DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

A Review of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Discipline 

Procedures

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

OIG-06-57 August 2006
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

August 18, 2006 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibility to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the department. 

This report identifies measures that can be taken by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to 

improve its employee disciplinary system and the efforts undertaken by ICE to establish a single, 

integrated disciplinary process that is uniform in its assessment of discipline for verified offenses of 

its employees. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and 

institutions, statistical analyses, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary................................................................................................................1 

Background.............................................................................................................................3 

Overview of ICE’s Disciplinary System.................................................................................4 

The Allegation Intake and Classification Process .........................................................4 

 Investigative Responsibility for Allegations of Misconduct .........................................6 

 Adjudicating Reports of Investigation...........................................................................6 

Results of Review ...................................................................................................................7 

Improvements Are Needed in ICE’s Disciplinary Process............................................8 

Effective Tracking and Processing of Cases Is Needed........................................8 

Completed Investigations Need to be Adjudicated In a Timely Manner............10 

Penalties Should be Uniformly Applied .............................................................13 

Policies and Management Oversight Are Needed .......................................................15 

Improved Policies Are Needed to Enhance Coordination ..................................15 

Current Decision Making Process Requires More Management Oversight.......16 

Coordination Issues Are Affecting Investigation Information Sharing.......................19 

 The Investigative Reporting Process and Requirements Need to be Clarified...19 

Improvements are Needed to Track the Distribution of DHS OIG 

Investigations ..................................................................................................20 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis .........................................................................21 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .......................................................................26 

Appendix B: Management Response to Draft Report ...............................................................27 

Appendix C: ICE Organization Chart........................................................................................32 

Appendix D: DHS Management Directive 0810.1 Appendix A................................................33 

Appendix E: DHS and BTS Memorandum of Understanding ..................................................35 

Appendix F: Total Reports of Investigation Statistics ..............................................................37 

Appendix G: DHS Inspector General Letter Concerning Delinquent Replies ..........................38

Appendix H: ICE’s Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement Letter ....39 

Appendix I: Major Contributors to This Report.......................................................................43 

Appendix J: Report Distribution...............................................................................................44 

A Review of Immigration and Customs Disciplinary Procedures 
Table of Contents 

Abbreviations 

AIG/I Assistant Inspector General for Investigations 

BTS Border and Transportation Security 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

ELR Employee and Labor Relations 

FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

JIC Joint Intake Center 

JICMS Joint Integrity Case Management System

 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OPLA Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 

OPR Office of Professional Responsibility 

ROI Reports of Investigation 

USCS United States Customs Service 

A Review of Immigration and Customs Disciplinary Procedures 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

On a cyclical basis, our Office of Investigations conducts quality assurance 

reviews of the internal affairs units in component agencies of the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS). These examinations address the handling of 

allegations, the quality and timeliness of investigations, management of the 

caseload, and reporting of the results.1 A review performed on the internal 

affairs unit of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) gave rise to 

concerns that completed internal affairs cases, in which the misconduct 

allegations had been substantiated, were not receiving timely or effective 

attention with a probable erosion of good discipline. 

In response to those concerns, we reviewed ICE’s disciplinary system to 

determine how, once an allegation has been investigated and found to have 

merit, ICE imposes and enforces discipline on the employee. Specifically, we 

reviewed the timeliness and consistency of disciplinary adjudications, and 

whether ICE’s disciplinary system was being administered in a uniform 

manner. We focused on the most serious cases of employee misconduct, 

commonly described in Reports of Investigation (ROI). We did not assess the 

reasonableness of the sanctions eventually imposed on ICE employees who 

engage in misconduct. 

To determine ICE's ability to track, monitor, and process disciplinary cases 

within its system, we reviewed the status of 246 ROIs from a universe of 268 

ROIs completed between January 2003 and August 2005. The ICE Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR) case management system does not track 

information on the status of disciplinary cases after the investigation of the 

allegation is complete. Once OPR has turned the investigated case over to ICE 

managers for assessment of an appropriate sanction, those managers may, but 

are not required to, ask the Employee and Labor Relations (ELR) servicing 

offices to assist. ELR does not have an effective system for tracking ICE 

disciplinary cases, which impacts its ability to maintain case file data. For 

example, because information in ELR case management logs is incomplete or 

inaccurate, we were unable to track the status of 22 ROIs. Furthermore, cases 

are not being subsequently adjudicated in a prompt manner when we or OPR 

We conduct investigations of serious misconduct and criminal behavior committed by DHS employees, but, pursuant 

to a Memoranda of Understanding between the OIG and the Department’s organizational elements with internal affairs 

units, we assign to cognizant internal affairs units responsibility for investigating lesser matters of misconduct. The 

quality assurance review discussed here is one way by which we monitor the performance of the internal affairs units and 

the cases they investigate. 

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1 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

substantiates serious misconduct. Of the 246 ROIs, there are 147 (60 %) with 

components for adjudication where no identifiable action has been taken, and 

only 71 ROIs (29 %) have been processed for adjudication. An additional 28 

ROIs (11 %) had no action taken by the component because the alleged 

misconduct was not substantiated. 

Currently, ELR uses five separate Tables of Offenses and Penalties to guide 

management in determining appropriate discipline for ICE employees. Four 

tables are from former agencies that merged within Border and Transportation 

Security (BTS) and one is an interim ICE Table of Offenses and Penalties for 

its non-bargaining component employees. As a result, the current disciplinary 

process does not provide uniform treatment for ICE employees. We highlight 

several cases where timeliness, consistency of disciplinary procedures, or the 

degree of discipline raises serious concerns. These cases underscore ICE’s 

need for more formal policy on the roles and responsibilities of those involved 

in the disciplinary process and better management oversight of the decisionmaking process. ICE and DHS OIG also need to improve their coordination 

and communication. ICE must establish a reliable process to respond to 

information requests on the disciplinary status of ROIs, and clarification is 

needed on what information ICE should provide in its required monthly 

reports to our Office of Investigations. 

To improve ICE’s ability to establish a single, integrated disciplinary process 

that is timely and uniform, we are making 11 recommendations. Essentially, 

we are recommending that: 

• ELR implement a centralized case management system, standardize 

the recording and collecting of information, provide more training to 

ELR employees, ensure active disciplinary case file information is 

transferred to the new case management system, establish performance 

measures for the timely adjudication of cases, and implement policies 

to process existing cases during the transition to the new system; 

• OPR provide notification to ELR when ROIs are completed, revise its 

procedures to ensure effective reporting on the disciplinary status of 

ROIs, and establish a process to track receipt and distribution of DHS 

OIG ROIs; and 

• ICE implement a single Table of Offenses and Penalties, and 

coordinate components' adjudication of disciplinary cases with ELR. 

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Background 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Border and 

Transportation Security Directorate as the primary customs and immigration 

enforcement entity in DHS. Within BTS, criminal investigators from the 

former United States Customs Service (USCS) and the former Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS) were combined in ICE. The border 

inspectors of USCS and INS were combined in the Bureau of Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP). As a result of a DHS reorganization that began in 

July 2005, BTS has ceased to exist and CBP and ICE operate independently. 

ICE’s mission is to prevent acts of terrorism by targeting the people, money, 

and materials that support terrorist and criminal activities. The largest 

investigative arm of DHS, ICE is responsible for identifying and shutting 

down vulnerabilities in the nation’s border, economic, transportation, and 

infrastructure security. ICE targets the people, money, and materials that 

support criminal activities. At the time we began our review, ICE had five 

operational components: (1) the Office of Detention and Removal, (2) the 

Federal Protective Service, (3) the Office of Intelligence, (4) the Office of 

Investigations, and (5) the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).2 The July 

2005 reorganization resulted in the transfer of FAMS from ICE to the 

Transportation Security Administration later that year. ICE currently has 

approximately 15,000 employees, of which approximately 6,000 are criminal 

investigators, and an operating budget of $3.9 billion in FY 2006. 

ICE employees must meet a high standard of ethical conduct that serves and 

protects the interest of the public and furthers ICE’s organizational goals. For 

this to occur, ICE needs an effective disciplinary system based upon welldefined policies and procedures, a system that assists its employees to 

understand expected behavior, and that deals fairly and objectively with 

employees accused of misconduct. 

According to Appendix A of DHS Management Directive 810.1, (see 

Appendix D), serious allegations of unprofessional conduct by ICE employees 

are referred to OIG for a decision whether OIG will investigate or decline in 

favor of an ICE investigation. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that 

defines which cases will be referred, and what procedures OIG and ICE will 

follow, was executed in March 2003 (see Appendix E). The MOU calls for 

timely reports back to the AIG/I by ICE. We began this review because ICE 

could not provide the disciplinary status on OIG conducted ROIs, which gave 

2 See Appendix C, ICE Organization Chart. 

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rise to concerns that allegations of employee misconduct were not receiving 

timely or effective adjudication. 

Overview of ICE’s Disciplinary System 

Title 5, United States Code, Chapter 75, provides the legal framework for 

federal agencies to address employee misconduct through discipline and 

adverse actions. Such actions range from oral and written admonishments, to 

suspensions or demotions, and ultimately to removals. According to Chapter 

75, employees may be disciplined for such cause as will promote the 

efficiency of the service. ICE has the authority to take disciplinary action 

when an employee’s misconduct or unacceptable performance interferes with 

the organization’s ability to carry out its mission. However, ICE currently 

does not have cohesive policies and processes in place to ensure the timely, 

uniform treatment of complaints against its employees. 

ICE’s disciplinary process involves two stages, investigation and 

adjudication.

3

 Once an investigation determines whether or not misconduct 

occurred, the case is transmitted to the employee's operating entity for 

disposition. In the adjudicative stage, disciplinary action is proposed and 

imposed. The ELR division is within ICE’s Office of Resource Management. 

ELR assists with the adjudicative stage, when invited by the appropriate ICE 

component, but can only assist when the entity managers make ELR aware of 

the case. ELR has three locations, headquarters in Washington, DC, and field 

offices in Dallas, Texas, and Laguna Niguel, California. 

The Allegation Intake and Classification Process 

Allegations of misconduct are received by ICE OPR from telephone calls to a 

24-hour toll free hotline, faxes, reports from other government employees, the 

public, anonymous sources, or referrals from the OIG and OPR field offices. 

Regardless of the source, allegations are forwarded to ICE’s Joint Intake 

Center (JIC) for processing and assignment. The JIC, which is located at CBP 

headquarters, is funded by CBP and operated by ICE OPR. The JIC is staffed 

with personnel from CBP and ICE who are responsible for receiving, 

classifying, and routing allegations of CBP and ICE employee misconduct. 

After an allegation is received at the JIC, an Intake Control Specialist catalogs 

the allegation in a two-step process described in OPR’s Investigative 

Guidebook as categorizing and classifying. 

3

 Many of the employees with whom we spoke used the word discipline to refer only to the adjudicative stage – 

discipline in the sense of punishment. We use it to refer to the entire process that disposes of allegations of professional 

misconduct – the investigation and the subsequent sanction, if any. 

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First, the Intake Control Specialist categorizes the allegation from a list of 

twenty named offenses covering a range of criminal, non-criminal, and 

administrative matters. Categories of offense include bribery, smuggling, 

falsification, sexual harassment, mismanagement, and lost credentials. After 

the allegation is categorized, it is then assigned to one of six investigative 

classes that determine how the allegation will be handled. These classes are: 

Class I - Criminal Misconduct 

Class II - Serious Non-Criminal Misconduct 

Class III – Administrative Misconduct 

Class IV – Informational Purpose Only 

Class V – Administrative Investigations or Non- Investigations 

Class VI – Computer Generated Files to Capture Non-Operational Duties 

Class I and II allegations are considered the most serious in nature. 

Allegations of bribery or employee involvement in drug smuggling would be 

classified as allegations of criminal misconduct. Allegations of sexual 

harassment or misuse of a government vehicle would be classified as serious 

non-criminal misconduct. Class III allegations generally are referred to ICE 

management for inquiry or action. These types of allegations would include 

unprofessional behavior or some specific conduct or action that would be 

considered inconsistent with ICE or government policies and standards. Class 

IV designations do not require any type of investigative action; the 

information concerning this class is indexed and may be referred to 

appropriate ICE officials for informational purposes and are generally closed 

without action, but a permanent record remains for future reference. For 

example, information regarding lost credentials would be a class IV 

allegation. Class V designations are used to electronically monitor a program 

or project, track an initiative, or to document integrity tests with no named 

subjects. Finally, the Class VI designation is used to capture non-operational 

duties for ICE employees such as leave, collateral duties, or to document 

special projects. 

After the allegation is analyzed, the respective ICE or CBP JIC supervisor 

reviews the case file to ensure it contains all relevant information, and is 

properly categorized and classified, before it is acted upon by DHS OIG or the 

appropriate ICE component. There are two JIC supervisors, one for CBP and 

one for ICE, who review their corresponding agency cases before they are 

assigned for processing. The CBP supervisor at the JIC is a labor and 

employee relations specialist; the ICE supervisor is a Senior Special Agent. 

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Investigative Responsibility for Allegations of Misconduct 

As described in DHS Management Directive 0810.1, OPR does not 

investigate all allegations of criminal or serious non-criminal employee 

misconduct. OPR is required to report all allegations of serious employee 

misconduct to DHS OIG, which either accepts or declines investigative 

responsibility for the case reported by OPR. If DHS OIG declines to 

investigate an allegation, the case file is returned to OPR for disposition. OPR 

then conducts its own investigation on any case declined by DHS OIG. 

Allegations that are investigated by either DHS OIG or OPR result in case 

files that are referred to as ROIs. 

Completed DHS OIG ROIs are forwarded to ICE OPR headquarters for 

review and appropriate disposition. The ROIs are first reviewed for 

sufficiency of information and documentation of the facts by a designated 

senior ICE supervisor.4 ROIs then go to the Director of OPR’s Investigations 

Support Unit, which is responsible for overseeing the accuracy and routing of 

completed investigations to the appropriate component directors. After this 

review process, the Director of OPR reviews and approves the ROIs for 

release to the appropriate ICE component Director for review and action. If 

there is a question regarding the sufficiency of information or documentation 

contained in an ROI, the case file is sent back to the investigating component 

for additional information. 

Even if the allegation has not been substantiated, the Director of OPR 

forwards the ROI for review to the appropriate ICE component Director 

because the employee’s conduct or action may still warrant non-disciplinary 

remedies such as counseling or training, a verbal warning, a letter of caution, 

or referral to an Employee Assistance Program. 

Adjudicating Reports of Investigation 

The case enters the adjudication stage once the ROI is forwarded to the 

appropriate ICE component Director. The four main actors during 

adjudication are the proposing official (usually the employee’s supervisor), 

the deciding official (superior to the proposing official), ELR, and ICE’s 

Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA). 

4

 ROIs conducted by OPR are initially reviewed by one of three Regional Operations Managers who are Senior Special 

Agents. The JIC OIG Desk Officer and ICE supervisor are responsible for providing the first level review for DHS OIG 

ROIs. 

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Upon receipt, the ICE component Director sends the ROI to the employee’s 

supervisor or manager, who serves as the proposing official. He or she 

reviews the ROI, determines whether misconduct has been substantiated, and 

proposes a penalty. The deciding official then reviews the ROI, the proposed 

penalty, and any written statement submitted or oral testimony provided by 

the employee. The deciding official determines whether to sustain or reduce 

the proposed penalty; he or she cannot increase the proposed penalty. 

ELR provides advice to both officials when requested,5 and reviews the 

proposal and decision letters to ensure technical and procedural compliance 

before issuance to the employee. ELR also represents ICE in some third-party 

hearings, such as arbitrations, and assists with Merit Systems Protection Board 

(MSPB) cases, unfair labor practice cases, and grievance procedures. 

OPLA provides legal advice throughout the process as requested, and 

formally reviews all proposals concerning suspensions of 15 days or more, 

which can be appealed to the MSPB. OPLA also represents the agency at all 

MSPB hearings. 

Results of Review 

The lack of reliable tracking and processing procedures prevents ICE from 

adequately documenting and monitoring completed investigations throughout 

the adjudication phase. Inadequate management oversight diminishes ICE's 

ability to ensure that disciplinary cases are adjudicated in a timely and 

uniform manner. The degree of coordination between DHS OIG and ICE 

OPR is insufficient, preventing timely information sharing on the adjudication 

status of completed investigations. 

Some of the management challenges we identify are similar to problems 

identified in other reviews of ICE.6 ICE officials acknowledge the need to 

resolve the deficiencies identified during the course of our review, but have 

not completed the corrective actions. 

5

 There is no policy that requires the proposing or deciding official to contact ELR or OPLA for advice when deciding 

what action, if any, to take in a disciplinary case. Even when ELR is contacted for assistance, the proposing or deciding 

official is not required to follow or consider ELR’s advice. 6

 Government Accountability Office, Department of Homeland Security, Addressing Management Challenges That Face 

Immigration Enforcement Agencies, GAO-05-664T (May 5, 2005), which also identified questions surrounding ICE’s 

strategic planning process, performance measures, and personnel accountability mechanisms. 

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Improvements Are Needed in ICE’s Disciplinary Process 

ICE does not have a centralized tracking system for its disciplinary cases. 

ELR must query multiple databases and manually review paper records in 

order to respond to requests for information on case files, a process that is 

cumbersome and time consuming. There are other deficiencies that affect 

ICE’s ability to administer its disciplinary cases in a timely and uniform 

manner. 147 of the 246 ROIs we examined had unexplained delays in 

processing. In addition, ICE has five separate Tables of Offenses and 

Penalties for its employees, and no systematic process to ensure consistency in 

the application of proposed penalties. 

Effective Tracking and Processing of Cases Is Needed 

ELR headquarters and the two field offices use electronic spreadsheets to 

manage disciplinary cases. There is no requirement for uniform record 

keeping among the three offices. Current case management practices do not 

provide ELR with the ability to readily manage or identify the total number 

and status of cases in its disciplinary system. The current system is also 

cumbersome in that it fails to provide ELR with the ability to readily 

reconstruct case histories. For example, it took ELR headquarters more than 

two weeks to provide information on three cases discussed later in this report, 

and the information was incomplete. 

ELR officials use case management logs to manage disciplinary caseloads. 

Each ELR servicing office enters into its log the information it considers 

relevant. The information contained in the different logs cannot be easily 

transferred or consolidated among the two ELR servicing offices or 

headquarters, making it difficult to share and consolidate case data. Even 

when the case management logs were shared, the data is incompatible. Each 

office records information differently, except for a few common data 

elements, such as the employee’s name and component. The differences 

range from coding an allegation to the format used for entering dates. For 

example, one servicing office used four different offense codes to identify the 

misuse of a government issued credit card. This lack of standardization 

makes it difficult to compile and compare data across the organization for 

reporting and statistical purposes. 

Reliable information is critical to informed decision making and effective 

management oversight. However, some information contained in the records 

provided by ELR was inaccurate and incomplete. Out of 268 ROIs, we had to 

exclude 22 ROIs from our review because of concerns regarding the accuracy 

of the dates or names in the records. In 21 of those 22 ROIs, ELR case 

A Review of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Disciplinary Procedures 

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management logs indicated the ROIs were active earlier than OPR recorded 

the ROIs as having been completed. In the 22nd case, OPR could not provide 

a date the ROI was delivered to the component for adjudication. We also 

question the reliability of data used to identify 26 of the remaining 246 ROIs 

because of missing, inconsistent, or incomplete information.7 

ELR officials said many of the errors in its case management logs are due to 

data entry mistakes by staff. In some instances, an ELR servicing office was 

not provided information by the component manager or there was inadequate 

verification of the information before it was entered into the logs. ELR 

officials also cited too few staff, too little training, and high turnover as 

reasons for the errors. 

OPR and ELR officials acknowledged they need a more reliable and efficient 

case management system and are addressing the issue. OPR, in connection 

with a broad redesign of its Case Management System,

8

 proposed 

incorporating ELR disciplinary case adjudication functions into the new 

system, known as the Joint Integrity Case Management System (JICMS), 

which became operational in October 2005. ELR has been working with OPR 

to define its system requirements, and as of early February 2006, ELR 

headquarters personnel were given access to this system. ELR officials noted 

that a full roll out of the system to all ELR personnel, including training, is 

anticipated in the near future. The JICMS is intended to be an all-inclusive 

system that will allow for the tracking and monitoring of ICE disciplinary 

cases from initial investigation to final adjudication. If implemented 

effectively, JICMS should address many of the shortfalls in ELR’s current 

disciplinary Case Management System.9 However, we have concerns that 

some issues will not be adequately addressed by ELR, such as (1) developing 

common data collection and reporting standards, (2) effectively training ELR 

personnel on the new system, and, (3) carrying over active case information to 

JICMS. ELR officials acknowledged these issues, but did not provide a 

definitive response on how they plan to resolve them. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that ICE implement a centralized and 

automated case management system to enhance effective tracking, processing, 

7

 See Appendix F, Total Reports of Investigation Statistics. 8

 The Case Management System used by OPR is a legacy Customs system that is shared with CBP to track and manage 

its investigative caseload. This system is not used to track ICE disciplinary cases once they move into the adjudication 

stage, and cannot be accessed by ICE ELR. 9

 This new system should also be managed and its access based on rules governing accepted personnel practices to 

ensure that the appropriate privacy safeguards are in place to protect sensitive employee information.

