IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2022 ND 134

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Aisha L. Piker, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20210344

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Lindsey R. Nieuwsma, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Joshua A. Amundson, Assistant State’s Attorney, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff 

and appellee.

Justin J. Vinje, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JULY 7, 2022 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

State v. Piker

No. 20210344

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Aisha L. Piker appeals from an amended criminal judgment ordering her 

to pay restitution. Piker argues the district court erred in determining the 

restitution amount. We affirm.

I

[¶2] In February 2021, the State charged Piker with aggravated assault after 

allegedly stabbing her boyfriend in the hand. In June 2021, Piker entered into 

a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of disorderly conduct. 

The plea agreement provided that Piker would pay restitution as determined 

at a later date. The district court accepted the plea agreement and entered 

judgment.

[¶3] In September 2021, the State filed a motion to amend the judgment, 

seeking $24,627.95 in restitution. At the subsequent hearing Piker argued no 

restitution should be awarded because she acted in self-defense. The parties 

submitted post-hearing briefs regarding the application of self-defense to 

restitution awards. Piker argued self-defense rendered her actions “noncriminal” and “therefore not subject to restitution.”

[¶4] The district court declined to apply self-defense to excuse awarding 

restitution, finding self-defense applies to the determination of whether a 

defendant engaged in criminal conduct and does not apply after a defendant is 

convicted of criminal conduct. The court found the victim incurred medical 

expenses as a result of Piker’s criminal conduct and ordered Piker to pay 

$24,627.95. The court amended the judgment accordingly.

II

[¶5] This Court reviews a restitution order to determine whether the district 

court acted within statutory limits, which is similar to abuse of discretion.

State v. Kostelecky, 2018 ND 12, ¶ 6, 906 N.W.2d 77. “A district court abuses 

its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable 
2

manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading 

to a reasoned determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. 

Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

[¶6] Piker argues the district court erred in finding self-defense does not 

apply to restitution determinations. She asserts the application of self-defense 

under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-05-03 justifies her actions and renders them “noncriminal” for purposes of the restitution statute. 

[¶7] Art. I, § 25(1)(n), N.D. Const., provides victims the right to “full and 

timely restitution in every case and from each offender for all losses suffered 

by the victim as a result of the criminal or delinquent conduct.”In ordering 

restitution, district courts “shall take into account the reasonable damages 

sustained by the victim or victims of the criminal offense, which damages are 

limited to those directly related to the criminal offense and expenses actually 

incurred as a direct result of the defendant’s criminal action.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-

32-08(1).

[¶8] Section 12.1-05-03, N.D.C.C., justifies use of force upon another person 

to defend against “danger of imminent unlawful bodily injury, sexual assault, 

or detention by such other person[.]” Self-defense applies to conduct, effectively 

making harmful conduct noncriminal. State v. Schumaier, 1999 ND 239, ¶¶ 

12-13, 603 N.W.2d 882. 

[¶9] Self-defense is a “defense” as opposed to an “affirmative defense.” State 

v. Thiel, 411 N.W.2d 66, 67 (N.D. 1987). “A ‘defense’ is raised when there is 

evidence in the case sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue.” Id. 

(citing N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-03(2)(b)). Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-03(1), a person 

cannot be convicted of a crime “unless each element of the offense is proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

“‘Element of an offense’ means:

a. The forbidden conduct;

b. The attendant circumstances specified in the definition 

and grading of the offense;
3

c. The required culpability;

d. Any required result; and

e. The nonexistence of a defense as to which there is evidence

in the case sufficient to give rise to a reasonable doubt on the

issue.”

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-03(1). Thus, self-defense operates as a bar to conviction

rather than to reduce or eliminate restitution.

[¶10] Here, Piker pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and provided a factual 

basis admitting to engaging in “tumultuous behavior that created a seriously 

alarming condition that served no legitimate purpose.” By her plea, Piker 

admitted her conduct was criminal. She had the opportunity to present 

evidence on self-defense and to attempt creating reasonable doubt she 

committed a crime. Instead, she pleaded guilty to the crime and waived all 

defenses. State v. Magnuson, 1997 ND 228, ¶ 10, 571 N.W.2d 642.

[¶11] At the restitution hearing, the victim testified Piker stabbed him in the 

hand with a knife. Piker also testified to stabbing the victim in the hand. The 

victim received medical treatment for the injury, and he testified he did not 

have medical insurance to cover expenses. The State presented the medical bill 

into evidence showing a total amount due of $24,627.95.

[¶12] Consistent with our precedent, the district court received sufficient 

evidence to determine Piker’s criminal conduct resulted in the victim’s injuries.

See State v. Pippin, 496 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1993) (requiring a causal connection 

between the defendant’s criminal conduct and the damages for which 

restitution is ordered). On this record, the court acted within the limits set by 

statute and did not err in awarding restitution. 

III

[¶13] We affirm the amended criminal judgment.
4

[¶14] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte