United States General Accounting OfIke 

GAO Testimony 

For Release 

on Delivery 

Expected at 

lo:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday 

Auqust 4, 1988 

Ten-Year Perspective on 

Federal Inspectors General 

Statement of 

Frederick D. Wolf, Director 

Accounting and Financial Management Division 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Legislation and National Securit;" 

Committee on Government Operations 

House of Representatives 

136464 

GAO/T-AFMD-88-16 I‘ GAO Form 160 (12,‘87) 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

me appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the 

progress that inspectors geqer31 (IGs) have made over the last 10 

years and to suggest ways in which that progress can continue in 

the future. We are interested in IGs functioning as successfully 

and effectively as possible because they represent a valuable 

in%ernal control on agency operations and a proven means for 

addressing fraud, waste, and mismanagement in federal programs. 

Twelve years ago, the Congress took one of its most 

significant steps to improve a federal agency's internal controls 

by establishing the first statutory inspector general in what has 

become the Department of Health and Human Services. The Inspector 

General Act of 1978 and similar legislation have expanded the IG 

concept to other departments an,d agencies. The General Accounting 

Office (GAO) has long supported the IG concept and the legislation 

that brought the concept into reality. 

We are fully aware, Mr. Chairman, that the concept of 

inspector general is one that you and your Subcommittee instituted, 

promoted, and developed to its current level of effectiveness. 

Your actions in fostering that legislation have paid significant 

dividends in the form of better government over the years and the 

benefits continue today. 
We have had many opportunities to observe and comment on IG 

<activities over the years in the course of many of our audits (see 

attachment. 1). GAO reviews of IG activities over the past several 

'rears indicated that the establishment of statutory IGs has been a 

key factor in strengthening federal internal audit and 

investigative activities and improving operations within the 

federal government. We believe that the statutory IGs have had a 

significant amount of success in accomplishing the purpose for 

which they were established--combating fraud, waste, and abuse and 

promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in federal 

programs and operations. 

The Congress, the executive branch, and the general public 

rely on inspectors general to hold agencies accountable for the 

proper and efficient use of taxpayer dollars, to ensure that 

federdl programs are meeting their intended objectives, and to 

foster improved internal controls and fraud prevention. One of 

the most successful aspects of the IG community is its independence 

and objectivity. In the last 10 years, the IGs have established 

their credibility and produced numerous management improvements and 

cost savings. Since their establishment, the IGs have been 

credited with over $100 billion in savings and cost avoidance 

measures in federal agencies. 

2 
The Inspector General Act of 1978 

Prior to the establishment of the IGs, the internal audit 

community was beset with problems such as the following. 

-- Audit efforts were fragmented because agencies had numerous, 

audit and investigative groups which operated without 

adequate coordination. 

-- Audit groups were typically understaffed and underfunded 

which frustrated efforts to achieve adequate audit 

coverage. 

-- Audit groups were not sufficiently independent from the 

program operating authorities who were responsible for the 

areas being audited or investigated. 

-- Procedures were lacking to ensure that the agency head and 

the Congress were informed of serious problems discovered 

in the agency. 

-- In general, audit coverage was inadequate and 

nonsystematic. 

-; Top managers paid little attention to audit findings and 

were not required to respond to audit recommendations. 

3 
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and similar 

legislation have played a significant role in strengthening 

federal internal audit and investigative activities and improving 

the operations of the federal government. These statutory IGs 

have been established through a bipartisan effort to improve the 

effectiveness of the federal government. The act and similar laws 

centralized the leadership of most major federal agencies' audit 

and investigative functions under an inspector general responsible 

only to the agency head or deputy and having the independence 

needed to detect, investigate, evaluate, and report on government 

fraud, waste, and abuse. Under the act, the IGs were given 

authority to conduct and supervise audits and investigations; 

recommend policies to promote economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness as well as the prevention of fraud; and detect fraud 

and abuse in programs and operations of their agencies. 

The act provides that IGs will be appointed by the President 

by and with the consent of the Senate, and that they will be 

independent from program management. The IGs are responsible for 

keeping agency heads and the Congress fully informed of agency 

problems and actions being taken to correct them. They are 

required to report on the results of their audits and 

investigations as well as prepare semiannual reports to 

communicate the results of their work to their agency heads and tk 

Congress. 

le 

4 
Sineteen statutory IGs have been established covering all 

cabinet-level departments and agencies except for the Departments 

of Justice and the Treasury (see attachment 2). The total number 

of internal audit and investigative staff at agencies with IGs 

increased from about 5,800 in fiscal year 1981 to about 7,800 in 

fiscal year 1988 (see attachment 3). Considering the problems 

with understaffing of these units in the 197Os, we believe that 

this additional staff was needed. 

Other Initiatives Have Been Beneficial 

Three initiatives have also improved the ability of IGs to 

function effectively and efficiently in the last decade. 

:- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-50 on 

audit resolution and follow-up was revised following a 

series of critical GAO and congressional reports. The 

circular provides guidance on how auditors and management 

officials should resolve and follow up on auditors' 

recommendations. The revised policy specifies the role of 

agency audit follow-up officials responsible for ensuring 

that systems for resolving audits are working effectively. 

It also emphasizes the importance of monitoring 

. 

implementation of corrective actions,and specifies ways to 

improve accounting and collection controls over money due 
the government as a result of audit findings. 

-- The Single Audit Act was passed in 1984 in response to 

concerns that large amounts of federal financial assistance 

were not subject to audit and that agencies sometimes 

overlapped on oversight activities. It stipulates that 

state and local governments which receive at least $100,000 

in federal financial assistance have a single audit 

conducted. Governments which receive between $25,000 and 

$100,000 in federal financial assistance have the option to 

have either a single audit or an audit in accordance with 

the requirements of federal programs which provided the 

assistance. These audits, which entail a review of a 

government's financial operations, internal controls, and 

compliance with laws and regulations, are intended to 

provide funding agencies reasonable assurance that funds 

they provided were expended in accordance with applicable 

laws and regulations and to serve as the foundation for 

additional audits. 

-- The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) 

was established to coordinate IG efforts to implement 

governmentwide activities to combat fraud and waste in 

federal programs and operations. Since then, the PCIE has 

. worked through its standing committees to share ideas and 

foster innovative and effective approaches to the 

6 
improvement of government programs and operations. For 

example, the PCIE was instrumental in developing 

implementation guidance for the single audit concept and 

has published a training guide which identifies and 

addresses the training and development needs of IG staff. 

QUALITY OF IG PERFORMANCE IS GENERALLY 

SUBSTANTIATED BY GAO REVIEWS 

Since the IGs were established, we have reviewed aspects of 

their operations on numerous occasions. Generally, we have found 

few serious problems. In recent .years, we conducted a series of 

quality assessment reviews that were designed to assess whether an 

IG office satisfactorily complies with government auditing 

standards and other professional standards. To date, we have 

completed reviews of six major IG offices: the Departments of 

Commerce, Agriculture, Transportation, and Health and Human 

Services: the General Services Administration; and the 

Environmental Protection Agency. (Our IG assessment reports are 

listed in attachment 1.) 

Each of the IGs satisfied standards in most areas that we 

reviewed. For example, we generally found satisfactory compliance 

with standards on independence, audit planning, staff 

qualif,ications, testing compliance with laws, and regulations, and 

fraud and abuse. However, in each review we have identified some 

7 
areas needing improvement. The most prevalent areas needing 

improvement have been supervision of projects, testing internal 

Scontrols as a part of audits, audit evidence retained in working 

papers, report clarity, and organizational planning. All the IGs 

have been particularly receptive to our recommendations for 

improvements in their quality controls and for changing aspects of 

their office management. 

Two earlier reviews of individual IG offices found more 

serious problems. In a 1983 report1 on allegations about the 

Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General, we 

found that some allegations were not being investigated 

consistently and all relevant matters not followed up. Also, in a 

19842 report on a coal lease sale by the Department of the 

Interior, we found that its Office of Inspector General had not 

adequately investigated an improper disclosure of sensitive data 

related to the sale. We found that numerous leads had not been 

pursued to reasonable conclusions or dismissed. Also, the reports 

on the investigation did not meet standards for accuracy and 

completeness. In these instances, one of the IGs resigned during 

our review period and the other shortly after the release of our 

report. 

llmprovements Needed in EPA's Inspector General Operations 

(GAO/AFMD-84-13, October 21, 1983). 

2Deficiencies In The Development Of The Powder River Basin Coal 

Lease Sale (GAO/RCED-84-167, June 11, 1984). 

8 
The rare problems we have found in the 12 years since 

st,2t,utory IGs were established serve to illustrate the overall 

success of the concept. These types of problems had been all too 

commonplace prior to the IG legislation. Recently, we reviewed 

the internal audit function of the Navy,3 which is not covered by 

the Inspector General Act of 1978. We found many problems, 

including concerns about the audit organization's independence. 

Some of the problems we found had been raised numerous times in 

the past but were still uncorrected. The fact that we have not 

found these types of problems with the statutory inspector general 

offices further attests to the act's effectiveness. 

ISSUES NEEDING THE ATTENTION OF 

THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 

'Although federal audit and investigative activities have been 

substantially strengthened in the last 10 years, additional issues 

require attention. Some of these issues are already before the 

Congress and others may be presented in the near future. 

3Naval Audit Service: Effectiveness Of Navy's Internal Audit 

Organization Is Limited (GAO/AFMD-88-12, February 24, 1988). 

9 
Maintaining Continuity of 

TG Leadership Is Important 

The IGs have provided independent and objective Views of 

program operations to both agency management and the Congress. 

Their views could be particularly valuable in a new administration 

because the value of many programs and operations will likely be 

reassessed. We believe that government agencies and the Congress 

would benefit greatly from the continued service of some existing . 

IGS. Although the President has the authority to appoint new 

inspectors general, we believe that consideration should be given 

to retaining IGs based on their individual capabilities and 

performance records, even when there is a change of administrations 

following a national election. This would be consistent with 

section 3 of the IG Act, which provides that IGs be appointed 

without regard for political affiliation and solely on the basis of 

integrity and demonstrated ability. High turnover among this group 

of agency officials would rob the government of important expertise 

and insight into the most pressing problems facing agencies and how 

to remedy them. 

The members of the PCIE have informally assisted in 

periodically developing lists of potential candidates for IG 

vacancies. Although there may be many other means of identifying 

suitable candidates for IG positions, the involvement of the PCIE 

. 

10 
is an approach which we believe should be continued for future 

Establishing Additional Statutory IGs 

We have supported the establishment of additional statutory 

IGs in certain agencies including Treasury and Justice--the only 

two cabinet-level agencies without a statutory IG--and also in the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC). Based on our observations in other 

agencies with IGs, we believe that a statutory IG at each of these 

agencies would strengthen management control over program 

operations, provide a higher degree of independence to agency 

audits, ensure that the agency head and the Congress are informed 

of significant audit and investigative findings, and promote more 

efficient and effective operations of the agency and its programs. 

We found weaknesses in the internal audit organization and 

operation at these agencies, which provides support for our view 

that they need statutory IGs. For example, at Treasury we found 

that there were five audit and investigative groups. The 

nonstatutory IG had audit and investigative responsibility for 

only 11 percent of Treasury's operating budget. The four law 

enforc.ement bureaus had their own internal a.udit and investigative 

staffs to audit the remaining 89 percent of Treasury's budget. In 

11 
addition, Treasury did not routinely inform the Congress about its 

a ud i t and investigative activities. 

At Justice, audit and internal investigation was fragmented 

among 15 separate audit and internal investigative units. We 

believe that, unlike statutory IGs, these units lacked 

organizational independence, and that this may have inhibited 

independent, objective assessments and reporting to the Attorney 

General and the Congress on department activities. In addition, no 

one person or office was responsible for coordinating audits and 

investigations.. 

We also believe a statutory IG would be appropriate at the 

CIA. Several recent revelations have brought into question 

existing mechanisms for providing control and oversight of covert 

government operations. Governmental powers appeared to be 

exercised without accountability to the Congress or the public. 

