The Future of Shipping in the Arctic: 
 

Acknowledgements: 

The Future of Shipping in the Arctic: New Perspectives on the Next Frontier

Jacquline L. Cottle, Ph.D. and John Kern 

The authors would like to express our sincere gratitude to the multitude of individuals, 

especially our interview participants, who gave of their valuable time and energy to help 

us with this project. So many people set aside time to help us get better acquainted with 

the Arctic, and for this we are so grateful. We are especially grateful to Jeremy 

McKenzie and Cara Condit at the Center for Arctic Study and Policy for all their help and 

guidance. We also would like to thank Ben Strong, who provided the data for the project, 

and the Watson Institute at Brown University for the grant funding to travel to Hamburg, 

Germany, so that we could get a crash course in all things Arctic shipping. 

Disclaimer: The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the 

authors and are not necessarily those of the Watson Institute for International and Public 

Affairs at Brown University, or the Center for Arctic Study and Policy at the United 

States Coast Guard Academy. We take full responsibility for all errors, omissions and 

misstatements. 

2 
3 

Executive Summary 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This year, levels of ice in the Arctic were the seventh lowest on record.

1 As ice has receded, there 

has been a corresponding increase in focus on the Arctic North Atlantic as the next area of great 

industrial expansion. However, despite increased media attention, and a number of predictions 

that trans-Arctic shipping was about to explode in the region, actual levels of shipping have been 

muted relative to the publicity. There have been increases, however, in the size and number of 

ships undertaking destinational voyages along established routes. The current study represents a

forecast analysis examining increased levels of shipping in the Arctic, paying specific attention to 

industrial development in the ANA region. 

For this analysis, we adopted a three-pronged approach. First, we examined historical data on 

incidents in the Arctic and North Atlantic region, in order to see which characteristics defined 

ship casualties in the past. We then reviewed a sample of after-action reports from tabletop or 

live action exercises conducted in the Arctic, in effort to determine which scenarios first 

responders felt were most likely, or most in need of preparation. Finally, we conducted 28

interviews with a wide variety of Arctic stakeholders, including representatives from shipping 

companies, think tanks, maritime insurance, cruise industry, government and coastal response 

agencies. Our interview participants also included academics, and members of Arctic Council 

working groups. Compiling data from all three sources of information provided us with a rich

understanding of the area under consideration, although it should be noted that we were unable to 

interview representatives from important stakeholder groups, which may lead to gaps in 

understanding. 

There were a number of themes which emerged from the data analyzed in the current study, the 

most prominent of which include: 

• Arctic shipping is all about the economics 

• We might need to expand our focus 

• For emergency preparedness, it is important to be proactive rather than reactive 

• We need to capitalize on existing strengths 

• There are very few absolutes in the Arctic 

A total of 11 recommendations resulted from the current analysis, some of which are more likely 

to be actionable at the present time than others. The most pressing recommendations include: 

1. Expansion of both tabletop and live exercises to include features of historical incidents,

and increased participation from both commercial industries and local communities. 

2. Explore public private partnerships in emergency management, especially as they relate 

to the potential inherent in vessels of opportunity. 

3. Expand the current Polar Code training requirements for crew operating vessels in the 

Arctic, to include actual ice navigation experience, and first responder training. Also, 

expand required training to all crew, not just officers. 

4. Open access to data regarding shipping incidents and traffic. Consider ways in which 

existing databases may be expanded to include relevant information needed in most 

emergency situations. Also consider ways to separate out classified from unclassified 

information to increase the effectiveness of information sharing in emergency response 

scenarios. 
Table of Contents 

 

 

 

2. Historical Trends in the Arctic as a Whole ....................................................21 

 

 

3. Casualty Trends in the ANA Region ...........................................................31 

 

 

 

 

 

6. Discussion: Forecasting the Future ............................................................60 

 

 

 

 

Executive Summary

1. Introduction...........................................................................................6 

a. Defining Arctic, Arctic North Atlantic...................................................6 

b. Economic Activity in the Arctic .........................................................9 

c. Arctic Governance and Cooperation....................................................13 

d. Risks in the Arctic ........................................................................14 

e. The Polar Code ............................................................................17 

f. The Current Study.........................................................................20 

a. Arctic Casualty Trends...................................................................22 

b. Arctic Casualty Types ...................................................................22 

c. Types of Ships Involved in Arctic Incidents ..........................................23 

d. Comparisons to the Worldwide Fleet ..................................................24 

e. Arctic Incident Flag States ...............................................................26 

f. Repeat Offenders .........................................................................27 

g. Arctic Incident Timelines ...............................................................28 

h. Search and Rescue Operations in the Arctic ..........................................29 

i. Cruise Ships in the Arctic................................................................29 

a. ANA Casualty Trends ....................................................................31 

b. ANA Casualty Types.....................................................................32 

c. ANA Ship Types ..........................................................................32 

d. ANA Flag States ..........................................................................33 

e. ANA Incident Timelines .................................................................34 

f. Search and Rescue in the ANA Region................................................35 

4. Live and Tabletop Exercises.....................................................................37 

a. Participants .................................................................................37 

b. Exercises ....................................................................................38 

c. Common Themes .........................................................................38 

d. Gaps in Capabilities.......................................................................39 

5. Interviews: Method and Results................................................................42 

a. Participants .................................................................................42 

b. Is Arctic Shipping Increasing?..............................................................................43 

c. Changes in Industry ......................................................................44 

d. Developing Industries ....................................................................46 

e. When is the Increase Significant?.........................................................................49 

f. Critical Gaps and Failures in the Governance Structure .............................50 

g. Which Incidents are Most Likely to Occur in the ANA Region?.........................51 

h. The Polar Code ...........................................................................52 

i. International Cooperation ...............................................................53 

j. Are any Additional Agreements Needed?............................................................54 

k. Gaps in Readiness and Capabilities ....................................................54 

l. Prevention of Arctic Incidents ..........................................................56 

m. Are there any additional threats?..........................................................................58 

a. Arctic Shipping is all About Economics ...............................................60 

b. We Might Need to Expand Our Focus....... ..........................................60 

c. Vessels of Opportunity...................................................................63 

d. The Future of the Polar Code ............................................................63 

e. Expanding Safety Utilizing Existing Resources ......................................64 

7. Conclusions...........................................................................................66 

4 
 

8. Recommendations..................................................................................67 

9. Bibliography.........................................................................................68 

10. Appendix A: List of Interview Questions.....................................................83 

11. Endnotes.............................................................................................85 

5 
 

 

The Future of Shipping in the Arctic:

New Perspectives on the Next Frontier 

Defining Arctic, Arctic North Atlantic 

 

 

 

The top of the world is melting, and at a much faster rate than anyone anticipated. The 

winter of 2018 brought new record lows in the extent of sea ice in the Arctic, nearly 

500,000 square miles less than the historic average2. Accompanying these changes has 

been an increased focus on the Arctic as the next center of global development with 

predicted increases in shipping, infrastructure and economic development. But while 

experts have been predicting a mass influx of shipping coming to the Arctic, actual 

development has been much more gradual. At present, shipping is constrained largely to 

existing industries, utilizing established routes. The goal of the current study was to 

prepare a foresight analysis for shipping in the Arctic, predicting trends that can be 

expected in the coming years, and highlighting policy gaps in the current regulatory 

framework. 

One of the early difficulties of any discussion of the Arctic comes from the fact that there 

are many different definitions of “the Arctic.” For example, in the map below compiled 

by the Arctic Portal, a non-profit focused on information sharing in the region, 

we see seven different definitions of what constitutes the Arctic. 3 

The variety of definitions come from different countries or organizations that have 

different priorities in the region. Below we show some of the boundaries that distinguish 

the Arctic from the rest of the globe. Defining what is “Arctic” and what is “sub-Arctic” 

can have real implications for policy creation and can make cooperation and international 

relations challenging. 

6 
 

 

 

Environmental groups may have 

motivation to expand the definitional 

boundaries of the Arctic, in order to 

encapsulate more of the area under the 

umbrella of the Arctic Council’s working 

groups. For example, this map depicts the 

boundaries defined by the Arctic 

Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 

one of the working groups of the Arctic 

Council, whose mandate is to “To 

monitor and assess the status of the Arctic 

region with respect to pollution and 

climate change issues.”4 AMAP 

acknowledges on their website that their 

definition of Arctic “extends beyond the 

Arctic to address global connections 

associated with long-range transport of 

contaminants” This holistic view of the 

Arctic is one that might be popular among 

environmental circles, but perhaps less practical in terms of cost when considering 

regulations for those operating in these areas. 

The area of the region may also be established via international regulatory agencies. This 

map shows the IMO definition for polar waters and the area where ships are obligated to 

abide by the Polar Code. Notice here that the Bering region delineation is at 60 degrees 

North latitude, well above the AMAP boundary, which extends farther south to the 

Aleutian Island Chain. The IMO definition also excludes Iceland, Faroe Islands and all of 

Scandinavia (except for 

Greenland and Svalbard). The 

IMO’s decisions regarding 

delineation of some regions of 

the Arctic as compared to others 

certainly bears further 

consideration, as it may pose 

additional problems with 

consistency of regulatory 

enforcement for ships sailing in 

the area. 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

Our Area of Interest 

 

 

 

 

Alternatively, countries may have 

motivation to instead define the 

Arctic in terms that would give the 

most control over their borders. 

For example, this map illustrates 

Arctic as defined by the United 

States’ 1984 Arctic Research and 

Policy Act. In the statute, the Arctic 

is defined as “all United States and 

foreign territory north of the Arctic 

Circle, and all United States 

territory north and west of the 

boundary formed by the Porcupine, 

Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all 

contiguous seas, including the 

Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, 

Bering and Chukchi Seas; and the 

Aleutian chain.”5 This particular 

definition of the Arctic includes 

areas as low as 52 degrees north 

latitude. 6 

With so many different definitions, it is perhaps unsurprising that some may have 

difficulty conceptualizing what is meant by “the Arctic.” Shifting regions also creates 

confusion when it comes to overlapping initiatives, regulatory compliance and 

information sharing. 

For the purposes of our report, we focused specifically on 

the entirety of the Arctic North Atlantic which includes the 

G-I-UK (Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom) gap. We 

also chose to utilize the “above 50 degrees” definition, as it 

was consistent with the data provided for analysis. 

Like all who attempt to study this region, we recognize the 

variability associated with ecosystems, economies and 

preparedness for incidents between countries, sub-national 

regions and waterways. However, by including the entirety 

of the region, we are able to get a holistic view of 

cooperation and activity in the region. By widening the 

scope of the region, themes emerged that may have been 

missed otherwise if we were to adopt a more narrow 

geographic focus. 

8 
Economic Activity in the Arctic 

 

Fishing

 

 

 

Mineral Resources 

 

 

 

 

 

Different parts of the Arctic and Arctic North Atlantic are home to a variety of different 

resources for development and exploitation, leading to increased attention to the 

economic potential in areas of fishing, energy, minerals, and shipping.7 But the Arctic, 

like anywhere else, matters differently to different stakeholders, for example, people 

trying to make a living through economic activity, and groups who have an interest in 

preserving ecologically sensitive spaces. Because the Arctic spans several different 

geopolitical regions, it also presents challenges in terms of governance. The following 

areas represent the largest potential sources for investment in the Circumpolar Arctic. 

Fishing in the region is responsible for $13 billion dollars-worth of economic activity and 

represents the biggest source of income for some Arctic states.8 Signaling how important 

this resource is to the future sustainability of the Arctic, many of the Arctic states, 

including the United States and Russia, as well as the European Union and China among 

others, signed a temporary 16-year moratorium on fishing in parts of the region.9 The 

agreement also requires a commitment for participating nations to invest in scientific 

research of fish stocks as the Arctic climate changes.10 

Not only is fishing important from a perspective of economic and food security, but 

fishing in the past has been tied to a country’s national security as well. A significant 

portion of the world’s population relies on protein from fish to survive, and differences of 

opinions regarding a country’s right to fish in the past has brought even friendly countries 

to the brink of war (e.g., the Cod and Turbot wars). While there were no combat deaths in 

these disputes, and they were eventually resolved through the Cold War’s necessity for 

expedient NATO cooperation,11 it still brings to light that this seemingly otherwise 

common industry can have implications outside the pier where the fish are unloaded and 

sold to market. 

There are also massive reserves of minerals and fossil fuels in the Arctic that may lead to 

further terrestrial development and increased shipping. A United States Geological 

Survey report estimates that “the total mean undiscovered conventional oil and gas 

resources of the Arctic are estimated to be approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 

trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.”12. This 

would account “for 15 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, [and] 30 percent of the 

world’s undiscovered gas.” 13 While some of this discovery is already being pursued by 

Arctic states and oil companies, the extent to which continued expansion will occur 

seems at present to be a matter of location. For example, oil exploration in the US Arctic 

has largely stalled for the foreseeable future after tests showed that the levels of oil and 

gas were insufficient to warrant further exploration.14 According to an executive at BP, 

the Arctic "is a very risky place [to explore] and very expensive to develop, so there are 

probably easier places to go."15 On the other hand, Russia’s oil and natural gas 

exploration is booming, and is expected to continue to expand well into the future.16 Like 

all activities in the Arctic though, fossil fuel and mineral exploitation can be complicated 

by the unique and often unpredictable conditions of the Arctic, as well as be influenced 

by global economic factors, which ultimately makes the prediction of their likelihood 

difficult. 

9 
 

 

 

Tourism 

 

 

 

 

Commercial Shipping 

 

The map below shows current oil and gas activity, and areas that are licensed for 

extraction.17 Drawn by the World Wildlife Foundation, it overlays the oil and gas 

activity over areas deemed ecologically significant to certain species like fish, seabirds 

and others. 

Another economic activity thriving in the region is tourism. “Politicians and businesses 

are hoping and planning for substantial growth in tourism, and with construction of three 

transatlantic airports planned, a broader societal discussion of how (much) tourism should 

be developed, in what ways, and by whom, is lacking.” 18 Tourism in the region varies 

from transatlantic visitors to Arctic countries, to passenger vessels that range from a few 

hundred to 1500-person cruise ships. As long as humans have had access to these colder, 

remote regions, they have piqued the curiosity of would-be adventurers.19 What was 

normally reserved for the extremely wealthy, or extremely connected has now become 

available to a growing global middle class. For example, Iceland alone saw a 60% 

increase in tourists between 2010-2016 according to one database.20These increases in the 

number of tourists is part of why many Arctic stakeholders fear that the danger to the 

Arctic is increasing, both in the form of over-tourism, and in terms of potential incidents 

which can occur due to the influx of expedition or adventure tourists. 

Commercial container shipping can come in different forms. Distinguishing between 

these types is important, because there is a belief that one type may increase, while 

another will stagnant. Destination shipping is defined as that which is “conducted for 

community re-supply, marine tourism and moving natural resources out of the Arctic.” 21 

All indications point to destinational traffic continuing to be the dominant form of 

shipping in the region, given the number of people moving to and from isolated 

communities. 

10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Destination shipping can 

be contrasted with transit 

shipping. For some, 

there is a hope that 

transit shipping would 

utilize the entirety of 

circumpolar shipping 

routes to redirect from 

warm-water routes that 

go through the Straits of 

Malacca, Suez or 

Panama Canals. A study 

published by the Asian 

Journal of Shipping and 

Logistics found that “if 

the NSR becomes 

commercialized, 

[companies] will be able 

to save about 5,000 

nautical miles in 

distance and sailing 

time.” 22 

A 2018 headline drew international attention when shipping giant Maersk conducted a 

test of the Northern Sea Route in northern Russia,23 leading many to speculate that this 

could be the new norm in global shipping. This speculation has led to a debate among 

many stakeholders of whether or not this will be the case. 

One of the major expectations of shipping is the idea of “reliability.” Despite a trend of 

seasonal ice melt, the environment in the Arctic does not appear to qualify as a viable, or 

reliable alternative to warmer, more trafficked routes. This is because, according to Palle 

Laursen, a spokesperson from Maersk, “Today, the passage is only feasible for around 

three months a year,”24 making it difficult to justify the investment required for ice 

capable ships for those months. Stephen Carmel, a senior executive at Maersk, also points 

to the cost-benefit ratio involved in trans Arctic shipping, highlighting the need to 

“...[formulate] appropriate strategy and intelligent investments, [and the importance of 

getting] past the hype.”25 According to Carmel, just because there is less sea ice, does not 

mean that increased transit shipping will follow. 

The belief that the Northern Sea Route may become a viable alternative to other global 

shipping routes is not one that is unwarranted. Those who see this region as a hub of 

transit shipping in the future point to the substantial recent investments by Russia on their 

northern border, and to China’s desire to become an Arctic player. According to Malte 

Humpert, a senior fellow at U.S.-based think-tank Arctic Institute, Russia’s investment in 

the region is seen as a point of national pride.26 Investments by Russia and China to make 

the region more reliable, coupled with a decrease in sea ice for longer periods of the year, 

11 
 

Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA)

 

 

 

Global Commons versus National Sovereignty 

 

makes it unclear just how long the regions’ transit shipping routes will remain impractical 

for business. 

In 2009, the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment was published by the Arctic Council’s 

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group focusing on current 

and future Arctic marine development. In over 200 pages, attention was focused on 

“natural resource development, governance challenges, climate change and marine 

infrastructure issues, [and how they were] influencing current and future marine uses of 

the Arctic.” In sum, the focus was on how many ships could be expected to set their 

sights on the area in the coming years as ice began to recede at the top of the world. 

Implicit in this publication was the idea that as ice left, shipping of all kinds would rush 

to take its place, making the Arctic host to the world’s new commercial shipping routes. 

In this work, attempts were made to quantify what was happening in the area, and predict 

what was to come in an effort to establish new safety standards by which this influx was 

to happen. Also, a call was put out to preserve and protect the pristine Arctic marine 

environment, encouraging the responsible development of an area which had up until 

then remained largely untarnished. At the time it was published, the key findings in the 

report concluded: 

• “Arctic natural resource development (hydrocarbons, hard minerals and 

fisheries) and regional trade are the key drivers of future Arctic marine activity. 

• Arctic voyages through 2020 will be overwhelmingly destinational, not transArctic. 

• Gaps in hydrographic data exist for significant portions of primary shipping 

routes important to support safe navigation. 

• Except in limited areas of the Arctic, there is a lack of emergency response 

capacity for saving lives and for pollution mitigation, including serious 

limitations to radio and satellite communications and few systems to monitor and 

control the movement of ships in ice-covered waters. The current lack of marine 

infrastructure in all but a limited number of areas, coupled with the vastness and 

harshness of the environment, makes conduct of emergency response 

significantly more difficult in the Arctic.” 

The report concluded with 17 recommendations meant to address the shortcomings that 

had been found and attempt to shape what responsible development might look like. To 

date, two updated reports have been published, in 2011 and 2013 reporting on the 

progress made towards these recommendations. But progress has been slow, and many 

of the concerns noted in the AMSA remain, even some 10 years later. 

With the awareness that there is economic value to be derived from the Arctic/North 

Atlantic comes a discussion of to whom the resources belong. One attempt to create an 

orderly process to claim these resources was through the United Nations Convention of 

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS is an “international agreement that defines the 

rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world’s ocean.” 

Since the ratification of UNCLOS by 166 countries, four of the Arctic states have made 

extended territorial claims in the region: Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark.27 

12 
 

Arctic Governance and Cooperation 

 

The Arctic Council 

 

Making territorial claims now may establish authority and sovereignty over each region’s 

economic resources as states and industry move into the area in the future. Worth noting, 

is that of all the Arctic nations, only the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS 

agreement, making it unclear how potential disputes over the US Arctic will be handled 

or resolved in the future. 

“Eight countries make up the Arctic: The Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, 

Sweden, Finland, Russia, the United States and Canada. And nothing would be 

worse than each of these countries trying to exploit the maximum instead of 

working with the other countries to promote responsible stewardship. Nothing 

could be worse than militarization based on mistrust between these countries that 

are neighbours.” -- Pamela Goldsmith-Jones, Parliamentary Secretary to the 

Canadian Minister of Global Affairs, 29 September 201628 

At present, governance of the Arctic happens through a series of intergovernmental fora, 

each having responsibility for oversight of different aspects of operation. 

In an effort to prevent chaos and destructive self-interest in the Arctic, the Arctic Council 

was created to be a “high level intergovernmental forum [which] provides a means for 

promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States.”29 The 

Council makes distinctions between three types of groups; member states, permanent 

participants and observing states, each with different qualifications and obligations. 

The council is comprised of the eight Arctic states, the United States, Russia, Norway, 

Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland). 

Membership was outlined in 1996, in the Ottawa Declaration, the founding document of 

the Arctic Council. All these countries have some territory inside the Arctic Circle, or just 

above 66 degrees north latitude, which makes their stake in the international governance 

of the region clear. The other members of the Arctic Council include permanent 

participants which are made up of six Indigenous groups who live in the Arctic and have 

a stake in how it is governed economically and politically.30 

The Council also allows for the presence of other governmental entities in the form of 

observing members. Observing members are those which have no territorial claim of 

lands in the Arctic, but may have an interest, morally or economically, in the 

development of the Arctic. Observing members are sub-Arctic countries like China, 

Korea and the UK. They may also be inter-state actors like the Nordic Council of 

Ministers and The United Nations Environmental Programme or non-government 

agencies (e.g., the Circumpolar Conservation Union and National Geographic Society). 

These observing members can make statements, issue recommendations or share 

expertise in the region.31 

13 
 

 

 

 

The Arctic Coast Guard Forum 

 

Ilulissat Declaration 

 

 

 

Risks in the Arctic 

Much of the work of the Council happens through the efforts of six working groups, 

including: Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and 

Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 

Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic 

Marine Environment (PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working Group 

(SDWG).32 All of these working groups are funded directly by Arctic Council nations, 

and work usually on a project-to-project basis for research and event hosting.33 The scope 

of our project most closely aligned with the work of the EPPR, although in many cases, 

the missions and work of the other working groups often intersect. This is because the 

EPPR, while having no operational capacities themselves, organize and conduct research 

for environmental protection and best practices for those who operate in the region.34 

Most notably, the EPPR has facilitated two landmark agreements between the states on 

the Arctic Council, the Search and Rescue Agreement and the Agreement on Cooperation 

on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA).35 Since the 

agreements were made, Arctic Council countries meet biannually to plan exercises, 

discuss best practices and establish contingency plans.36 (In fact, part of our research 

involved viewing these exercises to identify some of the lessons learned to frame policy 

recommendations.) 

By agreement, the Arctic Council is limited to political and regulatory discussions only, 

and cooperation is limited to non-military affairs, which hints at the notion of diplomatic 

isolation for issues facing the Arctic.37 But issues regarding coastal protection and 

security affairs, instead are under the purview of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. 

The Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) is another venue by which international 

cooperation is facilitated in the region. Separate from the Arctic Council, and not being 

born out of a treaty, its chairmanship and members are the same as the Arctic Council 

with the exception of the Indigenous permanent participants and observers. The group 

meets semi-annually with a focus, as the name implies, on Coast Guard-specific 

operations, focusing on best practices to and how to best achieve cooperation in the 

region.38 Like the Arctic Council working groups, the ACGF hosts live and table-top 

exercises regularly that can be examined to identify lessons learned. 

In addition to these other cooperative fora, the Ilulissat Declaration also gives reason to 

believe that there will be continued cooperation in the region. This agreement, signed in 

2008 by United States, the Russian Federation, Canada, Norway and Denmark, 

enumerated the countries’ intentions’ to resolve conflicts in the region through 

diplomacy. It also prioritizes scientific research, sustainable development and safety of 

navigation.39 The fact that this agreement has remained in place for 11 years serves as an 

example to those who believe that the level of cooperation in the Arctic is exceptional, 

despite the United States’ failure to ratify UNCLOS. 

As implied by the two preeminent agreements to come out of the Arctic Council, areas 

regarding search and rescue, and environmental protection represent two of the most 

14 
 

Search and Rescue 

 

Oil Spill 

 

 

 

 

 

Communication and Cooperation 

 

pressing risks to the pristine Arctic ecosystem. This region involves more risk than most 

others in the world. Even though the sea ice is receding, ice floes, dangerously cold 

weather, and uncharted waters characterize the dangers of this newly opening frontier. 

Even though industrial development represents much in the way of promise for the 

region, it also brings impending environmental pollution, overtourism and threats to 

Indigenous peoples’ way of life. 

One of the biggest concerns with regard to industrial development in the Arctic relates to 

the vast distances embodied in the Arctic, when compared to the existing infrastructure 

and capabilities to respond to accidents and incidents. By many, if not all accounts, the 

infrastructure that is there is sufficient only to handle the small numbers of locals who 

live in the region, and would quickly become overwhelmed with even small incidents 

which may occur in the region. 

Along with limited infrastructure in terms of hospitals and medical response capabilities 

on land, is a lack of permanent rescue assets like icebreakers, long range helicopters and 

in some cases, sufficient crew. In 2007, a small expedition style cruise ship called the 

Explorer sank in the Arctic after striking an iceberg, requiring the rescue of 150 

passengers and crew. Even though none of the passengers or crew perished in the 

incident, it took over 5 hours for them to be rescued from lifeboats. By standards of 

response in the region, 5 hours can be an incredibly short amount of time, because 

depending on where a potential incident occurs, help may be days away due to the lack 

permanent assets in the region. 

Many of the same assets that would be deployed for search and rescue operations would 

be required for oil spills. While oil spills in any marine environment can be costly and 

difficult, like search and rescue operations, the challenges inherent in the Arctic region 

like cold weather, poor satellite communication, poor visibility, and the lack of 

infrastructure make the threat of an oil spill even more problematic. 

The unique nature of the region, because of the presence of sea ice, can also lead to 

challenges for oil spill response as compared to other areas where oil is extracted and 

transported. According to the Arctic Oil Spill Response Technology Joint Industry 

Programme (JIP), an organization of nine oil and gas companies that examine risks and 

best practices associated with fossil fuel extraction and usage in the region, oil behaves 

differently in Arctic environments. 40 Because of oil’s unique behavior, this also 

influences how it can be cleaned, and at present, there is insufficient knowledge as to 

how to clean up oil in ice.41 For this reason, continued research into the unique risks 

posed by oil and gas exploration and extraction in Arctic regions should continue, so that 

both industry and first responders are able to assess risk and develop strategies for 

deploying assets in the region. 

To help give a sense of what cooperation actually looks like on a practical, operational 

level, the map below, created by the risk-management company DNV GL, shows the 

current location of helicopter bases (red) and hospitals (blue ‘H’) that would be activated 

15 
 

 

 

 

 

in the event of an emergency in the region. The vast distances from helicopter bases to 

remote areas is notable, as well as the expanse of areas with no hospital facilities. 

Looking at this map, it is easy to see why so many are concerned about sufficient SAR 

resources.42 

An additional issue that arises when considering communication and international 

cooperation in the region stems from the fact that search and rescue resources are, for 

some Arctic states, intertwined with military capabilities. Enmeshing search and rescue 

with national security concerns means that information sharing may not be as simple and 

straightforward as it otherwise could be. The United States, Norway, and in some cases 

Russia (whose coastal responsibilities are shared between military and civilian offices) 

have Coast Guards that operate under military organizations.43 Canada and Sweden, on 

the other hand, have Coast Guards that function under civilian departments.44,45Whereas 

no one could reasonably make the claim that any deployment of military ships for the 

purposes of search and rescue warrants fear of militarization, it could make coordination 

in the form of information sharing much more difficult. The fact also remains that there 

have been concerns raised that Russia’s buildup of infrastructure in the region could have 

hard security implications, in ways that buildup of civilian Coast Guard resources might 

not.46 

In addition to coordination among Arctic states, are issues with communication and 

coordination among Arctic states and other non-governmental entities. It was only 

relatively recently (i.e., 2000) that the IMO mandated that ships utilize ship tracking 

systems like AIS, to facilitate awareness of ship locations by coastal authorities. Other 

16 
 

 

 

 

 

 

The Polar Code 

 

initiatives for vessel tracking followed, including the creation of databases for vessels of 

opportunity for emergency response cooperation. Some examples are the voluntary 

Atlantic Merchant Vessel Emergency Reporting (AMVER) System based out of the 

United States, and the IMO mandated GREENPOS out of Greenland. The goals of these 

databases were to effectively “"take the search out of search and rescue” by ensuring that 

routes were planned and communicated to rescue agencies in the event of an incident.47 

These are examples of responsibility being placed on industry to be proactive in the case 

of emergencies where every moment lost could be catastrophic. 

Another recent example of attempting to organize ship traffic information is in the Long 

Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system. Below is an image that shows how the 

LRIT was created by the IMO in an attempt to ease information sharing for governments 

and emergency responders.48 Particularly worth noting is the requirement of a 

standardized format to ensure vital information is accessible across borders. 

The importance of these databases to all stakeholders in maritime activities is clear, but 

especially in the Arctic where emergency responders could take longer to meet those in 

distress due to the vast distances and remote locations. 

In response to some of these unique challenges and increased risks inherent in operating 

in Arctic and Antarctic waters, the IMO also put into place a series of other mandated 

requirements. The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) 

represents a series of regulations that “protect ships and people aboard them, both 

seafarers and passengers, in the harsh environment of the waters surrounding the two 

poles.” 49 

17 
 

 

Limits of The Polar Code 

 

The Polar Code presents a combination of functional safety regulations and 

environmental protections. Some of them are mandatory, like requiring cold-weather gear 

for crew and passengers,50 and banning of dumping certain materials deemed 

environmentally hazardous51. The Polar Code also requires ship owners to specify their 

ship’s unique limitations and capabilities, as well as form a plan for what to do if an 

incident were to occur in polar waters. The Polar Waters Operational Manual is required 

by the Polar Code, and it requires ships to specify their voyage plan, as well as “riskbased procedures to be followed for contacting emergency response providers for 

salvage, search and rescue (SAR), spill response, etc.” 52 They also must include 

“procedures for maintaining life support and ship integrity in the event of prolonged 

entrapment by ice, and shall include risk-based procedures for monitoring and 

maintaining safety during operations in ice, as applicable, including any requirements for 

escort operations or icebreaker assistance.”53 

The graphic presented below highlights some of the mandatory requirements put in place 

by the Polar Code, required for all new ships built after 2017. 54 

The boundaries to which the Polar Code applies, along with the provisions, are the result 

of years of discussions and debates among stakeholders. Those debates, according to 

some Arctic stakeholders, left a lot to be desired or overstepped the bounds necessary to 

govern the region safely. Worth highlighting are some of the geographic limits of the 

Code, and questions regarding enforcement. 

For example, some have questioned the decision to include the entire island of 

Greenland, while excluding all of Iceland, and most of coastal Norway, given that 

18 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Norway accounts for 

approximately 80 percent 

of all maritime traffic in the 

Arctic. One justification for 

these decisions was the 

belief that “Sea ice extent 

should be the primary 

determinant of the Polar 

Code boundary in the 

Arctic.”55 

From data made available 

by the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric 

Administration, the 

boundaries do appear to be 

consistent with such a 

definition for the region.56 

However, the presence of permanent sea ice might not be the best determining factor of 

what should be included in laws governing polar waters, especially since levels of sea ice 

are changing, and many of the same weather conditions and dangerous ice floes can be 

found in places outside the geographical delineations. Not requiring vessels sailing in 

similar conditions to adopt the safety regulations in the Polar Code may leave them at 

risk for the very problems the code was trying to address. 

In addition to geographical limits of the Polar Code’s application, were limitations in 

terms of the vessels to which the Code applied. The IMO’s Safety of Life at Sea 

(SOLAS) agreement, of which the Polar Code is an amendment, does not apply to vessels 

under 150-500 gross tonnage (GT), and instead delegates authority to flag states on how 

to regulate these vessels depending on the nature of their route.57 The decision to exclude 

these vessels from the regulations of the Polar Code makes these smaller vessels a higher 

risk, especially considering the nature of these types of vessels, fishing vessels and 

smaller pleasure craft. It is difficult to say why the Polar Code does not include these 

types of vessels except to say that fishing vessels are not covered under SOLAS either. 

