UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of Defense

 

Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With United 

States Military Operations

Submitted pursuant to section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91)

The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is approximately $37,400 for the 2019 Fiscal Year. 

This includes $25 in expenses and $37,400 in DoD labor.

Generated on 2019April29 E-95F9776
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Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-

91), as amended, states the following: 

Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With 

United States Military Operations

(a) ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than May 1 each year, the Secretary of 

Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on civilian casualties 

caused as a result of United States military operations during the preceding year. 

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall set forth the following: 

(1) A list of all the United States military operations, including each specific 

mission, strike, engagement, raid, or incident, during the year covered by such report that 

were confirmed, or reasonably suspected, to have resulted in civilian casualties. 

(2) For each military operation listed pursuant to paragraph (1), each of the 

following: 

(A) The date. 

(B) The location. 

(C) An identification of whether the operation occurred inside or outside of a 

declared theater of active armed conflict. 

(D) The type of operation. 

(E) An assessment of the number of civilian and enemy combatant casualties, 

including a differentiation between those killed and those injured. 

(3) A description of the process by which the Department of Defense investigates 

allegations of civilian casualties resulting from United States military operations, and, 

when appropriate, makes ex gratia payments to the victims or their families.

(4) A description of steps taken by the Department to mitigate harm to civilians in 

conducting such operations. 

(5) Any update or modification to any report under this section during a previous 

year.

(6) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines are relevant. 

(c) USE OF SOURCES.—In preparing a report under this section, the Secretary of 

Defense shall take into account relevant and credible all-source reporting, including information 

from public reports and nongovernmental sources. 

(d) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 

but may include a classified annex. The unclassified form of each report shall, at a minimum, be 

responsive to each element under subsection (b) of a report under subsection (a), and shall be 

made available to the public at the same time it is submitted to Congress (unless the Secretary 

certifies in writing that the publication of such information poses a threat to the national security 

interests of the United States).

(e) SUNSET.—The requirement to submit a report under subsection (a) shall expire on 

the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
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Department of Defense Report on Civilian Casualties in 

Connection With United States Military Operations in 2018

This report is submitted pursuant to section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 (Public Law 115-91), as amended. 

This report provides information primarily about U.S. military operations in 2018 that were 

assessed to have resulted in civilian casualties. This report, however, also contains updates to 

information Department of Defense (DoD) provided in the report submitted to Congress last year 

pursuant to Section 1057 of the NDAA for FY 2018. 

Some of the information provided in last year’s report about U.S. military operations in 2017 has 

been repeated in this report because the information was relevant to U.S. military operations in 

2018. 

This report is publicly available at Defense.gov.

As noted in Section 1 of Executive Order 13732, United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike 

Measures To Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force, of July 

1, 2016, the protection of civilians is fundamentally consistent with the effective, efficient, and 

decisive use of force in pursuit of U.S. national interests. Minimizing civilian casualties can 

further mission objectives; help maintain the support of partner governments and vulnerable 

populations, especially during counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; and enhance 

the legitimacy and sustainability of U.S. operations critical to U.S. national security. As a matter 

of policy, U.S. forces therefore routinely conduct operations under policy standards that are more 

protective of civilians than is required by the law of war. 

U.S. forces also protect civilians because it is the moral and ethical thing to do. Although 

civilian casualties are a tragic and unavoidable part of war, no force in history has been more 

committed to limiting harm to civilians than the U.S. military. This commitment is reflected in 

DoD’s consistent efforts to maintain and promote best practices that reduce the likelihood of 

civilian casualties, take appropriate steps when such casualties occur, and draw lessons from 

DoD operations to further enhance the protection of civilians. Section 2 of Executive Order 

13732 catalogues the best practices DoD has implemented to protect civilians during armed 

conflict, and it directs those measures be sustained in present and future operations. During 

2018, all operations listed below were conducted consistent with the best practices identified in 

Section 2 of Executive Order 13732. 
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I. UNITED STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING 2018 CONFIRMED, 

OR REASONABLY SUSPECTED, TO HAVE RESULTED IN CIVILIAN 

CASUALTIES

During 2018, U.S. forces continued to be engaged in a number of military operations, some of 

which were assessed to have resulted in civilian casualties. This section provides information 

regarding: a) Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and other military actions related to Iraq and 

Syria; b) Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, including support to the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO)-led RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission; c) U.S. military actions in Yemen 

against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS); d) U.S. military actions in Somalia against ISIS and al-Shabaab; and e) U.S. military 

actions in Libya against ISIS and al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

This section provides information about each operation, as well as a list of each specific mission, 

strike, engagement, raid, or incident during 2018 that was assessed to have resulted in civilian 

casualties. Each instance that was assessed to have resulted in civilian casualties identifies the 

date, location, the type of operation, and DoD’s assessment of the number of civilians injured 

and killed in that instance. Last year’s report used the term “a declared theater of active armed 

conflict,” as that term was understood in the context of Title 10 U.S.C. § 130f. Title 10 U.S.C. § 

130f has since been amended and no longer includes the term “a declared theater of active armed 

conflict.” The term “a declared theater of active armed conflict” is also not defined in relevant 

DoD doctrine. For the purposes of this report, the term “a declared theater of active armed 

conflict” will be considered to mean, for calendar year 2018, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, 

Syria, and Yemen. Thus, all U.S. military operations and particular instances listed below that 

resulted in civilian casualties occurred in a declared theater of active armed conflict, in the 

context of the ongoing armed conflict against al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and associated forces, 

including ISIS. 

