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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46183

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JESSE TREVINO SALINAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: September 25, 2019

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Minidoka County. Hon. Jonathan Brody, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to withdraw guilty plea, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sally J. Cooley argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Andrew V. Wake argued.

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BRAILSFORD, Judge

Jesse Trevino Salinas appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After observing Salinas make two turns without using his turn signal, drive over the solid 

white line on the right-hand side of the road (commonly known as the fog line) with both 

passenger side tires for approximately one hundred feet and then twice more cross over the fog 

line, Detective Murphy pulled Salinas’ car over. Detective Murphy asked Salinas for his license, 

registration, and proof of insurance. After Salinas failed to produce proof of insurance, 

Detective Murphy returned to his patrol vehicle to write Salinas a citation. During this time, 

another officer deployed a drug dog around Salinas’ car.
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The dog alerted, and a search of Salinas’ car yielded a syringe with residue. Salinas 

denied the syringe was his, although he admitted using methamphetamine earlier that day. 

Detective Murphy advised Salinas that if the syringe tested positive for drugs, he could be 

charged. Detective Murphy then released Salinas with a citation for failing to maintain 

insurance. Subsequently, the syringe tested positive for methamphetamine.

Several weeks after receiving the positive test results, Detective Murphy saw Salinas on 

the street. When Salinas got into a vehicle driven by another individual, Detective Murphy 

pulled the vehicle over to arrest Salinas based on the test results from the syringe seized during 

the initial traffic stop. During the arrest, Detective Murphy discovered a digital scale in Salinas’ 

pocket, and Salinas indicated there were drugs in the vehicle stating, “everything in the car is 

mine.” Through the passenger door, Detective Murphy observed several baggies, which were 

later determined to contain approximately 16 grams of methamphetamine.

Based on this evidence and the evidence discovered during the initial traffic stop, Salinas 

was charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, Idaho

Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(A); possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A; two counts of 

possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1); and an enhancement for a prior drug 

conviction. Salinas pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver in exchange for the State 

agreeing to drop the other charges. The plea agreement provided the State would recommend a 

sentence of not more than three years determinate and five years indeterminate. The agreement, 

however, was contingent on Salinas appearing at court hearings and refraining from further 

criminal conduct. Specifically, the agreement provided that “the Defendant understands that the 

State is released from this agreement if [he] commits any new and additional criminal acts prior 

to sentencing, or if [he] fails to attend all scheduled court hearings without just cause.” Salinas 

also completed and signed a guilty plea advisory form acknowledging he understood the rights 

he was waiving. The district court accepted the plea agreement, ordered a presentence 

investigation report (PSI), and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

Thereafter, Salinas failed a drug test performed as a condition of his release, failed to 

appear for an interview for purposes of his PSI, and failed to appear for his sentencing hearing in 

violation of his plea agreement. As a result, the district court issued an arrest warrant for Salinas. 

When Detective Murphy attempted to arrest Salinas pursuant to this warrant, Salinas fled on foot 
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and, while fleeing, he discarded several baggies of methamphetamine before being apprehended. 

Based on this conduct, the State charged him with additional crimes.

After the State charged Salinas with these new crimes, and about a month after he had

pled guilty to the prior charges, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea. In support, Salinas 

asserted he had become aware of grounds for a motion to suppress the evidence Detective 

Murphy discovered during the initial traffic stop. These grounds included (1) an alleged delay in 

conducting the traffic stop for purposes of the drug dog; and (2) the Idaho Supreme Court’s 

decision in State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 416 P.3d 957 (2018).1

 The Fuller decision was issued 

three days after Salinas failed to appear at his sentencing hearing and ruled that crossing the fog 

line alone is inadequate to establish reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Id. at 590, 416 P.3d 

at 962. 

After a hearing, the district court concluded that Salinas’ plea was entered knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily; he was improperly motivated to withdraw his plea to avoid a 

probable increased sentence after violating his plea agreement; and he had no just reason to 

withdraw his plea. For these reasons, the district court denied Salinas’ motion to withdraw his 

plea, and Salinas appeals this denial.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to determining 

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary 

action. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121, 714 P.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1986). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c), the timing of a motion to withdraw a plea dictates the 

legal standard to be applied. After sentencing, a defendant must show “manifest injustice” to 

withdraw a guilty plea. I.C.R. 33(c). Before sentencing, however, a defendant need only show a 

“just reason” for withdrawing a plea. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 536, 211 P.3d 775, 781 

(Ct. App. 2008). This case addresses a motion to withdraw a plea before sentencing, and thus 

the “just reason” standard applies. 

 1 Although Salinas asserted additional grounds below to support his claim of a viable 

motion to suppress, he does not raise those additional grounds on appeal.
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“The threshold ‘just reason’ requirement is ‘not an onerous burden.’” State v. Baxter,

163 Idaho 231, 234, 409 P.3d 811, 814 (2018). Rather, “[i]t is a reasonable requirement, to be 

administered liberally and with due recognition of the serious consequences attending a guilty 

plea.” Id. Whether a defendant has shown a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea is a 

factual decision within the district court’s discretion. State v. Sunseri, 165 Idaho 9, 14, 437 P.3d 

9, 14 (2018). “The trial court is encouraged to liberally exercise its discretion in granting a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. The district court may temper its liberal discretion, 

however, if the defendant has learned about a probable sentence recommendation before moving 

to withdraw his plea. State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639, 641, 377 P.3d 1102, 1104 (Ct. App. 

2016). For example, if a defendant reviews his PSI or other information and learns of an 

increased sentence recommendation, the district court may temper its liberal discretion to allow a 

defendant to withdraw his plea. Id. The district court may also temper its liberal discretion if the 

defendant has breached his plea agreement before seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. Baxter, 

163 Idaho at 235-36, 409 P.3d at 815-16. In other words, “the [district] court has broad 

discretion to take into account the defendant’s apparent motive” in seeking to withdraw his plea. 

State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162, 75 P.3d 214, 216 (Ct. App. 2003).

The first step in analyzing whether a guilty plea may be withdrawn is to determine 

whether the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Sunseri, 165 Idaho at 14, 437 P.3d at 

14. If the district court concludes it was, then the defendant has the burden of showing a just 

reason exists to withdraw his plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535-36, 211 P.3d at 780-81. 

Although a defendant does not need to show a constitutional defect in his plea to establish a just 

reason, the withdrawal of a plea before sentencing is not an automatic right. Id. 

In determining what constitutes a just reason, the Idaho Supreme Court in Sunseri has 

identified certain, nonexclusive factors the district court should consider:

Among other factors, the trial court should consider: (1) whether the defendant 

has credibly asserted his legal innocence; (2) the length of delay between the 

entry of the guilty plea and the filing of the motion; (3) whether the defendant had 

the assistance of competent counsel at the time of the guilty plea; and (4) whether 

withdrawal of the plea will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. 

Sunseri, 165 Idaho at 14, 437 P.3d at 14. Additionally, the defendant’s good faith, his 

credibility, and the weight of his assertions in support of his motion bear on whether a defendant 

has a just reason to withdraw his plea and are matters for the district court to decide. Id.
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If the defendant meets its burden of showing a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, 

then the State may avoid the withdrawal of a plea by showing substantial prejudice. Id. at 14-15, 

437 P.3d at 14-15. Substantial prejudice requires more than mere inconvenience and may 

include, for example, the death of a principal witness; the unavailability of evidence; or the 

passage of time affecting witnesses’ memories, especially witnesses with limited mental abilities. 

Id. at 15, 437 P.3d at 15. Even absent substantial prejudice, however, the defendant’s failure to 

present and support a just reason for withdrawal dictates against granting a withdrawal. 

Harstock, 160 Idaho at 641, 377 P.3d at 1104.

In this case, Salinas does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that his guilty plea 

was knowing, intelligent and voluntary,

2 and the State does not attempt to show it would suffer 

substantial prejudice if Salinas’ plea were withdrawn. Rather, the issue on appeal is whether the 

district court erred by concluding Salinas failed to show a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. 

The district court did not have the benefit of the Idaho Supreme Court’s discussion in Sunseri of 

the factors a court should consider when determining “just reason” for a plea withdrawal. 

Sunseri was issued after the district court’s denial of Salinas’ motion. Regardless, we conclude 

the district court’s analysis comports with the proper analysis, and the district court correctly 

concluded Salinas failed to show a just reason to withdraw his plea.