According to one IMO webpage, “The safety of fishing vessels has been a matter of 

concern to IMO since the Organization's inception, but the differences in design and 

operation between fishing vessels and other types of ship have proved to be an obstacle to 

their inclusion in the SOLAS...Conventions.”58 It would appear then that regulations 

with regard to these types of vessels is lacking as compared to other types of ships sailing 

in the area. 

The issue of enforcement is one that remains as a criticism of the Polar Code as it exists 

now. Some have pointed to the difficulties that flag states have in ensuring compliance 

with the Code. This is a concern mirrored by classification societies as well who have 

struggled with how to ensure compliance with the code in light of its goal-based nature.59 

19 
 

 

 

 

The Current Study 

 

It is also possible that some ships may be motivated to seek out particular flag states in an 

effort to avoid strict Polar Code enforcement. In a report examining issues of flag-state 

compliance, Matthew Gianni, in conjunction with the World Wide Fund and the 

International Transport Workers’ Federation, found that, “to shipping and fishing 

interests, the economic attraction of registering a vessel under a flag with lower costs, 

more relaxed crewing requirements and less vigorous regulation is undeniable.60 The 

Polar Code does not address this issue of flag state compliance, which can have 

extremely high consequences when disaster strikes. 

In conclusion, it is clear that the Arctic is a rich and varied area where many different 

stakeholders’ interests and capabilities combine. Even the word Arctic does not mean the 

same thing to all people. No matter how you define it, however, the region is not isolated 

from the rest of the world, where geopolitical and economic power influence behavior. 

As mentioned earlier, the goal of the current study was to prepare a foresight analysis 

regarding issues and incidents likely to occur in the Arctic North Atlantic region in the 

coming years. We also hoped to examine any policy gaps that exist in regulations of 

Arctic Shipping. Since development in the Arctic is still relatively new, we felt the best 

approach to understanding the future of Arctic shipping was to include factual data from 

historical events, insight from Arctic expert stakeholders, and an examination of available 

documentation in the form of after-action reports from joint exercises. 

We adopted a rather liberal definition of the Arctic for the purposes of our study, 

choosing to examine incidents north of 50 degrees latitude, and encompassing the entire 

area between Canada and Norway. Although these decisions may not adhere to others’ 

more traditional definitions of what constitutes the Arctic, we felt it would present the 

most inclusive picture of what we can expect in the region over the next 15-20 years. 

20 
Historical Trends in the Arctic as a Whole 

In order to forecast the likely casual factors of shipping incidents in the Arctic over the 

next 15-20 years, we examined historical trends in marine accidents and incidents 

occurring in the last 64 years. Casualty data was provided from IHS Lloyd’s Register 

Fairplay.61. The data included 1822 casualty incidents (from 1552 ships), occurring 

above 50 degrees latitude from 1955-2019, but also provided details regarding ship 

characteristics (year of build, ship size, ship type), incident characteristics (year, region, 

description) and owner/operator information. For the purposes of the current project, 

only the ship and incident characteristics were examined. There were some mistakes in 

the database noted (e.g., ship type characterizations varied for the same ship involved in 

more than one incident, or coordinates which did not match with incident descriptions), 

so the authors are unable to guarantee the completeness or accuracy of the data upon 

which the following analyses were based. However, assuming that, on the whole the data 

represented a representative snapshot of the types of incidents that have occurred in the 

Arctic region over the last 64 years, quite a few trends emerged that are worth 

consideration. 

Additionally, there were a few issues with the data that was included which made some 

of the analyses and interpretations more challenging. There was wide variability in the 

types of information available about each incident, the biggest example of this being with 

regard to the location of the incident, which was especially problematic when it came to 

analyses concerning specific regions (e.g., the Arctic North Atlantic). Therefore, these 

regional analyses should be interpreted with caution as they were conducted only on the 

subset of the data that specifically identified region. There may have been a higher 

number of incidents in the area that we were unable to include due to the lack of 

information provided. The amount of information available as far as descriptions of 

incidents also varied greatly, which placed some limitations on the ability to compare 

across incidents, both for the entire Arctic, and the ANA Region specifically. 

An additional caveat needs to be included as well. We were unable to obtain data on 

actual shipping traffic which would allow us to contextualize our findings in terms of the 

number of ships in the region. This information is important when considering the types 

of trends that emerged. More specifically, without this information, it is unclear whether 

increased incidents involving certain types of vessels were due to an increased threat this 

type of vessel may pose, or was merely a function of increased representation in the 

population of vessel traffic. For this reason, we attempted to contextualize our findings 

where possible, but future research examining these trends in light of vessel traffic is 

important to provide a more complete picture of incidents in the Arctic. 

21 
Arctic Casualty Trends 

Arctic Casualty Types 

Casualties	 	 	 	 by Type of Incident

 

Over the years, there has been a definite increase in the number of incidents occurring in 

the Arctic, which likely corresponds to the increase in accessibility to the area. 

Arctic Incident Trends 

All causalities in the Fairplay data were categorized as one of six types: Hull or 

Machinery Damage, Wrecked/Stranded, Fire/Explosion, Foundered (Sank), Contact, 

Collision and Missing. Descriptive analyses indicate that the most common incident in 

the Arctic involved damage to Hull or Machinery, and the least common was for a ship to 

go missing. 

Hull/Machinery

Damage

35%

Wrecked/Stranded

25%

Fire/Explosion

11%

Foundered

11%

Contact

9%

Collision

9%

Missing 0.2%

The most common type 

of casualty was damage 

to hull or machinery, 

followed by wrecked or 

stranded. 

22 
 

Type of Ship s Involved in Arctic Incidents (1955 -2019)

	 	 	 	 	

50

60

According to The Allianz Safety and Shipping Review 2018, worldwide from 2008-2017, 

the largest cause of accidents/incidents was foundering (n=593), followed by 

Wrecked/Stranded (n=229).62 Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a greater 

likelihood of hull and machinery damage in the Arctic region as opposed to the rest of the 

world. 

By far and away the greatest number of incidents in the full dataset occurred to fishing 

vessels, followed by cargo ships and oil/gas/chemical tankers. In 2009, it was predicted 

that fishing vessels represented 27% of the vessels sailing in the Arctic63. According to 

the incident database, these vessels account for almost half of all shipping incidents. 

47% 17% 11% 

Fishing Cargo Tanker 

Passenger 

7% 

Tug 

6% 

Bulk 

5% 

Other 

7% 

Incidents	by	Type	of	Ship	for	Last	10	Years

There	has	been	an	increase	in	incidents	involving	

both	Fishing	and	Cargo	vessels.

Number of Incidents40

30

20

10

0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fishing Vessels Cargo Ships Passenger Vessels

Oil, Gas, Chemical Tankers Tug and Towboats Bulk Carriers

Offshore Vessels Other Vessels

The variability in incidents over the last ten years poses interesting questions as to the 

reasons behind these fluctuations. One plausible hypothesis may be that these variations 

are tied to levels of sea ice. However, data from the National Snow and Ice Data Center 

23 
Comparisons to the Worldwide Fleet 

(NSIDC) 64 show that the relationship between incidents and sea ice levels are not as 

clear cut as they may seem. For example, as shown in the figure below, levels of sea ice 

were the lowest in 2012 and the highest in 2009 and 2013. While there was an uptick in 

fishing vessel incidents in 2009, other types of ships did not show similar increases 

during that time. Further, incident rates for fishing vessels were the lowest in 2013, 

which was a year that showed similar ice coverage. 

Levels of ice are 

greatest in March 

and lowest in 

September 

According to the Allianz Safety and Shipping reviews, worldwide from 2008-2017, the 

most common type of vessels involved in casualties were cargo vessels (n=471), 

followed by fishing vessels (n=174), which is the opposite trend as found in the Arctic. 

Therefore, it would appear that fishing in the Arctic is much more dangerous compared to 

the rest of the world. 

In order to contextualize the incident rates, we compared the percentage of total ships of 

each type in the worldwide fleet65, to the percent of incidents in the Arctic. In the two 

years for which data was available, Cargo Ships and Oil, Gas and Chemical 

24 
 

.3%

Tankers had a greater percentage of incidents in the Arctic. For example, in 2016, bulk 

carriers represented 43% of the worldwide fleet, but only 5% were involved in an 

incident that same year. 

*(Data unavailable for other types of ships) 

25 
Arctic Incident Flag States (1955-2019) 

	 	 	 	 	

	 	 	

There were 51 flag states represented in the Fairplay data. The top four flag states having 

the highest number of casualties were coastal Arctic states. 

Examining the trends over the last decade, incidents involving Russian flagged vessels 

have increased, with the number of incidents in 2018 being nearly double what it was in 

2008. 

Top 4 Flag States' Casualties

Last 10	Years

Ownership of the

World Fleet: 

Number of Ships

20173 

70

nts60 ice

50

Ind

40

of

30

mber 20 Nu

10

0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

United States of America Canada Norway Russia

Russia 

1707 

USA 

2014 

Norway 

1842 

26 
Repeat Offenders 

REPEAT OFFENDER	SHIP	TYPES

 

el

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FiGe

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Most ships in the 

incident database were 

involved in only one 

incident. However, 

12.5% of ships were 

involved in more than 

one incident, with three 

ships involved in 9 or 

more incidents. 

Similar to the overall rates of incidents by ship type, the most common type of ship in the 

repeat offenders database was fishing vessels, followed by general cargo and 

oil/gas/chemical tanker. 

100

86 90

31 29

23

11 10

1 1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Number of Ships

27 
 

 

	 	 	 	

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

A Timeline of Incidents 

The highest number of incidents occurred in February and August, followed by a roughly 

equal number of incidents occurred in the months of January, March, September, October 

and November (average =167). The fewest incidents occurred in April. 

MOST	DANGEROUS	MONTHS	FOR	

INCIDENTS

200

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Freq

q

uency

The bimodal nature of the distribution of incidents likely underscores the role of 

additional ice in February, and the possible role of increased ship traffic in August. 

According to the NSIDC, levels of ice are highest in March and lowest in September. 

This is borne out by the data in that, in addition to the higher risk of hull/machinery 

damage overall in the arctic, there are a greater number of incidents of fire/explosion and 

foundering in February, and a greater number of incidents due to wrecked/stranded and 

collision in August. 

Types of Incidents by Month

80

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Frequency

Hull/Machinery	Damage Contact

Foundered

Wrecked/Stranded

Collision Fire/Explosion

Missing

28 
 

 

 

	 	

	 	

	 	 	

Helicopter

Lifeboat, liferaft

Fishing vessel

Coast Guard vessel

Local rescue vessel

Merchant vessel

Tug vessel

Airplane

Other vessel

Water	rescue

Icebreaker

Search and Rescue Operations in the Arctic 

Only 302 of the 1822 incidents in the casualty database described the need for rescue 

operations. For those descriptions including the information, number of passenger/crew 

and type of rescue was examined, along with the vessels and vehicles responding. In 

general, it seems that the Arctic is relatively safe given that in the last 64 years, only 282 

individuals have died as result of marine casualties in the region, with an additional 486 

individuals listed as missing. Even assuming all those listed as missing perished, the total 

number of deaths in the region would be 768 over the last 64 years. (To put this number 

in perspective, in 2015, the International Transport Worker Federation reported that an 

average of 200066, individuals lose their lives each year in shipping incidents worldwide.) 

An additional 208 individuals required medical attention at the time of rescue (not 

including those who died). On the other hand, 3446 individuals were listed as rescued 

safely (the actual number of which is higher due to the number of entries simply stating 

“all crew” were rescued safely without providing numbers). 

Text entries for casualty events revealed that other, non-Coast Guard vessels were the 

most common response vehicle (n=96; e.g., fishing vessels, merchant vessels, tug and 

other vessels), with fishing vessels accounting for the majority of these vessels of 

opportunity (n=47). Helicopter rescues also accounted for a large proportion of the 

rescues in the region (n=55). Finally, life rafts and lifeboats were involved in 48 rescue 

incidents. As is evident from the Figure below, only a very small number of incidents 

involved icebreakers, or water rescues. 

ASSETS IN SAR OPERATIONS

IN	THE	ARCTIC

60

0

10

20

30

40

50

Nu

m

ber of Incidents

*NOTES: incidents often involved more than one type of asset; and not all entries listed the types of assets 

involved in rescue operations or utilized the same terminology when listing the rescue vehicles. 

Cruise Ships in the Arctic (1955-2019)

On the whole, there have been very few cruise ship accidents in the arctic (n=54) 

resulting in 5 deaths and 13 individuals missing (out of at least 8535 passengers where 

details permitted a passenger count). From these incidents, an additional 97 passengers 

required rescue medical services resulting from a cruise ship incident. (There have been 

an additional 5 deaths and 15 missing from incidents involving passenger/Ro-Ro vessels 

29 
 

 

Most Common	Incidents	 	 Cruise Ships

 

[ferries] which would bring the total of human casualties to 10, and the number missing 

to 28.) This means that in 64 years, at most 38 people have lost their lives as a result of a 

passenger vessel incident in the Arctic. But there have been incidents requiring the rescue 

of at least 1243 passengers and crew, all of whom were rescued safely. The three 

incidents involving the highest number of passenger rescues all have occurred between 

55 and 60 degrees latitude, and were described by the following: 

“Cruise ship caught fire 120 miles away from land in heavy weather. The vessel was still 

burning when it sank. All 300 passengers and 200 crew were rescued safely.” 

“Ship sustained punctures to forward fuel/water tanks. 122 passengers and 31 crew were 

rescued by fishing vessels.” 

“Stranded on the rocks when leaving Hubbard Glacier, divers’ inspection revealed 10 ft 

long, 5 inch wide gash in ballast tank. No injuries reported to the 2,000 passengers, 

temporary repairs made and ship continued after Coast Guard inspection.” 

Foundered

Wrecked/Stranded

44%

Hull/Machinery

Damage

19%

Fire/Explosion

19%

Contact

9%

Collision

7%

2%

The most common 

incident for cruise ships 

is running aground 

Historically, the greatest number of cruise ship incidents have been caused by running 

aground, followed by an equal number of incidents involving hull/machinery damage and 

fire/explosions. Of the incidents involving large numbers of passenger rescues, 8 were 

from running aground, and 2 involved fires. Passenger vessels which were repeat 

offenders tended to be ferries, with only 2 cruise ships being involved in more than one 

incident. 

Arctic Incidents at a Glance: 

Number of Incidents Extracted: 1822 Number Killed: 282 

Average year of build 1979 Number Missing: 486 

Average Gross tonnage: 7836 Pollution Noted (# of incidents): 98 (5%) 

Average Deadweight: 10535 

30 
 

 

1968197219781980198219841986198819901992199419961999200120032005200820102012201420162018

Arctic North Atlantic Region 

Since the main focus of the current analysis was to examine the Arctic North Atlantic 

specifically, we then wanted to then examine the trends and incidents occurring 

specifically in this region. Utilizing the Marsden Grid References in the all Arctic 

incident database (where available), we were able to clearly identify 160 incidents as 

occurring in the ANA region. We then conducted similar analyses as those done for the 

all incidents database. (It should be noted that the analyses reported earlier are inclusive 

of these 160 incidents that occurred in the ANA region.) In this region, as in the Arctic 

as a whole, marine incidents are on the rise. 

ANA	Region	Incident Trends

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Number of Incidents Per Year

Utilizing the Marsden Grid (below), we see the that the highest number of incidents 

occurred around the Murmansk area and Northern Norway, followed by the Baffin Bay 

region of southwestern Greenland. 

31 
 

 

Casualty	Incidents:	 	 ANA Region

Similar to the entire Arctic region, the most common casualty type in the ANA Region 

was Hull/Machinery Damage followed by Wrecked/Stranded, with the least likely 

incident after missing vessels being due to collisions and foundering. 

Missing

.6%

Hull/Machinery

Damage

37%

Wrecked/Stranded

29%

Contact

15%

Fire/Explosion

7%

Foundered

6%

Collision

6%

The most common type of 

casualty was damage to hull or 

machinery, followed by wrecked 

or stranded. 

Incident Ship Type in the ANA Region 

45% 17% 14% 

Fishing Cargo Tanker 

5% 5% 12% 2% 

Passenger Tug Bulk Other 

Also mirroring the trends in the entire Arctic region, fishing vessels accounted for the 

largest number of incidents in the ANA region (representing almost half of all incidents). 

However in this region, the percentage of incidents involving oil/gas/chemical tankers is 

slightly higher (14% vs 11%), as is the number of incidents involving passenger vessels, 

as compared to the entire Arctic region (12% vs 7%). Examining the trends over the last 

10 years (below), we see that fishing vessel incidents have increased dramatically, 

beginning in 2014. There was also an increase in 2014 in passenger vessel incidents, 

which was not sustained in the following years. 

32 
 

 

	 	 	 	 	 	

	 	

Number of Incidents Per Year

12

Casualties by	Ship Type: ANA Region Last 10	Years

10

8

6

4

2

0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fishing Vessels General Cargo Ships Oil/Gas/Chemical Tankers

Passenger Vessels Other

ANA Region Incident Flag States (1955-2019) 

Perhaps the biggest difference between the data for the ANA Region as compared to the 

larger Arctic as a whole corresponds to the flag states of ships with the highest number of 

incidents. In this region, the majority of incidents occurred to Norwegian flagged 

vessels, followed by Canadian and Russian. 

Panama

FaroeIslands 

33 
 

 

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

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We also see a greater amount of variability over the years in this region as to the number 

of incidents per flag state. Of note is the steady increase in incidents for Russian flagged 

vessels since 2014, and the alternating years of incidents for Norwegian flagged vessels. 

Top 4 Flag States ANA Region Last 10 Years

8

7

Number of Incidents 6

5

4

3

2

1

0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Norway Canada Russia Denmark

A Timeline of Incidents: ANA Region (1955-2019) 

The highest number of incidents in the Arctic North Atlantic region occur in the summer 

months of August and July, followed closely by September, corresponding likely to the 

reduced extent of sea ice. Whereas this is similar to the findings for the Arctic region as 

a whole which saw incidents spiking in August, the two areas do not share similar 

incident rates in the month of February. Here, February and January are tied as the safest 

months of the year. 

MOST	DANGEROUS	MONTHS

ANA	REGION

30

0

5

10

15

20

25

Frequency

34 
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Examing the type of incident by month, also presents a less clear cut picture as to the 

reason for the higher numbers of incients in August than for the Arctic as a whole. The 

highest number of incidents remain due to Hull/Machinery damage, follwed by 

Wrecked/Stranded and Contact. Even though summer months are often designated as 

“ice free,” we see that there is still a hightened chance of hull and machinery damage 

during this time. 

Type of Incident by Month- ANA	Region

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

Frequency

 

 

	 	 	 	

SAR	 	 	 ASSETS ANA REGION

Hull/Machinery	Damage Contact Wrecked/Stranded Foundered

Collision Fire/Explosion Missing

Search and Rescue ANA Region 

Only 19 incidents in the ANA Region database had sufficient information to examine 

SAR resources. Of those requiring rescue, 4 crew members died, none were listed as 

missing, and 44 required additional medical attention. At least 163 were rescued safely 

(again with the caveat that this number is likely higher due to the entries stating that ‘all 

crew’ were rescued safely). In this region, similar to the Arctic as a whole, the most 

common rescue assets were other vessels of opportunity (n=9), followed closely by 

helicopters and lifeboats (n=5). 

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

Number

35 
 

ANA Region Incidents at a Glance: 

Number of Incidents Extracted: 160 Number Killed: 6 

Average year of build 1985 Number Missing: 13 

Average Gross tonnage:5942 Pollution Noted (# of incidents): 9 (6%) 

Average Deadweight: 6613 

36 
 

 

Live and Table Top Exercises 

To see where state and industry leaders are both placing their priorities and to evaluate 

readiness, and to get an idea of what they believe to be the most likely scenarios in the 

future, we also looked at a number of exercises that have been conducted both live and 

notionally in the region. From our research, there have been three types of operations that 

have been conducted to test readiness by actors in the region; search and rescue, 

environmental response, and military operations. We hoped to study the after-action 

reports of these exercises to understand common themes of gaps in preparedness. 

Unfortunately, of the 25 exercises we identified, we were only able to access 11 after 

action reports from the source of the exercises. The nature of many of the response 

organizations directly reporting to or affiliated with defense departments led many of 

them to be classified documents. 

Although in many cases there were newspaper articles or some other secondhand 

accounts written about the events that were classified, we thought that narrowing our 

analysis to direct accounts of the exercises would give the best sample. Despite this small 

sample, we still believe themes can emerge in terms of readiness, cooperation and the 

way actors are thinking about potential disasters in the region. 

Participants

Of the 11 cooperative exercises we were able to access the reports for, all the Arctic 

Council member states were represented in at least one of the exercises. Our selected 

exercises had different hosting organizations including the Association of Expeditionary 

Cruise Operators, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, or bilateral operations organized by the 

respective countries. 

EXERCISE	PARTICIPANTS

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

Number of Exercises

United Denmark Sweden Finland Norway Russia Canada Iceland Industry

States

*(Not pictured are Italy, Singapore and the World Wildlife Fund who each participated 

in one of our exercise samples) 

37 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Exercises 

Exercise Name 

Exercise Type 

Lead Country/Agency 

Exercise Date Arctic Shield July 2015 

Live SAR Exercise 

USCG 

SarEx Greenland Sea 

Live SAR Exercise 

Denmark JACO 

September 2013 Arctic Zephyr September 2015 

TTX SAR Exercise 

USCG/USDOD 

Arctic Guardian 2017 

Live SAR Exercise 

ACGF/Finnish Border Guard 

September 2017 Northwest Passage August 2016 

TTX SAR Exercise 

USCG 

AECO 2016 

TTX SAR Exercise 

AECO 

April 2016 AECO 2017 April 2017 

TTX SAR Exercise 

AECO 

AECO 2018 

TTX SAR Exercise 

AECO 

June 2018 Kalajoki 2013 March 2013 

Live Environmental Response 

Finland Environmental Institute 

MOSPA 2016 

TTX Environmental Response 

EPPR/United States 

May 2016 MOSPA 2014 May-June 2014 

TTX Environmental Response 

EPPR/Canada 

As is evident from the above table, were able to access a variety of exercises, and extract 

information regarding the type of response and whether it was a live exercise or notional, 

involved a search and rescue and/or environmental response operation. A map of the 

locations of these joint exercises can be found below. 

38 
 

 

	 	

EVENT SCENARIOS

Common Themes 

Across the eleven exercises, we found that the most preparation was being done for a 

cruise ship disaster. 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Number of Scenarios

Passenger Vessel Collision Aircraft Grounding Struck Ice Floe

Of the eight SAR exercises we were able to access, six were focused on a hypothetical 

cruise ship accident. This suggests a consensus as to the need to prepare most for this 

particular kind of incident as it represents the worst-case scenario in the minds of rescue 

operators in the Arctic. 

Gaps in Capabilities 

There were a number of gaps identified in the after-action reports. The most common 

gaps identified involved communication and coordination issues, in the form of 

responsibility overlap and command/control. Each of these will be discussed in more 

detail below. 

AFTER	ACTION	REPORT	GAPS

Responsibility Overlap

Cross-Sector Integration

Media Control

Command/Control

Limited Assets

Technology

Training

Communication

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

39 

10
Responsibility Overlap 

 

 

Cross-Sector Integration 

 

 

Media Control 

 

 

Command/Control

 

 

Limited Assets 

 

 

One common finding from our analysis of available reports was a concern with 

overlapping responsibilities. Overlapping responsibilities occur at high levels which can 

cause confusion and redundancy for training. (High level being defined as the national 

and multi-national level.) Both in tabletop exercises and live exercises, participants often 

expressed a desire to have additional clarity in terms of their areas of responsibility for 

operations. 

Another concern that emerged from these reports was a lack of integration with nongovernment actors, specifically environmental groups and maritime industry. 

Environmental groups were mentioned so that they can share their expertise and concerns 

for events that might occur in the region. The maritime industry was mentioned for some 

of the same reasons, but also in terms of the assets that they may contribute to emergency 

response. A common conclusion was that these assets would improve effectiveness in 

real-life scenarios, and as such should be included in the planning and practice of 

emergency response. The fact that this concern was mentioned, even though over half of 

the exercises examined included some industry or environmental non-government actors, 

is notable. 

A few reports mentioned concerns regarding media communications, fearing that the 

media may compound on-scene panic and disorder. The importance of ensuring that 

correct information is being passed to passengers and media allows for other parts of a 

response operation to go as smoothly as possible. 

Another common concern from these reports was the confusions in command and control 

elements of the exercises, and how it could translate to impacts in real-life events. In 

some cases, especially in higher levels, there was confusion as to who was in charge of a 

particular area or stage of an operation. Role distinctions such as on-scene coordinator 

versus search and rescue mission coordinator appeared to created points of friction for 

operators during the exercise. 

Geographical distinctions created confusion in terms of command and control as well. 

Who took over when operations moved to land or across a particular boundary, for 

example, was mentioned as a problem in some of the exercises. 

Five of the reports made mention of the need to overcome the limitation of assets when 

responding to incidents in the region. Assets could be defined as response vessels, 

helicopters, fixed wing aircraft and on-shore resources like medical care facilities and 

personnel. The reports do not make normative statements in terms of requesting more, 

but more to facilitate an awareness to those doing business or preparing for response, that 

there are fewer resources in the area for emergency response. Especially in the table-top 

exercises that involved industry, the role that private vessels and their associated assets 

would have in responding to emergencies was highlighted. 

40 
Technology 

 

 

Training 

 

Communication 

 

 

Technology gaps unique to the nature of our region were also brought up by a few of the 

reports we reviewed. In particular, the lack of satellite imagery, communication and coldwater specific life rafts were brought up as concerns. Search and rescue agencies noted 

the lack of infrastructure to allow for a clear picture of weather conditions, and the 

inadequacy of life rafts during the exercises. Reports showed clear deficiencies 

concerning the life rafts, and difficulties in the ability to extract survivors from them. 

Another common theme that emerged as gaps in the reports involved training of both 

response agencies and crews onboard vessels in the maritime industry. Recommendations 

noted that responding agencies should either increase the number of the exercises, or 

cross-train with other agencies and countries, to hone their own skills and get 

perspectives of partners. 

For crews on private vessels, gaps were identified in the lack of clarity in the role that 

crews would play in an emergency event. The reports indicated that industry did not 

effectively delegate responsibility to different crewmembers on their vessels, which could 

aid in a timely and organized evacuation in the event of a disaster. 

The most common gap identified in the after-action reports was issues with 

communication. Communication, for our purposes, is widely defined to cover a number 

of issues. For example, reports showed a lack of common systems for communications, 

points of contact that had outdated names and numbers, or something as basic as a 

common language for those operating radios. Live exercises, table-top, search and rescue 

and environmental response all mentioned some deficit in communication in their 

practice situations. 

Many of these gaps seem to overlap, but in many ways appear to reflect the same gaps 

that we identified in our interview responses. One of the key takeaways may be that the 

best way to fill these gaps is to continue to exercise so that they can be identified and 

solved. 

41 
Participants

 

 

 

Interview Data 

We reached out via email to 51 individuals requesting interviews for the current project. 

These individuals were inclusive of a number of Arctic shipping stakeholders, including 

shipping companies, insurance company representatives, environmental groups, military, 

coast guards, and rescue operation centers. A total of 28 people agreed to be interviewed 

for the study, most of which were conducted by phone or Skype. Three interview 

participants preferred to respond to the questions in writing. Our interview subjects 

included individuals from all Arctic states represented in the Arctic and North Atlantic 

region (see table below provides a general overview of the participant pool). Interviews 

took, on average, about an hour and we asked the same questions of each respondent to 

ensure comparability across individuals (see Appendix A for the list of questions). 

Confidentiality was assured to our participants to encourage them to share openly. 

Interview responses were transcribed, and then coded utilizing NVivo software. 

Academics/Think 

Tanks 

Environmental 

Group 

Military/Coast 

Guard/Rescue Centers 

Shipping Insurance 

6 3 7 3 

Government Shipping Cruise Ship Industry Arctic Council 

Company Working Group 

5 2 2 2* 

* Two of our interviewees, although representatives of one of the industries noted above, were 

also members of an Arctic Council working group. 

As is clear from the table above, one of the shortcomings of our study was our inability to 

interview spokespersons from Arctic Indigenous groups, nor any representatives from 

Classification societies. We reached out to multiple members of each group but were 

ultimately limited to who responded to our interview requests. It should be noted 

however, that including perspectives from both of these groups would have provided 

important perspectives regarding industrial development in the region. 

42 
 

 

 

 

In our interview questions, we defined our region of interest as the area between the 

eastern coast of Canada and Norway. All of our interview participants rated their 

familiarity with the Arctic North Atlantic region as very good to intimate. It should be 

noted that although we asked interview participants to constrain their responses to the 

Arctic North Atlantic region, most of them had difficulty responding with regard to just 

this area and expanded their focus and responses to include Russia and the Northern Sea 

Route as well (n=17). We believe the reasons for this may be twofold: It appears that 

many of our respondents felt that the majority of the development was happening in the 

Russian Arctic as opposed to the North Atlantic region. Second, a number of participants 

responded that the issues that would be faced in the lower portions of the North Atlantic 

region would be similar to issues that were present in the Mediterranean or “the rest of 

the world,” given the lack of sea ice. Therefore, although our goal was to define our area 

of interest to only the Arctic North Atlantic, many times our respondents included a more 

expanded view in their responses. 

Is Arctic Shipping Increasing?

Whereas nearly everyone interviewed felt that shipping in the Arctic was increasing, 

there was some disagreement as to the extent. There was wide consensus that this 

expansion was happening only with regard to destinational traffic, and even then, isolated 

only to certain types of ships (most of which did not involve bulk container shipping). 

There was also general consensus that the increases did not match levels that were 

originally predicted. “The way it's reported, as massive, massive increases in traffic in 

the northern sea route, the traffic increases by 25%. Well, 25% of 12 ships is how many 

ships?” 

Our interviewees were likely to cite misconceptions surrounding the use of the term “icefree,” and consensus emerged regarding the extent to which the Arctic is, and will remain 

for the foreseeable future, a hostile environment for shipping. Many of our participants 

noted that despite the receding ice, rapid changes in weather and ice conditions continue 

to make the Arctic too dangerous and unreliable for large scale, transit cargo shipping 

(n=5). “I think the hyperbole around climate change is giving people the wrong 

impression about how easy it's going to be to operate in those environments.” 

Both shipping company representatives were in agreement with this assessment, with one 

stating, “Transit shipping is not going to happen in the Northern Sea Route anytime soon, 

and the Northwest passage will always be useless for commercial shipping transits. 

Economically, it doesn’t make sense to transit through Arctic when you consider the cost 

per unit cargo, it’s simply too expensive compared to the alternatives.” 

These costs could further increase with regulations under consideration, namely a ban on 

the use of heavy fuel oil (HFO) in the Arctic. “An HFO ban would require engine 

modifications to fuel pump and filter, and light oil is 2-3 times [more expensive], so it 

would be a big expense, which then makes shipping in the Arctic even less economically 

feasible.” It would appear then our respondents were not in agreement with the 

predictions that receding ice will result in drastically higher numbers of commercial ships 

transiting through the region. One academic summed up the general consensus, “I think 

[shipping is] going to increase, but the level I think is anybody’s guess in the next 15 

43 
 

 

years, with respect to the price of oil and how much it costs to move ships around in 

southern waters, which are so much easier than Arctic waters.” 

Despite the fact that our respondents discounted widespread increases in commercial 

cargo ship traffic in the Arctic, there was consensus as to more specific concerns 

surrounding untrained crew, and the increase in particular types of ships. Inexperienced 

crew operating in the region was mentioned by a large number of our interviewees (n=7). 

A common response was that if there were to be an increase in numbers of those 

currently and historically operating in the area (e.g., resupply ships), it would be of less 

concern than an increase in ships from new, less established industries or crew. Four 

respondents explicitly mentioned serious concerns about ice inexperienced crew sailing 

in polar waters. 

“You will not find a requirement for actually having been trained in Arctic regions. For 

me that's not, you cannot imagine cold if you haven't experienced it, and you cannot 

imagine how remote the area is if you've only, been sailing in the Indonesian waters.” 

