FOURTH DIVI SION November 26, 2008

No. 1-07-1799 In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of MAYA POLSKY, ) Co ok Co un ty. ) Petitioner -Appelle e and Cro ss-Appe llant, ) ) No. 03 D 2662 and ) ) MICHAEL

POLSKY, ) Honorab le ) William S. Boyd, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, ) Judge Presi ding. PRESID ING

JUSTICE

O'BRI EN delive

red the o pinion of t

he court : Respondent, Michael Polsky, appea ls the final judgment of dissolution awarding the petitioner, Maya Polsky

, more than $183 million. Michael contends the trial court erred by : (1) awardin g May a $183 milli on out of a

roughly $367 million

estate, when nea

rly all of the wealth was acq uired thr ough Mic hael's efforts while both

spouses w ere sep arately

engag ed in business pursuits o utside the home; (2)requirin

g Micha el to bea r all the c osts of liqu

idating the esta te to generate cash for Ma

ya; (3) a warding postjudgment interest in May a's favor for the entire pe

riod of liquidation; (4) failing to award Michael one-half of a $649,767 tax refund received by Maya; (5) failing to consider certain liabilities of Michael' s company, I nvenergy , when dividing the marital e state; an

d (6) aw arding

retroa ctive inte rest from the date

of the or iginal ju dgment, October 2006, even on the portion of the award that wa s added on June 4, 2007, as a result of the motions to reconsider. We affirm the property distribution and the award of postjudgment interest pending satisfaction of the judgment. We reve rse the order of retroactive intere st on the portion of the June 4, 2007, award that was added as a result of the motions to reconsider

.No. 1-07-1799

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Maya cr oss-appeals, contending the trial court err ed in its amended judgment by failing to award her $18.8 million of the $38.6 million Invenerg y had rec eived as a result of a financing

transaction. We af

firm on the

cross-a ppeal. At trial, the evidence established that May a first met Michael in February 1975 in Kiev. Maya had ob taine d a bach elor's degree i n Engli sh as a secon d langu age from Teache r's Col lege of Foreign L anguages in Kiev and wa s teaching English courses at the Pordig orgical Institute. At the time, Maya intended to pursue a doctorate degree , and she was preparing for a n examination that was r equired for entr y in to the doctorate progra

m. Michael was formally

trained as an eng ineer, having e arned a

master' s degre e in mechanical engineering

in Kiev in 1973. Michael decided to leave the Soviet Union because he was ambitious and saw no future for himself there. Michael intende d to emigrate to Canada because he had a cousin the

re. May a decide d to fore go her

doctora te degr ee and in stead em

igrate with Micha

el. On June 28, 1 975, May

a and Michael we

re marr ied in Kie v. Shortly

after their marriage, they

applied for permission to leave the country . In January 1976, they left the Soviet Union . They had o nly four o r five duffel bags of cloth es, $1 00, an d som e thin gs that Maya's father gave them to sell for additional money

. To leave the Soviet Union, Maya and Michael embarked on a train from the town of Chop in the Western Ukraine. The train from Chop took them to Vienna, Austria. I n Vienna, they were met by a Jewish orga

nization that assisted individuals who were leaving the Soviet Union for Isra el. Howe ver, sinc e May

a and Michael inte

nded to g o to Canad

a rathe r than I srael,No. 1-07-1799

-3-

they sought a ssistance

from the Joi

nt Distribu

tion Committe e in Vienn a, a gr oup that c ould assis t them in getting to Canada. After stay ing in Vienna for one week, the Joint Distribution Co mm it te e s en t t he m t o It al y. Upon arriving in Rome, May a and Michael were provided temporar y lodging by the Joint Distribution Committee. Thereafter, they found an apartment in Ostia Lido, I taly, which they shared with another family

. May a and Michael re

mained in Ostia Lido for six months. While t here, Ma ya was able to find emplo

yme nt with the

Joint Distrib

ution Committ

ee doing translat ion work. May

a used al l the money that she re ceived from the Joint Distribution Committee for the needs of Michael and herself . Michae l was una

ble to obta

in employ ment in Ost

ia Lid o. In stead, he

tried to r aise money by s elling the few thi

ngs they were a ble to brin

g from t he Soviet U

nion. Dur

ing the s ix

mo nt hs th ey l iv ed in Os ti a Li do , M aya an d M ic ha el su rv iv ed pr im ar il y on th e m on ey M aya earned doing translations, as well as the money Michael was able to get from selling their things. During this six-month period in Ostia Lido, May a became pregnant with their first child. While living

in Ita ly, May a and Mic hael we re infor med that they

were de nied entr y in to Ca na da . A s a re su lt , t he y ap pl ie d f or en tr y in to th e U ni te d S ta te s i ns te ad . In Ju ne 19 76 , M aya and Michael gained entry into the United States as refugees from the Soviet Union. They had noth ing wi th th em ex cept $ 500 an d som e clot hing. May a and Michael initi ally

settled in Detroit, Michiga

n, and fo und an ap artment. While Michael looked for work, they

receiv ed char

ity a ssistance

from the H ebrew I

mmigran t Aid Society . As Micha

el testif ied at tri al, he wa s told ther e were only four jobs availab le in Detr

oit,No. 1-07-1799

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and he wa s encour

aged to take a jo b as a pai nter. Mic hael re fused be cause he

"was de termined to be who [he] was which was an engineer, so [he] went to the library , research[ed] books every day , *** foun

d compani es in [his] fie ld and *** sent over a period of proba bly a month, month and a half about 200 resumes." Eventually , Michael received two job offers, and he accepted a job as an engineer with Bechte l Corporation in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The couple's first child, Alan, was born in November 1976, and shortly therea

fter they moved to A

nn Arbor to be nea rer to Mic hael's job at the Bechte l Corpora

tion. While l iving in Ann Arbor, May

a stayed home to c are for Alan and the family home. Maya testified tha t she "learned how to cook, how to clean, how to do eve rything, a nd basically, [she] was taking c are of the baby and Micha

el." Michael earned approximately $15,000 per yea

r, and Maya

described their lifestyle at that time as " modest." During this time, May a and Michael began taking walks together, which May

a characterized as a "tra

dition" that lasted until their separation. On average , the walks would last an hour, during which time they talked about "kids, [her] work when [she] worked, his work, [their] friends, every thing." After liv ing in An n Arbor f or appro ximately

1 1⁄2 years, Ma

ya and Micha

el moved t

o St. Cloud, Minnesota, w

here Mic hael took a job with B rown Bo very . May a worke d part-ti

me as a Ru ss ia n l an gu ag e t ea ch er at St . C lo ud St at e U ni ve rs it y fo r o ne se me st er . In Ma y 19 79 , M aya gave birth to their second son, Gabriel. May a and Michael purchased a house, and Ma ya serve d as homema

ker and t ook care of Alan a nd Gabri el. In 1980, when Alan was four years old a

nd Gabriel was a newborn, Michael ac cepted a position with Fluor Daniel Corporation in Chicago to work in the area of c ogeneration.No. 1-07-1799

-5-

Cogeneration involves harnessing the therma l energy created when electrical e nergy is produced and then p iping it to

an industr

ial user, which use s that stea m power to

run indust

rial plan ts. This position returned Michael to his area of expertise and offer ed him more money than his pre vious employ ment. After r enting a townhouse

for six month s, May

a and Michael pur

chased a home in Glencoe . While Michael work ed at Flu or Danie l Corpora

tion, May a tended to the hous ehold chores and took care of the children. Ma ya testified that she “ did everything . The boys [became] involved in [sports] a lot and all of these children’s activities. *** Alan actually was playing hockey a t that time. So it [was] just all the chores, you know, again, kee ping the house, cleaning the house, doing the laundry , cooking. *** Driving the boys, you know, to play [with other] kids, having kids over at the house, what mothers do.” Maya also took some cour ses and worked in real estate for appr oximately one y

ear. Also, when Gabe was four y

ears old and attending school, May a worked for a short time as a make-up artist at Saks Fifth Avenue. However, Gabe be gan having difficulties at school. May a quit her jo b t o s ta y ho me an d t ak e c ar e o f t he fa mi ly. By 1985, Micha

el decided that he wanted to pursue his own business. May a supported Michael’s decision. While Maya took care of the children and the couple’s home, Mic hael explored o

pportunit ies and e ventuall y de cided to c o-found I

ndeck Energy

Service s with Ger

ald Forsy the. I ndeck wa s a compa

ny t hat spec ialized in c ogene

ration pr ojects. Cogeneration requires both a purcha ser of thermal energy (a steam host) and an outlet for the electrical energy

(accomplished through a power purc hase agreement.) One of

Michael’sNo. 1-07-1799

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central roles in Indec

k was to find steam hosts. Michael testified that he "had to find the steam host, [he ha

d] to be abl e to neg otiate wi th them a d

eal for the land, [he] had to negotia te with [them] a deal for sale of materials, [he] had to find purchase of electricity ." Michael explained he had to find a company that would "build a plant, negotiate construction [contract]" and he ha d to "file, apply f

or all the permits necessary to build a plant. [He had] to find the money to finance the plant *** and then [he and Forsy the had] to operate and maintain the plant. So the development process is *** an involved process." Michael cited the example of

the Yerk es power plant: "I met a person from DuPont at a conference and he sa id that they are thinking

about building cogeneration

plant, but

they were a lready in the pro cess of a

greei ng with somebody

and I said liste n, just trus t me, we c an do it for you, give me an opportunity

to come and present to y

ou and explain why we ca n do for you and the

n you make y

our choice. He kind of resisted and he said ok, so then they invited me to DuPont headqua rters in Wi lmington , Delawa re. The re were about 10 p eople fr

om DuPont, purchas ing gu

y, e nginee ring g uy a nd the pla nt guy and the f acilitie s and cor

porate manage ment guy , every discipline , and I

was by mys elf, and

they were dis cussing

with me and I was able to ha

ndle most of the areas of the discussion and I could not believe that at the end they c all me and say listen, we ’re impressed, we trust y ou, you can do it. They g ave me the project." During this time, Michael also decided to pursue an MBA de gree from the University of Chicago. Initially, Maya wa s against the idea because it meant that Michae l would be home evenNo. 1-07-1799

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less than he was as a result of starting I ndeck. Nonetheless, Michael went ahead a nyway and ultimately earned the

degree. In 1990, when Alan was 13 y ears old and Gabe was 10 y ears old, Maya

decided to open an art gallery . With funds saved from Michael’s earnings, she opened the Maya Polsky

Gallery. Michael has desc ribed the galler y a s a brea

k-even p roposition . Family

funds we re used t o subsidize the gallery f

or the first five or six years of its existence. Michael also assisted by negotiating the initial lease of ga llery space

. Maya testified: "At th e po in t wh en I o pen ed t he g all ery, we w ere abl e to hav e a h ous eke epe r. * ** It wasn’t a big expense because these wome n were not very

expensive, but they took care of the house, cleaning and laundry and cooking most of the time, but I did the re st of the things. I sort of ov ersaw the house, went gr ocery shopping , every

thing for the boy

s, driving the boys, a

nd when there were other things [that] needed to be done ." Meanwhile, around the fall of 1990, Michael and Mr. F orsythe had a falling-out, and Mr. Forsythe te

rminated Michael. With Maya’ s support, Michael pursued legal action ag ainst Mr. Forsy the and I ndeck. M ichael’ s litigat

ion was su

ccessf ul, and he receiv ed two pa

yme nts as a result: approximately $5 million in 1992 and $20 million in 1994. In 1994, Alan went off to colleg e and Gabe went to prep school in Connecticut, followed later by colleg e. Michael started a new company, SkyGen. For a few months, Michael funded Sky Gen’s op er at io ns wi th fa mi ly s av in gs , b ut he la te r b ro ug ht in Al ls ta te Ins ur an ce to fu nd th e c om pa ny,No. 1-07-1799

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followed by ca

pital infusions from two energy companies in 1993 and 1997. The SkyG en venture proved extremely

success ful. Michael formed Sk

yG en to deve lop, own a

nd opera te elec tric ge

neratin g faci lities, primarily in cog eneration and peak-power g eneration, and it developed approximately 15 power plant projects. Michael testified that creating and building SkyGen was tre

mendously stressful for him an

d requir ed “a lot of conce ntration” as he “pu t all [his] ene

rgy , all [his] skil ls, all [his] talents and all [his] time into that.” Maya wa s not involved in the operations of SkyGen, a s she continued to focus on caring for the c ouple’s c

hildren a nd opera ting the art ga llery . Howeve

r, she an d Michae l continue d their tradition of taking walks together, during which they would discuss fa mily and business issues. Maya testified that these

walks were necessary

because things were difficult as “ it was a constant struggle and constant shortag e of money a nd constant search for financing a nd [buy] and sell, and it was very, ve

ry, very hard.” In 2000, Michael neg otiated the sale of SkyGe n to the Calpine company for approximately $425 million, of which $220 million was in cash, with the remainder in re stricted stock. The parties separated for two months in 2001. After the sepa ration ended, Michael spoke of an interest in forming another company , Invenerg y. At first, May

a opposed the new venture, though she testif

ied at tri al: “he s aid he ne eded to be doing thi s, you know, it

was impor

tant to him. He needed to be in action. He wanted to make dea ls. He started thinking about taking some of [the] people he used to work with *** to do something together, and so that was theNo. 1-07-1799

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beginning of the process for him to–and he already had the office at Sears Tower, and he took more space there to accommodate off ices for them, and that’s how it started.” Althoug h the sale of Sky Gen inclu ded a re striction

on Michae l’s ability

to partic ipate in the industry, Michael negotiated an early termination of that restrictive covenant, and then he fo rm ed Inv en er gy. Inv en er gy b eg an ac ti ve op er at io ns in Ma rc h 2 00 3. In t he me an ti me , M aya and Michael separated for the sec ond and final time in September 2002, and May a filed her action for dissolution of marriage on March 13, 2003, just as I nvenergy was getting started. Michael invested approxima

tely $73 million i

n marital funds in I

nvenerg y si nce its in ce pt io n. Wh en as ke d w hy h e t ho ug ht it ap pr op ri at e t o i nv es t m ar it al fu nd s i nt o In ve ne rg y, Michael testified "because [he’s] been twice ve ry succe ssful starting businesses from scratch and *** [he] had

the capa city , ability

, talent, skills, *** health a nd ability to move on a

nd continu

e to do what *** [ he] was good at ." Invenerg y has succe eded financially . At trial, the court valued the marital interest in the company at a

pproximately $75 million. On October 3, 2006, the trial court entered its judgment for dissolution of marriage. The trial cou rt deter mined the value of the marit al estate to be $339 ,645,805 a

nd that ea ch spouse should receive an equal share of the mar ital estate. In so finding, the c ourt stated: "The Cou rt has re viewed the mandat

es of 750 I

LCS 5/503. It has also reviewed c ase law in regards to the issue of distribution. The Court is also mindful of the concept that an equitable division of marital property is not necessarily a

n equal division. Again after reviewing the testimony , arguments of counsel, appropriate statutes a nd case law, theNo. 1-07-1799

