Office of Inspector General 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

A Review of Procedures to Prevent 

Passenger Baggage Thefts 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

OIG-05-17 March 2005 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared by the OIG as 

part of its DHS oversight responsibility to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the 

department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the checked baggage screening process 

employed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to prevent passenger baggage thefts 

and to process loss or stolen baggage claims. It is based on interviews with employees of TSA and

other officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable 

documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this report 

will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all 

of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 

Richard L. Skinner 

Acting Inspector General 
Contents 

A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 1

 Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 2 

Results in Brief .............................................................................................................................. 2 

 Background.................................................................................................................................... 3 

 Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.................................................................................................. 3 

 Checked Baggage Screening Process ............................................................................................ 3 

 Passenger and Carry-on Baggage Screening Processes ................................................................. 5 

 Instances of Baggage Content Thefts ..............................................................................................6 

 Background Checks of Baggage Screeners .....................................................................................8 

 Baggage Screener Training..............................................................................................................9 

 Missing Items Claims Processing ..................................................................................................10 

Appendices 

 Appendix A: Notification of Baggage Inspection Form........................................................14 

 Appendix B: Management Comments ..................................................................................15 

 Appendix C: OIG Analysis of Management Comments.......................................................18 

 Appendix D: Recommendations............................................................................................21 

 Appendix E: Major Contributors to this Report....................................................................22 

 Appendix F: Report Distribution ..........................................................................................23 

Abbreviations 

 ATA Airline Travelers Association 

 ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

 CMC Claims Management Center 

 CMO Claims Management Office 

 DHS Department of Homeland Security 

 FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

 FTCA Federal Tort Claims Act 

 HSA Homeland Security Act of 2002 

 OIAPR Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review 

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

 TSA Transportation Security Administration 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 2

 

Introduction 

In September 2003, we received a letter from Congressman Jim Turner containing 

several recommendations for audits, inspections, and investigations, including a 

reference to passenger criticisms about stolen, lost, and damaged baggage. 

Congressman Turner urged us to undertake a review of Transportation Security 

Administration’s (TSA) processing of passenger and checked baggage. In 

response to this request, we reviewed the passenger baggage screening process to 

determine the efficacy of TSA’s procedures to prevent baggage thefts, as well as 

the theft of baggage contents, and process lost or stolen baggage claims. 

Results in Brief 

From January 1, 2003, shortly after TSA was mandated to screen 100% of all 

checked baggage, to September 30, 2004, 37 baggage screeners were fired for 

committing thefts. Of these, 36 began employment before their background 

checks were completed. Also, TSA passenger and baggage screeners do not 

receive any specific ethics training before they begin employment or formal ethics 

training while on the job. 

Of the approximately 14,600 claims for items missing from passengers’ baggage, 

3,680 claims have been settled; 3,320 claims have been paid in full; 1,725 claims

have been denied; and 5,875 claims are pending. Approximately $736,000 has 

been paid to claimants for missing items.1

 In the absence of an agreement on 

shared liability with the airlines, TSA decided unilaterally to settle the pending 

missing items claims in July 2004. Since then, TSA reduced the number of 

missing items claims by 54%, from nearly 13,000 to 5,875 by September 2004. 

We are recommending that TSA: 

1. Evaluate the adequacy of supervision, the physical layout of inspection 

stations, and the feasibility of installing electronic surveillance techniques

near inspection stations. 

2. Include a module on professional ethics in its screening training 

curriculum.

3. Resume negotiating an agreement with the airline industry on shared 

liability for lost or stolen baggage claims. 

1

 The statistics summarize claims processing activity for the period November 2002-September 2004. 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 3

Background 

Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) following 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States (Pub. L. 107-71) and 

created the Transportation Security Administration. TSA assumed the mission of 

protecting the nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement of 

people and commerce. The federal security screener workforce completed the 

takeover of passenger screening from private sector contractor employees in 

November 2002 and baggage screening in December 2002. 

