In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-2429

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SEAN A. PECK,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 02-CR-20005—Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.

____________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2002—DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2003

____________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Sean A. Peck appeals the

denial of a motion to suppress evidence that was obtained

during a search of his residence, contending that there

was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for

the search warrant. The district court found that an

uncorroborated affidavit of a confidential informant satisfied the probable cause requirement and thus the warrant was valid. We disagree. However, because the evidence was admissible based on the good faith exception

to the exclusionary rule of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897 (1984), we affirm the district court’s denial of Peck’s

motion to suppress.
2 No. 02-2429

I. BACKGROUND

James Root, deputy sheriff of the Macon County Sheriff ’s

Department, received a phone call from a confidential

informant, “Pat Doe,” alleging that Peck possessed crack

cocaine and cannabis. Doe told Root that she wanted Peck

punished because he was not paying for diapers for their

child and that she thought Peck should be arrested because he was dealing drugs. Doe said she had been inside

Peck’s residence within the last two days. While inside

the residence, Peck allegedly showed Doe large amounts

of two substances wrapped in individual packages. Peck

told Doe that the substances were crack cocaine and

marijuana that he planned to sell. Even without Peck’s

representations, Doe claims that she knew what the substances were based on her own “personal experiences.”

Root drafted an affidavit including Doe’s statements.

Because Doe had not previously given any information to the police, Root asked Doe to visit the station and

swear under oath that her statements were true. Judge

Paine administered the oath to Doe, and Doe then signed

the affidavit. Relying on the affidavit, Judge Paine issued

a search warrant. The police executed the search warrant

and confiscated more than five grams of crack from Peck’s

house. As a result of the search, Peck was charged with

possession and intent to distribute crack in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii).

Peck filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized

from the search of his residence and challenged Doe’s

reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge. The district

court denied Peck’s motion, finding, based on the totality

of the circumstances, that there was enough information

to establish probable cause that there were drugs in the

apartment. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Peck pleaded

guilty and reserved his right to appeal the district court’s

denial of his motion to suppress.
No. 02-2429 3

II. ANALYSIS

A. Probable Cause

When an affidavit is the only evidence presented to a

judge in support of a search warrant, the validity of the

warrant rests solely on the strength of the affidavit. See

United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967).

Probable cause is established when, based on the totality

of the circumstances, the affidavit sets forth sufficient

evidence to induce a reasonably prudent person to believe

that a search will uncover evidence of a crime. See Illinois

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); United States v. Jones,

208 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2000). In reviewing a judge’s

probable cause determination, we review the legal conclusions de novo and factual findings including credibility

for clear error. United States v. McGee, 280 F.3d 803, 805

(7th Cir. 2002). Whether an affidavit established probable

cause is reviewed de novo. United States v. May, 214 F.3d

900, 905 (7th Cir. 2000).

In this case, Peck challenges Doe’s reliability and veracity. Thus, we consider the personal observations of the

confidential informant (“CI”), the degree of detail given in

the affidavit, independent police corroboration of the

information, the interval of time between the events and

application for a warrant, and whether the informant

testified at the probable cause hearing. See United States

v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 2002); United States

v. Pless, 982 F.2d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir. 1992). None of

these factors is determinative; however, “a deficiency in

one factor may be compensated for by a strong showing

in another or by some other indication of reliability.” United

States v. Brack, 188 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, the

district court weighed these factors and found that Doe’s

statements were credible because Doe appeared before

the issuing judge and signed the affidavit under oath.

Peck argues that even though Doe appeared before the
4 No. 02-2429

issuing judge, there was insufficient evidence to support

a finding of probable cause because Doe’s statement lacked

sufficient detail and there was no independent police

corroboration. We agree.

Although Doe claimed she personally observed drugs in

Peck’s house less than two days before the search warrant was executed and she appeared before the issuing

judge, these elements are not enough to overcome the

minimal amount of detail given in Doe’s affidavit. Doe

failed to give specific details about the drugs in Peck’s

house such as where the drugs were hidden, the total

amount of drugs Peck possessed, or the frequency with

which Peck sold drugs. The only details Doe gave were that

she had been in the house and was shown drugs. Cf. United

States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1259 (7th Cir. 1995) (CI not

only gave specific details about the building in which defendant resided, but also specified the precise location of the

guns in that building). Furthermore, even though Doe

stated that she was Peck’s girlfriend, she was unable to

give any information regarding Peck other than that he

was a black male. Cf. Jones, 208 F.3d at 605-06 (CI provided specific details about defendant which the police

were able to corroborate).

