U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Office for Domestic Preparedness

810 Seventh Street, NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Tom Ridge

Secretary

______________________________________________

Office for Domestic Preparedness

World Wide Web Homepage:

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp

______________________________________________

ODP HelpLine

1–800–368–6498

______________________________________________

NCJ 202198

Cover photographs include images from the Federal Emergency Management Agency Photo Library (www.fema.gov)

and the National Sheriffs’ Association.


PREFACE

In the two years since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America, Federal, State, and local

homeland security agencies have made major investments of time and resources to enhance their preparedness to prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. It is important to evaluate how

well these investments achieve enhanced preparedness.

The most effective way to evaluate preparedness prior to an actual incident is by conducting and evaluating threat- and performance-based exercises. Exercises provide a risk-free environment for jurisdictions to assess if they have the plans, policies, procedures, resources, and agreements in place to enable

homeland security personnel to perform critical tasks required to prevent, respond to, or recover from

a terrorist attack.

The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, has defined a

methodology and developed guidance for the evaluation of performance-based exercises, which are

described in Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, Volume II: Exercise Evaluation

and Improvement. The first document in this series on the Homeland Security Exercise and

Evaluation Program, Volume I: Overview and Doctrine, was published in March 2003. Volume III:

Exercise Development Manual and Volume IV: Sample Exercise Documents and Formats are under

development.

The exercise evaluation methodology outlined in Volume II is designed to enhance the quality and

usefulness of homeland security exercises by evaluating performance against standardized criteria,

enhancing data analysis, and focusing greater attention on implementation of improvements. It is a

methodology that recognizes that homeland security is a new activity for most Federal, State, and local

agencies and that capabilities will need to be built and enhanced over time. The evaluation process

recognizes those critical tasks that the exercise participants perform well and makes recommendations

for improvements that need to be made. The goal is to improve the overall preparedness of the Nation

so that all jurisdictions can perform required tasks at least at the 90 percent level.

The evaluation guides included in Volume II are an initial effort to define expected levels of performance. They build on past experience and will continue to be refined. The guides are incomplete at

this time because they focus on response, with emphasis on a chemical attack. Additional evaluation

guides are being developed to address prevention and deterrence, recovery, and other types of

weapons of mass destruction. ODP plans to issue subsequent editions of Volume II as additional

guides are developed and as the evaluation methodology is refined.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Background and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Purpose and Scope of This Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Chapter 1: Overview of the Evaluation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Evaluation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Task-Level Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Agency/Discipline/Function-Level Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Mission-Level Performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Overview of the Evaluation and Improvement Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Evaluating the Cycle of Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 

Chapter 2: Evaluating Discussion-Based Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Planning and Organizing the Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Define Evaluation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Prepare the Evaluation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Develop Evaluation Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Recruit, Assign, and Train Evaluators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Finalize Evaluation Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Observe the Exercise and Collect Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Analyze Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Draft the After Action Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Suggested After Action Report Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Chapter 3: Evaluating Operations-Based Exercises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Plan and Organize the Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 

Define Evaluation Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Prepare the EVALPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Develop Evaluation Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Recruit, Assign, and Train Evaluators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Determining How Many Evaluators Are Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Identifying and Recruiting Evaluators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Training Evaluators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Finalize Preexercise Evaluation Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Observe the Exercise and Collect Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Getting Started . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Observing the Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

What To Look for and Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Analyze Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Collect Supplemental Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Conduct Player Hot Wash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Reconstruct Exercise Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Analyze Across Functions and Jurisdictions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

v
vi

Determine the Root Causes of Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Identify Opportunities for Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Identify Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Draft the After Action Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Suggested After Action Report Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Chapter 4: Improving Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 

Debriefing the Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Developing the Improvement Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Distribution of the Final After Action Report/Improvement Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Monitoring Implementation of Improvement Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Sharing Lessons Learned and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Appendix A: Participant Feedback Forms

Appendix B: Evaluation Guides—Tabletop Exercises 

Appendix C: Evaluation Guides—Operations-Based Exercises

Appendix D: Sample After Action Report
LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1. Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Process: 

Data Collection and Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Exhibit 2. Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Process: 

Identification and Tracking of Improvement Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Exhibit 3. Evaluating Discussion-Based Exercises: 

Summary of Data Collection and Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Exhibit 4. Evaluation Guide Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Exhibit 5. Guide for Determining Evaluators Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Exhibit 6. The Why Staircase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

vii

The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP),

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is

implementing the Homeland Security Exercise

and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) to enhance and

assess terrorism prevention, response, and recovery capabilities at the Federal, State, and local

levels. The HSEEP is a threat- and performancebased exercise program. It employs a cycle,

mix, and range of exercise activities of varying

degrees of complexity and interaction. It is

designed to test the performance of critical

homeland security tasks against objectively verifiable performance standards, with analytical

review and strategic and operational application

of the results.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation

Program, Volume II: Exercise Evaluation and

Improvement is the second in a series of HSEEP

manuals and provides guidance to State and

local jurisdictions on evaluating terrorism exercises. It should be used in conjunction with the

other documents in the series:

♦ Volume I: Overview and Doctrine

♦ Volume III: Exercise Development

Manual

♦ Volume IV: Sample Exercise Documents

and Formats

The following DHS/ODP definition of homeland

security preparedness acknowledges the nature

and unique characteristics of the terrorism threat

and equates preparedness with performance.

Homeland security preparedness

is a comprehensive national program

encompassing all homeland security

systems involved in the planning of

organizational, operational, and technical measures designed to achieve

full and sustainable performance to

prevent, disrupt, or deter threats or

acts of terrorism; reduce vulnerabilities; mitigate the effects of acts of terrorism; respond to threats and acts

of terrorism; and perform effective

remediation and recovery efforts

from terrorist attacks throughout the

entire threat spectrum, including terrorist use of chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, and explosive

weapons of mass destruction

(CBRNE WMD).

As public officials know, success in a real emergency is measured by performance. The public

expects Government, law enforcement, and

response agencies to prevent terrorist attacks if

possible and, if attacked, to respond to and recover

from these attacks quickly and effectively, mitigate

the associated hazards, care for the victims, and

protect the public.

Exercises provide a means to train and practice

prevention,response,and recovery capabilities in

a risk-free environment and to assess and improve

performance. They allow individual responders

and teams of responders to demonstrate and apply

knowledge,skills,and abilities as well as provide

a forum for the community to test plans,policies,

procedures,and interagency/interjurisdictional

interactions and agreements. Terrorism exercises

are an advanced form of training through which the

homeland security community demonstrates performance of tasks essential to an effective response

and identifies and implements improvements.

This DHS/ODP methodology requires evaluation

of organizational, operational, and technical capabilities at the task, agency/discipline/function,

and mission levels. As part of its training strategy,

DHS/ODP developed Emergency Responder

Guidelines1 that identify the essential tasks that

response agencies must perform to effectively

prevent, respond to, and recover from a threat or

act of terrorism, including those involving the use

of CBRNE weapons. Performance measures for

the essential tasks associated with the response

to threats or acts of terrorism are being developed for use in evaluating performance through

exercises. The essential tasks and the performance measures will continue to be reviewed and

refined as threats and response requirements

change.

ix

INTRODUCTION
x

The methodology described in this document is

an initial step in helping communities assess

their level of preparedness, thereby contributing

to the measurement of national readiness. DHS/

ODP will continue to refine the approach by

developing a suite of terrorism exercise scenarios

designed to help jurisdictions test and evaluate

their performance of essential tasks and overall

response capabilities. Jurisdictions will be

encouraged to establish a cycle of exercise activity that uses this common suite of scenarios to

fully train to and test the continuum of tasks,

conditions, and standards needed to prevent or

respond to the range of probable terrorist threats

as defined by National Intelligence Estimates. As

these scenarios are developed, the evaluation

methodology will be enhanced and discussed in

subsequent editions of this document.

Background and Context

In 1998, ODP was established within the Department of Justice to help State and local governments improve their response to terrorism

incidents. The Homeland Security Act of 2002

transferred ODP to the Department of Homeland

Security and expanded its mission. DHS/ODP is

assigned “the primary responsibility within the

executive branch of government to build and sustain the preparedness of the United States to

reduce vulnerabilities, prevent, respond to and

recover from acts of terrorism.” Although ODP

has been at the forefront of homeland security

preparedness since 1998, the expanded responsibilities broaden its constituency from a State and

local focus to include Federal agencies, tribal governments, the private sector, and international

entities.

Although DHS/ODP’s mission has broadened,

enhancing terrorism prevention, response, and

recovery capabilities at the State and local levels

remains its most important priority. DHS/ODP

provides formula grant funds under the State

Homeland Security Grant Program to the 50

States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S.

Territories (hereafter collectively referenced as

the States). The funds are awarded to a State or

Territory Administrative Agency (SAA/TAA),

designated by the Governor, and the SAA/TAA

makes subawards to State agencies and local governments for implementation of the DHS/ODP

grant program. The funds may be used for planning, to purchase equipment, for training, and to

support exercises. States conduct vulnerability,

risk, and needs assessments, and develop and

implement a Statewide Homeland Security

Strategy. The strategy defines the State’s domestic preparedness goals; equipment, training,

exercise, and technical assistance needs; and

implementation strategy. Following the review

of the strategies, DHS/ODP develops a State

Assistance Plan (SAP) tailored to each State to

help implement the strategy. The SAP defines the

resources available to the State, including formula

grant funds, training slots or course offerings

available from DHS/ODP’s training program,

direct exercise support and technical assistance.

High threat urban areas follow a similar process

in developing a strategy under the Urban Area

Security Initiative. Additional information on

these and other DHS/ODP programs can be

found in Homeland Security Exercise and

Evaluation Program, Volume I: Overview and

Doctrine.

Purpose and Scope of

This Manual

This volume of the HSEEP provides a how-to

guide for conducting performance-based evaluations of terrorism threat-based exercises and

developing Improvement Plans (IPs) to enhance

prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.

All jurisdictions that implement an exercise with

grant funds or direct support available from

DHS/ODP are encouraged to use the evaluation

methodology outlined in this manual or to

enhance their existing methodology based on

this guidance. The document also sets out expectations for DHS/ODP contractors providing direct

support to State and local jurisdictions under the

HSEEP and provides requirements for exercise

support contractors funded with DHS/ODP grant

funds.

Because the users of this document may possess

a wide range of experience with exercise evaluation, this document was designed to provide a

HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT
xi

sound and straightforward process that can be

easily followed and adapted to a wide range of

exercise types, scenarios, and resource constraints. DHS/ODP’s goal is to help jurisdictions

objectively assess their capacity to prevent,

respond to, and recover from a terrorist attack

so that modifications or improvements can be

made before having to react to a real incident.

By focusing on performance and the root causes

for variances from expected outcomes,2 public

officials will be able to target their limited

resources on improvements that will have the

greatest effect on terrorism preparedness.

INTRODUCTION

1

planning and conducting an exercise require a

significant commitment of resources, it is important to maximize the benefits gained from the

exercise through implementation of this U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office

for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), evaluation and

improvement process.

Concerns are often expressed about the potential that a comprehensive and well-documented

evaluation to identify vulnerabilities could be

used by the media to criticize the participating

government agencies or, worse, help potential

terrorists plan an attack. Agencies need the ability to discuss areas for improvement and actions

that they plan to take without concern that the

information carries political or operational risks.

Thus, all DHS/ODP-funded After Action Reports

(AARs) and Improvement Plans (IPs),4 discussed

in more detail later, are designated as “For

Official Use Only.” Some jurisdictions may wish

to share portions of their AAR and IP with the

public. The decision to share the information

will be made collaboratively at the State and

local level by State and local officials.

Evaluation Methodology

This DHS/ODP evaluation methodology is

designed to analyze performance at three levels,

depending on the complexity of the exercise.

For tabletop and other discussion-based exercises, the evaluation focuses on the adequacy

of and familiarity with the jurisdiction’s plans,

policies, procedures, resources, and interagency/

interjurisdictional relationships that support the

performance of critical tasks required to prevent

or respond to a terrorist incident. For operationsbased exercises, actual performance in preventing or responding to a simulated terrorist attack

is expertly observed and assessed. The three levels of performance analysis are as follows:

The goal of exercise evaluation is to validate

strengths and identify improvement opportunities for the participating organization(s). This is

accomplished by observing the exercise and

collecting supporting data; analyzing the data

to compare performance against expected outcomes; and determining what changes need

to be made to the procedures, plans, staffing,

equipment, communications, organizations,

and interagency coordination to ensure expected outcomes. The focus of the evaluation

for discussion-based exercises (e.g., workshops

and tabletop exercises)3 is on plans, policies,

and interagency/interjurisdictional relationships,

whereas the focus for operations-based exercises (e.g., drills and full-scale exercises) is

on assessing performance in preventing or

responding to a simulated terrorist attack.

The participating agencies and jurisdictions

should view the evaluation results not as a

“report card” that grades weakness but rather

as an opportunity to identify ways to build on

strengths and improve capacity. Because jurisdictions are testing new and emerging plans,

skills, resources, and relationships in response to

a changed homeland security environment,

every exercise can be expected to result in multiple findings and recommendations for improvement. It may take several years or more and

multiple exercises before the enhanced capabilities in most jurisdictions are fully developed and

practiced. Through the process outlined in this

manual, exercise evaluators are encouraged to

identify and analyze the cause for all variances

from expected performance. Some of those variances will be positive changes that should be

adopted widely as standard procedure. Others

will require improvements on the part of the participating agencies or jurisdictions. Officials from

participating agencies and jurisdictions should

expect and demand an evaluation that is comprehensive, objective, and straightforward. Because

CHAPTER 1 

Overview of the Evaluation Methodology
♦ Task-level performance—the ability of

individual players or teams to perform a

required task during an exercise

♦ Agency/discipline/function-level

performance—the performance of

agencies (e.g., the police or fire department), disciplines (e.g., local, State,

and Federal law enforcement agencies),

and functions, often as defined by the

Incident and Unified Command Systems

(e.g., HazMat team, Emergency Operations

Center (EOC), or fire services)

♦ Mission-level performance—the ability

of the intergovernmental community as a

whole (i.e., across disciplines and across

jurisdictions) to achieve the expected outcomes in responding to an event

The results from these different levels of evaluation are needed to provide a comprehensive

assessment of jurisdictional preparedness, which

contributes to the national measurement of

homeland security readiness.

Task-Level Performance

At the fundamental level, an exercise evaluation

can be used to look at the ability to perform

individual prevention and response tasks. A drill

may focus on the performance of one or several

tasks, whereas a full-scale exercise will require

the effective performance of many tasks that

contribute to effective prevention or response.

Analysis at this level will answer the question,

Did the individuals or team carry out the task

in the way that you expected and in a way

that achieved the goal of the function? In

other words, did the person or small team do

the right thing the right way at the right time?

The evaluation of the performance of individual

tasks can help determine whether personnel,

training, and equipment are sufficient for the

individuals/teams to do their job. For example,

the evaluation may show whether first responders followed prescribed procedures when

responding to a terrorism incident and whether

equipment has been properly maintained and

operated correctly. Such information is useful

for team leaders and first-line supervisors when

determining training needs, scheduling maintenance, and making routine purchases. For a

drill, the analysis will generally stop with the

identification of training and equipment needs.

For a functional or full-scale exercise, the analysis

will also explore the effect that not completing

a task or not completing it in a timely manner

has on other actions and the integrated overall

response. Performance at the task level is

linked and contributes to performance at the

agency/discipline/function level and to mission

accomplishment.

Agency/Discipline/Function-Level

Performance

The exercise evaluation also assesses performance of specific agencies, disciplines, and functions. The purpose of evaluation at this level is

to answer the question, Did the larger team—

the incident command team—perform the

duties correctly in accordance with approved

plans, policies, procedures, and agreements?

The analysis at this level is useful for assessing

such issues as advanced planning and preparation; how the members work together at the discipline, department, or organizational level; and

how well team members communicate across

organizational and jurisdictional boundaries.

This information is used by department managers and agency executives at the State and

local level in developing annual operating plans

and budgets, communicating with political officials, setting long-range training and planning

goals, and developing interagency and interjurisdictional agreements.

The evaluation team should conduct the evaluation and analysis in a way that synchronizes

them with the organizational structures in use

by the community. For many jurisdictions, the

breakout of functional activities is defined by

the Incident Command System (ICS)/National

Incident Management System (NIMS).5 These

functional groups, and the activities they carry

out, are categorized as follows:

2 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT
CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 3

♦ Public health: Quarantine, medical

advice, epidemiology, public outreach and

education, and enforcement

♦ Government administrators: Public

information, evacuation, requests for

resources, and coordination

♦ Environmental: Environmental health,

assessment (air, water, soil, flora, fauna),

analysis, contamination, cleanup, and

enforcement

♦ Others

• Urban search and rescue

• Victim support (e.g., social services,

Red Cross, volunteer organizations, and

religious organizations)

• Mental health

• Coroner/medical examiner

Mission-Level Performance

At the highest level, the evaluation can be used

to assess whether the intergovernmental community as a whole (i.e., across disciplines and

across jurisdictions) achieved the expected mission outcomes in responding to a simulated

event. The focus is principally on outcome

rather than on the individual processes. For

example, the evaluation would assess whether

casualties were minimized or prevented, not

whether each individual followed a specific procedure. The purpose of evaluation at this level is

to answer the question, How prepared is the

community to prevent or respond to and

recover from a terrorist attack?

Mission-level outcomes are those things that citizens expect from their elected officials and public agencies in addressing a terrorist threat or

attack. Although the specifics may vary from

community to community, the following is a list

of mission outcomes that generally address public expectations:

♦ Prevention/deterrence: The ability to

prevent or deter terrorist actions

♦ Fire services: Initial response, fire suppression, explosive ordnance disposal,

standby unit, decontamination, rescue,

technical rescue, and recovery

♦ Emergency medical service/emergency

medicine: Triage, treatment, transportation, medical communications, air operations, sustainment, and protocols

♦ Health and hospitals: Treatment, hospitals, decontamination, surge capacity, and

hospital security

♦ HazMat: Entry, site access control,

safe refuge area, decontamination, technical specialists, coordination, personal

protection equipment selection, and

reconnaissance

♦ Law enforcement: Initial response, scene

security, force protection, investigation,

law enforcement task force, explosive

ordnance disposal, traffic control, and

evacuation

♦ Public safety communications: Incident identification and linking responders and emergency management

♦ Emergency management:

• Command and operations: Organization

of initial response, reinforced response

organization, multidivision/group organization, information, liaison, damage

assessment, economic impact, operational planning, intergovernmental communications, and assessment

• Planning: Situation, resources, documentation, and demobilization

• Logistics: Communications, medical,

supply, food, facilities, and transportation

• Finance/administration: Time, procurement, compensation/claims, and cost

♦ Public works: Heavy equipment, public

utilities, debris removal, construction,

contract management, drainage, and

water/runoff treatment
4 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

♦ Emergency assessment: The ability to

detect an event,determine its impact,classify the event,conduct environmental monitoring,and make government-to-government

notifications

♦ Emergency management: The ability to

direct, control, and coordinate a response,

provide emergency public information to

the population at risk and the population at

large, and manage resources; this outcome

also includes direction and control through

the ICS and Unified Command System,

EOC, and Joint Information Center (JIC)

♦ Incident/hazard mitigation: The ability

to control, collect, and contain an incident

at its source and to mitigate the magnitude of its impact; this outcome also

includes all response tasks conducted at

the incident scene except those specifically associated with victim care

♦ Public protection: The ability to provide

initial warnings to the population at large

and the population at risk, notify people

to shelter in place or evacuate the population at risk, provide evacuee support (e.g.,

transportation for evacuees, reception centers, and shelters), protect schools and

special populations, and manage traffic

flow and access to the affected area

♦ Victim care: The ability to treat victims

at the scene, transport patients, treat

patients at a medical treatment facility,

track patients, and handle and track

human remains

♦ Investigation/apprehension: The ability to investigate the cause and source of

the attack, prevent secondary attacks, and

identify and apprehend those responsible

♦ Recovery/remediation: The ability to

restore essential services, restore businesses and commerce, clean up the environment and render the affected area safe,

compensate victims, provide long-term

mental health and other services to victims and the public, and restore a sense

of well-being to the community

Overview of the Evaluation

and Improvement Process

The following overview describes the steps in

the DHS/ODP evaluation and improvement

process for operations-based and tabletop exercises. These steps do not apply to seminars and

workshops.

Step 1: Plan and organize the evaluation.

As part of the exercise design and objectives

development process, the exercise planning team

will determine what information should be collected, who will collect it, and how it will be

collected.

Step 2: Observe the exercise and collect

data. Expert (peer) evaluators collect data by

recording their observations during exercise

play and collecting additional data from records,

logs, and so forth. Evaluators of tabletop exercises record the discussion and review documents such as plans, procedures, and interagency

agreements.

Step 3: Analyze data. The analysis phase

should answer the following questions about the

exercise play:

♦ What happened?

♦ What was supposed to happen?

♦ If there is a difference, why?

♦ What is the effect of that difference?

♦ What should be learned from this?

♦ What improvement should be made or

exemplary practices adopted?

The first step in the analysis process is a player

hot wash, i.e., a short discussion session immediately following the exercise to get player

feedback.

The evaluation of tabletop exercises focuses on

assessing the adequacy of and familiarity with

existing plans, policies, procedures, agreements

and relationships, and resources that are needed

for an effective response. The analysis phase of a

tabletop exercise should address the following

questions:

♦ How would response personnel perform

the critical tasks?
CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 5

♦ What decisions would need to be made

and who would make them?

♦ Are personnel trained to perform the

critical tasks?

♦ Are other resources needed? If so, how

will they be obtained?

♦ Do plans, policies, and procedures support

the performance of the critical tasks? Are

response personnel familiar with these

documents?

♦ Do response personnel from multiple

agencies or jurisdictions need to work

together to perform the tasks? If yes, are

the agreements or relationships in place

to support the performance of the tasks?

♦ What should be learned from this?

♦ What improvement actions are

recommended?

Analysis of operations-based exercises is conducted using data collected to reconstruct the

timeline of events as they occurred, an approach

similar to the reconstruction of events that

most agencies do following an accident or

other type of incident. This information is then

used to identify and explore the differences

between what happened and what was supposed to happen to ascertain the root causes

for the differences.

Step 4: Develop the draft After Action

Report. As part of the analysis phase, the evaluation team drafts the AAR, which provides a

description of what happened, exemplary practices, issues that need to be addressed, and recommendations for improvements.

Exhibit 1 summarizes the steps in this process

and the documents that are developed in each

step of the exercise evaluation process.

The primary reason for conducting exercises is

to assess and enhance the jurisdiction’s capacity

to prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorist attack. Steps 1–4 in the Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Process are focused on

collection and assessment. Steps 5–8, described

below, are focused on enhancing capacity to prevent, respond to, or recover from a terrorism

attack.

The evaluators share the assessment information

with jurisdiction officials and, if appropriate,

facilitate the identification of improvements

that can be made. This phase of the Exercise

Evaluation and Improvement Process generally

consists of the following steps, which are

depicted in exhibit 2.

Step 5: Conduct Exercise Debrief meeting.

The exercise planners and/or evaluation team

will present their analysis findings and recommendations in an Exercise Debrief meeting with

Exhibit 1: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Process: Data Collection and Analysis

Step 1

Plan/Organize

the Evaluation

Step 2

Observe the

Exercise and 

Collect Data

Step 3

Analyze Data

Step 4

Develop After

Action Report

• EVALPLAN

• Evaluation guides

• Evaluator 

instructions/

training

Evaluator notes/

logs/records • Timelines

• Narratives

• Lessons learned

• Recommendations

Draft After

Action Report
6 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

officials from the agencies and jurisdictions that

participated in the exercise. They will also

solicit feedback and validation from the officials

on their observations and recommendations.

Step 6: Identify improvements to be implemented. Much of the Exercise Debrief meeting

will be devoted to discussing the specific actions

that the exercise jurisdictions will take to address

the opportunities for improvement contained in

the recommendations in the draft AAR. This list

of actions, which identifies what will be done,

who (person or agency) is responsible, and the

timeframe for implementation, is known as the

Improvement Plan (IP). Although the IP is a

written document, it should be viewed not as a

static document but as a dynamic program that

is updated and modified regularly in a constant

cycle of improvement.

Step 7: Finalize the After Action Report.

Following the Exercise Debrief meeting, the

evaluation team should finalize the AAR by incorporating any corrections or clarifications related

to the observations or recommendations as well

as the improvement steps that will be taken.

Some of the actions may include only the preliminary step of a multistep activity (e.g., create a

task force to review the issue and make recommendations for further action).

Step 8: Track implementation. Each jurisdiction should establish a process to track the

implementation of the improvement steps to

ensure that desired improvements are made.

Evaluating the Cycle of Exercises

The Exercise Evaluation and Improvement

Process outlined above provides guidance on

the evaluation and improvement process for a

single exercise. It requires that each exercise be

evaluated and that the jurisdictions and participating agencies implement an IP to address the

findings.

HSEEP encourages each State and local jurisdiction to implement a cycle of exercises that

cover a range of threats and test the capacity

to perform the critical tasks needed to prevent,

respond to, or recover from a terrorist attack.

As a jurisdiction goes through the cycle, each

exercise should build on the results of previous

exercises, expand the range and mix of exercise

activities, and increase in complexity and level

of interaction. This does not suggest that each

cycle will result in a straight line from seminars

to full-scale exercise. When making significant

changes in plans or procedures, there may be

times that a seminar or workshop would be the

most appropriate type of exercise to familiarize

participants with changes.

Exhibit 2: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Process: Identification and Tracking of Improvement Actions

Step 5

Conduct Debrief

Meeting

Step 6

Identify 

Improvements 

To Be Taken

Step 7

Finalize After 

Action Report

Step 8

Track 

Implementation

Improvement 

Plan

Final After 

Action Report
The results of previous exercises and steps taken

to enhance performance should always be

reviewed and considered during the planning

and design phase for subsequent exercises in the

exercise cycle. Needed improvements should be

made before conducting another exercise that

tests the performance of the same or related

tasks. The effectiveness of improvements made

following one exercise should be tested and

evaluated in subsequent exercises.

When completing an exercise cycle, which may

take several years, the jurisdiction should review

the results of all exercises conducted, improvements that have been made, and the range of

threats and critical tasks that were addressed

through the exercises. This information, along

with information on new threats or improved

prevention and response approaches or technologies, should be used to define the next

exercise cycle.

CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 7

9

CHAPTER 2

Evaluating Discussion-Based Exercises

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation

Program (HSEEP) employs a cycle, mix, and

range of exercise activities of varying degrees

of complexity and interaction. Generally, jurisdictions will start their exercise cycle with

discussion-based exercises such as seminars,

workshops, and tabletop exercises. These types

of exercise are less expensive and time-consuming

to implement and are an effective means of ensuring that plans, policies, procedures, resources, and

agreements are in place and that response agencies and personnel are familiar with them.

This chapter provides guidance on evaluating

discussion-based exercises, including seminars,

workshops, tabletop exercises, and games.

♦ Seminars are instructional sessions employed to orient participants in, or provide an overview of, authorities, strategies,

plans, policies, procedures, protocols,

response resources, or concepts and ideas.

Seminars provide a good starting point for

jurisdictions that are developing or making major changes to their plans and procedures. The seminar leader may provide

informal discussion, but communication is

mostly one way.

♦ Workshops are meetings in which a

facilitator guides a group to a conclusion

about a specific problem in the form of a

recommendation or written product.

They are used to develop plans, work on

particular issues, or design an exercise. In

some cases, a workshop may result in further issues to be examined in a tabletop

or other type of exercise.

♦ Tabletop exercises are designed to

assess the adequacy of plans, policies,

procedures, training, resources, and relationships or agreements that guide the

prevention or response to a terrorist

attack. They should serve as the final

“punch list” to check that the jurisdiction

is ready to test its ability to perform the

critical tasks during a full-scale exercise or

during a real incident. This assessment is

done by a group of officials from the various homeland security agencies in a jurisdiction talking through how they would

respond to a simulated attack. In a typical

tabletop exercise, players are presented

with a scenario that provides information

that would be available prior to, during,

and following an attack. Players discuss

the plans, policies, procedures, resources,

and agreements that are in place to respond to the scenario and the problems

presented by the leader/moderator. Problems are discussed as a group, and the resolution is generally agreed on and summarized by the leader. In more advanced

tabletops, players are given prescripted

messages that alter the original scenario.

♦ Games are simulations of operations that

often involve two or more teams, usually

in a competitive environment, using rules,

data, and procedures designed to depict

an actual or assumed real-life situation.

The sequence of events affects, and is in

turn affected by, the decisions made by

the players. Each episode is moved to the

next level of detail or complexity, taking

into account the players’ earlier decisions.

The decisions made by game participants

determine the flow of the game. The goal

is to explore decisionmaking processes

and the consequences of decisions.

Games stress the importance of the planners’ and players’ understanding and comprehension of interrelated processes.

For seminars and workshops, the evaluation

process is simple and generally involves gathering participant feedback from a participant
10 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

survey or critique. There is no After Action

Report (AAR) unless the effort is integrated into

a larger exercise. Workshops may also result in

documents that summarize recommendations

regarding the particular topic being discussed.

Games evaluate decisionmaking processes and

are not widely used in the homeland security

community at this time. The evaluation process

described for tabletop exercises can be adapted

for games. As games become more developed

and more commonly used, the U.S. Department

of Homeland Security (DHS), Office for Domestic

Preparedness (ODP), will include additional guidance on evaluating games in future editions of

this document.

The remainder of this chapter will focus on planning and conducting an evaluation of a tabletop

exercise. Tabletop exercises assess a jurisdiction’s capacity to perform critical tasks required

to prevent, respond to, or recover from a terrorist

attack as defined by the exercise scenario. This is

done as the participants discuss what plans, policies, procedures, trained personnel, equipment

and other resources, and interagency and interjurisdictional agreements and relationships are in

place or need to be put in place to support the

performance of the critical tasks required for an

effective response.

The evaluation process documents the strengths

and improvement opportunities identified by

the participants during the exercise. Following

the exercise, the evaluators compare what the

participants said they would do to prevent or

respond to and recover from the attack with

existing plans, policies, procedures, and agreements to identify inconsistencies or gaps that

should be addressed through training or other

means of familiarizing personnel with established requirements. The evaluators also analyze

how well these documents support the performance of essential tasks required to prevent or

respond to and recover from a terrorist attack.

This information is summarized in an AAR along

with any recommendations for improvement.

Exhibit 3 outlines the type of information that is

collected and documented as part of each of

these types of discussion exercises.

The sections below explain the evaluation

process for a tabletop exercise, following the

general process outlined in chapter 1.

Exhibit 3. Evaluating Discussion-Based Exercises: Summary of Data Collection and Documentation

Event Data Collection Type of Report

Seminar • Written participant critiques Critique summary retained by 

seminar sponsor

Workshop • Workgroup issue papers or recommendations Memo summary or report of

• Written participant critiques workshop retained by workshop 

sponsor

Tabletop exercise • Facilitator notes After Action Report

• Participant discussion and issues recorded during Improvement Plan

exercise

• Plans, policies, procedures, resources, and 

agreements

• Participant hot wash

• Written participant critiques

Games • Facilitator notes After Action Report

• Participant decisions and issues recorded during Improvement Plan

exercise

• Plans, policies, procedures, and agreements

• Participant hot wash

• Written participant critiques
CHAPTER 2: EVALUATING DISCUSSION-BASED EXERCISES 11

The evaluation planning team will use this information, as follows:

1. The evaluation planning team will first

use the exercise goals and objectives to

determine which tasks and associated

plans, policies, procedures, resources, and

agreements should be evaluated.

2. That information will be used to define

the discussion questions that should be

asked to focus the discussion on how well

these documents, resources, and relationships support the performance of essential tasks.

3. The above information is reviewed to

ensure that all required functions (e.g.,

individuals, teams, disciplines, organizations) will be involved in the exercise and

discussion.

4. The functional groups and the number

of participants in each group are used to

determine the number and background

of evaluators that will be required.

5. Once these steps have been completed,

the evaluation planning team identifies or

develops the appropriate evaluation tools

for the evaluators to use.

Prepare the Evaluation Plan

Although the process for evaluating a tabletop

exercise is less complex than that for a full-scale

exercise, it is no less important. An evaluation

plan or process should include the following

items:

♦ Exercise-specific information: This is

the scenario or a summary of the scenario, the functional groups for the exercise, and the exercise schedule (including

the evaluation schedule).

♦ Plans, policies, procedures, and

agreements: These are copies of or references to the jurisdiction’s applicable

plans, policies, procedures, and agreements that would be followed during a

response.

Planning and Organizing the

Evaluation

Planning the evaluation is a critical element of

the Exercise Design process, which is discussed

in volume III of the HSEEP. During this process,

exercise designers and the lead evaluator take

the following steps to plan the evaluation:

♦ Define evaluation requirements:

Determine what will be evaluated and

how information will be collected.

♦ Prepare a plan for evaluating the

exercise: Prepare the complete package

of information on the evaluation process.

♦ Develop evaluation tools: Develop the

forms evaluators will use to capture information during exercise observation and

data analysis.

♦ Recruit, assign, and train facilitators

and evaluators: Determine the necessary qualifications of a facilitator or evaluator, identify appropriate individuals, obtain

commitments from those individuals, and

train them.

♦ Finalize the plan for evaluation:

Undertake the activities necessary to

organize the evaluation immediately

before the exercise.

Define Evaluation Requirements

The planning team for a tabletop exercise develops

a situation manual (SITMAN) that describes the

exercise and provides the following information:

♦ Exercise goals and objectives

♦ Exercise participants

♦ Functional groups that will discuss

response issues during the exercise

♦ Scenario that will be used, usually presented in several modules

♦ Questions to guide discussion following

the presentation of each module
12 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

♦ Facilitator and evaluator assignments:

Identify how many facilitators and evaluators are needed, the background required,

and the functional group that each will

observe.

♦ Facilitator and evaluator instructions:

Instructions on what facilitators and evaluators should do before they arrive (e.g.,

review exercise materials, jurisdictional

plans and procedures, and the evaluation

plan/process) as well as their role throughout the exercise.

♦ Evaluation tools: Include the data collection instruments and guides as discussed below.

Develop Evaluation Tools

Once the evaluation planning team has determined what will be evaluated, specific evaluation

tools are developed for use in data collection

and analysis. DHS/ODP has developed Evaluation Guides to assist with the evaluation of the

tabletop exercises. These guides incorporate the

critical tasks identified in ODP’s Responder

Guidelines and build on the experience from

hundreds of terrorism exercises conducted

under DHS/ODP’s Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program, the Top

Officials (TOPOFF) National Homeland Security

Exercise Series, and the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) and U.S.Army’s

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness

Program (CSEPP). In addition, the guides benefited from focus groups of subject-matter experts

who came together to identify tasks essential to

effectively prevent, respond to, and recover from

a terrorist attack and measures of performance

for these tasks.

The Evaluation Guides for tabletop exercises

provide guidance on the data that should be

recorded and questions that should be asked

during the analysis phase. They focus on the

plans, policies, procedures, and relationships

needed to support the performance of the

essential tasks required to achieve the mission

outcomes.

Jurisdictions that conduct exercises with grant

funds or contract support from DHS/ODP are

encouraged to use the Evaluation Guides found

in appendix B or, at a minimum, incorporate relevant elements or criteria from the guides into

performance evaluation tools currently used by

the State or jurisdiction. The current guides

address essential tasks required to respond to

any type of terrorist incident and specific tasks

required to respond to chemical weapons.

Additional guides are being developed to

address tasks related to prevention and recovery

as well as responses to attacks involving other

types of weapons. DHS/ODP will continue to

enhance, expand, and validate the Evaluation

Guides.

Recruit, Assign, and

Train Evaluators

Selection, recruitment, and assignment of evaluators are crucial components of exercise design.

A Lead Evaluator should be identified early in

the planning process and should fully participate

as a member of the exercise planning team. The

Lead Evaluator should be a senior-level person

who is familiar with response functions; the

plans, policies, and procedures of the jurisdiction; command and decisionmaking processes;

and interagency coordination.

A number of evaluators will also be needed to

observe and record participant discussion during the exercise. Evaluators should be chosen

for their knowledge and understanding of the

specific functional area they will be assigned to

observe.

In addition to a facilitator to manage the exercise process, a facilitator and at least one evaluator will be needed for each functional group.

The exercise facilitator sets the expectations for

the exercise, introduces or presents the scenario

and the various modules, manages the time and

group report outs, and facilitates the discussion

of any coordination issues between groups. The

group facilitator keeps the group focused on the

issues and discussion questions and ensures that

all members have an opportunity to participate

in the discussion. The role of the evaluator is to
CHAPTER 2: EVALUATING DISCUSSION-BASED EXERCISES 13

observe and record the discussion during the

exercise, participate in the data analysis, and

assist with drafting the AAR.

Facilitators and evaluators are generally drawn

from nonplaying members of participating

organizations, contractors, or peer organizations.

Facilitators should have meeting facilitation or

training skills so that they can guide the discussion without injecting themselves into it (see

sidebar, “Tips for Facilitators”).

The facilitators and evaluators should have

copies of and be familiar with the jurisdiction’s

plans, policies, procedures, and agreements.

They should also have a reasonable level of

subject-matter knowledge.