DoD’s practice for many years has been not to tally systematically the number of enemy 

combatants killed or wounded during operations. Although the number of enemy combatants 

killed in action is often assessed after combat, a running “body count” would not necessarily 

provide a meaningful measure of the military success of an operation and could even be 

misleading. For example, the use of such metrics in the Vietnam War has been heavily 

criticized. We have therefore provided other information that is intended to help give context, 

such as information regarding the objectives, scale, and effects of these operations.

A longstanding DoD policy is to comply with the law of war in all military operations, however 

characterized. All DoD operations in 2018 were conducted in accordance with law of war 

requirements, including law of war protections for civilians, such as the fundamental principles 

of distinction and proportionality and the requirement to take feasible precautions in planning 
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and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects

protected from being made the object of an attack.

DoD assesses that there are credible reports of approximately 120 civilians killed and 

approximately 65 civilians injured during 2018 as a result of U.S. military operations in Iraq, 

Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. DoD has no credible reports of civilian casualties from U.S. 

military operations in Yemen or Libya in 2018. Sub-sections A through E below provide 

additional information. 

As stated above, this report also contains updates to information submitted to Congress in last 

year’s Section 1057 report. Last year’s report noted that, as of February 26, 2018, more than 450 

reports of civilian casualties from 2017 remained to be assessed due to the number of such 

reports received during 2017 and the resources required to review each report. Since that time, 

many more reports of civilian casualties from U.S. military operations in 2017 have been 

assessed. More reports of civilian casualties from 2017 have also been received, and DoD 

continues to assess new reports after they are received and updates previous assessments if DoD 

receives additional information on any previous report of civilian casualties. 

The assessments of civilian casualties listed below are based on reports that DoD has been able 

to assess as “credible.” DoD components conducting assessments deem a report as “credible” if, 

based on the available information, it is assessed to be more likely than not that civilian 

casualties occurred. Section II of this report describes in more detail the processes for 

conducting these assessments.

A. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and other military actions related to Iraq and 

Syria

Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. In 2018, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition – Combined Joint Task 

Force – Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR) – and partner forces liberated additional 

territory from ISIS and severely degraded ISIS’s capabilities, allowing more than 4 million 

internally displaced civilians to return to their home areas free from ISIS domination. During the 

past year, ISIS’s control of territory was reduced to less than half of one percent of the territory it 

once controlled. During 2018, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and partner forces killed thousands of 

ISIS fighters and destroyed media sites, weapons caches, command and control centers, and 

other facilities ISIS was using to conduct its operations. These actions have further degraded 

ISIS’s capabilities and access to funding, recruiting, arms, and training. 

As of the end of 2018, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and its partner forces were still conducting

operations to eliminate pockets of ISIS fighters. The Defeat-ISIS Coalition also began to 

emphasize providing partners with assistance, including support to sustainment activities 
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designed to help reconstitute and stabilize necessary local functions to allow the civilian

population in these areas to rebuild their communities and lives. 

DoD assessed that there were credible reports of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military

actions in Iraq and Syria during 2018. As of January 24, 2019, DoD assessed that 13 reports of 

civilian casualties during 2018 were credible, with approximately 42 civilians killed and 

approximately 7 civilians injured as a result of U.S. military actions. The following table 

contains additional details about each instance during 2018 that was assessed to have resulted in 

civilian casualties. As of January 24, 2019, 28 reports of civilian casualties from 2018 remained 

to be assessed. 

Date Location Operation

Type

Civilians 

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

1 9-Jan-18 Abu Kamal Air 0 5

2 18-Jan-18 Abu Kamal Air 0 1

3 20-Jan-18 Al Kashmah Air 0 4

4 2-Apr-18 Qanus 

Island

Ground 1 1

5 11-May-18 Al Hamadi 

Village

Air 0 4

6 14-May-18 Mishraq 

Village

Air 0 13

7 15-May-18 Al Susah Air 0 4

8 23-May-18 Hajin Air 0 4

9 31-May-18 Al Baghouz Air 0 2

10 13-Jun-18 Abu Kamal Air 1 0

11 25-Aug-18 Hajin Air 1 3

12 30-Sep-18 As Shusah Air 0 1

13 31-Oct-18 Hajin Air 4 0

TOTAL 7 42

Additionally, as of March 22, 2019, DoD assessed that 170 reports of civilian casualties during 

2017 were credible, with approximately 793 civilians killed and approximately 206 civilians 

injured as result of U.S. military actions. The following table contains additional details about 

each instance during 2017 that was assessed to have resulted in civilian casualties. As of March 

22, 2019, 69 reports of civilian casualties from 2017 remained to be assessed. Generally, the 

number of civilian casualties during Operation INHERENT RESOLVE were higher during 2017 

than during 2018 because of the significant military action needed in 2017 to help liberate Mosul 

and Raqqah – the former capitals of ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate.” 
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Date Location Operation

Type

Civilians 

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

1 4-Jan-17 Mosul Air 1 0

2 7-Jan-17 Raqqa Air 1 1

3 7-Jan-17 Al Kasrah Air 0 2

4 7-Jan-17 Tabiyah Air 0 1

5 13-Jan-17 Mosul Air 0 8

6 13-Jan-17 Mosul Air 0 3

7 14-Jan-17 Mosul Ground 0 1

8 16-Jan-17 Raqqah Air 0 1

9 17-Jan-17 Idlib Air 3 0

10 21-Jan-17 Rashidiya Air 0 15

11 26-Jan-17 Al Dawasah Air 15 2

12 30-Jan-17 Mosul Air 0 1

13 31-Jan-17 Omar Gosp Air 0 1

14 4-Feb-17 Raqqah Air 2 4

15 6-Feb-17 Mosul Air 3 0

16 9-Feb-17 Al Qaim Air 2 0

17 12-Feb-17 Mosul Air 0 2

18 16-Feb-17 Mosul Air 0 2

19 17-Feb-17 Raqqah Air 0 3

20 18-Feb-17 Mosul Air 6 4

21 18-Feb-17 Mosul Air 2 0

22 19-Feb-17 Mosul Air 0 10

23 19-Feb-17 Mosul Air 0 1

24 20-Feb-17 Raqqah Air 0 3

25 22-Feb-17 Mosul Air 1 0

26 23-Feb-17 Mosul Air 0 5

27 25-Feb-17 Mosul Air 0 5

28 25-Feb-17 Kheurbet Air 0 1

29 28-Feb-17 Mosul Air 0 2

30 28-Feb-17 Al Qaim Air 1 1

31 1-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 14

32 3-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 10

33 3-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 5

34 3-Mar-17 Raqqah Air 0 5

35 9-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 2

36 9-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 1

37 13-Mar-17 Al-Mahatta Air 0 11
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Date Location Operation

Type

Civilians 

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

38 14-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 27

39 17-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 105

40 20-Mar-17 Al-Tabaqah Air 0 10

41 20-Mar-17 Raqqah Air 0 40

42 20-Mar-17 Al-Thawrah Air 0 1

43 21-Mar-17 Tabaqah Air 0 10

44 21-Mar-17 Mosul Air 3 1

45 21-Mar-17 Tabaqah Air 2 0

46 21-Mar-17 Al Thawrah Air 1 1

47 22-Mar-17 Al Thani Air 0 7

48 25-Mar-17 Raqqah Air 1 0

49 27-Mar-17 Idlib Air 1 3

50 28-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 1

51 30-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 2

52 30-Mar-17 Anah Air 0 2

53 30-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 7

54 30-Mar-17 Mosul Air 0 12

55 4-Apr-17 Mosul Air 0 1

56 4-Apr-17 Mosul Air 0 1

57 5-Apr-17 Mosul Air 0 1

58 8-Apr-17 Tal Afar Air 0 3

59 10-Apr-17 Sekak Air 0 3

60 13-Apr-17 Mosul Air 0 6

61 17-Apr-17 Albu Kamal Air 40 25

62 18-Apr-17 Mosul Air 0 1

63 22-Apr-17 Mosul Air 0 1

64 26-Apr-17 Tabaqah Air 0 16

65 27-Apr-17 Rumaila Air 0 11

66 4-May-17 Raqqah Air 7 4

67 8-May-17 Mosul Air 0 1

68 8-May-17 Tabaqah Air 1 0

69 9-May-17 Mansura Air 1 0

70 10-May-17 Deir Ezzor Air 0 1

71 11-May-17 Raqqah Air 1 0

72 12-May-17 Raqqah Air 0 2

73 12-May-17 Quriya Air 1 0

74 15-May-17 Al Makef Air 0 2
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Date Location Operation

Type

Civilians 

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

75 16-May-17 Mosul Air 0 3

76 16-May-17 Mosul Air 0 20

77 16-May-17 Mosul Air 0 2

78 19-May-17 Mosul Air 0 1

79 19-May-17 Mosul Air 0 3

80 21-May-17 Kdeiran Air 0 9

81 23-May-17 Mosul Air 0 6

82 23-May-17 Al Duweir Air 0 1

83 25-May-17 Raqqah Air 0 10

84 25-May-17 Al Mayadin Air 0 15

85 27-May-17 Raqqah Air 0 3

86 29-May-17 Raqqah Air 1 0

87 29-May-17 Raqqah Air 0 1

88 4-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 0 4

89 6-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 1 0

90 7-Jun-17 Mahkan Air 0 1

91 8-Jun-17 Zanjili Air 0 10

92 10-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 0 2

93 12-Jun-17 Raqqah Ground 24 8

94 15-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 0 2

95 15-Jun-17 Mosul Air 0 4

96 15-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 0 4

97 15-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 0 25

98 21-Jun-17 Mosul Air 0 7

99 21-Jun-17 Mosul Air 0 1

100 23-Jun-17 Mosul Air 0 2

101 23-Jun-17 Mosul Air 0 2

102 24-Jun-17 Mosul Air 0 1

103 25-Jun-17 Deir Ezzor Air 0 12

104 25-Jun-17 Qurayya Air 0 1

105 25-Jun-17 Bokrus 

Tahtani

Air 0 2

106 26-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 2 0

107 26-Jun-17 Mayadin Air 2 0

108 26-Jun-17 Mayadin Air 0 8

109 26-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 2 0

110 28-Jun-17 Maleh Air 0 1
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Date Location Operation

Type

Civilians 

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

111 28-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 0 8

112 29-Jun-17 Deir Ezzor Air 2 1

113 29-Jun-17 Bab Lakash Air 0 6

114 30-Jun-17 Raqqah Air 0 1

115 4-Jul-17 Raqqah Air 0 1

116 6-Jul-17 Raqqah Air 0 2

117 10-Jul-17 Mosul Air 0 1

118 11-Jul-17 Mosul Air 3 0

119 13-Jul-17 Raqqah Air 2 2

120 14-Jul-17 Mosul Air 0 10

121 15-Jul-17 Raqqah Air 8 13

122 16-Jul-17 Deir Ezzor Air 1 0

123 18-Jul-17 Raqqah Air 1 11

124 22-Jul-17 Bajari Air 3 1

125 26-Jul-17 Albu Kamal Air 0 1

126 26-Jul-17 Deir Ezzor Air 0 2

127 29-Jul-17 Raqqah Air 0 1

128 29-Jul-17 Raqqah Air 0 1

129 29-Jul-17 Albu Kamal Air 9 3

130 1-Aug-17 Qadiya Air 2 2

131 2-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 0 3

132 3-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 0 1

133 5-Aug-17 Karabilah Air 1 0

134 6-Aug-17 Shadadi Air 0 1

135 6-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 2 4

136 7-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 0 2

137 10-Aug-17 Tal Afar Air 0 5

138 13-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 1 3

139 13-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 0 2

140 15-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 2 0

141 17-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 0 3

142 19-Aug-17 Tal Afar Air 0 5

143 20-Aug-17 Tal Afar Air 0 2

144 20-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 0 1

145 20-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 0 9

146 20-Aug-17 Raqqah Air 0 33

147 7-Sep-17 Anah Air 7 0
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Date Location Operation

Type

Civilians 

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

148 9-Sep-17 Abu Kamal Air 3 1

149 13-Sep-17 Rawah Air 2 0

150 22-Sep-17 As Safiyah Air 1 1

151 25-Sep-17 Abu Kamal Air 0 1

152 25-Sep-17 Al Jamahir Air 1 0

153 2-Oct-17 Al Asharah Air 1 0

154 3-Oct-17 Al Hadin Air 1 0

155 5-Oct-17 Al Qaim Air 0 1

156 10-Oct-17 Al Qaim Air 1 0

157 12-Oct-17 Raqqah Air 0 16

158 12-Oct-17 Al Badu Air 0 3

159 17-Oct-17 Al Qaim Air 0 1

160 31-Oct-17 Al Qaim Air 2 0

161 1-Nov-17 Al Qaim Air 0 1

162 1-Nov-17 Al Hiri Air 2 3

163 2-Nov-17 Al Baghouz Air 0 5

164 2-Nov-17 Barhouz Air 0 3

165 16-Nov-17 Al Shadadi Air 2 0

166 30-Nov-17 Darnaj Air 14 5

167 1-Dec-17 Al Burham Air 0 1

168 13-Dec-17 Hajin Air 1 0

169 13-Dec-17 Hajin Air 1 1

170 28-Dec-17 Rayhaniyah Air 2 3

TOTAL 206 793

It should be noted that CJTF-OIR, the U.S.-led Coalition to Defeat ISIS, as a matter of strategy 

and policy, considers all civilian casualties to be the combined result of “Coalition” action and 

jointly attributable to Coalition members. It is rarely the case that a single civilian casualty 

occurs solely from the actions of one nation’s military activities. Coalition personnel from 

multiple countries take part in every strike in some manner, from initial collection and analysis 

of intelligence, to the Coalition’s deliberate targeting process, and finally, in conducting the 

strikes themselves. In DoD’s view, this is the most appropriate way to view civilian casualty 

incidents related to Defeat-ISIS Coalition action in Iraq and Syria. Public reports released by 

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) about civilian casualties reflect this approach. 

For Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, USCENTCOM publishes a monthly report that: (1) 

catalogues reports of civilian casualties that have been received, including the date and location 

in which the civilian casualties reportedly occurred and the source of the report (e.g., a military 
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unit’s own after-action reporting, media report, non-governmental organization (NGO) report, or 

a posting on social media); and (2) whether the reports of civilian casualties have been assessed 

to be “credible” or not, and if not, the general reasons why such reports were assessed to be “not 

credible” (e.g., no Coalition strikes were conducted in the geographic area that corresponds to 

the report of civilian casualties or the report contained insufficient information regarding the 

time, location, or details needed to assess it). 

If a report is assessed to be “credible,” the assessment often lists what persons or objects were 

being targeted (e.g., an ISIS sniper position, armed ISIS fighters in a vehicle, an ISIS weapons 

cache, or an ISIS command and control facility) and describes how civilian casualties occurred

(e.g., vehicle with civilians entered target area after weapons were released to hit multiple ISIS 

vehicle shooting at friendly ground forces; civilians were in the proximity of ISIS fighters and 

ISIS weapon systems or launch sites for ISIS attacks during the strike). The monthly report also

identifies the reports of civilian casualties that still remain to be assessed. 

Additional military action in Syria. Additionally, on April 13, 2018, U.S. forces, acting in 

concert with French and British military forces, struck Syrian military chemical weapons-related 

facilities in response to the Syrian government’s continued and unlawful use of chemical 

weapons, including the horrific attack in Duma, Syria, on April 7, 2018, that injured or killed 

numerous innocent civilians. The purpose of this military action was to degrade the Syrian 

military’s ability to conduct further chemical weapons attacks and to dissuade the Syrian 

government from using or proliferating chemical weapons. The targets of the combined 

operation were a scientific research center installation, a storage facility, and a bunker. 

DoD has no reports of civilian casualties resulting from this military action. 

B. Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, including support to the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO)-led RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission

Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. In 2018, U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan in support of 

the South Asia Strategy (SAS) were conditions-based and focused on two well-defined and 

complementary missions. First, U.S. forces conducted counter-terrorism missions against alQa’ida, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and associated groups to prevent their resurgence and ability to 

plan and execute external attacks. Second, in partnership with NATO allies and operational 

partner nations in the RESOLUTE SUPPORT (RS) Mission, U.S. forces advise and assist the 

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their fight against insurgents and 

terrorist groups. The ANDSF have maintained a proactive mindset and have demonstrated 

exceptional resilience through a difficult and sustained fight.

DoD assessed that there were credible reports of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military 

actions in Afghanistan during 2018. As of March 19, 2019, U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-
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A) assessed that 37 reports of civilian casualties during 2018 were credible, with approximately 

76 civilians killed and approximately 58 civilians injured as a result of U.S. military actions. 

The following table contains additional details about each instance during 2018 that was assessed 

to have resulted in civilian casualties. 

Date Location Operation 

Type

Civilians

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

1 1-Jan-18 Nangarhar Air 4 0

2 1-Jan-18 Nangarhar Air 0 2

3 3-Jan-18 Helmand Air 1 1

4 8-Feb-18 Jawzjan Air 2 0

5 15-Feb-18 Helmand Air 1 1

6 16-Feb-18 Helmand Air 0 1

7 17-Feb-18 Laghman Ground 0 1

8 25-Feb-18 Balkh Air 2 0

9 11-Mar-18 Kandahar Ground 2 0

10 14-Mar-18 Kunar Air 1 3

11 31-Mar-18 Herat Air 0 1

12 8-May-18 Wardak Air 0 1

13 11-May-18 Kunar Ground 0 1

14 21-May-18 Helmand Air 1 0

15 1-Jun-18 Nangarhar Air 2 1

16 2-Jun-18 Logar Air 1 0

17 30-Jun-18 Farah Air 0 1

18 19-Jul-18 Kunduz Air 1 12

19 23-Jul-18 Helmand Air 0 2

20 26-Jul-18 Uruzgan Ground 1 1

21 16-Aug-18 Helmand Air 0 3

22 26-Aug-18 Zabul Air 0 2

23 6-Sep-18 Logar Air 1 0

24 29-Sep-18 Helmand Air 0 2

25 1-Oct-18 Kunar Ground 0 3

26 2-Oct-18 Laghman Air 4 5

27 2-Oct-18 Paktiya Ground 1 0

28 7-Oct-18 Paktiya Ground 1 0

29 10-Oct-18 Helmand Air 0 1

30 20-Oct-18 Kunar Air 0 3

31 10-Nov-18 Paktiya Air 1 2

32 19-Nov-18 Laghman Air 0 3

33 24-Nov-18 Helmand Air 4 0

34 27-Nov-18 Helmand Air 3 14
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14

Date Location Operation 

Type

Civilians

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

35 28-Nov-18 Helmand Air 2 1

36 3-Dec-18 Farah Ground 5 0

37 14-Dec-18 Kunar Air 17 8

TOTAL 58 76

DoD continues to acknowledge differences between DoD assessments of civilian casualties and 

reports by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). As explained in 

last year’s Section 1057 report and as noted in Section II below, UNAMA relies on different 

types of information and uses a different methodology to assess whether civilian casualties have 

occurred, and whether such casualties occurred as a result of U.S. military actions. For example, 

USFOR-A considers all available information in conducting assessments, including information 

furnished through UNAMA. Additionally, USFOR-A also considers information that is 

unavailable to UNAMA, such as classified intelligence information and operational data that can 

include full-motion video from surveillance and weapon platforms. USFOR-A assessments also

consider information provided by subject-matter experts, reports of partner forces, and the 

operational command associated with the report of civilian casualties. It is not unusual for 

classified intelligence information, as well as subject-matter expert and partner-provided 

information, to make clear that what appeared to be U.S. military-caused civilian casualties, 

when viewed through the lens of unclassified sources, actually had other causes. Even though 

USFOR-A meets with UNAMA monthly to brief it on the results of USFOR-A’s assessments, 

UNAMA has found itself unable to agree with those assessments because UNAMA simply lacks

access to all the information relevant to assessing whether civilian casualties resulted from U.S. 

military actions in any particular instance. 

C. U.S. military action in Yemen against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

and ISIS

During 2018, U.S. forces deployed to Yemen continued to work towards disrupting and 

degrading the terrorist threat posed by AQAP and ISIS. U.S. forces conducted 36 airstrikes 

against AQAP and ISIS operatives and facilities in Yemen and supported United Arab Emiratesand Yemen-led efforts to clear AQAP from Shabwah Governorate. 

DoD has no credible reports of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military actions in Yemen 

during 2018. 

D. U.S. military actions in Somalia against ISIS and al-Shabaab

Persistent pressure on terrorist networks by U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has been 

necessary to prevent destabilization of our African partner nations. The principal means for 
UNCLASSIFIED

15

applying pressure has been to work by, with, and through our African and international partners, 

increasing their security capabilities, and, only when necessary, using U.S. military force. 

Ultimately, our use of military force in African States, for example, in Libya and Somalia, allows 

these governments to provide the security and economic growth required for long-term stability 

and prosperity.

