COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judg es Alston, Decker and Senior Judge Coleman Argued by teleconference

JASON LAFIA MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1149-14-3 PER CURIAM JANUARY 20, 2015 ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE Charles N. Do rsey, Judge L. Brad Braford for appellant. Heather P. Ferguson, Assistant City Attorney (Daniel J. Callaghan, City Attorney; Charles J. Covati, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief) for appellee.
Jason Lafia, father, appeals the trial court order terminatin g his parental rights to his daughter, B.L-M. On appeal, he argues the evidence was insufficient to terminate his parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E) and to establish the goal of adoption. 1 B.L-M. was born on September 18 , 2013. On that date, Meagan Waid, an investigator with the Roanoke City Department of Social Services, (RCDSS), spoke with the child’s mother at the hospital and attempted to ta lk with father via telephone. However, father refused to speak with Waid. Waid testified RCDSS had wo rked with father in the past c oncerning another child, H.L. Father’s parental rights to H.L. were involuntarily te rminated in April of 2013.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 Although the parties initially waived oral argument, this was a case deserving of oral argument. Therefore, the Court invited th e parties to present oral argument.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - On September 20, 2013, Waid returned to the hosp ital and inquired if the parents had made alternative arrangements fo r caretakers for B.L-M. Waid testifie d father was angry, he did not want to speak with her, and he told her he did not have any family nearby. Father also told Waid the only person who helped the fami ly was the payee who assisted with hi s social security payments. Waid further testified father was not re sponsive to her attempts to discuss possible services RCDSS could recommend to him. Waid also st ated the hospital had attempted to teach father techniques to care for B.L-M. However, it di d not appear father reta ined the information. Courtney Jackson, a family services specialist with RCDSS, testified concerning the involvement of RCDSS with father regarding H.L. H.L. wa s born on August 22, 2011 and was placed in the legal custody of RCD SS on August 29, 2011. Jackson testified the original goal for H.L. was to return her to the family home. In order to achieve th at goal, father was to maintain contact with RCDSS, complete a parental capaci ty assessment, complete reunification services, attend visitation, and maintain employment and stable ho using. RCDSS offere d father outpatient counseling, substance abuse counseling, reunificati on services, supervised visitation, a parental capacity assessment, and a domesti c violence and abuse pr evention assessment. Father completed the psychological evaluation, and he cooperated with the reunific ation services. He failed to complete outpatient counseling and substance abus e counseling. Additionally, he did not complete the domestic violence assessment. Father had supervis ed visitation with the ch ild in the presence of an attachment specialist wh o assisted father with developing sk ills for caring for H. L. However, by April 2013, father had no t progressed past the need for supervis ion during his visits and RCDSS had concerns for father’s ability to ca re for H.L. Evidence was presente d that father sustained a closed head injury in 2011. Alexandria Bell, the foster care worker for B.L-M., testified fa ther told her he did not want any services from RCDSS. While B.L-M. was in the custody of RCD SS, father attended supervised- 3 - visitation with her. Bell testified that during eac h visit someone had to inte rvene with father’s care for the child. For example, father continuously failed to hold or feed B. L-M. appropriately, even after repeated intervention and instruction. Bell also stated father did not understand the developmental milestones of an in fant. Bell testified father has poor retention and is unable to implement basic parenting skills despite his best efforts. In addition, B.L-M. suffers from numerous medical issues. Father testified he refused services from RCD SS related to the care of B.L-M. because they suggested the same services he had previously been offered. He also as serted he had completed some of those services. Father testified he wa s now ready to cooperate by receiving services recommended by RCDSS, if given the opportunity. Father agreed that his 2011 head injury had an impact on his life and that he was no longer able to take care of his finances without assistance. Father’s counsel asked father if he had “any family anywhere that would be able to help” him with the care of B.L- M. Father responded, “I got someone in New York.” Father’s counsel asked, “Have you provided that information to the Department?” Father responded, “No.” Father identified the family memb er as “Debbie,” his aunt. Father di d not know Debbie’s last name and he stated that, although he spoke w ith Debbie “this week,” he did not discuss with her the possibility of her assisting in the care of B.L- M. Father testified Debbie knew B.L-M. was in foster care. The record contains a Foster Care Service Plan that states RCDSS asked both father and mother if any appropriate relatives could care for B. L-M. and they “were unab le to name anyone.” The plan further provides: “A relative search wa s done through Lexis-Nexis. Approximately seven letters were sent out to relatives of both [mother] and [father] that resulted in this search; however, to date, no one has contacted this agency regardin g [B.L-M.].” The plan doe s not state the names of any of these relatives.