TSA screens more than 250 million pieces of checked and carry-on passenger 

baggage annually at the nation’s 429 commercial airports. Since TSA screeners 

began inspections in November 2002, the agency has received more than 14,600 

complaints concerning missing items. 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The objectives of our review were to assess the passenger baggage screening 

process to identify its vulnerabilities for theft; and, recommend actions, as

appropriate, that would prevent or diminish baggage thefts, as well as improve 

lost or stolen baggage claims processing. 

We analyzed applicable rules and procedures relating to baggage handling and the 

handling of claims for lost or stolen baggage. We interviewed TSA officials from

the Claims Management Office (CMO), Office of Internal Affairs and Program

Review (OIAPR), Office of Human Resources, and four major airports. We 

observed checked and carry-on baggage and passenger checkpoint screening 

processes at: Ronald Reagan Washington National airport; BaltimoreWashington International airport; John F. Kennedy International airport; and 

LaGuardia International airport. Finally, we interviewed officials from two large 

commercial airlines and contacted an airlines’ passenger advocacy group and an 

airlines’ representatives group to obtain their assessment on the extent of the 

baggage theft issue. The airline advocacy group, however, did not respond to our 

questions. 

Our review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by 

the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

 

Checked Baggage Screening Process 

In early 2002, while still assigned to the Department of Transportation, TSA 

began screening checked baggage using equipment previously deployed at 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 4

 

airports. TSA deployments of explosives detection equipment began in mid2002, and by January 1, 2003, it was screening all checked baggage for explosives 

and prohibited items at each of the 429 commercial airports across the United 

States. A percentage of all checked baggage undergoes exterior testing only; a 

percentage of bags are opened and the inside lining seams are tested; and, for a 

smaller percentage, the bags are opened fully and thoroughly tested. 2

When a TSA screener opens a checked bag, which is locked with a TSArecognized lock, the baggage screener will unlock it and then relock the baggage 

after the inspection.3

 If the lock is not TSA-recognized,4 the baggage screener 

will attempt to unlock it with a master key. However, if unsuccessful, the lock 

may be cut or broken in order to complete the inspection. After a TSA screener 

opens the baggage, the screener is required to provide the traveler with a printed 

notification that his or her baggage was opened and inspected by authorized TSA 

security personnel (see Appendix A). 

Airlines assume responsibility for checked baggage at check-in. TSA has 

responsibility for checked baggage from the time it accepts the baggage for 

security screening. After checked baggage is screened or manually inspected, it is 

moved, usually by a conveyor system, to a restricted area at the airport referred to 

as the “bag room.” Once the baggage arrives there for sorting and loading onto 

aircraft, the airlines resume responsibility for its security. Although airline 

baggage handlers do not have a reason to open checked baggage, they have a brief 

but uninterrupted opportunity to rifle through baggage during aircraft loading. 

TSA officials believe that airline employees are responsible for a large percentage 

of thefts. TSA officials estimate that checked baggage is under the airlines’ 

control about 90% of the time. 

The location and number of checked baggage screening equipment varies among 

airports. Typically, baggage screening equipment is positioned either adjacent to 

the ticketing area or in the bag room, which usually is not accessible to the public. 

Some airports use a combination of baggage screening locations. For example, 

Ronald Reagan Washington National airport has screening machines adjacent to 

the airline ticket counters. Baltimore-Washington International airport, LaGuardia 

and John F. Kennedy International airport have screening machines in the vicinity 

of ticket counters and machines in its bag rooms. 

2

 In addition to the formula-driven testing, testing can occur when the explosive detection equipment senses an explosive 

or a suspicious item. In such cases, a TSA screener will manually inspect the suspect baggage, which may involve 

opening the bag and examining its contents. 3

 The “Travel Tips” section on the TSA website advises passengers to lock their baggage with a TSA-recognized lock

and when possible, place valuable items in their carry-on baggage. 4

 TSA concedes that TSA-recognized locks do malfunction, and it does not assume liability for damage to any type of

baggage locking mechanism.
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 5

 

A notification of baggage inspection form is placed in checked baggage after the 

bag has been opened and inspected. The note does not identify the screener who 

opened the bag. A TSA official said that the ability to identify individual 

screeners who open baggage would have little effect, if any, on theft deterrence. 

