UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 03-4136

KEVIN RYAN ROBINSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg.

Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.

(CR-01-1148)

Submitted: January 30, 2004

Decided: March 1, 2004

Before WIDENER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

David Bruce Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. James

Strom Thurmond, Jr., United States Attorney, Dean Arthur Eichelberger, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Kevin Ryan Robinson pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000). He was sentenced to 57

months in prison. Robinson now appeals. His attorney has filed a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising

three grounds for relief but stating that, in his opinion, there are no

meritorious issues for review. Robinson has filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm. 

I.

The Homes of the C.S.R.A., Inc. (CSRA), was a South Carolina

corporation that sold manufactured housing and operated under several names. Robinson was one of several CSRA employees indicted

for wire fraud. The purpose of the fraud was to make it appear that

unqualified customers were qualified to receive loans to buy homes,

and thereby to facilitate CSRA’s sale of more homes. Falsified financial information was sent to various out-of-state lenders by facsimile.

Typically, the facsimiles included bogus information about a purchaser’s employment and income. Often, information faxed to lenders significantly overstated the amount of a down payment that a purchaser

had made. 

After four days of trial, Robinson agreed to plead guilty to Count

Thirteen of the indictment, which charged him with wire fraud in connection with a sale of a home to Arthur Tyler. At Robinson’s Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11 hearing, the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)

summarized the transaction. A document that was transmitted to a

lender represented that Tyler paid $9148.23 as a down payment, when

in reality Tyler had paid only $2000. Additionally, the document gave

false job information about Tyler. Robinson instructed a salesman,

Roger Casteal, to insert the bogus job information. 

Robinson informed the court that the AUSA had correctly summarized the transaction. He specifically admitted that he signed off on

the documents knowing that the information about Tyler’s down pay2 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
ment and employment was false and knowing that the lender would

rely on this false information when considering the loan application.

Robinson’s probation officer prepared a presentence report that calculated an offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of III,

for a resulting guideline range of 57-71 months. Robinson was subject

to a statutory maximum of five years, and his guideline range became

57-60 months. He received a 57-month sentence. 

II

None of the claims raised in the Anders brief has merit. First, the

district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Second, the district court did not clearly err in increasing Robinson’s offense level

by two levels for obstruction of justice. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1997). In this regard, we note evidence that

Robinson recruited several women to set up phone lines in their

homes and verify bogus employment and income information when

lenders called to confirm information in loan applications. One of

these women testified at trial that Robinson, after apparently learning

that authorities were investigating the scheme, instructed her to disconnect the phone lines and to destroy all incriminating records. 

Third, the district court did not clearly err in refusing to give Robinson an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See USSG

§ 3E1.1. Although Robinson admitted involvement in the Arthur

Tyler transaction, he subsequently denied all involvement with bogus

employment information. Robinson thus "falsely denie[d], or frivolously contest[ed], relevant conduct that the court [had] determine[d]

to be true," and he was not entitled to the deduction. See United States

v. Pauley, 289 F.3d 254, 261 (4th Cir.), modified, 304 F.3d 335 (4th

Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1178 (2003). 

III

In his pro se brief, Robinson frivolously disavows involvement in

fictitious job verifications and in the Arthur Tyler transaction. Additionally, he claims that the amount of loss attributed to him was inaccurate. Our review of the record discloses that the district court did

UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 3
not clearly err in finding that the amount of loss attributable to Robinson was $993,792.16. See USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1); United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1274 (4th Cir. 1995). In arriving at this figure, the

court considered a list of fifty fraudulent transactions in which Robinson was involved. In each case, the loan was in default, and the home

was repossessed and sold. The loss for each house identified on the

list was the principal balance less the sale price of the home, with

some other minor adjustments. The court observed that the list was

conservative as it did not represent all the fraudulent transactions with

which Robinson was involved, but instead only those loans that were

in default. 

IV

We accordingly affirm Robinson’s conviction and sentence. In

accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire record and find

no meritorious issues for appeal. This court requires that counsel

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court

of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be

frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was

served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON