# C_2014129EN.01001102.xml

| 28.4.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 129/11 |
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28.4.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 129/11

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 10 February 2014 — Peter Gauweiler and Others

(Case C-62/14)

(2014/C 129/15)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesverfassungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Peter Gauweiler, Bruno Bandulet, Wilhelm Hankel, Wilhelm Nölling, Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider, Joachim Starbatty, Roman Huber and Others, Johann Heinrich von Stein and Others, Fraktion DIE LINKE im Deutschen Bundestag

Respondent: German Bundestag

Joined party: Federal Government

Questions referred

| 1. | (a) | Is the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 on Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions incompatible with Article 119 and Article 127(1) and (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and with Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank because it exceeds the monetary policy mandate of the European Central Bank laid down in the abovementioned provisions and encroaches upon the competence of the Member States?
  Is the mandate of the European Central Bank exceeded in particular because the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012







  (aa) | is linked to economic assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (conditionality)? |
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1.

(a)

Is the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 on Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions incompatible with Article 119 and Article 127(1) and (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and with Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank because it exceeds the monetary policy mandate of the European Central Bank laid down in the abovementioned provisions and encroaches upon the competence of the Member States?

Is the mandate of the European Central Bank exceeded in particular because the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012

(aa)

is linked to economic assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (conditionality)?

| (bb) | provides for the purchase of government bonds of selected Member States only (selectivity)? |
| --- | --- |

(bb)

provides for the purchase of government bonds of selected Member States only (selectivity)?

| (cc) | provides for the purchase of government bonds of programme countries in addition to assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (parallelism)? |
| --- | --- |

(cc)

provides for the purchase of government bonds of programme countries in addition to assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (parallelism)?

| (dd) | could undermine the limits and conditions laid down by assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (circumvention)? |
| --- | --- |

(dd)

could undermine the limits and conditions laid down by assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (circumvention)?

| (b) | Is the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 on Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions incompatible with the prohibition of monetary financing enshrined in Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?
  Is compatibility with Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union precluded in particular by the fact that the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012







  (aa) | does not provide for quantitative limits for government bond purchases (volume)? |
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(b)

Is the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 on Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions incompatible with the prohibition of monetary financing enshrined in Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

Is compatibility with Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union precluded in particular by the fact that the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012

(aa)

does not provide for quantitative limits for government bond purchases (volume)?

| (bb) | does not provide for a time gap between the issue of government bonds on the primary market and their purchase by the European System of Central Banks on the secondary market (market pricing)? |
| --- | --- |

(bb)

does not provide for a time gap between the issue of government bonds on the primary market and their purchase by the European System of Central Banks on the secondary market (market pricing)?

| (cc) | allows all purchased government bonds to be held to maturity (interference with market logic)? |
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(cc)

allows all purchased government bonds to be held to maturity (interference with market logic)?

| (dd) | does not contain any specific requirements for the credit standing of the government bonds to be purchased (default risk)? |
| --- | --- |

(dd)

does not contain any specific requirements for the credit standing of the government bonds to be purchased (default risk)?

| (ee) | provides for the same treatment of the European System of Central Banks as private or other holders of government bonds (debt cut)? |
| --- | --- |

(ee)

provides for the same treatment of the European System of Central Banks as private or other holders of government bonds (debt cut)?

| 2. | In the alternative, in the event that the Court does not consider the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 on Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, qua act of a EU institution, to be an appropriate object for a request pursuant to point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:






  (a) | Are Article 119 and Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank to be interpreted as permitting the Eurosystem, alternatively or cumulatively,






  (aa) | to make government bond purchases conditional on the existence of and compliance with economic assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (conditionality)? |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.

In the alternative, in the event that the Court does not consider the decision of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 on Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, qua act of a EU institution, to be an appropriate object for a request pursuant to point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

(a)

Are Article 119 and Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank to be interpreted as permitting the Eurosystem, alternatively or cumulatively,

(aa)

to make government bond purchases conditional on the existence of and compliance with economic assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (conditionality)?

| (bb) | to purchase government bonds of selected Member States only (selectivity)? |
| --- | --- |

(bb)

to purchase government bonds of selected Member States only (selectivity)?

| (cc) | to purchase government bonds of programme countries in addition to assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (parallelism)? |
| --- | --- |

(cc)

to purchase government bonds of programme countries in addition to assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (parallelism)?

| (dd) | to undermine the limits and conditions laid down by assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (circumvention)? |
| --- | --- |

(dd)

to undermine the limits and conditions laid down by assistance programmes of the European Financial Stability Facility or of the European Stability Mechanism (circumvention)?

| (b) | Having regard to the prohibition of monetary financing, is Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be interpreted as permitting the Eurosystem, alternatively or cumulatively,






  (aa) | to purchase government bonds without quantitative limits (volume)? |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

Having regard to the prohibition of monetary financing, is Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be interpreted as permitting the Eurosystem, alternatively or cumulatively,

(aa)

to purchase government bonds without quantitative limits (volume)?

| (bb) | to purchase government bonds without a minimum time gap from their issue on the primary market (market pricing)? |
| --- | --- |

(bb)

to purchase government bonds without a minimum time gap from their issue on the primary market (market pricing)?

| (cc) | to hold all purchased government bonds to maturity (interference with market logic)? |
| --- | --- |

(cc)

to hold all purchased government bonds to maturity (interference with market logic)?

| (dd) | to purchase government bonds without minimum credit standing requirements (default risk)? |
| --- | --- |

(dd)

to purchase government bonds without minimum credit standing requirements (default risk)?

| (ee) | to accept the same treatment of the European System of Central Banks as private and other holders of government bonds (debt cut)? |
| --- | --- |

(ee)

to accept the same treatment of the European System of Central Banks as private and other holders of government bonds (debt cut)?

| (ff) | to influence pricing, by communicating the intention to purchase or otherwise, coinciding with the issue of government bonds by Member States of the euro area (encouragement to purchase newly issued bonds)? |
| --- | --- |

(ff)

to influence pricing, by communicating the intention to purchase or otherwise, coinciding with the issue of government bonds by Member States of the euro area (encouragement to purchase newly issued bonds)?

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