U.S. military operations in Somalia were intended to support regional partners and to deny alShabaab and ISIS control of ungoverned spaces that could be used by terrorist organizations to 

plot and conduct attacks against the U.S. homeland.

During 2018, USAFRICOM conducted 47 strikes in Somalia. DoD assessed that there was a

credible report of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military actions in Somalia during 2018. As 

of April 1, 2019, USAFRICOM assessed that one report of civilian casualties during 2018 was

credible, with approximately two civilians killed as a result of U.S. military actions. The 

following table contains additional details about the instance during 2018 that was assessed to 

have resulted in civilian casualties.

Date Location Operation 

Type

Civilians

Injured

Civilians 

Killed

1 1-Apr-18 Galgadud Air 0 2

The report of civilian casualties in Somalia from 2017 that was identified as under investigation 

in last year’s report continues to be under investigation.

E. U.S. military actions in Libya against ISIS and AQIM

During 2018, USAFRICOM conducted 6 strikes in Libya. These strikes were U.S. direct action 

operations against ISIS and AQIM. U.S. military action has degraded ISIS’s and AQIM’s

operational coordination and logistical support.

DoD has no credible reports of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military actions in Libya 

during 2018. The assessment of one report of civilian casualties in Libya from November 2018 

remains to be completed. 

II. DOD PROCESSES FOR ASSESSING REPORTS OF CIVILIAN 

CASUALTIES FROM U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS

As reflected in Section 2 of Executive Order 13732, United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike 

Measures To Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force, of July 

1, 2016, the U.S. military, as appropriate and consistent with mission objectives and applicable 

law, including the law of war, has a practice of reviewing or investigating incidents involving 
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civilian casualties, including by considering relevant information from all available sources, such 

as other agencies, partner governments, and NGOs, and taking measures to mitigate the 

likelihood of future incidents of civilian casualties. 

Specific processes for reviewing or investigating incidents have varied over the years and may 

continue to vary by geographic combatant command and by operation. DoD has different

processes due to host nation requests, different mission objectives, different operational designs, 

different available resources, and different organizational designs and command relationships

within various areas of responsibility. As just one example, some commands do not have access 

to areas on the ground where civilian casualties are reported to have occurred. Commands also 

work to improve their processes over time and adapt to the ever-changing fog and friction of 

war. 

Over the past few years, USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM have continued to refine their 

practices and procedures for reviewing reports of civilian casualties. Under current 

USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM practices and procedures, the command or another entity 

identified by USAFRICOM or USCENTCOM (such as a special board or team) seeks to assess 

the credibility of reports of civilian casualties resulting from the command’s operations after 

reports become known. The command or entity considers reports from any source, including 

after-action reporting of military units or reports from external sources, such as NGOs, the news 

media, or social media. In assessing the report, the command or entity seeks to review all readily 

available information from a variety of sources. Sources may include, but are not limited to, 

operational planning data, video surveillance and other data from intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) assets, witness observations (including those of partnered forces) where 

available, news reports, and information provided by NGOs and other sources, such as local 

officials or social media. In assessing the report, the command or entity seeks to determine if the 

report is credible. 

Under current USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM practices and procedures, after reviewing the 

available information, a competent official determines whether the report of civilian casualties is 

“credible,” meaning more likely than not that civilians were injured or killed. A report may be 

found to be “not credible,” if, for example, (1) there was no U.S. military action within a 

reasonable distance and/or within a reasonable timeframe as that identified in the report; (2) a 

review of all available information, including information derived through intelligence sources, 

video from the weapon platform and/or ISR assets, and any information provided in the report, 

leads to the determination that it was more likely that civilians were not injured or killed; or (3) 

the report did not include enough information to assess it. 

If warranted, a commander or other competent official could direct a more extensive 

administrative investigation to find additional facts about the incident and to make relevant 
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recommendations, such as identifying process improvements to reduce the likelihood of future 

civilian casualty incidents. Command-directed investigations are conducted in accordance with 

applicable Military Department procedures, such as Army Regulation 15-6. A new DoD-level 

policy, currently under development, will establish additional guidance for assessing and 

investigating reports of civilian casualties. 

In some cases, DoD has not been able to assess a report as credible due to insufficient 

information provided or because reports are still pending review. However, DoD continues its 

assessments, and existing assessments are updated if new information becomes available.

DoD acknowledges that there are differences between DoD assessments of civilian casualties 

and reports from other organizations, including NGOs. These differences result from a variety of 

factors. For example, NGOs and media outlets often use different types of information and 

different methodologies to assess whether civilian casualties have occurred. Some organizations 

conduct on-the-ground assessments and interviews, while others rely heavily on media reporting. 

DoD assessments seek to incorporate all available information, including tools and information 

that are not available to other organizations – such as operational planning data and intelligence 

sources. As noted above, DoD updates existing assessments if new information becomes 

available, including new information received from NGOs or other outside organizations. 

Last year’s Section 1057 report included an excerpt from a Fact Sheet published by the RS 

Mission in April 2018 that sought to explain differences between its assessments and those of 

UNAMA. The entire RS Mission Fact Sheet, titled “Civilian Casualties: Making Sense of the 

Numbers,” can be found at https://rs.nato.int/media-center/backgrounders/civilian-casualtiesmaking-sense-of-the-numbers.aspx. 