This official believes that baggage screeners with criminal intent would not place 

an identifier in a bag from which they have stolen items; baggage screeners who 

correctly identify themselves are not likely to steal; and perpetrators could sign 

another screener’s name on the inspection notification or place a false identifier in 

the bag. In addition, providing individualized inspection notices for nearly 17,000 

baggage screeners would be difficult logistically and could create control issues. 

Therefore, TSA opposes the use of a baggage inspection notice that identifies the 

individual screener who opened the bag. 

Passenger and Carry-on Baggage Screening Processes 

On October 8, 2001, the Federal Aviation Administration issued an advisory that 

limits passengers to one carry-on bag and one personal bag, i.e., purse or 

briefcase. Airlines retained the discretion to set policy regarding the size and 

weight of carry-on items. Regardless of the airlines’ policies, each piece of carryon baggage must be screened for prohibited or suspicious items by a TSA 

screener. Carry-on baggage checks occur at a screening station or checkpoint 

where passengers themselves are checked prior to boarding their aircraft.

Passengers pass through a metal detector and carry-on items are x-rayed. 

Some passengers are sent to secondary screening based on TSA protocols or when 

their carry-on items activate an alarm at the screening checkpoint. TSA baggage 

screeners have the discretion and are authorized to refer passengers to secondary 

screening based on their own observations and judgment, even in the absence of 

one of the foregoing premises. When a passenger is selected for a secondary 

screening, his or her carry-on baggage may be opened and examined by a TSA 

screener. It is at this point that theft of contents from carry-on baggage can occur. 

According to TSA, 20 theft cases have occurred at passenger checkpoints since it 

began baggage screening. TSA baggage screeners have stolen change, paper 

currency, credit cards, pens, watches, cell phones, and jewelry from carry-on 

baggage. In addition, similar items unintentionally left at passenger checkpoints 

by travelers have been stolen. According to the baggage screeners’ training 

manual, loose change and other cash must be turned over to the checkpoint 

supervisor. TSA retains unclaimed money recovered at any airport security 

checkpoint for use toward expenses related to civil aviation security.5

5

 See 49 U.S.C. 44945, Disposition of Unclaimed Money, added by Pub.L. 108-334 (October 18, 2004). 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 6

 

When a passenger inadvertently leaves personal property other than cash at a 

screening checkpoint, the item is normally kept at that checkpoint for a few hours 

in the event the passenger returns to claim it. If the passenger does not return to 

claim the property, TSA makes a record of the item left behind and sends it to the 

airport’s lost and found facility. 

 Instances of Baggage Contents Theft 

We could not ascertain an authoritative estimate of the extent of passenger 

baggage content theft, either generally or since TSA took over baggage screening. 

We requested such data from the Air Travelers Association (ATA), an air 

passenger advocacy group. ATA did not provide empirical data, but reported that 

carriers have noticed increases in loss-of-contents complaints since physical 

inspection of checked baggage began. The magnitude of these increases varies 

from carrier to carrier, but it is appreciable. According to ATA, the rise in loss-ofcontents is occurring because passengers’ checked baggage is regularly opened 

and searched according to TSA security procedures, which is a new part of the 

baggage examination process rarely performed by the previous private screeners. 

Recent media reports have cited instances of baggage thefts. For example, two 

baggage screeners were arrested and charged with grand theft for allegedly 

stealing baggage at Miami International airport.6

 In this case, after checked 

baggage was screened at checkpoints in the airport’s ticketing area, the accused 

baggage screeners opened the bags in the restricted baggage handling area one 

floor below the ticketing area and stole compact discs, cologne, and digital 

videodisc players. At the New Orleans Louis Armstrong International airport, 

four baggage screeners were arrested for removing items from passengers’ bags 

and selling and trading the items at the airport’s employee parking lot.7

 At the 

Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International airport, four baggage screeners stole 

cash, credit cards, jewelry, and electronic devices from checked baggage.8

 In 

another incident, travelers who passed through the Spokane International airport 

reported some of their pain medications missing. In a sting operation, the U.S. 

Drug Enforcement Administration and TSA officials used a surveillance camera 

to identify a TSA supervisory screener taking prescription drugs from a 

passenger’s baggage. 9 Last, in a sting operation, four TSA baggage screeners 

were arrested at New York’s John F. Kennedy and LaGuardia airports for stealing 

money, jewelry, and other valuables from checked baggage.10

6 June 25, 2003, NBC 6 News Team, “Federal Baggage Screeners Charged With Theft” 7 June 26, 2004, New Orleans Times-Picayune, “Police Arrest Four More New Orleans Baggage Screeners” 8 June 30, 2004, The Miami Herald, “Four Fort Lauderdale Screeners Accused of Stealing From Luggage” 9 July 15, 2004, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, “Airport Screener Held for Stealing Drugs from Passengers’ Bags” 10 August 18, 2004, New York Times, “Bag It” 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 7

In addition to the arrest at the Spokane International airport where a surveillance 

camera was used, the arrests at the Miami, New York, Ft. Lauderdale, and New 

Orleans airports were accompanied by videotape recordings that captured the 

employees in the act of stealing from passenger bags. Video evidence constitutes 

significant support for criminal prosecutions. 

Incidents of theft are more likely to take place in an environment where an

opportunity to pilfer exists. This may result from inadequate supervision, the 

physical layout of the inspection area, or collusion among workers. It is more 

likely that thefts occur in unmonitored restricted areas at airports. 

Detection and prosecution of thefts cases in remote areas of the airport, where 

access is restricted, and observation by others is limited, will continue to be 

difficult. Increasing supervisory oversight, increasing the surveillance of bag 

rooms with cameras and better lighting, and increasing the likelihood of detection 

by other means may achieve deterrence. One avenue that TSA should consider 

arises from an analogous activity conducted by the OIAPR. OIAPR does

penetration testing of screeners to test their ability to detect prohibited baggage 

contents. Similarly, OIAPR could perform integrity testing at problematic 

airports, i.e., at airports where a statistical review of reported theft and loss data 

warrants. Testing could be modeled after the successful sting operations 

performed at the New York and Spokane airports. General awareness among the 

screener workforce that OIAPR is monitoring statistical data to look for 

problematic airports, and is prepared to undertake sting operations to seek out 

corrupt baggage screeners, would significantly enhance the deterrence element of 

a theft prevention program. 

Not all losses are thefts. A TSA official said that baggage screeners exercise care 

during the screening process to ensure that baggage contents are returned to the 

traveler’s baggage every time baggage is opened. However, TSA officials also 

mentioned that baggage screeners, on occasion, inadvertently would fail to repack 

items such as a single shoe, trousers, or cosmetic pouches. Haste, caused by a low 

ratio of staff to baggage volume, and inadequate inspection areas can contribute to 

such losses. For the passenger, the distinction between theft and inadvertent 

failure to return all items to baggage is immaterial. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for TSA: 

Recommendation 1: Evaluate the adequacy of supervision, the physical layout 

of inspection stations, and the feasibility of installing electronic surveillance 

equipment and other covert security techniques near inspection stations. 11

 11 On December 7, 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.L. 108-

458. Section 4020 required the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security to provide "assistance to airports 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 8

 

Background Checks of Baggage Screeners 

TSA was directed by the ATSA to hire federal passenger screeners by November 

19, 2002, and to employ baggage screeners and implement baggage screening by 

December 31, 2002. TSA reviewed more than 360,000 applications and hired 

approximately 55,600 screeners. During the height of the hiring period, TSA and 

its support contractors were hiring nearly 5,000 screeners per week. 

Pursuant to the ATSA, federal screeners must undergo a four-phase background 

investigation. The background check includes the following: 

● FBI national criminal history check; 

● Local criminal history, credit checks, and link analysis against terrorist 

watch list databases;

● Prior employment, education, and personal reference checks; and, 

● National agency records check incorporating the results of fingerprint, 

criminal history, and credit checks, as well as education, references, and 

citizenship verification. 