Establishing an IG at the CIA would contribute to improved 

accountability of that agency's operations and help assure the 

taxpayer that funds and programs are conducted within the 

parameters prescribed by law and regulation. We believe that a 

CIA IG could function effectively while giving appropriate 

consideration to national security. 

other agencies such as OPM, FEMA, and lYRC have important 

missions and expend considerable funds annually. Our reviews have 

12 
shown that these agencies' audit and investigative capabilities 

would he strengthened in terms of independence and audit coverage 

by having a statutory IG. As discussed later, legislation is 

pending which would establish statutory IGs in these organizations. 

Strengthening Other Audit 

and Investigative Groups 

Billions of dollars are expended by agencies not covered by IG 

Act requirements, such as the Farm Credit Administration, Commodity 

Futures Trading Commission, and National Science Foundation. In a 

1986 report entitled, Internal Audit: Nonstatutory Audit and 

Investigative Groups Need To Be Strengthened (GAO/AFMD-86-11, 

June 3, 19861, we identified audit or investigative units in 41 

agencies not subject to statutory inspector general requirements. 

In fiscal year 1985, these agencies had a combined total budget 

authority of over $100 billion and employed more than 250,000 

people. We found impairments to the independence of the audit 

function in 12 of the 41 agencies. In addition, at 4 agencies, we 

reported that 

-- important agency functions received little or no audit 

coverage, 

-- audit and investigative staffs were not evaluating most of 

the investigations of alleged fraud and abuse and did not 

13 
track the disposition or ascertain underlying causes of the 

illegal activities, and 

-- audit resolution and follow-up systems did not meet 

governmental requirements. 

As discussed later, legislation is pending which would strengthen 

audit and investigative units in these agencies. 

Emphasizing Fraud and Abuse 

Prevention in IG Work 

An area where the IGs must play an important role is in the 

prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse through the review and 

reporting on internal controls and accounting systems. With the 

passdge of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 

under the leadership of this Subcommittee, we have seen increasing 

emphasis on improving internal controls and accounting systems in 

the government. The IG community has been very supportive of 

governmentwide efforts to implement the act. As detailed in our 

1984 report4 on the act's implementation, the IGs not only 

evaluated and reported on internal controls and accounting systems, 

they also provided oversight and technical assistance, helped 

41mplementation of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act: 

First Year (GAO/OCG-84-3, August 24, 1984). 

14 
devise and conduct training programs for managers, and consulted on 

internal controls and accounting. 

A 1985 study by the President's Council on Management 

Improvement called on the audit community--GAO and the IGs--to 

somewhat refocus its audit emphasis on the results of the act. 

Audits of act implementation should focus on results such as 

whether the agency identified and reported all material weaknesses 

and is taking sound corrective actions. The study indicated that 

auditors could do a better job of (1) determining if significant 

problems were the result of internal control weaknesses and (2) 

linking reported deficiencies to the Internal Control Standards 

prescribed by the Comptroller General under the Financial Integrity 

Act. 

iit GAO, we have acted to ensure that internal controls are a 

integral part of our normal audit work and that the reporting to 

management of the linkage of our findings to internal control 

weaknesses is evident. We have shared our approach with the IG 

community. We understand that a number of the IGs, such as the 

Defense IG, have also acted to include internal controls as a 

component of their normal reviews. 

.n 

In our view, it is critical that IGs play a continuing 

import.ant role in assisting management in implementing the 

Financial Inteqrity Act. The audit community must routinely 

15 
review and evaluate internal controls and make managers fully 

aware of the internal control implications of audit findings. 

Also, t;le IGs need to look at the adequacy of accounting systems, 

focusing on the controls and the adequacy of the information 

produced by these systems. By pinpointing the causes of problems, 

the auditor can better help the manager improve government 

operations and the delivery of services to the public. Improved 

control and accountability must continue to be a priority. 

Further Improving the Audit Resolution Process 

The ultimate value of IG audits is dependent on how well 

deficiencies which IGs identify are corrected so that problems do 

not recur. Despite the guidance provided by OMB in Circular A-50, 

our reports have shown that agencies do not always adequately 

resolv'e auditors' findings and perform appropriate follow-up. For 

example, in one audit, we reviewed the way questioned costs were 

resolved at six agencies. We questioned the procedures employed to 

allow costs in about 25 percent of the decisions we examined.5 In 

another report we found that auditors did not always attempt to 

determine if there had been previous audits or to follow up on 

recommendations as required.6 In a third report, we found that 

5Audits Of Federal Programs: Reasons For The Disparity Between 

Costs Questioned By Auditors And Amounts Agencies Disallow 

(GAO/AFMD-84-57, August 8, 1984). 