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and reporting on disciplinary cases from receipt of an allegation to 

investigation through final adjudication. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that ICE standardize the methodology 

used for recording and collecting disciplinary case information. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that ICE implement a training program 

for all Employee and Labor Relations personnel on the Joint Integrity Case 

Management System. 

Recommendation 4: We recommend that ICE implement procedures to 

ensure that active disciplinary case file information is transferred to the new 

Joint Integrity Case Management System. 

Completed Investigations Need to be Adjudicated in a Timely Manner 

ICE managers do not ensure the timely processing of completed 

investigations. Between January 2003 and August 2005, ICE experienced 

excessive delays in initiating action on ROIs forwarded to component 

Directors for review and disposition. For example, of the 246 ROIs we 

tracked, we determined that 147 (60 %) had not been processed by the time of 

our review.10 The table below depicts how long the 147 ROIs had gone 

without being adjudicated as of September 30, 2005. 

Figure 1. Time Taken to Process 

Reports of Investigation 

Length of Time ROIs 

0 to 2 months 24 

3 to 4 months 24 

5 to 6 months 16 

7 months to 12 months 21 

1 year to 1.5 years 24 

1.5 years to 2 years 16 

2 years to 2.5 years 15 

Over 2.5 years 7 

Total Records Tracked 147 

Source: DHS Office of Inspector General, ICE Office of Professional 

Responsibility, and ICE Employee and Labor Relations records. 

10 We define an open case as a completed investigation that has been forwarded to the appropriate component Director 

for review and action, but ELR has no record of action being taken on the case file. 

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ICE officials involved in both the investigative and adjudicative processes 

expressed concerns over the length of time it takes to adjudicate completed 

investigations. They said that delays can occur for reasons outside 

management’s control, such as when an accused employee requests additional 

time to respond or when an adjudicator requests additional information. 

However, even after considering such factors, we were not able to determine a 

reasonable explanation for the excessive delays between the date an ICE 

component receives a case file for disposition and when action is initiated to 

adjudicate the case. 

OPLA officials said that when months or years lapse before disciplinary 

action is initiated on a case, the allegation of misconduct loses its urgency and 

it becomes harder to justify a suspension of 14 days or more, removal, or 

demotion. This is especially true in cases where the employee continues to 

hold a position of public trust after a serious allegation is substantiated, and is 

then issued a proposed removal after the case has languished for a year or 

more.

11 Some ICE officials blame OPR for the lack of timeliness in 

completing investigations, while others point to ELR as the source of the 

delay.12 

To emphasize this point, both ELR and OPLA officials cited as an example a 

case known as the “Phoenix Five,” which by some estimates has taken ICE 

four to five years to adjudicate. Based upon the information provided by 

ELR, the case involved five legacy INS employees and various allegations of 

misconduct that occurred between January 2000 and November 2002. OPR 

conducted an investigation and issued substantiated ROIs to the appropriate 

component director in January 2004. However, the case was transferred from 

the ICE field component to ICE headquarters for disciplinary action and 

processing. Proposal letters were issued and then rescinded. The case file 

was then returned to the component for a fresh review. Three of the five cases 

were finally adjudicated in September 2005, one case is being appealed to the 

MSPB, and one employee has filed an Equal Employment Opportunity 

complaint. ICE officials did not provide a clear explanation as to why the 

events unfolded in this manner. 

We asked ELR officials to provide us with the information on the oldest case 

in its system. The case, as described by ELR officials, involved a legacy INS 

criminal investigator who was eventually charged with a lack of candor during 

11 Generally, an employee is not placed on administrative leave during the investigation or pending disciplinary action. 

However, there are circumstances when an employee can be placed on indefinite suspension usually related to the 

initiation of formal criminal charges. 12 In August 2004, we conducted an oversight inspection of OPR to assess the quality and completeness of its internal 

investigations. The report determined that OPR was completing internal investigations in a timely manner.

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the course of an investigation by the Department of Justice’s OIG in January 

2002, for not having a positively adjudicated background investigation since 

1988. As a result of the substantiated lack of candor charge, the employee 

received a proposed removal in July 2003, but the proposal was later 

rescinded because of the delay in adjudication. A new proposal for removal 

was issued in October 2005, and as of August 1, 2006, the removal will be 

upheld unless an appeal is filed with the MSPB.13 

These examples, along with the 147 open ROIs, illustrate deficiencies in 

ICE’s overall ability to adjudicate completed investigations timely. We asked 

ICE officials whether it has performance goals and standards for processing 

and adjudicating disciplinary cases. They responded that the processing of 

cases is dictated by several factors, such as labor agreements, administrative 

procedures, and policies that are based upon case law or federal regulations, 

factors that exist generally for all federal agencies. In addition, ELR officials 

said they are not aware of any government regulation that requires the 

issuance of a decision letter in disciplinary cases within a specific time 

frame.

14 ELR officials also said ICE has informal internal goals that are used 

to assist the process, but considers it disadvantageous to the organization to 

establish formal timelines for rendering decisions. Even though no statutory 

authority requiring federal agencies to adjudicate disciplinary cases within a 

specific timeframe exists, we have concerns that currently there are no 

policies and procedures in place either to compel ICE managers to assess 

discipline expeditiously or to hold them accountable for their inaction. 

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal 

organizations to establish five-year strategic plans with clearly stated strategic 

goals, corresponding annual plans to assess yearly progress toward attaining 

those goals, and annual reports on progress. Although the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993 addresses the major functions and 

operations of federal organizations, the concept of measuring outcomes to 

improve effectiveness applies to all programs and processes. Setting goals 

and measuring performance assists federal organizations establish priorities, 

control operations, document accomplishments, and motivates personnel to 

improve performance. 

ICE’s Interim Strategic Plan for 2005 outlines specific program goals, 

objectives, and strategies for the organization. One strategic objective of the 

plan requires the investigation of allegations of misconduct in a timely 

manner. However, the plan does not include goals and measures pertaining to 

13 The employee’s duties have been restricted pending final adjudication. 14 ELR’s assertion is consistent with standard employee relations practices on the issue. 

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the adjudication phase of the disciplinary process.15 This absence, coupled 

with the need for broader organizational policies, inhibited ICE’s ability to 

identify deficiencies within its disciplinary system and initiate improvements. 

Recommendation 

Recommendation 5: We recommend that ICE establish performance measures 

and standards to ensure that completed investigations are adjudicated in a 

timely manner. 

Penalties Should Be Uniformly Applied 

ICE’s current disciplinary process fails to ensure the uniform treatment of ICE 

employees. Given similar circumstances, a uniform disciplinary system 

should ensure that employees receive similar discipline for similar 

misconduct. However, ICE management cannot determine whether 

disciplinary actions are being applied in a consistent and uniform manner. 

