NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0549n.06

No. 14-5664

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

V.

JERMETRIUS L. TURNER,

 Defendant - Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

OPINION

Before: MOORE and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; VAN TATENHOVE, District 

Judge.

GREGORY F. VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge. Defendant Jermetrius Turner has 

had a difficult time coming to terms with his guilty plea. Since pleading guilty he has sought, on 

three separate occasions, to withdraw it. He now appeals the district court’s order denying that 

request. For the reasons stated herein, the district court is AFFIRMED.

I

On January 17, 2012, two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, Turner moved pro 

se for new counsel. At a hearing on the motion, Turner explained that “nobody’s going to fight 

harder than me for myself.” Finding that Turner had “not shown good cause that a conflict of 

interest, a complete breakdown in communication, or an irreconcilable conflict sufficient to 

 



The Honorable Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, 

sitting by designation.
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

2

warrant substitution of counsel exist[ed],” the Magistrate denied his request. On January 20, 

Turner signed a plea agreement with the United States and, only a few days later, entered a 

binding plea agreement with the district court. Pursuant to that agreement, Turner pled guilty to 

Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2, and also to knowingly possessing a 

firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2. In exchange 

for admitting guilt, the United States agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts pending against 

him. The parties presented the court with an agreed sentence of 240 months imprisonment, 

followed by five years of supervised release. As is the case with a binding plea, Turner retained 

the right to withdraw his plea if the court declined to impose that sentence. The plea agreement 

also contained a waiver of Turner’s appeal rights.1

After the Assistant United States Attorney summarized the crimes to which Turner pled, 

the district court entered into the following colloquy:

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Davidson. Mr. Turner, did you hear the 

Assistant United States Attorney as she related what the Government says 

that you did in your case?

MR. TURNER: Uh-huh. I mean, yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you agree that that’s what you did?

MR. TURNER: No.

THE COURT: Okay. What do you disagree with?

MR. TURNER: Some facts in there. But don’t matter so continue, please.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree that you attempted to rob the 

individuals named in the indictment?

 

1 As stated in his plea agreement and explained to him at his hearing, Turner gave up his rights to 

appeal by way of pleading guilty. The Government explains in its briefing that it would ordinarily move to 

dismiss the appeal, but because Turner’s allegations implicate the validity of the plea itself, it has elected to 

address his claims on the merits. 
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

3

MR. TURNER: Knowingly or did I?

THE COURT: Did you?

MR. TURNER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. And do you agree that you had a weapon during the 

course of that crime?

MR. TURNER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Very well, then. In regard to Count Three of the 

indictment, charging a violation of 18 United States Code Sections 1951 

and 2, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?

MR. TURNER: Guilty.

THE COURT: And in regard to Count Four of the indictment, that is, 

using a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 United States 

Code Sections 924(c)(1)(A) and 2, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?

MR. TURNER: Guilty.

THE COURT: Do you understand what you’re pleading guilty to, Mr. 

Turner?

MR. TURNER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are, in fact, guilty?

MR. TURNER: Yes, sir.

After satisfying itself that Turner’s plea was both knowing and voluntary, the court accepted his 

plea of guilty and took his plea agreement under advisement, pending the completion of the 

presentence investigation report. 

Nearly five months later, on May 16, 2012, Turner again moved pro se for new counsel, 

alleging that his attorney had been ineffective in representing his interests. Defense counsel 

subsequently moved to withdraw, agreeing that there had been an irreparable breakdown in 

communication. A few days later, and before new counsel had been appointed, Turner moved 
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

4

pro se to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he was “misinformed about the elements of the 

agreement” and that his attorney had “co[e]r[c]ed and scarred [sic]” him into pleading guilty.

On May 31, the court granted Turner’s first attorney’s motion to withdraw and appointed 

new counsel. Turner’s new counsel advised that he would consult with Turner about how to 

proceed with regard to the pending motion to withdraw his plea. Apparently experiencing a 

change of heart, on August 14, Turner, through counsel, moved to withdraw his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea and provided the court with an affidavit in support of his request:

I have received a full and complete explanation of the charges against me, 

the consequences of the plea agreement, and I understand the plea 

agreement . . . will require that I be sentenced to exactly 240 months if 

accepted by the Court.