“You [can] get a certificate and then you can be a captain on a tanker or a passenger 

ship, be a chief officer, you can take that ship anywhere in polar regions under the polar 

code, but you've never seen a stick of ice in your life and you've never had to maneuver 

around it...and they have no experience in ice.” 

Therefore, on the whole, there seems to be the consensus that the answer to whether 

shipping is increasing in the Arctic and North Atlantic region is yes, but not to the extent 

that had been predicted, and depending on industry, is not necessarily a large cause for 

concern. Predictions that receding ice would open up the area to massive increases in 

containerized or cargo shipping has not been borne out by the data and, at least according 

to our interviewees, is unlikely to change anytime in the near future. Increases in 

established areas of shipping were considered to be less of a problem by our respondents, 

compared to the growth in the number of inexperienced individuals operating in the area 

stemming from increases to certain types of industry. 

Changes in Industry

We asked respondents about the changes that they’ve seen in the ANA region since the 

publication of the 2009 AMSA report. A large number of our interviewees were 

surprisingly unfamiliar with the report (see Figure below). 

44 
 

	 	

	 	

FAMILIARITY WITH AMSA

7

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Number of Responses

Very Familiar Somewhat	Familiar Somewhat	Unfamiliar Not Familiar

Even among those familiar with AMSA, a few were hesitant to attribute changes they’ve 

seen in the region directly to the report. For this reason, and because of the low level of 

familiarity in our sample, we asked any who expressed discomfort to simply respond 

about changes they’ve seen in the industry since the time of the report’s publication 

(2009). 

CHANGES	SINCE	AMSA/2009

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

Number of Responses

Increased Increased Increased Increased Increased Changesi in Increased

interest in interest in Regulations Tourism Media Oil and Gas Cooperation

Arctic Development Coverage Industry with Industry

shipping by Russia

Among those familiar with the report, the general consensus was that the AMSA raised 

awareness of the potential for increased Arctic shipping. A number of respondents also 

felt that the AMSA paved the way to greater regulatory oversight (including the eventual 

adoption of the Polar Code), brought increased awareness to the need to protect the 

Arctic environment, and enhanced Arctic marine safety. 

45 
Mining

 

grade

Almost half our interviewees (n=15) mentioned the ongoing mineral extraction in 

Canada, Norway and Greenland as both sources of current shipping, and projected into 

the next 15-20 years. Citing the rich mineral resources that have been found in the Arctic 

region, our respondents felt that this would be a continued and reliable source of Arctic 

shipping, especially as more minerals are discovered. open energy activity northern china

Developing Industries

We then asked our interviewees to describe the current industrial development in the 

region, along with projecting which industries would be present in the next 15-20 years. 

Responses showed a great deal of consistency and tended to fall into 4 main industrial 

areas: 

• Oil and gas, including offshore development 

• Mining 

• Fishing, 

• Cruise/tourism 

Again, it should be noted that commercial containerized shipping was not present in these 

projections, in fact, only 2 respondents noted that it was likely to increase in the next 15-

20 years. The figure below presents the most commonly mentioned keywords included 

in interviewee’s responses. 

connected norwegian

drilling numbers climate european baffin

transport global

states big greenland changes

natural iceland

icebergsatlantic

companies

coast

cruise

traffic

world

projects potential

cargo infrastructure economy

invest

rules

becoming

system

tourist

prices

svalbard norway iron production fishing tourismcanadian

guard

passage shipping

gas

lngpolar around

build

ice

oil

fuel ocean maritime

minerals

technology interest offshore

resources

government exploration island fishery access mining

ore

decades code

rescue

russian

ports

canadacovered

money

life growing search

sectors international biggest

46 
Energy Production

 

 

 

Cruise Tourism 

 

 

Fishing

Interviewees were also likely to mention oil and gas development in Norway and Russia 

as sources of current and future shipping. Although Canada and Greenland have recently 

prohibited new oil and gas exploration, our interviewees felt that if the price of oil were 

to increase to over $100USD per barrel, both oil and gas exploration and increased 

attention to the viability of shipping through the arctic regions would increase. 

According to one industry representative “.. oil and gas exploration ... also will be in the 

future, there will be a need for energy in the world and as long as there are no 

alternatives, this will be following the other developments in the Arctic.” 

The price of oil would also influence the extent to which North Atlantic offshore 

development would continue into the future, with the exception of Russian LNG exports. 

There was near unanimity in the belief that Russia would continue to expand its LNG 

production in the future, and since a main route for this LNG is through Norwegian 

waters, it can be expected that this type of traffic will expand in the future as well. 

However, oil and gas are not the only sources of energy production being considered in 

the area. 5 people mentioned the possibility of coastal alternative energy development 

stemming from water and ocean energy production. Others forecasted technological 

advances in fuel might increase levels of shipping in the Arctic, and may even bring 

about greater commercial shipping in the future. “So I would say that [shipping] will 

evolve through technology, maybe LNG powered ships in the future.” 

Of all of the industry development discussed by our interviewees, the one that received 

the most attention was the present and future increase in cruise vessel tourism all over the 

Arctic North Atlantic region. Respondents expected not only a greater number of ships, 

but also an increase in the size of ships that would be coming. Three respondents noted 

that there is already a number of new ships in production, which are specifically being 

built for Arctic cruise expeditions. There was also some consensus (n=5) projecting that 

the expedition cruise ships would continue to seek out more and more remote areas. 

Once again, however, the projection in expansion was qualified by global economic 

considerations by our participants, who pointed to the high price of these types of cruises 

(n=3). Four respondents expressed additional concerns regarding the impact of cruise 

tourism on local populations. One participant in particular brought up the recent 

weekend moratorium placed on tourist visits67 by the Faroe Islands, as an example of 

what could happen if the increase in cruise traffic results in overtourism. She also noted 

that “when there's 27 vessels coming in, probably not all biggest, but even if you take just 

a thousand people more and everybody's really interested in learning about the local 

people without really having time to do it in a proper way, they are really intruders more 

or less.” (LH) 

Because fish are moving farther north as sea temperatures rise, a large number of our 

interviewees also mentioned the fishing industry as one of the major areas of both recent 

and future industrial development. This development, including both fishing but also the 

transshipment of fish to other areas, is expected to increase in the entire ANA Region. 

47 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Because of this increase, it was not uncommon for some respondents to mention the fact 

that fishing vessels are outside of the polar code regulations (n=3). “You know fishing 

vessels as a general rule often aren’t subject to the same safety standards as other vessels 

are, there’s always a bit of concern there, and they tend to they follow the fish, and that 

often leads them to stray. There’s more risk of a fishing vessel I think getting caught in 

trouble than a larger tanker.” Another noted, “the fishing industry has to find more 

remote locations if they want to find fish.” 

Of those who mentioned it, our interview participants had generally positive things to say 

about the fishing moratorium in the high arctic, noting the importance of understanding 

how climate change will influence fish stock before allowing fishing in the High North. 

There were some concerns noted however as to what will happen when that moratorium 

expires, especially with regard to non-Arctic states like China, Japan and Korea, who 

may seek to expand their fishing activities in to the area. “The fisheries in the North 

Atlantic are well controlled and managed, I think. But how much pressure will be 

brought to bear by European fishing companies, and others from China?” 

A few of our respondents (n=2) also noted that this migration of fish might be a source of 

conflict in the area in the future. “The closest that NATO allies came to war with each 

other was over fishing.” A few individuals also expressed concerns over the lack of 

infrastructure and ability to police illegal fishing, but also included concerns about how 

ownership of fish stock may pose problems in the future. 

“[Right now] the Norwegians and the Russians cooperate really well on fish. Well, the 

crabs are starting to move east into Russian waters. And the Norwegians are claiming 

they’re still our crabs, and there’s a lot of tension over who gets the crabs.” 

“There will be an issue as to some states encroaching on our fishing waters, and the US 

is currently incapable of patrolling that area. Right now we have an inability to exercise 

sovereignty over our waters.” 

In sum, the general consensus seems to be that there will continue to be increases in 

Arctic shipping, but they will be constrained to four general areas. Two of these areas 

seemed to present more of a concern than the others in our interview sample, cruise 

vessels and fishing, perhaps due to the fears that these industries would continue to seek 

out more and more remote locations. Concerns were also raised as to the potential 

increase of inexperienced operators in the area that may accompany expansion of these 

industries. As one government participant noted, “but you know, these ships kind of fall 

below the regulatory threshold in many cases, and many more want to go off the path 

and, do stuff that's less regimented and I guess a lot of the smaller ships whether it be 

pleasure craft operators, adventurers, even fishing vessels to some extent just don’t have 

the history of the experience operating in the Arctic, compared to a lot of the fleet, the 

cargo ships, tankers etc. that have been operating in region for decades on end.” 

48 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

When Is the Increase Significant?

We then asked our interview participants when the increase in shipping would be 

significant or would signal a real change in levels of Arctic shipping. In this question, we 

saw quite a bit of variability in the manner in which people responded, as captured in the 

Table below. The majority of respondents felt that numerical estimates were less useful 

than focusing more on types of events or ship characteristics that would signal a 

significant increase. 

Q: What would be a significant Examples # 

increase?... 

Provided numerical estimates à

à

à

20-30% over 3-5 years 

30-50 through NSR, 15-20 NWP 

Couple thousand more 

3 

“Not the number but the type” à

à

à

Large influx of inexperienced crew 

Offshore oil leases resume (2) 

Big cruise ships in the area 

4 

“When it exceeds local tolerance” à Overtourism 4 

à Only a couple more from what is already impacting small 

communities 

à When it impacts economic development of local 

communities 

Provided time estimate à

à

à

Now 

Sooner rather than later 

In a 30 year horizon 

3 

Provided an event à When fish move north and industry follows 7 

à When industry finds it profitable to operate there 

à When ice melts 

à When there’s a significant increase in ice classed vessels 

(2) 

à When regular levels of cargo shipping 

à When there’s regular transits through NWP 

“When it exceeds SAR Capacity” 6 

“Not the number but the size” 3 

“When ships start going into remote 

areas” 

2 

“I don’t think the changes are 

significant” 

3 

49 
 

 

 

Critical Gaps and Failures in Governance Structure

There was also a fair amount of variability in responses to our question regarding critical 

gaps, or major points of failure in the governance structure in the Arctic. The most 

common responses referenced a greater need for search and rescue assets (e.g., 

helicopters, infrastructure, individuals with sufficient SAR training, etc.), a need for 

stricter requirements regarding environmental protection (e.g., pollution, heavy fuel oil, 

grey water, research on oil in icy areas), and/or a need for stricter regulations as far as 

crew training for those operating in the area. 

However, six interviewees believed that there were no gaps or major points of failure in 

the current governance structure, with an additional 3 respondents expressing the belief 

that “Regulations aren’t the best way to bring about changes in this area,” or 

“Regulations aren’t the only way.” Therefore, 9 out of our 28 interview participants were 

satisfied with the current regulatory status quo. One participant representing the shipping 

industry stated, “There hasn't been, knock wood [sic], a serious accident in the Canadian 

or American Arctic that I can recall in 20 years? And that's a testament to the fact that 

there are no critical gaps or major points of failure in the current governance structure.” 

Six respondents cited the two recent agreements coming from the Arctic Council, SAR 

and MOSPA, as evidence that the current governance structures were operating 

successfully. 

On the other hand, those in favor of strengthening either the regulations, or the regulatory 

agencies (e.g., IMO, Arctic Council) were most likely to recommend either greater 

enforcement authority, or stronger regulations. Three of our respondents felt that the 

current regulations in the form of the Polar Code were too “watered down,” or were not 

expansive enough in their coverage (e.g., polar code needs to be applied to smaller 

vessels and fishing boats, training requirements need to be stricter, or all aspects need to 

be mandatory). Three interview participants were also concerned about the lack of 

funding for the Arctic Council, with one stating that it created a regulatory body with “no 

teeth.” Some expressed similar concerns with the IMO stating that it was slow, limited 

or not focused enough on unique features of individual states. 

50 
 

	 	

	 	 	

	 	 	

	 	 	

	 	

	 	 	 	 	

	 	 	

	 	 	

	 	 	 	 	

	 	 	

	 	 	 	

CRITICAL	GAPS	OR	FAILURE	IN	

GOVERNANCE	STRUCTURE

US failure to ratify UNCLOS

Regulations are Response Driven

Smaller Vessels and Fishing Vessels Not...

Requirements Not Strong Enough

Information Availability, Sharing,	Dispersed

5	day Survivability Requirement Impossible

Failure to Have Presence

Lack of communication with industry, locals,...

Arctic Council Weak/Lacks funding

Cooperation among Arctic States

Charting/Hydrography

Meterology

Enforcement of Polar Code

No failures or gaps

Preparedness

Training

Pollution

Insufficient SAR Assets

0 2 4 6 8 10

Which Incidents are Most Likely to Occur in the ANA Region?

Because the main goal of our study was to forecast the likely ship traffic and incidents 

which are likely to occur in the ANA region in the coming years, we asked interviewees 

to rank the likelihood of three events we presented to them, including seaborne disasters 

(e.g., collisions or groundings), catastrophic incidents (e.g., including cruise ship accident 

or oil spill), and soft security threats (e.g., human trafficking, piracy, transport of illegal 

goods, or failure to adhere to polar code). There was a lot of variability in responses to 

this question as well, indicating a lack of consensus among our experts as to which 

incidents would be most likely. Examining the nature of their responses, it was also 

evident that our interview participants had difficulty separating out the issue of likelihood 

from consequence. Understanding that risk = probability x consequence, many preferred 

51 

12
 

 

 

 

	 	 	

to focus more on the consequence portion of the equation, rather than the most likely 

event from a probabilistic viewpoint. In fact, a few of our respondents told us explicitly 

that looking at risk of an event was less useful than looking at the risks stemming from a 

particular event. 

There was near universal agreement that a cruise ship disaster would be the biggest threat 

to the area, thereby posing the greatest risk. There were also very high levels of 

consensus that the soft security threats were the least likely (71%). “No self-respecting 

pirate is going to operate in the Arctic, and [regarding] the transport of illegal goods, if 

you land illegal goods up in the Arctic, what the hell are you going to do with them?” 

As far as rankings were concerned, most individuals rated cruise ship incidents first 

(53%), followed by a smaller number of individuals who rated ship collisions as most 

likely (47%). Oil spills (41%), groundings (34%), and risks stemming from smaller ships 

operating in the arctic (12%) were less likely to be rated as the most likely incident to 

occur. However, levels of agreement were much higher when examining the top two 

most likely incidents, with 82% ranking a cruise ship disaster as either first or second, 

71% ranking an oil spill as either first or second, and 65% ranking a ship collision as 

either first or second most likely. 

MOST	LIKELY	INCIDENTS	

Ranked First Ranked First or Second

90%

Cruise ship Collisions Oil Spills Groundings Danger from Piracy

accidents Small ships

The Polar Code 

Another theme we tried to gather from our interviews were stakeholder’s perceptions of 

the effectiveness of the polar code and where they could identify room for improvement. 

From the sample of interviewees we gathered, all but one had enough familiarity with the 

Polar Code to comment on its strengths and weaknesses. The group agreed that there was 

indeed a need for the Polar Code because of the unique nature of maritime activities in 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Rating Percentage

52 
 

 

Common Goals 

 

polar waters but disagreed on where it needed to be improved or if it needed adjustments 

at all. 

One theme that emerged was concerns about enforcement. Ten of the 20 respondents 

mentioned a gap in the enforcement of the polar code in its current form. In many cases, 

they brought up that even mandatory provisions of the polar code relied largely on 

operator claims of compliance. For example, the provision on requirements for five-day 

survival equipment was brought up by a high-level Coast Guard responder in Iceland, 

telling us that “ it is not possible to fulfill it. Research has shown that the personal life 

raft cannot... they will just survive for one or two days.” This may indicate a disconnect 

between those who are making such regulations and those who are being expected to 

comply with them. 

Other recommendations for improvement included some that believed that the Polar 

Code did not do enough in terms of environmental regulation – particularly in the form of 

a heavy fuel oil ban and waste water dumping. Some respondents believed that the 

boundaries of the polar code themselves seemed to be incorrect. Noting that “It’s political 

of course and financial because it excludes areas of traffic [like Iceland.” The issue of 

boundaries was also brought up in the uniformity of regulations in the Polar Code’s 

coverage. “It was a little bit strange to put the same requirement in the whole area.” 