The affidavit further failed to explain why Doe knew that

the substance in question was an illicit drug, another way

to show reliability. In United States v. Johnson, 289 F.3d

1034 (7th Cir. 2002), although the CI’s affidavit did not

provide the level of specificity needed, we found that the

CI’s statements that Johnson possessed cocaine were

reliable because the CI made statements against her

interest. Id. at 1036. The CI was able to identify the

white chunky substance as cocaine because she claimed

that she had previously purchased, packaged, and sold

cocaine. Id. In United States v. Jones, the CI admitted that

the reason she knew the substance at issue was marijuana was because she had been to Jones’s house on at
No. 02-2429 5

least three prior occasions to buy about twelve pounds of

marijuana. See 208 F.3d at 606. This indicium of reliability

is missing from Doe’s affidavit. Instead, Doe claims that

based on her “personal experiences” she knew that the

substances Peck showed her were drugs without explaining why she recognized the products as drugs. Thus, the

minimal amount of detail in Doe’s affidavit does not support a finding of probable cause.

Compounding the weaknesses of Doe’s statement is

the failure of the police to corroborate her allegations. The

only effort made by police to corroborate Doe’s statements was a check of Peck’s record, which showed that

Peck had previously been arrested for drug possession. The

government relies on several cases which are inapposite

because in those cases the police used other methods to

corroborate the CI’s statements. For example, in United

States v. Lloyd, the police also drove by Lloyd’s residence

with the CI, confirmed the CI’s description of the residence, had the CI pick out the defendant’s apartment,

asked the CI to pick Lloyd out of a photo array, and ran

Lloyd’s record. See 71 F.3d at 1259. In Jones, the police drove by Jones’s residence with the CI, confirmed

the CI’s description of the residence and that one of the

vehicles in the driveway was registered to Jones, and

corroborated the CI’s statement regarding the defendant’s

background by running his record. See 208 F.3d at 606. The

police need not always take these steps when trying to

corroborate a CI’s statements. However, the police must

do more than simply run a record check of the accused,

because this alone does not corroborate a CI’s statements

alleging that a search will uncover evidence of a crime.

Finally, although Doe appeared before the judge issuing the warrant, she did not offer any testimony. She

merely took an oath that her statements were truthful.

Given the deficiencies in the warrant application, we cannot

find that her oath compensates for the lack of detail in the
6 No. 02-2429

affidavit and the failure of the police to corroborate her

statements. Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, there was not sufficient evidence to support the

issuance of the search warrant.

B. Good Faith Exception

A facially valid warrant issued by a neutral, detached

magistrate will be upheld if the police relied on the warrant in good faith. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 922-23. We

“apply the de novo standard of review to the federal court’s

ultimate legal conclusion of whether a law enforcement

officer reasonably relied upon a subsequently invalidated

search warrant.” Koerth, 312 F.3d at 865.

Root’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence that he was acting in good faith. See Leon, 468 U.S.

at 921 n.21; Koerth, 312 F.3d at 868. To rebut this evidence Peck must show that the magistrate simply rubberstamped the warrant application, the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing the affidavit, or the warrant

was so lacking in probable cause that no officer could have

relied on it. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; Koerth, 312 F.3d

at 868. Peck does not argue that the issuing judge abandoned his role as a neutral and detached officer of the court

when he issued the warrant or that Root was dishonest

or reckless. Instead, Peck argues that the warrant was

facially deficient because Doe did not give any details

regarding Peck’s alleged drug possession and the police

knew that Doe was biased.

Even though the warrant issued by the judge was bare

bones, it was not so lacking as to make it facially deficient.

Although minimal, Doe’s statement did contain evidence

that Peck possessed and planned on selling drugs. Based

on this evidence, Root checked Peck’s record and determined that he had a prior drug conviction. In addition,

Root addressed issues regarding Doe’s credibility and veracity by requiring Doe to come to the police station and
No. 02-2429 7

sign her statement under oath in front of the issuing

judge. Therefore, it was reasonable for Root to rely on a

warrant issued by a neutral and detached officer of the

court. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

Peck also contends that because the police only made

cursory inquires into Doe’s motives, the fact that Doe

appeared before the issuing judge is not enough to remove

the taint of her bias from the warrant. However, most

CIs have a bias against the defendant or something to

gain from giving their statement. See, e.g., Lloyd, 71 F.3d

at 1259 (CI and defendant were in opposing factions of

the same gang). The fact that the police used Doe’s statement even when they knew she was biased was not unreasonable. In fact, her relationship with Peck may have

made her story more credible because, as someone close

to Peck, she was more likely to know that drugs were in

the house other than someone not close to Peck. Though

the police did not take the steps that we require to demonstrate probable cause, the measures that they did

take when receiving the information from the CI were sufficient to show their good faith reliance on the warrant.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—1-29-03