i

The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes 

to the education of world class senior leaders, 

develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions 

to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

iii

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

IMPACTS OF ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL 

MEASURES ON SPACE SYSTEMS: ISSUES AND 

IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMY AND JOINT FORCES

Jeffrey L. Caton

September 2018

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the 

U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 

and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy 

full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest 

of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

∗∗∗∗∗

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 

101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
vi

∗∗∗∗∗

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be 

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army 

War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, 

Carlisle, PA 17013-5238.

∗∗∗∗∗

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College 

External Research Associates Program. Information on this 

program is available on our website, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/,

at the Opportunities tab.

∗∗∗∗∗

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 

of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain reports 

may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 

an order on the SSI website. Check the website for availability. 

SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full 

with permission and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army 

Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our 

website at the following address: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/.

∗∗∗∗∗

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College 

Press publishes a quarterly email newsletter to update the national 

security community on the research of our analysts, recent and 

forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored 

by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic 

commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested 

in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at 

the following address: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-787-1
vii

FOREWORD

In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, U.S. Secretary 

of Defense James Mattis stated that his department 

“will prioritize investments in resilience, reconstitution, and operations to assure our space capabilities.”1

In March 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump upheld 

these defense priorities in his National Space Strategy

that focuses on the protection of “our vital interest in 

space—to ensure unfettered access to, and freedom to 

operate in space, in order to advance America’s security, economic prosperity, and scientific knowledge.”2

Four months later, President Trump directed the 

Department of Defense (DoD) to lay the foundation 

for a military Space Force on par with the existing Air 

Force. While this directive still must clear Congress, 

one thing is certain—military space operations remain 

an essential part of joint operations.

In this monograph, Mr. Jeffrey Caton explores 

challenges to these space-related U.S. security priorities posed by the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 

efforts of potential adversaries. He argues that Russia 

and China pose the most viable A2/AD threat to U.S. 

space assets and contends that these nations see space 

activities as an integral part of their military operations 

and national prestige. To address possible mitigation 

of A2/AD efforts in the space domain, Mr. Caton provides recommendations in the areas of realistic expectations for space support, cyberspace considerations in 

space systems, natural space hazards, and the potential 
of unintentional escalation. This monograph should 

inform the ongoing activities of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as well as individual service 

space organizations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

ENDNOTES - FOREWORD

viii

1. Department of Defense (DoD), Summary of the 2018 National 

Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of Defense, p. 6, available from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/

Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

2. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump is Unveiling 

an America First National Space Strategy,” Washington, DC: 

The White House, March 23, 2018, available from https://www.

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumpunveiling-america-first-national-space-strategy/.
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JEFFREY L. CATON is president of Kepler Strategies 

LLC, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a veteran-owned small 

business specializing in national security, cyberspace theory, and aerospace technology. He is also 

an intermittent professor of program management 

with Defense Acquisition University. From 2007 to 

2012, Mr. Caton served on the U.S. Army War College 

(USAWC) faculty, including as an associate professor 

of cyberspace operations and defense transformation 

chair. Over the past 9 years, he has presented lectures 

on cyberspace and space issues related to international 

security in the United States, Sweden, the United 

Kingdom, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and the Czech Republic, supporting programs such as the Partnership for 

Peace Consortium and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence. His current work includes research examining 

the recent elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to be a 

unified command as well as the evolving role of the 

U.S. Army with nuclear operations as part of the External Research Associates Program of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Mr. Caton is also a member of the 

Editorial Board for Parameters magazine. He served 

28 years in the U.S. Air Force working in engineering, 

space operations, joint operations, and foreign military 

sales including command at the squadron and group 

level. Mr. Caton holds a bachelor’s degree in chemical 

engineering from the University of Virginia, a master’s 

degree in aeronautical engineering from the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the Air War College.

xi

SUMMARY

In January 2012, former President Barack Obama 

and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta published new 

strategic guidance for 21st century defense. Third 

among the document’s 10 primary missions of U.S. 

Armed Forces is the call to “project power despite 

anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] challenges,” which 

included the charge to continue “efforts to enhance 

the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based 

capabilities.”1 Further, the fifth mission is to “operate effectively in cyberspace and space” potentially 

against “a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, 

or destroy assets.”2 The 2018 National Defense Strategy

and National Space Strategy both reaffirm the vital interests that the United States has in the domain of space.

The utilization of space-based capabilities is an 

established part of modern military operations. The 

first live test of a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) system 

in 2007 forever changed how the world operates in 

space. In one event, the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) created over 2,000 pieces of debris that increased 

the number of manmade objects in space by 20 percent, which increased the likelihood of collisions by 37 

percent. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained ASAT capabilities that included direct ascent, 

co-orbital, and directed energy systems; many of these 

could be reconstituted by Russia. The technologies 

required for A2/AD of space satellites were proven 

and some were even operationalized decades ago and 

it is reasonable to consider that future rivals may utilize 

such systems. In short, space operations are becoming 

inherently more hazardous and vulnerable to disruption, denial, or destruction.
xii

This monograph explores what might happen if an 

adversary applied such measures to U.S. space systems 

and how this might affect Army and joint operations. 

To accomplish this goal, this research focuses on the 

central question: What are ways for the Army to assure 

the success of its space-dependent warfighting functions in an A2/AD environment where space systems 

are degraded for significant periods of time? After 

providing some necessary background information on 

space systems, this monograph addresses this question in three parts. First, it analyzes the space capabilities of potential adversaries as well as the technologies 

required and the nations that possess such capabilities. Second, it explores the strategic implications of 

such attacks and their potential effects on elements 

of national power, and then it concentrates on operational effects if space systems were degraded or made 

unavailable to the Army and other joint warfighters. 

Third, it examines current measures that may mitigate 

the negative effects of adversary A2/AD activities as 

well as possible alternative space capabilities under 

development. Finally, it makes recommendations for 

U.S. defense leadership with regard to strategic and 

operational opportunities to enhance A2/AD mitigation activities and the effectiveness of U.S. space power 

writ large.

The vision of outer space as a vast and tranquil sea 

is but an illusion; space is an inherently hostile environment that has become congested, contested, and 

competitive among the nations—and this trend shows 

no sign of abatement. However, as with the land, sea, 

and air commons, the peaceful pursuit of economic, 

diplomatic, and informational ends in space often 

requires the support of a capable and restrained military space force. The continued preeminence of U.S. 
xiii

military space capabilities depends on deliberate 

efforts to ensure access to and freedom of movement 

within the space domain.

ENDNOTES - SUMMARY

1. Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, January 2012, pp. 4-5, available from 

http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf,

accessed August 11, 2017.

2. Ibid., p. 5.

1

IMPACTS OF ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL 

MEASURES ON SPACE SYSTEMS: ISSUES AND 

IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMY AND JOINT FORCES

In January 2012, former President Barack Obama 

and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta published new 

strategic guidance for 21st century defense. Third 

among the document’s 10 primary missions of U.S. 

Armed Forces is the call to “project power despite 

anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] challenges,” which 

included the charge to continue “efforts to enhance 

the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based 

capabilities.”1 Further, the fifth mission is to “operate effectively in cyberspace and space” potentially 

against “a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, 

or destroy assets.”2

The first live test of a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) 

system in 2007 forever changed how the world operates 

in space. In one event, the Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) created over 2,000 pieces of debris that 

increased the number of manmade objects in space by 

20 percent, which increased the likelihood of collisions 

by 37 percent. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union 

maintained ASAT capabilities that included direct 

ascent, co-orbital, and directed energy systems; many 

of these could be reconstituted by Russia. The technologies required for A2/AD of space satellites were 

proven and some were even operationalized decades 

ago and it is reasonable to consider that future rivals 

may utilize such systems. In short, space operations 

are becoming inherently more hazardous and vulnerable to disruption, denial, or destruction.

This monograph explores what might happen if an 

adversary applied such measures to U.S. space systems 

and how this might affect Army and joint operations. 
2

To accomplish this goal, this research focuses on the 

central question: What are ways for the Army to assure 

the success of its space-dependent warfighting functions in an A2/AD environment where space systems 

are degraded for significant periods of time? After 

providing some necessary background information on 

space systems, the monograph addresses this question 

in three parts. First, it analyzes the space capabilities 

of potential adversaries as well as the technologies 

required and the nations that possess such capabilities. Second, it explores the strategic implications of 

such attacks and their potential effects on elements 

of national power, and then it concentrates on operational effects if space systems were degraded or made 

unavailable to the Army and other joint warfighters. 

Third, it examines current measures that may mitigate 

the negative effects of adversary A2/AD activities as 

well as possible alternative space capabilities under 

development. Finally, it will make recommendations 

for U.S. defense leadership with regard to strategic and 

operational opportunities to enhance A2/AD mitigation activities and the effectiveness of U.S. space power 

writ large.

BACKGROUND

Space forces support the semi-independent execution 

of cross-domain maneuver and integrated security 

operations through space-based intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance [ISR]; satellite communications 

[SATCOM]; PNT [position, navigation, and timing]; 

environmental monitoring; and missile warning. Space 

operations enable movement and maneuver within the 

operational environment via joint friendly force tracking, 

navigation warfare, alternate compensatory control 

measures, and special technical operations. Space forces 
3

protect the use of space-based capabilities and space 

domain freedom of maneuver through offensive and 

defensive space control.3

The utilization of space-based capabilities is an 

established part of modern military operations. Before 

examining specific space-related A2/AD threats and 

responses, it is necessary to provide a brief background 

on what comprises a space system as well as how space 

systems are employed in joint operations. 

Three Segments of Space Systems

Space systems are comprised of three segments: 

ground, space, and link. Ground segments include 

space launch centers; telemetry, tracking, and command facilities; radar sites; and user application 

devices, such as a global positioning system (GPS) 

navigation aid. Space segments are items in Earth orbit 

such as satellites, space stations, and reusable launch 

vehicles. Link segments are the intentional electromagnetic emissions between space and ground segments 

to transmit data or energy.4

The current joint definition of A2/AD can be simplified as adversary efforts to deny long-range access 

to, or freedom of movement within, a given area of 

operations.5 Adversary A2/AD efforts against space 

systems can target any one of the three segments to 

be effective. Ground segments can be attacked by 

ground troops or precision fires, but the ground segments that support the space segment will likely be 

located outside the operational area. The link segment 

can be attacked by jamming the command signals to 

the space segment (uplink jamming) or by jamming 

the data transmission from the space segment to a 

user device (downlink jamming). In very sophisticated 
4

attacks, the uplink may be captured, modified, and 

retransmitted to “spoof” the space segment into performing unintended functions. The space segment 

can be attacked using means that do not cause permanent damage, such as the dazzling of optical sensors 

by low-power lasers. They can also be attacked with 

methods designed to disable or destroy the space segment, such as kinetic energy or explosive ASAT missiles, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic pulse 

devices, or even cyberspace malware inserted into the 

uplink.6 Given the importance of space capabilities for 

joint operations, it is prudent for U.S. military planners 

to anticipate that future adversaries will attack space 

systems.7

Space Mission Areas

Joint and Army doctrine organize space into five 

mission areas that this monograph uses as a framework for the analysis of space-related A2/AD threats 

and mitigation measures. They are defined as:

space situational awareness. Cognizance of the 

requisite current and predictive knowledge of the space 

environment and the operational environment upon 

which space operations depend [emphasis in original].

space force enhancement. Combat support operations 

and force-multiplying capabilities delivered from space 

systems to improve the effectiveness of military forces as 

well as support other intelligence, civil, and commercial 

users [emphasis in original].

space control. Operations to ensure freedom of action 

in space for the United States and its allies and, when 

directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space 

[emphasis in original].
5

space support. Launching and deploying space 

vehicles, maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit, 

rendezvous and proximity operations, disposing of 

(including deorbiting and recovering) space capabilities, 

and reconstitution of space forces, if required [emphasis 

in original].

space force application. Combat operations in, through, 

and from space to influence the course and outcome of 

conflict by holding terrestrial targets at risk [emphasis in 

original].8

Each of these mission areas are divided into functional 

capabilities that can be correlated to Army warfighting 

functions, as depicted in this monograph’s appendix. 

Further details of U.S. space doctrine are available to 

the reader in existing publications and will not be repeated here.9

 Having established a common lexicon for 

discussion, let us examine potential A2/AD threats to 

U.S. space operations.

SPACE A2/AD THREATS

The 2011 National Security Space Strategy posits, “The 

current and future strategic environment is driven 

by three trends—space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive [italics in original].”10 If 

competition leads to conflict, what countries currently 

possess or are working to develop specific space capabilities that could be used to achieve A2/AD against 

the United States?

Potential Adversaries in Space

In his April 2017 Congressional as Commander, 

U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), General 

John Hyten named four countries of particular concern 
6

to his command: Russia, China, North Korea, and 

Iran.11 However, do these countries have viable space 

A2/AD capabilities that could significantly affect U.S. 

military operations? To answer this question, we need 

to examine each country’s progress in major milestones 

related to military space power, their current presence 

in space, and their current capability to perform the 

five joint space missions.

Table 1 provides a historical timeframe for each of 

these countries of key space-related milestones that 

indicate progression in the development of advanced 

space capabilities. Driven by Cold War motivations, 

the United States and Russia followed the same evolutionary path of space-related technology and system 

development: atomic weapons, large rockets capable 

of orbiting satellites, missiles with intercontinental 

range coupled with payloads that can survive reentry 

to Earth, rockets and life support systems that enable 

human spaceflight, and ASAT systems with intercept 

and kinetic kill capabilities. China traveled a similar 

path over a decade later and they have made great 

strides in their space power during the 21st century.
7

Table 1. Significant Space-Related Milestones

Iran successfully launched its first satellite on October 27, 2005. Although it has plans to develop military 

reconnaissance and communications satellites, Iran 

currently has only one satellite in orbit. Much of the 

success of their missile development is credited to Russian technical assistance, which has steadily increased 

since Vladimir Putin became President.12 Some analysts 

contend that Iran is “developing boosters for what it 

claims are space purposes that create the potential to 

deploy a future ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile].”13 Regardless, Iran is still a fledging space power 

at best.

North Korea launched its first satellite on December 12, 2012, and its current active orbital inventory is 

a single satellite. Analysts from India’s National Institute of Advanced Studies who reconstructed the 2012 

satellite launch concluded that “North Korea is somewhat more advanced than either Iran or Pakistan in 

space and missile technologies and products [emphasis in original]” and that “the actual performance of 

Milestone

Country

United 

States

Union of Soviet 

Socialist 

Republics/Russia China

North 

Korea Iran

Atomic Bomb 

Test 1945 1949 1964 2006 ▬

Satellite 

Launch 1958 1957 1970 2012 2005

Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missile

1959 1957 1971 2017 ▬

Manned 

Orbital Flight 1962 1961 2003 ▬ ▬

Anti-Satellite 

Test 1960s 1960s 2007 ▬ ▬
8

the Unha launcher as a missile, must be a source of 

considerable concern to North Korea’s immediate 

neighbours as well as the United States [emphasis in original].”14 The North Korean missile force is 

estimated to have approximately 200 Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles and 100 Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles.15 North Korea has 

regularly pushed the limits of international patience 

with its defiant missile tests in the Pacific Ocean. In 

July 2017, they achieved the first two successful test 

flights of an ICBM.16 Even with such advances in their 

force application capability, North Korea, like Iran, is a 

very immature space power.

Table 2 depicts the current space object inventories 

for countries based on the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration’s (NASA) orbital “box score” for 

August 2017. The United States has the preponderance 

of active payloads in space, which number over twice 

that of Russia and China combined. However, not all 

space mission areas require assets in space; for example, many space situational awareness systems are 

ground-based radars.
9

Table 2. Space Objects Count for Selected 

Countries17

Table 3 provides a qualitative assessment of the 

space force capabilities of Russia, China, Iran, and 

North Korea organized by the five joint space mission 

areas. From this, it is reasonable to classify the overall 

Russian and Chinese military space capability as near 

peers to that of the United States.

Country/

Organization

National Aeronautics 

and Space 

Administration

CelesTrak Union of 

Concerned 

Scientists

Total 

Payloads

Total 

Objects

Total 

Payloads

Active 

Payloads

Active 

Payloads

United States 1,529 6,218 1,508 722 593

Commonwealth 

of Independent 

States (Russia)

1,509 6,506 1,500 147 135

China 250 3,844 249 205 192

Japan 162 258 165 84 *

India 82 197 83 54 *

European Space 

Agency

75 133 75 44 *

France 63 545 62 23 *

North Korea * * 2 1 *

Iran * * 1 1 *

Other 825 939 952 597 539

Totals 4,495 18,640 4,597 1,878 1,459

* value not available or discernible from source information 
10

Table 3. Overview of Space Capabilities for Russia, 

China, Iran, and North Korea

Joint Space Operations

Mission Areas

Potential Adversaries

Russia China Iran North Korea

Space Situational Awareness

Detect, Track, and Identify OP ▲ OP ▲ ▬ ▬

Threat Warning and Assessment OP ▲ OP ▲ ▬ ▬

Characterization OP OP ▲ ▬ ▬

Data Integration and Exploitation OP OP ▲ ▬ ▬

Space Force Enhancement

Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR)

OP OP ▲ ▬ ▬

Launch Detection OP OP ▲ ▬ ▬

Missile Tracking OP OP ▲ ▬ ▬

Environmental Monitoring OP OP ▬ ▬

Satellite Communications 

(SATCOM)

OP OP ▬ ▬

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 

(PNT)

OP ▲ ▬ ▬

Navigation Warfare OP OP ▬ ▬

Space Supports

Spacelift OP ▲ OP ▲ DEMO DEMO

Satellite Operations OP OP DEMO DEMO

Reconstitution of Space Forces OP OP ▬ ▬

Space Control

Offensive Space Control OP ▲ DEMO ▲ ▬ ▬

Defensive Space Control OP DEMO ▲ ▬ ▬

Space Force Application

Ballistic Missile Defense OP DEMO ▲ ▬ ▬

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBM)

OP ▲ OP ▲ DEMO DEMO

Legend:

OP = mature operational capability

DEMO = demonstrated/developmental capability

▲ = actively improving capability

▬ = no known capability
11

While many countries may be able to exercise some 

forms of A2/AD measures against U.S. space systems, 

the remainder of this monograph will focus on Russia 

and China as the most capable adversaries. Let us 

examine the current and projected capabilities areas 

with some examples of specific systems in the Russian 

and Chinese space forces.

Near Peer Space A2/AD Capabilities

Russia

A 2013 Marshall Institute report provided some 

historical background on Russian military space operations, noting, “The Soviet Union viewed outer space 

as a theater where a war would be fought sooner or 

later; consequently, it made preparations to fight a 

war in space.”18 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) developed sophisticated apparatus such as 

co-orbital and direct assent ASAT systems and a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, and ICBMs that 

would travel to the United States over the South Pole. 

Soviet space systems were largely considered to be of 

poorer quality than those of the United States, although 

there were significant exceptions in areas such as rocket 

engine design.19 Regardless, the remains of the Soviet 

space capabilities formed the backbone of the Russian 

space force, although substantial space infrastructure 

had to be integrated through agreements with former 

Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 2017 report 

Russia Military Power states that Russia has over 130 

civilian and military satellites performing a variety of 

terrestrial support functions. The report characterizes 

this space fleet as “both formidable and in a state of 
12

rebuilding” and noted there are efforts underway to 

“prioritize the modernization of its existing communications, navigation, and earth observation systems, 

while continuing to rebuild its electronic intelligence 

and early warning system constellations.”20 Let us 

examine some details of this force in each of the five 

space mission areas.

Space Situational Awareness: In this mission 

area, Russia is largely dependent on its competent 

ground-based early warning systems due to delays 

in the modernization of its space-based detection and 

tracking systems. A recent report from King’s College 

London was blunt about this current shortfall: “the 

space component of [an] early warning system has 

effectively ceased to exist,”21 referring to the decline 

of the Soviet-era Oko satellite warning system. Successful launches in November 2015 and May 2017 of 

the next-generation missile warning system—the Edinaya Kosmicheskaya Sistema (EKS, translated as Unified Space System)—completes only a quarter of the 

system’s eight-satellite constellation. Also known as 

Tundra, this modernization will improve the warning time since “a key improvement of the EKS system 

over Oko is that EKS satellites do not just detect missile 

launches, but can also track the path of the missile’s 

flight.”22 Data from the space surveillance systems are 

fused and utilized by the Main Missile Attack Center 

for ballistic missile launches and by the Main Space 

Situation Reconnaissance Center for orbital tracking 

and deconfliction.23

Space Force Enhancement: The current DIA 

assessment of Russian space resources indicates it 

offers many capabilities to its warfighters, “including 
13

high-resolution imagery, terrestrial and space weather, 

communications, navigation, missile warning, electronic intelligence, and scientific observations.”24 Consistent with their military doctrine, Russian forces 

emphasize the need for extensive SATCOM, which 

have been provided by at least six types of constellations 

over several decades.25 The GLONASS (Globalnaya navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema, translated as Global 

Navigation Satellite System)—the Russian equivalent 

of GPS—reached its fully operational constellation of 

24 satellites in 2011, and is being maintained regularly 

with new versions. The latest GLONASS put in service 

was a third-generation satellite launched in June 2016. 

The system currently has two on-orbit spares as well.26

Space Support: Russia has very mature space 

launch vehicle (SLV) systems and subsystems, as well 

as newer systems, some of which are based on retired 

ICBMs. The venerable Soyuz and Proton rockets have 

experienced a series of failures attributed to manufacturing and quality control issues over the past decade. 

These problems were serious enough to cause a gap 

in military launches over 11 months.27 Current Russian 

space policy calls for a robust national space industry and infrastructure to meet national interests that 

include “the creation of a new generation of space 

complexes and systems to enable them to be competitive in the world market.”28 Progress toward this 

space infrastructure revitalization has been uneven. 

One notable achievement was the first launch from 

the new Vostochny Cosmodrome in April 2016, a complex designed to reduce dependence on the Baikonur 

Cosmodrome located in Kazakhstan. President Putin 

attended the launch and stated afterwards, “Despite 

all its failings, Russia remains the world leader in the 
14

number of space launches.”29 In addition to these bases, 

Russia has four proven launch facilities within its borders at Kapustin Yar, Plesetsk, Svobodny, and Yasny.30

Space Control: The Russian Federation inherited 

many space denial capabilities from the dissolved 

Soviet Union that included proven direct-ascent and 

co-orbital ASATs as well as developmental laser and 

directed energy systems.31 Their co-orbital ASAT had, 

at a minimum, annual live tests from 1976 to 1982, 

and it remained operational until 1993.32 The 2017 

DIA Russia Military Power report indicates that many 

of these resources remain: “[Russian] Military capabilities for space deterrence include strikes against 

satellites or ground-based infrastructure supporting 

space operations.”33 Russia’s electronic warfare (EW) 

systems include the Zhitel satellite navigation jammer 

as well as the Borisoglebsk-2 complex designed to jam 

SATCOM and radio navigation systems.34 Russian EW 

systems with potential directed energy weapon abilities include the Krashukha-4, which has successfully 

countered U.S. radar reconnaissance satellites and 

claims to be able to disable electronics on low-orbiting 

satellites.35 Russian space forces are actively testing a 

new ASAT system based on the PL-19 Nudol missile36

with recent press reports of a fifth successful test in 

December 2016.37

Space Force Application: The Soviet Union 

invested heavily in land-based ICBMs as the strongest 

part of their nuclear forces that also included bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). 

Russia continues this tradition, and it has modernization programs underway, although implementation 

of these updates has suffered many delays. Its current 
15

force consists of Stiletto, Topol, Topol-M, Voevoda, 

and Yars strategic missiles, as well as the developmental Sarmat.38 Unlike the silo-based U.S. land-based missile force, Russia deploys its ICBMs using both silo and 

land-mobile basing, which may include rail-mobile 

systems in the future.39 Russia is also completing its 

new fleet of Borey-class ballistic missile submarines as 

well as the new Bulava SLBM.40 With regard to ballistic 

missile defense, Russia has fielded several versions of 

the S-300, S-400, and S-500 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 

systems, and it continues to maintain a formidable 

defense ring around Moscow. Additionally, these 

ABM forces are being augmented by modified fighter 

jets “used not only to gain air superiority but also to 

confront enemy attack means in near-Earth space.”41

Finally, Russia is developing hypersonic weapons 

with intercontinental range that could carry nuclear 

or conventional warheads, which may challenge the 

capabilities of the U.S. missile defense system.42

China

The current Army operating concept, Win in a 

Complex World, contends, “China works to negate U.S. 

advantages in space” in part through the development 

of advanced ASAT capabilities.43 This viewpoint is reiterated in the 2017 Department of Defense (DoD) report 

to Congress on China, which notes that China continues to invest in “space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology,” as well 

as “a variety of counter-space capabilities designed 

to degrade and deny the use of space-based assets by 

adversaries.”44 Indeed, since 2000, the Chinese orbital 

fleet has swelled from 10 satellites to over 200.45 Let us 

examine some recent details of how China is working 

to improve in each of the five space mission areas.
16

Space Situational Awareness: The DoD assesses 

that China has a functional space surveillance capability, but it seeks “to utilize space systems to establish 

a real-time and accurate surveillance, reconnaissance 

and warning system.”46 In his 2016 Congressional 

testimony, space expert Dean Cheng provided additional insight into the Chinese efforts to build a more 

robust space situational awareness, noting that such 

improved capability is essential for the success of 

their ASAT systems. Also, improved space situational 

awareness will facilitate their space defense measures 

by allowing them to detect and characterize adversary 

orbital ASATs earlier, thus allowing them more time to 

plan and execute evasive maneuvers.47

Space Force Enhancement: China continues to 

make progress in the critical areas of space-based imagery, PNT support, and communications. In August 

2014, China launched the Gaofen-2, its first imagery 

satellite with a sub-meter resolution capability that 

is used for government applications and commercial 

sales.48 The Chinese satellite navigation system continues to grow, with four Beidou I1-S satellites added 

in March 2015, two in medium Earth orbit like GPS 

satellites and two in inclined geosynchronous (GEO) 

orbit. These launches demonstrated the plan to extend 

the Beidou network beyond regional coverage.49 Current plans are to have global coverage with a constellation of 35 total satellites by 2020.50 In August 2016, 

China significantly enhanced its capability for secure 

SATCOM by launching the first experimental communications that use quantum encryption technology.51

Space Support: Over the past 2 decades, China 

has built an impressive infrastructure of spacecraft 
17

manufacturing, space launch, and satellite telemetry, 

tracking, and command facilities. The robust family of 

Long March SLVs was further expanded in 2016 with 

the debut launches of the LM-5 medium lift SLV and 

LM-5 heavy lift SLV, both of which can support their 

growing human spaceflight program.52 These launches 

were the first to occur from the new Wencheng space 

launch center completed on Hainan Island in 2015.53

The Chinese are developing operationally responsive 

space launch capabilities designed “to augment current constellations in time of crisis and to replace lost 

assets in time of conflict.”54 Thus far, they have successfully developed the Kuaizhou-1A solid rocket SLV 

to serve this purpose; its first launch of three small satellites occurred in January 2017.55

Space Control: China persists in acquiring technologies for its counter-space systems that provide hardkill and soft-kill options, to include directed-energy 

weapons, jammers, and ASAT missiles. In addition, 

they are suspected of testing dual-use capabilities, such 

as autonomous maneuvering, in their satellite designs 

that would allow them to perform counterspace tasks 

on orbit.56 In what may have been a demonstration of 

co-orbital ASAT capability, in 2010, two small Chinese satellites performed a series of maneuvers that 

included a controlled conjunction. Since their infamous 

2007 ASAT missile test, the PLA conducted additional 

missile tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014 that have ASAT 

applications.57 The missile in the 2013 test had a peak 

altitude over 30,000 kilometers bringing it near the 

vulnerable GEO belt, which is at an altitude of about 

36,000 kilometers. Although pressed for explanation 

by the United States and several international organizations, the Chinese Government has not given details 

of the test’s purpose.58
18

Space Force Application: Although it professes a 

“No First Use” nuclear doctrine, China is aggressively 

pursuing nuclear platforms with multiple warheads 

and hypersonic delivery vehicles.59 The current Chinese nuclear inventory consists of 75-100 ICBMs and 

4 of the Jin-class ballistic submarines, each carrying up 

to 12 SLBMs. The PLA is developing subsystems such 

as decoys, chaff, jamming, and shielding to enhance 

the survivability of these weapons.60

China has developed at least one hypersonic boostglide vehicle through a series of seven prototype flight 

tests since 2014. One of these tests included evasion 

maneuvers at speeds over Mach 10 intended to defeat 

U.S. missile defenses. The vehicle may be deployed 

in the mid-2020s with either conventional or nuclear 

warheads.61

China continues to develop a ballistic missile 

defense that includes kinetic energy intercept capability at atmospheric and exoatmospheric altitudes.62 The 

system includes two new indigenous radar designs, 

one of which may be able to track multiple ballistic 

missiles. The viability of the system was demonstrated 

by successful midcourse intercept tests in 2010 and 

2013.63

SPACE A2/AD IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMY AND 

JOINT OPERATIONS

What are the implications of space-related A2/AD 

activities for the United States, its adversaries, and 

other international entities? This section explores this 

question at both the operational military level as well 

as the strategic level that may include effects on other 

elements of national power.
19

Adversary View of Space Power

Strategic Level

Both Russia and China see space as a key part of 

their national security and their international prestige, as well as their economic, political, and informational power. They also see the opportunity that their 

space industries provide to access and influence other 

countries. For example, such efforts by China include 

satellite and space support infrastructure development for several Latin American countries, including 

Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.64

Russia provides the United States with access to the 

International Space Station and it supports several 

commercial spacelift ventures, including the company 

Sea Launch, which has its homeport facilities in Long 

Beach, California.65

For over 2 decades, the primary space launch program for the DoD, the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle (EELV), has included a critical dependence 

on Russian RD-180 engines for the Atlas V rocket.66

Selected on the basis of technological superiority, the 

agreement to purchase the engines from Russia was 

also influenced by the desire of the United States to help 

with Russia’s transition from the former Soviet Union. 

This arrangement held until Russia’s 2014 annexation 

of Crimea and the U.S. response of economic sanctions. 

Russian threats to retaliate include the possible refusal 

to sell any more RD-180 engines.67 There is no immediate replacement for the RD-180 and the cost estimates 

for replacement with a U.S. design are over $1 billion 

with a time lag of at least 5 years for the development 

of a new design.68
20

Despite the efforts to expand their arsenals of space 

weapons, Russia and China are leading the effort for 

global acceptance of the Treaty on the Prevention of 

the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space—first introduced in 2008 and updated in 2014. The crux of the 

treaty is found in its Article II, which states in part, 

“States Parties to this Treaty shall not place any weapons in outer space; [and] not resort to the threat or use 

of force against outer space objects of States Parties.”69

The official U.S. position is that:

the 2014 draft . . . [Treaty on the Prevention of the 

Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use 

of Force Against Outer Space Objects] is fundamentally 

flawed. The scope of the proposal, absence of working 

definitions, lack of verification mechanisms and failure to 

address terrestrial-based ASAT weapons were all issues 

for the United States.70

Operational Level

Like the United States, Russia and China seek to 

make space capabilities an integral part of their unified military operations. Further, both countries promulgate that growing their military capabilities into 

a strong, technologically advanced, and operationally 

unified defense force is necessary to meet the growing 

threats of the United States and its allies.