Greenland, for example, has the same mandates under the provisions of the Polar Code at 

its northern and southernmost points. On the other hand, the tendency of the 

requirements to treat the area uniquely or to have different requirements between states 

was brought up by two of our respondents, for the fear of business skirting those with 

more regulations to areas without. 

Another common response we had to the question of improving the Polar Code from a 

few of our respondents was that the Polar Code is so new and that both industry and the 

international community required some time to see how well it works in its current state 

before any changes should be made. “we need some time to both be sure that we 

understand the provisions and see that it is applied the same way all over [the region].” 

International Cooperation

We also surveyed respondents’ perceptions of international cooperation in the region to 

get a sense of how well different states and their corresponding agencies and departments 

worked with each other. Every respondent described cooperation in the region as good. 

However, there were several caveats they discussed with similar themes emerging from 

their criticisms. 

Seven respondents made sure to note that current levels of cooperation should not be 

taken for granted, or noted the need to be wary of what one respondent called “arctic 

exceptionalism” in the future. Cooperation, to these respondents, was happening in areas 

where state interests lined up in such a way that cooperation was the best way to achieve 

these interests. Citing as examples the Arctic Council’s SAR and MOSPA agreements, 

one respondent noted that “the issues that are cooperative are of course in everyone's 

interest to cooperate.” There were, however, concerns raised by some of our respondents 

regarding international cooperation, mostly centering around Russia and China. 

53 
Uncommon Goals 

 

 

 

 

There were a few respondents who believed that Russia would disrupt the current state of 

cooperation in the region. One respondent noted that “Russia might not be as involved as 

we'd hope [in cooperative fora]” and another stated that “I challenge you to find anything 

after 2014 where any of the countries were willing to surrender interest to the other side” 

– referring to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent backlash form the 

international community perhaps causing a disturbance in the standard of cooperation in 

the region. 

This view was not shared by all of our respondents. Others believed that geopolitical 

concerns may not have as big of an impact on the day to day operations in the Arctic. 

One person familiar with Coast Guard operations in areas patrolled by Canada, the 

United States and Russia told us that “[First responders] are cooperating on search and 

rescue. You know, it doesn't matter what happens up there when somebody's life is in 

danger, whether you're a Russian coast guard, American Coast Guard, Canadian coast 

guard, you pull the stops and you go. I know that's happening today.” 

Are Any Additional Agreements Needed?

After getting a sense of the cooperation in the region, we asked our respondents if there 

were any other agreements that should be considered by international community. Of the 

15 that answered the question, 11 told us that there currently appeared to be a good 

framework for international cooperation, but expressed a need to ensure that the ones that 

already existed were being implemented. One Canadian academic asked rhetorically, “[I 

don’t think] that somehow a new international agreement will magically solve all these 

problems. I think to a large degree, the issue is, ‘okay, how do we implement, how do we 

actually cooperate under these terms?’”– an opinion that was echoed by others both in 

Coast Guards and maritime industries. 

Of those who believed we needed more international agreements, two believed that there 

should be more environmental preservation agreements in the banning of Heavy Fuel 

Oils or waste water dumping. One suggested a ban on certain weapons in the Arctic could 

be fruitful, while another brought up security interests that should be discussed more in 

the Arctic. Therefore, the sense from the interviews is that in terms of agreements, there 

are enough, but they need to be implemented. 

Gaps in Readiness and Capabilities

After discussing some of the venues in which countries interact in terms of policy 

creation and other higher-level interactions, we asked our interviewees about some of the 

actual operational capabilities of search and rescue and environmental response. We 

received a wide range of responses on this subject in terms of perceptions of preparedness 

from “very good” to an unequivocal “poor”. This spectrum of responses might be 

attributed to a particular region within the Arctic North Atlantic. This continues to 

illustrate its lack of uniformity across countries and their respective obligations for search 

and rescue and environmental response – especially as we increase latitude. Part of this 

discussion about the gaps in readiness came also from the physical resources that are 

54 
 

 

Infrastructure 

Remoteness 

 

 

READINESS	THEMES Most respondents noted 

14 issues with assets or 

12

infrastructure, followed by 

concerns surrounding 

onses 10 Resp

8

umber of

6

4

N

2

0

remote areas 

available to actually perform the operations by operators. Below is a visual of how 

respondents characterized readiness. 

Of the 14 respondents who answered our question about readiness to respond to a search 

and rescue or environmental disaster, 12 mentioned some lack of infrastructure in the 

region. Our respondents described infrastructure as things from terrestrial resources like 

airports, communication bandwidth, and roads to sea and air-based assets like ports, 

ships, both ice-capable and otherwise, helicopters and equipment for responding 

operators. 

Our respondents also noted how a lack of infrastructure could affect sparsely-populated 

areas and their communities. When considering how to respond to a disaster, either 

lifesaving or environmental response, one respondent noted the importance of having 

sufficient resources, “even if it's temporary and we know that we can go and set up [in] a 

small community in a really harsh environment and survive, and not impact the local 

community and use all their resources.” Our respondents noted that even basic survival 

needs like food and water, shelter and restroom facilities would be in short supply for 

both the disaster responders and those who would need to be brought ashore in the case 

of a mass casualty event. When considering cruise ships that have as many as 3000 

passengers arriving in villages with sufficient resources to sustain the lives of 1500, it’s 

easy to imagine a situation that quickly becomes unmanageable, even with the best 

coordination and planning. 

Another common response we received in response to our question about readiness in the 

region had to do with the vast distances and harsh conditions that are covered by the 

relatively small numbers of assets in the area. One respondent, who works for a maritime 

insurance agency in Greenland stated that “Joint Arctic Command has one helicopter 

they can send out in case of such a rescue operation in Greenland, the area covers what 

is the size of India.” Concerns about sufficiency of resources in remote areas were 

Good Infrastructure Remoteness Poor

55 
“Good” 

 

echoed by a Canadian respondent who warned that “the farther north you go, the less you 

have infrastructure, the more problematic it becomes.” The sense from these interviews 

is that there is good cooperation and coordination from rescue services, but in the event 

of a large-scale incident, no one denies that the community is ill-prepared. 

When questioned about whether or not increases should be made in terms of investments 

towards infrastructure in the region, we received a lot of reasons why this may not be 

feasible. Many told us that it came down to a basic risk assessment. 

A Canadian industry respondent told us that “you just have to step back and look at the 

bigger picture that being you know, like a percentage of overall Canadian vessel traffic 

that is happening in the Arctic, 99% of it is South so it doesn’t make much sense from 

financial point of view, if I can be so blunt, to allocate a dedicated search and rescue 

station.” Two Danish search and rescue operators also echoed this sentiment, pointing 

out that “the question is, well you can do something about it, but it has a cost” and that 

“[if] a huge cruise ship capsizes it is not sufficient, but it wouldn't be sufficient anywhere 

in the world.” It would seem according to these emergency response operators, that 

preparedness is adequate for the relative risk in the region. 

Others believed we should “take [preparedness] seriously, but we need to get past the 

hyperbole [of the worst-case scenario].” On the other hand, there were also those felt that 

we’re already behind in needed investments. “The problem is that you don't just snap 

your fingers. we need to be thinking about the fact that development is just going to 

happen. you don't just snap your fingers and get arctic assets. One thing that I guess I 

was fearful of is that by the time we realize woah, we're out of step here it's going to be 

further behind that we are now.” 

Prevention of Arctic Incidents 

Turning from reaction to prevention, we then asked our respondents their opinion on the 

best way to prevent accidents from occurring in the first place. We received several 

answers, ranging from improved weather and ice modeling for the region, to the role of 

insurance agencies, but most respondents indicated that the best way to prevent a disaster 

is to train for one. 

56 
Training and Exercising

 

Insurance 

 

	 	

	 	

PREVENTION	THEMES

Training

Special Restrictions

Self-Sufficiency

Polar Code Enforcement

Insurance

Planning

0 2 4 6 8 10

Number of Responses

Training and exercises, as mentioned here referred to cooperative exercises between 

states. Some of our respondents were familiar with the joint exercises that have been 

done in the past and recognized their value as a tool to identify gaps in cooperative 

response capabilities (n=10). 

However, one respondent noted a need to expand beyond regional cooperation because 

“we should [conduct] exercises with the nations that we never have to cooperate with.” 

This sentiment was shared by another search and rescue operator who told us “I think 

they’re still small scale at least from what I’ve been able to see on the US side, because 

we just don’t have a lot of the capabilities to do a lot of the things we say we want to do 

in the Arctic.” Thus, while respondents recognized the value of practical exercises, they 

also warned of some of the political motives associated with them. 

We specifically asked our respondents about their perceptions of the role that the 

insurance industry should play in preventing disasters. 19 respondents said that insurance 

should play some role in prevention, most without providing specific suggestions for how 

that might occur. A few of our respondents did give us some specific insight into the role 

the industry has played in the past and gave us an idea how it might fit into prevention in 

the future. They also specified where they are unlikely to intervene. 

For example, our respondents noted that the insurance industry was proactive with regard 

to compliance with polar certificates. Another respondent who works in the maritime 

insurance industry specified her view of the insurance industry’s role in making policy in 

the future. “we are a business partner and we are making a business together with the 

shipowner.... if they follow the rules that the international bodies have laid out, it's very 

difficult to ask for something more.” Noting there that insurance companies will not take 

57 

12
Importance of Planning

 

 

Self-Sufficiency

 

Special Restrictions

 

 

 

New Arctic Operators

the lead in creating policy, but would follow what national or international bodies 

require. 

Another common response we received in terms of preventing incidents in the Arctic 

North Atlantic region was better planning through the improving of weather and ice 

forecasts as well as nautical charting. Weather forecasts appeared in six respondents’ 

recommendations for preventing disasters in the more northern areas of the Arctic North 

Atlantic. Understanding that weather in this region can shift rapidly was a concern for 

many of those who study the region and those charged with responding to a disaster. 

A common misconception that many of our respondents mentioned had to do with the 

notion of an “ice free arctic”. One Canadian Coast Guard official expressed his 

frustration about reports of “ice free summers” and how they can mislead those who 

would expect different conditions than actually exist, because they do not account for 

floating icebergs which can cause catastrophic damage to mariners. Six respondents 

claimed that tracking these ice floes are important in preventing incidents in the region. A 

respondent familiar with ice mapping explained that while this is being done in other 

regions of the world, it has yet to be expanded to the regions we studied. 

Similarly, nautical charting was also brought up by six of our respondents as a deficiency 

that leads to incidents. One participant also noted the lack of consistency across 

individual states’ agencies charting as a cause for concern. 

Five respondents highlighted the importance of private vessels to have the means to 

sustain themselves for long periods of time in the event of an incident, “being able to get 

to safe harbor and having some ability to tie into whatever infrastructure is there [is 

important].” Our participants mentioned a number of forms which self-SAR could 

occur, including detailed voyage planning, convoy travel and other means of rescue 

outside of coast guards. 

Two respondents mentioned the possibility of applying special restrictions as a means of 

prevention. Examples included designating areas where ships should not be able to go, or 

regulations specifying that ships carrying a type of environmental hazard must stay away 

from an ecologically sensitive areas. 

Are there Any Additional Threats?

We also asked our respondents if there were any additional threats that we had not 

discussed throughout the course of our conversations, or that were not being discussed by 

Arctic stakeholders. There were two recommendations that came up consistently, the 

introduction of new operators in the region and hard security threats. 

Five respondents described concerns about new operators that will come into the Arctic 

North Atlantic region as opportunities arise to explore new economic enterprises. Their 

concerns included both issues with governance, but also concerns at the operational level. 

58 
Hard Security Threats

An American academic warned of “this whole issue of domain awareness” and an 

Icelandic Coast Guard operator told us that “I think our main goal now is to educate 

people and inform,” especially those who have crews and companies based out of nonArctic states. These new Arctic operators tended to fit into people’s perception of how 

industry will increase, and the risk associated with crews primarily used to operating in 

warmer climates, as among their biggest fears. 

While Arctic Security was not the focus of our research, five respondents brought up the 

threat of a military event in the region. The fact that it was brought up not only by our 

military interview subjects, but by experts in several fields, made it compelling enough to 

include in our discussion. 

These respondents mentioned possible terrorist incidents, cyber security breaches, or a 

military confrontation originating in the Arctic. While few respondents elaborated on a 

scenario, one was able to articulate what many had alluded to, “... [an increased] 

military presence and communication [failure could] escalate a very minor incident.” 

These hard security threats, to these respondents, are among the issues that should be 

taken seriously in the region. 

59 
 

 

 

 

 

Forecasting the Future 

The purpose of the current study was to prepare a foresight analysis for shipping activity 

in the Arctic and North Atlantic. Although not expressly intended to do so, our report 

also serves as an update on conditions noted in the 2009 AMSA report. Regrettably, we 

cannot conclude that there have been drastic improvements on the state of affairs since 

the time of the AMSA report, although progress has been made in some key areas. Even 

now, some ten years after the publication of the report, were we to make a list of 

concerns for the region, it would look very similar to the concerns noted in 2009. The 

good news, however, is that shipping and activity levels have not adhered to what was 

predicted; and up until now, major catastrophes have been avoided. In what could 

properly be termed the ambivalence of the Arctic, the fact that there have been so few 

major incidents can be seen as both a blessing and a curse, insomuch as many have noted 

that change in the Arctic is often reactive rather than proactive. Instead there is the dual 

sentiment that it is “just a matter of time” before something happens, and it is only then 

that major regulatory changes will occur. 

Arctic Shipping is all about the Economics

The slow rate of change in the Arctic at present is being driven primarily by economic 

constraints that make increased trans-Arctic shipping more of a dream than a reality. As 

one of our interviewees from the shipping industry stated, “the economics simply aren’t 

there.” According to both qualitative and quantitative data examined in this study, the 

economics will likely remain unfavorable to large scale containerized shipping even into 

the near future, given the low price of oil, and unpredictability due to ice and weather 

inherent in shipping in the Arctic. Barring significant changes in the current geopolitical 

environment, or drastic increases in the price of oil, shipping in the Arctic is likely to 

remain largely restricted to destinational traffic which is predominant in the region. We 

take this to be a positive development, given limitations in the number of assets and 

infrastructure noted by so many of our interviewees. 

We Might Need to Expand Our Focus

The failure of the shipping boon to materialize at present may also be an advantage given 

insurers’ disinclination to step into a regulatory enforcement role in the Arctic. While 

insurers see themselves as part of the solution for ensuring safety in Arctic shipping68, 

they remain unwilling to increasing the cost of doing business for risk prone ships. Our 

insurers, similar to those surveyed in prior research, reiterated their unwillingness to 

serve in a regulatory or enforcement capacity, stating that it runs counter to their business 

model of partnering with shipping companies. When pressed about what would happen if 

a catastrophic incident occurred, insurers noted that what would change were the 

regulations, not the role that insurers play, preferring a more reactive, rather than 

proactive, stance. 

One of the most striking things that we came across in our research is the lack of 

concordance between what the data shows regarding the most likely incidents in the 

Arctic, and those that were mentioned by the interview participants. On the whole, the 

issues that concerned our interview respondents were simply not issues that were the 

60 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

most likely to occur from a historical perspective. This suggests a need to separate out 

the ‘day-to-day’ operations in the Arctic from the ‘worst-case scenario’ that may occur. 

Thankfully, the worst-case scenarios remain among the least likely, but with an increase 

in both the number and size of intra-Arctic ships, there has been a corresponding increase 

in incidents. Whereas some have said that the risk of an accident happening in the Arctic 

is the lowest it has ever been in terms of ship losses,69 our analyses were able to show 

that the number of smaller scale incidents is steadily increasing. Although the data 

accessible for the present study precluded the ability to determine the exact size of the 

correlation between the increase in traffic and the numbers of shipping incidents, it is not 

hard to imagine that these two are likely related. 

And yet, not all increases that are occurring in the area present equal cause for concern. 

