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The SIGINT Satellite Story 

by 

Major General David D. Bradburn, US Air Force (Retired) 

Colonel John 0. Copley, US Air Force (Retired) 

Raymond B. Potts, National Security Agency (Retired) 

National Security Agency (Retired) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

- -`1‘''93°141nitia: 

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BYE-9197/94 

December 1994 

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Information contained in this report is classified, controlled, and 

eligible for foreign release in accordance with the CIO Imagery 

Policy Series. 

National Security Unauthorized disclosure 

Information subject to criminal sanctions 

Dissemination Control 

Abbreviations 

NF (NOFORN) 

NC (NOCONTRACT) 

PR (PROPLN) 

OC (ORCON) 

Re! 

WN (WNINTEL) 

Not releasable to foreign nationals 

Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants 

Caution—proprietary information involved 

Dissemination and extraction of information controlled 

by originator 

This information has been authorized for release to . . . 

Warning notice—intelligence sources or methods involved 

I. 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

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Chapter 2. Early SIGINT Satellite Organization, 

Preface 

Chapter 1. Introduction 

Dedications 

I 

i up ecrei 

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-4. 

.., 

...ii.; , , ontents 

Development, and Evolution 15 

WS-117L Under ARDC and ARPA 15 

Evolution of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 22 

Evolution of the National Security Agency (NSA). 24 

Resolution of NRO and NSA Roles and Missions 29 

Chapter 3. The Navy Program (Program C) 37 

The DYNO Concept 37 

GRAB/DYNO-1 Development 41 

GRADDYNO Program Launches 45 

The POPPY Project 50 

68 

Chapter 4. The Air Force WS-117L-Derived Projects 75 

SAMOS E-1/F-1 (WS-117L and Project 102) 75 

The F-2 and F-3 Thor-Boosted Projects: 102, 698BK, and 770 83 

MULTIGROUP Launches 99 

STRAWMAN Launches 111 

Chapter 5. The Air Force AFTRACK 119 

The Origins of Quick Reaction SIGINT in Space 119 

The AFTRACK Program 123 

138 

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SIGINT Data Processing and Exploitation 

Mission Requirements 

Imaging and Signals Intelligence Space SyStems 

Early History 

xi 

ix 

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Chapter 6. 167 

167 

169 

183 

187 

191 

Chapter 7. 197 

197 

199 

213 

216 

Chapter 8. 223 

223 

226 

240 

246 

Chapter 9. Conclusions and Accomplishments 255 

The SIGINT Satellite System Mix as of 1975 

and Why It Was Effective 255 

The NRO Program Offices as Managers of Satellite Projects 257 

NRO and NSA Working Together 263 

Concluding Thoughts 268 

Appendix A. Role of Digital Computing in SIGINT 

Satellite Collection Systems 271 

Appendix B. SIGINT Satellite Contributions to Understanding 

Soviet ABM/AES Radar System Capabilities 283 

Appendix C. Soviet and Chinese Radar and 

Communications Signals 291 

Appendix D. SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 295 

Appendix E. Full-Text References 313 

Appendix F. About the Authors 385 

Appendix G. Acronyms and Abbreviations 389 

Appendix H. Index .397 

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nicyoepeconi m 

Figures 

Development of SIGINT EOB operational capability. 12 

Evolution of organizations involved in SIGINT satellite programs . . .33 

POPPY operational concept 38 

POPPY launch configuration 44 

Flight summary: Program C. Project POPPY satellites 61 

Key accomplishments, Project POPPY 67 

. STRAWMAN operational concept 76 

Typical injection trajectory, Project 698BK and 770 94 

STRAWMAN payload vehicle 102 

105 

Flight summary: Program A, Agena-based 

low-orbit SIGINT satellites 108 

Key accomplishments, Agena-based prime payloads 113 

124 

Flight summary: Program A, Project AFTRACK 

SIGINT payloads 133 

Key accomplishments, Agena AFTRACK payloads 138 

139 

144 

147 

154 

159 

162 

168 

177 

184 

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191 

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Photographs 

The first four Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office xvii 

Round Table principals xviii 

Round Table montage xix - xxix 

Writing team xxx 

Delivery of final draft to NPIC publication's team xxxi 

Dwight D. Eisenhower 4 

Joseph V. Charyk 4 

BGen Bernard A. Schriever 18 

Advanced reconnaissance system management transition 

planning meeting, Inglewood, California, 27 November 1956 19 

BGen Robert E. Greer 22 

Louis W. Tordella 27 

28 

Eugene G. Fubini 30 

31 

Howard Lorenzen 37 

Reid Mayo 39 

Marty Votaw 39 

William E. W. Howe 42 

Adolf K. Thiel and Capt David D. Bradburn pictured with 

Werner Von Braun and model of Thor/Able launch vehicle, 

Inglewood, California, 1958 45 

Capt Frank R. Sperberg, USN 50 

First POPPY/Thor/Agena launch, Vandenberg Air Force Base, 

13 December 1962 52 

Raymond B. Potts 58 

Lt Ronald L. Potts, USN 63 

RAdm Robert K. Geiger 69 

Col John 0. Copley 77 

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Participants in the dedication ceremony of the 

Airborne Instruments Laboratories, Inc., facility 

at Melville, Long Island, New York, where Subsystem F 

and subsequent 698BK payloads were built, 13 October 1959 79 

SAMOS 2/Atlas/Agena launch, Vandenberg Air Force Base, 

31 January 1962 82 

BGen William G. King, Jr. 83 

698BIC/TAT/Agena launch, Vandenberg Air. Force Base, 

29 June 1963 91 

92 

Maj Eldon Sasser 95 

Mitford M. Mathews 96 

Col Robert W. Yundt 97 

MGen John L. Martin, Jr. 100 

103 

104 

Col Frederic C. E. Oder 119 

Harold Willis 120 

161 

Albert D. Wheelon 169 

Brockway McMillan 171 

John McMahon 171 

Lloyd Lauderdale 171 

Alexander H. Flax 172 

LGen Marshall S. Carter 172 

Charles C. Tevis 175 

175 

Julian Caballero 178 

John L. McLucas 179 

Robert. F. Naka 180 

181 

Col David D. Bradburn 201 

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Robert J. Hermann 202 

202 

management meeting, Sunnyvale, 

California, January 1969 208 

VAdm Noel Gayler 209 

210 

Col John W. Browning 211 

Joseph Amato 211 

LGen Lew Allen, Jr. 212 

226 

231 

234 

235 

Col David D. Bradburn congratulates 

Col Henry B. Stelling, Jr., as Stelling takes 

charge of in May 1971 237 

Col Jack Simonton 237 

239 

241 

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edications 

To my dear wife, Bertha, whose strength and gentleness and thoughtfulness have been my great joy in life. During the events described in the 

hook she sent me off to work happy and secure, looking forward to each 

day. And in the writing of this history, she is again doing that. This is for 

Bertha. 

David D. Bradburn 

To my wife, Theresa, and my daughters, Denise and Diane, who for 

over 35 years have accepted, without question, the strange hours, mysterious trips, unintelligible telephone calls, and all the other incomprehensible aspects of my behavior that have been an everyday occurrence since I 

was assigned to the WS-117L Satellite System Office in Inglewood, 

California, in January 1958. Their support, with only meager knowledge 

of where I was or what I was doing most of the time, has made an absorbing and challenging program a most enjoyable and rewarding experience. 

John 0. Copley 

To my wife. Betty Jean. who worked with me putting in many extra 

hours during the early days of this program. She and my children, 

Stephen and Theresa, made many sacrifices and provided much needed 

support during the mid-I960s and early 1970s when my dedication. to this 

program required long hours and extensive travel. A special thanks to 

Dr. Louis Tordella, Deputy Director of NSA, without whose trust and support many of the-accomplishments and successes. would not have been 

possible. 

Raymond B. Potts 

My contribution to this book, which has been a pleasant cap on my 

NSA career, is dedicated to my dear wife, Jane, who gave so much love 

and support to me throughout all our years; this was in addition to the 

hard work demanded by her own career and our family, Peggy, David, 

and Cyndy, and all this was done without getting back the satisfaction of 

knowing much of what my work was about. 

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reface 

This history was undertaken at the request of Jimmie D. Hill, who 

maintained a continuing interest and provided moral support and advice 

as the work went along. The real instigator was Col James C. 

Fitzpatrick, USAF (Retired), who suggested the idea and showed us how 

it was done for the preceding volumes on the CORONA, GAMBIT, and 

HEXAGON imaging systems. Also, Col Frederic C. E. "Fritz" Oder, an 

old boss on the WS-117L project, who had a major role in the earlier histories, gave his advice at every turn, which really helped in getting 

started. 

Early on, we decided to write a single volume that would cover all 

the SIGINT satellite projects up to 1975. This was around the time the 

writers were retiring or moving to new jobs out of the SIGINT satellite 

business. It was also the time the main SIGINT satellites were all in 

place, the early versions. So we were writing about an entire set of satellites and we were writing about our own experiences. We decided to organize the book into introductory material, a series of project histories, and 

some summary material. This plan let us show how each satellite came 

into being and then show how the whole set worked together. It also 

allowed for themes about management and results to be summarized at 

the end after the examples have been given. 

Our reader could be an NRO manager, a Congressional staff member, or a family member of a long-time NRO or NSA government SIGINT 

satellite project participant. We have tried to explain the usually threatening SIGINT business to the non-expert. We owe a big debt to R. Cargill 

Hall, of the Office of History, United States Air Force, for acting as our 

professional advisor on methods and as our constant reviewer and editor 

during the writing process. He gave us his valuable piece, "On Writing 

History," and other references on clear writing. He also kept on his "nonSIGINT-expert" hat and kept challenging us to write for such people. If 

we have succeeded, it is Cargill Hall's digs in our ribs that we have to 

thank for it! 

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The team was organized with the help of of and 

Judy Colbert, Jane's secretary. We shared the office for the first 

few weeks of the project and got well started. Then we moved the Los . 

Angeles operation across the hall to offices in The Aerospace Corporation. with the help and support of who was our senior 

administrator for the nearly five years of the project.

and then acted as our primary management authorities in The Aerospace Corporation, giving us help and encouragement 

when it was most needed. was our secretary in the early 

days, and came in later as our secretary and team helper. 

Near the end of the project was our word-processing expert and 

thus made another major contribution. took over as our 

secretary for the last two years of the project and. in spite of lots of 

changes going on in the company and in the industry generally, provided 

a serene place for us to do our work, kept the project on track, and kept 

us paid and happy! 

Our technical editor came on board for the last 

year of the project and was a professional from the start, so the other 

members could concentrate on getting the story together while

polished the results. 

Our technical artist, was the newest member of 

the team and a great addition, working with and the team and 

getting our ideas for the graphic materials online and onto paper. 

of NPIC, acted as our scout and contact, helping us to 

set up the very helpful and good working relationship with our publisher. 

So did Director Leo Hazlewoo who became the primary person responsible for finishing the publishing job. Also at NPIC, 

editor and senior designer provided 

invaluable support during the publication process. 

At NSA, we would like to thank some people whose invaluable support made this history possible: 

VAdm William 0. Studeman, USN, Director of the NSA, who provided support from the start of this effort. 

VAdm John M. McConnell, USN, Director of the NSA, who continued 

that support. 

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George R. Cotter, NSA Senior Scientist, who provided 

support. 

David W. Gaddy, NSA Chief of the Center for Cryptologic History, 

who provided frequent guidance and whose staff provided day-to-day 

support. 

David A. Hatch, NSA Director of the Center for Cryptologic History, 

who replaced Dave Gaddy and continued the outstanding support. 

Henry F. Schorreck, NSA Historian, who provided valuable data. 

Thomas R. Johnson, NSA Historian, who provided valuable support. 

NSA 

Administration, who provided valuable support. 

{ NSA Administration, who provided much needed support in sending and receiving controlled material. 

NSA Archives, who made a laborious search of 

the archives to obtain the photographs used in this history. 

NSA, who provided the valuable RUFFER History

NSA, who provided valuable assistance in gathering 

processing data. 

enior staff 

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Preface xiii 

CO 

NSA. the expert who provided all the data on the 

target development and mapping satellites. 

Dr. David vanKeiren, NRL Historian, who found and provided photographs for Chapter 3. 

As the book went together, we interviewed many people, each of 

whom typically gave a morning or an afternoon for the purpose. Those 

people included the Directors of SAFSP now living: MGen John L. Martin, 

Jr., Gen Lew Allen, Jr., and BGen William G. King, Jr., all of whom generously also acted as members of our review group ("Red Team") in 

March 1994. We thank each of our interviewees separately for their time 

and the chance to renew old friendships: Joe Amato, George Barthel, 

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James V. Boone, Julian Caballer

Robert E. Conley, George Cotter (who participated by 

mail), Eugene G. Fubini, 

, Robert J. Hermann, Jimmie D. Hill, 

] MGen John G. 

Kulpa MGen John B. Marks, John N. McMahon, 

LtCol John 

M. O'Connell, Col Frederic C. E. Oder,

Navy Capt Frank Sperberg,

Charles C. Tevis

Donald Wagner, Albert D. Wheelon, an

H. Joe Amato, Julian Caballero, Bob Hermann, Jimmie Hill, John 

McMahon, and Bud Wheelon also came back to help on the Red Team in 

March 1994. 

RAdm Robert K. Geiger joined our Red Team in March 1994 and 

added a valuable dimension to our Navy story. 

Sanford Evans and Bob Gaylord of The Aerospace Corporation 

brought their insights to the Red Team in March 1994. 

We used a number of good histories, which are listed in the references. The ones that were especially useful were: 

• NSA in Space, April 1975, BYE-19385-75 (TS/B/TKICOMINT). 

This is an excellent history, giving many details and facts about 

all the projects for the same time period as our history. 

• RUFFER History, prepared by NSA, R321 Program Office, 

30 September 1990, NSA 86594-90. 

• History of the POPPY Satellite System, BYE-56105-78, thoughtfully furnished to us by Jim Morgan of Program C. 

, thoughtfully furnished by 

Julian Caballero of Program B. 

• 

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The NRO staff pitched in right from the start. Sharilyn Watts and 

helped us find files for building our chronology. As we 

got going, SAFSS Policy, was our main source of support in Washington. When we needed to have a meeting or get something done, we just asked and it was done. Helping was

who prepared materials for our reviews and briefings. 

came on the scene during the last year, when we 

were arranging for reviews by the first four former. Directors of the NRO, 

a big job. He made all that come together and helped to set the stage for 

some historic meetings. 

The writing was done in a matrix. Each writer wrote about what he 

knew best—for example, all processing by one author, all intelligence 

results by another. This led to chapters with multiple contributors. We 

hope this approach helps the book to be objective, even though we are 

writing as participants and not as historians going back to find out what 

happened. We started with the idea that NRO management was good. 

We ended with the idea that the creation of the office of the DNRO was 

the defining event that led to the results. This came out of the work and 

was a consensus among those interviewed. 

Our approach was to read, collect information, interview widely, 

write, and ask some senior people—our Red team—to review the book. 

This was done in March 1994. On this team were the first four Directors 

of the NRO, Joseph V. Charyk, Brockway McMillan. Alexander H. Flax, 

and John L. McLucas, whom we had not previously interviewed. These 

four also came to a first-of-a-kind Round Table meeting on 26 May 1994 

at which Louis W. Tordella, the distinguished Deputy Director of NSA 

from 1958 to 1974, and Julian Caballero, the distinguished Director of 

CIA's Program B at the time of his retirement in 1993 and a veteran of 

the from 1965, also took part. This turned out to be 

the high point of the work for the writing team and was well documented 

by video and still photography, thanks to the good work of

f the NRO Video 

Productions Center. 

This has been a satisfying job, with many rewards in sharing experiences and in planning and carrying out the work_ The authors hope this 

book will be of use and interest to all who can share it. 

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The first four Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office 

1,)( kv,I,k• 1mm lett • Joseph V. Charyk (1961-63), lohn L. McLucas (1969-73). 

Finn nv,..1. M Milian 1963-65L Alexander H. Flax 41965-69) 

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7

11111■1=111.""mummume■ -0,11111M111•=11 

Round Table principals, 26 May 1994 

Front row 'lett to right): R. Cargill Hall, Raymond B. Potts, Joseph V. Charyk, 

Brockway McMillan, Alexander H. Flax, John L. McLucas, Col lohn 0. Copley. 

Back row den to right): MGen David D. Bradburn, Jimmie D. Hill. Louis W. Torciella, 

Julian Caballero

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Writing team 

Front row den to right): authors Raymond B. Potts, Col John 0. Copley, 

MGen David D. Braciburn. .Back row deft to righii: 

technical editor historian/adviiOr.R. Cargill Hall. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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Delivery of final draft to NPIC publications team, 14 July 1994 

Left to right senior designer; editor; 

. Chief. Editorial Production Branch Chief. 

raphics Branch NPIC Special Control Officer; 

i. Chief. Graphics and Puilir•ttions Divisin.-i• mGen David D. Bradbum; 

Col John 0. Copley; Raymond B. Potts , project 

technical editor project technical artist:... 

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it Introduction 

The way the United States perfected 

and used space technology to solve intelligence problems is an important story; this 

remarkable technology helped ensure that 

the Cold War never turned "hot." In parallel with the crucially important development of ballistic missiles for our defense, 

there was the equally urgent program to 

develop reconnaissance satellites to provide advance warning of enemy military 

activity. Information about-military, 

industrial, and political activities in the • 

Soviet Union was the key to providing the 

United States with a survivable nuclear 

retaliatory force. The story of the photo 

reconnaissance satellites has been told in 

the three previous volumes in this series. 

This new story involves the challenge of 

collecting electronic signals being radiated 

from the Soviet Union using satellites in 

Earth orbit, some as high as geosynchronous altitude; sending those signals back 

to Earth; sorting and analyzing those signals with computers and with people; and 

providing to our national leaders the information needed to give our country a valuable advantage in confronting the threat of 

Soviet Communism during the most perilous times of the Cold War. The story now 

to be told is about the US 

SIGINT satellites.* 

' When an intercepted electronic signal is from the transmitter of a radar set, the information collected is called electronic intelligence. or ELINT; when the intercepted signal 

is for written or Spoken communications, the information 

• collected is called communications intelligence, or COMINT; 

and when the intercepted signal is from telemetry, the 

information being collected is called telemetry intelligence. 

or TELINT. These three applications are collectively called 

• 

Early History 

During World War II, lookouts aboard 

surfaced German submarines used handheld crystal-video radar receivers called 

ATHOS to detect pulses emitted by search 

radars on Allied warships and aircraft. 

This type of receiver consisted ofa tuning 

coil and capacitor to select the approximate 

radio frequency to be received; a crystal 

diode, usually of silicon, that acted as a 

one-way gate, or rectifier, and produced an 

audible sound; and a simple amplifier that 

broadcast the "detected" sounds over a 

headset or loudspeaker. After the war, this 

same technology was adopted and applied 

in the direction-finding systems of 

American warships and airplanes because 

of its simplicity, small size, and "wideopen" frequency-detection characteristics, 

Sputnik I, the world's first artificial 

satellite, inaugurated the Space Age on 4 

October 1957. On 22 June 1960, another 

satellite, built by the US Naval Research 

Laboratory and containing an ATHOS-type 

receiver in low Earth orbit, became the 

first US military satellite designed to 

intercept signals from Soviet radars. This 

marked the beginning of a concerted campaign by the United States to develop 

signals intelligence, or SIGINT. Prior to 1958 the term 

SIGINT was used to mean COMINT alone, and both were 

often written with only the first letter capitalized. In 1958, 

when ELINT was put under control of the National Security 

Agency, SIGINT came to mean both COMINT and ELINT. 

In the 1960s, TELINT came into use and was included 

under the term SIGINT. 

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satellites for signals intelligence (SIGINT) 

to listen to and record radar, communications, and telemetry signals coming from 

the Soviet Union, and to transmit that 

data to US intelligence agencies.1 

The SIGINT satellite history is part 

of the larger story of the use of reconnaissance satellites by the United States to 

provide crucial early warning of a Soviet 

surprise attack on this country, and to 

attempt to solve the larger riddle of the 

Cold War—what was the Soviet Union up 

to? Predicting the quick appearance of -

long-range rockets armed with nuclear 

bombs, Arthur C. Clarke described the 

potential strategic nuclear dilemma as 

early as 1946: "A country's armed forces 

can no longer defend it; the most they can 

promise is the' destruction of the 

attacker."2 

The problem foreseen by Clarke 

became a reality. Attacked with nuclear 

weapons, a country would have no time to 

mobilize its forces, much less to build new 

weapons for them. For the next 45 years, 

the secrecy of the Soviets, their explicit 

threats to the non-Communist world, and 

their eventual possession of nuclear 

weapons and intercontinental delivery systems occupied the attention of every US 

President and dominated every major foreign and domestic decision made by the 

United States. For American leaders, the 

central question became: How do we prevent the Soviets from mounting a surprise 

nuclear attack against-us? Although 

Clarke had described both the nuclear 

dilemma and the potentials of satellites by 

1946, his writing 'remained obscure and 

was not influential at the time. 

Within the United States, a scientific 

and engineering team at the RAND 

Corporation contributed to the determination that an Earth-orbiting satellite could 

be built that would have utility for reconnaissance. The RAND work culminated 

with a 1954 report, Project FEED BACK. 

that provided the rationale and the engineering calculations that prompted the 

United States to proceed with reconnaissance satellite development programs.3 

On the basis of the RAND studies and its 

own in-house work, the US Air Force in 

1955 issued contracts for development of 

military reconnaissance satellites. When 

•the Soviets launched Sputnik I in October 

1957, these projects were already in existence, awaiting only the additional impetus that the Space Age would provide. 

After Sputnik, the Air Force reconnaissance satellite work, based in Los 

Angeles at the Air Force's Western 

Development Division (WDD), was accelerated and placed under a succession of different management arrangements. It was 

placed first under the Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (ARPA), then under the 

Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee 

(AFBMC),* 4and finally, in late 1960 at 

Presidential direction, under direct management of the Secretary of the Air Force. 

This decisive move resulted in clean, short 

• The ballistic missile programs under development at the 

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division lAFBMD) in Los • 

Angeles were conducted under a streamlined manage. 

ment process called the Gillette Procedures. which provided for an Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee 

(AFBMC) and an Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Ballistic Missile Committee {OSDBMC) to expedite program decisions. The Air Force reconnaissance satellite 

project, then called SAMOS, was briefly placed under 

these Gillette Procedures and managed at the Air Force 

Secretarial level through the AFBMC, which was called 

the BMC for Space when in session for these programs. 

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decision lines for these important projects. 

Within two years, by May 1962, this same 

central authority was extended to cover 

Navy and Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) satellite projects, when Under 

Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. 

Charyk, reporting to the Secretary of 

Defense, became the first Director of the 

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 

The NRO would play a central, crucial role 

in satellite reconnaissance for the remainder of the Cold War. 

Mission Requirements 

Considering the prospect of a nuclear 

war with the Soviet Union, United States 

leaders in the 1950s had to know two 

things. First, what were the Soviets doing 

in their strategic missile programs? They 

had already demonstrated a nuclear capability with an atomic detonation in 1949 

and a fusion-weapon test in 1953. Could 

they launch a nuclear weapon on a rocket 

over intercontinental distances? Second, 

how effective might Soviet defenses prove 

to be against US forces? Could the Soviets 

detect and shoot down US long-range 

bombers? And could the Soviets counter 

the developing US missile capability? 

Conventional intelligence sources in 

the 1950s collected bits of data on both of 

these concerns; spies, or human intelligence, were effective in some areas but 

encountered significant problems because 

of the strict security rules inside the 

Soviet Union. One early attempt to reach 

deep into the Soviet land mass was by Jim 

Trexler of the US Naval Research 

Laboratory (NRL). He pioneered work on 

and tests of intercepting radar signals 

using the Earth's largest satellite, the 

Moon. He was successful in the late 1950s 

in collecting intercepts from Soviet

(the NATO designator) early warning radars on NRL's 60-foot parabolic 

reflector antenna in Maryland, and then, 

with better reception, on the National 

Radio Astronomy Observatory's 150-foot 

reflector in West Virginia. He proposed 

building a 300-foot and, at one time, a 

600-foot "big dish" to collect weaker Soviet 

radars.5In the early 1960s NSA built a 

special antenna feed for and successfully 

tested the 1,000-foot-diameter antenna at 

Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory, Puerto 

Rico, intercepting and other 

signals.6This technique also allowed 

radars to be located with an uncertainty of 

50 miles using multiple intercepts on separate days. 

Listening to radio communications, or 

COMINT, was somewhat easier. The 

Soviets used short-wave radio bands 

extensively for communications, and the 

US military intercept stations, expanded 

from their World War II numbers, heard 

many Soviet-Union-wide operational military, industrial, and research networks, 

yielding some understanding of the Soviet 

threat. US strategic planners, though, 

needed more specific data on the exact 

locations and capabilities of Soviet military and industrial installations. 

Attempts to take pictures with balloon 

overflights proved generally unproductive, 

and conventional aircraft reconnaissance 

was limited to flights around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc of states. For 

that reason, in November 1954 President 

Dwight D. Eisenhower approved development 

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of the U-2, a highly secret high-altitude 

reconnaissance aircraft, which was rapidly 

engineered and put into use in 1956. 

Dwight D. Eisenhower 

Eisenhower came to believe that the 

U-2 could overfly parts of Soviet airspace 

at will. But this would have represented a 

clear violation of international law, unless 

the leaders concerned had agreed to such 

flights. On 21 July 1955, Eisenhower proposed to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev 

that the United States and the Soviet 

Union provide "facilities for aerial photography to the other country" and conduct 

mutually supervised reconnaissance overflights.7Before the day ended. Khrushchev 

rejected the plan, which came to be known 

as the Open Skies doctrine, as an 

American attempt to "accumulate target 

information." Eisenhower said later, "We 

knew the Soviets wouldn't accept it, but we 

took a look and thought it was a good 

move."8The Soviets were thus forewarned of our U-2 flights and the groundwork was beginning to be laid for the use 

of reconnaissance satellites. Eleven 

months later Eisenhower approved the 

first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union.9 

Joseph V. Charyk 

Beginning with the first operational 

flight in July 1956, US analysts found in 

the U-2 data an extensive Soviet airdefense system being built to counter US 

strategic bombers and reconnaissance 

flights, including the U-2 itself. They also 

saw research and development (R&D) 

installations for long-range missile systems and, eventually, operational missile 

sites. Soviet short-range missiles had 

already flown that same year. Soon, near 

Sary Shagan, U-2 cameras photographed 

what appeared to be Soviet antiballistic 

missile (ABM) R&D facilities. Because it 

had a great effect on major US resource 

decisions on its own ABM, intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM), and countermeasures techniques, the "ABM problem" 

became the US's top intelligence priority, 

and eventually became the main focus of 

effort for SIGINT satellites. 

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US reconnaissance satellites, the successors to the U-2s, were developed 

expressly to provide visual and electronic 

access to the Soviet Union. The very first 

SIGINT satellites, launched in 1960, were 

intended to detect and locate air defense 

radars, to determine the electronic order of 

battle (EOB, which listed the types and 

locations of Soviet defense system radars), 

and thus to assist American bombers to 

pass through Soviet defenses to military 

targets in the event of war. The US 

Intelligence Board (USIB)* had not yet 

begun to issue formally documented 

requirements, but the US military and 

intelligence organizations perceived the 

nations of the world aligning themselves 

with one or the other of' the superpowers, 

each with its respective spheres of influence. Thus. the US Air Force Strategic Air 

Command (SAC) wanted details on SinoSoviet targets for attack, data on radars 

and antiaircraft weapons. technical information for design of electronic countermeasures, and exact locations of Soviet 

defensive installations in order to plan 

their aircraft penetration routes. The US 

Navy wanted to determine the threat from 

Soviet surface ships and submarines, and 

the US Army and NATO commanders 

. were concerned about Soviet and Warsaw 

Pact air and ground forces. 

Another driving force in the early 

development of SIGINT satellites was the 

electronic and rocket engineer's new 

The United States Intelligence Board (USIBI was established by President Eisenhower on 15 September 1958 to 

establish priorities for US intelligence activities. It was 

chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. with 

members from the Department of Defense. Department 

of State. the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other 

goYerinnent agencies. 

technical ability to build more and more 

sophisticated intercept and recording 

equipment in lighter packages, place these 

packages in satellites that circled the 

Earth, and do really useful reconnaissance 

jobs for significant durations of time in the 

vacuum of space. Technology indeed 

moved rapidly in the 1950s. The transistor, which would replace the cumbersome 

electronic vacuum tube as an amplifier of 

weak signals, was invented at Bell 

Telephone Laboratories in 1948.10The 

first "junction transistor" appeared in 

1951. By 1960, solid-state electronics 

began revolutionizing radio and data processing, the two fields on which SIGINT 

was based. Electronic hardware suddenly 

could be designed and built in ever smaller 

sizes and operated on lower power and 

would produce much less heat during 

operation. These advances, coupled with 

the new advances toward long-range rockets for military purposes, provided both 

the technology and the lifting capability to 

make possible the design and launch of 

SIGINT satellites. 

US military reconnaissance satellites, 

already well along in planning when 

Sputnik I was launched—and in some 

cases, even with hardware under development (the Air Force's Advanced Reconnaissance System, Weapon System 117L 

[WS-117L] was an example)—would number among the pioneers of orbiting artificial satellites. For its reconnaissance satellites, the Air Force developed a general 

operational requirement and very specific 

technical specifications based on intelligence data, as it did for all its weapons 

systems. Nevertheless, construction of 

WS-117L and the other early SIGINT 

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satellites turned on issues of what instrument might work, and, among those that 

did, which might be most useful as preliminary collectors of the needed data. At the 

time, ELINT seemed to be easier to try 

than COMINT, although COMINT was in 

the minds of some from the very beginning. Soon, feedback and crossfertilization 

networks developed among the groups 

building, using, and analyzing the ELINT 

data, from which new priorities would be 

set. The era of SIGINT satellites was 

starting and would enjoy many and varied 

forms and successes. The formal USIB 

requirements for the intelligence data 

these systems collected would come later. 

Imaging and Signals Intelligence 

Space Systems 

The major effort within the US satellite reconnaissance program in the 1960s 

and 1970s featured overhead visual imaging systems, which produced information 

not obtainable any other way. (CORONA, 

GAMBIT, and HEXAGON, the early filmbased satellite systems, have already been 

well documented in this series of histories.) But there were important intelligence questions that could not be answered 

with pictures alone. The first question 

involved determining the location and 

characteristics of Soviet radars that could 

detect American strategic bombers. The 

second involved the performance capabilities of Soviet missiles—ICBMs and ABM 

systems. These two problems led the list 

of reasons favoring SIGINT satellites that 

could listen to and record the signals of 

Soviet radars, radio communications, and 

telemetry systems. 

• 

A SIGINT satellite system had many 

of the same elements as an imaging satellite system, but with important differences. Instead of a camera and film, a 

SIGINT satellite mounted antennas, 

receivers, and, sometimes, tape recorders. 

Instead of sending its information down on 

film in a reentry vehicle, a SIGINT satellite transmitted its findings by radio link 

in realtime or shortly after passing over 

the target area. On the ground, instead of 

a photo-processing laboratory, technicians 

used a SIGINT processing system, usually 

computerized and immensely complicated, 

to translate the raw electronic signals into 

intelligence listings and reports for release 

to analysts. The targets of the SIGINT 

systems were the actual radio signals radiated by Soviet transmitter equipment, 

which meant that the satellites had to be 

in the right place, looking in the right 

direction, tuned to the right frequency, at 

the very time the Soviet transmitters were 

on the air. This was an entirely different 

game from the photo-collection business, 

but one with the potential to get different 

and extremely important information. A 

number of different types of SIGINT satellites were employed to gather this vita] 

information. 

First launched on 22 June 1960 in a 

70-degree-inclined, circular orbit about 

500 miles above the Earth, the Navy's 

POPPY satellites searched for the main 

beams of Soviet scanning radars and provided wide-area coverage of and locations 

for radars on the surface of the Earth. 

POPPY satellites acted as "repeaters," 

encoding each radar pulse as it was 

received and then retransmitting the pulse 

stream in realtime to US-manned ground 

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.sinFORN-ORCON 1 stations located around the periphery of the 

Soviet Union

The SIGINT satellites most nearly 

like the photo satellites in their appear- • 

ance and orbits were the WS-117L family, 

the Lockheed Agena-based low-orbiters 

called SAMOS F-1, 698BK, MULTIGROUP, 

and STRAWMAN. Starting with SAMOS 

F-1 on 31 January 1961, these satellites 

orbited at about 275 miles in 67-degreeinclined, circular orbits and searched for 

Soviet radars of all types, attempting to 

intercept the Soviet radars from high 

overhead and from a direction the Soviet 

radars were not "looking" (i.e., the "sidelobes" of the enemy radar antenna patterns). They operated by reading in and 

recording the radar information while over 

the Soviet Union. and reading out that data, 

by playback of onboard tape recorders, 

when they passed over the ground tracking stations of the US Air Force Satellite 

Control Facility (AFSCF) stations in 

California, New Hampshire, and Hawaii.. 

These satellites, developed by the Air 

Force, were the first successful orbital collectors of the EOB for SAC. They provided 

ELINT technical performance details and 

locations of radars that could threaten our 

strategic bomber forces. Phased out in 

1972, these low-altitude satellites were 

conceptual pioneers. succeeded by more 

powerful vehicles in different Earth orbits. 

A variety of small electronic boxes 

were attached to the Agena SIGINT and 

Photographic satellites. These boxes, 

sometimes with antennas of various 

sizes—special kinds of SIGINT collectors 

and experiments—were called AFTRACK 

payloads, due to their positioning on the 

ail rack of the Agena launch vehicle. The 

first, named SOCTOP, designed to detect 

tracking of the host vehicle by Soviet 

radars, was launched on 10 August 1960 

on DISCOVERER 13, a CORONA photo 

mission that had a one-day mission life 

and was the first to achieve successful. 

reentry of a photo payload from orbit.. 

From thiS beginning, a single day of operation, came a succession of these small 

SIGINT payloads, for many different purposes, usually designed and flown on short 

notice for little cost. each remaining 

attached to the host satellite and usually 

operating for the life of the host satellite. 

The launch rate of AFTRACK payloads peaked in the 1960s. By the 1970s. 

all the AFTRACK payloads were "vulnerability"-type payloads, used for detection of 

hostile radar activity

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In 1945 Arthur C. Clarke described 

two key types of Earth satellite orbits: the 

high, geosynchronous orbits suitable for 

communications, where the satellite's 

orbital motion coincided with the Earth's 

rotation and would enable the satellite to 

The term 'geopositioning here means "determining the 

location of a radar on the surface of the Earth." One 

method is by geometric reconstruction using the direction 

of arrival of the signal at a single intercepting satellite, 

whose location and orientation must be accurately 

known. The other method is time difference of arrival-

+TDOA,. which depends upon knowing the exact location.. 

but not the orientation. of two or more intercepting satellites and determining the location by measuring the difference in times of arrival of a particular signal as it 

takes different paths to the intercepting satellites and 

then to the receiving station. 

remain motionless over one point above 

the Earth's equator; and near-polar orbits, 

which would allow reconnaissance satellites to cover the whole Earth in successive 

passes as the Earth rotated beneath it. 

each pass occurring at the same local time 

of day on the ground.11These near-polar, 

sun-synchronous orbits were chosen for 

the photo satellites so that the target 

areas could be viewed in sunlight. Loworbiting SIGINT satellites, which did not 

need to have their targets in sunlight. 

used lower inclination (about 67 degrees}, 

non-repeating Earth orbits to get the best 

coverage of the target areas over a period 

of days or weeks. At the geosynchronous 

equatorial orbit (22,000 miles high), perceived by Clarke as the orbit most suitable 

for relaying of communications from one 

point on the Earth to another, SIGINT 

satellites became signal interceptors. 

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:E0 1.4.(c) 

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By 1975, the US employed SIGINT 

low-orbiters, POPP

and igh orbiters,

Collectively, they represented an extraordinary', complementary 

set of reconnaissance satellites. 

SIGINT Data Processing and 

Exploitation 

Just as solid-state electronic technology changed the capabilities of SIGINT 

satellites dramatically, the computer revolution that began in the 1950s, and that is • 

still underway, changed the capabilities of 

computer processing, almost day to day. 

The capability to process SIGINT information was especially powerful and quick to 

develop, because the SIGINT satellites collected electrical signals that, with proper 

coding, were in a form that computers 

could work on directly. From 1960 to 1975 

the multiplying effect of improved satellite 

collectors and improved computer processors would provide a many-fold increase in 

operational capabilities. Developing the 

processing methodology was the key. (See 

Appendix A for a discussion of NSA's role 

in computer evolution.) 

It is fairly easy for a trained photo 

analyst to recognize missiles and radar 

structures if the photograph is taken by a 

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properly focused camera with sufficient 

magnification on a clear day, with observable shadows. Likewise it is easy for the 

signals analyst or linguist to analyze an 

electronic signal if the signal structure is 

known and the signal is collected by a 

properly tuned receiver with sufficient 

sensitivity and no interference. Unfortunately, the SIGINT analyst usually 

encounters noise interference, competing 

signals on the same frequency, and little or 

no knowledge of the characteristics of any 

newly detected signal. Noise or interference impedes signal processing and analysis in much the same way as cloud cover 

impedes analysis of photo data. The 

denser the cloud cover in photographic 

data, or interference in SIGINT data, 

becomes, the more difficult it is to process 

or analyze the information: sometimes, 

analysis is impossible. 

Multiple electronic signals intercepted 

at the same time by SIGINT collectors 

appear much the same as multiple exposures on a photographic print. Or perhaps 

a better description would be multiple 

transparencies of different pictures 

stacked one on top of the other. Analysis of 

any one signal or picture is virtually 

impossible until the competing signals 

or overlapping pictures are separated out, 

or, as it is termed by analysts, "deinterleaved." 

Analysis of complex, structured signals such as telemetry or Multichannel 

communications require

before the data can be 

analyzed or processed. This is very much 

like the adjustment process required to 

successfully view a television picture. The 

proper channel must be selected, the horizontal synchronization must be established, and the vertical hold must be set to 

prevent the picture or frames from rolling. 

Encryption of electronic data to disguise their real information content introduces another major problem for the 

SIGINT processor and analyst. Encryption adds keying material, known only to 

the users, to the clear or unencrypted 

data, thus producing enciphered data for 

transmission. Anyone gaining unauthorized access to the encrypted data cannot 

read it. without a major effort to remove 

the encrypting-key algorithm, thus permitting one to decipher the data. Solving 

encryption problems is much more difficult 

than, but is similar in some respects to, 

the problems faced by photo analysts when 

camouflage paint or nets have been used 

to hide an object from view. 

Before electronic signals can he 

machine processed, extensive manual 

analysis of the captured signals is needed 

to clearly define the characters that are to 

be recognized, identified, and codified in 

special-purpose equipment or in computer 

software. This manual analysis involves 

listening to the signal, making signal measurements (often from hardcopy graphic 

representations of the signal), and developing an understanding of the signal 

structure (e.g., pulsewidth, type of modulation, pulse repetition rate). As a major 

designer, developer, and user of the latest 

in computer technology, the National 

Security Agency (NSA), established by 

President Harry S Truman in 1952 to exercise technical and operational control over 

US COMINT and communications security 

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activities, eventually employed computers 

to improve decryption and for handling 

and screening extremely large volumes of 

ELINT, COMINT, and TELINT data collected from all sources, including reconnaissance satellites. 

Beginning in the 1960s. ELINT data 

were processed to provide EOB of SinoSoviet radars for the nation's strike forces 

in the Single Integrated Operating Plan 

(SIOP) and for distribution to the military 

intelligence community. NSA eventually 

provided direct reporting of the location of 

threat emitters to the field within hours of 

their intercept. ELINT data were also 

used to tip-off other intelligence collection 

activities. The technical analysis of 

ELINT allowed. assessments of weapon 

and radar system capabilities to be made 

and electronic countermeasures to be 

designed. 

COMINT data, often used by NSA linguists fluent in the native language of the 

target nation, provided databases on that 

nation's economic capabilities, such as 

manufacturing, technical level of competence, number and types of resources (both 

civil and military), and personal data on 

key people. Most important, COMINT 

provided indications of target country 

political and military intentions, including 

military planning, deployment of troops, 

policy positions, and threats. NSA frequently applied special processing techniques to decrypt enciphered communications of target countries. 

TELINT processed by NSA was furnished to the CIA. the Air Force System 

Command's Foreign Technology Division 

(FTD), the Army Missile Command (AMC) 

and other Intelligence Community customers, which analyzed the data to deterBy 1975 these intelligence products 

were being rapidly and routinely reported 

throughout the Intelligence Community. 

They represented an enormous capabilityto collect, sort, and distribute information 

that could hardly have been imagined as 

the story began in World War II, or even 

by the start of the satellite era in 1960. 

The NRO and the NSA, the satellite oper 

ator and the processor of the SIGINT 

information, respectively, were the organizations that made these things happen. 

TELINT processing was the responsibility of NSA. 

although this assignment of responsibility was not 

accepted by the CIA for a long time—until the early 

1970s—because of CIA's interest and early' involvement. 

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Development of SIGINT EOB operational capability 

SIGINT 

Year Satellite 

Accuracy of 

Location (Miles) 

Radar Locations 

Produced Per Year 

Time From Intercept, 

To Delivery, To User 

1960 POPPY 400-8,000 — 1-2 months 

1961/62 698BK 

1964/65 69813K 

BIRD DOG 

POPPY 

1966/67 698BK 

SETTER 

POPPY 

1968/69 THRESHER 

REAPER 

1973/75 

The above chart of improving E0I3 capability over the years is typical of the kinds of improvement also made m RANT and telemetiv 

technical analysis. and large-volume COMINT reporting. 

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Chapter 1 References 

1. History of the POPPY Satellite System, BYE-56105-78, pp. 1-3. • 

2. Clarke, Arthur C., RAF Quarterly, March 1946, pp. 61-69. Republished in John Wiley, 

Ascent to Orbit, 1984. 

3. Davies. Merton E. and William R. Harris, RAND's Role in the Evolution of Balloon and 

Satellite Observation Systems and Related US Space Technology, Santa Monica, CA: the 

RAND Corporation, 1988, pp. 57-58. 

4. Martin comments, SIG1NT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

5. NRL Memorandum Report 1418, 20 May 1963. 

6 1"Extending the Radio Horizon for Intercept Purposes by Using the 

Moon as a Reflector," NSA Technical Journal, Vol. X. No. 2, spring 1965. 

7. "Statement on Disarmament. 21 July," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, 

No. 841, 1 August 1955. p. 174. Abel. Elie, "Eisenhower Calls Upon Soviet Union to 

Exchange Arms Blueprints," The New York Times, 22 July 1955, p. 1. See also John 

Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and. Russian Military Strength, New 

York: The Dial Press. 1982, pp. 31-32. The term "Open Skies doctrine" was coined later by 

the popular press and applied to Eisenhower's statement on disarmament. 

8. Parrnet. Herbert S., Eisenhower and the American Crusades, New York: The MacMillan 

Company, 1972, p. 406. Rostow, W. W., Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 

1955. Austin. TX: University of Texas Press. 1982, pp. 7-8. 

9. Ambrose, Stephen E., Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, Garden 

City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981, p. 266 and pp. 31-34. Quoted in R. Cargill Hall, The Air 

Force and the National Security Space Program, 1946-1988, USAF Historical Research 

Center. 1988. (TS/TK) 

10. Encyclopedia Americana, "Transistor," point contact. 

11. Davies and Harris, pp. 15-17. See also Arthur C. Clarke, "A Short Pre-History of 

Comsats, Or How I Lost a Billion Dollars in My Spare Time," in Voices from the Sky: . 

Previews of the Coming Space Age, New York: Harper& Row, 1965, pp. 119-128. 

12. Lew Allen comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

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Early SIGINT Satellite Organization, 

Development, and Evolution 

wS-117L Under ARDC and ARPA 

In March 1946 MGen Curtis E. 

LeMay, the first Army Air Forces Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Research and Development, asked the Project RAND team, then 

part of Douglas Aircraft Company in Santa 

Monica, California, to prepare a quick 

engineering study on Earth satellites.1* 

The resulting report, issued on 2 May 1946, 

1A,as titled Preliminary Design of an Experiniental W9rld-Circling Spaceship and 

identified as missions the following: satellites to guide missiles, satellites as the missiles themselves, satellites as "observation 

aircraft," satellites for attack assessment. 

satellites for weather reconnaissance, and 

s

atellites for communications.'- This 

RANDreport was an important first step 

in demonstrating an independent competence in space technology for the Army Air 

Forces (to become the US Air Force in 

1947) and in putting the Air Force on the 

track toward using Earth satellites for 

reconnaissance.3In April 1951 RAND 

issued an encouraging progress report and 

received authority from Headquarters, US 

Air Force, to place subcontracts for 

detailed subsystem studies.4In May 1953, 

believing that these studies would lead to 

hardware development, MGen Donald N. 

Yates, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for 

' In November 1948. Project RAND was separated from the 

Douglas Ant, eft Company and became the RAND Corpora. 

non. antndependeni nonprofit corporation, in Santa Monica 

Development, approved a request from 

planners at Headquarters. Air Research 

and Development Command {ARDC), in 

Baltimore, Maryland, to take responsibility 

for "active direction" of the RAND study by 

1 June 1953.5 

In the summer of 1953, LtCol Victor 

L. Genez, ARDC Director of Intelligence, 

was briefed on this study by personnel of 

the RAND "satellite office" at their facility 

in Santa Monica. Genez returned to 

Baltimore convinced that an immediate 

effort should be made to orbit an Earth 

satellite, even if a specific reconnaissance 

system was not yet available.6In December 

1953 ARDC established Project 409-40, 

"Satellite Component Study," and in 

January 1954 established Project 1115 

under a formal R&D system number, Weapon 

System 117L. At that time, pending completion of the RAND report, no funding 

was made available. 

In March 1954 RAND published its 

report "Project FEED BACK." This comprehensive and far-sighted study asserted 

that satellites for reconnaissance of the 

Earth were feasible and recommended that 

the US Air Force should initiate a development program immediately.? In May 1954, 

with FEED BACK published and based on 

the premise that feasibility of hardware 

development had been demonstrated, 

Headquarters CS Air Force (with the 

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approval of the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense IOSDJ), authorized ARDC to initiate the necessary studies to implement 

Project 1115, the Advanced Reconnaissance System (ARS). Shortly thereafter, 

Detachment 1. ARDC, was created at 

Wright Air Development Center (WADC), 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), 

Ohio, to accomplish this task. 

Maj Quentin P. "Q" Riepe, then assistant librarian at WADC, read the Project 

FEED BACK report as soon as it was 

received at WADC and immediately 

became interested in the idea. He began 

lobbying for implementation of the recommended developments. His obvious enthusiasm was rewarded in the summer of 1954 

with his assignment as Chief of Detachment 1 at Wright-Patterson. Shortly 

thereafter. he was joined by LtCol William 

G. King, Jr., the former Chief of the 

Airborne Guided Missile Office at WADC. 

King had also read the Project FEED 

BACK report and became equally enthusiastic after he was briefed on the subject by 

the RAND team. With King now the 

leader and Riepe as his deputy, this small, 

closely knit team of "space cadets" included 

Capt William 0. (Bill) Troetschel: Lt James 

(Jim) Coolbaugh, Lt Jack Herther. Fritz 

Runge (who came to the WS-117L staff as 

the only civil service member), and LtCol 

James (Jim) Seay. They set out to convince the Department of Defense (DOD), 

the Intelligence Community, and, through 

the Executive Branch, the President of the 

United States. that reconnaissance satellites were actually feasible and could provide needed surveillance of the interior of 

the Soviet Union so important to the 

defense of this country. This was a vision 

16 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

that not many people yet shared, because 

the first Atlas missile had yet to achieve a 

successful flight, and data about the Soviet 

ICBM program remained sketchy at best. 

Unbeknownst to King and Riepe, 

President Eisenhower had already triggered events in a related arena, when, on 

27 March 1954, he asked some of his top 

scientific advisors, including James B. 

Conant and James R. Killian. Jr., to 

develop a solution to the problem of surprise attack by the Soviets. The probability of such an attack was increasing at an 

alarming rate, given the Soviet determination to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems, possibly including missiles. 

Eisenhower asked Killian to chair a 

Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) to 

study surprise attack and the US ability to 

meet it. The panel operated with three 

project committees, one on offensive forces. 

one on defensive forces, and one on intelligence. Edwin H. "Din" Land. the founder 

of Polaroid. chaired the Intelligence 

Committee, known as Project 3. On 24 

November 1954, during TCP deliberations. 

President Eisenhower approved the development of the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft; Richard M. Bissell, Jr., of 

the CIA was placed in charge of this highest priority project. On 14 February 1955 

Killian and Land briefed President 

Eisenhower on the specific technological 

options that could alleviate uncertainties 

of strategic intelligence. These included 

systems for aerial overflight by aircraft or 

balloon and, somewhat farther in the 

future, satellite reconnaissance systems.8 

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On 27 November 1954, three days 

after the Killian Panel presented its 

interim report to the President, ARDC 

issued System Requirement (SR) 5, calling 

for development of a satellite reconnaissance system. Indirectly, the Killian Panel 

was possibly a stimulant to this effort to 

define the Air Force's formal requirements 

for a reconnaissance satellite system.9 

On 16 March 1955, Headquarters USAF, 

e

ndorsed SR 5 by issuing General Operational Requirement 80, which included 

Appendix 80-2, reaffirming the need for an. 

e

lectronic intercept capability as part of 

the WS-117L ARS. 

With this clear authority to proceed, 

the ARDC Detachment 1 "space cadets" 

offered system study contracts to four of 

the major contractors who had been 

involved in component studies for RAND. 

Three companies accepted: Glenn L. 

Martin Company, Baltimore, Maryland; 

Radio Corporation of America (RCA) at 

Camden, New Jersey; and Lockheed 

Aircraft Company, Burbank, California. 

Bell Telephone Laboratories, Whippany, 

New Jersey, was also solicited but declined 

to participate. Some of the ongoing component studies that had been initiated by 

RAND were also continued. One of these. 

with the Ampex Company in Redwood 

City, California, was a small tag-on to the 

RAND studies aimed at developing a widehand video recorder for photo missions. 

Ampex was spending a great deal of company money to develop the recorder for 

domestic TV use and this seemed like a 

great way to "get in on the act." Capt Bill 

Troetschel of ARDC Detachment 1 had 

another use in mind: magnetic-tape 

recording of wide-bandwidth ELINT for 

technical analysis. 03 

The Air Force was not the only service interested in outer space. In April 

1955 the Naval Research Laboratory 

(NRL) in Washington, DC, proposed a 

"Scientific Satellite Program" for the 

International Geophysical Year, to be 

known as the Vanguard Program. When 

this was approved in August 1955 the US 

was well on its way to establishing the 

principle in international law of "Freedom 

of Space."11The Vanguard activity looked 

attractive to Howard Lorenzen and his 

electronic payload development team, also 

at NRL. Just as WS-117L looked to the 

Atlas as a booster, the NRL electronics 

group saw the Vanguard as an excellent 

way to boost a small ELINT payload into 

orbit. Although there was no military 

mission involvement in the Vanguard 

Program, Lorenzen began some electronic 

intercept system studies, which led to a 

later Navy proposal for an ELINT satellite 

payload. 

In the meantime, in Ohio, King and 

his Detachment 1 team were on the briefing trail. In the fall of 1955 they briefed, 

among others, Gen Curtis E. LeMay at 

SAC headquarters on the reconnaissance 

satellite. They took along Maj Sidney 

Greene, who had a contract with the 

University of Iowa to investigate ways to 

put a grapefruit-sized payload on the 

Moon. LeMay sat in the front row, a participant recalled, chomping his cigar, and 

at the conclusion asked, "How did you get 

TDY money to tell me this crap?"12 This 

was a response typical of senior people 

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who received briefings in these "preSputnik" days. Most were skeptical, even 

Gen LeMay, who 10 years before had kicked 

off the RAND satellite studies when he 

was the first R&D Director for the Army 

Air Forces under Gen H. H. "Hap" Arnold. 

BGen (later advanced to Gen) Bernard A_ 

Schriever, first Commander of the Air 

Force's Western Development Division 

(WDD) in Los Angeles, convinced LeMay 

that the "space cadets" were developing a 

viable program. Six years later, in 1961, 

when LeMay became Air Force Chief of 

Staff, he was a strong advocate for Air 

Force space reconnaissance programs.13 

BGen Bernard A. Schriever 

Shortly after the LeMay briefing, 

BGen Schriever requested a briefing at 

WDD because of concerns at the national 

level (ICBM Scientific Advisory Group) 

that an Air Force space program would 

compete for boosters with the missile program. King's boss at Wright Air Development Center (WADC) was BGen Howell M. 

Estes, who had become unhappy with the 

satellite effort partly because of its cool 

reception at higher levels and partly 

because of bad public relations, including 

a letter from Governor Harold Stassen of 

Minnesota complaining that his constituents did not want a space satellite 

"spying on their activities." Stassen had 

been advised on overflight risks precedent 

to development of President Eisenhower's 

"Open Skies" proposal of 1955 by Col 

Richard Leghorn, who was familiar with 

RAND's studies on the political risk of 

high-altitude overflight.14As a result, 

Estes insisted that King develop a script 

for the briefing in Los Angeles and told 

him to give it verbatim. King was more 

than surprised when, looking out over the 

audience, he saw LGen Donald S. Putt. 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, 

Headquarters US Air Force. During this 

briefing, which took place in September 1955, 

BGen Schriever turned to Simon Ramo of 

the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, technical staff for the ballistic missile program. 

and asked, "What do you think, Si?" Ramo 

is said to have replied, "Let's do both space 

and missile work in Los Angeles, so we can 

avoid interference with the missile programs." Schriever took Ramo's.advice. 

This was a vital decision, as it separated 

the satellite work from the Air Force's regular development chain of command at 

WADC and placed it under the special . 

team established in Los Angeles in 1954 to 

develop the country's ballistic missiles_15 

In October 1955, at Schriever's 

request, Air Research and Development 

Command (ARDC) leader LGen Thomas S. 

Power directed the transfer of the WS117L Program Office from Wright-Patterson 

AFB in Ohio to the WDD in Inglewood, 

CA. The move took place in January 1956. 

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Schriever picked Commander Robert C. 

Truax, a member of his staff and that year 

President of the American Rocket Society, 

to be head of the WS-117L Program Office. 

LtCol King stayed at Wright-Patterson as 

Project Officer for the SNARK guided missile project. 

In November 1955 a Source Selection 

Board chaired by the WS-117L Office 

chose the Glenn L. Martin Company, RCA. 

and Lockheed to compete for a reconnaissance satellite development contract. 

From 12 to 20 March 1956 (after the move 

to WDD), a joint ARDC/Air Materiel Command (AMC)/WDD/WADC contractor evaluation board met at WADC and recommended that Lockheed be selected for 

the WS-117L development contract. 

Subsequently. on 2 April 1956, WDD 

published the WS-117L Advanced 

Reconnaissance System Development 

Plan, calling for R&D funds in the amount 

of $7.0 million for FY56, S32.1 million for 

FY57, and $75.6 million for FY58. On 

24 July 1956 Headquarters USAF, approved 

Advanced reconnaissance system management transition planning meeting, Inglewood, California, 

27 November 1956 

sack row left to rightl: Capt William 0. Troetschel, USAF. Wright Air Development Center iWADC), Ohio: 

WADC. tst it John C. Herther, USAF, WADC: LtCol William G. King, Jr., WADC: 

intelligence and Electronic Warfare Laboratory (I&EW Labi. Rome Air Development Center (RADC). New 

York: Capt lames Suttie. USAF, I&EW Lab. RADC I&EW Lab. RADC: Capt lames S. Coolbaugh. 

USAF. WADC: Capt Frank Jasen, USAF, WADC. Front row (left to right): Fritz Runge, WADC: Capt Richard 

P Bern•. USAF. RADC; Cmdr Robert C. Truax, USN, Western Development Division. Air Research and 

Development Command, Inglewood. California: WADC: LtCol George P. lones. USAF, Air 

Force Cambridge Research Center, Massachusett RADC. 

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the plan, but the DCS/D Development 

Directive, published 3 August 1956, allocated only $3.0 million for FY57. This low 

level of funding was continued until the 

launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957. 

Based on this initial funding 

approval, on 29 October 1956 the Air 

Force awarded contract AF 04(647)-97 to 

Lockheed to proceed with initial system 

development studies. Secretary of the Air 

Force Donald A. Quarles, who wanted the 

International Geophysical Year satellites 

to be first into orbit, insisted that this was 

to be for engineering studies only and that 

"no tin would be bent." By the summer of 

1957, a total of $10 million had been allocated and Quarles had relented enough to 

allow mockups to be constructed. It was 

anticipated that $35 million might be 

available in 1958. The first launch would 

not be before 1961. 

FY57 funds were sufficient to initiate 

studies in all the subsystem areas, including Subsystem F (S/S F), the electronic 

reconnaissance, or "ferret," system. An 

excerpt from the introduction to the winning S/S F proposal of the Airborne 

Instruments Laboratory (AIL), Mineola, 

Long Island, New York, dated April 1957, 

shows that this new job was taken seriously: "The contractor who develops the 

ferret portion of the 117L system assumes 

a responsibility to the country that cannot 

be lightly considered. In many ways this 

is an ideal vehicle: if the designer does not. 

make the most of the unique opportunities 

afforded to him, he will have failed." The 

proposal described the three essential elements of an effective reconnaissance 

system: knowledge of the intelligence 

requirements; ability to develop the collection system including limitations and 

growth potential; and the ground datahandling necessary to provide a useable 

product. Based on their experience in 

building many electronic-warfare systems 

for the government, Winfield "Win" Fromm 

and his AIL team knew that past collection 

systems had sometimes been built without 

processing capability or, in some cases, 

knowledge of intelligence requirements. 

The early SIGINT satellite programs were 

to be helped and shaped by these insights. 

Following the Soviet launch of 

Sputnik I, the WS-117L Program received 

a great deal of national attention as the 

US scrambled to counter the Russian successes in space. President Eisenhower 

faced the problem of gaining control over 

the rivalry among government agencies 

seeking to lay claim to one or another area 

of space operation and reducing, if possible, the media speculation about their 

efforts. On 7 February 1958, he formed 

the Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(ARPA) to undertake basic research and to 

direct R&D projects within the Department of Defense (DOD), as assigned to 

ARPA by the Secretary of Defense. As its 

main job, ARPA was to oversee all US mili- • 

tary space programs from the DOD level. is 

In the spring of 1958, ARPA Director 

Roy W. Johnson issued an invitation to allmilitary organizations to propose satellite 

systems whose development would further 

their goals. The Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO) relayed the query to all Navy 

scientific and technical organizations, asking, "All hands consider how they could 

20 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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use space in their design ideas for the 

Navy." Howard Lorenzen at NRL proposed an ELINT system to the CNO that 

was a very straightforward extension'of 

existing airborne ELINT systems. This 

became the DYNO program that flew piggyback with early Navy TRANSIT satellites and became the first US satellite 

ELINT system. 

The ARPA space era commenced officially in Los Angeles on 30 June 1958 

with ARPA Order 9-58, which said that 

Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., 

had assigned responsibility for WS-117L to 

ARPA under DOD Directive 5105.15. The 

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division 

(AFBMD), successor to WDD, was to submit a Development and Financial. Plan as 

soon as possible. This directive was followed by an 18-month period of continuous 

change, indicative of the national uncertainty in the arena of satellite reconnaissance policy. During this period funding 

fluctuated wildly, responsibility for WS-117L 

was transferred by ARPA from AFBMD 

to ARDC then finally to US Air Force 

Headquarters. 

To remove "weapon system" from the 

designation and suggest a purely defensive 

system, in 1959 the program identifier 

was changed from WS-117L to SENTRY. 

This effort was then divided into DISCOVERER (scientific research system, Thor 

boosted). MIDAS (IR system. Atlas 

boosted). and SENTRY (reconnaissance 

system, Atlas boosted). All of these programs were to be developed at the DOD 

SECRET security level. This included the 

scientific aspects of DISCOVERER, 

although this program was actually the 

cover effort for the covert CIA CORONA 

Photo Recovery Program, which had been 

approved by President Eisenhower in 

early February 1958.* On 6 August 1959, 

to provide additional security for the 

SENTRY Program, it was redesignated 

SAMOS, in order to ". identify reconnaissance program with an innocuous 

name that does not, repeat not, have mission association."17The name SAMOS was 

actually selected by ARPA Director 

Admiral John Clark, in reference to the 

Greek island of the same name. Most people 

thought the new name was an acronym for 

"space and missile observation system." 

and the attempt to choose a name without 

mission association was not successful.t 18 

There were several reprogramming 

actions, driven by problems in the SAMOS 

photo payload, Subsystem E (S/S E), development, particularly the tradeoffs between 

read-out and recovery type systems. Since 

the ferret system was always considered 

essential but not as important as the 

photo system, it neither attracted the 

attention nor suffered quite the wild variations that plagued the photo programs. 

• A contributing reason for approving the. CORONA program 

was that review suggested WS-117L was too elaborate. 

too complex to achieve an early operational capability. 

which was not. a high priority tin the Air Force This 

led to more focused programs that were less ambitious 

and more likely to provide early. useful data. See 

Joseph V. Charyk comments, SIGINT Satellite History 

Round Table, 26 May 1994. 

Samos is a Creek Island where the astronomer 

Aristarchus lived 1310-230 13.C.), referred to by 

Archithedes and Plutarch, He hypothesized that the 

heavens of the "fixed stars" remain at rest, and the Earth 

revolves in an.oblique circle about the Sun, while it 

rotates. at the same time. about its own axis. The interpretation of SAMOS as an acronym for -space and missile observation system- was originated by the press and 

became the accepted interpretation among the uncleared 

population in and around the Pentagon and Washington. 

Within the cleared circles, it became a joke, as an 

acronym for -same old SENTRY." 

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,1 

Evolution of the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 

Suite 4C1000 in the Pentagon became 

the location for some of the most secret and 

important activities in the US satellite 

reconnaissance programs. At the time of the 

Sputnik I launch, 4C1000 was occupied by 

the Air Force Office of Guided Missiles 

(AFCGM), headed by BGen Robert E. Greer, 

13Gen Robert E. Greer 

whose responsibility was primarily the 

development of air-launched guided missiles.*19The AFCGM staff also served as 

the secretariat for the AFBMC (a part of the 

special arrangements for managing the Air 

Force ballistic missile programs in Los 

Angeles), an activity that provided Greer's 

staff with insight into missile and space 

developments. In the Pentagon, most other 

R&D staff work was the responsibility of the 

Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for 

• 4C1000 was an executive-level conference room used by 

the senior Air Staff and the Air Force Secretaries for 

many conferences. Greer's AFCGM offices adjoined this 

conference room. When SAFMS was established, they 

simply annexed the 4C IOW conference room and that 

door became the entrance to the reconfigured suite. 

Development, LGen Roscoe C. Wilson. As 

ballistic missiles achieved operational status, 

they became the responsibility of AFCGM. 

When the MX-770 became the Atlas and 

deployment to operational sites began in 

1958, LtCol Edwin J. Istvan became the 

Atlas project officer in AFCGM. Later, he 

and Greer calculated that an entire Atlas 

sustainer stage could be placed in low Earth 

orbit to counter some of the bad publicity 

engendered by the Soviet lead in space. 

They obtained President Eisenhower's 

approval to install a payload playing 

Christmas carols and a Presidential greeting (plus telemetry). Thousands of listeners around the world heard the message 

and the carols during the satellite's brief 

three-day lifetime. This became project 

SCORE, an Atlas-B ICBM launched into low 

Earth orbit on 18 December 1958.20Due to 

the extreme secrecy of the arrangements, 

this probably qualifies as the first operational 

"black" payload. With the successful launch 

of project SCORE, emphasis in AFCGM 

gradually shifted from missiles to boosters, 

then to the satellites boosted by the missiles. 

On 26 May 1960, in the aftermath of 

the 1 May 1960 shootdown of F. Gary 

Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union. an 

event that involved terminating all aerial 

overflights of Soviet territory, President 

Eisenhower asked his new science and technology advisor, George B. Kistiakowsky, to 

form an ad hoc group and assess the 

nation's defense intelligence requirements, 

the ability of the SAMOS Program to meet 

them, and the Defense Department plans 

for employing the system.21On 10 June 

1960 Eisenhower gave the job formally to 

Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Jr., 

who appointed a committee consisting of 

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Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. 

Charyk, the Deputy Director of Defense 

Research and Engineering John H. Rubel, 

and science advisor Kistiakowsky. 

The findings of this group were presented to and approved by the President 

at a meeting of the National Security 

Council on 25 August 1960. Among the 

actions ordered were that " . . . this reconnaissance) program be managed with the 

directness that the Air Force has used on 

occasion, with great success, for projects 

with overriding priority. This can best be 

accomplished by direct line of command 

from the Secretary of the Air Force to the 

general officer in operational charge of the 

whole program ... ," and that " ... the socalled F payloads for gathering electromagnetic intelligence should be given 

lower priority than that assigned to photography.-22 This action was implemented 

on 31 August 1960 when the SAMOS 

Project Office was established at AFBMD, 

El Segundo, California, with BGen Robert 

E. Greer in charge, reporting directly to 

Under Secretary Charyk.23 

The Pentagon office, 4C1000, became 

the home of the Air Force Office of Missiles 

and Space (SAFMS), headed by BGen 

Richard Curtin, who had served at AFBMD 

in Los Angeles and in the office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Development in 

Washington. Curtin's niission was to provide direct staff support to Charyk and 

function as the Washington staff for Greer. 

The 4C1000 staff served the vital function of 

Providing liaison to other military organizations involved in military space programs. 

On 6 September 1961, the National 

Reconnaissance Program (NRP) was formally established, with Charyk named 

"Assistant for Reconnaissance" to the 

Secretary of Defense, in charge of Air Force 

Satellite Reconnaissance Programs, and 

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.. CIA Deputy Director 

for Plans, in charge of the CIA programs. 

The staff in 4C1000 became the Office of 

Space Systems (SAFSS), continuing to support Charyk as Under Secretary of the Air 

Force and Greer as the Director of the Air 

Force Office of Special Projects (SAFSP). 

Greer's earlier title, "Director of the SAMOS 

Project Office," had been dropped in favor of 

the less revealing "Director of Special 

Projects."24On 2 May 1962 Charyk was 

designated Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) on the basis of a 

DOD/CIA agreement, signed by Roswell 

Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and 

John A. McCone, Director of the CIA ( DCI i.25 

This agreement established a single Director 

of the NRO, responsible directly to the DCI 

and the Secretary of Defense for management of the entire NRP. It also established 

the NRO itself and designated the Under 

Secretary of the Air Force as the Director. 

This was made effective within the DOD on 

14 June 1962.'1'26On 23 July 1962 Charyk 

established the internal NRO structure 

and responsibilities. He also arranged for 

participation within the NRO by the CIA, 

the National Photographic Interpretation 

Center (NPIC), the National Security 

Agency (NSA), the Navy, and the Army 

through provision of qualified personnel 

• Since the NHO was a covert ("black-) facility, in the overt 

( -white') world it was known as the Office of Space 

Systems. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force 

(SAFSS), and the DNRO, a -black" title, was known in 

the "white-world as iand actually was) the Under 

Secretary of the Air Force (SAMS). 

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from those agencies and services to serve 

full-time tours on an interagency exchange 

basis. Charyk designated the Air Force 

NRO projects as Program A, the CIA projects as Program B, the Navy projects as 

Program C, and the overhead covert aircraft 

(U-2 and SR-71) as Program D.27LtCol Ed 

Istvan inherited the Electronic Systems 

position on the NRO staff in 4C1000 and 

handled all SIGINT matters until his 

retirement in 1963. Although the NRO 

was to face many reorganizations in the 

years to come, the stage was now set for 

the development of a series of satellite 

reconnaissance programs that were to 

become indispensable to the security and 

defensive preparedness of the United 

States. 

Evolution of the National Security 

Agency (NSA) 

NSA can trace its earliest beginnings 

as a national organization to a proposal in 

1943 to merge the Army and Navy radiointelligence units. These Army and Navy 

intercept organizations dated back to the 

early 1930s. when they were separate 

groups, usually competing vigorously for 

the collection and processing of diplomatic 

traffic-x28 Their merging was "delayed 

until the cessation of hostilities [in World 

War III because of the inevitable disruptions which occur as a result of major 

reorganizations.' 29 

Japanese PURPLE is one example. In the areas of 

Japanese or German Army and Navy traffic, little cooperation was possible because of the easily recognized distinctive characteristics of the respective opponent Service 

traffic. Post-World War II. the common or centrally 

controlled supply of (Russian) communication security 

doctrine made traffic source recognition quite difficult 

and a cooperative attack (AFSA. then NSA) feasible and 

desirable. 

• 

Also during World War II, the 

Army/Navy Radio Intelligence Coordinating Committee was established under the 

Joint Military Chiefs of Staff. This group, 

set up by a purely verbal "gentleman's 

agreement," later became the Army/Navy 

Communications Coordinating Committee 

of the Army/Navy Communications 

Intelligence Board. In 1945 the Department 

of State was added, because much of the 

COMINT collected during the war 

involved diplomatic targets, and the group 

was formalized as the State/Army/Navy 

Communications Intelligence Board 

(ST,kNCIB). 

In early 1946 Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg 

and Adm Thomas B. Engles of STANCIB 

met with J. Edgar Hoover to arrange for 

FBI membership in STANCIB.30On 

13 June 1946 the US Communications 

Intelligence Board (USCIB) was established 

to replace STANCIB and to carry out the 

same functions: to coordinate, develop policy for. control, and assign requirements 

for COMINT.31 

In 1947 President Harry S Truman 

signed Public Law 253, "The National 

Security Act of 1947," which created the 

Secretary of Defense as a cabinet post over 

the National Military Establishment and 

the three "co-equal" Secretaries of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force. The 1947 Act also 

established the National Security Council, 

the National Security Resources Board, and 

the CIA. The first Secretary .(if Defense was 

James V. Forrestal. During this period 

Congress also established an executive 

organization study group, and President 

Truman appointed former President 

Herbert Hoover its chairman. The Hoover 

• 

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group produced 19 reports, which included 

196 recommendations, in two years. In 

1949. by an amendment to the 1947 Act, 

DOD, destined to become a large and powerful institution, was formally created-32 

The CIA, established by the National 

Security Act of 1947 from the Central 

Intelligence Group (CIG), was the successor to President Roosevelt's World War II 

quasi-military Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS), which was organized and led by 

intelligence coordinator, collector, and analyst William J. Donovan. CIA's responsibilities were defined in Secret NSC directives. The first DCI, Admiral Sidney W. 

Souers, had already been heading the CIG 

since January 1946. In 1947, the second 

DCI, Air Force Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 

began to influence COMINT planning as a 

member of USCIB, although there were 

very few formal procedures for intelligence 

collection or reporting at that time. Adm 

Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter and, in the early 

1954s, Gen Walter Bedell Smith, former 

Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower during World War II. continued to strengthen 

the role of the CIA in the Intelligence—

and especially the COMINT—Community.33 

In the years after World War II, traditional turf battles between the Army and 

Navy intensified when the new Air Force, 

the State Department, and the new CIA 

were added to the list of intelligence contestants who would be involved in 

COMINT activities. In 1949, based on recommendations by several joint service 

committees and discussions with the members of the USCIB, Secretary of Defense 

Louis A. Johnson established, by executive 

order, the Armed Forces Security Agency 

(AFSA). This put all COMINT under one. 

military organization consisting of the 

Army and Navy radio intelligence groups 

as well as the new Air Force's own Air 

Force Security Service (AFSS). The Air 

Force had been created mainly from the 

Army Air Forces, so the Army's Signals 

Intelligence Service also had a piece split 

off to form AFSS. But AFSA only made 

matters worse; CIA and State were cut out 

of COMINT and the military services were 

subordinated to a new agency. 

On 24 October 1952, having received 

much criticism of AFSA, President Harry 

S Truman signed an Executive Directive 

making COMINT a national, not just a 

military, effort; this Directive changed the 

name of AFSA to the National Security 

Agency (NSAI and gave to the Director of 

the NSA, who reported to the Secretary of 

Defense, technical and operational control 

of all communications intelligence 

resources as well as responsibility for all 

"communications security" activities.' 

This Presidential directive, like the earlier 

AFSA, was resisted at first by the Army. 

Navy, and Air Force because it placed NSA 

firmly in control of their COMINT activities. From the CIA perspective, the new 

plan effectively took the CIA out of the 

COMINT chain by making COMINT a 

business of the DOD. There was also a 

process in which the Secretary.of State 

and the Secretary of Defense, as a "Special 

• President Truman sent a memo dated 24 October 1952 to 

Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of 

Defense Robert A. Lovett outlining the mission of NSA: 

on the same day National Security Council intelligence 

Directive No. 9 was issued, assigning NSA the COMINT 

mission for the US Government. 

t Communications security is defined as making US military and other high-level government communications 

secure from unauthorized readers. 

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Committee," coordinated on sensitive 

national security matters and at times 

kept out the DCI and CIA. After the 1952 

decision, in spite of resistance and with 

some exceptions, the bulk of the COMINT 

remained under NSA.34On 4 November 

1952. LGen Ralph J. Canine, US Army, 

was named the first Director of NSA and it 

was under his strong leadership that. NSA 

became a truly national communications 

intelligence and communications security 

organization.35 

On 10 July 1953 newly elected 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, following 

the lead of his predecessor, Harry S Truman. 

once again called upon former President 

Herbert Hoover (under Congressional 

mandate of PL 108) to study the complete 

reorganization and streamlining of the 

Federal Government after 20 years of 

Democratic control. This second Hoover 

Commission operated for two years, studied 60 agencies, and made 314 recommendations to Congress, many relative to 

reducing costs. A special task force, headed 

by General Mark W. Clark, investigated all 

the intelligence activities of the governMent and was charged to make appropriate recommendations. On 25 May 1955 

two reports were submitted. An unclassified report recommended that President 

Eisenhower appoint a committee of private 

citizens to report to him periodically on 

foreign intelligence activities; this was 

to become the President's Board of 

Consultants on Foreign Intelligence 

Activities t the Killian Board). A classified 

intelligence annex called for expansion of 

the COMINT effort "during an era when 

not only our national security but our 

national survival as well may depend on 

adequate intelligence." The Intelligence 

Task Force also observed that the 

"national interests will be better served. 

and more economical and efficient operation will result, if ELINT is placed under 

NSA."36 

On 13 July 1955 Secretary of Defense 

Charles E. Wilson issued DOD directive S3115.2, on ELINT. Although the Hoover 

Commission had recommended that 

ELINT be assigned to NSA. this directive 

assigned implementation responsibility in 

the ELINT field to the Secretary of the Air 

Force, pending the issuance of further recommendations by the USCIB and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff.37 

President Eisenhower's Executive 

Order of 6 February 1956 established the 

President's Board of Consultants on 

Foreign Intelligence Activities (the Killian 

Board, later the President's Foreign 

Intelligence Advisory Board IPFIAB)), 

chaired by Dr. James R. Killian, President 

of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 

to review and make semiannual reports on 

the foreign intelligence activities of the

government. In its report of 24 October 

1957, the board recommended that the 

functions of the USCIB and the Intelligence 

Advisory Committee be combined into a 

single body, the US Intelligence Board 

(USIB), and that this new board be 

chaired by the DCI.38 

While considering the Killian Board 

recommendations in February 1958, 

President Eisenhower requested USCIB 

to look again at ELINT management. 

Responding to his memorandum the board 

established a special ELINT task force, the 

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Louis W. To►della 

"Strong Committee," with retired US 

Marine Corps BGen Philip G. Strong, then 

of the CIA, as chairman.39Other members on the committee were Robert F. 

Packard, State Department; Louis W. 

Tordella, formerly Chief of NSA's Office of 

Analysis. then DOD Office of Special 

Operations. and soon to become Deputy 

Director, NSA; Col Russell H. Horton, US 

Army; Capt Charles M. Bertholf, US 

Navy; and Col Linscott A. Hall, US Air 

Force. The committee studied the US 

ELINT organizational structure and submitted its report on 11 June 1958. The 

Strong Committee concluded that there 

should be a single national operational 

and technical authority to direct and control all US ELINT activities and noted it 

was "logical, desirable, and feasible" that a 

single national authority direct and control 

both the COMINT and ELINT activities of 

the US Government, to wit, NSA.40The 

President approved these recommendations, and on 15 September 1958 this 

action was directed by NSC Intelligence 

Directive (NSCID) No. 6. Also issued on 

this date were NSCID No. 1. which created the US Intelligence Board and incorporated USCIB's COMINT/ELINT responsibilities into overall responsibility for 

national intelligence requirements and 

also described the national responsibilities 

of the DCI, including his chairmanship of 

the USIB; NSCID No. 5 dealing with the 

CIA; and NSCID No. 7 for Critical 

Communications.41 

• Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy 

signed the implementing directives for 

NSCID No. 6 on 19 March 1959 (DOD 

S-3115.4), officially assigning NSA operational and technical control of ELINT. 

NSA had no organization at that time to 

accept this responsibility for ELINT 

except for the National Technical Processing Center (NTPC), which had been 

formed previously from the World War II 

Army-Navy Electronics Evaluation Group. 

NTPC processed ELINT and TELINT collected from conventional military ground 

and airborne sources. CIA continued to 

operate the U-2 and to provide data 

(selected on CIA's determination of needto-know ) to members of the Intelligence 

Community.42 

At this time (the late 1950s), some 

NSA personnel in the ELINT processing 

organization, the Soviet and European collection organization, and the R&D organization had become aware of the ELINT 

satellite work in the Navy and the Air 

Force. Those NSA employees who used 

the U-2 photography to verify and collate 

SIGINT intercepts were among the first to 

be exposed to the possibility of satellite 

reconnaissance. Some with Navy contacts 

learned of the NRL effort to orbit the 

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4_, 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DYNO satellite and the Navy's plans to. 

use NSA's cryptologic stations on the 

periphery of the Soviet Union and China 

for reading out the data. Some in NSA 

R&D were tracking the RAND Corporation 

"Project FEED BACK" work for the Air 

Force and thereby learned of the WS-117L 

Reconnaissance Satellite Program Office 

and its activities. These individuals 

became aware that the satellite program 

had been well underway in the Air Force 

before NSA received clear responsibilities 

for ELINT in 1958. 

Many ELINT policies had already 

been initiated, plans developed. responsibilities assigned. and close working relationships established in the Air Force 

ELINT satellite programs before NSA 

became involved. In 1955, DOD Directive 

3115.2 had given responsibility for ELINT 

to the Air Force. In March 1955 the Air 

Force had started design studies for 

WS-117L. On 29 October 1956 the Air 

Force awarded contract AF 04(647)-97 to 

Lockheed Missiles and Space Division 

(LMSD) as prime contractor for the WS117L program. This contract included 

development of processing equipment for 

ELINT data located at the Vandenberg 

Tracking Station and the Satellite Test 

Center in California.43Because of 

progress made in these early activities, 

NSA had difficulty being accepted as a contributing team member. These difficulties 

were compounded by security rules and 

the limited distribution of NSCID No. 6 

and the DOD implementing Directive S3115.2 (Rev). 

NSA personnel had also begun to look 

at the possible use of satellites for COMINT. 

In August 1959 NSA issued a pioneering 

28 The SfG1NT Satellite Story 

"Study Report on COMINT Collection from 

Satellite Vehicles." TECHDOC No. 33.144, 

which showed that the "basic philosophy 

and some of the equipment of Subsystem F, 

the ELINT reconnaissance portion of the 

WS-1171, program, is generally adaptable to 

the requirements of COMINT data collection." An article b that 

summarized the report concluded that the 

then-imminent low-orbit satellite system 

was technically capable of COMINT collection and suggested that higher altitude 

COMINT satellites would be most practical, 

should be very specialized and not duplicative, and "based on careful consideration of 

the value of the expected end-product."44 

At the crucial meeting of President 

Eisenhower and the NSC on 25 August 

1960, which resulted in the formation of 

what would become the NRO reporting 

directly to the Under Secretary of the Air 

Force, Eisenhower also authorized another 

evaluation of all US intelligence agencies. 

On 15 December 1960 a "Joint Study 

Group Report on Foreign Intelligence 

Activities of the United States Government," 

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the Kirkpatrick Report, was issued. Chaired 

by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Inspector 

General, CIA, this group had studied the 

most effective and efficient use of intelligence resources. The group recommended 

that DOD unify ELINT resources under 

the operational and technical control of the 

Director of NSA and that DOD strengthen 

NSA control over the service cryptologic 

agencies. As had the Kistiakowsky • 

survey earlier, it also "cautioned about 

military domination of the intelligence 

process."45 

Resolution of NRO and NSA Roles 

and Missions 

Both the NRO and the NSA were 

formed for the same basic reason: to consolidate fragmented national intelligence 

efforts to face the challenges of a rapidly 

expanding Cold War. It was soon apparent that the NRO charter to develop and 

operate reconnaissance satellites, including SIGINT satellites, would overlap the 

NSA mandate (NSCID No. 6) to control all 

national SIGINT efforts. 

On 18 January 1961, two days before 

Eisenhower left office, the NSC recommended approval of a revised NSCID 

No. 6, "Communications Intelligence and 

Electronic Intelligence," proposed by the 

Secretary of Defense, in regard to collection and processing of COMINT and 

ELINT. Though never issued, this revision specified that "only the Secretary of 

Defense may exercise or delegate authority to perform these functions within the 

Department of Defense."46This would 

enable the Secretary of Defense to control 

SIGINT activities, roles, and missions, 

and the revision was resisted at NSA. 

Infighting and power struggles 

ensued. On 17 February 1961 NSA 

Director VAdm Laurence H. Frost sent a 

memorandum, "Development of Advanced 

Intelligence Collection Programs," to the 

new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. 

McNamara, citing NSA's responsibilities 

and authorities to task COMINT/ELINT 

resources, especially satellites. Frost also 

asserted that NSA had approval authority 

over military research and engineering 

programs involving COMINT/ELINT. 

Frost's memo pointed out the unique 

authority of the Director of NSA in COMINT/ 

ELINT operational planning and collection 

tasking. It was intended to assert NSA's 

authority over COMINT/ELINT 

satellites.47Frost's memo did not lead to 

any 'changes within the Office of the 

Under Secretary of the Air Force (later the 

NRO), nor did the USIB change any of its 

then-current delineations of existing roles 

and missions. However, the Under 

Secretary of the Air Force (later Director, 

NRO), Joseph V. Charyk, sent a memorandum on 21 March 1961 to NSA Director 

Frost inviting NSA to work with and assist 

the Air Force in planning and executing 

the national satellite reconnaissance program. Frost accepted the invitation in 

memorandum N1093, dated 31 March 

1961.48This exchange strengthened the 

DNRO's hand, but more work would be 

needed to define NRO and NSA roles. 

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Eugene G. Fubini 

With the 6 September 1961 agreement between CIA and DOD to establish a 

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), 

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 

turned to the interagency tension in the 

SIGINT area. On 7 September 1961, to 

provide an arbitrator for some of the 

SIGINT trouble spots, he appointed Gene 

Fubini. from the office of the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering (DDR&E), to examine all 

matters pertaining to SIGINT satellite 

programs. Fubini formed a study group to 

attack the problem, with himself as chairman. The group met first on 14 September 

1961. Included were Herbert L. Conley 

of NSA as alternate chairman, Walter G. 

Deeley of NSA as recorder, Howard C. 

Barlow of NSA, LtCol Edwin J. Istvan of 

SAFMS. Howard A. Stadermann of 

DDR&E, Cmdr Frank R. Sperberg 

(OP94G), William E. W. Howe from Navy 

(ONI), Maj Abram V. Rinearson, III, of 

Army, and Harold Willis. CIA. 

The Fubini group produced a blueprint, "Space Vehicle Electronic 

Intelligence Program Responsibilities and 

Resources," which was approved by 

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, on 20 October 1961. This document required the Air Force and NSA to 

work together to support the Air Force 

responsibility for development and operation of SIGINT satellite collection systems. 

In turn, NSA assumed the responsibility 

for processing and analysis of SIGINT 

satellite-collected data and provision of 

results to the Intelligence Community. 

Technical Instruction 1301 was provided to 

the NRO by NSA in 1963 to establish data 

formats, information requirements, and 

procedures. This arrangement continued 

essentially unchanged until the 1972 revision of NSCID No. 6 when NSA was given 

the responsibility for payload tasking 

while the NRO retained satellite technical 

tasking to maintain vehicle integrity. 

To further strengthen the ties 

between NSA and the NRO, a meeting was 

held on 25 May 1962. and was attended by 

DIRNSA Frost, Deputy Director of NSA 

Louis Tordella, and Herbert Scoville, Jr., 

Deputy Director for Research, CIA. The 

purpose of the meeting was to further clarify the NSA and NRO roles in responding 

to national requirements as determined by 

the US Intelligence Board (USIB). They 

agreed to cooperate in the implementation 

of a collection and processing program 

based on stated USIB requirements.49In 

response to paragraph 2b of this agreement, of NSA's 

ELINT processing organization, who had 

become a chief architect of NSA participation in satellite ELINT, moved over to the 

Pentagon SAFMS staff in June 1962. He 

was to assure that NSA recommendations 

were fully available to NRO planners at 

EL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

30 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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all times. proved to be an invaluable asset in planning and executing a 

system approach to determining and rec- . 

onciling SIGINT collection and processing 

developments. 

After more months of discussions, 

mostly between DOD and CIA. another 

agreement between the DCI and Secretary 

of Defense on the roles and relationships 

of CIA and NRO operations was signed on 

2 May 1962. On 13 March 1963, still a 

third agreement was issued: "AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE AND THE DIRECTOR OF 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM." The agreement stated, in part: "To carry out his 

responsibilities as Executive Agent for 

the National Reconnaissance Program, the 

Secretary of Defense will establish as a 

separate operating agency of the Department of Defense, a National Reconnaissance Office, under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of 

Defense." With respect to SIGINT, this 

agreement said the NRO should provide 

for " decommutation, conversion, technical correction and reconstruction of the 

collected electronic signal data to yield a 

usable collection product, and delivery of 

such collection product in proper format 

together with associated data necessary 

for exploitation to NSA or other user."50 

The definition of how SIGINT should be 

handled was essentially in place.' 

A major reorganization of the NRP 

occurred in 1965 with the formation of the 

NRP Executive Committee (ExCom I composed of three high-level officials—the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director 

of Central Intelligence, and the President's 

Science Advisor—with sole authority to 

approve or modify the NRO budget. This 

arrangement gave the DNRO a needed 

management mechanism, especially with 

respect to issues involving the CIA. In 

1967 and 1968 the Eaton Committee 

under DCI Richard Helms made another 

study of US SIGINT. and in 1972 NSA and 

NRO roles and missions were modified to 

give NSA a little more control over satellite collection. Most of the time, though. 

To carry out the necessary liaisons among the 

Intelligence Community members and the MRO, especially on the subject of national requirements. special 

committees came into being. The earliest forerunner of 

this kind of coordination of operations was the -Special 

Committee" of the Secretary of Defense and the 

Secretary of State in the early 1950s: this arrangement 

did not include the DCI or the CIA. In 1958. with the 

formation of USIB out of the earlier USCIR. COMINT 

was made the responsibility of the SIGINT Committee of 

USIR, and thus moved to a position of relatively less 

importance in the intelligence world. In the early 1960s 

all SIGINT satellite requirements were made the responsibility of the USIB's Committee on Overhead 

Reconnaissance rCOMOR). In 1963 this responsibility 

was placed under the COMOR SIGINT Working Group 

(CSWG/. In 1967 the CSWG became the SIGINT 

Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee r SORS) of the 

SIGINT Committee of the USIB. anarrangement that 

has continued for many years. 

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especially at the working level, there was 

so much enthusiasm for what was being 

done in the new era of space SIGINT that 

institutional prerogatives were forgotten. 

The next chapters detail the systems that 

were built and operated with this team 

spirit.* 

Appendix E contains the full text of documents referenced in this chapter. 

32 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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COVERT 

COLLECTION 

NATIONAL 

REr"..11ENEWS 

uNATION 

ARMY/NAVY 

RADIO 

LNTELuGENCE 

COORD. COMMITTEE 

• 

GOD 

OPERATIONS. 

INTELLIGENCE. AND 

DEVELOPMENT 

1 

ARMY INTELLIGENCE 

ARMY SIGNAL CORPS. 

1945 1946 1947- 

NATIONAL 

SECURITY 

COUNCIL (NSCI 

CENTRAL 

INTELLMENCE 

GROUP 

(C1G) 

CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY 

(CIA) 

NR 

RRoGRA 

(1962) 

DIRECTOR OF 

sTATEJARDAyi US CENTRAL 

NAVY COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (OCI1 

ommuNicAnoNs INTELLIGENCE 

INTELLIGENCE BOARD 

BOARD (USCIB) 

(STANCIB) 

ARMY/NAVY 

ELECTRONICS 

EVALUATION 

GROUP 

(ANEEG) 

Onaus. 

DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE (DOO) 

ARMY-ASSISTANT 

CHIEF 

OF STAFF/INTELLIGENCE 

ARMY 

SIGNALS 

• 

IACS/11 

tC0111,en 

sEcuRrTY1%.. ARMY 5ECURITY 

AGENCY AGENCY (ASA) 

ISSAI _ 

AIR FORCE-ASSISTANT 

CHIEF OF CO 

AIR FORCE SECURITY 

SERVIcE1AFSSI 

NAVAL SECURITY 

GROUP (NEC) 

OFFICE OF NAVAL 

INTEWOENCE (Om) 

P. 

NAVAL RESEARCH 

LABORATORY (NHL) s:---OBTROGRAM 

TO: TARO 

iC 

0962') • 

WWII 

PRESIDENTIAL 

SUPPORT 

ARMY/NAVY 

commuNicATIoNS 

INTELLIGENCE 

BOARD 

• 

NAVY COMBS 

NAVAL INTEL 

1........ 

NAVAL 

RESEARCH 

LABORATORY 

(NRL) 

OFFICE OF 

STRATEGIC 

SERVICES 

(055) 

CoLLECTIO4 

SECURITY 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

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• 1946 1947 

NATIONAL 

SECURITY 

COUNCIL INSCI 

CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY 

(CIA) 

US 

:CIIMMUNICATION 

INTELLIGENCE 

BOARD 

(USCIE11 

DEPARTMENT OF I 

DEFENSE (0001 

APAIT-ASSISTANT 

CHIEF 

OF STAFFANTELUGENCE 

(Acsro 

ARMY SECURITY 

AGENCY (ASAI 

AIR FORCE•ASSISTANT 

CHIEF OF 

STAFFAMELLIGENCE 

AIR FORCE SECURITY 

SERVICE IAFSSI 

NAVAL SECURITY 

GROUP INSCI 

(COMINT) 

NAVAL RESEARCH 

LABORATORY 'NAL/ 

TO: N110 

.---IPLPROGRAM C • 

(19621 

CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

GROUP 

/cIGI 

TO: NRO 

PROGRAMS 

(1962) 

DIRECTOR OF 

CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE (DC1 

OFFICE OF NAVAL 

INTELLIGENCE IOW 

1949 1952 1954 1956 

PRESIDENTS BOARD 

OF CONSULTANTS ON 

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 

ACTH/VIES 

(KILLIAN BOARD) 

ARMED FORCES NATIONAL 

SECURITY SECURITY 

AGENCY AGENCY 

(AF$AI (NSA) 

AIR FORCE AIR FORCE 

DEPUTY OFFICE OF 

CHIEF OF STAFF GIOEO MISSILES 

FOR (AEGGI,A) 

DEVELOPMENT 

(AFORE)) 

AIR FORCE WESTERN 

IR RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT 

AND INVisION OF 

SEVELovuEHT AROC 

CPAIAAND (ARDC) (WOO) 

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1957 

—, 

1959 1959 1960 1961 

A seism/pc r 

PRESIDENTS BOARD 

lArTS ON 

LICENCE 

ES 

TARO) 

1 PRDENTS PRET 

SCIENCE 

Aovisoprr 

COMMITTEE 

(Mg 

FOREIGN 

iNTEUJGENCE 

ADVISORY BOARD 

(PFIAB) 

• 

USIA 

COMMITTEE ON 

COMOA 

SIGINY 

UNITED STATES 

INTIUJOENCE 

OVERHEAD 

RECONNAISSANCE 

ICOIMOR) 

-...... WORKING 

GROuP (SWG) 

BOARD (USIB) 

USIA 

SIGIOIT 

COMMITTEE • 

NATIONAL 

(TRANSFERRED TO NSA 

Tr_IINICAL 

NSA 

EUNT 

PROCESSING 

ANALYSIS 

(COSA) 

DEFENSE 

IHTELIJOINCE 

AGENCY 

(DIAL 

N 

Ni: CONS N 

Rs: PROLE MS 

DEV 

R3: COLLEC S 

-.....,................„ 

PROCESSING 

CENTER 

,NTPC) 

C GROUP: MACHINE . DCVO. 

5 GROUP: SECURITY 

®

USAF . 

CROUP: UP: M A 

NSA c.,..: ,... 

N'"....10. A37: ELECTRONIC s) i., OfFTCF OF RADIO 

glEyEL0PMEN7 

TECHNICAL 

pLANNING 

GROUP 

ADVANCED 

RESEARCH 

PROJECTS 

AGENCY 

(ARPA) 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IE 

A-415: COM 

ISECOEFI 5-GROUP: COMMUNICSEI 

+ 

NSA 

CO.IX EL1NT -....-40 I 

UNDER SECRETARY PROCESSING • _ 

-------""Y--.--.---...........,..........„ 

OF THE AIR FORCE (SAFUS) ABU EUNT EON i r NAT704 

RECotercuil 

OFFICE ) 

PROGRAM A: 

OFFICE OF MISSILES I PROGRAM 

MR FORCE 

ILALLISTIC 

roma E DIVISION 

01 SPACE (SAFIASI PROGRAM 

OFFICE 6: 

OF SPECIAL 

PROGRAM 

IAJF130.10) 

SAMOS PROJECT 

OFFICE (SAFSP) 

PROJECTS 

ISAFSP) OFFICE OF S111 

SYSTEMS (SAO! 

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1963 1964 1965 1967 1969 

1971 

-.....— 

SIGINT 

OVERHEAD 

....----------------"--. 

RECONNAISSANCE 

stoacoporrree 

(soon) 

41 

NSA NSA NSA 4. A-67 EOB 

C4 MACHINE SUPPORT 

K-VSP ELIHT SYSTEM 

NSA 

OPERATIONS 

,-, "0.,,,, 

PLANNING 

W4 SYSTEM PLANNING 

W46 TASKING 

W-2 ELINT SYSTEMPROCESSING IL ANALYSIS 

LE 

NSA 

DEFENSE 

SPECIAL 

MISSILES AND 

PROCESSING A 

ANALYSIS 

R4 SYSTEM PLANNING 

(19661 

ISATELUTE W-3 508 

♦ 

NSA 

SIG/NT 

SATELLITE 

ASTRONAUTICS 

CENTER (SATELLITE TASKIRG1 MINT MISSION TASKING 

(OEFSMACI SUPPORT 

CENTER 

(SSSC) NATIONAL PROGRAM C 

 SPACE NAVY 

PROJECT OFFICE 

(PM-I61 

,_.4. 

PIRO 

SATELLITE 

RECONNAISSANCE 

PROGRAM 

EXECUTIVE 

Ali 

OPERATION 

CENTER (SOLI 

COMMITTEE 

(EXCOW 

., 

Et] PSAC ip 

] 

(SIGINT SATELLITE TASIUNG-COORD1NA 

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Evolution of organizations involved in 

SIG! NT satellite programs 

`,..EGEND 

INDICATES TRANSMON 

INDICATES SUBORDINATION 

1973 AS OF 1975 

NATIONAL SECURITY 

COUNCIL (NEC) 

..EssOlters FOREIGN 

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY 

BOARD IPF1AB) 

PRESIDENTS SCIENCE 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

(PSACI 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

(CM) 

t 

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) 

• 

- UNITED STATES INFEGENCE BOARD FUSIBI W

1 

SIGINT COMMITTEE OF usle 

I 

WANT OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE SUBCOMMITTEE (SORS) 

FROM W-fl 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. 

(NSA) 

uNG 

L4 

:YSIS 

RSA , 

P.M SYSTEM 

PLANNING. 

NSA 

s•TEUJTE 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM EXECUTIVE couserrEE (Dam Exec..) 

MEMBEIRG: pa. DEPSECOEF. PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISOR 

. 

ING 

OPERATIONS 

CENTER 

DIRECTOR. NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE .• 

(ONRO) 

INSOC) 

:E 

PROGRAM C 

NAVY SPACE annex OF SPACE SYSTEMS 

(SAPS)) 

-• 

4...6. 

PROJECT 

OFFICE 

(PME•106; 

—.... 1 

PROGRAM..

/AIR FORCE)- PROGRAM 

. . 

() CL& 

0 voroc...as c 

(NAVY) 

., 

Top Secrel 

fri4„dk a yivt4%. FAL EL % /-ifYFIOt f - 

COVINT Control Chantleh ore. 

101.4119:'.14 

Chaplet 2 3 

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siofoRN-oRcoN 

Chapter 2 References 

1. LeMay, Curtis E., with MacKinlay Kantor, Mission with LEMAY. My Story, Garden 

City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965, pp. 399-400. 

2. Douglas Aircraft Company (Santa Monica Plant, Engineering Division), "Preliminary 

Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship," Report No. SM-11827, 2 May 1946. 

Quoted in Merton E. Davies and William R. Harris, RAND's Role in the Evolution of 

Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related US Space Technology, Santa 

Monica, CA: the RAND Corporation, 1988, pp. 8 and 9. 

3. Davies, Merton E. and William R. Harris, RAND's Role in the Evolution of Balloon and 

Satellite Observation Systems and Related US Space Technology, Santa Monica, CA: the 

RAND Corporation, 1988, p. 18. 

4. Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance, The RAND Corporation, R-2I7, April 

1951 (Group 3 review, 30 April 1971) (C). 

5. Letter from MGen D. N. Yates, DCS/D, USAF, to CG, ARDC, "Project FEED BACK," 22 

May 1953. 

6. Memo for the Record, Lt Col V. L. Genez, DA, Deputy for Development, ARDC, 

"Conference with RAND Corporation re: FEED BACK Program," 13 August 1953. 

7. Lipp, James E. and Robert M. Salter (editors), Project FEED.BACK Summary Report, 

The RAND Corporation, R-262, Vol. I, 1 March 1954 (Group 3 review, 1 March 1974) (C). 

8. Davies and Harris, p. 61. 

9. Davies and Harris, p. 61. 

10. William 0. Troetschel interview, 27 March 1991. 

11. Hall, R. Cargill, The Air Force and the National Security Space Program, Chapter 1, 

P. 28. 

12. William G. King interview, 17 September 1991. 

13. King interview. 

14. Davies, Merton E. and William R. Harris, Research Note N-1532, July 1987. 

15. King interview. 

16. DOD Directive 5105.15, 2/7/58. 

17. MSG CITE DEF 963459 from ARPA SGD CLARK, 062217Z August 1959. 

18. Martin comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

19. Martin comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

20. TRW Systems Group, TRW Space Log, 1970-71, 1972, p. 85. 

21. Memo, BGen J. Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 

26 1960, Others Present: Dr. Kistiakowsky, Mr. Gordon Gray, Gen. Goodpaster," 31 May 

1960 (S/TK). 

22. Memo from James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary NSC, to Thomas S. Gates, Jr., 

SECDEF, "Reconnaissance Satellite Program," 1 September 1960 (S/TK). 

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23. SAF Order No. 116, "Director of the Samos Project Office," from Dudley C. Sharp, SAF, 

31 August 1960. . 

24. Memo from Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force, et al., Subject: "Assistant for Reconnaissance," with attached agreement "Management of the National Reconnaissance Program," 6 September 1961 (S/TK). 

25. Charyk memo, 8 March 1963. 

26. DOD Directive TS5105.23, 14 June 1962. 

27. Memo for Record, Col Paul E. Worthman, 8 March 1963, with attached draft "A 

Summary Review of the National Reconnaissance Office," 15 February 1963, prepared for 

Joseph V. Charyk's report to Gilpatric and McCone. 

28. Louis W. Tordella comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

29. Burns, Thomas L., United States Cryptologic History, Series V, Volume 1, The Origins 

of the National Security Agency, 1940-1952, NSA Center for Cryptologic History, 1990, and 

Reference Guide to Selected Historical Documents Relative to the NSAI CSS 1931.1985. 

30. Minutes, STANCIB meetings, 20 February, 27 February, and 12 June 1946. 

31. Burns. 

32. IEEE Spectrum, February 1986, p. 8, and Encyclopedia Americana. 

33. Burns, pp. 19, 39-41, 45, and 49-57. 

34. Tordella comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

35. Tordella comments, SIGINT Satellite History Round Table, 26 May 1994. 

36. Hoover Commission Report, Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal 

Government, Appendix I, Part 1. "Report of Survey of the National Security Agency" from 

the NSA Historical Collection: Series VI,C.1.7, 25 May 1955 f%). The report was prepared 

by a Task Force that included Gen Mark W. Clark, Chairman; Adm Richard L. Connolly, 

USN (Ret); Ernest F. Hollings, Lt. Governor of South Carolina; Henry Keanns; Edward V. 

Rickenbacker; Donald S. Russell; and MGen James G. Christiansen, USA (Ret), Staff 

Director. 

37. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.30. (8-3- 

38. Killian Board Report, "The Report from the President's Board of Consultants on 

Foreign Intelligence Activities," 24 October 1957, from The Killian Board for the President 

and the National. Security Council, NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area; Accession No. 

7507N. 

39. King interview, 17 September 1991. 

40. Strong Committee Report, "Report of the USCIB ELINT Task Force," 11 June 1958, 

from the Strong Committee to the USCIB, NSA Q4 Office. 

41. NSCID No. 5, No. 6, and No. 7, NSA Historical Collection, Series V, A.28. 

42. Tordella comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

43. USAF Space Programs 1945-1962 (S) and NSA in Space, April 1975, BYE-19385-75, 

P. 6 (TS/B/TK/C). 

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44. "COMINT Satellites—A Space Problem" NSA Technical Journal, 

VoITIV,No. 4, pp. 39-48, October 1959 (S). 

45. NSA History Collection Series VI, C.1.32.(TS), and R. Cargill Hall, The Air Force and 

the National.Security Space Program 1946-1986, draft, p.42 (TS). Kistiakowsky, p. 384; 

Welzenbach history; see Prados pp. 122-124. 

46. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.28. (TS). 

47. NSA Cryptologic Holding Area: Accession No. 2852. (TS) 

48. NSA in Space, BYE-19385-75, p. 70 (TS/13/TK/C). 

49. Memorandum of Agreement Concerning NSA Participation in the (S) National 

Reconnaissance Office, 25 May 1962, signed by Louis W. Tordella, Herbert Scoville. Jr., and 

Joseph V. Charyk. 

50. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE DIRECTOR 

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM, 13 March 1963, signed by John A. McCone, Director of Central 

Intelligence, and Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense. (Supersedes DOD-CIA 

NRO agreement, 2 May 1962.) (TS/

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• The Navy Program (Program C) 

!)i 

The DYNO Concept 

Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCON 

The Navy SIGINT Satellite Program, 

conceived in early 1958 by personnel of the 

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), combined the NRL's long experience in the 

fields of radar and electronic intercept Systems with the more recent space experience gained through their development of 

the Vanguard Satellite Program. Thus, 

Navy personnel could take full advantage 

of a call in early 1958 from the newly 

formed Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (ARPA) for military space-related 

projects. The Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO) relayed the query to all Navy scientific and technical organizations, asking, 

"All hands consider how they could use 

space in their design ideas for the Navy"' 

This call struck a responsive note 

with Reid Mayo, an engineer in Howard 

Lorenzen's electronics group at the NRL. 

Mayo proposed that a crystal-video receiver, 

such as the ones they were installing in 

submarine periscopes, be mounted in a 

Vanguard-type satellite in orbit around the 

Earth. When connected to an appropriate 

antenna on the satellite, such a receiver 

could "see" (intercept) the "main beam" 

from radar antennas on Earth whenever 

the antennas were pointed at the satellite. 

lie further reasoned that if this signal 

were sent from the crystal-video receiver to 

a transmitter on the satellite, it could be 

Howard Lorenzen 

returned to any ground station in view of 

the satellite or, in other words, to a ground 

station with a line-of-sight path to the 

satellite.' 

By the late 19.50s, the US intelligence 

services responsible for intercepting hostile 

(primarily Soviet) radio and radar signals 

had established a ground network of intercept stations ringing the Soviet Union on 

all sides except the Arctic north. It was 

possible, by locating satellite data-receiving 

equipment at intercept stations in countries such as

to see a satellite at a 67-degree-inclined, 

500-mile-altitude orbit, for many hours 

every day.3At the same time, the satellite 

could see the main beam signals from the 

radars in the Soviet Union. This concept 

of realtime "transponding" of radar signals 

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Projecl POPPY 

Orbital inclination: 66° - 70° 

Orbital altitude: SOO miles 

Orbital shape: Circular 

Ground coverage: Hemispheric (main beams only) 

Collection technique: Read-in main beams of target 

radars and transpond in 

rea 'lime to ground stations 

within satellite line-of-sight. 

Collection antennas: Omnidirectional dipoles. Later 

used multiple circular waveguide horns for high bands 

and npposite quadrant 

coverage selection to reduce 

radar signal density 

POPPY operational concept 

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l op SW el 

NOFORN-ORCON 

to peripheral listening posts became the 

foundation of the Navy satellite program, 

starting with GRAB/DYNO, POPPY

Reid Mayo 

The response to the ARPA request, 

sent by NRL to the CNO in March 1958, 

featured a "transponder" designed by 

Mayo and his fellow engineers of Howard 

Lorenzen's electronics group. The 

transponder was mounted in a spherical 

satellite. 20 inches in diameter, designed 

by engineers of the Vanguard Program 

Office underthe leadership of Marty 

Votaw. The receiver section of the 

transponder, the ELINT system, utilized 

six monopole antennas deployed around 

the surface of the sphere in such a way as 

to provide omnidirectional coverage of all 

radar beams impinging on the satellite. 

Each of these antennas was connected to a 

single crystal-video receiver consisting of a 

filter to determine the frequency coverage 

and a detector and amplifier with 

adjustable sensitivity. The receiver system was adjusted to assure that it was . 

sensitive only to the main beam signal 

from each radar as the radar looked in the 

direction of the satellite. The time between 

looks would determine the rate of rotation, or 

"scan rate," of the radar. This adjustment 

Marty Votaw 

also provided a "threshold" to mask out 

lower power signals that could cause interference to the desired main beam intercepts. Since the satellite was not stabi- 

•lized in any plane, great care was taken to 

assure that regardless of the direction of • 

arrival, all pulses would be received with 

the same amplification. At the output of 

the receiver, each pulse was "stretched" to 

a length of.450 microseconds, permitting it 

to be transmitted to the ground stations by 

a narrow-bandwidth transmitter connected to an omnidirectional turnstile 

antenna. In that way, any ground station 

in line of sight could receive the signals, 

but they were almost impossible to detect 

by an adversary if the satellite downlink 

frequency was not known with great accuracy. This technique provided a great deal 

of security from Soviet intercept (but not 

as great as standard encryption could).4 

1 

LEChapter 3 39 

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In addition to the transponder, the 

satellite contained a power system consisting of a storage battery plus six 9-inchdiameter round patches of 156 solar cells 

located symmetrically on the surface of the 

sphere, so that one watt of power would be 

available for any orientation of the satellite. A telemetry system provided engineering data on the status of the satellite 

as well as the state of commanding of the 

transponder. The command system consisted of a receiver and decoder that translated tones transmitted from the ground 

command station into relay closures, controlling such functions as data link on/off" 

and "timer start" to turn on the transponder. The command system shared the 

turnstile antenna with the data link transmitters and could receive commands 

whenever it was in view of a ground station having a command transmitter.5 

The Naval Research Laboratory 

(NRL) proposed to place this satellite in a 

67-degree-inclined, circular orbit, at an 

altitude of 500 miles, as an added payload 

along with the much larger TRANSIT IIA 

navigation satellite. According to the plan, 

it would be launched from the Cape 

Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. 

Ground stations to receive the data transmitted from the satellite were to be located 

at Intelligence Community intercept sites 

in

The 

ELINT mission was very straightforward: 

to intercept and identify known types of 

radars in the Soviet Union and to discover 

and describe new types of radars not previously intercepted by peripheral ground, 

sea, and airborne means. A further ELINT 

goal was to locate these radars as accurately as possible. 

To utilize the facilities of the existing 

ground intercept sites, maintain security, 

and minimize interference with ongoing 

activities, the DYNO ground stations were 

installed in self-contained transportable 

shelters known as Earth satellite vehicle 

(ESV) huts. These were lightweight, aluminum structures designed for worldwide 

service conditions. All equipment was 

installed at NRL and the huts were 

shipped as essentially standalone facilities, transportable by helicopter. aircraft, 

truck, rail, or ship. Once at the sites they 

were mounted on concrete pedestals, pavement, or on elevated platforms equipped 

with carport-type canopy roofs. All that 

was required was electrical power and 

they were ready to go! Multielement Yagi 

antennas (similar to those used for commercial television reception) were installed 

on the roof of each but and were rotated 

manually from inside the but to point in 

the direction of the satellite. Standard 

military vacuum-tube radio receivers 

(R-390/URR) with crystal-controlled converters were used to tune in both the radar 

signals transponded from the satellite and 

the telemetry signals containing the satellite's status. A two-track magnetic-tape 

recorder was provided for recording the 

intercept data. One track contained the 

radar signals, and the other track contained both the operator's comments prior 

to turn on of the intercept receiver and a 

digital representation of time during the 

intercept period. A chart recorder was 

installed to indicate the strength of the 

signal from the satellite as well as the 

state of the equipment on the satellite. A 

250-watt transmitter provided the ability 

to send commands, in the form of audio 

tones, to the satellite via a second Yagi 

antenna mounted on the ESV mast along 

40 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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1 

with the receiving antenna. The plan was 

to deploy these transportable ground stations to ground sites operated by the Naval 

Security Group (NSG), headquartered in 

Washington, DC. 6 

According to the NRL plan, these 

ESV sites would be manned and operated 

by NSG while the funding for operation 

would be provided as part of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program through NSA. 

In order to obtain adequate coverage of the 

Soviet Union it was also proposed to locate 

some of the huts at stations manned by 

the Army, Air Forc Furthermore, the data, collected on magnetic tape, 

would be forwarded through the Armed 

Forces Courier Service to the National 

Technical Processing Center (NTPC) at 

Headquarters, NSG. This center was 

shortly to be relocated and integrated into 

NSA in accordance with National Security 

Council Directive No. 6 (NSCID-6) dated 

15 September 1958, which assigned 

responsibility for national ELINT data 

Processing to NSA. In 1959, NTPC was 

moved to the NSA operations building.at 

Fort Meade, Maryland, where it became 

Part of the fledgling ELINT organization 

with the office symbol COSA-5. Here the 

data would be interpreted and distributed 

to intelligence users as required. 

On 29 July 1958 the National 

Aeronautical and Space Act became law, 

and on 10 October 1958 the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) commenced operation, charged 

with responsibility for all of the national 

lion-military space programs. Vanguard 

Et this category and was officially assigned 

to'NASA early in 1960. The DYNO 

program was directly impacted by the 

departure from NRL of Marty Votaw and 

other spacecraft designers along with the 

Vanguard program. Most importantly for 

this story, the Navy, though it retained 

responsibility for the TRANSIT and 

DYNO military programs through the 

Applied Physics Laboratory (APLi at 

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 

Maryland, now found it necessary to find a 

military booster. The Thor missile, with a 

second stage added in a configuration 

called Thor/Able-Star, was the booster 

selected. This combination could launch 

the DYNO satellite as a piggyback payload 

on the much larger TRANSIT satellite. Ed 

Dix of NRL took over design of the DYNO 

satellite and coordinated the launch 

efforts at Cape Canaveral. 

Howard Lorenzen, along with Jim 

Trexler of NRL, worked on this new plan 

and coordinated with other organizations 

to provide for interagency participation, 

the use of SIGINT stations for data collection, and forwarding of the data to NSA for 

processing and product dissemination. 

With Lorenzen's and Trexler's support, the 

Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence 

(DNI) undertook the task of obtaining program approval through DOD, ARPA, and 

the Executive branch of the government. 

GRAB/DYNO-1 Development 

RAdm Allan Reed of the Office of 

Naval Intelligence (ONI) shepherded the 

NRL DYNO proposal through the Navy. 

ARPA, DOD elements, and the Executive 

branch to obtain final approval by 

President Eisenhower in August 1959. 

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The DYNO program was to be conducted 

at the DOD SECRET security level under 

the code name TATTLETALE.? 

The DNI, who was designated as the. 

DYNO program manager in August 1959, 

formed a Technical Operating Group 

(TOG) to function as the steering committee. The TOG consisted of representatives 

from NRL, NSG, NSA, and the ONI Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center 

(STIC) at Suitland, Maryland. The NRL 

member of TOG was designated as the 

project manager/technical representative. 

NRL was responsible for the overall system concept as well as satellite and ground 

station development and support; in addition, NRL provided engineering and technical direction through the operational 

exploitation phase, training of mission 

ground station personnel, and launch/ 

on-orbit monitoring of spacecraft status 

and data quality. 

The NSG member was designated the 

project operational representative. NSG 

was responsible for directing and coordinating all mission ground station operations (including commanding the satellite 

operations); it acted as the focal point for 

all electrical communications associated 

with the operations of the project; and it 

provided sites, support facilities, and operating and maintenance personnel at the 

NSG mission ground stations. 

The NSA member of the TOG was 

designated the advisor to the staff. NSA 

authorized the allocation of service cryptologic personnel to man and operate the 

mission ground stations; it also processed 

all intercept data and disseminated the 

ELINT product to the Intelligence 

Community. With this responsibility, NSA 

also interpreted national intelligence collection and processing requirements, made 

recommendations for commanding satellite collection periods (tasking), and furnished the magnetic tapes for recording 

data at the mission ground stations: 

The STIC member provided intelligence requirements to the director, provided signal analysis support to NSA, 

monitored the signal analysis program. . 

and disseminated quality control technical 

data to the mission ground stations.S 

William E. W. Howe 

The TOG initially met at NSG 

Headquarters at the Naval Security 

Station in Washington, DC. Early members of the group were Navy Capt Fred 

Weldon of OP-94, representing the DNI; 

William E. W. Howe, a senior analyst from 

STIC; Chief of COSA-5 

(ELINT Processing Organization), NSA; 

Howard Lorenzen, DYNO Program 

Director at NRL; and Cmdr Frank R. 

Sperberg, representing NSG. 

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DYNO-1 was designed to receive in 

the radio frequency range of

MHz. This was the most densely populated range of frequencies and covered a 

variety of radar types, including derivatives of many widely used US, West 

European, and Soviet World War II "S-band" 

early warning and search radars. In the 

more recent JAN Electronic Warfare 

Frequency Channel Designators, these 

radars are designated "E-band." Since no 

formal national requirements for satellite 

ELINT collection had yet been established, 

it was up to the TOG to determine the collection requirements for this first satellite 

ELINT mission. Intelligence Community 

representatives felt that intercepts from 

this frequency range,. which contained 

many descendants of World War II prototypes, would yield a very productive harvest of significant radar information. The 

success of DYNO-1 proved this to be a very 

accurate prediction. 

The initial mission ground stations 

for DYNO were located a

All the stations had the ability to collect data, but onl

Could transmit commands to direct the 

satellite when to turn on and off. Whenever 

the collection system was turned on, all 

the sites within range could receive the 

data. NRL also maintained an engineering 

data readout and interrogation site at 

Hybla Valley, Virginia

Unfortunately, the DOD SECRET 

security system did not provide adequate 

security protection for the TATTLETALE 

program, and shortly after program 

approval in August 1959, The New York 

Times printed a complete program description. Given President Eisenhower's intention of achieving "Open Skies" through a 

national policy stressing peaceful uses of 

space, it was necessary to cancel the program at the DOD SECRET level to avoid 

any further disclosures that could lead to 

unwanted international repercussions. To 

ensure no further disclosures of this kind, 

the program was reclassified as TOP 

SECRET, and security control was to be 

exercised by the ONI under the WALNUT 

security system. Access required the 

approval of ONI, ARPA, or the Office of the 

Special Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and was 

limited to individuals with a strict needto-know. Those individuals granted access 

were required to execute a project secrecy 

agreement.19 

. Additional security was provided by 

adding an NRL scientific experiment as a 

cover. The experiment was designed by 

Marty Votaw to telemeter measurements 

of solar activity in X-ray, Lyman-Alpha, 

and ultraviolet radiation above the Earth's 

atmosphere. This cover experiment became 

the first of a series of SOLRAD satellite • 

experiments designed and exploited by the 

NRL. The cover name GRAB (galactic 

radiation and background) was used for 

the combined DYNO intelligence mission 

--e 

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NOFPRN-ORCON 

and SOLRAD scientific mission. In the 

classified world the first satellite became 

known as GRAB/DYNO-1, but in the 

unclassified world it was simply GRAB-1.11 

ELINT capability of GRAB/DYNO-1 was 

checked out at Wahiawa, Hawaii, well out 

of Soviet ground station range. t3 

GRAB/DYNO Program Launches 

On 22 June 1960 the first US SIGINT 

satellite, GRAB/DYNO-1, was launched 

from Cape Canaveral, Florida, by an Air 

Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD, 

at El Segundo, California) team headed by 

Maj James S. "Jay" Smith with Maj David 

D. Bradburn as guidance officer. The Air 

Force team was supported by a Space 

Technology Laboratories (STL) launch 

vehicle integration team headed by Adolf 

K. "Dor Thiel. The GRAB/DYNO-1 spacecraft, a piggyback payload attached to 

TRANSIT IIA and the whole mounted on.a 

Thor/Able-Star booster, attained a 330-by 

565-mile orbit, inclined at 66.7 degrees to 

the equator, with an orbital period of 101.6 

minutes. Although DYNO did not separate from the TRANSIT HA, this caused 

no problems since the two satellites had 

no common command or data links:12 

Following the shootdown of F. Gary 

Powers' U-2 on 1 May 1960, President 

Eisenhower directed that no reconnaissance overflight of the Soviet Union could 

collect intelligence information without his 

specific permission. Because of this strict 

limitation, at the President's direction, the 

DYNO payload could be turned on for only 

periods during the

lifetime of the satellite. On 4 July 1960, 

exactly four years after the first U-2 mission, the payload was turned on and the 

Adolf K. Thiel (center) and Capt David D. Bradburn 

(right) pictured with Werner Von Braun and model of 

Thor/Able launch vehicle, Inglewood, California, 7958 

Despite the limited tasking, the collection technology of the satellite and the 

functions of the mission ground stations 

were clearly demonstrated. Processing 

and analysis of data received from the first 

DYNO SIGINT satellite system, and the 

following POPPY satellites, was an interesting and challenging adventure. In the 

beginning, the best "all source" estimates 

of the signal environment and the volumes 

of data- available for analysis were far 

short of reality. The real magnitude and 

complexity of the processing and analysis 

job was not understood until the first 

satellite was on-orbit, collecting data. 

Each successive satellite had new and/or 

expanded capabilities and presented new 

challenges. For the first few years, the 

development of the processing systems ran 

behind the power curve. Frequently, prof cessing was planned and developed based 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

on poor estimates of expected data. 

Processing systems then had to be modified, or sometimes actually invented, to 

handle the data collected by satellites 

already on-orbit. Fortunately, the early 

satellite collection systems were fairly simple and had short operational lives. This 

allowed for an evolutionary development of 

ground processing and analysis systems 

and for feedback to the design of the satellite collection system, which did result in 

later successful total collection/processing 

systems. 

Processing consisted of manual analog 

data analysis performed at NSA by the 

personnel of the, former NTPC, which 

was now COSA-5, the ELINT processing 

group at NSA, Fort Meade, Maryland. 

was in charge of ELINT 

processing at NSA and directed the DYNO 

processing effort. Technical advice and 

recommendations were provided by Bill 

Howe, STIC supervised the 

manual analog. naLysis P Ffort with major 

assistance fror ian

, both of whom supervised a number of military and civilian analysts. :This 

group provided technical feedback to the 

mission ground stations to assist them in 

evaluating their operation. This manual 

data analysis allowed the determination of 

radar characteristics of pulse repetition 

frequency, scan rate, and radio frequency 

hand. A very rough approximation of location could be determined by comparing the 

first and last time the radar was intercepted .at different ground stations and 

noting signal up and down times." 

Soviet early warning radars were 

found to be numerous and extremely powerful. Signal density was more than four 

times greater than anticipated. This highlighted the need for some form of automated data processing. Howard Lorenzen, 

NRL DYNO Program Director, knew that 

computer processing could be used very 

effectively for this type of data, and early 

in 1961 he approached Louis W. Tordella, 

the Deputy Director of NSA, for assistance 

in developing such a capability. 

Tordella asked and 

oth of whom' had 

been involved in development of missile 

and space processing, to join them to discuss the problem. Earlier, in April 1960, 

ad published a technical article, 

"Determination of Missile and Earth 

Satellite Trajectories from Radar Observations." This article was an unclassified 

mathematical treatment of the determination of orbital plane and the least squares 

estimate of position, subvehicle pOint, and 

predictions, including perturbations due to 

Earth oblateness.15Lorenzen showed the 

assembled group a roll of visacorder paper, 

a tracing showing a longitudinal analog 

presentation of a few minutes of GRAB/ 

DYNO collected data

were given the job of automating this data 

reduction and proCessing.16NRL developed the original analog-to-digital converter to convert the analog signal into 

digital format for inpiit to the NSA BOGART 

computer.* 

• BOGART was a special-purpOse computer designed by 

NSA and built by Engineering Research Associates 

(ERA!, later UNIVAC, in St. P.auL Minnesota, for efficient data conversion and formatting. It was a 24-bit 

machine using diode/magnetic-core lagic,. with memorycycle time of 20 microseconds and IBM 727 magnetic 

tape for storage and input. BOGART led to the design of 

UNIVAC and Control Data CorpOration's (CDC) commerciaLcomputers. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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NOFORN.ORCON 1 DYNO-1, operating on frequencies 

betwee intercepted 

Only a few 

unidentified radar types were intercepted, 

which indicated the accuracy of US intelligence regarding high-power Soviet emitters. Altogether. 612 emitters were identified, 42 of which were located approximately 

and correlated to known installations.17 

On 30 November 1960 the second 

GRAB/DYNO was launched using essentially the same configuration as GRAB/ 

DYNO-1. Unfortunately, the Thor booster 

burned out 12 seconds early and was 

destroyed by the range safety officer. 

Fragments landed in Cuba and killed a 

cow in a farmer's field.18This incident 

was memorialized as, "The herd shot 

round the world" (a takeoff on Ralph 

Waldo Emerson's heroic line, "... and fired 

the shot heard round the world"). The 

incident resulted in the prohibition of any 

future launch trajectories that passed over 

the land mass of Cuba, thereby causing 

subsequent launches to include a dogleg in 

the launch sequence in order to obtain the 

desired 67-degree orbital inclination. 

EO 1.4.(c) 

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Since this required more booster energy, 

it resulted in a reduced payload weight 

capacity.* 

The third launch, designated GRAB/ 

DYNO-2, occurred 29 June 1961. It consisted of GRAB/DYNO-2 from NRL, and 

INJUN, sponsored by Dr. James Van Allen 

of the State University of Iowa. The two 

smaller satellites were connected together 

and mounted on top of the larger TRANSIT 

IIIB satellite. It was launched by a Thor! 

Able-Star booster from Cape Canaveral. 

An orbit 475 by 540 miles was achieved, 

inclined 66.8 degrees with a period of 

103.8 minutes. Separation from the 

TRANSIT IIIB occurred, but the INJUN 

and GRAB/DYNO-2 failed to separate 

from each other. Because the two satellites shared common up- and down-link 

radio frequencies, it was necessary to 

operate the two satellites on alternate 

days, thereby cutting the collection time in 

half.19 

In 1961, because of the apparent 

worldwide acceptance of overflight by 

peaceful satellites, the requirement for 

Presidential approval of each ,reconnaissance collection period (read-in) had been 

lifted. 'However, operating at

The possibility of any accident involving Cuba was given 

an "extreme" review before the launch. Only when 

"somewhat simplified and somewhat biased analyses" 

showed an extremely low probability was the flight 

authorized. Fortunately, the consequences were not 

major. See Joseph V. Charyk's comments. SIGINT 

Satellite History Round Table, 26 May 1994. 

The decision for special security for satellite programs 

was in part to avoid international reactions to what some 

would claim were "non-peaceful applications.- It was 

believed the Soviets understood and supported the concept since otherwise they would be forced politically to 

protest.- It would clearly add problems to their own 

efforts to develop such capabilities. Special security 

helped both efforts. To President Eisenhower. the results 

of the F. Gary Powers shootdown and the impact on the 

summit meeting in Paris were especially sensitive. See . 

- Justsp4V. Charyk's comments, SIGINT Satellite History 

Round Table, 26 May 1994. 

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GRAB/D'irN0-2 collected very little useful data. The alternateday tasking accounted for thiS in.part, and 

the choice of the intercept radio-frequency 

bands accounted for the balance.20Since the 

launch of DYNO-1, a national requirement 

for satellite SIGINT collection had been 

published by the US IntelligenCe Board 

(USIB-D-33.6/8, dated 5 July 1960). To 

satisfy this requirement to search for new 

and unusual signals, particularly those 

associated with the ABM network, the 

iradio frequency band

were selected by the 

Technical Operating Group (TOG) for 

GRAB/DYNO-2 collection. To identify the 

frequency band of the, intercepted signals, 

a different-length stretched pulsewidth 

was used on the down-link transmissions 

for each band. On subsequent launches, 

when more than two bands were intercepted, a separate pulsewidth would be 

assigned to each band. The satellite continued to operate until

although the lower band gradually lost 

sensitivity as the mission progressed. 

Although DYNO-2 ELINT collection 

results were sparse compared with DYNO-1, 

the gradual loss of sensitivity in the lower 

band demonstrated theextremely high 

power radiated by the 

early warning radar, which was the only 

signal that could be received near the end 

of the mission. Earlier, in the low band, a 

signal called (US ELINT designator) was interceptedand classified as the 

first Soviet ABM-type radar. Also intercepted were the

Magnetic tapes with data from this 

flight,were sent to NSA where, in addition 

to analog analysis, a new analog-to-digital 

converter called AUDICO, capable of digitizing data with a time interval accuracy 

of 67 microseconds for each count or 

machine unit, was used to prepare the 

data for computer processing. These outAUDICO runs. Short-term tape-speed 

variations were a problem. Comparisons 

with analog analysis did not produce very 

satisfactory results.22QualitY-control 

efforts instituted in the conversion process 

and at the collection sites helped improve 

this situation. Deinterleaving and scansort techniques and programs were continually improved over the years and were 

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applied to processing all ELINT data collected by POPPY and all other SIGINT 

satellite systems. 

Early attempts to identify radar locations from the GRAB single-satellite system were very crude

did not produce very accurate or 

useful locations. 

Because of political pressures within 

the Intelligence Community and lack of 

confidence within NSA, the US Air Force 

Strategic Air Command's 544th Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) was provided copies of the GRAB/DYNO-1 tapes. 

thus duplicating processing as a backup.23 

SAC processing at this time was primarily 

visual analysis of the filmed version of the 

stream of intercept pulses. Late in 1961 

During this same period NSA developed a location system 

called Radars with Stable. 

rotation rates lent themselves to this technique of analyzing their rotation rate 

doppler. With this technique a location 

was iteratively determined that yielded 

the best fit to the observed sequence of 

scan periods by the method of least squares. 

But the system also produced unreliable results with large uncertainty in the radar location. 

The satellite ground stations were 

improved along with the satellites onorbit. The first change was transfer of the 

ground station in the 

25 

The fourth launch occurred from Cape 

Canaveral on 24 January 1962 using a 

Thor/Able-Star booster, and it was intended 

to launch five satellites into orbit using a 

single booster. The launch was unsuccessful when the guidance system on the AbleStar upper stage failed.26When the 

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) 

was formed on 16 September 1961, the 

Navy ELINT program was made part of 

the NRP and redesignated as the POPPY 

project. Thus, the launch was assigned 

the name POPPY-1. 

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ki I IK( r A 

The fifth launch. POPPY-2. on 26 

April 1962 was from Vandenberg AFB in 

California and used a Scout vehicle as a 

booster. These changes were made to 

avoid the launch sequence dogleg necessary at Cape Canaveral and to provide a 

dedicated launch vehicle for the DYNO 

satellite. In this way. the near-polar orbit 

most suitable for reconnaissance could be 

selected. This launcIL ton. was a failure; 

because of a procedural oversight. the 

Scout fourth stage contained no attitude 

-control gas. and the entire system plunged 

into :tiv Pacific Ocean within sight atilt' 

launch pad.'27 

The POPPY Project 

On 23 July 1962 the Director of the 

NRO t DNRO). -Joseph V. Charvk. formally 

established NRO Program C as an organizational component to continue operation 

and management of the POPPY•ELINT 

satellites. The Director of Naval Intelli-

.gencewas designated to continue as 

Director. Program C. and funding formerly 

provided by ARPA and the Navy was 

transferred to the National Reconnaissance Program (NRPi as of fiscal year 1963. 

The Navy Bureau of Weapons tBUWEPSI. 

provided a fiscal representative to the . 

Technical Operating Group (TOGi who 

was responsible for preparing the annual 

budget. disbursing fUnds to the NRL. and 

submitting records of expenditures to the 

DirectOr. Program C. NSA continued funding_ through the Consolidated Cryptologic 

Program (CCP)_ for manning and support 

of mission ground stations. magnetic-tape 

costs. and NSA processing and analysis. 

r Force's Program A was assigned • 

the responsibility for launching Program C 

satellites and for launch vehicle/satellite 

integration. 

Capt Frank R. Sperherg. USN 

In 1962 the President's Foreign 

Intelligence Advisory' Board t PFIAB) concurred in DNRO Charyk's recommendation that ''. . . all satellite projects of the 

.NRP should be handled in the same 

manner by a single operations unit of the 

NRO staff. -29 The Satellite Operations 

Center t SOC). in morn BD944 of th'e 

Pentagon. commenced Operations in April 

1962. primarily to direct operations of the. 

photographic satellites'of Programs A and 

B. To assure coordination of NSG tasking 

of the POPPY satellites with US lntelli• 

gence Board (USIB) requirements. the 

Director of Program C transferred Crodr 

'later Captt Frank Sperberg. USN. from. 

the NSG Operations Center to the NRO 

offices in the Pentagon to work with.the: 

SOC personnel. Sperberg's primary • 

responsibility was to assure that corn- • 

manding of the POPPY system was 

responsive to requirements as initiall-v . 

stated by both the USIB's Overhead 

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top Secret 

PRV-I JW( \ 

Reconnaissance.tCOMOR) and SIGINT 

Committees. 'SIB direction was further 

• clarified in the spring of 1963 when the 

SIGLVF Overhead Reconnaissance 

SubcommitteelSORSi of the COMOR was 

formed to consolidate the responsibility for 

11 satellite SIGINT requirements. The 

Operations Center for translating the SOC 

interpretation of these instructions into 

actual commands to the POPPY network 

remained at NSG Headquarters."(' 

By December 1962 the BYEMAN 

security syStem was completed for 

Program.C. whose ELI NT satellites were 

designated as the POPPY series. The 

BYEMA P compartment, formed 

by combining the codename fro

P with the Program C codename POPPY. superseded the earlier . 

WALNUT security systern.31The final 

'"telligence product. as delivered by NSA 

❑e users. would be handled under the 

1` LEN system. which had 

been initially instituted for photo results. 

The primary reason for this arrangement 

was to make it possible to deliver the data 

to cleared personnel of the Intelligence 

Community, while avoiding the necessity 

of providing them access to BYEMAN 

information about satellites and collection 

operations. 

With the arrival of the BYEMJ-kN system• mission numbers in th series 

were assigned to POPPY launches, A . 

switch from the Scout to the Thor/Agena 

booster. launched from Vandenberg AFB 

cm the West Coast, permitted multiple 

POPPY satellite launches with much 

treater weight capability. Additionally, no 

over payloads were required since there 

were frequent military Thor/Agena 

launches from Vandenberg that were not 

announced in the press except as classified 

launches about which no details could be. 

revealed. 

• The initial Program C launch.

on la December 1962. was the 

first POPPY launch using a Thor/Agena 

booster from Vandenberg AFB. The Agena 

vehicle. tailed to cut-off at the end of• first 

burn. producing a very eccentric orbit of 

124 by 1.500 miles at 70.3 degrees inclination. This made reception of data at the 

ground sites difficult. but it.did produce a 

satellite lifetime of ove The 

objective of the mission was to search 

parts of the radi6 frequency rRF) band 

between for new 

"radars and RF hands in use by the 

Soviet Bloc. 

This Thor/Agena launched another 

Van Allen INJUN payload and two other 

scientific satellites along with the two 

satellites of The POPPY 

satellites were somewhat larger than 

DYNO due to the addition of a four-inchcfiameter:'belly band" to accommodate 

additional capabilities, which made the 

spherical satellites slightly thicker in the 

middle.

Top Secret 

/ or, rt, :0/ %.■ • unit 

L A I/A. I (iltiro( ( h.tnnrl• Chapter 3 51 

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First POPPY/Thor/Agena launch, Vandenberg Air Force Base, 13 December 1962 

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52 The SIGJNT Satellite Story 

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geste when the Presi ent's Scientific 

Advisory Committee (PSAC) initiated a 

special study in 1963 to stimulate new 

ideas in emitter location finding. Richard 

Garwin of IBM, representing the PSAC, 

chaired a series of meetings at NSA with 

personnel from SAC and NSA who had 

been working on techniques to produce 

emitter locations from POPPY data. 

These discussions were very open. Many 

hours were spent at the computer, with 

lots of explanations, lots of "what ifs," 

and lots of worry about what had been 

overlooked. 

Following the launch of POPPY 1, 

and as a result of the 1963 meetings with 

Garwin

 Following up on this suggestion. 

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Top Secret 

\oroRtv oRcoN 

• ! 

and then recording them 

on separate tracks of a GR-2500 instrumentation magnetic-tape recorder. These 

recorders had been installed in late 1961 

as upgrades to the mission ground stations. The analog tapes were later digitized by AUDICO at NSA using the stable 

reference tone recorded on the tapes at the 

time of collection to control the digitizer 

clock. The digitized data were processed 

on an IBM 7094 computer to deinterleave 

the signals and form Early attempts involved considerable 

manual effort using electromechanical 

Frieden desk calculators to associate 

be a major problem. In the early 1960s. 

orbit determination programs were very 

elementary. Vanguard I was placed in a 

highly eccentric orbit on 17 March 1958 

and transmitted its signal for over six 

years. This stable orbit with constant 

transmission from the satellite permitted 

the first long-term observation of orbital 

dynamics. This resulted in a series of 

sophisticated modeling efforts of the oblate 

Earth's gravity field, which were important for predicting satellite positions versus time. This early work in orbital 

dynamics was essential to the development of accurate emitter locations. 

Papers appeared in many publications in the open literature providing new 

gravitational constants, new closed-form 

solutions. new estimates of the size and 

• 

54 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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shape of the Earth, and many ideas on 

how atmospheric drag would affect the 

orbits. Among the early important contributors was f NSA, 

who published an article, "Maximum 

Likelihood Estimation of an Orbit," in 

1961.34Orbital elements were available 

from the Navy Space'Surveillance Center 

(NAVSPASUR), established at Dahlgren, 

Virginia, on 9 April 1960 to operate NRL's 

space surveillance system. North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) also 

produced orbital elements. NSA attempted 

to use the NORAD data, but at that time 

the data were frequently incomplete, not 

timely, or, in some cases, inaccurate. At 

first, none of the calculated orbital ele- • 

ments were consistent, 

To help solve the problem

and a group of mathematicians 

From NSA visited Hunt Small at Lockheed 

Missile and Space Company (LMSC) and 

met with John V. Breakwell at Stanford 

University. As a result of these discussions, NSA arranged for NAVSPASUR to 

provide magnetic tapes containing the 

satellite location and velocity vectors on a 

regular-time grid. NAVSPASUR was able 

to provide accurate orbital data, greatly 

aiding NSA. NSA also prepared the predictions for the POPPY orbits that the 

Naval Security Group (NSG) sent to the 

sites to guide the antenna steering.as 

was very similar t

but consisted of three satellites an

The mission covered in large 

part RF bands not covered by continuing the mission of discovering new radars 

and frequency band usage. The launch 

occurred on 15 June 1963 from Vandenberg 

AFB. This time, the Agena cut-off properly 

after the first burn but failed to circularize 

the orbit by means of a second burn. The 

resulting orbit was 95 by 495 miles, at an 

inclination of 69.9 degrees. The low perigee 

severely limited the orbital lifetime and the 

satellites reentered the atmosphere after

As a consequence, very few data were 

collected.37 

In the meantime, ground station 

upgrades continued, and in 1963, various 

site facilities were equipped to do field 

screening and analysis. The POPPY collection positions in the portable aluminum 

shelter huts had a playback capability but 

limited analysis equipment. However, by 

1963, all of the original magnetic-tape 

recorders had been replaced by 

instrumentation-type machines with seven 

tracks using 1/2-inch magnetic tape. 

Top Secret 

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COM1NT Control Channels lointiv 

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Chapter 3 55 

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NoFoRN.oRcoN 

0 1.4.,-;) • 

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if 

if 

Solid-state digital-time generators also 

were added.

led to advancements in the technical analysis of the analog data. As successive 

satellites were equipped with more RF 

bands and data links, analysts noted the 

The new collection tape recorders at 

the POPPY ground stations enabled the 

NSA playback recorder to use a frequency 

synthesizer to play the tapes at the same 

speed with which they were recorded by 

the field station during collection by using 

the 50-kHz reference signal. Other equipment could be used to record and repeatedly cycle through a short segment of data, 

to stop the recorder and display the pulses 

on the scope, or to print a chart of pulse 

amplitude versus time. This equipment 

aided in the

In April 1963 NSG operators began searching for and reporting new 

or unusual signals detected from analog 

analysis.38 

A Memorandum of Understanding 

governing Navy processing and analysis of 

POPPY data was signed by ONI and NSA 

in July 1963. NSA provided planning 

support and furnished tapes to the Naval 

Scientific and Technical Intelligence 

Center (STIC) for processing and technical 

analysis. NSA also provided support and 

guidance.39 

Some of the POPPY sites also had 

been equipped with an operator position 

dedicated to checking the quality of the 

data. These positions were installed in 

permanent buildings where proper security could be maintained for the SIGINT 

data. These quality-control positions were 

used by collection operators for post-pass . 

playback of recordings to verify verbal 

annotations, the presence of data, and correspondence with collection logs. With the 

aid of training tapes sent by NSA, collection operators were trained to listen for 

and recognize signals with the desired 

characteristics. Collection operators noted 

in their logs occurrences of 

After a 

collection pass, analog analysts at the 

ground stations played back the tapes at 

their analysis and quality-control positions 

and performed audio and visual scans of 

each of the recorded data links. Parameters of these signals of interest and. 

Unidentified signals were measured and 

tabulated. Additional collection time was 

provided by the installation of an interrogation capabilit at

or orbital passes. not available from the site. 

This online 'manual analysis produced the 

56 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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NOFORN.ORCON 

These alerts enabled NSA to 

set priorities for the processing and technical analysis of the POPPY data after they 

were couriered back to NSA.40 

launched on 11 

January 1964 from Vandenberg AFB, 

achieved for the first time a planned nearcircular orbit, 490 by 506 miles at 69.9 

degrees inclination: This was the first 

mission boosted by a thrust-augmented 

Thor (TAT), which permitted heavier and 

or more payloads. This was the second 

three-satellite launch, with some overlapping RF coverage on satellites

devised by R. T. 

Beal of NRL.

Although the continued to 

operate for a record and 

lost battery power after All 

of the satellites used a solar array/battery 

combination power system; the solar 

arrays were used to charge the batteries 

and the systems operated from battery 

powe

Mission 7104, launched on 9 March 

1965, achieved a 490- by 506-mile circular 

orbit, inclined 70.1 degrees. This was the 

first simultaneous launch of four POPPY 

satellites. The 24-inch-diameter satellites 

were launched

This activity was 

limited by the failure of the batteries in 

• respectively.

during their lifetimes o

respectively.

Unfortunately, the satellite stabilized 

on its side, thereby making it impossible 

to conduct the micro thruster test. The RF 

coverage was extended without.a gap to 

After a satellite commanding 

capability was installed at

in March 1966, the

facility was deactivated. For these 

missions, NSA in-house processing was 

upgraded to and 

to accommodate the large volumes of data 

being collected. APpendix A shows the 

increasing volume of data processed. The 

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• BYE.9197/94 

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nofoRN-OR CON 

1E0 1.4.(c) 

EL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

earlier laborious manual correlation efforts 

using 1950s mechanical desktop calculators by now had been converted to auto 

matic computer processing using the IBM 

7094 computer at NSA. The computer programs fo

.1 More accurate digital data 

were available from the new AUDICO 2 

analog-to-digital converter, providing more 

This 

improved significantly the listings of 

Soviet electronic order of battle (EOB) in 

terms of accuracy and timeliness.42For 

example, in 1965, usin data, 

NSA used the software to 

demonstrate excellent 

Raymond B. Potts, Chief of Special 

Projects at NSA, established a "last-in/ 

first-out" priority system for signals analysis to ensure that the most recent data was 

processed first, which resulted in significantly improved timeliness of ELINT technical reporting. Efforts by NSA to distribute the increasing SIGINT satellite 

processing workload also resulted in an 

agreement with SAC in August 1966, 

negotiated by Potts, who headed a threedivision organization called K-4/SP. One 

of the divisions (K-46) was devoted to processing POPPY FLINT data. Under the 

agreement with SAC, NSA processed all 

POPPY data except for

Raymond B. Potts 

which was assigned to SAC for processing. 

4 

In December 1966 NSA started shifting work from its IBM 7094 business computer at Fort Meade. Maryland, to a CDC 

6400 scientific computer, which had a 60-bit 

word that could accommodate processing 

of the digital representation of each pulse 

in one cycle of 1.1 microseconds per pulse.* 

Other technical features such as expanded 

memory and disk storage made the CDC 

6400 computer between three and four 

times faster than the IBM 7094 in processing POPPY data. These features further 

streamlined processing to reduce manual 

interventions when the oftware was converted to the CDC 6400 

computer. 

Th program 

became fully operational in 1966 and 

worked well against radars

I* The IBM 7094 had a 36-bit word that required two cycles 

of computer operation at 1.4 microseconds each to 

I process the digital data for each pulse. 

58 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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The regular satellite and processing 

system upgrade process was given a great 

boost on 18 November 1966 when the 

USIB approved an urgent requirement for 

satellite SIGINT collection directed 

program. As a result, the PSAC, which 

had a powerful review function on intelligence equipment and technology development, formed the Harry Davis Committee. 

The Davis Committee recommended, and 

DNRO Alexander H. Flax directed, modification of to provide

range, on w lich the Davisor Crirnittee 

wanted POPPY to concentrate its efforts. 

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NOFORN.ORCON EO 1.4.(c) • . 

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MHz, within which the Davis Committee 

believed the systems 

would be found. 

JuSt six months after this direction, 

the launch of on 31 May 

1967 frOm Vandenberg demonstrated that 

the NRO space and NSA ground technol- • 

ogy had come of age. The four satellites 

were launched into a near-perfect 500- by 

508-mile orbit, inclined at exactly 70.0 

degrees! During the almost ifetime of this mission a major advancement 

in system performance was realized. The 

previously used spherical configuration of 

the satellite was replaced with a multiface 

design for the

increasing their diameter to 27 inches and 

average weight to 180 pounds. Two of the 

satellites used 

Following 

this launch, all subsequent POPPY satellites used a 

Anhydrous ammonia 

crystals were heated in the satellite to produce control gas for thrusting whenever a 

correction was required.. This thrusting 

system worked so well that it was used in 

all subsequent satellites. Other innovaOn the ground, to meet the 

requirement, an analog-to-digital conversion system (ADCS) was installed to con-. 

vert the analog down-iink data to computerprocessable digital data at the

This change allowed 

on-site digital processing. Also, by this 

time a program to move all equipment 

from the original Earth satellite vehicle 

(ESV) huts into permanent facilities was 

well underway. This move included 

installing remote control.of the antenna, 

adding •elevation control, and doubling the 

number of Yagi antennas. Vertical polarization was added to the existing horizontally polarized Yagi antennas to further 

improve signal reception from the satellite 

regardless of the polarization of the signal 

from the satellite (which might vary from 

vertical to horizontal depending on position of the satellite relative to the ground -

station and/or the attitude of the satellite). 

In -1967 the engineering data readout and 

commanding facility operated by NRL was 

moved from Hybla Valley, Virginia

Starting in 1967,

developed at NRL. replaced the 

World War II-type R-390A/URR receivers 

that were used in the original huts for 

reception of the satellite down-links. Each 

receiver was calibrated to minimize any 

between receiving 

channels. The "half amplitude threshold" 

included in this receiver design also eliminated all time measurement error associated with amplitude variations in the data 

60 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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r Flight summary: Program C, Project POPPY satellites 

MISSION 

NUMBER 

PROJECT 

and 

PAYLOAD 

MISSION 

(All payloads 

are ELINT) 

OPERATIONAL LIFETIME LIFETIME 

1960 1961 

- 

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Months 

N/A 

N/A GRAB) 

RY140:1 _ 

GRAB/ 

DV NO-2 

GRAB/ 

QYNCI 

POPPY-1 

GSM 

GS/T1 

N/A 

_ 

N/A 

GSITI 

Booster 

failure 

GS/Ti 

Booster 

failure 

N/A POPPY-2 GSM 

Booster 

failure 

POPPY-3 GSM 

POPPY- Gsm 

POPPY-4 GS/TI 

POPPY- Gsin 

POPPY-4 OSiTir 

POPPY-5 GSM AND EBB

POPPY- GSM AND EOB

POPPY-5 Gsm AND EMI

POPPY-6

_ 

awn AND EOB

POPPY- Gam AND EOB

POPPY-S

POPPYGS/TI AND EOBGsm AND EOB

GS = General Search EOB = Electronic Order of Battle 

TI = Technical Intelligence 

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Flight summary: Program C, Project POPPY satellites (continued) 

MISSION 

NUMBER 

PROJECT 

and 

PAYLOAD 

MISSION 

(All payloads 

are E LINT) 

OPERATIONAL LIFETIME LIFETIME 

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1976 1977 Months 

POPPYABM, EOB, 

GS/TI 

POPPYPOPPYPOPPY-7

GS = General Search 

T1 = Technical Intelligence 

EOB = Electronic Orde of Battle 

ABM = Antiballistic Missile Radar 

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EO 1.4.(c) 

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stream and in both the recording and the 

playback systems.49The highly stable 

data were furnished to the ADCS. which 

Field digitization significantly reduced time variations and the resulting digital tape was 

forwarded to NSA.50 

With the high priority of the ABM 

radar search requirement directed by the 

DKR° at the recommendation of the 

Harry Davis Committee, NRL procured a 

System Engineering Laboratories SEL810 computer in three weeks, developed 

software to conduct ABM search, and 

deployed the computer-aided manual 

search (CAMS) system to the site at 

four months prior to 

the launch of in May 1967.51'Haller, 

Raymond and Brown, later HRB-Singer 

Company of State College, Pennsylvania, 

was given the contract to develop the 

computer-aided manual data processing 

system for the SEL-810 computer. 

V. Hellrich of NRL was the architect 

of the SEL-8.10 computer configuration. 

L. M. Hammarstrom of HRB-Singer speci—

fied th requirements for the initial field 

software.. R. Daniels of HRB-• 

Inger developed the initial algorithms/ 

software. Refinements and additions in 

the years following were made by Navy 

Lt Ronald L. Potts* (no relation to NSA's 

• In recalling these events. Ronald Potts said. "When I think 

tif the contributors to the Navy program over the years, 

remember Reid Mayo most gratefully as the gentle man 

who inspired and challenged so many people in the field. 

He would come to the stations and tell us what the nation 

needed and what we could do to help, and it would be as 

though he were coming directly to us from the CNO or the 

Lt Ronald L. Potts, USN 

Ray Potts) and Petty Officer C. Jorger, at 

M. Keebaugh, J. Riale, W. 

Bickam, and R. Daniels of HRB-Singer; 

and Ens L. A. Eichel, at 52 

Collected ELINT reconnaissance data 

were sorted 

Known Soviet 

ABM-related test-site geographic coordinates were used to calculate a sequence of 

of interest, many individual radars were 

located. Although originally these intercepts required manual analysis to determine the actual radar characteristics and 

location, by 1969 the analysis routines had 

been automated by HRB-Singer personnel 

and could be selected on demand. 

The CAMS system was installed in 

in April 1969 

and in late 1970. Processing 

D1RNSA or the NSC. Reid would listen and act on our 

needs for equipment or technical information or logistics 

support or even a water cooler. At any hour you might find 

him sitting the posts with the sailors, and we could talk 

about signals with him as though they were mutual. 

acquaintances." 

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EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

results were reported by teletype message 

to NSA at Fort Meade and to selected military organizations, with emphasis on those 

requiring time-critical signals. NSA, in 

turn, reported them electrically as preliminary ELINT technical reports (ELTs) to 

the Intelligence Community. 

These improvements in the ground 

station receiving system made it 

for NSA' and 

to develop another technique 

to compute ocations from

—table at the en • o ap r s ows 

increases in location accuracy achieved 

from satellite ELINT data over time as 

improvements were made.53 

The rapidly increasing volume of data 

to be processed from POPPY satellites 

began to tax analysis capabilities, and NSA 

adjusted processing priorities in 1967. 

This adjustment required Navy ground 

stations with analog analysis capability to 

do on-site screening of collected data and 

report results to NSA. Only those tapes 

carrying signals of special interest were 

forwarded to NSA for technical analysis. 

Since several ground stations collected the 

same data, only tapes from the station 

with the best coverage were forwarded for 

by machine processing. 

NSA identified in advance which POPPY 

site had the best 

processing. This site was then 

notified which tape to forward for

processing. NSA also requested 

all POPPY tapes collected at the same 

time that other collectors intercepted signals of interest or when a high-interest 

event took place. Recordings not forwarded were retained for 90 days and then 

reused, unless requested by NSA for analysis. By this time the POPPY system at NSA had been validated. The system 

was basically an all-automatic computer 

process that routinely produced

L 64 The SIGINT Satellite 51ory 

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The SEL-810 conversion of data pro-. 

cessing in rom anaH7 . 

log to digital in 1967 had other far-reaching 

consequences totally apart from the ABM 

problem. Because the accuracy of the digital manipulation of the data permitted the 

A number of special tasks were 

levied on mission ground stations to exploit 

the new overhead ELINT capabilities. 

In August 1967 USIB approved an NRO 

request that NSG task mission ground 

stations to identify and report on a not-tointerfere basis the details of intercepts of 

In April 1968, NSG personnel at the POPPY station in

Top Secret 

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O 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

analyzed, and located on a not-to-interfere 

basis sufficiently often to show feasibility 

and establish processing techniques. 

However, major emphasis was placed on 

the

In July 1969 NSG obtained authoriza- • 

tion and directed station to use 

suitably tasked passes and ordinarily 

untasked fringe passes to locate and 

report elements. of a

Throughout this period, Adm Thomas 

Moorer, CNO, was being briefed periodically 

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providing coverage of a 

total of was 

launched from Vandenberg AFB on 30 

September 1969 into a.491- by 506-mile 

orbit, with an inclination of 70.0 degrees. 

It consisted of four multiface satellites 

weighing an average of 235 pounds each. 

Five other scientific satellites were also 

launched on the same booste

Top Secret 

NoFORN.oeCON EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

on the POPPY capability to identify and 

track ships at sea and on the results of 

these preliminary tracking exercises.59 

Four transponded pulsewidths were 

used on each data link, thereby doubling 

the collection capability. By this time, the . 

ground stations had been closed, concluding the participation of the AFSS in the 

POPPY Program. This left improved 

ground stations in the network:

On 27 August 1969 the USIB SORS, 

responding to the CNO, made ocean 

surveillance an official function of POPPY 

in SORS 10./96, BYE-1565-69, "Mission 

Guidance In July 1970 NSG directed 

was launched on 14 

December 1971 into a nearly circular 530-

by 540-mile orbit, inclined 70.0 degrees. It 

was to be the last POPPY launch and consisted of four multiface satellites weighing 

270 to 280 pounds each, containing a total 

66 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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tO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Key accomplishments, Project 

POPPY 

• First SIGINT satellite, 1960; demonstrated intercept of foreign radars using 

the realtime transpond technique to 

relay signals directly to US stations. 

• Discovere radars very dense in 

USSR. 

• Many intercept firsts, including

In July 1970 authority was granted 

by USIB SORS for ongoing

to engage in ocean surveillance 

in support of US fleet commanders. 

Specifics of this mission were stated by 

CONINAVINTCOM in August 1970.. By 

this time USIB mission guidance added 

search for new or unusual emitters in 

•

first satellites 

launched simultaneously, 1962. 

• First ocean surveillance of shipborne 

radars, 1967. 

NSA added a CDC 6600 computer in 

1968 to be used full time with the CDC 

6400 Computer to handle the increased 

volume of POPPY data being collected. 

NSA Machine processing with the 6600 

computer produced and reported over 

radar locations, with accuracies of 

about or less in the first 15 

months of its operation. Many new/ 

unidentified signals reports were issued 

and technical measurements made.63 

During the first five months of operation, 

information was developed by NSA 

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66 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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RAdm Robert K. Geiger 

POPPY Project director functions were to 

be performed within the System Project 

Office (SPO) of PM-16.* 

Picking up on earlier planning that 

had been started by the Director, Naval 

Security Group in July 1969, Geiger earned out some funded studies to determine 

which ELINT technology would be most 

effective in a

During a trip to Europe in late 1971, 

DNRO McLucas visited the POPPY site at 

. That evening, in 

a hotel in DNRO McLucas, 

Robert J. Hermann of NSA, Col David D. 

For a further description of the POPPY system management relationships see NRO/NSAJCIA/USN Management 

Agreement for the POPPY System. 5 November 1971 

'APPendix Er. 

Bradburn of the NRO Staff, and Capt 

Geiger worked out the

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NC)FORN-ORCON 

• Meanwhile, on the. POPPY front, in 

September 1972 a further improvement 

in intercept capability occurred when the 

new POPPY Automated Processing 

System (PAPS) was added to the 

ThiS NRUHRB-Singer 

development used the SEL 86 computer to 

achieve the goal of a higher volume Of 

The new computer made 

possible processing in a continuous 

stream. PAPS was fed by either digital 

tape or for online processing by a priority 

data extractor (PDE). The system became 

operational two weeks after receipt at the 

site. About two months later, DNRO 

McLucas was shown the speed and ease of 

PAPS operations when two Soviet Naval 

combatant ships were located and reported 

In June 1973, the Navy's PM-16 was 

redesignated PME-106 of the Naval 

Electronic Systems Command, with its 

manager continuing as Director, Program 

C. Coordination continued with the Naval 

Intelligence Command, and NRL continued to be responsible for technical developE0 1.4.(c) . 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

70 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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NOFORN-ORCON 

POPPY's strengths stemmed from its 

utilization of traditional concepts and 

methods and an insistence on proven 

hardware and techniques not only to guarantee success, but also to hold costs to a 

bare minimum. Between 1959 and

the development cost amounted to only 

The costs of launch and of the 

Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) 

are not included in this calculation. 

POPPY utilized existing personnel and 

facilities whenever it was reasonably possible, and although innovative in many 

ways, the designers added only those 

improvements that involved minimal risk 

to the program. It grew from a single 

satellite with limited ELINT capability to 

a sophisticated satellite configuration per launch, which comprised an 

overhead ELINT reconnaissance system 

capable of ocean surveillance, search and 

characteristics. This low-cost success 

story is unlikely ever to be duplicated.* 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

This account of POPPY covers the highlights of the projects. Additional information can be 

found in the History of the POPPY Satellite System. 

BYE-56105-78. which has been extensively referenced 

here. 

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NoroRN-oRcoN 

Chapter 3 References 

1. NRO, Program C, Organization Manual, 18 May 1989, BYE 56 255-89 (hereafter 

referred to as Navy Org Manual), p. 73. Also: History of the POPPY Satellite System, 

BYE-56105-78 (hereafter referred to as POPPY History), p. 2. 

2. POPPY History, pp. 2 and A3-3. 

3. POPPY History, p. 8. 

4. POPPY History, pp. 8 and 12. 

5. POPPY History, p. 10. 

6. POPPY History, pp. 4-5. 

7. Navy Org Manual, p. 73. 

8. POPPY History, pp. 4-5. 

9. POPPY History, p. 17, paragraph 5. 

10. POPPY History, p. 2. 

11. POPPY History, pp. 2, 8, and A3-3. 

12. POPPY History, p. A1-2. 

13. POPPY History, pp. 2-3. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

14. POPPY History, p. A3-5. . 

15. NSA Technical Journal, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 67-78. (S) 

16 paper(provided 10 September 1990). 

17. POPPY History, p. 44. 

18. POPPY History, p. 39. 

19. POPPY History, p. 39. 

20. POPPY History, p. 39. 

21. POPPY History, p. 45. 

22. POPPY History, p. 30. 

23. NSA in Space, April 1975, BYE-19385-75, p. 17. 

24. POPPY History, p. 31. 

25. POPPY History, p. 17. 

26. POPPY History, pp. 39-40. 

27. POPPY History, p_ 40. 

28. Navy Org Manual, p. 75. 

29. Memo from Col Henry C. Howard, USAF, "A Cursory Review of the Evolution of the 

SOC," July 1968. 

72 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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IvoioRv-ORCON, 

30. Letter from DNI to DNRO, Subject: "System POPPY, reassignment of responsibilities 

for" (TS), 21 January 1963 (see Appendix E). 

31. Nauy Org Manual, p. 75. 

32. POPPY History, pp. 40, A1-8, and A1-9. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

33 aper (provided 10 September 1990). 

34. NSA Technical Journal, Vol VI, Fall 1961, No. 4, pp. 39-50. 

35. aper (provided 10 September 1990). 

36. POPPY History, pp. 45 and 46. 

37. POPPY History, p. 46. 

38. Nauy Org Manual, p. 75. 

39. NSA in Space, p. 73. 

40. POPPY History; p. 6. 

41. POPPY History, pp. 46, 47, A1-13, and A1.14. 

42. NSA in Space, p. 18, and Raymond Potts' personal notes (hereafter Potts' notes). 

43. POPPY History. pp. 33, A1-13. and A1-14. 

44. Potts' notes. 

45. POPPY History, pp. 31 and 33. 

46. NSA in Space. p. 18. 

47. POPPY History, p. 47. 

48. POPPY History, pp. 15.-16, A1-15, and A1-16. 

49. POPPY History, pp. 24 and 26. 

50. POPPY History, p. 35. 

51. POPPY History, p. 35. 

52. POPPY History, p. A3-6. 

53. nterview, 11 August 1992. 

54. POPPY History, p. 48. 

55. POPPY History, p. 48. 

56. POPPY History, pp. 48-49. 

57. POPPY History, pp. 48-49. 

58. Navy Org Manual, p. 77. 

59. RAdm Robert K. Geiger comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

80. POPPY History, pp. 50, 51, 52, A1-17, and A1-18. 

61. NSA in Space, p. 20. 

62. POPPY History, pp. 52 and 53. 

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63. K4SP Status Board, 20 December 1970. 

64. POPPY History, p. 51. 

65. K4SP Status Board. 20 December 1970. 

66. POPPY History, p. 51. 

67. POPPY History, p: 52. 

68. Geiger comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

69. Geiger comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

70. Robert J. Hermann comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review. March 1994. 

71. Hermann comments. SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

72. Geiger comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

73. Geiger comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

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l311•01,1-'04 

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The Air Force WS-117L-Derived Projects 

ram 

;34 madam 

i 

SAMOS E-1/F-1 (WS-117L and 

Project 102) 

The requirements for the Advanced 

Reconnaissance System, Weapon System 

117L (WS-117L), were incorporated in 

System Requirement No. 5, published by 

Headquarters, Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), on 29 November 

1954, and were validated in General 

Operational Requirement 80-2, issued by 

Headquarters, US Air Force, on 15 March 

1955. At that time ELINT was the responsibility of the US Air Force, as spelled out 

in DOD Directive S-3115.2 issued on 13 July 

1955. Intelligence requirements for the 

ELINT satellites of WS-117L were developed under guidance from Air Force 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

(AFCLN), MGen James Walsh. On 29 

October 1956 the Air Force awarded contract AF 04 (647)-94 to Lockheed Missiles 

and Space Division (LMSD) in Sunnyvale, 

California. for initial system development 

studies on WS-117L. In June 1957 LMSD 

awarded the first contract for US ELINT 

satellite payloads to the Airborne 

Instruments Laboratory (AIL) at Mineola, 

Long Island, New York. The work on contract was Subsystem F (S/S F), the ELINT 

payload of WS-117L. 

Because the US did not have radar 

data from the interior of the Soviet Union 

at that time, the requirements for WS-117L 

were stated in very general terms. 

Consequently, the S/S F ELINT payload 

designs were based on various national 

estimates of the Soviet radar environment. 

These estimates were contained in the 

RAND Corporation's Report 280, "Signal 

Density Study," published 1 September 

1955; the Air Force Technical Intelligence 

Center (ATIC) report, "Handbook of Soviet 

and Satellites RADAR Equipment," 9 November 1955; and in estimates by the Planning 

Research Corporation, a subcontractor to 

Ramo-Wooldridge, Inc., under contract to 

the Air Force for development of the WS117L Intelligence Data Processing Subsystem I (S/S I). These estimates relied on 

peripheral intercepts from ground sites, 

airplanes (including limited U-2 collection), and ships. Radar data collected by 

the early satellite ELINT payloads (Navy 

GRAB/DYNO in 1960 and Air Force ferret 

systems in 1961) showed that the actual 

density of radar data collected over the 

Soviet interior was many times greater 

than anticipated. Accommodating this 

large volume of data slowed the development of data processing systems, changed 

payload-tasking plans, and resulted in 

some payload modifications. 

The first true source of national 

requirements for satellite reconnaissance 

systems was published by the US Intelligence Board (USIB) in USIB-D-33.6/8, 

"Intelligence Requirements for a Satellite 

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walk STRAWMAN operations) concept 

Program A: Projects 102, 6988K, & 770 

(STRAWMAN satellite shown) 

Orbital inclination: 

Orbital altitude: 

Orbital shape: 

Ground coverage: 

Collection technique: 

Collection antennas: 

67° • 7S° 

275 miles 

Circular - 

1011-mile-diameler circle 

Read-in over denied area, 

record, and read-nut to 

SCE remote (racking 

stations. 

Circular horns for high 

frequency. Logarithmic 

conical spiral for VHF/UHF 

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Reconnaissance System of which SAMOS 

is an Example," 5 July 1960. It stated, in 

part, "There are important problems 

toward which electronic reconnaissance 

'could contribute critical information during the research and development phase .. . 

One of the most important of these is the 

search for emissions associated with an 

ABM system." Paragraph lc. stated, 

"Additional types of directed coverage may 

be required. Provision should be made to 

procure such equipment by Quick Reaction 

Capabilities (QRC)." Also ... a close 

working relationship between the R&D 

organization and the intelligence community is required."1 

Col John 0. Copley 

• Prior to the publication of USIB1)33.6/8, Maj (later Col) John 0. Copley, 

the Air Force WS-117L Project Officer for 

S/S F at the Air Force Ballistic Missile 

Division IAFBMD), Inglewood, California, 

had worked with LtCol John Poe of the 

APCIN staff. Cant John Marks of the 

Headquarters SAC Intelligence staff, and 

Jim Foreman and Art Thom, who were 

senior analysts at ATIC. Wright-Patterson 

AFB, Ohio, to determine collection 

requirements. for the S/S F payloads. They 

decided that the urgent requirement of 

SAC for an electronic order of battle (EOB) 

was the most important factor guiding 

payload design. These data were essential 

to SAC in planning bomber penetration 

routes. Next in order of importance were 

the detailed technical characteristics of 

these radars, especially for the early 

warning and ground'-to-air missile systems. The F-1 and F-2 ELINT payloads. 

with their compressed digital description 

of the radar intercepts, were designed for 

the EOB and general-search missions, 

while the F-3 payloads, with their wideband (6 MHz) analog output, provided the 

fine grain technical characteristics of 

selected radars. 

The 5 July 1960 USIB guidance 

appeared to validate the design of the S/S F 

payloads, if a QRC effort were included. 

The QRC requirement was met by a separate series of relatively simple, singlemission payloads that could be developed 

rapidly and mounted on the aft rack of the 

Lockheed Agena spacecraft. 

The S/S F payloads were mounted on 

the front rack of the nose-down, vertically 

stabilized Agena, which was continuously 

Earth-oriented when in orbit. The threeaxis stability of the vehicle was provided 

by control moment gyros supplementing 

the natural gravity-gradient force that 

tended to orient the vehicle vertically. 

Nickel-cadmium batteries supplied the 

power, limiting average spacecraft life to 

five or six days, depending on the weight 

of batteries that could be carried. 

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The S/S F-1 payload covered the frequency range of 2.5 to 3.2 and 9.0 to 

10.0 GHz. These frequency bands were 

the popular World War II S-band and 

X-band in which most of the area search, 

air-to-air, and ground-to-air missile radars 

were still operating. One additional frequency band, from 100 to 400 MHz, was 

used by the higher power, ground-based 

early warning radars, but the F-1 vehicle 

was incapable of carrying an antenna of 

Sufficient size to be effective in that radiofrequency range. This was remedied in 

the follow-on F-2 payloads by extending 

frequency coverage down to 59 MHz. 

The F-1 superheterodyne receiver 

scanned the radio frequency bands, measuring two pulse repetition intervals 

(PRIsi, pulsewidth (PW), radio frequency 

(RF), and time for each signal intercepted. 

This information formed a digital word for 

each intercept that was then transmitted 

at a 10-kilobit rate via a very high frequency (VHF) down-link to the tracking 

stations. The data could be transmitted in 

realtime or stored on a magnetic-tape 

recorder over the target area and played 

back when the satellite was in contact 

with a tracking station. Spacecraft and 

payload status data were transmitted on a 

second VHF telemetry link using pulse 

amplitude modulation of various tones to 

frequency-modulate the down-link 

(PAM/FM). Commands were sent to the 

vehicle via a 3,200-MHz transponder on 

the Agena vehicle, which was also used for 

tracking. 

The payload intercept antennas were 

nadir-pointing directional arrays, with a 

coverage circle on the ground about 100 

miles in diameter.at the center frequency 

of each band.* Additional nondirectional 

antennas performed an inhibit function, 

preventing signals originating outside the 

coverage circle of the directional antennas 

from reaching the payload via the sidelobes of the directional antennas. The system was known as a "sidelobe" intercepter 

because it intercepted the sidelobes of the 

ground radar antennas using its own main 

beam while, at the same time, it rejected 

signals (mostly main beams) from other 

ground radars that entered its•sidelobes. 

The payload intercept antenna main beam 

looked only at the zenith lobes (sidelobes) 

of the ground radar, thereby eliminating 

the scan rate of the ground radar main 

beam as an influence on the probability of 

intercepting the radar. This system was 

the reverse of the Navy DYNO payloads, 

which depended on seeing the main•beams 

of the ground radars. In both systems the 

sensitivity. of the system was adjusted very 

carefully to assure reception of only the 

portion of the ground radar antenna power 

that was desired (sidelobes for S/S F and 

main beams for DYNO). 

The S/S F and follow-on payloads 

were built by the AIL at Mineola and Deer 

Park, Long Island, New York, under the 

direction of Win Fromm. The F-1 payload 

used components of a vacuum-tube-type 

ELINT receiver, the AN/APR-9, which AIL 

had deVeloped for the Air Force in 1948. 

This equipment was extensively modified 

to operate in the space environment and • 

was unique in being the only vacuumtube-type ELINT payload ever flown in 

space by the United States. F-1 used 

motor-driven mechanical CAMS for frequency scanning, which was also unique to 

satellite-borne ELINT systems. 

• For a fixed antenna site, the diameter of the coverage 

.circle is an inverse function of frequency. 

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Participants in the dedication ceremony of the Airborne Instruments Laboratories, Inc., facility at Melville, 

Long Island, New York, where Subsystem F and subsequent 698BK payloads were built, 13 October 1959 

(Partial listing from left): Don Clark. Phil D. Doersam ;third). George P. Minalga ifounhl, Pete Sielman (sixth), 

Maj Walt H. Spindler (eighth). John L. Herne (ninth). Eugene Fuhini (1.1th). Maj Bill Bean (1 2th). Sid Hassin • 

(1 3011. George W. Price (14th), George Heiniger (15th). Bob Hunter 120th), William M. Harris.(24thi, lames I. 

Foreman (26th). Col Will Ray (27th). Capt Don Wipperman (28th), LtCol Robert Yundt 129th), LtCol John E. 

Poe (301h), Maj lohn 0. Copley (31st). Maj Donald Furr E..Fromm 33rd). Ken Knopi (34th), 

Jim Stevenson t35thi, lack Wieland (37th), and Gregg Stevenson (38th). 

To translate the 10-kilobit data 

stream received at the ground tracking 

site at Vandenberg AFB, California, into 

the actual PRI, PW, and RF of the individual intercepts, an F-1 ground data handler 

was furnished by AIL. This equipment 

used logic circuits constructed of hardware 

components to interpret the data stream 

and produce an output that listed PRI, 

PW, RF, and time of each intercept for 

each readout ofthe payload. This information was used at the tracking station to 

determine the payload status, particularly 

on reaitime readouts, that contained data 

from special LMSC-operated calibration 

vans and known local radars. A second F-1 

ground data handler unit was located at 

the Satellite Test Center (STC) at . 

Sunnyvale, California. to provide input 

data for the CDC-1604 computer. The 

readout data, recorded on magnetic tape 

at the Vandenberg tracking station, were 

transported by courier to the STC. There 

the data were translated by the F-1 

ground data handler in the same manner 

as at Vandenberg and were processed on 

the CDC-1604 computer. The computer 

contained acceptance criteria to validate 

the individual intercepts and, using the 

spacecraft ephemeris, translated the time 

of intercept into the location of each valid 

intercept. These data were then manually 

checked against the characteristics and 

location of known ground radars and the 

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calibration van transmitters to evaluate 

the accuracy of the output data. It was 

planned that readout data played back 

from the vehicle recorder, consisting of 

data intercepted over the Soviet Union or 

other areas outside the coverage circle of 

the ground tracking station, would be 

recorded at the tracking station and furnished to the processors at the Strategic 

Air Command (SAC) Headquarters at 

Omaha, Nebraska. There, functions similar to those used at the STC would be performed using the WS-117L Subsystem I 

Data Management System to develop finished intelligence data. 

When the SAMOS Program Office 

(SAFSP) was formed at Los Angeles Air 

Force Station, California, on 30 August 

1960, two development areas were defined. 

Program I included the readout projects of 

Subsystems E and F. The E-1, E-2, and E-3 

photo payloads (in increasing order of 

ground resolution) became Project 101, 

while the F-1, F-2, and F-3 ELINT payloads became Project 102. Program II was 

reserved for the photo recovery projects_ 

In Program I, the SAMOS 1 payload was 

unique, combining as it did the F-1 ferret 

and E-1 photo readout payloads. This 

arrangement was developed during the 

regime of the Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (ARPA) as a cost-saving measure. 

The F-1 was mounted in front of the E-1 

lens; that lens looked Earthward through 

a hole cut in the S-band horn antenna of 

the F-1. This novel arrangement severely 

vignetted the view of the E-1 camera. The 

problem was solved by installation of a 

squib which, when fired on orbit 21, detached 

the F-1. thereby providing the E-1 a full 

field of view. 

To determine the accuracy of the PRI, 

PW, and RF measurements made by the 

payload it was necessary to use the realtime mode to collect radar signals with 

known parameters and then check the 

payload measurements against the signals 

being transmitted. The S/S F Project 

Officer, Maj John Copley, remembered that 

in his previous assignment as the QRC 

Officer at Rome Air Development Center, 

New York, he was responsible for the modification of several AN/GPQ-T1 training 

sets, which were van-mounted radar 

receivers and simulated radar transmitters used by SAC for training electronic 

warfare officers. Since the radar transmitters could simulate known radars, they 

seemed an excellent choice for calibration 

vans, or -cal vans," to transmit radar signals to the satellite receivers. Copley 

located three vans in Air Force inventory 

and they were provided to LMSC to modify 

for this use. These vans were used for several years until requirements for radar 

simulation became too sophisticated for this 

relatively ancient equipment, originally 

built for the Korean War. In 1965 they 

were replaced with more modern equipment mounted in modified tour buses. 

The SAMOS 1 used an Atlas booster 

to lift the Agena vehicle into a low Earth 

orbit. The first ignition of the Agena main 

engine placed it in an eccentric transfer 

orbit with an apogee of 275 miles. A second ignition at apogee circularized the 

orbit at 275 miles. Polar inclination of the 

orbit assured coverage of the entire Soviet 

land mass. 

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Despite all obstacles, on a clear, crisp 

day on 11 October 1960, Copley, George 

Price (the LMSC payload manager), Vince . 

Henry (the AIL F-1 specialist), and the 

rest of their crew stood in the Vandenberg 

tracking station parking lot looking out 

over the launch base. The great day had 

arrived and SAMOS 1 was on the pad, 

ready to launch- They watched it rise out 

of a plume of white smoke in a pictureperfect launch until it was out of sight. 

Jubilation reigned momentarily until they 

reentered the tracking station control 

room and discovered that, during the 

launch,-the umbilical connector had stuck 

to the cold-gas bottle connection, thereby 

releasing all the attitude-control gas. 

Because this gas was needed to control the 

vehicle during the burning of the orbital 

engine, the Agena did not attain orbit. 

The launch of SAMOS 2 a few months 

later was somewhat different. It was a 

gray, rainy day on 31 January 1961 and 

the launch pad was not even visible from 

the tracking station. This did not deter 

the launch crew, and vehicle 2102 was 

launched into the desired orbit with both 

the E-I and F-1 payloads working as 

expected. On orbit 8 a realtime readout at 

the Vandenberg tracking station produced 

the first orbital intercept data from the 

F-1 system. These data were processed on 

the F-1 ground data handling equipment, 

Which transformed the 10-kilobit data 

stream into individual intercepts. This 

Was done at Vandenberg and the STC in 

Sunnyvale. Output of the F-1 ground data 

handier at the STC was processed on the 

1604 Computer, producing 69 identifiable 

Intercepts of signals from US West Coast 

radars and the cal vans. This verified 

. beyond doubt that the AIL concept had 

produced a working system. The 2-kilocycle 

inverter in the payload power supply 

failed shortly thereafter and no more 

intercepts, friendly or otherwise, were 

made. 

In the meantime the E-1 photo payload was collecting pictures through the 

hole in the S-band horn and there was 

great elation at the tracking station as the 

E-1 ground processing system produced 

100-foot-resolution pictures on many 

orbits. even though they were rather 

vignetted. There was great anticipation of 

bigger and better pictures when the squib 

was fired on orbit 21 to remove the F-1 

payload, but the results suggest that a 

catastrophe had occurred. The spacecraft 

was never heard from again. 

This proved to be the only successful 

SAMOS Atlas/Agena readout program 

launch. and it was only a partial success. 

The third E-1/F-1 was cancelled to save 

money for the E-2 launch the following 

spring. Unfortunately, in April 1961 the 

Atlas booster for that vehicle blew up on 

the pad; consequently, shortly thereafter, 

the photo readout program was cancelled 

in favor of the more promising photo 

recovery programs (the already successful 

CORONA, and GAMBIT, approved for 

development). The third E-IJF-1 payload 

was placed in storage until the F-1 was 

resurrected and used as the Group 0 payload in the upcoming Project 102 missions. 

The F-1 payload worked long enough 

to produce 69 intercept words, but that 

was not the whole story. Just as importantly, under the leadership of Frank 

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SAMOS 2/Atlas/Agena launch, Vandenberg Air Force Base, 31 January 1962 

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.uirig, the LMSC crew at the STC processed'i the data on the CDC 1604 computer. !Using known West Coast radars 

and the cal van signals for verification, 

they proved that a workable system had 

been developed. Not only could the data 

be collected. but the data could also be 

processed and a useful output produced. 

The approval of the follow-on SAMOS 

Project 102 ELINT missions on 9 March 

1961 by the Under Secretary of the Air 

Force, Joseph V. Charyk, was very 

strongly influenced by these factors.' 

The F-2 and F-3 Thor-Boosted 

Projects: 102, 698BK, and 770 

On 23 December 1960. even prior to 

the successful E-1/F-1 launch of January 

1961, Under Secretary of the Air Force 

/I{ directed modification of the 

-40S ELINT Project 102, as follows: 

'The use of Atlas boosters in the flight test 

program for subsystem F-2 will be terminated. Subsystem F-2 and F-3 flight test 

Quill utilize Thor boosters in combination 

With the Agena vehicle, and will be conducted as an integral part of the SAMOS 

Program. The initial F-2 flight test should 

be scheduled at the earliest practical date. 

In planning for the F-3 development and 

night test, consideration should be given 

to include provisions for secure transmission of analog readout data through 

encryption or other techniques."*3 

' During the SIGHT Satellite History peer review in 

March 1994. BGen William G. King. Jr.. who played a 

Prominent rule in this history. said. The curt nature of 

Or. Charyk's direction to redirect Project 102 was typical 

the explicit and direct instructions we received in the 

field. Suggest you highlight this fact. It probably was 

basic to the 1.*IRO management approach." 

BGen William G. king, fr. 

The switch from Atlas intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) to Thor intermediaterange ballistic missile (IRBM) boosters was 

a logical step in light of the rapid developments in solid-state electronics and digital 

circuitry. Use of these techniques, plus 

new lightweight materials, resulted in an 

F-2 payload less than two-thirds the 

weight of the F-1. The F-2 covered more of 

the radio frequency spectrum using three 

frequency bands, as compared to the two 

on F-1. Nonetheless. Col (later BGen) 

William G. King, Jr., the Project 102 director. recommended four F-2 and four F-3 

launches, using an Agena vehicle patterned 

after the Agena of the DISCOVERER/Thor 

program. Having first-hand knowledge of 

the failures that the DISCOVERER program 

had overcome, he felt that four launches of 

each payload would provide adequate 

assurance that at least one of each would 

be successful (DISCOVERER had finally 

been successful on the 13th launch). This 

philosophy, along with the success of F-1, 

was convincing enough to gain Charyk's 

approval of an eight-launch program, with 

the first launch in February 1962. 

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On 9 March 1961, Charyk allocated $35 

million in FY62 funds as an initial increment for Project 102, scheduled to launch 

four F-2s in 1962 and four F-35 in 1963.4 

The new Project 102 required names 

for each'payload more specific than F-2 

and F-3. To accomplish this, Copley and 

his counterpart, LtCol Edwin J. Istvan of 

the Air Force Office of Missiles and Space 

(SAFMS) staff, devised a system that identified payloads by the type of output data 

they produced (a digital data stream or a 

wide-bandwidth analog signal) and by the 

radio frequency bands that they intercepted. The frequency band configurations 

were numbered 1, 2, or 3, and the term 

"digital" was adopted for payloads with 

digital output and "analog" for those with 

analog output. For example, Group 2D 

provided radio frequency coverage from 

0.059 to 0.130, 2.5 to 3.2, and 8.2 to 12.4 

GHz and produced a digital data stream as 

the output, whereas Group 2A provided a 

wide-bandwidth analog output covering 

the same frequency bands. Payloads with 

digital output were EOB and general 

search (GS) collectors. Their output was a 

10-kilobit digital data stream. Payloads 

with wideband analog output collected 

technical intelligence (TI) to determine the 

fine-grain characteristics of radars of the 

highest priority. Their output bandwidth 

was 6 MHz and they utilized the analog 

magnetic instrumentation equipment 

(AMIE) wideband helical scan video 

recorder developed by RCA for on-orbit 

recording. 

As a further cost-saving measure, the 

third SAMOS E-1/F-1 Agena vehicle, 2103, 

with the E-1 photo components removed, 

was redesignated 2301 and reconfigured 

for launch on a Thor booster. The F-1 payload became Group 0, the first of the 

Project 102 Thor-boosted launches. 

Although it was conducted as part of 

the SAMOS Program, Project 102 had 

much more in common with DISCOVERER. 

which was the cover name for the "black" 

CORONA photo recovery project: They 

both used the same Thor/Agena launch 

configuration and had many common subsystems, they were both under contract to 

LMSC, and administration of the "white" 

elements of DISCOVERER had been 

'transferred to the SAMOS office on 9 September 1960. 

It soon became clear that operating 

Project 102 as part of the SAMOS office 

required duplication of most functions of 

the DISCOVERER office except for payload operation. As a result, in April 1961 

BGen Robert E. Greer moved Project 102 

from SAFSP to the nearby DISCOVERER 

office, both of them located at the Air 

Force El Segundo complex. This essentially meant that Maj Copley and his secretary Katherine Holt moved in with Col 

Lee Battle and the DISCOVERER development team. The arrangement worked 

out very well with Copley handling the 

SIGINT payloads and Capt Bill Johnson 

handling the photo payloads. Most other 

subsystems were common to both programs, and from external observation it 

was impossible to tell the difference 

between a SIGINT and a photo launch. 

There was a difference in the security classification of the payloads. The photo payloads were developed and operated using 

the CIA's covert ("black") CORONA security. 

1 

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system, whereas SIGINT payloads were 

DOD SECRET, with strict "need-to-know" 

enforced. 

That this combination of the two programs worked well was proven when, 

instead of the minimum two-out-of-eight 

successes King had predicted, by the end 

of 1965 the SIGINT program had grown to 

nine launches, all of which had been successful. Lee Battle believed that one manager per subsystem or element was more 

than adequate and steadfastly refused to 

fill extra billets that were made available 

to him. The success of the DISCOVERER 

and 102 projects certainly validated this. 

position. 

When the joint CIA/DOD agreement 

was signed on 6 September 1961, forming 

the National Reconnaissance Program, the 

administrative bond between the photo 

and SIGINT sections of the DISCOVERER 

Project Office was strengthened further.5 

The most notable effect was that the CIA 

CORONA payload was now procured and 

operated under the new joint-agency 

covert DOD-CIA BYEMAN system, which 

included both the CIA's CORONA compartment and the Air Force "black" compartments (GAMBIT for the photo recovery 

system and for SIGINT projects). The Air Force ELINT payloads in 

Project 102 remained DOD SECRET, with 

a strict "need to know," and were assigned 

mission numbers" in the TALENTKEYHOLE intelligence product protection 

security system, starting with 7151 for the 

Group 0 launch of January 1962. 

By December 1961 Project 102 was 

settling into its new environment. Due to 

funding limitations, every effort was made 

to simplify the configuration and the project was cut back to seven flights, four in 

1962 and three in 1963. There would be 

no Group 2 analog payload and no flexible 

on-orbit programmer for the analog missions. Encryption for the wideband analog 

down-link was still required_ .A project 

ceiling of $33.4 million for FY62 was 

imposed.6To meet this ceiling, Copley 

worked closely with George Price, the 

LMSC payload director; to assure that 

the Project 102 payload designers were . 

imbued with a "no-frills" attitude. Digital 

Group 0 was not a problem since it used 

the last F-1 payload and was compatible 

with the subsystems of the Agena vehicle. 

The new digital payloads used many 

of the F-1 techniques including frequencysweeping superheterodyne receivers; but 

with lightweight solid-state components 

that provided improved versatility and 

reliability. Electronic frequency scan and 

switching were a great improvement over 

the former electromechanical methods 

employed for these functions by the F-1 

payloads. The digital output continued to 

be a 10-kilobit data stream similar to that 

of F-1. The frequency range from 59 to 

12,500 MHz was covered in three configu-. 

rations (Groups 1 through 3). To provide 

the wide-bandwidth TI needed to understand the operation of new Soviet ABM 

and ground-to-air radars, operation of the 

analog payloads was necessarily more 

complex. Recording of radar intercepts 

was accomplished by the AMIE recorder 

developed for this task by RCA in Camden, 

New Jersey. To obtain the 4-MHz 

• 

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bandwidth of the early models, a helical 

scan machine was developed using four 

recording heads scanning sequentially in 

exactly the way present-day video cassette 

recorders (VCRs) operate. To obtain maximum utilization of the wideband recording capability of the AMIE recorder, it was 

necessary to stop the frequency scan of the 

receivers and dwell on the frequency of 

interest while making the recording. The 

receiver had to either recognize a signal of 

interest (at least, the presence of a signal) 

or be pretuned to suspected frequencies of 

interest. Because the AMIE recorded only 

when the receiver "recognized" a specific 

signal, the recording time per orbit was 

frequently very short and used a small 

fraction of the tape available. To avoid 

wearing out the tape by constantly using 

the first few minutes of tape recording 

time, it was necessary to allow the analog 

payloads to collect for many orbits before 

reading out the data. This often caused 

the analyst processing the data great difficulty in identifying the segment he was 

looking at, particularly when (sometimes 

inadvertently) another read-in occurred 

before all the previous data had been readout. To ease this problem. in later payloads the digital data word describing the 

signal characteristics, in addition to time, 

was recorded on the AMIE recorder tape 

along with each intercept. 

The Agena support systems were very 

similar for all DISCOVERER flights 

except that the photo-mission spacecraft 

were horizontally stabilized, while the 

SIGINT missions were vertically stabilized, with the front rack of the Agena 

vehicle nadir-oriented. The Agena spacecraft would naturally assume a vertical 

position with respect to Earth while in 

orbit due to the gravity-gradient effect. 

This made the attitude control for the 

SIGINT spacecraft much less complex 

than for the photo systems, which had to 

make constant adjustments. The command 

and control systems were very similar 

except that the SIGINT vehicles had two 

encrypted 10-kilobit down-link transmitters on the digital missions and an encrypted 10-megabit down-link for the analog 

system. Actually, it was not technically 

feasible to encrypt the full 4-MHz bandwidth of the analog recorder at that time 

(it would have required at least a 40-megabit 

down-link), so the first analog mission 

returned 750-kHz bandwidth of analog 

data via the 10-megabit down-link. This 

system was flown on the first analog mission, 7156, on 27 February 1964. Afterward. 

the Director of NSA reviewed the situation 

and determined that, due to the complexity of wideband analog data, encryption 

would not be necessary for future analog 

down-link data. 

Both the digital and analog payload 

commands were transmitted via the 

S-band (3.2 GHz) transponder used for 

tracking the Agena. The command instructions for each orbit were generated by the 

Mission Control Center (MCC) in the STC 

for the F-I and Project 102, Group 0. Only 

off/on commands were available at this 

time and the normal commanding was to 

turn the payload on as it came within 

sight of the Soviet-Sino Bloc and turn it off 

as it exited the area. Command instructions became more complex for the Project 

102 payloads, starting with the Group .2-D 

launch on 18 June 1962. 

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1 

On 2 May 1962. the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was formally 

created and in July 1962 the Director of 

the NRO (DNRO), Joseph V. Charyk, 

defined his support staff, known as the . 

Office of Space Systems, Office of the 

Secretary of the Air Force (SAFSS). An 

operatiOns staff, SS-4, headed by Col Tom 

Herron, was responsible for working with 

the appropriate committees of the USIB to 

translate their requirements to specific 

payload operations and to advise these 

boards of present and planned capabilities 

of the NRO. By this time, the SAMOS 

Program Office at Los Angeles Air Force 

Station had been renamed the Office of 

Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of 

the Air Force (SAFSP), and was still 

headed by BGen Robert E. Greer, who 

reported directly to Charyk. Greer gave 

his operations staff at SAFSP the office 

symbo

DNRO Charyk proposed and received 

an approval from the President's Foreign 

Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 

1962 that, . . . all satellite projects of the 

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) 

should be handled in the same manner by 

a single operations unit of the NRO 

Star7 A Satellite Operations Center 

(SOC) was created as part of SS-4, an 

office in SAFSS, and was located in Room 

BD-944 in the Pentagon. Initially, the 

SOC.was concerned primarily with tasktog the CORONA and GAMBIT photo programs and exercised minimal control over 

the SIGINT satellite's, which, like the 

Photo satellites. were controlled from the 

Satellite Test Center (STC) in Sunnyvale. 

In the SIGINT arena, the initial function 

of SOC was to translate USIB requirements 

into mission requirements for specific payloads. The National Security Agency 

(NSA) representative who 

had joined the NRO staff as part of the 

1962 DNRO agreements. became increasingly involved in this process. In 1964, as 

the SIGINT satellite payloads, and consequently their commanding or "tasking" 

(planning and controlling their collection 

o erations) became more complex;{

f NSA was added to the SOC staff 

to oversee the SIGINT tasking requirements. These requirements were transmitted to in Los Angeles where, in 

conjunction with the MCC personnel at 

the STC, they were translated into specific 

tasking for each mission. Lockheed technical personnel at the STC ensured that 

operation of the satellite vehicle support 

subsystems was optimized. 

The lifetimes of the early vehicles 

were limited to between six and 20 days 

depending on the weight of the batteries 

that could be carried. In late 1962 the 

"standard" Agena D satellite development 

was initiated at AFBMD, basically to control cost. This vehicle made it possible for 

each project to choose "accessories" to customize the standard Agena bus. This 

improvement, plus the thrust augmented 

Thor (TAT) program, which added three 

solid rockets to the Thor booster, increased 

the available on-orbit weight and flexibility of the Agena. Lockheed incorporated 

solar arrays starting with vehicle 2702, 

launched on 19 July 1965. ELINT payload 

life gradually increased from 51 days for • 

2702 to over one year for the follow-on 

MULTIGROUP and STRAWMAN payloads. 

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The Group 0 digital mission, vehicle 

2301, mission 7151, was launched on 

21 February 1962 from Vandenberg AFB, 

California. The tube-type F-1 receiver 

operated successfully for six days in orbit 

until the spacecraft batteries were depleted 

and the mission was terminated. It became 

the first Project 102 mission to collect data 

from the Soviet Union and read-out data 

at the Nevi Hampshire and Hawaii remote 

tracking stations (RTSs) as well as at the 

Vandenberg RTS. Data were processed in 

essentially the same way that the F-1 data 

had been handled. The output from the F-1 

ground data handling equipment in the 

STC was processed on the CDC 1604 computer to validate each intercept and, based 

on the vehicle ephemeris, translate time of 

intercept into geoposition. 

Development of the data handling 

subsystem, S/S I of WS-117L, was under 

way prior to the formation of SAFSP. It 

was designed to process the data from the 

wideband photo readout (RF down-linked) 

surveillance system on film and the data 

from the ELINT readout systems as they 

were recorded on magnetic tape at the 

tracking stations. When Acting Secretary 

of the.Air Force Joseph V. Charyk directed 

the change of program emphasis from 

readout to recovery on 4 November 1960, 

he also cancelled Subsystem I. This left 

the S/S F ELINT data users with no system to process the S/S F data. The LMSC 

data processing of realtime readouts in the 

STC for engineering evaluation was the 

only capability available to produce validated and geopositioned intercepts from 

the Group 0 payload. By applying the 

LMSC processing system to all of the data 

(rather than just the realtime readouts), it 

was possible to provide both the NSA and 

SAC with verified intercepts containing 

emitter parameters and locations. 

During 1961, increasing emphasis 

was placed on protecting the security of 

Project 102 data and mission operations. 

John G. Schaub, the Lockheed Project 102 

manager, recognized the difficulty of protecting both the hardware and the data in 

building 104:the heart of the Lockheed 

.building complex at Sunnyvale, California, 

which was surrounded by a myriad of 

unclassified activities. To provide a facility where good security could be maintained, he convinced Lockheed management that an isolated location was required. 

This led to the construction of

in an isolated area of 

Sunnyvale formerly occupied by tomato 

fields. For many years this area was 

known as the

housed the unclassified spacecraft 

development and test activities, and

provided a secure area to conduct 

the classified development program, check 

out the payload, and process the reconnaissance data. 

The buildings were completed in • 

January 1962, shortly before the launch of 

vehicle 2301, and included an F-1 ground 

data handler and CDC 1604 computer for 

processing the data. The original plans for 

called for a single stairway at 

one end of,each building. Realizing the 

inconvenience this could cause when an 

individual.on the stairless end wanted to 

go from floor to floor, Schaub insisted that 

there be stairways on both ends of the 

buildings. When he won this battle, the 

• - • 

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second stairway in was 

dubbed

a name it presumably retains 

to this day. 

The data from mission 7151, Group 0, 

was checked in by comparing 

the computer output with manually 

processed data from the calibration vans. 

The STC capability was used primarily for 

realtime data evaluation for mission control purposes. Preprocessing of mission 

7151 data at both the STC and

produced 4.800 intercept words of 

high-quality corrected data, which were 

sent to NSA on IBM 727 digital tape for 

processing at their operations building at 

Fort Meade, Maryland. Initial processing 

was done on the IBM 7090 computer and 

later on the IBM 7094. Each intercept 

NSA processors to refine the radar characteristics and determine a common area in 

the individual circles of coverage, thereby 

Improving the location accuracy and 

enhancing identification of the intercept. 

The NSA operational ELINT organization, headed by used 

MILGO plotters to display the overlapping 

—Itercept-circles,and_produced u

data which were provided to the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA) for EOB listings 

and to other customers for their direct use. 

But early location accuracy produced by 

the overlapping circles was generally poor, 

with a circular error probable (CEP) as 

great as By the conclusion of 

mission 7152, in June 1962, the LMSC 

team in had refined selected 

data to a and 

concluded that this was about the limit of 

the system as then constituted. The preprocessed ELINT data were also sent to 

the 544th RTG at SAC Headquarters. 

Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska. for further 

processing on their Finder (AN/GSQ-1) 

computer system. The output of this processing was added to the Single Integrated 

Operations Plan (SIOP), which SAC used 

to control all their bombing missions. 

Ed Stillman, one of the early LMSC 

processing team members, recalled that 

his first assignment at Lockheed was in 

working with Jack Shepherd, 

also of Lockheed, to handle the ground 

segment of this mission and also mission 

7152, flown in June 1962. To verify the 

accuracy of the data, Stillman used locations of known radars in Alaska (such as 

the IVISQ-1) to correct the biases in the 

ELINT reconnaissance data. The first 

thing that Stillman discovered in the data 

from vehicle 2301 (mission 7151) was that 

the arithmetic signs of spacecraft pitch 

and roll had been entered into the computer reversed. Once this was corrected, 

Stillman was able to correlate the data. 

He discovered this error through manual 

analysis and has since come to believe that 

manually checking computer data (at least 

the initial and unusual data) is really 

mandatory.9 

• Circular error probable (CEP) is a term for accuracy. It 

means that 50 percent of all the locations reported will be 

within this distance of the correctlocation. 

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• PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Vehicle 2312, mission 7152, was 

launched on 18 June 1962 . carrying the 

first Project 102 digital payload, Group 2-D. 

This first all-solid;state system had many 

advantages over the vacuum tubes and 

mechanical scanners of the Group 0 (F-1) 

payload. In addition to extended frequency coverage, this system was much 

lighter, more reliable, and used considerably less power. Expectations for a long, 

useful life, however, were dashed on the 

• second evening of operation (at about four 

a.m.). In those days program office personnel felt obligated to be in the Mission 

Control Center (MCC) of the Satellite Test 

Center (STC) to supervise the conduct of 

all orbital operations until everything was 

checked out and became routine. .When 

the satellite was "acquired" on orbit 26, it 

appeared that the tape recorder would not 

read-Out during the pass. What actually 

happened was that a "read7in" command 

had been sent by mistake. So, when the 

program office decision to send another 

read-out command was executed, the tape 

recorder tried to operate in forward and 

reverse simultaneously. This ended the 

mission and caused an immediate redesign 

of the recorder command system. It also 

terminated the continuous presence of program office personnel in the MCC (without, at least, some occasional sleep). 

The Douglas Corporation, which manufactured the Thor booster, invented a 

method of increasing the booster's thrust 

by strapping three XLR-81 solid rockets to 

its base. Lee Battle of the DISCOVERER 

team decided that vehicle 2313 would be a 

good one to use for testing the new booster, 

which was called the thrust-augmented 

Thor (TAT). Unfortunately, George Price 

and his Lockheed payload engineers could 

not deliver the Group 1D payload by the 

November 1962 launch availability of the 

new Thor, so Battle substituted:. a photo 

bird. When it was launched on 16 November 

1962, one of the solids failed to fire, promptly 

dumping the payload into the Pacific Ocean. 

The next flight, vehicle 2313, mission 7153, . 

with a Group 1 digital payload, launched 

on 16 January 1963 using a Thor, was successful. However, the mission lasted only 

two days due to a battery failure. It collected

/and updated radar sites in 

the Soviet Union. Some months before, 

shortly after he was designated DNRO.. 

Joseph Charyk changed the project identifier from 102 to 698BK. This made vehicle 

2313 the first launch under the new pro-. 

gram number and changed the security 

classification to DOD SECRET, SPECIAL 

HANDLING. 

Vehicle 2314, mission 7154, a Group 1 

digital payload, was launched on. 29 June 

1963 using a TAT booster, as did all subsequent 698BK launches. It established a 

program record of 10 days of orbital operations and produced approximately 140,000 

good intercept words. The first wideband . 

analog mission, 7156; was launched on 

vehicle 2316, 27 February 1964, with a 

mission life of 12 days. The value of the 

data was degraded by erratic operation of 

the wideband AMIE helical-scan tape 

recorder, mostly caused by tape "gunking" 

of the recording heads, resulting in frequent loss of data from one or two of the 

four recording heads. The down-link data 

90 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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698UK/TAT/Agena launch, Vandenberg Air Force Base, 29 June 1963 

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limited the analog data bandwidth to 

about 750 MHz and further degraded the 

data. A previous payload named HAYLOFT, 

mission 7210, had been orbited as an auxiliary payload on the POPPY Program 

launch of 11 January 1964 as a test bed for 

• the AMIE recorder and KW-26 encryptor. 

Project 698BK, vehicle 2316, also carried an auxiliary payload that was to 

become an integral part of future Project 

770 missions. The story of this payload 

began in Garland, Texas, a little over two 

years earlier, at the Electronic Systems 

Division of Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV). By 

the summer of 1962, Maj Copley had instituted regular monthly meetings to review 

the status of all the Program A SIGINT 

projects. Frequently these meetings would 

be held at the facility of a payload contractor. Organizations and representatives 

typically attending, in addition to Copley 

and/or his newly assigned assistant. Capt 

John O'Connell, would be from 

the Office of ELINT (OEL) at CIA (who 

was assigned to assist Copley in interpreting requirements and evaluating payload 

configurations), rom NSA, 

Eldon Sasser .from SAC, Don Wipperman 

from the US. Air Force Security-Service 

(AFSS), and on occasion, representatives 

from other government organizations, plus 

LMSC and the payload subcontractors. 

George Price, Bill Harris, and Vince Henry 

of LMSC would present the project status, 

which would be followed by a discussion of 

problems or changes necessary. It was not 

unusual for new payload ideas to be presented at these meetings, followed by discussion of their merits. 

Introduction of the new auxiliary payload came about in exactly this way. Gene 

Kieffer, President of LTV Electronic 

Systems Division (later E-Systems) in 

Dallas, Texas, had approached both Price 

and Copley about an interferometer-type 

payload that promised to obtain

location accuracy from a 275-mile-high 

orbit. At a meeting in October 1962 at the 

LTV E-Systems facility, Kieffer presented 

the results of an aircraft 

test that supported this accuracy prediction when translated to a

s •ace •a load targeted against the new 

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version of the S-band system that shot 

down F. Gary Powers' U-2). The payload 

idea gained wide acceptance and was 

named BIRD DOG for its pointing 

accuracy. Despite some concern for sensi13IRD DOG was included as an auxiliary 

Payload on 2316 and the following three 

vehicles, 2315 and 2317 of the 698BK 

Project and 2702 of the 770 Project. 

The interferometer used phase mea, 

surements to describe the angle-of-arrival 

of a signal based on intercept of a single 

pulse. A digital word was formed in the 

payload, identifying the location cell by 

the phase measurements of the intercept. 

New digital words were formed for each of 

the multiple hits on the same radar while 

the emitter was in the spacecraft-field-ofview. Digital words that described the 

same signal parameters and whose cells 

Were in an approximate straight line parallel with the flight path of the spacecraft 

were combined to produce more accurate 

locations than was possible with a single 

direction-finding hit. The digital payload 

output was preprocessed at LMSC to correct for vehicle attitude and receiver and 

antenna calibration. These data were sent 

to NSA, where intercepts were combined 

and emitters identified. SAC also received 

and processed the same data fordirect 

entry into the STOP. BIRD DOG produced 

the first high volume locations with accuracies better th ccinades 

were Often as good 

EO 1.4.(C) 

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Vehicle 2315, mission 7155, a Group 2 

digital payload, was launched on 3 July 

1964. It operated for 17 days and proThe last Project 698BK digital payload, 2317, mission 7157, carrying a Group 

3 digital payload, was launched on 3 

November 1964 and operated for four 

days. In addition to the digital output, to 

supplement the technical intelligence (TI) 

output of the wideband analog missions, 

the detected video output from the 

receivers was recorded in analog format on 

a 100-kHz bandwidth Leach magnetic 

recorder. The analog data proved to have 

limited value since the radar pulses had to 

be "stretched" to fit the 100-kHz band- . 

width of the recorder, thus preventing 

effective analysis of the "fine grain" characteristics of the radar.pulses needed for 

the TI mission. The location accuracy of 

the 698BK digital data provided to SAC 

and NSA had improved to approxiniately 

Also launched on vehicle 2317 was 

the auxiliary payload BIRD DOG 3. This 

version used an inflatable antenna system 

the antenna proved to be incapable of 

withstanding orbital conditions and collapsed, completely ending thoughts of lowfrequency BIRD DOGs. A powerful 

ground camera snapped a picture of this 

subsidiary payload in orbit and it was an 

ugly, wrinkled sight! 

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AJoIS aliltaMS 1N1D S 

2'00BURN (23.5' SO 

(2.5 SEC) 

AINAL ORBIT 

(275 N. MI.) 

P/1. ANTENNA 

DEPLOYMENT 

90° PITCH DOWN 

for BURN IGNITION ----- 

1sT BURN CUT-OFF 

r 

EXTEND SOLAR ARRAYS 

LIFT-OFF (VAF9) 

MECO 

BOOSTER SEPARATio 

Typical injection trajectory, Project 6988K and 770 

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After the earlier June 1962 launch of 

the Group 2 digital payload, mission 7152, 

all of the Project 102/698BK digital data 

were preprocessed by Lockheed in

using their CDC 1604 computer. In 

preparation for the processing of 7152 digital data, it was necessary to update the 

previously used F-1 processing capability 

to match the new payload format. The F-1 

ground data handler was not useable 

without major changes in hardware logic, 

and it was recognized that, with the 

advances in data processing technology, 

writing computer software was much more 

effective than constantly rebuilding hardware logic circuits to match new formats. 

A program was written for the CDC 1604. 

computer to translate the 10-kilobit F-2 

down-link data into radio frequency, pulsewidth, pulse repetition rate, and time data 

for each intercept. A second program validated this data and translated time into 

geolocation using the vehicle ephemeris. 

Since the project number was still 

102 at that time, given the contemporary 

popularity of a St. Louis beer known as 

Brew 102, it wasn't strange that these 

computer software programs became 

known as BREW 1 and BREW 2. In the 

summer of 1962 when the CDC 1604 computers were upgraded to much more capable CDC 3200s and the project name was 

changed to 698BK, it seemed only logical 

to change these program names to the 

more conventional ferret system terms, 

ROOK an

The validated ELINT output of these 

software programs was sent to both NSA 

and SAC. Once NSA had assumed the 

responsibility for processing ELINT data 

in the fall of 1961, NSA and SAC had 

become parallel processors. A Memorandum 

of Understanding between NSA and SAC 

was signed on 11 September 1962 that. 

clarified these ELINT processing arrangements. SAC would process certain space 

vehicle ELINT signals data in response to 

the operational intelligence need and in 

satisfaction of tasking instructions 

provided by NSA. NSA would provide 

planning and technical support and 

guidance.11 

Maj Eldon Sasser 

A practical demonstration of this 

cooperation occurred late in 1962, when 

Raymond B. Potts of NSA Research and 

Development (R&D) met with Maj Eldon 

Sasser and Capt Donald Wagner, SAC 

544th Reconnaissance Technical Group 

(RTG), at NSA, Fort Meade. Maryland, to 

discuss a SAC requirement for a specialpurpose signal deinterleaver and photographic output to process U-2 and satellite 

data collected in dense signal environments. 

The deinterleaver consisted of specialpurpose equipment that accepted analog 

signals on magnetic tape and used digital 

• 

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Mitford M. Mathews 

counters and hardware logic to separate 

overlapping signals (cieinterleaving them) 

of the same pulse repetition interval (PRI) 

before filming the analog data for analysis. 

Mitford Mathews, Assistant Director for 

NSA R&D, approved the development of 

the special-purpose deinterleaver and proposed to develop an analog-to-digital 

converter and the necessary computer software to provide an automated analysis 

• system for SAC. Mathews personally 

developed the software and Potts directed 

the development of the analog-to-digital 

converter in-house at NSA. Fort Meade. 

Potts also obtained a five-channel photographic strip film unit to photograph the 

output from the special-purpose deinterleaver from Space•Technology Laboratories 

(STL) in El Segundo, California:.The work 

at STL was under the direction of Douglas 

Royal. This equipment was installed at 

SAC headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, in 

early 1965.'1'12 

• The special-purpose deinterleaver was a hardware logic 

device that would open logic gates or windows so that all 

the analog pulses from a particular radar would be available for filmtng on one channel or track on the film. This 

system would separate up to five signals from five different radars with the same PRI. The filming device would 

present five parallel tracks of data-one fronteach dein- _ 

terleaver output. 

Since the initiation of the 698BK 

Project in June 1962, the project had been 

operating under the security of SECRET. 

SPECIAL HANDLING. even though the 

balance of the NRO projects by now were 

all operating under the BYEMAN security 

system, including the POPPY project. In 

order to achieve uniformity, 698BK was 

brought under the BYEMAN system in 

November 1963 and the program number 

was changed to 770. Since the contracting 

was switched from Air Force SECRET, 

SPECIAL HANDLING to SECRET/ 

BYEMAN, it was necessary to change the 

vehicle numbering system to disguise the 

- connection between 698BK and 770. The 

•first 770 Agena vehicle became 2701. 

which was a POPPY Project launch in 

March 1965. 

As a consequence of these changes. 

Copley had been moved from the 

DISCOVERER Program Office back to the 

nearby Air Force Special Projects Office 

(SAFSP) in El Segundo in November 1962. 

Within SAFSP, all the SIGINT projects 

were assigned to the SIGINT Project 

Office with Col Robert Yundt as 

chief. Copley became Chief of the Payload' 

Section . In July 1964 Copley was 

transferred from Los Angeles to Andrews 

AFB, Maryland, and Capt John O'Connell, 

who had joined Copley during the D1S- • 

COVERER days, took charge of To 

provide O'Connell with adequate support, 

in the summer of 1964 Yundt requested 

technical assistance from The Aerospace 

COrporation, similar to the support that 

firm was providing the photo programs. 

An Aerospace group under Sandy Evans 

was formed for this purpose. He assigned 

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Col Robert W. Yundt 

Daymond Speece to support software developments. Maj. John G. Kulpa was assigned 

as Chief shortly thereafter. 

To further improve relationships 

,etween the NRO and the NSA in their 

collection and processing activities, the 

DNSA proposed on 28 January 1964 to 

ar 

following a series of monthly trips to 

Sunnyvale, California was 

assigned to represent.NSA at the STC and 

undt was unsure of 

NSA motives and required that 

he call every time he visited and 

to log in and.out when he did so. Eventually convinced Yundt that 

efforts were desirable and this 

unnecessary prohibition was lifted. 

The first Project 770 mission was 

vehicle 2702, mission 7158, launched on 

16 July 1965, the legacy of vehicle 2316. 

mission 7156, which had been the first 

wideband analog payload (it was launched 

on 27 February: 1964). It was a Grotip 3 

configuratiOn covering 640 MHz to 8.28 

GHz. It operated for 51 days and marked 

the first effective use of solar arrays'on a 

SIGINT vehicle (vehicles starting with 

2316 had solar arrays, but battery prob 

lems prevented effective use or very long 

life). NSA had been planning to process 

these data since late in 1962, when NSA's 

Ray Potts responded to a requirement. 

from NSA operations and conducted a 

study of the analog-to-digital conversion 

needs to proCeSs the analog data that 

would be collected by the 698BK analog 

system. A special high-speed analog-todigital converter, BEERMAN, was proposed and subsequently developed inhouse in 1963 by NSA R&D. 

The BEERMAN equipment had been 

operated in the R&D spaces at NSA to 

support the mission 7156 and 7210 launches 

in 1964, and it used the R&D CDC 1604 

computer as the buffer tape controller to 

provide temporary digital-data storage 

and control for:the digital-tape recorders. 

, LtCol George Barthel, USAF, was 

assigned to the Sunnyvale area as the 

SAC representative to the STC and

. Also at this time.

US Army who had been recently assigned 

to NSA from the CIA intercept site at 

, was assigned to the satellite data processing axea. In October 1965, 

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NoroRN-nRcoN 

The BEERMAN analog-to-digital converter 

into a digital format for computer processoperations served a useful R&D function, 

but due to the short life of the missions 

and relatively narrow 750 kHz bandwidth 

of the unencrypted data, very little useful 

product was collected. BEERMAN was 

installed in operational spaces at NSA in 

late 1964 after the specially designed 

buffer tape controller was delivered by 

Control Data Corporation. Potts. meanwhile, moved from NSA R&D to NSA 

Operations as Chief of Special Projects 

K-4/SP) in May 1965 and was responsible 

for processing, analysis, and reporting of 

data collected by SIGINT satellites. 

Everything was in place to support 

mission 7158, the first mission whose output data would record predetection in 6-MHz 

bandwidth analog form and transmit to 

the ground without encryption. Computer 

programs had been written by NSA to process this data and to produce locations and 

identifications. The computer printouts 

were also used to scan the data for signals 

analysis. Considerable manual analysis of 

the analog data and the computer output 

was required to produce useable results 

from this first wideband analog mission. 

Experience gained in processing and analyzing the data from this mission in 1965 

provided valuable design information for 

follow-on systems.15 

• 

The last F-2 type payload was mission 

7160, carried on vehicle 2703, a Group 3-D 

payload launched on 9 February 1966. It 

also carried a 100-kHz bandwidth Leach 

magnetic tape recorder of the same type 

used on mission 7157 for analog-signal 

detection. Altogether, 736 readouts of digital and 429 readouts of analog data were 

collected during the seven-month lifetime 

of the payload. Several thousand updates 

to the EOB data were furnished to DIA 

and SAC, but the analog data suffered 

from the same bandwidth restrictions that 

plagued the mission 7157 data. and little 

technical intelligence (TI) was produced. 

Vehicle 2703 also carried an auxiliary 

payload proposed by LTV E-Systems as a 

follow-on to the BIRD DOG series. This 

version, known as SETTER, was designed 

98 The SICINT Satellite Story 

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the best achieved to that date. A byproduct of this best-ever accuracy was the discovery by Ed Stillman of LMSC that the 

vehicle was yawing in response to the 

interaction of the vehicle's magnetic field 

with the magnetic field of the Earth. 

Duane Scott of the guidance department 

was able to calculate these forces and compensate for them by placing magnets 

appropriately on the vehicle structure to 

counteract the natural forces. This procedure was used to damp unwanted oscillations on the following MULTIGROUP and 

STRAWMAN missions with great success. 

By the end of 1965 it was becoming 

increasingly obvious that was 

bursting at the seams. Moreover,

was not designed to provide the electronic security required, particularly for 

personnel involved in data analysis at the 

product, level and for the COMINT payloads, where testing and processing of sensitive data were very difficult. The need 

fora more secure facility, adequate to support expanded testing and processing 

requirements, became obvious to contractor and government personnel alike. Bill 

Harris and Bill Troetschel, LMSC, responsible for the AFTRACK packages; George 

Price, LMSC, in the 698BK area; Jerry 

C • en. LMSC, in processing

US Army, representing NSA; 

an. tCol George Barthel, US Air Force, 

representing SAC, all lobbied John 

Schaub. LMSC Program Manager, to press 

fora new building adequate for all their 

activities. Schaub listened and with the 

backing of Fritz Oder, LMSC Vice President 

for Programs, and Jim Plummer, alsO an 

LMSC Vice President, convinced Dan 

Houghton, LMSC Chairman of the Board, 

to invest in an appropriate facility. Thus, 

construction o was initiated 

in the LMSC complex at Sunnyvale, 

California, and was completed just in time 

to process the output of the first of the new 

MULTIGROUP payloads, launched 28 

December 1966. 

By the summer of 1962 it was becoming clear to many on the 698BK development team that improvements could be 

made in the design of the 698BK payloads. 

which had a set of fixed frequency combinations labeled Group 1, 2, or 3 and covering that had to be 

selected long before launch. No other frequency coverage was possible without 

major payload modification. This was primarily because' the antenna configurations 

were very difficult to change without 

major redesign and testing. Additionally, 

the command and control support systems 

were limited in flexibility by the small 

number of commands available. 

To develop a payload more responsive 

to changing requirements, LMSC and AIL 

initiated proposal activity to develop a 

new payload configuration to be called 

MULTIGROUP. It would have eight frequency bands, each with a matched 

antenna. Any four bands could be flown . 

on any given mission with minimal 

turnaround time. It also would be capable 

system and an on-orbit programmer would 

also improve system flexibility. 

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MULTIGROUP Launches 

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MGen John L. Martin, Jr. 

Top Secret 

NoroeN.oRcoN 

In June 1963, LtCol John Copley, 

along with George Price, Chief of the . 

LMSC Payload Office, briefed the members of the Washington NRO staff (SAFSS) 

on details of the new payload project. In 

November 1963, approval to initiate development of the MULTIGROUP project was 

received from Brockway McMillan, who 

had replaced Joseph V. Charyk as the 

DNRO in April 1963. In April 1964 

McMillan approved launch of the first 

MULTIGROUP for April 1966, plus three 

additional launches in FY67. This was 

later reduced to three total launches when 

the successor STRAWM.AN project was 

approved in September 1966. • 

The configuration of the first Project 

770 MULTIGROUP vehicle 2731, mission 

7161, was similar to the previous Project 

770 Agena launch vehicle 27.03 with the 

exception of the new payload and improved 

UHF command system. It was the last 

Project 770 mission to use the TAT booster 

of the former 698BK project. The launch 

date slipped to 28 December 1966, mostly 

because of changes caused by concerns 

over the technical characteristics Of the 

payload. The numbers and density of 

Soviet radars were increasing rapidly, and 

signal overlapping and interference were 

becoming difficUlt to deal with. Additionally,. 

the presence of high-power continuouswave (CW) signals (such as television and 

high-power point-to-point communications) had made processing of 698BK payload data even more complex. These signals tended to overpower the antenna's 

signal-processing programs. To address 

these technical problems, the bandwidth of 

making it possible for the data processors 

to, at a minimum, detect the presence of 

interference. 

BGen (later MGen) John L. Martin. 

Jr.. named Director of Special Projects at 

El Segundo. California, on 1 July 1965. 

became.concerned about the efficacy of 

performing a system test of the integrated 

payload and vehicle system in

at Sunnyvale and then disassembling it for 

shipment to Vandenberg AFB for launch. 

This required reassembly of the system at 

the Vandenberg vehicle assembly building 

and retest prior to launch. Not only did 

this process cause excessive wear and tear 

on the system, but it also made very 

attractive the option of shipping the payload and Agena from Sunnyvale with problems ("open items") that presumably would 

be solved or fixed at Vandenberg. After 

considerable study, a new, more rapid factory-to-pad system of processing the payload and vehicle as.a unit was initiated for 

100 The SICINT Satellite Story. 

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Agena vehicle 2731. Named FASTBALL, 

it set as a goal 17 days from receipt of the 

payload at Vandenberg AFB to launch. 

LtCol Jack Sides, who had replaced 

Yundt as the Project Director, felt 

confident enough to direct the launch on 

29 December 1966, just 25 working days 

after 2731 had arrived at the base. 

Despite the misgivings of many of the contractors and launch crew, and much to the 

delight of Sides. the launch was perfect 

and the spacecraft operated with no problems on orbit. Sides, who was retiring 

from the Air Force at the end of December, 

considered this an excellent Christmas 

present! His successor, Col David D. 

Bradburn, presided over the remaining 

two MULTIGROUP launches with equal 

success. 

Project 770 MULTIGROUP Agena 

Vehicles 2732 and 2733 were boosted into 

orbit by an improved Thor booster using 

CASTOR solid rocket motors replacing the 

former XLR-81s. The extra thrust made it 

possible for vehicle 2732 to carry an addon payload called DONKEY, which used a 

6-foot parabolic "wrapped rib" dish 

antenna that deployed on orbit, in addition to the originally scheduled SETTER 

1A and MULTIGROUP 2 payloads. 

MULTIGROUP set new records for length . 

of on-orbit operation. Vehicle 2731 lasted 

over five months, the DONKEY payload 

on 2732 went a few days longer, and 2733 

produced data for almost 15 months! A 

great deal of this success is attributable to 

improved solar arrays and batteries devel-

°Ped for the Agena D vehicle. 

The more sophisticated commanding 

and programming capability of these payloads, which permitted many different 

adjustments Of the payloads during each 

orbital collection pass, stimulated an effort 

to use the collection system in the most 

effective way. In July 1964 of 

NSA joined the staff at the Satellite 

Operations Center (SOC) at SAFSS and 

becaMe a part of the effort to translate 

USIB guidance into vehicle operations 

responsive to this direction. NSA tasking 

messages were sent to the STC from the 

SOC, providing both long-term and immediate operating direction. These "ITEMY" 

messages. as they were called, combined 

NSA and NRO interpretation of USIB 

guidance...Alerts to upcoming Soviet activities were provided by NSA through their 

Defense Special Missile and Astronautics 

Center (DEFSMAC) so that payload tasking could be responsive. 

In the late summer of 1966, the 

Director, NSA, LGen Marshall S. Carter, 

US Army, and Ray Potts visited the 

SAFSP contractor facility at LMSC while 

was under construction. The 

possibility of expanding NSA's participation with the Air Force and its contractor 

was discussed with the local SAFSP representative and with the NSA 

representative at LMSC. On 28 October 

1966 NSA forwarded to the Director SAFSP 

a concept paper regarding the establishment of an NSA Support Detachment 

(NSD) at Sunnyvale, .California.16 

Completed in December 1966,

was put to immediate use. Vince 

Henry of LMSC, now manager of the

payload program, had established a need 

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O 

a 

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for a secure test and checkout area. This 

need dovetailed well with the government 

need for a secure data-analysis facility. 

The DNSA forwarded a letter to the 

Director, SAFSP, on 14 February 1967 

describing the scope and nature of a West 

Coast NSD a and advising 

that SAC had agreed to participate in the 

detachment to support NSA processing 

and to serve as the SAC liaison officer.17 

The NSA Assistant Director for Production, 

Oliver Kirby, subsequently forwarded a 

memorandum to DNRO Alexander H. Flax 

on 29 February 1967, informing him of the 

plans and rationale for the detachment's 

On 15 March 1967 the Director SAFSP 

concurred with the objectives and functions outlined for the NSD and agreed to 

arrange for contractor support by LMSC.19 

The NSD was established in July 

.1967 at LMSC with

ad resigned 

from the Army in March 1967 and converted to civilian status with NSA, reporting to Potts (K4/SP). Assigned tc

were four analysts;

ivias also assigned as an NSA 

intelligence information research technician. Also working for ere 

Maj Bob Jackson. US Air Force, and Maj 

silly Thornton. US Air Force, of Operating 

Location 65 (0L65):SAC. Two analyst 

Positions (operating stations) were quickly 

up using Mincom 1-MHz recorders that 

"obtained." although the recorders were 

originally intended for George Cotter, 

already a 'senior official at NSA! Later they 

Were replaced by properly ordered recorders, 

and Cotter got his Mincoms back. This 

capability was augmented by signals analysis support from LMSC that was later 

expanded by the establishment of an 

LMSC Special Signals Analysis Team 

(SSAT), headed by John Riley, which did 

in-depth analysis of new and unusual 

intercepts. The initial mission for the 

NSD was to prescan data and do preliminary analysis on signals of interest. In 

addition, the detachment was to support 

all West Coast NSA operations and interfaces with the SAFSP and their contractors located on the West Coast. To do this, 

the detachment had direct communications 

with K4/SP at NSA using a dedicated 

secure teletype link known as the 

"SUNCOM." 

The NSA Support Detachment (NSD) 

activities pretty well filled up one side of 

was built 

essentially in the form of two mirror 

images, with space between the two halves 

of the building to park and check out the 

calibration vans. On the processing side, 

the new building made it possible for NSA 

to delegate certain ELINT data processing 

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and analysis activities to LMSC personnel, 

under NSD direction. In December 1966 

.LtCol Jack Sides, and Potts agreed 

to place an NSA engineer as an integrated 

member of the SAFSP staff in El Segundo 

to manage the SAFSP processing opera 

tion at LMSC in Sunnyvale (both NRO and 

NSA responsibilities).

was assigned from NSA, K4/SP, and 

arrived at in February 1967. He was 

welcomed by Col David D. Bradburn, who 

by then had succeeded Sides as head of 

This action coincided with the 

implementation of the Mission and Data 

Services (MADS) contract with LMSC to . 

support processing activities in

and also to support analysis activities 

of the NSD.

An action occurred on 29 September 

1967 that illustrates the spirit of cooperation engendered by the close working relationship of Bradburn, and Potts. 

NSA.K4./SP was notifie by message from 

that the Air Force budget would not 

permit their support of NSA processing 

operations at LMSC. Three and a half 

hours later Potts sent.a message to

coordinated through all appropriate senior 

officials and NSA Deputy Director 

Tordella, transferring $370,000 to fund a 

compatible computer facility in

to process data for NSA.20This led to 

the negotiation of a formal agreement 

between Bradburn and Potts 

entitled "SAFSP SUPPORT FOR NSA 

PROCESSING OPERATIONS." It provided for a compatible Data Processing 

Facility implemented as a joint NRO/NSA 

activity at which was essentially parallel to the satellite data processing capability within NSA. 

This combined payload development 

and processing facility in provided the flexibility necessary to make 

maximum and effective use of personnel 

and equipment on a mission-by-mission 

basis. Additional benefits included 

improved timeliness in processing, improved 

feedback for tasking operations, optimized 

interaction of processing considerations in 

the design of SIGINT payloads, and significant economies by having an integrated 

approach .to collection and processing operations. This effort was provided by the 

SAFSP MADS contract with LMSC. The 

individual task orders under the contract 

Were defined either as NRO or NSA dataprocessing functions. 

NRO processing included payload 

support and preprocessing. NSA, through 

the MADS contract, provided technical direction and selected processing and 

analysis by LMSC. This was the first use 

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STC 

• COMMAND GENERATION 

• DATA ANALYSIS 

OPERATING DECISIONS 

• TIM DATA 

• ORBITAL VECTORS 

• COMMANDING IN 

TO NHS 

TM A P/L 

DATA Iry 

COMMANDS 

MIL COMSAT 

TRACKING STATIONS 

• SGLS RANGE AND 

ANGLE TRACKING 

• SGLS PCM DATA LINK 

• 5GL5 DIGITAL COMMAND 

LINK 

• WiDEBAND AND NARROW 

BAND ANALOG RECORDING 

• COMPRESSED PA DATA 

TO 

GUAM 

RTS 

MICROWAVE 

VTS 

Data collection network, Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

of contractor processing by NSA. Contractor 

signals analysis support had previously 

been. established and used by NSD in early 

1967.21NSA arranged for special funding 

and transferred funds to or the NSA 

share of the costs. Within

was responsible for technical surveillance 

of the MADS contract. Potts was responsible for the NSA participation in the 

program. • 

Within the SAFSP 

Assistant Deputy for Field Operations, Lt 

Col Rich Gray, was responsible to

for all data-processing operations performed on-site. The detachment chief,

land other NSA representati‘es 

as appropriate, provided the technical 

guidance for the NSA data processing and 

were technically responsible for contractor 

performance and acceptability of the final 

product. A Data Handling and Operations 

Plan (DAHOPS) identified responsibilities; 

milestones, effort, and equipment required. 

Software that had been. developed by NSA 

was provided to the MADS contract, NSA 

sent knowledgeable personnel to assist the. 

contractor in getting the system operational and in training personnel for the 

particular job.22The establishment of the 

joint processing facility in LMSC

with the Air Force, NSA, and the contractor working closely together soon 

removed most. if not all, the suspicions 

and distrust that had previously existed. 

On the digital processing side, NSA 

provided a CDC-6400 computer, initially to 

handle MULTIGROUP digital data (Ray 

Potts intervened with CDC President Bill 

Norris to secure the computer on time). 

The CDC-6400 computer was installed in 

in the fall of 1967: NSA 

sent the software developed to process 

MULTIGROUP/SETTER

Computer Processing GroUp (c Group) 

spent many long hours at 

helping Jerry Christiansen and his LMSC 

crew to get this software installed.and modified for the 17 January 1968 launch of 

MULTIGROUP 3. The MULTIGROUP/ • 

SETTER data were the first to be completely contractor-processed at LMSC 

under the MADS contract Under NSA 

technical direction. The; results were sent 

directly via secure communications links 

to NSA's Operational FLINT Organization, 

then headed by who had 

replace for reporting to the 

Intelligence Community and to SAC for 

integration into the SIOP. DIA received 

the radar identification and location data 

from NSA for inclusion in the DIA EOB 

database. 

To handle the wideband analog, RCA 

model TR-22 CVR predetection recorders 

were used at the ground sites and processing centers. The TR-22 recorders were 

commercial television recorders modified 

for continuous video recording (CVR), with 

improved technical characteristics to meet 

the requirements for predetection instrumentation recording. NSA specified the 

recorders to be used and a combined purchase was made for all recorders by

Special processing and analysis equipment 

was developed jointly by NSA and

NSA, through acquired a special 

RCA one-tenth-speed TR-22 CVR recorder 

to be used for detailed signal analysis. 

106 The S1GINT Satellite Story 

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NOFORN-ORCON 

The predetection analog data, along 

with other payload digital data from 

MULTIGROUP, were filmed a

using a continuous strip of photographic film. NSD and LMSC (under • 

detachment direction) selectively analyzed 

the film using the Analog Processing 

Equipment (APE) developed by Ben 

Gardner of Gardner Associates, San Diego, 

California. The original analog tapes were 

sent to NSA for technical analysis. At 

NSA the analog tapes were processed 

through the BEERMAN analog-to-digital 

'converter, which was modified to accept 

the payload time and.receiver data, which 

were merged to provide a digital tape output for computer processing. The computer printouts were used to produce 

radar locations and to scan the data for 

signal analysis. Considerable manual 

analysis of the analog data and the computer printouts was required to produce 

useable results. 

The technical analysis efforts at NSA 

and at were very closely coordinated. The large volume of data 

required the combined efforts of all the 

technical analysis people available. Both 

analysis groups screened the data for signals of interest. NSA used tip-off from 

other sources or data and the results of 

intercepts from POPPY and the to 

identify dates and times of particular 

interest to be examined. Duplicate analysis was generally avoided except in those 

cases where the combined expertise of all 

the analysts and the payload. designers 

was required to resolve analysis problems 

Presented by unusual signals.. 

An excellent example of these combined efforts occurred in the analysis of a 

Improvements to the digital EOB 

payloads resulted in significantly more 

accurate radar locations. Back in 1960-61, 

the original SAMOS collected three successive pulses from the cone of coverage. 

Processing of the data from each threepulse group using overlapping circles produced locations with accuracies of about 

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E0 1.4.(c) 

/urnsalmales INIDIS a I I 

Flight summary: Program A, Agena-based low-orbit SIGINT satellites 

MISSION 

NUMBER 

PROJECT 

and 

PAYLOAD 

MISSION 

(All payloads 

are ELINT) 

OPERATIONAL LIFETIME LIFETIME 

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Day s 

N/A 

SAMOS 1 

(F-1 PAYLOAD) GS 10/1% 

I 

Booster 

(allure 

N/A SAMOS 2 

(F-1 PAYLOAD! 

• GS • 1/31 2/1 

I 1 

7151 102 

Group 0-D EOB 2/ 21 2/27 6 

7152 102 

Group 2-D SOB 6/11 

1/16 1/18 N 

1 

7153 2 6986K 

Group 1-D 

EOB 

7154 698BK 

Group 1-0 EOB 6/29 

I 

719 

. 

10 

7156 98BK . 

Gr

6

oup 1-A DCM 2/27

11

a/11 12 

7212 BIRD DOG 2 2/27 3/13 

II 15 

7155 698BK 

Group 2-D 

BIRD DOG 1 

LOB 7/2 717 

I 

7/3 7/8 

I 

5 

5 7211 

7157 69813K 

Group 3-D EOB 11/3 11/7 

I 4 

7213 BIRD DOG 3 VHF 

EOB 

11/31 Antenna 

failure 

7158 - 770 

Group 1 DCM 7/16 9/5 si 

power 

supply 

fsil ire 

Mg 

I 

7/16. 

I. 7226 BIRD DOG 4 aun 

GS = General Search EOB = Electronic Order of Balite DC = Directed Coverage 

TI = Technical Intelligence ABM = Antiballistic Missile. VHF = Very High Frequency 

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NUMBER. 

PROJECT,, 

and 

PAYLOAD 

MISSION 

(All payloads 

_ are CLINT) 

OPERATIONAL LIFETIME LIFETIME 

1966 1967 1988 1969 1970 Days/ 

mot 

7160 _ 

7228 

770 

Group 3-13 

SETTER 1 

Me 2/9 9/6 

Mid. 7 mos 

"AND ' 

E0e 

2/9 3/22 

..II. 40 days 

7161 770 MULTIGROUP 1 

GS/DCM 

EOB 

12/21/. 6/17 5 mos 

7229 SETTER 2A Tir 1 19 5 mos 

7162 770 MULTIGROUP 2 

Gsiocm 

EOB 

7/24 MI. 12/28 5 mos 

7230 SETTER 113 S-BAND 

Eau 

7/24 12/24 

iMiliilillii 5 mos 

7163 770 MULTI - 

GROUP 3 

- Gsfacrn 

BOB 

1 7 4/3 14 mos 

7232 SETTER 1B 

STRAWMAN 1; 

._ . 

THRESHER 2 

S-BAND 

EOB 

SOB 

GS/ 

LOB 

ABM 

DM 

Osrocm 

46/1/Mili 

10! 

10/6igua 

0=1111 

• 

. 

14 moil 

12 mos 

12 mos 

12 mos 

7164 

7233 REAPER 1 

7238 CONVOY1 9/27 

7165 STRAWMAN 2; 

THRESHER 2 

GS/DCM . 

EOB 

7/31 9/27 13 mos 

7234 REAPER 2 GS/DC/11 LOB 

-7/31 .9/27 

13 moa IIMINMIIIIM 

7239 

- 

CONVOY 2 ABM 

DWI 7/31 8/30 

Min 31 days 

AZ 

0 

Flight summary: Program A, Agena-based low-orbit SIGINT satellites (continued) 

EOB = Electronic Order of Battle DC = Directed Coverage TI = Technical Intelligence ABM = Antiballistic Missile 

GeneralSearch 

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Aio)s a)!IialeS 1r117lS a91 

MISSION NUMBER 

, PROJECT 

'. and . 

1. PAYLOAD ' 

MISSION 

(All payloads 

are ELINT) 

OPERATIONAL LIFETIME LIFETIME 

1970 1971 1972 1973 , Months 

.,..m. 

' 1 °°: 

STRAWMAN 3; THRESHER 3 436/9C/11 

EOB 

8/26 - 

MINIMMIIIIIIIMMIUM111 

2/1 

. 17 

- -il 7235. REAPER 3 L ""in EOB 8/28 

INNIMMUNIMMINil 

2/1 17 

' 7167 STRAWMAN 4; THRESHER 6 GS/DCM EOB 7/16 3/23 

t 17 

7236 - REAPER 4 GS/DC/TI EOB 7/16 3/23 

16 

.. 7240 HARVESTER GS 7/16 12/16 

illi 

.... 

r ''', 

STRAWMAN 5; THRESHER 5 PROGRAM CANCELLED - NO FLIGHTS 7237 . 

. ... REAPER 5 

E08 = Electronic Order of Balite DC Directed Coverage 

Technical Intelligence ABM = Antiballistic Missile Radar 

= General Search 

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op secret 

NoFoRN-ORLON 

r in Vietna_m_bemmea_high priority. 

STRAIVIVIAN Launches 

Even before the first MULTIGROUP 

launch in December 1966, the payload and 

its support systems had been outdated by 

the rapidly changing electronics technology and collection requirements of the 

1960s. The expectation that interchangeable receiver and antenna modules would 

give MULTIGROUP more flexibility did 

The technical capability provided by 

MULTIGROUP wide band predetection 

collection and the combined analysis by 

NSA headquarters, the NSD detachment, 

and LMSC of the collected data resolved 

An important development occurred 

In the spring of 1968 when data on SA-2 

s

urface-to-air missiles and other defensive 

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NoFoemoRcoN 

It 

not hold up when the realities of preparing 

the spacecraft for launch were confronted. 

A testing program at both the subsystem 

and system level was absolutely required 

to qualify any payload for launch. Once 

the system had been subjected to vacuum, 

thermal, mechanical, and electrical qualification testing, there was no way a 

receiver and antenna module could be 

changed (for. different frequency coverage) 

without repeating the entire test process. 

Although MULTIGROUP did have different configurations on each mission, the 

configuration had to be determined six to 

eight months in advance. In the case of 

Agena vehicle 2733, the last MULTIGROUP. 

there was time to change the configuration 

to make the payload collection more 

responsive to the ABM/AES threat. It 

would have been desirable to change 2732 

also, but the necessary six- to eight-month 

slip in schedule was unacceptable. 

• In the summerof 196

from NSA joined as an integrated member of the payload staff, and at 

approximately the same time Bob Yundt 

requested technical support from The 

Aerorporation. By the summer of 

1965 ong with Sandy Evans of 

7 c_e_Co, 

Aerospace, through both an in-house effort 

and contractor studies, began defining an 

improved payload that would combine the. 

capabilities of the MULTIGROUP payload, 

built by Airborne Instruments Laboratory 

at Deer Park, New York, and the SETTER 

payload, built by E-Systems at Dallas, 

Texas. Although these payloads flew 

together on all the MULTIGROUP missions, they operated independently, 

thereby requiring considerable duplication 

of support-system functions. The SETTER 

payload provided excellent emitter location accuracy (+1- 5 miles), but it could not 

operate at frequencies lower than 2 GHz 

due to excessive size of the multiple antennas required for an interferometer-type 

payload. MULTIGROUP used single spiral antennas that divided the target area 

into sectors and used single-pulse phase 

comparisons to achieve geolocation. 

Though not as accurate as SETTER, it 

was capable of determining location within 

+/- 20 miles at frequencies as low as 59 MHz. 

Using improved versions of these payloads 

sharing a new solid-state core memory for 

the digital data and an improved tape 

recorder called a data storage unit, for 

the wideband analog data, the proposed 

STRAWMAN payload offered increased 

flexibility combined with improved payload performance. Moreover, room would 

be available for one additional payload 

that could share the recorders and other 

new support systems. 

Improvements in the support systems 

now included adoption of the new S-band 

Space-Ground Link System (SGLS) developed for the Satellite Control Facilities. 

This provided a pulse code modulation 

down-link operating at 128 kilobits per 

second (kbpS) and an inflight-loadable programmer capable of 1,021 commands. 

There was also a backup command link • 

with 32 discrete commands. For the first 

time it would be possible to encrypt these 

links using. NSA-provided KGR-29 and 

KGT-28 equipment. The 6-MHz wideband 

down-link remained unencrypted. 

An improved booster, the THORAD, 

allowed an increased on-orbit. weight of 

the Agena spacecraft and ELINT payloads 

112 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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NOFORN-ORCoN 

of 3,850 pounds, and a new battery/solar 

array system provided 270 ampere-hours 

per day. Because it was subject to quick 

revision if necessary, the new configuraProject Director at the time, briefed 

the STRAWMAN concept to DNRO Flax 

on 1 April 1966. On 6 June 1966 Flax 

gave his approval to protect long-lead-time 

items. In September 1966 Flax approved 

the project and initiated project contractual action with LMSC. The project 

was to consist of five flights, with the first 

launch in October 1968. There would be 

one flight per year thereafter through 1972. 

Rey accomplishments, Agena-based 

prime payloads 

° First scanning superheterodyne receiver and 

On-orbit radar signal digital processing of RF 

and pulsewidth and interval measurements 

with location information, all aboard a 

three-axis stable ELI NT platform, in 1961. 

• First wide band magnetic-tape recorder onorbit, in 1964, provided a technical [LINT 

capability, which led to the following 

accomplishments. 

The first two STRAWMAN missions 

carried an auxiliary payload designed to 

determine detailed characteristics of ABM 

radars. The-first was called CONVOY and 

The first STRAWMAN launch. 

another in the Project 770 series. was Agena 

vehicle 2734 on 5 October 1968. All of the 

payloads and support systems operated 

— Intercepted many new, unique radar signals 

other than ABMs. 

— First very accurate location-finding (less 

processed on-board, in 

1966; for SAMs in Vietnam (with less than 

data were provided in 

near-realtime (hours) to US field commanders in 1968. 

— Auxiliary payloads in1968-71 collected 

even more detailed ABM and SAM radar 

data, such as CW capability and measured 

power. 

• •••—.....•s•• • 

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for a little over a year, twice the planned 

lifetime of six months. Agena 2735, 

launched on 31 July 1969, operated for 

over 13 months, resulting in a projection of 

at least a nine-month lifetime for the following launches. Agena 2736 continued 

the record by lasting for almost 18 months 

after a launch on 26 August 1970. The 

final vehicle, Agena 2737, was launched on 

16 July 1971 and lasted over 20 months: 

On this mission the antenna connector to 

the lower band antenna of HARVESTER 

failed, thereby eliminating any chance to 

intercept the SA-5 signals at 5 GHz. This 

was the only major failure of any of the 

four vehicles, making STRAWMAN by far 

the most successful ELINT system to date. 

By 1970 NSA had expanded the processing facility at Fort Meade for satellitecollected SIGINT to three CDC 6600 computers. in order to handle the greatly 

increased volume of data from the POPPY 

and missions. Concentration on these 

programs at Fort Meade was possible 

because of the resources available at 

An 

STRAWMAN, THRESHER, and REAPER 

digital data were processed for NSA by 

LMSC under the MADS contract in 

using the same arrangements 

that were established for MULTIGROUP 

and SETTER. The necessary software 

modifications to take advantage of collection system improvements to provide more 

accurate locations were developed under 

the MADS contract for NSA as a joint NSA • 

and LMSC technical development effort. 

In 1970 a CDC 6600 computer replaced 

the CDC 6400 computer at LMSC to pro- • 

vide the needed three-times increase in 

processing capacity and speed to handle 

the increased volume of data being collected by the new satellite systems. At the 

same time, a new MADS contract was 

negotiated b he NSA 

integrated member of th staff. This 

contract provided the needed flexibility to 

cover premature failure or the extended 

life of a payload being processed. It also 

provided for the addition of a new payload 

to be processed. The funding for the computer and the MADS contract was split 

between and NSA based on costsharing agreements worked out for each 

mission. 

The THRESHER digital EOB collection and processing system produced radar 

locations with a 15-mile accuracy. The 

processing of data from THRESHER 2, 

launched 31 July 1969, produced 9,444 

radar locations, including 183 radar locations reported electrically to US forces 

in Vietnam within hours of intercept. 

THRESHER 3, launched 26 August 1970, 

produced 11,519 radar locations with 

15-mile accuracy in. the first four months 

of operation. During this same four-month 

period, REAPER.3, a part of the same 

STRAWMAN mission, produced 33,915 

locations with a 5-mile accuracy.25 

All ELINT payloads that were a part 

of the STRAWMAN collection system—

THRESHER, REAPER, CONVOY, and 

HARVESTER—were connected to the predetection analog recorder in the prime 

payload. The predetection analog data 

analysis was split between NSA and the 

LMSC Special Signal Analysis Team. 

(SSAT), which was working for the NSA 

detachment (NSD) to make efficient use of 

114 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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the limited number of technical analysts. 

The signal analysis efforts were complementary except for combined efforts on 

special signals of interest. The all-source 

and multiple-satellite-source technical analysis was generally done by analysts at NSA. 

By 1968 the Grab Bag data system 

was developed by Joyce Warnkassel of 

LMSC to store all "left over" satellite data. 

This included all intercepts that were 

geolocated but did not meet NSA reporting 

criteria as valid emitters. This provided a 

very valuable database for comparison 

with other data and intercepts to find new 

high-interest signals for technical analysis. 

For example, Grab Bag made it possible to 

identify and correlate data from a frequency agile radar that transmitted signals at different radio frequencies but 

never stayed on one frequency long enough 

for the payload to make a pulse repetition 

interval (PRI) measurement. 

Technical intelligence produced by • 

STRAWMAN included ABM radar details GHz).34These are but a few highlights of 

the technical contributions of STRAWMAN. 

The data processing experience gained 

from the STRA\VMAN predetection data 

analysis provided the basis upon which 

the data analysis system was 

developed. 

The extensive QRC reporting from 

THRESHER/REAPER to military forces in 

Vietnam and Europe continued the project 

PENDULUM effort initiated with MULTIGROUP/SETTER. All QRC reporting was 

in less than 24 hours from time of intercept, with the average time from collection 

to reporting being about 5 1/2 hours. During 

1969 there were 41 projeCt PENDULUM 

reports and 183 in 1970. 

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NOfORN•ORCON 

In the spring of 1970, DNRO John L. 

McLucas reassessed the SIGINT satellite 

programs in view of budgetary constraints. 

Considering the design capabilities of 

plus 

the capabilities of other low-orbiting 

ELINT satellites (POPPY and , the 

STRAWMAN capability seemed redundant. He therefore directed the cancelladon of vehicle 2738 and all further development work. Under this plan, the 

STRAWMAN system continued operations 

through July 1972. 

STRAWMAN represented the culmination of a development effort that started 

before the first spacecraft was launched 

and incorporated many pioneering concepts. STRAWMAN's legacy could be seen 

not only in the development of spaceborne 

equipment but, even more importantly, in 

the development of ELINT predetection 

technical analysis techniques and equipment used by practically every follow-on 

system. 

116 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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Not ORN.ORCON 

Chapter 4 References 

1. USIB-D-33.6/8, "Intelligence Requirements for a Satellite Reconnaissance System of 

which SAMOS is an Example" 5 July 1960. 

2. MSG SECRET/SAFMS SEN-61-29, Part I, Program I, Project 102, 9 March 1961. 

3. MSG SECRET/SAFMS PHOTO 60-68, 23 December 1960. 

4. MSG SECRET/SAFMS SEN-61-29, Part 1, Program I, Project 102, 9 March 1961. 

5. Letter from Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense. to Allen W. Dulles. 

Director of Central Intelligence. "Management of the National Reconnaissance Program," 

6 September 1961. 

6. S/MSG to LMSC, Sunnyvale, CA, fm HQ SSD, SSZDK-12-12-15, "Program 102 

Reorientation," signe Contracting Officer, 27 December 1961. 

7. Memo from Col Henry C. Howard, USAF, "A Cursory Review of the Evolution of the 

SOC," July 1968_ 

8. TWX (S) SAFMS-INS-60-31, quoting memo from Joseph V. Charyk to Chief of Staff, 

USAF, "Memoranda Relating to the Disposition of Sub System I," 4 November 1960. 

9. Ed Stillman interview, 28 February 1991. 

10. LMSC Data from 770 History, BIF003/2-021054-69, 22 July 1969. 

11. NSA in Space, April 1975, (BYE-19385-75) p. 71. 

12. Raymond Potts' personal notes (hereafter Potts' notes). 

13. NSA-BYE-17835-4. 

14. Potts' notes. 

15. Potts' notes. 

16 1535-6 (TS/B/TK). 

17. NSA-BYE-60000-67, and NSA in Space, p. 33. 

18. NSA-BYE-60051-67, and NSA in Space. p. 34. 

19. NSA in Space, p.34. 

21. Potts' notes. 

22• SAFSP SUPPORT 'FOR NSA PROCESSING OPERATIONS (BYE-70872-67)(S/B); 

Appendix 4. 

23. Stillman interview, 28 February 1991. 

24. Stillman interview, 28 February 1991. 

25- K4SP Status Board, 20 December 1970. 

26

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 27

28'

• 

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29.

30.

and

31.

32.

33, 

34.

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NOFORN-ORLON 

e Air Force AFTRACK and 

The Origins of Quick Reaction 

SIGINT in Space 

In the summer of 1957, Col Frederic 

C. E. "Fritz" Oder, Director of the WS-1171, 

Project Office at the Air Force Ballistic 

Missile Division (AFBMD), Inglewood, 

California, struggled with a very difficult 

budgetary crisis. Funds for missile and 

space activity had fallen victim to an austere DOD budget, providing only $10 million 

Col Frederic C. E. Oder 

for FY57, with promise of little more in 

Fab. Oder and BGen Osmond J. Ritland, 

the Deputy Commander of AFBMD, 

decided a new approach was required to 

obtain effective support for the project. 

Their previous associations with the CIA 

on the U-2 project led them to the belief 

that a covert approach would be more 

palatable and effective, particularly in 

view of President Eisenhower's desire to 

secure "Open Skies." The plan would 

involve the concept of covert overflight 

from orbit, participation of the CIA, and a 

definite project acceleration. Oder's secretary Betty Hawkins called it the "second 

story" because she was required to keep 

the details in a file separate from the 

WS-117L documentation. 

The centerpiece of the plan was a 

covert photo payload with a recoverable 

film capsule, to be launched on Thor boosters, earlier than the already planned Atlas 

launches. On 7 February 1958 President 

Eisenhower, in a meeting with James 

Killian, approved the plan. Eisenhower's 

decision was prompted in part by the 

launch of Sputnik I in October 1957. 

Richard Bissell. Assistant Director of the 

CIA and the U-2 Project Director, had 

agreed to head the CIA effort that would be 

responsible for the covert security system 

and procurement of the photo payload. 

Also in February 1958, President 

Eisenhower established the Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to consolidate all military space systems development. Since ARPA would be responsible 

for the "white" development of the reconnaissance spacecraft, booster, and all support systems, Oder arranged for his assistant on WS-117L, Capt Bob Truax, US 

Navy, to be assigned to ARPA to assure 

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adequate coordination between the white 

support systems and the "black" CORONA 

payload. ARPA named the cover for the 

capsule recovery project DISCOVERER 

and assigned to it biomedical and other 

scientific activities to disguise its real 

mission. 

In November 1959 the DISCOVERER 

project was reassigned from ARPA to the 

Air Force as an "operational" project. 

When BGen Robert E. Greer became 

Director of the SAMOS Project in August 

1960, he used the authority of his "second 

hat" as Deputy Commander of AFBMD 

to incorporate Col Lee Battle and the 

DISCOVERER Project Office into his organization. To the unwitting ("white") Air 

Force and to the world at large it appeared 

that DISCOVERER was an AFBMD scientific project. 

Harold Willis 

These events set the stage for the 

invention of the Agena AFTRACK Project. 

Harold Willis, who worked for George 

Miller in the Office of ELINT (OEL) at CIA 

Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, was 

• 

briefed on the CORONA project in 1959 

because of concern in the Intelligence 

Community about the electronic security 

of the DISCOVERER Agena spacecraft's 

commanding and tracking subsystems. It 

was thought that the Soviets might be con= 

structing antiballistic missile (ABM) or 

anti-Earth-satellite (AES) radars that 

could be used to track or even interfere 

with the US tracking of DISCOVERER 

satellites. 

Willis was aware of the role of the 

Lockheed Missile and Space Company 

(LMSC), not only as the system engineer 

for development of the DISCOVERER 

Project. but also for the Air Force SAMOS 

Project, which included an ELINT capabil; 

ity called Subsystem F (S/S F). If a Soviet 

radio frequency (RF) transmission or interference threat existed, there was a good 

chance that- in several years S/S F would 

be capable of detecting it. But Willis felt 

the Soviet RF threat could develop much 

sooner and that waiting several years to 

detect it was a very risky proposition. In 

discussions with Bill Harris of the LMSC 

S/S F payload staff and Maj John Copley, 

the Air Force S/S F SAMOS payload manager, Willis concluded that a small, selfcontained electronic payload permanently 

attached to the aft rack of the DISCOVERER Agena vehicle would be capable of 

detecting any Soviet tracking or interference with the S-band beacon used on the 

Agena vehicle. This critical beacon was 

used for tracking and commanding the 

vehicle through US Verlort ground radars. 

Copley obtained approval and the minimal 

funding necessary for the payload development, test, and incorporation on the aft 

rack of the Agena. Willis briefed Bissell 

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NOFORN-ORCON 

and obtained CIA approval of the scheme 

in November 1959. The small AFTRACK 

project was underway. 

Although S/S F procurement was done 

in the white world at the DOD SECRET 

level, there was general agreement that, 

in keeping with the covert nature of the 

CORONA payload, activities associated 

with the AFTRACK project should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. In 

the same way they had provided the Hiller 

Aircraft Building as a cover for the 

CORONA development, LMSC arranged • 

office space on Hanover Street in Palo 

Alto, California, for Bill Harris to conduct 

payload development and integration 

activities. Only those people directly associated with the project were made aware 

of its existence. 

From this modest beginning, the concept of a quick reaction capability (QRC) 

payload that was small, simple, and 

required minimal development, time 

caught on rapidly. QRC developmental • 

activities for intercept of ELINT had a history in the Air Force dating back to the 

Korean War, when radar technology was 

advancing at a rapid rate and collection 

systems that required years of normal 

development time were hard pressed to 

keep up. The plan was to build systems 

that could be developed in less than nine 

months, did not necessarily conform to all 

military standards (even commercial parts 

were allowed), but could operate reliably 

for a long enough period to answer urgent 

questions and provide inputs to the Intelligence Community and to the design of collection systems then under development. 

The program had started at WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio, at the Wright Air 

Development Center (WADC) in the early 

1950s for airborne equipment (primarily 

in the area of electronic warfare). The 

ground QRC program was initiated at 

Rome Air Development Center in 1955, 

and Copley was chosen as the first ground 

QRC officer. This background provided 

the necessary basis for the concept of 

simple, rapidly developed, and effective 

AFTRACK payloads fixed to the 

DISCOVERER Agena vehicle. 

The aft rack of the Agena vehicle was 

well suited to this application. There was 

considerable vacant space available; the 

real problems were power and weight. 

Small, simple, lightweight payloads requir7 

ing minimal power were 'ideally suited to 

this application. A few extra telemetry 

points were always available for narrowband data to be down-linked and a simple 

on/off command did not overtax the command system. The Agena vehicle developers had only one mandatory requirement: 

there must be a fuse in the power line of 

the SIGINT payload so that there was no 

way the primary payload power system 

could be jeopardized. Since the DISCOVERER Agena vehicle flew with its major 

axis perpendicular to nadir (so that the 

CORONA camera, mounted at right angles 

to the long axis of the Agena, would always 

point toward the Earth), it was no problem 

to install Earth-pointing antennas on the 

aft rack. 

Initially the DISCOVERER vehicle 

had a lifetime limited to five or six days, 

owing to complete reliance on battery 

power. This limited the collection time for 

the AFTRACK payloads but it was long 

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enough to collect useful data. When the 

CORONA Program developed a capability 

to return two recovery capsules, a system 

For this 

it was necessary to add an independent 

programmer and data link- This was done 

and many later AFTRACK payloads did 

operate during the Very 

early in the AFTRACK program, recorders 

had been added (where the telemetry 

recorder was not adequate) so the payload 

could collect data over the Soviet Union 

and return it to the remote tracking stations (RTSs) of the US Satellite Control 

Facility (SCF) in Sunnyvale. 

Security was a serious concern, as 

mentioned earlier, not only because of the 

CORONA payload on the same vehicle, but 

also to avoid providing the Soviets with 

ammunition to attack President 

Eisenhower's "Open Skies" efforts in 

space. Initially the project was handled at 

the DOD SECRET level and strict need-toknow was enforced. The initial DOD/CIA 

partnership agreement to participate in a 

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) 

in September 1961 required stricter security. The SAMOS Program Office in El 

Segundo became the Office of Special 

Projects (SAFSP). LtCol Ed Istvan, who 

had been assigned responsibility for Space 

SIGINT Systems on the SAFSS staff in 

Washington, was tasked with developing a 

more secure system-access control. After 

struggling mightily with Air Force 

Security Regulation 205-1 (the SIGINT 

program was still under DOD security control), he came up with the codeword 

to protect AFTRACK payloads. This required all personnel requiring access to sign a security 

agreement. and a list of cleared personnel 

was maintained. Documents were stamped 

"SPECIAL HANDLING," in the same 

manner as the Air Force black GAMBIT 

photo project. The National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO) was formed on 2 May 1962. 

In December 1962 the BYEMAN system 

was applied to all SIGINT Programs 

except 698BK. which remained "SPECIAL 

HANDLING" until November 1962. A new 

codeword replaced the Air Force 

and Navy POPPY designators. 

From that time on all space reconnaissance programs have been conducted by 

the NRO under security control of the 

BYEMAN system: 

In December 1962 Copley was transferred from the DISCOVERER Program 

Office to the newly formed SIGINT Project 

Office of SAFSP as Chief Division. 

responsible for payload development. In 

November 1963, a new program number, 

770, was assigned to disassociate the new 

BYEMAN effort from the previous DOD 

698BK program. Boosters, Agenas, and 

associated support equipment continued to 

be procured in the white world, but since 

that time all payloads have been procured 

through black BYEMAN contracts. 

Five days prior to the launch of the . 

first AFTRACK payload on DISCOVERER 

13, 10 August 1960, the US Intelligence 

122 The SIC,INT Satellite Story 

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Board (USIB) issued the first nationallevel SIGINT requirements document, 

USIB-D-33.6/8, "Intelligence Requirements 

for a Satellite Reconnaissance System of 

Which SAMOS is an Example," 5 July 1960. 

Paragraph lc. stated: " . additional 

types of directed coverage may be 

required. Provision should be made to 

procure such equipment by Quick Reaction 

Capabilities (QRC)." Also " . . a close 

working relationship between the R&D 

organization and the Intelligence 

Community is required." The AFTRACK 

project personnel felt that the program followed this direction very closely! 

Work started on the first ARPA

calle in the spring of 

1962

. Col Lee Battle and his staff at the 

DISCOVERER Project Office brought it to 

the attention of Maj John.Copley, who 

sPonsored the fixed AFTRACK payloads. 

This 

development eventually led to the phasing 

out of the fixed aft rack payloads on the 

Agena vehicle except for the "vulnerability 

payloads," which were continued on the aft 

rack of all photo missions to detect hostile 

radar tracking of the vehicle. The last of 

the SIGINT AFTRACK payloads, mission 

7225, SQUARE TWENTY. was launched 

28 October 1965 on vehicle 1620. Although 

the 72XX series of mission numbers was 

continued after this time for secondary 

payloads, none were mounted on the aft 

rack during the time frame covered by this 

history. 

The AFTRACK Program 

In early 1960, concern was growing in 

the US Intelligence Community that the 

Soviet Union was building not only missile 

systems but also systems to counter US 

missiles and satellites. U-2 photography 

had shown that large ground radar sites 

were under construction at the Soviet Sary 

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Shagan R&D test site in the vicinity of the 

missile launch pads. The Soviets also had 

several ships and trawlers equipped with 

large radomes whose purpose was not 

known. In February 1960, Harold Willis 

of the CIA Office of ELINT (OEL), having 

recently been briefed on the CORONA 

photo satellite program, contacted Maj 

Copley and told him of these concerns. He 

expressed the national-level fears that the 

Soviets might in some way interfere with 

the operation of the CORONA command 

and tracking subsystems. 

Copley was responsible for the contract with LMSD to develop the ELINT 

subsystem, S/S F of the SAMOS System, 

for the Air Force with the Airborne Instruments Laboratory (AIL) at Mineola, Long 

Island, New York, as the subcontractor. 

Willis had discussed with Bill Harris of 

the LMSD S/S F office the possibility that 

support might be available on the aft rack 

of the CORONA Agena spacecraft for a 

small electronic "black box" that could 

detect any electronic interference to the 

mission. Willis had also discussed the 

Problem with Gene Fubini of AIL, who 

became an enthusiastic supporter of the 

AFTRACK concept and suggested a small 

Payload called SOCTOP, which received 

signals in the 2.5- to 3.2-MHz frequency 

band in which the Agena S-band beacon 

Operated. It required only an on/off command and a few telemetry points to encode 

Its output. Copley was able to obtain the 

rninimal funding required, and Willis 

arranged for authority to mount SOCTOP 

on the aft rack of the DISCOVERER 13 

Agena vehicle. The presence of SOCTOP 

created very, little notice when DISCOVERER 13 was launched on 10 August 1960. 

Most of the attention was focused on the 

recovery capsule that attained fame as the. 

first object to be recovered intact from an 

orbiting spacecraft (something the Soviet 

Union had not yet achieved). 

The immediate analysis of the SOCTOP 

data was almost as remarkable as the capsule recovery. It showed what appeared to 

be Soviet tracking of the CORONA spacecraft on almost every readout by a USoperated tracking station (there was no 

recorder, so data could he received only 

when the spacecraft was in view of the 

tracking stations). That Soviet tracking 

was so extensive worldwide was a surprising and alarming discovery; Willis quickly 

passed the "tracking" story on to the 

Intelligence Community. However, further 

analysis of the data revealed that SOCTOP 

actually was receiving signals from US 

Verlort radars at the remote tracking stations (RTSs) as they tracked the spacecraft. Despite the embarrassment to Willis 

and others caused when the error was discovered, the small AFTRACK payload for 

QRC response to urgent ELINT questions 

did catch on! 

SOCTOP was the first of a long series 

of "vulnerability" payloads, so called 

because of their part in an NRO program 

to determine susceptibility of reconnaissance satellites to hostile Soviet (or other) 

activities. Eventually this type of payload 

flew. on almost every Program A lowaltitude reconnaissance satellite 

launched. The objective was to determine 

if Soviet or other hostile radars were actually tracking or trying to interfere with the 

electronics on the vehicle and the degree of 

success they achieved. A byproduct of this 

• 

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activity was verification of the tracking 

radar characteristics or discovery of new 

variations in their patterns not seen previously. The payload configuration changed 

as new and improved tracking radars 

appeared and as collection payload technology improved. 

In early 1963, following a series of 

SOCTOP launches, a competition was held 

by the Special Projects Office to design a 

more sophisticated payload capable of 

receiving and returning characteristics of 

signals in the frequency 

range. A recorder was to be included, 

Pitsenbarger and his team at Electronics 

Defense Laboratory (EDL)-Sylvania in 

Mountain View, California, won the competition and produced the new version, 

known as STOPPER. This initiated an 

era, continuing through 1975, in which 

EDL produced all of the electronic vulnerability payloads that were installed on most 

photo and SIGINT satellites. 

to this frequency range. By this time the 

NRO had been formed and the SAFSP in 

El Segundo, California, had been given 

responsibility for the development of a survivability program for all NRO vehicles. 

Accordingly, sponsorship of these "BIT 

boxes" was transferred from the SAFSP 

ELINT office to the SAFSP vulnerability. 

office. 

Maj Murray J. Sherline developed the 

concept of tailoring the frequency coverage 

of the BIT boxes to the known radar threats. 

rather than duplicating the mission of the 

ELINT satellites of looking for new threats. 

The data from the STOPPER missions was 

proceSsed at the EDL-Sylvania plant at 

Mountain View, California.

Many versions of the BIT boxes were 

developed as new radar data were received 

and as payload construction techniques 

improved. BIT I through IX versions were 

built as more data on 

collected. In 1968 the BIT boxes were consolidated under the title

with configurations 

tailored to the individual launches. 

126 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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The BIT box output was distributed 

to NSA and other interested agencies and 

was also used to program the operation of, 

and sometimes to aid in the design of, 

other SIGINT satellite payloads. NSA had 

no responsibility for processing the vulnerability payloads but did benefit from the 

results

Following the first AFTRACK payload (SOCTOP 1), flown in August 1960, 

Gene Fubini and his AIL team came up 

with a simplified version of the forward 

rack SAMOS Project 102 payload (F-2) 

tha

t would simply scan the 0.4- to 1.5-GHz 

band to detect radar activity in the Soviet 

Union, including suspected ABM/AES 

radars. Its mission was almost the reverse 

of SOCTOP (detection of ground radars 

rather than radar tracking of the satellite) 

so, naturally, it was.named TOPSOC. It 

used the F-2 high-gain super-heterodyne 

receivers and, essentially, omnidirectional 

antennas. Since TOPSOC lacked the 

directional antenna of the F-2 payload, but 

still retained the sensitivity, it scooped up 

a large number of interleaved signals, 

horizon to horizon, including sidelobes and 

main beams! Although an RF band had 

been chosen that was thought to be relatively quiet (400 to 1,600 MHz); the first 

TOPSOC, launched on 12 September 1961, 

encountered a signal environment in the • 

Soviet Union that proved far too populated 

and active to be successfully processed by 

any.automatic or manual techniques avail- . 

able at that time. The first lesson in 

matching the collection system to the processing system had been learned! It was 

also clear that, in the 1960s, there were 

many more radars in the Soviet Union 

than previously thought. Another. thing 

learned was-that unless the intercept is 

unique and of very high priority, an intercept without a location has very little 

value (at the same time, Navy POPPY 

satellites were proving this same axiom). 

The TOPSOC launches occurred in 

the summer and fall of 1961, but sometime 

before this another approach to the QRC 

AFTRACK payloads had developed. In 

those days, the Air Force sponsored an 

annual review at the Stanford Electronics 

Laboratories (SEL) in Palo Alto, California, 

of SEL's activities in support of ELINT, or 

more precisely. the electronic warfare community. These were called the Technical 

Advisory Committee (TAC) meetings. 

Almost all contractors and government 

. agencies involved in the development or 

use of electronic warfare systems attended 

regularly, making it one of the premier 

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ELINT events of the year. Until this time, 

of course, ground, sea, and airborne platforms were the extent of the discussions. 

Bill Harris, the LMSC AFTRACK 

payload manager; Phil Doersam, LMSC 

S/S F manager; and Maj Copley attended 

the TAC meeting in August 1960 in search 

of concepts for AFTRACK payloads. At the 

meeting, Jim DeBroekert of SEL demonstrated a newly developed miniaturized 

-receiver. With the receiver connected to a 

power meter, he had been flying it in his 

Cessna airplane around the San Francisco 

Bay area to demonstrate radar-location 

techniques. Harris asked DeBroekert if 

his receiver could be adapted to an 

AFTRACK application. The result was 

included a tape recorder, making it the 

first AFTRACK payload with this capability. Bill Rambo, in charge of SEL at the 

time. was intrigued with the simplicity of 

the concept and even made a short 8-mm 

movie to illustrate it. This was the beginning of a long association between SEL, 

LMSD, and SAFSP that ended only when 

pacifists protested SE L's involvement with 

the military during the Vietnam war. 

Don Grace, who became the SEL 

manager for AFTRACK payloads, set up a 

small lab in the basement of their building 

on the Stanford campus where Don 

Eslinger built (essentially single-handed) 

all the SEL payloads (10 total). Other very 

capable members of their staff were John 

Hunter, Tony Taussig, Tom Miles, and 

Chuck Schoens. DeBroekert, Miles, and 

Hunter went on to form ARGO Systems 

when the university gave in to protesters 

in the spring of 1967 and closed SEL. 

Eslinger went to Georgia Tech, Schoens to 

Stanford Research Laboratories (SRI), and 

by 

way of Applied Technology, Inc (ATI). 

The SEL policy was to design and build 

the first of a new series and then turn 

production over to industry. Following 

TAKI, WILD BILL was invented in the 

spring of 1961. (Neither Grace nor 

DeBroekert would admit which Bill—

Harris or Rambo—it was named after!). 

would utilize. The first WILD BILL was 

launched on 7 July 1961 and operated for 

two days with no important intercepts. 

The second, designated WILD BILL 1, was 

launched on 27 February 1962 and operated for only two orbits with no significant 

results. Later versions of WILD BILL 

were built by ATI, which had been formed 

in the Palo Alto area by John Grigsby, 

128 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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a. 

another former SEL engineer. LMSC had 

contracted with Grigsby to build the followon versions of SEL payloads. 

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to provide an output compatible with the 

ELINT processing system called FINDER, 

which had been designed to process data 

from the U-2 and other airborne collection 

systems. PLYMOUTH ROCK 1 was 

launched on 24 Npveniber 1962 and achieved 

at least two firsts: it was the first AFTRACK 

payload to receive a mission number, 7201, 

in accordance with the new BYEMAN procedures, and it was also the first space 

payload to use a sweeping yttrium-irongarnet (YIG) filter for frequency discrimination. Two more PLYMOUTH ROCKS 

were built by ATI. the last of which had 

the further distinction of being the only 

AFTRACK payloa

The outputs from the AFTRACK payloads included commutated data from 

selected points on the primary mission 

telemetry commutator and also, at times, 

recorder output from the AFTRACK pay-. 

load. Each payload was unique and produced different processing and analysis 

challenges. LMSC processed the data to 

evaluate payload performance and assisted 

NSA and SAC in their processing and analysis effort. 

Data from TAKE, WLLD BILL, TOPSOC. 

PLYMOUTH ROCK, and LONG JOHN were 

processed at NSA on an electronic machine 

complex known as

The 

differences in data format for each mission 

required extensive programming effort to 

write and extensive machine-time to check 

out the computer programs for each individual package. Frequently more time 

was spent in developing the processing 

than was required to process the data. For 

example, once the basic computer programs for a TAKI mission were written 

and checked out, it took a relatively small 

amount of time to process all the formatted data from that TAKI mission and any • 

subsequent identical TAXI 

Unfortunately, most missions were not 

identical because the AFTRACK payloads 

had to compete for points on the primary 

mission telemetry commutator, so data formats changed frequently. Analysis of the 

data still required extensive manual effort 

after or in parallel with the machine processing. 

SAC processing and analysis of data 

from the AFTRACK payloads were frequently done by LMSC in

Sunnyvale, for SAC with SAC participation. LMSC provided space and equip130 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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elements of the US Intelligence Community 

to function as a part of the Soviet ABM 

system. 

It was Capt Don \Vipperman and his 

associates at Air Force Security Service . 

(ASS), San Antonio, Texas, who came up 

with the first COMINT satellite concept. 

Together with the AIL team, they presented an idea for an AFTRACK payload 

Capable of interceptin

communications signal that was then 

thought to be from the prevalent air/ground 

(A/G) communications system in the 

Soviet Union. This resulted in the TEXAS 

PINT (AFSS was in Texas). Its only drawback was that when launched on 30 August 

1961. it showed tha had been 

suPerseded by more advanced 

communications systems. It did provide a 

good look at the VHF environment over 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

the Soviet, Union. These data were used 

extensively in later payload designs. In 

the summer of 1961. Sanders Associates at 

Nashua, New Hampshire, teamed with 

While the AFTRACK ELINT story 

was unfolding, other parallel efforts were 

underway in the COMINT area. Interest 

in COMINT had surfaced in several 

F of WS-117L might be adapted to 

COMINT collection, but he felt that feasibility needed to be demonstrated. 

In another area of the COMINT 

scene, Wayne Burnett of HRB-Singer at 

State College, Pennsylvania, came up with 

a concept to intercept, encode, and record 

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Top Secret 

N0FURN-ORCON 

payload launched on 4 December 1962 had 

pretty much the same results. A final version, OPPORKNOCKITY ("it tunes but 

once"), was launched on 21 August 1964. 

Two more payloads, SQUARE 

TWENTY and DONKEY, launched in 1965 

and 1967, completed the story of AFTRACK 

COMINT collection. With the experience 

to date. the concept of copying content 

from low orbiters was losing its attraction, 

and accurate location was becoming a 

more important consideration. SQUARE 

TWENTY, designed to locate the Soviet 

One other AFTRACK payload that 

was actually integrated into the front rack 

along with MULTIGROLTP 2 and SETTER 

1B was DONKEY. launched on 24 July 1967. 

This payload was part of a program initiated by Col John Copley, who was then 

assigned to the Manned Orbiting Laboratory 

(MOL) staff at US Air Force Headquarters. 

The payload activities were handled under 

the BYEMAN program, but through a 

unique management arrangement, the 

overall effort was managed by the Air 

Force. Back in February 1965, Copley had 

been assigned to determine if there were 

132 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

any SIGINT applications that might be 

enhanced by the manned aspect of the 

MOL. Several ELINT applications were 

examined, but in the area of COMINT, the 

could also be collected from the sidelobes. 

however, intercept times could be lengthened appreciably and might permit intercept of adjacent emitters on the same link. 

thereby providing the necessary continuity. 

This is what DONKEY attempted to 

demonstrate. 

A program developed by the team of 

E-Systems in Garland, Texas. and EDLSylvania, using Soviet transmitter 

specifications involved 

airborne testing against a simulated

terminal installed at the. E-Systems facility. 

An Air Force helicopter was used to fly a 

payload in an intercept pattern through 

the main beam and sidelobes of the 

microwave antenna. Phil Fyre and a team 

of analysts at EDL analyzed the data and 

made recommendatiOns for mission profiles. The results were sufficiently encouraging to convince the team that a satellite 

test should be performed to verify the. 

flight-test data. 

but the need for a 

three-axis-stable platform indicated the 

Agena vehicle was the appropriate carrier. 

Vince Henry, the AFTRACK and

Top Secret 

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.10=11/RDHEIN,I# 

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MISSION* 

NUMBER 

PROJECT . 

and 

PAYLOAD 

• MISSION 

OPERATIONAL LIFETIME • LIFETIME 

ard Duane. anCums« tat Maar Intl Guar. 3rd Chaa.ir 4lisClusrlas fill Gunnar Zirdatiattilif SrdOW.w n 

1960 1960 1961 1961 1961' 1961 1962 1962 . 1962

Days 

I 

N/A 

N/A 1 

, 

** 

SOCTOP 1 

TAKI 1 

08110-11 

I . 1 - 

06116-17 

I 2 - 

N/A - WILD BILL 

777.6 

I 2 

' 

N/A .- TEXAS PINT 8130-911 

I 2 

N/A ; TOPSOC 1 9112-9119 

I 5 

N/A •TOPSOC 2 9/19 21 7- 

I 4 

• N/A • TOPSOC 3- 1W13-10/15 

I 2 

N/A . TOPSOC 4 11/5-11/7 

I 2 

WA • 1 GRAPEJUICE 1 

12/12-12/13 

I 1 

N/A WILD BILL 2 2127 

I 

2 orbits; 

0.15 

• WA , GRAPEJUICE 2 

4/18 -4/22 

I 5 

N/A - TAKI 2 6/21:7/5 7 

N/A • 

' 

NEW 

JERSEY 1 

727- W2 

I 

9/17122 

I 

5 

N/A 5 ' GRAPE 

JUICE 3 

OS = General Search ABM = Antiballistic Missile 

• ...Ion nun*. nal assigned lo AFTFIACK payloads unlir nostril!. ladia 

a a suinsfablary payloads fisted on Napa.. lobla 

COPY = Lock-on Copy Conlenl 

og 

Cn 

n 

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• MISSION 

NUMBER 

PROJECT 

and 

PAYLOAD 

MISSION 

OPERATIONAL LIFETIME LIFETIME 

ath Quota IP Owner 2n0 000.i 3r0 (Nada ath °mho let OW*, and Owl,* 

1962 1963 " 1963 1963 1963 1964 1984 Days 

7201 PLYMOUTH 

ROCK 1 

111212/01 4- 

i I 5 

7202 WILD BILL 2 12/12 -12/15 

 1 1 3 

7203 VINO 1 12/4-12/7 

I 1 3 

7204 : TAKI 3 12/4-12/7 

1 

_ 

6 

7205 NEW 

JERSEY 2 I 

1/7-1/14 

6 

7206 VINO 2 2/28 

I (Failed to orbit) 0 

7207 WILD BILL 3 6/12 6 6 

M 13 

7216 WILD BILL 4 - 84 7/20 - 

.35 

7208 , PLYMOUTH 

ROCK 2 

6/29 7/11 

III 12 

7219 . LONG 

JOHN 2 

11/27 12112 

_ IS 

15 

7218 LONG 

' JOHN 1 

" 

12121 1/10 

 20 

7210 . HAYLOFT 111 1130 

'MI 19 

7222 LONG 

JOHN 3 

. 

2/15 3/9 

IMI 23 

7224 LONG 

JOHN 4 

..., 

_ 

6/13 6/25 

11111 13 

ye 

EID 1.4.(c) 

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Flight summary: Program A, Project AFTRACK SIGINT payloads (continued) 

GS = General Search COPY = Lock•on Copy Content 

=Tee 

/ l a i c 

al Intelligence 

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Flight summary: Program A, Project AFTRACK SIGINT payloads (continued) 

MISSION 

NUMBER 

PROJECT 

and 

PAYLOAD 

MISSION . 

I

OPERATIONAL LIFETIME LIFETIME 

3r0 Cuartar! ,if.L.:2.4 in'5.-•;:arsi '13,'12.l.1.5i■ It 7,, !:111;ig: ■1.,■ aaiksJ ' sl‘f 3t0 Opyrtay 4111 Opanse ha Opens" D 

1964 1964 1965 1965. 1965 1965 NI 1957 1967 1968 BYI 

7215 OPPOR- 

.KNOCKITY 

8/21 10/23 

• . 

53 

7223 NEW 

HAMPSHIRE Cancelled due to technical problems 0 

7225 SQUARE 

TWENTY 

10/28 11/8 

• 20 

7231 DONKEY 

r 

. 7/24 1/28 

190 

NOW 7200 Solos BIRO DOG. SETTER. CONVOY. and HARVESTER wars classIllad s• oaeonclary payload" 

on 1192115,770. andSTRAVYkU1N Pro/oats, and wars Haled with thorn. 

COPY = Lock•on Copy Content 

LOC = Locale = 15 miles 

EO 1 4 (c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

0 

Oo 

0 

VI 

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Top Secret 

NoFoRN-nRcoN 

manager at LMSC, determined that a location on the forward rack was the only practical place to mount the 6-foot expandable 

parabolic antenna required for the mission. 

Agena vehicle 2732, scheduled to launch 

the MULTIGROUP 2and SETTER 1B 

Payloads in July 1967, would have new, 

more powerful CASTOR II solid rockets, 

providing greater thrust than the previously used thrust-augmented Thor (TAT) 

booster. This made it a logical choice for 

the addition of DONKEY. Installation of 

all three payloads (including three outboard expandable antennas) required very 

innovative engineering. This may have 

been the point at which the payload was 

named DONKEY (for lack of a better 

explanation ). In any case DONKEY 

boasted an independent down-link and 

when launched on 24 July 1967 'operated 

30 days longer-(for a total of 182 days) 

than the other payloads following the failure of their data link transmitter. 

DONKEY was unable to perform the 

sidelobe intelligibility mission on orbit due 

'to the failure of the pointing mechanism 

on the 6-foot dish antenna. This did not 

liminary COMINT data were va ua e in 

mission planning for the 

In fact. the initial airborne intelligibility program convinced Gene Pitsenbarger 

of EDL and Vince Henry (and his boss, 

George Minalga) of LMS

emitter as the low-orbiting MOL flew 

swiftly over the Soviet Union (this may be 

another explanation for the name of the 

DONKEY COMINT AFTRACK payload). 

The locations produced by 

SQUARE TWENTY, DONKEY, and the 

All of the data from the COMINT payloads were analyzed at the contractor facilities and at NSA, mostly by rather laborious manual processing. The information 

gained from the early TEXAS PINT. NEW 

JERSEY, GRAPE JUICE, and VINO payloads was minimal except for the development of a. healthy respect for the interference environment over eastern Russia. 

136 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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.\U un.N.uKt.t.t\ 

The AFTRACK payloads had run 

their course by the time of the SQUARE 

TWENTY launch in 1965. The much more 

Top Secret 

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by LMSC, took over the original QRC-type 

missions of the AFTRACKs, and went on 

to greater capability, utility, and inevitably, 

the accompanying and ever-increasing cost. 

Key accomplishments, Agena 

AFTRACK payloads 

138 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

• 

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• 

Top Secret 

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Chapter 157 

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(TM UN T Control Ch,Innels Jointly 

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RI_ 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Chapter 5 References 

1. NSA-BYE-20850-65 and

2. NSA in Space, April 1975, BYE-19385-75, pp. 13-14. 

3 inal Report, 1 May 1968, BYE-19347-68. 

5. NSA in Space, pp. 14-15 

6.

7.

8. NSA in Space. 

9. Reports A1\441, 17 June 1970, and AM78, 30 October 1970, TK/WC-W205/47-71 

10. NSA in Space, p. 29. 

11.

12. 

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25. Report 004, 16 January 1970. 

26. TCS 58527-71, 13 October 1971; Report AM63, 28 September 1970; Report AM81, 24 

November 1970: Report AIV107, 23 February 1971; Report AM16, 15 April 1971; Report 

AM29, 5 August 1970; Report AMO9, 28 January 1972. 

27. Report 29, 1 and 12 May 1970; Report 32, 15 May 1970; Report 25, 29 June 1971; 

Report 27, 2 August 1971; Report 51, 4 November and 8 December 1971; Report 43, 7 

October 1971: Report 28. 5 May 1972;

28

29

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vOfORN.ORCON 

../PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

30

31

32. Raymond Potts' personal notes (hereafter Potts' notes). 

33. TIVWC-W205/47-71 (TS/BaK). 

34. Potts' notes. 

35. TK/WC-W205/47-71. 

36. TK/WC-W205/47-71. 

37

38

• 

39. Report # R19, 21 March 1969. ./ 

40. Photo of the K4SP Status Board, 20 December 1970. 

41.

42 TK/WC-W205/43-71. 

43. K4SP Status Board photo. 

44.

45. interview, 11 August 1992. 

46

47. K4SP Status Board photo. 

48. Report 72. 20 October,1970. 

49. TK/WC-E205/008-72. 

50. Report 45, 8 October 1971. 

51. Report 61, 29 December 1971. 

52 KAVC-E205/008-72. 

53. QR, 31 March 1971. 

54. Interviews with

55

56

57. NSA in Space, p. 30; 

58. QR,.31 March 1974. 

59 nterview, 25 July 1990, 

60 interview, 27 February 1991. 

61. NSA in Space. 

26 June 1992. 

A 

62. Interviews with 27 February 1991

and 24 June 1992. 

63. interview, 24 June 1992„, -_ 

-Reverse side blank 

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8YE.9147/94 

24 June 1992; 

Chapter 5 165 

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NOECNN.OWCON 

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EO 1.4. (c) 

Mission Requirements 

During the late 1950s, the Intelligenc

Community's weapons system analysts 

began to realize that overhead photography alone could not do a complete job of 

assessing the Soviet missile threat. 

Though crucial for strategic indications 

and warning (I&W), photography was 

essentially static; it showed the number 

and kind of launching pads but revealed 

little about the missiles themselves in 

terms of actual in-flight performance. The

information of greatest value to US missile

intelligence analysts was that used by the 

Soviet missile designers themselves. Like 

their US counterparts, Soviet missile 

designers put instruments on board their 

vehicles to monitor various internal functions during the missile development and 

test phase. These data were transmitted 

to Earth in coded-signal format, called 

telemetry, for engineering evaluation and 

assessment. Because of the design and 

function of telemetry, US intelligence agen

cies made special efforts to collect this 

information, along with beaconry and 

other electronic emissions from rocket test 

vehicles. all of which came to be called foreign instrumentation signals, or FIS. The 

collection and analysis of such signals for 

intelligence purposes is called TELINT. 

EO 1 .4. (c ) 

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The Project Story 

On 27 July 1963; the Hughes Aircraft 

Company's SynCom II became the world's 

first successful equatorial geosynchronous 

satellite. Located 22,000 miles above the 

Earth's equator and orbiting around the 

Earth once each day at the same peripheral velocity that the Earth's equator 

turned beneath it, the equatorial geosynchronous satellite appears to an observer 

on the ground to remain motionless in the 

sky. This is a perfect orbit for a satellite 

designed for relaying information from one 

place on the Earth to another–ideal for a 

communications satellite or a COMINT 

Satellite. SynCom II marked the birth of 

the era of communications satellites and it 

also set in motion the idea for a project 

that.was to play center stage at the. CIA 

and the National Reconnaissance Office 

(NRO

Albert D. Wheelon 

Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon was one of 

the original bright young engineers hired 

by Simon Ramo at the Ramo-Wooldridge 

Corporation, the technical manager of the 

US Air Force ballistic missile program, in 

November 1953. By the late 1950s Wheelon 

was involved in Ramo-Wooldridge's analysis work on the capabilities of Soviet missiles. He became acquainted with Presidential Science Advisors Jerome Wiesner, 

James Killian, and Edwin A. "Din" Land. 

In June 1962, at the invitation of Herbert 

"Pete" Scoville, Jr., he joined the CIA. 

1 

Top Secret 

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NOFORN-ORLON 

Then, at the request of Ray Cline, Deputy 

Director for Intelligence (DDI), and over 

Scoville's objections, Wheelon was assigned 

as Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence and head of the Office of Scientific 

Intelligence (OSI), reporting to Cline, and 

Chairman of the Guided Missiles and 

Astronautics Intelligence Committee 

(GMAIC) of the US Intelligence Board 

(USIB). These were the dark days of the 

Cuban Missile Crisis. CIA's reputation for 

innovative excellence, built on the reconnaissance successes with the U-2 aircraft 

and CORONA photo satellites, was now 

being overtaken by the failures of the Bay 

of Pigs. At the highest levels of government, CIA's reputation and influence were 

declining. In August 1963 Wheelon was 

appointed Deputy Director for Science and 

Technology (DDS&T) of the CIA by 

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John 

McCone. Wheelon was given McCone's 

mandate to put the CIA back into the 

reconnaissance business in a strong way. 

170 The SIGINT Satellite Stone EO 1.4.(c) 

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Brockway McMillan 

John McMahon 

Lloyd Lauderdale 

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EO 

Alexander H. Flax 

172 The SiGINT Satellite Story 

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LGen Marshall S. Carter 

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
N0I UK.` .(MCC" 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EC) 1.4. (c) 

1 

Top Secret 

Handle Vic) 13 Y f N TAL ENT -1‘ EYHOtfCOmiNr Control Channels Jointh 

1311•9197.74 

Chapter 6 173 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCON 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605, 

EO 1.4. (c) 

174 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 Top Secret 

Handle v,a BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLECOMINT Control Channels lointh, 

AYF-9)97,94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

Handle via BYEMAN.rALENT-Kf YHOLECOMINT Control Channels lomilY 

8 YE.9197/94 

Chapter 6 175 

*'L 86-36/50. USC 3605 

Ec.) 1.4.{c) 

fr" 

Charles C. Tevis 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORMORCON EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

176 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle rra BYfMAN-TALfNT•KfYHOLfCOMINT Control Channels 10infiv 

BY f-q7q7/94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

1-landle via BYEMAN- TAL f NT .KE Y14011- 

COM1N T ConrTOT Channels lchntls 

81E .9 97194 

Chapter 6 177 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCON 

4 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EQ1.4.(c) 

PL- 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Julian Caballero 

PL 86-36/60 USC 3605 

178 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle rid 13YEMAN-TALENT.KEYHOLE- 

. COMINT Control Channels /fund., 

al.F.9197NS 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOf ORN-ORCON 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'EO 1.4.(c) 1 

John L. McLucas 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

Top Secret • 

Handle via 8 YEAtAt-4- rAL ENT-KfYHOLECOM1NT Control Channels logillv 

8YE-9197'94 

Chapter 6 179 

jai 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

tg0FORN.nRcoN 

Robert F. Naka 

180 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle yea 8Y f MAN- !MINI-KEYHOLECOMINT Control Channels lamb• 

RIT.gt Q7/94 * 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

N0FORN.nRCD.ti' 

Top Secret 

Handle vra 8YfAIAN.TATENT.KEYHOLFCOATiNT Control ChJnopb,lointly 

1414.010.04 

Chapter 6 181 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

vOFORN-ORCON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

182 The SIGINT Satelfite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle VIJ erfitiAN-TALENT-KEYHOLECOMINT Control Channels Jointly 

8yE.8 7 97/94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

N0FORN-oRCav 

it 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret - 

Haldle via BIIMAN-TALENT-larricmcomystr Control Channels to ntiv 

8 yF.a 1 n74,4 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605: 

Chapter 6 183 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOF0R.voRCON 

Top Secret 

Handle via 81,1mAni. rALINT-KE YHOL f184 The SIG INT Satellite Story comb./ 7' Control Channels lotnriv 

811.o 4:v9J 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
NGFORN-ORCON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 1 

1 

• 

Top Secret 

Handl,. via EIVIMAN-rAtENr•Kf 

COMINT Control Channels toroth, Chapter 6 185 

8'a-9191194 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

N0FORN-ORCON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

186 the SKINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle via 8YEMAN-TALENT.KEYHOLfaMIINT Control Channels 

ByE.Q797/94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via RYVAAN- rALENT-KEY HOLECOmiNT Central Channels kunllY 

8Y(.919;794 

Chapter 6 187 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
(40IS 1,1101v51NIL11S a41 

FL 8E-36/50 USC 3605 

E0 1.4. (c) 

DS 

z 

Zp 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

Nornery-oecoN 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle BYEmAN- TAL ENT-KE THOLECOmtnIT Control Channels lotwiT • 

6TE.9197/94 

Chapter 6 189 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

rvorofriv.oecory 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

190 The SlCINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle tia BYEMAN.TALENT--KfYHoLiCOMllT Comm! ChAnnric !ninth 

SYE.9,97,44 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN•ORCON 

E0.ATO. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle- via BYEMAN.TALENT-KEYHOLECOtixNT Control Channels to,nriv 

BYE-9)97/94 

Chapter 6 191 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NoFoRt.boRcON 

EO 1.4.(C) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

192 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top-Secret 

Handle via frefmmv-TALENT•KEYHOLE-

. COAntur Conlin/ Channels 'Dingy 

Rs1.0in=in3 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
NOFORN-ORCON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via 8YEMA N • TALENT-KEYHOIECOMINT Conrrol Channels fotnnv 

BYE-9)97,94 

' Chapter 6 ' 193 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NoFoRmoecoN 

Chapter 6 References 

Top Secret . 

Handie via 8 YEMAN. TALENr-KEYHott194 The SIONT Satellite Story comiNT Crft.,,,oi;.chazers /amity 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
PL 8E-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

t up Secret 

NOFORN.ORCON 

iterroffe side 

Top Secret 

Handle via 8 YEMAN- TALENT-KEYHQLECOMINT.Control Channels ichnlls, Chapter 6 • 195 

8.'1..9197/94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
1 

Top Secret 

NOFORN.ORcoN 

lit EC 1.4. (c) 

PI, 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret • 

Handle via BY f MAN - rAt ENT-KEYHOLECOMINT Control Channels 

BYE.9.7 97/94 

Chapter 7 197 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
INIOIS 

0 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NororeN-rm-av 

EO 1.4.(o) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

50 USC 3605 

lop Secret 

1-1.indie rid BYEMAN- EJV T. KCYHOl. CCOM/N f Control Channels Jointly 

BYE-9197/94 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

Chapter 7 199 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

vofoRN-(wa ("EO 1 . 4 . ( 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

200 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle EIVENtANJALENT.KEIHOLE— 

COMINT Cunrwl Channels lomat, 

131,'F.0197r94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCON 1 EC) 

PL 

1.4. (c) 

86-36/50 USC.3605 

Col David D. Bradburn 

Top Secret 

Handle s.la 8 YCMAN• TALE NT-KEYHOLECOVIINT Connell Channels knntly 

Hyt.q1,47,V4 

Chapter 7 201 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN-toRcritv 

Robert 1. Hermann 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

202 The SIGIN'T Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle v,a BYEMAN.TAIENT-KEYNOLE0041INT Comm, Channels fornriv 

RYE-glq7,Q4 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

Notoe.v-ORCoN PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

• E0 1.4. (c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYFMAN• TALENT-KEYHOLECOMINT Control Channels . Chapter 7 203 

8YE-9 I 9.7A4 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c), EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NofOR.VORCON 

PL 86-36/50 U S E.: 3605 

204 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

• - • •—••-• E0 1 . . ( c ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via BY f mAN-TALfN T-Kf rHocfCOMINT Condo) Channels lointiv 

Brf.9197:94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NC)FORN.oircoN 

Top Secret 

1-1,mdfe s.,a yo0AN.rmINT.KtiH(..)1.ECC)MINT Conn°, Channel, lo,nrh- Chapter 7 205 

qv( .opn7-o.j 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOroRN-pricoN 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

206 The SIC!NT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle yia BYEMAN.TALENT.Kf l'HOLECUMIN r Comm! Channt* !ninth. 

81.1 .o o7,u4 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NofoRN-oRcon. 

PI, 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E0 1.4.(c) 

k Chapter 7 207 t,i 

Top Secret • 

Handle via roAnr- TAUNT-6:f YtIOLECOMINT Control Channels knotiv 

9YE.9 I 97+9,1 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCON FL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 US 3cu5 

208 The SIGINT Satellite Story • 

• Top Secret 

Handle 1,,,d Y fmAtv.TAI. ENT.laYHO( ECOMINT" canon) Chanr:rels Ones, 

BYE.9797.94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret .'EC) 1 . 4 . 

NOFORN-OkCav PL 86-36/50 USc 

VAdm Noel Gayler 

Top Secret 

Handle via 13YEALAN.TACENT.KEYHOLECat77Nr Ce101110 

• QVI .)10 -0.1 

Chapter 7 209 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NotORN-oRcov 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

USC, 3605 

planning meeting, El Segundo, California, April 

1970 

ti 210 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle via EI'VfMAN. TA LEN YHOL fcomrNT Control Channels loinllv 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NoFoersi-ORLON 

Col John W. Browning 

EO 1.4.(e) 

FL 86-36/50 USC 3'CO5 

Top Secret 

r-lJndle yr.; 81EMAN-TALENr-xerHOLECOMINT Control Channels foinav 

8VE.0197/94 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Chapter 7 211 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
LGen Lew Allen, Jr. 

EC, 1.4.(c) 

. PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

EO 1.4.(d) 

PL 86-36/50- '3&05-7-7- 

212. The SIGINT Satellite Story 

.Top Secret 

Handle laa BYEMAN- 1 ALEN T-1( f vmelfCOmINT.Convol Ctiannels Jointly 

13Y197..41,1 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c), EO 13526 1.4(d)<25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(d)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

N0FORN.ORCON 

r!.E0 1.4. (e) 

ECJ .1.4. (d) 

pi, 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYEMAN.TAL f NT-KEYHOLECOmINT Control Channels lomflv 

fryE.nsq7m4 

Chapter 7 213 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(d)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Trip Secret 

NOTnRN.ORci 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

ro1.4.(c) 

PL;86-36/50 USC3605 

Top Secret 

Handle v,a BYENTAN-TALENT-KEYHOL fCOntr,vr Conuol Channels knnth, 

MI.Q)07.0a 

214 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
PL 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCoN EO 1.4.(cl 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605' 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

216 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

HAncile. v,.i FIYFMAN-TALENT-KFYHOL ECOMINr comm! Ch4nne.ls /nervily 

QV , 010-, 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN-ORCON 

'1E0 1.4. (c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYES4.4N. TALENT-KEYHOLECOM1NT COftfrOi Channels !fluids, 

BY E .9197/94 

Chapter 7 217 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Fop Secret 1.4.(c) 

NOTORN.oRcox FL 86-36/50 USC 3605. 

218 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYEAmmTALENT•KEYHOLECOMINT Control Channel, family 

BYE•9197/44 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
E0 1.4. ( c ) 

EO 1.9. (c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Nott.;H:s.-utecoN 

1.4.(d) 

FL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'Congressional committees have oversight of NSA and 

NRP operations. :Ind approve NSA and NRP budgets and 

activities. The six committees are the House-Armed 

&mires Committee t HASCi. the Senate Armed Services 

Committee iSASC I. the House Appropriations Committee 

1,11ACI, the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC), the 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

(HPSCII, and the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence tSSCI). 

iOutstanding high-school graduates with a demonstrated 

aptitude for foreign language were hired and trained 

because the military services.could not recruit enough 

`schootgraduates who quatified-forthe—prograin e 

hired as GS-3s, promoted to GS-4s upon successful completion of the first six months of the program. and promoted to GS-5s upon completion of the intensive one-year 

program. Many went on to get a college degree in language from a local college or university while continuing 

to work for NSA. • 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via YEMAN- TAL ENT.Kf YHOLECOMINT Control Channels fointly Chapter 7 219 

BYE-9/07/9d • 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c), EO 13526 1.4(d)<25Yrs

EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOf OR N. CNC ON 

O 1.4.c) 

Fj. 86-36/50 USC 3E05 

Top Secret 

Handle s,a BYCNIAN7TAL EN T•KEYHOLL-- 

COmlNT Convol Channels Jointly 

3}1-91 97M4 

220 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Tap Secret 

Noroa.v.nRCoN 

Chapter 7 References 

Reverse side blank 

Top Secret • 

Handle vh3 BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLECONIIA'r Control Channels losnth, 

qvr.n. n-n 

USC 3605 

• Chapter 7 221 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

VOFORN.ORCCIN 

ItIO 1.4.(e) 

FL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

HJorite vm VEMAN- rALENT-XEYHOLECOAWVT Co,, & Ch.mnel< Chapter 8 223 

1311.," iu;" 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
luois atme)PS 1NtDIS aql 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NoFoRN-rJRCoN 

Ito 1.4.(c) 

Zi?- 1, 86-3E/50 USC 3605 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYEMAN-TALENTKEYHOLECOMINT Control Channels loinar 

8S1.9 I 9 :/cli 

Chapter 8 225 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secret 

NOFORN.oRCON 

E0 1.4.(c) 

tj, 8E-36/50 USC 3E05 

226 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Hjnrc. 8YEMAN• T.-1L eNT • KE 11-40L - 

COM) N T romercil 

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Nor oRrv.oecon: 

Col David D. Bradburn (left) congratulates Col Henry 

B. Stelling. Ir., as Stelling takes charge o in 

May 1971 

Col jack Simonton 

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COnclusions and Accomplishments 

'PI, 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

The SIGINT Satellite System Mix 

as of 1975 and Why It Was Effective 

By 1975 the National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO) SIGINT satellite world consisted of an effective set of complementary 

space vehicles. The low-orbiting POPPYs 

were busy searching for new signals and 

using their elegant relay techniques to provide the Navy, especially, with up-to-date 

locations of radar-equipped ships anywhere on the surface of the Earth. Going 

through a constant evolution from launch 

to launch, POPPY proved to be the best 

system for intercepting ship-based radars. 

which were sometimes only on for a few 

fleeting moments as the commanders used 

special tactics to avoid detection. This 

same main-beam intercept capability was 

immensely powerful in determining the 

power and scan properties of any groundbased radar that happened to illuminate 

the POPPY satellites. As a main-beam collector POPPY was the best and

was assured of an 

important continuing role. 

Along the way, the original WS-1171... 

low-orbiters helped pave the way, but had 

been retired by the early 1970s. They were 

replaced by a new ensemble that could 

bring back signals faster, locate them more 

accurately, and make reports almost as the 

events were happening. 

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By 1975, the NRO had a strong capability i basic SIGINT satellite systems. 

The mix of orbits and capabilities proved 

an important quality.

They covered the frequencies of interest and each 

of them carried out missions that were 

easy and natural to do from each orbit. 

This ensemble. developed thoughtfully 

over time in response to various perceived. 

problems was actually a good set of architectural pieces, efficient and technically 

clever, that met real intelligence needs.'" 

Budget pressures prompted efforts at consolidation, using fewer basic satellite systems. But no such effort at consolidation 

was to be successful because, despite some 

mutually reinforcing overlaps in capability, each of th systems possessed a 

unique basic function that the others could 

not perform at all—a testimony to the 

Ingenuity and insight that put them there. 

*DNRO Alexander H. Flax said. "There was a plan. 

although like all long-range planning it evolved over time 

(Particularly in COMINT collections. but in many 

reaPect_s the architecture was envisioned in crude outline 

From the beginning." 

The NRO Program Offices as 

Managers of Satellite Projects 

The NRO SIGINT Program Offices 

shared a short chain of command, high 

motivation, a sense of team spirit, and a 

sense of urgency. They also worked in 

total secrecy. It was a management environment that the participants say was 

unusually rewarding and unlikely ever to 

be repeated. 

In SIGINT satellite development, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense staffs and 

the Army and Air Force staffs (but not the 

Navy, initially) were removed from the 

management chain by the establishment 

of the SAMOS Project Office (later the Director of Special Projects. SAFSP), reporting 

to the Secretary of the Air Force, in late 1960. 

This Presidential decision effectively froze 

out all other participants and provided for 

a short chain of command and quick decisions, first for the Air Force's SAMOS 

Project. This organizational precursor 

became the NRO, established formally in 

1962. From 1962 on, all SIGINT satellites, 

including Air Force, Navy, and CIA satellites, would be developed and operated by 

the NRO. 

The creation of the NRO, and in particular, the office of the Director of the 

NRO (DNRO), harnessed the creative 

technical energies of the nation. The 

DNRO was empowered to work on the 

whole problem of providing satellite reconnaissance for the country. That job, being 

covert, did not in itself, require the DNRO 

to do anything except work on the problems 

of developing and operating the nation's 

reconnaissance satellite fleet. The tying of 

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`DrDR•v-nCc),y 

research and development (R&D) with 

operations, all under the DNRO, became 

the key to the whole plan. The genius was 

in defining the job in this way. It provided 

a single forum to focus on how systems 

would work together. Consideration of 

engineering principles, along with cost and 

the desires of the individual participants, 

was possible. This approach allowed system2°. 

level and architectural decisions to be 

made cleanly. It saved valuable time in 

putting new designs into orbit and it 

ensured that the reconnaissance satellites 

of the United States would be technically 

superior. 

DNRO Alexander H. Flax said, "In my 

mind, tying R&D to operations under the 

DNRO was essential. The NRO never had 

a pure R&D launch; all had some operational objective. Feedback from operations 

to R&D was almost instantaneous. Given 

the rapid pace of the technologies involved, 

these characteristics were invaluable."2 

Eugene Fubini reinforced this view: "The 

NRO was designed to relieve stresses: the 

fact that it has survived so long is a testimony to the wisdom of those who set it up."3 

This management approach made 

possible the creative work by the Directors 

of Programs A, B, and C, who similarly 

had both operational and R&D work blended 

under their operating charters. Within the 

NRO, then, the work came to support the 

primary missions of the, organizational elements that were to carry it out. 

The covert Air Force (SAFSP) elements. Program A, based in Los Angeles, 

California. developed the WS-117L-derived 

low-altitude systems (SAMOS F-1, 698BK, 

MULTIGROUP, and STRAWMAN).

These projects 

all originated in Air Force needs and interests. They were mostly carried out within 

the SAFSP offices in Los Angeles, with 

support easily arranged from the noncovert, or "white," Air Force organizations 

for launch services, tracking, and communications. The DNRO was also the Under 

Secretary of the Air Force* and this was 

the key to a simple and effective management arrangement for Director, Program A. 

He was working on projects of interest to 

the Air Force and he reported to the top of 

the Air Force's statutory chain of command. Since the DNRO occupied an overt 

position—usually Under Secretary of the 

Air Force—he had the obvious authority to 

provide the necessary direction to elements 

outside the NRO. This arrangement worked 

well but at a price. The Air Force people 

in Program A came to view themselves. 

and to be viewed by the rest of the Air 

Force, as "outside the system."' The DNRO 

was also in a difficult position, having to 

exclude from the management chain senior 

Air Force officers and others throughout 

DNROs Joseph V. Charyk (1962-63), Brockway McMillan - 

(1963-65). and John L. N1cLucas. Jr. (1969-73). served as 

Under Secretary of the Air Force: McLucas later served 

as Secretary of the Air Force (1973-75). DNRO Flax 

11965-69) was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Research and Development. and arranged for special 

authorities to carry out his job. Other DNROs have 

served as either Secretary, Under Secretary, or Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force. 

MI Directors of Program A. except one, retired in the 

rank held (brigadier general or major general) as Director 

of Special Projects (SAPS?). Lew Allen, Jr.. was the 

exception: after serving as Director of Special Projects 

major general. 1971-721, he served as Director. NSA 

(lieutenant general. 1973-771, and Chief of Staff. United 

States Air Force igeneral. 1978-821. 

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Noroerv.oRCOY 

the Department of Defense who would 

normally be able to offer good counsel but 

who were excluded and knew it." 4 

At the CIA, the Director of Program B 

had a.different set of problems and motivations.

It was a major organizational 

and conceptual victory within the NRO. 

But the CIA Director of Program B, with 

also lived in 

a complicated world, alienated from the 

larger CIA because of his affiliation with 

the NRO. He. too, had his own problems 

of reporting to a line boss, the Deputy 

Director for Science and Technology in the 

CIA. and by dotted line to the DNRO, an 

official of the Defense Department. His 

management chain was not as clean as for 

Director, Program A. but he had an advantage: Director, Program B, was in the CIA 

and therefore was closer to the requirements side of the Intelligence Community 

than were the other program managers. 

The ONRO collaterally reported to the senior Air Force 

Management. but for most NRO matters. reporting was 

14 the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

The Navy's POPPY. originally 

designed to collect against land-based 

emitters, came under NRO control in 1962. 

and the role of ocean surveillance, late in 

1970. fit in well with the interests of Navy 

sponsors outside the Program C offices. 

Still; the Director of Program C also had 

the problem of dual allegiance: he reported 

to the Chief of Naval Operations, either 

through the Director of Naval Intelligence 

or. later, through the Chief of Naval 

Materiel.6His reporting line to the DNRO 

was a dotted line to an office that was 

really in the Air Force. So the Director of 

Program C had a slightly more complicated life than Director of Program A. . 

But the POPPY project proved of.interest 

and value to the Navy and generally was 

well supported by both NRO Navy leaders.7 

These charters, arrived at through 

historical experience and by executive 

decisions of the DNRO, turned out to be 

very practical and productive. The 

POPPY

effective set of SIGINT satellites in an 

engineering and analytic sense and also 

matched the interests of their sponsoring 

development and acquisition agencies. 

Altogether, the NRO management team. 

consisted of highly mission-oriented project offices, with extremely short lines of 

control to the decision makers. 

NSA, while not a builder of satellites, 

played a central role in the decision process for new SIGINT systems. Gen Lew 

Allen .described it this way: "If the DNRO 

wants to make a major decision in the 

SIGINT world, he should have NSA on his 

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NOFORN- ( )R( ()c 

side and the CIA not opposed." From 1960 

to 1975, that set of conditions was always 

present. The DNRO had NSA working 

with him, supporting the recommended 

plan. 

the CIA got into the planning 

discussions too and did not question 

DNRO decisions after they were made.8 

So long as the DNRO did his homework, 

he could make his decisions stick. 

With the NRO jobs assigned and the 

organizational relationship established, 

the actual design and building of satellites 

in Program A and Program B were carried 

out by industrial contractors. The Navy's 

Program C POPPY satellites were built by 

the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL); 

were first 

built by NRL and subsequently manufactured by industrial contractor teams. In 

Program A, the SAFSP SIGINT project 

offices i used a few people in the 

office for each project. In a matrix form of 

organization, each project team was supported by an SAFSP procurement team 

, a budget team

and an operations team that 

worked with the tracking and communications network of the Air Force Satellite 

Control Facility (AFSCF) sites. Launch 

vehicles—the Atlas, Thor, and Titan derivatives—were procured by sending money 

to the "white" Air Force project offices in 

Los Angeles. This arrangement allowed 

project managers to concentrate on 

the SIGINT mission part of the job, which. 

because it revealed that reconnaissance 

was being carried out, was bought with 

covert or "black.' contracts. 

The black contracts were administered so as to comply with all procurement 

rules contained in Federal Statutes—the 

law—but with waivers from any of the 

implementing or reporting instructions of 

the US Department of Defense or the US 

Air Force that would have required disclosure of the existence of the contracts to 

persons who were not working on them. 

The Director of SAFSP. as head of a contracting agency, held his own warrant as a 

contracting officer and signed in that 

capacity on large procurements. These 

arrangements gave him effective control 

over every aspect of the reconnaissance 

side of his job and a way of getting support 

for all the other space-related needs 

through the "white- Air Force, which operated the tracking network and the launch 

bases at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg 

Air Force Base. . 

The Air Forc project manager 

viewed himself as the head of a task force, 

with his main job being the leading of a 

team made up mostly of industrial contractors. To motivate that team he used 

performance incentive contracting, developed for the photo satellites by BGen John 

L. Martin, Jr., (the "Martin Incentive") and 

then first applied to SIGINT satellites by 

BGen David D. Bradburn with Martin's 

close supervision. Under this approach, 

good performance by the contractor was 

linked to successful mission performance. 

If the project succeeded, the fee would be 

high. If the project failed. the fee would be 

low. This direct coupling of the project goal' 

turned the contract into an important 

instrument of delegation. The contractor 

team became an extension of the roject office. 

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NotoRN-DRCON 

Under the Martin Incentive, objective 

measures of performance, such as total 

days of successful operation and the percentage of usable information, were worked 

out in advance. With this system, if the 

satellite needed more testing on the ground 

to ensure it would work right in orbit, the 

contractor would do the testing on his own 

initiative. When all were confident, the 

launch would proceed. 

The Air Force, through became 

responsible for operating each Program A 

satellite as it went into orbit. From that 

time on, the incentive provisions were • 

especially useful, because contractor team 

members, experts on the mission, were on 

duty at the mission ground stations, pur–

suing the same goals in the contract originally laid out by the government project 

manager. If the Air Force manager 

decided to operate the satellite in a way 

that would place the vehicle at risk, the 

contractors affected by the planned action 

could choose either to accept the risk and 

leave their incentive fees riding or to 

select the "no-fault" option, with fees lower 

than for a full success (but not zero) for 

the remainder of the flight. 

This Performance Incentive contracting method made for simple, short contracts. Air Force managers spent much of 

their time negotiating and administering 

these incentive provisions. Senior managers 

of the contractors also spent their time on 

the incentive provisions. before and during 

the life of the contract. This was time well 

spent because it constituted the heart of 

the delegation process. When all had 

agreed on the incentives, there was then 

no need for detailed government contract 

specifications, and contract changes could 

be made without fear by the government 

that some important performance goal 

might be lost. Government offices to 

administer the black projects were much 

smaller than equivalent offices administering similar white programs because the 

more detailed specification process (called 

"configuration management" on the white 

side) was not applied on the black side. 

To reiterate: The Program A SIGINT 

projects used a team approach, incentives, 

motivation, and simple contracts to delegate the work to the contractor teams. In 

this way they made the contractors part of 

a task force, with the same priorities as 

the government managers. 

A set of special circumstances not usually found in the Air Force, in the opinion 

of MGen John Martin, Jr., helped make 

this management structure successful: 

1. The effect of the increased responsibility which such limited and compartmented management places on 

each of the participants. SAFSP captains typically had more responsibility than many colonels. 

2. The extent of continuity realized 

within the system. There were 

changes of station and specific jobs, 

while maintaining essential continuity 

for both individual development as 

well as the organization's effectiveness. 

3. The extremely beneficial effect of 

many key people being in place long 

enough for the 'chickens to come 

home to roost'—to see the direct 

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results produced by the decisions 

which they made or in which they 

participated. 

4. The unique benefit of working in a 

closed-loop enterprise, where the end 

results'are evident to ail—where, 

although it's nice to be told that one's 

work is good, it's not necessary in 

order to know, for the entire results 

tell all there is to be told: technically, 

operationally, financially; the ultimate 

in work incentive and job satisfaction.9 

Secrecy was probably a help, on balance, especially during the formative days 

of the NRO, between 1958 and 1962. when 

steps were taken to exclude the military 

services and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense staff from the management chain. 

The freedom not to be involved in routine 

R&D administration, more a question of 

short decision-making channels than of 

secrecy as such, motivated those on the 

inside. The disadvantage was the ill will 

engendered among those on the outside, 

who were not taken into confidence, and 

whose cooperation was sometimes difficult 

to arrange. This was a continuing problem, particularly in the Air Force, because 

the SAFSP organization did not report 

through the Air Force Systems Command 

or the Air Force Staff in the Pentagon; to 

those on the outside, it often appeared that 

the SAFSP people and their CIA friends 

were using secrecy to keep others away for 

personal convenience rather than for any 

legitimate purpose. This difficulty—there 

were outsiders who knew generally what 

was going on and wanted more access and 

less secrecy—was a manageable problem 

at the time but, with the passing of the 

Cold War, will lead to new looks at security 

policy. 

In thiS history, the real argument for 

short. management channels was the 

urgency of the SIGINT satellite mission. 

The real argument for secrecy was the fear 

of Soviet diplomatic intervention or 

attempts to interfere with the satellites; 

there was also the concern for compromise 

of intelligence sources and methods—the 

possible drying up of a SIGINT source 

when the Soviets became aware of our 

ability to use the radio frequency (RF) signal. Secrecy made the job easier in most 

cases and helped to ensure the privacy of 

the short management channels. Both factors were probably important to the 

results that were achieved. 

The NRO project teams, charged with 

building and operating SIGINT satellites. 

brought these new spacecraft into existence in a short time and brought them to 

bear on the intelligence problenis of the 

nation quickly and effectively. POPPY . 

typically achieved new models within one 

or two years.

These short times from concept to 

operation were remarkable and a testimony to the dedication and skill of their 

government and contractor teams. These 

records were achieved in unique circumstances—a one-time blending of threats to 

our national survival and technological 

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opportunity—and were made possible by 

an astute decision about how to organize 

for the job.*lO 

N-11,0 and NSA Working Together 

In 1958, National Security Council 

(NSC) Directive No. 6 (NSCID No. 6) 

placed NSA in charge of coordinating all 

US ELINT activity. This decision put. NSA 

in a business it had not been in before; up 

to that time NSA people were really 

COMINT specialists, not ELINTers. This 

new assignment for NSA was resisted by 

many of the rank and file in the CIA and 

in the military services, who were the traditional ELINT collectors, users. and operators. By the 1960s, NSCID No. 6 also led 

to a conflict between NSA and the NRO 

over roles and missions: with the NRO in 

charge of satellite reconnaissance.and 

NSA in charge of EL1NT, who would be in 

charge of ELINT satellites? This question 

came up again. and with more importance, 

when COMINT satellites became a reality. 

The answer was usually worked out by 

NRO/NSA teaming arrangements and 

agreements on a project-by-project basis, 

along the lines suggested by Gene Fubini 

In 1961: typically, the NRO would build 

and operate the satellites, and NSA would 

be the resident SIGINT expert and process 

the satellite data for analysis by the 

Intelligence Community customers. 

At the end of the 1950s, NSA was 

recognized as the processor of satelliteCollected SIGINT and that, too, was not 

'There were no dedicated R&D flights and no formal test 

alld evaluation (light programs. This alone distinguished °Ito programs from almost all other R&D programs. 

seriously questioned thereafter, although 

Tasking—that is, giving detailed commands to the satellites to direct their collection operations—on the other hand, was 

more painfully sorted out. Eventually. 

tasking was defined in phases; authority 

ultimately resided in the US Intelligence 

Board (USIB), which delegated the 

detailed work of target selection and priorities to its committees. The committees 

discussed and wrote the official requirements and set priorities which. in some 

cases, became extremely detailed, even 

awkward, and. at least in the early 1960s, 

inefficient. The NRO acquiesced to what 

many felt was an intrusion and, in 1962. 

set up the Satellite Operations Center 

(SOC) in the Pentagon. NSA, in turn, saw 

the SOC as usurping a traditional NSA 

role in managing the tasking of SIGINT 

collectors. Later in 1962, NSA personnel 

were integrated into the NRO, both on the 

collection side (satellite planning and budgeting) in the Office of the Secretary of the 

Air Force, Space Systems I SAFSS), and on 

the operational side, in the SOC. Then, in 

an evolutionary step, in 1968 the SIGINT 

part of the SOC provided a representative 

to NSA offices at Fort Meade, Maryland. 

An amicable arrangement evolved: USIB 

was in titular control,T NRO was in control of the satellite vehicles, and NSA 

orchestrated target collection and, of 

course, did or arranged for all the SIGINT 

processing. 

Actually, when one reviews the voluminous detail in the 

more recent USIB files on SIGINT satellites, particularly 

their 'Guidance on the NRP" published annually and 

then for fiveand then 10 years in advance, one could conclude that USIB. if not in control, certainly spent a lot of • 

time and resources attempting control of SIGINT satellites. 

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The mission ground stations (MGSs) 

were important to the collaboration between 

the NRO and NSA. The GRAB/POPPY 

mission ground stations were primarily at 

the Navy stations

used the Air Force 

• Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) sites 

built by the Air Force for the imaging and 

SIGINT satellites. In 1966

became the first—ecill—aborativelymanned 

operational site at which NSA people carried out processing of SIGINT data with 

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With the advent of the high-altitude. 

and also realtime, SIGINT satellites. NSA 

did in fact make a determined and successful 

effort to get back into the business of SIGINT 

operational control. On 10 February 1968 

the Director of NSA, LGen Marshall S. 

"Pat" Carter. approved the establishment 

of the SIGINT Satellite Support Center 

(SSSC) at NSA Headquarters. Fort 

Meade. Maryland.14This was a specialized tasking center to focus and- centralize 

all tasking for conceived by 

Charlie Tevis and headed by

who had developed much of the software 

himself. The SSSC was originally manned 

by approximately eight people to handle 

COMINT, ELINT, and TELINT. In • 

January 1972 two representatives from 

the NRO/SOC were integrated into the 

SSSC to operate certain phases of NRO 

tasking at NSA. By the summer of 1972 

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there were at least four NRO/SOC representatives, mostly Air Force personnel, 

working jointly with NSA personnel in the 

SSSC.'15 

The timing and personnel were just 

right for the SSSC to go into operation. 

The spirit of cooperation between NSA and 

the NRO was high under Carter and his 

Directors of Operations, Oliver Kirby and 

later MGen John E. Morrison. Jr., US Air 

Force. A NSA assistant to 

the Director of SSSC, remarked, NSA 

could not unilaterally have developed and 

begun operating its SSSC as part of the 

NRO satellite control and tasking system 

either before or after the late 1960s: earlier. 

the NSA wasn't capable; later. the NRO 

was better organized and probably wouldn't 

have relinquished control of SIGINT satellite operations.16Later, much of the task 

planning for

The SSSC was ahead of its time, but 

it was not politically acceptable in the 

Intelligence Community. The US Intelligence Board (USIB) hierarchy—its SIGINT 

Requirements Subcommittee, especially—

did not like the SSSC, even though it was 

intended to provide a mechanism for consolidating NSA recommendations on the 

SIGINT satellite collection requirements. 

As a part of an internal NSA reorganization, the SSSC was formally disestablished 

on 18 September 1974. The 24-hour watch 

operations in SSSC were assimilated into 

• 

The Operations Center for Mission Control (0CMCIwss 

established at NSA by a memo signed by John McMahon' 

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in 1984. 

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The good times were when the limelight was shared—when each participant 

respected the other. 

O This sharing started in the early 

years, from 1958, between the Air 

Force and NSA, as John Copley and 

remember so well. 

* Charlie Tevis and Raymond Potts 

remember that the good times overwhelmingly outnumbered the bad, 

and both cite the enthusiastic support of Deputy Director of NSA 

Louis Tordella as crucial throughout all those years, until Tordella's 

retirement in 1974. He set up 

direct access/short-chain management. 

o NSA Director LGen Pat Carter, 

1965 to 1969, of course, encouraged 

team play. 

* DNROs Joseph V. Charyk (1962 to 

1963), Brockway McMillan (1963 to 

1965), Alexander H. Flax (1965 to 

1969), and John L. McLucas (1969 

to 1973) also added to the cooperative spirit. 

• SAFSP key team leaders in the 

1960s and 1970s were BGen Bill 

King, Col Bob Yundt, LtCol Jack 

Sides, and MGen Dave Bradburn. 

Bradburn was among the first in 

SAFSP senior management to 

establish a close collaborative 

working relationship between 

SAFSP and NSA. 

• LMSC leaders such as Bill 

Troetschel, Bill Harris, George . 

Price, and were team 

players who often acted as extensions to the SAFSP project offices. 

• Bob Hermann, as NSA Chief, high 

altitude) Satellite Programs in the 

1970s, then as Director of all NSA 

R&D, from mid-1973 to 1975, 

advised NSA not to try to take over. 

He was instrumental in resolving 

NSA/Air Force and NSA/CIA 

problems. 

• NSA Directors VAdm Laurence H. 

Frost (1960 to 1962), and VAdm 

Noel Gayler (1969 to 1972) tried to 

get control, while the Air Force and 

Army Directors of NSA, LGen 

Gordon Blake, US Air Force 1962 

to 1965), Pat Carter, US Army 

(1965 to 1969), Samuel C. Phillips, 

US Air Force (1972), and Lew 

Allen, US Air Force (1973 to 1977), 

felt comfortable without getting 

complete control. 

So there was an ebb and flow of NSA/NRO/ 

CIA cooperation. George Cotter says he 

will always consider SIGINT satellites as 

the only SIGEINT_program where NSA was 

not master. land Potts believe that 

some Air Force and Navy airborne military 

SIGINT also belong 

in the same (NSA not driving) category. 

The CIA, from the early days of Bud 

Wheelon's arrival from the academic community and industry, was a technical tiger. 

As Wheelon said, "Killian and Land got to 

President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs 

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when Allen Dulles was fired in November 

1961; so CIA was not gutted; instead, its 

technical capability was preserved and 

expanded."" The Air Force and NSA then 

had real competition. So, tensions were 

bound to develop; they were resolved only 

when personalities allowed for cooperation 

or when the excitement of the job overwhelmed the spirit of competition. In the 

interviews conducted for this history, an 

opinion frequently proffered was that in the 

late 1970s and later years, interagency 

relations became more formal and difficult. 

This point of view (actually in

words) could be summarized this 

way: "There are too' many middlemen and 

we won't ever get back to the simple days: 

the systems are so large we can't do some 

very important jobs the way we used to do 

with small systems–we have lost that skill; 

and organizations have become so large, it 

is easier not to do at all what, in the old days, 

was accomplished with a short discussion." 

Concluding Thoughts 

The story of the SIGINT satellites is 

first the story of decisions by national 

leaders: The creation of a Department of 

Defense, a Director of Central Intelligence. 

and a National Security Agency by President 

Truman: the arrangement to have the 

Director of Central Intelligence take full 

charge of setting priorities for military and 

civil intelligence operations by President 

Eisenhower; Eisenhower's creation of the 

US Intelligence Board (USIB), the 

• Wheelon was the first CIA Deputy Director for Science 

and Technology iDDS&TI: preceding Wheelon were Herb 

Pete' Scoville and Don Chamberlain. who were the first 

and second CIA Deputy Directors for Research. 

President's Scientific Advisory Committee, 

and the President's Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board; and Eisenhower's initiation 

of what became the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which brought creative minds to assist the President in his 

stewardship over these crucial national 

security activities of the country. These 

decisions can now be seen as legacies of 

the very first importance—actions that 

shaped the manner in which the Cold War 

would unfold. 

The objectives of President Eisenhower's 

"Open Skies" proposal were actually achieved 

at greater altitudes above national airspace by the US space reconnaissance systems. Even though the Soviets never • 

agreed to permit US reconnaissance aircraft to overfly their airspace, they did permit US reconnaissance satellites to overfly 

the Soviet Union and benefited by the 

same access for their satellites over the 

United States. This tacit cooperation was 

made possible by Eisenhower's three-track 

approach to organizing and carrying out 

the US space effort. Assigning the manned 

and scientific space work to NASA, the 

standard military projects to the military 

services, and all space reconnaissance 

under a separate and covert organization 

was a brilliant organizational plan. By. 

hiding the US reconnaissance effort under 

the NRO, the United States kept the diplomatic pressure off. Neither the Soviet 

Union nor the United States had to admit 

publicly that it was overflying the territory 

of the other or that the sovereignty of its 

own territory might be "violated." The 

tacit agreement served well. These initiatives and activities would have been hard 

to negotiate and even harder for leaders to 

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agree to in public. So the plan was good, it 

worked, and it suited the special circumstances of the Cold War perfectly. 

The SIGINT satellites that were built 

were good, too. They made a complementary set and provided our leaders with the 

information they needed to make crucial 

defense decisions. Especially on the Soviet 

ABM—the big question as to whether the 

Soviets could actually defend themselves 

against incoming US missiles (they couldn't!)—the answers were vital and they 

were provided in time to preserve the confidence of US leaders in the deterrent 

power of their forces. 

These results meant that the leaders 

of the United States could wait and not be 

led by uncertainty into the disaster of a 

nuclear exchange. For the United States, 

this made possible the successful outcome 

of the Cold War. 

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Chapter 9 References 

1. Alexander H. Flax comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

2. Flax comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1991. 

3. Eugene Fubini interview, 20 May 1991. 

4. Flax comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

• 5. Flax comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

6. RAdm Robert K. Geiger comments, SIGINT Satellite. History peer review. March 1994. 

7. Flax comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

8. Flax comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

9. MGen John L. Martin, Jr., comments. SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

10. Flax comments, SIGINT Satellite History peer review, March 1994. 

11. Julian Caballero interview, 29 October 1990. 

12. James V. Boone interview, 19 September 1971. 

13. George Cotter interview, 23 May 1991. 

14. NSA-BYE-19016-68, 9 February 1968. 

15. NSA in Space, April 1975, BYE-19385-75, pp. 84-85. 

16. interview, 1 October 1991. 

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/., Appendix 

...-...,, 

Role of Digital Computing in 

SIGINT Satellite Collection 

Systems 

The role of digital computers in the 

development of SIGINT satellite collection 

systems can be appreciated through a 

review of digital computer development 

and the application of this development to 

processing of SIGINT data collected by the 

various overhead satellite systems. 

The timeline in this appendix presents a brief outline of computer development from 1935 to 1975. 

Chart 1 depicts the improvement in 

processing capacity at the National 

Security Agency (NSA) from 1960 through 

1971 as more powerful computers were 

developed and applied to the processing of 

SIGINT data from the first mostly experimental programs of the early 1960s to the 

more sophisticated programs of the 1970s. 

Chart 2 demonstrates a similar trend 

to the_processing-capability_de_veloped by 

Chart 3 is a measure of the increasing data produced by the POPPY Program 

as its collection progressed from a single 

satellite with a single frequency band to 

multiple satellites with as many as

Chart 4 shows the total number of 

radar locations produced per year as the 

number of collection systems increased and 

became more sophisticated. Advanced 

techniques

made these increases 

possible. 

Chart 5 is a comparison of emitter 

location accuracy for the various SIGINT 

systems as they were developed.

is a far cry from the 400- to 8.000-mile 

locations of the first POPPIES or even the 

300-mile accuracy of the first Project 

698BK satellites. 

Chart 6 reminds us that in addition 

to the digital processing applied to identification and location of SIGINT emitters. 

there was a parallel development in using 

digital techniques to glean the technical 

information from the narrow and wide 

bandwidth analog tapes produced in the 

same timeframe. 

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Digital Computer Evolution 

Date Event 

1935 IBM 601 Multiplying Card Punch was developed These punched-card 

machines were the backbone of the machine support for processing by NSA's predecessor organizations, the Navy's Communications Supplementary Activities. 

Washington (CSAW), and the Army Security Agency (ASA). 

1944 Mark 1 relay computer was developed at Harvard under direction of Howard 

Aiken.2 

1946 ENIAC. the first large, general-purpose electronic computer, which had 18.000 

vacuum tubes, stored only 20 numbers, and was programmed by plugging large 

cables between registers, was developed by J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly 

at the Moore School of Electrical Engineering, University of Pennsylvania.3 

1950 Engineering Research Associates, Inc. (ERA), delivered the first ATLAS computer 

(started in 1948) to CSAW in December 1950. The ATLAS digital computer was a 

large, vacuum-tube machine that used magnetic-drum storage with a capacity of 

16,384 words of 24 bits (binary digits) each and had an access time of 17 miliseconds.4ATLAS I was the first parallel electronic computer in the US with 

drum memory. 

1952 ABNER I, developed by ASA engineers, became operational in 1952. ABNER I 

used mercury delay lines developed by Technitrol for ASA for memory, digital 

tape drives developed by Raytheon. and a unique instruction set developed by 

ASA programmers and engineers, the first of which emphasized upon nonarithmetic operations. ABNER was a serial computer similar in logic to SEAC and 

EDVAC. It was the most sophisticated computer of its time and was the first 

computer to perform computations simultaneously with input-output operations. 

ABNER had the most complete complement of input-output capabilities of its 

time, including punched cards, punched paper tape, magnetic tape, parallel 

printer. typewriter, and console. ABNER II. built for NSA by Technitrol 

Corporation, became operational in June 1955.5 

1953 The first ATLAS II computer was delivered to NSA (established on 4 November 

1952) in October 1953 by UNIVAC (ERA had been acquired by Remington Rand. 

Inc.. in 1952. and UNIVAC was formed). The first ATLAS II computer used electrostatic tubes for high-speed memory. 

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1954 The second ATLAS II computer delivered to NSA in November 1954 is believed 

to be the first magnetic-core-memory computer delivered. ATLAS II was 1,000 

times faster than ATLAS I, with the new magnetic-core memory.7 

1956 IBM 703 and UNIVAC 1103 are the first commercial digital computers to use 

magnetic-core storage.8The UNIVAC Scientific 1103 was the commercial version of the ATLAS 11.9 

1957 The first of five BOGART computers, built by Sperry Rand (Remington Rand 

and Sperry Corporation combined in 1955 to form Sperry Rand.), St. Paul. 

Minnesota, to specifications provided by NSA to provide data conversion, formatting, and other special functions, was delivered to NSA, Fort Meade, in July 

1957. Work started on BOGART in July 1954. The BOGART computer used 

diode and magnetic-core logic with a 24-bit word size and had the capability to 

select any of three 8-bit portions of the word. The cycle time of the magnetic 

core memory was 20 microseconds. IBM 727 magnetic tape drives, which were 

becoming the industry standard, were also used. BOGART was probably the . 

first US computer that was built using "design automation' techniques. Many 

features of BOGART were carried over into the family of Navy Tactical Data 

System computers.10The BOGART computer was the first computer used by NSA 

in 1961 to process ELINT data collected by the Navy program (see Chapter 3). 

1958 SOLO. the first operational digital computer using transistors, was delivered to 

NSA in March 1958. NSA recognized in January 1955 the potential for transistors to replace vacuum tubes and formed a small group of engineers (including 

and Raymond Potts) to lead efforts using transistors and to 

form the nucleus of what became the transistor generation. In June 1955 Philco 

Corporation was awarded a contract to build a transistor machine using surfacebarrier transistors (a technology that was superseded by junction transistors) to 

duplicate the design of the ATLAS II computer. The SOLO transistor version of 

the ATLAS II computer operated with a clock speed of 1 megacycle and was contained in a desk. compared to the 400 square feet of space required for ATLAS II. 

Philco marketed a commercial version of SOLO as the TRANSAC 1000. A 

larger, improved computer, the TRANSAC S-2000, based on the Navy CXPQ 

computer and later called Philco S-2000, was marketed with more success.11 

1960 The first Control Data Corporation (CDC) 1604A computer was delivered. CDC 

was formed by William Norris and a small group of engineers from Remington 

Rand in 1957. These engineers included Seymore Cray as the chief computer 

designer. Cray later formed Cray Research where he designed, built, and delivered the very large scientific CRAY computers. 

Appendix A .273 

Top Secret 

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NoFoRN-ORLON 

1962 HARVEST, the most sophisticated model of the STRETCH series of computers 

built by IBM, was delivered to NSA in February 1962.12Construction of the IBM 

STRETCH series of computers started in 1955 with the design for the more 

capable HARVEST version to meet NSA requirements submitted in May 1957. 

The proposed HARVEST system was estimated to be. 100 to 200 times faster 

than current equipment. The HARVEST system for NSA was basically the same 

as other STRETCH systems, with the following major additions: two additional 

banks of high-speed memory, with a 0.9-microsecond access time; a high-speed 

streaming unit to perform special statistical calculations; and the TRACTOR 

automatic, high-speed, high-capacity data storage system. TRACTOR consisted 

of three automatic tape-cartridge handling units, each capable of automatically 

seeking and extracting data under program control. The 160 tape cartridges, 

each using 1.75-inch-wide tape with 3,000 bits per inch. could store 88-billion 

characters, with an instantaneous information-transfer rate of 1,280,000 characters per second. The TRACTOR tape system was the first completely automated 

tape library. The system also pioneered the use of error-correcting codes and deskewing buffers. 

The logic technology used in IBM's 7000-series and subsequent models followed 

the STRETCH and HARVEST foundation. The 2-microsecond magnetic-core 

memory technology was used in IBM's 7090 and other computers.13 

• 

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Handle via BYFMAN-TALENT-laYHOL f274 The SIGINT Satellite Story C01,1IN T Cor,rol Channels lo.nrly 

gyE.or 07/04 

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lop secret 

NoFocm-ORLON 

Chart 1 

Processing capacity increases applied to satellite ELINT data 

at NSA, Fort Meade, Maryland. 

160 

150 

140 

160 — 

120 

110 

100 —

90 I80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

1 

The throughput figure of merit shows the relative 

computer power of each•new computer system 

compared to the original BOGART computer 

Throughput figure of merit 

Computer 

Shifts used 

Year 

BOGART IBM7090 IBM7094 CDC6400 6400 & 6600 6400 & three 6600s 

1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYffinAN. TALENT-KEYHOL f"— 

COmINT Control Channels lointly 

8r(.9197'94 

Appendix A 275 

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0 

2 

CYBER 74 

upgrade 

mass storage 

The throughput figure of merit shows the relative 

computer power of each new computer system 

compared to the original BOGART computer 

CDC 1700 

3200 

3300 

6400 CDC 1700 

3200 

3300 

CDC 3200 

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 

Processing capacity increases applied to satellite SIGINT data 

40 

agsI

MO'S agi 

Thr

oughp

ut figure of merit 

1700 

3300 

6600 

CDC 74 DDT 

EO 1 4 (C) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Chart 2 

Yon, 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Tape screened/processed at POPPY fields sites. — 

i. 

NSA assigned selected 

screening/processing 

responsibilities to POPPY 

field sites. 

ORN-ORCLA 

Chart 3 

POPPY tapes processing. 

50,000 — 

45,000 

40,000 

35,000 

30,000 — 

25,000 

20,000 

15,000 

12,000 

10,000 

7,000 

6,000 — 

5,000 — 

4,000 Tapes processed by NSA at Fort Meade. I 

3,000 — 

2,000 — 

1,000 — 

0 I I 

0 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 

Years 

No accurate tape volume data available after 1969 

• 

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tiVE.91 97/94 

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30,000 

20,000 

19,000 

18,000 

17,000 

16,000 

15,000 

14,000 

13,000 

12,000 

11,000 

10,000 

9,000 

8,000 

7,000 

6,000 

5,000 

4,000 

3,000 

2,000 

1,000 

700 

600 

500 

400 

300 

200 

100 

0 

Number ofradar locations 

Top Secret 

Norowni.( )RC (Rid 

Chart 4 

Number of radar locations produced per year. 

40,000 

50,000 

! I I t I f I 1 

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 

Year 

No accurate tape volume data available after 1970 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYFAIAN.T.ALENLKEYHOf E278 The SIGINT Satellite Story catav r Cowl°, Chinneh loonfle 

FtVF•n I n",14 

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tO 

O1 

0,

rn N 

POPPY 

POPPY BK 

POPPY BIRD DOGBK 

POPPY BK. 

- SETTER POPPY 

SETTER 

_REAPER THRESHER 

REAPER THRESHER 

Location accuracy in miles 

LO 

On 

CA) 

CD 

U' 

CO 

cr) Oo 

m

▪ 

• a, tO ch 

tO 

01 

LO 

0 

iO 

tO 

CA) ".4

Location accuracy i

mprovements by FLINT satellite 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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35,000 — 

NSA assigned selected screening/processing 

responsibilities to POPPY field sites and 

started processing at LMSC for NSA under NW direction. 

30,000 

25,000 

20,000 

15,000 

10,000 

9,000 

8,000 

7,000 

6,000 

5,000 

4,000 

3,000 

2,000 

Tapesperyear 

1,000 

0 

Top Secret 

NocoRmoRCON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Chart 6 

Volume of ELINT analog tapes processed by NSA at Fort Meade, Maryland. 

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1995 1966 1967 1968 1969 

Yeats 

In addition to the ELINT analog tapes there were large quantities of digital data processedThere are NO complete records of the digital volume. The analog tapes include 10 kHz, 

detected data up to 10 MHz, and predetected data. 

No accurate tape volume data available after 1969 

• 

Top Secret 

Handle via YfloAN. TAL ENT-KEYHOU_ 

280 The SIGINT Satellite Story - comWTcontrol ChannelSlandy 

BYE-9197,94 

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Top Secret 

Not oRN-oRCON 

Appendix A References 

1. Encyclopedia of Computer Science, 3rd Edition. Van Norstrand Reinhold. NY, 1993. p. 

1488. 

2. Encyclopedia of Computer Science, p. 1488. 

3. Snyder, Samuel S. Influence of U.S. Cryptologic Organizations On The Digital 

Computer Industry. National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, MD, May 1977, p. 3. 

4. Snyder, pp. 5, 7, and 8. 

5. Snyder, p. 10. 

6. Snyder, p. 8. 

7. Snyder, p. 8. 

8. Encyclopedia of Computer Science, p. 1488. 

9. Snyder, p. 8. 

10. Snyder, pp. 17-18. 

11. Snyder. pp. 18-19. 

12. Snyder. p. 29. 

13. Snyder, pp. 19-22. 

• 

Reverse side blank 

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BYE-QI Q7,94 

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NoroRm-ORLON 

f0 1.4.(c) 

pL 86-36/50 USG 3605 

Apr 60 U-2 photography Two HEN ROOST radars, one HEN HOUSE radar, a HEN NEST 

radar, and two HEN EGG radars, all thought to be tracking radars, 

were photographed at the research and development comple's 

under construction at Sary Shagan.' 

Appendix B 283 

Top ,Secret 

Handle via B Yf MAN. TALEN 7-KEYHOLECOMEN 7" Control Channels It:witty 

SIGINT Satellite Contributions to Understanding Soviet Antiballistic Missile/ 

Anti-Earth Satellite (ABM/AES) Radar System Capabilities 

Date Mission ABM/AES Information Developed 

1961 Satellite photo BIG SCREEN construction detected.-! 

7 Aug 61 GRAB/DYNO 2 "On the 7th or August 1961. the first signals helievedto ernanate 

28 Oct 62 •

26 Jun 63 WILDBILL 3, 

Mission 7207: 

and POPPY 4, 

27 Nov63 LONG JOHN 2, 

Mission 7219 

1 1 Ian 64 POPPY 5. Using a series of intercepts in the band made 

during POPPY 5 operations, National S-ec7irity gency (NSA) analysts 

27 Jan 64 MOON BOUNCE Satellites provided the only signal collection of Soviet ABM radars 

program until the MOON BOUNCE intercept arranged by NSA and the 

Naval Research Laboratory (NRU. 

25 Dec 64 •POPPY 5. 

Table continues) 

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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9 Mar 65 POPPY 6, 

25 lun 65, 

1 Sep 66, 

and 

21 Dec 66 

POPPY 6, 

. 28 Dec 66 MULTIGROUP 1, 

Mission 7161 

1 

Top Secret 

vort)R.vokroN 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SIGINT Satellite Contributions to Understanding Soviet Antiballistic Missile/ 

Anti-Earth Satellite (ABM/AES) Radar System Capabilities 

Date Mission ABM/AES Information Deveicleed 

2 Feb 65 POPPY 5, 

'Table continues) 

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Handle via 811MAIV. TAUNT-Kt' YHOLE284 The SiGINT Satellite Story Comuvr Control Channels lomtly 

BYE •q 97 to4 

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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NocoRtv.oRcon. EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SIGINT Satellite Contributions to Understanding Soviet Antiballistic Missile/ 

Anti-Earth Satellite (ABM/AES) Radar System Capabilities 

Date Mission ABM/AES Information Developed 

31 May 67 POPPY 7, 

24 Jul 67 MULTIGROUP 2, 

mission 7162 

28 Sep 67 MULTIGROUP 2, 

Mission 7162 

19 Dec 67 POPPY 7, 

9 Apr 68 

MULTIGROUP 3, 

Mission 7163 

3 Oct 68 THRESHER 1, 

Mission 7164 

(Table continues 

Top Secret 

Handle via flYfmArv-TALENT-KEYHOLECOmiNT Control Channels Jointly Appendix B 285 

BYE-9197194 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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N'OfORN-ORLON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SIGINT Satellite Contributions to Understanding Soviet Antiballistic Missile/ 

Anti-Earth Satellite (ABMJAES) Radar System Capabilities 

Date Mission ABM/AES Information Developed 

5 Oct 68 CONVOY, 

Mission 7238 

31 Jul 69 THRESHER 2, 

Mission 7165 

31 Jul 69- CONVOY 2, . 

Mission 7239 

26 Aug 70 REAPER 3, 

Mission 7235 

(Tobix conetnuesl 

286 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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81T-9197,'94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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top Secret 

NOFORN.ORCON 

EQ 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SIGINT Satellite Contributions to Understanding Soviet Antiballistic Missile/ 

Anti-Earth Satellite (ABM/AES) Radar System Capabilities 

Date Mission ABM/AES Information Developed 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYEAIAN-TALENT.KEYHOLECOMINT Control Channels lointiv 

811.9197194 . • 

• Appendix B 287 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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NOFORN-())20". PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Appendix B References 

1. Thompson1Fred C., Emory Richardson, Thomas F. Kenly, and Leo W Lemlev. Synthesis 

of th jadar System, HRB Singer Inc. Report, , 5 June 1964. 

p. 9. 

F 

• 

2. A Study of the Radar Signal. by the Special Signal Analysis Team of 

Agency

Lock.17:1-and -ancl-Space-COrnpany,--under-the -direction of the National Security 

3. Signal Characteristics Summar', of Antimissile / Antisatellite System Type 

Signals, 27 January 1966, TCS-650001-66. p. 9. para 7. 

4. History of the POPPY Satellite System, BYE-56105-78, p. 45 I hereafter cited as POPPY 

History). 

5. Summary of Antirnissile I Antisatellite System Signals. 27 January 1966., 

TCS-650001-66, pp. 10-11. 

6. Summary of .Antimissile I Antisatellite System Type Signals, p. 13. 

7. NSA in Space, April 1975, BYE-19385-75, p. 13. 

8. POPPY History, p. 46. 

9. A Study of th adar Signal. p. 3. 

10. Summary=of_Antimissile I Antisatellite System npe Signals. p. 21, and Radar Signal 

Similar to Intercepted by Satellite

11. POPPY History, p. 47. 

12. History 0 ercepts by Mission 7312 TCS650070-66, 9 ay 

13. A Study of the Radar Signal, pp 3-4. 

14

15

16

18. Summary of SLEWTO, Mission 7318, Intercept Analysis, TCS 

40117-68, 20 March 68. 

19. POPPY History, pp. 47-48. 

20

21

22. A Study of the Radar Signal, p. 4. 

23.

24. POPPY History, p. 48. 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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Handle wa 8 YEMAN- TALENT -Kf YHOL (- 

288 The slaw Satellite Story COMINT Control Channels faintly 

8YEAr o7ma 

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

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NOFORN•ORCOIC PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

25.

26. A Study of the Radar Signal, p.- 5. 

27

28

29

30

31. TK/WC-W205/47-71 and TK/WC-W205/08-72. 

32. Report AM019, 17 April 1970 and 22 July 1970. PL 

EO 

86-36/50 

1.4.(c) 

USC 3605 

33. Report AM 103, 8 December 1989. 

34. Report AM007, 20 February 1970. 

35. Report AM73, 21 October 1970. 

36. Report 004, 16 January 1970. 

37. Performance Characteristics Based on Wave Form Analysis of by the 

Special.Signal Analysis Team of Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, under the direction of the National Security Agency, 13 October 1971, TCS 58527-71. 

38. Reports: 06, 18 February 1971; AM10. 12 March 1971; 15. 6 April 1971; and AM24, 15 

June 1971. 

39

4 0

41

72

42. NSA in Space. April 1975, BYE-19385-75, Appendix H, p. 1. 

Reverse side blank 

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Harldfr via 8YEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLEcow,/ r Control Channels Jointly 

BY E.9 1 97'94 

Appendix B 2139 

EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

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NuFoRN.oRCON 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

rs Appendix 

1;4 

Soviet and Chinese Radar and Communications Signals 

Radars 

US/NATO Name Function 

Soviet ABM. target acquisition and tracking 

Soviet ABM, target acquisition and tracking 

Soviet acquisition radar for the SA-5 GAMMON surface-to-airmissile tSAM) system 

Soviet shipborne surface search 

Soviet early warning 

Soviet early warning, ground-controlled intercept 

Soviet early warning 

Soviet early warning 

Soviet shipborne early warning 

Soviet ABM target warning 

Soviet ABM. target acquisition and tracking 

Soviet ABM 

Soviet ABM, target acquisition and tracking 

Soviet ABM, target acquisition and tracking 

Soviet target tracking for the GALOSH antiballistic missile 

(ABM) system 

Soviet early warning 

Soviet target acquisitiOn for the GALOSH ABM system 

Soviet antiaircraft fire- control 

Soviet, believed slewable phased array 

Soviet target tracking and missile guidance for SA-2 GUIDELINE 

SAMs also used in the People's Republic of China (PRO 

Soviet target tracking and missile guidance for SA-2 SAMs 

Soviet antiaircraft fire control 

Soviet early warning for antiaircraft fire control 

Soviet target tracking with coherent radio frequency, believed to 

emit from a'slewable phased array 

Soviet early warning. 

PRC target-tracking radar associated with the CS/'0 SAM system 

(Table continues) 

MEN HOUSE I) 

(HEN HOUSE II) 

BACK NET 

BALL GUN 

BAR LOCK 

BEER CAN 

BIG BAR 

BIG MESH 

BIG NET 

BIG SCREEN 

BUEB (HEN HOUSE) 

BUGH 

HEN HOUSE) 

HEN HOUSE) 

CAT HOUSE 

CROSS OUT 

DOG HOUSE 

DRUM TILT 

EGG HEAD 

FAN SONG, C-band 

FAN SONG, S-band 

FIRE CAN 

FLAT FACE 

FLAT TWIN 

FULL TIME 

GIN SLING 

Top Secret 

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811-9197.'94 

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EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Norouv.oRm... 

Radars 

US/NATO Name 

GUN DISH 

HEAD LIGHTS 

HEAD NET 

HEN EGG 

HEN HOUSE I 

HEN HOUSE II 

HIGH SIEVE 

LONG TRACK 

LOW BLOW 

MOON MAT 

MUFF COB 

NYSA-C 

PART TIME 

PAT HAND 

POP GROUP 

ROCK CAKE 

SHEET BEND 

SHIP WHEEL 

SHOCK SING 

SLIM NET 

SNOOP SLAB 

SNOOP TRAY 

SQUARE PAIR 

STRAIGHT FLUSH 

STRIKE OUT 

STONE CAKE 

TALL KING 

THIN SKIN 

TOKEN 

TOP ROOST 

TOP SAIL 

TOP TROUGH 

TRY ADD 

YO YO 

Function 

Soviet shipborne antiaircraft 

Soviet shipborne target tracking and missile guidance for 

the SA-N-3 missile 

Soviet shipborne air search and early warning for the SA-N- I 

Soviet ABM 

Soviet ABM target-tracking: B.1371 formerly BUEB and 

Soviet ABM target-tracking; B375Z, formerly BVFW and T5136 

Soviet shipborne surface search 

Soviet target acquisition radar associated with SA-4 GANEF, 

SA-6 GAINFUL, and SA-8 GECKO SAM systems 

Soviet larget-tracking radar associated SN ith the SA-.3 GOA SAM 

Early warning copy US SCR-270 

Soviet shipborne antiaircraft fire control 

Polish early warning 

Soviet early warning 

Soviet target-tracking for the GANEF SA-4 SAM system 

Soviet shipborne SA-N-4 missile guidance. target .tracking 

Soviet height finder 

Soviet coastal surveillance radar associated with the SS-28 

surface-lo-surface missile system 

Soviet missile beacon-tracking/instrumentation 

PRC early warning associated with the SA-3 

Soviet shipborne surface search/target acquisition 

Soviet submarine-borne navigation 

Soviet submarine-borne navigational radar 

T8856 Soviet target•rrasking radar for the SA-5 missile system 

Soviet target-tracking radar associated with the SA-6 missile system 

Soviet early warning 

Soviet height finder 

Soviet early warning 

Soviet height finder associated with the SA-4, SA-6, and SA-8 

Soviet early warning. 

Soviet ABM target-tracking, can track multiple targets 

Soviet shipborne for SA-N-3 

Soviet shipbome early warning 

Soviet target-tracking, missile tracking, and guidance for the 

GALOSH ABM system 

Soviet target tracking for GUILD SA-1 SAM 

292 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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Top Secret 

voFoRN-cmCoN EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Communications Signals 

US/Soviet Name Soviet Function Frequency° 

Designator 

Radio Frequency Ranges 

pe Range Wavelength 

HF (high frequency) 3-30 MHz 100-10 meters 

VHF (very high frequency) 30-300 MHz 10-1 meter 

UHF (ultrahigh frequency) 300-3.000 MHz 1 m to 10 cm 

S-band 2,000-4,000 MHz 10 cm 

C-band 4,000-6,000 MHz 5 cm 

X-band 8,000-10,000 MHz 3 cm 

SHF (superhigh frequency) 3-30 GHz 10-1 cm 

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BYE-9 07..14 

Appendix C 293 

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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SIGINT Satellite Mission Summitry 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor (GHz) Life 

1960 

6/22/60 xxxx GRAB/ Transit 11A NRI. 90 days 

DYNO-1 Thoir/Able-Star 

8/10/60 xxxx SOCTOP 1• Thor Agena All 1 day 

DISCOVERER 13 

10/11/60 xxxx SAMOS 1 Atlas-Agena Aft 

E-I/F-1 

1- . • 

1140/h0 xxxx GRAII/ Transit II1A NRI 

DYNO Thor/Able-Star 

1961 

01 '31/61 xxxx SAMOS 2 Allas-Agena AIL 21 orbits 

E-1/F-1 

*The SOCTOP payloads were the first in a series of vulnerability payloar Is it /e flown On most photo rectionaissance missions. The 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

First SIGIN I IEL1N 

satellite 

First aft-rack payload 

vulnerability mission 

. failed 10 orbit 

Failed to orbit 

First digital 

prof (wing III1191 

0

A 9 

. * 

EL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E0 1.4 . (c) 

SOCTOP payloads were intended hr determine if the Soviets were tracking 41 trying kr interfere with the commanding of the satellites, 

either al beacon frequencies in S-hand (2.5-3.2 GI lz) or suspected ABM rada frequencies between WO MI 12 and 1.0 GI It.. These 

-were followed try HIT 110.150.0.164 GI-Ial and 1111 1110.19.0.3061•14 paylo ids flown from 1964 to 19(41 lc) dclemlinv it the satellites 

were being tracked by HEN HOUSE radars. Another series was to determine if the satellites were hying 

detricted/tracked by the HEN HOUSE, HEN EGG/TRY A1)15, or DOG HOUSE radars. was divided into HIT 'IV, MT V, and BIT IX 

packages packages were developed lo determine if the Soviets were usin interfere 

wiiti photo satellite operations. SOCTOP packages were flown on 10 additional C( )RONA missions itioni mission 9010, Will( heti 011 

09/13/611, to mission 9028, launched 1111 I i/i 5/61 I and Iwo SAM(115 missions (mission '220 I, lam( bed on 12/22/91, and mission 221)4. 

launched on 03/07/62). BIT packages were flown on 4')COR()NA missions Brom mission 7051, taunt lad on 117/3 I/64. through mission 

111 7, launched on (15/25/72), on 33 GAMBIT missions (from mission 41)29. laum bed on ObAl thimigh mission 4 144. lawn hell 

on 04/18/751, and on 13 HEXAGON missions Mom mission 12111, I, bed on (11,/15/71, through mission 1211. lame lied on 

06/27/771. (for further details on thew missions. MT SIG IN I Satellite Mission 

Log, National Reconnaissance Office, Washington. DC, 15 Ft-balmy 19781 

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
MOTS INIOIS 

. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor (GHz) Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

1961 (caul) 

°WI (0.1 xxxx AKI 11lir Aget1,11.1 

DISCOVERER 25 

2 (I.tys first EL inibsirm 

record/playback 41414 

06/29/61 xxxx - GRAB/ Transit 11113 NRI. 6 month, failed to sevar.ile. 

I)YNO-2 Thor Limited L.11.111(1 EI.INT. 

07/07/61 xxxx W111)11111 I Thin Ahem 0 SE L 2 Clays I IEN 11011SE search. 

DISCOVERER 26 Mong frequency bond. 

07/17/61 xxxx OPS( IC 2 1111111 Age's.' II All cidys Ste rorsoc 

111SCOVERI K 11 

(ln/ SO/6 1 xxxx If XAS PIN f flew Agen.I II Al I. 4 (lays itsi CumIN I ihlylrxrl. 

DISCOVERER 241 Smo01..(15'11F t•I ivir Iinmwil

09/12/111 xxxx rt WSOC I liner Agena II 

DISCOVERER III 

All. 511.1y. Alltvl scan h: high•gain 

rer ewer t lagged clam 

nom vssing. 

1(1/1 3/61 xxxx RH'S( :S I hor Agen411 All 2 (Ely. Si',' El )1•5( )lDISCOVERER .42 

11/05/61 xxxx rovsoc 4 '4111,1- Age:Ian 

DISCOVERER IS 

All. 2 (lay, fire I I 11'9 R.I 

12/12/61 xxxx I Ilan Agena II 

DISCOVER' K 1.6 

11101- 

Singer 

I flay ( (WWI :ru)nrd.1 

hanor-I o

1962 

0111:1/62 xxxx TAKI Then Agcna 11 `11:1 1 .61,1 In odmt 

DISCOVERER i7 

eAddevr,ribu...,4 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor-tGHz1 Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

1962 Icon' 

01/24/62 xxxx P(11'1'1' I 111oi/Ahle:Slar NRI. Failed to orbit. DYNO 

plusfourimyloads. 

(12/21/62 7151 Project 102 Illor Agena All. 1.1.INT: 21 readouts; 

Group 0 2301 9,600 readoul words. 

First rli.iildl•t'unlpulerproctssed !motions 

Soviet rodars. 

(12/27/(12 xxxx ' W111)13111 1 Thor Agena II Slit. Link IWO failed. ABM 

DISCOVERER to ELINT mission. 

(14/17/61 MOO( GRAPt JUICE 2 Ulm Avila II 11RO• 

DISCOVERIR Pt ' Singer 

04/29/62 xxxx IAK12 Thar Attest., II 

DISCOVIRLR 40 

All. S.tiliplyd 1AI I KIM; 

radar (.11Vill 111111t'lli 

06/18/62 7151 l'iojr•ct 1112 1 hi it Agt41,1 It All. I s Fel tuck.' failure 

;mop 2-I) Vehir le 2 111 oil MI Ili 26. 110411 

RINI. I.( 01. 

06/24/62 xxxx VOITY 2 St inil NRI. 1,,ilt•i to orbit 

07/27/62 • xxxx NEW If Rtif 1' I Him Agena II ( I )MIN!: Itx atrrl 

( 04( )NA 90.01 

09/17/62 moot CRAPE:JUICE .1 I her Agena It 

.(:( )KONA 90.1 i 

I IRISSlow( 

)MINI . nlininlal 

(spy, I Ie.Hy iHIotioleHre. 

you rInue...1 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
AJoIS aPllaleS MD'S 

0 

tPL 86-36/50 USC 

Eo 1.4. (c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

3605 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date MiNsion Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor 1.611z) Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

1962 (coal) 

11/24/62 72111 NAM( A/111 /but Agent' It SEA 

• 

7 (lap E list YIG filler in space. 

ROCK I (111(( NA '10411 Et.INI. CS. l'iocesseil 

by SAC. 

12/04/1.2 720.1 VINO I "lbor Agent' II i days 1nti1Wn•t•d GRAMUICE. 

(A )BONA 9049 Singer • Atillintal copy dot Io 

illIC1101:11(t. 

12/12/62 7101 .1A/14 Thor Agena NRI. CLINICS. Locaied 

12 satellites) . Vehicle 2151 .PMCCI radars. flail 

urbil 1124 by 1.5(K) 

12/12/62 72(12 W111/ 011 L 2 'INK Agent' II 

PUPPY

All I 5 cloys I If N.I I( )t/SL scan h. 

iletitiency hand. 

12/14/62 7204 TAKI I Thor Ag0na II A II 6 clays LLINI 1A11 KING ratla 

CORI )NA 91150 51.M1.111tio lot ahole.1 

1963 

(11/(17/61 7205 NEW IF.RSEY 2 I hot Awl/.t II Sambre. days (1 /NUN olowler 

C(1141 /NA 9051 Int ,I111111c by t onirat lot 

14 

(11/16/6.1 715.1 Proje4.1101/SISK Thnr Agella All riArs IIINI 11/11.

Group 14) Veltit le 2 III radar lot anon. ill Sot fel 

(12/211/63 72116 VINO 2 I lito Agent' I) IRI?• It, 4111)11 

)R( )NA 4072 Siligt 

f Tribb."mhwiex, 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.Sp). 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor (GHz) Life 

1963 (con() 

06/12/63 7207 WILD 1111.1..1 Thor Agena 1) ATI 13 days 

CORONA '/054 

MP 5/63 POPPY 4

salelliles) 

Thor Agena I) 

Whit It. 2353 

NRI 

06/15/63 72 16 MU) 4 Thor Agena I) 

l'OPPY 7102 

ATI 17 days 

06/2W63 7154 Pr6jet t 691111K TAT Agena I) All 10 days 

1:rotai) I digital Vellic le 2 11.1 

2.5- 1.2 

06/29/63 72011 • l'INts101111 TAT Agena I) ATl 12 days 

ROCK 2 6q111-1K 7154 

11/27/6.3 721') LONG 1011N. 2 IA) Awn.' I) All 15 days 

CORONA 9061 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

First HEN HOUSE radar 

inlercept. First FLINT 

mission. 

Bad nrltil (96 by 495 

miles). CLINT C.S. 

Confirmed ITENIIOLISE 

FLINT, ABA1 radar 

sears 11. More HEN 

lit ISE Mimes/Hs_ 

Firs) IA1*.bronsitli 

SIGIN r mission. [LINT: 

CS anc11.011. 

FLINT CS. Processed 

by SAC kit VMS inpur. 

ELINI 1)1.4iiwt1 t 

1rr ircuiiivor y ul I IEN 

f( )L/Sf 

4111h11,4MI iiiiii • 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E0 1.4.(c) 

SWINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range . 

Contractor (CHz) Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

1963 (conl) 

12/21/6.1 721 H LONG/011N i TAI Agena I) MI 10 days FLINT T1. Same as 

CORONA 90(,2 LONG 10FIN 2. 

1964 

01/11/1,-1 l'OPPY rAT Agena I) NRL First 500.mile circular 

(3 sa1e1liles1 Vehicle 2354 inbit itINT GS/E013. 

01/11/64 721(1 11M-1.0E1 TAT Agena I) 

POPI'Y 710 1 

11R11. 

Singer 

9 days Irs1ilight of Mill 

wille1).111(1 rut EIrtivr %vial 

1111-megabil till ryord 

(12/15/64 7222 LONG II H IN 3 1AT Agena 1) 

C( )BONA 111114 

/VII 2 i day, No dila (n110.0011. 

"(ape rec order failed. 

(12/27/64 7156 l'rojet 16411HK TM Agena I) All 2 (lay, hu.I widehand .111,164; 

Group I-A Vehii le 2 (I I, Lipt• recuulei. El 

(12/27/64 7212 133RD 1)0(G 2 TM' Agena I) 

('33113K 71531 

(IV I4 clay. film II IN I inipriernme• 

ler ....164111e 1.1 load. • 

ham I radar 

him 

(16/13/64 7224 LONG RH IN 4 1 AI Agcna I) 

AR( ;ON 9111.1.1 

All 	 	I I day, IIINI

cniri 

RV, ()141'r .I.cllot I nn 

luudh 41.1l. 

1 

O ^JOTS aupaie5 1NIDI5 a41 

freado.11,11 iiiiiiiiii 

EO 1.4.(c) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
611111-- - • 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

ED 1.4.(c1 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range Features, Mission, 

Contractor (GlIz) Life Accomplishments 

1964 (cant) 

. 07/02/64 7155 Project 69811K 

(;roof) 2-1) 

TAT Agena I) 

Vehicle2315 

AIL 17 days FLINT F.013. 114.521 

intercept words, 357 

tonfinned sites, 48 new 

sites. Beacon problem 

141,110 read-in orbits. 

07/02/64 72I I IIIRI) DOG I TAT Agena D LTV 5 days 

na 

t• 

T0.1811K 7155 ' 

11 

z 9 07/21/64 7215 

KN( )CK1FY 

lAT Agena I) 

AR( /N 1)(166.1 

I IR11: 

Singer 

51 days 

0 

Tu Mr rwi uMwO 

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c), EO 1352

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
0 

PL 

EC 

86-36/50 USC 3605. 

1.4.(c) 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Frequency 

Range Features, Mission, 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle Contractor MHz) Life AccomplishmentS 

0 

z --4 

1964 (coal) 

11/03/64 7157 Pit/16(130100K IA1 Agena I) All. 4 clays .ELINT:digiiall:013 plus 

Croup Illigilal Vehicle 2317 100 kI-lz analog data 

0 11/0:3/64 7211 IIIRIIIXX: 3 TAT Agerm I) 

60011K 7157 

I. FV Affienna tailed to 

inflate 

1965 

(11/09/65 POPP TAT Atteria 1) NKL (LINT (;5. First 

to 

Whide2701 SIG1N1 Idiom)) under 

111TN1AN.srActtl 

Irstijet I 77111. 

, 

i

.-'

0 

07/1(065 71531 l'ooleci 771) 1AF Attena I) All. 51 (I.tvs l'11341 II: 4 MI Ir 

Comp I-A Vehit le 2702 111(iCI 

07/121/65 7226 111121) 1)O(.4 FAT Agend I) I IV 2 m4441,11110 

77(17158 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
• 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

--Eo-1747re1'- 

3605 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload 

Frequency 

Range 

Launch Vehicle Contractor (GHz) Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

1965 trout) 

10/211/65 7225 SQUARE TAT Agena I) [TV 11 days COPAN!: hid 

TWENTY CORONA 1026 

• IiiikS7FT,Cif 

cnnverler from EI)L. 

1966 

02/09/66 7160 Project 77(1 TAT Agena D All. 7 months RANT FOB. Digital 

Gump 3.1) Vehicle 2703 with 100-kliz 

daia. 

02/09/66 7228 SETTER lA TAT Agcna I TV 40 days FLINT E08. S-hand. 

77(1 7160 

,CAAkiveaimws. 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Y

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
pi, 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

flange 

Contractor (GHz) Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

1966 (con)) 

12/28/66 7161 MULTIGROUP 1 

TAT Agena 

Vehicle 2731 

Aft . 5 months FLINT ED)) TI. Firs) analog nredeiet ruin wide 

rct !tram:. Fitt.' 

o 

12/2(i/1,6 7229 • SE ITER IA TAT Agena I) I IV Ft IN I LO I). 

771) 7110 

1967 

05/11/67 POPPY (Ng Agena I) NRI. II INI 

Vehit k. 2704 Slnphurnr- 

'Tubb 1,00 rm,.I 

4 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
soE p xpuaddv 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E0 1.4.(c) 

SIG1NT Satellite Mission Summary 

Data Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor ((atiz) Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

• 1967 (coal) 

07/24/67 7162 MULTI- TA1 Agena D • 5 mmillis ELINT FOR and TI. 

GROUP 2 Vehicle 2732 ARM radar search and 

ii 07/24/67 7210 SETTER IA TAT Agena D LTV 5 months ELINt FOB and TL 

77(1 711,2 S-hand. 

07/24/67 72 11 DONKFY .TAI Agciiii L) 

770 7162 

11)I. 5 gnu' till, 

1968 

01/17/60 7163 MULTI- TAT Agena I) All. 14 nionlhs FLINT ECM and TL 

GROUP 3 Vehicle 2733 ARM raddr search ,m11 

01/17/68 72 12 SETTER 113 TAT Agena I.) L IV I-I monilis II IN I IS 

770 7163 

.151.!,- ,,,,,,, 

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(3)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
W

O /Jon *Imamsirulonayi 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor (GHz) Life reatureu, Miumion 

Accompli nhments' 

1969 (coat) 

OW10/69 POITY 11 TI IORAD Agena I) NRL A- 28 mos EL1NT EMI. Ocean 

Vehicle 2706 inns surveillance. 

C- 2/1 inns 

D• 5 his 

1970 

08/26/70 7166 SIRAWMAN/ II IORAI) Agena I) AIL 17 nil milts El IN I EC )N and 11 

TITRESI•IFR 1 Vein( It 27.16 Digital and analog. 

C011ebtUrs) 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
SWINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor (C1/1z) Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

1970 (coal) 

08/20/70 72.15 , ST RAWMAN/ 

HEAVER 3 

Ili()RAD Attena 1). 

Vehicle 2730 

1. I V.. 17 months El I Ni t( 111 IL 

Iligital and analog. 

1971 

07/10/71 71117 STRAWMAN/ II IC )14A1) Agena I) All 20 months ELI('-IT MB and 

THRESHER 4 Vehicle 27 17 Analog and digital. 

07/16/71 7210 STRAWMAN/ 1110RAI) A-ria I) I IV 20 ii iu,niIi II IN F [(HI and -fl. - 

REAPER 4 Vehicle 27 17 Analog and digital. 

07/10/71 7240 HARVESTER 1110kAll Agena I) )51 5 nillis . ELIN I GS. and 

Vehicle 2737 natintions wave radars. 

low band antenna 

invivsaling . 

ill11411111 la SA-5 radar: 

Mil* I 00000 

PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

EC' 1.4.(c) 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
E1.INT CS, FOB, and 

TI. Ocean surveillance. 

X.1 

i4 

n1 

1111.0*Mtri 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 0 

Date Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor (Gliz) Life 

1971 (con!) 

• 

• 12/14/71 POPPY THORAD Anew 1) NR1. 70 months 

Veltit le 2707 (A/B/(/DI 

1972 

• 

. 

1.11161,011,,trill ractil 

AJoIS al!liamS INIDIS ;41 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
. 

- 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

80 1.4.(c) 

Z 

na 

a .,' :,-; 'hi ~ i 

1,': - g g. ';gXg 

!, "- 

ei5 

-.? 

3 

0 

- 

i 

SIGINT Satellite Mission Summary 

Date • Mission Payload Launch Vehicle 

Frequency 

Range 

Contractor Life 

Features, Mission, 

Accomplishments 

1973 (con!) 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

10 FEBRUARY 2016
Top Secrel 

MO( )RN.f JRCON 

Full-Text References 

Explanatory note to full-text documents: National Security Council 

Intelligence Directive 6 (NSCID 6), dated 

15 September 1958, delegated to NSA the 

authority to organize and control all US 

electronic intelligence (ELINT) intercept 

and processing. The 1958 version of this 

NSCID added ELINT to NSA's responsibilities, and since this directive was written 

before SIGINT began to use space vehicles, 

references to "satellites" are neither specifically included nor excluded. As a result of 

a Presidential reorganization in 1971, 

NSCID 6 was rewritten; the 1972 revision 

of the directive delineates NSA's responsibilities on control of the intercept payload 

and processing of data collected by SIGINT 

satellites. This appendix contains both an 

extract from the original NSCID 6 on the 

mission, administration, and specific 

responsibilities of NSA and its director and 

a copy of the 17 February 1972 directive. 

(Ref: Page 60, NSA in Space.) 

The following documents are reproduced here in full text: 

Extract from National Security 

Council Intelligence Directive 6, dated 15 

September 1958. paragraphs 6 and 7. 

(Ref: Appendix N, NSA in Space.) 

Full text of National Security Council 

Directive 6. dated 17 February 1972. (Ref: 

Appendix N, NSA in Space.) 

Memorandum signed by Secretary of 

Defense Robert S. McNamara. dated 6 

September 1961, attaching letter from 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L.. 

Gilpatric to Director of Central Intelligence 

Allen W. Dulles. dated 6 September 1961. 

subject: Management of the National 

Reconnaissance Program. (Ref: Appendix P. NSA in Space.) 

Memorandum from the Secretary of 

Defense, subject: Space Vehicle 

Electronics Intelligence Program, dated 20 

October 1961. (Ref: Appendix Q,-NSA in 

Space.) 

Tordella-Scoville-Charyk agreement, 

dated 25 May 1962. (Ref: Appendix R, 

NSA in Space.) . 

Agreement for Reorganization of the 

National Reconnaissance Program, dated 

11 August 1965, signed by Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance and 

Director of Central Intelligence W. F. 

Raborn. (Ref: Appendix S, NSA in Space.) 

Memorandum from Chief of Naval 

Operations, subject: System POPPY, reassignment of responsibilities for," dated 21 

January 1963. (Ref: Appendix T, NSA in 

Space.) 

Appendix E 313 

. • • • • -• r••••••• 

Top Secret 

Handle via OYEMAN-TALENT.KEYHOLE- 

. COMINT Control Channels Joinilv 

BYE•9197/94 

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.vnrc)RN ( 

NRO/NSA/CIA/USN Management 

Agreement for the POPPY System, dated 5 

November 1971. (Ref: Appendix U, NSA 

in Space.) 

PL 66-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

314 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle %-t4 BY1.44AN-I ALENT •XEYHOLEa-11,4;NT Control (tunnels tooth. 

RYF-41q744 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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EXTRACT FROM NSCID 6, DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1958 

"6. The National Security Agency 

a. The COMINT and ELINT missions of the National 

Security Agency (NSA) shall be to provide an effective, unified 

organization and, control of the (1) COMINT and (2) ELINT 

intercept and processing activities of the United States, to 

provide for integrated operational policies and procedures 

pertaining thereto and to produce COMINT information and ELINT 

information in accordance with objectives, requirements and 

priorities established by the U.S. Intelligence Board. 

b. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated 

by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, whose appointment shall be for a term of four 

years. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer 

of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and 

shall enjoy at least 3-star rank during the period of his 

incumbency. The Director shall have a civilian Deputy. 

7. The Director, National Security Agency. 

a. The Director of NSA shall be responsible for 

accomplishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all 

COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the 

United States are placed under his operational and technical 

control. When action by the Chiefs of the operating agencies 

of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required, 

the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to 

COMINT and ELINT operations through them. However, because of 

the unique technical character of COMINT and ELINT operations, 

the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating 

elements under his operational control task assignments and 

pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such 

elements to accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, 

and direct communications with, any elements of the Service 

or civilian COMINT or ELINT agencies on any other matters of 

operational and technical control as may be necessary, and he 

is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence... 

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

Washington, D.C. 20505 

February 17, 1972 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

The Secretary of State 

The Secretary of the Treasury 

The Secretary of Defense 

The Attorney General 

The Director of. Central Intelligence 

The Director, Office of Science and Technology 

The Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 

Board 

The Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

SUBJECT: Issuance of Revised NSCID's 

In accordance with the President's memorandum of November 

5, 1971, directing a reorganization of the intelligence 

community, the staffs of the NSC, DCI, and OMB, in consultation 

and coordination with the President's Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board, have prepared revisions of National Security 

Council Intelligence Directives 1-8. These revisions have 

been approved, and the revised NSCID-6 is attached. This 

sUpersedes all previous versions of this NSCID. 

The revised NSCID's 1-5 and 7-8 have been distributed 

separately. 

/S / 

Henry A. Kissinger 

Attachment 

cc: The Director, Office of Management 

and Budget. 

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE 

DIRECTIVE NO. 61 

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 

(Effective 17 February 1972) 

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which comprises Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) 

and the activities pertaining thereto are. national 

responsibilities and must be so organized and managed as to 

exploit to the maximum the available resources of the 

Government, to satisfy the intelligence needs of the National 

Security Council and the departments and agencies of the 

Government, and to provide for. efficiency and economy in the 

use of technical resources. Therefore, pursuant to the 

National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security 

Council. authoriies and directs that SIGINT activities shall be 

conducted as prescribed herein. 

1. Definitions 

For the purpose of this directive, the terms "Communications Intelligence" or "COMINT" shall be construed to mean 

technical and intelligence information derived from foreign 

communications by other than the intended recipients. 

COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those 

activities that produce COMINT by the collection and processing 

of foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other 

electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, 

and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, 

however transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercept 

and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, 

transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic 

analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the 

fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results. 

COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall 

not include (a) any intercept and processing of unencrypted 

written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts, or 

(b) censorship. 

1 This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 6 dated 15 September 1958, 

revised le January 1961. 

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ELINT activities are defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the processing for subsequent 

intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, 

non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from 

other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT • 

is the technical and intelligence information product of ELINT 

activities. 

2. The Director of Central Intelligence 

Consistent with his responsibilities as set forth in 

NSCID Nos. 1,'2 and 3, the Director of Central Intelligence 

shall: 

a. Establish with the advice of the United States 

Intelligence Board and issue appropriate intelligence 

objectives, requirements and priorities to guide the conduct 

of all United States SIGINT activities. 

b. Review the needs and performance of United States 

SIGINT activities as a basis for preparing a consolidated 

intelligence program budget. 

c. Establish policies and procedures for the conduct 

of SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments with the 

advice of the United States Intelligence Board. 

d. Develop and establish policies and procedures for 

the protection of SIGINT including the degree and type of 

security protection to be given SIGINT activities through the 

protection of information about them or derived from them. 

3. The Secretary of Defense 

a. The Secretary of Defense is designated as 

Executive Agent of the Government for the conduct of SIGINT 

activities in accordance with the provisions of this directive 

and for the direction, supervision, funding, maintenance and 

operation of the National Security Agency. The Director of the 

National Security Agency shall report to the. Secretary of 

Defense and shall be the principal SIGINT advisor to the 

Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense may 

delegate in whole or part authority over the Director of the 

National Security Agency within the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. 

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b. The Secretary of Defense may determine, after 

consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of 

Central Intelligence, that a SIGINT matter forwarded by the 

Director of Central Intelligence to the National Security 

Council far decision presents a problem of an emergency nature 

and requires immediate action. His action will be Implemented 

and will govern, pending a decision by the National Security 

Council. 

4. The National Security Agency 

a. There is established under the Secretary of Defense 

and subject to his authority and control a National Security 

Agency with a Director who shall be head thereof and a Deputy 

Director who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the 

Director during his absence or disability. The Director and 

Deputy Director shall be designated by the Secretary of 

Defense subject to the approval of the President. The duration 

of their appointments shall be at the pleasure of the President. 

The Director shall be a commissioned officer of the armed 

services, on active or reactivated status and shall enjoy not 

less than three star rank during the period of his incumbency. 

The Director shall have a Deputy who shall be a career civilian 

with SIGINT experience. 

b. It shall be the duty of the Director of the 

National Security Agency to provide for the SIGINT mission of 

the United States, to establish an effective unified 

organization and control of all SIGINT collection and processing activities of the United States, and to produce SIGINT 

in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities 

established by the Director of Central Intelligence with the 

advice of the United States Intelligence Board. No other 

organization shall engage in SIGINT activities except as 

provided for in this directive. 

c. Except as provided in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this 

directive, the Director of the National Security Agency shall 

exercise full control over all SIGINT collection and processing 

activities, except the operation of mobile SIGINT platforms 

which will normally be exercised through appropriate elements 

of the military command structure. The Director of the 

National Security Agency is authorized to issue direct to any 

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operating elements engaged in SIGINT operations such instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in 

this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to 

the Secretary of Defense. 

d. In consonance with the aims of maximum overall 

efficiency, economy and effectiveness, and to the extent he 

deems necessary and desirable, the Director shall centralize 

and consolidate the performance of SIGINT functions for which 

he is responsible. To this end, there is established a Central 

Security Service under the Director of the National Security 

Agency, which shall be organized in accordance with a plan 

approved by the Secretary of Defense. It shall be principally 

collection oriented and shall include SIGINT functions 

previously performed by various Military Department and other 

United States governmental elements engaged in SIGINT activities. 

The Director of the National Security Agency .shall determine 

the appropriate division of responsibilities among the elements 

under his direction. 

e. The Armed Forces and other departments and agencies 

often require timely and effective SIGINT. The Director of 

the National Security Agency shall provide information requested, 

taking all necessary measures to facilitate its maximum 

utility. As determined by the Director of the National 

Security Agency or as directed by the Secretary of Defense, 

the Director of the National Security Agency shall provide 

such SIGINT either through the direction of activities under 

his control or through the delegation to an appropriate agent 

of specified SIGINT facilities and resources from among the 

elements under his direction for such periods and for such 

tasks as appropriate. 

f. Specific responsibilities of the Director of the 

National Security Agency include the following: 

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans, 

policies and procedures to provide for integrated operations. 

(2) Managing SIGINT resources, personnel and 

programs. 

(3) Conducting research and development to meet 

the needs of the United States for SIGINT. 

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(4) Determining and submitting to the authorities 

responsible for logistic support for activities under his 

control requirements together with specific recommendations as 

to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the 

Government should supply. 

(5) Prescribing within his field of authorized 

operations requisite security regulations covering operating 

practices, including the transmission, handling and 

distribution of SIGINT material within and among the elements 

under his control; and exercising the necessary monitoring 

and supervisory control to ensure compliance with the 

regulations. 

(6) Providing the Director of Central Intelligence 

with such information as he may require on the past, current 

and proposed plans, programs and costs of the SIGINT activities 

under the control of the Director of the National Security 

Agency. 

g. The intelligence components of individual 

departments and agencies may continue to conduct direct liaison 

with the National Security Agency in the interpretation and 

amplification of requirements and priorities within the 

framework of objectiveS, requirements and priorities established 

by the Director of Central Intelligence. 

h. It is the intent of this directive that the 

National Security Agency not engage in the production and 

dissemination of finished intelligence, but be limited to the 

production and dissemination of COMINT and ELINT. 

5. Relationship to other SIGINT Activities 

a. The Director of Central Intelligence with the 

advice of the United States Intelligence Board shall determine 

the requirements and priorities for collection by SIGINT 

satellites that shall be developed, launched and maintained 

in operation by the National Reconnaissance Office. The 

Director of the National Security Agency, with respect to his 

technical and operational control of the intercept payload, 

and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, with 

respect to his control of spacecraft operations, shall provide 

for the tasking of these satellites based on guidance provided 

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by the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Security 

Agency shall process the collected data. 

b. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to 

encroach upon or interfere with the unique requirements for 

clandestine operations covered under NSCID No. 5. Those 

SIGINT collection and processing activities (other than 

cryptanalysis) that are specifically designated by the Director 

of Central Intelligence to be essential and integral to the 

operation of clandestine espionage and counterintelligence 

activities abroad, including arrangements with foreign 

clandestine services, shall be conducted under the provisions 

of that directive. To the extent practicable, however, 

information pertaining to the activities and derived therefrom 

shall be handled so as to give suitable protection to related 

SIGINT activities. Material collected under these circumstances 

that would have been considered COMINT or ELINT will be passed 

to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the 

Director of the National Security Agency as soon as special 

requirements of the collector have been satisfied. 

c. The Director of the National Security Agency shall 

conduct such COMINT and ELINT activities as are required to 

support electronic warfare activities. The conduct of such 

search, intercept, direction-finding, range-estimation, and 

signal ana'ysis of non-communications electromagnetics 

radiation as must be undertaken to permit immediate operational 

use of the information in support of electronic measures and 

countermeasures and rescue operations, if delegated by the 

Director of the National Security Agency, shall be the 

responsibility of the Military Departments or Commands, as 

appropriate. The responsibility for such activities with 

respect to electromagnetic radiations of COMINT interest shall 

normally not be delegated and shall remain the responsibility 

of the Director of the National Security Agency. 

6. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach 

upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal 

security, including such intercept and processing activities as 

may be undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 

connection with its functions. 

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Washington 

6 September 1961 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING 

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE GENERAL COUNSEL 

SUBJECT: (TS) Assistant for Reconnaissance 

Reference the attached Agreement between the Secretary 

of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

entitled Management of the National Reconnaissance Program. 

The Under Secretary of the Air Force is hereby designated 

my Assistant for Reconnaissance, and is delegated full 

authority for management of this program. In this regard, he 

will act as my direct representative both within and outside 

the Department of Defense. He will be given any support 

that he requires from normal staff elements, although these 

staff elements will not participate in program matters 

except as he specifically requests. He will, however, keep 

pertinent key officials informed on a regular basis on the 

status of these programs. 

Because of the extreme sensitivity of the projects involved 

in the National Reconnaissance Program, particular care must 

be taken to protect the Security of the arrangements described 

herein. The existence of the referenced Agreement, its contents 

and the organizational implementation employed for its 

execution are all classified TOP SECRET. This information will 

not be disclosed to anyone to whom such disclosure is not 

mandatory in order to carry out actions required by the terms 

of the referenced Agreement or by my Assistant for 

Reconnaissance in carrying out his responsibilities in the 

National Reconnaissance Program. 

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All Department of Defense satellite or overflight 

photographic reconnaissance, mapping, geodesy, and electronic 

signal collection programs will be handled in accordance with 

the referenced Agreement, and existing project assignments 

will be brought into conformity and present directives will be 

revised at the earliest date that such action can be taken 

with plausible overt appearance. 

A new public relations policy for satellite launches will 

be announced as a separate action to minimize political 

vulnerability of these programs. • 

Robert S. McNamara 

1 Att. 

Agreement 

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Washington • 

6 September 61 

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Washington, D.C. 

Re: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program 

Dear Mr. Dulles: 

This letter confirms our agreement with respect to the 

setting up of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the 

arrangements for dealing both with the management and 

operation of this program and the handling of the intelligence 

product of the program on a covert basis. 

1. The NRP will consist of all satellite and overflight 

reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will 

include all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy 

and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects 

for electronic signal intelligence and communications 

intelligence resulting therefrom. 

2. There will be established on a covert basis a National 

Reconnaissance Office to manage this program. This office will 

be under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force 

and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence 

Agency acting jointly. It will include a small special staff 

whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of Defense 

and the Central Intelligence Agency. This office will have 

direct control over all elements of the total program. 

3. Decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office will be 

implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance 

Program made effective:. within the Department of Defense, by 

the exercise of the authority delegated to the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force; within the Central Intelligence Agency, by 

the Deputy Director (Plans) in the performance of his presently 

assigned duties. The Under Secretary of the Air Force will be 

designated Special Assistant For Reconnaissance to the Secretary 

of Defense and delegated full authority by me in this area. 

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4. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of 

the Air Force will be the operational agency for management 

and conduct of the NRP, and will conduct this program through 

use of streamlined special management procedures involving 

direct control from the office of the Secretary of the 

Air Force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the 

field, without intervening reviews or approvals. The 

management and conduct of individual projects or elements 

thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be assigned 

to the Central Intelligence Agency as the operational agency. 

5. A Technical Advisory Group for the National 

Reconnaissance Office will be established. 

6. A uniform security control system will be established 

for the total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. 

Products from the various programs will be available to all 

users as designated by the United States Intelligence Board. 

7. The National Reconnaissance Office will be directly 

responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic 

signal collection requirements and priorities as established 

by the United States Intelligence Board. 

8. The National Reconnaissance Office will develop 

suitable cover plans and public information plans, in 

conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public 

Affairs, to reduce potential political vulnerability of these 

programs.. In regard to satellite systems, it will be necessary 

to apply the revised public information policy to other nonsensitive satellite projects in order to insure-maximum 

protection. 

9. The Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office 

will establish detailed working procedures to insure that the 

particular talents, experience and capabilities within the 

Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are 

fully and most effectively utilized in this program. 

10. Management control of the field operations of various 

elements of the program will be exercised directly, in the 

case, of the Department of Defense, from the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force to the designated project officers for each 

program and, in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, 

from the Deputy Director (Plans) to appropriate elements of 

the Central Intelligence Agency. Major program elements and 

operations of the National Reconnaissance Office will be 

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reviewed on a regular basis and as special circumstances 

require by the Special Group under NSC 5412. 

If the foregoing is in accord with your understanding of 

our agreement, I would appreciate it if you would kindly 

sign and return the enclosed copy of this letter. 

/S/ 

Roswell L. Gilpatric 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

1 Atch: 

Chart "Single Mgmt for 

National Reconnaissance • 

Programs (TS) 

CONCUR: 

.C. P. Cabell, General, USAF 

Acting Director 

Central Intelligence Agency 

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SECRE'TARY c DEFENSE 

WASHINGIUN 

October 20, 1961 

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

SECRETARY OF 1 AIR FORCE 

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENSTMEER1NG 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

GEgERAL COUNSEL 

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR REONNALSSANCE TO THE SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: Space Vehicle Electronics Intelligence PLu9 am 

The attached document entitled "Space Vehicle. Electronic Signal 

Collection Responsibilities and Resources" is approved and will be 

implemented within the Department of Defense by all departments, agencies, 

and special activities. 

This documentation is provided as an ariditional basis for understanding 

the relationships, responsibilities and working arrangements applicable to 

space vehicle electronic signal collection and data processing that is in 

consonance with the responsibilities set fOrth in my memorandum of 

6 September 1961, subject: "Assistant for Reconnaissance". As used within 

this document, the term -"Depaxtrent of the Air Force (SAFMS)" specifically 

refers to that activity for which the Under Secretary of the Air Force 

has been designated as myAssistant for Reconnaissance. 

1 Attachment 

As stated, w/tabe A and B 

cc: CSD/DDREIE, Dr. Eugene G. Fubini 

CSD/OSO, Mr. Clyde W Elliott 

ACSI, Ma) Abram V. Rinearson, III, USA 

ONI, D/N, Capt D. M. Showers, USN 

SAFMS, D/AF, Lt Col Edwin J. Istvan, USAF 

USA, Mt. Herbert L. Conley 

CIA, Mr. Harold Willis 

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SPACE VEBICIT ELECTRONIC SIGNAL COLLECTION 

RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES 

References: (a) National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6 

(b) National Security Council Memo, dated 1 Sep 60, Subject: 

Reconnaissance Satellite Program 

(c) DOO Directive 5160.32, Development of Space Systems 

(d) DOD Directive 5160.34, Reoonnaissance and Gendetic 

Programs 

(e) Secretary of Defense Memo, dated 6 Sep 61, with Inclosures 

1. The utilization of space vehicles as a means for collection of 

electronic signal information is a special augmentation to other signal 

intelligence resources of the U.S. Government. In order that the present 

and future intelligence collection capabilities of earth satellites and 

other space vehicles can be vigorously explored and developed to add to 

the total U.S. intelligence posture, the procedures used for management, 

direction, and technical supervision of this intelligence collection 

medium will: 

a. Assure that appropriate planning takes place for both 

collection and processing systems in a well-coordinated fashion. 

b. Provide a means whereby immediate advantage is taken of break 

throughs in either the collection or processing state-of-the-art. 

2. Present approved collection and processing programs, through 

CY 1962 are essentially complementary and will not be modified, except 

as supplementary programs are developed in accordance with the 

responsibilities and procedures contained herein. 

3. Security considerations affecting this medium will provide that 

the sensitivity of the projects can be protected, and that full 

dissemination is made of extracted intelligence information to elements 

having a genuine need. 

4. TO provide for accomplishment of management, direction, and 

technical supervision in accordance with the above, the following 

responsibilities and arrangements are defined. 

a. The Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) will be solely 

responsible for the research, development, planning, and operations for 

electronic signal collection by space vehicles, taking into consideration 

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the effective utilization of all resources available to the U.S. 

Government. This responsibility will be implemented in accordance with 

Tab A hereto. 

b. 'fl Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) will develop the 

over-all collection effort to satisfy electronic signal collection 

requirements established by the U.S. Intelligence Board The National 

Security Agency will review USIB electronic signal (COM1NT and FLINT) 

requirements and will recommend to the Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) 

those which, in NSA's opinion, can best be fulfilled by means of overhead 

reconnaissance. The over-all collection program prepared by the 

Department of the Air Fbrce (SAFMS) will be subject to approval by the USIB. 

c. The National Security Agency will be solely responsible for 

the research, development, planning, and operations for processing of 

electronic signal data (CDMINT and FLINT) collected from space vehicle 

sources, taking into consideration the effective utilization of all 

processing resources available to the U.S. Government. The processing will 

include technical feedback to the Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) 

as well as extraction of intelligence data, but technical feedback from 

other sources may be provided. This responsihility will be implemented 

in accordance with Tab B hereto. 

d. The Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) will determine the 

data format for the electronic signal collection products in close 

consultation with the National Security Agency so as to optimize the match 

between collection and processing. 

5. All applicable resources of the Department of Defense will be 

used in fulfillment of the above responsibilities. The resources of all 

other components of the U.S. Government engaged in electronic signal 

intelligence activity will be utilized as feasible. 

2 Incls: 

1. Tab A - Implementation of Collection Responsibilities 

2. Tab B - Implementation of Processing Responsibilities 

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TAB A 

IMPLEMETTTATICN CF COLLECMCN 17.1PCLISEBILITIES 

1. The Department of the Air Farce (SAFMS) collection responsibilities 

include all aspects of the research, development, planning and operation 

of electronic signal collection by earth satellites or other space craft. 

These responsibilities encompass all aspects of the collection systems 

and include necessary ground support functions and equipment incident 

to the proper operation of the space craft and/or payload and as may be 

required to recover, transmit, convert, reformat and technically correct 

or reconstruct the collected data in order to yield a imahle collection 

product for exploitation by the processor. 

2, The Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) will utilize all resources 

within the U.S. Government in the. accomplishment of its collection 

responsibilities 

3. fl Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) will establish, organize 

and manage the electronic signal collection effort in accordance with 

USIB approved requirements and priorities, and will exercise technical' 

direction, program planning, funding, security, and operational control 

of the collection programs. 

4. The Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) will accomplish payload 

configuration control and mission planning. In accomplishing these 

functions, the Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) may utilize the services 

of a technidal advisory group. 

5. The collection products of this effort will be placed under a 

single unified security control system. 

6. All original (record) copies of the collection product will be 

maintained in a repository designated by the Department of the Air Force 

(SAFMS). 

7. The collection product of this effort will be made available 

by the Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) to the NSA for fulfillment 

of processing responsibilities, and to such other activities designated 

by NSA or specifically authorized by USIB. 

B. No basic changes to existing collection programs scheduled 

through calendar year 1962 will be made. Augmentations to the collection 

effort will be in accordance with the procedures and responsibilities 

outlined herein. 

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9. The Department of the Air Force (SAFMS) will consult with the 

National Security Agency, in a timely manner, concerning the anticipated 

product and format from each electronic collection effort to facilitate 

planning for the exploitation processing in accordance with the 

responsibilities assigned to the National Security Agency, and will providA 

technical assistance to facilitate accomplishment of the exploitation 

processing. 

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TAB B 

IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCESSING RESPChIBELITIES 

1. The National Security Agency processing responsibilities include 

all aspects of the research, development, planning, and operation of the 

processing effort for electronic signal collection, products provided by 

the Department of the Air Force (SAFMS). These responsibilities encompass 

all aspects of the processing of collectionproduct, including the 

distribution of end product information reports as authorized by USIB. 

2. The National Security Agency will establish, organize, and 

supervise the electronic signal processing effort in accordance with the 

requirements and priorities established by the USIB and will exercise 

technical direction, program planning, security control, and supervision 

of the processing program. 

3. The National Security Agency will take cognizance of all resources 

within the U.S. Government in accomplishment of its processing 

responsibilities. To achieve maximum effectiveness, the National Security 

Agency will be responsible for specifying those U.S. resources to be 

applied to the processing of space vehicle collection products. In 

accomplishing its responsibility, the Director, National Security Agency 

may utilize the services of a technical advisory group. 

4. No basic changes to presently existing approved processing 

programs scheduled 'trough calendar year 1962 will be made Additions 

or augmentations to the processing effort will be in accordance with the 

procedures and responsibilities outlined herein. 

5. The National Security Agency will place the end product 

information reports of the processing effort under a security control 

system to safeguard the source of the material. Such a system will be 

subject to USIB approval. 

1 I 

6. The National Security Agency will provide specified technical 

or other feedback as required by. the Department of the Air Force (SAFMS). 

7. In the exercise of the responsibility for processing the 

collection product, the National Security Agency shall assign tasks to 

appropriate organizations of the United States Government. An 

organization within the Department of Defense may not refuse to apply 

available resources for the accomplishment of a particular task on the 

basis that it.will require the diversion of such resources from the 

accomplishment of other missions, unless such refusal is approved by the 

Secretary of the Military Department or the Commander of the Unified 

or Specified Command concerned. Assignment of tasks to organizations 

outside the Department of Defense will be subject to the approval of 

the head of the particular orgnaization concerned. 

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8. In those cases where NSA delegates processing responsibility, the 

NSA will: 

a. Provide app oiALiate planning support, and will Eurnish 

required operational and technical instructions. 

b. Assure that specified feedback as required by the Department 

of the Air Force (SINS) is provided. 

c. Arrange for each processing element to provide results to 

NSA, in one of two forms, either (1) as data to be integrated with other 

information into NSA distributed reports, or (2) as a finished report to 

be provided to all authorized custarers In either caqp, distribution 

will be rade as authorized by USIB. The reports of type (2) above will be 

distributed in an NSA reporting series but will contain a designator 

showing the 0 ganizatian of origin. 

d. As authorized by USIB, provide applupLiate processing units 

with instructions for "sanitization" in order that information produced 

can be provided unddr apptupulate classification to all intelligence 

users, including the unified and Specified commands and their operating 

elements. 

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT CONCERNING 

NSA PARTICIPATION IN THE 

(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

1. In the course of discussions between Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville, 

Admiral Frost and Dr. Tordella on 25 May 1962, it was made known that 

the (S) National Reconnaissance Office in its SIGINT program will respond 

only to requirements levied by the United States Intelligence Board 

Further, that the NW will request the USIB to determine which subordinate 

committee on the Board (COMOR or SIGINT Committee) will be responsible 

for applicable SIGINT requirements. 

2. During these discussions, it was agreed that: 

a. NSA will provide advice and consultation to the NRO on how 

best to meet requirements which are levied by the Board. 

b. NSA will nominate one of its personnel to become a full-tire 

member of the NRO. 

c. After discussion with the NSA the NMI may assign primary 

responsibility for development of certain aspects of the SIGINT collection 

program to NSA. 

d. NSA will be reskr-g:sible for advising the NRD on desired 

format of the SIGINT material to be collected. NSA will also be rebFunsible 

for accomplishing or supervising analysis and reporting of collected 

SIGLNT materials. 

e. Security safeguards required for the handling of NI10 collected 1

SIGINT materials can be provided as described in memorandum from Director, 

NRO, to Chairman USIB; dated 31 May 1962; Subject: Security Handling 

of SIGINT Collected by Reconnaissance Satellites. 

/S/ 

LOUIS W. TDRDELLA 

Acting Director 

Concur. /s/ Herbert Scoville, Jr. 

Concur. /s/ Joseph V. Charyk 

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AGREEmwr Fat REORGANIZATION CF THE 

NATICNAL RECONNAISSANCE PFOGRAM 

A. The National Reconnaissance Program 

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the 

intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, 

for the development, management, control and operation of all prOjects, 

both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of 

mapping and geodetic inforrnaticri obtained through overflights (excluding 

peripheral recannaissarce operations). The potentialities U.S. 

technology and all operational resources and f.ftrilities must be 

aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems 

far the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the 

Government's intelligence needs and objectives. 

2. The National Recannaiseame Program shall be responsive directly 

and solely to the intelligence collection requirerrents and priorities 

establishers by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting 

requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both 

satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue 

to be the responsihility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of 

the 303 Committee. 

B. The Secretary of Defense will: 

1. Establish the NR) as a separate agency of the DoD and will have. 

the ultimate responsibility the managanent and operation of the NRO 

and the NRP; 

2. Choose a Director of the HC who will report to him and be 

responsive to his instaax7tibms; 

3. Concur in the Choice of the Deputy Director of the NRO who 

will report to the DNRD and be respcnsive to his instructions; 

4. Review and have the final power to approve the NRP budget; 

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5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when'necessary, to 

reach decisions an issues on which committee agreement could not be 

reached. 

C. The Director of Central Intelligence will: 

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the 

targeting of NEP operations and the estahlishment of their frequency of 

°overage; 

2 Review the results obtained by the NEP and recommend, if 

appropriate, steps for improving such results; 

3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee; 

4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year; 

5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a unform system in 

the whole NEP area. 

National Recermaissance Program Executive Committee 

1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, the Director of Central IntPiligence, and the Special 

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is hereby 

established to guide and participate in the formulation of the_NEP 

through the DNRO. (The DNRD will sit with the Executive Committee but 

will not be a voting member.) If the Executive Committee can not agree 

on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the 

COmmittee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision The 

NRP Executive Committee will: 

a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level 

of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided 

by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations. 

b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance 

Program and its budget. 

c. Approve the allocation of reSponsihility and the corresponding 

funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. Funds 

shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory 

development effort is achieved. and maintained by the Department of Defense 

and CIA to ciPqign and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requiremeztts 

aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be 

carried out by both CIA and DoD. 

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d. Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and 

the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view 

to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new system 

is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government 

best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to 

undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for 

collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. 

Assignment of responsibility for engineering development of sensor 

subsystems will be made to either the CIA or DoD components in 

accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all 

other subsystems, including epacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and 

booster interface subsystems shall in general be assigned to an Air Force 

camponent, reccgniaing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry 

vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which 

utast proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring 

optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for 

overhead recumnaissance. TO optimize the primary objective of systems 

development, design requirement of the sensors will be given priority 

in their integration within the epaoecraft and reentry vehicles. 

e. Assign operational responsimlity for various types of manned 

overflight missions to CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 

Committee. 

f. Periodically review the essential features of the major 

program elements of the NRP. 

2. The Executive Committee shall meet an the call of either the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All 

meetings will be attended by the DNS) and such staff advisors as the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence 

consider desirable. 

E. National Peccmaissance Office 

1. Tb implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish 

the leo as a separate operating agency of the DoD. It shall include the 

SOC which shall be jointly manned. 

2. The Director of the NeD shall be appointed by the Secretary of 

Defense. The Dissector 

a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense 

and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D 

above, have the responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP. 

I. 

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b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the 

provisions of Section D above, have authority to initiate, approve, 

modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in 

the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate reoannehdations to the Executive 

COmmittee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities 

and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies 

of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the 

invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to 

t USIB requirements. 

c. Have authority to require that he be kept. fully and 

completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government 

of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NEP. 

d. Maintain and provide tO•the members of the Executive 

Oammittee records of the status of all projects, programs and 

activities of the NEP in the research, development, production and/or 

operational phases. 

e. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the 

National Recxxmoissance PieeLaui. 

f. Establish a figral control and accounting procedure to 

ensure that all funds expanded in support of the National Reconnaissance 

Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the 

agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately 

those funds to be applied to rcoearch and exploratory design development, 

systems development, procurement, and operational activities Finds 

expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central 

Intl 11 under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted 

for by CIA and will be reported to DNED in accordance with agreed upon 

Pte. 

g. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NEP. 

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the 

concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full 

time in a line position directly under the Director Na). The Deputy 

Director shall act'fbr and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO 

during his absence or eiaability 

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion as to reflect 

the best talent alcervpriately available from the CIA, the three 

military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will 

report to the DNRO and DOM and will maintain no allegiance to the 

originating agency or Department. 

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F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsihilities 

1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NPP shall be 

allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto. 

(signed) Cyrus Vance (signed) W. F. Raborn 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Director of Central Intelligence 

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The following assignments for the development of new optical sensor 

subsystems are made to take full advantage of technical rArnhility and 

experience of the agencies involved. 

1. The CIA will develop the imprwerents in the CORONA general 

search optical sensor subsystems. 

2. Following the selection of a concept, and a contractor, for 

full-scale development, in the area of advanced general search, the CIA 

will develop the optical sensor subsystem for that system. 

3. The Air Force (SAFSP) will develop the G-3 optical sensor 

subsystem for the advanced high-resolution pointing system. 

4. SAFSP will develop the optical sensor subsystems (manned and 

unmanned) for the MO. program. 

The Director, NRO will, in managing the corresponding overall systeffis 

developments, ensure that: 

1. The management of an contracting for the sensors is arranged 

so that the design and engineering cArahilities in the various 

contractors are most efficiently utilized 

2. The sensor packages and other subsystems are integrated in an 

overall system engineering design for each system, with ONRO having 

responsibility for systems integration of each overall system. 

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 

From: Director of Naval Intelligence 

Director, National Reconnaissance Off ice (s) 

Subj: System POPPY, reassignment of responsibilities for (TS) 

Ref: (a) Missions cperatians Directive (BYE-4337-62)- of 6 Nov 62 

(b) Your memo subj: "Organization and Functions of N1 (S)" of 

23 July 62 

(c) DNI ltr sUbj: "Project POPPY; assignment of responsihilities 

for (rS)" of 10 September 62 

1. The responsibilities delineated by reference (a) necessitate a realignment of the organizational information requested by reference (b) and 

supplied by reference (c} Accordingly, reference (c) is hereby cancelled 

and sqpmmded. 

2. System POPPY of Project is currently the only NRP assignment 

within Program C. 

3. One formal agreement has been made between the Director of NaVal 

Intelligence and the Director, National Security Agency regarding 

interrogation of POPPY satellites This agreement authorizes the NSA to 

direct PoPPY satellite interrogation and collectinnuten "quick-reaction", 

resulting from short tip-off of Soviet space or missile activity, is 

required. Although this is the only formal agreement entered into an 

additional informal understanding has been made with the National Security 

Agency. This understanding permits the allocation of U.S. Army, U.S. Air 

Force and U.S. Navy cryptalogic personnel to man and operate Navy furnished 

electronic equipment at regularly established collection stations along the 

periphery of the Soviet Bloc.

In accordance with these understandings the 

respective services/agency man the equipment with their regularly assigned 

personnel when the POPPY satellites are transmitting and when the stations 

are tape recorded and ccuriered to the NSA for analysis. Operations 

resulting from these informal understandings have proven entirely 

satisfactory. 

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4. The specific responsibilities of the organization/individuals 

associated with the project are as follows: 

a. 'The PLogiam Director's Staff (Technical Operations Group): 

(1) This group of specialists provides the Program Director, 

through the Project Director, the necessary technical information and 

guidance. This includes advising the Director of Intelligence requirements, 

satellite instnimentatian, missile rocketry, orbital requirements, field 

station operations, aid signal processing. In addition, this group insures 

that overt research and development programs, approved by the Director, 

Program C, are conducted in a proper manner to support System POPPY. 

(2) Designated members of the PLugiam Director's Staff (7110G) 

shall meet with the Deputy Director for Operations, NRO, as required, 

to prepare routine taskir schedules for the operational control of the 

POPPY aatpllite after it has achieved orbit. Activation of the satellite and appropriate collection farilities will be accomplished by this 

staff as directed by the Satellite Operations Center (SOC), NRO. The. 

non-routine interrogation required in the event of indications requiring 

quick reaction will be accomplished as set forth in paragraph 3 above. 

(3) The Staff will report, as occurring, any significant changes 

in the technical capability of the satellites to the Director, Progrmn C. 

b. The Director of Naval Intelligence is responsible for: 

(1) Providing the Project, Director 

(a) The Project Director's responsihilities are to supervise 

and administpx all aspects of the project subject to the approval of the 

Program Directnr. 

(2) Providing the Product Control Representative 

(a) The Product Control Representative is normally attached 

to the Scientific and Technical. Intplligence Center of GNI and is 

responsible for informing the Project Director of intPlligence requirements. 

Additionally, he is responsible for disseminating quality control technical 

data to the field stations, for monitoring the signal analysis progrm, 

and for .supervision of in-house signal analysis support where required. 

c. The Director, Naval Research TAhriratory is responsible for: 

(1) Providing the Project Technical Representative. 

(a) The Project Technical Representative is responsible for 

estahlishing such liaison with the Naval Research laboratory as will 

provide the following: 

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1. Overall Instrumentation concepts, including the 

aaterl ite. 

2. Provision of all equipnents required for collection 

and interrogation, including but not limited to, the shipment and supply 

of technical expendables and spare parts to the field stations 

3. Coordination of vehicle and misaion payload 

integration, and tfie preparation including the monitoring of the launch 

thereof. 

4. The training of all peraannel involved in collection 

and interrogation. 

5. Operational control of the satellite prior to its 

launch. 

d. The Director, Naval Security Group is responsible for. 

(1) Providing the Project Operational Representative whose 

responsibilities are: 

(a) The direction and coordination of field station operations 

These responsibilities include insuing project planning and operationaldirectives to the field stations and keeping each of these stations 

advised of the tasking requirements necessary to perform the project 

mission. 

(2) Acting as the focal point for all electrical canmunications 

associated with the project. This includes all operational, technical 

and logistical traffic. 

(3) Providing operating perscnnel at the Navy collection sites. 

e. The Director, National Security Agency is responsible for: 

(1) Providing a representative who sha11 act as an advisor to 

the Project Director's staff. 

(2) Processing all collected data and developing an EuRr product 

therefrom. 

(3) Disseminating, through specified security channels, any 

intelligence information derived from the data as initially agreed upon 

by the Project Director and Director, National Security Agency. 

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(4) Interpreting National Intelligence Pequirements into. 

technical EL= requirements and making recommendations to the staff far 

operational tasking of the satellite. 

(5) Providing magnetic tapes to field collection sites an a 

continuing basis. 

f. The Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons is responsible for: 

4 

(1) Providing the Project FisnAl Representative whose 

responsibilities are: 

(a) Budget preparation and sUbmission. lie is responsible 

for the diShursement of project funds to the U.S. Naval Research 

Tahoratnry and, further, for the sUbnission of expenditure statements 

to the Program Director. 

g. The Air Force Security Service is responsible for: 

(1) Providing sites and the support faril ities at these sites 

1 for a collection hut. This includes physical security and utilities 

A 1 

(2) Providing operating personnel at the Air Force collection sites. 

(3) Providing one qualified individual who may act with authority 

and may coordinate Air Force operations in 000rdinaticn with the Project 

Director. 

h. The Army Security Service is responsible far: 

(1) Providing sites and the support facilities at these sites 

for a collection hut. This incluries physical security and utilities 

(2) Providing operating personnel at the Amoy collection sites. 

(3) Providing one qualified individual who may act with authority 

and may coordinate Army operations in coordination with the Project 

Director. 

1 

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NRO/NSA/CIA/USN 

MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT FOR THE POPPY SYSTEM 

I. PURPOSE: 

The purpose of this agreement is to define the organizational 

responsibilities and the lines of authority associated with the 

management of the POPPY System Project. 

II. BACKGROUND: 

The Navy Space Project (PM-16) was established by the Chief of Naval 

Operations under the Chief of Naval Material. The Manager, Navy Space 

Project, is also the Director of Ni0, PloyLam C. As the Director, 

Program C, he is supported by elements of the National Security Agency, 

the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Navy in fulfilling 

his responsibilities under the National Reconnaissance Program. 

III. RESPONSIBELTITES: 

The Director, Program C, is responsible to the Director, National 

Reconnaissance Office, for the overall management of the POPPY Project. 

The Director, National Security Agency, is responsible for the processing, 

analysis, and reporting of POPPY collected data.

The Director, Naval 

Research Laboratory, is responsible to the Director,. Program C, for the 

engineering and technical support in the design, development, 

fabrication, test, and on-orbit operation of the system. the Commander, 

Naval Security Group. Command,'utile functioning in support of the NRO, 

exercises for the. Director, Program C, in flight operational control of the 

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POPPY system, executing the tasking directions of the NRO and 

processing priorities of NSA. 

/S/ 

John L. McLucas 

Director 

National Reconnaissance Office 

5 November 1971 

/S/ 

Noel Gayler 

vice Admiral, USN 

Director 

National Security Agency 

27 October 1971 

/S/ 

Carl E. Duckett 

Deputy Director for 

Science and Technology 

16 July 1971 

/S/ 

Robert A. Frusch 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Researth.and Development) 

25 June 1971 

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SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE POPPY SYSTEM 

1. The DireCtor, Program C, is responsible to the Director of the 

National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) for overall management of the POPPY 

Project. Included in his responsibilities are the following: 

a. Establishes the policy for the management of the POPPY Project. 

b. Coordinates all aspects of the project to ensure optimum 

effective employment of the system. 

c. Develops reqpirements for POPPY mission concepts, personnel, 

ground support equipment, facilities, etc., and submits pioposals to 

the DNRO for approval. 

d. Prepares a coordinated plan for the design, development, 

construction, and implementation of approved concepts. 

e. Coordinates, prepares, and submits the POPPY budget. 

f. Allocates NRO funds as required for the design, development, 

and support of the project in accordance with DNRO Program and fund 

approvals. 

g. Monitors the technical. development, test, production, quality 

assurance, maintenance, training, and other logistic support matters 

to meet system objectives. 

h. Provides guidance to COINAVSEDSRU for his responsibilities in 

the execution of POPPY operations. 

i. Keeps the DNRO advised of the status, trends, acoLuvlishments, 

problems, and any other ingx)rtant aspects of the project. 

j. Furnishes requirements information and basic planning data to 

elements of the POPPY Project. 

k. Performs continuous evaluation of progress against plans, cost 

against funds available, and capability against design objectives. 

Initiates corrective actions whenever necessary. 

1. Ensures efficient utilization of manpower, materials, and funds 

pertaining to the project. 

m. Provides guidance and review of security controls within the 

POPPY Project. 

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2. The Director, Naval Research Laboratory, is responsible to the 

Director, Program C, for the engineering and technical support in the 

design, development, fabrication, test, and on-orbit operation of the 

POPPY.system. His responsibilities include the following: 

a. Prepares mission concepts for submission to the Director, 

Program C. 

b. Initiates system engineering design to support approved concepts 

in the space and ground systems. 

c. Designs, develops, and fabricates satellite vehicles and provides 

on-board equipment required to implement approved concepts. 

d. Provides ground support equipment and repair parts required in 

the colleCtion and interrogation functions of POPPY ground sites, 

ensuring appropriate interface between collection and processing functions. 

e. Assures complete engineering coordination between spacecraft 

and launch vehicle. 

f. Provides pre-launch technical coordination and monitoring of the 

POPPY launch. 

g.. Monitors satellite telemetry to assess on-orbit spacecraft 

systems and reports as required. 

h. Prepares funding data as required by the Director, Program C. 

3. The Commander, Naval Security Group Command, while functioning in 

support of the NRD, exercises for the Director, Pickg.Lam C, in-flight 

operational control of the POPPY system, executing the tasking 

directions of the NRO and proceSsing priorities of NSA. His - 

responsibilities include the following: 

a. Exercises management authority over POPPY field stations. 

b. Develops, plans, programs, and coordinates as required for 

current And future requirements for equipment, materials, supplies, 

facilities, maintenance, and administrative support services (other 

than that directly involved in collection and processing functions), 

housing, barracks, and messing needed for the POPPY operational mission. 

• c. Plans and programs for manpower requirements at POPPY field 

stations. 

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d. Develops procedures for executing the tasking directives of the 

NRO Satellite Operations Center and initiates guidance to field stations . 

in response to NSA policy on processing priorities and other matters 

concerning field processing functions. 

e. Monitors the operations of POPPY field activities to ensure the 

maintenance of high standards of performance. 

f. Coordinates with NRL and NSA regarding all collection and 

processing equipment for POPPY field stations and monitors all 

installation plans and schedules for its impact an station facilities 

and service requirements. 

g. Provides for routine repair and upkeep of POPPY operations 

equipment and interfaces with NRL regarding non-routine maintenance and 

repair. 

h. Plans and programs for ccmnunications facilities to support 

POPPY operations. 

i. Provides for the physical security facilities and services 

required to maintain authorized SI, TIc and BYEMAN control centers at the 

POPPY field stations. 

j. Develops and administers, in coordination with Chief of Naval 

Personnel, the requisite training programs for officer and enlisted 

personnel assigned to POPPY field stations. Administers the personnel 

security program for these personnel. 

4. The Director, National Security Agency, has overall responsibility 

for the processing, analysis, and reporting of POPPY collected data. 

Included in his responsibilities are the following: 

' a. Provides SIGINT technical guidance and feedback to the POPPY 

Processing System to ensure its effectiveness in conjunction with other 

satellite and non-satellite SIGINT operations. 

b. Plans the technical and ficia1 management of the processing 

and analysis functions of the POPPY system to include the manpower 

resources of the POPPY field sites. As such, he determines processing 

equipment requirements at the sites and coordinates with NRO, NRL, and 

NSG in the procurement, installation, and operational use of the 

equipment. 

c. Budgets for the procurement and repair parts for POPPY processing 

and analysis equipment. 

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d. Interfaces with the NRO; Director, Program C; NRL; and NSG in 

the development of future POPPY concepts as they relate to processing 

and analysis functions. 

e. Processes, analyzes, and publishes data collected from. the POPPY 

system. 

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Top Secret 

NoFoRN-OwC(?N 

About the Authors 

David D. Bradburn was born in 

Hollywood, California, on 27 May 1925. 

He attended South Pasadena High School 

and the US Military Academy at West 

Point, New York, where he graduated in 

1946. Commissioned a Second Lieutenant 

in the Army Air Corps, he was transferred 

into the US Air Force in 1947 and advanced 

through the ranks to Major General, US 

Air Force. He holds Master's degrees in 

engineering from Purdue University and 

in international affairs from The George 

Washington University. 

His Air Force assignments included 50 

missions as a B-26 light bomber pilot in 

Korea in 1950 and 1951 and. a tour as a 

research and development (R&D) staff officer at Headquarters, Air Research and 

Development Command (ARDC), in 

Baltimore, Maryland, from 1952 to 1957. 

Trained in electrical engineering at Purdue 

and in R&D staff work at ARDC, he moved 

to California in 1957 to help Col Fritz Oder 

set up the WS-117L office. In 1960 he was 

among the first to join the SAMOS Project 

Office, again using his R&D and space 

experience to help BGen Robert E. Greer 

organize the new "black" Air Force space 

projects. From 1962 to 1964 Bradburn 

originated and orbited the QUILL Project, 

a satellite-borne synthetic aperture radar, 

which demonstrated the engineering 

feasibility of imaging radars in space. 

From 1967 to 1971 he was head of

during the ferment of the ABM problem, and took a major 

part in the planning and launch

from 1971 to 1973 he was 

Director-of the Office of Space Systems (NRO 

Staff); and from 1973 to 1975, he was 

Director of the Office of Special Projects 

(SAFSP). 

In 1975, just in time for the US Bicentennial and a great time to be in New England, 

Bradburn moved to Hanscom Air Force 

Base. Bedford, Massachusetts, as Vice 

Commander, Air Force Electronic Systems 

Division. When he retired from the Air 

Force in 1976 the Bedford Minutemen. a 

sociaUhistorical association, came out to 

play with fifes and drums. In 1978 and 

1979, Bradburn was the Representative of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the US team 

negotiating with the Soviet Union on limitations on antisatellite weapons (ASATs). 

At that time, under. the Carter Administration, the United States was opposing 

the development or use of ASATs, a position 

consistent with President Eisenhower's 

Open Skies strategy. 

In 1979 Bradburn joined TRW Defense 

Systems Group in El. Segundo, California, 

as Director of Engineering, concentrating 

mainly on TRW's project management 

Top Secret 

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lop Secret 

N4 )f 

methods with Gen Samuel C. Phillips, the 

expert who managed Apollo. Retired from 

TRW in 1987, Bradburn volunteered for 

this assignment as a historian in 1990 and 

has been busy and happy managing this 

smaller project ever since! 

John Copley was born in Bangor, 

Maine, on 26 August 1922 at the height of 

a severe thunderstorm which, some believe, 

may have shaped certain events in his 

future. His father was a teacher who, in 

search of greener pastures (or warmer?), 

made' several career moves in a southerly 

direction. As a result, Copley's early education was in Massachusetts, but he spent 

his high school years in New Rochelle, 

New York, where he graduated in 1940. 

He attended Williams College; Williamstown, Massachusetts, until November 

1942, when he entered the Aviation Cadet 

Program, eventually piloting a B-24 with 

the 15th Air Force in Italy during 1944 

and early 1945. 

The next 12 years were spent in communications and electronics assignments 

in such locations as Johnston Island and the 

Korean Peninsula. In 1953 he entered the 

Air Force Institute of Technology, graduating with a degree in electrical engineering 

in August 1955. Following two and a half 

years at Rome Air Development Center, 

Griffis Air Force Base, New York, in charge 

of the ground quick reaction capability 

(QRC) program at the Intelligence and 

Electronic Warfare Laboratory, he found 

himself in Inglewood, California, assigned 

to the Air Force WS-117L Program Office 

(thanks mostly to the launch of Sputnik I 

in October 1957). His initial assignment 

was development of Subsystem H, the 

386 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Ground/Space Communications System: 

however, his SIGINT background prevailed 

and in July 1958 he was assigned to Subsystem F, the "ferret" payloads. He continued 

as the SIGINT payload chief for SAMOS 

and then when the project was classified as BYEMAN in December 1962. 

In July 1964 he was assigned to the 

Manned Orbiting Laboratory in an attempt 

to expand the mission into the SIGINT 

area. When this attempt was terminated 

in 1967, he became the first National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) assignee to 

the National Security Agency (NSA). 

While there he was Chief of K-45 charged 

with processing the data

Copley retired from the Air Force in 

May 1974. The next 15 years were spent 

at Rockwell International Space Division 

where he finally realized a lifelong ambition and was able to actually participate in 

the engineering development of electronic 

systems for spacecraft (including the space 

shuttle). In February of 1990, MGen David 

D. Bradburn invited him to participate in 

the writing of this history, after which a 

third retirement should be in order! 

Raymond B. Potts was born in 

Wellsburg, West Virginia, on 15 September 

1931. He graduated from West Virginia 

University in 1954 with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering, majoring in 

electronics with a mathematics minor. He 

also completed the Modern Engineering 

Management Program at Carnegie Mellon 

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PL 8E-36/50 USC 3605 

University in 1964.and the Federal Executive Institute, Senior Executive Development, in 1982. He served in the US Air 

Force from 1954 to.1956, attaining the 

rank of First Lieutenant and later Captain 

in the US Air Force ReServe in 1957. 

His career at NSA actually began 

while he was in the Air Force, and his First 

work there involved research on the use of 

transistors. From 1956 to 1958 he worked 

on some special R&D projects including 

the first computer to use transistor logic. 

SOLO. From 1958 to 1960 he worked on 

an effort to solve a major 

cryptanalytic problem. From 1960 to 1963 

he was Chief of the Technical Planning 

Staff for equipment that required technology beyond the state of the art. He started 

into the satellite field in 1963 as task 

leader for the development of the high 

speed analog-to-digital converter.for processing analog data from the Air Force 

prime payloads in Project 698BK. managed by SAFSP. From 1966 to 1971 Potts 

was Deputy Chief of the Of of ELINT 

and Chief of Special Projects; in these jobs 

he was responsible for NSA participation 

in the low-orbit SIGINT satellite projects. 

He managed all the analysis and processing of SIGINT collected data, made agreements with the Strategic Air Command, 

established th

and started the 

activity of processing SIGINT data by 

means of a contractor, Lockheed Missiles 

and Space Company, under an Air Force 

contract. He also represented NSA in 

development of the high-altitude SIGINT 

satellite projects. 

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EO 1.4.(c) 

After a series of increasingly responsible jobs. including Deputy Assistant 

Director NSA for Science and Technology, 

in 1974 Potts became Deputy Director of 

Training, NSA/Central Security Service/ 

Commandant of the National Cryptologic 

School, where he managed courses in 

equipment maintenance through graduatelevel language. computer science. and 

management. From 1980 to 1985 he was. 

Deputy Chief and Acting Chief. Operations 

and Control, managing SIGINT colleCtion 

operations via satellites, comsat remotes, 

high frequency, and embassies. From 1985 

to 1987 he was Deputy Chief, Joint . 

Programs, leading the acquisition of major 

collection systems jointly bought by NSA 

and the Service Cryptologic Agencies. 

Potts received the NSA Meritorious 

Civilian Service award in 1980. 

On his retirement in.1987, Potts 

became a Cryptologic Reservist at the 

National Cryptologic School at NSA. 

where he prepared a book on -Lessons 

Learned in Systems Acquisition" for use in 

systems acquisition training. He also 

organized the Acquisition Management 

Association to provide a forum to exchange 

information and ideas on acquisition. In 

1990 Potts agreed to take a leading role in 

writing this SIGINT history, which is 

based to a large degree on his experience 

and interests, which have kept him at the 

center of the satellite SIGINT world. With 

this job done, he plans to spend a lot more 

time with his family and keep his hand in 

the SIGINT business from time to time. 

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Noitlit.N.oRCON 

13L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

n 1952 he 

joined NSA as an electronics engineer working on development of microwave antennas 

and over-the-horizon SIGINT ultra-highfrequency collection equipment. This 

began a neer in SIGINT. In 1957 

and 195 rved in Tokyo as Chief 

of the R sta involved in experimental 

collection systems; from 1958 to 1964 he 

was in the technical planning staff, monitoring US Air Force and Navy SIGINT 

satellite projects; and in 1964 he joined the 

NRO staff in the Pentagon, helping to tie 

NSA and NRO interests together. In 1967 

he became Chief of R83 at NSA, the office 

of SIGINT satellite projects; and from 1967 

to 1970 he was advisor to the Director, NSA, 

on SIGINT satellite reconnaissance. From 

19Z0 until 1973 he was Chief of W05, 

responsible for ELINT end product reporting. From 1973 to 1976 he was Chief of 

the NSA group of analysts/linguists integrated in the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) headquarters to evaluate special 

covert SIGINT; from 1976 to 1979 he was 

Scientific Advisor to the Chief. AS. monitor 

ing special Na SIGINT; and from 1979 

to 1986 was Scientific Advisor to 

the Chie of roup, the largest operations group responsible for collection. 

analysis, and planning for 

SIGINT on Soviet and East European 

countries. 

Since his retirement from NSA in 

1986. has been a consultant for the 

• CIA on ad vanced SIGINT and related 

satellite programs. In 1988 he was a volunteer at the Smithsonian Museum of 

Natural History as a docent for the waterfowl exhibit, and from 1989 to the present 

he has been a volunteer for Recording for 

the Blind, Inc., in Washington. DC. reading, monitoring other readers, controlling 

the master tape recorder, and duplicating 

tapes on over 100 textbooks for collegelevel electronics, physics, mathematics, 

and technical trade school courses. He 

was awarded the Air Force Meritorious 

Service Medal in 1966 and the NSA 

Meritorious Service Medal in 1968. In his 

retirement has had time to concentrate on a HetOng interest in singing. -

Since 1972 he has appeared in over 100 

concerts with the Paul Hill Chorale in the 

Kennedy Center in Washington, DC. He 

volunteered for the assignment as a main 

member of this SIGINT history team in 

1990 and plans to concentrate on singing 

and summers in Martha's Vineyard in the 

future. 

388 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

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• -• - NUHAVii .ORCUN 

I Appendix = 

' ' 

• 

Acronyms and Abbreviations 

AAA antiaircraft artillery 

ABM antiballistic missile 

ADCS analog-to-digital conversion system 

ADD/DP Assistant Deputy Director for Data Processing

AD/FO Assistant Deputy for Field Operations {SAFSP) 

ADP Assistant Director for Production (NSA) 

AES anti-Earth satellite 

AFB Air Force Base 

AFBMC Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee 

AFBMD Air Force Ballistic Missile Division 

AFCGM Air Force Office of Guided Missiles 

AFSA Armed Farces Security Agency (pre-NSA) 

AFSC Air Force Systems Command 

AFSCF Air Force Satellite Control Facility 

AFSS Air Force Security Service 

AIL Airborne Instruments Laboratory 

AJOY analog-to-digital converter and computer system provided by NSA to SAC to 

process ELINT data 

AMC Army Missile Command 

AMIE analog magnetic instrumentation equipment, a spaceborne, wide-bandwidth, 

helical-scan magnetic-tape recorder used on Program A SIGINT 

reconnaissance satellites 

APE analog processing equipment 

APL Applied Physics Laboratory (Johns Hopkins University) 

ATIC Air Force Technical Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 

ARDC Air Force Research and Development Command 

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency 

ARS Advanced Reconnaissance System 

ATI Applied Technology, Inc. 

BUWEPS Bureau of Weapons (Navy) 

C-band radar operating frequency, 4 to 8 GHz 

CAMS computer-aided manual search 

CCP Consolidated Cryptologic Program 

CDC Control Data Corporation 

CEP circular error probable (locations) 

CES Communications Equipment Subsystem 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

Tap Secret 

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New ( wN-1 )isy ). 

CIG 

CINCPAC 

CINCPACFLT 

CNO 

COMINT 

COMNAVINTCOM 

COMDR. 

COMSEC 

CONUS 

COTR 

CSAW 

CSWG 

CVR 

CW 

DACS 

DAGER 

DAHOPS 

DCI 

DC SID 

DDC 

DDI 

DDO 

DDR&E 

DDS&T 

DEFSMAC 

DF 

DIA 

DIRNSA 

DNI 

DNRO 

DOD 

DSP 

DSU 

EDL 

ELINT 

ELT 

EMP INT 

EOB 

ERA 

ERP 

ESV 

EW/GCI 

EXCOM 

Central IntelligenCe Group • 

Commander in Chief. Pacific i US military forces} 

Commander in Chief. Pacific Fleet . 

Chief of Naval Operations • 

communications intelligence 

Commander. Naval Intelligence Command 

USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance 

communications security 

Continental United States 

Contracting Officer's Technical Representative 

Communications Supplementary Activities. Washington (Navy) 

COMOR SIGINT Working Group 

continuous video recording 

continuous waver versus pulsed) electromagnetic signal 

Data Acquisition and Control Segment. 

Director's Advisory Group for ELINT and Reconnaissance (NSA) 

Data Handling and Operations Plan 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Development ( USAF) 

Data Distribution Center 

Deputy Director for Intelligence 

Deputy Director for Operations (NSA) 

Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 

Deputy Director for Science and Technology (CIA). 

Defense Special Missiles and Astronautics Center 

direction-finding 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Director, National Security Agency 

Director of Naval Intelligence 

Director, National Reconnaissance Office 

Department of Defense 

Defense Support Program 

data storage unit 

Electronics Defense Laboratory (Sylvania) 

electronic intelligence (primarily radars, 

ELINT technical (reporting) 

electromagnetic pulse intelligence !nuclear detonation, 

electronic order of battle (radar locations) 

Engineering Research Associates 

effective radiated power 

Earth satellite vehicle 

early warning/ground-controlled intercept (radar) 

Executive Committee of the NRO 

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s.ofe 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FDM frequency-division-multiplex 

FIS foreign instrumentation signals 

FM frequency modulation 

FMSAC Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (CIA) 

FOC final operational capability 

FOV field of view 

FSK frequency shift key 

FTD Foreign Technology Division 

FY fiscal year 

GCHQ General Communications Headquarters (UK) 

GC' ground control intercept (radar' 

GE General Electric Company 

GHz gigahertz one billion cycles per second) 

GOR general operational requirement 

GPS Global Positioning System 

GRAB Galactic Radiation and Background 

GS general search 

HF high frequency (3 to 30 MI-h) 

HF/DF high-frequency/direction-finding 

HUMINT human intelligence 

Hz hertz one cycle per second) 

I&W indications and warning 

IBM International Business Machines, Inc. 

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 

IHF Intercept History File 

"MINT imagery intelligence 

IOC initial operating capability 

IR infrared 

'RENT infrared intelligence (primarily missile radiation) 

ITEP Interim Tactical ELINT Processing (Equipment) 

JAN Joint Army/Navy (publications, nomenclature, etc.) 

kbps kilobits per second 

kHz kilohertz one thousand cycles per second) 

L-band radar operating frequency, 1 to 2 GHz 

LMSC Lockheed Missiles and Space Company 

LMSD Lockheed Missiles and Space Division 

LOP line of position 

Top Secret 

Handle VId BYFMAN-rALENT-KEYHOLECOMINT Control Channels /0,111y 

Rif-9197%94 

Appendix G 391 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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Top Secret 

Nor ocv( )k(( 

MAD S mission and data services (processing) 

Mbps megabits per second 

MCC mission control center 

MGS mission ground station 

MHz megahertz (one million cycles per second) 

MOL Manned Orbiting Laboratory 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

NAVSPASPUR Naval Space Surveillance Center 

NIC Naval Intelligence Command 

NORAD North American Air Defense Command 

NPIC National Photographic Interpretation. Center 

NRL Naval Research Laboratory 

NRO National Reconnaissance Office 

NRP National Reconnaissance Program 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSC National Security Council 

NSCID NSC Intelligence Directive 

NSD NSA Support Detachment 

NSG Naval Security Group 

NSOC National SIGINT Operations Center 

NTPC National Technical 'Processing Center 

OCMC Operations Center for Mission Control 

OEL Office of ELINT (CIA) 

ONI Office of Naval IntelligenceOPELINT operational ELINT 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSDBMC Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ballistic Missile Committee 

OSI Office of Scientific Intelligence • 

OSP Office of Special Projects (CIA) 

OSS Office of Strategic Services I pre-CIA? 

PAC ELINT Pacific ELINT Center 

PAM/FM pulse amplitude modulation/frequency modulation 

PAPS POPPY Automated Processing System 

PCM pulse code modulation 

P DE priority data extractor 

PFIAB President's Foreign I ntelligence Advisory Board 

PPM pulse position modulation 

PRC People's Republic of China 

PRF pulse repetition frequency 

PRI pulse repetition interval 

PSAC President's Science Advisory Committee 

PSK phase shift key 

PW pulsewidth 

Top Secret 

Handle tmAN-TALf NT-KEYHOLE392 The SIGINT Satellite Story Ca% tr,vr Control Chanrieii• Jointly 

RYE' Ann' '94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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Top Secret 

tf OR IR( t" 

QRC quick reaction capability 

R&D research and development 

RAND Research for America's National Defense I the.RAND Corporation) 

RCA Radio Corporation of America . 

RF radio frequency 

RTG Reconnaissance Technical Group 

RTS remote tracking station 

RTTY radio teletype 

S Secret 

S-band radar operating frequency. 2 to 4 GHz 

S/S E Subsystem E (SAMOS photo payload) 

S/S F Subsystem F (SAMOS electronic reconnaissance, or "ferret.-system( 

S/S 1 Subsystem I (WS-117L processing system, 

SAC Strategic Air Command 

SAFMS Office of Missiles and Space I Air Force) 

SAFSP Office of Special Projects ( NRO Program A) 

SAFSS Office of Space Systems ( NRO staff) 

SAFUS Under Secretary of the Air Force ( DNRO) 

SALT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 

SAM surface-to-air missile . 

SAMOS ARPA unclassified designator for former SENTRY Program 

SAMS • Signal Activity Monitor System (ELINT) 

SAS Signal Analysis Subsystem (COMINT) 

SCA Signal Analysis Console 

SCF Satellite Control Facility . 

SDS Students for Democratic Society. 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SEL Stanford University Electronics Laboratory 

SGLS space-ground link system 

SHARS signal handling and recording segment 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SIOP Single Integrated Operating Plan 

SOC Satellite Operations Center, NSA 

SOCOMM Satellite Operations Communications network (Air Force) 

SORS . SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (USIB) 

SP SAFSP, including

SPO system project office 

SR system requirement 

SRI Stanford Research Laboratories 

SSAT Special Signals Analysis Team 

SSSC SIGINT Satellite Support Center (NSA) • 

STANCIB State/Army/Navy Communications Intelligence Board (pre-USCIB) 

STC Satellite Test Center 

• 

Top Secret 

Handle via 13YEMA Ai. TM. YHOtiCOMINT Control Cimnnels tom* 

8YE-9197194 

Appendix G 393 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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Top Secret 

■.1 o( 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

STIC Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center IONII 

STL Space Technologies Laboratories 

STRUM standard technical report using modules NSA format 

TAC Technical Advisory Committee 

TAT thrust-augmented Thor 

TCP Technological Capabilities Panel 

TCR time-criticafteporting 

TDY temporary detached duty 

TEBAC Telemetry and Beaconry Analysis Community 

TECHINS technical instructions 

TELINT telemetry intelligence 

THE technical history file 

TI technical intelligence 

TK Talent-Keyhole security compartment 

TOA time of arrival 

TOG Technical Operating Group 

TS Top Secret 

TV television 

TW tactical warning 

UAR United Arab Republic 

UHF ultrahigh frequency (300 to :3.000 MHz 

USA United States Army 

USAF United States Air Force 

USCIB United States Communications Intelligence Board pre-CSI131 

USIB United States Intelligence Board 

USN United States Navy 

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

VAB vehicle assembly building 

VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base 

VCR video cassette recorder 

VHF very high frequency 130 to 300 MHz) 

WADC Wright Air Development Center 

WDD Western Development Division 'Air Forcer 

WS-117L. Weapon System 117L. 

X-band radar operating frequency, 8 to 10 GHz 

YIG yttrium-iron-garnet 

Top Secret 

Haortle ht TIM TAL % T.A.F1'HOL E394 The SIGINT Satellite Story Comm,r Confroi Channels lowelv 

B . I f-qr V4 

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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Military Rank Abbreviations 

Gen General 

Adm Admiral 

LGen Lieutenant General 

VAdm • Vice Admiral 

• MGen Major General 

RAdm Rear Admiral 

BGen Brigadier General 

Col Colonel 

Capt Captain (USN) 

LtCoi Lieutenant Colonel 

Cmdr Commander 

Maj Major 

LtCmdr Lieutenant Commander 

Capt Captain (USAF) 

Lt . Lieutenant (senior grade) 

lLt First Lieutenant 

Lt (j.g.) Lieutenant (junior grade) 

2Lt Second Lieutenant 

Ens Ensign 

___"14everse ide Meek - 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYENAN. TA LENT.KF}'HOL ECOml`ar Control Channels Omits, Appendix G 395 

3t.E-9197/94 . 

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Top Secret 

Noroax-oRm..... 

i • 

; 

4.-5Appendix 

.11V*1 W. I 

PL 86-36/5Q USC 3605 

P.L 8 6-3 6/5 0 USC 3605 - 

EC) 1.4. (c) 

Index 

AAA 

-:_•eletIT: • 

'Top Secret 

Handle ,na BYEMAN-EALENT-KEYHOLECOMlNr Control Channels Mindy Appendix H 397 

BYE-9197/94 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 1.4.(c) 

Top Secret 

:v( fit fitvi as 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

• 

Top Secret 

Handle %ta syemAN- rAt IN TAE)1101.1- 

C ()MINT Control Channth Inendv 

Ryi.oJ.'-'ia 

398 The SIGINT Satellite Story IA 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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lop secret 

NofMN-t /RUN 

8 6-3 6/ 50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

tie die via 5 YEMAN- TALENT-KEYHOLE- • COMINT Control Channels Jointly 

8YE-919794 

Appendix H 399 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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, 

Top Secret 

\l N\ 4 1 

EO 1.4. (c) 

PL 8 6-3 6/5 0 USC 3 605 

400 The SICINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Rwrite aid SVEMAN. TALENT-KT YHOLE- • 

.COmiNT Control Channel,. !ninth. 

FIST.° I ha 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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yr g 

'FL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle wa 8rEMAN-rALENTAEYHOLECOMINT'Control Channels lowly 

BY(.9197/94 

Appendix H • 401 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Top Secret 

N.( 0?•.( NC( )1 

'PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

402 The StGINIT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Kindle vw BY(.+441c. rAt ENT-KM-104 

COmt:v r Contml Channels lo,nriv 

frrl -q I 97-'9.1 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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*L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Eq 1.4.(c) 

Appendix H 403 

Top Secret 

Handle wa BYE.StAtsl• rAtENT•la MOLE- 

• COMIN Control Channel, luoriv 

.911.9107/q4 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Top Secret 

ni(WORN.< WO as: 

t"L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

404 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Handle via BYEMAN-TALEN T. KEYHOLECOMINT Conn& Channels !ninth, 

BY 1:-Ql9.7fila 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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lop >cirri 

N.-Lifrnt.,..ukt (fr.\ 

FL 8E-36/50 USC 305 

Top Secret 

Handle $,IefilfmAN.TALENT.KEYHOftCOMiNT Control Channels losntiv 

BYE-9197/94 

Appendix H 405 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Top Secret 

NorogN.r NU \ 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

FO 1.4.(c) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Top Secret 

Handle via 13 MIA TALENT-KfyHOLECOMINT Comm! Channel, 

R11.°1""44 

406 The SIGINT Satellite Story 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Top Secret 

)K' -ON( 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Appendix H 407 

Top Secret 

Handle rya 8VEMAN-TALENT.KET NUL fCavil/yr Control Channels Jointly 

BYE-9187/84 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Top Secret 

)R.v•virorm. 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

• • • 

408 The SIC INT Satellite Story 

Top Secret 

Hrndle tla BYE.MAN.TALENT-NEYHO(ECO•l.}INT Control Clunnel4 loontiv 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c)

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up 'eve( 

NI )F( )R X•( AV(V. 

-`PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Beuer-se.side blank ....... . 

Top Secret 

Handle vra BYEMAN-TMENT.KEYHOLECOhtINT Control Channels lornthr 

['PT-9/97/94 

Appendix H 409 

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs, EO 13526 3.5(c), EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs

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