As of June 8, 2004, TSA had terminated 37 baggage screeners for committing 

theft. Of those, TSA records indicate that 36 baggage screeners began work 

before their background checks were complete. TSA records indicate that only 

one screener among those who were terminated for theft began employment after 

the background check had been completed. Of the 36 screeners whose 

background checks had not been completed prior to their employment, TSA had 

no record of the status of five screeners’ background checks; two screeners’ 

background checks were discontinued for unspecified reasons, yet those screeners 

remained on the job; and two other screeners’ background checks subsequently 

were returned as unacceptable, which may be construed as meaning their 

background checks revealed derogatory information. Those screeners also 

remained on the job. 

Our report, A Review of Background Checks for Federal Passenger and Baggage 

Screeners at Airports, dated January 2004, noted that as of May 31, 2003, about 

42,000 applicants had one or more incomplete phases in their background check. 

Overwhelmed by the volume of applications and the deadline to meet the mandate 

at which screening is required . . . and that have checked baggage screening areas that are not open to public view in the 

acquisition and installation of security monitoring cameras for surveillance of such areas in order to deter theft from

checked baggage and to aid in the speedy resolution of liability claims against the Transportation Security 

Administration." This new statutory requirement satisfies the intent of our recommendation. The follow-up monitoring

that we conduct when tracking a component's corrective actions against our report recommendations will permit us to

continue to evaluate TSA's provision of assistance to airports, as mandated.
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 9

of the ATSA, screeners were hired and permitted to work contrary to sound 

personnel security practices and the provisions of the ATSA. On August 23, 

2004, CBS televised footage of a TSA baggage screener caught by a surveillance 

camera removing items from a passenger’s baggage. It was later discovered that 

the screener had four social security numbers and a criminal conviction for 

shoplifting. 

It is now TSA policy to complete a favorably adjudicated criminal history records 

check before offering employment to job candidates. TSA has established 

processes, procedures, and systems to ensure that fingerprint and preliminary 

background checks are complete before candidates are hired. We will continue to 

monitor TSA’s progress in this area. 

 

Baggage Screener Training 

Baggage screeners are duty bound to protect air travelers by identifying 

explosives and harmful objects in baggage and preventing them from being 

loaded onto aircraft. Instances of baggage theft committed by TSA baggage 

screeners not only erodes public confidence in the TSA baggage screening 

process, but also questions the ethical conduct of TSA baggage screeners. 

Passengers have a right to expect that their belongings will be secure when they 

relinquish control of their baggage. 

TSA baggage screener training is designed to instruct baggage screeners on the 

use of equipment that detects explosives and to identify prohibited items that 

might be concealed in passengers’ checked or carry-on baggage. The training 

curriculum does not include, however, a module on ethics. A TSA official said 

that although ethics training was not included, baggage screeners are expected to 

“know” that willfully taking passengers’ property is unethical. In addition, a TSA 

official said that TSA Management Directive No. 1100.75-1, which sets forth 

policies and procedures on the use of disciplinary and adverse actions to address 

employee performance and conduct problems, is posted on the TSA intranet site. 

According to this directive, conduct involving theft is an offense for which 

removal from employment is required. Although this directive is on TSA’s 

intranet, a TSA official said that most baggage screeners do not have access to the 

agency’s intranet. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for TSA: 

Recommendation 2: Include a module on professional ethics in the screenertraining curriculum and provide periodic ethics training for all baggage and 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 10

passenger screeners. Such training should detail the disciplinary actions that will 

be taken to address employee misconduct. 

Missing Items Claims Processing 

If a passenger discovers, typically after leaving the airport and unpacking at their 

destination, that contents are missing from his or her baggage, it is likely that the 

passenger will contact the airline last flown. The airline will usually recommend 

that the passenger contact TSA, either by visiting the TSA website or by calling 

TSA’s toll-free number. TSA provides instructions both on its website and toll 

free telephone number to passengers who wish to file a claim. In addition to filing 

instructions, TSA’s website has a version of the claim form, Claim For Damage, 

Injury, Or Death, Standard Form 95 (SF-95). Passengers who have access to the 

internet and who desire to file claims are encouraged to download, complete, and 

mail the claim form to the CMO. Passengers who do not have access to the 

Internet may call the TSA Contact Center and a claim form and instructions will 

be mailed within 10 days. In lieu of the form SF-95, passengers may file a claim

by sending a signed letter that contains the claim information to the CMO. Also, 

the website provides information on the limits of TSA’s liability for damaged or 

missing items and the length of the filing period. 

The CMO has a staff of eighteen who process claims. Their duties also include 

adjudication, review, management oversight, financial transactions, and 

Congressional Correspondence. Upon receipt of the form SF-95 or the signed 

letter, the CMO conducts a preliminary review of the claim to determine whether 

the alleged incident was a result of TSA’s negligence. In this regard, TSA has 

instructed baggage screeners to acknowledge any damage they may have caused 

by placing their business card in the baggage. Claims where a TSA screener has 

acknowledged responsibility for damage are processed with minimal delay. 

 

The value and age of all claim items must be verified. Claimants must provide 

proof of purchase as evidenced by receipts, credit card statements, bank 

statements, purchase orders, or invoices. If no receipt is available, the claimant 

must provide an itemized list that includes the price and product specifications or 

a description of a comparable item. If necessary, the CMO contacts the claimant 

to obtain additional information. Also, the CMO may contact others who may 

have knowledge of the circumstances associated with the loss or officials at the 

airport where the loss may have occurred. 

When a claim is logged into the claims management database, it is automatically 

checked to determine whether it was entered previously. If the claim is not in the 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 11

 

database, it is entered and assigned an identification tracking number. The 

tracking number enables CMO employees to identify claims readily. In addition, 

TSA has added a feature to its website that allows claimants to track the status of

their claims through the use of the tracking number. TSA issues an 

acknowledgement letter to notify the claimant that the claim has been received. 

TSA adjudicates claims under the guidelines established by the Federal Tort 

Claims Act (FTCA).12 A claimant is entitled to the fair market value of the 

missing property measured at the time and place of the loss. The FTCA does not 

establish a dollar limit for a claim, but does require that claims be filed within two 

years from the date of the incident. The CMO receives all tort claims, including 

lost or damaged property and personal injury, involving or related to TSA 

personnel or screening operations. CMO investigates all property tort claims and 

can approve payment up to $2,500. The Office of Chief Counsel approves claims

payments from $2,501-$25,000. Claims payments greater than $25,000 are 

forwarded to the Department of Justice for approval. Under the FTCA, all 

payments above $2,500 are paid out of the “Judgment Fund” administered by the 

Department of Treasury. 

TSA is obligated to investigate and pay claims as deemed appropriate. In 

accordance with the FTCA and applicable state law, TSA generally does not pay 

for incidental or consequential expenses, such as phone calls, mail, missed or 

rescheduled flights, or hotel bills that may have resulted because of the loss. For 

similar reasons, TSA generally does not consider the sentimental value of an item.

All claims must be sufficient regardless of the amount claimed. However, 

verifying the details of each case can be time consuming and costly. Therefore, it 

is typical for a case to remain active for three or more months. To reduce the 

backlog of claims and simultaneously reduce costs, a TSA official said that once 

they factor in the often expensive cost of investigating a claim, they generally find 

it prudent to pay claims valued up to a threshold amount. Approximately 75% of 

all missing items payments are less than $500 - - the average being $120.

TSA estimates that checked baggage is under the control of TSA and the airlines 

about 10% and 90% of the time, respectively. Even when it is possible to verify 

that a passenger suffered a theft or loss, it may be impossible to attribute 

responsibility between TSA baggage screeners and airline baggage handlers. In 

August 2003, TSA and the airline industry started negotiations on an agreement 

wherein TSA would be required to pay 35% and the airlines 65% of approved 

claims filed after the memorandum was signed. By July 2004, however, the two 

sides were unable to reach an agreement. Thereafter, TSA decided to settle 

pending missing items claims while pursuing agreements with individual airlines, 

12 28 U.S.C.: 1346(b), 2671 et seq. 
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in lieu of a universal agreement. As a result of this decision, TSA has reduced the 

number of pending missing items claims by 54% from nearly 13,000 in June 2004 

to 5,875 in September 2004. The following chart shows the significance of this 

reduction. 

 

Chart 1: Statistics on Baggage Claims Processing

529 137 572

12,869

2,691

3,543

1,153

5,875

0

3,000

6,000

9,000

12,000

15,000

claims settled for

full amount

claims settled for

less than full

amount

claims denied claims pndg as of

06/04 09/04

Number of claims

11/02-06/04

07/04-09/04

From November 2002 through June 2004, TSA paid $137,000 to claimants. 

However, because TSA decided unilaterally to settle many pending missing item

claims, as shown in Chart 2, TSA paid $599,000 from June to September 2004. 

The total of all claims paid as of September 2004 was $736,000. 

Chart 2: Dollar Amount Paid to 

Claimants

137,000

599,000

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

11/02-06/04 07/04-09/04

Time period

In Dollars

Despite continued uncertainty on shared liability between TSA and the airline 

industry for missing items, we commend TSA for its recent aggressive process for 
A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 13

adjudicating pending missing items claims. However, TSA should resume

negotiations with the airlines. Currently, TSA is making 100% of restitution when 

it determines that it is solely liable for the loss. TSA makes 50% of the restitution 

when liability could be shared with the airlines. Moreover, some unscrupulous 

claimants might be submitting claims to both TSA and the airlines and are being 

paid by both. An agreement with the airlines would reduce any double payments. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for TSA: 

Recommendation 3: Resume negotiating with the airline industry to devise an 

equitable method for sharing the liability for missing checked baggage items

claims.
Appendix A 

Notification of Baggage Inspection Form

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Appendix B 

Management Comments 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments 

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Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments

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We evaluated TSA’s written comments to the draft report and made changes as 

appropriate to the final version. Below is a summary of our analysis of TSA’s 

response to the recommendations contained in the draft report.

Recommendation 1: Evaluate the adequacy of supervision, the physical layout of 

inspection stations, and the feasibility of installing electronic surveillance 

techniques near inspections stations. 

TSA Response: TSA replied that it is continuously reviewing procedures related 

to baggage screening issues, including supervision of baggage screeners, the 

physical layout of screening stations, and the use of electronic surveillance system

(ESS) techniques. With regard to ESS, TSA’s Office of Aviation Security 

Programs is coordinating with its Chief Information Officer to plan for the 

installation ESS where none exists or to supplement existing systems. In addition, 

TSA is working with airports to find the most cost effective method to maintain 

current systems and install future ESS. Limited funds are available for ESS in 

FY2005. In addition, TSA is implementing the requirements of the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act concerning checked baggage screening 

area monitoring. 

 

OIG Evaluation: We concur with TSA’s action and regard the recommendation 

as resolved and open. TSA’s continuous internal scrutiny of baggage screening 

procedural issues as well as management matters is responsive. The installation of 

ESS systems at every baggage inspection area in all airports would exceed 

reasonably foreseeable federal funding. However, TSA needs to be more specific 

in explaining how it will deploy ESS at select airports. We will close this 

recommendation once TSA supplements its response to show that it has finalized 

its ESS installation and supplemental plans and provides evidence that installation 

of new ESS or the upgrading of existing ESS is in progress. 

Recommendation 2: Include a module on professional ethics in its training 

curriculum.

TSA Response: TSA plans to make ethics training mandatory for all of its 

employees. Presently, only employees who file financial disclosure reports are 

required to attend ethics training. TSA’s Office of Workforce Performance and 

Training (OWPT) is developing TSA’s general ethics course. TSA expects that 

this course will be available on its Online Learning Center by April 27, 2005. 

