ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622

Appellate Court

Caption

TERESA KIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM BIANUCCI,

Defendant-Appellee.

 District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-10-0622

Filed December 13, 2011

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

The denial of plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the judgment dissolving her

marriage to defendant was upheld over her contentions that the trial court;

inter alia, improperly denied her motion for substitution of judge, erred

in reopening discovery after the trial began, erred in allowing defendant

to amend his pleadings, improperly allowed him additional time to

respond to a request to admit, and improperly intervened and advised

defendant to testify.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 06-D6-30547; the

Hon. Edward A. Arce, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Barrett & Sramek, of Palos Heights (Bernadette Garrison Barrett, of

counsel), for appellant.

Panos & Associates, LLC, of Palos Heights (Diane M. Panos, Nancy M.

Donlon and Jeffrey L. Paustian, of counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Presiding Justice Quinn and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment and

opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 This appeal arises from a February 9, 2010 order entered by the circuit court of Cook

County, which denied plaintiff-appellant Teresa Kic’s (Teresa) motion to reconsider the

judgment for dissolution of marriage. On appeal, Teresa argues that: (1) the trial court erred

in denying her motion for substitution of judge; (2) the trial court erred in reopening

discoveryafter trial began and allowing the defendant-appellee, William Bianucci (William),

to amend his pleadings; (3) the trial court improperly allowed William additional time to

respond to a request to admit facts; (4) the trial court erred by failing to name a residential

parent and failed to enter an order of child support, education expenses and extracurricular

activities for the minor child; (5) the trial court improperly intervened and advised William,

who was acting pro se, to testify; (6) the trial court’s ruling allowing William a year to

refinance the marital residence was inequitable and improper; (7) the trial court improperly

penalized Teresa for the same financial matter more than once; (8) the trial court erred in

failing to incorporate a list of marital property subject to distribution in its order; and (9) the

trial court erred in failing to find a specific date regarding the breakdown of the marriage and

its finding of dissipation of marital assets by Teresa was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. In response, William argues that: (1) Teresa has forfeited four of the issues she

raises on appeal for failing to include them in her motion to reconsider; (2) Teresa has

forfeited eight of the issues she raises on appeal due to their deficiency under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2008); and (3) the trial court properly denied

Teresa’s motion for substitution of judge. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment

of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Teresa and William were married on August 29, 1987, and the marriage was registered

in Cook County, Illinois. In 1998, the parties acquired the marital residence located at 11740

Shaker Ct., Orland Park, IL (Shaker Ct. home), through tenancy by the entirety. The parties

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obtained a mortgage at the time the residence was purchased, and after it was refinanced the

home was encumbered by a mortgage of approximately $500,000. The home was further

encumbered by a home equity line of credit with a balance of approximately $99,632.

Between 1998 and 1999, the parties acquired a commercial building located at 525 Burnham

St., Calumet City, IL (State Farm office), through joint tenancy. The State Farm office

contains five total rental units, one of which is used for Teresa’s sole proprietorship as an

insurance agent for State Farm Insurance Company. Teresa rents the other four units in the

building, generating income from the property which amounted to $16,104 in 2007. The

State Farm office was encumbered by a mortgage of $53,187.67 as of October 2008.

¶ 4 On May 13, 2003, Teresa and William’s only child, Robert Bianucci (Robert) was born.

In December 2003, William was convicted 1 count of bank fraud and 12 counts of false

statements to a bank. William was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’

supervised release and ordered to pay restitution in the sum of $3,418,854. The restitution

lien against William also attached to both the Shaker Ct. home and the State Farm office. On

June 29, 2004,William executed a durable power of attorney to Teresa which gave her the

authority to control all his finances. William was incarcerated on June 30, 2004, and released

on March 5, 2007. On July 12, 2005, Teresa formed a limited liability company called Bigsy

Properties L.L.C. (BigsyProperties). In July2005, BigsyProperties borrowed $400,000 from

Teresa’s mother, Jane Kic (Jane). These funds were used to purchase vacant lots pursuant

to a business agreement between Bigsy Properties and R&D Development. On January 31,

2006, William revoked his power of attorney.

¶ 5 On May 18, 2006, Teresa filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. William, while he

was still incarcerated, filed an answer to the petition for dissolution of marriage on June 26,

2006, acting pro se. William also filed a motion for a temporary stay of all proceedings until

he was no longer incarcerated and able to return to Chicago. On the same day, Teresa filed

a motion for a default prove-up. On September 13, 2006, William was granted leave to file

an appearance.

¶ 6 On December 12, 2006, Teresa was awarded temporary sole custody of Robert. William

was awarded visitation and ordered to pay child support in the amount of $70 per week.

Teresa was allowed possession of the Shaker Ct. home from Sundaythrough Thursdaynight.

William was allowed possession of the residence from Thursday night through Sunday.

Teresa was also ordered to pay all utilities of the home and monthly installments of the home

equity line of credit. William was ordered to pay the monthly mortgage payments and real

estate taxes. On March 5, 2007, William was released from prison.

¶ 7 On August 7, 2007, counsel for Teresa filed a motion for leave to withdraw as attorney

of record. The motion was granted on August 16, 2007. On May 9, 2008, Teresa, appearing

pro se, filed a petition for legal separation. On January 10, 2008, the parties entered into a

mediation agreement that established a joint custody agreement by which they each agreed

to share residential responsibilities in caring for Robert. On May 1, 2008, Judge Naomi

Schuster (Judge Schuster) set the matter for pretrial on June 18, 2008. Laterthat week, Judge

Schuster was reassigned to a different court and Judge Edward Arce (Judge Arce) was

assigned to handle the matter. On June 18, 2008, both parties appeared pro se and presented

motions before Judge Arce. The matter was then set for trial. The trial date was continued

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and at a status hearing Teresa presented a motion for substitution of judge. On July 30, 2008,

William presented an emergency motion that sought payment by Teresa for the real estate

taxes; contribution to the monthly expenses of the marital residence; and to assert a claim

dissipation of marital assets by Teresa. On August 14, 2008, the court granted Teresa’s 1

emergency motion for leave to file an additional appearance by counsel. On September 30,

2008, Teresa’s motion for substitution of judge was denied.

¶ 8 The trial commenced on November 18, 2008 in the circuit court of Cook County. Teresa

appeared with counsel. William appeared pro se during the entirety of the trial. On January

26, 2009, William presented (but did not file) a motion claiming marital economic

misconduct including but not limited to the dissipation of marital assets by Teresa. Teresa

filed a motion to strike these additional allegations but the trial court allowed discovery on

these issues. After the parties exchanged discovery, William was allowed an extension 2

beyond 28 days to respond to Teresa’s request to admit facts. During trial on June 25, 2009,

as William was preparing to rest his case in chief, the trial court asked him whether he

planned to testify. The trial court then told William that without testimony from him there

was nothing to consider with respect to William’s case. William then gave his testimony in

narrative form.

¶ 9 On September 8, 2009, the trial court entered the judgment for dissolution of marriage.

The extensive order ruled on all of the contested issues including custody, maintenance,

distribution of real property, distribution of retirement accounts, dissipation, and division of

martial property. Most notably, the trial court reserved the issue of child support, granted

William sole possession of the Shaker Ct. home with a yearto refinance and removeTeresa’s

name from any attached obligations, and found that Teresa had dissipated the marital estate

in the sum of $310,964.03. On October 7, 2009, Teresa filed a motion to reconsider the 3

court’s ruling of September 8, 2009. Her motion alleged: (1) that the reopening of discovery

and allowing William to assert a claim of economic misconduct in January 2009 after trial

began was a manifest error of law; (2) that it was a manifest error of law to grant William an

extension of time to answer Teresa’s request to admit facts; (3) that allowing William a year

to refinance the Shaker Ct. home is a manifest error of law; (4) that the trial court failed to

specify the date of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage for the dissipation claim; and (5)

that the finding of dissipation of marital assets by Teresa is against the manifest weight of

the evidence. Teresa also sought modification of the judgment for dissolution in the amount

that William was awarded regarding her State Farm mutual fund retirement account. On

This motion is not in the record because it was never actually filed in court. The trial court 1

ruled that the motion was not an emergency and it was never filed.

The trial court did not actually grant or deny William’s motion in a written order but instead 2

ordered the parties to exchange discovery on the issues presented in William’s motion.

This sum was based on individual findings of dissipation in the amounts of $147,000,

3

$86,458.16, $55,000, and $22,505.87. The actual balance due to William was $124,719.52 due to

the court’s finding of William’s dissipation of $61,525.

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October 29, 2009, William filed a response to Teresa’s motion to reconsider and for

modification of the judgment for dissolution.

¶ 10 On February 9, 2010, the trial court ruled that Teresa’s motion to reconsider was granted

regarding William’s award from the State Farm mutual fund, but that the remaining issues

were denied. William’s motion for modification was also denied. On February 25, 2010,

Teresa filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 As a preliminary matter before we consider Teresa’s arguments, we must determine if

this court has jurisdiction. William argues that Teresa forfeited four of the issues raised in 4

her brief because she failed to include them in her motion to reconsider in the trial court.

William presents a compelling argument that Teresa may not raise issues for the first time

on appeal. William points out that Teresa raised the issues in a legal memorandum instead

of in a motion. He argues that no exception to the forfeiture rule should apply to Teresa. In

general, William’s argument is correct as applied to jury cases. Specifically, a partymay not

argue on appeal any point that was not specified in the party’s posttrial motion before the

trial court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(b)(2)(iii) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). However, in civil bench trials,

“[n]either the filing of nor the failure to file a post-judgment motion limits the scope of

review.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(b)(3)(ii) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Furthermore, it has been repeatedly

held that failure to raise an issue in a posttrial motion does not preclude a party from raising

that issue on appeal in nonjury civil cases. Shumak v. Shumak, 30 Ill. App. 3d 188, 332

N.E.2d 177 (1975); City of Chicago v. Mid-City Laundry Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 88, 289 N.E.2d

233 (1972). Therefore, Teresa’s failure to include arguments (1), (4), (5), and (8) in her

motion to reconsider is not fatal to her arguments on appeal.

¶ 13 We first consider Teresa’s argument that the trial court erred in denying her motion for

substitution of judge. A motion for substitution of judge as of right shall be granted if it is

presented before trial and before the judge has made a ruling on any substantial issue. 735

ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2)(ii) (West 2008). The trial court “has no discretion to deny a proper

motion for substitution of judge.” Rodisch v. Commacho-Esparza, 309 Ill. App. 3d 346, 350,

722 N.E.2d 326, 330 (1999). In addition to the substantial issue rule, there is an exception

that allows the denial of a motion for substitution of judge. When the happenings at a pretrial

conference allow a party to “test the waters” and get an idea of the judge’s opinion on some

of the issues of the case, a motion for substitution of judge can be properly denied. In re

Estate of Gay, 353 Ill. App. 3d 341, 343, 818 N.E.2d 860, 863 (2004). The purpose of this

exception is to keep parties from “judge shopping” when they are able to tell which way a

judge is leaning on a case before substantial issues have been decided. Id. In Gay, the trial

judge hosted pretrial conferences that were not memorialized. Id. The appellate court held

that when the trial judge’s recollections do not contradict or impeach the record, the judge

can rely on those recollections in determining the substance of the pretrial conference. Id. at

344, 818 N.E.2d at 863. The denial of a motion for substitution of judge is reviewed de novo.

Specifically, issues (1), (4), (5), and (8). 4

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Id. at 343, 818 N.E.2d at 863.

¶ 14 In this case, the parties are in dispute as to whether a pretrial conference was held and

whether Teresa was able to test the waters before presenting her motion for substitution of

judge. The question of whether the trial judge ruled on a substantive matter is not at issue

here and has no bearing on our analysis. On May 1, 2008, Judge Schuster set the matter for

pretrial on June 18, 2008. During the first week of May 2008, Judge Schuster was reassigned

to another court and Judge Arce was assigned to handle the matter. On June 18, 2008, the

parties appeared pro se and presented motions before Judge Arce. Teresa presented a motion

for legal separation and William presented a motion for property settlement. Judge Arce set

the matter for trial status on August 11, 2008, and for trial on August 18, 2008. The trial date

was continued and Judge Arce continued to hear various motions from both parties during

the period before trial. At a trial status hearing on September 22, 2008, Teresa presented a

motion for substitution of judge, and Judge Arce set the motion for hearing on September 30,

2008. On September 30, 2008, Judge Arce denied Teresa’s motion for substitution of judge

on the basis that he had conducted a pretrial conference before the motion was presented.

¶ 15 At the time of the June 18, 2008 pretrial, both parties appeared pro se. The proceedings

went unmemorialized and Teresa offers no bystander’s report or affidavit describing the

substance of the proceedings. Therefore, we are only able to rely upon Judge Arce’s own

recollections. In dealing with two pro se parties presenting motions at a pretrial conference,

it is reasonable to assume that Judge Arce discussed matters of substance regarding the case.

The record suggests that from his recollections of the pretrial conference, Judge Arce

determined that Teresa’s motion for substitution of judge was inappropriate at this point in

the proceedings. There is no evidence in the record that contradicted Judge Arce’s

recollections. Absent any such evidence by Teresa, we hold that Judge Arce’s denial of

Teresa’s motion for substitution of judge was proper. 

¶ 16 We next examine whether the trial court committed reversible error when the trial court

allowed William to reopen discovery and amend his pleadings after the trial began. As a rule,

the trial court is able to supervise “all or any part of any discovery procedure.” Ill. S. Ct. R.

201(c)(2) (eff. July 1, 2002). It is well established in Illinois that the trial court is afforded

broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters. BlueStar Energy Services, Inc. v. Illinois

Commerce Comm’n, 374 Ill. App. 3d 990, 996, 871 N.E.2d 880, 887 (2007). The exercise

of the trial court’s discretion will not be overturned on appeal unless there was clearly an

abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court acts arbitrarily

and fails to employ conscientious judgment and ignores recognized principles of law.”

Castro v. Brown’s Chicken & Pasta, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 542, 554, 732 N.E.2d 37, 47

(2000) (citing Avery v. Sabbia, 301 Ill. App. 3d 839, 844, 704 N.E.2d 750, 755 (1998)).

¶ 17 Teresa argues that the trial court erred by allowing William to present (but not file) an

emergencymotion on July 30, 2008. The motion sought contribution to real estate taxes and

monthly expenses of the marital estate by Teresa, and also asserted a claim of dissipation of

marital assets by Teresa. The trial court ruled that William’s motion was not an emergency

and continued the motion until the time of trial on the issues of contribution to real estate

taxes and monthly expenses of the marital estate. The trial court did not rule on the issue of

dissipation of marital assets. The record shows no evidence that the trial court abused its

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discretion in allowing William’s motion to be presented. There are no facts to suggest that

the trial court acted arbitrarily, failed to employ conscientious judgment, or ignored

recognized principles of law. Because the trial court is afforded broad discretion in

overseeing discovery matters, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, this court will not

overturn the trial court’s ruling.Teresa highlights the fact that, although continued, William’s

July 30, 2008 motion was never filed with the clerk of the court and never ruled on by the

trial court. However, this fact proves to be detrimental to Teresa’s argument. In the absence

of an adverse ruling against Teresa, she cannot claim wrongdoing or prejudice by the court.

The trial court did not rule on William’s July 30, 2008 motion as a separate act but rather

seems to have considered the issues raised in the motion in the context of resolving the whole

case. Based on this analysis, the actions of the trial court cannot be said to be detrimental to

Teresa. Accordingly, Teresa’s argument on this issue fails.

¶ 18 Teresa argues that the trial court erred when it allowed William to present a motion on

January26, 2009 claimingmarital economic misconduct, including the dissipation of marital

assets by Teresa. Teresa filed a motion to strike William’s motion, but the trial court denied

her motion to strike and reopened discovery. Teresa claims that William’s supplemental and

amended pleadings were in the improper form. Further, Teresa argues that the rules require

that a party claiming dissipation must put the opposing party on notice of the claim if it is not

pled. She also argues that William’s January 26, 2009 motion contradicted his answer to the

petition for dissolution of marriage and his emergencymotion of July 30, 2008 regarding the

date of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.

¶ 19 The trial court has broad discretion in whether or not to reopen discovery, and that

decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Ruane v. Amore, 287 Ill. App.

3d 465, 471, 677 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 (1997). The record does not reveal any evidence that

the trial court abused its discretion. Furthermore, Teresa does not provide citations to case

law or cases whose facts are analogous to this case. Accordingly, we find no error by the trial

court. Simply put, Teresa’s arguments are unsupported by the record or case law and are

unpersuasive.

¶ 20 Teresa makes additional arguments attacking William’s pleadings and motions as a

whole based on deficiency in form. However, Teresa’s arguments are unsupported by the

record or case law. Section 2-616 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure states in relevant

part:

“At any time before final judgment amendments may be allowed on just and reasonable

terms, introducing any party who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant,

dismissing any party, changing the cause of action or defense or adding new causes of

action or defenses, and in any matter, either of form or substance, in any process,

pleading, bill of particulars or proceedings, which may enable the plaintiff to sustain the

claim for which it was intended to be brought or the defendant to make a defense or

assert a cross claim.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2010).

Thus, the trial court, in its discretion, could properly allow William to amend his complaint.

Furthermore, dissipation may be considered by the trial court sua sponte regardless of the

pleadings of either party. In re Marriage of Sanfratello, 393 Ill. App. 3d 641, 653, 913

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N.E.2d 1077, 1089 (2009); 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2) (West 2010). Teresa further argues that

William’s dissipation claim from the July 30, 2008 motion and the January 26, 2009 motion

should not be considered. However, the trial court has the discretion to consider dissipation

by either party regardless of the allegations in the pleadings. In this case, the court did not

rule on the issue of dissipation until it entered the dissolution order. Therefore, Teresa was

not prejudiced by any ruling on the issue.

¶ 21 Similarly, Teresa argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed

William more than 28 days to respond to a request to admit facts. On March 13, 2009,

Teresa’s request for admission of facts was mailed to William. After receiving no response,

Teresa filed motions to strike William’s amended complaint and to deem the request to admit

facts as true and correct. In response, William stated: (1) that he did not receive any requests

prior to April 28, 2009; (2) that if the requests were sent on March 13, 2009, he would have

received them on March 17, 2009; (3) that there was a vacation hold placed on his mail from

March 16, 2009 to March 19, 2009; and (4) that he believes Teresa intercepted and picked

up his mail from the post office on March 18, 2009.

¶ 22 The decision whetherto allow an extension for a discoverymatter is discretionary. Teresa

is unable to show that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing William an extension.

The Illinois Supreme Court Rules allow the trial court to extend the time to file any pleading

either before or after the expiration of the deadline when good cause is shown. Ill. S. Ct. R.

183 (eff. Feb. 16, 2011). What constitutes “good cause” is a fact-dependent issue and falls

withing the discretion of the court. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334, 353,

875 N.E.2d 1065, 1079 (2007). Supreme Court Rule 183 applies to responses to requests to

admit facts. Id. at 343, 875 N.E.2d at 1072. In this case, the trial court considered William’s

explanations for his untimely response and granted an extension. There is no evidence of

abuse of discretion by the trial court.

¶ 23 Teresa next presents a number of arguments that are not framed in the context of a proper

legal theory or supported by any legal authority whatsoever. William argues that this

unorthodox presentation should bar Teresa’s claims from being considered. The Illinois

Supreme Court Rules provide that the appellant’s brief must contain contentions along with

citations to the authorities and pages in the record relied upon. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.

July 1, 2008). A failure to cite relevant authority violates Rule 341 and can cause a party to

forfeit consideration of the issue. Fortech, L.L.C. v. R.W. Dunteman Co., 366 Ill. App. 3d

804, 818, 852 N.E.2d 451, 463 (2006). Arguments that violate Rule 341 do not merit

consideration and can be rejected solely for that reason. Maun v. Department of Professional

Regulation, 299 Ill. App. 3d 388, 399, 701 N.E.2d 791, 799 (1998). “The appellate court is

not a depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.”

Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719, 495 N.E.2d 1132,

1137 (1986). However, a court may consider improperly raised issues in the interest of

finding a just result because Rule 341 is not a limitation on the court’s jurisdiction, but an

admonishment to the parties. Brown v. Brown, 62 Ill. App. 3d 328, 332-33, 379 N.E.2d 634,

637 (1978). Five of Teresa’s nine arguments are presented with absolutely no citations to

legal authority. The arguments contain record citations that are intermittent and often

inaccurate. We note that these issues could be forfeited on the basis of noncompliance with

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Rule 341. However, notwithstanding the deficiencies, Teresa’s argumentswarrant discussion

and resolution.

¶ 24 The first of these unsupported contentions is that the trial court committed reversible

error when it failed to name a residential parent and failed to enter an order on child support,

educational expenses and extracurricular activities for the minor child. The Illinois Marriage

and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) states that the court has jurisdiction to enter a

judgment for dissolution of marriage even if it has reserved the issues of child custody,

support, maintenance or distribution of property. 750 ILCS 5/401(b) (West 2010). This can

be accomplished through either the agreement of the parties or motion by either party and a

finding of “appropriate circumstances” by the court. Id. While we recognize that the statute

generally discourages judgments that are bifurcated, it does provide that when appropriate

circumstances are present the court has discretion to reserve the issues of child custody,

support,maintenance or distribution of propertyto be determined subsequent to the judgment

of dissolution. See In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982). It has

been held that appropriate circumstances include circumstances “where the court does not

have in personam jurisdiction over the respondent, where a party is unable to pay child

support or maintenance if so ordered, where the court has set aside an adequate fund for child

support pursuant to section 503(d) of the Act [citation], or where the children do not reside

with either parent.” In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 195, 443 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1982).

This rule has been interpreted not just to allow the reservation of ancillary issues in the

enumerated circumstances listed above, but also to include circumstances that are of the

same caliber. In re Marriage of Wade, 408 Ill. App. 3d 775, 778, 946 N.E.2d 485, 488

(2011). The trial court’s decision to enter a bifurcated judgment for dissolution is reviewed

using an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 778, 946 N.E.2d at 488. As the finder of fact, this

allows the court broad discretion in deciding whether to grant bifurcation. Id. at 780, 946

N.E.2d at 490.

¶ 25 Teresa argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it reserved the issue

of child support. In this case, the only issue that was reserved was child support and there is

considerable evidence in the record and in trial court’s order that supports the ruling by the

trial court. In determining whether to reserve the issue of child support, the court considered

a number of statutory factors, including the financial resources of the child, the split custody

system that was established by the mediation agreement, and the fact that both parents earned

considerable income that could provide for Robert. The court felt that in light of these facts,

the application of a child support order against either party was not warranted. Although the

facts and circumstances in this case are not among the enumerated circumstances listed in

Cohn and Wade, they are of the same caliber. Teresa makes no showing that the trial court

acted arbitrarily or ignored established principles of law in reserving the issue of child

support. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

¶ 26 Teresa also claims that the trial court erred by entering an order that was silent on the

issues of designating a residential parent and contributions to educational expenses and

extracurricular activities for Robert. A close examination of the trial court’s order does not

support Teresa’s contentions. On the issue of designating a residential parent, the trial court

recognized that the parties had agreed to and implemented a stable system where Robert lives

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in the Shaker Ct. home full time (the home in which he has lived since birth). William lives

in the Shaker Ct. home with Robert from Thursday night through Sunday of each week, and

Teresa lives with Robert in the same home from Sunday through Thursday afternoon of each

week. The system was established by a mediation agreement between the parties dated

January 10, 2008. In its ruling, the court considered many factors including the statutory

guidelines that permit joint custody of a child (750 ILCS 5/501 (West 2010)), and the

guidelines that determine the best interests of the child (750 ILCS 5/602(a) (West 2010)).

Without restating significant portions of the trial court’s order, we note that the court gave

a lengthy, in-depth analysis of relevant factors before ultimately deciding not to disrupt the

already agreed-upon system that had been established by the parties. The trial court declared

that each parent would share the residential responsibilities in caring for Robert. Most

notably, the trial court reasoned that both the parties had adjusted their lifestyles and work

schedules and had successfully set their personal differences aside for the best interests of

their child. Clearly, the court weighed appropriate factors in making its determination.

Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion and the trial court’s ruling will not be

disturbed.

¶ 27 In regard to the claims concerning educational, medical, and extracurricular activity

expenses, the trial court’s order in fact addressed each one of these issues. In its final

judgment, the trial court’s orderstates that each partywill pay equally all medical and dental

expenses for Robert which are not covered byinsurance; that Teresa will provide Robert with

medical insurance coverage and that William is to reimburse Teresa for half of the cost of

coverage; and the parties are to consult each other concerning all of Robert’s extracurricular

activities. Therefore, Teresa’s arguments that the trial court failed to rule on these issues are

without merit.

¶ 28 Teresa also argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to

incorporate, in paragraph T of the judgment for dissolution, a list of marital property that was

subject to distribution. No reasoning is presented nor citations to legal authority. An

examination of paragraph T along with paragraphs L and M shows that while the trial court

did not specifically itemize all the property that was to be distributed, it did award each party

his or her own personal clothing, jewelry, bank accounts, automobiles, items of apparel and

other personal property. The order also provided a method for the parties to fairly distribute

the remaining property in the marital residence. The deficiency of this argument is such that

there is no basis for disturbing the trial court’s ruling on these issues.

¶ 29 Next, we consider Teresa’s argument that the trial court committed reversible error when

the trial court advised William that he should testify. Generally, the court has wide latitude

when conducting a trial. Crump v. Universal Safety Equipment Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 202, 210,

398 N.E.2d 188, 194 (1979). Moreover, in a nonjury trial, the comments of a trial judge are

allowed greater latitude than in jury trials. City of Chicago v. Westphalen, 93 Ill. App. 3d

1110, 1121, 418 N.E.2d 63, 72 (1981). “[N]ot every comment or unguarded expression by

a trial judge will support a claim of prejudice. A showing of prejudicial effect is required.”

Id.

¶ 30 In Westphalen, the trial judge advised the defendant in open court to retain another

lawyer. See Westphalen, 93 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 418 N.E.2d 63. This court found that the

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comments made were not prejudicial. See id. The comments made by the trial court in this

case are even less prejudicial than in Westphalen. At trial, as William was about to rest his

case in chief, the following exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: No other witnesses?

MR. BIANUCCI [William]: No

THE COURT: You’re not going to testify on your own case?

MR. BIANUCCI [William]: Can I just make statements?

THE COURT: You’re going to have to. You’re representing yourself.

MR. BIANUCCI [William]: Okay.

THE COURT: But if you don’t present a case as part of your case, then–I mean Istill

haven’t heard from you what you are saying your date of separation was, other than as

part of your questioning, but that’s certainly not evidence.

MR. BIANUCCI [William]: Okay. I do apologize.

THE COURT: And I apologize for overstepping my bounds a little bit, but if I don’t

do this then ***.”

These are the statements that Teresa is challenging. We do not find that this comment by the

court suggests that it was acting as an advocate for William. On the contrary, the trial court

was within its discretion in clarifying the procedural process during trial. There is nothing

to suggest that the trial court’s statements prejudiced Teresa. We note that this was a bench

trial.

¶ 31 Teresa also argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed William

a year to refinance the Shaker Ct. home and to remove Teresa’s name from any mortgage

obligation. Teresa claims this ruling limited her options. In support of this assertion, Teresa

cites section 503 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2010)), which sets forth the factors to

be considered in equitable distribution.

¶ 32 “In cases involving the distribution of martial property, the appellate court will reverse

only upon a finding that the lower court abused its discretion.” In re Marriage of McHenry,

292 Ill. App. 3d 634, 639, 686 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1997). Equitable distribution does not have

to be equal, and when the court rules that one spouse receives income-producing assets, “the

court may achieve an equitable distribution by awarding offsetting payments to the other

spouse or by awarding a greater share of the total marital assets to the spouse who does not

receive the income-producing assets.” Id. at 643, 686 N.E.2d at 677.

¶ 33 In this case, the trial court recognized that the parties owned the Shaker Ct. home,

encumbered by a mortgage of $500,000, and a home equity loan of $99,632. They also

owned the State Farm office, encumbered by a mortgage of $53,187.67, in joint tenancy.

Both qualify as marital property and are also encumbered by a federal lien of $3,418,854 due

to William’s criminal conviction. The trial court considered the relative value and primary

purposes of both properties. The court reasoned that the Shaker Ct. property does not have

any substantial equity. On the other hand, the court found that the State Farm office

generated $16,104 in rental income in 2007 and was estimated at the time to be worth

between $140,000 and $150,000. The court reasoned that the only way to effectuate an

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equitable division of marital property would be to sell the properties; however, both parties

requested that the court not exercise that option. The parties agreed that William should be

allowed to retain the Shaker Ct. home as long as he is able to refinance the existing

mortgages and remove Teresa’s name. The court awarded William the Shaker Ct. home

while awarding Teresa the income-producing State Farm office. At the time of the ruling,

Teresa’s income was more than twice the amount of William’s income. The mere fact that

William was given a year to refinance the Shaker Ct. home does not support an abuse of

discretion allegation in the distribution of marital property. Absent an abuse of discretion,

we cannot hold that the distribution of marital property was inequitable.

¶ 34 Teresa further argues that the trial court committed reversible error by penalizing her

twice for the same matter when it found that she dissipated funds by withdrawing money in

the amount of $86,458.16 from the State Farm mutual fund account on November 19, 2007.

However, she makes no cogent argument in support of this contention. Because this

argument is clearly deficient pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341, we will not

consider this issue on appeal and it is therefore forfeited.

¶ 35 Teresa’s final argument is that the trial court committed reversible error when it found

that she dissipated martial assets and failed to identify the date of the irretrievable breakdown

of the marriage. Again, she fails to make a cogent argument and provides no legal support

for her theory. “A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite

conclusion is clearly evident or where it is unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the

evidence.” In re Marriage of Berger, 357 Ill. App. 3d 651, 660, 829 N.E.2d 879, 887 (2005).

We must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, and where there is

a possibility for multiple inferences, we must accept those inferences that support the court’s

order. In re Marriage of Divelbiss, 308 Ill. App. 3d 198, 206-07, 719 N.E.2d 375, 381

(1999). Teresa’s theory that the trial court’s finding of dissipation was against the manifest

weight of the evidence is wholly unsupported by the record or established legal principles.

Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

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