At the time of our review, ICE had five separate Tables of Offenses and 

Penalties for its employees. Two of the tables are from the former INS and 

USCS, one table is from FAMS,16 and one table is from the General Services 

Administration, which covers the Federal Protective Service employees. In 

April 2005, ICE implemented its own interim table for ICE non-bargaining 

unit employees.17 

The use of multiple tables facilitates inconsistent treatment of similar 

employees for similar offenses. This risk is greatly increased because the 

proposing official, who is generally the employee’s supervisor, decides which 

Table of Offenses and Penalties should apply regarding an employee under 

their supervision. Consequently, two similarly situated employees, that 

commit similar misconduct under similar circumstances, within the same unit, 

could receive different penalties. 

The table below demonstrates the range afforded a first offense for 

insubordination and misuse of position across the five applicable Tables of 

Offenses and Penalties utilized by ICE. 

15 In February 2005, ICE submitted their Interim Strategic Performance Plan for DHS approval. 16 For the period covered by this review, FAMS was still a component of ICE. 17 ELR officials said all Tables of Offenses and Penalties apply a similar methodology in that they provide a range of

penalties for certain offenses and are designed to function as a “guide” to assist managers in determining appropriate 

discipline. 

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Figure 2. Comparison of ICE Five Tables of Penalties and Offenses 

Component: 1st Offense18: 

Insubordination 

1st Offense: 

Misuse of Position 

INS Reprimand to removal 15 days to removal 

Customs 5 days to removal Reprimand to 10 days 

FAMS 14 days to removal Reprimand to removal 

General Services 

Administration 

Reprimand to removal Suspension to 

Removal 

ICE (Interim) 5 days to removal 5 days to removal 

Source: ICE Employee Labor Relations. 

ELR officials said they review their individual case management logs to 

ensure uniformity when advising proposing officials or deciding officials on 

similar penalties for similar offenses. Each ELR servicing office uses a 

combination of information from their individual case management logs and 

its staff’s historical knowledge. However, because ELR offices do not have 

the ability to access information from the others’ case management logs, 

proposed penalties cannot be reviewed for uniformity of process across the 

organization. Furthermore, proposing and deciding officials do not always 

seek advice from ELR, so some cases are not reviewed by ELR for 

uniformity. 

ICE officials said efforts to implement an agency-wide Table of Offenses and 

Penalties had been postponed to await the implementation of DHS’ new 

personnel system, known as MaxHR. The MaxHR system will, if implemented, 

permit the implementation of an organization wide Table of Offenses and 

Penalties, without having any formal negotiations with the unions. Because a 

federal district court ruled against DHS on portions of the new personnel 

system, ICE officials have decided to move forward without the benefit of 

MaxHR system flexibilities.19 

18 The descriptions of these first offenses are generalized because each tables use different language and 

characterizations to describe similar offenses. 19 DHS had intended to implement MaxHR performance management components on August 15, 2005. On August 7, 

2005, the Federal District Court ruled sections of MaxHR illegal. On September 9, 2005, DHS circulated an internal 

memorandum stating MaxHR performance-based pay components would be delayed up to one year. 

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ICE officials said the agency is formulating a single Table of Offenses and 

Penalties that will apply to all employees and is preparing notification to its 

unions of ICE’s intention to include bargaining component employees under 

the new table. 

Recommendation 

Recommendation 6: We recommend that ICE implement a single Table of 

Offenses and Penalties that applies to all ICE employees. 

Policies and Management Oversight Are Needed 

ICE does not have a policy that requires its operational divisions to coordinate 

their efforts with ELR in adjudicating completed investigations. There is also 

a lack of oversight of officials involved in the disciplinary process. 

Collectively, these conditions prevent objective enforcement of rules and 

regulations and compromise the integrity of ICE’s disciplinary process. 

Improved Policies Are Needed to Enhance Coordination 

When an investigation is completed, OPR’s Director hand delivers the 

investigative case file to the appropriate component director for review and 

action. However, neither OPR nor ICE component Directors consistently 

provide notification to ELR when a completed investigation has been 

submitted for adjudication. Even when ELR officials are made aware that a 

component has received a completed investigation for adjudication, it is ELR 

policy to wait for the component to contact them for assistance, instead of 

proactively reaching out to offer their services. ELR officials said that severe 

budget and staff shortfalls have hampered its efforts to address this issue, and 

additional staff would be required to facilitate outreach efforts to the 

components. 

More importantly, ELR officials said component managers are not required to 

contact ELR for assistance when they receive a case file for action, and are 

not required to follow or consider ELR’s advice. Of the 246 completed ROIs 

we reviewed, only 71 had been adjudicated to completion. Of those 71 

adjudicated disciplinary cases, 9 were not on ELR’s case management logs, 

which indicates that ELR was not involved in the decision making process 

concerning their adjudication. 

Out of the 246 completed investigations, 28 completed investigations had no 

disciplinary action taken by the component because the alleged misconduct 

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was unsubstantiated by the OPR investigation. We have concerns regarding 

26 of those 28 completed investigations, because the investigations were 

closed by the component without contacting ELR for advice or assistance.20 

Because all completed investigations are forwarded by OPR to the appropriate 

component for review whether or not the allegation of misconduct has been 

substantiated,21 it is imperative ELR be involved in all aspects of the 

disciplinary process to ensure the uniform application of discipline. This is 

particularly important when dealing with unusual or complex cases, such as 

those involving multiple findings of misconduct, more than one employee, or 

multiple tables of offenses. An ELR official said ICE would be issuing a 

directive to provide agency wide guidance on its adverse action process, and 

that this directive would provide guidance on the roles and responsibilities of 

those involved in the disciplinary process. The official did not provide a 

timeframe when the directive would be issued. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 7: We recommend that ICE require its Office of 

Professional Responsibility to notify Employee and Labor Relations when 

completed Reports of Investigations have been transmitted to ICE components 

for adjudication. 

Recommendation 8: We recommend that ICE implement policies to ensure 

all ICE components coordinate with Employee and Labor Relations in the 

adjudication of all completed investigations. 

ICE informed us that it is working to improve coordination, consultation, and 

communication between its operational divisions. ICE officials noted the 

establishment of the ICE Policy Action Committee, an internal policy 

development forum. The committee is responsible for identifying gaps in ICE 

policy and selecting best practices from among the policies formerly used at 

legacy agencies to be incorporated into ICE policies. 

Current Decision Making Process Requires More Management Oversight 

In explaining the mechanics of the ICE disciplinary process, various ICE 

officials told us that deciding officials may take whatever disciplinary or 

20 See Appendix F, Total Reports of Investigation Statistics. 21 The case file is forwarded by OPR to the appropriate component for review even when the alleged misconduct has not

been substantiated because the facts of the investigation may suggest the employee’s conduct warrants corrective 

measures or non-disciplinary remedies. 

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adverse action they deem appropriate,22 including no action, without any 

management oversight.23 One ELR official stated that there was definitely a 

lack of uniformity within the system, resulting in the perception that a “good 

old boys” network still existed where certain infractions were simply made to 

go away. For example, OPR officials noted a recent case that it investigated 

involving a Senior Executive Service employee. The employee had several 

serious charges of substantiated misconduct that were referred to the 

appropriate component director for discipline. The initial decision to impose a 

three-day suspension was rescinded, and a letter of reprimand was imposed, 

which is under appeal.24 OPR officials we interviewed expressed surprise at 

the lenient penalty, considering the serious nature of the misconduct and the 

employee’s seniority and position, and thought the misconduct warranted a 

stronger penalty than was imposed. Another official familiar with the case 

stated that the component responsible for disciplining the employee is widely 

known for being too lenient. OPR officials said this case is an example of 

why better management oversight of the current decision-making process is 

needed. 