The district court essentially concluded Salinas did not have a credible claim of legal 

innocence by rejecting his claim that he had a viable motion to suppress. See Sunseri, 165 Idaho 

at 14, 437 P.3d at 14 (ruling whether defendant has credibly asserted legal innocence is a factor 

for consideration). Salinas contends he has a viable suppression motion because Deputy Murphy 

purportedly delayed the traffic stop unlawfully for the drug dog and because Deputy Murphy did 

not have reasonable suspicion under Fuller to stop Salinas.

In Fuller, an officer observed Fuller drive onto and temporarily cross over the fog line. 

Id. at 587, 416 P.3d at 959. Based only on this conduct, the officer pulled Fuller over, 

discovered she did not have a valid driver’s license or proof of insurance, and arrested her for 

 2 Salinas does argue that the district court “placed too onerous a burden” on him by 

requiring him to show his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Had Salinas made 

such a showing, however, that would have ended the analysis and been grounds for allowing him 

to withdraw his plea. Because he made no argument that his plea was not knowing, intelligent or 

voluntary, the district court properly proceeded to the next step in the analysis--whether a just 

reason exists to allow Salinas to withdraw his plea.
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these violations. Id. An inventory search of Fuller’s vehicle revealed drugs and drug 

paraphernalia, resulting in criminal charges. Fuller moved to suppress this evidence arguing the 

officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Fuller, and the district court granted her motion. Id. 

Affirming this decision, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated its prior ruling in State v. 

Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 447, 362 P.3d 514, 522 (2015), that an isolated incident of touching a fog 

line does not constitute a traffic violation. Fuller, 163 Idaho at 590, 416 P.3d at 962. Further, 

the Court ruled “merely that a tire temporarily touches or crosses the fog line will not by itself 

give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion” for a traffic stop. Id. Importantly, however, the 

Court ruled that driving on or crossing the fog line may still factor into reasonable suspicion: 

“To be sure, driving onto or across the fog line may be considered when evaluating whether an 

overall pattern of erratic or unsafe driving gives rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that [a 

traffic violation has occurred] under a totality of circumstances.” Id.

In this case, the district court correctly distinguished the facts in Fuller from Deputy 

Murphy’s traffic stop of Salinas on the basis that Deputy Murphy relied not only on the fact that 

Salinas crossed over the fog line, but also on the fact that he failed to use his turn signals twice. 

In other words, Deputy Murphy did not base his reasonable suspicion exclusively on Salinas’ 

crossing the fog line. Rather, in accord with Fuller, Deputy Murphy’s reasonable suspicion was 

based on Salinas’ overall pattern of driving under the totality of the circumstances, which 

included more than merely crossing the fog line. See id. 

Salinas contends the district court improperly speculated about the facts in this case to 

distinguish it from Fuller. Specifically, Salinas challenges the district court’s reliance on Deputy 

Murphy’s probable cause affidavit, arguing the district court was “merely speculating after 

reading the probable cause affidavit as to what facts would be introduced at [a suppression] 

hearing.” Salinas’ argument, however, misconstrues the burden: “The burden rests on the 

defendant to demonstrate a justification for withdrawal of the guilty plea.” State v. Stone, 147 

Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). 

Whether meeting this burden requires the defendant to offer admissible evidence in 

support of his motion to withdraw his plea turns on the nature of the defendant’s purported just 

reason for withdrawing his plea. As this Court has previously ruled in Stone:

Whether this showing [of a just reason] requires presentation of new evidence 

depends upon the basis for the motion--whether it turns upon matters that appear 

in the court’s record, or that occurred in open court, or alleged events that 
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occurred outside the judicial proceedings and that the State has not acknowledged 

or stipulated to.

Id. In this case, Salinas’ reliance on Fuller turns on matters outside the record--namely, it turns 

on whether facts support Salinas’ assertion that Deputy Murphy improperly based his reasonable 

suspicion exclusively on Salinas’ crossing the fog line. Because these purported facts were not 

in the record, Salinas had the burden to offer them in support of his motion to withdraw his plea. 

Salinas, however, failed to make any showing regarding the traffic stop. 