- 4 - At the conclusion of the evidence, father argu ed that he had provided “at least a little bit of information about an aunt in New York,” and he requested that the trial court con tinue the case and direct RCDSS to explore Debbie as a pos sible relative placem ent for B.L-M. The guardian ad litem opined that father “sim ply cannot take care of this child” and that it was in the best interest of B.L-M. to terminate father’s parental rights. The guardian ad litem also disagreed with the assertion that Debbie was “going to be appropriate,” stating, “[s]he would have volunteered it by now. She knew what was going on.” The trial court found father had not failed to do anythi ng that he had the ability to do. The trial court ruled the “requirements of law have been met,” it terminated fath er’s parental rights to B.L-M. pursuant to Co de § 16.1-283(E), and it approved th e goal of adoption for the child. The law is ve ry clear that: [w]hen addressing matters concerning the custody and care of a child, this Court’s paramount consideration is the child’s best interests. On appeal, we presum e that the trial court thoroughly weighed all the evidence, consider ed the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests. The trial court is vested with broa d discretion in making decisions “necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” We will not disturb a trial court’s factua l findings on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Brown v. Spotsylvania Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 43 Va. App. 205, 211, 597 S.E.2d 214, 217 (2004) (citations omitted). Code § 16.1-283(A) provides, in pertinent part, that before terminating parental rights, “the c ourt shall give a consideration to granting custody to relatives of th e child, including grandparents.” This Court has held that term ination of parental rights is considered a grave proceeding and other remedies should be sought when available. Before te rmination of parental rights by the court, the agency seeking te rmination has an affirmative duty to investigate all reasonable options for placement with immediate relatives. Code § 16.1-283(A). The agency seeking termination has the burden to show that no reasonable alternatives exist; relatives who may be considered as alternatives have no duty to present themselves as such.- 5 - Sauer v. Franklin Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Se rvs., 18 Va. App. 769, 771, 446 S.E.2d 640, 641 (1994) (other citations omitted). The duty to investigate is a rule of re ason dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. “As long as evidence in the record supports the trial court’s ruling and the trial court has not abusedits discretion, its ruli ng must be affirmed on appeal.” Brown v. Brown, 30 Va. App. 532, 538, 518 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1999). While we recognize that it wa s the responsibility of RCDSS to investigate all reasonable potential relative placements and that “relatives who may be considered as alternatives have no duty to present themselves as such[,]” Saue r, 18 Va. App. at 771, 446 S.E.2d at 641, there is no evidence in the record that Debbie is suitable or willing to care for B.L-M ., particularly in light of B.L-M.’s medical issues. In addition, the record does not indicat e that prior to the termination hearing, father suggested to RCDSS that Debbie s hould be considered as a potential custodian. When B.L-M. was two days old, the RCDSS investig ator asked father if he had “any family” and he responded that he did not have any family “near by.” Prior to that conversation, father refused to speak with the investigator on the telephone. Furthermore, fath er testified at the termination hearing that he had not provi ded RCDSS with information concerning Debbie. RCDSS was not required to investigate th e home of every relative of a child, especially those whom father failed to suggest to RCDSS. See Hawthorne v. Smyt h Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 33 Va. App. 130, 139, 531 S.E.2d 639, 644 (2000) (“It is well established in Virginia that a court will not compel ‘a vain and useless undertaking.’” (quoting Virginia Passenger & Power Co. v. Fisher, 104 Va. 121, 129, 51 S.E. 198, 201 (1905))). Moreover, despite the fact that father testif ied he had recently conversed with Debbie, he stated he did not discuss the po ssibility of her caring for B.L-M. In addition, he did not secure Debbie’s presence at the terminati on hearing and she was aware that the child was in foster care.