The current disciplinary process also raises serious concerns about the 

possibility for inconsistent treatment of employees, especially in cases where 

the maximum punishment is a suspension of less than 14 days, as these cases 

are handled exclusively at the component level.25 Without transparency and 

accountability in the disciplinary process, disciplinary actions can be assessed 

and imposed differently depending upon grade, position, or office. The 

problem is compounded by the fact that ELR has no defined oversight 

authority in the adjudication process, and that ICE has yet to address 

unresolved legacy INS issues regarding the lack of accountability standards 

for ICE employees.26 

22 Supervisors are to consider twelve factors commonly referred to as the “Douglas Factors.” See Douglas v. Veterans 

Administration, 5 Merit Systems Protection Board Reporter 280, which established criteria that supervisors should 

consider in determining an appropriate penalty to impose for an act of employee misconduct. 23 In an October 2001, statement before House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, the 

Department of Justice Inspector General was critical of INS saying, “INS has not sufficiently demanded accountability 

either of individual INS employees or from the organization as a whole.” The Inspector General also said, “Discipline 

for INS employees who have committed misconduct has been spotty and uneven.” 24 According to Office of Personnel Management regulations, an agency may suspend a Senior Executive Service 

employee for 14 days or more, but the regulation is silent on suspensions of 14 days or less, so there are no provisions 

for such suspensions. An agency may issue a reprimand or admonishment for offenses that do not warrant a suspension 

for more than 14 days. 25 Under federal regulations in 5 CFR 752 Parts C and D, an employee has the right to appeal a suspension of more than 

14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, a removal to the MSPB or alternatively arbitration. The MSPB appeal or arbitration 

provides a level of review in the discipline process that a disciplinary action 14-days or less is not afforded. 26 See footnote 23, detailing Department of Justice OIG comments on INS accountability and discipline issues. 

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In June 2005, OPR prepared an internal memorandum proposing that ICE 

explore other alternatives, such as the establishment of a Disciplinary Review 

Board, to promote fairness and consistency in addressing cases of alleged 

employee misconduct. Input was solicited from ICE components to assist in 

the evaluation of different options regarding the implementation of a 

centralized disciplinary system. 

In August 2005, ICE officials elected to implement a new disciplinary system 

similar to a Disciplinary Review Board. Under the new system, disciplinary 

responsibilities would be transferred from the individual ICE component 

where the assessment of the penalty is usually made by the employee’s 

supervisors. Instead, disciplinary responsibilities would rest with a new 

central disciplinary entity at ICE headquarters that would review reports of 

misconduct and propose disciplinary or adverse actions as appropriate. The 

new entity would apply uniform standards of conduct to all ICE employees 

regardless of their grade, position, or office. As described in the internal 

memorandum, the disciplinary process would be a two-tier system consisting 

of a proposing panel and a decision board. The proposing panel would 

consider and issue proposed actions, as well as determine whether lesser 

actions, e.g., reprimands and counselings, should be returned to the 

component manager or ELR for action. The decision board would have the 

responsibility of reviewing all relevant documents, including employee 

responses, and issuing final decisions. ICE officials said they are in the final 

stages of determining staffing requirements and the system should be 

operational by mid 2006.27 

Implementing the new system should provide ICE with a better opportunity to 

establish a single, integrated disciplinary process that is timely and uniform. 

However, we have concerns with how ICE will address current disciplinary 

cases during the transition period. ICE said directives would be issued, but 

these directives were not available during our review and no timeframe was 

provided for when the directives would be implemented. 

Recommendation 

Recommendation 9: We recommend that ICE implement policies for 

processing existing disciplinary cases during the transition to the new 

centralized disciplinary system. 

27 ICE recently began recruiting candidates to the proposing panel and decision board through its pilot Management 

Development Program. The program is open to all Non-Bargaining Unit GS-14 and GS-15 level employees who are 

interested in career development training that focuses on core competency skills related to Senior Executive Service 

level positions. The panel and board will be located at ICE headquarters and positions initially will be held for one year. 

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Coordination Issues Are Affecting Investigation Information Sharing 

We identified two issues that affect information sharing and hamper DHS 

OIG efforts to obtain timely and accurate information on the disciplinary 

status of their ROIs: ineffective ICE procedures for reporting back to OIG and 

unclear guidance on reporting requirements. More focused attention on these 

issues is needed by ICE to ensure an appropriate resolution. 

The Investigative Reporting Process and Requirements Need to be Clarified 

In September 2004, the DHS Inspector General sent a memorandum to the 

Under Secretary for BTS requesting an update on the status of its ROIs. The 

memorandum informed BTS that DHS OIG had not received, as requested, a 

response within 30 days on the status of its ROIs, some of which dated back to 

2003.28 The Under Secretary did not reply to the memorandum. We asked an 

OPR official why the Under Secretary did not reply and were provided a copy 

of an October 13, 2004, memorandum from ICE’s Assistant Secretary to the 

Under Secretary that addressed the Inspector General’s concerns.29 The 

official could not explain why the memorandum was never transmitted to the 

Inspector General. 

DHS OIG routinely attaches a transmittal letter to substantiated ROIs that 

requests a status on the case file within 30 days. OPR passes the ROI and 

reporting requirement on to the appropriate component director for action. An 

OPR official told us that OPR acts only as the postman to deliver ROIs to the 

appropriate component director, and the component is responsible for 

reporting directly back to DHS OIG on the disposition of the completed 

investigation, specifically what disciplinary action, if any, was taken. The 

OPR official stressed that it is in the same position as DHS OIG because ICE 

components are also not reporting back to OPR on the status of its ROIs, and 

OPR does not have the authority to mandate that ICE components report back 

to either entity. 

Also, ICE is not providing the disciplinary status on DHS OIG ROIs in its 

monthly status report.30 We were told ICE is only required to report on all 

28 See Appendix G, DHS Inspector General letter dated September 30, 2004. 29 See Appendix H, ICE’s Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement Letter dated October 13, 2004. 30 In March 2003, BTS and DHS OIG signed a MOU, providing the authority for DHS OIG to investigate allegations of 

misconduct involving BTS employees. In June 2004, DHS issued Management Directive 0810.1 that provided DHS 

OIG with the authority to review all allegations of BTS employee misconduct to determine whether DHS OIG would 

conduct the investigation. Both the memorandum and the directive require ICE to provide monthly status reports on all 

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open investigations, and OPR defines DHS OIG investigations as closed once 

the ROI is completed and forwarded by OPR to the responsible component for 

action.31 However, DHS OIG does not consider its ROIs closed until the 

completed investigation has been adjudicated. The current process is not 

working and both entities have fundamentally different understandings of 

what information is to be reported.32 This lack of coordination demonstrates 

the need for clearly defined policies and procedures for all entities involved in 

the disciplinary process. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 10: We recommend that ICE provide DHS Office of 

Inspector General with a monthly report on the disciplinary status of all 

Reports of Investigation. 