III. DOD PROCESSES FOR CONSIDERING EX GRATIA PAYMENTS OR 

OTHER FORMS OF RESPONSE TO CIVILIAN HARM

A DoD-level policy under development will provide guidance on the range of responses that 

might be appropriate for DoD to take when U.S. military operations injure or kill a civilian or 

damage or destroy civilian property. An “ex gratia payment” may be one of several possible 

response options that may be deemed appropriate under the circumstances. Other possible 

response options could include an acknowledgement of responsibility, medical care, or other 

appropriate measures that may be consistent with mission objectives and applicable law.

The U.S. Government may make “ex gratia payments” in appropriate circumstances in instances 

of property damage, personal injury, or death incident to the activities of U.S. forces. An 

offering of ex gratia seeks to convey feelings of condolence or sympathy toward the victim or 

the victim’s family. Such payments are not: (1) required by law; (2) an admission of 
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wrongdoing; or (3) for the purpose of compensating the victim or the victim’s family for their 

loss. 

When commanders identify a situation in which it is appropriate to extend an ex gratia payment, 

DoD has authority and funds to do so, including a global authority residing in the Combatant 

Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF). The Military Departments have regulations related to the 

proper payment of “solatia” and other forms of “ex gratia payments.” 

Commanders are responsible for evaluating and deciding whether or how much to pay, and 

generally ex gratia is only considered when requested by, or with the express consent of, those 

impacted by the activities of U.S. forces. When payments are appropriate, the amounts can vary. 

Commanders have significant discretion in deciding how much to pay. Multiple factors could 

impact a commander’s decision, including advice from host nation officials, local economic 

realities, cultural norms, mission objectives, and other variables. Numerous factors can cause 

commanders to decline to extend ex gratia payments related to civilians harmed or killed by U.S. 

military operations. 

For example, U.S. forces have been working “by, with, and through” partners in Iraq and Syria 

and providing those partners support in the effort to defeat ISIS and other hostile terrorist groups. 

The vast majority of airstrikes in Syria were in areas controlled by ISIS. Unlike 

counterinsurgency operations in Iraq before 2011 or in Afghanistan a few years ago, U.S. forces 

did not have widespread, day-to-day interaction with the local population in Syria and Iraq 

during those strikes, including those for whom an expression of sympathy or condolences would 

be appropriate. Moreover, in cases where a host nation government requests U.S. military 

support of local military forces, it may be more appropriate for the host nation or its military to 

respond to the needs and requests of the local civilian population by offering condolences

themselves, including ex gratia payments, in appropriate circumstances. Often lasting peace is 

best ensured by the host nation and its own military helping to rebuild society from the tragic 

consequences of war. 

IV. STEPS DOD TAKES TO MITIGATE HARM TO CIVILIANS

In carrying out their respective missions, all Commands and forces assigned to Combatant 

Commands adhere to the law of war, Secretary of Defense-approved rules of engagement, 

instructions promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, and joint doctrine that 

establish policies, processes, and procedures that help to protect civilians and minimize civilian 

casualties. Below are examples of steps, among other efforts, DoD has taken in 2018 to help 

protect civilians during military operations. 
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Policies, processes, and procedures: All Combatant Commands conducting military operations 

adhere to Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instructions (CJCSIs) that contain guidance to 

help protect civilians and minimize civilian casualties, including CJCSI 3160.01C, No-Strike and 

the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology. Like other DoD issuances, CJCSI 3160.01C is 

routinely updated, including through lessons learned from U.S. military operations. Successive 

versions of CJCSI 3160.01 have incorporated lessons learned from Operations IRAQI 

FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, ODYSSEY DAWN, UNIFIED PROTECTOR, 

FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, and INHERENT RESOLVE. As an example of how seriously the 

Joint Force takes the process of improving targeting procedures, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff has also established a committee of senior targeting representatives from the Joint Staff, 

the Military Services, the Combatant Commands, and DoD Combat Support Agencies, and 

representatives of participating partner nations, to propose, review, debate, analyze, and 

prioritize targeting issues of mutual concern, and, when appropriate, to decide on and implement 

common solutions. 

Combatant Commands also usually have several boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and/or working 

groups that contribute to efforts to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. Because much of 

the relevant work occurs during the targeting process, these efforts are focused in groups that 

implement the targeting process, such as a Target Development Working Group, a Joint 

Targeting Working Group, and a Joint Targeting Coordination Board. Although the primary 

purpose of a Target Development Working Group, Joint Targeting Working Group, and Joint 

Targeting Coordination Board is to achieve an intended outcome against an enemy target, when 

components of the Combatant Commands identify potential targets for military operations, those 

working groups, boards, and other entities also review and evaluate targets to minimize the 

potential for civilian casualties. In addition, proposed targets are reviewed for compliance with 

the law of war. For example, a judge advocate would review a proposed target to advise the 

Target Engagement Authority whether the proposed target is a valid military objective under the 

law of war. 

Other working groups that are not as directly involved in the targeting process could also 

contribute to efforts to minimize civilian casualties or to respond to reports that U.S. forces 

caused civilian casualties. For example, an Information Operations Working Group could help 

generate warnings for civilians to avoid military objectives or areas of active combat.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in the report, Section 2 of Executive Order 13732, United 

States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures To Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. 

Operations Involving the Use of Force, of July 1, 2016, catalogues the best practices DoD 

implements to protect civilians during armed conflict, and it directs that those measures be 

sustained in present and future operations. For ease of reference, Section 2 of Executive Order 

13732 is reproduced as follows.
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“Sec. 2. Policy. In furtherance of U.S. Government efforts to protect civilians in U.S. operations

involving the use of force in armed conflict or in the exercise of the Nation’s inherent right 

of self-defense, and with a view toward enhancing such efforts, relevant departments and 

agencies shall continue to take certain measures in present and future operations.

(a) In particular, relevant agencies shall, consistent with mission objectives and applicable 

law, including the law of armed conflict:

(i) train personnel, commensurate with their responsibilities, on compliance with legal 

obligations and policy guidance that address the protection of civilians and on 

implementation of best practices that reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, 

including through exercises, pre-deployment training, and simulations of complex 

operational environments that include civilians;

(ii) develop, acquire, and field intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems 

that, by enabling more accurate battlespace awareness, contribute to the protection of 

civilians;

(iii) develop, acquire, and field weapon systems and other technological capabilities

that further enable the discriminate use of force in different operational contexts;

(iv) take feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the likelihood of civilian 

casualties, such as providing warnings to the civilian population (unless the 

circumstances do not permit), adjusting the timing of attacks, taking steps to ensure 

military objectives and civilians are clearly distinguished, and taking other measures 

appropriate to the circumstances; and

(v) conduct assessments that assist in the reduction of civilian casualties by identifying 

risks to civilians and evaluating efforts to reduce risks to civilians.

(b) In addition to the responsibilities above, relevant agencies shall also, as appropriate and 

consistent with mission objectives and applicable law, including the law of armed conflict:

(i) review or investigate incidents involving civilian casualties, including by considering 

relevant and credible information from all available sources, such as other agencies, 

partner governments, and NGOs, and take measures to mitigate the likelihood of future 

incidents of civilian casualties;

(ii) acknowledge U.S. Government responsibility for civilian casualties and offer 

condolences, including ex gratia payments, to civilians who are injured or to the families 

of civilians who are killed;
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(iii) engage with foreign partners to share and learn best practices for reducing the 

likelihood of and responding to civilian casualties, including through appropriate training 

and assistance; and

(iv) maintain channels for engagement with the International Committee of the Red Cross 

and other NGOs that operate in conflict zones and encourage such organizations to assist 

in efforts to distinguish between military objectives and civilians, including by 

appropriately marking protected facilities, vehicles, and personnel, and by providing 

updated information on the locations of such facilities and personnel.”

During 2018, all operations listed above were conducted consistent with Section 2 of Executive 

Order 13732. For example, pre-deployment training for U.S. military units during 2018 included

instruction on the law of war, rules of engagement, and other policies related to protecting 

civilian populations. 

Civilian casualty cells: Combatant Commands or subordinate commands also employ “civilian 

casualty cells” to address civilian casualty issues specifically, such as by responding to reports 

that U.S. or Coalition military operations caused civilian casualties. 

Technological advancements: The prevention of civilian casualties during current operations is 

challenging. Our enemy’s proven willingness to use civilians as human shields coupled with the 

tight urban terrain adds increasing difficulty to an already complex situation. To meet this 

challenge, DoD pursues the latest advances in precision-guided weapons and ISR 

technology. The majority of strikes in 2018 used state-of-the-art weaponry and technology to 

characterize the target area as precisely as possible and to employ the weapons’ capabilities 

against the enemy while reducing effects on nearby collateral concerns. DoD Components with 

target engagement authority have also made process improvements to identify and eliminate 

contributing factors that have the potential to lead to civilian casualties, including through 

monthly reviews of weapons employment across various commands to identify additional areas 

of improvement and to disseminate best practices and lessons learned. Additionally, 

commanders are leveraging emerging technologies that enhance battlefield situational awareness, 

that reduce the probability of potential civilian casualties, and that enable better integration of 

fires. Lastly, mission planners seek to minimize risk to civilians by employing the most 

appropriate munition available, including, at times, non-lethal capabilities, to accomplish the 

mission.

Operational pauses: U.S. forces, working in coordination with Coalition members and partner 

forces, implemented, in appropriate circumstances, operational pauses to allow for the safe 

passage of civilians and other non-combatants from areas of hostilities. 
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Studies and lessons learned: In December 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

directed an assessment of civilian casualties that resulted from U.S. air or artillery strikes in 

USCENTCOM’s and USAFRICOM’s respective areas of responsibility from 2015 to 2017. The 

study focused primarily on Operations INHERENT RESOLVE, FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, and 

ODYSSEY LIGHTNING. It made findings and provided recommendations related to policy, 

doctrine, operational planning, and technological investments. This effort is covered in more 

detail in the report submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 936 of the NDAA for FY 2019.

Civilian Casualties Working Group: DoD also established a Civilian Casualties Working Group 

to promote coordination within DoD on civilian casualty issues and to increase engagement with 

NGOs to understand better outside concerns on civilian casualty issues. This effort is covered in 

more detail in the report submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 936 of the NDAA for FY 

2019.

Conclusion

Moving forward, the measures DoD takes to reduce the risk to civilians and to assess and 

respond to reports of civilian casualties will be enhanced by DoD’s ongoing efforts to draft a 

DoD-wide policy that will address the priority areas identified in Section 936 of the NDAA for 

FY 2019, as well as other issues identified during the drafting process. DoD has brought

together representatives of various DoD components to help draft this DoD-level civilian 

casualty policy, which will reflect best practices across the Department and incorporate lessons 

learned from military operations.