Evaluators need to be trained and thoroughly

prepared to effectively perform their assigned

duties. The training should address all aspects of

the exercise to include exercise goals and objectives, the scenario, participants, and evaluator

roles and responsibilities. The training should

also include guidance on observing the exercise

discussion, what to look for, what to record, how

to use the Evaluation Guides or other evaluation

tools, and how to analyze the data.

During the training, evaluators should be provided with copies of the following materials for

review prior to the exercise:

♦ Exercise documents, such as the Situation

Manual (SITMAN).

♦ Appropriate jurisdictional plans, policies,

procedures, and agreements.

♦ Evaluation materials, Evaluation Guides

and/or other evaluation tools, exercise

agenda and schedule, and evaluator

assignment.

Finalize Evaluation Plans

Just before an exercise actually takes place, the

Lead Evaluator will meet with the facilitators and

evaluators to verify roles, responsibilities, and

assignments and to provide any updates to the

scenario or evaluation tools. The briefing should

include a review of exercise activities and the

scenario. This briefing is the time for evaluators

to ask questions and ensure that they completely

understand their roles and responsibilities.

Evaluator questions should be addressed and

information clarified so evaluators feel confident

they can effectively perform their assignments.

Observe the Exercise and

Collect Data

In a tabletop exercise, data collection occurs

when the evaluator records the discussion as it

progresses. The evaluator should record the

Tips for Facilitators

✦ Keep discussion focused on how critical tasks

would be performed.

✦ Always remain neutral, objective, and fair.

✦ Record all ideas and facts.

✦ Face the group.

✦ Involve the participants whenever you can.

✦ Don’t be afraid to cut off people who are

rambling on.

✦ Honor break times, lunchtimes, and quitting

time.

✦ Call people by name.

✦ Use the space you’re in.

✦ Allow group members to speak to each other,

not to you.

✦ Know when to be quiet; don’t answer too

many questions.

✦ Don’t allow the group to transfer ownership

of the process, problem, or recommendation

to you.

✦ Read the group and respond.

✦ Never say, “I told you so.”

✦ Know your art, be confident, and be flexible.

✦ Preserve the integrity of the group and every

individual.

✦ Learn to laugh at yourself.

Source: http://www.c3i.osd.mil/bpr/bprcd/4122.htm
14 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

issues that are identified, the discussion on each

issue, how decisions are made, roles and responsibilities, coordination and cooperation issues,

and recommendations from the group. The evaluator also needs to capture unresolved issues.

The role of the evaluator should not be confused

with that of the group recorder. The discussion

group will generally assign one of its members

to serve as a recorder who will present the discussion group’s report to the full group of participants. The recorder may use a whiteboard or

flip charts to write down the group’s issues or

presentation points. The evaluator should not

serve as the group recorder but instead should

gather the recorder’s notes or flip chart sheets

to supplement his/her notes, as appropriate.

The evaluators should record the following

types of information from the participant

discussion:

♦ What plans, policies, and procedures

would the participants follow to prevent

or respond to and recover from a terrorist attack, as described in the exercise

scenario?

♦ Are roles and responsibilities of the various government agencies and private

organizations clear?

♦ How are various decisions made? Who

has authority to make the decision?

♦ What information about the scenario, the

weapon, the victims, and the risks to responders and the public is collected?

Who collects it, and what do they do

with it?

♦ How is information shared with other

agencies and with the public? What information is shared?

♦ What is the role of State and Federal agencies? How are State and Federal resources

requested? Who makes the request?

How are the resources distributed and

controlled?

♦ What mutual aid agreements exist? How

would they be activated?

♦ What recommendations for improvements

were made by the group?

♦ What issues were unresolved or require

followup?

♦ What actions do participants plan to take

to address outstanding issues?

Time is allotted during the exercise for participants to address, as a whole, any key issues,

cross-disciplinary issues, or conflicting recommendations that were identified during group

discussion. Although assigned to record discussion within an assigned group, all of the evaluators should capture information on cross-cutting

issues.

A hot wash or critique with the exercise planning team, facilitators, and evaluators is held

immediately following the exercise. The purpose of the hot wash is to collect observations

and thoughts about what happened during the

exercise and how well participants think it

went. The hot wash also provides the evaluators

with the opportunity to clarify points or collect

any missing information.

Another source of information that should be

collected is feedback from participants. Sample

participant evaluation forms are provided in

appendix A.

Analyze Data

Following the exercise (usually the next day),

the evaluators will analyze the data. The analysis

consists of the following steps:

♦ Review evaluator notes on the discussion,

decisions, and recommendations from the

exercise; results of the hot wash; and participants’ feedback forms; and identify any

inconsistencies captured from different

discussion groups.

♦ Compare what the participants said they

would do to respond to the incident with

existing plans, policies, procedures, resources, and agreements, and identify

whether there were differences and why.

♦ Review the Evaluation Guides to determine if the performance of essential tasks

is supported by existing plans, policies,

procedures, resources, and agreements.
CHAPTER 2: EVALUATING DISCUSSION-BASED EXERCISES 15

♦ Identify what should be learned and provide recommendations for improvement.

The analysis focuses on the following types of

issues:

♦ Clarity of current plans, policies, and/or

procedures

♦ Consistency of plans, policies, and/or procedures across agencies or jurisdictions

♦ Determining who has the authority to

take a specific action (e.g., order an evacuation) or the procedure required to act 

♦ Adequacy of coordination or cooperation

between agencies 

♦ Sharing of information among agencies 

♦ Ensuring that plans have been updated or

new policies or procedures have been

developed to address new issues arising

from terrorism

As the evaluation team identifies issues and their

causes, it develops recommendations for improvement. The recommendations should

clearly state what the jurisdiction or participating agency should do to enhance plans, policies,

procedures, resources, or relationships/agreements to support the performance of essential

tasks. The recommendations should state what

should be done and who should do it. The recommendations should have enough detail to

make them useful. The analysis team should use

the following questions as a guide for developing recommendations for improvement:

♦ What changes need to be made to plans,

policies, procedures, and relationships/

agreements to support the performance

of essential tasks?

♦ What changes need to be made to organizational structures to support the performance of essential tasks?

♦ What changes need to be made to leadership and management processes to support the performance of essential tasks?

♦ What training is needed to support the

performance of essential tasks?

♦ What changes to resources or additional

resources are needed to support the performance of essential tasks?

♦ What practices should be shared with

other communities?

Throughout this process, the analysis team

should also document any lessons learned that

should be shared with other jurisdictions. For

additional guidance on developing recommendations and lessons learned, see the discussion on

developing recommendations for operationsbased exercises in chapter 3.

Draft the After Action Report

Following the analysis, the facilitator and/or

recorders will take the issues, discussions, and

recommendations identified during the exercise

and synthesize them into the draft AAR. The AAR

is the tool used to provide feedback on the

results of the exercise to officials from the participating agencies and jurisdictions. The AAR summarizes the discussion related to the plans, policies, procedures, training, resources, agreements,

and relationships that have been put into place

to support the performance of tasks critical to

the prevention of or response to the terrorist act

defined by the exercise scenario. The report also

captures issues that could not be resolved during

discussion and therefore require followup as well

as alternative or innovative approaches that

could be implemented. Recommendations for

improvements identified by the participants during the exercise or by the evaluators during the

analysis process are presented in the AAR. The

report and the recommendations provide a tool

for jurisdictional and agency officials to establish

priorities to implement improvements that

would be needed to enhance performance during a full-scale exercise or when responding to

a real incident. The improvement steps that will

be implemented should be identified during the

review of the draft AAR and should be incorporated into the final AAR. See chapter 4 for additional information on the review of the AAR

and development and implementation of the

Improvement Plan (IP).
16 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

Suggested After Action

Report Format 

Executive Summary

The executive summary is a 1- to 2-page summary of the exercise highlighting the scope, participants, key successes, and most significant

areas for improvement.

Exercise Overview

This section provides background information

on the exercise and participating jurisdictions/

agencies, such as the dates and location of the

exercise, the type of exercise, the sponsoring

agencies, the participating agencies, an overview

of the scenario, and a description of the evaluation process.

Exercise Goals and Objectives

The goals and objectives for the exercise are

listed.

Analysis of Mission Outcomes

This section provides an analysis of the jurisdiction’s capacity to perform the mission outcomes

related to the exercise scenario. It provides an

assessment of how well the jurisdiction(s)

would be able to achieve the mission outcomes

(e.g., public protection or victim care), based on

its capacity to perform the critical tasks related

to the mission outcome.

Analysis of Capacity to Perform

CriticalTasks

This section provides an analysis of each task

identified as critical to the response to the attack

defined by the exercise scenario, with a focus on

how prepared the jurisdiction is to perform the

task in a full-scale exercise or actual event. It

should be organized by task as described below.

If the jurisdiction is prepared to perform a task

and there are no issues, complete the analysis

section with a brief description of what is in

place and put “None” in the recommendations

section.

♦ Task Number and Description: The

number and title of the task from the

exercise evaluation guides (EEG).

♦ Issue Number and Description:

Number consecutively under the task and

provide a statement that describes the

issue. If multiple issues relate to a task, list

issue number 1 followed by the relevant

analysis and recommendations, then present issue number 2.

♦ References: Cite the source of the issue

in the EEG, plans, procedures, mutual aid

agreement, and so on.

♦ Summary: Provide a brief description of

the issue.

♦ Consequence: Describe the anticipated

effect of the issue on the ability of the

community to respond as expected, with

reference (as appropriate) to the effect on

the mission outcomes, other functions or

disciplines, or the performance of other

tasks.

♦ Analysis: Briefly describe whether the

jurisdiction has the plans, policies, procedures, trained personnel, equipment,

mutual aid agreements, and so on needed

to perform the required task.

♦ Recommendations: Provide a statement

that describes what can be done to resolve the issue (e.g., changes in plans or

procedures, organizational structures, leadership and management processes, training, equipment or resources, and interagency or interjurisdictional agreements).

♦ Improvement Actions: Describe what

specific actions the jurisdiction will take

to address the recommendation, who is

responsible for addressing the recommendation, and when the action will be completed. This section is completed by the

exercising jurisdiction(s) following a

review of the draft AAR. See chapter 4 for

further explanation.
Conclusion

This section should provide a brief summary of

the major conclusions from the exercise.

Appendix A: Improvement Plan Matrix

The Improvement Plan Matrix lists, for each task,

the recommendations, the improvement actions

that will be taken, the responsible party or

agency, and the expected completion date.

CHAPTER 2: EVALUATING DISCUSSION-BASED EXERCISES 17

19

CHAPTER 3

Evaluating Operations-Based Exercises

This chapter provides guidance on evaluating

operations-based exercises, which include drills,

functional exercises, and full-scale exercises. As

discussed in chapter 2, the evaluation process

for each type of exercise will follow the same

general steps:

♦ Plan and organize the evaluation before

the exercise to determine what will be

observed and where.

♦ Observe the exercise and collect data.

♦ Analyze the collected data to assess performance at the task, agency/discipline/

function, and mission outcome levels.

♦ Identify opportunities for improvement.

♦ Draft the After Action Report (AAR).

Each of these steps is discussed below, whereas

the steps related to improving preparedness are

discussed in chapter 4.

Plan and Organize the Evaluation

Planning for the evaluation is a critical element

of the Exercise Design process, discussed in

volume III of the Homeland Security Exercise

and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). During this

process, exercise designers implement the following steps to plan for the evaluation:

♦ Define evaluation requirements:

Determine what will be evaluated and

where the observations will occur.

♦ Prepare the EVALPLAN: Prepare the

complete package of information on the

evaluation process.

♦ Develop evaluation tools: Develop the

forms evaluators will use to capture information for evaluation during the exercise

observation.

♦ Recruit, assign, and train evaluators:

Determine the necessary qualifications of

evaluators, identify appropriate individuals, obtain commitments from those individuals, and train them.

♦ Finalize the evaluation plan: Undertake the activities necessary to organize

the evaluation just before the exercise.

Define Evaluation Requirements

While the exercise is being designed, the evaluation planning team will be provided, via the

Exercise Plan (EXPLAN), the Master Scenario

Event List (MSEL), and other exercise documents,

with information on:

♦ Exercise goals and objectives

♦ Exercise flow

♦ Critical actions

♦ Exercise participants

♦ Functions and activities to be evaluated

The evaluation planning team will use this information to plan the evaluation, as follows:

1. The evaluation planning team will first use

the exercise goals and objectives to determine what performance outcomes should

be evaluated.

2. Once the outcomes to be evaluated are

determined, the team identifies what activities should be evaluated.

3. Based on these activities, the team identifies which functions (e.g., individuals,

teams, disciplines, organizations) should

be evaluated.

4. From the functions, the evaluation planning

team can identify where the observations
20 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

should take place (i.e., what locations) and

which specific tasks should be evaluated.

5. Once these steps have been completed,

the evaluation planning team can identify

or develop the appropriate evaluation

tools for the evaluators to use.

Prepare the EVALPLAN

The evaluation planning results in the Evaluation

Plan (EVALPLAN), which consists of the following:

♦ Exercise-specific information: The

EVALPLAN should include the scenario,

the map of the play site (including evaluation locations), and the exercise schedule

(including the evaluation schedule).

♦ Evaluator team organization, assignments, and location: The EVALPLAN

should identify how many evaluators are

needed, where they will be located, and

how they are organized. Evaluators cannot see everything that occurs at any one

location during a response. Yet, during the

exercise, evaluators must be able to capture information that provides insight into

how effective each group is as well as

how well they operate with each other.

Thus, the location and number of evaluators are crucial to the data collection

process.

♦ Evaluator instructions: Evaluators

should be given instructions on what to

do before they arrive (e.g., review exercise materials, jurisdictional plans and procedures, and the EVALPLAN) as well as

how to proceed upon arrival.

♦ Evaluation tools: The EVALPLAN should

include the data collection instruments

and guides, as discussed below.

Develop Evaluation Tools

Once the evaluation planning team has determined what will be evaluated and where the

observations will occur, specific evaluation tools

are developed for use in the data collection and

analysis.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP),

has developed Evaluation Guides to assist with

the evaluation of performance demonstrated

during operations-based exercises. These guides

incorporate the critical tasks identified in ODP’s

Responder Guidelines and build on the experience from hundreds of terrorism exercises conducted under DHS/ODP’s Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program; the Top

Officials (TOPOFF) National Homeland Security

Exercise Series; the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) and U.S.Army’s Chemical

Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

(CSEPP); and focus groups of subject-matter

experts who came together to identify tasks

essential to effectively prevent, respond to, and

recover from a terrorism attack and measures

of performance for these tasks. The Evaluation

Guides have been developed for use by experienced exercise evaluators as well as by practitioners who are subject-matter experts but have

little or no exercise evaluation experience. The

guides consist of four sections that provide evaluators with information on what they should

expect to see, space to record observations, and

questions to address after the exercise as the first

step in the analysis process.

The Evaluation Guides are organized so that they

can be used by individual evaluators assigned

to observe individual tasks or groups of tasks.

During the analysis phase, evaluators combine

their observations with those of the other evaluators. They reconstruct the events and analyze

outcomes and interactions across agencies, disciplines, and jurisdictions in achieving broad mission outcomes. The responsible team (agency or

discipline), function, jurisdiction, and mission

outcome are indicated on the guide to facilitate

this analysis.

Jurisdictions that conduct exercises with grant

funds or contract support from DHS/ODP are

encouraged to use the Evaluation Guides, which

are found in appendix C, or, at a minimum, incorporate relevant elements/criteria from the

guides into performance evaluation tools currently used by the state or jurisdiction. The

current guides cover universal tasks that are

required to respond to any type of terrorist
CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES 21

will be demonstrated by exercise players, and

indicates whether simulations will be used for

nonparticipating organizations. It also identifies

exercise locations such as emergency operations

centers, medical facilities, decontamination sites,

and field locations.

The Lead Evaluator plays a critical role in

operations-based exercises and should be identified early in the process to fully participate as a

member of the exercise planning team. The

Lead Evaluator should be a senior-level person

who understands command and decisionmaking

processes and interagency coordination as well

as specific response functions. Exercises with

play in multiple sites will need an Evaluation

Team Leader for each site.

A number of evaluators will also be needed to

observe and record player performance during

the exercise. Evaluators should be chosen for

their knowledge and understanding of the specific functional area they will be assigned to

observe. Evaluators should be assigned to monitor all participating organizations and player

locations. The following guidelines will help participants determine the number of evaluators

that are needed:

incident and specific tasks related to response to

a chemical weapon attack (see exhibit 4). Additional guides are being developed to address tasks

related to prevention and recovery as well as response to attacks using other types of weapons.

DHS/ODP will continue to enhance, expand, and

validate the Evaluation Guides.

Recruit, Assign, and

Train Evaluators

The selection, recruitment, and assignment of

evaluators are crucial components of exercise

design. The individual primarily responsible for

these tasks is the Lead Evaluator. The Lead

Evaluator may be assisted in this task by the

other members of the evaluation planning team

or the exercise design team.

Determining How Many Evaluators

Are Needed

The Exercise Plan, which is developed by the

exercise planning team, serves as the basis for

determining the number and expertise of evaluators needed for the exercise. This document will

define the scope and concept of play for the

exercise. It describes the response tasks that

Exhibit 4. Evaluation Guide Content

Section 1: General Information Identifies the mission outcome being addressed, the members of the response 

team, the observation location, jurisdiction, and evaluator contact information.

Section 2: What To Look For Describes what the evaluator should expect to observe, including the inputs 

that trigger an action or decision, conditions that might affect the action or 

decision, expected outcomes, steps that the players will generally take, and 

the consequences of the effective completion of the task. These elements may 

be modified in accordance with jurisdictional plans and procedures.

Section 3: Observation Record Provides a log to record observations that include the time, the action or 

decision, who took the action, what triggered it, and the result.

Section 4: Data Analysis Questions Provides performance criteria and a series of questions to help the evaluator 

and Measures assess whether or not the expected activities occurred, how well they were 

performed, and why activities did or did not occur as expected. The evaluator 

should review the criteria and address the questions immediately following 

the exercise or during a lull in activity. The questions are also used throughout the analysis process to assess task performance, decisionmaking, and 

interactions.
22 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

♦ Field response. A minimum of one evaluator for each function evaluated (e.g.,

incident command, decontamination, and

emergency medical services); additional

evaluators are needed for functions that

involve multiple activities that take place

simultaneously or activities that take place

in multiple locations.

♦ Hospital. A minimum of three to five

evaluators at each participating medical

facility, depending on hospital size and

expected patient flow; additional evaluators are needed for functions that involve

multiple activities taking place simultaneously or activities taking place in multiple

locations.

♦ Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

A minimum of three to five evaluators at

each participating facility, depending on

the size and organizational structure of

the EOC.

Exhibit 5 shows the various functions that may

be included in an exercise and the minimum

number of evaluators needed to observe each

function. A drill may focus on only one or two

of the listed functions, whereas a full-scale exercise could include most or all of the listed functions. Additional evaluators would be needed

for a large exercise with many players performing a function in a single location or for each

location when the function is performed at

multiple sites.

Identifying and Recruiting Evaluators

Where do you find 30 or more evaluators who

are familiar with the functions, processes, and

organizations being exercised? Generally, exercise evaluators will be peer reviewers identified

by reaching out to participating agencies and

departments or to other jurisdictions or agencies

that perform similar functions. States or regions

within States may consider establishing peerreview teams of practitioners who are trained

and available to serve as evaluators for exercises

conducted within the region or State. This peerreview approach may also be supplemented

by independent evaluators who can assist in

monitoring compliance. Potential evaluators can

be identified from multiple sources, including the

following:

♦ Members of the Exercise Design Team,

who are fully versed in the scenario, the

players, and expected action, are a good

source for evaluators (if they are not

already committed to other duties during

the exercises).

Exhibit 5. Guide for Determining Evaluators 

Needed

Incident Site—Function # of Evaluators

Incident/unified command* 2 to 3

Fire operations* 1

Decontamination* 1

HazMat operations* 1

HazMat entry team(s)* 1

Emergency medical services 

operations* 1

Triage* 1

Treatment* 1

Transport * 1

Law enforcement operations* 1

Bomb squad/explosives

ordnance disposal 1

Special ops/SWAT 1

Communications 1

Public health 1

Public information/Joint 

Information Center (JIC) 1 to 2

Mass care/evacuee reception 

center 1 

Hospital—Function

Incident command/Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC)* 1 to 3

Triage/treatment* 2 to 3

Decontamination* 1 to 2

Security 1

Public information 1

Communications 1

EOC—Function

Command/policy* 1

Plans/logistics/finance* 1 to 3

Operations* 1 to 2

Public information/JIC 1

Communications 1

Volunteer agencies 1

Security 1

*Indicates a critical function.
CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES 23

♦ Experienced members of the participating

agencies who are not involved in the play

are a good choice for evaluators because

they are familiar with the organizations,

plans, and procedures.

♦ Professionals in similar agencies in adjacent or nearby jurisdictions can be a

source for evaluators, especially when all

of the participating jurisdiction’s members

of a specialized function, such as a HazMat

team, are involved in the exercise.

♦ The State or jurisdictions within a region

may establish a pool of evaluators who

would be available to evaluate exercises

within the State or region.

♦ Evaluators may also be obtained from contractors or other support organizations.

Although serving as an evaluator requires a considerable commitment of time, evaluators and

their agencies can expect to gain significant benefit from the peer evaluation process. For example, observing other locations exercising their

emergency response plans may help evaluators

gain insight into best practices or other ways to

provide emergency response, which could benefit their own communities.

Evaluators are generally expected to be available

for the preexercise training and briefing/site

visit, the exercise itself, the postexercise hot

wash, and the data analysis and contribution to

the AAR. This time commitment is usually equivalent to 1 day before the exercise, the exercise

day(s), and 1 day after the exercise. One or

more of the evaluators may devote additional

time to drafting the AAR and briefing jurisdiction

officials on findings and recommendations. If

contractor support was available for the exercise, the contractors generally assume responsibility for drafting the AAR and briefing local

officials.

Training Evaluators

Evaluators need to be trained and thoroughly

prepared to effectively perform their assigned

duties. The training should address all aspects of

the exercise and include such topics as the exercise goals and objectives, the scenario, safety

procedures, participants, realism, simulation, free

play, contingency messages, prompting, and

player interface. Considerable time should be

devoted to guidance on the evaluator’s roles and

responsibilities as well as the evaluation process,

including observing the exercise play, noting

what to look for and what to record, using the

Evaluation Guides or other evaluation tools, and

analyzing the data.

The training should include a discussion of various situations that could occur during an exercise and how the evaluators should handle

deviations from the EVALPLAN. For example,

suppose the local Incident Commander makes

an unexpected protective action recommendation to evacuate a school that is well outside the

hazard area of the weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) device. The jurisdiction agrees with the

recommendation and begins the evacuation

process. Because the evaluation team did not

anticipate this action, it has no predetermined

guide for collecting information for the tasks

associated with the school evacuation process.

The team must now determine how they are

going to observe this situation and what data

to collect. Team members need to know how

they will get instruction on implementing midexercise changes to the evaluation plan.

During the training, evaluators should be provided with copies of the following materials for

review prior to the exercise:

♦ Exercise documents, such as the EXPLAN,

including objectives and appendixes

♦ Jurisdictional plans and procedures

♦ Evaluation materials, such as the

EVALPLAN, Evaluation Guides and/or

other evaluation tools, and supporting

materials such as the exercise schedule

of events and locations and evaluator

assignments

Finalize Preexercise Evaluation Plans

Just before an exercise actually takes place, the

Lead Evaluator will organize the evaluation team,

verify the roles and functions of all evaluators on

the team, provide any updates to the evaluation

tools, and prepare contingency evaluation
24 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

procedures for deviations that may occur during

the exercise.

Evaluators will be expected to attend the

Controller and Evaluator Orientation Briefing,

which is generally conducted at the exercise site

the day before the exercise. Each evaluator

should be given an Evaluator Package of procedures and outcomes to observe. The evaluator

package contains evaluation forms, evaluator

instructions, and other items. Evaluators should

bring the package to the exercise. Evaluators

may reorganize the material so the information

critical to their specific assignment is readily

accessible. Evaluators may also bring to the

exercise additional professional materials specific to their assigned exercise activities.

The briefing should include a detailed review of

exercise activities and the scenario. This briefing

is the time for evaluators to ask questions and

ensure that they completely understand their

roles and responsibilities. Evaluator questions

should be addressed and information clarified so

evaluators feel confident that they can effectively perform their assignments. Evaluators will

also be given any updates from exercise planners on changes to plans and procedures. The

briefing often includes a tour of the exercise site

so that evaluators are familiar with the venue

and know where they should position themselves to observe the exercise play.

Observe the Exercise and

Collect Data

During the exercise, the evaluators’ primary duty

is to observe and record what the players do.

After the exercise, that information will be used

to determine whether the expected performance outcomes were achieved and to identify

strengths and opportunities for improvement.

Getting Started

Evaluators should be located in the appropriate

position at least 15 minutes before the start of

the exercise. Within the assigned location, evaluators must determine when and where to position themselves to observe exercise events and

are expected to follow the movement of the

play. Evaluators should not simply attach themselves to the team, section, or organization

leader. They can often see more from locations

where players are doing critical tasks or where

they can observe the overall flow of organization and actions. The best place to be is wherever the evaluator can best see and hear the

action. However, an evaluator should not take a

position where he or she might be a distraction

or interfere with the exercise play.

Observing the Exercise

Evaluators must keep an accurate written record of

what they see and hear. To be reliable,they should

take notes as players take action and make decisions. Notes should identify the following:

♦ Who (by name or position) performed the

action or made the decision

♦ What occurred (the observed action)

♦ Where (the location) the action or decision took place

♦ When (the time) the action took place

♦ Why the action took place or decision

was made (the trigger)

♦ How they performed the action or made

the decision (the process)

The Evaluation Guides provide space to create a

chronological record of the action to address the

above questions. Although evaluators should be

familiar with the expected outcomes and steps

outlined in the “Typical Steps” section of the

guide and the questions in the “Follow-Up

Analysis” section, they should not try to use

these sections as a checklist. It is important to

concentrate on simply recording what is happening. The analysis of how well the exercise

met expectations is done later.

If the space provided in the Evaluation Guide

does not provide a convenient tool for the evaluator, the evaluator should use any recording system that fits his or her need. When observing

multiple tasks with multiple Evaluation Guides, it

is generally easier for the evaluator to record

observations on a single guide or other tool

rather than flipping through several guides to

locate the applicable one. Many evaluators
CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES 25

♦ Discussion: A conversation involving

several people.

♦ Decision: An individual or group arrives

at a conclusion or makes a specific determination. Decisions might be made following a discussion or can be made independently. Decisions often, but not

always, lead to directives.

♦ Directive: An individual gives an order or

specific direction to one or more people.

A directive is often, but not always, given

by an individual in a position of authority.

Directives can be given in person or via

other types of communication such as

radio or telephone.

♦ Movement: An individual, group, or

piece of equipment relocates.

♦ Activity: An individual or group performs

a specific, clearly definable action or function. Putting on a HazMat suit or checking

patient status is considered an activity.

♦ Inject: Information, including directives,

instructions, and decisions that are provided by exercise controllers to exercise

players. Injects can be written, oral, or televised and can be transmitted via any

prefer to use notebooks, blank sheets, or index

cards. If the jurisdiction uses an evaluation tool

other than the Evaluation Guides, it should

ensure that the evaluators are recording their

observations and not simply making marks on a

checklist. Evaluators who use a checklist often

miss actions that vary from those identified on

the list. Using a checklist also makes it difficult

to recreate the exercise during the analysis

phase to evaluate how long it took players to

take certain actions and determine the order of

the activities.

Evaluators should bring or be provided with a

clipboard or another writing tool. Some evaluators may choose to supplement their record

through the use of electronic devices, such as a

portable tape recorder or video camera, but they

should be aware of their limitations. In particular, it may be difficult to concentrate on and

record the actions when focused on getting a

good shot. Also, evaluators should be aware that

the use of such devices may be intrusive or

intimidate exercise participants. For example, an

evaluator may speak more loudly than normal

when using recording devices. Players may find

this distracting.

What To Look for and Record

Because numerous events may be occurring

simultaneously, evaluators may not be able to

record all the action. Knowing which events are

important makes recording the action manageable, eliminates superfluous information, and

provides the kind of data most useful for exercise evaluation. Important events evaluators

should record include the following:

♦ Message in: An individual or group

receives information from somebody outside of their physical location. Messages

can be sent via radio, telephone, e-mail, fax,

or another means other than face-to-face

conversation. If known, indicate if the message is an inject (see next page).

♦ Message out: An individual sends information to another individual or group of

people outside of their physical location.

Messages can be sent via radio, telephone,

e-mail, fax, or another means other than

face-to-face conversation.

Tips for Successful Observation

DO:

✦ Be at the appropriate position when players

arrive.

✦ Get a good view of activities.

✦ Focus on critical activities.

✦Take detailed notes, including time of events.

✦ Write legibly.

DO NOT:

✦ Leave your post at key times.

✦ Prompt players.

✦ Get in the way.

✦ Answer questions for players (refer questions

to the controller).
26 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

means (e.g., fax, phone, e-mail, voice,

radio, or sign).

Other things to look for and note include the

following:

♦ Initiating scenario events (including when

players first detect abnormal conditions)

♦ Deviations from plans and implementation

procedures

♦ Timeliness of critical actions

♦ Monitoring and assessing scenario events

♦ Command and control at the scene

♦ Creative player problem-solving beyond

current plans and implementation

procedures.

♦ Plans or procedures that affect player

efforts

♦ Equipment issues that affect player efforts

Much of the above information will be obtained

through watching and listening to the exercise

players. However, the evaluators may also interact with players during the exercise if they have

a question about something they observed. This

may be especially important for those evaluators observing play in EOCs, Joint Information

Centers, or similar locations where much of the

activity is conducted over the phone. Because

evaluators cannot hear what is happening on

the other end of the line, they may have to ask

who the player was talking to and what was discussed. Evaluators should not interrupt play to

ask such questions but should wait until there

is a break in activity.

The exercise planners may find it useful to share

this information with the exercise participants

so that the participants know what the evaluators will be looking for and that they are not

focused on individual performance.

Analyze Data

The goal of data analysis is to assess performance by identifying what aspects of the exercise

went well and what areas need improvement.

The analysis compares players’ actions with

what was expected to happen. As discussed in

chapter 2, an exercise evaluation can be used to

analyze performance at several levels, depending

on the purpose, scope, and complexity of the

exercise:

♦ Task-level performance (i.e., the performance of one or several individuals or a

team’s performance)

♦ Department/discipline/function-level

performance (i.e., the performance at

the department, discipline, and functional

levels)

♦ Mission-level performance (i.e., how

well the participating jurisdictions and

agencies achieved expected prevention,

response, and/or recovery missions such

as managing the response, mitigating the

hazard, protecting the public, and victim

care)

The analysis phase generally involves four activities, each of which builds on the previous one.

1. Complete data collection: Immediately

following (and sometimes during) the

exercise play, evaluators should ensure

that they have a complete record of their

observations and have collected sufficient

information to support the analysis.

2. Conduct a player hot wash or critique:

This is typically a short discussion of

about 1 hour, immediately following the

exercise, to get player feedback on the

exercise.

3. Reconstruct exercise events: In this analysis, the participants will reconstruct the

exercise using evaluator observations and

notes and supplemental data (e.g., electronic logs). This discussion involves a

representative set of players, controllers,

and evaluators from all exercise functions

and locations who conduct separate analyses for each location. The purpose of this

analysis is to compare what happened to

what was supposed to happen and determine the root causes of differences. As

part of the analysis, the participants identify lessons learned and recommendations

for improvements.
CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES 27

4. Conduct cross-functional or cross-jurisdictional

analysis: The purpose of this analysis is to

identify any issues and areas for improvement that may have been missed in the

previous analysis. This discussion involves

one or two representative players and

evaluators from each exercise function

and location. This analysis allows those

who were not directly involved in a particular task to identify the potential

impacts of actions taken by others and

examine how particular actions interrelate. As a result of this analysis, additional

areas for improvement and recommendations may be identified that would not

necessarily come out of focused group

analysis of a particular task. This group

also determines the degree to which players achieved overall response outcomes.

Using information collected during these analyses, the evaluation team begins to draft the AAR.

Each of these steps is described in more detail

below.

Collect Supplemental Data

Immediately following the exercise, the evaluators should review their notes, fill in any gaps,

and review and respond to the questions in the

section of the Evaluation Guide titled “Data

Analysis Questions and Measures” or complete

the alternative evaluation tool provided. The

data analysis questions in the Evaluation Guide

are designed to prompt the evaluator’s recollection of key activities. Evaluators may use lulls in

action during the exercise to begin to complete

this task. Evaluation materials,including notes and

forms,become part of the exercise documentation.

In preparation for the detailed analysis necessary

to reconstruct the exercise, evaluators should

also attempt to collect supplemental data that

may be useful in filling in data gaps that are

identified by the group. For example, one useful

source of information could be records produced by automated systems, communications

networks, and responders. This action is similar

to preserving evidence during an actual emergency. When appropriate, these records can

help evaluators validate their observations, determine equipment status, and identify the effect of

inaccurate information on response operations.

The EVALPLAN should describe how these

sources of data will be collected.

Automated records can come from a variety of

sources. Many EOCs record all telephone conversations, allowing evaluators to later listen to

the information flow between EOCs and field

teams. Most siren system consoles produce

printouts when sirens are sounded that show

the time of activation and operational status.

Many automated information management systems allow for record dumps of all actions

recorded by the system during the event.

Written records typically consist of the duty

logs and message forms completed by EOC

staff or field responders. Additionally, evaluators need to be aware of information recorded

on status boards and periodically copy down

their contents. Although most status boards

cannot make photocopies of what is written on

them, a digital camera may provide an effective

means of capturing the data.

Conduct Player Hot Wash

Immediately after the exercise, the evaluation

team will attend a player-debriefing hot wash

with the players and controllers. A hot wash is a

facilitated meeting that allows players to participate in a self-assessment of the exercise play

and provides a general assessment of how the

During analysis, evaluators try to answer

the following questions:

✦ What happened—what the observation team

actually saw and supporting documentation

✦ What was supposed to happen—based on

the plans and procedures

✦ Was there a difference and why—conduct a

root cause analysis of why

✦ What was the impact—were the consequences of the action (or inaction, or decision) positive, negative, or neutral

✦ What should be learned and what are the

recommendations for improvements—the

fixes to the root cause
28 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

jurisdiction performed in the exercise. The hot

wash also provides the evaluators with the

opportunity to clarify points or collect any missing information from the players before they

leave the area. The hot wash is conducted as

soon as possible after the exercise, usually the

same day. In full-scale exercises with several

exercise sites, separate hot washes may take

place at each location.

A hot wash will be most effective if it is led by

an experienced facilitator who can ensure that

the discussion stays on point. The box below

provides some sample ground rules that a facilitator may present to the group at the beginning

of the hot wash session.

To supplement the information collected during

the player hot wash, the evaluation team should

distribute exercise critique forms to get feedback from participants on their perception of

the exercise and how well their unit performed.

This information can provide insight into why

events happened the way they did or why some

expected actions did not take place. The analysis team should review these forms and record

any useful information.

Reconstruct Exercise Events

A major component of the analysis process is

the reconstruction of the activities that occurred

during the exercise. Typically, the participants

involved in a particular location or function

(e.g., the evaluators, players, and controllers

involved in the EOC) will conduct the analysis

for that location. The evaluators will take the

notes and other collected data (e.g., logs,

records) and begin to build a picture of what

Sample Hot Wash Ground Rules

✦ Short time duration

✦ Facilitated discussion format

✦ Constructive comments only

✦ Identify things that:

✦ Went well

✦ Need improvement

occurred during the response in their jurisdiction. This process usually occurs soon after the

hot wash (either later in the day or the next

morning) and generally takes several hours. The

purpose of this analysis is for the participants to

identify discrepancies between what happened

at that location and what was supposed to happen, and develop recommendations for improvement to address those gaps.

The first step in creating the timeline is to identify what activities were expected to occur, and

when, based on the Master Scenario Event List

(MSEL). The times and events from the MSEL

can be displayed by any manner useful to the

analysis group. An easy form to use for organizing and later sorting of the information is a

spreadsheet6 or Gantt7 chart. The evaluation

team can prepare in advance a spreadsheet that

lists the major events and allows participants to

add in their recollections and observations.

Index cards or whiteboards could also be used.

Data used to develop the timeline includes such

sources as evaluator notes and controller logs.

Another important data source is the SIMCELL

staff, who interacted with players throughout

the exercise. These data can be used to resolve

discrepancies regarding the timing or sequence

of events.

An experienced facilitator familiar with the

major key events in the exercise scenario should

lead the reconstruction process to ensure that

participants do not get bogged down in minute

details. For most tasks, the exact minute that an

action was taken is not critical and should not

be labored over as long as the general time and

the sequence can be determined. More effort

can be devoted to resolving discrepancies for

tasks that are time sensitive. One approach to

ensure that the group stays on track is to require

each group to prioritize the areas for discussion

as follows:

♦ Create a timeline that reconstructs the

events that occurred at that location.

♦ Review the site-specific objectives and

tasks to be accomplished at that location.

♦ Determine which tasks went well and

which tasks need improvement.
CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES 29

♦ Rank the task improvements in order of

importance (this can be done through

multivoting or other technique).