Improvements Are Needed to Track the Distribution of DHS OIG 

Investigations 

We reviewed an initial list of 184 ROIs from DHS OIG to determine how OIG 

investigations are processed and when those investigations are delivered to the 

component directors for action. 

When the JIC receives an ROI from DHS OIG, a document called a “blue 

sheet” and a letter of transmittal are attached to the ROI for internal routing to 

the Director of OPR. Once the Director reviews and approves the ROI for 

release, the blue sheet is returned to the JIC for filing. At some point 

thereafter, OPR’s Director delivers the ROI with a signed transmittal letter to 

the appropriate component director for action. 

According to OPR officials, DHS OIG ROIs are not tracked in its Case 

Management System.

33 Other than the blue sheet, there is no system in place 

to determine when the ROI was received by OPR or when it was delivered to 

a component director for action. For the 184 OIG ROIs we reviewed, the 

majority of transmittal letters did not have dates and many of the blue sheets 

open investigations. However, neither specifically requires reporting on the disciplinary status of DHS OIG 

investigations. See Appendices D and E for further information. 31 OPR defines a continuing or ongoing investigation as open. 32 OPR officials said on numerous occasions they discussed these issues with DHS OIG, but have not reached a 

resolution. 33 A DHS OIG ROI is classified as closed in the Case Management System after it is received into the JIC. The ROI 

receives a first level review at the JIC and is forwarded with a generic transmittal letter for the signature of OPR’s 

Director when the case file is approved for release. A blue sheet is attached to the case file for internal routing to the 

OPR Director. 

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were missing. Without this information, OPR had no way of tracking whether 

the ROIs were received by the JIC, or delivered to the components for 

processing. Under the current system, ROIs could be lost or misplaced 

without OPR’s or OIG’s knowledge. For example, OPR said they never 

received six DHS OIG case files.34 We could not determine whether the ROIs 

were never received by the JIC, or they were lost in OPR’s internal routing 

process. 

Recommendation 

Recommendation 11: We recommend that ICE track the receipt and 

distribution of DHS Office of Inspector General Reports of Investigation. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We issued our draft report to ICE on May 2, 2006, and met with ICE officials 

on May 31, 2006, to discuss the report. ICE provided its written response on 

June 6, 2006, in which it concurred with the report’s information, findings, 

and recommendations. ICE is taking actions to resolve most of the 

deficiencies noted in our report. We consider five recommendations resolved 

and closed. Four recommendations remain resolved and open, and two 

remain unresolved and open. 

Following is our analysis of ICE’s response to our draft report. 

Recommendation 1; We recommend that ICE implement a centralized and 

automated case management system to enhance effective tracking, processing, 

and reporting on disciplinary cases from receipt of an allegation to 

investigation through final adjudication. 

ICE Response: ICE agrees with the recommendation. On October 6, 2006, 

ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) launched the Joint 

Integrity Case Management System (JICMS). This system improves 

management of ICE discipline cases. 

OIG Evaluation: This recommendation is resolved and closed. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that ICE standardize the methodology 

used for recording and collecting disciplinary case information. 

34 There were three ROIs containing two subjects each. As a result of our findings, we informed DHS OIG that these 

ROIs should be reissued. 

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ICE Response: ICE agrees with the recommendation. In developing JICMS, 

OPR worked with ICE Employee and Labor Relations (E&LR) personnel and 

CBP labor employee relations specialists to determine the scope and type of 

data collection protocols needed to record, manage, and track ICE discipline 

cases. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and closed. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that ICE implement a training program 

for all Employee and Labor Relations personnel on the Joint Integrity Case 

Management System. 

ICE Response: ICE agrees with the recommendation. ICE recently 

completed one-on-one training of all ELR personnel who manage and 

adjudicate employee disciplinary matters. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and closed. 

Recommendation 4: We recommend that ICE implement procedures to 

ensure that active disciplinary case file information is transferred to the new 

Joint Integrity Case Management System. 

ICE Response: ICE responded that the recommendation appears to be the 

same as recommendation 9, to which a response has been provided. 

OIG Analysis: ICE has misinterpreted the intent our recommendation. The 

intent of recommendation 4 is to ensure that active and historical disciplinary 

case file information is not lost during the transition period to the new Joint 

Integrity Case Management System (JICMS). Recommendation 9 focuses on 

the need for transparency and consistency in the current decision making 

process. We highlighted in the report the difficulty ELR had in reconstructing 

details of discipline cases, and have concerns this issue has not been 

adequately address by implementation of JICMS. Recommendation 4 is 

unresolved and open. 

Recommendation 5: We recommend that ICE establish performance 

measures and standards to ensure that completed investigations are 

adjudicated in a timely manner. 

ICE Response: ICE agrees with the recommendation. ICE ELR is 

addressing this issue through the MaxHR ePerformance system that includes 

goal requirements based on measurable data and competencies. ICE’s Chief 

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Human Capital Officer is working with DHS to realign all non-bargaining unit 

employees into DHS’ ePerformance system by October 1, 2006. This would 

ensure that MaxHR supervisors, managers, and employees would all be held 

accountable for their respective responsibilities in the discipline process. In 

the interim, ICE programs have been directed to include performance 

standards for managers in their appraisals to emphasize individual 

accountability for the timely adjudication of discipline cases. 

OIG Analysis: ICE is currently in the process of addressing the issue of 

measurable performance standards for employees involved in the discipline 

process. This recommendation is resolved but remains open. 

Recommendation 6: We recommend that ICE implement a single Table of 

Offenses and Penalties that applies to all ICE employees. 

ICE Response: ICE agrees with the recommendation. Compliance is 

underway, in that the agency-wide Table of Offenses and Penalties (TOP) has 

been finalized and forwarded to the respective unions for review and 

comment. ICE is required to wait for the unions to submit comments and 

requests for negotiations, and complete any related dispute resolution before 

the agency-wide TOP can be implemented. 

OIG Analysis: ICE is currently in the process of implementing an agencywide Table of Offenses and Penalties. This recommendation is resolved and 

open. 

Recommendation 7: We recommend that the Office of Professional 

Responsibility notify Employee and Labor Relations when completed Reports 

of Investigations have been transmitted to the ICE components for 

adjudication. 

ICE Response: ICE agrees with the recommendation. With the 

implementation of the Joint Integrity Case Management System (JICMS), 

ELR can directly confirm the real-time status of all administrative cases. 

Additionally, the Office of Professional Responsibility provides ELR with a 

hard copy of the final Report of Investigation (Redbook), when it is provided 

to the ICE directorate for adjudication. 

OIG Analysis: ICE did not provide any specificity on actions taken or 

planned to ensure ELR also receives notification of DHS’ Reports of 

Investigation (Blackbooks). This recommendation is resolved and open. 

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Recommendation 8: We recommend that ICE implement policies to ensure 

all ICE components coordinate with Employee and Labor Relations in the 

adjudication of all completed investigations. 

ICE Response: ICE agrees, and is in the process of implementing a 

Discipline and Adverse Action Process (DAAP) that will institute one uniform 

and consistent discipline system for its employees. The DAAP places 

responsibility for all disciplinary actions, except reprimands and counseling 

with the DAAP panel instead of field managers. The DAAP panel will review 

all investigations and make decisions regarding proposed penalties and 

charges. Designated officials will make final decisions on such actions after 

hearing employee replies, and reviewing the facts and aggravating and 

mitigating factors. E&LR and ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 

(OPLA), will review discipline cases for legal and administrative sufficiency. 