Russia views U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) space power as a viable threat, which 

is reflected in their 2015 National Security Strategy and 

2014 Military Doctrine.71 Specifically, these documents 

express concern regarding:

U.S. missile defense systems stationed abroad, 

Global Strike capabilities, and ‘strategic non-nuclear 
21

high-precision weapons,’ as well as the militarization of 

space, all themes that came up in the military doctrine.72

To help address these security challenges, the 2017 DIA 

report, Russia Military Power, asserts that Russia sees 

counter-space operations as a way to control deterrence and escalation, especially with space-enabled 

adversaries such as the United States.73

In August 2015, Russia created the Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily (VKS, translated as Russian Federation 

Aerospace Forces) as an organization that mirrors 

aspects of the North American Aerospace Defense 

Command (NORAD).74 In a statement announcing 

the reorganization, Russian Defense Minister Shoygu 

noted that it was “prompted by a shift in the center of 

gravity in combat struggle to the aerospace sphere.”75

Further, Russian leadership noted that formation of 

the VKS was motivated by the increased speed of operations and decreased warning times in aerospace, as 

well as the increased aerospace weapons development 

by the United States.76 Accordingly, the VKS structure 

includes space forces tasked with “conducting space 

launches and maintaining the ballistic missile early 

warning system, the satellite control network, and the 

space object surveillance and identification network.”77

Chinese military leaders view “the control of outer 

space as a natural extension of a nation’s control of 

its territory.”78 Their careful observation of modern 

wars in southwest Asia cause many of these leaders 

to assess that “joint operations and command were so 

effective because of U.S. space assets.”79 The 2017 DoD 

report to Congress on Chinese security notes the “PLA 

strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems—and to deny them to adversaries—as central to 

enabling modern informatized warfare.”80 To exploit 
22

the potential advantages of space capabilities, the current PLA guiding thought (roughly equivalent to U.S. 

doctrine) emphasizes space operations in the active 

defense and unified operations of the military:

Space operations must also be integrated into larger, joint 

campaign plans to help achieve terrestrial objectives; 

command and control [C2] of space operations must 

therefore reconcile space-related requirements, timing, 

and structure with those of the overarching joint 

campaign.81

In late 2015, China established the Strategic Support Force to combine China’s military, space, cyber, 

and EW missions. President Xi described the force as a 

“new-type combat force to maintain national security 

and an important growth point for the PLA’s combat 

capabilities.”82 To unify their military forces further, in 

February 2016, the PLA established five theater commands (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and 

Central) followed in April 2016 by the formation of 

their Joint Operations Command Center.83

Operational Space Links for U.S. Forces

Joint Operations

Space forces play a prominent role in current U.S. 

joint operational concepts. The Capstone Concept for 

Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO) views the 

space domain’s importance to globally integrated military operations in a manner similar to that of Russia 

and China:

Space and cyberspace will play а particularly important 

role in the years ahead. As these domains figure more 

prominently in the projection of military power, 
23

operations in them will become both а precursor to and 

integral part of armed combat in the land, maritime and 

air domains.84

The CCJO also notes the “dramatic increases in the 

ability for adversaries to disrupt, degrade or destroy 

cyberspace and space systems” and thus the need to 

design U.S. systems that can operate in such degraded 

environments.85 Further, the CCJO includes two explicit space-related force development initiatives: “continue to improve defensive space capabilities” and “integrate missile defense systems.”86 Finally, the CCJO 

acknowledges the realities of defense acquisition and 

admits, “such technologies, especially in а time of restricted budgets, may prove prohibitively expensive to 

develop and deploy.”87

The 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) 

was written to provide a vision for the joint force to 

address the challenges posed by emerging adversary 

A2/AD capabilities. The JOAC bases this guidance 

on three major trends: growth of A2/AD capabilities, 

change in U.S. overseas basing, and conflict in space 

and cyberspace. It also envisions a significant increase 

in the role of space and cyberspace forces in traditional 

air-sea-land operations.88 To counter this operational 

synergy, the JOAC anticipates that “enemies may try 

to disrupt U.S. use of space and cyberspace—commercial as well as governmental—well before the onset of 

lethal combat.”89 Accordingly, 1 of the 11 operational 

access precepts that enable the JOAC’s primary goal is 

to “protect space and cyber assets while attacking the 

enemy’s cyber and space capabilities.”90

The 2014 Joint Concept for Entry Operations “establishes a common intellectual framework for the challenge of entry in advanced A2/AD environments.”91
24

It emphasizes the integration of forces across domains 

and notes “regardless of the type of maneuver, mobility and flexibility are critical and enhanced when fully 

integrated with cyberspace and space capabilities.”92

Consistent with current joint doctrine, the responsibility to incorporate space forces into a joint force—the 

space coordinating authority—may fall upon the joint 

force land component commander, if so designated.93

Army Operations and Multi-Domain Battle

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) publishes the 525-series of pamphlets to 

describe “how future Army forces will prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars 

while operating as part of our Joint Force and working 

with multiple partners.”94 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-

1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex 

World, 2020-2040, echoes the themes of joint operational access and discusses A2/AD challenges, which 

include those related to space systems. This document 

explicitly states that Landpower planners and leaders 

should expect potential enemies to utilize “space capabilities such as anti-satellite [ASAT] weapons to disrupt U.S. communications and freedom of maneuver,” 

and offers the example that adversary GPS jamming 

could degrade the accuracy of precision fires.95 Win in a 

Complex World also notes the active role of Army forces 

in protecting U.S. space systems “through reconnaissance, offensive operations or raids to destroy landbased enemy space and cyberspace capabilities.”96

TRADOC pamphlets that complement Win in a 

Complex World include documents that describe future 

Army warfighting function concepts and amplify 

the relevant space-based support needed for future 
25

mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and maneuver support.97

These concepts explicitly state that space warfighters 

facilitate multi-domain battle and that such support 

will likely involve: 

Maneuver forces leverage space-based capabilities 

through organic and embedded space professionals and 

cadre within the formation. Space support elements, 

Army space support teams and other specialized teams 

combine to plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate 

the human and technical elements of space operations to 

support maneuver forces across joint, interorganizational, 

and multinational partners.98

The most recent TRADOC Concept Capability Plan

for space operations precedes the CCJO by 6 years, but 

it contains the key themes of an increased integration 

of space capabilities into Army operations, in parallel 

with increased counter-space capabilities by adversaries. One of its explicit imperatives calls for the Army 

to “systematically and deliberately evolve Army space 

support operations over time to provide dedicated, 

responsive theater focused support to operational and 

tactical commanders.”99 A significant feature of such 

theater support is the incorporation of the systems that 

operate in a high altitude environment to augment 

orbital assets, noting that “a high altitude long-loiter 

system can provide long duration coverage of up to an 

850-mile diameter field of view.”100

Presently, the Army, working with the Marine 

Corps, is focused on the development of the Multi-Domain Battle concept of combined arms, which addresses 

the A2/AD challenges identified in joint concepts and 

includes a greater emphasis on space and other contested domains.101 The concept envisions future adversaries, such as Russia and China, that emphasize the 

use of long-range precision strike capabilities protected 
26

by integrated air defense networks that would force 

the joint forces to operate from dispersed locations. 

The Multi-Domain Battle concept has three major components: “creating and exploiting temporary windows 

of advantage; restoring capability balance and building flexible, resilient formations in the Joint Force; and 

altering force posture to enhance deterrence.”102 To 

aid in the concept development as well as its eventual 

mission command, TRADOC offers a draft battlefield 

framework that expands the three physical spaces of 

AirLand Battle (rear, close, and deep) to six physical 

spaces (strategic support, operational support, support, close, deep, and deep fires areas).103 In the current 

framework version, space capabilities have a presence 

in all of these physical spaces:

It is important that even virtual locations are tied 

to physical locations within this framework. Space, 

cyberspace, and information are often cited as exclusive 

virtual domains or dimensions, but that attribution is 

inaccurate. Achieving a physical effect requires a physical 

location of a delivery mechanism, supporting points to 

facilitate delivery, and the point of the intended effect.104

Given the importance of this crucial dependence on 

space forces, what ongoing world activities might affect the future application of U.S. space power?

International Efforts

While space-based operations may occur in a near 

vacuum environment, their effects and implications, 

intentional or not, are rarely isolated to this domain. 

Thus, with the United States, Russia, and China all 

pursuing highly integrated military operations across 

multiple domains, the possibility of unintentional 

escalation is a prudent consideration. Vincent Manzo 

of the National Defense University argues for the 
27

development of a common framework for interpreting 

cross-domain operations “that would give decisionmakers a better sense of which actions and responses 

are expected and accepted in real-world scenarios and 

which would cross thresholds that escalate the situation.”105 He presents a vignette where China interferes 

with a U.S. satellite during a military crisis, but does 

not damage it. The U.S. response uses cyberspace 

operations to interfere with the belligerent Chinese 

system, but does not damage it. Is the U.S. response 

proportional because it is in direct response to the initial aggression, or is it escalatory because it crosses 

domains? The predicament is that different officials 

in different governments may interpret such events in 

dissimilar manners. Thus, the development of common 

frameworks for space operations may decrease the 

potential for unintended escalation of hostility that 

could be sparked by counter-space activities.

The topic of weapons in space has garnered significant international attention, including from several 

organizations within the United Nations (UN) such as 

its Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and 

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 

within the Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). 

Building upon the foundation of the Outer Space 

Treaty of 1967, these venues facilitate several noteworthy endeavors amongst nations to better define 

the security environment of space, such as the No First 

Place of Arms in Outer Space initiative and the 2013 

UN Group of Government Experts on Transparency 

and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer 

Space Activities.106 The report of the 2016 UNIDIR 

Space Security Conference notes that “the United States 

is committed to implementing norms of behavior from 

the 2013 UN . . . [Group of Government Experts] on 
28

space TCBMs report” and that it encourages other 

nations to do the same.107 A detailed analysis of these 

ongoing efforts is worthy of its own monograph.108

The European Union (EU) continues to champion 

the adoption of an International Code of Conduct for 

Outer Space Activities, a proposal that has been met 

with mixed reviews from other countries.109 In October 2016, the European Commission formally proposed a Space Strategy for Europe focused on four 

strategic goals. The third goal, “Reinforcing Europe’s 

Autonomy in Accessing and Using Space in a Secure 

and Safe Environment,” clearly establishes the priority for EU Member States to maintain autonomous 

access to space and related radio frequencies as well 

as to protect European space infrastructure.110 Part of 

the ways intended to achieve these ends is to leverage 

the inherent synergies between military and defense 

space systems, which include their Copernicus Earth 

observation capabilities and the Galileo navigation 

constellation.111

SPACE A2/AD MITIGATION MEASURES

The Joint Operating Environment 2035 (JOE 2035) predicts, “Competition in orbit (even during peacetime) 

will be intense” involving a variety of counter-space 

activities.112 What current Army and joint measures 

may mitigate the negative effects of adversary A2/AD 

activities and what space systems under development 

may provide alternative capabilities for such mitigation? This section addresses this question by providing 

examples of how the Army, joint forces, and coalition 

members are working to address space-related A2/

AD concerns.
29

Army Measures

During his June 2017 testimony before Congress, 

Lieutenant General James Dickinson, Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC)/Army Forces Strategic Command 

(ARSTRAT) and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, addressed the 

challenges facing U.S. ballistic missile defense and 

noted the essential role that space-enabled capabilities provide. Progress in the emplacement of groundbased interceptors at Fort Greeley, Alaska, as well as 

the establishment of an inflight interceptor communications system data terminal at Fort Drum, New 

York, have greatly increased the capability to defend 

the United States against ICBM attacks from Iran and 

North Korea.113

Earlier Congressional testimony by four Army generals representing the areas of operations and planning, 

force management, capability development, and acquisition addressed the results of the Army’s first Strategic 

Portfolio Analysis Review. Capability gaps identified 

by the review included air and missile defense (AMD); 

assured PNT; EW; and assured communications.114

Fortunately, the described ongoing Army programs 

are addressing some of these shortfalls.

Resilient Space Systems

In its assessment of the technological needs for the 

future joint force, JOE 2035 notes that systems other 

than traditional large satellite constellations—such as 

microsatellites or nanosatellites and near space platforms—may provide more responsive and resilient 

space support.115 The USASMDC/ARSTRAT Technical 
30

Center recently completed an important milestone in 

its Kestrel Eye technology demonstrator to provide 

space-based imagery augmentation directly to theater warfighters at the brigade combat team level. On 

August 14, 2017, the first Kestrel Eye was launched 

on SpaceX Falcon 9 where it will be transferred to the 

International Space Station for final orbital insertion.116

Once established in orbit, the microsatellite (about 

50 kilograms) will go through a series of exercises by 

U.S. Pacific Command to assess the system’s operational utility. If the demonstration is successful, then 

the Army may opt to build a constellation of the satellites.117 If so, the aim for production versions of the 

satellite is to cost less than $2 million each and have an 

operational life of at least 1 year.118

The Army is also pursuing resilient SATCOM 

through the Space and Missile Defense Command 

Nanosatellite Program (SNaP) as an effort “to be a 

cost-effective and responsive satellite technology 

to mitigate the impact from the loss or disruption of 

national space capabilities.”119 The concept is similar to 

“a cellphone tower in space, except . . . for Army radios” 

that provide voice and data SATCOM using nanosatellites (about 5.5 kilograms) that can hitch a ride to orbit 

on larger space launches.120 Warfighters in U.S. Southern Command have helped to assess the operational 

utility of some of the earlier SNaP demonstrations.121

Other areas of ongoing Army development include 

high altitude and near space systems, navigation warfare, and high-energy lasers. High altitude systems 

have the potential to augment and extend tactical communications as well as help provide PNT capabilities in 

degraded environments.122 The USASMDC/ARSTRAT 

Future Warfare Center is developing the concepts and 

required capabilities to characterize the tactical PNT 
31

environment, assure friendly force use of PNT, and 

deny adversary use of PNT.123 Various high-energy 

laser demonstrators are being developed and tested 

by USASMDC/ARSTRAT as part of a Maneuver and 

Fire Integration Experiment (MFIX) series. Two mobile 

lasers testbeds successfully contributed to MFIX 2016 

at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and they demonstrated lethality against simulated threats. The lasers also serve as 

platforms for warfighter familiarization and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures development.124 The current lasers operate with up to 10 kilowatts of power; 

the development goal is to increase the capability to 50 

kilowatts by 2018 and 100 kilowatts by 2022.125

Training and Exercises for Theater Forces

To support the advancement of Multi-Domain 

Battle concepts, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is creating 

a multi-domain task force that “will integrate space 

effects at the tactical level to support maneuver elements of the operational Army.”126 The task force is 

planned to grow to a strength of 1,500 Soldiers and 

its effectiveness can be enhanced through increased 

awareness of space capabilities within the Army writ 

large. Toward this end, the USASMDC/ARSTRAT 

Future Warfare Center’s Directorate of Training and 

Doctrine trained more than 8,750 Soldiers and civilians during fiscal year (FY) 2016 in over 30 different 

courses that covered various aspects of the 5 space 

mission areas. Many of the courses are open to members of other services.127 Also, the ARSTRAT G-3 Training and Exercise Division (TREX) is developing field 

training events to demonstrate the effects of electromagnetic interference on GPS receivers—something 

that Soldiers should expect to encounter in a contested 
32

space environment.128 To help instill space capability awareness at the beginning of an officer’s career, 

USASMDC/ARSTRAT is partnering with West Point 

for their Space and Missile Defense program that was 

established in 2015, with a stand-alone major created 

in 2017.129

Army forces help to spread the benefits of U.S. 

space capabilities to other militaries around the world. 

In May 2014, ARSTRAT TREX demonstrated space 

kits to members of U.S. Army Africa that focused on 

space-enabled force tracking and GPS jamming awareness;130 similar training was provided to Soldiers in 

U.S. Army South earlier that year.131 In May 2016, 

USASMDC/ARSTRAT teamed with the California 

National Guard to provide space operations training 

to Ukrainian soldiers in their country to help them deal 

with degraded space support they experienced during 

their conflict with Russian separatists.132 Additionally, 

in June 2016, Army Space Support Teams supported 

NATO exercise Anakonda-16 in Poland—a 10-day 

event that involved more than 30,000 troops from 24 

countries.133

Joint and Coalition Measures

In April 2016, the U.S. Air Force Space Command 

announced its new Space Enterprise Vision to provide 

an integrated approach that spans the five space mission areas and “enhances U.S. space forces’ ability to 

deter others from interference and attack, defend our 

space systems if deterrence fails and contribute to the 

defense of allied space systems.”134 Let us examine 

some specific examples in each space mission area of 

ongoing efforts to increase the resilience of U.S. forces 

in a contested space environment.
33

Space Situational Awareness

During a January 2017 presentation at Stanford 

University, USSTRATCOM Commander General John 

Hyten discussed the formerly classified Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), 

calling the four-satellite constellation “basically a 

neighborhood watch program for everything that goes 

on in that high-value orbit.”135 The Air Force declared 

the initial operational capability of GSSAP in September 2015.136 To provide a more holistic approach to 

space situational awareness, USSTRATCOM established the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) in October 2015 at Schriever 

Air Force Base, Colorado. JICSpOC’s mission was to 

facilitate the fusion of space data amongst USSTRATCOM, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Air 

Force Space Command, the Air Force Research Laboratory, as well as to members of the intelligence community and commercial data providers.137 In April 

2017, the JICSpOC was renamed the National Space 

Defense Center to better match its mission as well as 

to avoid it from being confused with the Joint Space 

Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, California.138

Several DoD programs seek to improve space 

object detection and data processing for space force C2. 

In February 2015, officials broke ground at Kwajalein 

Atoll for construction of the Space Fence, an improved 

replacement for the aged Air Force Space Surveillance 

System. The system provides unprompted detection 

data to the JSpOC for space objects as small as 10 centimeters.139 The Space Fence is on track for an initial 

operating capability by 2019, and its future capability 

may be expanded to a second site in Australia.140 Space 
34

C2 is also being improved through the JSpOC Mission System modernization of hardware and software, 

to handle the increased volume of space situational 

awareness.141 The Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA) is exploring future space situational 

awareness capabilities such as OrbitOutlook, a program to provide automated synthesis of diverse sets 

of orbital data that may “improve the capability of the 

U.S. military and the global space community to make 

decisions about potentially hazardous space objects in 

near real time.”142

Space Force Enhancement

Modernization efforts continue for several constellations of satellites that provide crucial force 

enhancement to warfighters in the areas of PNT, communication, missile warning, weather, and imagery. 

In addition to the acquisition of the next-generation 

GPS III satellites starting in 2017, the procurement of 

the GPS Next Generation Operational Control System 

ground control system will “provide enhanced cybersecurity, precision, reliability, and integrity.”143 In 

addition, the Air Force is developing the Military GPS 

User Equipment receiver for joint warfighters that will 

improve PNT capabilities and resistance to emerging 

counter-space measures such as jamming.144

Ongoing SATCOM improvements include the 

upcoming launch of the fourth Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency satellite system, part of a four-satellite 

constellation that “provides survivable, anti-jam, low 

probability of detection/intercept, worldwide secure 

communications for tactical and strategic users,” as 

well as nuclear effects-hardened SATCOM.145 The 

Enhanced Polar System will serve as a polar-orbiting 
35

extremely high frequency SATCOM adjunct to the 

advanced extremely high frequency system. Its second 

of two satellites is planned for launch in late 2017 for 

an operational capability achieved by mid-2018.146

With regard to Earth observation systems, the spacebased infrared system (SBIRS) remains the mainstay 

for space-based launch detection and missile warning. 

The third GEO SBIRS satellite was launched in January 2017 and the fourth GEO SBIRS is scheduled to 

launch in early 2018 to complete the constellation that 

also includes two smaller satellites in highly elliptical 

orbit.147 The Weather System Follow-on-Microwave is 

the DoD’s third attempt to replace the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. The weather system satellite 

is in the early phases of development; its system-level 

preliminary design review is scheduled for mid-2018. 

Ongoing efforts by the DoD’s Defense Innovation Unit 

Experimental initiative include contracts for improved 

satellite imagery. The DoD has two contracts for the 

analysis of data from synthetic aperture radar microsatellites to increase terrestrial situational awareness—

one with Capella Space for the satellite imagery and 

one with Orbital Insight Space for analysis.

Space Support

The EELV has amassed an impressive 70 consecutive successful national security space launches as 

of March 2017. The current fleet is comprised of the 

Atlas V, Delta IV Heavy, and Falcon 9 SLVs that can 

compete for three planned launches for 2018.148 The 

Air Force is exploring reusable spacecraft technologies using the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle, the first 

vehicle since NASA’s Space Shuttle to successfully fly 

in space, land on a runway, and return to space in a 
36

subsequent launch. The X-37B has flown four times 

since April 2010.149 DARPA is also working on the 

most responsive space access capabilities such as the 

Experimental Spaceplane program formerly known as 

XS-1, “an entirely new class of hypersonic aircraft that 

would bolster national security by providing short-notice, low-cost access to space.”150 A defunct DARPA 

program, the Airborne Launch Assist Space Access, 

aimed “to propel 100-pound satellites into low Earth 

orbit . . . within 24 hours of call-up, all for less than $1 

million per launch.” While the program did make it 

to the design phase of a technology demonstrator and 

some subscale tests, safety concerns over its highly 

energetic monopropellant ended the program.

DARPA is partnering with industry to explore 

possible on-orbit satellite maintenance systems such 

as the Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites 

(RSGS) designed to inspect, maintain, and repair GEO 

satellites.151 The RSGS goal is to have a technology 

demonstrator in orbit by 2022.152 While such a system 

would provide incredible new capabilities for the U.S. 

space fleet, the dual-use potential of RSGS may also be 

viewed as a weapon by potential adversaries.

Space Control

The JOE 2035 calls for the possible use of offensive 

space control as part of the defense of global commons 

as well as the need for U.S. forces to be able to respond 

to attempts by adversaries to create orbital debris 

fields.153 In 2008, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency conducted Operation Burnt Frost at the direction of President Bush to destroy a non-functioning U.S. satellite 

that posed a hazard to life during an uncontrolled reentry. Although not its intended purpose, the successful 
37

operation demonstrated the low-orbit ASAT capability 

of the U.S. Aegis cruiser/Standard Missile-3 system.154

Defense counter-space forces include two Air Force 

squadrons of Space Aggressors tasked “to prepare joint 

forces and coalition partners to fight in and through 

contested space environments by analyzing, teaching and replicating realistic, relevant and integrated 

space threats.”155 Currently, the 26th and 527th Space 

Aggressor Squadrons focus on replicating live electronic attacks on GPS and SATCOM systems to help 

warfighters hone their tactics, techniques, and procedures. During the 2016 exercise Red Flag-Alaska 16-3, 

a Soldier from the 1st Space Battalion was integrated 

into the aggressor squadrons for the first time.156

Space Force Application

From a monetary resource viewpoint, the United 

States is very serious about maintaining an able space 

force. Ballistic missile defense systems for services 

are funded for $6.5 billion in the DoD FY 2018 budget 

request for an investment for interceptors and surveillance radars. The budget includes an additional $7.9 

billion for the Missile Defense Agency and $3.7 billion 

for two Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers in missile 

defense configuration.157

Members of U.S. missile defense forces continue to 

partner with allies in the biannual Nimble Titan missile defense experimentation campaigns sponsored 

by USSTRATCOM and led by the Joint Functional 

Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, 

which is the “third hat” for USASMDC/ARSTRAT. 

The Nimble Titan events not only bring warfighters 

from different nations together, but also players who 

focus on policy-level lessons for their organizations.158
38

In March 2017, the Nimble Titan 18 campaign commenced with an event in the Netherlands attended 

by participants from 26 nations. The campaign will 

address missile defense interoperability and integration as well as strategic issues such as deterrence and 

de-escalation measures.159

Like Russia and China, the United States is investing heavily in the modernization of its land- and seabased strategic ballistic missiles. The FY 2018 budget 

request includes $1.27 billion for the ongoing Trident 

II SLBM life extension that will keep the missiles as a 

viable deterrent through 2042, as well as $1.89 billion 

for work on the Columbia-class fleet ballistic missile 

submarine, which is set to begin replacing Ohio-class 

submarines in 2028.160 The Ground-Based Strategic 

Deterrent program aims to provide a modern replacement for the venerable Minuteman III ICBM fleet. Still 

in its earlier stages, the program will incorporate technologies necessary to address the projected threats 

through 2075. It is currently funded for $215 million in 

FY 2018, with deployment planned for the late 2020s.161

NATO Space Capabilities

NATO doctrine for space operations is included 

as chapter 5 of Allied Joint Publication-3.3, Allied Joint 

Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. It focuses on three 

of the Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, mission areas: space situational awareness, space force 

enhancement, and space control, which includes defensive space control operations to protect friendly space 

systems and recover from adversary disruptions and 

attacks. Allied Joint Publication-3.3 also identifies the 

roles of space in the planning and execution of NATO 
39

operations as well as how to accomplish space support 

coordination at the strategic and operational levels.162

While NATO has conducted space operations since 

1970, it relies on its member nations to provide military 

space capabilities. In a 2014 Marshall Center paper, 

Colonel Paul Tombarge argues for the establishment 

of a NATO Center of Excellence for space operations. 

To support his case, he presents a detailed compilation of existing NATO member space assets and the 

existing space-related positions in NATO’s command 

structure as well as recommended changes to improve 

the integration of these space capabilities.163

The recent Trident Junction 2016 included the “first 

integration of Space in a major NATO exercise as it 

involved incorporation, synchronization, integration 

and exploitation of Space-based products and services 

into Joint Task Force . . . operations.”164 Participants 

included space experts from USASMDC/ARSTRAT, 

as well as ones from France, Canada, Germany, and 

Italy. The current plan is to build on this success by 

establishing such space operations participation in 

future Trident Junction exercises.165

RECOMMENDATIONS

With the most capable space systems in the world, 

U.S. space forces are alluring targets for adversaries 

who wish to diminish the effectiveness of joint forces 

that depend upon space capabilities. Based on the 

material discussed in this monograph, the following 

recommendations identify opportunities for improvement at the operational and strategic levels to build a 

more coherent and effective military space force that 

supports all elements of national power.
40

Operational Opportunities

Awareness and Realistic Expectations for Space Support

Space operations typically receive short shrift in 

the core curriculum of intermediate and senior service 

schools, often crammed into a single lesson that covers 

the entirety of USSTRATCOM missions. This relegation of priority may propagate ignorance of the wealth 

of opportunities available from space forces, and thus 

hamper the full integration of space operations into 

new paradigms, such as Multi-Domain Battle.

In contrast, the DoD and the U.S. Army should 

be cautious not to over-promise and under-deliver 

on space capabilities. Publicly accessible USASMDC 

videos, such as “Army Space Power 2035,” border on 

fantasy in their depiction of Army space capabilities 

that might be available in less than 2 decades. The video 

“SMDC2017” is a more realistic depiction of Army 

space operation, albeit somewhat overdramatic.166

Aerospace as the Center of Gravity

The creation of the VKS (Aerospace Force) is a huge 

change for the Russian military, driven in part by the 

perceived “shift in center of gravity in combat struggle to the aerosphere,” as noted by Defense Minister 

Shoyu.167 Current Army activities often focus disproportionately on Landpower first and add in generic 

(vice integrated) inputs from aerospace sources. 

Instead, Army training, education, and planning 

should actively consider and possibly embrace the 

Russian view of aerospace as the center of gravity of 

the future, with land and sea forces as rapid maneuver 

elements. Such a shift in perspective can help to inform 
41

how the Army should evolve to remain the world’s 

preeminent Landpower force.

“Space-Cyberspace-Electromagnetic Spectrum” Confusion

Military operations that involve space, cyberspace, 

or the electromagnetic spectrum are probably the least 

understood by those who plan and execute them. 

The DoD and the joint staff should actively promulgate the development of coherent military theory for 

these areas as a foundation for doctrine and concept 

development.168 In an August 2017 article, then-TRADOC commander General David Perkins noted that, 

“integrating space and cyberspace domains and the 

electromagnetic spectrum for how Army units and 

joint forces will fight is something the Department of 

Defense [DoD] is just now beginning to understand.”169

As such, many Army and joint guidance documents 

simply lump these three spheres of operation together. 

This current muddled approach to doctrine and concepts works against the achievement of unified action 

and it will become more of an issue now that U.S. 

Cyber Command will become a unified command separate from and equal to USSTRATCOM.170

Cyberspace Consideration in Space System Designs

The DoD should fully explore the role of cyberspace 

forces in protecting the link segments to space-based 

assets since it is possible for malware to be inserted 

in uplinks and distributed via downlinks. Moreover, builders of satellites and space support facilities 

should implement cybersecurity features as integral 

design elements. Such features should emphasize mission resilience of the overall space system vice mere 

protection of individual system assets.171
42

Consideration of Natural Space Hazards

Outer space is an inherently hostile environment 

driven by solar weather with volatile effects that can 

disrupt space links and damage spacecraft. Significant solar weather events can also degrade the effectiveness of space surveillance, warning sensors, and 

terrestrial communications. Although not discussed 

in this monograph, planning and execution of space 

operations need to consider the naturally hostile space 

environment itself fully, especially when assessing 

and attributing damage to on-orbit assets during crises 

or conflict.

Strategic Opportunities

Unintentional Escalation Potential

The DoD should thoroughly and proactively assess 

the escalation potential associated with the means and 

effects of space-related A2/AD activities in increasing 

levels of crisis and conflict. This assessment should 

avoid egocentrism in assigning value to various elements of a space force, but must clearly articulate the 

threshold bounds for attacks on certain crucial U.S. 

space systems (such as ICBM early warning and nuclear 

C2). These thresholds should be communicated by 

means of diplomatic and informational national power 

using venues such as the bilateral agreements and UN 

fora.

Hypersonic Weapons

In her assessment of the status of hypersonic 

weapon development around the world, Department 
43

of Energy technical analyst Rachel Wiener noted, “The 

totality of Russian and Chinese advancements has a 

potentially destabilizing effect for U.S. nuclear deterrence posture and presents complex strategic choices 

for U.S. policymakers.”172 The DoD should continue to 

ensure that development of future U.S. missile defense 

addresses the unique operational profiles presented 

by such weapon platforms. In addition, as the U.S. 

deterrent force is revitalized, USSTRATCOM and the 

DoD should continue to assess the role of hypersonic 

systems in deterrence—which may include delivery of nuclear warheads—and provide the necessary 

resources for success.

Whole-of-Government Approach

The DoD space organizations should continue to 

develop and maintain vehicles like the National Space 

Defense Center to facilitate unity of national space 

power but also to create synergy for approaching new 

challenges. A recent opportunity for such activities is 

found in the revival of the National Space Council on 

June 30, 2017, which marks the return of this venue 

since it ceased operation in 1993. Upon signing the 

Executive Order, President Trump declared, “The 

National Space Council will be a central hub guiding 

space policy within the Administration.”173

Partnering with Industry

The DoD should continue to partner with U.S. 

aerospace industry and other private sector technology organizations to pursue innovative and cost-effective approaches to future space operations. In addition 

to the ongoing Defense Innovation Unit Experimental 

initiative, both USASMDC and the Air Force Space 
44

and Missile Systems Center released Broad Agency 

Announcements to the public this year to solicit 

new technologies and concepts for the DoD space 

enterprise.174

Stewardship of Technology

The DoD as well as the Departments of State and 

Commerce should continue their vigilance with regard 

to the export of technology, especially space-related 

technologies that can be dual tasked (for example, an 

autonomous maintenance satellite that could be used 

as an ASAT). The DoD should examine the RD-180 

Russian engine situation for lessons learned regarding 

the dependence on imported technology for critical 

aspects of U.S. space systems. Finally, when deliberating the proper balance of investment across diverse 

technologies, the DoD should consider the advice 

offered in JOE 2035 that “the fascination with small 

and cheap must be balanced against an appreciation 

for capital-intensive weapons and industrial technologies with the potential to dramatically alter the strategic landscape.”175

Role of Humans in Space-Based Operations

Russia and China, as well as much of the world, 

consider their active capability for human space flight 

to be a matter of great national prestige. In contrast, the 

United States willingly abdicated its ability to launch 

astronauts. Since 2011, NASA has been paying the Russian Government to provide the United States access to 

the International Space Station, a spacecraft in which 

the United States has invested over $50 billion. It may 

be a prudent measure for the DoD and NASA to carefully examine how human space flight contributes to 
45

all elements of U.S. national power and to develop a 

long-range strategy based on the path that would best 

benefit the United States writ large.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The vision of outer space as a vast and tranquil sea 

is but an illusion; space is an inherently hostile environment that has become congested, contested, and 

competitive among the nations—and this trend shows 

no sign of abatement. However, as with the land, sea, 

and air commons, the peaceful pursuit of economic, 

diplomatic, and informational ends in space often 

requires the support of a capable and restrained military space force. The continued preeminence of U.S. 

military space capabilities depends on the continued 

efforts to ensure access to and freedom of movement 

within the space domain.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, January 2012, pp. 4-5, available from 

http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, 

accessed August 11, 2017.

2. Ibid., p. 5. The full description of the mission is:

Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space. Modern 

armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective 

operations without reliable information and communication 

networks and assured access to cyberspace and space. 

Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure 

face a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy 

assets. Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic 

and international allies and partners and invest in advanced 

capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and 

resiliency in cyberspace and space [emphasis and italics in 

original].
46

3. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department 

of the Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and 

Maneuver, 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2017, p. 29, hereafter, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6.

4. Brian Garino and Jane Gibson, “Space System Threats,” in 

Air Command and Staff College Space Research Electives Seminars, AU-18 Space Primer, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, September 2009, available from http://www.au.af.mil/

au/awc/space/au-18-2009/index.htm, accessed August 2, 2017.

5. DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 17, 2012, p. 6, 

available from http://defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_

Jan%202012_Signed.pdf, accessed August 11, 2017. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) definition for anti-access/area denial 

(A2/AD) is:

As used in this paper [JOAC], antiaccess [A2] refers to those 

actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to 

prevent an opposing force from entering an operational 

area. Antiaccess actions tend to target forces approaching 

by air and sea predominantly, but also can target the cyber, 

space, and other forces that support them. Area-denial [AD] 

refers to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter 

range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to 

limit its freedom of action within the operational area. Areadenial capabilities target forces in all domains, including 

land forces. The distinction between antiaccess and areadenial is relative rather than strict, and many capabilities 

can be employed for both purposes. For example, the same 

submarine that performs an area-denial mission in coastal 

waters can be an antiaccess capability when employed on 

distant patrol [italics in original]. 

6. Laura Grego, “A History of Anti-Satellite Programs,” 

Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, January 2012, 

pp. 15-16, available from http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/

legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.

pdf, accessed August 12, 2017.

7. TRADOC, Department of the Army, The United States 

Army’s Concept Capability Plan (CCP), Space Operations, 2015-2024, 
47

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-4, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, November 15, 2006, p. 13. Potential attacks on 

U.S. space systems are summarized as follows:

Adversaries may alter the space operations environment 

by interfering with spacecraft, communication links, 

ground stations, terminals, or the associated information 

infrastructure. Adversaries may employ a variety of antisatellite [ASAT] techniques. Enemy special or conventional 

forces, theater missiles, electronic warfare [EW] means, cyberattack, and terrorists all pose a threat to vulnerable ground 

stations, control facilities, and terminals. Future adversaries 

will likely not be limited to today’s conventional munitions, 

but will likely develop both the intent and capability 

to employ WMDs or effects. Nuclear and non-nuclear 

electromagnetic pulse and directed energy weapons must 

also be considered. Adversaries may also attack spacecraft 

industrial facilities, launch sites, and even space vehicles 

during their ascent. The various bottlenecks associated with 

space systems will make unique space vehicle integration 

and launch facilities, and control and downlink facilities 

particularly valuable targets. Electronic attacks will aim to 

degrade satellite communications [SATCOM]; telemetry, 

tracking, and control links; and ground stations. Low power 

signals, such as those emitted by the global positioning 

system (GPS), are particularly susceptible to localized 

interference.

8. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2013, p. GL-8. 

See also Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Space 

Operations, Field Manual 3-14, Washington, DC: Department of 

the Army, August 2014. Although Field Manual 3-14 is unclassified, its distribution is limited to the DoD and DoD contractors in 

order to protect certain technical data. Thus, details of its contents 

are not included in this monograph.

9. In addition to joint and Army space doctrine, see Jeffrey 

L. Caton, Evolving Army Needs for Space-Based Support, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 

2015, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.

cfm?pubID=1262.
48

10. Robert M. Gates and James R. Clapper, National Security 

Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2011, p. 1.

11. John E. Hyten, “Statement of John E. Hyten, Commander, 

United States Strategic Command, before the Senate Committee 

on Armed Services,” 115th Cong., 1st sess., April 4, 2017, available 

from http://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/Hyten_04-04-17.

pd.pdf?ver=2017-04-04-154107-750, accessed July 8, 2017.

12. Alexandr V. Nemets and Robert W. Kurz, “The Iranian 

Space Program and Russian Assistance,” Journal of Slavic Military 

Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2009, pp. 87-96.

13. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Rocket and Missile Forces 

and Strategic Options, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, December 2014, p. x.

14. S. Chandrashekar, N. Ramani, Rajaram Nagappa, and 

Soma Perumal, North Korea’s Successful Space Launch, Report No. 

R20-2013, Bengaluru, India: National Institute of Advanced Studies, Indian Institute of Science Campus, April 2013, p. 1.

15. Pooja Bhatt, “North Korea’s Nuclear, Ballistic Missile & 

Satellite Tests,” Issue Brief, New Delhi, India: Indian Council of 

World Affairs, March 18, 2016, available from http://icwa.in/pdfs/

IB/2014/NorthKoreaNuclearBallisticMissileSatelliteIB18032016.pdf, 

accessed July 5, 2017.

16. “U.S. Condemns North Korean Missile Launch,” DoD 

News, Washington, DC: Defense Media Activity, July 4, 2017, 

available from https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/123

6993/us-condemns-north-korean-missile-launch/; and “Pentagon 

Spokesman Comments on North Korean Missile Launch,” DoD 

News, Washington, DC: Defense Media Activity, July 28, 2017,

available from https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1261

474/pentagon-spokesman-comments-on-north-korean-missile-launch/.

17. Table data for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) values sourced from “Satellite Box Score,” Orbital 

Debris Quarterly News, Vol. 21, Iss. 3, August 2017, p. 12, available 

from http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/odqnv21i3.

pdf, accessed August 9, 2017. This satellite box score is based on 

the objects cataloged by the U.S. space surveillance network as of 
49

August 4, 2017. Table data for CelesTrak values sourced from T. 

S. Kelso, “SATCAT Boxscore,” CelesTrak, current as of August 

8, 2017, available from http://celestrak.com/satcat/boxscore.asp, 

accessed August 8, 2017. This satellite box score is maintained by 

Dr. T. S. Kelso based on open source data from the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and is continuously 

updated. Table data was current as of August 8, 2017. Table data 

for Union of Concerned Scientists values sourced from “UCS 

Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists, last revised 

November 7, 2017, available from https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclearweapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.WzuAISAnY-6, accessed 

August 4, 2017. This satellite box score was current as of December 31, 2016. It also indicates the breakdown of the 593 U.S. satellites as: 10 civilian; 297 commercial; 136 government; and 150 

military. It is important to note that this is the same database cited 

by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Russia Military Power, 

see endnote 20 in this monograph.

18. Jana Honkova, The Russian Federation’s Approach to Military 

Space and Its Military Space Capabilities, Policy Outlook, Arlington, 

VA: George C. Marshall Institute, November 2013, p. 8, available from http://studylib.net/doc/8138846/the-russian-federation-sapproach-to-military-space-and, accessed July 5, 2017.

19. Ibid., p. 8.

20. DIA, Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support 

Great Power Aspirations, Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence 

Agency, 2017, p. 35, available from http://www.dia.mil/MilitaryPower-Publications/, accessed July 10, 2017.

21. Pavel Baev, “The Nuclear Dimension of Russian Military 

Power,” in Natasha Kuhrt and Valentina Feklyunina, eds., Assessing Russia’s Power: A Report, London, UK: King’s College London 

and Newcastle University, 2017, p. 14, available from http://

www.bisa.ac.uk/files/working%20groups/Assessing_Russias_Power_

Report_2017.pdf, accessed July 5, 2017.

22. William Graham, “Soyuz 2-1B launches Tundra missile detection spacecraft,” NASASpaceFlight.com, May 25, 2017, 

available from https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2017/05/soyuz-2-1blaunches-tundra-missile-detection-spacecraft/, accessed August 10, 

2017.
50

23. Timothy L. Thomas, Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 

21st Century Reform and Geopolitics, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015, p. 188, available from https://

community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/195605/

download, accessed July 5, 2017. Thomas summarizes the details of 

these command centers as follows:

The Space Command Troops include the Main Missile Attack 

Warning Center, whose space echelon monitors the launch of 

ballistic missiles of other nations and whose ground echelon 

monitors their flight. A Unified Space System is supporting 

the space echelon, while new Voronezh-type radars are 

active components of the ground echelon. Near Moscow 

the Don 2N radar system performs missions in support of 

missile defense. The Main Space Situation Reconnaissance 

Center is responsible for warning about foreign objects 

that might impact the International Space Station. Finally 

the Main Space Systems Test Center is developing both the 

space and ground echelons. Outside of Russia the Volga 

and Dnepr radars are located in Belarus and Kazakhstan, 

respectively, and the Okno space surveillance system is 

located in Tajikistan. 

24. DIA, p. 35.

25. Honkova, pp. 25-31. The families of Russian communications satellites include Raduga, Molniya, Meridian, Strela, and 

Gonets, as well as the Geizer and Garpun relay satellites.

26. “The Current Status and Further Development of the 

GLONASS Orbital Grouping in Support of Multi-Constellation 

GNSS Implementation,” Working Paper A39-WP/452, presented 

by the Russian Federation, Montreal, Canada: International Civil 

Aviation Organization, September 20, 2016, p. 2, available from 

http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Documents/WP/wp_452_en.pdf, 

accessed August 10, 2017. The presentation includes the following status of the GLONASS (Globalnaya navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema, translated as Global Navigation Satellite System) 

constellation:

2.1.1 In recent years, GLONASS has been maintained at the 

optimal level of 24 satellites, and it has been significantly 

modernized. As of July 2016, the GLONASS system, in line 

with its intended use, included 24 satellites, 23 of which 
51

were second generation (GLONASS-M) space vehicles . . . ,

and one third-generation (GLONASS-K). However, one 

GLONASS-M space vehicle (successful launch conducted on 

29 May 2016), was put into service on 27 June 2016, two . . . 

[space vehicles] are being held in orbital reserve, and another 

GLONASS-K space vehicle is undergoing flight tests.

27. Graham. This article provides these details on the gap in 

Russian military space launch: 

Thursday’s [May 15, 2017] mission was Russia’s first military 

launch since 4 June last year—one of the longest gaps 

between Russian, or formerly Soviet, launches in history. A 

reported budget squeeze, coupled with reliability concerns 

and manufacturing problems has seen Russia’s launch 

rate—usually the highest in the world—drop significantly 

over the last twelve months.

The lull in activity has in part been down to manufacturing 

defects and quality control issues affecting Russia’s 

production of rocket engines. A contractor was found to have 

been using cheaper materials in place of precious metals in 

alloys used to make parts of the engines. Seventy-one Proton 

engines and a number of Soyuz engines were recalled for 

inspection and repair.

28. Anastasia Edelkina, Oleg Karasev, and Natalia Velikanova, “Space Policy Strategies and Priorities in Russia,” Basic 

Research Program Working Paper 37/STI/2015, Moscow, Russia: 

National Research University Higher School of Economics,

2015, p. 4, available from https://publications.hse.ru/en/preprints/

147513677, accessed July 5, 2017. The authors summarize the goals 

of the Russian space policy related to space support as follows:

In addition, the national space policy includes measures for 

the industry development of the rocket-space complex that 

meet national interests. These measures include the creation 

of a new generation of space complexes and systems to 

enable them to be competitive in the world market and the 

completion of the development of the GLONASS system; the 

development of satellite groups, including the creation of 

groups of communications satellites, ensuring the growth of 

the use of all forms of communications—fixed, mobile and 

personal; the creation of a group of meteorological satellites 
52

that are capable of delivering information in real time; 

the expansion of the Russian presence in the world space 

market, and finally, the modernization of ground space 

infrastructure and technological equipment. 

29. Agence France-Presse, “Putin hails first rocket launch 

from new cosmodrome,” The Guardian, April 28, 2016, available 

from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/28/putin-rocketlaunch-cosmodrome-soyuz-delay-space, accessed August 11, 2017.

30. “United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer 

Space,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, n.d., available from http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/spaceobjectregister/resources/

index.html, accessed August 4, 2017.

31. DoD, Soviet Military Power 1990, 9th ed., Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Defense, 1990, pp. 60-61, available from http://

www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA229299, accessed August 12, 2017. 

The section titled “Antisatellite (ASAT) Systems” includes the following summary of Soviet capabilities in 1990: 

The Soviets maintain a significant ASAT capability against 

low-earth-orbit and medium-earth-orbit satellites, but 

capabilities against high-altitude ones are limited. Future 

ASAT developments could include new directed-energy 

weapons or direct-ascent nonnuclear interceptors. 

The Soviets have additional potential ASAT capabilities 

exoatmospheric. ABM missiles [anti-ballistic missiles], 

located around Moscow and at the Sary Shagan test range, 

that could be used against satellites in near-earth orbit; at 

least one ground-based laser, also at Sary Shagan, that may 

have sufficient power to damage some unprotected satellites 

in near-earth orbits; and electronic warfare [EW] assets that 

probably would be used against satellites at all altitudes. 

Research and development of technologies applicable to 

more advanced ASAT systems continue at a steady pace. 

Areas of investigation that appear to hold promise include 

high energy laser, particle beam, radio frequency, and 

kinetic energy technologies. 

32. Grego, p. 4.

33. DIA, p. 36.
53

34. Thomas, pp. 155-157. Technical details on the highly capable Russian Borisoglebsk-2 systems include: 

This is reportedly a multifunctional EW complex 

consisting of nine machines. Designed to jam mobile 

satellite communication and radio-navigational systems, 

the complex ‘has electronic reconnaissance and electronic 

jamming facilities with an expanded frequency band, an 

increased speed of scanning the frequency range, reduced 

reaction time with regard to unknown frequencies, higher 

accuracy in determining the coordinates of a source of 

radiation, and jamming facilities with a higher throughput 

capacity.’ It is stated that the complex can suppress over 

twice the frequency range than its predecessors (such as 

the Mandat or R-330), and it can find a signal to jam in a 

hundredth of the time. The Eastern Military District, Arctic, 

and Southern Military District have tested the complex 

at Tambov, with the Arctic units attempting to take into 

account the specific conditions of the Polar Region. It is 

mounted on a mobile tracked MT-LBu armored personnel 

carrier. The Borisoglebsk-2 was produced by the Sozvezdiye 

Concern. (p. 157)

35. Ibid, pp. 158-159. Technical details of the Krasukha-4 EW 

system relevant to space control include:

Manufactured by the Radioelektronnyye Tekhnologii 

Concern, part of Rostekh, each system is comprised of two 

KamAZ vehicles with an operating radius of more than 

300 km. The new system is fully automated and takes into 

consideration changes in wavebands and how the frequencies 

of homing-guidance heads operate as well as the algorithms 

of its effect. The system detects the frequencies on which 

reconnaissance is being conducted and initiates suppression 

automatically. The old Soviet systems, on the other hand, 

often saturated a waveband with noise and unfortunately 

suppressed its own equipment in the process. The system 

has successfully countered the US Lacrosse-class radar 

reconnaissance satellites. Lacrosse-class radar surveillance 

satellites are designed to monitor launch sites of the Topol 

or Yars mobile ground-based systems. The system creates a 

dome that is impenetrable to electromagnetic waves. It can 

blind and deafen AWACS-type long-range radar surveillance 

planes, space satellites used to guide rockets to targets, and 
54

in tough situations, can control a high-frequency beam to 

‘burn out all of an airplane’s electronic systems, rockets, or 

low-orbiting satellite.’. . . The system also can be found in 

the Eastern and Southern Military Districts and in the Arctic. 

36. Baev, “The Nuclear Dimension,” p. 14.

37. Weston Williams, “Russia launches anti-satellite weapon: 

A new warfront in space?” The Christian Science Monitor, December 22, 2016, available from https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/

Military/2016/1222/Russia-launches-anti-satellite-weapon-A-newwarfront-in-space, accessed July 5, 2017. Few details of the Russian 

tests are available: 

Once more, Russia has conducted a successful test of an antisatellite [ASAT] weapon, Pentagon officials said Thursday.

It was the fifth time the weapon, a PL-19 Nudol missile, had 

been tested. Some military analysts have expressed concern 

over the test, saying that it was a provocative demonstration 

of Moscow’s might on a relatively new military frontier: 

outer space. But they suggest that it’s more about Russian 

posturing than an imminent threat.

The latest test of the Nudol missile took place on December 

16, an official with knowledge of the launch told The 

Washington Free Beacon. The launch originated from a 

facility near Plesetsk, about 500 miles north of Moscow, 

and was apparently successful, despite CNN reports that 

no debris was detected by US monitoring stations, meaning 

that no test target was destroyed.

38. Baev, “The Nuclear Dimension,” p. 14.

39. Thomas, pp. 191-194. The envisioned operational advantages of a rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 

system are described as follows:

Another way that Russia has restored its missile shield is 

through the announcement that it will be resurrecting its 

rail-mobile ICBM system. This is in response to the US global 

strike platform. In the Soviet era the RT-23 Molodets (NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] classification as the 

SS-24 Scalpel) was the rail-mobile combat missile complex 

(BZhRK). It will be replaced by the Barguzin BZhRK, which 
55

should become operational by 2020. The main weapon of the 

Barguzin will be the RS-24 Yars missile, which contains four 

warheads. Each Barguzin will carry six Yars. Like Molodets it 

can be hidden from space surveillance among “the thousands 

of railroad trains bustling throughout the expanses of an 

enormous country daily.” It took less than three minutes for 

the Molodets to receive an order and execute it by launching 

the first missile. Whether such parameters are available for 

the Barguzin is not known. (p. 194)

40. Baev, “The Nuclear Dimension,” pp. 13-14.

41. Thomas, pp. 181-187. This book includes a concise overview of Russian ABM systems: 

The enhanced but yet to be produced S-300VM/VMK is 

capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of 2,500 

km and re-entry speeds of 4.5 km/s, whereas the S-400 is 

claimed to be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with 

a range of 3,500 km, which equates to re-entry speeds of 4.8 

to 5 km/s. A system designed to intercept warheads at 5 

km/s has the ability to act as a point system against simple 

ICBM warheads, which have a typical re-entry speed of 7 

km/s. Apart from the main Moscow deployment, Russia 

has striven actively for intrinsic ABM capabilities of its late 

model . . . [surface-to-air missile] systems.

The S-500 (and the S-400) most likely will use the 77N6-N 

and the 77N6-N1 missiles. They were reported to be capable 

of direct engagement with targets flying at hypersonic 

speeds (seven kilometers per second). However, it is not 

clear when the 77N6-N and the 77N6-N1 will enter service. 

