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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

JEREMY DROUILLARD,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

FOR PUBLICATION

February 27, 2018

v No. 334977

St. Clair Circuit Court

AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE

CORPORATION,

LC No. 2015-002282-NI

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and METER and TUKEL, JJ.

METER, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent because I believe the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion 

for summary disposition. I would affirm.

As noted by the majority, plaintiff’s insurance policy defined “uninsured motor vehicle”

as follows:

“Uninsured motor vehicle” means a land motor vehicle or “trailer”:

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d. That is a hit-and-run vehicle and neither the driver nor owner can be 

identified. The vehicle must hit, or cause an object to hit, an “insured,” a covered 

“auto” or a vehicle an “insured” is “occupying”. If there is no direct physical 

contact with the hit-and-run vehicle, the facts of the “accident” must be 

corroborated by competent evidence, other than the testimony of any person 

having a claim under this or any similar insurance as the result of such “accident”.

In Dancey v Travelers Prop Cas Co, 288 Mich App 1, 2-3, 11-12; 792 NW2d 372 (2010), 

this Court considered a situation analogous to that in the instant case; the insured’s vehicle hit a 

ladder in a roadway, and the policy language at issue was identical to that at issue here. The 

Court stated:

Defendant claims that in order for the hit-and-run vehicle to “cause an 

object to hit” plaintiff’s vehicle, there must be a physical nexus between the hitand-run vehicle and the object. Defendant argues that because no one could 
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affirmatively state that the ladder fell off another vehicle, only speculation would 

permit a jury to conclude that there was any nexus between the ladder and the hitand-run vehicle, and speculation is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact. 

Plaintiff argues that there was no other logical explanation for how the ladder 

came to be in the roadway, given that the area was not under construction, was 

not open to pedestrian traffic, and was not beneath an overpass from which a 

ladder could have fallen. [Id. at 12.]

This Court ultimately affirmed the denial of summary disposition to the insurer, concluding that 

sufficient evidence had been presented to establish a substantial physical nexus between the 

ladder and another vehicle. Id. at 21-22. The majority indicates that the Dancey Court was 

focusing on the possibility of a “substantial physical nexus” between the ladder and another 

vehicle and not on the “cause an object to hit” phrasing from the policy. Implicit in the Dancey 

Court’s holding, however, was that the situation in Dancey satisfied the pertinent language of the 

policy. Therefore, Dancey provides supportive caselaw for plaintiff’s position in the present 

case. 

In Berry v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 219 Mich App 340, 342-343; 556 NW2d 207 

(1996), the insured’s vehicle struck an object in a roadway and she sought uninsured motorist 

benefits. The insurance policy in question defined an “uninsured motor vehicle,” in part, as a 

hit-and-run vehicle that “strikes . . . the vehicle the insured is occupying.” Id. at 342. This Court 

stated:

[D]efendant takes issue with the [trial] court’s legal conclusion that plaintiff was 

covered under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance policy. 

Defendant acknowledges, and we agree, that the policy’s requirement that a hitand-run vehicle must strike the insured’s vehicle constitutes a requirement of 

physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured’s vehicle. 

Defendant’s arguments all concern whether physical contact between a hit-andrun vehicle and plaintiff’s vehicle occurred in this case.

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[T]his Court has construed the physical contact requirement broadly to include 

indirect physical contact, such as where a rock is thrown or an object is cast off by 

the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the 

disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs. 

In this case, defendant argues that an insufficient nexus existed between a hit-andrun vehicle and the metal piece lying in the road. [Id. at 346-347 (citations 

omitted.]

The Berry Court ruled that “the legal requirement of a substantial physical nexus between the 

hit-and-run vehicle and the object struck by plaintiff was established.” Id. at 350. The Court 

indicated that adequate evidence of contact between the insured and another vehicle had been 

presented because “the metal piece lying in the road that [the insured’s] vehicle struck was 

deposited by the hit-and-run vehicle itself, i.e., the truck hauling a trailer of scrap metal.” Id. at 

352. 
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The relevant policy language in Berry was “a . . . motor vehicle . . . which strikes . . . the 

vehicle the insured is occupying,” and the Court found adequate evidence of coverage. Id. at 

342, 352. The relevant language in the present case is “a . . . vehicle [that] . . . cause[s] an object 

to hit . . . a vehicle an ‘insured’ is ‘occupying’.” The policy language in the present case is 

broader than that at issue in Berry.

Both Dancey and Berry suggest the existence of coverage in the present case.1 In 

addition, the plain language of the insurance policy supports the existence of coverage. Evidence 

demonstrated that the building materials in the road “hit” the ambulance when the ambulance 

proceeded over them. Random House Webster’s Dictionary (1997) defines “hit,” in part, as “to 

come against with an impact[.]” The building materials “c[a]me against” the ambulance “with 

an impact[.]” Accordingly, the white pickup truck “cause[d] an object to hit” the ambulance.

In light of the policy language and existing caselaw, I would affirm the denial of 

summary disposition to defendant.2

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

 1 Contrary to the suggestion made in the concurring opinion, I do not find that Dancey and Berry

are strictly binding in the present case. I find them suggestive of coverage, and reading them in 

conjunction with the plain language of the policy leads me to conclude that the trial court did not 

err in denying summary disposition to defendant.

2 I agree with the majority that defendant was not entitled to summary disposition based on the 

argument relating to the common definition of a “hit-and-run vehicle” because, contrary to 

defendant’s argument, the trial court correctly concluded that there were genuine issues of fact

regarding knowledge on the part of the driver. Whether this knowledge must ultimately be 

proven in order for plaintiff to recover is not a question currently before us because we are 

reviewing, simply, whether the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition.