COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ALONZO L. WILLIAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2258-01-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 MAY 21, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 

Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge 

 Steven Brent Novey (Tomko & Novey, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Alonzo Williams was convicted by a jury for forcible sodomy 

of a child under the age of thirteen. The jury set his sentence 

at life in prison. Williams moved to set aside the sentence on 

the ground that the prosecutor's argument at sentencing was 

prejudicial. The trial court heard argument on the motion, 

denied it, and sentenced Williams to life in prison. Williams 

appeals that sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

Background

 Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

party prevailing below, the evidence proved that, on May 19, 
2000, Williams entered the bedroom of his eleven-year-old 

daughter and orally sodomized her. See Burlile v. Commonwealth, 

32 Va. App. 796, 798, 531 S.E.2d 26, 27 (2000). The jury found 

Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 Testifying in his own behalf, Williams admitted that he had 

been convicted of two prior felonies and three misdemeanors. 

At sentencing, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of two prior 

convictions. One of the convictions was for attempted 

aggravated sexual battery of a four-year-old child. Williams 

introduced no evidence. The prosecutor's argument to the jury 

at sentencing was as follows: 

We've all done a days [sic] work today. The 

Court will present you when you leave with 

two copies of the defendant's prior criminal 

record. I tell you now that one of them is 

a prior aggravated sexual battery, against a 

four year-old. I'm going to keep it very 

brief and very easy. You've done the hard 

part as far as I'm concerned today. You 

have a range of five years to life. It's a 

huge sentence one way or the other. Five 

years is a long time. Life is a long time. 

My question to you is, I'm going to turn the 

tables around and ask you a question. When 

do you want to let this defendant out so he 

can live next to you, to your family, to 

your daughter, to your sister, to your 

mother, to anyone that you don't want 

sexually abused? He's done it twice, to 

children. All I'm asking you is when do you 

want him to come out and live next to you? 

Thank you. 

 Defense counsel did not object to any portion of this 

argument or move for a mistrial. Instead, he made his own 

closing argument to the jury. He argued that it was the jury's 

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"job" to determine what part of the five to life range of 

punishment he deserved and pointed out several facts in 

mitigation, including the fact that the prior similar offense 

had been committed 11 years earlier and that he would be at 

least 60 years old before he could be paroled. He concluded by 

asking the jury to give Williams a sentence that the jury 

thought was "just," within the range of punishment. The jury 

returned a sentence of life in prison. 

 Williams filed a motion to set aside the jury sentence 

based on his claim that the prosecutor's argument was improper 

and prejudicial. After considering argument and briefs, the 

trial court overruled the motion and sentenced Williams to life 

in prison. 

Analysis

 Williams claims that his case should be remanded for 

resentencing on the ground that the prosecutor's closing 

argument at sentencing was improper and prejudicial. Because 

this argument is procedurally barred, we will not consider it on 

appeal. Rule 5A:18. 

 "It is well-settled that errors assigned because of a 

prosecutor's alleged improper comments or conduct during 

argument will not be considered on appeal unless an accused 

timely moves for a cautionary instruction or for a mistrial." 

Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38, 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 

(1990) (emphasis added); accord Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 262 

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Va. 388, 396, 551 S.E.2d 306, 311 (2001); Yeatts v. 

Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137, 410 S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991); 

Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 741, 744, 187 S.E.2d 174, 176 

(1972); Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 257, 148 S.E.2d 820, 

825 (1966); Mack v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 5, 7-9, 454 S.E.2d 

750, 751-52 (1995). "Making a timely motion for mistrial means 

making the motion 'when the objectionable words were spoken.'" 

Yeatts, 242 Va. at 137, 410 S.E.2d at 264 (quoting Reid v. 

Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 774, 232 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1977)). 

"Counsel cannot remain silent when improper argument is made and 

after the whole argument is concluded and in the absence of the 

jury successfully move for a mistrial." See Russo, 207 Va. at 

257, 148 S.E.2d at 825. The rationale for this rule is that an 

objection to a prosecutor's statements at the time the 

objectionable words are spoken allows the trial court to cure 

the claimed error with a curative instruction, a remedy that it 

cannot effect after the jury has retired. See id.; Craddock v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 402, 405, 429 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1993) 

(considering appellant's objection despite failure to request a 

mistrial, because the objection was made before the judge and, 

thus, did not require a cautionary instruction). 

 Moreover, Williams' failure to object to the prosecutor's 

argument at the time it was made, or shortly thereafter, does 

not come within either the "good cause" or "ends of justice" 

exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule. See M. Morgan 

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Cherry & Assocs. v. Cherry, 37 Va. App. 329, 339-40, 558 S.E.2d 

534, 538-39 (2002) (holding that appellant's failure to object 

was without good cause because he failed to utilize his ample 

opportunity to object); Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 

131, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1989) (noting that the "ends of justice" 

exception is narrow and to be used sparingly, and requires a 

determination that the error affected the outcome of the case). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams' conviction 

and sentence. 

Affirmed.

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