The S-500 is expected to use the following radars: the 91N6A 

(M) acquisition and battle management radar, the revised 

96L6-TsP acquisition radar, and the new 76T6 multimode 

engagement and 77T6 ABM engagement radars. Further, 

the Aerospace Forces have in their inventory some 125 

aerodromes. About 80 percent require upgrades, and the 

repair will last until about 2020. (pp. 186-187)

42. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Hypersonic Threats: The Need for a 

Realistic Assessment,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August 9, 2016, 

available from http://carnegie.ru/2016/08/09/hypersonic-threats-needfor-realistic-assessment-pub-64281, accessed August 12, 2017. The 
56

author describes the mission profile of a possible Russian hypersonic weapon:

According to accounts in Russian defense publications and 

journals, the development of such a missile complex was 

conducted based on government order No. 173-45, issued on 

February 9, 1987. The complex’s development was carried 

out by the NPO Mashinostroenia (NPOmash) Design Bureau 

under the leadership of Gerbert Yefremov. In theory, the 

complex’s design was relatively simple: At boost phase, the 

UR-100N UTTKh (SS-19) intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) would launch a so-called hypersonic gliding vehicle 

(HGV) to an altitude of 80 to 90 kilometers, after which 

the HGV would make a low-angle turn toward the earth’s 

surface and accelerate at a descending trajectory, gliding 

to intercontinental range at hypersonic speed, or five times 

the speed of sound. An HGV armed with a nuclear weapon 

would supposedly make rapid cross-range maneuvers to 

circumvent ground-based U.S. missile defenses.

43. TRADOC, Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

October 31, 2014, p. 13, hereafter, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. 

This document certainly views China as a potential adversary in 

space: 

China works to negate U.S. advantages in space and 

cyberspace. China is developing significant anti-satellite 

[ASAT] capabilities, integrating cyber into all aspects of 

military operations, and developing sophisticated missiles 

and air defenses as part of an effort to challenge United 

States’ ability to project power. 

44. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Annual Report to Congress, Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 15, 2017, p. 34, available from http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_

China_Military_Power_Report.PDF?ver=2017-06-06-141328-770, 

accessed July 29, 2017.

45. Anthony H. Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, “How 

China Plans to Utilize Space for A2/AD in the Pacific,” The Buzz, 

blog of The National Interest, August 17, 2016, available from 
57

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-china-plans-utilizespace-a2-ad-the-pacific-17383, accessed June 19, 2017.

46. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, Annual Report to Congress, Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 26, 2016, p. 61, available from http://defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20

China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf, accessed July 29, 2017.

47. Dean Cheng, U.S.-China Competition in Space, Testimony 

before Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology before the U.S. House of Representatives on September 27, 2016, 

Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, September 27, 2016, 

available from https://www.heritage.org/node/159801/print-display, 

accessed June 19, 2017.

48. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Annual Report to Congress, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 7, 2015, p. 13, 

available from http://defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_

China_Military_Power_Report.pdf, accessed July 29, 2017.

49. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, p. 36.

50. Cordesman and Kendall.

51. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, p. 34.

52. Ibid.

53. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, p. 14.

54. Cheng, U.S.-China Competition in Space, p. 13.

55. Rui C. Barbosa, “Chinese Kuaizhou-1A rocket launches 

several small satellites,” NASASpaceflight.com, January 9, 2017, 

available from https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2017/01/chinesekuaizhou-1a-launches-several-small-satellites/, accessed August 17, 

2017. This monograph’s author notes with some irony that the 

name of one of the satellites was “Caton-1.”
58

56. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, p. 35.

57. Dean Cheng, The PLA’s Interest in Space Dominance, Testimony before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

on February 18, 2015, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, February 24, 2015, available from https://www.heritage.org/

node/163551/print-display, accessed June 19, 2017.

58. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, p. 14.

59. Hyten, p. 3.

60. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, p. 60.

61. Rachel Wiener, “The Impact of Hypersonic Glide, BoostGlide, and Air-Breathing Technologies on Nuclear Deterrence,” 

in Mark F. Cancian, ed., Project on Nuclear Issues: A Collection of 

Papers from the 2016 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and PONI Conference 

Series, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, May 1, 2017, pp. 136-160, available from https://www.csis.

org/analysis/project-nuclear-issues-2, accessed August 8, 2017.

62. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, pp. 49-50.

63. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, p. 34.

64. R. Evan Ellis, Indian and Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Comparative Assessment, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 13, 2017, 

p. 33, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.

cfm?pubID=1346. The author summarizes China’s recent space-related efforts in Latin America:

In space services, China’s National Space Administration 

and its space services provider, Great Wall Industries, have 

developed and launched four satellites for Brazil, two for 

Venezuela, and one for Bolivia, as well as the launch of 

the Pegasus microsatellite for Ecuador. Such projects have 

included Chinese construction of space-ground-control 
59

infrastructure for both Venezuela and Bolivia, and the 

training of personnel for both newly created space programs 

in the PRC. The PRC has also built a deep space radar 

tracking facility in a remote part of Neuquén, Argentina, 

as a laser range-finding capability at Argentina’s San Juan 

Observatory, and has tried unsuccessfully to win contracts 

to develop and launch satellites for Chile and Argentina. 

65. Sea Launch has been acquired by S7 Space since the 

writing of this monograph. Their former website, archived with 

Internet Archive, included information about the heritage of the 

company, see “History,” Sea Launch, n.d., available from https://

web.archive.org/web/20170812073104/http://www.sea-launch.com:80/

about/11129, accessed July 3, 2018: 

The concept for Sea Launch originated in the early 1990’s, 

when numerous commercial voice, data and broadband 

satellite constellations were being planned for launch. After 

the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR), RSC Energia looking to utilize their wealth of 

space expertise, in conjunction with The Boeing Company, 

Kvaerner, Yuzhmash and Yuzhnoye agreed to do conceptual 

studies on what an ocean-based Zenit-3SL launch system 

would look like.

Since its inception in 1995, and its first demonstration 

flight in 1999, Sea Launch has carved out a niche as one of 

the industry’s premier launch providers that has brought 

innovation, competition, diversity of supply and service to 

the world’s satellite operators.

66. “Russian Rocket Engines used by the United States,” 

Fact Sheet, Colorado Springs, CO: Space Foundation, August 8, 

2016, p. 2, available from https://www.spacefoundation.org/sites/

default/files/reports/RussianRocketEnginesUsedByTheUnitedStates.

pdf, accessed July 13, 2017. This document includes a brief history 

of how the Russia RD-180 rocket engine came into the U.S. space 

launch supply chain:

The RD-180 is based on the RD-170/RD-171 engines. The 

RD-170 was used in the Soviet-era Energia launch vehicle—

which had only two launches. The RD-171 engines are still 

in service on various versions of the Ukrainian/Russian 

Zenit rockets; these are used by Russia for some government 
60

launches and also by the Sea Launch and Land Launch 

companies that perform commercial satellite launches. 

General Dynamics’ Convair Division originally developed 

the Atlas rockets and that division was acquired by Martin 

Marietta in 1994, which in turn merged with Lockheed 

Corporation to form Lockheed Martin. The company 

negotiated the rights to use the RD-180 as a first stage engine 

for the Atlas rocket—initially to launch commercial satellites 

and later as part of the Department of Defense’s [DoD] 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. The 

original intent was for the RD-180 to be produced by NPO 

Energomash for commercial satellite launches and by Pratt 

& Whitney (a subsidiary of United Technologies Corp.) for 

U.S. Government launches, but to date all engines have been 

produced in Russia. 

67. Todd Harrison, Andrew Hunter, Kaitlyn Johnson, Evan 

Linck, and Thomas Roberts, Beyond the RD-180, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 21, 

2017, available from https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-rd-180, 

accessed August 3, 2017.

68. “Russian Rocket Engines used by the United States,” p. 5. 

This document summarizes the challenges associated with eliminating the Russia rocket engines from the U.S. Atlas V design:

The U.S. Government and industry have invested 

approximately $300M over the last 20 years in technology 

associated with . . . [the oxygen-rich staged combustion] 

engines. The Department of Defense [DoD] estimates it 

would need $1 billion over five years to establish production 

of an RD-180 class engine on U.S. soil. Meanwhile, if the 

supply is interrupted, some missions could be offloaded to 

the Delta IV while Pentagon officials prioritize what missions 

need to be flown on the Atlas V. (The Delta IV uses the RS-68 

engine, manufactured by Aerojet Rocketdyne; the RS-68 is a 

U.S. engine, develops 663,000 pounds of thrust at sea level, 

and uses Liquid Hydrogen . . . and . . . [liquid oxygen] for 

fuel.)

69. “Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 

Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against 

Outer Space Objects,” Geneva, Switzerland, United Nations 

Conference on Disarmament, June 12, 2014, p. 3, available from 
61

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/050/66/pdf/

G1405066.pdf?OpenElement, accessed August 15, 2017. The full 

text of Article II is:

The States Parties to this Treaty undertake: 

• Not to place any weapons in outer space;

• Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer 

space objects of States Parties to the Treaty;

• Not to engage, as part of international cooperation, 

in outer space activities that are inconsistent with the 

object and purpose of this Treaty;

• Not to assist or induce other States, groups of States, 

international, intergovernmental or non-governmental 

organizations, including non-governmental legal 

entities established, registered or located in territory 

under their jurisdiction and/or their control, to 

participate in activities inconsistent with the object and 

purpose of this Treaty.

70. Daniel Golston, UNIDIR Space Security Conference 2016: 

Sustaining the Momentum: the Current Status of Space Security, Conference Report 28-29 April 2016, Geneva, Switzerland: United 

Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2016, p. 50, available 

from http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/space-security-2016

-en-654.pdf, accessed August 4, 2017.

71. Isabelle Facon, Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine and their implications for the EU, Brussels, Belgium: 

European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, 

European Parliament, February 1, 2017, p. 9, available from http://

www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578016/EXPO_

IDA(2017)578016_EN.pdf, accessed July 5, 2017. The European 

Union (EU) assessment of current Russian security strategies 

include:

All Russian security documents explicitly single out the 

challenges that the policies of Western states supposedly 

create for Russian security (with particularly harsh words 

in the Security strategy). Grievances connected to what 

Russia sees as ‘systemic problems in the Euro-Atlantic 

region’ (Foreign policy concept), the enlargement of NATO, 

the location of its military infrastructure close to Russian 
62

borders, its ‘offensive capabilities’ and the trend towards 

the Alliance acquiring ‘global functions’, the ‘symptoms’ 

of the U.S. efforts to retain absolute military supremacy 

(the global antimissile system, Global Strike capabilities, 

militarization of space)—all these problems were mentioned 

in the previous versions of these doctrines.

72. Olga Oliker, “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security 

Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 

7, 2016, available from https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpackingrussias-new-national-security-strategy, accessed July 5, 2017. See 

also Thomas, pp. 179-181; details on the U.S. systems that concern 

Russia include:

In June 2014 nearly 200 scientists took part in the 17th AllRussia Scientific and Practical Conference on Defense and 

Security in Saint Petersburg. The discussion began with a 

presentation by the President of the Russian Academy of 

Missile and Artillery Sciences, Vasiliy Burenok, who listed 

six 21st century military-technical threats to Russia, four of 

which turned out to be aerospace-related: the US and Chinese 

missile defense systems; the US’s adoption of hypersonic 

cruise missiles; NATO’s development of high-speed kinetic 

weapons, laser systems, and weapon control systems; and 

space technology developments, such as the use of mini- and 

nano-satellites. (pp. 179-180)

73. DIA, p. 36. Reasons why the Russian military desires to 

increase its space power include:

The Russian General Staff argues for pursuing in wartime 

such strategies as disrupting foreign military C2 [command 

and control] or information support because they are 

so critical to the fast-paced, high-technology conflicts 

characteristic of modern warfare. Russia believes that having 

the military capabilities to counter space operations will 

deter aggression by space-enabled adversaries and enable 

Russia to control escalation of conflict if deterrence fails. 

Military capabilities for space deterrence include strikes 

against satellites or ground-based infrastructure supporting 

space operations. 
63

74. Thomas, pp. 174-175. The Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily

(VKS, translated as Russian Federation Aerospace Forces) is now 

one of four services in the Russian military forces:

The Air Force and those forces currently belonging to 

the . . . [Russian Aerospace Defense Forces] have now been 

integrated into one service. The Air Force will cease to exist 

as a separate service; only the Ground Forces, Navy, Strategic 

Rocket Forces, and VKS will remain. One source noted that 

the VKS will include an aerospace attack reconnaissance 

and warning system, an aerospace attack deterrence system, 

a unified control system, and a comprehensive support 

system. (p. 174)

75. Ibid., p. 198.

76. Ibid., p. 199. More details regarding the Russian motivation for forming the VKS include:

Russia’s military offered three reasons for the reorganization 

effort. Primarily, defense in aerospace is very different 

from other defense postures. Aerospace defense systems 

are defending against attacks launched at them at superhigh speeds from hundreds of kilometers away, which 

makes warning times extremely short and the destruction 

potentially significant, depending on the target chosen 

and the destructive force of the incoming projectile/wave. 

Secondly, as Deputy Commander of Aerospace Defense 

Troops Major General Kirill Makarov asserted in April 

2015 (and repeated by Shoygu in August), since the end 

of the last century the . . . [center of gravity] of warfare has 

shifted to the aerospace sphere. Finally, Russia’s military 

sees an aerospace threat from the US in the form of the 

Prompt Global Strike concept, which, according to Makarov, 

“presupposes an instantaneous strike against any state 

which the US considers the enemy within a short space of 

time, from 40 minutes to two and a half hours.” The threat 

could include cruise or intercontinental missiles, as well as 

hypersonic aerial vehicles.

77. DIA, p. 37.

78. Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

and Space Warfare: Emerging United States-China Military 
64

Competition, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 

October 17, 2007, p. 4, available from http://www.aei.org/wp-content/

uploads/2011/10/20071017_SpaceWarfare.pdf, accessed August 16, 

2017.

79. Ibid., p. 2.

80. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, p. 50.

81. Cheng, U.S.-China Competition in Space, p. 7.

82. DoD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, p. 34. 

83. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

84. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: 

Joint Force 2020, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2012, p. 2.

85. Ibid., p. 9.

86. Ibid., p. 12. The full context of the two space-related force 

development initiatives is:

Continue to improve defensive space capabilities. Given 

the heavy reliance of Joint Forces on space systems and the 

rapidly increasing proliferation of counter-space systems, it 

is essential that Joint Forces bе аblе to protect friendly space 

capabilities, including defensive space control and space 

situational awareness capabilities.

Integrate missile defense systems. As missile technology 

improves and proliferates, missiles will become а major threat 

to deployed and deploying forces and even to forces in the 

homeland. А concept predicated on global agility requires 

the ability to protect against such а threat. Integrating 

existing capabilities into а comprehensive defensive system 

will be as important as developing new capabilities. 

87. Ibid., p. 14.

88. DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept, Foreword.
65

89. Ibid., p. 26.

90. Ibid., pp. iii, 9. One of the seven key anti-access capabilities identified in the JOAC is “Kinetic and nonkinetic antisatellite 

weapons that can disable space systems vital to U.S. force projection.” (p. 9)

91. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Entry Operations, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2014, pp. iii, 

v, available from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/

concepts/jceo.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162000-837, accessed August 11, 

2017.

92. Ibid., p. 20.

93. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Land 

Operations, Joint Publication 3-31, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, February 24, 2014, p. II-3. The possible joint force 

land component commander role of integrating space forces into 

the joint force is described as:

Performing the duties of the space coordinating authority 

(SCA), if designated. The individual designated to be 

the . . . [joint force land component commander] may also be 

designated to be the SCA within a joint force to coordinate 

joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. The 

SCA has primary responsibility for joint space operations 

planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within 

the joint force. The SCA gathers operational requirements 

that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the 

use of established processes by joint force staffs to plan and 

conduct space operations. 

94. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, p. i.

95. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

96. Ibid., p. 12.

97. The following TRADOC Pamphlets describe U.S. Army 

functional concepts for warfighting functions. TRADOC, Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Intelligence, 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-2-1, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2017, available from 
66

http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets.html, accessed June 29, 

2018; TRADOC, Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command, 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-3, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

February 2017, available from http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/

pamphlets.html, accessed June 29, 2018; TRADOC, Department of 

the Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Fires, 2020-2040, 

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-4, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, February 2017, available from http://adminpubs.

tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets.html, accessed June 29, 2018; TRADOC, 

Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for 

Maneuver Support, 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2017, 

available from http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets.html, 

accessed June 29, 2018; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6; TRADOC, 

Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for 

Sustainment, 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-4-1, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2017, available 

from http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets.html, accessed 

June 29, 2018.

98. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, p. 29.

99. TRADOC, Department of the Army, The United States 

Army’s Concept Capability Plan (CCP), Space Operations, 2015-2024,

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-4, ver. 1.0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 15, 2006, pp. ii, 19, available 

from http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets.html, accessed 

June 29, 2018.

100. Ibid., p. 12. Details of the high altitude environment and 

its contribution to future Army space operations include: 

The high altitude region can supplement orbital space 

capabilities and integrate additional high altitude long-loiter 

capabilities to support the joint force commander in a theater 

with emphasis at the operational and tactical levels. Systems 

operating in the high altitude region have the potential 

to provide rapid, on demand, dedicated capabilities 

augmenting strategic space assets.

The proximity of high altitude long-loiter systems over 

orbital space systems can provide improved performance 
67

in support of certain Army operations. A high altitude 

long-loiter system can provide long duration coverage of 

up to an 850-mile diameter field of view. Operations in this 

region allow for flexibility, augmentation to existing air and 

space systems, and tailorable, recoverable packages that 

can be reconfigured to meet changing operational needs. In 

addition, high altitude long-loiter assets have the potential to 

reduce the operational tail and airspace management issues 

associated with the aerial layer. The combination of orbital 

space and high altitude long-loiter capabilities is a critical 

enabler for implementation of the fundamental principles of 

the future Modular Force concepts, particularly with respect 

to achieving information superiority, creating situational 

understanding, and operating within the high tempo, 

non-contiguous, simultaneous framework of distributed 

operations. 

101. TRADOC, Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 

21st Century, White Paper, Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, February 24, 2017, pp. 3-4, available 

from https://web.archive.org/web/20170713102300/www.tradoc.army.

mil/multidomainbattle/docs/MDB_WhitePaper.pdf, accessed June 29, 

2018. The white paper addresses anticipated A2/AD efforts by 

future adversaries: 

Yet the Joint Force cannot assume command and control [C2] 

systems fielded over two decades of assured access to space, 

cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum will suffice 

now and into the future. Adversaries can challenge access 

to these domains with attacks that will severely degrade 

the synchronization critical to effective operations because 

the Joint Force currently possesses limited countermeasures 

and interdependent capabilities with few redundancies. 

As a result, the Joint Force should anticipate disrupted 

deployment and sustainment operations and degraded 

effectiveness of the stand-off targeting and strikes currently 

required to gain access and seize the initiative. (p. 3)

Multi-Domain Battle evolves combined arms methodology 

to include not only those capabilities of the physical domains, 

but also greater emphasis on space, cyberspace, and other 

contested areas such as the electromagnetic spectrum, the 

information environment, and the cognitive dimension of 

warfare. ( p. 4)
68

102. Ibid., p. 4.

103. David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: Driving Change 

to Win in the Future,” Military Review, Vol. 97, No. 4, July-August 

2017, pp. 10-11. The six physical spaces of Multi-Domain Battle 

are summarized as: 

• A deep fires area is beyond the feasible range of 

conventional maneuver forces, but it is where joint 

fires and national capabilities may be employed to 

operational or strategic effect. Likely within sovereign 

borders, it is largely denied by maneuver elements.

• A deep area contains challenges that must be defeated 

in order to be successful in the close area. In a deep area, 

maneuver forces must have the capability to converge 

and open temporary windows of domain superiority to 

seize the operational initiative.

• A close area is where the major direct fire fight unfolds. 

In a close area, ground forces seize and hold key terrain, 

maneuver to destroy enemy ground formations, and 

secure populations.

• A support area directly supports the forward fight. 

A support area enables operations in the close, deep 

maneuver, and deep fires areas with sustainment, fires, 

maneuver support, and mission command capabilities.

• An operational support area holds the central point, 

key capabilities, and sustainment of joint forces. An 

operational support area provides the location of critical 

joint force mission command, sustainment, and fires 

and strike capabilities.

• A strategic support area stretches from the homeland, 

along deployment lines of communication, to the 

initial point of entry. In detail, a strategic support 

area encompasses home ports and stations, strategic 

sea and air lines of communication, and homeland 

communications. Traversing through, and operating 

within, the strategic support area will undoubtedly 

require acute cross-combatant command coordination. 

104. Ibid., p. 11.

105. Vincent Manzo, “Deterrence and Escalation in 

Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace 

Fit?” Strategic Forum, No. 272, Washington, DC: National 

Defense University, December 2011, p. 5, available from 
69

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-272.pdf, 

accessed August 11, 2017.

106. Golston, pp. 1-2.

107. Ibid., p. 5.

108. Readers who wish to learn more about United Nations 

(UN) treaties and resolution related to outer space should consider the following document as a good starting point: UN Office 

of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), United Nations Treaties and 

Principles on Outer Space and related General Assembly resolutions, 

New York: United Nations, 2008, available from http://unoosa.org/

pdf/publications/st_space_11rev2E.pdf, accessed August 15, 2017.

109. Draft: International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Brussels, Belgium: European Union, March 31, 2014, available 

from http://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/space_code_conduct_draft_

vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf, accessed August 15, 2017.

110. Space Strategy for Europe, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic 

and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2016) 

705 final, Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, October 26, 

2016, pp. 3, 5, 8, 11, available from http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/

regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN-MAIN.PDF, accessed 

August 4, 2017. The other three goals of the strategy are: 

1. Maximising the Benefits of Space for Society and the EU 

Economy. (p. 3)

2. Fostering a Globally Competitive and Innovative European 

Space Sector. (p. 5)

4. Strengthening Europe’s Role as a Global Actor and 

Promoting International Cooperation. (p. 11)

111. Ibid., p. 10. Regarding the dual use (military and civilian)

of many space systems, the strategy states: 

Most space technologies, infrastructure and services can 

serve both civilian and defence objectives. Although some 

space capabilities have to remain under exclusive national 

and/or military control, in a number of areas synergies 
70

between civilian and defence can reduce costs, increase 

resilience and improve efficiency. The EU needs to better 

exploit these synergies.

This will be a key theme of the European defence action 

plan, which is expected to highlight space’s crucial 

enabling role for civilian and defence capabilities. The EU 

and Member States’ institutional actors, including those 

providing security services to citizens, increasingly rely 

on satellite communication services for their missions and 

infrastructure, but the critical security and defence needs are 

not fully met today. The Commission is therefore working 

with the European Defence Agency and . . . [European 

Space Agency] to assess the demand for and feasibility of 

a new initiative providing resilient satellite communication 

services for governmental and institutional security users.

It will also assess further the potential of Copernicus and 

Galileo/EGNOS to meet EU autonomy and security needs 

and improve the EU’s capacity to respond to challenges 

related to migration, border control and maritime 

surveillance. To this end, the Commission will strengthen 

security requirements when developing these systems 

and will reinforce synergies with non-space observation 

capacities (e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles).

For more information on the Copernicus and Galileo space systems, see Vincent Reillon, “Galileo and Copernicus—EU flagship space programmes,” European Parliamentary Research 

Service Blog, April 11, 2017, available from https://epthinktank.

eu/2017/04/11/galileo-and-copernicus-eu-flagship-space-programmes/, 

accessed August 6, 2017.

112. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Environment 2035: The 

Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 14, 2016, pp. 32-33, available from

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joe_

2035_july16.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917, hereafter JOE 2035. 

The document describes the full context of a future contested 

orbital environment as:

The space commons is the primary medium of military 

communication, data transmission and ISR [intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance]. Although the United 
71

States currently possesses a pronounced advantage in 

space-based sensors, Russia, China, and other nations 

have developed increasingly capable space-based C3/ISR 

systems. Competition in orbit (even during peacetime) will 

be intense, highlighted by satellites maneuvering to hinder 

the operations of other satellites, co-orbital jamming, and 

the use of ground-based lasers to dazzle or destroy imaging 

sensors. Future adversaries will also have the capability to 

deploy blockers and grapplers to impede the free operation 

of commercial and military satellites, and they will use 

ASAT weapons launched at space assets from the ground as 

well as from other satellites. Ultimately, this may generate 

space debris leading to a runaway chain reaction which 

destroys other satellites and threatens the integrity of many 

important orbits.

113. “Statement by Lieutenant General James H. Dickinson, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space And Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command and 

Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile 

Defense,” before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, United States House Of Representatives, 

115th Cong., 1st session, June 7, 2017, available from http://docs.

house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20170607/106064/HHRG-115-AS29-

Bio-DickinsonJ-20170607.pdf, accessed July 30, 2017.

114. Statements by Lieutenant General John M. Murray, Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, Major General Robert M. Dyess, 

Jr., and Brigadier General Robert L. Marion, before the Subcommittee on AirLand, Committee on Armed Services, United States 

Senate, on Army Modernization, 115th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 

2017, pp. 7-8, available from http://armed-services.senate.gov/imo/

media/doc/Murray-Anderson-Dyess-Marion_03-22-17.pdf, accessed 

August 15, 2017. Descriptions of the space-related capability gaps 

identified by the Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review are:

Air and Missile Defense (AMD). We lack the capability 

and capacity to meet the AMD demands of the combatant 

commanders to cover key fixed sites and provide effective 

AMD protection of the maneuvering forces. . . . Assured 

Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). The commercial and 

Military Global Positioning Systems (GPS) are susceptible 
72

to threat disruption (jamming) and spoofing (mimicking 

friendly forces). . . . Electronic Warfare (EW). The Army is 

unable to conduct Electronic Attack and EW Support against 

near-peer adversaries. . . . Assured Communications. Current 

communications systems are vulnerable to near-peer threat 

detection, disruption/denial, and exploitation.

115. JOE 2035, p. 17. The document explains how other systems can augment traditional satellite constellations:

Emergence of micro/nano-satellites and near-space 

capabilities. Micro/nano-satellites, as well as ultra-high 

altitude aircraft and balloons, will continue to replace 

large satellites because they are considerably cheaper and 

faster to build and launch. These advances will likely lead 

to improved reliability, with networks of small satellites 

and stratospheric swarms performing the tasks previously 

reserved exclusively for large satellites.

116. Jason B. Cutshaw, Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC)/Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT), 

“Army’s Kestrel Eye hitches ride to International Space Station,” 

U.S. Army, August 15, 2017, available from https://www.army.

mil/article/192321/armys_kestrel_eye_hitches_ride_to_international_

space_station, accessed August 16, 2017.

117. Jason B. Cutshaw, USASMDC/ARSTRAT Public Affairs, 

“SMDC prepares for upcoming Kestrel Eye launch,” U.S. Army, 

August 1, 2017, available from https://www.army.mil/article/191708/

smdc_prepares_for_upcoming_kestrel_eye_launch, accessed August 

1, 2017.

118. “Kestrel Eye Visible Imagery Microsatellite Technology 

Demonstration,” factsheet, Huntsville, AL: U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command, Army Forces Strategic Command, 

Public Affairs Office, 2017, p. 1, available from http://www.smdc.

army.mil/FactSheets/KESTRELEYE.pdf. The factsheet overview for 

Kestrel Eye is:

The Technical Center is developing Kestrel Eye as an electrooptical microsatellite-class imagery satellite for tasking 

by the tactical ground component Warfighter. Capable of 

producing tactically useful imagery, Kestrel Eye’s data can 

be downlinked directly to the same Warfighter via a data 
73

relay network that is also accessible by other Warfighters 

in theater without any continental United States relay. The 

intent of Kestrel Eye is to demonstrate a tactical space-based 

imagery microsatellite. A Kestrel Eye satellite constellation 

provides dramatically lower unit cost than typical spacebased assets. With this low cost, large numbers of satellites 

can be procured enabling the system to be dedicated to the 

tactical Warfighter. (p. 1)

119. “SNaP: Space and Missile Defense Command Nanosatellite Program,” factsheet, Huntsville, AL: U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command, Army Forces Strategic Command, 

Public Affairs Office, 2016, p. 2, available from http://www.smdc.

army.mil/FactSheets/SNAP.pdf, accessed August 16, 2017. The factsheet notes: 

In October 2015, three SNaP nanosatellites were launched 

from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. After launch 

and being released from the main rocket body, the three 

SNaP [Space and Missile Defense Command Nanosatellite 

Program] satellites were diagnosed for status and 

functionality, and were tracked by SMDC [Space and Missile 

Defense Command]/ARSTRAT [Army Forces Strategic 

Command] ground stations. 

Each SNaP nanosatellite consists of three approximately 10 

centimeter cubes stacked for a length a little more than 30 

centimeters, weighing nearly 5.5 kilograms. Each has four 

deployable solar panels and four deployable . . . [radio 

frequency] antennas. 

120. David Vergun, Army News Service, “Nanosatellites 

may soon communicate with Soldiers from space,” U.S. Army, 

May 18, 2015, available from https://www.army.mil/article/148754/

Nanosatellites_may_soon_communicate_with_Soldiers_from_space/, 

accessed August 2, 2017.

121. Jason B. Cutshaw, USASMDC/ARSTRAT Public Affairs, 

“Future Army nanosatellites to empower Soldiers,” U.S. Army, 

July 20, 2015, available from https://www.army.mil/article/152508/

Future_Army_nanosatellites_to_empower_Soldiers/, accessed August 

2, 2017.
74

122. Army Capabilities Integration Center, The United States 

Army Warfighters’ Science and Technology Needs, Fort Eustis, VA: 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 21, 2016, 

pp. 30-31.

123. James B. Johnson, “Future Warfare Center Overview 

to Huntsville Aerospace Marketing Association,” PowerPoint 

briefing, Huntsville, AL: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, Army Forces Strategic Command, Future Warfare 

Center, August 12, 2016, slide 10, available from http://hamaweb.

org/presentations/2016/august2016jamesjohnson.pdf, accessed July 

13, 2017.

124. “Warfighter Experimentation with High Energy Lasers,” 

factsheet, Huntsville, AL: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, Army Forces Strategic Command, Public Affairs 

Office, 2017, available from http://www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/

WEHEL.pdf, accessed August 16, 2017.

125. David Vergun, U.S. Army News, “‘Eyes in space’ and 

more powerful lasers will soon enhance the Army’s arsenal,” 

U.S. Army, July 21, 2017, available from https://www.army.mil/

article/191197/eyes_in_space_and_more_powerful_lasers_will_soon_

enhance_the_armys_arsenal, accessed July 30, 2017.

126. Ibid.

127. Jason B. Cutshaw, USASMDC/ARSTRAT Public Affairs, 

“SMDC trains record number of space Soldiers,” U.S. Army, 

October 7, 2016, available from https://www.army.mil/article/

176524/SMDC_trains_record_number_of_space_Soldiers/, accessed 

August 1, 2017.

128. John J. Abbatiello, SMDC/ARSTRAT G-3 Training and 

Exercise Division (TREX), “Contested space training occurs on 

Fort Carson,” U.S. Army, December 29, 2015, available from 

https://www.army.mil/article/160456/Contested_space_training_

occurs_at_Fort_Carson/, accessed August 2, 2017.

129. Jason B. Cutshaw, SMDC/ARSTRAT, “SMDC partners with military academy to develop future space officers,” 

U.S. Army, March 23, 2017, available from https://www.army.mil/
75

article/184832/smdc_partners_with_military_academy_to_develop_

future_space_officers/, accessed August 1, 2017.

130. Alexander Urosevich, SMDC G-3 TREX, “G3 TREX 

demonstrates space kits to support U.S. Army Africa operations, exercises, training,” U.S. Army, June 16, 2014, available 

from https://www.army.mil/article/128097/G3_TREX_demonstrates_

space_kits_to_support_U_S__Army_Africa_operations__exercises__

training/, accessed August 2, 2017.

131. Mahlet Tesfaye, U.S. Army South Public Affairs, “U.S. 

Army South to increase its space capabilities for future missions,” U.S. Army, April 1, 2014, available from https://www.

army.mil/article/123015/U_S__Army_South_to_increase_its_space_

capabilities_for_future_missions/, accessed August 2, 2017. Details 

of the space kits are: 

Space Kit 1, known as space knowledge tablets, are software 

programs (Android-based iSpace applications) with 

constantly updated positioning of satellites that Soldiers 

can use to locate satellites from anywhere in the world. The 

programs are used to predict GPS accuracy for a location 

on the Earth, determine ground site visibility for selected 

satellites, determine angles from ground site to satellite, and 

use augmented reality to display satellites across the sky.

Space Kit 2 is a space enhancement kit used to enhance 

situational awareness and force protection, ideally suited 

to small units operating in remote locations. This kit allows 

GPS tracking on displayed map, text messaging, and picture 

uploads between Soldiers, a ground-based weather sensor 

that provides wind data, humidity, and lightning detection, 

uses networked solar powered sensors to geolocate threat 

and report via Wi-Fi/satellite, and also uses a seismic and 

motion detection sensor kit to distinguish between humans, 

vehicles and animals.

Space Kit 3, called the Space Degradation Kit, contains a 

system capable of demonstrating effects of space system 

degradation such as GPS jamming. The kit will be used as a 

training tool in preparation for unit deployment.
76

132. Dottie K. White, USASMDC/ARSTRAT, “SMDC provides space operations training to Ukrainian soldiers,” U.S. Army, 

May 27, 2016, available from https://www.army.mil/article/167439/

SMDC_provides_space_operations_training_to_Ukrainian_soldiers/, 

accessed August 1, 2017.

133. Dottie White, USASMDC/ARSTRAT Public Affairs, 

“Army Space Support Team participates in Exercise Anakonda,” 

U.S. Army, June 30, 2016, available from https://www.army.mil/

article/170786/Army_Space_Support_Team_participates_in_Exercise_

Anakonda/, accessed August 1, 2017.

134. Air Force Space Command Public Affairs, “Hyten 

announces Space Enterprise Vision,” U.S. Air Force, April 13, 

2016, available from http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/

Article/719941/hyten-announces-space-enterprise-vision/, accessed 

July 10, 2017.

135. Cheryl Pellerin, “Hyten: Deterrence in Space Means No 

War Will be Fought There,” DoD News, Defense Media Activity, January 26, 2017, available from https://www.defense.gov/

DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=753&

Article=1061833, accessed July 8, 2017.

136. For information about the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), see J. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation: FY 2016 Annual 

Report, Washington, DC: Officer of the Director, Operational 

Test and Evaluation, December 2016, pp. 371-372, available from

http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2016/, accessed August 29, 

2018.

137. Pellerin.

138. Phillip Swarts, “The JICSpOC is dead; Long live the 

National Space Defense Center,” Space News, April 4, 2017, 

available from http://spacenews.com/the-jicspoc-is-dead-long-live-thenational-space-defense-center/, accessed July 10, 2017.

139. SMDC/ARSTRAT Public Affairs Office, “Groundbreaking represents start of construction phase for Space Fence,” U.S. 

Army, February 20, 2015, available from https://www.army.mil/

article/143204/Groundbreaking_represents_start_of_construction_

phase_for_Space_Fence/, accessed August 2, 2017.
77

140. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, Report No. GAO17-333SP, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, March 30, 2017, pp. 155-156, available from https://www.

gao.gov/products/GAO-17-333SP, accessed August 17, 2017.

141. Jerry “JD” Harris, Jr., Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., and Mark 

C. Nowland, “Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on AirLand Forces, Subject: Air Force, 

Force Structure and Modernization Programs,” 115th Cong., 1st 

sess., March 29, 2017, pp. 16-17, available from https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/download/?id=E26AA57B-172F-4ED6-B3C3-

453C309EF7C6&download=1, accessed August 15, 2017.

142. “OrbitOutlook Integrates Largest and Most Diverse 

Network of Space Sensors Ever to Help Avoid Collisions in 

Space,” Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency, June 29, 2016, available from https://www.darpa.mil/newsevents/2016-06-29, accessed August 2, 2017. 

143. Harris, Jr., Bunch, Jr., and Nowland, p. 15.

144. U.S. Government Accountability Office, pp. 149-150.

145. DoD, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System: United 

States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request, Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Chief Financial Officer, May 2017, p. 7-2, available 

from http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/

fy2018/fy2018_Weapons.pdf, accessed August 14, 2017.

146. U.S. Government Accountability Office, pp. 135-136.

147. DoD, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, p. 7-5.

148. Ibid., p. 7-3. See also U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, pp. 137-138.

149. “X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle,” factsheet, U.S. Air Force, 

April 17, 2015, available from http://www.af.mil/About-Us/FactSheets/Display/Article/104539/x-37b-orbital-test-vehicle/, accessed 

August 17, 2017.
78

150. Scott Wierzbanowski, “Experimental Spaceplane,” 

Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 

n.d., available from https://www.darpa.mil/program/experimentalspace-plane, accessed June 21, 2018. The desired vehicle performance would include:

DARPA envisions a fully reusable unmanned vehicle, 

roughly the size of a business jet, which would take off 

vertically like a rocket and fly to hypersonic speeds. The 

vehicle would be launched with no external boosters, 

powered solely by self-contained cryogenic propellants. 

Upon reaching a high suborbital altitude, the booster would 

release an expendable upper stage able to deploy a 3,000-

pound satellite to polar orbit. The reusable first stage would 

then return to Earth, landing horizontally like an aircraft, 

and be prepared for the next flight, potentially within hours.

151. “DARPA Selects SSL as Commercial Partner for Revolutionary Goal of Servicing Satellites in GEO,” Arlington, VA: 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, February 9, 2017, 

available from https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2017-02-09, 

accessed August 2, 2017.

152. “Program Aims to Facilitate Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites,” Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, March 25, 2016, available from https://www.darpa.

mil/news-events/2016-03-25, accessed August 2, 2017.

153. JOE 2035, p. 47. The full context of the potential use of 

offensive space control by U.S. space forces is as follows:

The Joint Force must be prepared to conduct Global 

Commons Defense to disrupt the ability of adversaries to 

interdict the seas, air, space, and electromagnetic spectrum, 

or otherwise degrade an adversary’s ability to operate in 

the commons in ways unfavorable to U.S. interests. These 

missions might involve the creation of forward-projected, 

multi-domain blockades to impede adversary use of the 

commons. The Joint Force will establish these area-denial 

zones through a flexible combination of surface and 

subsurface sea control capabilities, air defense measures, 

offensive space operations, and electronic warfare [EW]. 

This mission is likely to be complicated by an adversary’s 

use of strike assets positioned on sovereign territory or 
79

the deceptive placement of sensor systems on commercial 

platforms, to include space assets. Despite these challenges, 

the Joint Force must maintain the ability to conduct targeted 

command and control [C2] warfare, counter ISR operations, 

and discriminate sensor interdiction and spoofing in all 

commons. Furthermore, the Joint Force should be capable 

of responding to the threat of adversaries creating debris 

fields in important orbits. The Joint Force should explore 

ways to enhance operations in the commons by leveraging 

anticipated advances in long-range robotic and autonomous 

systems. 

154. For the archived website information page with video, 

see “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, One-Time Mission: Operation 

Burnt Frost,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, 

n.d., available from https://web.archive.org/web/20170901154211/

mda.mil/system/aegis_one_time_mission.html, accessed August 17, 

2017.

155. Darren Domingo, 50th Space Wing Public Affairs, “527 

SAS, 26 SAS: Knowing your enemy,” Schriever Air Force Base, July 

15, 2016, available from http://www.schriever.af.mil/News/Features/

Article/841606/527-sas-26-sas-knowing-your-enemy/, accessed July 

28, 2017.

156. Shawn Nickel, 354th Fighter Wing Public Affairs, “Army, 

AF integrate first ever space aggressor soldier in RF-A 16-3,” Eielson Air Force Base, August 9, 2016, available from http://www.

eielson.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/909522/army-af-integratefirst-ever-space-aggressor-soldier-in-rf-a-16-3/, accessed August 1, 

2017.

157. DoD, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, pp. 4-1, 

6-4.

158. Jason B. Cutshaw, USASMDC/ARSTRAT Public Affairs, 

“NIMBLE TITAN provides multi-national cooperation for missile 

defense,” U.S. Army, April 25, 2016, available from https://www.

army.mil/article/166716/NIMBLE_TITAN_provides_multi_national_

cooperation_for_missile_defense, accessed August 1, 2017.

159. Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated 

Missile Defense, Press Release, “Nimble Titan strengthens 
80

multinational missile defense cooperation,” U.S. Army, April 3, 

2017, available from https://www.army.mil/article/185351/nimble_

titan_strengthens_multinational_missile_defense_cooperation/, 

accessed August 1, 2017.

160. DoD, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, pp. 5-14, 

6-8.

161. Ibid., p. 5-16.

162. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, Allied 

Joint Publication-3.3, Edition B, Version 1, Brussels, Belgium: 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Office, April 

2016, available from http://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/AJP3.3-EDB-V1-E.pdf, accessed August 4, 2017.

163. Paul A. Tombarge, NATO Space Operations: The Case for 

a New NATO Center of Excellence, Occasional Paper Series, No. 26, 

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall Center, 

December 2014, p. 15, available from http://www.marshallcenter.

org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occpaper_26-en.pdf, accessed August 4, 2017. The paper includes a 

concise overview of the source of NATO space capabilities:

NATO has been active in space since 1970, beginning 

with the launch of its NATO I, II, III, and IV series of 

communications satellites. However, the 28-nation Alliance 

largely relies on the military and civilian capabilities of its 

member nations, fifteen of which are active in space (Canada, 

the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 

Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 

Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 

Although NATO does not conduct space operations, its 

members do, and the Alliance must understand what 

capabilities are available as well as plan for and ensure 

those space capabilities are properly integrated into NATO 

operations. 

164. Robert Kroeger, John Patrick, and Kai Richter, “Introducing Space Support to operations,” The Three Swords Magazine, 

No. 31, January 2017, pp. 74-75, available from www.jwc.nato.int/

images/stories/_news_items_/2017/SPACE.pdf.

165. Ibid.
81

166. ArmySMDC, “Army Space Power 2035,” September 22, 

2009, ArmySMDC YouTube Channel, video file, available from 

https://youtu.be/QBH61gT3Cck, accessed August 18, 2017; and 

ArmySMDC, “SMDC2017,” April 18, 2014, ArmySMDC YouTube 

Channel, video file, available from https://youtu.be/D9mJ8PfJKOA, 

accessed August 18, 2017.

167. Thomas, p. 189.

168. Jeffrey L. Caton, The Land, Space, and Cyberspace Nexus: 

Evolution of the Oldest Military Operations in the Newest Military 

Domains, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, March 2018, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/

pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1378.

169. Perkins, p. 12.

170. “Statement by President Donald J. Trump on the Elevation of Cyber Command,” Washington, DC: The White House, 

August 18, 2017, available from https://www.whitehouse.gov/

briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-elevationcyber-command/, accessed August 18, 2017.

171. See Jandria S. Alexander, “Achieving Mission Resilience for Space Systems,” Crosslink, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2012, 

pp. 30-37, available from http://aerospace.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/

wp-content/uploads/crosslink/V13N1.pdf.

172. Wiener, “The Impact of Hypersonic Glide,” pp. 136-

137. The author describes the potentially destabilizing nature of 

hypersonic weapons:

At the present time, it is not possible to determine whether 

the configuration of a hypersonic weapon is conventional 

or nuclear prior to impact. Due to the extremely short time 

from launch to delivery to target, nuclear-armed hypersonic 

glide and boost-glide weapons have the potential to be 

used as a strategic first-strike capability. Compounding the 

situation, according to publicly available reports, Russian 

and Chinese hypersonic glide and boost-glide weapons are 

designed to evade U.S. antiballistic missile defense detection 

and interdiction. 
82

173. “Remarks by the President Signing an Executive Order on 

the National Space Council,” Washington, DC: The White House, 

June 30, 2017, available from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-signing-executive-order-nationalspace-council/, accessed August 2017. See also “President Trump 

Issues Executive Order on Reviving the National Space Council,” 

Washington, DC: The White House, June 30, 2017, available from 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/president-trump-issues-executiveorder-reviving-national-space-council/. For the full Executive Order, 

see “Presidential Executive Order on Reviving the National Space 

Council,” Washington, DC: The White House, June 30, 2017, 

available from https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/

presidential-executive-order-reviving-national-space-council/.

174. “Space Enterprise Vision Industry Study Broad Agency 

Announcement,” Announcement Number: FA8814-17-R-0003, 

Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA: Space And Missile Systems 

Center, June 16, 2017, available from https://www.fbo.gov/utils/

view?id=81ac21c07d6ea3d8cfe96cc57323e30d, accessed July 11, 

2018. See also Jason B. Cutshaw, USASMDC/ARSTRAT Public 

Affairs, “SMDC seeks technologies and concepts that will enable 

Multi-domain Battle,” U.S. Army, April 14, 2017, available from 

https://www.army.mil/article/186118/smdc_seeks_technologies_and_

concepts_that_will_enable_multi_domain_battle/, accessed June 22, 

2017. For the USASMDC broad agency announcement, see “New 

and Innovative Ideas for Air, Space and Missile Defense Technology,” Broad Agency Announcement W9113M-17-R-BAA1, 

Redstone Arsenal, AL: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command and Army Forces Strategic Command, April 6, 2017, 

p. 4, available from https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mod

e=form&tab=core&id=1e0c9ee97a1d5d864db6903c158cecb8, accessed 

June 22, 2017. This document solicits studies in several specific 

focus areas:

4.1 Expected technology white papers and/or proposal areas 

of interest reflect USASMDC/ARSTRAT emphasis for Fiscal 

Years (FY) 2017 and 2018, specifically in the areas as follows: 

Tactically Responsive Space; Space Superiority; Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense [AMD]/Homeland Defense; 

Directed Energy . . . ; High Altitude . . .; Cybersecurity; 

Positioning, Navigation, Timing (PNT)/Navigational 
83

Warfare . . . ; Test, Lethality, and Survivability; and Global 

Satellite Communications (SATCOM). 

175. JOE 2035, pp. 17-20: 

• Proliferation of advanced radio-frequency weapons.

Advances in phased-array technology will facilitate 

the development of beam-focusing systems, which will 

permit high-powered radio frequency . . . weapons to 

degrade or destroy very precisely versus omnidirectional 

systems. This will lead to new applications for area 

denial, crowd control, and the destruction of a range of 

electronic equipment [emphasis and italics in original]. 

(p. 17)

• Availability of non-nuclear . . . [electromagnetic pulse]. 

Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse . . . weapons will 

allow for the discriminate and precise targeting of a 

range of electronics-based systems. The next two decades 

will see these weapons integrated into air, ground, and 

surface systems providing adversaries the capability 

to disrupt, degrade, and disable components of U.S. 

and allied . . . [Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers/ISR] networks [emphasis and italics in 

original]. (pp. 17-18)

• Deployment of >100 KW electrical lasers. Electrical laser 

systems will become smaller, lighter, and cheaper, and 

the introduction of femto- and pico-second pulses will 

lead to novel sensors and effects. Ultra-precise, multiple 

shot, weaponized lasers will easily achieve >100 KW, 

permitting stealthy engagements at longer ranges with 

less dwell time required to achieve effects [emphasis 

and italics in original]. (p. 19)

• Hypersonics. It is probable that one or more states 

will field an operational hypersonic weapon system 

within the next two decades. Likely to achieve speeds 

in excess of one mile per second on non-ballistic flight 

paths, functional hypersonic systems will improve the 

range, accuracy, and lethality of offensive global strike 

capabilities and have the potential to disrupt portions 

of anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] capabilities as well 

as missile defense systems [emphasis and italics in 

original]. (p. 19)

85

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD anti-access/area denial

ABM anti-ballistic missile

AMD air and missile defense

ARSTRAT Army Forces Strategic Command

ASAT anti-satellite

C2 command and control

CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

DARPA Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DoD Department of Defense

EELV Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle

EKS Edinaya Kosmicheskaya Sistema

(translated as Unified Space 

System)

EU European Union

EW electronic warfare

FY fiscal year

GEO geosynchronous

GLONASS Globalnaya navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema (translated as Global 

Navigation Satellite System)

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 

(worldwide)

GPS global positioning system

GSSAP Geosynchronous Space Situational 

Awareness Program

HGV hypersonic gliding vehicle
86

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance

JICSpOC Joint Interagency Combined Space 

Operations Center

JOAC Joint Operational Access Concept

JOE 2035 Joint Operating Environment 2035

JSpOC Joint Space Operations Center

NASA National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense 

Command

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PNT position, navigation, and timing

RSGS Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites

SATCOM satellite communications

SBIRS space-based infrared system

SCA space coordinating authority

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic 

missile

SLV space launch vehicle

SMDC Space and Missile Defense 

Command

SNaP Space and Missile Defense 

Command Nanosatellite Program

SSI Strategic Studies Institute

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TREX Training and Exercise Division

UN United Nations
87

UNIDIR United Nations Institute for 

Disarmament Research

UNOOSA United Nations Office for Outer 

Space Affairs

USASMDC U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command

USAWC U.S. Army War College

U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command

VKS Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily

(translated as Russian Federation 

Aerospace Forces)

89

APPENDIX

Joint Space Operations

Mission Areas

Army Warfighting Functions

MissionCommandMovement and Maneuver Intelligence Fires SustainmentProtection

Space Situational Awareness

Detect/Track/Identify X X

Threat Warning & Assessment X

Characterization X X X X

Data Integration & Exploitation X X X X X X

Space Force Enhancement

Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance X X X X X

Launch Detection X X X X X

Missile Tracking X X X X X

Environmental Monitoring X X X X X X

Satellite Communications X X X X X X

Positioning, Navigation, & Timing X X X X X X

Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) X X X X X X

Space Supports

Spacelift X

Satellite Operations X X X X X X

Reconstitution of Space Forces X

Space Control

Offensive Space Control X X X X X

Defensive Space Control X X X X X X

Space Force Application

Ballistic Missile Defense X X X X X X

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles X

Table Appendix-1. Joint Space Operations Support 

of Army Operations1
90

1. Revised table originally printed in Jeffrey L. Caton, Evolving 

Army Needs for Space-Based Support, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2015, p. 7.

ENDNOTES – APPENDIX
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General John S. Kem

Commandant

∗∗∗∗∗

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

AND

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Mr. Jeffrey L. Caton

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

∗∗∗∗∗

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil