Filed 7/24/14 P. v. Grace CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
DAVID JERMAINE GRACE, JR. et al.,
Defendant and Appellant. B249353
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA085315)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County, Candace Beason, Judge. Affirmed. Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant, David Jermaine Grace. Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointmen t by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Ramon Robert Wright. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorn ey General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys Gene ral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Appellants Ramon Robert Wright a nd David Germaine Grace were each convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first degree residential burglary in
violation of Penal Code 1 section 459 and one count of co nspiracy to commit burglary in violation of section 182, subdivision (a)(1). Following appellants’ wa iver of their jury trial rights, the trial court found true the a llegations that each had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction within the mean ing of sections 667 a nd 1170.12 (the Three Strikes law). The court sentenced appellant Grace to a total term of 13 years in state prison. Appellant Wright, who was on proba tion at the time of the current offenses, received a total term of 18 year s, 4 months in state prison. Appellants appeal from the judgment of conviction, contending there is
insufficient evidence to support their convictions. We affirm the judgment.

Facts On January 17, 2012, at about 9:15 a.m ., Harry Yasuda and his wife left their home at 1274 Ridgecrest Street in Monterey Park. At about 9:15 or 9:20 a.m., Darwin Sen, who lived at 1083 Ri dgecrest, noticed a metallic orange car heading up the street at about forty miles per hour. Fifteen or twenty minutes later, Sen noticed the car go by again. About ten minutes later, Sen called 911. He told the operator that a 2010 or 2011 meta llic orange Dodge Charger with out-of-state license plates was driving around the neig hborhood and had driven down Ridgecrest twice in a fifteen minute span. Sen also told the 911 operator that there had previously been some burglaries in the neighborhood. At 10:36 a.m., Monterey Park Poli ce Department Officer Danny Salazar responded to Sen’s 911 call. As Officer Sa lazar drove north on Ri dgecrest, he saw an orange Dodge Charger parked just north of th e Yasuda residence. Kiara Camacho was in the driver’s seat, and the engine was runn ing. Sen later identified Camacho from a photographic line-up at the driver of the car he had seen and reported. Officer Salazar

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.3 went up to the car and began talking to Camacho. Her cell phone began to ring continuously. Later, when the car was search ed, police found two flathead screwdrivers
and a box cutter in the trunk. These tools ar e often used by burglars to pry open windows

or screens or to cut screens. Other police officers came to the area. Officer Arthur Rousseau arrived at about 10:45 a.m. and began checking h ouses for signs of possible bur glaries. At the Yasuda residence at 1274 Ridgecrest, he saw an op en bathroom window from which the screen
had been removed. He then saw that a slid ing glass door at the rear of the house was partially open, and a screwdriver was on the fl oor beside it. While Officer Rousseau was investigating, Yasuda returned home. Ya suda inspected the house, noted that the
contents of chests of draw ers had been dumped out, and discovered that three watches
and some collectible silver dollars were miss ing. One of the watches was a gold-plated
Seiko. Motorcycle Officer Jay Silverman came to the area at abou t the same time as Officer Rousseau, and saw appellant Wright, wh om he believed to be a potential suspect. Officer Silverman approached appellant Wright and asked to speak with him. Appellant Wright walked away, crossing the street toward appellant Grace. When Officer
Silverman walked toward the two men, they moved away and began to run. The men entered a parking lot. Officer Silverman cal led Officer Peter Palomino and told him two suspects were running away from him thro ugh the parking lot at 1576 Monterey Pass
Road toward the 7-Eleven stor e at 1600 Monterey Pass Road. Officer Palomino looked in the parking lot of the 7-Eleven store and saw appellant Wright standing on top of a dumpster. Appella nt Wright then climbed up to the roof. Officer Palomino opened the lid of the dump ster and found appellant Grace inside. Appellant Wright eventually came down from the roof. A gold Seiko watch was found in appellant Wright’s pocket.
Officer Rousseau showed th e watch found in appellant Wright’s pocket to Yasuda, and Yasuda responded th at it was his. At trial, Yasuda put the watch on his wrist and showed that it fit him perfectly.4 Sen later made a partial identification of appellant Grace as the front seat passenger of the car he had seen. Se n did not identify ap pellant Wright. Telephone records show ed that appellants called or attempted to call each other six times between 6:59 a.m. and 7:33 a.m. on the day of the burglary. Appellant Grace and Camacho exchanged text messages as early as 7:30 a.m. In one message, Camacho asked: “[W]e going in your car or mine.” Between 10:07 a.m. and 10:37 a.m., the approximate time of the burglary, appellants ma de or attempted to make nine calls to
each other. While appellant Wright was in a courthouse lockup cell, he made a telephone call which was recorded by the Los Angeles County Jails’ Inmate Telephone Monitoring System. Appellant Wright said: “I can beat it, I can really beat it. Cause they don’t have no witnesses saying we was in that house, th ey don’t have no evidence saying we was in - - - no evidence proving we was in that house. I got my stuff down on paper what I’m gonna give to my attorney to pull up the stuff because for a burglary you need these six
facts that’s for sure to make it a burglary . . . so I have to get that dropped. And I need that girl to come to court and say what she say. And if she say something different we
can cross-examine her out and th en they won’t be ab le to use nothing she talking about. And then all they would have was that wa tch. That watch would be county time, receiving stolen property, and tim e served or something. A few months later, appellant Grace ma de a telephone call from North County Correctional Facility which was recorded. Ap pellant Grace said: “You want to talk about motive? That’s your motiv e. That’s why people steal. Right? They don’t steal, some people - - most people, they steal for financial reasons , money. [¶] I don’t have a big brother to teach me or te ll me to do this or that. Basically, I’m doing everything for you. I am fighting time. I’m doing all this [t ype] of shit so I can tell you not to do it. [¶] It ain’t for me. It ain’t for nobody. And it took this last time to see, damn, this ain’t for me. The money, all this money shit ai n’t worth it, it ain’t worth it at all.”5 Discussion Appellants contend there is no evidence th at they entered the Yasuda residence,
and so there is insufficient evidence to support their convictions for burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary. We do not agree. There is substantial circumstantial evidence linking appellants to the conspiracy and the burglary. “‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficien cy of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it disclo ses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasona ble doubt.” [Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of ever y fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] The same standard of revi ew applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence a nd to special circumstance allegations. [Citation.] “[I]f the circumst ances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” [Cita tion.] We do not reweigh evidence or
reevaluate a witness’s cred ibility. [Citations.]’” ( People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210.)

1. Burglary The crime of burglary consists of the unl awful entry into a build ing with the intent to commit a felony or theft. ( People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 10 27, 1041; §459.) If the building is an inhabited dwelling, the burglar y is in the first degree. (§ 460, subd. (a).

a. Appellant Wright Appellant Wright was found in possession of Yasuda’s recently stolen watch near the location of the burglary. “When . . . a defendant is found in po ssession of property stolen in a burglary shortly after the burglary occurred, the corro borating evidence of the defendant’s acts,6 conduct, or declarations tending to show hi s guilt need only be slight to sustain the burglary convictions. [Citations.]” ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 176.) Appellant Wright did not live in the area, a nd had no apparent reason to be there. Further, telephone records suggest that his pr esence in the area was not just random chance, but a planned trip with appellant Gr ace and Camacho. Camacho’s car had tools
in it which could be used for burglary. Thus, the circumstances of appellant Wright’s presence in the area had a slight tendency to show guilt. When police tried to speak with appellant Wright, he fled, which supports an inference of consciousness of guilt. Late r, while awaiting trial, appellant Wright implicitly acknowledged that the watch was st olen, stating: “And then all they would
have was that watch. That wa tch would be county time, receiv ing stolen property . . . .”
He also stated that he woul d “beat the rap” because the prosecutor did not have any
evidence he was in the house rather than stating that he would win because he was innocent. Viewing the eviden ce in the light most favorab le to the judgment, these
statements can be reasona bly understood as showing a consciousness of guilt. Appellant Wright’s possession of the recen tly stolen watch near the burglarized residence, together with the circumstances surrounding his presence in the area and his acts and statements showing c onsciousness of guilt, is sufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction. We do not agree with appella nt Wright that the evidence is insufficient to show that the watch in his pocket belonged to Yasuda because the wa tch was mass-produced with no distinctive markings. The watch matched the descri ption Yasuda gave to police before appellants were detain ed. When shown the watch by police, Yasuda said it was
his. Yasuda testified that he had receive d the watch as a pres ent for his 45th wedding anniversary and so had had the watch for well over ten years. He showed the jury that the watch fit him “perfectly.” It is more than reasonable to infe r that the watch was
Yasuda’s watch. It is much less reasonable to infer that the ten year old watch belonged to twenty year old appellant Wright, who ju st happened to be carrying it in his pocket7 when detained by police near the location where Yasuda’s identical watch was stolen and
within a short time afte r the theft occurred.

b. Appellant Grace No stolen property was fou nd on appellant Grace. Th ere is, however, substantial
evidence to show that he aided and abetted appellant Wright in the commission of the burglary. “‘A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purp ose of the perpetrator, (ii) a nd with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or en couraging commission of the crim e, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigat es the commission of the crime.’” ( People v.
Culuko (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 326-327.) Aiding and abe tting a general intent crime does not requires a specific intent. ( People v. Torres (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 763, 770.) “The aider and abettor may have only the va guest idea of the precise ‘act’ by which the perpetrator will commi t the crime.” ( People v. Culuko, supra , 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 327.) “Among the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presen ce at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” ( In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094.) Here, all three factors support a finding that appella nt Grace aided and abetted appellant Wright in the commission of the burglary. Appellant Grace was discovered near the sc ene of the burglary around the time the burglary occurred. Appellant Grace’s involve ment with appellant Wright began before the burglary and conti nued until the men were arrested by police. Appellants called or attempted to call each six times between 6:59 a. m. and 7:33 a.m. This activity supports an inference of planning, particularly when considered with appellant Grace’s contemporaneous texts with Camacho abou t transportation. Appellants called or attempted to call each other nine times betw een 10:02 a.m. and 10:37 a.m., during the estimated time of the commission of a burglar y. These calls support an inference that appellant Grace was acting as a look-out, or in some other support role. Once police8 arrived at the scene, appellants fled from police together, supporting an inference of consciousness of guilt.

2. Conspiracy “A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and another person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific
intent to commit the elements of that offens e, together with proof of the commission of an overt act ‘by one or more of the parties to such agreement’ in furtherance of the conspiracy.” ( People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 41 6.) The commission of the target offense in furtherance of the conspi racy satisfies the overt act requirement. ( People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 121.) “The act of one conspirator is the act of all. Each is respon sible for everything done by his coconspirators, in cluding those things that follo w as the probable and natural consequences of the executi on of the conspiracy.” ( People v. Zacarias (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 652, 657.) “To prove an agreement, it is not necessary to establish the parties met and expressly agreed; rather, ‘a criminal conspira cy may be shown by dir ect or circumstantial evidence that the parties positively or tac itly came to a mutual understanding to accomplish the act and unlawful design.’” ( People v. Vu (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1025.) There is ample circumstantial evidence to support appellants’ convictions for conspiracy to commit burglary. As we discuss, above, there is substa ntial evidence to sh ow that appellants committed a burglary. This same evidence is sufficient to sh ow a pre-existing conspiracy to commit that burglary Appellants made repeated phone calls to ea ch other on the morn ing of the burglary and at the same time appellant Grace wa s exchanging texts with Camacho about transportation. Camacho and appellant Grac e were observed drivin g around Yasuda’s neighborhood before the time of the burglary. Appellant Wright was later found on foot9 in the same area. None of th e three lived in the area or had any apparent reason to be
there. It is more than reasona ble to infer that the three agre ed to come to the area for a specific purpose.
Camacho’s car contained a box cutter a nd two flathead screwdrivers, which are often used by burglars. This supports an inference that appe llants came to the area for the purpose of committing a burglary. 2 Appellants called or attempted to call each other nine times during the period of the burglary, again suggesting coordinated and preplanned
action. As we discuss abov e, the evidence shows the men did commit a burglary, thus satisfying the overt act requirement. Appellant Wright relies on People v. Powers-Monachello (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 400 for the proposition that me re association prior to an offense is not sufficient to establish a conspiracy to comm it the offense. Appellant Wright is certainly correct that mere association is not sufficient to prove a conspiracy, but more than mere association was present here. As we discuss, appellants both went to the location of the burglary at the same time, both remained in the area during the time the bur glary was committed, they communicated or attemp ted to communicate with each other during the time the burglary was being committed and both fled th e scene together when police arrived. The coordinated nature of appellants’ behavior supports a reasonable inference that the behavior was agreed upon in advance.

2 Although the tools remained in the car during the Yasuda burglary, it appears that no tools were needed to force entry into the Yasuda residence.10 Disposition The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MINK, J. *

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

KRIEGLER, J.

* Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superi or Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.