I have fully discussed my options with my appointed counsel and I fully 

understand my options.

I am satisfied with the explanation of the charges against me, the words 

contained in the Indictment, the contents of the plea agreement, the factual 

basis, the appeal waiver, the nature of the 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, and 

that once I sign this Affidavit and it is filed that I will no longer be able to 

request to withdraw my plea agreement. 

I wish to withdraw my previously filed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea... 

[and] I have and continue to accept the January 20, 2012 plea agreement 

previously entered into... and filed with the Court....

In accordance with his wishes, Turner was permitted to withdraw his motion.

Nine months later, at his sentencing, Turner renewed his request to withdraw his guilty 

plea. Exercising great patience, and against the Government’s wishes, the court continued the

sentencing hearing and set Turner’s oral motion for a hearing. In anticipation of that hearing, 

counsel filed a written motion seeking leave for Turner to withdraw his guilty plea:

[Turner] submits that he is unable to understand the provisions of the plea 

agreement, is not able to appreciate the advise [sic] of counsel regarding 

the facts and potential defenses in his case, is entitled to assert his 
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

5

innocence as to counts one and two of the Indictment and not have those 

acts factored into the current plea for a sentence above the applicable 

guideline range, and his mental state did not allow him to enter into the 

plea and/or withdraw his previous request to withdraw the plea knowingly 

and voluntarily.

 

At this point, Turner sought and was granted a competency examination. 

After Turner was found competent, the court held a hearing on his most recently filed

motion to withdraw his plea. Following the hearing, the district court denied Turner’s motion by 

way of a very thorough and thoughtful memorandum opinion and order. Thereafter, the court 

proceeded to sentencing, accepted the binding plea, and sentenced Turner to 240 months in 

prison.

II

A

A defendant who wishes to plead guilty must be competent, and his plea must be both 

knowing and voluntary. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993). The court must ensure 

that the defendant understands “the nature of each charge to which [he] is pleading.” Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). A plea is considered to be “knowing and voluntary” when a “defendant 

actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether 

the decision is uncoerced.” Id. at 401 n.12. “[A] plea does not qualify as intelligent unless a 

criminal defendant first receives real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.” United 

States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 379 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 

614, 618 (1998)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Turner argues that his plea was not knowing because he was misadvised on what was 

required to prove the interstate commerce nexus, which is requisite to proving Hobbs Act 

robbery. During his colloquy with the judge at his change of plea hearing, Turner does appear to 
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

6

have hesitated on this point, responding to the district court’s questions with some trepidation. 

As evidence of his first attorney’s misunderstanding, Turner directs the Court to his December 3, 

2013 hearing on his final motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At that hearing, Turner’s first

attorney testified that he had likely explained to Turner that the Government would have had to 

prove that “the weapon that he was alleged to have used would have to have been in interstate 

commerce.”

A de minimis effect on interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional 

requirement for a robbery conviction under the Hobbs Act. United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 

899, 902 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case, Turner was correctly advised of the interstate commerce 

element of Hobbs Act Robbery both in his written plea agreement and by the Assistant United 

States Attorney during the plea hearing.

2

 Additionally, Turner was subsequently appointed new 

counsel and following new counsel’s appointment, on August 14, 2012, Turner attested that he 

was “satisfied with the explanation of the charges against [him]” and wished to “continue to 

accept the January 20, 2012 plea agreement. . . .” Turner does not suggest that he was 

misadvised at this juncture in the proceedings.

In sum, despite the allegedly faulty advice rendered by Turner’s first counsel, the record 

shows that he was properly advised both in writing and orally at the time he pled guilty and then, 

again, subsequently. Such a record does not support his contention that his plea was either 

unknowing or involuntary.

 

2 Turner’s plea agreement explains that Count Three requires proof that “[t]he persons targeted were engaged 

in commercial activities in interstate commerce or an industry which affects interstate commerce.”
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

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B

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) provides that “[a] defendant may withdraw a 

plea of guilty... after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if...the defendant 

can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Id. (emphasis added). “A

defendant has no right to withdraw his guilty plea.” United States v. Martin, 668 F.3d 787, 794 

(6th Cir. 2012). Rather “[t]he purpose of the rule ‘is to allow a hastily entered plea made with 

unsure heart and confused mind to be undone. . . .’” Id. (quoting United States v. Alexander, 948 

F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1117 (1992)). With this purpose in mind, 

a district court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be reversed when 

it is found that the district court abused its discretion. Id. at 794. 

In considering whether a defendant has presented a fair and just reason for withdrawing 

his plea, the court may consider the following factors:

(1) the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to 

withdraw it; (2) the presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure 

to move for withdrawal earlier in the proceedings; (3) whether the 

defendant has asserted or maintained his innocence; (4) the circumstances 

underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the defendant’s nature and 

background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had prior 

experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to 

the government if the motion to withdraw is granted.

United States v. Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994).

1

Determining how much time passed between Turner’s guilty plea and his motion to 

withdraw that plea is complicated by the fact that Turner moved to withdraw his guilty plea on 

several occasions. He first sought to escape his plea 120 days after he entered it. Turner 

subsequently withdrew that motion. Next, Turner orally moved to withdraw his plea at his May 
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

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2013 sentencing hearing, 473 days following his decision to plead guilty. Following that aborted 

sentencing, and nearly eighteen months after he pled guilty, Turner supplemented the record with 

a written motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

As the district court explained in its memorandum opinion, this Court has routinely 

denied motions to withdraw guilty pleas where far less time has passed between the entry of the 

plea and the defendant’s motion. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903, 912-913 (6th 

Cir. 2004) (75 day delay); United States v. Durham, 178 F.3d 796, 798-99 (6th Cir. 1999) (77

day delay); United States v. Pluta, 144 F.3d 968, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1998) (four month delay); 

United States v. Baez, 87 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 1996) (67 day delay); United States v. 

Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1988) (55 day delay); United States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 

236, 239 (6th Cir. 1987) (35 day delay).

Turner acknowledges that the delay was lengthy, but argues the magnitude of a 20 year 

sentence, coupled with his persistence, negates the delay. Defense counsel cites no case to 

support this proposition because, quite frankly, this is not the standard. To the contrary, this 

Court has held that “the shorter the delay, the more likely a motion to withdraw will be granted, 

and a defendant’s reasons for filing such a motion will be more closely scrutinized when he has 

delayed his motion for a substantial length of time.” United States v. Dixon, 479 F.3d 431, 436 

(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Baez, 87 F.3d at 808) (additional citations omitted). Even if the Court 

gives Turner the benefit of the doubt and considers the timing of his first (but subsequently 

withdrawn) motion, the delay was a substantial 120 days. 

2

Turner provides no convincing reason for failing to move for withdrawal earlier. 

Turner’s counsel conceded this point at a hearing before the district court: “you know, I don’t 
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

9

know that there is any reason to have not withdrawn [the plea] earlier.” Turner now argues that 

his difficulty in communicating with his prior counsel contributed to the lengthy delay between 

his guilty plea and his motion to withdraw. Poor communication with counsel does little to 

explain, however, why Turner could not have filed his motion earlier, and pro se. Turner was 

well aware of how to file such a motion as he had earlier filed a pro se motion to appoint new 

counsel, and then ultimately filed his first motion to withdraw his guilty plea pro se as well. In 

short, Turner provides no convincing justification for failing to file his motion earlier.

3

While the parties agree that the Defendant has consistently maintained his innocence with 

regard to counts one and two, charges that were dismissed when he pled guilty, there is little to 

indicate that he has maintained innocence with regard to counts three and four. Quite to the 

contrary, Turner admitted his guilt at his plea hearing. Such “[s]tatements of guilt under oath at 

a plea hearing support the district judge’s decision not to permit withdrawal.” Martin, 668 F.3d 

at 796 (citation omitted). 

Turner made a further statement at his sentencing hearing which suggested he was 

something other than innocent:

You know, that sometimes mistakes are made, and before I even signed 

that plea up here in the court, that I was innocent until I was proven guilty. 

And by me withdrawing my plea, I retain my innocence, I still am 

innocent until I’m proven guilty. Do I feel like I’m guilty? I can’t 

answer that right now. But I’ll just tell you this right here, Judge, that I 

feel like 20 years is not right for me.

As noted by this Court in Dixon, “[t]his exchange is a far cry from the ‘vigorous and repeated 

protestations of innocence’ that would support a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 479 F.3d at 

437 (quoting Baez, 87 F.3d at 809).
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

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4

The circumstances surrounding Turner’s plea do not support permitting its withdrawal. 

At his sentencing hearing, Turner articulated that he had pled guilty because his counsel had 

advised him that he would “either receive 40 years or sign 20.” While Turner might have felt 

some pressure to plead guilty due to the drastic benefit he received by way of pleading, the 

bottom line is that statements at a plea hearing are solemn declarations that are given significant 

weight. United States v. Owens, 215 F. App’x 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2007) (“A defendant’s 

statements at a plea hearing should be regarded as conclusive [as to truth and accuracy] in the 

absence of a believable, valid reason justifying a departure from the apparent truth of those 

statements.”).

There is no question that the district court properly advised Turner of his rights at the plea 

hearing. Turner’s counsel has conceded that the plea colloquy was legally sufficient. The Court 

has already determined that, despite the allegedly mistaken advice of his first counsel, Turner’s 

plea was both knowing and voluntary. 

5

Courts that have considered the defendant’s nature and background frequently focus on 

whether the defendant was capable of understanding the proceedings brought against him. See

Martin, 668 F.3d at 796. Turner cites to his “difficulty with school and diagnosis related to his 

cognitive ability,” but the bottom line is that Turner was found competent, and, as discussed 

supra, his waiver was both knowing and voluntary. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400 (“In addition 

to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a trial 

court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.”) 
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

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(citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992)) (additional citations omitted). The record 

demonstrates that Turner is indecisive about his decision, but not incapable of understanding it.

6

In considering how much experience the defendant has with the criminal justice system, 

this Court has distinguished those defendants that are “novice[s] to the criminal law” from those 

that are “knowledgeable and shrewd.” Spencer, 836 F.2d at 240 (quoting United States v. 

Kirkland, 578 F.2d 170, 171-72 (6th Cir. 1978)). Turner was only eighteen when he committed 

this crime, so it is no surprise that he does not have much exposure to the adult criminal justice 

system. As articulated by the district court, however, Turner did have experience with the 

juvenile criminal justice system, including convictions for both possessing cocaine and strong 

armed robbery. 

7

Finally, the Government need not show that it will suffer prejudice unless the defendant 

“establishes a fair and just reason for allowing the withdrawal.” United States v. Goddard, 

638 F.3d 490, 495 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); Spencer, 836 F.2d at 240 (“[A]lthough the 

government is not required to establish prejudice that would result from a plea withdrawal, 

unless and until the defendant advances and establishes a fair and just reason for allowing the 

withdrawal, the district court may consider potential prejudice in exercising its discretion in 

considering the motion.”). While this factor does not bear on the Court’s decision, the delay 

would be prejudicial to the Government, as granting his motion after such a significant delay

would likely hamper the Government’s ability to prove its case at trial. See Dixon, 479 F.3d at 

437 (two-year delay found prejudicial to Government).
No. 14-5664, United States v. Turner

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III

The record shows that Turner’s plea was knowingly and voluntary. His subsequent 

“attempt[s] to avoid his agreement cannot be viewed as other than a dilatory tactic or strategy to 

attempt to obtain an even better deal.” Kirkland, 578 F.2d 171-72. Having considered the 

Bashara factors, it is apparent that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

Turner failed to provide fair and just reasons for withdrawing his plea. For all the 

aforementioned reasons, the district court’s decision is AFFIRMED.