## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 06-2689

___________ R.S. McCullough; Darrell Brown, Sr., *
* Appellants, *
* v. *
* Stark Ligon, in his capacity of * Executive Director of Arkansas * Committee on Professional Conduct; * J. Michael Cogbill, in his capacity as * Chairman of APCC Panel; State of * Arkansas; Tom Glaze, in his offici al * Appeal from the United States capacity as Justice of the Arkansas * District Court for the Supreme Court; Robert Brown, in his * Eastern District of Arkansas. official capacity as Justice of the * Arkansas Supreme Court; Betty * [UNPUBLISHED] Dickey, in her official capacity as * Justice of the Arkansas Supreme * Court; James Hannah, in his official * capacity as Justice of the Arkansas * Supreme Court; Annabelle Clinton * Imber, in her official capacity as * Justice of the Arkansas Supreme * Court; Donald Corbin, in his official * capacity as Justice of the Arkansas * Supreme Court; Jim Gunter, in his * official capacity as Justice of the * Arkansas Supreme Court, *
* Appellees. *1 The Honorable David S. Doty, United Stat es District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation in the Eastern District of Arkansas.
-2- ___________ Submitted: March 24, 2008 Filed: March 27, 2008

___________ Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. R.S. McCullough and Darrell Brown, Sr., (plaintiffs) appeal the district court’s 1 order remanding their attorney disciplinary pr oceedings back to Arkansas state court. We have jurisdiction to review the re mand order because plaintiffs purported to remove their disciplinary proceed ings under 28 U.S.C. § 1443. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (providing an order remanding a cas e is not reviewable on appeal, except an order remanding a case which was removed pursuant to § 1443 shall be reviewable); Neal v. Wilson , 112 F.3d 351, 354-55 (8th Cir. 1997) (reviewing district court’s remand order because disbarment proceedings were removed under § 1443).

We conclude the district court’s rema nd was proper because plaintiffs did not allege facts showing a state law or other “equally firm prediction” has prevented or will prevent them from enforcing th eir rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (stating a civil action commenced in state court can be removed to federal court when an action is against any person who is denied or ca nnot enforce in state court any law providing for the equal right s of United States citizens); Georgia v. Rachel , 384 U.S. 780, 792, 800, 803-04 (1966) (explai ning, for a case to be removable under § 1443, defendant must rely upon law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality, and must show th at, due to a formal expression of state law or other equally firm predic tion, he would be denied or cannot enforce federal rights-3- in state court); Neal , 112 F.3d at 355 (concluding the di strict court properly remanded disbarment proceedings where the defenda nt failed to meet § 1443(1) requirements; agreeing with the district court that de fendant’s contentions “boil[ed] down to little more than a belief by him that, since th e state actors disagree with him and his lawyers, they must have racially discri minatory motives” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We also agree with the district court that plaintiffs were not entitled to a hearing to determine whether the disciplin ary proceedings wereremovable. See News-Texan, Inc. v. City of Garland, Texas , 814 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1987) (deciding “no evidentiary hearing is required if the section 1443 grounds purportedly justifying removal are patently invalid from the face of the removal petition”).

We affirm.

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