61nspedtors General: Compliance With Professional Standards By The 

Agriculture Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-86-41, September 30, 1986). 

16 
management did not always take prompt, responsive action on 

findings and recommendations as agreed, nor did it ensure that 

c10sed recommendations had, in fact, been implemented.7 

Inspectors general are also finding that their agencies are 

not following up on audit recommendations effectively. A recent 

report by the Department of the Interior IG found that the agency 

did not fully implement audit recommendations in 32 percent of the 

424 cases reviewed. The percentage of nonimplementation per 

bureau or office ranged from 8 to 57 percent. Four bureaus 

exceeded 33 percent, according to the IG report. 

In view of these problems, it appears to us that systems of 

audit resolution and follow-up require continuing efforts by both 

management and IGs to ensure their effectiveness. 

Better Reporting of Audit 

Results to the Congress 

We have also found that the reporting of audit results could 

be more accurate and clear. For example, some IG semiannual 

reports have overstated the amount of costs questioned by auditors, 

and management commitments to take corrective actions were 

inappropriately po'rtrayed as savings. In addition, the 

'Audit Resolution: Responsiveness of Defense Management to 

Internal Audit Recommendations (GAO/AFMD-87-37BR, July 31, 1987). 

17 
terminology used to present audit results was not used 

G:onsistently in scme semiannual reports. For example, IGs have 

used different and inconsistent definitions for the term 

"questioned cost." Proposed amendments to the IG legislation 

provide some remedy for misleading and confusing reports. 

PENDING LEGISLATION ADDRESSES 

SEVERAL ISSUES 

Legislation is pending in the Congress to implement some of 

the improvements we believe useful. Bills in the House (H.R. 4054) 

and the Senate (S. 908 and S. 1818), when taken together, provide 

for the establishment of a statutory IG at Treasury, Justice, CIA, 

OPM, Internal Revenue Service, FEMA, and NRC. In addition, Y.R. 

4054 and S. 908 contain provisions that would extend protections 

and requirements like those in the IG act to most existing federal 

audit and investigative units. For instance, the legislation would 

have the audit/investigative unit head report to the head of the 

agency, and the audit/investigative unit head would not be 

prevented from initiating a;d completing any audit or 

investigation. The legislation would help prevent impairments to 

independence, provide protection to the audit and investigative 

functions, and keep the Congress and agency heads better informed 

about problems. The legislation would also improve audit 

resolution and follow-up processes by establishing clear 

. 

18 
definitions of terms and requirements for statistical reporting on 

-119 results of audit resolution. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Much has been done in the past decade to correct the 

weaknesses in federal internal audits and investigations which were 

so prevalent. A key change was the establishment of statutcry IGs 

who strive to keep the Congress and agency management informed of 

significant problems. Our reviews have shown that the IG concept 

has worked well and that IGs are generally performing high quality 

work and achieving a significant amount of success in combating 

fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Other initiatives have been taken to enhance the 

effectiveness of internal audits and investigations. OMB revised 

Circular A-50 on audit resolution and follow-up. The Single Audit 

Act was passed providing a more efficient and effective use of 

audit resources through entitywide audits instead of individual 

grant audits. The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency 

was established to coordinate IG efforts in combating fraud, waste, 

and abuse. 

These efforts should be continued and some new actions taken 

to address previously identified problems and emerging issues 

outlined in this testimony. We endorse the legislation which has 

19 
been proposed to remedy some of the issues. We plan to work with 

the Congress, the IGs, and other executive branch officials to 

aiidress these issues. 

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, we believe that to maintain 

progress and enhance the effectiveness of federal internal audit 

operations in the future, the executive branch and the Congress 

could take several actions. The executive branch should 

-- Retain incumbent inspectors general based on their 

individual capabilities and their record of 

performance. 

-- Continue to involve existing statutory IGs in 

periodically developing and updating lists of 

* potential candidates for IG vacancies. 

-- Continue an organization such as the current 

President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency to 

coordinate and facilitate the work of the IGs. 

-- Continue efforts to improve the quality of IG work. 

-- Review the scope of IG work to ensure that there is 

. an emphasis on internal controls and,reviews of 

agencywide information and accountability systems. 

20 
.4s we recommended previously, we believe that the Congress 

should 

-- Establish statutory IGs in the remaining cabinetlevel departments and other agencies as 

appropriate. 

-- Strengthen audit and investigative units in 

agencies that do not have statutory inspectors 

general by extending to them protections provided 

to the IGs. 

Mr. Chairman, we at GAO believe that our government is a 

better one today thanks to the inspector general program. You and 

your iubcommittee are responsible for the successful achievement of 

instituting inspectors general as key mechanisms for combating 

fraud, waste, and abuse. 

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. We will be pleased 

to respond to any questions you may have. 

21 
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT 1 

LIST OF SELECTED GAO REPORTS ON 

INSPECTOR GENERAL ISSUES--l978 to 1988 

Inspectors General: Compliance With Professional Standards by the 

HHS Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-88-36, to be issued) 

CPA Audit Quality: A Status Report on the Accounting Profession's 

Enforcement Efforts (GAO/AFMD-88-28, April 25, 1988) 

Naval Audit Service: Effectiveness of Navy's Internal Audit 

Organization Is Limited (GAO/AFMD-88-12, February 24, 19883 

DOD Fraud Investigations: Characteristics, Sanctions, and 

Prevention (GAO/AFMD-88-SBR, January 20, 1988) 

Inspectors General: Compliance With Professional Standards by the 

Transportation Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-87-28, August 10, 1987) 

Audit Resolution: Responsiveness of Defense Management to Internal 

Audit Recommendations (GAO/AFMD-87-37BR, July 31, 1987) 

Inspectors General: Compliance With Professional Standards by the 

GSA Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-87-22, July 20, 1987) 

Inspectors General: Compliance With Professional Standards by the 

Agriculture Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-86-41, September 30, 1986) 

Inspectors General: Compliance With Professional Standards by the 

EPA Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-86-43, Septembe,r 30, 1986) 

Treasury Department: An Assessment of the Need for a Statutory 

Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-86-3, August 21, 1986) 

Internal Audit: Nonstatutory Audit and Investigative Groups Need 

To Be Strengthened (GAO/AFMD-86-11, June 3, 1986) 

DOD Fraud Hotline: Generally Effective but Some Changes Needed 

(GAO/AFMD-86-9, March 21, 1986) 

Justice Department: An Assessment of the Need for a Statutory 

Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-86-8, February 24, 1986) 

CPA Audit Quality: Inspectors General Find Significant Problems 

(GAO/AFMD-86-20, December 5, 1985) 

22 
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT 1 

i:omplrance With Professional Standards by the Commerce Inspector 

General (GAO/AFMD-85-57, August 12, 1985) 

Review '7-:"3ups Not Located in the Offices of Statutory Inspectors 

General \GAO/AFMD-85-36, February 5, 1985) 

Assessment of Audits of Bilingual Education Grants in Texas by 

U.S. Department of Education's Office of Inspector General 

(GAO/AFMD-85-6, December 14, 1984) 

Department of Defense Progress in Resolving Contract Audits 

(GAO/AFMD-84-4, October 27, 1983) 

Improvements Needed in EPA's Inspector General Operations 

(GAO/AFMD-84-13, October 21, 1983) 

Impact of Administrative Budget Procedures on Independence of 

Offices of Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-84-78, September 26, 1984) 

S-Year Summary of Results of GAO Fraud Hotline (GAO/AFMD-84-70, 

September 25, 1984) 

Audits of Federal Programs: Reasons for the Disparity Between Costs 

Questioned by Auditors and Amounts Agencies Disallow (GAO/AFMD-84- 

57, August 8, 1984) 

Deficiencies in the Department of the Interior OIG Investigation 

of the Powder River Basin Coal Lease Sale (GAO/RCED-84-167, 

June 11, 1984) 

Status of Internal Audit Capabilities of Federal Agencies Without 

Statutory Inspectors General (GAO/AFMD-84-45, May 4, 1984) 

The Audit and Inspection Functions at the United States 

Information Agency Need Management Attention (GAO/NSIAD-84-14, 

April 4, 1984) 

Use of Investigative Information by Inspectors General To Identify 

and Report Internal Control Weaknesses (GAO/AFMD-84-38, 

February 24, 1984) 

Improvements Needed in EPA's Inspector General Operations 

(GAO/AFMD-84-13, October 21, 1983) 

GAO's Review of Selected Operations of the Department of 

Transportation's Office of Inspector General. (GAO/RCED-83-116, 

August 23, 19831 

23 
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT 1 

:t1..a::t? Department's Office of Inspector General Should Be More 

Independent and Effective (GAO/AFMD-83-56, June 2, 1983) 

Inquiry into Allegations Concerning Matthew N. Novick, Former 

Inspector General, EPA (GAO/AFMD-83-49, March 4, 1983) 

Review of Inspector General Functions in Agency for International 

Development (GAO/ID-82-9, May 21, 1982) 

Validity and Comparability of Quantitative Data Presented by the 

President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency on Inspectors 

General Activities (GAO/AFMD-82-78, May 18, 1982) 

TVA's Internal Audit Improved but Inspector General May Still Be 

Needed (GAO/EMD-82-61, March 19, 1982) 

Who Is Watching the Defense Dollars? (GAO/AFMD-82-26, February 5, 

19821 

Fraud in Government Programs: How Extensive Is It? How Can It Be 

Controlled? Volume III (GAO/AFMD-82-3, November 6, 1981) 

Fraud in Government Programs: How Extensive Is It? How Can It Be 

Controlled? Volume II (GAO/AFMD-81-73, September 30, 1981) 

Examination of the Effectiveness of Statutory Offices of Inspector 

General.(GAO/AFMD-81-94, August 21, 1981) 

Improvements Needed in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office 

of Inspector and Auditor (GAO/EMD-81-72, July 7, 1981) 

Review of Circumstances of the'Mass Removal of Statutory 

Inspectors General (GAO/AFMD-81-86, July 9, 1981) 

r 

Allegations that a Political Appointee at the Environmental 

Protection Agency Was Exercising Control Over the Office of the 

Inspector General (GAO/AFMD-81-77, June 25, 1981) 

Fraud in Government Programs: How Extensive Is It? How Can It Be 

Controlled? Volume 1 (GAO/AFMD-81-57, May 7, 1981) 

Weak Internal Controls Make Some Navy Activities Vulnerable to 

Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (GAO/AFMD-81-30, April 3, 1981) 

Weak Internal Controls Make the Department of Labor and Selected 

CETA Grantees Vulnerable to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (GAO/AFMD-81- 

46, March 27, 1981) 

24 
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT 1 

1,)1jappoLnting Progress in Improving Systems for Resolving Billions 

in Audit Findings (GAO/AFMD-81-27, January 23, 1981) 

Continuing and Widespread Weaknesses in Internal Controls Result 

in Losses Through Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (GAO/FGMSD-80-65, 

August 28, 1980) 

Weak Financial Controls Make the Community Services Administration 

Vulnerable to Fraud alld Abuse (GAO/FGMSD-80-73, August 22, 1980) 

Review of the Environmental Protection Agency's Efforts To Detect 

and Prevent Fraud and Abuse (GAO/CED-80-100, May 29, 1980) 

GAO Findings on Federal Internal Audit--A Summary (GAO/FGMSD-80- 

39, May 27, 1980) 

Improved Grant Auditing and Resolution of Findings Could Save the 

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Millions (GAO/FGMSD-8O21, February 19, 1980) 

Investigation of an Allegation that the NASA Office of Audit 

Director Had Suppressed Audit Reports (GAO/PSAD-80-28, February 8, 

1980) 

Defense Logistics Agency Inspector General Inspections Should 

Change From a Compliance to a Systems Approach (GAO/FGMSD-80-24, 

December 27, 1979) 

The Navy's Inspection System--Could Be Improved (GAO/FGMSD-80-23, 

December 26, 1979) 

The Army Inspector General's Inspections--Changing From a 

Compliance to a Systems Emphasis (GAO/FGMSD-80-1, October 30, 1979) 

Improving Interior's Internal Auditing and Investigatinq 

Activities-- Inspector General Faces Many Problems (GAO/CED-80-4, 

October 24, 1979) 

Federal Civilian Audit Organizations Have Often Been Unsuccessful 

in Obtaining Additional Staff (GAO/FGMSD-79-43, July 27, 1979) 

A Look at the Air Force Inspector General's Inspection System 

(GAO/FGMSD-79-51, August 28, 1979) 

The Effectiveness of the Defense Contract Audit Agency Can Be 

Improved.(GAO/FGMSD-79-25, May 10, 1979) 

25 
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT 1 

;t-;~ttz Department's Off ice of Inspector General, Foreign Service, 

!-To Improve Its Internal Evaluation Process (GAO/ID-78-19, 

December 6, 1978) 

26 
ATTACHMENT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 

S'IYAT~JTORY INSPECTOR GENERAL LEGISLATION 

Public Law number Departments and agencies 

94-505 Health, Education, and Welfare 

(now Health and Human Services) 

95-91 

95-452 

Energy 

Agriculture 

Interior 

Commerce 

Housing and Urban Development 

Labor 

Transportation 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Veterans Administration 

General Services Administration 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Small Business Administration 

Community Services Administrationa 

Date 

enacted 

10/15/76 

8/4/77 

10/12/78 

96-88 Education 10/17/79 

(amended P.L. 

95-452) 

97-113 

(amended P.L. 

95-452 1 

Agency for International 

Development 

12/29/81 

97-252 

(amended P.L. 

95-452) 

Department of Defense g/8/82 

98-76 

(amended P.L. 

95-452) 

Railroad Retirement Board 8/12/83 

99-93 

99-399 

(amended P.L. 

95-452) 

State 8,'16/85 

United States Information Agency 8,'27/86 

. 

aThe Community Services Administration is no longer in existence. 

Its Office of Inspector General, created in the 1978 act, is not 

functioning although it is still authorized. 

27 
ATTACW 3 ATTACHMENT3 

AGENCY 

Agriculture 

AID 

Comerce 

IDefensea 

F?ucation 

Energy 

EPA 

HHS 

HUD 

Interior 

Labor 

NASIL 

SBA 

State 

INSPECTOR - STAFFING 

(ETE BY FISCAL YEAR) 

1981 

900 

179 

171 

385 

284 

125 

142 

531 

867 

481 

189 

* 439 

100 

NAb 

124 

67 

Transportation 448 

Veterans 330 

USIA NA 

Total 5,762 

1982 

872 

171 

176 

496 

269 

153 

174 

483 

922 

499 

206 

430 

100 

NA 

140 

67 

445 

342 

NA 

5,945 

1983 

897 

160 

200 

937 

283 

178 

180 

404 

1280 

499 

278 

471 

102 

NA 

133 

69 

436 

345 

NA 

6,852 

1984 

879 

179 

215 

900 

299 

180 

229 

419 

1317 

488 

317 

528 

100 

NA 

124 

82 

434 

356 

NA 

7,046 

1985 

891 

192 

208 

1081 

304 

178 

256 

400 

1307 

498 

314 

524 

97 

NA 

124 

88 

462 

385 

NA 

7,309 

1986 

820 

175 

206 

1080 

272 

178 

260 

361 

1225 

472 

289 

562 

98 

NA 

120 

98 

457 

385 

36 

7,094 

1987 

818 

183 

192 

1334 

278 

178 

256 

364 

1204 

469 

278 

519 

111 

22 

125 

149 

456 

381 

36 

7,353 

Estimate 

1988 

818 

205 

206 

1380 

320 

178 

280 

452 

1236 

493 

300 

530 

131 

45 

132 

181 

451 

381 

44 

7,763 

aDOD figures reflect the staffing of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for 

Oversight and Review and the statutory DOD OIG (created in 1983) and do not include 

the inspector general functions housed in the military departments. 

‘nNA means data are not available. 

SWRCE: PCIE 

28