* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SATNAM SINGH, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent. No. 06-72050 Agency No. 75-309-978

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted July 14, 2010 San Francisco, California Before: HUG and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HOGAN, District Judge. ** Petitioner Satnam Singh, a native and citizen of India seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of the 

# FILED

SEP 15 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protecti on under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and we deny the petition. As the facts and procedural history are fam iliar to the parties, we recite them here only as necessary to explain our decision. We reject Singh’s contention that the IJ violated his due process rights by admitting the asylum officer’s notes in th e officer’s absence. On appeal, Singh argues that “[i]t was fundamentally unfair for the IJ to admit these confusing andultimately dispositive documents despite Petitioner’s lack of opportunity to crossexamine the officer who prep ared them.” We disagr ee. In an immigration proceeding, “[t]he sole test for admissi on of evidence is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair.” Espinoza v. INS , 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995). The IJ’s use of the notes for impeachment purposes did not prevent Singh from reasonably presenting his case, as Singh had an opportunity to explain inconsistencies between his testim ony and the notes. Further, we conclude that even if cross-examination of the o fficer might have reduced the probative value of the notes, Singh was not prejudiced, as the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is supported on other grounds. See id. at 310-11. Moreover, Singh provides no reason to doubt that the IJ took the officer’s unavailability into consideration.1 Singh attacks findings of inconsistency between his sworn declaration and his subsequent testimony, contending that “it was unreasonable for the IJ to fault Petitioner for the hyperbole contained inhis written declaration, which was prepared by an immigration consultant.” We disagree. The IJ invited Singh to make changes to his application or declar ation before certifying its veracity. Singh reviewed it with counsel and made onl y one change, adding one item to his statement, and signed it. 3 Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Singh’s testimony about the circumstances surrounding his arrests in 1989, 1990, and 1996, the arrests of his son, and the level of his political involvement lacked consistency and specificity. See Singh-Kaur v. INS , 183 F.3d 1147, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Wang v. INS , 352 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th Cir. 2003) (“So long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of [the petitioner’s] claim of pe rsecution, we are bound to accept the IJ's adverse credibility finding.”). Notably, ev en if we set aside the asylum officer’s notes and Singh’s prior interview testimony, the IJ identified a significant inconsistency between Singh’s declaration and his testimony regarding whether his son was arrested in 1990. 1 The record shows that Singh had ample opportunity to explain the apparent discrepancies, and we find no error inthe IJ’s consideration of them nor in the IJ’s conclusion that Si ngh’s explanations were “implausible.”4 Singh also argues the IJ erred by improperly considering the absence of corroborative evidence in support of his reque sts for relief. Because the IJ had valid reasons for questioning Singh’s credibility, the IJ could properly consider Singh’s failure to produce corroborating evidence. See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales , 416 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2005). The IJ properly noted that Singh offered no corroborating evidence, such that the cr edibility of Singh’s testimony “is extremely important in this case.” Singh fails to show any indication that the IJ improperly considered the availability of corroborating evidence. Cf. Malhi v. INS , 336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2003); Chebchoub v. INS , 257 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001). In the absence of credible testimony, Singh failed to demonstrate eligibility for asylum. See Farah v. Ashcroft , 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Because Singh failed to meet the lower burden of pr oof for asylum, he necessarily failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales , 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006). Finally, Singh failed to establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to India, as his testimony lacks credibility and the record lacks sufficient evidence of a likelihood of to rture. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. See Wakkary v. Holder , 558 F.3d 1049,5 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2009); Kamalthas v. INS , 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001). PETITION DENIED.