Russian Challenges from Now into the Next 

Generation: A Geostrategic Primer

by Peter B. Zwack and Marie-Charlotte Pierre

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 29

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs, and Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise 

INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting 

research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, 

policy support, and outreach.

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the 

Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at 

NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and 

the broader national security community. 

Cover: Vladimir Putin meets in the Kremlin with the leaders of the 

Federation Council, the State Duma, and dedicated committees of both 

chambers, December 25, 2018. (President of Russia Web site/Kremlin.ru)
Russian Challenges from

Now into the Next Generation

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

Series Editor: Thomas F. Lynch III

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

March 2019

By Peter B. Zwack and Marie-Charlotte Pierre

Russian Challenges from

Now into the Next Generation:

A Geostrategic Primer
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit inss.ndu.edu/Publications.aspx.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, March 2019
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 2

Russia and Its Perception of Existential Threats............................................. 6

A Short Geostrategic Survey Around Russia’s Periphery.............................. 8

The Russian Military ........................................................................................39

Further Afield: Latin America and Africa.....................................................44

Reemerging Nuclear Concerns.......................................................................47

Possible Worst-Case Scenarios.......................................................................51

Internal Concerns.............................................................................................54

The Renewed Foundational Role of Religion ...............................................57

Strategic Deception and the Gray Zone ........................................................59

The United States and Russia ..........................................................................61

Policy Recommendations for Consideration................................................62

Conclusion ........................................................................................................67

Notes ..................................................................................................................69

About the Authors............................................................................................92

1

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

Executive Summary

U.S. and Western relations with Russia remain challenged as Russia increasingly reasserts itself on the global stage. Russia remains driven by a worldview based on existential 

threats—real, perceived, and contrived. As a vast, 11-time zone Eurasian nation with major 

demographic and economic challenges, Russia faces multiple security dilemmas internally 

and along its vulnerable and expansive borders. Exhibiting a reactive xenophobia stemming 

from a long history of destructive war and invasion along most of its borders, the collapse of 

the Soviet Union, the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and perceived 

Western slights, Russia increasingly threatens others and lashes outward. However, time is 

not on Russia’s side, as it has entered into a debilitating status quo that includes unnecessary confrontation with the West, multiple unresolved military commitments, a sanctionsstrained and only partially diversified economy, looming domestic tensions, and a rising 

China directly along its periphery.

Washington still has an opportunity to carefully improve U.S.-Russia relations and regain a more stable relationship in the near term, but only if activities and initiatives are based 

on a firm and frank appreciation of each other’s core interests, including those of their allies 

and partners. In a dual-track approach, the United States and its allies must continue to work 

closely to deter any destabilizing Russian behavior ranging from corrosive gray zone disinformation activities—including malign cyber efforts to erode Western democracies—up to full 

and overt military aggression. Simultaneously, rebuilding atrophied conduits between key 

American and Russian political and military leadership is imperative in order to calm today’s 

distrustful and increasingly mean-spirited relations, to seek and positively act upon converging interests, and to avert potential incidents or accidents that could potentially lead to dangerous brinksmanship. Notably the July 2018 Trump-Putin summit failed to bring any positive developments to the U.S.-Russia relationship; however, pragmatic efforts to bridge major 

and increasingly dangerous divides must continue. Perhaps most notable during the summit 

was the emphasis made by both sides that the weakened arms control regimen and overall 

strategic stability be addressed to stop a dangerous drift toward renewed nuclear weapons 

development and competition.1

 Yet in recent months, the relationship has only continued to 

weaken on multiple fronts too numerous to summarize, including Russian actions against 

Ukraine in the Sea of Azov and the end of the 31-year Intermediate Nuclear Weapons Treaty 

signed in 1987 by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan.2
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

Introduction

In recent years, Russia has dramatically reasserted itself on the global stage, highlighting 

unresolved tensions with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

that have grown increasingly complex and tense. Despite these complexities, U.S. national security priorities in the region remain clear. The United States must deter Russia from further 

political, economic, and military aggression in Europe, bolster the security of NATO Allies and 

partners, reestablish and invigorate languishing arms control regimens, and reconstitute direct 

conduits for frank dialog and crisis deescalation, all while aggressively countering Russian “disruption” campaigns worldwide. These interests are directly linked to the turbulent course Russia 

has charted as it struggles to break out of a status quo that it views as debilitating and threatening. As this paper explores, the resulting security dilemmas that have emerged are grounded 

in Russia’s historic perception of what it considers to be an existential threat to its survival and 

dissatisfaction regarding the world order it found itself in at the end of the Cold War.

The illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and unattributed combat operations in 

Eastern Ukraine left Russia politically and economically marginalized from much of the global 

community by year’s end. Russia found itself thrown out of the Group of Eight and under a 

heavy sanctions regime from both the European Union (EU) and the United States. Any euphoria from the 2014 Sochi Olympics and the seemingly successful stealth operations in Crimea 

rapidly dissipated as Russian proxy separatists became bogged down in an increasingly messy 

and bloody conflict in Eastern Ukraine, culminating that July with the civilian Air Malaysia 

MH-17 jetliner being shot down by a Russian-provided Buk missile, killing 298 innocent people 

onboard, most of whom were EU citizens.3

 Russia also saw NATO move to enhance its collective defense for all 29 of its signatory members, and, despite the continued threat of a Russian 

disruption of energy, the EU continued to coalesce behind a strong sanctions regime while 

diversifying its gas and oil access.4

 Throughout all of this, Ukrainians found a renewed sense 

of national purpose and patriotism, fueling anti-Russian sentiments at a time when Russia was 

seeking to grow pro-Russian support within the country. Oil prices, from which Russia derives 

the bulk of its revenue, substantially fell with the value of a barrel of oil dropping by $40 from 

June to December 2014,5

 while the ruble lost over 50 percent of its value.6

Due to all of these difficulties, the regime of Vladimir Putin, in what could be best characterized as a pseudo-democratic autocratic kleptocracy, was forced to confront the prospect 

that its domestic legitimacy was beginning to erode from 2014 to late 2015. Even if the regime 

did not uphold the values of civil society and electoral democracy, it recognized that popular 
3

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

unrest makes it more difficult to enact policy agendas and maintain order and stability in any 

country; this is especially true in a country the size of Russia. The regime no doubt remembered 

and feared an encore of the large and primarily middle-class Bolotnaya Square protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg during the winter of 2011–2012.7

 Despite the strident disinformation 

that dominated airwaves, Russia simmered internally with disparaging international news and 

difficult economic conditions that stressed its generally loyal population. Even the devoted and 

patriotic majority became troubled by stories of egregious corruption and disconcerting information about Russian soldiers and intelligence operatives being captured or killed in Eastern 

Ukraine.8

During the majority of 2015, Russia remained marginalized internationally. Sanctions continued to bite, and NATO continued to regain its confidence and strategic balance, taking measures to increase shared spending while reasserting its presence in and around those areas that 

felt threatened by an increasingly confrontational Russia. However, Russia remained assertive 

in the Middle East and within several international organizations, notably the United Nations 

(UN); the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Association of Nations; the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO); the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); and the 

Eurasian Economic Union. Russia was also instrumental as a member of the P5+1 consortium 

(China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that negotiated 

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal).9

 Perhaps most important was 

Russia’s deepening but utterly transactional “strategic partnership” with China. Despite a flawed 

natural gas deal, this partnership gave both nations the opportunity to focus their attention and 

efforts toward different fronts and not against each other.10

In a major strategic gambit in late September 2015, Russia aggressively reasserted itself 

diplomatically and militarily in the Middle East. The Putin regime, under considerable pressure diplomatically and economically since the Ukrainian invasion, hoped to regain its role 

as a major power player internationally, while also seeking to diminish U.S. global credibility, 

counter rising Chinese influence, and address terrorism before it became an issue within its 

borders. With its sharp-elbowed military intervention in Syria, Putin—for the first time since 

1979 in Afghanistan—successfully reasserted Russia’s military presence beyond the confines of 

the Former Soviet Union (FSU), establishing Russia once again as a key player in the Middle 

East.11 By restoring the short-term viability of the Bashar al-Asad regime and securing bases 

at Tartus and near Latakia in Khmeimim, Russia showed the region, the world, and its own 

citizens that it remained a major power to be reckoned with on the world stage.12 The widely 

reported “shock and awe” demonstration of military firepower using heavy bombers and long-
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

range Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian Flotilla further accentuated this narrative.13 This 

phenomena may in part explain the labored sortie in late 2016 of Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, 

the Admiral Kuznetsov, and flotilla from its Northern Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean.14

In taking these steps, Russia has mostly broken out of the debilitating status quo of late 

2014–2015. The Russian population, suffering the effects of sanctions and collapsed oil prices, 

responded positively to Putin’s decisiveness in the eastern Ukrainian and Syrian interventions. 

The destruction of Russia’s civilian Metrojet over Egypt by likely entities of the so-called Islamic 

State (IS) and al-Sham and the Turkish downing of a Russian warplane in late autumn 2015 

sent tremors into Russia, ending the easy initial phase of intervention and signaling that Russia 

would likely face a long, hard slog in Syria. Despite this, Putin announced in early December 

of 2017 that Russia would withdraw the majority of its forces in an attempt to shore up support 

before the Russian presidential election.15 Yet a quick exit would prove difficult for Russia. Soon 

after, in early 2018, a Russian attack aircraft was shot down by a rebel group formerly affiliated with al Qaeda in Syria.16 Even with the tortured fall of Aleppo and the proxy-supported 

military resurgence of the Asad regime, Russia remains deeply and violently enmeshed in an 

open-ended Syrian civil and sectarian war that, with the increasing involvement of regional 

powers such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the stateless Kurds, has a long way to go before any full 

Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, August 2012 (Russian Ministry of Defense)
5

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

cessation of hostilities. The endgame for the remaining U.S. forces in eastern and northeastern 

Syria, despite Presidential pronouncements in December that they will be withdrawn, is still 

being determined.

International condemnation of Russia continues for its indiscriminate bombing in Syria 

that has brutally breached any mainstream adherence to international laws of war. This was 

magnified in a nearly razed Aleppo and the eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus while Idlib—

inside ostensible “deconfliction zones” established in Astana by the Russians, Turks, and Iranians—is still highly vulnerable.17 While Russia does not typically concern itself with human 

rights concerns, such tactics could further detract from its standing in the world. Russia also has 

the added burden of being enmeshed within a violent, expensive, and increasingly unpopular 

frozen conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

Meanwhile at home, even with the slow improvement of its banking system and economy, 

Russian coffers dwindle, food imports are reduced, and the ruble remains weak at approximately 65 to the dollar, inflated from 33 to the dollar in early 2014.18 Oil prices, though improved, are 

near $53.79 per barrel (bbl), well down from their 2014 highs of $105 bbl.19 These factors will 

continue to put increasing long-term pressure on Russia and Putin. While it is difficult to predict Russian actions, it is clear Russia will be looking for every way to keep its narrative—both 

internationally and domestically—assertive, positive, and forward moving. How Washington 

both treats and manages Russia while maintaining credible U.S. principles and now challenged 

allied-partner cohesion will be key toward any collaborative future between the United States 

and Russia.

The definitive event that slayed the 2009 political “reset” between the United States and 

Russia and set off Russia’s strategically defensive, tactically preemptive military actions of early 

2014 was the February ouster of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine.20 This 

followed several key events that infuriated the Russian regime and Putin in particular. The first 

was the fall of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 (facilitated by the United States and NATO) after 

Russia abstained from vetoing UN Security Resolution 1973, which advocated an international 

military no-fly zone over Libya.21 The later-defeated Qadhafi was slain by the opposition.22 Second and immediately thereafter was the critically undermining precursor event of 2011–2012, 

the so-called Bolotnaya Square riots, where tens of thousands of mostly Russian middle class 

demonstrators turned out primarily in Moscow and St. Petersburg against what they perceived 

was a gerrymandered Putin accession to a third term as Russian president in an ostensibly 

democratic process.23 By multiple accounts, these three events viscerally tore at Putin’s personal 

fears of regime change.24 Russia’s handling of these protests drew criticism globally. However, 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

the Putin regime actively promotes the idea that the United States directly supported these major internal Russian protests as part of its own hybrid warfare efforts supporting color revolutions and regime change, such as those that occurred in Libya in 2011. This perception poisons 

the U.S.-Russian relationship to this day.25

For many observers, it is difficult to comprehend why Ukraine’s desired inclusion into a 

peaceful economic union set off a violent reaction and invasion by Russia. Called a Westernbacked coup by the Russian disinformation machine, this vociferous and dogged expression of 

the majority of Ukrainians again hit at the core of the Putin regime’s existential fear of a robust 

opposition pressing for internal regime change.26 Ultimately, Russia exists in and is in some 

ways trapped by its historical worldview. It lives in a world full of existential threats, real, perceived—and contrived.

Russia and Its Perception of Existential Threats

Geographically, Russia is Eurasia, but not necessarily in the mystical, destiny-tinged way 

that Russian thinker-philosopher and Putin favorite, Alexander Dugin, would say.27 In 1997, he 

wrote, “The Eurasian Empire will be constructed on the fundamental principle of the common 

enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, the strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow 

liberal values to dominate us.”28 This perception could be a psychological blueprint of sorts 

for some of the rhetoric and related actions that have transpired in recent years across Russia’s 

periphery, both in Soviet and post-Soviet times.29 Such behavior can be seen in the Russian 

creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 with nearly the same membership of its security alliance as the CSTO—Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, excluding 

Tajikistan.30

Russia’s challenges across the Eurasian space are daunting. Its sheer size, relatively small 

population, long terrestrial borders, and tough climates create major security dilemmas. Even 

after its territorial decline at the end of the Cold War, Russia still encompasses about one-eighth 

of the globe’s landmass and is 60 percent larger than Canada, the world’s second largest country.31 This is as much a vulnerability for Russia as it is a strength. Russia touches or influences 

about 70 percent of the world where the United States has serious economic and security interests. These aspects all yield to the fact that any discussion about Russia must first return 

to “fundamentals” by recognizing the defining role that geography and history have played in 

determining the Russian perspective. How does one effectively govern a barely cultivatable, 

permafrost-heavy nation of about 145 million people spread out over 11 time zones, where all 

trains depart on centralized Moscow time before traveling through lands mostly cut out of the 
7

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

hide of former nations and civilizations?32 Since imperial czarist times, this has been a central 

dilemma for Russian security.

In prior generations, ideological struggle was represented by the great “isms,” namely capitalism, communism, imperialism, socialism, and fascism. Today, Russia and China’s perception 

of “liberalism” could be added to the fray, aspects of “globalism” are contentious and resurgent 

“nationalism” dangerously looms. These drove great power dynamics and fueled global conflicts for generations and still do today. Tomorrow’s conflicts, however, will likely be resource 

driven including access to fresh water. Russia is a warehouse of natural resources—many still 

untapped—and as competition grows, it will feel an increased vulnerability to its energy- and 

resource-dependent neighbors, as its economy remains largely dependent on energy exports.33

Given all of these challenges, a Russian military general staff planner conducting an objective strategic assessment out to 2050 would have to be highly concerned about the future of 

the nation. Foremost, Russia has a looming demographic challenge, especially when comparing population sizes with its immediate neighbors and potential adversaries. Any population 

growth will be marginal at best and will have to factor in the growing number of Russians emigrating annually.34 In 2015, it is estimated that 350,000 Russians emigrated, and a large portion 

of these emigres were highly skilled workers.35

Currently, a significant portion of Russia’s population, about 74 percent, lives in urban 

areas primarily west of the Ural Mountains, where greater Asia becomes greater Europe.36 This 

gives the state a predominately Western feel, even in Siberia and the Far East, where Chinese influence is growing. Yet the nature of the population is also changing, especially in the southern 

regions bordering Central Asia and the Caucasus where birthrates are higher than in the western “European Russian” regions. Much of this future population “supplement” will be Muslim, 

something of concern to the Russian Orthodox Church, which is enjoying a renaissance of faith 

and worship with up to 73 percent of the “Great Russian” population.37 Manageable now, this 

will present another major demographic challenge for Russian strategists by 2050. For Putin 

and the Kremlin, the demographic rise of groups and peoples long oppressed by leaders such as 

Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov will create a political threat that could prompt reforms 

that have been avoided to date by the current regime.

The conflicts along Russia’s periphery and within the Middle East involving Sunni Islam 

threaten to intensify anti-Russian sentiment both externally and among Russia’s approximately 

15 million predominantly secular Sunni Muslims.38 The dynamics of Chechnya, and the incipient Sunni insurgency in Dagestan, can only become more complicated and dangerous for Russia as surviving jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq eventually return home.
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Russia’s petroleum-based economy must adapt and diversify as access to oil and natural 

gas will become more challenging in the years ahead. Despite record volume today, petroleum 

extraction will become increasingly difficult and costly in the high latitudes of the frozen but 

melting tundra. As such, in the years ahead the economy will increasingly struggle with fewer 

barrels extracted at higher cost.39 Compared to its 2014 high of $114 bbl that continued to 

fuel much of Russia’s initial Putin-era growth, including its military modernization, the major 

2014–2016 drop in oil prices to $28 bbl created havoc among Russian budgets and outlays. By 

August 2018, oil prices had gradually ticked upward back and forth to approximately $70 bbl 

before settling back into the mid-$50s where they are as of this writing. While not satisfactory, 

this moderate growth is deemed enough by some analysts to balance Russia’s budget at $68 bbl 

and above.40 Russia and the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries have begun working together to manage production cuts, likely in an attempt to cut supply and drive up prices.41

Diversification of petroleum extraction locations is a major catalyst driving Arctic development—an area of potential cooperation or conflict—and concomitant military basing to expand and secure its claims. These claims include the Lomonosov Ridge extending to the Arctic 

Pole and access to natural resources along the widening Northern Sea Route.42

Additionally, much of the Russian population is struggling when it comes to health care. 

This is evident with continued high alcohol and tobacco use and the ecological blight that came 

with Soviet-era rust belt industrial development and poorly regulated nuclear reactor construction and storage.43 Life expectancy for males in Russia is 13 years lower than the global average. 

Systematic underfunding of healthcare infrastructure and unaffordable pharmaceutical drugs, 

as well as a lack of a governmental response to a rise in HIV cases, have all contributed to 

the poor quality of life in Russia.44 Furthermore, the recently announced reform proposal to 

substantially raise retirement pension ages to 65 for men and 60 for women makes older Russian society even more anxious, prompting protests in response. Unless convincingly addressed, 

these concerns will only grow as Russia’s population continues to age.45

A Short Geostrategic Survey Around Russia’s Periphery

Russia’s sheer size imposes strategic challenges that touch most of the world’s issues. Russia 

defines its defense strategy largely based on how it can increase or leverage influence to pursue 

the economic and political objectives that feed into its broad, defense-oriented security outlook. 

This adds a level of intensity to most ongoing disputes in the world, as Russia often embeds itself 

in these conflicts to exert its influence and pursue its agenda.
9

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

While most broad overviews of Russia traditionally are Western-centric, this one instead 

commences from the East, highlighting the complexities, opportunities, and considerable challenges Moscow will likely face east of the Urals over the next generation.

The Far East and Asia

The territory of the Russian Far East is largely calm, although dormant geostrategic fault 

lines persist. Armed with plenty of deterrent capability, particularly within its Aerospace and 

Rocket forces, as well as its Pacific Fleet, Russia has no offensive eastern territorial ambitions 

and is focused on maintaining its current borders. The heart of its conventional defensive posture is built around a capable multilayered anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) posture that the 

Chinese are also working to adopt.46 Russia’s principal active Asian territorial issue remains the 

Kuril Islands dispute with Japan that continues to linger almost 75 years since the southern four 

islands were occupied in the final weeks of World War II. In recent years, both countries have 

taken a renewed interest in reaching a peace treaty,47 yet state visits in Japan in December 2016 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

and Russia in April 2017 and January have highlighted that many barriers need to be overcome 

before a resolution can be reached.48 Further hampering any deepening of relations is Japan’s 

continued support of U.S.-EU sanctions against Russia tied to its 2014 Ukraine incursions.49 

The Russia-Japan relationship could become important to both nations in the years ahead, especially if China’s influence in the overall region continues to grow.

Thinking long term, the Russians will surely oppose any major rearming of Japan, a topic 

discussed in President Donald Trump’s recent visit to Tokyo and reinforced to one of this monograph’s writers during a visit to the Russian Far East in November, 2018.50 Russia will regard a 

heavily armed Japan as a reinforced platform for American influence in the Far East. If Russia 

finds itself in a weaker condition, it could also feel vulnerable to possible Japanese revanchism 

toward territories and islands occupied at the end of World War II.51

North Korea, with which Russia shares a narrow 11-mile land border along the Tumen 

River, presents growing challenges. However, it also provides a wedge for Russia and China to 

disrupt U.S. interests and policy in Northeast Asia.52 Remaining verbally supportive, Moscow is 

both wary and skeptical of how any potential rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang develops. At a high water mark, Russia reportedly had between 30,000 and 50,000 low-paid 

North Korean laborers in its Far East. These numbers have slipped in recent years mainly due to 

increased sanctions placed on the North Korean regime. Russia is, as is especially China, concerned about a refugee influx if war breaks out or the Kim Jong-un regime implodes. Its principal 

concern is the possibility of a unification on the peninsula that would bring an American-backed 

Korea to the Yalu and Tumen rivers.53 While not desiring a conflict, official Russian policy—

carefully coordinated with China, as highlighted by officials from both nations at the Moscow 

Security Conference in April 2017—is focused on a noncombat resolution to current tensions.54

With that said, Moscow—a long-time interlocutor with North Korea since 1945 when, in the 

wake of World War II and collapsed Japanese occupation, it supported the 33-year-old Kim Ilsung to attain unquestioned power—still maintains a direct relationship with Pyongyang that 

occasionally runs counter to Chinese interests.55 Contrary Russian actions in 2017 during a period of Chinese sanctions toughness toward Pyongyang—due to its threatening missile launches 

and rhetoric—included sending oil supplies via rail and sea as well as providing an alternative 

Internet backbone to the Kim regime.56 Both countries will continue to closely watch the aftermath of President Trump’s May 2018 and February 2019 meetings with Kim, as well as continued 

talks between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in.57 Likely to maintain influence in 

Pyongyang and the region as a major diplomatic player, and in anticipation of the second round 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

of Trump-Kim talks, Moscow reportedly offered the construction of a nuclear power plant to 

North Korea in exchange for dismantling its nuclear weapons program.58

Neither Russia nor China desire North Korea to obtain more and longer range nuclear 

weapons. However, paradoxically, even on the Korean Peninsula, where the missile threat is unambiguous, both are loudly opposed to the seemingly logical deployment of the U.S. Terminal 

High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea and declared such in the recent security conference. The Russian and Chinese perception of the U.S. missile defense system is that 

it is a growing global system that is aimed primarily at Russian and Chinese strategic delivery capabilities, rather than rogue-like threats, such as those from Iran and North Korea.59 One Russian 

senior think tank analyst frankly stated when pressed that it was the “principle” of THAAD and 

overall missile defense to which Russia was opposed, not the actual system.60 The entire missile 

defense issue will only intensify the “Strategic Stability” dialog as American SM-3 Aegis Ashore 

interceptors will soon be deployed to Poland, following their recent installation in Romania.

Looking to Russia-China relations, maintaining the status quo seems to be the preferred 

outcome for both countries. Despite resettlement efforts in the Far East by the Russian regime, 

regional demographics are overwhelmingly in China’s favor. While a scant 8 to 9 million Great 

Russians live between Siberian Irkutsk on Lake Baikal to Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean, over 

130 million Chinese live in neighboring Manchuria (The “Northeast”), including a significant 

number living and trading on Russia’s side of the border.61 Notably of strategic interest, Moscow 

in November 2018 legislated the transfer of the Trans-Baikal (Chita) and Buryatia (Ulan Ude) 

Oblasts (regions) with their population and resources to the Far East Federal District to buttress its weak demographic and social position in Asia. This major regional realignment came 

after several elections in late 2018 where Putin’s United Russia party suffered reverses in local 

voting. This regional shift included military units commanded by the Central Military District 

in Ekaterinberg being transferred to the Eastern Military District in Khabarovsk. Furthermore, 

the capital of the Russian Far East was shifted to Vladivostok from Khabarovsk, though the 

Eastern Military District headquarters remains in Khabarovsk. All these moves increased the 

Far East’s population to about 9 million citizens, bolstered its budget, and revealed the regime’s 

concern about managing its regions and population. It also supported Russia’s efforts to build 

stronger, more viable economic links to Asia and Pacific region, offsetting in part, its difficult 

relations with the West.62

The border dispute along the Ussuri River near Khabarovsk that culminated in bloody 

clashes between the Soviet Union and China in 1969 was pragmatically resolved in 2004.63 Additionally, trade and military contacts have increased, including the signing of a massive $400 
12 

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billion natural gas deal. Due to continued low oil prices, this deal has not proved to be profitable 

for Russia.64 Yet with Russia embroiled in Eastern Ukraine and Syria, and China increasingly 

committed to exerting influence and control within the Spratly and Senkaku islands, these arrangements make temporal and geostrategic sense and have significantly relaxed tensions over 

the 2,600-mile shared land border.65

Looking long term, however, one could see tensions rising again within this vast resourcerich zone north of Manchuria. Russia’s Far East and Eastern Siberia are rich in natural resources 

beyond oil and gas that resource-starved China could covet. For years, Russian locals along the 

border have complained about illegal Chinese logging activity, as much of Manchuria’s timber 

has been cut down.66 Notably, a huge chunk of the Russian Far East north of the Amur River, 

and the lands that encompass Vladivostok east of the Ussuri River, was wrested from a weak 

Qing Dynasty by Imperial Russia in the mid-1800s. While formalized by the Treaties of Aigun 

(1858) and Peking (1860), this is a fact that has not been forgotten by Chinese historians or and 

nationalists.67

While the Russians and Chinese are both practicing prudent foreign policy regarding one 

another, they are not natural friends or allies, with histories, cultures, religions, ethnicities, and 

fundamental philosophies that are different and at times opposing. The sheer mismatch between Russian and Chinese demographics (Russia’s population is approximately one-ninth that 

of China’s) and economies (Russia’s economy is the 13th in gross domestic product [GDP] to 

China’s second) will relegate Russia to a subordinate role in any major long-term partnership 

with China.68 As such, geostrategically, Russia seems is working to buy time in the Far East, 

while China, thinking dynastically, appears to be biding its time.

Central Asia and Afghanistan

In Central Asia, Russia sees the five independent FSU nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as within its so-called privileged sphere of influence. 

History shows that Russia will take firm action to ensure that no excessive foreign military 

presence takes root in the region.69 Whatever may be its post-Soviet imperial desires, the demographically and economically challenged Russia does not have the military means to annex and 

permanently occupy these diverse states. Therefore, it has taken measures to maintain a strong 

and influential regional suzerainty among them.

Within the past 3 years, two longstanding regional leaders who firmly defined the direction of their post-Soviet countries, while maintaining a careful balance with Russia, have moved 

from power. Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan since 1989, died suddenly, and Tashkent’s 
13

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

transition to new leadership under a more moderate President Shavkat Mirziyoyev proved unexpectedly smooth with few signs of overt Russian influence.70 In neighboring Kazakhstan, on 

March 19, 2019, the other dominant post-Soviet ruler in Central Asia, President Nursultan Nazarbayev, announced his retirement after 30 years in power. This action surprised the region and 

Russia, which has significant equities in Kazakhstan including energy and the leased Baikonur 

space complex.71 Additionally, there is a significant ethnic Russian minority of about 24 percent 

in Kazakhstan, though relations and their status have been calm.72 Only time will tell how these 

nations evolve. There is little doubt that Russia has military contingencies prepared to counter 

a wide range of scenarios—including precluding so-called color revolutions—in Central Asia 

that might lead toward some form of local liberal democracy, as Moscow attempted to preempt 

in Ukraine. This is a major reason that the Russian-controlled CSTO exists.73

A long-term wild card concerning Russia’s influence in Central Asia is the increasing move 

toward the implementation of the Chinese-inspired and mostly financed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—formerly known as the One Belt One Road Initiative—that would build roads, rail, 
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Used with permission
15

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

and linkages from western China through former Soviet Central Asia into the Caspian and 

beyond into Europe.74 The Russians officially support this project, though quietly some academics and policymakers evince concern, as noted by Vladimir Portyakov, deputy director of 

the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, who stated, “The most 

unpleasant issue for us is that China is becoming a serious center for integrational processes 

in Eurasia, which it never was in the past. Instead of linking up the Eurasian Economic Union 

and the Belt and Road, we may end up with the Eurasian Economic Union being subordinated 

to this Chinese scheme.”75 Adding to potential regional challenges coupled with economic opportunity for Russia involving China is Beijing’s recent announcement of a future Polar Silk 

Road, which would transit the Northern Sea Route opening up due to major summer ice melt 

in Russia’s Arctic area of interest.

Growth and influence projected from such economic corridors will likely further integrate 

the countries in its reach. Beijing, which in a generation from now will be even more dependent 

on regional natural resources, will stand to benefit greatly by leveraging its growing presence 

and access to the region’s oil and national gas wealth that could make it less reliant on Russia’s 

energy assets. Over time, a solid Chinese economic presence in Central Asia, with commensurate influence, could evolve into a major security challenge for Russia.

The dynamics of Central Asia have significantly evolved since the Soviet Union’s breakup 

in 1991. In the 1990s, with Russian power and influence diminished, major Western aid initiatives were undertaken in the region, most notably in 1994 when all five former Soviet Central 

Asian republics joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace. These relationships, with Russia’s acquiescence, were later leveraged to support the swift U.S.-allied invasion of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan after 9/11.76 While Russia was generally uncomfortable with U.S. activity and airbases 

in Central Asia (Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan), its initial support of the war on terror and concern about militant Sunni Islam triumphing in Afghanistan 

superseded those worries. This enabled (at considerable financial benefit) the establishment 

of the Northern Distribution Network in 2009 as part of the brief U.S.-Russia “reset” in relations. The network brought substantial nonlethal materials and personnel through Russia and 

Central Asia into Afghanistan, bypassing more dangerous routes via Pakistan.77 This logistics 

arrangement, which included the brief establishment of a Russian-operated NATO logistics 

hub at Ulyanovsk in 2012, gradually eroded as relations degraded between the United States 

and NATO and Russia.78 For example, under major Russian pressure, Kyrgyzstan pressured the 

United States to close its logistics base at Manas in 2013, which had been important for NATOU.S. nonlethal supply to Afghanistan.79 Russia maintains considerable leverage over the FSU, as 
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seen in Kyrgyzstan. Two years before the base’s ultimate closure, Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed 

a 15-year base deal, and Russia agreed to forgive $500 million in Kyrgyz debt.80 This indicates 

that while Russia is willing to allow the West to have a short-term significant presence in the 

FSU, Russia seeks to be the longstanding, dominant partner and will make moves to ensure its 

continued strength and presence. How Russia carefully shapes the major China-led BRI effort 

through these sensitive natural gas–rich former southern lands of the Soviet Union will have 

ramifications for the Russian economy and its ability to gain leverage over the FSU for generations to come.

Russia’s difficult-to-define relationship with the Taliban is disruptive to the Afghan government of Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, as well as to the U.S.-led international coalition supporting 

the effort to keep the government soluble.81 While Russia states that it supports the efforts of this 

coalition, it appears irresistible to Russia—from global, competitive, and adversarial perspectives—not to simultaneously undermine this U.S.-driven stabilizing mission. Accentuating this 

is the disputed claim that Russia is providing weapons via neighboring Tajikistan to the Taliban, 

which is fighting both the coalition and IS splinter groups in Afghanistan. Iran ostensibly has a 

role in this as well.82 Ironically, the failure of this mission would likely further negative regional 

disorder, all of which would be against Russia’s long-term interests. Such fallout could include 

any combination of terror, crime, drugs, and migration flowing north into Russia’s influenced 

band of Central Asian and FSU neighbors, destabilizing the mostly autocratic secular regimes 

and further flowing into the Russian Sunni Muslim–heavy south, the Caucasus, and China’s 

Uighur-dominated Xinjiang Province.83

Russian contact with the Taliban, while clearly disruptive to the government of Afghanistan and coalition stabilization efforts, appears also to be a strategically defensive move intended to cobble together a regional “firebreak” to shore up future Afghan power players and 

factions, responding to what they believe will be a failure of the current stabilization mission 

and collapse of the current Afghan government. Chinese senior think tank analysts essentially 

stated the same to one author in Beijing during conversations in December of 2017.84 The Russians appear to be hedging their bets, readying themselves for the next geostrategic crisis to 

Russia’s south. To this end, they are looking for ways to shore up their influence and firebreak 

in Central Asia, including acceding to the massive Chinese-driven BRI project that, if successful, would likely significantly reduce Russian influence in the region while increasing and 

expanding China’s influence in its vulnerable south.85 However, it would create more ties between China and Russia, giving Russia a strong partner to counter the United States and NATO, 

particularly in the face of increased Western isolation.86
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

Still, the 2014 shutdown of Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan is indicative of just how viscerally sensitive Russia is to U.S. or NATO bases or the perception of excessive influence on FSU 

territories. The bloody crises that ensued in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 are recent 

examples of this perspective. Moving forward, Russia will have to find a balance between impeding security and development in the region and assisting in the efforts. Finding a realistic 

balance will be the only way for Russia to maintain a permanent foothold in the region while 

avoiding a confrontation with looming economic powerhouse but resource-weak China in the 

years ahead.

The Caucasus

This complex, fractious region of both Russia and the FSU looms as dynamic and contentious in the years ahead. An ethnic, religious, and migratory crossroads for centuries, the 

Caucasus straddles both the Black and Caspian seas and presents significant current and future 

security challenges for Russia. The issues are not only geostrategic and economic but also ethnic, linguistic, and religious.

The clumsy Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 served notice to the region and the world 

that Russia would remain aggressively engaged in FSU lands. It was an unseen precursor of 

future reactions in Ukraine during 2014, and a harbinger for other potential flashpoints such as 

Moldova, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and while less likely, also NATO’s Article 5–protected Baltic 

States. Today’s Russia will resist what it perceives as excessive foreign influence within the 

FSU or discrimination against ethnic Russians living within its lands. How it reacts—either 

by aggressive gray zone influencing and political pressure or more overtly by armed intervention—will warrant review situationally on a case-by-case basis. Russia feels that it ought to be 

the dominant partner for FSU countries, making any “Western pivot” within them a threat to 

Russian dominance.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, wrested into autonomous “statelets” by force of arms, remain a frozen conflict between Russia and Georgia.87 The Russian 102nd Military Base garrison 

in Gyumri, consisting of about 3,000 troops, continues to be a guarantor of Armenia, which 

borders hostile Azerbaijan.88 True to form, Russia ensures that it maintains its central role by 

involving itself in all aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, from mediation to arms deals. 

As of 2015, Russia was the primary supplier of weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.89

Smarting and revanchist over its 1990s losses in still-simmering Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched major incursions in April 2016 using late-model Russian-provided weapons 

that shook Armenian trust in Moscow. Skirmishes continued into 2017, resulting in further 
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Armenian-Azerbaijani de-confliction negotiations in Geneva. This ultimately led to the release 

of a joint statement by both Presidents Serzh Sarkisian (Armenia) and Ilham Aliyev (Azerbaijan) who “agreed to take measures to intensify the negotiation process and to take additional 

steps to reduce tensions.”90

Notably, Russia-aligned Sargsyan’s 10-year tenure in power ended ignominiously in April 

2018 when he stepped down from power after weeks of major nonviolent demonstrations protested his efforts to contrive another term. He was unseated by the efforts of opposition leader 

Nikol Pashinyan, who in May 2018 became Armenia’s Prime Minister. 

Furthering his push to change Armenia’s political landscape, Pashinyan then called a snap 

election the following December in which his My Step Alliance won an overwhelming majority at the expense of the formerly entrenched Republican majority in Parliament. While Pashinyan promised to maintain Armenia’s political alliance with Russia, it appears that Armenia 

will be more flexible in its foreign policy.91

While Russia uncharacteristically maintained a low profile during this drama, clearly this 

popular expression of national will leading to regime change within a neighboring FSU ally 

is worrisome for the Russian regime that regularly stokes domestic fears and passions with its 

narrative emphasizing threats of Western-backed color revolutions.92 Armenia, regardless, is 

dependent on continued Russian support for its own protection. Another controversial issue for 

Armenia remains the continued Turkish denial of the World War I–era Armenian genocide.93

Russia’s 2015 official recognition pleased an antsy Armenia, straining relations with Turkey in 

the process.94 While this region remains frozen in conflict, Moscow’s influence will be necessary for any possible resolution in the future.

The most organic “kinetic” danger to Russia comes from within Russia’s border—its Caucasus region. Mountainous Chechnya, the site of two horrific military campaigns commencing 

in 1995 and 1999, remains under Russia’s thumb in the guise of the Russian-enabled Ramzan 

Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic, who staunchly supports most of Putin’s actions, including sending Chechen fighters into eastern Ukraine’s Donbas in early 2014.95 This support 

could be severely challenged, however, if, as anticipated, several thousand surviving Sunni 

Russian jihadists in Syria and Iraq eventually return to Russia in Chechnya and elsewhere.96 In 

adjacent Dagestan, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has been fighting a low-boil 

insurgency for years. It is likely this insurgency, as part of the diminished “Caucasus Emirates” 

or growing IS, will increase in intensity as angry, revenge-minded fighters return home spreading extremist Wahhabist Islam in the overall region.97
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

There is significant concern that this radical cancer could metastasize from the Caucasus 

and Central Asia into Southern Russia, where, in contrast to Russia’s overall demographic 

stagnation, the Muslim population is gradually growing via higher birthrates and illegal immigration.98 Additionally, these concerns have been stoked by several pointed IS statements 

specifically branding Russia as an enemy.99 Furthermore, Putin well remembers the Wahhabist 

Chechen threat in particular, after the grisly attack and bungled rescue operation in 2004 on a 

school in the North Ossetian town of Beslan in which 331 people, mostly children, perished.100

This is a dangerous long-term threat to Russia, and another reason Russian forces have been 

ordered into Syria to fight Islamic extremists while supporting an old ally.

101

Reasons for concern likely also stem from the incredible unpopularity that Russia faces 

within Chechnya and globally for its past brutal treatment of Chechens. Exacerbating this was 

the international outcry during 2017 over the persecution, abuse, and detention of dozens of 

gay men in Chechnya led by Putin ally Kadyrov.102 In late December 2018, reports began to 

surface that there was a new wave of persecution of the Chechen lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, 

and queer community, with two individuals dead and dozens incarcerated.103 The longer that 

Russia waits to address this abuse, the higher the potential for additional backlash becomes, 

staining the already fragile international reputation of the regime. Reforming these behaviors 

in the region could result in positive coverage and a modicum of goodwill, something that the 

government needs moving forward as it pursues its revisionist agenda.

The Middle East

The Russian intervention in late September 2015 on behalf of Asad’s Ba’athist regime in 

Syria signaled the most significant geostrategic shift in Russia’s military activity since the end 

of the Cold War. This intervention has been a bold endeavor that, despite major battlefield and 

political successes, risks leaving Russia enmeshed in a hornet’s nest of competing regional 

factions and interests that have taken on a Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian flavor involving multiple 

regional states including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.104 Up until then, direct Russian military action had been confined within territorial Russia, notably in Chechnya and Dagestan, 

and FSU states.

Not since the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan during Christmas 1979 has Russia seemingly moved so aggressively “out of area.”105 For Russia watchers, this intervention 

should not have been a surprise. As one of his unstated “Red Lines,”106—akin to unattributed 

Russia’s main force intervention into Eastern Ukraine in late summer 2014 to restore its failing proxies—Putin repeatedly signaled Russia’s full support for the Syrian Ba’athist regime, 
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an unbroken Soviet-Russian-Syrian relationship that dates back to 1956.107 Even in the face 

of tensions during this 60-odd-year relationship, they rely on their continued partnership to 

support each other regionally, as seen in the Syrian civil war. In the rubble of the Arab Spring, 

this relationship strengthened as Putin sought to stabilize the Russian presence in the changing Middle Eastern landscape. In Moscow’s view, shared by some of its neighbors,108 violent 

regime change in Syria would further destabilize a region in near free-fall and further weaken 

Russian influence within the region.109 As a result, preservation of the Syrian regime was a 

major reason in 2013 that Russia acceded to assisting the removal of the bulk of Syria’s chemical munitions that precluded a U.S.-led coalition bombing of Syrian regime installations and 

bases.110 One author helped facilitate some of these negotiations in Moscow in 2013 where 

Russian guarantees were made—and tangible measures taken—that all Syria’s chemical weapons would be removed. Since then, despite this agreement, there have been numerous chemical 

attacks reported within Syria. A major Syrian atrocity in April 2017 resulted in a subsequent 

U.S. Tomahawk missile strike on Shayrat Air Base. A year later on April 7, 2018, another attack ensued in Dhouma, followed this time by U.S., French, and British airstrikes on Syrian 

chemical research facilities.111 As a key guarantor of the Asad regime’s compliance, major 

questions concerning Russia’s intent or ability to ensure Syria’s cooperation are currently in 

stark focus. The repeated head-scratching denials and obfuscation on behalf of its ally, Syria 

has even further increased the high-level global distrust of any consistent Russian geostrategic 

narrative. This fundamental distrust of the Russian regime by many of the world’s nations is a 

strategic factor. 

With Asad’s forces significantly weakened in late summer 2015, the Russians likely went 

through a “go and no-go” intervention criteria and risk assessment before launching their operation in late September 2015, with the intent to save the Syrian regime and batter the Islamic 

rebels most threatening to its immediate viability.112

It should be no surprise, therefore, that the Russians first went after anti-regime rebels, the 

so-called moderates most lethal to the Asad regime. While the Russians also saw IS as a growing 

threat, their first priority in Syria was to stabilize the Asad regime and consolidate longstanding 

interests in Syria such as the Tartus naval base, their only functioning port facility outside of 

the FSU.113 Their main goal is the perpetuation of a stable and allied Syrian regime and regional 

platform and not necessarily the specific long-term preservation of the ruling Asad family.

Putin also wanted to take the fight against militant Sunni Islam beyond Russian borders. 

Only time will tell if this preemptive strategy will prevent attacks both against and within the 

Russian homeland by its large Sunni minority, whom he views as empathetic to the cause of 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

IS and other terrorist groups.114 Woven into this entire situation is a supporting narrative that 

asserts Russia’s role as a serious global player beyond the confines of the FSU, while simultaneously promoting a narrative of U.S. and Western weakness.115

The Russian intervention in Syria also created the conditions to test and showcase the 

resurgence of Russian military prowess, capability, and systems. These include the swift, opportunistic deployment into Syria of the lethal long-range S-400 “Triumph” air defense system with 

its formidable A2/AD capability in the stunned aftermath of the Turkish downing of a Russian 

SU-24 bomber in November 2015. This deployment, along with recently inserted S-300s, has 

changed the regional airpower equation and greatly complicated the consideration of regional 

no-fly or safe zones.116 In June 2017, Russia, Iran, and Turkey began a series of dialogs in Astana, 

agreeing to set up safe zones in Syria, a move that was met with concern by the U.S. State Department and was initially rejected by rebel groups.117 It is still unclear as to the level of success 

in providing safety for refugees in these zones, several of which have unraveled.

The rapid deployment of air and ground assets into Syria in late September 2015, coupled 

with long-range, sea-based Kalibr precision cruise missile strikes and bombings by strategic 

bomber assets, showed that the Russian deployment into Syria was also a demonstration and 

testing of firepower reminiscent of the 1936 Spanish Civil War. It unambiguously signaled to the 

world and its own populace that the Russian military was back.118 Essentially a laboratory for its 

evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures across a wide spectrum of conventional warfare—

as well as a training ground for a new generation of military leaders—Syria, and more subtly 

Eastern Ukraine, has reaped numerous short-term benefits for the Russian military. Russian 

chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, as much as stated this by declaring 

that real officers are “born in battle” and that the overall Syrian experience was “priceless” for 

the development of the Russian military.119 Russian arms exporters are also benefiting from the 

successful demonstration of their leading-edge systems.120

However, a potentially dangerous situation is evolving in Syria as resurgent Russian-backed 

Syrian forces—interlaced with Russian and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps “advisors” enabling a mix of foreign Shia militias—come increasingly into proximity with U.S.-supported 

counter-IS, anti-Asad regime forces, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, and the Israeli border.121 The defeat of “main force” IS entities and the seizure of their cities and infrastructure have 

driven them mostly underground or increasingly out of the country, creating zones where Russian and American personnel are in near proximity. Inflaming the situation greatly, on February 

7, 2018, ethnic Russian Wagner paramilitary “contractors” pressed too aggressively into U.S. 

positions backing resident Kurdish Syrian Democratic Front forces near Deir Ezzor in western 
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Syria and were roundly repulsed with likely close to 200 killed.122 Not even in the depths of Cold 

War was there ever such a loss of life between U.S.-NATO and Soviet forces in direct contact, 

signaling just how dangerous this encounter could have been. In a positive vein the standing 

communications link between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford 

and Russian Chief of General Staff General Valeriy Gerasimov—one of the few still standing at 

a high level between the U.S. and Russian militaries—may have helped deescalate any further 

action by either side. While Russia was quick to dissociate itself from these unattributed “mercenaries,” it is likely that it saw this as a tough lesson learned and may look for a way to “pay 

back” this bloody riposte against Russian nationals.123

Despite this stunning action, and whatever is resolved (or not) in Geneva and Astana, 

the U.S. and Russian militaries are maintaining their daily deescalation contacts between U.S. 

Central Command in Qatar and the Russian expeditionary headquarters near Latakia, Syria.

While Syria remains volatile, there may an opportunity for both the Unites States and Russia to be constructive interlocutors between the numerous states and factions in carving out 

some semblance of a regional peace, as unlikely as it may seem. This remains true even with the 

announcement that the United States will be withdrawing from Syria. If Russia is shortsighted 

and strives to drive the United States and its partners entirely out of Syria, it will be left alone 

with the Asad regime and Iran to manage a dangerous and likely never-ending chain of regional 

violence, especially if Shi’ite Iranian influence grows into a palpable threat to Israel via an emboldened Hizballah, and more Sunnis are killed—or ethnically cleansed—from regime reconquered zones. Not to work pragmatically toward a broader regional peace involving the United 

States and its partners risks the permanent ensnarement of major Russian military resources in 

Syria that, in the long term, can only weaken its political and economic resources and agenda 

worldwide.

In December of 2017, Putin announced that Russia had succeeded in Syria and would begin to immediately reduce its involvement. This drawdown in the wake of what looked to be a 

real battlefield victory for the Asad regime and its partners appears different than the one loudly 

announced in March 2016, where the reduction in the teeth of a still dangerous opposition 

proved more of a reorganization and reapportionment of forces—as well as a probable Asad 

regime obstruction—than an actual withdrawal.124 Russia’s ideal plan was to maintain a smaller, 

permanent military presence in Syria.125

Since Putin’s December 2017 announcement, the situation on the ground has become 

more complex and tangled with major regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel becoming even more involved and entangled. While this declaration may have helped Putin win 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

a short-term victory in the run-up to Russia’s presidential election in March 2018, how the 

scale-down in Syria actually occurs, as well as Russia’s ability to extract itself favorably from the 

ongoing conflict, remains to be seen. In particular, Russia has to balance reducing its influence 

in Syria with maintaining its interests, such as keeping the Asad regime in power. As of late July 

2018, Asad stated his desire that Russian forces remain long term in Syria.126

Russia’s complex relationship with Iran also bears watching; it appears to be a cynically 

pragmatic partnership of convenience. Russia provided a decisive role as part of the P5+1 negotiations with Iran that led to the 2015 nuclear agreement, where Russia wanted to avoid any 

prospect of the United States bombing Iranian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, Russia does not 

want increased nuclear proliferation beyond the current nuclear powers. However, this strategic 

nonproliferation stance has not curbed Iran’s increasingly aggressive actions in other spheres, 

highlighting the awkward relationship between Russia and Iran, both of whom enable Syria’s 

brutal counter-rebel fight while increasingly alarming Israel and irritating Sunni-dominated 

Turkey. This is most evident with the expansion of Iranian influence in Syria via its Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds Force, as well as via its Shi’ite and Hizballah proxies. This 

focused effort in tandem with Russia’s force of arms helped Asad’s military survive in late 2015 

and continues to weaponize Shi’ite Iranian influence throughout southern Iraq and Syria and 

within the Levant.

In discussing the Middle East and Russia, one must not forget Israel. Israel is keeping a 

somewhat low profile regarding the Syrian civil and sectarian war, but its highly trained and 

superbly equipped military would snap into immediate action if it thought it were directly 

threatened. It is apparent that Israel overall prefers a predictable stability in the greater region. 

This is especially true along its borders, which would be severely disrupted if the Syrian regime 

were to precipitously collapse. This is probably a reason that little Israeli opposition to Russia’s 

intervention ever came forth, even after the insertion of long-range Russian S-400 air defense 

missiles into Syria in late 2015.127 To emphasize, what Israel is acutely concerned about is the 

aforementioned rise of Iranian influence in southern Syria and into Lebanon; in the future, this 

is something that Russia will have to directly address with Israel.

Keeping in mind Israel will aggressively respond to threats, Israeli air strikes occurred 

near Damascus on April 10, 2018, 2 months after a prior strike in which an Israeli F-16 was shot 

down by Syrian air defenses. This Iranian spread of influence south in Syria and Lebanon toward 

the Israeli border guaranteed a military confrontation between Tel Aviv and Tehran.128 Perhaps 

boosted by the Trump administration’s May 8 withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal,129 the 

extensive Israeli airstrikes on May 10 across the breadth of the Iranian military presence in Syria 
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was a sharp and unambiguous throwing down of the gauntlet by Tel Aviv and virtually ensures 

that the Russian intervention presence in Syria will only become more problematic and vulnerable.130 As one Russian senior think tank analyst stated afterward, “We told the Iranians that 

if they strike Israel they would get a bloody nose. And then they did, and got a bloody nose!”131

Moscow will need to balance its currently practical relations with Israel carefully so as to avoid 

a major Israeli preemptive cross-border reaction into either southern Lebanon or even from the 

Golan into southern Syria.132 After a recent meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 

Netanyahu and Putin, it was reported that Netanyahu told Putin that Israel would not challenge 

Asad staying in power in Syria but that the Iranian presence remains unacceptable for Israel.133

Based on Israel’s recent actions and statements, Moscow’s recent provision of S-300s missiles to 

the Syrian arsenal will almost certainly trigger an eventual Israeli reaction.134 This could further 

feed concerns that the fraught situation in and around Syria could spread into a larger regional 

conflict with multiple state and nonstate actors. With its forces caught in between, such an 

escalation would clearly not be in Russia’s best interest, shredding the mostly pragmatic and 

cooperative relations currently between Tel Aviv and Moscow.

This Russian-Iranian partnership is not without its friction points, as noted by the Iranian 

expulsion of Russian aircraft based at Hamedan in August 2016 that occurred just a week after 

strategic bombers arrived from Russia. This occurred because of public Russian declarations 

about its bombers’ use of this Iranian airbase that the proud and nationalistic Iranians, apparently preferring some discretion, saw as excessive.135 However, this partnership—which has 

included sharing facilities—will likely continue as both seek to establish a stronger, more dominant presence in the Middle East.

Russia is also working to fill a perceived regional void of receding American power and 

presence in both the Middle East and the aforementioned Afghanistan. Its growing regional 

relationships include reopening civilian flights and signing a nuclear energy deal with Egypt 

after Putin’s visit to Cairo in December 2017 to meet Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi136

and the recent opening with the dominant powerbroker in Libya, Libyan National Army Commander Khalifa Haftar.137 Furthermore, the landmark visit in October 2017 of Saudi Arabia’s 

King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz to Moscow also punctuated Russia’s increasing assertiveness and 

credibility in the Middle East as both a power and energy powerbroker. The fact that Putin met 

Salman during a period of major tensions and increasing brinksmanship between Iran and 

Saudi Arabia over war-torn Yemen and tentatively agreed to supply S-400s to Riyadh could not 

fail to put its so-called partner Iran on notice that Russia will work flexibly with multiple partners in the region to secure its interests.138 Regional balancing was also evident with Putin’s lack 
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of criticism of Saudi Arabia for the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi embassy in 

Istanbul. Showing utter disdain for international norms, at the Buenos Aires G20 Summit, he 

even publically “high-fived” Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is seen as complicit in the grisly murder. Putin opted to compare it to the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, 

a former GRU intelligence officer who became a defector and critic who was attacked by Russia 

using poison, stating that it wanted to wait for all the evidence to be produced.139 Such posturing is an extension of Putin’s attempts to maintain powerful allies in the Middle East, while also 

indicative of the Russian government’s general disdain for journalists and dissidents.

One other indicator of Russia’s political breakout from its 2014–2015 political marginalization was how it set the agenda and participants for the ongoing Syria mediation process as part 

of the Astana talks that include Russia, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. Only belatedly was the United 

States invited to join this group. This has been seen by some observers as a way to circumvent 

the UN Geneva process.140 Due to the complexity of the conflict in Syria, the UN Special Envoy 

for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, has maintained that the UN Geneva process is the only way to 

reach a peace deal.141 Reaching peace in Syria remains a true obstacle, and how it is ultimately 

negotiated may also depend on the political ambitions and survival of Trump and Putin in the 

coming years—and whatever transpires in the tangled aftermath of the Trump-Putin summit 

in Helsinki.