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Court finds that it is only equitable that the parties share in the marital estate equally ." Following the trial court's entry of the judgment, Michael moved for reconsider ation. Michael asserted the trial court erred in a warding May

a an equal share of the marital estate. May a also mov ed for r

econside ration ba sed prima

rily on variou s alleg ed mathe matical e rrors in the judgment. On June 4, 2007, the trial court entered an amended judgment of dissolution, the eff ect of which, a ccordin g to Michael, wa s to incre ase the s ize of the marital e state and to incre ase Michael's judgment obligations to May a. The trial court denied Michael's motion to reconsider the equal division of the marital estate. In so de nying Micha

el's motion, the trial court stated: "Michael does not present this Court with any new information or that the Court ha[d] erred or misapplied any applicable law in its determination of the equitable division of the marital assets." I. Michael's Appe al On appeal, Michael contends the trial court err ed by awa rding May

a an equal share of the marital estate, roughly

$183 million, following the parties' 30-y ear marriage. Section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriag e and Dissolution of Marriage Act (her einafter, the Act) provides the

trial cou rt: "[S]hall divide the ma

rital pro perty without re gard to

marital mi sconduc t in just propo rtion s cons ideri ng all r elevan t fact ors, i nclud ing: (1) the contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, or increase or decrease in value of the marital or non-ma rital property, including

the contribution of a spouse as a homema

ker or to the famil y un it;No. 1-07-1799

-11- (2) the d issipation by e ach par

ty o f the mar

ital or non-marita

l proper ty; (3) the value of the property assigned to each spouse; (4) the d uration o f the mar

riage ; (5) the relevant economic circumstance s of each spouse when the division of property is to become

effective, including the desirability of awarding the family

home, or the right to live therein for reasonable pe riods, to the spouse having custody of the childre n; (6 ) a ny o bl ig at io ns an d r ig ht s a ri si ng fr om a p ri or ma rr ia ge of ei th er pa rt y; (7) any antenupt ial agr eement o f the par

ties; (8) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sourc es of income, vocational skills, emp loyability, estate , liabilitie s, and ne eds of ea ch of the parties; (9) the custodial provisions for any children; (10) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; (11) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income; and (12) the tax conseq

uences o f the pro

perty division up on the re spective economic circumstances of the parties." 750 I LCS 5/503(d) (West 2002). Michael contends the trial court's 50/50 division of the marital property must have resulted from an incorrect interpretation and a pplication of the statutory fa ctors under section 503(d), and the 50/50 division therefore reflected a n error of law that is reviewable de novo . Michael's contention is without merit, where the trial court expressly stated that it had "reviewedNo. 1-07-1799

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the mandates" of section 503, and where the record contains no indication the trial court ignored, misi nterp reted, or mis appli ed any of th e stat utory fact ors se t fort h ther ein. C ontra ry to Mich ael's contention that the de novo standard of review applies, it is well established that decisions concerning the distribution of marital property lie within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See In re Marriage of Parker , 252 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1018 (1993). An abuse of discr etion is found only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Parker , 252 Ill. App. 3d at 1018-19. Michael contends the court's 50/50 split of the marital property , in which Maya wa s awarde d appr oxi matel y $183 mi llio n, con stit uted a n abus e of di scret ion b ecause the co urt's award ignored the "ove

rwhelmingly dispropor

tionate" contribution Michael made to the value of the esta te. Micha

el conte nds the ma ssive mar

ital esta te exists sol ely

because of his ef forts in acquiring three companies: I ndeck (for which he receive d approximately $25 million after suing to enforce his rights in the company ); SkyGen (which he

sold in 2000 for approximately $425 million in cash and stock); and Invenerg y (a ventur

e that Michael started after the parties' final separation in which the marital interest was valued at approximately $75 million). Michael argue s that May

a was ne ver empl oye d by

Inde ck, Sky

Gen or I nvenerg y, t hat she ne ver wor ked to advance their goals, and the " explosion of wealth set off by Michae l occurred during a period of time when

May a was pursuing he

r own busi

ness inte rests [ i.e. , her art gallery] outs ide the hom e."

Michael further argue s:No. 1-07-1799

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"[t]he size of the marital estate necessarily affects the weight to be give n to the statutory criteria, especially

when, as here, the size is both extraordinary and the direct result of one spouse's extraordinary

contributions. In another case, if there were minimal property and the cour t had to be

concer ned with providing

for the b asic nee ds of a de pendent s pouse with custody of minor children, the f inancial contributions of the parties might not be the most important factor, and the court might be more likely to award a greater por

tion of the property to the spouse with the greater need. On the other hand, when there is a very large marital e state, a s here- -more tha n enoug h to provid

e for ea ch party 's rea sonable needs an d future financi al secur

ity- -it only

makes se nse to gi ve more w eight to

the part ies' contributions, because the other factors will be neutral." Michael contends that "if the marit al estate is like the

one now be fore the

Court--e nough to provide each party

with much more money than c an reasonably be spent in a lifetime, so that the court's task is to divide a huge 'surplus' --the General Assembly 's expression of public policy directs that the party

responsible for creating that surplus rec eive the lion's share of it." Michael's contentions are without merit. The Act' s objective is to recognize and compensate each party

for his or her contributions to the marriage and to plac e each party in a position to begin anew. Parker , 252 Ill. App. 3d at 1018. Pursuant thereto, the Act provides tha t marital property is to be divided in " just proportions" considering all relevant factors, including "the contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, or increase or dec rease in value of the marit al or non- marital property , includin g the co ntribution of a spous e as a homemaker or to the family unit." 750 I

LCS 5/503(d)(1) (West 2002). The "dura tion of the marriage" also is to beNo. 1-07-1799

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considered (750 IL

CS 5/503(d)(4) (West 2002)) , as well as some 10 other factors, including the relevant economic circumstances of ea ch spouse when the division of property becomes effective (750 IL CS 5/503(d)(5) (West 2002)), and the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income (750 I LCS 5/503(d)(11) (West 2002)). (See also our discussion above.) Thus, under section 503(d), a spouse's financia l contribution to the acquisition of marital propert y is only one of se veral f actors the trial c ourt cons iders whe n fashion ing an e quitable distribution of marital assets. In re Marriage of Johns , 311 Ill. App. 3d 699, 704 (2000). I n In re Marriage of Heroy

, No. 1-07-0308, slip op. at 32 (September 17, 2008), this court recently has held that "[a]lthoug

h a party 's gr eater f inancia l contribu tion may support a dispropor

tionate property a

ward in favor of the contributing spouse (see , e.g. , In re Marriag e of Jones , 187 I ll. App. 3d 20 6 (1989); In re Marriage of Guntren , 141 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1986)), 'a spouse's greater financial contributions do not necessarily entitle him or her to a greater share of the marital

asset s' ( In re

Marriage of Scoville , 233 Ill. App. 3d 746, 758 (1992)). I ndeed, '[i]n a long-term marriage, the source of the a ssets in acquiring marital property becomes less of a factor, and a spouse's role as homemaker becomes g reater.' Scoville , 233 I ll. App. 3d at 758." Each ca se rests on its own facts. In re Marriage of Cec il , 202 Ill. App. 3d 783, 790 (1990). In the present case , during the course of the parties' 30-year marriage, May

a emigrated from Kie v with Michael; she

helped su

pport Michael in I

taly by d oing tra nslations; she ga

ve birth to th eir fi rst ch ild i n Mich igan an d cook ed, cl eaned, took care of the ba by and did "everythi ng" while Michael wor

ked at the Bechte l Corpora

tion; she g ave birt

h to their s econd child inNo. 1-07-1799

-15-

Minnesota and continued to serve as homemaker and ca re for the children while Michael now worked f or Brow n Bover y; she contin

ued to ten d the house

hold and ta

ke care of the ch ildren in Glencoe after Michael took a job with the Fluor Da niel Corporation in Chicago in 1980; she

encoura ged Mic hael to g o into business with G erald F orsy the and st art I ndeck Energy

Service s in 1985; after Michael's termination from I ndeck, she encouraged him to pursue litig ation, which eventually re sulted in a $5 million payment in 1992 and a $20 million pay ment in 1994; she cared f or the ch ildren a nd opera ted an ar t galle ry after Mi chael st

arted Sky Gen, whic

h he initia

lly funded with family saving s and later sold for approximately $425 million; and Michael late r started I nvenerg y, i nto which he invest ed $73 milli on in marit

al funds. These facts indi cate t hat Ma ya was the h omema ker and prima ry caregiver for th e coup le's two children during the course of their 30-y ear marriage, all of whic

h enabled Michael to move from job to job and city to city, earn an MBA degre e, start up three different companies, and e arn vast amounts of money. This case is similar to In re Marriag e of Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d 235 (1981), and Heroy . In Stralow , Harold and Dorothy Stralow were married in I owa in 1937. Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 235. Upon the marriag e, Harold began working as a tenant farmer. Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 235. The couple eve ntually bought a 320- acre farm near Coleta, Illinois. Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 235-36. Harold sold 40 acre s and farmed the rest of the land. Stralow , 95 I ll. App. 3d

at 236. Eig

ht y ears la

ter, the couple bo

ught a 2 55-acr

e farm in the same vicinity. Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 236. They sold 175 acres and "the remaining la nd [was] put into produ ction." Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 236. I n 1969, Harold quit active farming and went to work for the Illinois Highway Department. Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 236. Meanwhile,No. 1-07-1799

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during the course of the marriag e, Dorothy " did those tasks expected of an Illinois farm wife," including raising the children, and doing the cooking, laundry , and housework. Stralow , 95 I ll. App. 3d at 236. The marriage was dissolved in 1979. Stralow , 95 I ll. App. 3d at 236. Th e estate consisted primarily of the f amily farms and wa s valued at over $1 million. Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 236. The trial court divided the marital estate about equally between the parties. Stralow , 95 Ill . App. 3d a

t 236. On a

ppeal, H arold contended t hat the a pportionment of the

marital e state was ineq uitable a s it faile d to prope rly take into accoun t that he h ad contr

ibuted, by his labor , all the capital to the farm. Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 237. I n affirming the property

distribution, the appellate court noted the trial court had credited H arold's financial contributions and management capabilities. Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 237. The appellate c ourt also noted that "[a]lthough different in kind, the wife's service s were not of less significance than her former husband's con tributio ns." Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 237. The appellate c ourt held that "[t]he fact one party