♦ Identify the strengths and weaknesses in

carrying out those tasks.

♦ For the highest priority areas for

improvement:

• Determine why the action was not

accomplished (e.g., use the “why staircase” or another technique to identify

the root cause).

• Recommend a corrective action that

defines who (position or agency)

should take action and what the action

should be.

♦ If there is still time, repeat this analysis for

the next level of priority items, and so on.

♦ Present the results of the analysis (i.e., key

strengths, key weaknesses, and recommended actions) to the entire analysis

group.

Analyze Across Functions

and Jurisdictions

Following the presentation by each group, a

more limited group of evaluators, controllers, and

players then meet to analyze performance across

the various functions and locations. This analysis

identifies areas for improvement by comparing

the observations from different locations and

functions. Whereas the analysis above allowed

those participants involved in a particular location or function to assess their own performance

and capabilities, this analysis allows a discussion

of how the actions of one function or location

may have affected or been affected by the

actions of another function or location.

To facilitate this discussion, the evaluation team

may want to provide the group with a list of the

key tasks that were exercised at the various locations and then discuss whether the task was performed in a way that meets the objectives, and if

not, why. It is important that this discussion not

Example of Cross Functional Analysis 

An exercise was conducted to test the process

for accessing and implementing the National

Pharmaceutical Stockpile in response to a

bioterrorism incident.

At the dispensing site where the pharmaceuticals were being distributed, the evaluator

observed that patients were not initially being

moved through the process very quickly. When

the players assessed the situation, they concluded that the cause was the staffing level at

the pharmacists’ station. To correct the situation, they moved staff from the greeting stations to the pharmacists’ station. The analysis

team from the dispensing site observed this

discrepancy during their timeline analysis and

recommended that staffing levels be revisited

periodically during any dispensing operation.

During the cross-functional analysis, an issue

came to light that would not otherwise have

been recognized. The events were as follows:

✦ The group began the analysis by discussing whether the State epidemiologist had

effectively completed the task of issuing

a statewide standing order prescription.

Participants from the dispensing location

commented that the order did not effectively

explain how to use the injectable pediatric

medicine that they had been provided.

✦ In response to this comment, staff from the

State receiving and distribution site indicated

that the dispensing site was not supposed

to have received injectable medicine. They

determined that the wrong medicine had

been sent.

✦ Staff from the dispensing site then determined that the previous problem with the

pharmacists was caused not by understaffing

but by spending time trying to determine

how to distribute a medication that should

not have been there in the first place.

Because the dispensing site was not aware

that they had been sent the wrong medicine,

they would not have known that the problem

was more than just a matter of staffing.
30 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

determine why there was a difference between

what was planned and what actually occurred.

It also helps an analysis team detect flaws in its

reasoning.

Each step is a symptom (or effect) of the item

below and a cause of the item above. It starts

with the event, action, or decision and ends with

the root cause for their occurrence. Its purpose

is to get the analyst past the surface, where the

true issue is rarely found. When using this

process, analysts may want to develop a chart

that shows the relationship between the causal

factors found at each step of the staircase. The

“Why Staircase” is presented in exhibit 6.

Identify Opportunities for Improvement

The identification of issues and their root causes

enables the analysis team to develop recommendations for improvement. The recommendations

should state what should be done and who should

do it. The recommendations should have enough

detail to make them useful. Recommendations

such as “Train on alert and warning process”do

not help the response community. However, a recommendation indicating that “the 24-hour warning

point staff needs additional training on reading

repeat any of the weaknesses identified earlier

but rather focus on issues that may not have

been otherwise identified. One example is

described in the sidebar at right.

More specific guidance on carrying out the following various elements of these analysis

processes is provided below:

♦ Reconstructing the timeline of events

♦ Determining root causes for discrepancies

♦ Developing recommendations for

improvement

♦ Identifying lessons learned

Determine the Root Causes

of Differences

As the timeline is completed, the participants

should be able to identify those tasks that were

successfully accomplished and any disconnects

or weaknesses. Questions to consider include:

♦ Was the task completed as expected?

♦ If yes, was it completed within the

expected timeframe?

♦ If not, what effect did the delay have on

other activities or on the overall response

mission?

♦ If the task was completed using an alternative approach, is there something that

can be learned from how the task was

done? Is the alternative approach better

or more efficient?

♦ What effect did not completing the task

have on other tasks and on the ability of

the jurisdiction to achieve mission success?

The participants should then search for the root

cause of why an expected action did not occur

or was not performed as expected. The analysis

team should keep asking why an event happened or did not happen until it is satisfied that

it has found the cause. It is important to reach

this level of understanding to make recommendations to enhance preparedness.

A number of different analysis tools are available

for root-cause analysis. One commonly used tool

is the “why staircase.” This tool is used to help

Example of Root-Cause Analysis

During an exercise, it was observed that the

field teams could not find certain environmental monitoring locations because their maps

were different from the one used by the Field

Team Coordinator. The recommendation was

that “all maps used by the Coordinator and the

field teams should be the same.”

However, this observation does not address the

root cause of why field teams had different

maps. Therefore, it is not clear how to ensure

that the problem would not be repeated. For

example, was it a problem in distributing the

maps? Further discussion revealed that the

field teams had actually been given the same

map as the Coordinator, but they chose to use

the old map because the new map was not as

clear or well laid out. Thus, part of the solution

to the problem would involve improving the

map itself. 
CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES 31

siren system printouts so they can better identify

system failures”focuses on a root cause. Sometimes it is not clear exactly what should be done

(e.g., no resources exist to purchase new equipment) or who should do it (e.g., coordination is an

issue). In these cases, the analysis team may recommend that the Emergency Management Agency

Director appoint a task force to address the issue.

The analysis team should use the following questions as a guide for developing recommendations for improvement:

♦ What changes need to be made to plans

and procedures to improve performance?

♦ What changes need to be made to

organizational structures to improve

performance?

♦ What changes need to be made to leadership and management processes to

improve performance?

♦ What training is needed to improve

performance?

♦ What changes to (or additional) equipment is needed to improve performance?

As part of identifying recommendations, the participants need to focus on who will be responsible for carrying out the action, which in turn

will depend on whether the recommendation is

aimed at the individual, team, department, function, or jurisdiction level.

Identify Lessons Learned

For purposes of the Homeland Security Exercise

and Evaluators Program (HSEEP), a “lesson

Exhibit 6: The Why Staircase

1. Why did it happen?

3. Why was that the way it was?

4. Why was that?

5. And so on...?

6. And so forth...?

2. Why did that happen?

DOWN TO THE BASIC UNDERLYING CAUSAL FACTOR

Each step must completely explain the step above.

Tips for Writing Recommendations

✦ Don’t be afraid to make honest recommendations; improvement is the primary goal of

exercises.

✦ Recommend a specific action that can be

implemented and measured.

✦ Use action verbs.

✦ Indicate who (which agency) should take

responsibility for implementation.

✦ Recommendations should flow from the

observations and analysis.

✦ Make each recommendation a stand-alone

statement that can be understood without

referring to the text; spell out acronyms.

✦ Check for consistency; resolve issues that

lead to conflicting recommendations.

✦ Indicate where performance was good or

adequate and no recommendations were

needed.
32 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

learned” is knowledge gained from an innovation

or experience that provides valuable evidence—

positive or negative—recommending how to

approach a similar problem in the future. A lesson learned is not just a summary of what went

right or wrong; rather, it provides insight about

a change that was made to address a particular

issue. More broadly, these lessons should be suitable to share with other jurisdictions across the

country in an effort to enhance preparedness.

Although every recommendation that comes

out of the analysis process may result in a lesson

learned for the participating jurisdictions, those

recommendations that may be applicable to

other jurisdictions should be highlighted as lessons learned in the AAR.

Draft the After Action Report

The AAR is the tool used to provide feedback to

the participating jurisdictions on their performance during the exercise. The AAR summarizes

what happened and analyzes performance of the

tasks identified through the planning process as

critical to the response to the attack defined by

the exercise scenario. The AAR also analyzes the

demonstrated capacity of the participating jurisdictions to accomplish the overall mission outcomes, such as protecting the public or hazard

mitigation. The draft AAR includes recommendations for improvements based on the analysis.

As described further in the next chapter, an

Improvement Plan (IP) is developed in response

to the recommendations presented in the draft

AAR, which is incorporated into the final AAR.

The AAR also provides State and Federal homeland security agencies with information needed

to assess the preparedness of the Nation and to

identify and provide needed resources and support. Therefore, the final AARs will be provided

through the State to DHS/ODP. It should include

specific information about the exercise and the

participating agencies and jurisdictions as defined

in the Overview section of the sample AAR found

in appendix D. An Improvement Plan Matrix

should also be included in the AAR. It provides a

summary of the recommendations, improvement

actions, responsible individual/agency, and completion date for each task. The Improvement Plan

Matrix provides a tool for the local jurisdictions

that participated in the exercise as well as State

and Federal agencies to track implementation of

required improvements.

Although all or most of the evaluators will be

involved in the analysis, the actual drafting of the

AAR generally falls to one or two people, which

may include the Lead Evaluator or contract support personnel. The following is a suggested format for presentation of the AAR. (See appendix D

for a sample AAR.) After the AAR is drafted, the

participants should follow the improvement

actions outlined in chapter 4 of this manual,

which discusses the recommended process for

presenting the draft AAR to jurisdiction officials,

developing the IP, and finalizing the AAR.

Suggested After Action Report

Format 

Executive Summary

The executive summary is a 1- to 2-page summary of the exercise highlighting the scope, participants, key successes, and most significant

areas for improvement.

Exercise Overview

This section provides background information

on the exercise and participating agencies and

jurisdictions, such as the dates and location of

the exercise, the type of exercise, the sponsoring

agencies, the participating agencies, an overview

of the scenario, and a description of the evaluation process.

Example of a Lesson Learned

During a chemical weapons exercise, the jurisdiction found that using buses to transport

large numbers of walking wounded to medical

facilities improved incident response by reducing strain on EMS vehicles and by decreasing

transit times for victims. This lesson learned

involved a number of agencies and disciplines

and can be widely applied.
Exercise Goals and Objectives

The goals and objectives for the exercise are

listed.

Exercise Events Synopsis

This section provides a synopsis by time of the

major actions that were taken during the exercise at each of the exercise locations. This information is useful in understanding what happened, when and where it happened, and how

the events affected performance of critical tasks

and achievement of mission outcomes.

Analysis of Mission Outcomes

This section provides an analysis of the mission

outcomes. It summarizes how the performance

or nonperformance of the tasks and interagency/

interjurisdictional interactions affected the ability of the jurisdiction to achieve the mission outcomes. It should include an analysis for each

mission outcome that is applicable to the

response to the exercise scenario.

Analysis of Critical Task Performance

This section analyzes the performance of each of

the tasks identified as critical to responding to

the exercise scenario. It should be organized by

task and should address each task, including

those that are performed as expected. Each task

writeup should be organized as described

below. If a task was performed well and there

are no issues, complete the analysis section with

a brief description of what happened and put

“None” in the recommendations section.

♦ Task Number and Description: The

number and title of the task from the

exercise evaluation guides (EEGs).

♦ Issue Number and Description:

Number consecutively under the task and

provide a statement that describes the

issue. If multiple issues relate to a task, list

issue No. 1 followed by the relevant analysis and recommendations, then present

issue No. 2.

♦ References: Cite the source of the issue

in the EEGs, plans, procedures, mutual aid

agreement, and so on.

♦ Summary: Provide a brief description of

the issue.

♦ Consequence: Describe the effect of the

issue on the ability of the community to

respond as expected, with reference (as

appropriate) to the effect on mission outcomes, other functions or disciplines, or

performance of other tasks.

♦ Analysis: Briefly describe what happened, what was supposed to happen,

why there was a difference (the underlying causal factor; see Root Cause Analysis),

and what should be learned from what

happened.

♦ Recommendations: Provide a statement

that describes what can be done to resolve the issue (e.g., changes in plans or

procedures, organizational structures, leadership and management processes, training, equipment or resources, interagency

or interjurisdictional agreements,and so on).

♦ Improvement Actions: Describe what

specific actions the jurisdiction will take

to address the recommendation, who

(position or agency) is responsible for

addressing the recommendation, and

when the action will be completed. This

section is completed by the exercising

jurisdiction(s) following a review of the

draft AAR. See chapter 4 for further

explanation.

Conclusion

This section should provide a brief summary of

the major conclusions from the exercise.

Appendix A: Improvement Plan Matrix

The Improvement Plan Matrix lists, for each task,

the recommendations, the improvement actions

that will be taken, the responsible party or

agency, and the expected completion date.

CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES 33

35

CHAPTER 4

Improving Preparedness

information. The debrief should also include a

facilitated discussion of ways in which the jurisdiction can build on strengths identified and begin

to address recommendations for improvement.

Ideally, the exercise debrief should be scheduled

for a time within several weeks of the end of the

exercise and should be scheduled for a full day

to allow adequate time to discuss the findings,

recommendations, and corrective actions. The

meeting should be held at a convenient location

or at the site where the exercise action took

place. Holding the meeting at the site provides

a context for events that occurred and may

facilitate the discussion of physical barriers to

performance.

Developing the Improvement

Plan 

As mentioned above, the exercise debrief provides an opportunity for the evaluation team

leaders to help exercise participants and community leaders understand what was planned

to happen, what actually happened during the

exercise, why it happened, and what could have

been done differently to improve performance.

The Improvement Plan (IP) is the means by

which the lessons learned from the exercise

are turned into concrete, measurable steps that

result in improved response capabilities. It is

developed by the local jurisdiction and specifically details what actions will be taken to address each recommendation presented in the

draft AAR, who or what agency will be responsible for taking the action, and the timeline

for completion. An initial IP should be developed at the debrief while all key officials are

together.

For some recommendations, the course of

action will be clear and can be defined at the

The purpose of an exercise is to evaluate capability to prevent, respond to, and recover from

a terrorism incident. However, the effort of an

exercise is wasted if the lessons from the exercise are not translated into actions that result

in improvements to the capabilities tested. The

draft After Action Report (AAR) presents observations and recommendations based on the data

collection and analysis completed by the evaluation team. The evaluation team helps the jurisdictions that conducted the exercise turn those

recommendations into action. The team debriefs

the exercise to the participating agency officials

and, as appropriate, to public officials, then helps

them identify and document corrective actions

for program improvement.

Debriefing the Exercise

As soon as possible after the analysis of data

from the exercise and the drafting of the AAR,

the Lead Evaluator and other evaluators, as

appropriate, should set up a meeting with senior

officials from the participating agencies and

jurisdictions to debrief the exercise. The exercise debrief provides a forum for jurisdiction

officials to hear the results of the analysis and

validate the findings and recommendations

presented in the draft AAR. The presentation

generally includes a discussion of the exercise

objectives, what happened during the exercise,

any differences between expected performance

and actual performance, the reasons for differences and their impact on the response, lessons

learned, and recommendations for improvement.

The debrief should be interactive, with the jurisdiction officials validating the observations and

recommendations and providing insight into

activities that might have been missed or misinterpreted by the evaluation team. The draft AAR

should be modified to incorporate any clarifying
36 HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, VOLUME II: EXERCISE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT

debriefing meeting. For others, additional

information will need to be gathered to determine the appropriate course of action. In those

cases, the IP developed at the debriefing meeting should indicate at least the first step in the

process (e.g., specify that the following agency

heads will meet to explore the issue and determine actions to be taken, and provide the timeframe for that meeting).

Some improvement actions will require

resources (e.g., recommendations related to

training, equipment, or personnel). The IP

should be realistic and establish priorities for the

use of limited resources. Every effort should be

made to address recommendations related to

performance of critical tasks. Other recommendations should also be addressed as appropriate.

During the exercise debriefing and development

of the IP, the meeting facilitator should help the

participants explore options for obtaining

needed resources, such as submitting a request

to the City Council or to the State Administrative

Agency (SAA) that manages the Federal grant

funds. For some action items, it may be appropriate to enter into agreements with neighboring jurisdictions to share the response resource

or capability and the associated costs.

When the availability of resources may not be

immediate, the facilitator should help the participants develop short- and long-term solutions.

For example, one of the recommendations identified the need to improve communications

among the various city agencies, and the jurisdiction determined that new equipment was

needed. However, the jurisdiction is not likely

to receive needed funds from the city or be a

high priority for funding from the SAA this year.

Therefore, the IP should indicate that the

Emergency Management Agency (EMA) will

request funds to purchase new equipment

and will also implement interim measures to

improve communication in the short term, such

as providing cell phones to essential personnel.

Generally, the initial IP is included in the final

AAR. The final AAR should follow the same format as the draft AAR with the addition of the

improvement actions that will be taken to

address specific recommendations.

Distribution of the Final After

Action Report/Improvement Plan

First and foremost, the AAR/IP is the product of

the agencies and jurisdictions that participated

in the exercise. The AAR/IP should address

their needs and serve as an important tool to

help them focus limited resources on improvements in preparedness.

The AAR/IP also provides valuable input into

strategy development and program planning at

the State and Federal levels as well as lessons

learned that should be shared with other jurisdictions across the country to raise the preparedness of the Nation. Therefore, the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office

for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) is requiring

that copies of the AAR/IP for all exercises

implemented with grant funds and/or DHS/ODP

contractor support be forwarded to the SAA and

to DHS/ODP within 60 days of completion of

the exercise.

The goals and benefits of sharing the AAR/IP are

several:

♦ The AAR/IP should be shared with officials from the agencies that participated

in the exercise. For local jurisdictions, the

IP will provide a workable and systematic

process to initiate and document improvements to plans, policies, and procedures

and to identify and secure needed training, equipment, and other resources. It is

developed by local officials to address

local needs.

♦ For the SAAs, the AAR/IP provides a

method for collecting information about

improvement actions from local governments and State agencies so the needs

identified can be integrated into statewide

strategy process and resource allocation

plans.

♦ For DHS/ODP, the AAR/IP provides needed

information for program planning, directing resources, and assessing national levels

of preparedness. This information will

also enable DHS/ODP to provide DHS officials and Congress with accurate information on Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) performance

as executed by Federal, State, and local

agencies as well as a basis for integrating

HSEEP initiatives with other programs in

DHS/ODP, DHS, and other departments.

The AAR/IP also provides information

that can inform the development and

refinement of performance standards

and recommended practices and enhance

federally sponsored training programs.

Monitoring Implementation of

Improvement Plans

DHS/ODP is developing a secure Internet-based

Exercise Management System that will provide

a centralized calendar of exercises across the

country, provide for the electronic submission

of AARs/IPs to the SAA and DHS/ODP, and monitor implementation of IPs. The system is being

designed so that all information flows through

the SAA, providing it with a tool to enhance

the management of their exercise program.

All AARs/IPs and followup information will be

designated “For Official Use Only.”

Sharing Lessons Learned and

Best Practices

DHS/ODP will provide copies of the AARs to

the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of

Terrorism’s (MIPT) Ready-Net, a Web-based best

practices and lessons learned information network for first responders and emergency planners nationwide. The MIPT Ready-Net is funded

by DHS/ODP and will be available by the end of

2003. MIPT Ready-Net will serve as the national

repository for best practices and lessons learned

and will be accessible to approved users within

the response community through the DHS/ODP

secure portal. Ready-Net will analyze the information and pull out the best practices, lessons

learned, and trends. All AAR information will be

secure and will be provided to approved users

in summary form and with all identifying information removed.

CHAPTER 4: IMPROVING PREPAREDNESS 37

39

ENDNOTES

1.The Emergency Responder Guidelines were

developed by engaging subject-matter experts

from both the public and private sectors in an

iterative process of examining and defining critical tasks required to prevent, respond to, and

recover from a WMD incident. They build on

existing codes and standards of agencies, such as

the National Fire Prevention Association, and

Federal regulatory agencies, such as the U.S.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration,

and were reviewed by other Federal agencies

involved in first responder and homeland security training.

2.“Variances from expected outcomes” are shortcomings identified through the evaluation of

actual task-level, agency/discipline/functionlevel, or mission-level performance compared

with the list of essential tasks and their performance measures.

3. For definitions of the various types of exercises, see DHS/ODP’s Homeland Security

Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP),

Volume I: Overview and Doctrine.

4.The IP is called a Improvement Plan in HSEEP,

Volume I, and the FY 2003 Homeland Security

Grant Program Application Kit. The name of

the plan has been changed to acknowledge the

current capabilities of homeland security agencies while recognizing the continuing need to

enhance prevention, response, and recovery

capabilities in light of new threats and technologies.

5. NIMS is under development by DHS. DHS will

encourage State and local organizations to adopt

NIMS by making it a requirement for Federal

preparedness grants beginning in FY 2005.

6.A spreadsheet is a tool for organizing a

sequence of events, tasks and timelines. Data

can be placed in rows and columns for detailed

clarification and task management.

7.A Gantt chart is a horizontal bar chart developed as a production control tool. Frequently

used in project management, a Gantt chart provides a graphical illustration of a schedule that

helps to plan, coordinate, and track specific

tasks in a project. The length of the Gantt bars

represents duration and the lines between tasks

represent task relationships. Gantt charts may

be simple versions created on graph paper or

more complex automated versions created

using project management applications such as

Microsoft Project or Excel.

APPENDIX A

Participant Feedback Forms

Sponsored by: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness

Delivered to: _____________________________________________________________________

City State

Exercise Name: ______________________________Date: ______________________________

Participant Name: ___________________________ Title: ______________________________

Agency: _____________________________________ Role: ___Player ___Observer ___Facilitator

Part I—Recommendations and Action Steps

1. Based on discussions today and the tasks identified, list the top three issues and/or areas 

that need improvement.

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

2. Identify the action steps that should be taken to address the issues identified above. For 

each action step, indicate if it is a high, medium, or low priority.

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________ 

3. Describe the action steps that should be taken in your area of responsibility. Who 

should be assigned responsibility for each action item? 

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

4. List the policies, plans, and procedures that should be reviewed, revised, or developed.

Indicate the priority level for each.

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation and Action Steps

Tabletop Exercise
Part II—Exercise Design and Conduct 

1. What is your assessment of the exercise design and conduct?

Please rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, your overall assessment of the exercise relative to the 

statements provided below, with 1 indicating strong disagreement with the statement 

and 5 indicating strong agreement.

Rating of Satisfaction With Exercise

Strongly Strongly 

Assessment Factor Disagree Agree

a. The exercise was well structured and organized. 12345

b. The exercise scenario was plausible and realistic. 12345

c. The multimedia presentation helped the participants understand and become engaged in 

the scenario. 12345

d. The facilitator(s) was knowledgeable about 

the material, kept the exercise on target, and 

was sensitive to group dynamics. 12345

e. The Situation Manual used during the exercise 

was a valuable tool throughout the exercise. 12345

f. Participation in the exercise was appropriate for 

someone in my position. 12345

g. The participants included the right people in 

terms of level and mix of disciplines. 12345

h. The exercise provided a good test of knowledge/

skills obtained in WMD training courses.

(If no training, check here: _____) 12345

i. The WMD training course(s) enhanced my performance during the exercise. 12345

2. What changes would you make to improve this exercise?

Please provide any recommendations on how the exercise could be improved or enhanced to better prepare emergency responders to safely and effectively respond to terrorism incidents.

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________
Sponsored by: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness

Delivered to: _____________________________________________________________________

City State

Exercise Name: ______________________________Date: ______________________________

Participant Name: ___________________________ Title: ______________________________

Agency: _____________________________________ Role: ___Player ___Observer ___Facilitator

Part I—Recommendations and Action Steps

1. From your observation, list the top three issues and/or areas that need improvement.

When and where did they happen?

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

2. Identify the action steps that should be taken to address the issues listed above. For 

each action step, indicate if it is a high, medium, or low priority.

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

3. Describe the action steps that should be taken in your area of responsibility. Who 

should be assigned responsibility for each action item?

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

4. List the policies, plans, and procedures that should be reviewed, revised, or developed.

Indicate the priority level for each.

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation and Action Steps 

Operations-Based Exercise
Part II—Design and Conduct Logistics

1. What is your assessment of the exercise design and conduct?

Please rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, your overall assessment of the exercise relative to the 

statements provided below, with 1 indicating strong disagreement with the statement 

and 5 indicating strong agreement.

Rating of Satisfaction With Exercise

Strongly Strongly 

Assessment Factor Disagree Agree

a. The exercise was well structured and organized. 12345

b. The exercise scenario was plausible and realistic. 12345

c. Participants understood their roles and become 

engaged in the scenario. 12345

d. The controller(s) was knowledgeable about the 

area of play and kept the exercise on target. 12345

e. The exercise material used to prepare for/

participate in the exercise was useful. 12345

f. Participation in the exercise was appropriate 

for someone in my position. 12345

g. The participants included the right people in 

terms of level and mix of disciplines. 12345

h. The exercise provided a good test of knowledge/

skills obtained in WMD training courses.

(If no training, check here: _____) 12345

i. The WMD training course(s) enhanced my 

performance during the exercise. 12345

2. What changes would you make to improve this exercise?

Please provide any recommendations on how the exercise could be improved or enhanced to better prepare emergency responders to safely and effectively respond to terrorism incidents.

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX B

Evaluation Guides—Tabletop Exercises

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Task # Outcome/Task Response Element 

I. Criminal Prevention and Deterrence

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

II. Emergency Assessment 

II-1 Dispatch First Responders and Establish Initial Communications Dispatch (911 Center Staff) 

II-2 Make Immediate Incident Scene Reports First Responders 

II-3 Detect and Identify Agent HazMat 

II-4 Collect Input for Hazard Assessment EOC/HazMat/Environmental 

Protection 

II-5 Make Hazard Assessments and Predictions EOC/HazMat/Environmental 

Protection 

II-6 Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations EOC Staff or IC/UC 

II-7 Conduct Monitoring and Sampling Environmental Protection or HazMat 

III. Emergency Management 

III-1 Alert and Mobilize EOC Staff EOC Staff 

III-2 Activate, Expand, and Operate the EOC EOC Staff 

III-3 Direct and Control Response Operations EOC Staff 

III-4 Notify Government Agencies and Officials EOC Staff 

III-5 Direct Activation of Traffic and Access Control Points EOC Staff (Transportation) 

III-6 Direct and Control Protection of At-Risk Population EOC Staff (Transportation)/IC 

III-7 Direct Protective Actions for Schools, Day Care Centers, and 

Special Populations 

EOC Staff (Public Health/IC

III-8 Direct and Control Distribution of Supplies and Equipment IC/UC or EOC Staff 

III-9 Request and Coordinate Additional Response Support EOC Staff 

III-10 Request State/Federal Assistance EOC Staff 

III-11 Direct and Control Critical Infrastructure Mitigation EOC Staff (Public Works) 

III-12 Direct and Control Public Information Activities EOC (PIO) 

III-13 Activate and Operate JIC JIC 

III-14 Provide Emergency Public Information to Media and Public PIO/JIC 

III-15 Establish and Maintain Rumor Control Operations PIO 

IV. Incident Site Hazard Mitigation

IV-1 Isolate Incident Scene and Define Hazard Areas First Responders 

IV-2 Establish Incident Command/Unified Command IC/UC 

IV-3 Conduct Incident Command IC/UC 

IV-4 Maintain Accountability of Responders and Citizens IC/UC 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Task # Outcome/Task Response Element 

IV-5 Preserve Incident Scene First Responders/IC/UC 

IV-6 Direct Agent Release Mitigation Efforts IC/UC 

IV-7 Conduct Agent Release Mitigation Efforts HazMat 

IV-8 Conduct Firefighting Operations Fire Department 

IV-9 Dispatch Bomb Squad 911 Center Dispatch 

IV-10 Assess Incident and Develop Action Plan Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) 

IV-11 Execute Incident Action Plan Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) 

IV-12 Implement Post-Render-Safe Procedures Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) 

IV-13 Decontaminate Responders and Equipment Fire Department/HazMat 

V. Protection

V-1 Develop and Implement Protective Action Decisions EOC Staff 

V-2 Prepare and Disseminate Protective Action Messages EOC Staff 

V-3 Activate Traffic and Access Control Points Law Enforcement 

V-4 Coordinate Protective Actions for Special Populations EOC Staff 

V-5 Implement Protective Actions for Special Populations Special Population Sites 

V-6 Coordinate Protective Actions for Schools and Day Care Centers EOC Staff 

V-7 Implement Protective Actions for Schools and Day Care Centers Schools and Day Care Centers 

V-8 Direct Reception Center Operations EOC Staff 

V-9 Operate Reception Centers Reception Centers 

V-10 Direct Shelter Operations EOC Staff 

V-11 Operate Shelters Shelters 

V-12 Arrange for Veterinary Services EOC Staff 

VI. Victim Care

VI-1 Provide Immediate Emergency Aid First Responders (non-EMS) 

VI-2 Conduct Search and Rescue Operations Search and Rescue 

VI-3 Provide Emergency Triage, Treatment, and Stabilization EMS 

VI-4 Decontaminate Patients at Incident Site Fire and First Responders 

VI-5 Screen Individuals for Agent Contamination EMS 

VI-6 Decontaminate Individuals at Screening Site EMS 

VI-7 Treat Patients at Screening Site EMS 

VI-8 Report Victim Status to EOC/Hospital EMS 

VI-9 Prepare to Receive Patients Hospital Staff 

VI-10 Transport Patients to Hospital EMS 

VI-11 Decontaminate Patients at Hospital Hospital Staff 

VI-12 Treat Patients at Hospital Hospital Staff 

VI-13 Track Patient Status/Location EOC Staff/Hospital Staff 

VI-14 Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains EMS/Medical Examiner 

VI-15 Coordinate Disposition of Human Remains EOC Staff/Medical Examiner 

VI-16 Notify Next-of-Kin EOC Staff/Hospital staff 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Task # Outcome/Task Response Element 

VII. Criminal Investigation and Apprehension

VII-1 Dispatch Law Enforcement Law Enforcement 

VII-2 Secure Crime Scene Control Law Enforcement 

VII-3 Conduct Criminal Investigation Law Enforcement 

VII-4 Dispatch SWAT Team Law Enforcement/SWAT 

VII-5 Assess Incident and Develop Action Plan Law Enforcement/SWAT

VII-6 Conduct Hostage Negotiations Law Enforcement/SWAT

VII-7 Conduct Tactical Deployment Law Enforcement/SWAT

VII-8 Apprehend Suspect Law Enforcement/SWAT

EOC Emergency Operations Center 

IC Incident Command 

UC Unified Command 

JIC Joint Information Center 

PIO Public Information Officer 

EMS Emergency Medical Services

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Outcome: Emergency Assessment 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Identify and check the tasks associated with the mission outcome that would be required to respond 

to the tabletop exercise scenario. For additional information on these tasks refer to appendix C, 

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, Operations-Based Exercises. 

Task # Task Response Elements 

 II-1 Dispatch First Responders and Establish Initial 

Communications 

Dispatch (911 Center Staff) 

 II-2 Make Immediate Incident Scene Reports First Responders 

 II-3 Detect and Identify Agent HazMat 

 II-4 Collect Input for Hazard Assessment EOC/HazMat/Environmental 

Protection Staff 

 II-5 Make Hazard Assessments and Predictions EOC/HazMat/Environmental 

Protection Staff 

 II-6 Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations EOC Staff or IC/UC 

 II-7 Conduct Monitoring and Sampling Environmental Protection or HazMat
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the exercise, evaluators should compile their notes and address the followup analysis 

questions for each selected task. More detailed analysis questions on performance of these tasks during a 

full-scale exercise are found in appendix C, Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, OperationsBased Exercises. 

1. How would response personnel perform this task? 

2. What decisions would need to be made and who would make them? 

3. Are personnel trained to perform this task? 

4. Are other resources needed and how will they be obtained? 

5. Do plans, policies, and procedures support the performance of this task? Are response 

personnel familiar with these documents? 

6. Do response personnel from multiple agencies or jurisdictions need to work together to 

perform this task? If yes, are the agreements or relationships in place to support its 

performance? 

7. What should be learned from this task? 

8. What improvement actions are recommended? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Outcome: Emergency Management 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Identify and check the tasks associated with the mission outcome that would be required to respond 

to the tabletop exercise scenario. For additional information on these tasks refer to appendix C, 

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, Operations-Based Exercises. 

Task # Task Response Elements 

 III-1 Alert and Mobilize EOC Staff EOC Staff 

 III-2 Activate, Expand, and Operate the EOC EOC Staff 

 III-3 Direct and Control Response Operations EOC Staff 

 III-4 Notify Government Agencies and Officials EOC Staff 

 III-5 Direct Activation of Traffic and Access Control 

Points 

EOC Staff (Transportation) 

 III-6 Direct and Control Protection of At-Risk Population EOC Staff (Transportation)/IC 

 III-7 Direct Protective Actions for Schools, Day Care 

Centers, and Special Populations 

EOC Staff (Public Health)/IC 

 III-8 Direct and Control Distribution of Supplies and 

Equipment 

IC/UC or EOC Staff 

 III-9 Request and Coordinate Additional Response 

Support 

EOC Staff 

 III-10 Request State/Federal Assistance EOC Staff 

 III-11 Direct and Control Critical Infrastructure Mitigation EOC Staff (Public Works)

 III-12 Direct and Control Public Information Activities EOC/PIO 

 III-13 Activate and Operate JIC JIC 

 III-14 Provide Emergency Public Information to Media and 

Public 

PIO/JIC 

 III-15 Establish and Maintain Rumor Control Operations PIO
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the exercise, evaluators should compile their notes and address the followup analysis 

questions for each selected task. More detailed analysis questions on performance of these tasks during a 

full-scale exercise are found in appendix C, Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, OperationsBased Exercises. 

1. How would response personnel perform this task? 

2. What decisions would need to be made and who would make them? 

3. Are personnel trained to perform this task? 

4. Are other resources needed and how will they be obtained? 

5. Do plans, policies, and procedures support the performance of this task? Are response 

personnel familiar with these documents? 

6. Do response personnel from multiple agencies or jurisdictions need to work together to 

perform this task? If yes, are the agreements or relationships in place to support its 

performance? 

7. What should be learned from this task? 

8. What improvement actions are recommended? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Identify and check the tasks associated with the mission outcome that would be required to respond 

to the tabletop exercise scenario. For additional information on these tasks refer to appendix C, 

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, Operations-Based Exercises. 

Task # Task Response Elements 

 IV-1 Isolate the Incident Scene and Define Hazard Areas First Responders 

 IV-2 Establish Incident Command/Unified Command IC/UC 

 IV-3 Conduct Incident Command IC/UC 

 IV-4 Maintain Accountability of Responders and Citizens IC/UC 

 IV-5 Preserve Incident Scene First Responders/IC/UC 

 IV-6 Direct Agent Release Mitigation Efforts IC/UC 

 IV-7 Conduct Agent Release Mitigation Efforts HazMat 

 IV-8 Conduct Firefighting Operations Fire Department 

 IV-9 Dispatch Bomb Squad 911 Center/Dispatch 

 IV-10 Assess Incident and Develop Action Plan Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) 

 IV-11 Execute Incident Action Plan Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) 

 IV-12 Implement Post-Render-Safe Procedures Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) 

 IV-13 Decontaminate Responders and Equipment Fire Department/HazMat 

 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the exercise, evaluators should compile their notes and address the followup analysis 

questions for each selected task. More detailed analysis questions on performance of these tasks during a 

full-scale exercise are found in appendix C, Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, OperationsBased Exercises. 

1. How would response personnel perform this task? 

2. What decisions would need to be made and who would make them? 

3. Are personnel trained to perform this task? 

4. Are other resources needed and how will they be obtained? 

5. Do plans, policies, and procedures support the performance of this task? Are response 

personnel familiar with these documents? 

6. Do response personnel from multiple agencies or jurisdictions need to work together to 

perform this task? If yes, are the agreements or relationships in place to support its 

performance? 

7. What should be learned from this task? 

8. What improvement actions are recommended? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Outcome: Protection 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Identify and check the tasks associated with the mission outcome that would be required to respond to 

the tabletop exercise scenario. For additional information on these tasks refer to appendix C, 

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, Operations-Based Exercises. 

Task # Task Response Elements 

 V-1 Develop and Implement Protective Action Decisions EOC Staff 

 V-2 Prepare and Disseminate Protective Action 

Messages 

EOC Staff 

 V-3 Activate Traffic and Access Control Points Law Enforcement 

 V-4 Coordinate Protective Actions for Special 

Populations 

EOC Staff 

 V-5 Implement Protective Actions for Special Populations Special Population Sites 

 V-6 Coordinate Protective Actions for Schools and Day 

Care Centers 

EOC Staff 

 V-7 Implement Protective Actions for Schools and Day 

Care Centers 

Schools and Day Care Centers 

 V-8 Direct Reception Center Operations EOC Staff 

 V-9 Operate Reception Centers Reception Centers 

 V-10 Direct Shelter Operations EOC Staff 

 V-11 Operate Shelters Shelters 

 V-12 Arrange for Veterinary Services EOC Staff

 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the exercise, evaluators should compile their notes and address the followup analysis 

questions for each selected task. More detailed analysis questions on performance of these tasks during 

a full-scale exercise are found in appendix C, Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, OperationsBased Exercises. 

