In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2040

CHARLES H. BUDDE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KANE COUNTY FOREST PRESERVE,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:06-cv-01165—Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 13, 2010—DECIDED MARCH 4, 2010

Before BAUER, MANION and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Charles Budde, the police chief

for the Kane County Forest Preserve District (the “District”), sued his former employer, claiming that it discriminated against him on the basis of his disability,

alcoholism. The district court entered summary judgment for the District. We affirm.
2 No. 09-2040

I. BACKGROUND

Charles Budde decided to drive home after drinking

four or five glasses of wine at the Moose Lodge. He rearended another car, sending both the driver and passenger

to the hospital. Budde was found to have a blood alcohol

level of .23, nearly three times the legal limit in Illinois.

Monica Meyers, the District’s executive director and

Budde’s immediate supervisor, initially placed Budde on

paid administrative leave and subsequently terminated

him. At the time of his termination, Budde’s driver’s

license had been revoked as a result of the accident, but

he had not yet been convicted of driving under the influence. The termination letter stated, in part:

The decision to terminate your employment was

based on a number of factors all of which independently would justify your termination. Those factors

include a pattern of errors in judgment on your part,

your inability to perform your duties as Director of

Public Safety due to the suspension of your driving

privileges, and engaging in conduct that is below

the standard expected for this position.

Following his termination, Budde filed suit, contending

that the District violated the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) by discriminating against him because of

his disability when they fired him; by failing to accommodate his alcoholism; and by retaliating against him

for requesting a reasonable accommodation. The District

moved for summary judgment on all of Budde’s claims.

In granting the motion, the district court concluded

that Budde was barred from recovering under the ADA
No. 09-2040 3

because he was terminated for his misconduct, not

because he had a disability. The district court found that

the drunk driving accident was the foundation for the

three reasons Meyers gave for Budde’s termination. Budde

v. Kane County Forest Pres., 603 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142-43

(N.D. Ill. 2009). Even assuming that he was disabled, the

district court found Budde was not a “qualified individual with a disability” entitled to protection under

the ADA because he violated clearly established work

rules. Id. at 1143. Specifically, the district court concluded

that Budde violated the Standard Operating Procedure

(“SOP”) that stated “all employees and members of the

Department . . . may be made subject of disciplinary

action” for violating “any Federal, State, County, or

Municipal law.” Id. at 1142. The district court noted that

the ADA “neither prevents employers from holding

persons suffering from alcoholism . . . [to] reasonable

rules of conduct, nor protects alcoholics from the consequences of their own misconduct.” Id. (citation omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts and reasonable inferences in Budde’s favor. Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d

598, 602 (7th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is proper if

the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures, and

affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact

such that the District is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c).
4 No. 09-2040

In order to prevail on his discrimination claim, Budde

must first establish that he is a “qualified individual with

a disability.” Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th

Cir. 2001). A “qualified individual with a disability” is

someone who (1) satisfies the requisite skill, experience,

education, and other job-related requirements of his

employment position, and (2) can perform the essential

functions of the position held or desired, with or without

reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). Budde’s

claim fails because, as a result of his misconduct, he

cannot perform essential job functions in that he

(1) failed to comply with universal workplace rules and

(2) could not perform an essential job function in that

he was unable to operate a motor vehicle due to his

suspended driver’s license.

Violation of a workplace rule, even if it is caused by a

disability, is no defense to discipline up to and including

termination. Pernice v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 783, 785

(7th Cir. 2001). Where the misconduct at issue involves

a plaintiff’s off-duty criminal behavior, an employer

is not required to wait for the outcome of a criminal

adjudication and/or have proof beyond a reasonable

doubt before it can impose discipline. Id. at 784.

Based on the record, we find that there were sufficient

facts for Meyers to believe that Budde’s misconduct

constituted a violation of the District’s SOPs, which

warranted his termination. He violated both the SOP that

prohibited officers from being publicly intoxicated, as

well as the SOP that prohibited employees from

violating public laws. As police chief, the District could
No. 09-2040 5

reasonably expect Budde to refrain from engaging in

unlawful activities. We agree with the district court that

in choosing to drive while intoxicated and causing a

crash that sent two people to the hospital, he failed to

comply with the workplace rules, and Budde was no

longer qualified to perform his job as police chief.

In addition, both the District and Budde agree that one

of Budde’s essential job functions was the ability to

operate a vehicle: Budde was the police chief who

authored General Order 92-09, stating that the ability

to operate a vehicle is an essential job function, and the

District provided Budde with a police car to use at all

times. Appellant’s Br. at 13-14. The District argues that

Budde was not “qualified” because, as a result of his

misconduct, his driver’s license was suspended and

he could not operate a vehicle. In contrast, Budde argues

that “the ability to operate a vehicle” is different from

“hav[ing] a valid driver’s license.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.

We do not find Budde’s attempt to draw a distinction

persuasive. The only logical reason to require the police

chief to have the ability to operate a vehicle is so that

he can, in fact, drive the vehicle. And under Illinois

law, “no person shall drive a motor vehicle unless he

holds a valid license, permit, or restricted driving permit.” Illinois Driver Licensing Law, 625 Ill. Comp. Stat.

5/6-101. Budde’s inability to operate a vehicle is not the

result of his disability; it is a consequence of choosing

to drive his car after consuming four or five glasses

of wine.

The District terminated Budde because of his misconduct, not due to discrimination. Budde was not “quali-
6 No. 09-2040

fied” to perform his job as police chief, based on his

failure to comply with workplace rules and his inability

to operate a vehicle. Budde’s claims for failure to accommodate and retaliation for seeking an accommodation

are also without merit.

III. CONCLUSION

Budde failed to conform to workplace rules and, as a

consequence, was no longer qualified to perform an

essential function of his job as police chief. We therefore

AFFIRM the district court’s granting of summary judgment.

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