OIG Analysis: ICE is currently in the process of adopting a new discipline 

system that has not been fully implemented. This recommendation is resolved 

and open. 

Recommendation 9: We recommend that ICE implement policies for 

processing existing disciplinary cases during the transition to the new 

centralized disciplinary system. 

ICE Response: ICE responded that policies, procedures, and implementation 

guidelines have been written and reviewed in conjunction with 

implementation of its Discipline and Adverse Action Process (DAAP) panel. 

OIG Analysis: ICE did not provide any specificity on actions taken or 

planned that we consider responsive to the intent of the recommendation. We 

intended to highlight the absence of any specific discussions by ICE officials 

as to how the agency plans to ensure transparency and consistency of process 

in the decision making process for existing discipline cases until the DAAP is 

implemented. This recommendation remains unresolved and open. 

Recommendation 10: We recommend that ICE provide DHS Office of 

Inspector General with a monthly report on the disciplinary status of all 

Reports of Investigation. 

ICE Response: ICE has provided the DHS OIG full access to JICMS, which 

provides us with the capability to view investigations and adjudications as 

they progress and generate current reports from the system. ICE has also 

provided our investigative staff with JICMS training. 

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OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and closed. 

Recommendation 11: We recommend that ICE track the receipt and 

distribution of DHS Office of Inspector General Reports of Investigation. 

ICE Response: ICE agrees with the recommendation. ICE Office of 

Professional responsibility has established a tracking database into existing 

protocols to improve tracking of DHS OIG investigations. ICE in its response 

requested DHS OIG provide OPR with one bound copy full copy of each 

report and also one copy without evidentiary materials in electronic portable 

document format. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with the actions and initiatives taken. We will 

forward ICE’s request regarding delivery protocols for DHS OIG 

investigations to the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations for review 

and appropriate action. This recommendation is resolved and closed. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The purpose of our review was to determine whether completed OIG and ICE 

investigations involving employee disciplinary actions were being processed 

in a uniform and timely manner. We focused on the current procedures to 

establish a single, integrated disciplinary process for employees. 

We reviewed the status of ROIs performed between January 2003 and August 

2005 and analyzed case management logs provided by DHS OIG, OPR, ELR 

headquarters, and ELR servicing offices in Texas and California. 

We interviewed officials from the various ICE components, as well as DHS 

OIG. The majority of our fieldwork was performed in Washington, DC. 

We also reviewed ICE policies, memoranda, and organization charts. These 

included a white paper on the Discipline Review Process, Customs, INS, 

FAMS, and ICE interim Tables of Offenses and Penalties, internal 

memoranda on the Discipline Review Process, Discipline and Adverse Action 

Procedures, and documentation on ICE budget and staffing. 

Our fieldwork was performed between August 2005 and September 2005. 

This review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections 

issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft 

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Appendix B 

Management Response to Draft 

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Appendix C 

ICE Organization Chart 

Chief of Staff 

Principal 

Legal Advisor 

Office of 

Professional 

Responsibility 

Assistant Secretary 

Policy & Planning 

Office of 

Resource 

Management 

Director 

Of 

Operations 

Federal Protective 

Service 

Federal Air 

Marshal Service 

Detention and 

Removal 

Operations 

International Affairs 

Special Agents in 

Charge 

Field Unit 

Directors 

Office of 

Investigations 

Office of 

Intelligence 

Regional Directors Special Agents in 

Charge 

Field Office 

Directors 

Facility Security 

Managers 

Security Officers 

Field Offices 

Air Marshals 

Removal Unit 

Removal Officers 

Resident Agents in 

Charge 

Resident Agents 

Resident Agents in 

Charge 

Resident Agents 

Operational/Core Elements 

35 

35 FAMS was removed from ICE as of October 16, 2005, and is now part of the Transportation Security Administration 

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Appendix D 

DHS Management Directive 0810.1 Appendix A 

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Appendix D 

DHS Management Directive 0810.1 Appendix A 

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Appendix E 

DHS and BTS Memorandum of Understanding 

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Appendix E 

DHS and BTS Memorandum of Understanding 

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36

Appendix F 

Total Reports of Investigation Statistics 

Total Reports of Investigation Statistics 

January 2003 – August 2005

TOTAL REPORTS OF INVESTIGATION (DHS OIG and OPR) 

Total Reports of Investigation 385 

Minus Records Out of Scope36 -117 

Records Sent to ELR for Status Review 268 

Minus Records with Errors37 -22 

TOTAL RECORDS 246 

Source: DHS Office of Inspector General and ICE Office of Professional Responsibility investigation records. 

STATUS Reports of 

Investigation 

On ELR Log Not on ELR 

Log 

Questionable 

Data Provided 

Records Open38 147 0 147 

Records Action 

Pending, Proposed, or 

Taken 

71 62 9 23 records had missing or 

incomplete information. 

2 other records were logged by 

ELR with multiple active entry 

dates. 

Records No Action 

Taken - No 

Independent 

Oversight39 

28 2 26 3 records had missing or 

incomplete information. 

Total Records 246 64 182 

Source: DHS Office of Inspector General, ICE Office of Professional Responsibility, and ICE Employee and Labor Relations 

Records. 

 The 117 records excluded were: 23 records were removed because they were outside our scope (2002), 21 records 

were removed because the subjects were unknown, 20 civilian records, 16 resigned/retired, 11 non-ICE employees, 8 

records OPR said they never received from OIG Investigations, 7 duplicate or inconsistent/unidentifiable names or case 

numbers, 6 Non-ICE Employees, 4 duplicate or subject unknown records (irreconcilable), and 1 case was referred back 

to OIG for processing. 37 We excluded from our review 21 records because of inconsistent or missing dates between OPR and ELR records, and 

1 record because of a duplicate or inconsistent/unidentifiable name. 38 We define an “open” case as a completed investigation that has been forwarded to the appropriate component director 

for review and action, but where no visible action has been documented to date. 39 We define a record with no action taken and no independent oversight as a completed investigation that has been 

forwarded to the appropriate component director for review and action, but was closed without action and without any 

independent oversight from ELR or OPLA. 

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Appendix G 

DHS Inspector General Letter Concerning 

Delinquent Replies 

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Appendix H 

ICE’s Assistant Secretary for Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Letter 

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Appendix H 

ICE’s Assistant Secretary for Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Letter 

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Appendix H 

ICE’s Assistant Secretary for Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Letter 

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Appendix H 

ICE’s Assistant Secretary for Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Letter 

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Appendix I 

Major Contributors 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

Carolyn Aya Johnson, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections and Special Reviews 

Ryan Carr, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections and Special Reviews 

A Review of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Disciplinary Procedures

Page 43 
Appendix J 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

DHS GAO OIG Audit Liaison 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Audit Liaison 

Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection 

Customs and Border Protection, Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

A Review of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Disciplinary Procedures

Page 44 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 

254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or 

noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG Hotline 

at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, 

Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to 

protect the identity of each writer and caller.