DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Transportation Security Administration

Review of the TSA Passenger and

Baggage Screening Pilot Program 

OIG-04-47 September 2004 

Offi ce of Audits 

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Offi ce of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the program or operation under review. It 

is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, 

and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................3

Results in Brief ................................................................................................................................3

 Background ......................................................................................................................................5

TSA’s Role Limited Opportunities for Identifying Program Improvements ...................................8 

 Hiring Limitations ......................................................................................................................8

 Staffi ng Limitations .................................................................................................................10

 Training Limitations ................................................................................................................12

TSA’s Evaluation of Contractor Performance Needs Improvement ..............................................14

 TSA Management and Oversight .............................................................................................14

 Performance Evaluation Plans .................................................................................................15

 Pilot Program Reorganization ..................................................................................................16

Other Matters .................................................................................................................................17

` Controls Over Uniforms and Badges .......................................................................................18

Referral of Selectee Passengers ...............................................................................................18

 Recommendations..........................................................................................................................20

Appendices

 Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ...................................................................21

Appendix B: Chronology of Events ......................................................................................23

 Appendix C: Contract Performance Criteria .........................................................................25

 Appendix D: Management Comments ..................................................................................27

 Appendix E: OIG Analysis of Management’s Comments ....................................................32

Appendix F: Major Contributors to This Report ..................................................................35

 Appendix G: Report Distribution ..........................................................................................36

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 1
Contents

Abbreviations 

ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act

 COTR Contracting Offi cer’s Technical Representative 

FDO Fee Determining Offi cial 

FSD Federal Security Director

 ITS International Total Services

 JHAB Jackson Hole Airport Board

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

OJT On-the-job training

 PEP Performance Evaluation Plan 

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

 TSA Transportation Security Administration 

Page 2 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Offi ce of Inspector General 

Introduction 

On November 19, 2001, the President signed the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act (ATSA) that created the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA). ATSA required TSA to assume responsibility for security screening at 

commercial airports in the United States. ATSA also required TSA to implement a 

two-year private security screening pilot program designed to determine whether, 

with proper government supervision and controls, private contract screening 

companies could provide and maintain passenger screening performance at levels 

equal to or greater than the TSA screener workforce. On October 10, 2002, TSA 

awarded four pilot program contracts covering five different sized airports, with 

one contractor providing security services at two airports. The pilot program 

began at the five airports on November 19, 2002. 

The OIG evaluated the pilot airport program with specific emphasis on: (1) TSA’s 

role in recruiting, hiring, deploying, and training screeners; and (2) the steps taken 

by TSA to monitor program operations and to measure, evaluate, and reward 

contractor performance. 

The OIG conducted the audit from April 2003 through November 2003 at the 

San Francisco International Airport, Kansas City International Airport, Greater 

Rochester International Airport, and Jackson Hole Airport. In addition, the OIG 

conducted its review at TSA headquarters, contractor facilities at the airports, 

and at one contractor’s headquarters. The audit did not include Tupelo Airport, 

which is the smallest of the five pilot program airports, and is part of the contract 

awarded to the contractor for San Francisco International Airport. For further 

information regarding the scope and methodology of the audit, see Appendix A. 

Results in Brief 

TSA’s level of involvement was intended to ensure that pilot airport screeners 

would operate at a level at least equal to screeners at federalized airports. TSA’s 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 3 
level of involvement, while apparently not inconsistent with congressional intent, 

significantly limited any role the contractors may have played in improving 

all aspects of the program, including hiring, training, and on-the-job screener 

performance. For example, contractors had to rely on TSA to evaluate and 

approve applicants through assessment centers1

 established ad hoc for that 

purpose. When contractors needed additional staff, they had to wait for TSA to 

reestablish an assessment center, which sometimes took months. This resulted 

in understaffing, excessive overtime, and poor morale. Further, TSA’s screener 

approval process resulted in high (about 70 percent) rejection rates, even when 

applicants were pre-screened by contractors. 

TSA headquarters provided overall policy for the pilot program, but relied on 

local TSA officials to manage and monitor the contractors. However, when local 

officials needed policy decisions or other program guidance from headquarters, 

there was no central point of authority; their requests had to be routed through 

numerous divisions within TSA headquarters to be researched, discussed, and 

finally approved. Consequently, the four pilot program contractors interpreted 

program guidelines differently or received different guidance from TSA on 

similar issues, leading to inconsistencies in operations among the pilot program 

contractors and making comparisons among them diffi cult. 

Further, TSA had not developed or implemented adequate performance 

standards or criteria to monitor, measure, and evaluate pilot program contractors’ 

performance, or to compare private screeners’ performance with federalized 

screeners’ performance. Specifically, performance evaluation plans were not 

developed and implemented uniformly within stated contract time periods, 

and the evaluation plans lacked measurable performance criteria to evaluate 

each individual contractor properly. Lacking performance criteria, award fee 

determinations were highly subjective and based primarily on contractor selfassessments and input from TSA offi cials. 

The OIG is recommending that TSA: (i) develop criteria for measuring and 

comparing the performance of contractor and federal screeners; and (ii) establish 

greater flexibility within the program to test innovations and new approaches. 

TSA addressed the issue of evaluating contractor performance, but did not address 

the issue of comparing contractor and federal screener performance. TSA should 

address how it intends to compare performance in its formal response to this 

final report. See Appendix D for management comments to the draft report and 

Appendix E for the OIG’s analysis of those comments. 

1 Assessment centers, operated by a TSA contractor, were established to test screener applicants to determine their eligibility for 

employment. 

Page 4 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Background

Prior to September 11, 2001, airlines were responsible for providing security 

screening services at airports. The airlines generally contracted with private 

companies to provide passenger and baggage screening. On November 19, 2001, 

the President signed ATSA into law to improve and strengthen the security of 

the civil air transportation system. Specifically, ATSA strengthened hiring and 

training qualifications of passenger and baggage security screeners, increased 

screeners’ pay scales, and transferred the responsibility for providing civil air 

transportation security from the airlines to TSA at more than 440 national airports. 