For example, our interview participants seemed less concerned about the expansion of 

veteran, more established industrial operations. It was when increases exceeded the 

expertise threshold, when expansion was accompanied by more unprepared or 

inexperienced individuals operating in the region, that our interview participants felt that 

increased shipping posed a problem. 

Many indicators, however suggest that an increase in novice operators may be on the 

horizon, stemming from industries that have the current economic motivation and ability 

to expand. Both cruise tourism and fishing are predicted to show expansive growth in the 

coming years, and both serve as industries most likely to bring inexperienced operators to 

the region. Combined with the fact that a large-scale cruise ship accident is everyone’s 

worst-case scenario, and it is easy to see why the time for concern may be sooner rather 

than later. Especially because, according to our respondents, we simply do not have 

sufficient assets and infrastructure to deal with a large number of passengers in an 

emergency situation in the Arctic. 

Coincidentally, while this project was in press, a cruise ship incident occurred involving 

the Viking Sky off the coast of Norway. Boasting of being the first U.S. cruise ship to 

offer a full-length itinerary in the Arctic Circle during the winter season70, this cruise ship 

carrying almost 1400 passengers and crew nearly ran aground in rough weather. The 

incident resulted in the rescue of around 470 passengers over the course of 20 hours, 

utilizing two rescue helicopters able to carry only 20 people at a time. Twenty of those 

rescued required hospitalization.71 If the ship had been in a more remote location, this 

could have easily been that worst-case scenario on everyone’s minds. In fact, one of our 

interviewees followed up with us after the event stating, “Imagine[the] same off the coast 

of Northern Canada or Greenland – and you have your catastrophic incident....” 

The story of the Viking Sky is not unique compared to historical accounts of rescues in 

Arctic shipping. Despite the high visibility of the dangers of the incident, the Viking Sky 

also speaks to the importance of a well-trained crew with self-sustainable rescue 

capabilities. What this and many other incidents share is a story of rescue operations that 

could have been so much worse, given the current state of SAR readiness and capacity. 

While nearly all accounts concur that resources are suboptimal at present levels, there 

have been relatively few human casualties stemming from marine incidents in the Arctic. 

The number of human casualties from cruise ship incidents is even lower, according to 

61 
Joint Exercise Gaps

 

 

the sample of data we have (around 0.2%). But with planned increases in cruise ship 

activity, and an additional 30 ships on order for the purposes of expedition style cruising, 

the likelihood of an incident occurring far from rescue resources will also increase. 

The other industry experiencing rapid growth in the region, presenting a heightened 

potential for accidents, is fishing. Fishing vessels are twice as likely to be involved in a 

marine incident than cargo ships, and are almost three times as likely to have repeated 

casualties. These statistics are concerning for a number of reasons, including their 

overrepresentation in the Arctic shipping fleet, but also in light of their own economic 

incentives to follow fish stocks to more remote areas. The fact that fishing vessels are not 

currently subject to the regulations of the Polar Code was mentioned as a concern by a 

number of our experts. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative data in our study 

suggests that it may be time to revisit extending the requirements of the Polar Code to 

fishing vessels. Timing may now be of the essence, before the fishing moratorium runs 

out and there are even more fishing vessels plying Arctic waters, and before even more 

stakeholders may be motivated to fight an expansion in regulations. 

Thus, as is clear from our analyses, there exists a disconnect at present with regard to 

disasters in the Arctic. The disaster everyone fears, which has a lower likelihood of 

occurrence, and the disaster that is most common, but is not as prominent in everyone’s 

minds. Future work in the area should continue to monitor and prepare for both types of 

disasters if we are to effectively manage the safety of maritime operations in the ANA 

region. 

Given the tendency for Arctic stakeholders to focus on the “hyperbole of the worst-case 

scenario,” it is perhaps unsurprising that tabletop exercises, currently the primary means 

of preparing for disasters in the Arctic, also show this predisposition. Six out of 11 live or 

notional exercises have focused on a cruise ship disaster, with 5 involving preparation for 

all other types of marine incidents combined. The timing of these incidents may also be a 

factor, in that our analyses indicate that the most common months for accidents in the 

Arctic are in February and August (with August being the most common month for 

disasters in the ANA region). The fact that most live exercises are conducted in the 

summer months, likely due to constraints of availability, again suggests limitations in our 

preparatory and readiness capabilities. The recent redesign of Operation Nanook to 

include exercises in March, and expanded to including a larger number of representatives 

from Arctic states, is a step in the right direction, and it is our hope that other exercises 

will follow suit.72 

We also recommend, where possible an expansion of exercises to include industry and 

local community participation as well. Given the lack of assets and infrastructure, it 

becomes even more important to include the emergency response assets of both of these 

stakeholders in SAR and environmental operations in the area. 

Finally, there is a tendency for exercise scenarios to focus on either rescue or oil spill 

intervention. The number of incidents involving both in the incident database points to 

the need for more expanded and inclusive preparations to enhance our readiness and 

62 
 

 

capabilities to respond to the accidents that are happening, in addition to the ones we 

most fear. 

Vessels of Opportunity

Additionally, when we think of search and rescue assets, there is a tendency to consider 

only emergency responder assets and vessels, to the exclusion of the most common asset 

in actual SAR incidents. Historically, in the ANA region, as in the Arctic as a whole, the 

most common vessel responding in rescue operations is vessels of opportunity. This is 

perhaps unsurprising given the vast distances and lack of permanent infrastructure in the 

area. The fact remains that the relative safety of the Arctic has occurred in large part due 

to the presence of vessels of opportunity, and expansion of preparations that include 

coordination of these vessels would be beneficial. We echo the sentiment expressed in 

the after action reports, and recommend that industry should be included in emergency 

preparations whenever possible, as these assets are likely to be needed in to respond to 

incidents in the Arctic. 

In another example of the ambivalence of the Arctic, while cruise ships and fishing 

vessels pose the greatest threat, they also represent the most promising vessels of 

opportunity. Should a disaster happen, cruise ships are more likely to have assets on 

board that would be needed in times of crisis (e.g., lifeboats, medical staff and resources, 

food, space, etc.); and, historically, fishing vessels have been the most common SAR 

asset after lifeboats and helicopters. 

Given the harsh conditions of the Arctic, however, vessels of opportunity may fall victim 

to similar problems, and become ships in distress themselves. As seen with the recent 

incident involving the Viking Sky, the cargo ship diverted to assist also suffered engine 

failure, and rescue helicopters had to be diverted away from the cruise ship in order to 

rescue the crew of the cargo ship. 

In any event, it is clear that rescue preparations should continue, and insomuch as they 

are able, should include both worst-case scenario preparation, as well as preparation for 

the more common scenarios which may be encountered in the Arctic. The coordination 

and use of commercial vessels of opportunity in emergency response scenarios should be 

expanded, as they are the most likely rescue asset utilized in incidents so far. 

The Future of the Polar Code 

Expansion and clarity were also among the many suggestions for the future of the Polar 

Code. Perhaps unsurprisingly, responses from industry representatives tended to adopt a 

“wait and see” approach, while responses from SAR responders tended to call for more 

stringency and specificity to the provisions. Despite the lack of consensus as to the future 

of the Polar Code, one area in which the data and interviews agree related to the 5 day 

survivability requirement, as specified in the Polar Code. To date, no study has confirmed 

survivability in a lifeboat for that length of time. Combined with the fact that lifeboats 

and liferafts were among the most frequently utilized rescue assets, and the need for 

additional research and development is obvious. 

Representatives from all industries were also likely to call for greater specificity and 

more stringent requirements in the area of crew training. There was a near universal 

63 
 

 

 

 

concern over the possibility of new inexperienced crew coming into an area where 

experience is crucial. Therefore, strengthening the training requirements for all crew (not 

just officers), and requiring actual ice navigation experience, are advisable based on the 

increasing levels of incidents over the years, and the expected increases in traffic to 

come. 

Finally, we would recommend that the mandatory provisions of the Polar Code be 

expanded to include the areas which are most incident prone. This would include 

Murmansk, and parts of coastal Norway. According to one of our interview participants, 

“[The Polar Code affects] areas with very little traffic anyway. So the areas that really 

need heavy regulations are excluded.” Data on incident rates in the ANA region confirm 

that these areas are among the most incident prone, so ensuring that safety regulations 

extend to these areas is important. 

Expanding Safety Utilizing Existing Resources

Calls for increased investment into new assets and infrastructure such as icebreakers, 

helicopters and oil spill response capacity are not new, and thus need not be repeated 

here. Until such time as capacity increases to meet the level of risk in the Arctic, it is 

clear that such investments should be made. However it is our belief that targeted 

investments, aimed at strengthening existing resources, may also greatly improve Arctic 

marine safety. The following recommendations involve capitalizing on the fact that 

vessels of opportunity are the most likely first responders to incidents in the Arctic. 

Training of Additional First Responders. Because professional first responders from 

state agencies may be days away when an incident occurs in the Arctic, training crew of 

all vessels to assist in smaller scale incidents in the Arctic would improve emergency 

response capacity. Similar to recent calls for local communities to be trained to assist in 

marine incidents,73 it seems advisable that crew members operating vessels in the area 

might also receive such training, especially as they become more likely to be called on to 

respond when something goes wrong. Additional training to include oil spill response 

capabilities, for crewmembers to mitigate problems until professional help arrives may 

also be advisable. 

Expansion of Rescue Resources. Again capitalizing on the fact that commercial vessels 

are likely to be closer in times of crisis than first responders might be, we also propose a 

policy that expands the SAR resources that are required to be on board vessels operating 

in the Arctic. Requiring or incentivizing ship operators through subsidies, to provision 

more than just sufficient resources for self-SAR would be a cost-effective way to ensure 

that rescue resources are available in the areas in which they are most needed. Providing 

incentives for private companies to secure additional rescue equipment, oil spill 

intervention equipment, or to carry more equipment than necessary would allow for an 

expansion of rescue capacity at a low cost. This would mean that Coast Guard resources 

which may be days away, may only be hours away on board another ship, and policies 

examining how to encourage private purchase and provisioning of rescue resources may 

bear further examination. 

64 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Expansion of Shipping Databases and Open Access to Information. The above 

mentioned initiatives, however, are much less useful if no one knows which ships are in 

the area, or what capabilities and resources they have. One suggestion to alleviate this 

problem is by combining two existing regulations that currently apply to ships sailing in 

Arctic waters. First, participation in Long Range Information Tracking (LRIT) is 

mandated under SOLAS, for all passenger and cargo ships over 300 gross tons engaged 

in international voyages, to provide regular updates as to their location.74 Additionally, 

the Polar Code requires ships to prepare a Polar Water Operational Manual, which 

includes ship specific capabilities and limitations with regard to SAR procedures, and 

plans for ensuring safe operations and life support, if needed. Combining these two 

requirements, we propose expansion of the LRIT database to include a mandatory filing 

of all ships’ Polar Water Operational Manuals, and we propose that this database be 

accessible to all relevant rescue responders. Expanding information required on file 

through LRIT would help rescue coordinators make more informed decisions regarding 

the resources that may exist in the area. This in turn will mean more effective 

deployment of the most needed resources, especially if a ship of opportunity were to be 

called upon to assist in an emergency. The Polar Code already requires preparation of this 

vessel plan for ships sailing in the Arctic, having it on file somewhere where rescue 

operators can access it seems like the next logical step. 

Having access to information regarding a ship’s position and capabilities would also be 

useful for more than just reacting to incidents as they occur. Having an open database for 

ship traffic and capabilities would also allow for more proactive research to be conducted 

regarding trends and best practices. The lack of data on ships, and ship incidents is 

astounding for an area that claims to be concerned with enhancing ship safety. The fact 

that this information is currently hidden behind paywalls means that relevant information 

is not accessible to those who may need it most. As it stands, Arctic stakeholders have 

very limited access to free information regarding ship incidents, and the information that 

is available is inconsistent or hard to combine. Even the Arctic Council’s own PAME 

database, the ATSD requires a fee to access, making the development of Arctic marine 

best practices much more difficult. (So much so, that we were never able to get access to 

this database for use in the current study.) 

Expanding Charting and Hydrography. Hull and machinery damage, and 

wrecked/stranded vessels were the two most commonly occurring incidents in the Arctic, 

according to historical data. It is not surprising then that a consistent gap identified by 

coast guard operators in our study was the need to update charting and maps, which may 

in some cases be over 30 years old, and in others nonexistent. Combined with the fact 

that melting ice will continue to open up areas that no one has navigated, means that 

more attention should be paid to charting, hydrography and navigational technology. 

Again, capitalizing on the potential offered by existing vessels operating in the Arctic, we 

encourage examination of the extent to which symbiotic relationships through public 

private partnerships can occur. Ships that are currently operating in the region could 

transmit data that would assist businesses in designing technology that industry needs. It 

would also make it much easier for ships to transmit data that is mandated (e.g., ship 

locations to LRIT). As noted earlier, making data easier to be collected and disseminated 

is in everyone’s interest and will make the Arctic a safer place to do business. 

65 
 

 

 

Conclusions 

Despite the fact that by all accounts, existing SAR resources do not match the level of 

risk in the Arctic, our study has shown that the Arctic remains a relatively safe place to 

do business (as compared to other parts of the world). However, just because the area has 

avoided a major catastrophic incident thus far, does not safeguard against the future. In 

other words, while the probability of a mass casualty or mass pollution event is low, the 

severity of either of these events would be immeasurable. There is a troubling consensus 

as to the fact that “it is just a matter of time” before the worst-case scenario happens, 

which everyone agrees will take the form of a large cruise ship disaster. With the recent 

near-grounding of the Viking Sky, it is clear that these fears are not without merit. But the 

truth remains that other types of incidents remain far more likely to occur in the ANA 

region than this worst-case disaster, and we should increase readiness and capabilities to 

respond to these types of disasters as well. Putting all of our attention and resources into 

SAR capabilities, to the exclusion of charting and hydrography, for example, may mean 

that we fail to address the much more common incidents that are happening now. 

International cooperation is rated favorably in the area, and a mandatory regulatory 

framework has recently been put in place that will make shipping in the Arctic safer. 

Concerns regarding enforcement of those regulations, as well as the limits to international 

cooperation loom large in the minds of those who we interviewed. For these and many 

other reasons, it is perhaps a good thing that the predicted explosion in Arctic shipping 

has, at least for now, seemingly been placed on hold. But there are increases coming in 

industries that pose a great deal of threat to the area. With an additional 30 expedition 

style cruise ships on order, additional scrutiny is prudent to ensure that development 

happens in a responsible manner. Further, expanding the requirements of the Polar Code 

to fishing vessels, and doing it sooner rather than later, makes logical sense according to 

their safety record in the Arctic, and the impending end of the fishing moratorium. 

Given the current economic climate, it seems unlikely that large scale investments in 

assets and infrastructure are on the horizon for any of the Arctic states (save Russia). 

This means that every effort to make the most of the resources that exist, bears 

consideration. This is happening now in the form of cooperative agreements and joint 

training exercises, but there are a number of other areas we think should be explored. 

Considering alternative ways we could position rescue resources in remote areas, without 

requiring large state investments in permanent infrastructure, could have a sizeable 

impact on marine safety. Capitalizing on commercial vessels of opportunity is advisable 

in light of the fact that the majority of incidents are smaller in scale, and are most likely 

responded to by vessels of opportunity first. Initiatives aimed at expanding upon local 

capacities should also be explored. In sum, by over focusing on catastrophic incidents, 

we may miss opportunities to make a real difference now, utilizing the resources we 

currently have. 

A full list of our recommendations can be found below: 

66 
Recommendations: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Explore public private partnerships in emergency management 

2. Explore potential inherent in vessels of opportunity 

3. Establish unsecured channels of communication for information sharing among 

Arctic States 

4. Enhanced data sharing and establish a repository of openly accessible data on ship 

incidents 

a. Expand Long-Range Information Tracking (LRIT) to include: 

i. Polar Water Operational Manual for all ships operating in Arctic 

waters 

ii. Rescue equipment and resources on board 

iii. Ship capacity 

iv. Medical or first aid resources on board 

5. Expand training exercises 

a. to non-summer months 

b. to include more participation by industry and non-governmental groups 

6. Increase coverage of Polar Code 

a. To include fishing vessels 

b. To include incident prone regions that are not currently covered by the 

Polar Code (e.g., Murmansk, Coastal Norway, Iceland) 

7. Expand training requirements of the Polar Code to include actual ice experience, 

and expand to include all crew 

8. Look for ways to engage expertise of local communities regarding safe zones, 

weather trends, etc. Capture existing “institutional knowledge” while exploring 

opportunities for strengthening ties to Indigenous groups, and providing real 

avenues for stakeholder inclusion. 