's contribution to the estate can be readily quantified in dollars in no way maximi zes that p arty's interest over ano ther's." Stralow , 95 Ill. App. 3d at 238. In Heroy , the husband, David Heroy , and the wife, Donna Heroy, were both attorney s at the time they marrie d. Heroy , slip op. a t 2. David

practic ed in the a

rea of b ankruptc

y la w, while Donna worked as a law librarian. Heroy , slip op. at 2, 4. The couple married in 1980 and had their first child in 1983. Heroy , slip op. at 2-3. Following the birth of their first child, Donna returned to work full-time as a law librarian. Heroy , slip op. a t 3. Donna

gave b irth to the ir second child in 1985. Heroy , slip op. at 3. Donna returned to work part-time until 1987. Heroy ,No. 1-07-1799

-17-

slip op. at 3. Donna resigned in 1987 and never ag ain resumed full-time employme nt outside the home. Heroy , slip op. at 3-4. Instead, she devoted appr oximately 10 hours per week to a publishing company she

had started, earning $5,000 annually

. Heroy , slip op. at 4. Donna gave birth to the couple's third child in 1990. Heroy , slip op. at 4. Over the course of the marriag e, David was the family's primary source of income. Heroy , slip op. a

t 4. He be gan his l egal c areer at Gardn er, Cart on and Dou

glas in 1 976 and hi s salary e ventually rose to appr

oximately $240,000 per y ear. Heroy , slip op. a

t 4. In 1989, Dav

id began employ

ment at Neal, Gerber and Eisenberg , became the chairperson of the bankr uptcy department, and earned approximately $350,000 to $475,000 annually. Heroy , sl ip op. at 4 . In 1997, David trans ferred to Bel l, Boyd & Lloyd, w here he became the ch airper son of the fi rm's bankruptcy de

partment and a corporate partner. Heroy , slip op. at 4. In 2000, David became a n equity partner

at the firm and a member of the firm's executive c ommittee. Heroy , slip op. at 4. In addition to his law firm income, David also rec eived substantial stock and real estate rental income from a company

started by his pare

nts. Heroy , slip op. at 4. Throughout the marriage, the c ouple employed domestic help. From 1984 through the time Donna

filed for divorce in 2003, the

couple e mploy ed a full -time person to assi st Donna in caring for the children. Heroy , slip op. at 8. The couple also employe d a cleaning lady who worked t wo day s per we ek, a lau

ndress w ho worke d one day

per wee k, and va rious private che fs. Heroy , slip op. at 8. In 2003, Donna filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Heroy , slip op. a t 2. David filed a counterpetition for dissolution of marriage. Heroy , slip op. at 2. After a hearing, the trialNo. 1-07-1799

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court valued the marital estate at $8.7 million and awarded 55% of the marital estate to Donna. Heroy , slip op. at 13, 14. The court awarded 45% of the marital estate to David. Heroy , slip op. at 14. On appeal, David argued the tria l court failed to properly

consider the parties' relative contributions to the acquisition, preservation, or increase or decr ease in value of the marital or non-marital property

as required by

section 503(d)(1) of the Act. Heroy , slip op. a t 31. Davi d noted that he had earned 99% of the family 's income since 1987, that he had contributed $11.9 million from his nonmarital estate, and that his "extraordinary efforts" resulted in the sale of the marital home at a price more than $1 million higher than prior sale offers. Heroy , slip op. at 31. David contended Donna's marital contributions were not "extraordinary " and the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Donna 55% of the mar ital property. Heroy , slip op. at 31. The app ellat e court affirm ed the prope rty dist ribut ion, stati ng: "[W]hile David's financial contribution weighs strongly in his favor, other factors favor Donna. A s the tria

l court ob served, Donna me aningf ully contribu ted to the family unit during t he Heroys'

26-y ear mar riage . She devo ted the ma jority of her time to raisi

ng their three children a

nd play ed an inte gral pa

rt in their educati onal and s ocial live s. She also contributed meaningfully as David's spouse by

managing the household and enterta ining his business associates. At the time of the hearing, Donna was 56 y ears old and had not worked full-time outside of the house for approximately 20 years. The

trial court's order reflects that it c areful ly c onsidere d the factors outlined in section 503 of the Act, including the contribution of the parties, in setting the property distribution award.No. 1-07-1799

