In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3256

State of Wisconsin,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Hotline Industries, Inc.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 99-C-0398-C--Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

Argued August 8, 2000--Decided December 29, 2000

 Before Bauer, Coffey, and Manion, Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. This case involves an

award of attorney’s fees to the State of

Wisconsin under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1447(c), the feeshifting provision governing improper removal.

The principal issue is whether sec. 1447(c),

which authorizes payment of "actual" attorney’s

fees "incurred" in resisting removal, permits

salaried government attorneys to recover at

prevailing market rates. The district court

concluded that it does. Because we believe that

the provision limits a fee award to actual

outlays, we vacate the award and remand for

further proceedings.

I.

 Hotline Industries, Inc., a Minnesota

corporation, owns and maintains an old railroad

ore dock on Lake Superior that is adjacent to a

public boat ramp maintained by the City of

Superior, Wisconsin. When Hotline began

installing piers off the dock and advertising a

marina development, the State of Wisconsin sought

a preliminary injunction in state court to enjoin

Hotline from constructing any more piers.

According to the state, Hotline never obtained

the permits required by state law for placing

structures in navigable waterways. The state also

complained that the piers obstructed boat traffic
around the public boat ramp and constituted a

public nuisance. Hotline removed this case to

federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1441.

The district court set a hearing date for the

state’s preliminary injunction motion, and the

state moved to remand the action to state court.

See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1447(c).

 Although the hearing was held, the motion for

preliminary injunction was never addressed

because Hotline could not establish a basis for

federal jurisdiction (states are not citizens for

purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and there was

no federal question). The court advised Hotline

that the removal appeared groundless, and that it

could either file a response to the state’s

remand motion or stipulate to a remand. Hotline

stipulated to the remand, and the court issued a

remand order. The state then filed a motion for

costs and fees under sec. 1447(c), attaching

affidavits from an assistant attorney general

that claimed an hourly billing rate of $200 for

nearly 28 hours that she and another assistant

devoted to the removal proceedings. The court

accepted the $200 hourly figure as a reasonable

market rate for the government attorneys, and

awarded the state $5,583.60 for attorney’s fees.

From this decision Hotline appeals.

II.

 Hotline limits its appeal to the award of fees;

we have jurisdiction to review this award. Tenner

v. Zurek, 168 F.3d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1999). We

review the district court’s fee award for abuse

of discretion, Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,

211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000), but to the

extent that the district court’s decision rests

on its interpretation of sec. 1447(c), our review

is de novo. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural

Answers, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 00-1375, 2000 WL

1735075, at *9 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 2000).

 Hotline first argues that the district court

lacked jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees

after it remanded the case to state court.

Focusing on sec. 1447(c)’s language, Hotline

contends that the award had to be included in the

very same order remanding the case, and the

district court’s remand order did not mention an

award. The plain wording of sec. 1447(c) does not

resolve the question; it provides only that "an

order remanding the case may require payment of

actual expenses, including attorney fees,

incurred as a result of the removal." But the

statute does not purport to be exclusive, and it

contains no language to suggest that there cannot

be a supplemental order. Several courts have

directly rejected Hotline’s argument, holding

that district courts retain jurisdiction to
consider collateral matters after remand and that

attorney’s fees may be awarded under a separate

order. Stallworth v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l

Transit Auth., 105 F.3d 252, 257 (6th Cir. 1997);

Mints v. Educational Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253,

1257 (3d Cir. 1996); Moore v. Permanente Group,

Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1992); see

Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Steel Co., 230

F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2000). Hotline attempts

to distinguish this line of cases by observing

that the remand order in the present case was

based on a voluntary stipulation. But Cooter &

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990),

held that a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal did

not divest the court of jurisdiction to assess

fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See Szabo Food

Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073,

1076-79 (7th Cir. 1987). Although Cooter & Gell

dealt with Rule 11 sanctions, its underlying

principle applies in the context of sec. 1447(c).

See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 &

n.2 (1992). A district court has jurisdiction to

award attorney’s fees under sec. 1447(c) even if

the removing party voluntarily withdraws its case

and stipulates to a remand.

 Hotline next contends that the state did not

incur any reimbursable attorney’s fees because

its lawyers already were on the government

payroll as salaried employees. But salaried

government lawyers, like in-house and non-profit

counsel, do incur expenses if the time and

resources they devote to one case are not

available for other work. See Hamilton v. Daley,

777 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming

fee award under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988 to state’s

attorneys for their representation of "prevailing

defendants"); Napier v. Thirty or More

Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1092-93

(3d Cir. 1988) (affirming fee award under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11 to government for time of assistant

U.S. attorney in defending a frivolous lawsuit);

see also Central States, Southeast & Southwest

Areas Pension Fund v. Central Carthage Co., 76

F.3d 114, 115-16 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming award

under ERISA fee-shifting statute to prevailing

pension fund for its staff attorneys’

representation); see also Softsolutions v.

Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 1106 n.5 (Utah

2000) (collecting federal and state cases). To

deny reimbursement under these circumstances

would indirectly penalize the institution, be it

public or private, for providing its own legal

counsel throughout a case.

 Even if fees are recoverable, Hotline argues,

they exceed whatever amount was allowed under

sec. 1447(c). Section sec. 1447(c) provides that

"[a]n order remanding the case may require

payment of just costs and any actual expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of

the removal." The district court construed sec.

1447(c) to authorize a fee award based on the

prevailing rate in Madison, Wisconsin for lawyers

specializing in similar work. "From a purely

practical standpoint," the court wrote, "it makes

sense to compensate government lawyers in the

same manner as privately retained counsel rather

than undertaking a calculation of the actual

costs incurred."

 In using the market rate as the measure of

compensation, the district court followed the

general rule for calculating fee awards made

under numerous statutes authorizing a "reasonable

attorney’s fee as part of the costs." This rule,

applied in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895

(1984), holds that "reasonable fees" under feeshifting statutes such as 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988

"are to be calculated according to the prevailing

market rates in the relevant community,"

regardless of whether the plaintiff is

represented by a private law firm or a legal aid

society. See also Independent Fed’n of Flight

Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989)

(observing that "fee-shifting statutes’ similar

language is ’a strong indication’ that they are

to be interpreted alike") (citation omitted);

Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 559, 562 (1992)

(extending "our case law construing what is a

’reasonable’ fee . . . uniformly to all

[similarly worded fee-shifting statutes]").

Congress enacted such fee-shifting statutes to

encourage lawyers to take meritorious cases and

thereby promote private enforcement of the law.

See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council, 478 U.S. 546, 560 (1986); Blum 465 U.S.

at 893-94. By using market rates as a basis to

calculate attorney’s fees, Congress intended that

nonprofit legal aid organizations (which have no

billing rate) would receive no less in fee awards

than lawyers working in the private sector. Blum,

465 U.S. at 894. This general rule has been

applied even when the victorious party is

represented by salaried government counsel. See,

e.g., Hamer v. Lake County, 819 F.2d 1362, 1365

n.9 (7th Cir. 1987); Hamilton, 777 F.2d at 1213;

State of Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 657

F.2d 855, 861-62 (7th Cir. 1981); United States

v. Big D Enters., Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 936 (8th

Cir. 1999); Napier, 855 F.2d at 1092-93.

 But Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517

(1994), in our words, "squelched" any inclination

to treat all fee-shifting statutes as if they

were minor variations on sec. 1988. Stomper v.

Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241, 27 F.3d

316, 318 (7th Cir. 1994). Fogerty involved the

interpretation of 17 U.S.C. sec. 505, the

attorney’s fee provision of the Copyright Act.
Although sec. 505 tracks 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e5(k), the attorney’s fee provision in Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court held

that both statutes have unique historical

contexts and interpretations that cannot be

generalized to one another. 510 U.S. at 522-25.

After Fogerty, "[d]ifferent statutes receive

individual analysis," or should. Stomper, 27 F.3d

at 318; see Citizens for a Better Environment,

230 F.3d at 931.

 Section 1447(c) is unusual among fee-shifting

statutes. Unlike the numerous statutes that

authorize the recovery of "reasonable" attorney’s

fees, see, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council, 478 U.S. at 562; Marek v. Chesny, 473

U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (appendix to Brennan, J.,

dissenting), sec. 1447(c) expressly limits fee

awards to actual outlays-- specifically, to "any

actual expenses, including attorney fees,

incurred" (emphasis added). The mention of

"actual" and "incurred" is significant. Neither

word appeared in the statute’s earlier version

that authorized only "the payment of just costs."

As amended in 1988, sec. 1447(c) now explicitly

includes "attorney fees" among the "actual

expenses" that can be awarded. The statutory

change makes clear that sec. 1447(c) constitutes

an alternative means to reimburse the victorious

party without resorting to Rule 11. The

legislative history of this change is scanty (a

mere two paragraphs), but it reveals that "the

proposed amendment to section 1447(c) will ensure

that a substantive basis exists for requiring

payment of actual expenses incurred in resisting

an improper removal; civil rule 11 can be used to

impose a more severe sanction when appropriate."

H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72,

reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033.

 Only a few fee-shifting statutes explicitly

limit recoveries to actual outlays. For example,

the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real

Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 U.S.C. sec.

4654, will "reimburse" prevailing claimants for

attorney’s fees "actually incurred" in litigating

condemnation proceedings brought by the

government. See United States v. 122.00 Acres of

Land, 856 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1988). Similarly,

the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. sec.

2412(d)(1)(A), authorizes monetary recovery for

attorney’s fees "incurred" as a result of

unjustified federal action, see TGS Int’l, Inc.

v. United States, 983 F.2d 229, 230 (Fed. Cir.

1993); United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161,

1164 (4th Cir. 1992), and an analogous statute

contained in the Internal Revenue Code permits

recovery of attorney’s fees "paid" or "incurred"

in successful challenges to tax related actions,

26 U.S.C. sec. 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii); see Marre v.
United States, 38 F.3d 823, 828-29 (5th Cir.

1994). These three statutes, all of which aim to

check or deter unjustified governmental conduct,

permit parties to be reimbursed for fees actually

incurred in achieving victory. But cf. Raney v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 222 F.3d 927, 934

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing the Freedom of

Information Act, the Privacy Act, and Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(a)(4) as examples in which "the courts

have neither interpreted the ’incurred’ term . .

. to restrict or limit the payment of fees to

those actually incurred, nor prevented marketrate fees from being awarded").

 Congress envisioned a similar reimbursement

scheme under sec. 1447(c). This provision

specifies that the fees awarded must be the

"actual" fees that were "incurred." This

formulation more closely approaches the Uniform

Relocation Act or the Equal Access to Justice Act

than the civil rights statutes that speak of a

"reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs."

Cf. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 F.3d 827, 833

(7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the formula in

the False Claims Act authorizing "reasonable

attorneys’ fees" as part of "damages" has

"greater affinity to sec. 1988 than to the Equal

Access to Justice Act"). Indeed, we have likened

sec. 1447(c) to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), the

fee-shifting rule requiring the loser in certain

discovery disputes to pay his opponent’s legal

expenses. Both rules contemplate that the victor

should recoup his full outlay. As we reiterated

in Garbie, 211 F.3d at 411, "The rationale of

fee-shifting rules is that the victor should be

made whole--should be as well off as if the

opponent had respected his legal rights in the

first place." Improper removal prolongs

litigation (and jacks up fees). Under the

American Rule parties bear their expenses in one

court system, "but when their adversary

wrongfully drags them into a second judicial

system the loser must expect to cover the

incremental costs." Id. For the State of

Wisconsin, those incremental costs include its

actual attorney’s fees incurred (a proportional

share of the salaries of its attorneys handling

the removal) plus related overhead costs.

 We vacate the judgment as to the amount of

attorney’s fees awarded to the state and remand

so that the district court may determine the

actual amount of fees incurred. The state bears

the burden of proving these amounts. The district

court, however, has discretion "to tailor the

documentation requirement" according to the

stakes involved, see Garbie, 211 F.3d at 411;

Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 987 (7th Cir.

1988), lest the resources devoted to detailing

entitlements outstrip the expenses received under
sec. 1447(c).

Vacated and Remanded