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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49660

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MELODY DEVONNA BOYER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: July 20, 2023

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Melody Devonna Boyer appeals from the judgment of conviction finding her guilty of 

trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled substance (Suboxone), and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Boyer argues the district court erred in admitting evidence of the unopened, intact

box with a package label of “Suboxone” and a list of the ingredients pursuant to Idaho Rule of 

Evidence 803(17) exception to the prohibition against hearsay. The State argues the district court 

did not err in admitting the evidence but even if it did, the error was harmless. This Court holds 

that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Boyer was driving her boyfriend’s pickup truck. Law enforcement performed a traffic stop

after Boyer drove past a construction roadblock. Thereafter, the officers searched a bag belonging
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to Boyer and found an unopened, intact box labeled “Suboxone,” which listed the ingredients of 

Suboxone as “buprenorphine and naloxone.” Officers also located a golf-ball-size amount of 

heroin in a duffle bag that Boyer claimed belonged to her boyfriend.

The State charged Boyer with felony trafficking in heroin, Idaho Code § 37-

2732B(a)(6)(B), misdemeanor unlawful possession of a controlled substance, Suboxone, I.C. § 37-

2732(c), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. Following a jury 

trial, Boyer was convicted of all three counts; she does not appeal either her conviction for 

trafficking in heroin or her conviction for possessing paraphernalia. For misdemeanor possession 

of a controlled substance, Boyer was sentenced to 256 days in jail, with 256 days credit for time 

served. Boyer appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stell, 162 Idaho 827, 830, 405 P.3d 

612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). Where a criminal defendant shows an error based on a 

contemporaneously objected-to, nonconstitutional violation, the State then has the burden of 

demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the 

jury’s verdict. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017). Thus, we examine 

whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was harmless. See id. Harmless error

is error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 

revealed in the record. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 674, 462 P.3d 1125, 1138 (2020). This 

standard “requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the 

erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error.” Id. 

If the error’s effect is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt without the error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict 

rendered and is harmless. Id. The reviewing court must take into account what effect the error 

had, or reasonably may have had, on the jury in the context of the total setting and in relation to 

all else that happened, which necessarily includes the evidence presented. Kotteakos v. United 

States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
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III.

ANALYSIS

Boyer argues on appeal the district court erred in finding that the packaging containing the 

word “Suboxone” and the list of ingredients was admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 803(17) because 

the packaging label was hearsay evidence regarding the contents of the box. The district court 

agreed that the package label was likely hearsay, but nevertheless ruled that the evidence was 

admissible under the “market reports” exception set out in I.R.E. 803(17). The State argues that 

the district court did not err; the label, as well as the list of ingredients, individually, met the 

requirements of I.R.E. 803(17) but even if the district court erred in admitting the evidence, any 

error was harmless in light of Boyer’s trial testimony that the Suboxone in the box was hers and 

she had a prescription for it.

Boyer argues that I.R.E. 803(17) does not apply to a name on a box because a name is not 

a market quotation, list, directory, or compilation, as required by the rule. Alternatively, Boyer 

argues that to the extent Suboxone’s ingredients, buprenorphine and naloxone, are listed on the 

package, the “list” would establish that Suboxone is comprised of those two compounds but would 

not qualify as substantive proof that the box contained those two compounds. Finally, Boyer 

argues that in order for I.R.E. 803(17) to apply, the proponent must show “necessity and reliability” 

pursuant to United States v. Woods, 321 F.3d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 2003), neither of which was 

established by the State. 

In contrast, the State argues the district court correctly concluded that where “drug 

packaging that is intact and unopened [includes] a list of ingredients in the package,” that list is a 

“market list within the meaning of Rule 803(17).” Second, the State argues that Boyer failed to 

preserve a claim that the list of Suboxone’s ingredients was irrelevant. To the extent “reliability”

and “necessity” are required as predicate facts for admission, the State argues the district court 

correctly found that pharmaceutical labels are heavily regulated and broadly relied upon within the 

medical community and, therefore, have sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

Third, the State contends that Boyer’s definition of necessity is not supported by the language of 

I.R.E. 803(17) and reading the rule as Boyer does would lead to absurd results. Finally, the State 

argues that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because Boyer testified that she had 

a prescription for the Suboxone that was found and although she did not know how many Suboxone 

strips the package contained, she did not disagree that the number was twelve. Consequently, it 
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was Boyer’s testimony, not the package label, that established the substance was Suboxone and 

that it was hers.

We need not address the evidentiary issue because any error in admitting the label with the 

word “Suboxone,” and the list of ingredients was harmless in light of Boyer’s theory of defense 

and her testimony. Defense counsel told the jury in its opening statement that Boyer was “charged 

with possession of Suboxone, and the evidence will show that she had a prescription for that 

Suboxone.” (Emphasis added.) The Suboxone referenced by defense counsel was the Suboxone 

found in Boyer’s bag. On cross-examination of one of the officers, Boyer clarified that the 

Suboxone box was found in a flower-print bag, which Boyer later confirmed was hers. When 

cross-examining the officer who located the Suboxone about whether the officer also located a 

prescription for Suboxone, the district court asked defense counsel, “I gather when the defendant 

testifies, she’s ultimately going to say she has a Suboxone prescription[?]” Defense counsel 

answered, “Yes.” Thereafter, Boyer objected to State’s Exhibit 9, a photograph of the Suboxone 

box. The district court discussed the objection and whether a limiting instruction would be 

appropriate. The district court also noted that the State had evidence Boyer admitted she possessed 

Suboxone and claimed to have a prescription for it. The State indicated that if the district court 

was inclined to provide a limiting instruction regarding the Suboxone, it would re-call an officer 

who would testify that Boyer “told [the officer] that that was her Suboxone” and she “had a 

prescription for it.” The district court admitted Exhibit 9 pursuant to I.R.E. 803(17). 

During Boyer’s direct examination, counsel attempted to introduce two prescriptions for 

Suboxone. The first was an Idaho prescription dated August 2017 that did not include refills and 

was no longer valid. The second was a California prescription dated 2020, which had been filled 

on July 17, 2020, and also did not include refills. The State objected to the admission of both 

exhibits as irrelevant, and the district court sustained the objection. During her cross-examination, 

Boyer acknowledged she had previously testified that she had a prescription for the Suboxone that 

was found in the vehicle, did not disagree that the number of Suboxone strips recovered was twelve,

and that she asked her boyfriend to print a picture of a Suboxone prescription that was on her 

phone, “preferably without the dates.” Thus, Boyer’s testimony established that she knowingly

possessed the Suboxone that was found in the vehicle, but she believed the possession was lawful 

because she had a prescription. 
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Despite her trial testimony, Boyer argues on appeal that absent the Suboxone package 

label, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance in the unopened, intact 

package was Suboxone because the contents of the Suboxone package were not confirmed by 

chemical testing and that counterfeit substances exist. Given this lack of proof, Boyer argues that 

the admission of Exhibit 9 for purposes of establishing that the substance found was Suboxone is 

not harmless. This Court disagrees. Regardless of whether the contents of the Suboxone package 

were tested, Boyer’s testimony that she knew the substance she possessed was Suboxone was 

sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Boyer possessed Suboxone and any 

evidence confirming the identity of the substance as Suboxone was merely cumulative of Boyer’s 

testimony. 

When weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the alleged 

erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error, any 

error in admitting the packaging label was minimal because even absent the admission of the 

exhibit with the label, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Boyer’s theory of 

defense was that her possession of Suboxone was lawful, she testified she knowingly possessed 

Suboxone, and the fact that she failed to present evidence rendering her possession lawful does 

not negate her other admissions. In light of Boyer’s testimony, the probative force of the record 

establishes her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without the admission of the Suboxone label and,

thus, any error admitting the label did not contribute to the verdict rendered and is harmless. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Any error in admitting the evidence of the Suboxone packaging was harmless, and Boyer’s 

judgment of conviction for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.

Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.