-19-

Accordingly , although David was the primary economic provider during the duration of their marriage, we cannot c onclude that the trial court's order awa rding Donna 55% of the marital est ate constit utes an abus e of discreti on." Heroy , slip op. at 32-33. In the present case , as in Stralow and Heroy , the trial court properly could find that Maya' s contributions as homemaker and primary care giver for the c ouple's children during the course of their 30-y

ear marriage wer

e of no less significance than Michael' s financial contributions; that Maya meaning fully contributed to the family unit by raising their two children, playing

an integral part in their educational and soc ial lives, and by manag ing the household; and that Maya the reby ena bled Michael to study, trave l, and work at growing the three businesses that provided the bulk of the marital estate. As such, we c annot say the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the estate 50/50, such that no reasonable pe rson would take the view adopted by

the trial court. Parker , 252 Ill. App. 3d at 1018-19. Accordingly, we aff irm the property distribution. Michael contends, though, that "there is no dispute that the over whelming portion of the marital estate was developed at a time when the childre n were grown and May

a was no longer working as a homemaker--instead, she was pursuing her own business outside the home. Aga in, by the time Michael re ceived the $25 million Indeck settlement and ha d started SkyGen--which produced most of the wealth in the estate--May a had been working outside the home for seve ral years, the family had alre ady reta

ined full-time housekeepers, and the couple's two sons we re both awa y a t school." Accord

ingly, Michae l argue s that "[n]o matter how gene

rously one could describe May

a's homemaker contributions, they do not remotely come c lose to the significance ofNo. 1-07-1799

-20-

Michael's financial contributions when viewed in the conte xt of the value of the marital estate." As discussed above, though, the standard of revie w here is extremely de ferential; the appellate court's property distribution will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion such that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial c ourt. See Parker , 252 I ll. App. 3 d at 10 18-19 . The t rial c ourt r eason ably coul d have concl uded h ere tha t Maya's contribu tions as ho memaker

and prima

ry caregiver from 1975 (wh en the co uple was married ) to 1990 (when Maya began working at the a rt gallery ) set the foundation for Michael's subsequent business achievements. Moreover, May a testified that even after she beg an working at the art gallery and hired housekeepers, she continued to oversee the house, shop for groceries, and do "ever yth ing for the boy s." Thus , even after the

opening of her a rt galle ry , May a continu ed to provide important nonfinancial contributions to the marriage and to Micha el's business pursuits. And, the t rial cou rt reasonably

could fin d that Michael used

marital a ssets obta

ined in the

early years of the couple's marriage to star t SkyGen and financ e Invenerg y, and that Michae l would not have ha d the asse ts for eit her vent ure witho ut May a's sig nifican t nonfina ncial contribution

to Michael's career. Michael contends the trial court did not consider any evidence of May

a's needs for the future, that May

a did not pr

ove that she need

ed 50% of

the marit al estate , and that

May a could make do w

ith much le ss. Howev er, the r elevant inquiry is whethe

r the tria l court a bused its discretion in making the award. For all the re asons discussed above, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in the instant case. Next, Michael contends the trial court erred by requiring him to bear the costs ofNo. 1-07-1799

-21-

liquidatin g a por tion of the

marital e state to sa

tisfy the judg ment. Michael cla

ims these liquidation-rela

ted costs include i ncome ta xes that will

become d

ue on rea lized ga ins upon sa

le of certain assets, as well as transaction fee s associated with the sale of assets. Michael contends the costs associated with this liquidation will be just over $4 million, and the court should have required May

a to bear the costs of liquidation. Michael first raised this issue in his posttrial motion for reconsideration. I n denying Michael's motion, the trial court stated that it was allowing Michael to pay Maya over

time, thereby allowing Michael to liquidat

e assets "in a de liberate

and orde rly fashion s o as not to disrupt and/or impair his business." The court also recognized that Michae l was a "unique businessman who, given the challenge, more than rises to the occasion"; in effect, the cour t was stating that it had given Michael enough le eway to ke ep the costs of liquidation relatively low. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's order. Next, Michael contends the trial court erred by charging him postjudgment interest at 9% pending satisfaction of the judgment. Section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "[j]udgments recovered in any court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the judgment until satisfied." 735 I LCS 5/2-1303 (West 2002). Inter est on dissolution judgments is within the discretion of the trial court. In re Marriage of Kaufman , 299 Ill. App. 3d 508, 511 (1998). As noted by May

a in her appellate brief, courts allow interest to enc ourage a judgment debtor to pay the judg ment witho

ut undue d

elay . In the prese

nt case, Michael

retaine d the asse

ts that he was to liquidate to pay the judg ment, as well as any

increase in value those assets realizedNo. 1-07-1799

-22-

prior to li quidation . The tria l court' s amende d judgme nt gave Michael the time ne cessar

y to liquidate his assets in a delib erate f

ashion so t

hat his bus inesses c ould conti nue to ef ficientl y function . The cou

rt noted that it "es sentially has allow ed Michael to do tha t which he

is best suited for, to make the business decision as to what, when and how assets are to be used o[r] liquidated to satisfy the awar d to Maya." The trial court tempered this benefit to Michael by allowing a reasonable ra

te of inte rest to be paid to Ma

ya while Michael took

the time to

liquidate assets and pay the

award. We find no abuse of discretion. Next, Michael contends the trial court erred by failing to award him one-half of a $649,767 income tax refund that Maya received and allegedly

spent after March 31, 2006. Michael claims that Maya successfully a

rgued the income tax refund of $649,767 should not be added ba ck to the marital e state. Mic hael con tends the trial cou rt's fa ilure to a ward him one-half of that inc ome tax ref

und was inconsiste

nt with its or

der reg arding

a separ ate $814, 004 in refunds that the court credited to the marital estate and or dered to be divided between the parties. Michael states the "diffe rence b etween