1. How would response personnel perform this task? 

2. What decisions would need to be made and who would make them? 

3. Are personnel trained to perform this task? 

4. Are other resources needed and how will they be obtained? 

5. Do plans, policies, and procedures support the performance of this task? Are response 

personnel familiar with these documents? 

6. Do response personnel from multiple agencies or jurisdictions need to work together to 

perform this task? If yes, are the agreements or relationships in place to support its 

performance? 

7. What should be learned from this task? 

8. What improvement actions are recommended? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Outcome: Victim Care 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Identify and check the tasks associated with the mission outcome that would be required to respond 

to the tabletop exercise scenario. For additional information on these tasks refer to appendix C, 

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, Operations-Based Exercises. 

Task # Task Response Elements 

 VI-1 Provide Immediate Emergency Aid First Responders (non-EMS) 

 VI-2 Conduct Search and Rescue Operations Search and Rescue 

 VI-3 Provide Emergency Triage, Treatment, and 

Stabilization 

EMS 

 VI-4 Decontaminate Patients at Incident Site Fire and First Responders 

 VI-5 Screen Individuals for Agent Contamination EMS 

 VI-6 Decontaminate Individuals at Screening Site EMS 

 VI-7 Treat Patients at Screening Site EMS 

 VI-8 Report Victim Status to EOC/Hospital EMS 

 VI-9 Prepare to Receive Patients Hospital Staff 

 VI-10 Transport Patients to Hospital EMS 

 VI-11 Decontaminate Patients at Hospital Hospital Staff 

 VI-12 Treat Patients at Hospital Hospital Staff 

 VI-13 Track Patient Status/Location EOC Staff/Hospital Staff

 VI-14 Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains EMS/Medical Examiner 

 VI-15 Coordinate Disposition of Human Remains EOC Staff/Medical Examiner 

 VI-16 Notify Next-of-Kin EOC Staff/Hospital Staff 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Tabletop Exercises

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the exercise, evaluators should compile their notes and address the followup analysis 

questions for each selected task. More detailed analysis questions on performance of these tasks during a 

full-scale exercise are found in appendix C, Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide, OperationsBased Exercises. 

1. How would response personnel perform this task? 

2. What decisions would need to be made and who would make them? 

3. Are personnel trained to perform this task? 

4. Are other resources needed and how will they be obtained? 

5. Do plans, policies, and procedures support the performance of this task? Are response 

personnel familiar with these documents? 

6. Do response personnel from multiple agencies or jurisdictions need to work together to 

perform this task? If yes, are the agreements or relationships in place to support its 

performance? 

7. What should be learned from this task? 

8. What improvement actions are recommended?
APPENDIX C

Evaluation Guides—Operations-Based Exercises

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # Outcome/Task Location Response Element 

I. Criminal Prevention and Deterrence 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

II. Emergency Assessment

II-1 Dispatch First Responders and Establish Initial Communications Emergency 

Call Center 

Dispatch (911 Center Staff) 

II-2 Make Immediate Incident Scene Reports Incident Site First Responders 

II-3 Detect and Identify Agent Incident Site HazMat 

II-4 Collect Input for Hazard Assessment EOC/Incident 

Site 

EOC/HazMat/ 

Environmental Protection 

II-5 Make Hazard Assessments and Predictions EOC/Incident 

Site 

EOC/HazMat/ 

Environmental Protection 

II-6 Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations EOC/Incident 

Site EOC Staff or IC/UC 

II-7 Conduct Monitoring and Sampling Incident Site or 

in Community 

Environmental Protection or 

HazMat 

III. Emergency Management 

III-1 Alert and Mobilize EOC Staff EOC EOC Staff 

III-2 Activate, Expand and Operate the EOC EOC EOC Staff 

III-3 Direct and Control Response Operations EOC EOC Staff 

III-4 Notify Government Agencies and Officials EOC EOC Staff 

III-5 Direct Activation of Traffic and Access Control Points EOC EOC Staff (Transportation) 

III-6 Direct and Control Protection of At-Risk Population EOC/Incident 

Site 

EOC Staff (Transportation)/ 

IC 

III-7 Direct Protective Actions for Schools, Day Care Centers, and 

Special Populations 

EOC/Incident 

Site 

EOC Staff (Public 

Health)/IC

III-8 Direct and Control Distribution of Supplies and Equipment Incident Site/ 

EOC 

IC/UC or EOC Staff 

III-9 Request and Coordinate Additional Response Support EOC EOC Staff 

III-10 Request State/Federal Assistance EOC EOC Staff 

III-11 Direct and Control Critical Infrastructure Mitigation EOC EOC Staff (Public Works) 

III-12 Direct and Control Public Information Activities EOC EOC (PIO) 

III-13 Activate and Operate JIC JIC JIC 

III-14 Provide Emergency Public Information to Media and Public JIC PIO/JIC 

III-15 Establish and Maintain Rumor Control Operations JIC PIO 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # Outcome/Task Location Response Element 

IV. Incident Site Hazard Mitigation

IV-1 Isolate Incident Scene and Define Hazard Areas Incident Site First Responders 

IV-2 Establish Incident Command/Unified Command Incident Site IC/UC 

IV-3 Conduct Incident Command Incident Site IC/UC 

IV-4 Maintain Accountability of Responders and Citizens Incident Site IC/UC 

IV-5 Preserve Incident Scene Incident Site First Responders/IC/UC 

IV-6 Direct Agent Release Mitigation Efforts Incident Site IC/UC 

IV-7 Conduct Agent Release Mitigation Efforts Incident Site HazMat 

IV-8 Conduct Firefighting Operations Incident Site Fire Department 

IV-9 Dispatch Bomb Squad 911 Center 911 Center/Dispatch 

IV-10 Assess Incident and Develop Action Plan Incident Site Law Enforcement (Bomb 

Squad) 

IV-11 Execute Incident Action Plan Incident Site Law Enforcement (Bomb 

Squad) 

IV-12 Implement Post-Render-Safe Procedures Incident Site Law Enforcement (Bomb 

Squad) 

IV-13 Decontaminate Responders and Equipment Incident Site Fire Department/HazMat 

V. Protection

V-1 Develop and Implement Protective Action Decisions EOC EOC Staff 

V-2 Prepare and Disseminate Protective Action Messages EOC EOC Staff 

V-3 Activate Traffic and Access Control Points In Community Law Enforcement 

V-4 Coordinate Protective Actions for Special Populations EOC EOC staff 

V-5 Implement Protective Actions for Special Populations In Community Special Population Sites 

V-6 Coordinate Protective Actions for Schools and Day Care Centers EOC EOC Staff 

V-7 Implement Protective Actions for Schools and Day Care Centers In Community Schools and Day Care 

Centers 

V-8 Direct Reception Center Operations EOC EOC Staff 

V-9 Operate Reception Centers In Community Reception Centers 

V-10 Direct Shelter Operations EOC EOC Staff 

V-11 Operate Shelters In Community Shelters 

V-12 Arrange for Veterinary Services EOC EOC Staff 

VI. Victim Care

VI-1 Provide Immediate Emergency Aid Incident Site First Responders (nonEMS) 

VI-2 Conduct Search and Rescue Operations Incident Site Search and Rescue 

VI-3 Provide Emergency Triage, Treatment, and Stabilization Incident Site EMS 

VI-4 Decontaminate Patients at Incident Site Incident Site Fire and First Responders 

VI-5 Screen Individuals for Agent Contamination In Community/ 

Incident Site 

EMS 

VI-6 Decontaminate Individuals at Screening Site In Community EMS 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # Outcome/Task Location Response Element 

VI-7 Treat Patients at Screening Site In Community/ 

Screening Site 

EMS 

VI-8 Report Victim Status to EOC/Hospital Incident Site/ 

In Community 

EMS 

VI-9 Prepare to Receive Patients Hospital Hospital Staff 

VI-10 Transport Patients to Hospital In community EMS 

VI-11 Decontaminate Patients at Hospital Hospital Hospital Staff 

VI-12 Treat Patients at Hospital Hospital Hospital Staff 

VI-13 Track Patient Status/Location EOC/Hospital EOC Staff/Hospital Staff 

VI-14 Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains Incident Site/ 

In Community EMS/Medical Examiner 

VI-15 Coordinate Disposition of Human Remains EOC EOC staff/Medical 

Examiner 

VI-16 Notify Next-of-Kin EOC/Hospital EOC Staff/Hospital Staff 

VII. Criminal Investigation and Apprehension 

VII-1 Dispatch Law Enforcement Incident Site Law Enforcement 

VII-2 Secure Crime Scene Control Incident Site Law Enforcement 

VII-3 Conduct Criminal Investigation Incident Site Law Enforcement 

VII-4 Dispatch SWAT Team Incident Site Law Enforcement/SWAT 

VII-5 Assess Incident and Develop Action Plan Incident Site Law Enforcement/SWAT

VII-6 Conduct Hostage Negotiations Incident Site Law Enforcement/SWAT

VII-7 Conduct Tactical Deployment Incident Site Law Enforcement/SWAT

VII-8 Apprehend Suspect Incident Site Law Enforcement/SWAT

EOC Emergency Operations Center 

IC Incident Command 

UC Unified Command 

JIC Joint Information Center 

PIO Public Information Officer 

EMS Emergency Medical Services

Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # II-1: Dispatch First Responders and Establish Initial Communications 

Outcome: Emergency Assessment Location: Emergency Call 

Center 

Response 

Element: Dispatch (911 Center Staff) Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Receipt of incident information, direct observation, and 911 

call. 

Conditions: Person-to-person, and electronic or telephone 

conversation. 

Expected Outcomes: 911 center receives information and dispatches 

appropriate response units. 

Typical Steps:

1. Record information. 

2. Analyze 911 calls for information, which may indicate a weapons 

of mass destruction incident (e.g., large volume of calls reporting 

sick or injured persons with no known reason; reports of mist or 

cloud; unusual odors; and chemical exposure symptoms, 

explosion, etc.) 

3. Assess response requirements (if not automatic based on dispatch 

matrix already determined). 

4. Alert response units. 

5. Convey hazard information to responders: 

a. Reported signs/symptoms 

b. Approach to the incident (upwind) 

c. Staging areas 

d. Use of personal protective equipment (PPE) if available 

6. Alert other dispatchers and agencies. 

7. Notify adjacent jurisdiction 911 centers and nearby military bases. 

8. Identify communication mechanisms being used by various 

response elements (e.g., police, fire, and emergency medical 

services [EMS]). 

9. Coordinate communication requests for resources. 

10. Address technical difficulties with interoperability among response 

elements and communication overloads. 

11. Establish and maintain communication link between incident site 

and Emergency Operations Center (EOC). 

Consequences: Appropriate first responders are quickly dispatched to 

the incident scene. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Communications Protocols 

1. Was the initiation of the alert, notification, and dispatch of assets conducted in accordance with established 

procedures? Discuss areas that may require improvement or additional attention if appropriate. 

2. Were the pre-established protocols for response adequate to ensure the correct number and type of units and 

equipment were dispatched? Is the response matrix appropriate for the call type? 

3. How did dispatch ensure appropriate administrative personnel and city officials were alerted/notified of the incident? 

4. What procedures are established to maintain a communications link or liaison with the incident scene and the EOC? 

Information Assessment 

5. What pertinent data were collected to facilitate the response? 

6. Describe the adequacy of protocols to obtain threat and victim information from callers, especially as they relate to a 

terrorist incident. 

7. Did the initial notification contain information needed to execute a safe response? 

8. Were personnel able to use data to identify trends and patterns outside normal response for which they were 

dispatched? 

Interoperability

9. Describe how communications were maintained between the various response elements (e.g., police, fire, EMS). How 

were communication requests for resources coordinated between agency dispatchers? 

10. How did dispatch facilitate communications between responding units with interoperability difficulties? 

11. How effective was dispatch in establishing liaison with the EOC? 

Communications System Capacity 

12. Was the communication system adequate to handle calls and demands? 

13. How did dispatch respond to communications overload? 

14. What capability exists to provide backup personnel for dispatch during a critical incident? 

15. What procedures were in place to address personnel rotation? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # II-2: Make Immediate Incident Scene Reports 

Outcome: Emergency Assessment Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: First Responders Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Observations of witnesses, and the incident scene. 

Conditions: Time available; incident scene limitations (e.g., injuries, 

facility damage, fire, wreckage, etc.); response team composition; 

availability of communications systems; weather; and knowledge of 

plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Prompt and accurate (as possible) immediate 

informal report(s) from the incident scene. 

Typical Steps:

1. Arrive at incident scene from safe direction. 

2. Stop at safe distance and quickly obtain information that describes 

the incident: 

a. Number and nature of injuries 

b. Description and nature of the incident scene (type of event) 

3. Communicate the information available to the appropriate dispatch 

center. 

4. Promptly request additional response units as necessary. 

Consequences: Incident Commander is able to analyze data, assess 

the seriousness of the incident, make an initial estimate of the 

incident’s impact, and mobilize appropriate response. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Initial Assessment

1. Did first responders recognize event as terrorism event? What type of event (biological, chemical, explosive, etc.)? 

2. What information was used to make this assessment (e.g., victim symptoms, agent-specific signs, etc.)? 

3. How quickly was the determination made? 

4. Did responding units take proper precautions? What were they? 

5. How did initial units recognize a seriously escalating situation? 

6. How did initial units convey this to other incoming units? 

7. How did responding units consider possible secondary devices? 

Communication and Coordination 

8. Which responders arrived first? 

9. What information did first arriving responders relay to the communications center? Were the initial reports adequate? 

10. In what order did other responders arrive, and how did they coordinate? 

11. Were additional and/or specialty units requested? Which ones? 

Protection and Equipment 

12. Were responding units equipped with appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) to handle the situation? 

13. Were any response personnel contaminated? 

14. Did responders re-assess PPE needs after identifying the incident? 

15. Was appropriate equipment readily available? 

16. Was equipment properly maintained? 

17. Was interchangeable or compatible equipment considered? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # II-3: Detect and Identify Agent 

Outcome: Emergency Assessment Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

HazMat Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Preliminary information on agent from first responders’ 

observations of signs and symptoms.

Conditions: Sampling and monitoring equipment and teams. 

Recognition and analysis of signs and symptoms presented by victims. 

Expected Outcomes: HazMat team determines type of and/or 

identifies agent from collected data. 

Typical Steps:

1. Arrive on scene. 

2. Don appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). 

3. Set up equipment. 

4. Collect information: 

a. To identify agent 

b. To characterize the incident (e.g., offsite meteorological 

information, and readings from air monitoring devices) 

c. About other hazards of concern (e.g., fire, explosives, other 

hazardous materials) 

5. Determine reportable quantity. 

6. Notify Incident Commander of findings. 

Consequences: Emergency Operations Center is able to obtain 

sufficient information to begin hazard assessment. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Responder Protection 

1. Were HazMat personnel equipped with appropriate PPE to handle the situation? 

2. Were any personnel contaminated? Why did they become contaminated? 

Agent Identification Procedures and Equipment 

3. How was the agent identified (e.g., what equipment was used, where was sampling conducted)? 

4. Was sampling conducted in hot and warm zones? Was appropriate equipment readily available? 

5. Did the equipment used function properly? 

6. Did personnel follow standard procedures for using the equipment? 

7. Was interchangeable or compatible equipment considered? 

8. Was specific equipment lacking that could have been useful in agent identification? 

9. Could agent identification time be shortened? How? 

10. Was agent sampling coordinated among all sampling teams, including those provided by other agencies or 

jurisdictions? 

11. Were all teams proficient with the equipment being used (particularly when equipment is shared among multiple 

teams)? 

Notification 

12. Once the agent was identified, who was notified, and how was notification made (e.g., law enforcement, hospitals)? 

13. Whose responsibility is it to notify all the agencies on the scene? How was this done? 

14. Were any notifications missed? Why? 

15. If appropriate, was correct information sent to the National Response Center (NRC) in a timely manner, using the 

NRC Standard Report Form? 

16. Was the agent information relayed to hospitals? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # II-4: Collect Input for Hazard Assessment 

Outcome: Emergency Assessment Location: EOC/Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

EOC/HazMat/Environmental Protection Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Initial reports describing the accident (include information 

about the hazards present, modes of release of the agent, and 

potential for additional releases); periodic update reports describing 

changes in the hazards posed by the accident; hazard description 

source documents; results from monitoring and sampling operations; 

and guidance from the Incident Commander (IC). 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems, 

meteorological monitoring system, and emergency management 

information system; changing conditions at the incident site; changing 

meteorological conditions; and knowledge of plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Hazard analysts are able to assess the 

seriousness of the incident, make an initial estimate of the incident’s 

impact, and produce initial and subsequent hazard assessments and 

predictions. 

Typical Steps: 

1. Receive and confirm initial reports about the incident. 

2. Request additional information as necessary from the IC to allow 

representatives at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to 

make an accurate initial hazard prediction. 

3. Collect other information to characterize the incident (e.g., offsite 

meteorological information and readings from air monitoring 

devices). 

4. Collect information about other hazards of concern (e.g., fire, 

explosives, and other hazardous materials). 

5. Continuously review collected data to support the hazard 

assessment. Request the additional information as required. 

6. Continuously monitor reports and other data to change or refine 

the hazard analysis. 

7. Archive all data in formats that allow for quick retrieval and for 

subsequent analysis, investigation, and official reports. 

Consequences: Production of hazard assessments and predictions is 

not delayed or compromised by incorrect or incomplete information. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Information Sharing 

1. Comment on frequency and adequacy of the information flow between the incident command post and the EOC. 

2. What could have been done to improve the information flow? 

3. Were problems encountered by the EOC in filling resource requests from the IC? What actions could have been taken to 

alleviate those problems? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # II-5: Make Hazard Assessments and Predictions 

Outcome: Emergency Assessment Location: EOC/Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

EOC/HazMat/Environmental Protection Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Data collected for making hazard assessments and 

predictions. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of hazard analysis equipment, 

changing conditions at the accident site, changing meteorological 

conditions, guidance and priorities from the Incident Commander (IC), 

and knowledge of plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Hazard area plots (maps) showing risk areas 

and a predicted hazard area, identification of populations at risk, 

protective action options, monitoring guidance, and information on 

projected plume behavior. 

Typical Steps:

1. Determine the initial actual and predicted hazard area. 

2. In coordination with activities already potentially underway by the 

IC: 

a. If an airborne hazard, determine plume direction and length, 

and populations at risk 

b. Support field operations by identifying areas to monitor beyond 

the immediate incident scene 

c. Predict plume behavior (tail/tip times) to aid in protective action 

decision-making 

d. Conduct new analyses in near real time to reflect changing 

conditions and site mitigation efforts 

3. Conduct consequence management analyses to determine if other 

populations might become at risk and determine areas to conduct 

monitoring operations to validate the hypothetical situation. 

4. Confirm the validity and reliability of model outputs. 

5. Provide model and analysis results to surrounding communities as 

necessary. 

Consequences: Accurate information is developed as input to making 

protective action decisions (e.g., evacuation/shelter-in-place). 

Appropriate adjustments are made as conditions change. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause.

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Was information/data coordinated and communicated among response elements? 

2. Did the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), in consultation with the IC, analyze information/data to formulate 

mitigation and corrective actions? 

3. What additional resources did the EOC consider activating to support the IC (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency 

Emergency Response Team, U.S. Coast Guard Strike Team, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 

Support Team, FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit)? 

4. What hazard modeling software was used to make chemical plume predictions? 

5. How did the hazard plume generated by the model compare with “exercise truth”? 

6. What assumptions were used as data inputs in the model? 

7. Were data limitations and error potential in the model provided to decision-makers? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # II-6: Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations 

Outcome: Emergency Assessment Location: EOC/Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff or IC/UC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Hazard analysis results showing predicted extent of the 

hazard. Monitoring and sampling requests from the accident site. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of communications systems, 

availability of monitoring and sampling equipment, availability of 

monitoring and sampling teams, availability of laboratory support, 

meteorological and topographical conditions, physical constraints at 

monitoring and sampling locations, plans and procedures, and 

memorandums of agreement/memorandums of understanding 

regarding response phase monitoring and sampling. 

Expected Outcomes: Monitoring and sampling teams are deployed to 

the correct locations to collect information that accurately characterizes 

the hazard area. 

Typical Steps:

1. Develop a wide-area monitoring and sampling plan that provides for 

sample chain-of-custody and independent confirmation of sample results, 

and is consistent with hazard analysis results. 

2. Coordinate with field locations and other affected jurisdictions to 

determine safe routes to monitoring and sampling locations. 

3. Coordinate third-party observation of monitoring and sampling teams. 

4. Dispatch monitoring and sampling teams in support of field operations. 

5. Provide dispatch instructions that include safe routes to each monitoring 

and sampling location and access to public and private property. 

6. Track the deployment of all monitoring and sampling teams. 

7. Arrange for laboratory testing of samples. 

8. Obtain hardcopy sampling assay results from laboratories. 

9. Re-deploy monitoring and sampling teams based on results of monitoring, 

sampling, and laboratory analysis or changes in priorities made by the 

Incident Commander or the Emergency Operations Center. 

10. Coordinate the return of deployed monitoring assets. 

11. Store monitoring and sampling results in a hazard assessment and 

prediction database. 

Consequences: Monitoring and sampling results are available to 

make decisions about protecting emergency responders and 

populations at risk, site mitigation, and reentry. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements.

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Comment on the appropriateness and effectiveness of monitoring and sampling operations by all resources utilized. 

2. What might have been done differently to create greater effectiveness of operations? 

3. Was information that was developed coordinated, and shared among the response agencies? 

4. Which agency coordinated the monitoring and sampling operations? 

5. Would effectiveness have been enhanced if a different agency were lead? Which agency and why?
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # II-7: Conduct Monitoring and Sampling 

Outcome: Emergency Assessment Location: Incident Site or in 

Community 

Response 

Element: 

Environmental Protection or HazMat Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Instructions to monitor and sample for the presence of a 

chemical agent. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of communications systems, 

availability of monitoring and sampling equipment, availability of 

monitoring and sampling teams, availability of laboratory support, 

availability of plans and procedures, availability of position locating 

tools, meteorological and topographical conditions, physical 

constraints at monitoring and sampling locations, plans and 

procedures, and memorandums of agreement /memorandums of 

understanding regarding offsite response phase monitoring and 

sampling. 

Expected Outcomes: Monitoring and sampling teams collect 

authentic, credible information about chemical agent hazards. 

Typical Steps:

1. Perform pre-operation checks and inventory of vehicles, 

equipment, supplies, and systems. 

2. Bring all vehicles and equipment needed for field operations to 

operating status; calibrate the monitoring equipment. 

3. Establish reliable communication with hazard analysts 

coordinating the monitoring and sampling operations. 

4. Proceed to the designated monitoring or sampling locations by the 

designated safe route. 

5. Conduct monitoring and sampling operations. 

6. Maintain sample chain-of-custody and avoid cross-contamination. 

Allow for verification of sample by independent third-party 

observers during the collection process. 

7. Validate monitoring results in the field IAW monitoring protocols. 

8. Field assay of samples from the IAW sample collection protocols. 

9. Deliver samples for assay to approved laboratories IAW sample 

collection and analysis protocols. 

10. Process equipment and personnel for decontamination. 

Consequences: Monitoring and sampling information is not 

compromised by lack of authenticity or credibility. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. What equipment was used to conduct monitoring and sampling? Was the equipment used appropriate for the 

incident? 

2. Where were monitoring and sampling conducted? 

3. Which agency determined these locations? 

4. Were available resources properly coordinated on-scene? 

5. How could monitoring and sampling operations be improved? 

6. Note any innovative or unusual procedures used by monitoring and sampling teams. 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-1: Alert and Mobilize EOC Staff 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Incident notification and determination that partial or full 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staffing is necessary. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, availability of 

EOC staff, plume direction, knowledge of plans and procedures, and 

current EOC staff rosters. 

Expected Outcomes: The EOC is staffed with personnel to manage 

the jurisdiction's response. 

Typical Steps:

1. Determine whether plume direction restricts EOC staff routes to 

the EOC. 

2. Recall required EOC staff using appropriate procedures and 

advise of route restrictions, if any. 

3. Safely proceed to the EOC. 

Consequences: Direction and control of critical public protection 

operations are provided for the duration of the jurisdiction’s response. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Was the emergency management director or designated alternate notified of the incident in a timely manner? How 

was this notification made? 

2. Did the appropriate authority authorize activation of the EOC? Who authorized the activation (name and title)? 

3. Did dispatch/communications initiate alert/recall procedures for EOC personnel? Was the recall list current? 

4. Was the EOC accessible to the agencies or participants represented? Where was it located? 

5. Was the EOC established in a safe and secure area? What security measures were used? 

6. Did the appropriate staff respond to the recall? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-2: Activate, Expand, and Operate the EOC 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Decision to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and 

EOC staff mobilization. 

Conditions: Current facility operating status, time available for EOC staff to 

respond to the EOC, availability of needed equipment and facilities, availability 

of communication systems, availability of EOC staff, and knowledge of plans 

and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: The EOC achieves its full operational status quickly 

and maintains this level of effort for the duration of the response. 

Typical Steps:

1. Upgrade facility from current to emergency status. 

2. Follow procedures for removing equipment from storage locations, ensure 

equipment is operating properly, prepare facility for emergency use, and 

review plans and procedures appropriate to the incident. 

3. Concurrently with EOC activation or expansion, confirm that EOC 

communications systems (primary, backup, and alternate) are operational. 

Maintain an uninterrupted capability for the duration of the response. 

Immediately correct communications system malfunctions. 

4. Brief EOC staff on the status of the incident and current response 

activities upon their arrival and at regular intervals thereafter. 

5. Provide command, control, coordination, and leadership of emergency 

response activities. 

6. Establish and maintain security throughout the response. 

7. Promptly post information about the incident and decisions in the EOC. 

The information is archived for subsequent analysis, investigation, and 

preparation of official reports. 

8. Plan for uninterrupted 24-hour operation to include publication of 

schedules that cover all shifts with adequate staff. 

9. Maintain continuous EOC operations during rest, meal breaks, and shift 

changes. Conduct shift transition briefings in accordance with plans and 

procedures. 

Consequences: Direction and control of critical response operations are 

performed without interruptions caused by lapses in EOC staffing, 

communications systems malfunctions, or shortfalls in facility capabilities. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Activation/Notification 

1. Did the Emergency Management Director (EMD) declare a local emergency in accordance with the Emergency 

Operations Plan (EOP)? 

2. What procedures were established to maintain a communications link or liaison with the incident scene and the EOC? 

3. Were current listings of key personnel and their telephone numbers for EOC activation available and used? What 

procedures are established to ensure the list(s) are current? 

4. Were the participants you observed stopped and identified prior to entering the EOC? How was this conducted? 

5. Were all agencies advised of the EOC’s location? What agencies were notified? 

6. Were copies of the EOP made available for all EOC personnel? When was this plan last updated? 

7. Were the plan implemented appropriately? Was the EOC organized by functions according to the EOP? What were 

the functional areas activated in the EOC? 

8. Was the activation and response coordinated and efficient? 

9. Were arriving staff appropriately briefed upon their arrival? 

Roles and Responsibilities 

10. Did the EMD or the designated alternate assume overall control of EOC operations? 

11. What were the name and title of the person assuming control? 

12. Describe the overall level of control maintained in the EOC—did the EMD maintain appropriate control? 

13. Describe the EMD’s use of available resources and staff positions—were they appropriately used to maximize 

efficiency and effective response operations? Were staff sufficiently trained to accomplish their duties? 

14. Did the EMD understand all functions to be carried out by different staff? 

15. Does the EMD have authority to use necessary resources to mitigate the emergency and coordinate additional 

elements? 

16. What liaisons from participating agencies/departments were present at the EOC? 

17. Did the liaisons have decision-making authority for their respective agencies? If not, who had this authority? 

18. Were the agencies/departments you observed properly equipped to perform their functions? Please list any missing 

tools. 

19. Were a determination of incident stabilization and termination of command made? How and by whom? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-3: Direct and Control Response Operations 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports from the incident site and the incident command post 

(ICP). 

Conditions: Time available, conditions at the incident site, availability 

of trained emergency responders, emergency plans and procedures, 

and conditions at variance with plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Direction and control of response activities are 

established, and activities of responders are properly directed and 

coordinated to ensure maximum efficiency of response operations. 

Typical Steps:

1. Assist the Incident Commander (IC) and staff in 

developing/implementing action plans and alternate plans to 

confine, collect, and contain the release. 

2. Monitor communication between responders and the ICP, and 

receive reports regarding the status of search and rescue and site 

mitigation operations. Make recommendations to the IC and staff 

regarding adjustments to these operations based on the situation 

presented. 

3. Direct the dispatch of available additional responders if on-scene 

needs are beyond the capabilities of the responders. 

4. Direct the dispatch of specialized responders (e.g., firefighters, 

Emergency Operations Director [EOD]) if such assets are required 

to support site operations. 

5. Assist the IC and staff in developing and implementing mitigation 

plans. 

6. Monitor communication between responders and the ICP, and 

receive reports regarding the status of mitigation operations. Make 

recommendations to the IC and the ICP staff regarding 

adjustments to these operations based on the situation presented. 

Consequences: Search and rescue and site mitigation operations 

occur quickly and successfully, eliminating further risk to the 

environment, workers, and general population. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Operations 

1. Were Emergency Operations Center (EOC) operations consistent with plans, procedures, and protocols? Were plans 

sufficient for response to a weapons of mass destruction incident? 

2. Does the EMD have authority to use necessary resources to mitigate the emergency and coordinate additional 

elements? 

3. Did the EOC, in consultation with the Incident Commander (IC), analyze information/data to formulate mitigation and 

corrective actions? 

4. Did EOC personnel maintain an account of incident events? How was this done? 

5. Did the liaisons have decision-making authority for their respective agencies? If not, who had this authority? 

6. Did members of the agencies/departments that you evaluated maintain personnel accountability throughout the 

incident? How was this maintained? 

7. Were progress reports given to all agencies when necessary? How often and by whom? 

Coordination 

8. Was the response to the incident unified and integrated? Did the agencies involved in this exercise demonstrate good 

teamwork and coordination? 

9. Were there written agreements in place between appropriate agencies? 

10. Were functional areas of responsibility assigned for direction/control and coordination? 

11. How was the multijurisdiction/regional incident coordinated? 

12. Were mutual aid plans implemented? 

13. Was information/data coordinated and communicated among response elements? 

14. Based on your observations, would you say communication with other agencies was adequate? On site, face to face? 

On site, radio? On site, agency to agency? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-4: Notify Government Agencies and Officials 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports describing the incident, and initial and updated hazard 

analyses. 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; 

knowledge of plans, procedures, laws, regulations, and memorandums 

of agreement/memorandums of understanding. 

Expected Outcomes: All appropriate Federal, State, and local officials 

and agencies are informed about the incident and significant changes 

to the situation before the media and the public. 

Typical Steps:

1. Make initial and followup notifications to local (adjacent and 

nonadjacent), State, and Federal response and law enforcement 

agencies. 

2. Notify local government officials of significant changes to the 

situation prior to distributing press releases concerning the 

incident. 

Consequences: Local, State, and Federal government officials have 

correct information. The near-site Emergency Operations Center’s 

credibility as being responsible for public health and safety is not 

compromised. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. What led to the decision to notify county, State, and higher offices? 

2. Was there a coordinated response in sharing of information with local, State, and Federal agencies and officials? 

3. Are the roles and functions of each level of government recognized, understood, and adequately performed? 

4. Were all potentially impacted jurisdictions considered and included in coordination? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-5: Direct Activation of Traffic and Access Control Points 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: EOC Staff (Transportation) Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Evacuation order for the population at risk, selected evacuation routes, 

and defined predicted hazard area. 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; availability 

of personnel; availability of vehicles, barricades, and other traffic control 

equipment; predetermined access control points (ACP)/traffic control points 

(TCP) locations; pertinent maps, diagrams, and plans; weather and 

environmental conditions; and situations at variance with assumptions in plans 

and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: TCPs are in place in time to support the evacuation 

order and facilitate an orderly evacuation, and access to the predicted hazard 

area is prevented. 

Typical Steps:

1. Review selected evacuation routes. Identify situations that could cause 

traffic queues to form. Modify the evacuation routes to mitigate the effects 

of these conditions. 

2. Select ad hoc traffic control points, which support the selected evacuation 

routes. Identify locations for access control points. Determine whether 

locations are to be staffed or not. 

3. Dispatch traffic and access control crews (e.g., police, fire, and public 

works) with appropriate vehicles, equipment, and materials to specified 

control points. 

4. Direct changing of traffic lights at locations to facilitate traffic movement. 

5. Dispatch highway department crews to clear evacuation routes of snow or 

debris as required. 

6. Dispatch tow trucks to locations for handling disabled vehicles and 

dispensing emergency gasoline supplies. 

7. Brief TCP crews on modifications to evacuation routes. Provide all 

evacuation support crews appropriate maps, diagrams, and implementing 

instructions. 

8. Contact appropriate government organizations or businesses to block 

access to the predicted hazard area by rail, water, and air traffic. 

9. Coordinate traffic and access control activities with the adjacent 

jurisdictions. 

10. Direct the repositioning of TCPs or ACPs and/or mobilizing additional 

resources as changes in conditions occur. 

11. Review rosters to assure continuous, 24-hour operation, and assign traffic 

and access control personnel to tasks and shifts where they are most 

needed. Provide a transition or situation briefing to later shift personnel 

before they begin work. 

Consequences: The population at risk and population at large are protected 

from exposure to a chemical agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or 

impede achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Decision-Making 

1. Did the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) transportation representative identify situations that might result in traffic 

jams (e.g., tollbooths, railroad crossings, lane reductions, barriers)? How were the problems handled? 

2. How were TCPs identified? Were they predetermined? Did they support the selected evacuation routes? 

3. How were ACPs selected? Were they sufficient to prevent unauthorized people from entering the hazard area? 

Communication and Coordination

4. How well did the EOC communicate with traffic and access control crews? Which departments were contacted and 

what responsibilities did each perform? 

5. How were TCP crews briefed? What information was provided? Was it sufficient? 

6. Which agencies were contacted to prevent transport access to the hazard area? What actions did these agencies 

take to prevent access? 

7. What other jurisdictions were contacted? How was this decision made? How often were these agencies provided 

updates? 

8. How often were TCPs and ACPs repositioned? What information was used to make this decision? Who was notified 

of these changes (e.g., other jurisdictions)? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-6: Direct and Control Protection of At-Risk Population 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC/Incident Site 

Response 

Element: EOC Staff (Transportation)/IC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Protective action decisions warning provided to the population 

at risk; selected evacuation routes; and pertinent maps, diagrams, and 

plans. 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; 

availability of responders; availability and condition of evacuation 

routes; availability of transportation assets; warning information given 

to the at-risk population; preselected traffic control points (TCPs), 

assembly points, and evacuation routes; situations at variance with 

assumptions in plans and procedures; and population’s familiarity with 

evacuation plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Appropriate support is provided for protecting 

the population inside the predicted hazard area until all personnel are 

safe and accounted for, and no persons remain inside the predicted 

hazard area except for authorized emergency responders. 

Typical Steps:

1. Obtain information from first responders on who was inside the 

predicted hazard area when the incident occurred. 

2. Confirm that the population inside the predicted hazard area was 

alerted and given correct, specific sheltering and evacuation 

instructions, using appropriate warning systems. 

3. Coordinate evacuation routes with appropriate authorities and 

agencies, including other jurisdictions. 

4. Receive accountability and protection status reports for the 

population inside the security cordon and predicted hazard area 

from security forces, field supervisors, and the Incident 

Commander. 

5. Direct and coordinate additional assistance as required. 

6. Determine when it is appropriate for the sheltered population to 

leave their shelters and begin subsequent evacuation. 

7. Adjust the assembly points, evacuation routes, TCPs, and ACPs to 

accommodate unforeseen events and to facilitate reentry when 

this is authorized. 

Consequences: No unprotected persons are exposed to hazards from 

the incident. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. What information did first responders provide about who was inside the hazard area? 

2. How did the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) confirm that this population was given appropriate information? 

3. Which agencies were contacted regarding coordination of evacuation routes? 

4. What information was provided from the Incident Command Post? 

5. How did the EOC make decisions regarding sheltered population? What decision was made? Who was involved in 

decision-making? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-7: Direct Protective Actions for Schools, Day Care Centers, and Special 

Populations 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC/Incident Site 

Response 

Element: EOC Staff (Public Health)/IC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Protective action decision for schools, day care centers, and 

special populations. 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; 

information on size and location of affected populations; sheltering 

options (expedient, enhanced, pressurized) for the school; lists of host 

facilities; weather and other environmental conditions; selected 

evacuation routes; availability of transportation assets; and situations 

at variance with assumptions in plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: All school and day care students and staff as 

well as special populations are sheltered in place or are promptly and 

safely evacuated to host facilities, and caretakers are notified. 

Typical Steps:

1. Identify at-risk schools, day care centers, and special population facilities. 

2. Contact at-risk schools, day care centers, and special population facilities 

to inform them of the protective action to be implemented for their specific 

situation. Obtain information about any assistance they may need. 

3. Compile resource requests and contact resource providers to obtain 

needed support. 

4. Stage transportation assets. Brief drivers on the hazard area, routes to 

follow, emergency procedures, pickup points, and final destinations. 

5. Coordinate with traffic control personnel to expedite movement of 

transportation assets to and from affected facilities. 

6. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) notifies host schools, day care 

facilities, or other facilities and reception centers to prepare to receive 

evacuees. 

7. If affected facilities were directed to shelter in place, provide appropriate 

assistance for implementing sheltering measures. 

8. Promptly communicate changes in directed protective actions (e.g., from 

shelter in place to evacuation) to the affected facilities. Repeat previous 

steps, as appropriate, to support the change in protective action. 

9. Provide caretakers and public at large with information regarding 

protective actions taken at individual affected facilities, the location of host 

facilities, and procedures for reuniting with their family members. 

Consequences: The population at risk and population at large are 

protected from exposure to an agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. How were at-risk facilities identified? What information was used, how was it provided, and who provided it? 

2. How were facilities contacted? What information was requested of them? 

3. How was transportation coordinated? Who was involved in obtaining the appropriate transportation assets and 

directing them to the appropriate location? 

4. How were host facilities identified? What information were they provided? 

5. How was the decision made to evacuate or shelter in place? 

6. How were the caretakers of the affected population notified? What information were they provided? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-8: Direct and Control Distribution of Supplies and Equipment 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: Incident Site/EOC 

Response 

Element: 

IC/UC or EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Team: Incident command post staff, staging area, and Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC). 

Inputs: Agent contamination remaining at and around the incident site 

following release control operations, and other contaminated 

equipment, supplies, and materials. 

Conditions: Time available; conditions at the incident scene; 

availability of communications systems; availability of trained workers; 

availability of equipment and supplies; and plans, procedures, and 

regulations regarding mitigating the effects of an agent release. 

Expected Outcomes: Sufficient equipment, vehicles, and supplies are 

available to control and mitigate the release and to perform related 

support tasks. 

Typical Steps:

1. Dedicate available supplies, equipment, and vehicles to support 

release control and mitigation operations at the incident site. 

2. Test, inspect, and repackage supplies and equipment for issue to 

response teams. 

3. Issue supplies to responders on demand. 

4. Track supply and equipment usage rates to forecast rates of issue 

and to accurately account for costs associated with the response. 

Factor contamination losses for durable and non-expendable 

supplies and equipment used at the incident site when compiling 

usage rates. Report high supply and equipment issue rates to the 

EOC logistical staff. 

5. Have equipment and vehicles identified for release control and 

mitigation operations prepared for use by motor pool or facility 

engineer personnel. 

Consequences: Release control and mitigation operations are 

sustained for the duration of the response to the incident. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Were appropriate procedures in place to locate, acquire, distribute, and account for services, resources, materials, 

and facilities procured or donated to support the response? 

2. Was the resource allocation plan applied appropriately? 

3. How were equipment/supply priorities established? 

4. How was equipment usage tracked? What information was provided and by whom? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-9: Request and Coordinate Additional Response Support 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports from the incident scene or incident command post 

(ICP) identifying the need for personnel, supplies, and equipment for 

response operations. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems; availability of 

responders; availability of supplies and equipment; memorandums of 

agreement; and plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Sufficient personnel, equipment, and supplies 

are available for search and rescue and site mitigation operations, and 

to perform related support tasks. 

Typical Steps:

1. Solicit information about usage rates for supplies and equipment 

from the ICP. 

2. Compare inventory of available supplies and equipment with 

known and projected requirements to support search and rescue, 

containment, and mitigation operations. Identify shortfalls and 

priorities. Determine the most expedient sources for obtaining 

needed supplies and equipment. 

3. Solicit information about the need for additional trained responders 

and resources above those available from jurisdiction resources. 

Determine shortfalls and priorities. Determine the most expedient 

sources for obtaining additional resources. 

4. Obtain responders and emergency supplies and equipment from 

the State or adjacent jurisdictions. 

5. Arrange for the receipt and internal distribution of supplies and 

equipment to sustain response operations. 

6. Arrange for the arrival, transportation, feeding, and lodging of 

augmentees. Assign augmentees to tasks and shifts. 

Consequences: Response operations are sustained for the duration 

of the response to the incident. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause.

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. What information did the ICP provide about usage rates? How often were updates provided? 

2. Who compared the inventory with projected usage? Where did inventory information come from? 

3. How was information obtained about additional trained responders? Who was contacted? 

4. How was new equipment tracked? 

5. How were priorities for distributing additional equipment made? 

6. Was the need for additional resources or specialized teams (e.g., Metropolitan Medical Strike Team, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction – Civil Support Team, and U.S. Public Health Service ) assessed, in consultation with the Incident 

Commander, and were steps taken to obtain their help? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-10: Request State/Federal Assistance 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Need for additional personnel, supplies, and equipment for 

response operations; 42 US Code 68 (Disaster Relief); and 

memorandums of agreement/memorandums of understanding with 

other jurisdictions for provision of emergency personnel, supplies, and 

equipment. 

Conditions: Availability of trained responders, and inventory of 

supplies and equipment versus requirements. 

Expected Outcomes: Local and State declarations of emergency are 

prepared, signed, and transmitted to higher authorities. Sufficient 

personnel, equipment, and supplies are made available. 

Typical Steps:

1. Identify any shortfalls in personnel, emergency supplies, 

equipment, or other resources that affect the ability to respond to 

the emergency. 

2. Confirm that appropriate emergency management officials have 

determined that effective response is beyond local capability and 

that additional assistance is necessary. Local declaration of 

emergency is prepared and forwarded to the Governor’s office or 

other appropriate agency. At the State level, the Governor makes 

a determination that the emergency situation is of such severity 

and magnitude that Federal assistance is necessary. 

3. Prepare the State declaration of emergency describing the State 

and local efforts and resources that have been, or will be, used to 

alleviate the emergency, and defining the type and extent of 

Federal aid required. The Governor signs the declaration and 

forwards it to appropriate Federal authorities. 

Consequences: Hazard is mitigated because appropriate assistance 

and resources become available. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause.

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Was the need for additional resources or specialized teams (e.g., Metropolitan Medical Strike Team, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction – Civil Support Team, U.S. Public Health Service) assessed, in consultation with the Incident 

Commander, and were steps taken to obtain their help? 

2. Were the State and county advised of the local declaration and updated on the city’s activities? 

3. Did the emergency management director request (from the State) that the State EOC be activated and a State 

emergency be declared? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-11: Direct and Control Critical Infrastructure Mitigation 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: EOC Staff (Public Works) Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports from the incident scene or incident command post 

(ICP) identifying the need for personnel, supplies, and equipment for 

debris removal, infrastructure stabilization, and damage assessment. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, availability of 

public works staff, availability of supplies and equipment, knowledge of 

plans and procedures, and knowledge of plans and procedures for 

contaminated equipment. 

Expected Outcomes: Sufficient personnel, equipment, and supplies 

are available for debris removal, damage assessment and 

infrastructure stabilization, mapping, and performance of related public 

works support tasks. 

Typical Steps:

1. Establish priorities to clear roads, repair damaged water/sewer 

systems, and coordinate the provision of temporary, alternate, or 

interim sources of emergency power and water/sewer services. 

2. Identify water and sewer service, restoration, debris management, 

potable water supply, and engineering requirements as soon as 

possible. 

3. Evaluate status of current resources to support public works 

operations. 

4. Allocate existing and available resources. 

5. Request additional resources as needed. 

6. Accurately account for costs associated with response. 

7. Begin damage assessment for recovery. 

8. Identify equipment exposed to the agent for decontamination. 

Consequences: Direction and control of critical public works 

operations are provided for the duration of the jurisdiction’s response. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause.

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Notification 

1. Why was public works notified? By whom? What preliminary information was given? 

2. Did personnel arrive in a timely manner? Were appropriate equipment/resources brought on scene? 

Response 

3. What type of resources or assistance did public works provide? 

4. Were public works personnel able to apply the appropriate equipment? 

5. Did they recognize the capability and limitations of the equipment? 

6. How was coordination among responding assets organized? 

7. Was the response coordinated efficiently? What methods could have been incorporated that would have improved 

these efforts? 

8. Was debris removal conducted appropriately and safely? 

9. Were precautions, safeguards, or any additional coordination implemented to protect responders from contamination? 

10. How was evidentiary integrity of debris and contaminated debris maintained to an appropriate degree? 

11. Was damage assessment conducted according to standard procedures? 

Safety 

12. Was a safety supervisor assigned? 

13. What plans and procedures were in place to ensure worker safety? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-12: Direct and Control Public Information Activities 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: EOC (PIO) Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports describing the incident, information regarding the 

State’s response, other emergency information, and broadcast and 

published media reports. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, the impact of the 

incident statewide, the location of the Joint Information Center (JIC), 

availability of safe routes to the JIC, availability of public information 

staff, plans and procedures for emergency public information 

programs, memorandums of agreement (MOA) and procedures for 

using a Joint Information System, and activating and operating a JIC. 

Expected Outcomes: The JIC is activated and operated in 

accordance with established protocols and MOAs, and without 

interruptions in providing timely and accurate emergency information to 

the public. 

Typical Steps:

1. The Public Information Officer (PIO) and public information staff 

conduct initial public information activities from the Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC) or other designated area(s). 

2. The PIO coordinates with PIOs from other agencies to determine 

their ability to support, activate, and operate the JIC. The PIO 

advises the Emergency Management Director (EMD) on the status 

of public information and makes recommendations for activating 

the JIC. 

3. The EMD directs the activation of the JIC (see Task III-13). 

4. The EMD assigns the PIO and/or public affairs to the EOC and the 

JIC according to staff availability, response priorities, and the JIC 

plan. 

5. The PIO announces the shift of focus for the jurisdiction’s public 

information activities from the EOC to the JIC once it is activated 

and operating. 

6. The PIO and/or the public affairs staff keep the EMD informed 

about JIC operations so that the direction and control of public 

information activities can be adjusted to suit the circumstances. 

Consequences: The public receives accurate and timely information 

about the incident, and the credibility of public authorities and public 

confidence in the State EOC is maintained. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause.

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Communications Plan 

1. Was a single media point of contact established early in the incident? Who and where? 

2. Was a media conference area established? Was the need for regular briefings and information releases recognized 

and acted upon? Who provided the briefings? 

3. How did the agencies involved prepare and coordinate news releases for dissemination, and/or conduct press 

conferences for the local media? 

4. What actions were taken within dispatch to handle public inquiries? 

5. What procedures were used to ensure essential incident information was provided to the PIO? 

6. How was the media plan developed? Was it implemented in an effective and timely manner? 

Dissemination of Public Information 

7. What procedures were used to publicly disseminate information? 

8. What information was provided to the public to educate them about potential hazards and risk reduction methods? 

9. How was use of the Emergency Broadcast System coordinated to disseminate information to the public? 

10. How did the media plan use media outlets to keep the public informed? 

Agency Coordination Protocols 

11. Were progress reports given to all agencies where necessary? How often and by whom? 

12. Were updates given to supporting agencies/organizations? How often were updates provided? 

13. How was critical/sensitive information disseminated to agencies (e.g., in person, by telephone, by radio)? 

14. What measures were taken to coordinate with the Governor’s press secretary on a recurring basis? 

15. How was coordination established with the myriad of Federal and State agencies before their inclusion in the JIC? 

16. What measures were taken to ensure a common government message? 

17. Was a JIC established? Why or why not? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-13: Activate and Operate JIC 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: JIC 

Response 

Element: 

JIC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Decision to activate the Joint Information Center (JIC). 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems; the impact of the incident 

on the community; the location of the JIC; availability of safe routes to the JIC; 

availability of public information staff; plans and procedures for emergency 

public information programs; memorandums of agreement; plans and 

procedures for activating and operating a JIC; and availability of JIC facilities, 

supplies, and equipment. 

Expected Outcomes: A JIC fully capable of performing all emergency public 

information operations is established. There is a continual flow of information 

among the JIC, the respective Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and 

other participating response organizations; interruptions in providing timely and 

accurate emergency public information do not occur. 

Typical Steps:

1. Open the JIC. 

2. Inform EOC and other appropriate authorities that the JIC is operational 

and that direction and control of public affairs/public information activities 

have shifted from the EOC to the JIC. 

3. Promptly post response information in the JIC. Archive this information 

upon receipt of subsequent analysis and investigations and preparation of 

official reports. 

4. Plan for and maintain uninterrupted 24-hour operation to include 

publication of schedules that cover all shifts with adequate staff. 

5. Provide the media with briefings on significant events in a coordinated, 

complete, accurate, and timely manner. 

6. Monitor media reports for accuracy to identify items that may cause a 

misunderstanding of emergency instructions to the public or that 

misrepresent the response. Contact the media to amplify, clarify, or 

correct information. 

7. Arrange use of a facility for media briefings. 

8. Maintain a log of all media inquiries. 

9. Track rumors or misinformation from either media accounts or the public 

and bring to the attention of the Public Information Officer (PIO) for 

clarification and correction as appropriate. 

Consequences: Information disseminated to the public is coordinated and 

consistent; the credibility of public authorities and public confidence in their 

ability to respond to the incident are not compromised; and JIC operations are 

sustained for the duration of the response to the incident. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause.

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

JIC Activation 

1. What factors drove the establishment of a JIC?

2. Did public information staff report to the EOC or JIC in a timely manner? 

3. What agencies and organizations were represented in the JIC? 

4. Were any agencies missing that should have been included in the JIC? Who and why? 

5. What local procedures were followed to establish a JIC? 

6. Discuss which agency has the lead and who has final policy and decision authority over the JIC (e.g., director of 

emergency management, mayor, or city manager). 

JIC Operation

7. How was the location of the JIC determined? How was information disseminated to agencies and media? 

8. Was the JIC organized to effectively execute its role? Were supporting agencies adequately staffed and equipped to 

perform their functions in the JIC? 

9. What plans have been developed to support a JIC expansion to accommodate Federal and State involvement? 

10. What actions were taken to set criteria for and control of access to the JIC? 

11. How was coordination established with the myriad of Federal and State agencies before their inclusion in the JIC? 

12. Did media and public affairs personnel report to the EOC or JIC in a timely manner? 

13. What was the procedure for the approval of press releases? Who had final approval authority? 

14. Were public messages correct and consistent among JIC staff and remote public information staff? 

15. What messages were inconsistent? Why? What was the impact? 

JIC Staffing and Equipment

16. What volume of calls (media and public) did the JIC have to manage? 

17. How adequate was the staffing in relation to the call volume and need to prepare press releases and briefings? 

18. How adequate was the equipment provided (computers, fax, copiers, telephones, etc.) to manage the volume of 

 public and media inquiries?
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-14: Provide Emergency Public Information to Media and Public 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: JIC 

Team: PIO/JIC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports describing the incident, information regarding the 

State’s response, protective action decisions or other emergency 

information, and broadcast and published media reports. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, the impact of the 

incident on the community, the location of the Joint Information Center 

(JIC), availability of public information staff, plans and procedures for 

emergency public information programs, memorandums of agreement, 

and procedures for activating and operating a JIC. 

Expected Outcomes: Prompt, accurate, consistent, and responsive 

emergency information is provided to the public. 

Typical Steps:

1. Gather information about the incident, the response, and the 

emergency information to be provided to the public. 

2. Prepare media releases to provide the public with updated or new 

emergency information. 

3. Coordinate the content of the media releases prior to 

dissemination. 

4. Disseminate media releases according to plans and procedures. 

5. Send copies of all media releases via fax or e-mail to the affected 

jurisdictions’ Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and others 

as appropriate. 

6. Spokespersons from appropriate agencies provide the media with 

briefings on significant events in a coordinated, complete, 

accurate, and timely manner. 

7. Monitor media reports for accuracy to identify items that may 

cause a misunderstanding of emergency instructions to the public 

or that misrepresent the response. The Public Information Officer 

(PIO) or the JIC staff contact the media to amplify, clarify, or 

correct information. 

8. Arrange use of a facility for media briefings; prepare graphic 

materials, video or still photos, and copies of news releases, and 

announce the time and place for the briefing in sufficient time to 

permit media coverage. 

9. Reply to media inquiries with coordinated, authorized information 

that is accurate, clear, and complete in a timely manner. 

10. Maintain a log of all media inquiries. 

Consequences: The correct populations identify themselves as being 

in danger and comply with suggested protective actions; the credibility 

of public authorities and public confidence in their ability to respond to 

the incident are not compromised.

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause.

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this?

9 What corrective actions are recommended?

Information Gathering and Analysis 

1. How did the public information staff gather and share essential incident information from the response organization? 

2. How did the public information staff gather information from the public and media to ensure that their message was 

being properly received? 

3. What trends in media reporting were identified and provided to the PIO and emergency management officials? 

4. What trends in public inquiries and rumors were identified and provided to the PIO and emergency management 

officials? 

Dissemination of Public Information 

5. What procedures were used to publicly disseminate information? 

6. How frequently were press releases issued? 

7. What information was provided to the public to educate them about potential hazards and risk reduction methods? 

8. How was this information checked with technical experts to ensure it was accurate before release? 

9. What procedures were used for press release approval? 

10. How was use of the Emergency Broadcast System coordinated to disseminate information to the public? 

11. How did the media plan use media outlets to keep the public informed? 

Agency Coordination Protocols 

12. Were progress reports given to all agencies where necessary? How often and by whom? 

13. Were updates given to supporting agencies/organizations? How often were updates provided? 

14. How was critical/sensitive information disseminated to agencies (e.g., in person, by telephone, by radio)? 

15. What measures were taken to coordinate with the Governor’s press secretary on a recurring basis? 

16. How was coordination established with the myriad of Federal and State agencies before their inclusion in the JIC? 

17. What measures were taken to ensure a common government message? 

18. Was a JIC established? Why or why not? 

 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # III-15: Establish and Maintain Rumor Control Operations 

Outcome: Emergency Management Location: JIC 

Team: PIO Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports describing the biological incident/outbreak, 

information regarding the State’s response, protective action decisions 

or other emergency information, and broadcast and published media 

reports. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, the impact of the 

incident on the community, the location of the Joint Information 

Centers (JIC), availability of public information staff, plans and 

procedures for emergency public information programs, 

memorandums of agreement, and procedures for activating and 

operating a JIC. 

Expected Outcomes: Public information is delivered in a coordinated 

and timely manner. Public inquiries are handled with a consistent, 

unified response. 

Typical Steps:

1. Set up rumor control operation consisting of volunteers trained to 

handle incoming calls from concerned public. 

2. Provide scripted message to each rumor control staff member and 

conduct staff briefing. 

3. Provide to public, via media outlets, the telephone number for 

inquiries regarding incident. 

4. Rumor control staff work 24/7 in shifts taking calls from public and 

are updated regularly as situation changes. 

5. Rumor control staff advise the Public Information Officer (PIO) of 

trends in rumors based on incoming telephone calls or monitoring 

of media reporting. 

Consequences: Rumors or misinformation from either media 

accounts or the public is tracked and brought to the attention of PIOs 

and corrected as appropriate. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause.

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. How did the lead PIO or JIC activate a Rumor Control Center? 

2. What rumors were detected and corrected? 

3. What rumors were not detected or not corrected? 

4. What impact did the rumors have on response operations? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-1: Isolate Incident Scene and Define Hazard Areas 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: First Responders Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Initial reports of hazards from witnesses and/or other first 

responders at the incident scene. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of communications systems, 

and availability of properly equipped security forces with vehicles. 

Expected Outcomes: A preliminary perimeter is established to control 

the hazards. 

Typical Steps:

1. Survey the area. 

2. Identify personnel other than first responders and direct them to 

assembly points outside the assumed hazard area. 

3. Obtain preliminary information regarding the hazards at the site. 

4. Define hazard zones around the predicted hazard area and 

contamination control areas (hot and warm zones). 

5. As appropriate, redefine hazard zones in coordination with the 

Incident Commander (IC) throughout the response. 

Consequences: An appropriately defined hazard zone is established 

and no additional personnel are contaminated by unauthorized entry 

into the hazard area. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Protection and Equipment 

1. Did responders recognize the need to don personal protective equipment (PPE)? 

2. Did responding personnel don appropriate PPE to prevent their becoming contaminated? 

3. Were any response personnel contaminated? Why? 

4. Did responders reassess PPE needs after identifying the agent? 

Hazard Zone Identification 

5. Did first responders establish a hot zone around the hazard area? 

6. How soon after arrival was the hot zone established? 

7. What information was used to establish the zones? 

8. Were the zones established in an efficient and effective manner? 

9. How were the zones marked? 

Communication and Coordination

10. How was information about the hazard zones communicated and to whom? 

11. How did fire, emergency medical services, and law enforcement coordinate in establishment of the zones? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-2: Establish Incident Command/Unified Command 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

IC/UC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Information from dispatch, witnesses, and initial first 

responders. 

Conditions: Environmental conditions and standard operating 

procedure (SOP). 

Expected Outcomes: Effective control is established to assure 

minimum additional loss of life and property; safety of responders is 

not compromised. 

Typical Steps:

1. Assess the scene from a safe distance: 

a. Assess damage (what has already occurred) 

b. Identify hazards and vulnerabilities (potential for further 

injuries, contamination, and damage) 

2. Determine immediate goals for: 

a. Life safety 

b. Victim rescue 

c. Protection of critical systems 

d. Incident stabilization 

3. Establish incident site control: 

a. Define the initial predicted hazard area and contamination 

control areas (hot and warm zones, clean area), if not done 

already by initial first responders 

b. Select the initial incident command post (ICP) 

c. Select the staging area 

d. Make initial assessments and response assignments 

e. Organize and direct response elements 

f. Make initial situation reports to the Emergency Operations 

Center (if activated) 

4. Develop incident action plan, including goals and strategies, and 

revise based on effective performance and changing conditions. 

Consequences: Incident command/unified command is established to 

direct response operations. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Scene Assessment 

1. What information did the Incident Commander (IC) use to make an initial assessment? 

2. Did the IC assessment differ from any initial establishment of hazard zones? 

Incident Site Control 

3. Which first responder unit initially established command? 

4. How soon after arrival was command established? 

5. Where was the command post set up in relation to the on-scene activity? Discuss appropriateness of the ICP location. 

6. How was the location of the command post communicated to others on the scene? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-3: Conduct Incident Command 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

IC/UC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Building of the incident command post (ICP) staff and field 

reports regarding the incident. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of response personnel and 

equipment, availability of communications systems, and plans and 

procedures for Incident Command (IC) operations. 

Expected Outcomes: Activities of responders are properly 

coordinated to ensure maximum efficiency of response operations. 

Typical Steps:

1. Obtain and direct issuance of equipment, personnel, and supplies. 

2. Ensure safety procedures are established and followed. 

3. Brief ICP staff on status of response operations and provide safety 

directives and mission directives. 

4. Direct response operations to bring the incident scene under 

control. 

5. Direct establishment of access control points (in coordination with 

law enforcement). 

6. Develop incident action plans and alternate plans, incorporating 

goals and strategies. 

7. Adjust the initial predicted hazard area and contamination control 

area as conditions change. 

8. Adjust responder personal protective equipment (PPE) 

requirements as conditions dictate. 

9. Expand or contract the ICP as necessary with key positions (e.g., 

operations officer, staging officer, safety officer). 

10. Conduct briefings to update command staff on accomplishments, 

assignments, plans, etc. 

Consequences: Response operations do not result in needless 

damage to property or the environment, or cause injury or loss of life to 

civilians and responders, and assure the greatest practical 

preservation of the incident scene. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Overall IC structure 

1. How were responding units and resources coordinated? Did responding units coordinate with the IC? 

2. What other agency liaisons were present at the ICP? Were they effectively used? 

3. How was command passed from the first arriving unit to the command officer? Was it passed in accordance with 

agency protocols? 

4. Was there one IC or was responsibility shared? Between whom was command shared and why? 

5. What were the strategies and goals of command, who formulated them, and how were they discussed among the 

participants? 

6. As the incident escalated, what additional command support was requested and when? 

7. How and to whom was command passed as additional units were called in? 

Unified Command 

8. Did the IC transition to Unified Command (UC)? If so, was transition appropriate and timely? What agencies were 

brought into the UC and when? 

9. Was a unified command post (UCP) vehicle identified? Describe vehicle used and effectiveness as UCP. 

10. Comment on the effectiveness of the overall establishment and expansion of UC. Was the UC appropriately and 

efficiently built to manage the incident effectively? If not, why not? 

11. What liaisons were present at the UCP? 

12. What sectors/branches/divisions were established at the UCP? 

13. How were the sector/branch/division officers identified? Were they established in a timely manner? 

14. What security measures were provided at or around the UCP? 

15. Was the UCP operating tactically or strategically, and why? 

Communication 

16. What initial information did the IC communicate to responding units? 

17. How were incoming units advised of the ICP location? 

18. How were first responders (law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services) able to communicate with each 

other? 

19. How were field operational units from the various agencies able to communicate with each other? 

20. How effectively was pertinent information received from the field conveyed to other agencies on the scene? 

21. How did the IC communicate initial goals, mission directives, safety procedures, and so on. 

22. Did the IC obtain updates from ICP staff? 

23. How often did the IC provide briefings for ICP staff and responding units? 

24. What information was conveyed during these briefings? 

25. Was information provided in a timely manner? 

26. How did the IC handle the media and information flow to the public? 

Protection of First Responders 

27. How did the IC communicate procedures to be followed by responding units (safety procedures)? 

28. How did the IC ensure that procedures were followed? 

29. Were PPE and equipment appropriate for the response throughout the duration of the response? 

30. Were PPE and equipment requirements changed as needed? 

31. Was there a safety officer present? Where was the safety officer located? 

32. Was the safety officer used effectively? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-4: Maintain Accountability of Responders and Citizens 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

IC/UC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Alert and warning to the population at risk, extent of damage, 

nature and extent of injuries, law enforcement personnel orders, and 

deployment of emergency responders. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, availability of first 

responder and law enforcement forces and vehicles, and extent of 

information given to the public via alert and warning systems. 

Expected Outcomes: First responders and citizens are accounted for, 

and their health and safety is assured. 

Typical Steps:

1. Establish staging area and check-in point for all incoming 

response units and personnel. 

2. Instruct all first responders at the incident site to don appropriate 

respiratory protection and relocate to positions outside of the 

predicted hazard area. 

3. Ensure accountability for all units and personnel operating on the 

scene. 

4. Ensure controlled ingress and egress to hazard area and control 

areas. 

5. Ensure all citizens are accounted for and are appropriately 

protected. 

Consequences: No response personnel and citizens are exposed to 

hazards from the event. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Were incident command procedures for personnel and resource management effective? 

2. Did responding units have an accountability policy and procedures? 

3. Did they follow them? 

4. Did HazMat units have appropriate safety policies and procedures (e.g., for medical monitoring of entry crews, 

monitoring time in the hot zone, using buddies, etc.)? 

5. Did they follow them? 

6. Was there a law enforcement liaison at the incident command post to ensure protection of responders and civilians? 

7. Were all onsite actions taken under the directions of the Incident Commander? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-5: Preserve Incident Scene 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: First Responders/IC/UC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports from the incident site, and response decisions and 

operations. 

Conditions: Conditions at the incident site, and plans, procedures, 

and guidance on incident investigations.

Expected Outcomes: The incident scene is preserved to the degree it 

does not interfere with criminal investigation, rescue, and agent 

mitigation; records that document the decisions and operations 

associated with the response are secured and preserved. 

Typical Steps:

1. The Incident Commander (IC) communicates to first responders 

that the site is a crime scene, and that evidence must be 

preserved. 

2. IC obtains advice and recommendations regarding which physical 

conditions to document and preserve at the incident scene. 

3. IC considers incident scene preservation recommendations when 

directing and controlling containment and mitigation operations at 

the incident site. 

4. Responders take all actions necessary to rescue victims, secure 

the incident scene, identify and render safe any other devices, and 

contain the hazard but, to the greatest extent possible, avoid 

disturbing equipment, materials, and conditions at the site other 

than what is required for rescue, security, containment, and 

decontamination. 

5. Responders assist law enforcement with documenting conditions 

at the incident site as thoroughly as the situation allows throughout 

the response (sketches, photographs, and audio or video 

recordings). 

6. Responders assist law enforcement with maintaining chain-ofcustody procedures. 

7. Responders document their decisions and response activities 

(e.g., all handwritten notes, duty logs, other documents, electronic 

records, records of decisions) in a permanent record as soon as 

possible after leaving the site. 

Consequences: Investigators can accurately determine the cause of 

the incident. Investigations are not compromised by lack of evidence or 

suggestions of evidence tampering. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Did first responders recognize the scene as a crime scene? 

2. Did the IC adequately communicate with first responders regarding processes for preserving evidence? 

3. Did first responders adequately document any evidence identified, and coordinate with law enforcement? 

4. Did first responders coordinate with law enforcement regarding site control and sharing of initial information? Explain. 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-6: Direct Agent Release Mitigation Efforts 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

IC/UC Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Agent released as a liquid spill, a vapor plume, or aerosol 

deposition; and the incident scene. 

Conditions: Time available; conditions at the incident scene; 

availability of communications systems; availability of trained 

responders; availability of equipment and supplies; and plans, 

procedures, and regulations regarding confining, collecting, and 

containing an agent release. 

Expected Outcomes: The migration of the agent release is limited to 

the smallest possible area. The release is terminated at its source. 

Typical Steps:

1. In coordination with the HazMat team leader: 

a. Assess the situation and develop a plan and alternate plans 

for confining, collecting, and containing the release 

b. Approve work plans prior to beginning release control 

operations 

c. Monitor release control operations 

d. Provide additional personnel or equipment as needed 

2. In coordination with appropriate environmental and/or public health 

agencies, determine decontamination procedures for personal 

protective equipment (PPE), equipment, and vehicles used in the 

response. 

Consequences: Further damage to property and the environment is 

prevented; there is no further risk to workers and the public caused by 

an agent release. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Did the HazMat team leader communicate with the Incident Commander (IC) regarding contaminant mitigation and 

identification plans? 

2. Did the IC communicate with appropriate agencies regarding decontamination? 

3. Who made the decision regarding what equipment would be decontaminated, how, and where?
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-7: Conduct Agent Release Mitigation Efforts 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

HazMat Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Agent contamination remaining at and around the incident site 

following release control operations; and other contaminated 

equipment, supplies, and materials. 

Conditions: Time available; conditions at the incident scene; 

availability of communications systems; availability of trained 

responders; availability of equipment and supplies; and plans, 

procedures, and regulations regarding mitigating the effects of an 

agent release. 

Expected Outcomes: Contaminated materials are safely contained 

and disposed of in a safe and legal manner. 

Typical Steps:

1. Don appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) before 

proceeding to the release location to begin release control 

operations. 

2. Absorb, neutralize, or collect residual liquid agent and aerosol 

deposition. 

3. Collect and package contaminated equipment, decontamination 

by-products, materials, and soil. Items are processed through the 

contamination reduction zone for appropriate disposal. 

4. If the release occurred in a structure, thoroughly decontaminate it. 

5. Monitor clean areas within the contamination control line and 

sample for agent residue and hazardous decontamination byproducts. Continue mitigation efforts until cleanliness standards 

have been met. 

6. Record and archive monitoring and sampling results for response 

records. 

7. Report mitigation operations to the Incident Commander (IC). 

Request additional personnel or equipment from the IC and/or 

Emergency Operations Center. 

Consequences: The incident site is restored to an acceptable level of 

risk for access and future use. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Were HazMat personnel wearing appropriate PPE for the situation? Was PPE use consistent among all responders 

operating within the hot and warm zones? 

2. Describe agent mitigation methods within the structure (if applicable) and throughout the contaminated area. 

Comment on the effectiveness of the efforts.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-8: Conduct Firefighting Operations 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: Fire Department Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Initial reports of a chemical incident, evidence of fire or smoke, 

need for firefighting equipment, and the incident scene. 

Conditions: Time available; conditions at the incident scene; 

availability of communications systems; availability of firefighters; 

availability of firefighting equipment; and plans, procedures, firefighting 

standards (e.g., National Fire Protection Association standards, 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health), and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Fires at the incident scene are fought safely. 

Additional equipment and manpower are available for response 

operations. 

Typical Steps:

1. Deploy personnel and firefighting equipment to the incident scene. 

2. Don appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) prior to 

entering any area suspected of being contaminated. 

3. Extinguish or suppress fires at the incident scene using good 

firefighting practices. Take care to avoid causing unnecessary 

migration of released agent and to preserve the incident scene. 

Fires involving explosives are not fought. 

4. As appropriate, use firefighting equipment for other hazard 

mitigation activities (e.g., vapor suppression, tank cooling, etc.) 

5. Inform the incident command post (ICP) of the status of firefighting 

operations. 

6. Redirect to other functions or release firefighters when activities 

are completed. 

7. Process firefighters and firefighting equipment through the 

decontamination process after completing operations in the hot 

zone. 

Consequences: Response operations are able to be conducted 

without the additional risk imposed by fire. Reduce the threat posed to 

response operations. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Were incoming crews properly protected for the type of incident dispatched? Explain. 

2. Did first responders become contaminated and become victims? How could this have been prevented? 

3. Were firefighting operations conducted in a manner appropriate to the incident? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-9: Dispatch Bomb Squad 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: 911 Center 

Team: 911 Center/Dispatch Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Initial incident report or bomb threat received via facsimile, 

e-mail, telephone, or other means. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of communications systems, 

emergency management information system, changing conditions, 

and knowledge of plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: The 911 dispatch center is able to assess the 

seriousness of the bomb threat, make an initial estimate of the impact, 

and recall and dispatch bomb squad. 

Typical Steps: 

1. Receive and confirm initial bomb threat and complete the 

appropriate bomb threat report as established in plans and 

procedures. 

2. Request additional information from caller (number of device, 

location of primary bomb device, location of secondary device, 

device is rigged with booby traps, time device is expected to 

detonate). 

3. Maintain contact with caller long enough to trace the call. 

4. Request appropriate first responders to assist with bomb threat, 

(e.g., fire, law enforcement, medical/emergency medical services, 

director/administrator Emergency Operations Center, bomb squad, 

etc.) in accordance with plan and procedures. 

5. Collect other information pertinent to the situation and forward to 

appropriate agency/organization. 

6. Continuously monitor bomb threat incident, complete duty log, and 

immediately forward updated reports to the appropriate 

agency/organization. 

7. Maintain contact with threat caller and incident command until the 

Incident Commander assumes full control of the bomb threat. 

8. Archive all data in appropriate format that allows for quick retrieval 

and for subsequent analysis, investigation, and official reports. 

Consequences: Potential mass casualties due to delay or 

compromise by incorrect or incomplete information being passed to 

bomb squad. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements.

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or 

impede achievement of the outcome. 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of 

events, describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any 

outcomes that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the 

sequence of events and attempt to determine the cause using the 

questions at right. The questions below may further help 

determine root cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Incident Recognition

1. How adequate is the communications system to handle calls and demands? 

2. Was dispatch able to quickly and accurately distinguish clusters or patterns or emergency service requests? 

3. What reference materials were available to verify incident patterns? How were they used? 

4. What surveillance systems were available to fuse data and identify trends and patterns? How were they used? 

Bomb Squad Dispatch

5. Was alert, notification, and dispatch of the bomb squad conducted in accordance with established procedures? 

6. How detailed and adequate was the initial alert information provided to the bomb squad? 

7. How was intelligence related to the incident obtained? 

8. When and how were threat updates provided to the bomb squad as new information was received? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-10: Assess Incident and Develop Action Plan 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Team: Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: 911 dispatch center initial bomb threat report. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of communications systems, 

type and yield of explosive device, and changing conditions. 

Expected Outcomes: Bomb squad is able to assess the seriousness 

of the bomb threat; make an initial estimate of the impact; and prepare 

action plan to render safe, remove, or destroy the bomb. 

Typical Steps: 

1. Obtain intelligence on the explosive device, including: 

a. Exact time it was discovered or reported 

b. Expected time of detonation 

c. Suspect group modus operandi 

2. Conduct a 360-degree visual sweep for command detonation, 

secondary devices, and booby traps. 

3. Secure and evacuate the crisis site interior and exterior perimeter 

(depending on the size and type of the bomb, a safe 

detonation/back blast distance) with local law enforcement agency. 

4. Suspend use of all radios and electronic communication devices in 

the exclusion area around the suspect device. 

5. Determine the exact number of personnel required to execute the 

tactical operations plan. 

6. Determine the appropriate support teams/agencies needed. 

7. Prepare tactical action plan to include: 

a. Overall course of action 

b. Search procedures 

c. Render-safe procedures (RSP) 

d. Removal of explosive device 

e. Decontamination procedures; processing and containment of 

explosive runoff following RSP 

f. Personnel rotation plan (for extended tactical operations) 

g. Emergency rotation plan for stressed team members 

h. Emergency extraction plan for bomb squad team 

i. Equipment replacement plan due to damage/contamination 

j. Communication plan 

8. Coordinate the tactical action plan with the Incident Commander 

(IC)/On-Scene Commander and appropriate teams/agency/ 

organizations. 

9. Determine best location for the bomb squad forward command 

center (away from and within a safe distance from the incident 

command post [ICP]) to safely conduct tactical rehearsal(s). 

Consequences: Bomb squad is ready to render safe the explosive 

device without injury to responders or the public. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or 

impede achievement of the outcome. 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of 

events, describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any 

outcomes that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze 

the sequence of events and attempt to determine the cause 

using the questions at right. The questions below may further 

help determine root cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Assessment 

1. How detailed and adequate was the initial alert information provided to the bomb squad? 

2. How was intelligence related to the incident obtained? 

3. How did this information affect the formulation of the plan of attack? 

4. What specific information was requested by the squad and how quickly was it obtained? 

5. Has the bomb squad been adequately trained and equipped for operations in a contaminated sector? Discuss their 

capability and recommended improvements. 

6. Did the bomb squad conduct a long-range reconnaissance, including a 360-degree visual sweep for command 

detonation? What other physical or structural hazards were identified in the surrounding area, if any? What 

precautions were taken? 

7. What precautions were taken for secondary devices? 

Site Control and Monitoring 

8. What priorities were established and actions taken to ensure site evacuation was completed prior to initiating any 

procedure? 

9. How were ingress and egress controlled during bomb squad operations? 

10. How was area monitoring done for chemical agent presence on approach? 

11. What equipment was available to the bomb squad to conduct area monitoring? 

12. What procedures were followed for point monitoring of the device? 

Tactical Action Planning and Coordination

13. How were the assessment and action plan development coordinated with the IC and other responding entities? 

14. How did the action plan address contingencies (e.g., bomb squad extraction plan in the event of bomb detonation, 

personnel injuries, and stress)? 

15. Did the plan prioritize actions and responsibilities? If so, how? 

16. Did the bomb squad ensure that the ICP was established at a safe location and distance? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-11: Execute Incident Action Plan 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Team: Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Tactical action plan, Incident Commander (IC)/On-Scene 

Commander (OSC) approval of actions, ongoing intelligence, bomb 

squad response equipment, and personal protective equipment (PPE). 

Conditions: Time available, availability of communications systems, 

degree of population evacuation, changing conditions, and knowledge 

of plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Bomb squad is able to render safe, remove, or 

destroy the explosive device. 

Typical Steps: 

1. Continuously receive updates on bomb threat from the IC/OSC. 

2. Ensure that the perimeter is secure and evacuated before 

removing or detonating the explosive device. 

3. Conduct equipment inventory and operational checks (robotics, 

bomb containment shell, detection and monitoring device, 

breathing apparatus tanks, etc). 

4. Don appropriate PPE. 

5. As time permits, coordinate and conduct tactical rehearsal 

(entrance, retrieval, and removal) with integrated first responders. 

6. Conduct final render-safe procedures (RSP) communications 

clearance with the IC/OSC and other appropriate 

teams/agencies/organizations prior to commencing tactical 

operations. 

7. Synchronize bomb squad team watches and clocks with Incident 

Command center. If available, ensure that the IC is issued a bomb 

squad stopwatch and coordinate activation of the stopwatch. 

8. Conduct search of facility for primary and secondary bomb device. 

9. Prepare containment for any explosive runoff. 

10. Reconnoiter the bomb facility, prior to RSP, to identify emergency 

escape routes and internal safe shelter(s). 

11. Conduct RSP according to tactical action plan. 

12. Maintain 100 percent personnel accountability of bomb squad 

teams. 

13. In the event of an accident, safely extract all personnel. 

14. Assess the potential degradation of bomb squad capabilities and 

equipment and coordinate immediate replacement for each. 

15. Immediately following the bomb detonation (accidentally or 

intentionally), conduct initial monitoring to determine the explosive 

components of the bomb. 

Consequences: Bomb squad prevents potential mass casualties due 

to detonation of the explosive device. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of 

events, describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any 

outcomes that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the 

sequence of events and attempt to determine the cause using the 

questions at right. The questions below may further help 

determine root cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Protective Measures 

1. What protective measures for access to the fragmentation area or the contaminated area were directed? Describe 

capabilities to conduct a mechanical approach. 

2. What guidance was provided regarding secondary devices and booby traps? 

3. Does the bomb squad have proper PPE? 

4. Were modifications of PPE made to address both the chemical and explosive hazards? If so, what were they? 

Diagnostic Procedures

5. What diagnostic procedures were performed? Were they adequate? 

6. Was significant data obtained by the diagnostic procedures? How were the x-rays interpreted and were additional 

diagnostics required? 

7. Describe how the squad addressed the threat of the chemical agent filler identified and plans for mitigation. Discuss 

how this was shared with other sectors and what impact it could have on the rest of the response. 

Render-Safe Procedures

8. Did the RSP developed further complicate the incident? Discuss the anticipated/actual effect an unintended release 

of additional chemical agent would have and who was the final authority to approve RSP. 

9. What were the criteria used to formulate the final RSP and support instrument selection? Did the criteria follow FBI 

guidelines? 

10. Upon completion of the RSP, was a secondary search of the surrounding area conducted? Was anything found? 

Were additional response units warned? 

Personnel Safety

11. What actions and procedures were followed to monitor the exposure level of bomb squad personnel? 

12. Describe the bomb squad’s concept for personnel rotation. 

13. What active measures were in place to monitor the accountability of bomb squad and support personnel? 

14. What actions were taken to extract the primary team in the event of an accident on site? 

15. How was the extraction accomplished? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-12: Implement Post-Render-Safe Procedures 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Team: Law Enforcement (Bomb Squad) Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Rendered-safe bomb, evacuation distances, intelligence 

requirements, availability of transportation routes, and explosive 

transportation vehicles. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of communications systems, 

weather, and populated areas. 

Expected Outcomes: Bomb squad is able to gather intelligence on 

the bomb’s maker and source materials; bomb squad safely disposes 

of bomb. 

Typical Steps: 

1. Conduct secondary search of surrounding area. 

2. Alert responders and implement render-safe procedures (RSP) for 

secondary devices, if any. 

3. Determine a safe location for forensic investigation/intelligence 

exploitation and dispose of explosive device. 

4. Plan safe transportation route in coordination with government 

transportation officials. 

5. Transport explosive device with security escort to location for final 

disposition. 

6. Coordinate debris removal with public works. 

7. When incident site is declared clear, restore normal activities in 

area. 

8. Coordinate forensic investigation/intelligence exploitation of 

explosive device with FBI and military explosive ordnance disposal 

units. 

9. Dispose of or destroy explosive device in approved explosives 

destruction area in accordance with local plans and procedures. 

10. Archive all data in appropriate format to allow for quick retrieval 

and for subsequent analysis, investigation, and official reports. 

Consequences: Gathered intelligence is used to track down suspects; 

no personnel or property damage occurs during post-RSP. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Post-Render-Safe Actions 

1. Upon completion of RSP, was a secondary search of the surrounding area conducted? Was anything found? Were 

additional response units warned? 

2. What protective actions were taken to coordinate destruction in place or transportation for destruction of the explosive 

device? 

3. How quickly was intelligence about the device design and construction forwarded promptly to investigation teams? 

What information was provided? 

4. Did the Incident Commander approve all post-RSP actions? 

5. What actions were taken to preserve evidence for investigation? 

6. What actions were taken to coordinate post-explosion debris removal with public works? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # IV-13: Decontaminate Responders and Equipment 

Outcome: Incident Site Hazard Mitigation Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: Fire Department/HazMat Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Operations at the accident site. 

Conditions: Time available, availability of personnel, availability of 

decontamination equipment, and plans and procedures regarding 

decontamination operations. 

Expected Outcomes: Contaminated personnel and equipment do not 

leave the scene until decontaminated or properly packaged for later 

decontamination. Personnel and equipment in the cold zone are 

protected from contamination. 

Typical Steps:

1. Select locations for personnel decontamination operations that are 

large enough for efficient operations, have direct approaches from 

both the incident site and the staging area, and are between the 

hot line and the contamination control line. 

2. Set up the operations in accordance with local policies and 

procedures. 

3. Confirm that sufficient personnel, materials, and supplies are 

available to assist responders exiting from the incident site and to 

sustain decontamination operations for the duration of the 

response. 

4. Conduct decontamination operations. 

5. Record the method of decontamination, conduct decontamination 

monitoring, and note monitoring instrument used for all persons 

processed through the operation. 

6. Once through the decontamination process, ensure that 

responders report to the rehabilitation area for rest and 

subsequent assignment to duty. 

7. Report decontamination operations to the incident command post 

(ICP). Request additional personnel or equipment as needed from 

the ICP. 

8. If appropriate, establish procedures for onsite and/or offsite 

decontamination of equipment. 

Consequences: Agent hazards are not spread beyond the 

contamination control line. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Why were the specific decontamination areas selected? 

2. Where was first responder decontamination placed in proximity to victim decontamination? 

3. What decontamination solutions were used? Were they appropriate? 

4. How were runoff considerations handled? What additional agencies were contacted concerning runoff issues? 

5. What provisions were made to cover and warm responders after completing decontamination? 

6. What equipment was used to scan the responders for remaining contamination? Was it adequate? 

7. Was agent information passed on to the Incident Commander and the decontamination sector? Did this have an effect 

on the procedures used? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-1: Develop and Implement Protective Action Decisions 

Outcome: Protection Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Information from the incident scene and recommendations 

from Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff and public health 

officials. 

Conditions: Time limitations; conditions at variance to plans (e.g., 

road conditions, availability of shelters, etc.); availability of senior 

elected official or designated decision-maker; availability of 

communications systems; preexisting or default protective action 

decision (PAD) agreements; and knowledge of plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: PADs (evacuation/shelter-in-place) appropriate 

for the risk are presented to the jurisdiction’s population. 

Typical Steps:

1. Receive information on population at risk from the Incident 

Commander at the scene. 

2. Obtain decision on protective action recommendation (PAR) from 

EOC leadership and public health official or designee with regard 

to projected exposure from computer models, exposure from field 

measurements, protective action guides in the jurisdiction plan, 

shelter availability, evacuation time estimates, and relative 

exposure savings between evacuation and sheltering. 

3. EOC leadership (senior elected official or designated decisionmaker) develops the PAD (e.g., evacuation or shelter in place). 

4. Communicate the PAD to the IC and other jurisdictions as soon as 

practical. 

5. Be aware of any conflicts, updates, adjustments, or cancellation of 

the PAD. 

Consequences: Appropriate warning information is provided to the 

population at risk; public is protected from exposure to agents. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination

1. What was the timeline for development and implementation of the PAD? 

2. Who was responsible for the details and accuracy of the PAD? 

3. Who ensured that the PADs were consistent with preexisting or default PAD agreements and plans and procedures? 

Planning

4. What PADs were made? 

5. What time limitations for the implementation and/or compliance with the PADs existed? 

6. What additional resources were needed to implement the PADs? 

7. At what time were the IC, the onsite responders, and other jurisdictions notified of the PAD? Was it in a timely 

manner? 

8. At what time was the declaration of emergency declared? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-2: Prepare and Disseminate Protective Action Messages 

Outcome: Protection Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Jurisdiction protective action decision (PAD). 

Conditions: Time limitations, activated Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC), availability of staff, availability of prescripted messages, and 

knowledge of plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Appropriate protective action messages (PAMs) 

can be transmitted and/or disseminated to the affected population. 

Typical Steps:

1. Identify and select prescripted protective action message 

appropriate for the PAD for broadcast via the Emergency Alert 

System (EAS) or other broadcast media. Fill in blanks or modify 

selected messages with information specific to the accident. 

2. Prepare ad hoc message if there are no prescripted messages 

appropriate for the PAD. 

3. Place EAS stations or other local broadcast media on standby to 

receive messages. 

4. Provide PAMs and inform participating EAS stations or local 

broadcast media of the time interval that PAMs are to be 

broadcast. 

5. Select individual sirens/radios or groups of sirens/radios for 

activation as appropriate for the area at risk. 

6. Ensure that needs of mobility, visual, or hearing impaired, nonEnglish speakers, and institutions are addressed in the PAM. 

7. Provide copies of selected message(s) to other local EOCs and 

response agencies if required by procedures. 

8. Monitor EAS stations or other media to ensure they broadcast the 

message(s) within specified time and at the specified interval. 

Consequences: Affected community populations are alerted and 

notified of the PAD and recommended protective actions; population 

takes protective action; population is protected from the effects of 

exposure to chemical agents. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination 

1. Who was responsible for the preparation, coordination, and dissemination of news releases? What press conferences 

were conducted to explain the PAD? 

2. Were the State and county advised of the local declaration and updated on the city’s activities? 

3. What organization(s) was responsible for the coordination of the EAS and the dissemination of information to the 

public? 

4. Did the EOC directly notify specified facilities such as large businesses, highway administrators, major recreational 

facilities, airports, railroads, or institutions? 

5. Who was responsible for placing the EAS stations or other local broadcast media on standby to receive PAMs? 

6. Did the EAS stations or local broadcast media use prepositioned and prescripted messages or ad hoc messages? 

 

Planning

7. Describe how dispatch or the EOC alerted sites with special warning requirements (e.g., hospitals and schools)? 

8. Were updates given to supporting agencies/organizations? How often were updates provided? 

9. Were backup systems available to ensure transmission of the message? 

10. Were alternate or supplementary methods (e.g., route alerting, pagers, signs, visual signals, etc.) of alert and warning 

identified? 

11. Was route alerting used to notify special populations and rural areas not supported by conventional notification 

methods? 

12. What communication equipment did the vehicle used for route alerting have? 

13. Were maps, a copy of the message, and directions for the route alerting area provided for the vehicle? 

14. Who was responsible for briefing the team on safe routes to and from the area, expected stay times, and other hazard 

protection information? 

Implementation

15. Was the transmission of the EAS message successful in all affected sectors or zones? 

16. Were there time intervals between broadcast of the PAMs? 

17. Who was responsible for monitoring the EAS stations or local broadcast media to ensure the message(s) was 

accurately broadcast within the specified time period and intervals? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-3: Activate Traffic and Access Control Points 

Outcome: Protection Location: In Community 

Response 

Element: 

Law Enforcement Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Direction to establish traffic control points (TCPs) and access 

control points (ACPs). 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; 

availability of personnel; availability of vehicles, barricades, and other 

traffic control equipment; selected evacuation routes; selected ACP/ 

TCP locations; pertinent maps, diagrams, and plans; weather and 

environmental conditions; and situations at variance with assumptions 

in plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: TCPs are in place in time to support the 

evacuation order; an orderly evacuation is facilitated; and access to 

the predicted hazard area is prevented. 

Typical Steps:

1. If sufficient time is available, inventory and stage crews, vehicles, 

and equipment to support establishment of the specified ACPs and 

TCPs. 

2. Move to designated locations. 

3. Set up equipment in the proper locations to prevent access to 

restricted area and to direct movement out of the area. 

4. Make communications checks and report operational status to the 

appropriate supervisor or EOC staff. Make followup reports at 

regular intervals. 

5. Direct evacuees along evacuation routes. 

6. Prevent unauthorized access into the predicted hazard area. 

7. Facilitate the movement of emergency vehicles and crews through 

restricted areas. 

8. Promptly relocate TCPs and ACPs as directed by supervisors. 

Consequences: The population at risk and population at large is 

protected from exposure to the agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination

1. Who was responsible for ensuring that inventoried and staged crews, vehicles, and equipment were available to 

support the establishment of specified ACPs/TCPs? Was it performed in a timely manner? 

2. Who received the operational reports and status checks from the field locations? Were followup reports received at 

regular intervals? 

Operations 

3. Who directed the law enforcement personnel to move to designated ACP/TCP locations? 

4. What are the responsibilities of law enforcement at ACP/TCP locations? 

5. What equipment did the ACP/TCP officer use to assist in the completion and operation of ACPs/TCPs? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-4: Coordinate Protective Actions for Special Populations

Outcome: Protection Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Protective action decisions for special populations. 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; the 

identity, location, and numbers of disabled, institutionalized, and transitdependent people; knowledge of institutions equipped for enhanced or 

pressurized sheltering in place; knowledge of plans and procedures; weather 

and other environmental conditions; selected evacuation routes; availability of 

vehicles to transport special populations; and situations at variance with 

assumptions in plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: All special populations are sheltered in place or are 

promptly and safely evacuated to host facilities or reception centers. 

Typical Steps:

1. Identify at-risk special populations and facilities. 

2. According to established procedures, contact at-risk special populations 

and facilities and inform them of the protective action to be implemented 

for their specific situation. Obtain information about any assistance they 

may need. 

3. Compile resource requests and contact resource providers to obtain 

needed support. 

4. Stage transportation assets. Brief drivers on the hazard area, routes to 

follow, emergency procedures, pickup points, and final destinations. 

5. Coordinate with traffic control personnel to expedite the movement of 

transportation assets to and from special population pickup routes and 

special facilities. 

6. Through public information assets, inform transportation-dependent 

populations on how to obtain transportation out of the hazard area. 

7. According to plans and procedures, Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 

notifies host facilities or reception centers to prepare to receive special 

population evacuees. 

8. If special populations or facilities were directed to shelter in place, provide 

appropriate assistance for implementing sheltering measures. 

9. Promptly communicate changes in directed protective actions (e.g., from 

shelter in place to evacuation) to the affected special populations and 

facilities. Repeat previous steps, as appropriate, to support the change in 

protective action. 

10. Through public information assets, provide the public at large with 

information regarding protective actions taken by special populations and 

facilities, the location of host facilities or reception centers the special 

populations have been evacuated to, and procedures for reuniting with 

family members who may be part of a special population. 

Consequences: The population at risk and population at large is protected 

from exposure to a chemical agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination 

1. Who is responsible for compiling and delegating resource requests? 

2. Who contacted resource providers to obtain needed support? 

3. Who was responsible for ensuring that transportation assets were available? 

Planning 

4. Who was responsible for briefing drivers on the hazard area, routes to follow, emergency procedures, pickup points, 

and their final destinations? 

5. What was the protocol for responding to changes to protective action decisions? 

6. Did the EOC and/or school staffs notify reception centers and host facilities to prepare to receive special population 

evacuees? 

7. Did traffic control personnel expedite movement of transportation assets to and from special population pickup routes 

and special facilities? 

8. What support information was available to transportation-dependent populations? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-5: Implement Protective Actions for Special Populations

Outcome: Protection Location: In Community 

Response 

Element: Special Population Sites Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Notification of protective actions to be taken for special 

populations. 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; 

sheltering options (expedient, enhanced, and pressurized) available to 

the special population or facility; weather and other environmental 

conditions; selected evacuation routes; availability of transportation 

assets; and situations at variance with assumptions in plans and 

procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: All special populations are sheltered in place or 

are promptly and safely evacuated to host facilities or reception 

centers. 

Typical Steps:

1. If directed to shelter in place, implement normal, expedient, or 

pressurized shelter-in-place procedures, following local 

procedures. 

2. If directed to evacuate, identify transportation resources needed 

and request their prompt deployment, including requesting 

additional resources. 

3. Ensure that transportation providers: 

a. Mobilize vehicles and crews 

b. Brief drivers on emergency procedures, location of pickup 

point, location of host facility (destination), emergency 

procedures, and routes to follow to the pickup point and final 

destination 

c. Establish and maintain communication for the duration of the 

evacuation 

4. If privately owned vehicles are used, provide drivers with maps 

and brief them on emergency procedures, the destination, and the 

route to follow. 

5. Assemble institutional populations, load on buses or other 

transportation assets, and transport to the host facility. 

6. Respond promptly and correctly to changes in protective action 

(e.g., from sheltering in place to evacuation). 

Consequences: No special populations are exposed to the agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination 

1. Who is responsible for compiling and delegating resource requests? 

2. Who contacted the resource providers to obtain needed support? 

3. Who was responsible for ensuring that transportation assets were available? 

Planning 

4. Who was responsible for briefing drivers on the hazard area, routes to follow, emergency procedures, pickup points, 

and their final destinations? 

5. What was the protocol for responding to changes to protective action decisions? 

6. Did the Emergency Operations Center and/or special population facilities notify reception centers to prepare to 

receive special population evacuees? 

7. Did traffic control personnel expedite movement of transportation assets to and from special population pickup routes 

and special facilities? 

8. What support information was available to transportation-dependent populations? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-6: Coordinate Protective Actions for Schools and Day Care Centers

Outcome: Protection Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Protective action decision for schools and day care centers. 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; the 

identity, location, and capacity of public and private schools and day care 

centers; sheltering options (expedient, enhanced, and pressurized) for the 

school; lists of host schools; weather and other environmental conditions; 

selected evacuation routes; availability of transportation assets; and situations 

at variance with assumptions in plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: All school and day care students and staff are sheltered 

in place or are promptly and safely evacuated to host schools, day care 

facilities, or reception centers; parents are notified when and where to reunite 

with their children. 

Typical Steps:

1. Identify at-risk schools and day care centers. 

2. According to established procedures, contact at-risk schools and day 

care centers and inform them of the protective action to be implemented 

for their specific situation. Obtain information about any assistance they 

may need. 

3. Compile resource requests and contact resource providers to obtain 

needed support. 

4. Stage transportation assets. Brief drivers on the hazard area, routes to 

follow, emergency procedures, pickup points, and final destinations. 

5. Coordinate with traffic control personnel to expedite the movement of 

transportation assets to and from schools and day care centers. 

6. According to plans and procedures, Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC) and/or school staffs notify host schools, day care facilities, or 

reception centers to prepare to receive school and day care center 

evacuees. 

7. If schools and day care centers were directed to shelter in place, provide 

appropriate assistance for implementing sheltering measures. 

8. Promptly communicate changes in directed protective actions (e.g., from 

shelter in place to evacuation) to the affected schools. Repeat previous 

steps, as appropriate, to support the change in protective action. 

9. Through public information assets, provide parents and guardians with 

information regarding protective actions taken at individual schools and 

day care centers, the location of host schools and day care facilities, and 

procedures for reuniting with their children. 

Consequences: The population at risk and population at large is protected 

from exposure to the agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination 

1. Who was responsible for compiling and delegating resource requests? 

2. Who contacted the resource providers to obtain needed support? 

3. Who was responsible for ensuring that transportation assets were available? 

Planning 

4. Who was responsible for briefing drivers on the hazard area, routes to follow, emergency procedures, pickup points, 

and their final destinations? 

5. What was the protocol for responding to changes to protective action decisions? 

6. Did the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and/or school staffs notify host schools, day care facilities, or reception 

centers to prepare to receive school and day care center evacuees? 

7. Did traffic control personnel expedite movement of transportation assets to and from schools and day care centers? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-7: Implement Protective Actions for Schools and Day Care Centers 

Outcome: Protection Location: In Community 

Response 

Element: Schools and Day Care Centers Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Protective action decisions (PADs) for schools and day care 

centers. 

Conditions: Time available; availability of communications systems; 

the identity, location, and capacity of public and private schools and 

day care centers; sheltering options (expedient, enhanced, and 

pressurized) for the school; lists of host schools; weather and other 

environmental conditions; selected evacuation routes; availability of 

transportation assets; and situations at variance with assumptions in 

plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: All school and day care students and staff are 

sheltered in place or are promptly and safely evacuated to host 

schools, day care facilities, or reception centers. 

Typical Steps:

1. If directed to shelter in place, implement normal, expedient, or 

pressurized shelter-in-place procedures, following local 

procedures. 

2. If directed to evacuate, identify transportation resources needed 

and request their prompt deployment, including requesting 

additional resources. 

3. Ensure that transportation providers: 

a. Mobilize vehicles and crews 

b. Brief drivers on emergency procedures, location of pickup 

point, location of host facility (destination), emergency 

procedures, and routes to follow to the pickup point and final 

destination 

c. Establish and maintain communication for the duration of the 

evacuation 

4. If privately owned vehicles are used (e.g., by a small day care 

facility), provide drivers with maps and brief them on emergency 

procedures, destination, and route to follow. 

5. Assemble children and accompanying adults, load on buses or 

other transportation assets, and transport to the host facility. 

6. Respond promptly and correctly to changes in protective action 

(e.g., from sheltering in place to evacuation). 

Consequences: No special populations are exposed to the agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination 

1. Who was responsible for compiling and delegating resource requests? 

2. Who contacted the resource providers to obtain needed support? 

3. Who was responsible for ensuring that transportation assets were available? 

Planning 

4. Who was responsible for briefing drivers on the hazard area, routes to follow, emergency procedures, pickup points, 

and their final destinations? 

5. What was the protocol for responding to changes to PADs? 

6. Did the Emergency Operations Center and/or school staffs notify reception centers to prepare to receive school 

evacuees? 

7. Did traffic control personnel expedite movement of transportation assets to and from schools and day care centers? 

8. Was sufficient capacity available at the reception or host school/day care? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-8: Direct Reception Center Operations 

Outcome: Protection Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Protective action decision that includes evacuation. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, time available 

prior to evacuee arrival, list of reception centers, availability of 

reception center staff and equipment, selected evacuation routes, 

weather and other environmental conditions, and other conditions at 

variance with assumptions in plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Direction and control of reception center 

activities are established; reception center activities are coordinated to 

ensure the efficiency of evacuee support. 

Typical Steps: 

1. Determine number of reception centers to be activated. Select 

predetermined locations or identify ad hoc locations along 

evacuation routes where they will not impede evacuation. 

2. Notify the government or nongovernment agencies identified to 

operate reception centers and direct them to mobilize their staff 

and equipment to establish the facilities. 

3. Notify agencies that provide support to the reception center (e.g., 

emergency medical services, law enforcement). 

4. Provide operating and supporting agencies with information on 

which reception centers will be activated, the hazard area, routes 

to take to the reception centers, and en route emergency 

procedures. 

5. Coordinate with traffic control personnel to expedite movement of 

reception center assets to the designated locations and direct 

evacuees to them. 

6. Notify adjacent jurisdiction Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) 

of decision to activate reception centers and their location. 

7. Receive reports and solicit information regarding the status of 

reception center operations, paying special attention to the need 

for additional staff or equipment. 

8. Obtain and arrange for distribution of supplies and equipment 

needed to sustain reception center operations. 

9. Coordinate for additional manpower to assure continuous, 24-hour 

operation. Assign augmenting personnel to reception centers 

where they are most needed. 

Consequences: Evacuees desiring shelter are quickly screened, 

registered, and assigned to a shelter. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements.

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. At what time was the reception center activated? 

2. Who is responsible for notifying adjacent jurisdiction EOCs of the decision to activate reception centers and their 

locations? 

3. Who was responsible for maintaining contact with the reception center? 

4. Who was responsible for fulfilling requests for resources from the reception center? Did response to requests happen 

in a timely manner? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-9: Operate Reception Centers 

Outcome: Protection Location: In Community 

Response 

Element: Reception Centers Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Decision to activate reception centers. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, time available 

prior to evacuee arrival, list of reception centers, availability of 

reception center staff and equipment, selected evacuation routes, 

weather and other environmental conditions, and other conditions at 

variance with assumptions in plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: A fully staffed and functioning reception center. 

Typical Steps:

1. Notify agency staff that reception centers are being activated. 

2. Stage reception center assets. Brief staff on reception center 

locations, the hazard area, routes to follow to the reception 

centers, and en route emergency procedures. 

3. Set up the reception center facility according to established plans 

and procedures. Report to the Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC) when the center is ready to process evacuees. 

4. Using established protocols and procedures, register evacuees as 

they arrive at the reception center. 

5. Assign evacuees to shelters based upon their needs and desire for 

shelter. 

6. Make periodic reports to the EOC according to local plans and 

procedures. 

7. Review rosters to assure continuous, 24-hour operation, and 

assign registration personnel to tasks and shifts where they are 

most needed. Provide a transition or situation briefing to later shift 

personnel before they begin work. 

Consequences: Evacuees are registered and referred to shelters or 

other facilities for their safety and protection. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination 

1. At what time was the reception center activated? 

2. Who is responsible for notifying adjacent jurisdiction EOCs of the decision to activate reception centers and their 

locations? 

Planning 

3. How were reception center assets staged? 

4. At the reception center, who was responsible for maintaining contact with the EOC? 

5. At the reception center, which staff member was responsible for requesting resources from the EOC? 

6. Did the EOC respond to resource requests from the reception center in a timely manner? 

7. What was the primary objective of the reception center? 

8. What contingency plans and locations did the reception center have in place to compensate for overflow? 

Implementation 

9. How was the reception center able to meet the needs of special populations, mobility impaired, or medically 

dependent individuals? 

10. What was the intended evacuee throughput of the reception center? 

11. How many evacuees did the reception center process each hour? 

12. What bottlenecks occurred in evacuee processing? How could they be remedied? 

13. To which shelters were evacuees directed? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-10: Direct Shelter Operations 

Outcome: Protection Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Protective action decision that includes evacuation. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, time available 

prior to evacuee arrival, list of shelters, availability of shelter staff and 

equipment, selected evacuation routes, weather and other 

environmental conditions, memorandums of agreement (MOAs)/ 

memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with host communities and 

facility operators; MOAs/MOUs with nongovernment agencies, and 

other conditions at variance with assumptions in plans and procedures.

Expected Outcomes: Direction and control of shelter activities are 

established; shelter activities are coordinated to ensure the efficiency 

of evacuee support. 

Typical Steps:

1. Notify the government or nongovernment agencies identified to 

operate shelters and direct them to mobilize their staff and 

equipment to establish the facilities. 

2. Notify agencies that provide support to shelters (e.g., emergency 

medical services, law enforcement). 

3. In coordination with the operating agency, determine number of 

shelters to be activated. Select predetermined locations or identify 

ad hoc locations along evacuation routes where they will not 

impede evacuation. 

4. Provide operating and supporting agencies with information about 

which shelters will be activated, the hazard area, routes to take to 

the shelters, and en route emergency procedures. 

5. Coordinate with traffic control personnel to expedite movement of 

shelter assets to the designated locations and to direct evacuees 

to them. 

6. Notify adjacent jurisdiction Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) 

of decision to activate shelters and their location. 

7. Receive reports and solicit information regarding the status of 

shelter operations, paying special attention to the need for 

additional staff, equipment, or shelters. 

8. Obtain and arrange for distribution of supplies and equipment 

needed to sustain shelter operations. 

9. Coordinate for additional manpower to assure continuous, 24-hour 

operation. Assign augmenting personnel to shelters where they 

are most needed. 

Consequences: Evacuees are provided with adequate care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination 

1. At what time was the shelter activated? 

2. Who is responsible for notifying adjacent jurisdiction EOCs of the decision to activate shelters and their locations? 

3. Who was responsible for maintaining contact with the shelter? 

4. Who was responsible for fulfilling requests for resources from the shelter? Did the response to requests happen in a 

timely manner? 

Planning 

5. How were shelters selected? 

6. How many people were estimated to need shelter? 

7. What is the capacity of the available shelters? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-11: Operate Shelters 

Outcome: Protection Location: In Community 

Response 

Element: 

Shelters Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Decision to activate shelters. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems, time available prior to 

evacuee arrival, list of shelters, availability of shelter staff and equipment, 

selected evacuation routes, weather and other environmental conditions, 

memorandums of agreement (MOAs)/memorandums of understanding 

(MOUs) with host communities and facility operators, MOAs/MOUs with 

nongovernment agencies, and other conditions at variance with assumptions 

in plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Evacuees receive essential care services until it is safe 

to return home. 

Typical Steps:

1. Notify agency staff that shelters are being activated. 

2. Stage shelter assets. Brief staff on shelter locations, the hazard area, 

routes to follow to the shelters, and en route emergency procedures. 

3. Set up the shelter facility according to plans and procedures. 

4. Verify that food service, security, first aid and medical service, childcare, 

sanitation, social services, counseling and religious support, and disaster 

welfare information services are in place. 

5. Report to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) when the shelter is 

ready to receive evacuees. 

6. Check evacuees to indicate they have been through reception and 

registration, including screening for contamination as necessary. 

7. Meet the needs of special populations, mobility impaired, or medically 

dependent individuals. 

8. Provide evacuees with assistance in locating and uniting with family 

members from whom they have become separated. As needed, poll other 

shelters to determine if someone has been registered elsewhere, and 

handle inquiries from other locations seeking information on registrants. 

9. Make arrangements for the care and handling of evacuees’ pets. 

10. Make periodic reports to the EOC according to local plans and 

procedures. 

11. Arrange to open other facilities as capacity is reached. 

12. Review rosters to assure continuous, 24-hour operation and assign 

registration personnel to tasks and shifts where they are most needed. 

Provide a transition or situation briefing to later shift personnel before they 

begin work. 

Consequences: Evacuees are provided with adequate care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Coordination 

1. At what time was the shelter activated? 

2. Who is responsible for notifying adjacent jurisdiction EOCs of the decision to activate shelters and their locations? 

3. Who was responsible for maintaining contact with the EOC? 

Planning 

4. How were shelter assets staged? 

5. Who was responsible for requesting resources from the EOC? Did responses to requests happen in a timely manner? 

6. What was the primary objective of the shelter? 

7. What contingency plans and locations did the shelter have in place to compensate for overflow? 

Implementation 

8. Was the shelter able to meet the needs of special populations, mobility impaired, or medically dependent individuals? 

9. What was the intended capacity of the shelter? 

10. How many evacuees did the shelter accept? 

11. How many evacuees were turned away, if any? Where were they sent? 

12. What shortcomings, if any, were there in food, water, sanitation, and beds? How could they be corrected? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # V-12: Arrange for Veterinary Services 

Outcome: Protection Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reports describing the incident; hazard analysis results; and 

information regarding exposure, injuries, or fatalities to companion 

animals, livestock, and wildlife. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems; veterinarians and 

veterinary specialists available; plans and procedures for providing 

veterinary support; and plans, procedures, and official guidance 

regarding veterinary support. 

Expected Outcomes: Livestock, companion animals, and wildlife that 

are injured or exposed to an agent, or are at risk of injury or exposure, 

are identified and treated humanely. 

Typical Steps:

1. Determine the need for veterinary support. 

2. Request available veterinarian assets based on the composition 

and circumstances of the potentially affected livestock, companion 

animals, and fauna to ensure an appropriate response. 

3. Assign veterinary services personnel to tasks and shifts. 

4. Provide a transition or situation brief to newly arrived personnel. 

5. Monitor veterinary services (e.g., medical treatment or euthanasia 

for livestock, companion animals, and wildlife using good 

veterinary practice). 

Consequences: The veterinary support needs of affected residents 

are met; services provided comply with environmental protection 

regulations. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Who requested veterinary support? 

2. Who is responsible for allocating the veterinary support assets? 

3. At what time did veterinary services receive their initial task request? 

4. Who is responsible for assigning and tasking veterinary services personnel? 

5. What are the laws and authorities governing the roles and responsibilities of veterinary services? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-1: Provide Immediate Emergency Aid 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: First Responders (non-EMS) Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Contaminated or potentially contaminated, exposed or 

potentially exposed, and injured civilians or workers at the incident site 

or in the safety restricted area or projected hazard area (wedge). 

Conditions: Time available; incident scene limitations (facility 

damage, fire, wreckage, number of victims, etc.); nature and extent of 

illness, injury, contamination, or exposure; availability of trained and 

equipped nonmedical emergency responders; availability of 

communications equipment; and knowledge of local laws, 

memorandums of agreement/memorandums of understanding, plans, 

procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Victims are protected from additional trauma, 

injury, and chemical agent exposure. Appropriate life-saving self aid 

and first aid is accomplished.

Typical Steps:

1. Perform immediate aid until medical response teams assume 

treatment. This includes: 

a. Donning personal protective equipment (PPE) as appropriate 

and available 

b. Moving victims from the immediate danger area 

c. Providing the airway, breathing, and circulation (ABC) of CPR, 

controlling blood loss, supporting fractures, and administering 

antidotes 

2. Remove gross contamination from the victim’s exposed skin and 

PPE. 

3. Move victims to the emergency decontamination area, continuing 

life-support and first aid treatment during movement. 

4. If a personnel decontamination station is not established, conduct 

expedient decontamination. 

5. Arrange victims for immediate triage by the medical response 

team upon completion of decontamination procedures. 

6. Contribute to patient history, with particular attention given to the 

agent antidote regimen (as appropriate), and to decontamination 

processes accomplished. 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a 

result of gaps in victim care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Initial Assessment 

1. What steps were taken to isolate the immediate area and contain the victims? 

2. How did first responders approach victims? 

3. Did first responders determine appropriate treatment and request emergency medical services? 

4. What initial assessment was made regarding agent identification? What symptoms were observed (e.g., breathing 

difficulties, pupil abnormalities, other physiological reactions to agents)? 

Responder Preparation 

5. Were incoming crews properly protected for the type of incident dispatched? Explain. 

6. Were the first responders adequately prepared to treat the victims? 

7. Did first responders become contaminated and become victims? How could this have been prevented? 

Victim Care 

8. How were patients extracted or otherwise removed from immediate danger? 

9. Were patients removed in the appropriate order? 

10. Were the victims quickly assessed and given timely and reasonable treatment? 

11. What basic assessments were done (e.g., airway, breathing, circulation)? 

12. What immediate aid was given? 

13. What method of mass decontamination was used by the initial units on the scene? 

14. What steps were taken regarding “walking wounded” who may have left the area? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-2: Conduct Search and Rescue Operations 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

Search and Rescue Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Initial reports of witnesses or first responders from the incident 

scene. 

Conditions: Time of day structure collapsed, type of construction and 

usage, extent of structural damage, availability of communications 

systems, and availability of properly equipped Urban Search and 

Rescue personnel and equipment. 

Expected Outcomes: Trapped victims are located, medically 

stabilized, extracted from debris, and evacuated for definitive medical 

treatment. 

Typical Steps:

1. Survey the area, and identify and interview individuals who may 

have information about the structure and potential location of 

entrapped victims. 