ATSA also required TSA to implement a two-year private passenger and baggage 

screening program at five airports of different sizes. ATSA required that the 

level of screening provided at the airports under the pilot contracts be equal to 

or greater than the level provided at the airports by federalized screeners. ATSA 

was silent on TSA’s role in recruiting, hiring, staffing, and training screeners 

for the pilot airports. TSA chose to set staffing levels, approve or disapprove all 

applicants, and train all screeners. After the two-year pilot program ends, airport 

operators may request approval from TSA to opt out of the federal screening 

program. If approved, TSA will award contracts to qualified private screening 

companies to perform passenger and baggage screening. 

Nineteen airports applied for the pilot program. In June 2002, TSA selected one 

airport for each of the five airport categories, as required by ATSA. U.S. airports 

are categorized by different risk categories based on size and other factors, with 

“Category X” representing the largest airport and “Category IV” representing the 

smallest airport. On October 10, 2002, TSA awarded the following contracts: 

Airport Category Contractor 

San Francisco International X Covenant Aviation Security 

Kansas City International I International Total Services 

Greater Rochester International II McNeil Technologies 

Jackson Hole Airport III Jackson Hole Airport Board 

Tupelo Airport IV Covenant Aviation Security 

The first year contracts totaled about $111.7 million, while the second year totaled 

about $111.1 million. These figures include Tupelo Airport where contract fees 

totaled about $1 million per year. 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 5 
Covenant Aviation Security (Covenant). Covenant was awarded a one 

year $70.3 million contract to provide private screening services at San 

Francisco International Airport. Covenant was to furnish all labor, supervision, 

management, facilities, equipment, materials, and services necessary to operate 

and maintain screening services at the airport. The contract also contains an 

option for a second year of screening services valued at $72.6 million. As an 

incentive, the contract offers a first year award fee of about $5.2 million and a 

second year award fee of about $5.4 million if Covenant met certain performance 

objectives. Covenant initially hired approximately 1,000 passenger screeners. 

By December 2002, Covenant increased its workforce to about 1,300 screeners, 

which included over 300 baggage screeners. 

International Total Services2

 (ITS). ITS was awarded a one year $29.3 million 

contract to provide private screening services at Kansas City International Airport. 

ITS was to provide gate screening, checkpoint screening, and checked baggage 

screening services. The contract contains an option for a second year of screening 

services valued at $26.3 million. As an incentive, the contract offers a fi rst year 

award fee of about $1.8 million, and a second year award fee of about $1.6 

million if ITS met certain performance objectives. ITS had an initial workforce 

of more than 500 passenger screeners. In December 2002, ITS added over 200 

baggage screeners. 

McNeil Technologies (McNeil). McNeil was awarded a one year, 

$7.9 million contract to provide private screening services at Greater Rochester 

International Airport. McNeil was to provide all management, administrative, 

clerical, and supervisory functions of the pilot program. The contract contains 

an option for a second year of screening services valued at $7.9 million. As an 

incentive, the contract offers a first and second year award fee of about $779,000 

if McNeil met certain performance objectives. McNeil’s initial workforce was 

130 passenger screeners. In December 2002, McNeil added about 60 full-time 

and 15 part-time additional baggage screeners. 

Jackson Hole Airport Board (JHAB). Unlike the other three pilot program 

contractors, JHAB is not a private company. Instead, JHAB is a “government 

body corporate,” that is, a governmental entity set up within the Town of Jackson 

and County of Teton under Wyoming state statutes. Another distinctive feature 

of this airport is that JHAB hired the airport operator and provided security 

screening services at the Jackson Hole Airport prior to the pilot program. 

2 International Total Services has changed its name to FirstLine Transportation Security. 

Page 6 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
The JHAB was awarded a one year $3.2 million contract to provide private 

screening services at the Jackson Hole Airport. The contract requires 

JHAB to provide all labor, supervision, and management necessary to provide 

screening services at the airport. The contract also contains an option for a 

second year of screening services valued at $3.3 million. As an incentive, the 

contract offers a first and second year award fee of $150,000 if JHAB met 

certain objectives. JHAB’s initial workforce was about 60 screeners, which was 

sufficient to perform both passenger and baggage screening duties. 

Recruiting and Hiring Process 

TSA used assessment centers to screen applicants. Both TSA and the pilot 

program contractors participated in the initial recruitment. Initially, TSA hired 

NCS Pearson Company to establish the assessment centers and test screener 

applicants to determine their eligibility for employment. Once determined 

eligible by NCS Pearson, pilot program contractors could then select their 

employees from among those applicants. Subsequently, TSA replaced NCS 

Pearson Company with Cooperative Personnel Services to administer the 

assessment centers. 

The assessment center process verified U.S. citizenship and educational 

credentials and administered drug, image recognition, and English profi ciency 

tests. Applicants had to meet minimum requirements for basic aptitudes and 

physical abilities as well. 

 Initial Training 

ATSA required all screeners to complete a minimum of 40 hours of classroom 

training and 60 hours of on-the-job training before independently performing 

screening duties. This was a major increase over the previous Federal Aviation 

Administration requirements for airline contracted screeners, who generally 

were required to have 12 hours of classroom training and 40 hours of on-the-job 

training. 

For the initial training of screeners, TSA hired Lockheed Martin to provide the 

training for passenger screening, and Boeing-Siemens to provide the training for 

checked baggage screening. The TSA mobile screening force also provided onthe-job-training at some airports. Currently, Lockheed Martin provides the 40-

hour classroom training for both passenger and checked baggage screening. 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 7 
 Award Fee Methodology 

Under TSA’s contracts with the private contractors, Performance Evaluation Plans 

(PEP) were to be developed by TSA ten calendar days prior to the start of the fi rst 

evaluation period. However, the PEPs were not developed. In lieu of the PEPs, 

TSA devised an award fee plan, based on the statement of work specified in the 

contract to evaluate contractor performance. The award fee plans, however, did 

not include a rating scale to define performance achieved and percentage of award 

fee earned. 

The contracts contained an award fee base period of year one and a two-year 

option period. The contracts provided for the individual contractors to submit 

written self-evaluations to TSA within fifteen days after the evaluation periods. 

These optional self-assessments summarized contractor achievement relating to 

the objectives contained in each contractor’s statement of work. 

The contracts also designate performance monitors, including the Federal Security 

Director (FSD), the Contracting Officers Technical Representative (COTR), the 

Area Director, and the Contracting Officer. Each is required to submit written 

evaluations within fifteen days of the end of an evaluation period. For San 

Francisco, the Deputy FSD is also required to submit an evaluation. At the end 

of each evaluation period, the performance monitors send their evaluations to 

TSA headquarters. The responsible TSA headquarters official for the award fee 

determination is the Acquisition Airport Operations Division Director, who is also 

called the Fee Determining Offi cial (FDO). 

TSA’s Role Limited Opportunities for Identifying 

Program Improvements 

TSA’s tight controls over the program, while apparently not inconsistent with 

congressional intent, prevented pilot program contractors from independently 

addressing hiring, staffing, and training issues to improve effectiveness and 

effi ciency. 

 Hiring Limitations 

The inability to hire screeners independently left pilot program contractors totally 

dependent on TSA to obtain their initial workforce and to backfill any attrition 

during the first year of the contract. Accordingly, the pilot program contractors 

could not effectively address problems with high attrition levels, understaffi ng, 

excessive overtime, or poor employee morale. 

Page 8 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program
Hiring Shortages 

Shortly after the pilot program began, Covenant and ITS experienced high levels 

of attrition. Because of TSA’s high rejection rate for screener applicants, the 

contractors depleted their pools of eligible candidates during the initial hiring. 

Covenant and ITS were unable to backfill the positions as they became vacant in 

the San Francisco and Kansas City airports. As a result, the two contractors were 

understaffed and incurred excessive overtime costs. According to contracting 

officials, screeners were unable to take their requested time off because of the 

shortage, which led to job dissatisfaction. Additionally, due to the extended 

periods of overtime hours worked, the potential existed for deterioration in the 

screeners’ effective detection of security threats. 

The staffing shortage at Kansas City Airport was so severe that, to meet the 

minimum staffing requirements and to ensure airport screening security, TSA 

temporarily deployed 68 federal screeners to two passenger checkpoints and three 

baggage screening areas. The federal screeners were deployed to the Kansas 

City Airport for two months, costing TSA over $1 million. Because of TSA’s 

involvement, the pilot program provided no “lessons learned” on how private 

contractors might independently and better handle the staffing shortages now and 

in the future. 

The third pilot program contractor was affected by seasonal work requirements 

which were not accounted for by the TSA staffing model. The Jackson Hole 

Airport has two periods during the year that have a high influx of passengers, 

greatly increasing the need for additional screeners. JHAB faced diffi culty 

in getting TSA to open an assessment center for its peak season. After many 

requests from JHAB, TSA opened an assessment center barely in time to meet the 

airport’s high season needs. JHAB maintained that, had it been able to perform 

its own hiring like most government contractors, it would have started the hiring 

process much sooner and trained new screeners well before additional staffi ng 

needs arose. 

Applicant Screening 

The TSA assessment process prevented Covenant from hiring applicants whom 

the company believed were qualified to be screeners. During the second round 

of screener recruitment, Covenant pre-screened all the applicants prior to 

sending them to the TSA assessment center. The pre-screening process included 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 9 
interviews with screener supervisors and human resource personnel. In addition, 

Covenant conducted drug, English aptitude, and threat image recognition tests. 

Covenant and local TSA officials believed that Covenant’s pre-screening process 

would increase the assessment center pass rate for the pre-screened applicants. 

So, Covenant officials believed that the 225 applicants they approved and would 

have hired would result in more than enough qualified screeners to fi ll 100 

part-time screener positions. However, only 70 (31 percent) passed the TSA 

assessment process. After the second round of recruitment, Covenant was still 

30 part-time screeners short of its optimum staffing level. Covenant had to wait 

for another TSA initiated assessment center before it could attempt to fi ll the 

remaining vacant positions. 

ITS also pre-screened its second round screener applicants prior to sending them 

to the TSA assessment center. Unlike Covenant’s detailed pre-screening process, 

ITS merely verified applicants’ U.S. citizenship and educational credentials. Of 

the 900 pre-screened applicants whom ITS pre-approved, only 323 (36 percent) 

passed the TSA assessment process. 

According to San Francisco TSA and Covenant officials, the above pass rates (31 

and 36 percent) were consistent with the previous average pass rate of 

30 percent, when less applicant pre-screening, if any, was performed. In attempts 

to improve the applicant pre-screening process, local TSA and Covenant offi cials 

asked TSA headquarters to share its hiring criteria for screeners. However, TSA 

headquarters refused to provide them with the information or to allow Covenant 

to screen and hire applicants on its own.

 Staffi ng Limitations 

In addition to the inability to hire screeners when needed, pilot program 

contractors were unable to staff screeners according to the airports’ varying 

workload demands or to select employees who were best suited for the screener 

positions. 

Staffi ng Levels 

TSA restricted the number of screeners the pilot program could hire to levels 

specified in TSA’s staffing models. TSA established the staffing models in general 

terms and did not take into account each airport’s unique characteristics, such as 

the Jackson Hole Airport seasonal passenger load requirements or Covenant’s 

screener requirements for training, leave, and other “indirect hours” spent on 

Page 10 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
non-operational matters. Consequently, although JHAB and Covenant hired the 

maximum number of screeners allowed by TSA, these contractors believed that 

they needed additional screeners to achieve optimum performance. 

Furthermore, although the TSA pilot contract award press release and the pilot 

program contracts noted a requirement for baggage screening, TSA did not 

include the authorizations for baggage screeners in the initial hiring or staffi ng 

levels. Because pilot program contractors were required to provide checked 

baggage screening, screeners were deployed to perform baggage screening duties 

even though they were hired as passenger screeners. 

Part-time Screeners 

Due to the constraints of the initial TSA staffing model, Covenant believed that 

it was not allowed to hire part-time screeners. With only full-time screeners 

available, the pilot program contractor did not have the flexibility to adjust 

staffing levels to accommodate the airport’s peak and slow periods, resulting in 

excessive downtime during the slow periods and excessive overtime during the 

peak periods. 

After recognizing the need to optimize staffing by accommodating airports’ 

varying passenger loads, TSA began hiring part-time screeners at national airports 

and approved Covenant’s hiring part-time screeners to backfill its continued 

attrition in July 2003. On the other hand, three pilot program contractors had 

been hiring part-time screeners since the beginning of the pilot program. 