the two re funds wa s that [the $ 649, 767] re fund wen t into an account that May

a used for her discretionary spending, while the other [$814, 004] went into a different account, but both parties were a ble to identify the amounts of the re funds and to confirm the refunds had been received by the marital estate. The refunds should have been tre ated the same, and the failure of the trial court to do so had the ef fect of tilting the distribution of [the] marital est ate from the p urported 50 /50 spli t into a sp lit that f avored Maya over Michael ." Although Michael contends the $649,767 income tax refund went into an acc ount that Maya used f

or her discretionary

spending and should be added back to the marital estate , he hasNo. 1-07-1799

-23-

failed to provide any

record citation thereto. Our review of the 22-volume record has uncovered a pleading from May

a in which she states that Michael's "contention that the [$649,767] refund was 'received and used e

xclusively by

Maya' is deceptive and disingenuous. I t appears from discussions with the parties' tax counsel, Fullbright & Jaworski, that Michael's pe rsonal accountant, Jon Taiber, had indicated to Fullbright & Jaworski that the par ties received a refund check made pay

able to Michael and May

a, and the refund check was deposited into a joint checkin g acc ount." T

his plead ing app ears to c ontradict Michae l's cont ention tha t May a had sole use of the $649,767 via an account she used for her discretionary spe

nding, a contention that Michael has not supported with a citation to the record. Michael also has f ailed to cite to the portion of the 22-vo lume rec ord in whic h the par ties made their re spective

argume nts as to whether the $649,767 income tax refund should be added back to the marital e state. The failure to provide

releva nt citations to the r

ecord is a violation of Supre

me Court Ru

le 341(h) (7) (210

Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7)) and results in waiver. See Gomez v. The Finishing Co. , 369 Ill. App. 3d 711, 723 (2006). Next, Micha

el conte nds the tr ial cour t erred by f ailing to deduct f rom the ma

rital est ate certain liabilitie s pay

able to I nvenerg y e mploy ees unde r the so- called " Inve

nergy Phantom Rig

hts Plan." The Invene

rgy Phantom Rights Plan provides, upon the liquidation of Invenerg y, and afte

r Michael receives back his capital contribution in I nvenergy , that certain employe es would receive compensation calculated as a percenta ge of Inve nergy 's value. Michael's counsel conc eded to the trial cou rt that if the marit al intere st in I

nvenerg y w as $75 milli on, then " there a re no [pha

ntom] rights im plicated for the e mploy ees of I nvenerg y." The tria

l court sp ecifica

lly f ound the f

airNo. 1-07-1799

-24-

market value of Inve

nergy was $75 million and the marital interest in Invenerg y is $74, 250,000. As such, the trial court did not err in determining the employ ee's so-called phantom rights wer e not implicated. Next, Micha

el conte nds the tr ial cour t erred by a warding retroa ctive inte rest from the date of the original judgment, October 2006, eve n on the portion of the award that was added on June 4, 2007, as a result of the motions to reconsider. An award of intere st on a money judgme nt requires the amount of money owed is certain, such that the judgment debtor can te nder the amount of the judgment, thereby halting the accrual of interest. Kramer v. Mt. Carmel Shelter Care Facility , Inc. , 322 Ill. App. 3d 389, 392-93 (2001). I n the present case, it was not until June 4, 2007, when the trial court ruled on the motions to reconsider, that Michael knew f or certain the

exact amo

unt of mone

y owed as a r

esult of sa

id motions. Accordin

gly , intere st thereon should run from June 4, 2007, and should not run retroactively from the October 2006 date of the original judgment. Therefore, we reverse the order of re troactive interest on the portion of the award that was added on June 4, 2007. II . Maya' s Cross-appeal On cross-appeal, May

a contends the trial court erred in its amended judg ment by failing to award her $18.8 million of the $38.6 million Invenerg y had rec eived as a result of a financing

transaction. As dis cussed extensively above, the trial c ourt's d

istribution of marit

al prope rty will not be reversed absent an abuse of discr etion, such that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial c ourt. Parker , 252 Ill. App. 3d at 1018-19. I n the present case, the trial court awarded May

a approximately $183 million out of a roughly $367 million estate. The $183No. 1-07-1799

-25-

million award constituted a just division of the marital property tha t adequately r

eflected the relevant statutory f

actors, including the relative contributions of each pa rty to the acquisition, preservation, or increase in the value of the marital property a

nd the duration of the marriage. We cannot say the tria

l court abused its discretion by f ailing to give May

a an additional $18.8 million on to

p of the $1 83 million a

lready awarde d to her. We

affirm on May

a's cr oss-appe al. For the foregoing r

easons, on Michael's appeal, we a ffirm the property

distribution and the award of postjudgment interest pending sa tisfaction of the judgment, and we reverse the order of retroactive interest on the portion of the June 4, 2007, award that was a dded as a result of the motions to r

econside r. We aff irm on May

a's cr oss-appe al. Michael's appeal is affirmed in part a nd reversed in part; May

a's cross-appeal is affirmed. Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cr oss-appeal is affirmed. GALL AGHER and NEVIL

LE, JJ.'s concur.