)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,638,434)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.15)
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6967

JAMES D. WILKES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DR. INERIO ALARCON; UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, 

District Judge. (1:11-cv-00131-IMK-JSK)

Submitted: November 21, 2013 Decided: December 9, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James D. Wilkes, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

James D. Wilkes appeals the district court’s order 

adopting as modified the recommendation of the magistrate judge 

and dismissing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (2012) his complaint 

filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). We have reviewed the 

record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for 

the reasons stated by the district court. See Wilkes v. 

Alarcon, No. 1:11-cv-00131-IMK-JSK (N.D. W. Va. May 21, 2013). 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
INCLUDED IN SUCH REPORT.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>          9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>      DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>           SEP-30-1996

<CASH>                         26,495,128 
<SECURITIES>                         0    
<RECEIVABLES>                   9,110,387 
<ALLOWANCES>                      246,324 
<INVENTORY>                   202,285,303 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     0    
<PP&E>                         79,699,815 
<DEPRECIATION>                       0    
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                337,306,081 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                0    
<BONDS>                              0    
<COMMON>                             0    
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                0    
<PREFERRED>                          0    
<OTHER-SE>                    240,376,631 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  337,306,081 
<SALES>                       232,001,652 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              232,001,652 
<CGS>                         196,544,044 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 196,544,044 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               16,721,377 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                     0    
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   0    
<INCOME-PRETAX>                18,736,231 
<INCOME-TAX>                         0    
<INCOME-CONTINUING>            18,736,231 
<DISCONTINUED>                       0    
<EXTRAORDINARY>                      0    
<CHANGES>                            0    
<NET-INCOME>                   18,736,231 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                       44.74 
<EPS-DILUTED>                       44.74 


        

</TABLE>
###### Editorial Note on Part 355

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 355 appear at 69 FR 13717, Mar. 24, 2004.

#### § 355.55 Principal display panel of all fluoride rinse drug products.

In addition to the statement of identity required in § 355.50, the following statement shall be prominently placed on the principal display panel: “IMPORTANT: Read directions for proper use.”
§ 520.154b Bacitracin methylenedisalicylate and streptomycin sulfate powder. ( a ) *Specifications.* Each gram of powder contains 200 units bacitracin methylenedisalicylate and streptomycin sulfate equivalent to 20 milligrams of streptomycin.
( b ) *Sponsor.* See No. 054771 in § 510.600(c) of this chapter.
( c ) *Conditions of use in dogs* — ( 1 ) *Amount.* Administer 1 level teaspoonful per 10 pounds of body weight three times daily, mixed in a small quantity of liquid or feed.
( 2 ) *Indications for use.* For the treatment of bacterial enteritis caused by pathogens susceptible to bacitracin and streptomycin such as *Escherichia coli, Proteus* spp., *Staphylococcus* spp., and *Streptococcus* spp., and for the symptomatic treatment of associated diarrhea.
( 3 ) *Limitations.* Federal law restricts this drug to use by or on the order of a licensed veterinarian.
[71 FR 17702, Apr. 7, 2006, as amended at 79 FR 28818, May 20, 2014; 81 FR 17607, Mar. 30, 2016]