- 6 - Further, t he Foster Care Service Plan stated that RCDSS inquired of both father and mother if any appropriate relatives coul d care for B.L-M. and they “were unable to name anyone.” RCDSS conducted a relative search and sent approximately seven letters to relatives of both mother and father, but received no responses. The Foster Care Service Plan di d not state the names of any of these relatives. Thus, RCDSS investigated the ex istence of relatives of B.L-M. and made efforts to contact these relatives in order to determine a possible al ternative placement for B.L-M. Evaluating and investigating alternative placement of a child with a rela tive is a very important part of the process when considering whether to terminate parental rights . On this reco rd, and given that father failed to provide RCDSS with Debbie’s name when asked, we can not say the trial cour t erred in ruling the statutory requirements were met. Father also contends the evid ence was insufficient to terminate his parental rights to B.L-M. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E). “[A] termination pursuant to Code § 1 6.1-283(E)(i) must be based upon clear and convincing evidence that th e action is in the best inte rests of the child. See Code § 16.1-283(E). In addition, the trial court must find the parent’s rights to a sibling of the child previously had been terminated. See Code § 16.1-283(E)(i).” Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’ t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (f ootnote omitted). Clear and convincing evidence prov ed that termination was in the best interests of B.L-M. Father sustained a closed head injury in 2011 and since that time he has been unable to take care of his finances without the assistance of a payee. He agreed the head injury has had an impact on his life. Evidence was presented that, despite instruction provi ded to father by an attachment specialist, father lacks the skills ne eded to meet the basic needs of B.L-M. Bell testified father has poor retention and is unableto implement basic pa renting skills despite his best efforts. In the past, father- 7 - has refused to participate in services recommended by RCDSS, although at trial, he stated he was, at that time, willing to do so . Furthermore, B.L-M. has numerous seri ous medical issues that require ongoing medical care. Moreover, evidence was pres ented that father was al so unable to care for B.L-M.’s older sibling, H.L., and his parental rights to that childwere terminated in 2013. Virginia law recognizes the “maxim that, sometimes, the most reliable way to gauge a person’s fu ture actions is to examine those of his past.” Petry v. Petry, 41 Va. App. 782, 793, 589 S.E.2d 458, 463 (2003). “As many courts have observed, one permissible ‘measure of a parent’s future po tential is undoubtedly revealed in the parent’s past behavior with th e child.’” Id. “No one can divine with any assurance the future course of human events. Nevertheless, past actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of wh at the future may be expected to hold.” Winfield v. Urquhart, 25 Va. App. 688, 696-97, 492 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1997). Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 267-68, 616 S. E.2d 765, 770 (2005). At the time of the te rmination hearing, B.L-M. had been in foster care for seven months. Nothing in the record suggests th at “the mere passage of time” would resolve father’s parental difficulties. See Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 312, 456 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1995) . “Thus, further delay would prolon g [B.L-M.]’s familial instab ility without the prom ise of benefit to h[er], a result clearly contrary to the child’s best interests.” Id. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find ou t when, or even if, a pa rent will be capable of resuming his or [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywo od v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’ t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E. 2d 492, 495 (1990). It is importan t for a child to have permanence and stability in her life. Fath er has not demonstrated an ability to adequately care for and provide for B.L-M. Thus, clear and convincing evidence proved that termination of father’s parental rights and establishing the foster care goal of adop tion are in the best in terests of the child. Based on the evidence concerning the effort by RCDSS to locate suitable re latives willing and able to assume custo dy of B.L-M. and father’s inability to care for B. L-M., we cannot say the- 8 - trial court erred in finding th at RCDSS presented clear and convi ncing evidence satisfying the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283(E) and proving that it wa s in the best interests of the child to terminate father’s parental rights. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.