Salinas contends that because the “just reason” requirement is “not an onerous burden” 

he was not required to present anything other than the mere assertion he had a viable motion to 

suppress under Fuller. A mere assertion of a legal argument without more, however, does not 

satisfy Salinas’ burden to demonstrate a justification for withdrawing a plea agreement. Absent 

an actual showing based on admissible evidence that Salinas’ motion to suppress would be 

viable, the only facts in the record were that a motion to suppress was not viable. As a result, 

Salinas failed to meet his burden.

This failure to make a showing with admissible evidence is also fatal to Salinas’ claim 

that Deputy Murphy unlawfully delayed the initial traffic stop for the drug dog. Nothing in the 

record supports Salinas’ assertion that Deputy Murphy improperly delayed the stop. Salinas 

offers no factual support for his claim. Indeed, he does not even cite any supporting case law. 

Although he is correct that the district court did not mention his drug-dog argument in denying

his motion to withdraw his plea, Salinas provided nothing for the district court to consider. 

Therefore, any failure to mention the argument was not an abuse of discretion.

In addition to rejecting Salinas’ claim of a viable legal defense, the district court also 

ruled he was not motivated by a claim of innocence but, rather, by the fact he had twice violated 

his plea agreement by failing to appear for his sentencing hearing and being charged with new 

crimes. Because Salinas had violated the plea agreement, the State was no longer bound by its

recommended sentence. The district court concluded this circumstance was akin to Salinas being 

improperly motivated to withdraw his plea after learning information about his probable sentence 

in his PSI.

Salinas accuses the district court of speculating about the facts to reach this conclusion, 

including purportedly speculating the State would not be bound by the plea agreement and would 

request an increased sentence. Although Salinas concedes the State would likely no longer be 

bound by the plea agreement, he argues “none of these speculative facts had come to fruition at 
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the time [he] moved to withdraw his plea.” Salinas, however, does not dispute he violated the 

plea agreement twice before seeking to withdraw his plea. Indeed, he does not and cannot 

dispute that he failed to appear at his sentencing hearing and was charged with additional crimes 

based on conduct occurring after signing the agreement--both of which incidents violated the 

plea agreement. As a result, the district court’s conclusion that Salinas likely sought to withdraw 

his plea to avoid an increased sentencing recommendation was not speculative. Rather, Salinas’ 

good faith and credibility about his motivation for moving to withdraw his plea were matters for 

the district court to decide. See Sunseri, 165 Idaho at 14, 437 P.3d at 14; see also State v. Litz, 

122 Idaho 387, 389, 834 P.2d 904, 906 (Ct. App. 1992) (affirming denial of motion to withdraw 

plea where defendant believed State would request harsher sentence after defendant violated plea 

agreement). Having concluded Salinas was motivated by information that the State would likely 

recommend an increased sentence, the district court correctly concluded it could temper its 

liberal discretion in reviewing Salinas’ motion to withdraw his plea. See Baxter, 163 Idaho at

235-36, 409 P.3d at 815-16 (concluding district court may temper liberal discretion after 

defendant breaches plea agreement); see also Hartsock, 160 Idaho at 641, 377 P.3d at 1104

(concluding district court may temper liberal discretion if defendant has reviewed his PSI or 

received other information about sentencing).

Finally, Salinas criticizes the State for not addressing the district court’s ruling in the 

context of Sunseri. Regardless, the district court’s analysis both comports with the analysis 

outlined in Sunseri and relies on case law Sunseri cites with approval, including Hanslovan and 

Harstock. Although the district court did not address all the factors identified in Sunseri, none of 

the remaining factors support Salinas’ position that just reason exists to allow him to withdraw 

his plea. Nothing in the record indicates Salinas’ counsel was incompetent at the guilty plea 

stage. A total absence of any admissible evidence to support Salinas’ proposed suppression 

motion suggests addressing such a motion would have been a waste of judicial resources. 

Although there was not a lengthy delay between Salinas’ plea and his motion to withdraw that 

plea, the events that occurred during that interim were significant. During the interim, Salinas 

violated his plea agreement twice, which weighs in favor of not allowing him to withdraw his 

plea. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling Salinas failed to 

show a just reason to withdraw his plea.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Because Salinas has failed to show there is just reason to allow him to withdraw his 

guilty plea, we affirm the district court’s order denying his motion.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.