Once the ethics course is available, new employees must complete the course 

within 90 days, while tenured employees have up to 6 months to complete the 

course. 
Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments

A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 19

TSA also pointed out that a copy of “TSA Guide to Major Ethics Rules” is 

provided to new employees; all employees are required to sign the TSA HRM 

Letter No. 735-1, Interim Policy on Employee Responsibilities and Conduct; and 

ethics posters are displayed in TSA offices and break rooms. Finally, TSA’s 

Office of Counsel often offers ethics training sessions for financial disclosures 

filers at airports. These sessions are open to all employees including the screeners. 

OWPT also plans to incorporate into TSA’s three basic screener courses, lessons 

learned as a result of screeners who have been prosecuted for committing baggage 

thefts. 

OIG Evaluation: TSA’s commitment to educate its employees on their ethical 

obligations through general ethics training, by distributing literature that focuses 

on ethics rules, and by displaying ethics posters is encouraging. These initiatives, 

while beneficial, do not achieve the result sought by our recommendation. We

recommended that all screeners receive ethics training, not just lessons learned, 

during the initial training preparatory to their starting work, not after they have 

started. Moreover, TSA has not provided an assurance that it has a method to 

track and ensure that each employee takes the general ethics training it proposes 

to offer. We regard this recommendation as resolved because of TSA’s stated 

intention to expand new screener training, but it will remain open until lessons 

learned are made part of TSA’s formal ethics training on issues related to worker 

integrity, public trust, and the prohibitions and penalties for theft or reckless 

treatment of passenger belongings. 

 

Recommendation 3: Resume negotiating an agreement with the airline industry 

on shared liability for lost or stolen baggage claims.

TSA Response: TSA resumed discussions with the airline industry on January 

11, 2005. The goals of the discussion included identifying methods for improving 

customer service as well as enlightening passengers where to file claims; 

enhancing detection of fraud; facilitating cooperation in resolving exceptional 

claims; and, establishing communications between the Claims Management 

Office and airline claims offices. TSA plans to present a white paper on the 

proposed goals to the airline industry in spring 2005. Then, the airline industry is 

expected to share the paper with its members, and provide input to TSA. Finally, 

the plan is to have all domestic airlines sign a memorandum of cooperation by late 

spring 2005. 
Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments

A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 20

OIG Evaluation: Though TSA has resumed negotiations with the airline 

industry, sharing liability for loss or stolen items claims did not appear to be on 

the agenda. This recommendation remains unresolved until TSA provides 

evidence that the issue of shared liability is being negotiated with the airline 

industry.
Appendix D 

Recommendations 

A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 21

Recommendation 1: Evaluate the adequacy of supervision, the physical layout 

of inspection stations, and the feasibility of installing electronic surveillance and 

other covert security techniques near inspection stations. 

Recommendation 2: Include a module on professional ethics in the screenertraining curriculum and provide periodic ethics training for all baggage and 

passenger screeners. Such training should detail the disciplinary actions that will 

be taken to address employee misconduct. 

Recommendation 3: Resume negotiating with the airlines to devise an equitable 

method for sharing the liability for missing checked baggage items claims.
Appendix E 

Major Contributors To This Report 

A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 22

Carlton I. Mann, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office 

of Inspections and Special Reviews 

M. Faizul Islam, Ph.D., Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

Vivian M. Dupuy, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections and Special Reviews
Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts Page 23

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

 Deputy Secretary 

 General Counsel 

Chief of Staff 

Acting Under Secretary, Border and Transportation Security 

Deputy Chief Security Officer 

Public Affairs Officer 

DHS OIG Liaison 

Transportation Security Administration

Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA 

Director, Credential Program Office 

Director, Human Resources Office 

Director, Aviation Operations 

Manager, Claims Management Office

OIG Liaison, Office of Transportation Security Policy 

Office of Management and Budget

 Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

 DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG

web site at www.dhs.gov.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; or write to the 

Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, Attn: Office of 

Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to 

protect the identity of each writer and caller.