Supervisory Positions 

Based on screener applicants’ test results, the assessment center categorized the 

eligible applicants as “screeners,” “lead screeners,” or “screener supervisors.” 

The pilot program contractors hired the screeners and supervisors accordingly. 

However, both the pilot program managers and federalized airport offi cials 

discovered that, in many cases, the applicants selected as supervisors did not 

have the proper supervisory training or experience to meet the needs of the 

position. The lack of proper supervisory training also was identified in a recent 

TSA study on passenger screener performance improvement.3 

3

 Passenger Screener Performance Improvement Study - Performance Analysis Final Report, July 2003. 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 11 
One pilot program contractor interpreted the pilot contract to allow the hiring 

or promotion of only those candidates and screeners who initially qualifi ed as 

“supervisors.” The other three pilot program contractors promoted screeners 

based on their ability or potential to supervise, or their previous supervisory 

experience in screening.

 Training Limitations 

Because TSA controlled and approved all the training for screeners, pilot program 

contractors were not able to meet their training needs in a timely or effi cient 

manner. 

Cross-Training 

Initially, TSA did not provide screeners with training in both passenger and 

checked baggage screening. Instead, TSA provided only passenger screening 

training to those hired as passenger screeners, and checked baggage screening 

training to those hired as baggage screeners. As a result, pilot program 

contractors did not have the ability to cross-utilize the screeners in either 

screening area when needed. Additional training for the baggage screeners had to 

take place during normal daily operations. 

To attain staffi ng flexibility, pilot program contractors, with approval from local 

TSA officials, cross-trained passenger screeners in checked baggage screening 

on their own. After recognizing that cross-training screeners would facilitate 

optimum usage of screeners, local TSA worked in conjunction with pilot program 

contractors to cross-train new screeners in both screening areas after the initial 

training, if necessary. In June 2003, TSA began providing new screeners training 

in both passenger and checked baggage screening at one pilot program airport. 

According to the TSA program manager, TSA plans to implement dual training at 

all airports, including pilot airports, as soon as possible. 

Training Differences 

Inconsistent training also resulted in the inability to cross-utilize screeners. 

A Covenant official discovered that screener performance was inconsistent 

throughout the airport. In the pilot program training official’s opinion, the 

inconsistent screening performance resulted from training differences received 

during the initial TSA on-the-job training process. Consequently, the pilot 

Page 12 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
program contractor was unable to deploy screeners throughout the airport until 

they were able to perform the screening procedures in the same manner. 

Training Standards 

Although TSA believes that ongoing training is critical to maintaining and 

enhancing screener skills, TSA has not set standards for recurrent, remedial, 

or supervisory training to ensure that screeners are effectively trained. 

Comprehensive and frequent training are the key to a screener’s ability to detect 

threat objects. In addition, studies have shown that ongoing training can lead to 

more effective performance and lower turnover rates. Pilot program contractors, 

with the approval of local TSA officials, eventually developed and implemented 

their own recurrent and supervisory training courses to meet their training needs. 

Moreover, to address weaknesses identified as a result of TSA covert testing, 

TSA’s pilot program contractors also provided their own remedial training to 

screeners who failed the covert tests. TSA still needs to develop the standards for 

security training so that all screeners receive appropriate security and supervisory 

training. 

Training Restrictions 

TSA restricted pilot program contractors from providing covert testing of 

screeners as part of screener training. Pilot program contractors believe that 

covert testing is the best way to detect training weaknesses and to measure 

screener performance. So, they wanted to incorporate covert tests into their 

training program. However, TSA allowed only its headquarters staff to perform 

the official covert testing of screeners, which occurred about once a year. 

On the other hand, with the approval of local TSA officials, one airport performed 

covert testing as part of its screeners training program beginning in June 2003. 

A TSA official at that airport said that they requested permission from TSA 

headquarters but received no reply, so they approved it locally. 

TSA required screeners to receive three hours of computer based threat image 

training per week. However, TSA provided only one training software package 

for identifying threat images and did not update the software with new images. 

As a result, screeners eventually memorized the threat images, rendering the 

training software ineffective. To provide screeners with continued effective 

training, pilot program contractors wanted the flexibility to purchase alternative 

training materials. However, TSA controlled the dissemination of training 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 13 
materials. Further, the pilot program budget did not include funds for training 

software. 

Although two pilot program contractors hired in-house training personnel 

specifically to address and administer screener training, TSA prohibited the two 

other pilot program contractors from hiring training coordinators. TSA believed 

that contractor training coordinators would be unnecessary, as they would 

duplicate the efforts of the regional TSA training coordinators for these two 

pilot program airports. Additionally, when asked by the TSA regional training 

coordinator why the pilot program airport could not have a training coordinator, 

TSA headquarters personnel said that all the pilot program contracts had to be 

the same. As a result, these pilot program contractors delegated one screening 

supervisor to act as the training officer in addition to performing normal screening 

duties. The two pilot program contractors are, therefore, dependent on TSA to 

address their daily training needs. 

TSA’s Evaluation of Contractor Performance Needs Improvement 

TSA has not developed or implemented consistent performance standards or 

criteria to monitor, measure, and evaluate the results of the private screener 

performance, or to compare private screener performance against federal screener 

performance. 

 TSA Management and Oversight 

TSA headquarters provided overall policy for the pilot program, but relied on 

local TSA officials to manage and monitor the contractors. However, when local 

officials needed policy decisions or other program guidance from headquarters, 

there was no central point of authority; their requests had to be routed through 

numerous divisions within TSA headquarters to be researched, discussed, and 

finally approved. Consequently, the four pilot program contractors interpreted 

program guidelines differently or received different guidance from TSA on 

similar issues, leading to inconsistencies in operations among the pilot program 

contractors and making comparisons among them diffi cult. 

According to the TSA program manager, TSA does not monitor the pilot program 

routinely at the headquarters level. Instead, TSA relies on the airport FSD for 

monitoring. It is the FSD’s responsibility to inform headquarters of any unusual 

contractor practices. TSA headquarters is involved primarily in developing policy 

Page 14 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
on such issues as hiring and training. However, one problem identified with this 

management structure was that headquarters was not aware of the operational 

differences occurring at each pilot program airport. When asked how these 

operational differences occurred, the program manager said that there has not 

been any formal reporting process from the FSD to the program manager. Some 

TSA airport officials said it was much easier just to make their own decisions 

rather than to contact headquarters. 

Some local TSA officials discussed their frustrations dealing with headquarters. 

They complained that the TSA headquarters was often non-responsive to their 

requests for guidance or that inaccurate guidance was sometimes given. A 

TSA headquarters official admitted that turnover of the contracting offi cer and 

program manager positions contributed to these problems. However, the offi cial 

emphasized these positions have stabilized and recent improvements have been 

made to the program to improve efficiency and oversight. 

Generally, airport operators considered the pilot program a success. They 

believed that the quality of security screening at the airports has improved and 

that screeners were more courteous to passengers than prior airline contracted 

security personnel. However, they believed there was little difference between 

the pilot program airports and the airports with federal screeners because TSA 

controls the hiring, training, and the screener staff levels. The airport operators 

considered the TSA organizational structure to be restricting and confi ning, 

allowing the pilot program contractors little flexibility in managing the program. 

 Performance Evaluation Plans 

TSA failed to establish contract performance evaluation plans (PEP) within stated 

contract time periods. TSA was required under the contracts to establish the PEPs 

unilaterally ten calendar days prior to the start of the first evaluation period. The 

plans were to include the criteria to be used to evaluate each performance area 

and identify the percentage of award fee available for each area. TSA did not 

complete either contract requirement. Instead, TSA evaluated the contractor’s 

performance by using the objectives contained in each contract’s statement 

of work, which were based on each contractor’s proposal. Three of the four 

contracts did not contain measurable performance criteria. A TSA official said that 

the PEP for the contracts were not completed timely due to the nature of the pilot 

program and the hectic environment TSA was under at that time. 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 15 
A TSA program official said that the contract PEPs were delayed originally in 

November 2002 until January 2003 due to the complications of putting together 

a new pilot program. The official added that in February 2003, a draft PEP 

was circulated among the FSDs, COTRs, and the four contractors for review. 

However, the draft PEP was put on hold by TSA headquarters pending the 

program office’s determination as to how best to evaluate the private contractor 

airports and the federally run airports and whether the award fee process would 

affect the evaluations. The PEPs were to be unilaterally established by TSA no 

later than September 30, 2002. As of September 18, 2003, TSA was still in the 

final stages of finalizing PEPs for the pilot program. 

Notwithstanding the lack of PEPs, three airports received award fees prior to 

September 18, 2003. The awards were based on contractor self-assessments 

and input from some, but not all, of the TSA offi cials identified in the contract. 

Two of the three contractors received at least 85% of the maximum award fee 

amount. For the third contractor, the FSD and COTR both recommended to the 

FDO that the contract be terminated at the end of the first year for continuing 

poor performance; however, the FDO awarded the contractor almost $300,000 

in award fees. Due to the significance of the largest award fee for the fourth 

contractor and second round of award fees for the other three contracts scheduled 

in September 2003, the OIG briefed TSA on September 17, 2003, on its fi ndings 

and recommendations concerning award fees. 

The four pilot program contracts were reviewed to identify the pre-established 

performance criteria used in their evaluation. Appendix C contains a summary for 

each contract. 

A TSA official said that TSA was working to ensure that all pilot program 

contracts are uniform and that they contain the same measurable criteria, where 

applicable, in order to evaluate the program and the contractors accurately. By 

implementing corrective action, TSA can better determine the strengths and 

weaknesses of the individual contractors and improve the overall pilot program 

operations.

 Pilot Program Reorganization 

TSA has taken steps to improve the monitoring and oversight of the pilot 

program. On June 9, 2003, TSA announced that numerous changes were being 

made to the pilot program structure following a meeting of the Leadership 

Council on Performance Evaluation. One of the major changes in the structure 

Page 16 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
allows the program office, which includes the program manager, to have greater 

influence regarding program evaluation, strategy, and general management. The 

new structure also created an advisory board comprised of experts from industry 

and academia, to provide external guidance and evaluation. Although the 

structural changes began to occur in June 2003, operational improvements were 

just beginning to take shape in November 2003. 

On September 25, 2003, TSA implemented other positive management and 

oversight changes to the pilot program. Important changes included changing the 

organizational structure for the determination of the pilot program award fee and 

giving the program manager more responsibility for evaluating the pilot program 

contractors’ performance. Prior to that date, the FDO for the contract award fee 

was the acquisition airport operations division director. However, the offi ce of 

acquisitions is involved primarily in administering contracts and typically has 

minimal or no involvement in developing program objectives and goals, setting 

performance criteria, or running day-to-day operations. The FDO position was 

changed to the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Aviation Operations, who is in a 

better position to evaluate overall contractor performance and operations. 

Under the current program manager, pilot program contractors have said that 

there have been noticeable improvements in the pilot program in recent months. 

These improvements include closer TSA headquarters involvement and timely 

answers to contractor questions. Additionally, program communication has been 

strengthened between TSA headquarters and airport level personnel by having 

more meetings to discuss pilot program strategies and working together to solve 

the different problems facing the pilot airports. 

In October 2003, TSA contracted with Bearing Point to develop screening 

performance criteria. These new screening performance criteria should allow 

TSA officials to make a better comparison of the screening effectiveness of 

both the pilot and federal airports. In addition, a TSA official said that TSA was 

working to ensure that all pilot program operations were generally uniform, 

and that it was making program management and oversight changes based on 

recommendations contained in the OIG’s briefing of September 17, 2003, on 

TSA’s pilot program contract practices. 

Other Matters 

The following issues were identified during the OIG’s visits to the pilot 

airports, but were outside the scope of the audit. However, these issues require 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 17 
management attention. These issues include controls over uniforms and badges 

and the referral of selectee passengers to secondary screening. 

Controls over Uniforms and Badges 

One pilot program contractor did not have adequate controls to track the issuance 

and return of uniforms and badges for 35 former employees. An unauthorized 

person could use the uniforms and badges to pose as an employee and gain access 

to secure airport areas. The uniforms and badges were to be returned to the pilot 

program contractor upon an employee’s termination, at which time the program 

contractor would return the badges to the airport aviation department. The pilot 

program contractor said that these former employees could have returned some or 

all of their screener uniforms. 

However, the contractor admitted that it did not maintain adequate records on 

those who returned the uniforms or how many pieces of clothing may have been 

missing. 

TSA did not consider missing screener uniforms and airport badges to be “a 

security risk” because the badges do not provide access to other secure areas, 

only to passenger checkpoints, and security employees have to go through the 

same security checks as all passengers. However, lost uniforms and badges were 

enough of a concern for TSA to issue letters requesting return of the uniforms and 

badges, lest the former pilot program employee face a $10,000 fi ne.

 Referral of Selectee Passengers 

Airline contracted personnel sometimes failed to identify and refer “selectee” 

passengers, i.e., passengers identified by computer requiring automatic second 

screening, to secondary screening operations. TSA Directive Number SD 1544-

01-10V, dated April 9, 2003, places the responsibility on the airline to pre-screen 

passengers entering the security screening checkpoints. 

Prior to ATSA, airline ticket counter personnel identified potential selectees 

to be checked by the airline contractors, who were responsible for passenger 

security. Currently, the airline’s automated ticketing system designates passengers 

as selectees. This is based on pre-determined computerized criteria, which 

are matched against the passengers’ personal information. As a selectee, the 

passenger is automatically required to undergo secondary screening, regardless 

of whether the metal detector alarms during the initial walk through. The airline 

or airline-contracted employees are responsible for identifying all the designated 

Page 18 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
selectees and referring them to federal or pilot program screeners for secondary 

screening. 

At one pilot airport, the airline contracted employee located at the front of the 

security check lane failed to identify three of four selected passengers who entered 

the lane within minutes of each other. Fortunately, a screener noticed the selectee 

designation on the passengers’ boarding passes and referred all four selectees to 

secondary screening. However, the screening supervisor said that screeners are 

not required to check boarding passes and do not usually look out for selectee 

passengers. Moreover, the screeners generally rely on the airline or its contracted 

employee to identify selectees because it is their responsibility. Both local TSA 

officials and private contractor screeners believe that this function should be their 

responsibility so that they could be sure that all passengers selected for secondary 

screening actually undergo such screening. 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 19 
Recommendations 

The OIG recommends that the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for 

Transportation Security Administration: 

Recommendation #1: Develop measurable criteria to compare and evaluate 

the performance of both contractor and federal screening operations. 

Management Comments: In September 2003, a contract modifi cation 

was issued to incorporate the Performance Evaluation Plan (PEP) into 

each contract according to contract clause H.2, PEP, and H.4 Finalization 

of PEP. The PEP covers Operational/Technical, Management/Leadership, 

Contract Management, and Human Resources criteria under which contractor 

performance is evaluated. 

OIG Comments: TSA was partially responsive. TSA developed and issued 

measurements for evaluating contractors’ performance in September 2003; 

however, it did not address the requirement for developing measurable criteria 

for comparing contractors to federal screeners. However, TSA actions taken 

to date, such as the Bearing Point Study and subsequent studies, show efforts 

are being made to measure federal screening performance and compare private 

contractor performance against federal screening performance. TSA should 

address its recent actions and progress in the development of measurements 

for comparing performance in response to this report. 

Recommendation #2: Establish a true passenger and baggage screening 

pilot program that allows greater flexibility for both contractor and federally 

staffed airports to test innovations and new approaches in hiring, training, and 

managing screeners. 

Management Comments: TSA formed a leadership team to address the 

above issues, among others, and provide for greater flexibility in areas such as 

human resources. One such outcome of this effort has been to grant the PP5 

contracting companies the ability to conduct their own recruitment, staffi ng, 

and scheduling. Also, TSA is in the process of giving a greater degree of 

freedom to the private screening companies with regard to assessments and 

training. 

OIG Comments: Management concurred with the recommendation and 

actions planned and being taken should greatly increase flexibility for both the 

contractors and federal screener operations. 

Page 20 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The OIG evaluated the pilot airport program with specific emphasis on: (i) 

TSA’s role in recruiting, hiring, deploying, and training screeners; and (ii) the 

steps taken by TSA to monitor program operations, and measure and evaluate 

contractor performance. During the course of the audit, the OIG identifi ed issues 

relating to the subjectivity of the award fee process that required additional 

audit steps covering TSA’s management of the pilot program contracts. The 

OIG briefed TSA on its findings and recommendations relating to award fees on 

September 17, 2003. 

Audit fieldwork was conducted from April to November 2003, and included audit 

work at San Francisco International Airport, Kansas City International Airport, 

Greater Rochester International Airport, and Jackson Hole Airport. The OIG 

also conducted audit work at TSA headquarters in Arlington, VA and McNeil 

Technologies in Springfield, VA. Further, the OIG conducted audit work at a fi eld 

office for Covenant in San Francisco, CA, and a fi eld office for ITS in Kansas 

City, MO. 

The OIG interviewed federal and pilot program contractor offi cials and 

employees, reviewed the pilot program contractors’ personnel and training 

files, and evaluated security operations at the airports to determine: whether 

pilot program contractor personnel met ATSA hiring and training standards; 

the adequacy of pilot program contractor monitoring of passenger and baggage 

screening operations; and the effectiveness of security procedures and operations 

of pilot program contractor personnel. In addition, the OIG reviewed and 

evaluated the four contracts to determine whether: TSA had developed and 

implemented uniform pre-established performance criteria; the performance 

criteria were measurable; contract performance milestones were enforced; and 

there were any unusual contract practices relating to the award fee process. 

Additionally, the OIG selected a 20% judgmental sample of screener fi les from 

each contractor, except Jackson Hole where a 100% review was performed, 

to determine compliance with the applicant screening factors. Finally, to gain 

insight into and knowledge about the pilot program, the OIG reviewed Public 

Law 107-71, also known as the Aviation and Transportation Security Act; TSA 

standard operating procedures relating to passenger screening, baggage screening, 

and on the job training procedures; TSA press releases on the subject of airport 

security and the pilot program; prior audits of the screener security program, 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 21 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodologys 

including contract oversight; and various congressional reports on the subject of 

aviation security. 

This review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

Page 22 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Appendix B 

Chronology of Events 

The following is a chronology of events related to the TSA Passenger and 

Baggage Screening Pilot program. 

Sep. 11, 2001 Attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon occurs. 

Nov. 19, 2001 Public Law 107-71 creates TSA and requires a pilot program 

where the screening of passengers and property will be 

performed by private screening parties. 

Dec. 19, 2001 TSA established airport security screener qualifi cation 

standards. 

Jan. 18, 2002 TSA airport security screener training plan was developed. 

Feb. 17, 2002 TSA begins to pay for contract passenger screening services. 

Seventy-four third-party security screener contracts were 

assumed from airlines. 

Feb. 22, 2002 49 CFR-Chapter XII – 

Establishes PART 1544.405, New screeners: Qualifi cations of 

screening personnel. 

Establishes PART 1544.407, New screeners: Training, 

testing, and knowledge of individuals who perform screening 

functions. 

Establishes PART 1544.409, New screeners: Integrity of 

Screener test. 

Establishes PART 1544.411, New screeners: Continuing 

qualifications for screening personnel. 

Jun. 18, 2002 TSA announces that five airports would be participating in the 

pilot program. 

Sep. 30, 2002 Reason Public Policy Institute issues Improving Airport 

Passenger Screening study that recommends expanding the 

number of pilot program airports from 5 to 40, which in turn 

would reduce TSA requirements for hiring and training by 25 

percent. 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 23 
Appendix B 

Chronology of Events 

Oct. 10, 2002 TSA awards contracts for the Private Screening Pilot Program 

at Kansas City, MO; Rochester, NY; Jackson Hole, WY; San 

Francisco, CA; and Tupelo, MS airports. 

Nov. 19, 2002 Start of pilot program screening for passengers at airports. 

Dec. 31, 2002 Start of pilot program screening for baggage at airports. 

May 18, 2003 First contract award fee evaluation period that began in October 

10, 2002, ends. Each pilot program contractor becomes 

eligible for award fee; however, only McNeil and JHAB 

receive their award fees. ITS’ award fee extended to June 30, 

2003, and Covenant until August 18, 2003. 

Jun. 9, 2003 TSA restructures organization of pilot program. 

Jul. 11, 2003 TSA issues press release approving the hiring of part-time 

screeners at Federalized and pilot program airports. 

Oct 1, 2003 Bearing Point contract issued. 

Oct. 1, 2003 Due date for TSA to report to Congress - HR Report 

108-169 directs TSA to report to Congress on the advantages or 

disadvantages of the contract screening. 

Nov. 18, 2003 Revised second award fee period ends. Each pilot program 

contractor is eligible for remainder of first year award fee 

earned since end of first award fee period, as well as any 

unearned amount carryover not earned from first award fee 

period. 

Page 24 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Appendix C 

Contract Performance Criteria

 Pre-Established Contract Performance Criteria 

The following is a summary of the pilot program contracts award fee evaluation 

criteria. 

Covenant 

According to the contract, the award fee evaluation criteria are to be fi nalized 

by the government and the contractor within thirty days after contract award. 

Therefore, these criteria should have been established by November 9, 2002, for 

all four contracts. However, it was not until May 5, 2003, that TSA fi nalized 

the first award fee criteria for Covenant. The criteria primarily identifi ed the 

contractor responsibilities, as listed in the statement of work. The criteria failed 

to identify any specific performance standards and did not identify specifi c 

performance goals or milestones. The contract required Covenant to provide to 

TSA clear criteria, acceptable measurement methodologies, and criteria weighting 

values within the first six-month performance period. There is no evidence that 

Covenant complied with this requirement or that TSA tried to enforce this contract 

requirement. Covenant did, however, submit the optional self-assessment. 

ITS 

On May 5, 2003, contract modification number five was issued, identifying the 

award fee criteria as ITS delivery of security screening services and performance 

of activities as defined and developed by the contractor on an attached activity list. 

The criteria primarily identified the contractor responsibilities and areas in which 

the contactor should focus attention, including basic start-up responsibilities. 

However, the criteria failed to identify any specific performance standards and 

identify specific performance goals or milestones. 

The activities list contained 36 items, many of which had no bearing on the actual 

performance of the screeners. Pilot program evaluation activities on the list 

included hiring a payroll administrator and controller, having someone to review 

and implement expense controls, and offering customer care cards. 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 25 
Appendix C 

Contract Performance Criteria 

McNeil Technologies 

On May 14, 2003, TSA finalized the first period award fee criteria for 

McNeil Technologies. The criteria contained eight specifi c performance 

objectives with standards to measure progress towards meeting stated 

goals. In addition, each of the eight performance objectives had an 

assigned percentage for the award fee value. Six of the eight objectives 

contained criteria to evaluate performance. A TSA official was asked 

why McNeil Technologies was the only pilot program contractor 

having specific award fee criteria. The official explained that McNeil 

Technologies developed and wrote their own award fee criteria in their 

contract proposal, which was then incorporated in the original contract, 

dated October 10, 2002. The TSA official was also asked why the award 

fee criteria was not finalized until May 2003, when the criteria was 

available for review seven months earlier. The official said that the pilot 

program required numerous issues to be addressed quickly, and this issue 

was not addressed. 

JHAB 

On April 18, 2003, TSA finalized the first award fee criteria for the JHAB. 

The contract criteria were based on the delivery of security screening 

services. The award fee criteria contained performance evaluation factors 

with award fee percentages for each category. However the standards to 

evaluate accomplishments were vague and subjective. For example, one 

objective was control of indirect costs, yet no standards were identifi ed 

that set acceptable levels of cost control. 

Page 26 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Appendix D 

Management Comments 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 27
Appendix D 

Management Comments 

Page 28 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Appendix D 

Management Comments 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 29
Appendix D 

Management Comments 

Page 30 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Appendix D 

Management Comments 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 31
Appendix E 

OIG Analysis of Management’s Comments 

Recommendation # 1: Develop measurable criteria to compare and evaluate the performance of 

both contractor and federal screening operations. 

TSA was partially responsive. TSA developed and issued measurements for evaluating contractors’ 

performance in September 2003. This should enhance the ability of TSA to determine appropriate award 

fee amounts for contractor performance. The OIG agrees with TSA’s assertion that the contract allowed 

for unilateral establishment of award fee criteria. However, prior to September 2003, the award criteria 

in place were not measurable for three of the four contracts. For example, for one of the three contracts, 

the criterion was a list of basic contractor tasks, including hiring a comptroller. The current monthly 

review by the Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program’s Office is one of many steps being taken 

to centralize headquarters oversight and should help to improve the pilot program. 

TSA’s comments did not address the requirement for developing measurable criteria for comparing 

contractors to federal screeners. However, TSA actions taken to date, such as the Bearing Point Study 

and subsequent studies, show efforts are being made to measure federal screening performance and to 

compare private contractor performance against federal screening performance. TSA should address its 

recent actions and progress in the development of measurements for comparing performance in response 

to this report. 

Recommendation 2: Establish a true passenger and baggage screening pilot program that allows 

greater flexibility for both contractor and federally staffed airports to test innovations and new 

approaches in hiring, training, and managing screeners. 

Management concurred with the recommendation and actions planned and being taken should greatly 

increase flexibility for both the contractors and federal screener operations. TSA has formed a 

leadership team to address flexibility in the hiring, training, and managing screeners. TSA comments 

listed in Appendix D provides examples of progress already being made at PP5 airports. 

Training Limitations: TSA implementation of the TSA Approved Instructor program should help in 

correcting many of the issues addressed in the report. This is another example of the fl exibility TSA is 

providing contractors and federal screeners. As for the comments on “cross training” availability, the 

OIG fully recognizes the urgency that TSA faced in taking over screening services at national airports. 

The delay in which PP5 airports began implementing the cross training could have been caused by many 

factors including misinterpretation of guidance on the part of the contractors. However, contractors 

wanted cross training and believed it would have been beneficial had cross training been available from 

the beginning. 

Training Differences: This issue was attributed to the contractor’s pilot program training offi cial. 

However, the comment made by TSA that it was the responsibility of each private screening contractor 

to monitor on-the-job training is incorrect. According to the TSA SOPs dated April 4, 2003, for 

Page 32 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Appendix E 

OIG Analysis of Management’s Comments 

Passenger Screeners and April 1, 2003, for Baggage Screeners, the airport level FSD is responsible 

for the screener workforce. The FSD is responsible for coordinating the hand off between trainees 

coming out of the 40-hour classroom training and into the pilot program airport for the 60-hour OJT. 

FSDs are also responsible for tracking and recording all OJT information required by TSA. At the end 

of the 60 hours of OJT, TSA screening managers must review each trainee’s performance and certify 

a record of completion provided in the SOP. The OIG agrees that the frequent changes to standard 

operating procedures could have caused the training differences. However, the changes are a TSA issue 

not a contractor controlled issue. In addition, although TSA used the same training curriculum, the 

initial trainers and Mobile Screening Force implemented the procedures differently depending on their 

individual experience. 

Training Standards: The OIG’s portrayal was accurate at the time of the audit. TSA “recurrent” 

training guidance was issued in December 2003, which was after the fieldwork was completed in 

November 2003. As stated in this report, pilot program contractors, with the approval of local TSA 

officials, eventually developed and implemented their own recurrent and supervisory training courses to 

meet their training needs. The types of recurrent training implemented varied among the pilot program 

contractors. Moreover, to immediately address TSA operational test failures, pilot program contractors 

also provided their own remedial training to screeners who failed the operational tests. Finally, as stated 

in the TSA response under “Clarifications,” TSA said that this training problem existed during the audit 

fieldwork, but no longer existed after recertification of screeners was completed in March 2004. 

Even though the TSA response states that it is the contractor’s responsibility for supervisory training, 

GAO, in a report from September 2003, pointed out that TSA was sending screener supervisors to the 

basic United States Department of Agriculture supervisor’s course until it could develop its own training 

for supervisors. TSA expected to implement the screener supervisory training in April 2004. Therefore, 

based on all these facts, the OIG believes its portrayal was accurate. 

Screener Assessment: TSA comments reinforce the position that TSA will continue to control when 

hiring will take place, not the private contractor. As the response states, it is TSA who “requests” the 

assessment centers and thus determines when the hiring process will begin. The comments go on to say 

even under the new program, the PP5 airports are not given more input. However, TSA also states that 

future opt-out airports will have more fl exibility. 

Training Restrictions: TSA is correct in their assertion that the interim guidance requires three hours 

of remedial training for screeners who failed covert testing. The OIG did not take exception to that fact. 

The OIG addresses the TSA restriction on contractors who wanted to perform their own covert testing 

to evaluate their screening capabilities. The OIG also addresses the ability of screeners to memorize the 

computer-based test that is given to meet the 3-hour requirement. TSA said in meetings with the OIG 

that they disapproved of local covert testing because the testing could raise the level of concern of the 

traveling public if something were to go wrong. As for the X-ray Tutor program implemented in March 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 33 
Appendix E 

OIG Analysis of Management’s Comments 

2004, this is another example of the program manager’s efforts to improve operations and the 

OIG welcomes these improvements. 

JHAB Statement Correction: This report merely restates JHAB personnel’s belief that more 

screeners were needed to meet optimum performance at the airport. TSA may be correct in its 

assessment that 63 screeners provide optimum screening performance at Jackson Hole. However, 

the main point is that the contractor could not or did not hire the number of screeners that it 

would have if the contractor was making its own decisions. Regardless of whether Jackson 

Hole hired the maximum number of screeners allowed, both Jackson Hole and Covenant at the 

time believed that they needed more screeners than were approved by TSA to achieve optimum 

screening performance. 

Page 34 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 
Appendix F 

Major Contributors to this Report 

John A. Richards, Supervisory Auditor 

John E. Carnahan, Auditor 

Helen K. Wong, Auditor 

Donald Emery, Auditor 

James Nelson, Auditor 

Gale Dwyer, Auditor 

Gregory Huff, Auditor 

Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program Page 35 
Appendix G 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

The Secretary Secretary 

The Deputy Secretary 

Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security 

General Counsel 

Chief of Staff 

Office of Public Affairs 

DHS OIG Liaison 

Transportation Security Administration 

Assistant Secretary 

Assistant Administrator for Transportation Security Policy 

Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Homeland Security Branch Chief 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Aviation 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

Page 36 Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program 

Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.