Office of Inspector General 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Effectiveness of Customs and Border

Protection’s Procedures to Detect Uranium

In Two Smuggling Incidents

Office of Audits 

OIG-04-40 September 2004 

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Offi ce of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

This report represents an abbreviated version of our classified report assessing the effectiveness 

of Customs and Border Protection’s procedures to detect uranium in two smuggling incidents. It 

is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein, if any, have been developed to the best knowledge available to the 

OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Introduction 

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) 

priority mission is detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from 

entering the United States (U.S.). A major component of its priority mission is to 

ensure that oceangoing cargo containers arriving at the seaports of entry are not 

used to smuggle illegal and dangerous contraband. 

On September 11, 2002, ABC News reported that a steel pipe containing a 

15 pound cylinder of depleted uranium was shipped from Europe to the U.S. 

undetected by CBP. On September 11, 2003, ABC News reported that the same 

cylinder was smuggled to the U.S. from Jakarta, Indonesia, again undetected. 

At the request of John Dingell, Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy 

and Commerce, and Jim Turner, Ranking Member, House Select Committee on 

Homeland Security, we reviewed CBP’s procedures in place at the time of the two 

smuggling incidents initiated by ABC News. 

Results in Brief 

Improvements are needed in the inspection process to ensure that weapons of 

mass destruction or other implements of terror do not gain access to the U.S. 

through oceangoing cargo containers. Detection equipment and search protocols 

and procedures are the two areas where improvements would enhance the 

effectiveness of the inspection process. We made recommendations that address 

these areas. CBP initiated numerous changes and has plans for additional changes 

in the future to improve the ability of inspectors to detect threat items in cargo 

containers. 

Effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection’s Procedures to Detect Uranium Page 1

In Two Smuggling Incidents 
Background 

To test controls over importing weapons of mass destruction, ABC News was 

successful in two attempts at smuggling depleted uranium into the country. 

Scientists advised ABC News that shielded depleted uranium had the same 

signature as shielded weapons-grade uranium, and loaned ABC News a 15 pound 

cylinder of shielded depleted uranium. However, we were informed by CBP that 

the radiation signatures of shielded depleted uranium and shielded weapons-grade 

uranium are distinctly different. For educational or research purposes, it is legal 

for an individual to possess up to 15 pounds of depleted uranium, and import it 

into the U.S., as long as it is declared. 

In the first smuggling event, ABC News reported that a steel pipe containing a 15 

pound cylinder of depleted uranium, which was shielded with lead, was placed 

in a suitcase and accompanied the ABC News reporters by rail from Austria 

to Turkey. The reporters thought that this route would simulate a journey that 

a terrorist would most likely take in smuggling radioactive materials from the 

former Soviet Union. During this 47-hour European rail trip, the suitcase was 

placed on a rack in the cabin of the train car. The reporters said that they saw no 

sign of any radiation detection equipment during the trip. In Istanbul, Turkey, the 

suitcase was placed inside an ornamental chest that was crated and nailed shut. 

The crate containing the suitcase was then placed alongside crates of huge vases 

and Turkish horse carts in a large metal shipping container that was ordered from 

a company that arranges shipments to the U.S. The container was then loaded 

onto a ship that left Istanbul on July 10, 2002. The crate was targeted as high-risk 

for screening by the U.S. Customs Service (Customs). ABC News broadcast on 

September 11, 2002, that Customs failed to detect depleted uranium carried from 

Europe to the U.S. 

During the second smuggling event, ABC News smuggled the same cylinder of 

depleted uranium in August 2003. ABC News placed the cylinder containing 

depleted uranium into a suitcase. The suitcase was then placed into a teak trunk. 

The trunk, along with other furniture, was loaded into a container in Jakarta, 

Indonesia, and then transshipped to the U.S. from Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia. 

The container was shipped in late July 2003 and arrived on August 23, 2003. 

This shipment was also targeted as high-risk for screening and subsequently 

inspected by CBP personnel, but was then allowed to proceed from the port by 

truck on September 2, 2003. As in the earlier incident, ABC News announced on 

September 11, 2003, that Customs again failed to detect depleted uranium. 

Page 2 Effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection’s Procedures to Detect Uranium 

In Two Smuggling Incidents 
Capability of CBP’s Deployed Equipment To Detect Radiation Emitted in 

the Two Smuggling Incidents 

At our request, CBP prepared an analysis that addressed the capabilities of 

various detection equipment. To perform the analysis, CBP utilized the services 

of senior scientists on loan to CBP from the Department of Energy’s Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory. The testing was based on simulated models 

using actual sources of uranium, which assumed that both depleted uranium and 

weapons-grade uranium were smuggled into the country in a manner similar to 

the two smuggling events. The analysis described the distances beyond which the 

detection equipment would no longer detect the radiation source. The radiation 

portal monitors installed by CBP have the inherent sensitivity to detect both 

depleted and highly enriched uranium in cargo. The ability to detect is reduced by 

certain factors. We made recommendations that will enhance the effectiveness of 

radiation detection equipment. 

Search Protocols and Procedures Followed by CBP in Each of the Two 

Events 

The protocols and procedures that CBP officials followed, at the time of the 

two smuggling incidents, were not adequate to detect the depleted uranium. 

CBP has since enhanced its ability to screen targeted containers for radioactive 

emissions based on deployment of more sensitive technology, better procedures, 

and training. Along these lines, we made recommendations that would enhance 

training and search procedures followed by CBP inspectors. 

Effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection’s Procedures to Detect Uranium Page 3

In Two Smuggling Incidents 
Appendix A 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Under Secretary for Border & Transportation Security 

DHS OIG Liaison 

DHS Public Affairs 

Customs and Border Protection 

Commissioner 

Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

Page 4 Effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection’s Procedures to Detect Uranium 

In Two Smuggling Incidents 

Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at www. 

dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.