2. Structure triage, assessment, and marking. 

3. Establish a safety plan for incident site. 

4. Develop and implement search strategy and tactics: 

a. Physical search 

b. Technical search (visual/acoustic) 

c. Canine search 

5. Prioritize potential search sites. 

6. Develop and implement rescue strategy and tactics. 

7. Ensure appropriate medical personnel are standing by to stabilize 

victims prior to and during extrication. 

8. Develop plan for disposition of victims to definitive medical care 

following extrication. 

Consequences: Trapped survivors of the initial weapons of mass 

destruction event are rescued, thereby reducing loss of life. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Assessment 

1. Were time of day of incident and site usage factored into planning the response? 

2. Were the initial first responders and building engineer/manager contacted and interviewed to pinpoint locations where 

victims might be trapped? 

3. Were site plans requested/utilized? 

4. Was the area to be searched clearly defined? 

Responder Protection 

5. Was the structure collapse analyzed and shored as needed? 

6. Was a safety plan developed and briefed? 

7. What personal protective equipment (PPE) was used? Was it appropriate for the degree of chemical hazard? 

Resources and Coordination 

8. Were special search units (canine, visual, acoustic) available and utilized? 

9. Were potential rescue sites prioritized? By what means? 

10. Was an operations chief established for each site? 

11. Was appropriate equipment brought in to support operations? 

Medical Care

12. Were plans, personnel, and equipment in place for medical stabilization of the victims prior to and during extrication? 

13. Were plans in place to transport victims to definitive medical care? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-3: Provide Emergency Triage, Treatment, and Stabilization 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

EMS Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Contaminated or potentially contaminated; exposed or 

potentially exposed; and injured civilians, workers, or responders at the 

incident site or in the safety restricted area or projected hazard area 

(wedge). 

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of injury or illness; 

agent type; extent of contamination by or exposure to the agent; prior 

expedient field care administered; availability of emergency medical 

teams and equipment; availability of communications equipment; and 

knowledge of local laws, memorandums of agreement/memorandums 

of understanding, plans, procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Patients are stabilized and taken to a hospital in 

time to prevent death or permanent incapacitation.

Typical Steps:

1. Don appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). 

2. Begin proper triage procedures at the emergency patient 

decontamination site (PDS). 

3. Conduct primary patient assessment/decontamination (if needed). 

4. Address life-threatening issues and establish patient history. 

5. Treat signs and symptoms; continually assess the patient. 

6. Determine the hospital to which the patient will be transported. 

7. Arrange for ambulances or other transport vehicles. 

8. Prepare victims for transport to the hospital. Continue patient 

treatment while preparing patients for transport. 

9. Provide patient tracking information to medical services 

coordinator. 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a 

result of gaps in victim care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Initial Actions 

1. At what point during the incident were the first emergency medical services (EMS) personnel on the scene? 

2. What preliminary information was given to the first responding units? 

3. What steps were taken to isolate the immediate area and contain the victims? 

4. How did EMS personnel approach victims? 

5. What initial assessment did EMS personnel make regarding agent identification? What symptoms were observed (e.g., breathing 

difficulties, pupil abnormalities, other physiological reactions to agents)? 

Responder Preparation 

6. Were incoming EMS personnel properly protected for the type of incident? Explain. 

7. Was treatment conducted within the capability of the PPE? 

8. Were EMS personnel properly equipped with necessary tools to treat victims (e.g., suction, bag valve masks)? 

9. What preestablished procedures were used to mobilize the necessary equipment and personnel? 

10. Did EMS personnel become contaminated and become victims? How could this have been prevented? 

11. What actions were implemented to protect responders from the threat of secondary devices (time, distance, shielding)? 

EMS Organization and Control

12. Was someone appointed to be in command of EMS activities? Was this person easily identifiable? Where was he or she located?

13. What assessments were made regarding the need for additional medical resources? 

14. Were communications problems encountered between the EMS sectors and other operational sectors (e.g., HazMat) with the 

Incident Commander (IC)? 

15. How were patient data tracked? Were they passed on to the receiving hospital and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)? 

16. Was a triage officer appointed and identified? Did the triage officer perform his or her role effectively? 

17. How were treatment and triage areas for the victims designated? Discuss their size and location in relation to the transportation 

area and their overall suitability.

18. Was a treatment officer appointed and identified? Did the treatment officer perform his or her role effectively? 

19. How were the treatment sector and medical care activities organized? 

20. Were the treatment personnel advised of the type of agent by the IC? Did treatment personnel recognize what the agent type might 

be based on signs and symptoms? 

21. How was coordination between agencies accomplished (face to face, radio)? 

22. Was evidence obtained and/or preserved without compromising the life and health of the patient? 

Victim Care 

23. What actions did medical personnel take to provide the earliest possible intervention, including basic life support? 

24. How was need for treatment prioritized? 

25. How were the “worried well” handled? 

26. Was there a medical doctor on the scene? Were there other specialists on the scene (e.g., priests, critical incident stress

management )? If so, how were they identified? Were their skills effectively used? 

27. Were all EMS personnel used effectively? 

28. What provisions were made for protection of victims from the environment, the press/media, and secondary contamination? 

29. Were established triage protocols followed? Were there sufficient personnel available to initiate triage? 

30. What procedures were followed for treatment? Were they effectively conducted? Were they adequate to deal with the complex 

patient care issues confronting EMS personnel and the command staff? 

31. Was the treatment rendered noted completely on the triage tags? 

32. How was the medical monitoring of first responders accomplished? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-4: Decontaminate Patients at Incident Site 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Incident Site 

Response 

Element: Fire and First Responders Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Contaminated or potentially contaminated, exposed or 

potentially exposed, and injured civilians, workers, or responders in the 

vicinity of the incident site, in the safety restricted area, or projected 

hazard area (wedge). 

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of injury; agent type; 

extent of contamination by or exposure to the chemical agent; 

availability of decontamination and emergency medical teams and 

equipment; availability of an established decontamination site in the 

contamination reduction (warm) zone; availability of communications 

equipment; and knowledge of local laws, memorandums of 

agreement/memorandums of understanding, plans, procedures, and 

regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Effective decontamination or making the patient 

as clean as possible to reduce contamination to a level that is no 

longer a threat to the patient or the responder.

Typical Steps:

1. Don personal protective equipment (PPE). 

2. Conduct gross decontamination at the decontamination station: 

a. Remove all patient clothing and belongings and secure 

b. Begin with the least aggressive decontamination methods, 

using warm water and soap. Wash exposed areas gently 

under a stream of water 

c. Decontaminate patient from the head down; prevent 

contamination of open wounds. Decontaminate exposed 

wounds and eyes before intact skin. Cover wounds with 

waterproof dressing after decontamination 

3. Remove contaminants to the level that they are no threat to the 

patient or response personnel. 

4. Isolate the patient to prevent the spread of any remaining 

contaminants and prepare patient for transport to a hospital. 

5. Identify level of decontamination in patient history and identify (tag) 

the patient as decontaminated. 

6. Coordinate transportation of victims to a hospital. 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a 

result of gaps in victim care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Initial Actions 

1. What initial actions were taken to contain and control the crowd? Explain their effectiveness. 

2. What alerted the responders to the need for emergency mass decontamination? 

3. How was mass decontamination initiated? Was it effective? 

Responder Protection 

4. Were emergency medical services staff wearing appropriate level of PPE, based on the agent and conditions? 

5. What actions were taken to minimize responder exposure to the victims’ contaminates? 

6. Were first responders contaminated by the victims? If so, how could this have been prevented? 

Decontamination Procedures

7. What method of mass decontamination was used by the initial units on the scene? 

8. To what extent was initial decontamination timely and effective? 

9. What instructions were given to responders regarding the initial decontamination? To victims? 

10. Who was present to direct the victims at the end of the decontamination corridor? What directions were given to the 

victims? 

11. Why was each decontamination area placed where selected? 

12. How were modesty and cultural considerations handled? 

13. What provisions were made to secure and protect individuals’ belongings? 

14. Was the equipment adequate to perform the task? 

15. How were the victims monitored to ensure thorough decontamination? 

16. What decontamination solutions were used? Were they appropriate? 

17. What provisions were made to cover and warm the victims after completing decontamination? 

18. Were triage, treatment, and transport personnel available at the end of the decontamination corridor? 

19. What equipment was used to scan the victims for residual contamination? Was equipment properly maintained? 

20. To what extent was runoff a consideration? How were runoff considerations handled? What additional agencies were 

contacted concerning runoff issues? 

Communication and Coordination

21. Did the first responders obtain any agent type information? How and to whom did they pass the information? 

22. At what point were additional units called to assist in decontamination? 

23. Where were the emergency antidotes staged during the exercise? 

24. What information was given to the victims at the beginning and end of the decontamination corridor? 

25. How were mutual-aid assets incorporated into the decontamination sector? 

26. How did public health personnel serve as technical advisors for decontaminating victims? 

27. Did public health personnel confer with the appropriate agencies regarding decontamination issues? With whom did 

they confer? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-5: Screen Individuals for Agent Contamination 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: In Community/ 

Incident Site 

Response 

Element: 

EMS Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Evacuation order for the population at risk, selected 

evacuation routes, and defined predicted hazard area. 

Conditions: Availability of communications systems; availability of 

personnel, equipment, and material; and conditions at variance with 

plans and procedures. 

Expected Outcomes: Potentially exposed persons are identified and 

screened for decontamination.

Typical Steps:

1. Select evacuee screening locations according to established plans 

and procedures. 

2. Set up the screening location according to local plans and 

procedures, paying special attention to contamination and access 

control measures. 

3. Conduct differential screening of evacuees by determining: 

a. Whether they present signs and symptoms of agent exposure 

b. Whether they have been evacuated from the predicted hazard 

area 

c. Their time of departure from the predicted hazard area (to 

determine if they have traveled through the plume) 

d. Whether they desire decontamination even though they have 

not or are not likely to have been exposed 

4. Escort exposed evacuees (those presenting signs and symptoms) 

directly to the decontamination area. 

5. Direct potentially exposed evacuees and others desiring 

decontamination to a holding area. 

6. Direct all other evacuees to reception centers or shelters. 

7. Review rosters to assure continuous, 24-hour operation and 

assign screening personnel to tasks and shifts where they are 

most needed. Provide a transition or situation briefing to later shift 

personnel before they begin work. 

8. Provide reports to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). 

Consequences: Exposed or potentially exposed evacuees are not 

incapacitated as a result of lapses in care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Were emergency medical services (EMS) personnel able to quickly and accurately recognize the type of agent based 

on presenting signs and symptoms? 

2. What equipment was exercised to identify the agent? 

3. Were EMS personnel able to accurately identify agents based on clusters of calls? 

4. Were EMS personnel able to coordinate with law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue? 

5. Was specific equipment lacking that could have been useful in agent identification? 

6. Once the agent was identified, who was notified, and how was notification made? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-6: Decontaminate Individuals at Screening Site 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: In Community 

Response 

Element: 

EMS Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Unprotected, exposed or potentially exposed, ill, or injured 

people; screened evacuees requiring or requesting decontamination; 

and established decontamination site. 

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of illness and/or injury; 

agent type; extent of exposure to the agent; availability of 

decontamination and emergency medical teams and equipment; 

availability of clean clothing; availability of communications equipment; 

and knowledge of local laws, memorandums of 

agreement/memorandums of understanding, plans, procedures, and 

regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Contamination is reduced to a level that is no 

longer a threat to the patient or the responder.

Typical Steps:

1. Set up decontamination areas according to local plans and 

procedures, 

2. Don appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) before 

starting operations. 

3. At the holding area, segregate evacuees by exposure, symptoms, 

and gender. 

4. Prepare individuals for decontamination; secure clothing and other 

removed personal items. 

5. Conduct gross decontamination of victims, including secondary 

decontamination for injured victims. 

6. Remove contaminants to the level that they are no longer a threat 

to the patient or response personnel. Rescreen and 

decontaminate again as necessary. 

7. Isolate the patient from the environment. Tag patient as 

decontaminated. Provide clean clothing. Coordinate transportation 

of victims to a hospital or shelter. 

8. Review rosters to assure continuous, 24-hour operation and to 

assign decontamination personnel to tasks and shifts where they 

are most needed. Provide a transition or situation briefing to later 

shift personnel before they begin work. 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a 

result of lapses in victim care; responders are protected from exposure 

to effects of a chemical agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Decontamination Areas 

1. What was the decision process to designate and establish the selected decontamination area? 

2. Were there problems with the decontamination area setup (e.g., inside, outside, adequate size)? 

3. How was information regarding decontamination location disseminated? 

4. How was the decontamination area made safe for use (e.g., negative ventilation used, air ducts covered with HEPA 

filters, environmental readings taken)? 

5. How were contaminant control measures addressed at the decontamination areas? 

6. Did the area provide sufficient supplies of water, fuel, and electricity? 

7. Describe the adequacy of training and equipping staff assigned to the decontamination area. Identify other 

requirements for them to operate effectively in a chemical environment. 

Responder Protection

8. Did personnel employ self-protection measures, both equipment-based and evasive, quickly and appropriately? 

9. Did the responders select the appropriate PPE for incident, based on available information? 

10. Were the chemical agents identified quickly and accurately? 

11. Were the chemical agents’ properties and risk to health identified properly? 

12. What actions were taken to minimize responder exposure to the victims’ contaminates? 

Decontamination Preparation 

13. How were victims segregated and prioritized for decontamination (e.g., by exposure or potential exposure). 

14. Was decontamination conducted for victims who were not exposed? How were victims’ personal belongings handled 

(e.g., automobiles)? 

15. How did evacuees know how to collect their property? 

16. Describe process for victim preparation decontamination. 

17. What provisions were made to secure and protect individuals’ belongings? How was collection of patient 

clothing/eyeglasses managed? 

18. How were modesty and cultural considerations handled? 

19. What information was given to the victims at the beginning and end of the decontamination corridor? 

Decontamination Procedures

20. How were the victims monitored to ensure thorough decontamination? 

21. Describe the decontamination process for an individual. Was the process conducted head down? 

22. What decontamination solutions were used and where? Were the least aggressive methods used first (e.g., did crews 

start with just warm water and soap)? Under what circumstances were chemicals and mechanical methods 

introduced? 

23. How were injured patients decontaminated? What actions were taken for wounds? 

24. What provisions were made to cover and warm the victims after completing decontamination? 

25. Were triage, treatment, and transport personnel available at the end of the decontamination corridor? 

26. How effective was decontamination for ambulatory and nonambulatory patients? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-7: Treat Patients at the Screening Site 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: In Community 

(Screening Site) 

Response 

Element: 

EMS Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Unprotected, exposed or potentially exposed, or ill civilians, 

workers, or responders in the predicted hazard area. 

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of injury or illness; 

agent type; extent of exposure to the chemical agent; availability of 

emergency medical teams and equipment; availability of 

communications equipment; and knowledge of local laws, 

memorandums of agreement/memorandums of understanding, plans, 

procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Patients are stabilized and taken to a hospital in 

time to prevent death or permanent incapacitation.

Typical Steps:

1. Don personal protective equipment (PPE) and take other 

measures to protect medical providers from danger due to 

contamination, bloodborne pathogens, bodily fluids, etc. 

2. In a multiple patient situation, begin proper triage procedures. 

3. Conduct primary patient assessment while simultaneously 

conducting decontamination (if needed). Assign highest priorities 

to life-threatening issues (airway, breathing, circulation) and 

decontamination. Except for the administration of antidotes, 

perform invasive procedures only in uncontaminated areas. 

4. Once life-threatening issues have been addressed, and as 

conditions allow, direct attention to secondary patient assessment 

and establish patient history. 

5. If not already done, arrange for and coordinate transportation of 

victims to a hospital. 

6. Using good medical practice, treat presenting signs and symptoms 

as appropriate and when conditions allow. 

7. Reassess the patient continuously because of possible latent 

physiological effects of agent exposure. 

8. Delay prophylactic measures until the patient is decontaminated. 

9. Prepare victim for transport to hospital. 

10. Provide patient tracking information in accordance with established 

protocols and procedures. 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a 

result of lapses in victim care; and responders are protected from 

exposure to effects of a chemical agent. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Responder Preparation

1. Were incoming emergency medical services (EMS) properly protected for the type of incident? Explain. 

2. Was treatment conducted within the capability of the PPE? 

3. Were EMS personnel properly equipped with necessary tools to treat victims (e.g., suction, bag valve masks)? 

4. What preestablished procedures were used to mobilize the necessary equipment and personnel? 

5. Did EMS personnel become contaminated and become victims? How could this have been prevented? 

Victim Care 

6. How were treatment and triage areas for the victims designated? Discuss their size and location in relation to the transportation 

area and overall suitability. 

7. What actions did medical personnel take to provide the earliest possible intervention, including basic life support? 

8. How was need for treatment prioritized? 

9. Were established triage protocols followed? 

10. Were there sufficient personnel available to initiate triage? 

11. What procedures were followed for treatment? Were they effectively conducted? Were they adequate to deal with the complex 

patient care issues confronting EMS personnel and the command staff? 

12. How were treated patients reassessed? 

13. How were the “worried well” handled? 

14. What provisions were made for protection of victims from the press/media? 

15. Was the treatment rendered noted completely on the triage tags? 

16. How was the medical monitoring of first responders accomplished? 

17. What did EMS do with the materials to be disposed? 

Communication and Coordination 

18. What assessments were made regarding the need for additional medical resources? 

19. Were communications problems encountered between the EMS sectors and other operational sectors (e.g., HazMat)? 

20. How were patient data tracked? Were they passed on to the receiving hospital and the Emergency Operations Center? 

21. How was coordination between agencies accomplished (face to face, radio)? 

22. What actions were taken to arrange for transportation? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-8: Report Victim Status to EOC/Hospital 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Incident Site/In 

Community 

Response 

Element: 

EMS Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Location and condition of civilians, workers, and responders in 

the safety restricted area or projected hazard area who are injured, ill, 

or exposed to a chemical agent. 

Conditions: Time available to make reports while treating victims; 

nature and extent of injuries and decontamination; availability of 

communications equipment and knowledge of local laws, 

memorandums of agreement/memorandums of understanding, plans, 

procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: The Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC)/hospital has current information about the location and status of 

all victims of injury or agent exposure.

Typical Steps:

1. Make initial reports to the EOC/hospital about the location and 

status (extent of injury and exposure, and care being provided) of 

all injured or exposed persons. 

2. Make regular update reports to EOC/hospital (from the incident 

site or screening site) about the location and status (extent of 

injury and exposure, and care being provided) of all injured or 

exposed persons. 

3. Make regular update reports to EOC/hospital about delays in care 

for victims, and recommend or request assistance to remedy the 

delay. 

Consequences: No victims of injury or agent exposure die or are 

permanently incapacitated as a result of higher priorities given to other 

response activities. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. How were appropriate hospitals identified? 

2. Were tracking procedures, including tagging and identifying, demonstrated? 

3. What was the process for releasing public information to the health care community? 

4. How often did the dissemination of information to hospitals and urgent care centers occur? What information was 

provided? 

5. What actions were taken to ensure patient data were completely and accurately recorded and passed on to the 

receiving hospital and the EOC? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-9: Prepare to Receive Patients 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Hospital 

Team: Hospital Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Advance notice of the arrival of injured, ill, or exposed civilians, 

workers, or responders who were at the incident site or in the safety 

restricted area or projected hazard area. 

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of reported injuries or 

illness; treatment by emergency medical services (EMS) and 

decontamination; availability of emergency medical staff; availability of 

appropriate medical equipment and supplies; availability of 

communications equipment; and knowledge of local laws, 

memorandums of agreement/memorandums of understanding, plans, 

procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: The hospital is prepared for the arrival and 

treatment of patients.

Typical Steps:

1. Receive notification that an incident has occurred and requests to 

receive patients. 

2. Notify all services involved in the plan and mobilize the emergency 

department. 

3. If any incoming patients were potentially contaminated or exposed 

to a chemical agent, implement the hazardous material plan for the 

facility: 

a. Prepare the decontamination and treatment areas 

b. Select personal protective equipment (PPE) and prepare the 

triage and decontamination teams to receive patients 

4. Notify patient transports of any special approach or entrance to the 

hospital. 

5. Receive initial and followup patient information from the incident 

site and patient transports. 

6. Make arrangements to identify and isolate potentially 

contaminated patients that present themselves to the hospital 

unannounced or outside of regular EMS channels. 

7. Report the status of requests to receive patients and the state of 

preparedness to accommodate the requests to the local medical 

services coordinator. 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a 

result of gaps in victim care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. What actions were taken to provide security to the hospital? Discuss internal capabilities and dependency on and 

availability of outside support. 

2. How were nonincident-related patients isolated and relocated? Discuss the decision process, external coordination, 

and support required. 

3. How did the staff initiate proper notifications (e.g., emergency department staff, hospital administration, public 

relations, local walk-in providers)? 

4. What means were used to conduct external communication and coordination (e.g., HazMat, Emergency Operations 

Center [EOC], poison control)? Discuss how the procedures affected the response effort. 

5. How was information disseminated within the hospital? 

6. How are interhospital communications anticipated to occur? Is this type of coordination anticipated to ensure critical 

technical and medical information is shared between providers? 

7. What information did the EOC and other external policymakers require from the hospital on a recurring basis? Discuss 

the capability of the hospital to provide this in a timely manner. 

8. What level of PPE was worn by the hospital staff? 

9. Was the dress-out area in close proximity to the decontamination sector, adequate in size, and effectively organized? 

10. What medical monitoring was done before and after the staff used PPE? Was inclusion/exclusion criteria used to 

determine who can get dressed? 

11. Were there adequate amounts and sizes of proper PPE for the staff to wear? For how many staff rotations? 

12. Did the staff don and doff the PPE properly? How long did personnel remain in PPE? 

13. Were problems encountered during the staff use of PPE? 

14. Were the staff able to communicate effectively with one another and patients while wearing PPE (e.g., radios, public 

address system, white boards)? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-10: Transport Patients to Hospital 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: In Community 

Response 

Element: 

EMS Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Contaminated or potentially contaminated, exposed or potentially 

exposed, and injured or ill civilians, workers, or responders who have been 

treated at or near the incident site.

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of injury or illness; nature and 

extent of treatment and decontamination; availability of emergency medical 

teams and transport equipment; availability of communications equipment; and 

knowledge of local laws, memorandums of agreement/memorandums of 

understanding, plans, procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Patients are taken to a hospital in time to prevent death 

or permanent incapacitation; vehicle, crew, and emergency medical services 

(EMS) personnel are returned to service.

Typical Steps:

1. Coordinate patient surface or air transport to the hospital. 

2. If patient is to be directly transported to a hospital, coordinate patient 

admission in accordance with facility procedures. 

3. Prepare the transport vehicle. If practical, drape surfaces and remove all 

nonessential equipment from the transport vehicle. 

4. Don personal protective equipment. 

5. Before placing patient in the transport vehicle, ensure the patient has 

been decontaminated as appropriate and wrapped to prevent crosscontamination. 

6. Coordinate with the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to ensure that 

the patient transfer will be via a safe route, and will be expedited through 

any traffic control points and access control points that have been set up. 

7. Transport patient to the designated hospital. Continue appropriate 

treatment during transfer and transport. Provide treatment and patient 

history updates to the receiving hospital. 

8. Upon arrival at the hospital, park the ambulance in an area away from the 

emergency department or at an area designated by the facility. Do not 

bring a patient into the hospital until permission is received from the 

hospital staff. 

9. After unloading the patient, check with the hospital to determine where the 

transport vehicle can be safely decontaminated so the vehicle can be 

returned to service. 

10. As appropriate, decontaminate exposed vehicle, crew, and EMS 

personnel. 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a result 

of lapses in victim care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Communication and Coordination 

1. Was a transport officer appointed and identified? Were sufficient resources available for transport? 

2. Did the transport officer perform his or her role effectively? 

3. Did the EMS personnel conducting transport coordinate with health care, HazMat, and facilities? 

4. How did the transportation officer organize the transportation sector? 

5. What coordination occurred among the transportation, evacuation, and loading sectors? Describe its adequacy and 

highlight areas needing further refinement. 

6. How did the transportation officer determine what hospitals would receive patients? 

7. Were maps, special instructions, or escorts provided to transport teams going to hospitals with which they might be 

unfamiliar? 

8. Were alternative transportation vehicles (e.g., buses and vans) used effectively? 

9. Did the transportation officer use a preprinted log to record patient destination information? 

10. Was pertinent patient destination information shared with the Incident Commander? 

Transportation Procedures 

11. Did the EMS personnel transport the patients in a safe and timely manner? 

12. Did the EMS personnel transport patients to the appropriate receiving or transfer facility? 

13. How were appropriate transportation corridors identified and utilized? 

14. How were patients monitored during transportation? 

15. Were tracking procedures, such as identification and tagging, demonstrated? 

16. Were basic and advanced life support units easily identifiable? 

17. Were transport assets adequately staffed with trained EMS personnel? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-11: Decontaminate Patients at Hospital 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Hospital 

Response 

Element: Hospital Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Arrival of contaminated or potentially contaminated, exposed 

or potentially exposed, injured, ill, or exposed civilians, workers, or 

responders who were at the incident site or in the safety restricted area 

or projected hazard area. 

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of reported injuries or 

illness; previous treatment and decontamination; availability and 

completeness of patient history documentation; availability of 

emergency medical staff; availability of appropriate medical equipment 

and supplies; availability of communications equipment; and 

knowledge of local laws, memorandums of agreement/memorandums 

of understanding, plans, procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Effective decontamination, making the patient 

as clean as possible, to reduce contamination to a level that is no 

longer a threat to the patient or the medical staff.

Typical Steps:

1. Prepare the staging area to receive, treat, and monitor incoming 

patients. 

2. Don personal protective equipment (PPE). 

3. Meet the ambulance or transport vehicle upon arrival and begin 

triage. 

4. Remove and secure personal belongings. 

5. Conduct gross decontamination at the decontamination station. 

6. Remove contaminants to the level that they are no threat to the 

patient or response personnel. 

7. Isolate the patient to prevent the spread of any remaining 

contaminants and prepare patient for transport to a hospital. 

8. Identify level of decontamination in patient history and identify (tag) 

the patient as decontaminated. 

9. Review patient history; assess patient’s condition (note type and 

quantity of antidote administered and the method and extent of 

decontamination). 

10. If patient comes directly from the hazard area and has not 

previously been decontaminated, have the decontamination team 

perform gross and secondary decontamination before the patient 

enters the hospital. 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a 

result of lapses in victim care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Decontamination Preparation 

1. Did the health care/hospital personnel select the appropriate PPE for the incident based on available information? 

2. Was the hospital prepared to receive patients needing decontamination and medical treatment? 

Decontamination Procedures 

3. Was patient transfer between emergency medical services and hospital medical emergency response staff 

adequately performed? What directions were given to patients? 

4. Was patient marking, identifying, and tracking performed? 

5. What method of patient decontamination did the hospital medical emergency response staff use? 

6. To what extent was initial decontamination timely and effective? 

7. What instructions were given with the initial decontamination? 

8. Did the hospital obtain any additional agent information? How and to whom did they pass the information? 

9. Was the layout of the patient decontamination area consistent with the emergency response plan? 

10. What provisions were made to secure and protect patients’ belongings? 

11. What information was given to the victims at the beginning and end of the decontamination corridor? 

12. How were the victims monitored to ensure thorough decontamination? 

13. Was the equipment adequate to perform the task? 

14. What actions were taken to minimize responder exposure to the victims’ contaminates? Were hospital staff 

contaminated by the victims? If so, how could this have been prevented? 

15. What decontamination solutions were used? Were they appropriate? 

16. What provisions were made to cover and warm the victims after completing decontamination? 

17. Were triage, treatment, and transport personnel available at the end of the decontamination corridor? 

18. What equipment was used to scan the patient for residual contamination? 

19. How effective was decontamination for ambulatory and nonambulatory patients? 

20. How was the facility decontaminated and how was it certified as clear of any contamination? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-12: Treat Patients at Hospital 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Hospital 

Response 

Element: Hospital Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Arrival of injured, ill, or exposed civilians, workers, or 

responders who were at the incident site or in the safety restricted area 

or projected hazard area. 

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of reported injuries or 

illness; previous treatment and decontamination; availability and 

completeness of patient history documentation; availability of 

emergency medical staff; availability of appropriate medical equipment 

and supplies; availability of communications equipment; and 

knowledge of local laws, memorandums of agreement 

(MOA)/memorandums of understanding (MOU), plans, procedures, 

and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Patients are given appropriate medical 

treatment consistent with their injuries, illness, or extent of exposure. 

Patients are stabilized and admitted, transferred, or discharged as 

appropriate.

Typical Steps:

1. Don appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). 

2. Meet the ambulance or transport vehicle upon arrival and begin 

triage. 

3. Begin proper triage procedures at the emergency personal 

decontamination station. 

4. Conduct primary patient assessment/decontamination (if needed). 

5. Treat presenting signs and symptoms according to good medical 

practice. 

6. Address life-threatening issues and establish patient history. 

7. Review patient history; assess patient’s condition (note type and 

quantity of antidote administered and the method and extent of 

decontamination). 

8. Treat signs and symptoms; continually assess the patient. 

9. If treatment required exceeds the hospital’s capability, refer patient 

to another hospital. 

10. Admit, transfer, or discharge patients. 

11. Provide patient tracking information to the Emergency Operations 

Center (EOC). 

Consequences: No patients die or are permanently incapacitated as a 

result of lapses in victim care. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Hospital Preparation 

1. Did health care/hospital personnel use appropriate PPE? 

2. Was PPE used consistently for the same hazards? 

3. Was operational data requested and obtained in a timely manner (e.g., beds, ventilators, pharmaceuticals)? 

Hospital Coordination and Communication 

4. Does the hospital use a formal incident management system? 

5. Were command officers physically identified? 

6. Were personnel familiar with their assigned areas of responsibility? Did the Incident Command System work 

effectively? 

7. Were staff used effectively in each operational area? 

8. Were long-term operational issues addressed? 

9. Were actions taken to alter the staff rotation policy to meet the demands of the incident? 

10. Does the hospital have a published weapons of mass destruction emergency preparedness plan? Is it regularly 

exercised? What adjustments could be made to improve procedures? 

11. Were there evacuation plans for the relocation of patients who were already admitted? How is the evacuation 

coordinated? 

12. How were patient records maintained? Were patients effectively tracked through the system? 

13. What procedures were followed to ensure the hospital’s status and appropriate victim data were shared with outside 

agencies? Discuss the efficiency of the system and recommended systematic and equipment improvements. 

Patient Treatment 

14. Was a proper diagnosis developed early in the treatment of the victims? What could have been done to expedite 

these efforts? 

15. Was treatment of the patients appropriate and on a timely basis? Was the correct protocol used? 

16. Was triage done quickly and accurately? Were collaboration and communication demonstrated between health 

care/hospital and first responder personnel? 

17. How was patient clothing collected and managed? 

18. Was evidence obtained and or preserved without compromising the life and health of the patient? 

19. Was the hospital staff cognizant of requirements to support crime scene evidence recovery? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-13: Track Patient Status/Location 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: EOC/Hospital 

Team: EOC Staff/Hospital Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Reported information about the location and status of civilians, 

workers, or responders in the safety restricted area or projected 

hazard area who are ill, injured, or exposed to a chemical agent. 

Conditions: Availability of communications equipment and knowledge 

of local laws, memorandums of agreement/memorandums of 

understanding, plans, procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and 

hospital are satisfied that patients’ identities are confirmed, that their 

medical needs are taken care of, and that accurate information is 

available to notify patients’ next-of-kin. No patient’s identity or 

information is mistakenly released in reports or news releases.

Typical Steps:

1. Receive initial and followup reports (e.g., from emergency medical 

services (EMS) or the hospital) about the location and status 

(extent of injury and exposure, and care being provided) of all 

persons who are ill, injured, or exposed as a result of the incident. 

2. Postpatient information to status boards and brief senior officials in 

accordance with local procedures. 

3. Periodically solicit updates on patients if they are not forthcoming 

from EMS. 

4. Identify delays in patient care. 

5. Coordinate with county and State health department/medical 

services coordinator and exchange information regarding the 

status and location of patients. 

6. Ensure that the identities of patients are positively confirmed by a 

medical professional or a supervisor before next-of-kin 

notifications are made or reports or news releases are made that 

identify patients by name. 

Consequences: No victims of injury or agent exposure die or are 

permanently incapacitated as a result of higher priorities given to other 

response activities; no names of injured or deceased persons are 

released to families or the news media without positive confirmation. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. What actions were taken to ensure patient data were completely and accurately recorded and passed on to the 

receiving hospital and the EOC? 

2. How was information disseminated within the hospital? 

3. How are interhospital communications anticipated to occur? Is this type of coordination anticipated to ensure that 

critical technical and medical information is shared between providers? 

4. What information did the EOC and other external policymakers require from the hospital on a recurring basis? Discuss 

the capability of the hospital to provide this in a timely manner. 

5. Are patients monitored during treatment and residence? 

6. How was patient marking, identifying, and tracking performed? 

7. Are active (trend-tracking) and passive (cases reported from physicians and hospitals) surveillance systems in place 

and functioning appropriately, benchmarked against baselines? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-14: Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: Incident Site/In 

Community 

Response 

Element: 

EMS/Medical Examiner Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Civilian, worker, or responder fatalities in the incident area or 

projected hazard area. 

Conditions: Availability of victim recovery teams; availability of 

decontamination equipment and teams; availability of graves 

registration/mortuary facilities; knowledge of local laws, memorandums 

of agreement/memorandums of understanding, plans, procedures, and 

regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Remains are treated with dignity and respect at 

all times, and are made available to the next-of-kin.

Typical Steps:

1. Ensure that remains are not moved until authorized by a 

designated official, unless movement is required to prevent 

destruction of the body or to protect life, safety, or health. 

2. If contamination is suspected, tag remains and move to a 

decontamination site when movement is authorized. 

3. Remove, monitor, and decontaminate (if possible without 

destruction) the personal effects of the deceased; segregate by 

contamination status and secure. Make special provisions for 

personal effects that cannot be decontaminated without being 

destroyed. 

4. If the remains are identified as potentially contaminated or 

exposed, thoroughly decontaminate the remains using the same 

procedures as used for exposed persons who were not fatalities. 

Make a record of the methods used for decontamination and 

confirm that decontamination is complete. 

5. Contain remains and properly store pending arrangements for 

transfer to a mortuary or other appropriate facility. 

6. Report location and status of remains to the Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC). 

Consequences: Human remains can be interred in accordance with 

the wishes of the next-of-kin. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

Responder Protection 

1. Did personnel implement established procedures for handling contaminated remains, including the use of personal 

protective equipment (PPE)? What specifically? 

Handling of Remains 

2. What steps were implemented to identify victims? 

3. What procedures were implemented for handling personal effects? 

4. How were religious and cultural considerations handled? 

5. What procedures were followed regarding decontamination of deceased before they were taken to the morgue? 

6. Were personal effects decontaminated? What method was used to determine that personal effects were adequately 

decontaminated? 

7. Were personnel, equipment, and vehicles decontaminated after handling contaminated remains? What method was 

used to determine whether personnel and equipment were adequately decontaminated? 

8. Were temporary morgue areas established? What and where specifically? 

9. Was the morgue sector identifiable, secure, and adequately staffed? 

10. Who was in charge of the morgue sector? 

11. How were the bodies transported to the morgue? Were there sufficient transportation resources? If not, what solution 

was implemented? 

12. Did the medical examiner (ME)/coroner’s office have adequate storage facilities to handle the deceased? What 

specifically? If not, what remedy was used? 

13. Did the ME/coroner implement appropriate procedures for preserving remains for evidentiary purposes? What 

specifically? 

Communication and Coordination 

14. Did the local disaster plan adequately address fatality management? 

15. What role did the ME/coroner play? 

16. Did the ME/coroner coordinate with the incident command HazMat team? How was liaison established with the EOC? 

17. Did the ME/coroner request assistance for mutual aid or disaster mortuary operational response? How were these 

agencies used? 

18. Did the ME/coroner have a coordinated plan with the hospitals for the storage/pickup of contaminated bodies? Were 

the hospitals aware of the protocols necessary for storing contaminated bodies? 

19. What documentation was prepared regarding deceased personnel? Were different procedures/considerations given to 

deceased first responders? 
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-15: Coordinate Disposition of Human Remains 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: EOC 

Response 

Element: 

EOC Staff/Medical Examiner Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Confirmed fatalities from the projected hazard area that have 

been exposed or potentially exposed to a chemical agent. 

Conditions: Availability of communications equipment and knowledge 

of local laws, memorandums of agreement/memorandums of 

understanding, plans, procedures, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: Legal requirements for handling remains are 

met; next-of-kin receive assistance with claiming the remains of the 

deceased.

Typical Steps:

1. Receive reports of fatalities from field locations, record information, 

and inform the emergency services coordinator/senior elected 

official or designated representative. 

2. Contact coroner/medical examiner (ME) to determine whether an 

investigation as to cause of death will be required, if the 

coroner/ME will require custody of the remains, and if the remains 

can be moved. 

3. Track decontamination status and location of remains and 

personal effects. 

4. Confirm that the victims are deceased, confirm their identity, and 

report the information to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). 

5. If identity cannot be immediately determined, move remains to an 

ME’s or coroner’s facility for later identification. 