9. Communities should consider adopting their own regulations and mechanisms of 

enforcement to suit their own regions and zones to capture the unique needs of 

each area while working to ensure that ships do not have too many disparate 

regulations to deal with as they cross areas. 

10. Increased funding for research to examine the effects of oil spills in these areas, 

including continued investigation of the role of HFO in international shipping in 

general (not just Arctic). 

11. Continue strengthening ties through existing organizations (e.g., Arctic Council 

ACGF and EPPR). Work to streamline operations so each has clear, minimally 

overlapping duties. 

It should be noted that there is some overlap between our recommendations and those 

proposed in the AMSA (2009) report. This should not be surprising given that, as noted 

earlier, our list of concerns remain very similar to those raised in the original report. Our 

report shows that safety in the Arctic remains a work in progress, even some 10 years 

later. Considering alternative solutions to the recommendations which have already been 

proposed may prove fruitful in designing smaller scale interventions which can impact 

shipping safety, until such time as infrastructure, readiness and capabilities match the 

level of risk in the ANA region. 

67 
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Retrieved January 15, 2019, from https://www.agcs.allianz.com/insights/expertrisk-articles/ss-2018-sensors-could-improve-navigation-supply-chain-and-cargorisk-management/ 

Shell Stops Arctic Activity after 'Disappointing' Tests. (2015, September). BBC News, 

Retrieved from: www.bbc.com/news/business-34377434. 

Snyder, J. (n.d.) Arctic Tourism: Past , Present, and Future.” University of New 

81 
Hampshire, Strategic Studies Retrieved from: 

www.crrc.unh.edu/sites/crrc.unh.edu/files/media/docs/Workshops/arctic_spill_su 

mmit/presentations/snyder.pdf 

The Cod Wars Revisited - Media Centre. (2018). BBC. 

www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/proginfo/2018/40/the-cod-wars-revisited. 

Welcome to AMAP. AMAP, www.amap.no/about. 

Woo-Lee, S., & Song, J.M. (2015). Economic Possibilities of Shipping Though Northern 

Sea Route.” The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2092521214000601?via%3Dihub. 

82 
Appendix A 

Project Description: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

List of Interview Questions 

Graduate students from Brown University are working with the U.S. Coast Guard’s Center for 

Arctic Study and Policy (CASP) on a foresight analysis to define and characterize potential 

seaborne disasters, catastrophic incidents, and security threats in the Arctic and North Atlantic 

(ANA) region. This initial research will tie into the broader objectives of the Arctic and North 

Atlantic Security and Emergency Preparedness Network “ARCSAR” project spearheaded by 

Joint Regional Control Center North-Norway. In addition to defining and characterizing 

historical incidents in this region, the research will also consider whether the combination of 

economic potential, environmental change, and increased interest and traffic in the ANA region 

has increased the risk of a maritime incident requiring cooperation amongst governments, 

industry, and security organizations. The ANA region’s threats include, but are not limited to, the 

potential for armed conflict, terrorism, piracy, ship collisions or accidents, natural disasters, and 

pollution and other environmental impacts. The below questions are meant to develop data from 

the numerous stakeholders which will then be analyzed and presented to the U.S. Coast Guard for 

further contribution to ARCSAR. 

With your permission we will be recording the interview so as to facilitate with transcription. 

Our goal will be to attempt to discern patterns in the data, so responses to the interview questions 

are expected to be reported in the aggregate. Recordings will be deleted as soon as they are 

transcribed. Should we wish to utilize any direct quotes from you, we would ask your permission 

beforehand. 

Interview Questions: 

1. Can you describe your (or your organization’s) level of familiarity with the North 

Atlantic maritime region (defined as region between Eastern edge of Canada and 

Norway?) 

2. What areas of industrial development do you currently see in this region? Will that 

development increase or decrease in the 15-20? 

3. What potential areas of industry do you think are ripe for development in the next 15-20 

years? 

4. How familiar are you with the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment1

? 

5. Have you noticed any changes in the industry or area that have occurred since the 2009 

Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment? 

6. What would you consider to be a significant increase in shipping traffic in the Arctic 

region? What are the critical gaps or major points of failure in the current governance 

structure? 

7. We are focusing on three main areas of threat in the region - seaborne disasters (such as 

ship collision, grounding), catastrophic incidents (including oil spill, cruise ship accident) 

and security threats (piracy, transport of illegal goods, human trafficking, etc.)- of these, 

which do you see as the greatest likelihood? Why? 

83 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8. Are you familiar with the provisions of the Polar Code? As the current international law 

protecting polar waters, how could we strengthen the polar code? 

9. What is your perception of the level of international cooperation in this region? By 

cooperation, we mean information sharing, joint exercises, etc... 

10. Is there a model of cooperation that would work better in this region? What? Why? 

11. How would you characterize the readiness and capability (including training, assets and 

infrastructure) for large-scale search and rescue operations? Environmental response 

operations? 

12. What additional agreements should be considered? Bilateral, multilateral, or regional? 

13. Turning to prevention, what is the most effective means of planning for an eventual 

disaster in the North Atlantic? Insurance? Self-SAR? Polar Code Enforcement? 

14. In your experience, are there any threats we have not discussed? 

15. Finally, do you have any recommendations for people we should talk with or sources for 

data we should consult? 

Dissemination of this report will be dependent on clearance of the U.S. Coast Guard. 

84 
 

 

 

 5 https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/arctic/iarpc/arc_res_pol_act.jsp). 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Endnotes 

1 NASA (2019). Arctic sea ice 2019 wintertime extent is seventh lowest. Retrieved from: 

http://spaceref.com/arctic-2/arctic-sea-ice-2019-wintertime-extent-is-seventh-lowest.html

2 Gramer, R. (2018). Stretched thin on thin ice. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/stretched-thin-on-thin-ice-arctic-circle-climate-changenorway-coast-guard

3 Arctic Portal - About Us. Arctic Portal. Retrieved from: https://arcticportal.org/about-us 

4 Welcome to AMAP. Retrieved from: www.amap.no/about 

6 GeoHack - Attu Island. Powered by Wikimedia Cloud Services, 

tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Attu_Island¶ms=52_51_N_173_11_E

7 The Emerging Arctic. (n.d.) Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: 

https://www.cfr.org/interactives/emerging-arctic?cid=otr_marketing_use-arctic_Infoguide%2523

8 Arctic Fisheries. National Ocean Economics Program, Retrieved from: 

www.oceaneconomics.org/arctic/fisheries

9 Harvey, F. (2018, October). Commercial fishing banned across much of the Arctic.” The 

Guardian, Retrieved from: www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/03/commercial-fishingbanned-across-much-of-the-arctic. 

10 Fenn, K. (2018, October) High Arctic fishing ban a win for future generations, says member of 

Alaska tribe. CBCnews, Retrieved from: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-fishing-banreaction-1.4854205. 

11 The Cod Wars Revisited. (2018) BBC news. Retrieved from: 

www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/proginfo/2018/40/the-cod-wars-revisited. 12 Bird, K.J. (2008). Circum-Arctic resource appraisal: Estimates of undiscovered oil and gas 

north of the Arctic Circle. U.S. Geological Survey. 13 Kemp, J. (2012, November). Russia's tantalising Arctic oil and gas deposits. Reuters. 

Retrieved from: www.reuters.com/article/column-kemp-russia-oil/column-russias-tantalisingarctic-oil-and-gas-deposits-kemp-idUSL5E8M8HZ620121108.

14 Shell Stops Arctic Activity after 'Disappointing' Tests.(2015). BBC News, Retrieved from: 

www.bbc.com/news/business-34377434. 15 Ibid 

16 Foy, H. (2018, June). Russian oil industry proves its resilience.” Financial Times. Retrieved 

from: www.ft.com/content/14b4cc22-64ae-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56.

17 Mapping the Arctic Landscape. Exploring the Arctic, wwfarcticmaps.org 

18 Arctic Tourism - More than an Industry? (2018, April). The Arctic Institute, Retrieved from: 

www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-tourism-industry/

19 Snyder, J. (n.d.) Arctic tourism: Past, present, and future. University of New Hampshire, 

Strategic Studies. Retrieved from: 

crrc.unh.edu/sites/crrc.unh.edu/files/media/docs/Workshops/arctic_spill_summit/presentations/sn

yder.pdf

20 Arctic Tourism Data. (n.d.) National Ocean Economics Program, Retrieved from: 

www.oceaneconomics.org/arctic/tourism/tourData.aspx. 21 Ellis, B. & Brigham, L. (2009). Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. Retrieved 

from: https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/54

22 Woo-Lee, S., & Sun, Ju-Mi. (2015). Economic possibilities of shipping though Northern Sea 

Route. The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics. Retrieved from: 

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2092521214000601?via%3Dihub. 23 Maersk Concludes Trial Passage of Northern Sea Route. (2018, September). Retrieved from: 

www.maersk.com/news/2018/09/28/maersk-concludes-trial-passage-of-northern-sea-route. 24 Ibid 

25 Carmel, Stephen. The Cold, Hard Realities of Arctic Shipping (2013, July). Retrieved from: 

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013/july/cold-hard-realities-arctic-shipping 

85 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

26 Jacobsen, S. (2018, August). Maersk sends first container ship through Arctic route. Reuters, 

Retrieved from: www.reuters.com/article/us-arctic-shipping-maersk/maersk-sends-first-containership-through-arctic-route-idUSKCN1L91BR.

27 A Quick Start to UNCLOS. (n.d.) The Arctic Institute. Retrieved from: 

www.thearcticinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/TAI-Quick-Start-to-UNCLOS.pdf. 28 Lackenbauer, W. (2017). One Arctic: The Arctic Council and circumpolar governance. 

Canadian Arctic Resource Committee Retrieved from: carc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/One-Arctic-2017.pdf.

29 Arctic Council. (2019). Retrieved from: www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/. 

30 Ibid 

31 Ibid 

32 Ibid 

33 Arctic Council Secretariat.(2016, March). Arctic Council funding: An overview.” AC Archive 

Home. Retrieved from: https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1721/EDOCS-3199-v4-ACSAOUS202_Fairbanks_2016_5-

1_Arctic-Council-funding-an-overview.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

34 About EPPR.(n.d.) EPPR, www.eppr.org/about-eppr/. 

35 Ibid 

36 Arctic Council. (2017). Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 

Response in the Arctic. Retrieved from: www.oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/529. 37 Arctic Council. (1996). Ottawa Declaration. Retrieved from: www.oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/handle/11374/85. 38 ACGF. Retrieved from: www.arcticcoastguardforum.com/about-acgf. 

39 http://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=c26bc6ee-f208-43da-a8b6-1923a3fd5824 

40 About the JIP (n.d.) Retrieved from: arcticresponse.wpengine.com/about-the-jip/. 

41 Environmental effects of Arctic oil spills and spill response technologies. Introduction to a 5 

year joint industry effort. (2018, January) Marine Environmental Research. Retrieved from: 

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0141113617307109. 42 DNV GL Data Sources Retrieved from: 

https://maps.dnvgl.com/arcticriskmap/arp_data_sources.pdf

43 Alchetron. (n.d.) Free social encyclopedia for world. Retrieved from: 

http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/russia/bord_grd.htm. World Navies Today: Maritime Units of 

the Russian Border Guard Forces, www.hazegray.org/worldnav/russia/bord_grd.htm 

44 Kustbevakningen. (2016, September). Till Kustbevakningens Startsida, Retrieved from: 

www.kustbevakningen.se/.

45 Our Organization. (2018, August). Government of Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 

Communications Branch, Retrieved from: www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/about-notre-sujet/org/indexeng.htm

46 Lajeunesse, A., & Lackenbauer, W. (2017). Russia's Arctic militarization: A reality 

check.” News Deeply. Retrieved from: 

www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/community/2017/03/17/russias-arctic-militarization-a-reality-check. 47 Amver.com - Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue System - History of the Amver 

System, www.amver.com/Home/AmverHistory 

48 Long-Range Identification and Tracking of Ships (LRIT) (n.d.) Retrieved from:

www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/LRIT.aspx. 49 International Code for Shipping in Polar Waters (Polar Code). Retrieved from: 

www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx. 50 Polar Code Infographic. Retrieved from:

http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/Polar%20Code%20Ship%20Sa 

fety%20-%20Infographic_smaller_.pdf

51 Ibid 

52Ibid 

53Ibid 

86 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

54Ibid 

55 Polar Code Boundaries for the Arctic and Antarctic. (2011). Retrieved from: 

www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx. 56 Ibid 

57 The Safety of Navigation- What Is in SOLAS Chapter V? (2018, February). Retrieved from: 

www.navsregs.wordpress.com/2017/09/18/the-safety-of-navigation-what-is-in-solas-chapter-v/.

58 Fishing vessel safety. (2019). Retrieved from: 

http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Regulations/FishingVessels/Pages/Default.aspx

59 Mejlaender-Larsen, M. (2018). IMO Polar Code: Experience so far. Presentation at the Arctic 

Shipping Best Practices Forum. Retrieved from: www.pame.is/arcticshippingforum. 

60 Gianni, M. (2008). Real and present danger flag state failure and maritime security and safety. 

WWF International. Retrieved from: www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/state-sovereigntyand-corruption/flags-of-convenience.html.

61IHS acquiring joint venture interest in Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay. (2018). Retrieved from: 

https://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/corporate/ihs-acquiring-joint-venture-interest-lloydsregister-fairplay

62 Allianz Shipping and Safety Review (2018) *Image credit for selected ship type icons 

63 Ellis, B. & Brigham, L. (2009). Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. Retrieved 

from: https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/54 

64 Charctcic interactive sea ice graph. (2019). National Snow and Ice Data Center Retrieved 

from: https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/charctic-interactive-sea-ice-graph/

65 MAREX (2017). The global fleet revealed. The Maritime Executive. Retrieved from: 

https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/the-global-fleet-revealed) 

66 George, R. (2015). Worse things still happen at sea: the shipping disasters we never hear about. 

The Guardian. Retrieved from: 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/shipping-disasters-we-never-hear-about

67 Nikel, D. (2018). Why the Faroe Islands are saying no to tourists for a weekend. Forbes. 

Retrieved from: 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidnikel/2019/02/21/why-the-faroe-islands-are-saying-no-totourists-for-a-weekend/#43d82d1966b4

68 WWF Arctic (2017). Arctic shipping and marine insurance. Thin Ice Blog. Retrieved from: 

http://arctic.blogs.panda.org/default/arctic-shipping-insurance/

69 Moss, J. (2018). How will the marine insurance industry respond to new sources of risk. Knect 

365 Maritime. Retrieved from: 

https://knect365.com/shipping/article/593a4ff5-64bd-44a2-af7a-9806ee9e5f94/how-will-themarine-insurance-industry-respond-to-new-sources-of-risk

70 www.viking.com 

71 Brown, V. (2019). Viking Sky cruise ship stranded off Norway towed to shore as ‘traumatised’ 

passengers hospitalized. News.com.au. Retrieved from: 

https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/incidents/viking-sky-cruise-ship-stranded-offnorway-towed-to-shore-as-traumatised-passengers-hospitalised/newsstory/61e433b80cfd8bbbb57b77306c686c42

72 Bell, J. (2019). Redesigned Operation Nanook gets underway in the Canadian Arctic. 

Nunatsiaq News. Retrieved from: 

https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/redesigned-operation-nanook-gets-underway-in-thecanadian-arctic/

73 Østhagen, A. (2017). Utilising local capacities in the Arctic. The Arctic Institute. Retrieved 

from: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/utilising-local-capacities-arctic/ 

74 Jensen , Ø. (2007). The IMO guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters from

voluntary to mandatory tool for navigation safety and environmental protection? Fridtjof Nansen 

Institute. Retrieved from: 

https://www.fni.no/getfile.php/131675-1469868943/Filer/Publikasjoner/FNI-R0207.pdf 

87