6. Determine next-of-kin wishes for movement of remains to a 

mortuary or other appropriate facility (part of the notification 

process). 

Consequences: Human remains can be turned over to the next-of-kin.

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. How was management of disposition of human remains addressed? 

1. Were arrangements made for primary and temporary morgue facilities? 

2. What provisions were made to augment capabilities through mutual support or Federal and State assistance? 

3. What documentation was prepared regarding deceased personnel? Were there different procedures/considerations 

given to deceased first responders? 

4. Was the disposition of remains coordinated with law enforcement agencies?
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Task # VI-16: Notify Next-of-Kin 

Outcome: Victim Care Location: EOC/Hospital 

Response 

Element: EOC Staff/Hospital Staff Jurisdiction: 

Evaluator: Contact #: 

Task Information Notes 

Inputs: Confirmed information about the identity, location, and status 

of people who are fatalities or were ill, injured, or exposed to a 

chemical agent. 

Conditions: Time available; nature and extent of reported injuries or 

illness, treatment by EMS, and decontamination; availability of 

notification staff; availability of communications equipment; and 

knowledge of local laws, memorandums of agreement/memorandums 

of understanding, plans, procedures, protocols, and regulations. 

Expected Outcomes: The next-of-kin of fatalities or ill, injured, and 

exposed persons are promptly notified and their immediate needs are 

supported. Information about the victims or their next-of-kin are not 

reported or released unless authorized. 

Typical Steps:

1. Collect all information needed to contact the next-of-kin. 

2. Ensure that an individual trained in next-of-kin notification contacts 

the next-of-kin and provides them with essential information about 

the victims. 

3. Follow appropriate limitations on releasing the identity of the 

victims and/or the next-of-kin both prior to and following the 

notification. 

Consequences: The next-of-kin of victims learn about the location 

and status of the victims from the appropriate source first, with due 

consideration for their special circumstances. The privacy of victims 

and their next-of-kin is respected. 

Note: These are “typical” steps that you might expect to see a player 

carry out when performing this task. Please consult the specific 

jurisdiction’s plans and procedures for actual requirements. 

Record time task starts and is completed. Describe 

any actions that appear to significantly help or impede 

achievement of the outcome.
Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Guide 

Operations-Based Exercises 

Followup Analysis 

Upon completion of the day’s exercise play, evaluators should 

compile their observations into a chronological narrative of events, 

describing outcomes achieved or not achieved. For any outcomes 

that are not achieved, the evaluator should analyze the sequence 

of events and attempt to determine the cause using the questions 

at right. The questions below may further help determine root 

cause. 

9 What happened? 

9 What was supposed to happen? 

9 If there is a difference, why? 

9 What is the impact of that difference? 

9 What should be learned from this? 

9 What corrective actions are recommended? 

1. Were protocols in place to ensure privacy? 

2. Who is responsible for the notification of the next-of-kin? 

3. Were staff available to assist with family notification and to provide other essential information about the victims? 

4. Were procedures in place to describe how information about the victims and/or the next-of-kin would be released? 
APPENDIX D

Sample After Action Report

SAMPLE AFTER ACTION REPORT

Executive Summary

Homeland security preparedness involves a cycle of outreach, planning, capability development, training, exercising, evaluation, and improvement. Successful exercises lead to an ongoing program of

process improvements. This report is intended to assist agencies striving for preparedness excellence

by analyzing exercise results and:

♦ Identifying strengths to be maintained and built upon.

♦ Identifying potential areas for further improvement.

♦ Recommending exercise followup actions.

The suggested actions in this report should be viewed as recommendations only. In some cases, agencies may determine that the benefits of implementation are insufficient to outweigh the costs. In

other cases, agencies may identify alternative solutions that are more effective or efficient. Each agency

should review the recommendations and determine the most appropriate action and the resources

needed (time, staff, funds) for implementation.

The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS; formerly the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile [NPS]) held a 

2-day full-scale weapons of mass destruction (WMD) exercise June 17–18, 2003. The exercise was

cosponsored by the State Department of Public Health (DPH) and the State Emergency Management

Agency (EMA) with assistance from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for

Domestic Preparedness (DHS/ODP). This exercise was the State’s first using newly developed procedures to receive, distribute, and dispense SNS supplies in response to a statewide bioterrorism

incident.

The exercise included CDC delivery of mock SNS supplies to a central receiving warehouse in the capital city. The participating agencies coordinated the unloading, reapportionment, and distribution of

those supplies to two actual and four simulated distribution points. The Capital County Public Health

Department activated a temporary Dispensing Site and conducted emergency dispensing operations

for 5 hours, treating 600 role-playing patients.

Strengths

Key strengths identified during this exercise include the following:

♦ The participants of all agencies at the State and local levels demonstrated excellent teamwork.

♦ A new cooperative partnership was established between DPH and EMA.

♦ The planning forethought demonstrated by State and local agencies in designing their SNS

receipt, distribution, and dispensing procedures was excellent.

♦ The participating agencies successfully demonstrated an initial capability to manage a statewide

bioterrorism incident including the supply and operation of a temporary dispensing clinic.

The Executive Summary provides a brief overview of the exercise, major strengths demonstrated

during the exercise, and areas that require improvement.

D–1
♦ The participants demonstrated a positive attitude and the ability to recognize and react to shortfalls in the new SNS plans as they were uncovered and to smoothly adjust operations.

In addition, several successes of this exercise should be recognized, among them:

♦ This was the first major DPH exercise.

♦ This was the first test of the State’s new SNS Standard Operating Procedures.

♦ This was the first joint DPH/EMA exercise.

♦ This was one of the Nation’s first exercises to comprehensively test SNS request, delivery, redistribution, and dispensing operations in a single, near-real-time exercise.

♦ In response to the quality, scope, and scale of the exercise, CDC provided three SNS training

packages rather than the usual single package, and it piggybacked a no-notice CDC SNS deployment exercise onto the State exercise.

Areas for Improvement

Through the exercise, several opportunities for improvement in the State’s ability to respond to a

bioterrorism incident were identified. Major recommendations include the following:

♦ Electronic emergency management information system access and training should be expanded

to all State agencies and all counties in the State.

♦ State quarantine plans and procedures should be reviewed and enhanced.

♦ Communication between the State and county Emergency Operations Centers and the temporary SNS distribution network should be enhanced.

♦ Efficiency improvements should be made to the implementing procedures for the Receiving,

Staging, and Storage (RSS) site and dispensing center.

♦ Improvements should be made to the dispensing center exterior security and to crowd 

control.

Planners should use the results of this exercise to forecast dispensing and treatment center locations

and staffing requirements for a large-scale bioterrorism event requiring implementation of mass prophylaxis. Planners should consider scenarios to serve 1,000; 10,000; 100,000; and 1 million patients

for contagious or noncontagious threats.

Subsequent exercises should test specific improvements instituted as a result of this exercise and should

include a focus on public information measures. Planners should consider exercising the alternate RSS

site should the primary site be unavailable in an emergency. Additional Dispensing Sites should be exercise to ensure that emergency prophylaxis measures can be instituted at key areas across the State. For

cost effectiveness, planners should consider rotating Dispensing Site exercises across the State, with or

without an SNS stockpile deployment exercise.

D–2
Chapter 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name

Strategic National Stockpile Tabletop and Full-Scale Exercise

Duration

2 days

Exercise Date

June 17, 2003: Tabletop Exercise

June 17–18, 2003: Full-Scale Exercise

Sponsor

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)

Type of Exercise

Tabletop Exercise 

Full-Scale Exercise

Funding Source (Agency Receiving Funding)

State Emergency Management Agency

Program

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, State 03 Funding

Focus

___ Response 

___ Recovery 

___ Prevention 

___ Other

Classification

___ Unclassified (U) 

___ For Official Use Only (FOUO) 

___ By Invitation Only (IO)

Scenario

___ Chemical release or threat (C) 

___ Biological release or threat (B) 

___ Radiological release or threat (R) 

___ Nuclear detonation or threat (N) 

___ Explosive detonation or threat (E) 

The Exercise Overview describes the exercise, identifies the agencies/organizations that participated

in it, and describes how it was structured and implemented. This information will be gathered in a

database on the National Exercise Program and will be available for planning, scheduling, and evaluation purposes.

D–3

X

X

X
___ Cyber (Y) 

___ Other/Specify (O)

Location

Anytown, US

Participating Organizations

Cosponsors

Local Agencies

♦ County Emergency Management

State Agencies

♦ State Department of Public Health

♦ State Emergency Management Agency

Federal Agencies

♦ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness

♦ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Contract Support (if applicable)

♦ (Name of Consulting Firm)

Participants

Federal Agencies

♦ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

♦ U.S. Marshals Service

State Agencies

♦ Attorney General’s Office

♦ Bureau of Radiological Health

♦ Department of Agriculture

♦ Department of Personnel

♦ Department of Public Health

♦ Department of Public Safety

♦ Department of Transportation

♦ National Guard

♦ Emergency Management Agency

♦ Department of Health and Human Services 

D–4
Local Agencies

♦ Capital City Fire Department

♦ Capital City Police Department

♦ Capital City Public School District

♦ Capital County Health Department

♦ Suburban County 1 Health Department

♦ Suburban County 2 Health Department

♦ Capital County Air Quality Division

♦ Capital County Department of General Services

♦ Capital County Emergency Management Agency

♦ Capital County Health Department

♦ Capital County Sheriff’s Office

♦ Suburban County 1 Emergency Management Agency

♦ Suburban County 1 Fire Department

♦ Suburban County 2 Emergency Management Agency

♦ Suburban County 2 Department of Public Health

♦ Other organizations

• Various county public health department and hospital volunteer role players

• American Red Cross

• Downtown pharmacy

• Central pharmacy

• State Board of Medical Examiners

• State Board of Pharmacy Examiners

• State Motor Truck Association

• State Pharmacy Association

• State Veterans Affairs

• State Visiting Nurse Services

• Capital City Hospital

• Central Medical Center

• Capital County Health Advisory Board

• Capital County Medical Society

• Private Business Partners

• University Hygienic Laboratory

D–5
International Agencies

♦ None

Number of Participants

♦ Players 136

♦ Victim role players 100

♦ Controllers 28

♦ Evaluators 28

♦ Observers 89

Exercise Overview

The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Full-Scale Exercise was designed to be a 2-day terrorism exercise. The goal of the exercise was to familiarize the necessary agencies with the protocols in place for

deploying SNS supplies. Exercise play focused on the logistics associated with ordering, delivering, distributing, and dispensing SNS supplies.

The exercise was designed to:

1. Continue to solidify the partnership between the State and the Federal Government.

2. Assess the inter/intraagency coordination of Federal agencies, the State, and local jurisdictions

during a public health crisis triggered by a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction

(WMD).

3. Improve the operational readiness of the State emergency management system, and augment the

capabilities of that system to respond to emergency situations.

4. Provide an opportunity for individual training and agency cross-training to achieve a high level

of collective preparedness.

5. Assist the State in assessing, validating, and updating the State’s Emergency Operations Plan

(August 1999) and its Terrorism Incident Response Annex (January 2003), the State Emergency

Operations Center Standard Operating Procedures (May 2000), and the SNS Standard Operating

Procedures (March 2003).

6. Revisit and validate some of the lessons learned during the State’s SNS Tabletop Exercise of

January 2003.

Participants were advised that the exercise was an “evaluated practice,” a format that allowed players to

test their plans and procedures within a no-fault learning environment. At the same time, Evaluators,

Controllers, and Simulators collected information to assess performance of critical tasks during exercise play using State and local plans and procedures.

The scope of play required activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the Department of Public Health (DPH) Emergency Coordination Center (ECC), the Receiving, Staging, and

Storage (RSS) Site, the RSS Forward Command Post (FCP), two State-operated Distribution Nodes,

and a locally operated Dispensing Site.

Organizations that were not directly involved as participants at one of the exercise locations and

actions that took place outside of these play locations were played by Controllers in the simulation

cell (SIMCELL). From the SIMCELL, the Controllers injected messages and implemented the scenario

through phone calls, faxes, and electronic messages.

D–6
The exercise consisted of a half-day tabletop exercise followed by a day-and-a-half full-scale exercise.

♦ Tabletop Exercise: Executive-level players from the Governor’s Office, the State DPH, and

the State Emergency Management Agency (EMA) participated in a tabletop component that

exercised their decision-making procedures for requesting the SNS 12-Hour Push Package from

the CDC. After the executive group had decided to request the SNS, players predesignated to

staff the EOC, DPH ECC, and RSS FCP were notified through normal processes to report to their

respective locations by 1230.

♦ Full-Scale Exercise: The State’s SNS Receiving Team reported to the RSS and began preparing

to receive the SNS supplies. At 1230, players at each site received an introductory briefing including exercise rules and the scenario background. Full-scale exercise play continued until

1630. Players returned to the EOC, DPH ECC, and RSS FCP at 0730 the next day. Players also

activated two additional exercise locations: the Capital County Distribution Node and the

Capital City Dispensing Site. Full-scale play continued until 1530 that afternoon, including

3 hours of dispensing supplies to role-players at the Capital City Dispensing Site.

Onsite hot washes were conducted at the EOC, DPH ECC, RSS FCP, and the Capital City Dispensing

Site. Information from those hot washes was incorporated into the Exercise Evaluation Conference

conducted on the day after the exercise.

Exercise Evaluation

The exercise was designed to provide participants with an opportunity to assess current capabilities to

perform the critical tasks required to respond to a public health emergency resulting from a bioterrorist attack. Through assessment of those capabilities, participants identified strengths, weaknesses, and

future training needs.

Evaluators were positioned at all exercise locations to observe and record exercise events, including

player actions. Immediately following the conclusion of the tabletop segment and the termination of

the entire exercise, Controllers at each location facilitated hot washes to capture observations and

opinions from players. In addition, all participants were provided with exercise critique forms to

record their observations of the exercise.

An Exercise Evaluation Conference was conducted on June 19, 2003. At the conference, Evaluator

observations were analyzed, compared, and prioritized through a facilitated process with key players

and Controllers to determine lessons learned, make recommendations for improvement actions, and

identify key areas of emphasis for future planning.

In keeping with the no-fault nature of this exercise, the evaluation in this report examines the plans,

procedures, and response systems used. As an evaluated practice, individual and team player performances were observed and documented to make recommendations for future improvements. Evaluator

observations focus primarily on overall unit actions and the interaction between response units rather

than on individual players.

D–7
Chapter 2: Exercise Goals and Objectives

The State established the following goals and corresponding objectives for this exercise. All exercise

goals were demonstrated during exercise play and ultimately accomplished. Through demonstration of

these objectives, the exercise players successfully simulated an effective response to scenario events.

At the same time, exercise play revealed ways that future responses could be made more effective.

Goal 1: Test and improve the draft State Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Standard Operating

Procedures for a terrorist biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack.

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability of the executive management team to assess the public

health threat in accordance with the State SNS Standard Operating Procedures.

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability of the executive management team to initiate a request

for SNS deployment in accordance with the State SNS Standard Operating Procedures.

Goal 2: Test the interoperability of the State SNS Standard Operating Procedures with the State

Emergency Operations Plan and Terrorism Incident Annex.

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to alert and activate personnel, facilities, and systems

required to support a large-scale response to a biological incident using SNS supplies.

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability of State public health personnel to develop a decision aid

and to prioritize the allocation of SNS supplies.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to establish a Forward Command Post to coordinate logistics and security for receipt and distribution of SNS supplies.

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate public information, including rumor control, among multiple Federal, State, and local agencies to effectively notify, warn, and instruct, and

disseminate to, the public during a biological WMD attack.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the ability to effectively communicate and coordinate among State

and local agencies through established emergency response protocols including the utilization

of State and local Emergency Operations Centers.

Goal 3: Demonstrate the ability to receive, break down, distribute, and dispense SNS supplies to minimize casualties in a large-scale biological attack.

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain security at all sites involved in

the handling of SNS supplies.

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate a distribution network for SNS

supplies including a Receiving, Staging, and Storage center and at least one Distribution Node.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate at least one Dispensing Site for

SNS supplies.

Objective 4: Evaluate the response times to receive, distribute, and dispense SNS supplies

under the draft State SNS Standard Operating Procedures.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the capability to implement SNS supplies and patient tracking procedures under the draft State SNS Standard Operating Procedures.

D–8

The Exercise Goals and Objectives section lists the goals and objectives for the exercise. These are

developed during the exercise planning and design phase and are used to define the scope and content of the exercise as well as the agencies and organizations that will participate. 
Chapter 3: Exercise Events Synopsis

Scenario

The events depicted in the scenario take place during a period of heightened alert throughout the

United States. The threat of international terrorism is a continual source of concern, and the Homeland

Security Advisory System is set at threat condition Orange. In particular, the region of the country

where the State is located has been warned that a domestic terrorist group, the Allies of Islam, has purportedly made vague but aggressive statements aimed at the heartland.

The scenario takes place in the early summer after an average winter during which influenza cases

were common. There have been higher than usual caseloads of patients experiencing severe respiratory distress and other influenza symptoms because of several new virus strains that spread periodically throughout the winter.

Executive Tabletop Component: Morning, Exercise Day 1

Module 1: June 13–15, 2003

Scenario events begin on June 13, 2003, when Capital City-area hospitals and clinics see an aboveaverage number of patients complaining of flu-like symptoms. Eight of these patients have symptoms

severe enough to be admitted to hospitals. The scenario then follows these patients through the next

few days as their symptoms worsen and their sickness is reclassified as suspected pneumonia. The illness continues to spread across the State with more and more people being admitted to hospitals and

clinics complaining of flu- and pneumonia-like symptoms.

As the epidemic spreads to more and more areas, the State Department of Public Health (DPH) begins

to monitor the situation, requesting samples from hospitals with suspicious cases. On June 15, 2003, a

doctor treating patients in Capital City receives test results that confirm some of his patients are

afflicted with pneumonic plague. At the same time, DPH receives presumptive test results indicating

that pneumonic plague has spread to every region of the State.

An Executive Group consisting of the Director of DPH, the Director of the Office for Disease Control,

the State Epidemiologist, the Director of Clinical Services, the Director of the State Emergency

Management Agency (EMA), the Homeland Security Advisor, and the Director of the Department of

Health and Hospitals convened to discuss the growing emergency and determine appropriate State

actions.

Players discussed notifying neighboring States and contacting the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention to acquire additional information from those sources regarding further potential pneumonic plague outbreaks. Players also indicated that DPH would use the Health Alert Network to notify

hospitals and clinics statewide of the emerging situation and that EMA would activate the State EOC,

with DPH representation, to monitor the emergency. Because the media had already become aware of

the problem, players stressed that Public Information Officers (PIOs) would be engaged to manage

D–9

The Exercise Events Synopsis provides an overview of the scenario used to facilitate exercise play and

the actions taken by the players to respond to the simulated terrorism attack. The activities are presented in the general sequence and timeline that unfolded at each site. The events synopsis provides

officials and players with an overview of what happened at each location and when. It is also used to

analyze the effectiveness of the response, especially the time-sensitive actions. It provides a means of

looking at the ramifications of one action not happening when expected on actions taken by other

players and on the overall response. The following example presents the synopsis for the first of three

modules for the following tabletop and action at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on Day 1 of

the full-scale exercise. Similar writeups would be included for each element of play. 
public information and rumor control. Players also considered the availability and adequacy of local

and State medical supplies to treat the epidemic and discussed how the Governor’s Office would make

State-level assistance available to the affected counties. Finally, the players acknowledged that quarantine measures would have to be considered.

Full-Scale Component: Afternoon, Exercise Day 1

State Emergency Operations Center

By 1230: Players reported to the State EOC for a briefing on the public health emergency and the

exercise Rules of Play. In the briefing, the players were informed of the reported numbers of persons

infected with pneumonic plague, the distribution of the epidemic across the State, the actions taken so

far at the direction of the Executive Group, and other pertinent background information. Scenario

information indicated that 10 counties were affected, with 432 reported cases and 181 reported deaths

attributed to pneumonic plague.

1320: Full-scale exercise play began.

By 1330: The Governor issued a Health Disaster Proclamation, making State assets available to assist

the overwhelmed localities. The Executive Office in the EOC made contact with the appropriate agencies in the neighboring States and began discussing issues such as quarantine and accessing Emergency

Management Assistance Compact resources.

The EOC received notifications from affected localities that their county EOCs were activated, and

many were being overwhelmed with inquiries from worried well individuals. The EOC established a

rumor control line staffed by a PIO to relieve some of the public information pressure from the county

EOCs. The Joint Information Center also began receiving media inquiries from newspapers and radio

and television stations.

The EOC directed the 21 counties preidentified in State plans to set up Distribution Nodes to receive

the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Push Package supplies. The EOC also directed the affected

counties to begin setting up their Dispensing Sites in preparation for the SNS supplies.

The FBI contacted the State Department of Public Safety to coordinate the criminal investigation.

By 1420: The Executive Office, in consultation with DPH support personnel at the Emergency

Coordination Center and officials from neighboring States, decided that enforcing a statewide quarantine was unfeasible. Instead, the State encouraged citizens to voluntarily limit their travel and avoid

public places until the epidemic was controlled.

1430: The Receiving, Staging, and Storage Center contacted the EOC inquiring about SNS Push

Package distribution allocation and repackaging guidance. DPH decided to break down and distribute

half of the Push Package supplies to the identified counties and hold the other half in reserve in case

the epidemic spread to other areas of the State before the arrival of Vendor Managed Inventory supplementary supplies.

The Executive Office remained in contact with the neighboring States. It was eventually decided that

the State would refuse the offers of assistance from neighboring States so those States could have their

resources available in the event the epidemic spread beyond State lines.

The players in the Executive Office also discussed elevating the State’s internal threat level from

Orange to Red. This elevation was rejected in favor of keeping the State’s threat level the same as that

of the national Homeland Security Advisory System (Orange).

The State issued press releases indicating that DPH and its local and Federal partners were investigating an apparent outbreak of pneumonic plague. The releases described symptoms, outlined measures

D–10
citizens should take to reduce their risk of contracting the disease, and summarized the actions being

taken by the State to control the epidemic.

1630: Exercise play was suspended for the day at the scheduled time.

D–11
Chapter 4: Analysis of Mission Outcomes

D–12

This section of the report analyzes how well the participating jurisdictions as a whole (i.e., across disciplines and across jurisdictions) achieved the expected mission outcomes in their response to the

simulated terrorist event. The focus of this analysis is on outcomes rather than processes. The mission

outcomes are actions the public expects from its public officials and agencies when faced with a terrorist threat or attack. Results for each mission outcome are summarized below by outcome area. A

detailed analysis of the activities and processes that contributed to results related to the mission outcomes is found in “Analysis of Critical Task Performance.”

Emergency Management

Direction and Control of State Response

State agency participants effectively demonstrated the ability to manage a bioterrorism incident. Alert

and activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the Emergency Coordination Center

(ECC) were accomplished through a previously scheduled limited activation order. The EOC was

staffed primarily with Emergency Management and Public Health personnel in accordance with the

Exercise Plan, with limited participation from the State Department of Transportation, State Department of Public Safety, and other selected State staff. The EOC is a well-equipped, state-of-the-art facility.

The Emergency Management staff are well trained and serve as the primary personnel to facilitate

operations involving staff assigned from other agencies. The EOC was fully operational at the start of

the exercise and maintained operations for the scheduled operations (single-day shift only).

The State Department of Public Health (DPH) and Emergency Management Agency (EMA) demonstrated excellent coordination in directing and controlling response operations, operating as a nearly

seamless integrated team. An Executive Policy Team managed key decisions such as requesting

Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) supplies from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

(accomplished during the tabletop component). Agency officials generally found it easy to attain consensus on a course of action. Problem-solving was accomplished as a team.

The EOC did not activate a Planning, Information, and Intelligence Cell. Therefore, ad hoc policy teams

were formed to examine urgent issues such as the decision to implement quarantine. Although the use

of issue teams is an effective information management technique, the absence of a dedicated Planning,

Information, and Intelligence Cell somewhat inhibited the ability of the State to forecast future requirements and decisions. As a result, exercise players often were reacting to events rather than anticipating

events. For example, high school students were the primary infected population and thus the primary

disease vector. Exercise controllers introduced the issue of school closure several times before players

recognized school closure as a means to disrupt disease progression.

Activation of a limited SNS supply network occurred per the Exercise Plan and included the central

Receiving, Staging, and Storage (RSS) site at the airport, two Distribution Nodes (located in Capital

County and Suburban County 2), and a single Dispensing Site in Capital City. The RSS received the

This section of the After Action Report (AAR) analyzes how well the participating agencies and jurisdictions addressed the mission outcomes. Mission outcomes are those broad outcomes or functions that the public expects from its public officials and agencies. As defined in ODP’s Homeland

Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, Volume II: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement, the

mission outcomes include prevention and deterrence, emergency assessment, emergency management, hazard mitigation, public protection, victim care, investigation and apprehension, and recovery and remediation. The exercise goals and objectives will define the mission outcomes that are

addressed by the exercise and that should be analyzed in this section of the AAR.
SNS 12-Hour Push Package supplies and rapidly dispatched them to the Distribution Nodes. A slight

lag in determining the allocation of supplies among Distribution Nodes resulted in an initial 30- to 60-

minute delay in the loading of supplies. However, supplies reached the Capital City Dispensing Site in

time for planned operations to begin on schedule.

Decision-making for allocation of SNS supplies was resourceful; approximately half of the inventory

was distributed to known impacted counties and half reserved for anticipated, developing impacts. On

Day 2, as it became evident that the population at risk of infection exceeded supplies available in the

12-Hour Push Package, the ECC was tasked with determining the allocation of Vendor Managed Inventory supplies. The Hospital Preparedness Coordinator and Assistant State Epidemiologist considered the utility of issuing prophylaxes to the entire State versus only to potentially exposed citizens.

It is not clear whether a decision was reached before the conclusion of the exercise.

The EOC demonstrated the capability to direct and control distribution of supplies and equipment,

with some limitations. The EOC considered the use of Statewide Mutual Aid Compact resources and correctly determined that the statewide impact of the epidemic precluded any significant sharing of

resource among counties. The EOC made good use of Emergency Management Assistance Compact

resources to provide assistance to affected counties. However, communications between the EOC and

RSS were very limited, resulting in some disconnect in operational direction.

Players commented that they underutilized State resources (e.g., State buildings, public works organizations, and the State’s National Guard) and Federal resources (disaster medical assistance teams and

Federal funds to allocate resources). The EOC has no consistent method for tracking resources used or

needed, which players attributed to “uncertainty” in the adequacy of department inventory methods.

No resource-tracking displays (status boards or electronic projections) were evident in the EOC.

D–13
Chapter 5: Analysis of Critical Task Performance

Task III-14: Provide Emergency Public Information to the Media and the Public

Issue 1: Some counties did not receive press releases. 

Reference: Joint Information Center (JIC) standard operating procedures, EEG III-14.

Summary of Issue: JIC staff prepared a series of press releases to convey information to the public.

Each release was coordinated with the Executive Management Team. The press releases were distributed over the Emergency Management System (EMS). However, not all counties use the EMS to obtain

their information. For example, the Capital County Dispensing Site did not receive any news releases

because they do not use EMS.

Consequence: Outdated and conflicting information was put out by one county that had not seen

the latest press release.

Analysis: The JIC relied solely on the EMS as its method of distributing the press releases. The procedures for the JIC require that press releases be faxed to counties that do not have access to or use the

EMS. However, when the second press release was sent, the Deputy Public Information Officer (PIO)

asked if he should fax the release to the counties and was told by the PIO that it is the county’s

responsibility to ensure access to and use of the EMS. Capital County has access to the EMS but does

not generally use it because staff are not trained for its use. The Capital County PIO indicated that the

system was not properly installed and therefore they could not use it.

Recommendations and Improvements

Recommendation 1: The Emergency Management Agency (EMA) should establish procedures or

protocols to ensure that news releases reach all affected counties or agencies, regardless of their EMS

capabilities.

D–14

This section of the report reviews performance of the individual tasks as defined in the Evaluation

Guides. Each task identified by the exercise planning team as critical to the response required by the

scenario should be discussed in this section. Tasks that were performed as expected require only a

short writeup that describes how the task was performed and generally would not be followed by recommendations. For tasks that were not performed as expected, the writeup should include 1) an

issue statement; 2) references to plans, procedures, and evaluation guides; 3) a brief summary of the

issue; 4) the consequence of the issue on the response; and 5) an analysis of what happened or did

not happen and the root causes for the variance from the expected outcome. Recommendations for

improvement should be presented to address identified issues. To facilitate tracking of recommendations and improvements, acronyms should be spelled out in each recommendation. The Analysis of

Critical Task Performance section of the report also should be used to document a variance from

expected performance that may have resulted in an improved response or innovative approaches that

were used during the response. 

Note: At some point in the future, when the performance criteria have been validated and enhanced,

jurisdictions will be asked to rate the performance of each task and to provide an overall performance

rating for the exercise.

Following the review and validation of the draft report findings by key officials from the participating

agencies/jurisdictions (during the debriefing meeting), the officials define the actions that will be

taken to address the recommendations. These improvement actions are presented following each recommendation and include the action, the responsible party/agency, and the timeline for completion.
Action 1: The director of EMA issued a directive on September 1, 2003, requiring that all personnel assigned to work in the JIC receive a copy of the operating procedures, become familiar

with them, and follow them during an emergency.

Action 2: The director of EMA will convene a working group with representatives from

selected counties to develop a plan to provide all counties with access to the EMS and train

county staff. The working group will be established within a month.The plan will be completed

by February 1, 2004, and training will be available by March 1, 2004.

Action 3: The EMS system director will develop and implement a backup system (e.g., fax, email) to ensure that all counties receive news releases.

Task III-15: Establish and Maintain Rumor Control Operations

Issue 1: Rumor Control was not provided with a script or other written instructions on the message

to be conveyed to the public. 

Reference: JIC standard operating procedures, EEG III-15.

Summary of the Issue: The JIC established a Rumor Control Center staffed by two people for the

exercise. Rumor Control directed callers to other telephone numbers and Emergency Alert System

(EAS) stations for additional information and developed responses based on the latest information

available to them. However, staff did not always have the most recent information and sometimes

released information that had not been approved by the PIOs.

Consequence: The information provided to the public was not always consistent or up to date.

Analysis: When Rumor Control received a call, staff would provide a response based on the best

information they had or would discuss the request with the PIOs. On several occasions, the PIOs were

busy, so the Rumor Control staff developed a response that reflected outdated information. The two

Rumor Control staff worked independently but generally coordinated their responses. Each kept a

folder of information that they had gathered. However, because they were developing their own

responses, the information was not consistent.

Recommendations and Improvements

Recommendation 1: The EMA should develop procedures for the PIOs to place a high priority on

developing a script for Rumor Control staff to use in responding to public inquiries.

Action 1: The director of EMA will work with a group of State and local PIOs to develop procedures for the development and distribution of a script that can be used by Rumor Control staff

during an emergency.

Issue 2: Rumor Control was not provided with adequate reference materials. 

Reference: JIC standard operating procedures, EEG III-14.

Summary: Several callers were told to contact their local EMA or stay tuned to the local EAS station.

However, Rumor Control did not have the telephone numbers for some of the agencies and the radio

frequencies for the EAS stations.

Consequence: Callers were frustrated and felt that they were getting the “runaround” because they

could not get the information they needed from one source.

Analysis: The JIC, where the Rumor Control staff were located, had some of the reference materials

and telephone numbers but they were not pulled together in a single resource that could be accessed

by all staff. Various staff members had developed their own references.Although staff were willing to

D–15
share reference information, it was not easy to access and was not available at all when the person

who developed the information was not present.

Recommendations and Improvements

Recommendation 2: The EMA should develop a list of EAS stations and frequencies as a reference

tool for Rumor Control.

Action 1: A list of EAS stations and frequencies has been developed and is available in the

Emergency Operations Center, the 911 Center, and the Emergency Control Center, and has been

distributed to all State and county PIOs.

Action 2: The EMA PIO will review the list at the beginning of each month and report any

changes that are required.

Task V-1: Develop and Implement Protective Action Decisions

Issue: None.

Summary: Public Health demonstrated the ability to implement a representative sample of population protective measures for a terrorist-induced statewide pneumonic plague outbreak. Following confirmation of the agent, participants requested the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) push package from

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), following the procedures outlined in their

plans. Once the SNS arrived at the designated receiving site, responsibility for the package was transferred to the State and local authorities, who began the breakdown and distribution. Public Health

established geographic and risk-group dispensing priorities and adjusted them as information continued to develop throughout the scenario. Public Heath arranged additional pharmaceutical and medical

supplies through the Vendor Managed Inventory to ensure a continued supply of prophylaxis.

Recommendations and Improvements

None.

D–16
Conclusions

This exercise was the State’s first exercise of newly developed procedures to receive, distribute, and

dispense Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) supplies in response to a statewide bioterrorism incident.

Exercise participants demonstrated an initial capability to

♦ assess an emerging bioterrorism event,

♦ request National Pharmaceutical Stockpile supplies from the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC),

♦ institute coordinated emergency management with State and local public health agencies,

♦ institute population protective measures for a bioterrorism incident,

♦ establish a distribution network for SNS supplies, and

♦ operate a temporary clinic for the emergency distribution of antibiotic prophylaxis.

Exercise participants completed all planned exercise objectives. In a no-notice deployment test, CDC

delivered SNS supplies within 11 hours of the State request, which meets CDC’s 12-hour delivery target. The State sent (mock) SNS supplies to two Distribution Nodes for further shipment to Dispensing

Sites and treatment centers. A Capital City Dispensing Site received SNS supplies and was ready to

begin dispensing operations within 34 hours of the SNS request. The temporary dispensing clinic

exceeded the planned goal of processing 300 patients through the temporary dispensing clinic within

3 hours by actually processing 398 patients.

Exercise participants identified several lessons learned for improvements in the State’s ability to

respond to a bioterrorism incident. Major recommendations include:

♦ Expand Emergency Management System access and training to all State agencies and all counties

in the State.

♦ Review State quarantine plans and procedures.

♦ Improve communications processes between the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC),

county EOCs, and the temporary SNS distribution network.

♦ Implement Receiving, Staging, and Storage (RSS) and dispensing center efficiency improvements.

♦ Improve dispensing center exterior security and crowd control.

The State can use the results of this exercise to further refine plans, procedures, and training for a

bioterrorism incident. The State should prepare expected dispensing and treatment center locations

and staffing requirements for incidents that will require mass prophylaxis through multiple Dispensing

Sites. CDC recommends preparing plans to serve 1,000; 10,000; 100,000; and 1 million patients for

contagious or noncontagious threats. Plans should address transportation management for large

incidents.

In addition, the State should review public information protocols for a large-scale bioterrorism incident. Preplanned messages and a coordinated State and local public information effort will help public

health officials efficiently direct citizens to centers for prophylaxis or medical treatment. Effective communication of risk and protective measures to citizens can reduce disease propagation and public

anxiety.

D–17
D–18

Subsequent exercises should test specific improvements instituted as a result of this exercise and should

include a focus on public information measures. Planners should consider exercising the alternate

Receiving, Staging, and Storage site if the primary site is unavailable in an emergency. Additional Dispensing Sites should be exercised to ensure that emergency prophylaxis measures can be instituted at

key areas across the State. For cost effectiveness, planners should consider rotating Dispensing Site

exercises across the State, with or without an SNS deployment exercise.
Responsible Completion 

Task Recommendations Improvement Action Party/Agency DateIII-14: Provide Emergency 1. The Emergency Management Agency EMA Director Completed Public Information to (EMA) should establish procedures or 9-01-03

the Media and the Public protocols to ensure that news releases

reach all affected counties or agencies, regardless of their Emergency Management System (EMS) capabilities.

EMA Director 2-01-04

III-15: Establish and Maintain 1. The director of EMA will work with EMA Director 1-15-04Rumor Control Operations a group of State and local PIOs to

develop procedures for the development and distribution of a script thatcan be used by Rumor Control staffduring an emergency. 1. A list of EAS stations and frequen- EMA PIO Completecies has been developed and is available in the Emergency OperationsCenter, the 911 Center, the Emergency Control Center, and has been distributed to all State and county PIOs.2. The EMA PIO will review the list at EMA PIO Monthlythe beginning of each month and report any changes that are required.

V-1: Develop and Implement None.

Protective Action Decisions

1. The director of EMA issued a directive on September 1, 2003, requiringthat all personnel assigned to work inJoint Information Center (JIC) receive acopy of the operating procedures, become familiar with them, and followthem during an emergency.2. The director of EMA will convene aworking group with representativesfrom selected counties to develop aplan to provide all counties with accessto the EMS and train county staff.3. The EMS system director willdevelop and implement a backup system (e.g., fax, e-mail) to ensure that allcounties receive news releases.

AAR Appendix A: Improvement Plan Matrix

1. The Emergency Management

Agency (EMA) should advise PublicInformation Officers (PIOs) to place ahigh priority on developing a script (incoordination with the Emergency Control Center (ECC)) for Rumor Controlstaff to use in responding to publicinquiries.2. The EMA should develop a list ofEmergency Alert System (EAS) stations and frequencies as a referencetool for Rumor Control

EMS System 1-15-04Director

D–19

*NCJ~202198*

NCJ 202198