While discussing the Middle East, it must be stated how complex, yet integral, oil and 

natural gas are for Russia and other powers. Even though Russia greatly desires a return to the 

pre-2014 prices of well over $100 per barrel that fueled its economic rise, it would not be in 

the interest of increasingly huge oil consumers, such as China and India, to see major price increases. While China is awash in income that could absorb high prices in the near term, India’s 

growth would be significantly stunted by such. In the status quo, both maintain cordial relations 

with Russia. India also currently buys the bulk of its weapons from Russia, a relationship Russia 

is keen to continue developing.

Russia has collaborated with both Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite Iran to increase oil prices, 

running counter to EU and Association of Southeast Asian Nations economic interests. Many 

countries have taken proactive measures in response to this. Despite Russian threats to cut off 

energy supplies to EU countries in response to heavy sanctions, EU countries have not changed 

their position regarding Russia, though the recent spate of contentious EU and U.S. relations 

could affect Europe’s solidarity regarding Russian-related policy. The United States, on the other 

hand, with its shale revolution is now more protected from these oil and gas price fluctuations. 
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China is aggressively seeking alternative supplies it can ultimately control, as seen in the South 

China Sea and with the BRI.

The West

Any discussion about the West must begin with the Russian perception of a liberal democratic and economic system that is an existential threat to the Russian state. With a narrative 

designed to present and exaggerate external threats and reinforce Russian self-reliance and internal controls, the regime sees Russia as facing a permanent state of competition and confrontation with the West. As events have shown since Georgia in 2008, Russia will use overt or 

nondeclared force if it feels its direct interests are threatened, especially within the FSU. Russia 

does not want to go to war with NATO or the United States, but certainly feels threatened by 

them and has singled them out as its principal adversaries.142 As such, in a way nearly impossible 

for liberal democracies to fathom in peacetime, Moscow prepares its military and is mobilizing 

its societal base for what some would say is inevitable war.143

Russia’s obsession with the so-called color revolutions and regime change reveals Putin’s 

deep insecurity concerning the legitimacy of his regime within the eyes of Russia’s own domestic population.144 Secure nations, comfortable with their governance and succession processes, 

do not obsess about regime change. After Qadhafi’s fall in 2011 in Libya, and the large-scale Bolotnaya protests in Moscow in 2011–2012, the Russian state-controlled media and government 

pronouncements became quite strident.145 During 2014–2016, a main theme at the Moscow 

Security Conference was the perceived threat to Russia of Western-backed color revolutions. 

Some Russian variation of President Yanukovych’s ignominious February 2014 fall from power 

in Ukraine is likely what “keeps Putin up at night.”

Anyone in Russia over the age of 45 remembers the fall of Communism, when a restive Soviet population induced by deteriorating economic conditions, a discredited ideology, and the 

unpopular conflict in Afghanistan pressed Soviet leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris 

Yeltsin to take bold reform measures. Those measures unintentionally led to the breakup of the 

Soviet Union in December 1991 and the birth of a new Russia shorn of 14 of its republics comprising one-third of its landmass and half its population, including over 25 million ethnic Russians, spread into an often-contentious peripheral diaspora. This remarkable event was, and still 

is, a bitter pill for many Russians, best captured by Putin’s now well quoted statement in 2005:

Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a 

major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found 

themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration 

infected Russia itself.146

The difficult and mismanaged economic reforms in the 1990s saw the rise of the first wave 

of oligarchs—corrupt, powerful businessmen with heavy influence on Moscow’s inner political circles. Western political chortling of victory in the Cold War, difficult to coordinate and 

execute Western aid efforts, a lack of Russian understanding as to why NATO enlarged, and 

poorly handled insurgencies and conflicts in Chechnya and the Russian “Near Abroad” helped 

pave the way for a strong no-nonsense leader when Putin became president of Russia in 2000.

From the Western perspective, NATO enlargement has focused on the incorporation of 

newly sovereign states into a democratic, market-based system with defensive intentions. The 

traumatized nations of Central and Eastern Europe were desperate to be part of a peaceful and 

NATO Expansion, 1949–2017

Source: Patrick Neil/Wiki Commons
28 

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credible defensive alliance, after the Soviet breakup and centuries of being bloodily squashed 

“in-between,” marched over, and occupied by adversarial great powers.147 The key point Russia 

never fully comprehended in the wake of its dissolution and breakup of the Warsaw Pact is that, 

unlike NATO, membership was never democratic or voluntary for its members.

The Alliance worked hard to bring Russia into its fold as a partner in the 1990s, resulting 

in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and NATO-Russia Council.148 One author saw these efforts 

up close while working on NATO Policy and the Partnership for Peace program on the Joint 

Staff from 1996–1999 and even wrote a thought piece about bringing Russia into the military 

structure as part of a NATO-Russia Contingency Command.149 Pulling Russia completely into 

the Alliance, however, was simply not feasible with ongoing internecine clashes—Moldova, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan come to mind—in the FSU. It was also too difficult 

to get NATO member governments to buy into Article 5 assurances for a nation that shared 

an approximately 2,600-mile land border with China, with whom Russia had border problems 

until only recently.150

Both Russia and the United States did manage to sign the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, 

guaranteeing Ukrainian sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.151

Russian paratroopers were even integrated into NATO operations in Bosnia.152 This NATORussia interaction in the Balkans that lingered into 2003 was a challenging and difficult process 

that expired primarily due to unchecked Serbian excesses that ended with the NATO bombing 

of Belgrade and intervention to stop genocide in Kosovo in 1999.153 Even moderate Russians 

were deeply upset by the U.S.-NATO intervention despite the righteousness of Western actions 

to prevent a Kosovar-Albanian genocide.154 This was the real break and the beginning of the 

downward spiral of post–Cold War NATO-Russia relations.155

From a Russian perspective, the problems concerning NATO’s enlargement began in the 

discussions about Germany’s reunification. For decades, the Russian narrative contended that 

verbal promises were made to Gorbachev at high levels that NATO would not expand to the east 

when Germany reunified.156 Most Russians, stoked by their state-controlled press, genuinely 

believed this. In recently released documents from The George Washington University National 

Security Archive, evidence appears to support the Russian contention that private assurances 

were made that NATO would not expand east if Germany was allowed to unify. The reporting 

of such was widely reported within Russian media, but lightly covered in the West.157

Whatever occurred, it is clear that most Western leaders had no premeditated plan in 1990–

1991 to expand NATO; it was only in 1994 that the intention to enlarge was announced. Over 

time, and a changing situation that included Eastern and Central European nations clamoring 
29

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

to be part of the alliance, a careful and methodical enlargement by deserving nations abiding by 

rule of law became part of NATO’s policy.158 Notably NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), its key 

interoperability program to prepare nations for potential NATO membership, was not established until 1994; Russia even briefly became a participating PfP member in 1995.159

By 1990, a reunited Germany was in NATO, and in 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 

Republic entered the Alliance.160 Throughout the process, the Russians were consulted, and to 

any informed observer, the militaries joining the Alliance were not a conventional threat to Russia.161 In 2004, a second major tranche joined the alliance—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 

Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.162 Of the seven, all with small militaries, three are former Soviet 

republics bordering contemporary Russia, something that Moscow has not taken lightly. It has 

long been the policy of NATO to dictate that no external state should interfere with the accession 

process. Russia’s direct interference in this enlargement process by issuing incendiary statements 

over Montenegro’s invitation and ultimate entry into NATO in 2017 has further damaged the 

fragile NATO-Russia relationship.163

The main takeaway from this is that there was no preordained, opportunistic stampede to 

enlarge NATO after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; rather, it was a 

slow, methodical, and difficult diplomatic process within NATO and its aspirant nations. Even 

if the United States understood Russia’s concerns about an expanded NATO, it was impossible 

to ignore the democratic will to join within each of these nations. The post–Cold War era was 

about these countries deciding their own destinies, independently from Russia. Despite this, 

the eastern expansion of NATO will always be perceived as a threat to Russia, as it questions 

the necessity of the Cold War institution in the 21st century—in Russian eyes, its mere existence 

signals that Russia does not fit into the modern international order.

Judging from the Russian reaction to tiny Montenegro, with just 2,000 military personnel 

who pose no threat, there will be a continued and robust Russian political and gray zone effort to undermine any serious Serbian or any other Balkans state joining the European Union. 

The Serbian leadership with some division is still considering the EU option while striving to 

keep good relations with Moscow. However, Russia, with its strong historical and cultural ties 

to Serbia, continues to aggressively counter any such move politically and by other disruptive 

hybrid methods. These include efforts to destabilize Kosovo and to back the ethnic-Serbian 

Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina.164 To date, Russia’s reaction to the future Republic of 

North Macedonia’s signing of an accession protocol on February 6, 2019, to become NATO’s 

30th member state has been measured.165
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As Dimitar Bechev of the European Policy Institute in Sofia, Bulgaria, stated, “Russia sees 

the West meddling in its backyard, and President Vladimir V. Putin shows he wants to reciprocate. They see the Balkans as the West’s underbelly, and they use it to throw their weight around 

and project power on the cheap.”166 These efforts will be a key Balkans development to watch. 

One can only look at Russia’s aggressive reaction to Ukraine’s drive toward EU association in 

2013 as a barometer of how it may act, especially if Serbia were to move toward more European 

integration. Such a move would also require the intermediary step of Serbia’s reconciliation and 

ultimate recognition of Kosovo’s statehood, something that Russia is adamantly against.167

While a natural progression from the Western perspective, NATO’s enlargement and its 

embrace of reforming Central and Eastern European nations desiring Article 5—collective defense—sanctuary was seen by the Russians ominously through a prism steeped in the centurieslong historiography of traditional Western threats. In 1989, the Warsaw Pact extended deep into 

central Europe. While providing a menacing offensive platform for huge Soviet and satellite 

country armies, xenophobic Soviets also saw the borders as a major buffer separating the Soviet 

Union from the West, which in the lifetime of senior Russian and FSU citizens viciously prosecuted a war of annihilation by Nazi Germany that led to the deaths of a staggering 20–26 million Soviets, many of whom were civilians.168 The 1989 East-West German border was 880 miles 

from Leningrad and surrounded West Berlin 800 miles away. Today the distance from NATO’s 

Estonian-Russian border at Narva to St. Petersburg is a mere 85 miles.

Russia also harbors a deep suspicion toward NATO/EU soft power. It was after all Russia’s response to the EU’s offer of association to Ukraine in late 2013 that began the slide into 

today’s continued, difficult, and still bloody confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv.169 Russia’s reaction following Yanukovych’s ouster—surreptitiously committing special forces to seize 

Crimea and backing proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine—shed light on evolving Russian geostrategic thought, especially regarding the regions on its periphery. The perception that democratic 

revolutions designed toward regime change are the greatest existential threat to the Russia state 

has heavily influenced Russian interventions since.170 In both cases, Russia took both overt and 

covert military action to achieve its objectives, which should give policymakers insight into 

how Russia might preemptively react over future events involving FSU nations Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova (Transnistria), Ukraine, and, most dangerously, NATO’s Baltic allies. 

Closely watching future secession scenarios, for example in Belarus and Kazakhstan, will be 

instructive, though the succession of power after the long-time autocrat President Islam Karimov’s 2016 death in Uzbekistan was surprisingly peaceful and smooth.171
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

Much has been written about the dramatic events that transpired between Russia and 

Ukraine after the fall of its pro-Russian regime in 2014. While the Russians, exercising impressive imagination and operational security, were successful with their masked invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea, follow-up efforts using proxies and nonattributed Russian forces to 

secure large tracts of Eastern Ukraine on behalf of its large ethnic Russian population bogged 

down after initial successes.172 Efforts to use variations of hybrid, nonlinear warfare, seemingly 

so effective in Crimea, failed to create the conditions necessary to seize Kharkiv, Mariupol, and 

Odessa. The likely unwitting Russian proxy downing of Air Malaysia MH-17 packed with EU 

civilians in July 2014 signaled a nadir for Russian efforts in Eastern Ukraine and international 

marginalization that did not improve until after Russia’s bold intervention in Syria 15 months 

later.173

From 2014 through 2016, four new strategic factors emerged that continue to influence the 

greater Ukraine conflict today:

■ Catalyzed by aggressive Russian actions, a sense of mainstream Ukrainian patriotism 

beyond former right-wing splinter nationalism coalesced among the bulk of the Ukrainian 

population and especially with Ukrainian elites.174 Over 32 million Ukrainians, while not 

necessarily anti-Russian, were now proudly pro-Ukrainian. They would fight to protect 

their identity and their homeland. This was a significant strategic miscalculation by Russia, which used the idea of protecting “ethnic Russians” to promote its efforts in Ukraine.

■ The EU managed to implement effective and sustained sanctions that have remained in 

place despite Russian countermeasures and the aftermath of the Brexit vote, adding pressure on both the Russian economy and public well-being.175

■ NATO sharpened its strategic Article 5 European focus after the transition of its International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan to Operation Resolute Support’s 

role of advise and support. This NATO realignment was another key strategic development that Russia had not counted on. Shortly afterward, Russia shut down its already 

diminished Northern Distribution Network, which had provided strategic transit routes 

to Afghanistan.176

■ Russia in 2014 had not anticipated the simultaneous fall in oil prices and the inflation of the ruble. These, combined with EU sanctions, placed great stress on the Russian 
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economy and by extension, the regime’s long-term Achilles’ heel, the pro-regime cohesion 

of its population.177

Despite the apparent success in Syria and elsewhere, these four strategic developments will continue to extract a high cost in the future in exchange for limited gains.

Neighboring Ukraine, and not part of any security alliance except Russia’s weak CSTO, is 

Alexander Lukashenko’s prickly Belarus. Other than Ukraine, the easily trafficable Belarus is 

the other major component of any traditional buffer between the West and Russian heartland. 

Directly astride the main invasion route between Central Europe and Moscow, Belarus was the 

pathway toward Moscow and Russia’s vitals both for Napoleon’s 1812 frozen march to oblivion, 

and within the lifetime of its senior citizens, the brutal onslaught of Hitler’s Nazi legions in 1941. 

As a result, over 2 million of Belarus’s approximately 8 million citizens perished during World 

War II, the worst loss by any country or state republic during the war.178

For these mostly “buffer zone” territorial reasons, major concern was evinced about the 

viability of the Lukashenko regime in early 2017, triggering discussions about what Putin would 

do if the current regime collapsed and Minsk was to be seen leaning West in its orientation. This 

regime change narrative is probably, other than Ukraine, the scenario that could most trigger 

a Russian military intervention to prop up pro-Russian interests in Minsk that incidentally did 

not support Russia’s 2014 reactive invasion of Ukraine.179 Such a scenario would be extremely 

dangerous and could regionally spill—either by accident or calculation—into dangerous brinksmanship involving Russia and its Kaliningrad exclave, Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine into a 

worst-case scenario Article 5 conflict. In September 2017, there were major concerns that the 

Russians would insert additional forces into Belarus using the widely publicized 2017 quadrennial military exercise Zapad (West) for cover as it has done with other exercises.180 Such a move, 

however, would have been totally counterproductive for Russia; why antagonize the mostly pliant Lukashenko regime by inserting forces without its assent and lose one of its few allies while 

incurring potential resistance and even more stringent international sanctions? Strategically, 

however, if Russia generally thought war was imminent, Belarus’s position and role would be 

perceived as massively important for both Russia and its neighbors.

Another nearby state is Moldova, with its breakaway republic of Transnistria that pulled 

away from Moldova in a post-Soviet 1992 civil war. Wedged between Moldova and Ukraine, 

this tiny elongated ethnic Russian-dominated swath of land along the Dniester River remains 

a “frozen conflict” that effectively freezes Moldova out of any realistic near-term prospect for 

EU or NATO membership.181 In recent years, Moldova and the EU have forged a closer bond, 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

fostering stronger economic and political ties. For example, Moldovans can now travel in the 

Schengen Zone without a visa. Relations at present, involving Russia and Moldova, are complicated as seen with the political infighting that led to the January 2018 suspension of its proRussian President Igor Dodon.182

Concerns persist that Russia could enhance conflict and destabilize the region—including 

Romania and Ukraine—using hybrid techniques in breakaway Transnistria as a springboard. 

Russia maintains its “14th Army” in Transnistria—about 1,200 troops—which remains ostensibly to protect the interests and autonomy of its majority ethnic Russian population of about 

385,000.183 This would be, however, a difficult military proposition for Russia, as reinforcing 

Transnistria would require an air or sealift through unfriendly airspace in crisis. For now, despite 

dependent Transnistria’s expensive support costs, it appears Russia will keep the region fomenting and unresolved.184

Overall within and along the periphery of the Black Sea, the always edgy geostrategic situation turned increasing dangerous in late 2018. The November 25 incident when Russian ships 

seized three Ukrainian vessels trying to enter the Sea of Azov through the narrow Kerch Strait, 

where Russia in 2017 completed a 12-mile bridge, encapsulates many of the strains and tensions in the greater region, especially between Ukraine and Russia. The next day, the Ukrainians placed its military on full alert and declared martial law. Russia bridles at internationally 

supported Ukrainian freedom of navigation through the strait and provisioning of the coastal 

cities of Mariopol and Berdiansk. Moscow directly challenges that due to the proximity of the 

annexed Crimean and Russian-mainland Kerch land-mass that it has legal primacy as to who 

should transit the strait and sail within the Sea of Azov. Since the incident, as of February 2019, 

Moscow is still holding 24 Ukrainian seamen captive, and the region remains tense with concerns that these moves could presage more aggressive Russian actions including a military sealand offensive to link up its mainland near Rostov over land to Crimea. This would support the 

aspirations of those still advocating for a czarist-era “New Russia,” a fateful step that would net 

Russia vociferous worldwide condemnation and sanction. While unlikely, this military scenario 

is plausible if overall tensions continue to grow, piling on with the ongoing bloodshed in Eastern 

Ukraine, the breakaway Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and eyes on a likely contentious Ukrainian election in March, 2019.185

Turkey

Due to its geostrategic crossroads position, Turkey mandates specific mention. A stable, 

supportive Ankara appears an increasingly unlikely challenging proposition for the United States 
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and NATO, the European Union, and the numerous nations it regionally abuts. Ankara’s policies 

and inclinations appear increasingly as a Near Middle Eastern nation first and a NATO Ally second, troubling trends that Russia appears to be opportunistically exploiting.186 Russia’s deft handling of Turkey after the loss of one of its fighter bombers to a Turkish F-16 fighter in November 
35

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

2015 was impressively measured and nonkinetic. Not only did Russia shortly afterward insert S400s into Syria, but relations burgeoned after an initial frost between autocratic President Recep 

Tayyip Erdogan and Putin. Contact further accelerated between Moscow and Ankara after the 

failed Turkish military-led coup against Erdogan in July 2016.187 Despite this, Ankara is working 

alternatives that include Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Qatar to mitigate Turkey’s dependence on 

Russia for about 55 percent of its natural gas imports, which gives Moscow additional leverage 

on Turkish affairs.188

While major differences separate Russia and Turkey regarding Ankara’s anti-Asad posture and the Turkish military cross-border push in northern Syria, implacability regarding the 

Kurds,189 and ongoing complicated machinations in the Caucasus regarding Georgia and Armenia190 relations have improved between the two autocrats, making future events in the Middle 

East and Southeast Europe even more unpredictable.

One must remember, however, the difficult history regarding Turkey and Russia. Their 

traditional centuries-long tensions, magnified by Russia’s restless push against the Ottoman 

Turks to dominate the Black Sea and Dardanelles while supporting Orthodox friends in the 

Balkans, are factors that led to numerous bloody conflicts between the two nations.191 While 

Russia may temporally revel at the growing estrangement between the United States, NATO, 

EU, and Turkey that even includes the Turks agreeing to buy Russian S-400 missile systems, 

Moscow should take a deep look into the next generation and think carefully about the risks of 

Ankara unanchoring from a stability-based organization such as NATO and evolving back into 

a large, increasingly conservative Sunni Islamic nation directly to its south. Turkey still borders 

substantial Russian interests and has recently been a conduit for transiting terrorists. Shortterm geopolitical gains regarding Moscow and Ankara could very well come at the expense of 

Russian internal security when growing Sunni-based demographics will play an even larger role 

in future Russia. Notably as recently as August 17, 2017, according to Pew polling, despite all 

the recent Ankara-Moscow engagement, up to 54 percent of Turks still had a negative view of 

Russia.192

The Arctic and the High North

Russia is significantly building its presence in the Arctic and High North in a strategically defensive posture that we would describe as “aggressively status quo.” It is placing several 

ground brigades in the north, reactivating a chain of mutually supporting Soviet-era airbases, 

and aggressively consolidating territory that it claims is within its territorial span laid out in the 

Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).193 It is also modernizing and building ports and search and rescue 
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stations near the fast-melting Northern Sea Route (NSR) to accommodate Russian and international shipping, including the Chinese.

To manage this effort, the General Staff created out of the Northern Fleet a new Arcticfocused headquarters in Severomorsk named the Joint Strategic Command North, in essentially 

a 5th Military District added to the Western (St. Petersburg), Central (Ekaterinberg), Southern 

(Rostov), and Eastern (Khabarovsk) military districts.194

Its security concerns are multifaceted. First, the relentless melting of the polar ice pack is 

opening up a large channel from the Barents to the North Atlantic. When coupled with the inexorable thawing of vast tracts of Russia’s northern permafrost emitting large gouts of methane and 

unsettling gas pipelines, the NSR is creating both a strategic economic opportunity and strategic 

vulnerability for Russia with a heightened risk for accidents and environmental disasters. Russia, 

with some foreign aid, is investing billions into an industry that will produce short- to mid-term 

gains, but generationally is not sustainable. Despite real efforts, especially in the realms of information technology and agriculture, Moscow struggles to adequately diversify its economy.195 In 

the long term, major Russian energy buyers like the EU may transition to cleaner forms of energy 

entirely, leaving Russia further in debt with unused infrastructure. Notably, the Arctic Zone of 

the Russian Federation now accounts for 20 percent of the entire Russian GDP, an impressive feat 

considering that the new Russian pivot toward the Arctic only started in 2007.196

Russia has accelerated the construction of its already numerous icebreaking fleet by laying the keel of the nuclear-powered Sibir, the largest in the world, in September 2017.197 In all, 

Russia has over 40 icebreakers in its fleet, 6 of which are nuclear. No other country possesses 

such a nuclear icebreaker fleet.198 In contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard has two icebreakers, one 

of which is constantly under repair with up to six more set as a requirement; Sweden, Finland, 

and Canada have small fleets.199 China has two, with one more planned for 2019.200

To Russia, the value of the Arctic north is multifold. First, it is a strategic bastion for its 

strategic ballistic missile submarines concentrated near the Kola Peninsula and its southeast 

toward the Sea of Okhotsk. Second, as Siberian oil and natural gas are increasingly depleted, or 

made more difficult to extract due to the thawing permafrost, it is a potentially valuable asset 

in terms of its deposits of oil and gas. However, such assets require major effort and a safe environment to extract. Third, the NSR promises trade advantages, especially if it becomes commercially viable for major long-haul shipping as an alternative to potentially more vulnerable 

southern routes, especially if, for example, a crisis were to break out near the Strait of Malacca, 

choking off Asian supply. It also has a major cost-savings benefit. Using the Northern Sea Route 

instead of the Suez Canal to travel from Rotterdam, Netherlands, to Dalian, China, for example, 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

would shorten the trip by 13 days, which is nearly 20 percent.201 A drawback, however, for major NSR growth as a commerce conduit is that without icebreaking, it is seaborne trafficable for 

only about four months a year.

While the Russian military’s actions in this region seem aggressive, in totality, they appear strategically defensive. With its already stretched military and sheer inhospitality of the 

Far North, it is unfeasible that Russia has any realistic notion of “conquering” the entire Arctic 

region, as some argue. More realistically, it is firmly consolidating its position and putting itself in 

a military posture to support the Arctic claims that it is trying to stake out via UNCLOS.202 This is 

doubly important to Russia, as the bulk of its GDP even with fallen prices is oil- and gas-derived. 

Therefore, the Russians see no other choice but to expand their extraction to the north.203 As 

Konstantin Simonov, director of the Moscow-based National Energy Security, found “Russia’s 

current predicament is very simple. . . . Gas fields discovered in the 1960s laid the foundation for 

Russia’s decades-long dominance of the global natural gas market. Now these Soviet-era giants 

are in decline. Moving farther north into the Arctic is the next logical step.”204

The Arctic is an arena where there may be a basis for real cooperation primarily through 

the auspices of the eight-nation Arctic Council. It is in the interest of these nations—Canada, 
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Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and United States—to avoid excessive militarization of the Arctic’s pristine climate and fragile ecosystem, as well as to prevent it from becoming a battleground. All these countries are wary of other nations making claims in this vast 

area that could unsettle the unwritten balance in the region.205 Therefore, it will be essential in the 

years ahead that all members, including NATO Allies, sail and tread carefully in the High North.

For example, northeast of the strategic GI-UK (Greenland-Iceland, United Kingdom) Gap 

are Norway’s Svalbard Islands. Well north of the Arctic Circle, they are relatively near sensitive 

Russian nuclear-focused naval installations in the Barents and White Sea. Their international 

legal status is complex. While made sovereign to Norway, the 1920 Treaty stipulated that citizens 

of the signatory nations all have access to Svalbard and that Svalbard remains demilitarized. This 

includes Russia, as the Soviet Union became a signatory in 1925, and today the second-largest 

settlement on Svalbard is a Russian mining settlement called Barentsburg that maintains the 

northernmost consulate in the world. The Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin controversially visited the settlement by air in 2015.206

Northern Sea Route

Source: Arctic Council/Susan Harder
39

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

While disputes are mostly linked to maritime limits within the Barents Sea and fishing 

rights beyond Svalbard’s territorial zone, this appears to be an area ripe for tension and exploitation if tensions were to worsen between Russia, Norway, and by extension NATO and the Arctic 

overall.207

Similar but different dynamics are important to consider for the waters abounding the Russian Far East, especially near Kamchatka Peninsula, Sakhalin, and the Sea of Okhotsk where, in 

1983, the ill-fated off-course Korean Air Lines 007 was shot down by a Soviet interceptor in one 

of the most dangerous incidents of the Cold War.208 While all nations militarily plying these waters must be carefully measured, Russia in particular must show restraint with its increasingly 

dangerous naval and aerial saber-rattling in the region, as an accident or incident in the High 

North could be exceedingly perilous for all parties concerned.

China, having already acquired two icebreakers and planning to build another, is a notable 

concern. Despite such concerns, China, along with India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, were welcomed as observer states to the Arctic Council in 2013. In a new white paper 

published in January of 2018, China documented its belief that it is a “near-Arctic” nation, announcing its plan to become heavily involved in the region while following international law.209

The stated goal of such policy is to establish a “Polar Silk Road,” enhancing the attractiveness 

of BRI by making resource-strapped China less reliant on southern sea routes.210 Such involvement may raise further concerns for Russia about the competition and threat of an increased 

Chinese Arctic presence interested in commercial navigation, and resources including not only 

oil and natural gas but also its still bountiful fish stocks. Yet China could also serve as a nearterm development partner in the region, especially filling the vacuum of former mutual investors such as ExxonMobil that, due to sanctions pressure, pulled out of its relationship with 

Rosneft in early 2018.211 Russia would benefit financially from an enhanced Chinese presence, 

particularly as new Russian ports are developed. In the near term, this partnership could serve 

Russia’s strategic interest, especially if it is able to improve its financial situation—although this 

could become problematic by the next generation if Chinese-Russian relations become more 

strained and competitive with China is more firmly rooted in the region.

The Russian Military

The Russian military, though much improved as an overall fighting force, is not the juggernaut it is sometimes perceived to be. With a defense budget only one-ninth of the U.S. budget and few true allies, Russian leaders and planners must think carefully about how and when 

to best employ their military.212 Therefore, its aggressive yet carefully calibrated and continued 
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intervention into Syria was of major significance. Even so, despite much diplomatic rhetoric, 

its careful non-escalatory steps surrounding the aforementioned battering by U.S. forces in 

February 2018 of overly aggressive Russian military contractors in Syria, followed in April by 

U.S., British, and French strikes against the Asad regime’s chemical warfare capabilities, perhaps best reveal its own real perception of the limits of its out-of-area military reach in the face 

of a world-class military opponent.213

Russia’s current demographic and economic challenges make it difficult to sustain large 

standing field forces especially abroad.214 Short of a mobilization, it is hard-pressed to put a million active-duty personnel under arms. Russia’s robust security services, even before factoring 

in the omnipresent Federal Security Service (FSB), include roughly a quarter-million MVD 

interior troops, who compete in the same Russian personnel pool as the regular armed forces. 

The role of the MVD has devolved to primarily law enforcement and physical security activities, while the regime’s recently constituted “national guard” continues to flesh out to a force of 

over 300,000 that could be employed internally or externally with a type of “Praetorian Guard” 

Norway's Svalbard Islands

Source: Rob984/Wiki Commons
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

allegiance to the regime.215 While major strides have been made under its “New Look” initiative 

in reducing its bloated structure and streamlining the military into a more lethal and deployable 

force, major inconsistencies remain in terms of force preparedness and budget.216

Despite its major and partially successful effort to create a volunteer force, the expenses, 

current sanctions, and social challenges have slowed progress.217 The Russian military, especially the land forces, still consists of over 30 percent conscripts who are called up in annual drafts 

for a service term of 1 year. This was reduced from 18 months in 2008.218 Conscription is generally unpopular in Russia, though due to major reforms and successes since the 2008 Georgian 

conflict, the popularity of the Russian military has grown in recent years, reaching 58 percent 

approval in 2017.219 However, for career leaders and trainers, the challenges of annually bringing in and assimilating several hundred thousand temporary, 1-year recruits into formed units 

remain quite daunting.220 What has helped is that in Syria, outcomes aside, many forces were 

able to get ground experience.221 Dedovshina (hazing) of recruits remains a problem despite 

overall improvements in military quality of life. Moving forward, Russian decisionmakers will 

have to think long and hard before deploying conscript-heavy, social media–connected ground 

units into complicated, sensitive, and potentially divisive cross-border arenas such as Eastern 

Ukraine, the Baltics, or even Syria.222

Russia’s standing nuclear forces (Strategic Rocket Forces, Strategic Aviation, and navy) still 

command the crème of the Russian military personnel system. Elite forces such as the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (otherwise known 

at the GRU) and FSB Spetsnaz, airborne forces, and naval infantry, which do most of the hard 

“out of area” work, continue to improve their capabilities and are increasingly battle-hardened 

across a broad spectrum with direct and indirect (hybrid) conflict in Crimea, Donetsk-Luhansk, 

and Syria. These forces have been heavily used in the past 4 years and despite their major advancements are likely in major need of rest and refit. Cracks have appeared in the facade of even 

elite elements, as revealed by their occasional capture in cross-border locations such as Eastern 

Ukraine, followed usually by official nonattribution as Russian military by the Putin regime.223

Notably, the entire Russian nonnuclear military has been recently exercised and challenged 

in a troika of three major military operations between 2014 and 2019. Each operation—from 

the mostly nonviolent 2014 stealth invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea directly after the Sochi Olympics, followed by the still ongoing shadow conflict within Eastern Ukraine, to the full-blown, 

conventionally tactical and strategic intervention into Syria in late 2015—that has stretched 

into 2019—has improved the overall fighting prowess and organization of the Russian military. In these operations, especially in Eastern Ukraine and Syria, the Russians have made great 
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strides in refining complex military capabilities using increasingly sophisticated intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets including extensive use of drones and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. Knitted within a robust and speedy cyber backbone, these capabilities increasingly enable Russia’s enhanced tactical to strategic command and control of joint air, 

ground, and sea operations, as well as special forces employment. This also has extended into 

coalition operations with their Syrian, Iranian, and Hizballah partners.224

The Russians have stated that they do not want to go to war with the United States and 

NATO, as demonstrated in the recent rewrite of their strategic doctrine and recently announced 

National Security Strategy.225 However, they are preparing their military and society for potential 

conflict with the West.226 Closely noting our U.S. and allied lessons learned most notably during 

the two operationally decisive Iraq campaigns in 1991 and 2003 (that highlighted our revolution 

in military affairs) and ongoing strategic investment in high-tech offsets, Moscow has worked 

on a tech-heavy offset of its own. Calling it “New Generation Warfare,” this Russian effort incorporates a wide range of tactics from nonkinetic gray zone activities to full-fledged combat 

operations.227

The Russians are well aware of their overall deficiencies and lack of allies.228 Its military 

is also quite spread out, attenuated along Russia’s vast periphery with high-quality forces directly engaged in Syria and discreetly in Eastern Ukraine, with standing garrisons in Armenia, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Transnistria. Therefore, any major prospective action must involve 

some mobilization and internal regrouping with concentrations masked and distracted by prehostility corrosive soft power “hybrid” activities before launching a surprise first strike that 

must be fast, deep, precise, and multispectral.

Every year the Russian military, with large elements of its society supporting the effort, 

undertakes a major military exercise rotating annually through the regional military districts. 

During these preplanned, widely publicized exercises, a wide array of joint forces in essentially 

a national effort stretch the nation’s transportation and logistics network supporting scenarios 

involving major foreign threats. The Zapad (West) 2017 wargame that occurred primarily in 

the Western Military District—including near the Baltic and Belarusian borders—riveted the 

region as concerns proliferated that Russia would use the exercise as a guise to invade the three 

NATO Baltic nations and/or slip major forces into Belarus. While there was much maneuvering 

and exercising, no such invasion occurred. In 2018, all eyes were on the Vostok (East) exercise 

in the Russian Far East, advertised as Russia’s largest ever exercise, a major signal given that the 

Soviet Union also held huge exercises during the Cold War. Vostok 2014, set just months after 

Crimea’s annexation, was also billed as Russia’s largest exercises to date.229 Notably, regional 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

partners such as China and Mongolia participated. With reportedly 3,200 soldiers directly involved, the Chinese role was substantive, but still relatively small. It did, however, connote a 

further deepening of military-to-military relations between these traditionally wary nations 

who share a vast, formerly contentious border. This development must be closely watched to 

determine if these highly publicized Chinese-Russia military exchanges are just interactive and 

largely symbolic in nature, or, more ominously, will they become increasingly focused on interoperability with an eye on future collaborative coalition operations. While at Zapad 17, there 

was much “flash and bang”; in Vostok 2018, there is no specific threat that would envision a 

scenario in which Russian forces would intervene across the border in Asia unless further west 

in Central Asia within the southern lands of the FSU.

Another potential threat to monitor are the numerous “snap exercises” ordered on short 

notice by the Russian Ministry of Defense, focusing on unit and infrastructure readiness, that 

could put large standing forces traveling by ground, sea, air, and rail into proximity of a perceived vulnerability, regional hot spot, or target of opportunity. These major exercises—whether 

announced or snap—must be closely monitored as they could set a precondition for intervention or invasion as occurred with exercise Caucasus 2008 just before Russia’s military seizure of 

Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008.230

While there are those who wish for the geographic reknitting of the Soviet Union, most 

pragmatic Russian military thinkers realize this is impossible. Instead, the military is being rebuilt to maintain credible strategic nuclear retaliation, conventional area and maritime denial 

using precision munitions, the ability to commit swift deployable forces that could, for example, 

overturn a looming color revolution within a failing former FSU capital such as Minsk or Astana, or even the ability to conduct limited out-of-area operations in strategically important regions such as Syria. Without a significant mobilization, the Russian military, especially with its 

conscript-reliant ground forces, cannot hold large expanses of contested ground as would have 

been the case if it made, or still considers, a 120-mile deep attempt at seizing Crimea’s Isthmus 

of Perekop via Mariupol.

Finally, Russia still must contend with the challenges posed by extremely long and chronically difficult to defend borders with the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East. Unfortunately, due to its reactive behaviors based on obsolete threat perceptions, Russia views the Ukraine 

and Baltic border regions as tense and threatening—as reinforced by the recent deployment of 

SS-26 Iskander short-range ballistic missiles to Kaliningrad—even though these areas should be 

among the quietest and most peaceful of all Russia’s borders.231
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Further Afield: Latin America and Africa

Although this survey focuses on the extended geostrategic “girdle” of nations that are contiguous to or near Russian borders, for comprehensiveness, a short mention should be made of 

major peripheral regions where the Russians—economizing force and resources by use of asymmetric means—are also active. While not major staging areas for their military, Latin America 

and Africa are certainly platforms for aggressive Russian diplomacy, economy, intelligence, and 

corrosive asymmetric gray zone activities. National Security Advisor John Bolton outlined that 

the Trump administration plans to counter Russian and Chinese investment in Africa by increasing economic ties in the region.232

Latin America

In Latin America, Russia seeks to rebuild and cultivate relationships with some of its former 

Soviet-era partners, such as Nicaragua and El Salvador and the new “ALBA Bolivarian Alliance,” 

both for economic influence reasons and to chip away at American regional dominance.233

In recent years, especially after its retrenchment in the 1990s, Russia has pushed major 

inroads within Latin America across a broad front of activities. These include:

■ An increasing surge of senior-level Latin American visitors with Russia, which far outstrips corresponding visits to the United States.234

■ A growing number of regional nations are enthusiastically supporting Russia’s agenda 

and seek to aid it in displacing what they see as U.S. hegemony in Latin America. These nations include Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuela, Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua, and the Farabundo 

Martí National Liberation Front’s El Salvador. Furthermore, the above-mentioned 14-nation ALBA bloc, founded in 2004 by the mercurial former president of Venezuela, Hugo 

Chavez, and Cuba’s Fidel Castro is increasingly supporting Russia’s growing diplomatic, 

economic, and military activities in the region.235

■ Russia, adept in gray zone media manipulation, has expanded its media presence in 

Latin America, opening outlets aimed at state and nonstate entities that promote Russian and partner activities while expounding a corrosive anti-American narrative in the 

region.236
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

■ Specifically, in Nicaragua, in addition to military and other projects, Russia is supporting the Ortega regime with intelligence expertise and counternarcotics assistance. Reportedly one Russian facility may contain satellite equipment conducting international 

surveillance.237

■ Russian arms sales have significantly risen to the broad region, reaching approximately 

$10 billion since 2000.

■ Russian cyber security and surveillance cooperation have also expanded in Latin 

America in recent years. The Russian Protei ST company has been particularly involved 

in several regional projects.238

■ In countries such as Guatemala, Russian government and related oligarchic financial 

entities are increasingly able to manipulate host governments into giving them advanced 

accesses and privileges that include taking actions against Russian citizens that they disfavor. Notably in 2003, the Russian oil tycoon Alexander Khodorkovsky was sentenced 

to 10 years in a Guatemalan prison after he fell into displeasure with the Putin regime.239

■ In Cuba, Russia is regaining its presence and influence. Economically, it is expanding its 

trade role, with an estimated 81 percent increase in exports to Cuba in 2017. While China 

remains Cuba’s main trading partner, Russia has gained traction with its old ally.240 Additionally, Putin spoke of strengthening Russia’s “strategic partnership” with Cuba on the 

recent election of Miguel Diaz Canel-Bermudez to president, replacing Raul Castro and 

ending 59 years of Castro rule.241 While discussion emerged in 2016 about Russia reestablishing a military base in Cuba, no tangible evidence of such has been noted.242

■ Finally, the 2019 crisis in Venezuela has put Russia in the challenging position of having to support a clearly failed and internationally unpopular leader in a broad region 

where Moscow’s influence, while disruptive, is clearly limited. Moscow’s support for 

Maduro reveals how differently Russia (and China) looks at the world politically and 

philosophically. Recent, visible attempts to publically shore up the Maduro regime, while 

unambiguously messaging the United States and the world, was highlighted by the fly-in 

of two strategic, nuclear capable Blackjack bombers in December and by staunchly supporting the Maduro regime in its efforts to survive a growing popular movement set on 

its overthrow. 
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Summarizing Russia’s position in Cuba, and perhaps in Latin America overall, a senior Obama 

official stated, “Russia is a much less important economic player in the hemisphere than China. 

Russia has fewer interests in the Americas, but likes to meddle in what they perceive as our 

backyard.”243

Africa

Russia has also staked out interests in Africa. Moscow views Africa as a significant investment opportunity and a means to generate future support at the UN. From 2000–2012, trade 

between Russia and Africa overall increased tenfold.244 It reached $17.4 billion in 2017, and 

from 2012 to 2017, Russia doubled the amount of weapons that it was seeling to African countries.245 Since Russia was sanctioned for its actions in Crimea, it has signed 19 military cooperation deals with countries in sub-Saharan Africa.246 Russia’s heightened interest in Africa has 

included the following:

■ More Russian soldiers are involved in peacekeeping in Africa than those from France, 

the United States, and United Kingdom combined.247

■ After the United States denied a Nigerian request for attack helicopters, Nigeria turned 

to Russia, investing in Russian aircraft. It also canceled a U.S. training program and allowed Russia to fill the void.

■ In February 2015, Russia and Uganda signed a $4 billion deal to develop and operate 

a crude oil refinery. In the same month, Russia and Zimbabwe signed a $3 billion deal 

for the development of a platinum mine.248 After a January 2019 meeting in Moscow between Vladimir Putin and President of Zimbabwe Emmerson Mnangagwa, a deal was 

announced for Russian investment in Zimbabwe’s diamond industry, two finance deals 

worth $267 million, and a fertilizer supply contract.249

■ Russia has pursued a dual strategy in Libya. It has pursued a relationship with General 

Khalifa Haftar, assisting his troops located near western Egypt. At the same time, it has 

also maintained contact with the Government of National Accord. Its ultimate goal is to 

have an influence on the future of Libya.

■ Algeria and Russia share intelligence on terrorism in North Africa and have publicly 

announced plans for higher levels of military cooperation.
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

■ Tunisia and Russia have also shared intelligence and announced a nuclear energy cooperation agreement in 2016. By 2016, Russian tourism had also increased tenfold in 

Tunisia.

■ In October 2016, Morocco and Russia announced 11 agreements in agriculture, military, and energy, including the sale of Russian liquefied natural gas.250

■ In 2017, with UN Security Council approval for an arms embargo exception, Moscow 

sent weapons and contractors to the Central African Republic (CAR) to train local soldiers and protect mining projects.251 In January 2019, the CAR’s defense minister stated 

that there was a possibility that Russia could open a military base in the country.252

■ A growing controversy in the CAR is the presence of Wagner, a Russian paramilitary 

company that is also involved in Syria and Ukraine. In July 2018, three Russian journalists 

were killed while investigating the group in the CAR.253

■ Other relationships with Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Ethiopia are also in development.254

Russia is positioning itself to be a significant development partner for African countries, 

trying to compete with the United States and China along with others. It will likely remain a 

junior partner in the near term but could still complicate matters in the region for the United 

States, particularly as it is actively seeking involvement in the military and energy sectors.255

Reemerging Nuclear Concerns

The pending U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 

formalized on February 2, 2019, with a 6-month period to be fully consummated, has focused 

the world on the ever-dangerous perils of nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, the world was lucky 

to survive the Cold War nuclear competition between the United States and Soviet Union. Typically, nations that build lethal weapons of strategic scope almost always eventually use them—

the Cold War with its Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) being the most notable exception. 

The surreal days of major Civil Defense exercises that stretched into kindergarten classrooms 

with “duck and cover” drills catalyzed in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis were brought 

back into stark reality with the recent false nuclear alarm in Hawaii that panicked millions.256

The Cuban crisis showed how close the world came to nuclear annihilation; the Cold War was 
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no longer just a theory, but a real threat to global peace and security. Subsequently, steps were 

taken that led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, later paving the way toward a sustained, global effort to limit nuclear arms and reduce the threat implicit in the MAD doctrine.

Since the ascent of Putin 19 years ago and the rise of an increasingly assertive Russia, we 

have reentered the uncomfortable continuum of renewed nuclear tension with Russia. It appears that no major breakthroughs in arms control are on the horizon, although overall strategic stability, including arms control, initially appeared to be the most positive and actionable 

item discussed at the 2018 Putin-Trump Helsinki Summit.

Nuclear weapons serve as a strategic guarantor for Russia’s generally outgunned and outmanned conventional military that feels forced to address numerous potential threats, real and 

perceived, across its vast periphery. It is an up-and-down nuclear dance with the West that has 

gone on for generations and, while occasionally dangerous and always uncomfortable, is a paradigm both sides understand.

We must remember, however, that Russia also shares a long border with China that would 

be enormously difficult to conventionally defend. While relations at present are pragmatically 

cordial with the declared “strategic partnership” between these nuclear-tipped behemoths, Russian defense planning must take into account a worst-case scenario that could conceivably put 

Russia and China at loggerheads in the next generation. Medium-range missiles of which China, not an INF signatory, has several hundred could be part of that equation. In this scenario, 

nuclear weapons would be a strategic balancer both for deterrence and for conflict, as unlikely 

as it may seem today.257 Several Russian senior military and think tank researchers have stated 

their long-term concerns about China, especially if its currently peaceful economic expansion 

becomes more aggressive via major Eurasian projects such as the BRI or more direct access 

to natural resources. More specifically, for the current generation of Kremlin leaders, nuclear 

weapons are part of what makes Russia a global superpower and a nation to be respected and 

reckoned with. As such, nuclear weapons have broad political and military utility; they are a 

potent means to intimidate and coerce during both peacetime and crisis and play an important 

role in Russia’s approach to contemporary conflict. Russia’s renewed push in the nuclear realm 

has recently manifested itself by:

■ A persistent and insistent pattern of nuclear saber-rattling and threats, such as against 

Denmark in 2015 and both Norway and Sweden in late 2016, that seeks to induce fear, 

caution, and, ultimately, paralysis among governments that would have to contemplate 

whether and how to counter Russian aggression.258
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

■ Continuously evolving military doctrine that envisions the possibility of initiating the 

use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to “deescalate” a regional conventional war.

■ Weakening the 1987 INF that as touched on previously mandated the elimination of 

the entire class of ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 miles and overall strategic stability by the likely violation of that treaty.259 The likely violation in question was the introduction of the SSC-8 Novator groundlaunched cruise missile. It could launch from the same mobile launcher as the Iskander-M 

and, along with U.S. and allied calls to respond by fielding a similar missile risks breaking 

the enervated remainder of the remaining arms control regime.260

■ Continued investment in modernized nuclear forces of all ranges and types.261

■ Overall, a general refusal to reengage on the question of additional nuclear arms control 

and threat reduction beyond existing agreements and programs.

The risks to strategic stability are equally evident. Concerns are growing due to the introduction of increasingly capable long-range conventional munitions, including cruise missiles, 

that can potentially threaten adversaries with nuclear strike and counterstrike capabilities.262

Coupled with this is a Russian aversion to any Western platform with anti-ballistic missile capability, no matter what threat that it is directed toward. Despite its hundreds of defense-inundating delivery systems, such an aversion extends even to reasonable responses regarding the 

Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. The U.S. unilateral decision in 2002 to withdraw 

from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty no doubt fed into this sensitivity.

Furthermore, the atrophying state of the arms control regime assiduously built during the 

Cold War by legions of hard-working and often disagreeing diplomats, scientists, and bureaucrats makes the current environment potentially even more dangerous. Much of the arms control foundation, which by its sheer existence was a colossal confidence-building measure for all 

involved parties, has significantly eroded.263 Major pillars of such measures are all either discontinued or on life support.264 While all eyes are now focused on the final outcome for INF and the 

future of the New Start Agreement in 2021, one should recall the substance of prior treaties and 

agreements now eliminated or suspended. For example, in 2015, Russia withdrew from the Conventional Forces–Europe Treaty and canceled the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program.265 The Open Skies Agreement has been increasingly questioned, and the Anti-Ballistic 
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Missile Treaty was scrapped in 2002 by the United States.266 Furthermore, a longstanding agreement signed in 2000 between the United States and Russia for the mutual disposal of dangerous 

military plutonium stockpiles was recently canceled by Russia.267 The erosion of this major layer 

of depressurizing points of contact that paradoxically were more robust and established during 

the Cold War bodes ill for the future.268

Risk-taking behavior by the Russians could lead to a crisis or even unintended nuclear 

escalation as could U.S. and/or allied actions misinterpreted by Moscow. This is especially dangerous given the lack of communication between key American and Russian regional military 

intermediaries—especially the U.S. combatant commands with Russian regional military districts—which could possibly deescalate a potentially disastrous crisis before it engulfs Moscow 

and Washington decisionmakers. Russia’s described deliberate escalation to the tactical nuclear 

level in a regional conflict could also trigger a series of exchanges well beyond Moscow’s ability 

to predict or control. The whole debate could be specious as it is the view of these authors that 

the Russian or American use of just one nuclear weapon in the current environment, with the 

current state of weakened fail-safe mechanisms, would lead to an exchange that likely would 

end our civilization as we know it.

The danger is that Putin and his circle may well believe they can avoid or control such risks 

by operating in a preconflict gray zone and conventionally under a “nuclear shadow.” This belief 

seems central to the way Moscow would seek to achieve a rapid fait accompli against a NATO 

member particularly in the Baltics, or Turkey, and then essentially engage in nuclear blackmail 

to deter a meaningful collective defense response from the Alliance. Should this attempt at 

coercion fail, Russia seems prepared to consider the actual use of tactical nuclear weapons to 

achieve its objectives rather than wage war against NATO forces that, when fully mobilized, 

would bring superior combat power to the fight.269 Such actions are those of an insecure nation with major regional aspirations that also realizes it is outgunned and outnumbered both 

conventionally and diplomatically. This imbalance will only increase into the next generation.

The dangers of Russian nuclear coercion are quite real to those European states most exposed to them. Moscow’s preemptively reactive aggression in Ukraine has renewed fears that 

Europe once again could become a battleground in a conflict that carries no small risk of nuclear use. As a result, NATO finds itself engaged in serious discussions about how to leverage its 

own conventional and nuclear forces to deter Russia and to deny it the ability to gain advantage 

from a strategy of nuclear coercion and escalation control. The task of credibly deterring Moscow requires the West not only to shed outdated assumptions and mindsets about Russia but 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

also to reconstitute its ability to understand Russia as a political and military rival—as well as a 

potential adversary in war.

An added factor to consider—an enormous tactical-to-strategic leap—is the reemerging 

Soviet doctrine of using tactical nuclear weapons to “deescalate” a conflict.270 Additionally, it is 

unknown exactly how far along in development, or operationally ready, is an entire new generation of conventional and nuclear weapons that Moscow—including Putin in his last two state of 

the union speeches, the most recent on February 20, 2019, to the Federal Assembly—has noisily 

declared to the world and the Russian people. These consist of a wide array of enhanced capabilities including a powerful new intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-28 Sarmat, replacing 

the aging multiple-warhead SS-18 Satan; an intercontinental hypersonic missile named Avangard that ostensibly can fly to targets at 20 times the speed of sound;271 the controversial “Kanyon” long-range nuclear torpedo; and an already deployed Kindzal hypersonic missile in the 

Southern Military District with a range up to 1,250 miles.272 Notably, Putin emphasized in his 

2019 speech that Russia would react to any U.S. repositioning of nuclear missiles to Europe by 

targeting nations that pose “direct threats.” Additionally, implying the U.S. mainland, he stated 

that Russian missiles could be targeted on “where the centers of decisionmaking are located.”273

Furthermore, according to Putin, who emphasized that “Russia had no plans to be the 

aggressor,” Moscow has been developing a nuclear-powered cruise missile. He stated that 

“the launch and the set of ground tests allow to get to creating a radically new type of weaponry—a strategic nuclear weaponry complex with a missile fitted with a nuclear-powered 

engine. It ostensibly has unlimited range and unlimited ability to maneuver.”274

Finally, adding even more to this already jagged narrative, and the regime’s obsession 

with aspects of regime change, was General Gerasimov’s strange declaration in March 2019 

during a speech at Moscow’s Academy of Military Sciences. He stated that the United States 

was developing a “Trojan Horse” plan to hit Russian missile defense sites with long-range 

precision-strike weapons in support of domestic anti-government demonstrations.275

Possible Worst-Case Scenarios

If Russia saw war as inevitable, much as Japan did before World War II, it would attempt to 

strike first and fast using cyber-enabled maskirovka (deception) and disinformatsiya (disinformation) to mask its intent. This has been a core aspect of Soviet-Russian thinking and planning 

since Stalin’s era and has manifested in the Russian General Staff ’s perception of Russia’s territorial and societal “strategic uniqueness” and the need for an asymmetrical mindset and approach 

to maximize its strengths and offset its vulnerabilities.276 War could be sparked by the fear of 
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regime change, a bordering color revolution, or some incendiary incident that rapidly moves 

to brinksmanship. One increasingly feasible possibility is that conflict could erupt from a failed 

attempt to subvert a NATO state protected by Article 5.

While preparing its population and the world with an intense media and disinformation 

campaign, Russian moves would also involve an initial cyber and electronic warfare onslaught 

to blind, deafen, and confuse U.S. and allied command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance, as well as space and navigational capabilities. Kinetic strikes would follow to 

attack U.S. and allied capital ships—especially aircraft carriers—and forward-based aviation 

with an opening barrage of precision munitions. The loss of these symbols of Western power 

and prestige, coupled with a Russian rapid seizure of its objectives, would be followed by a 

declaration of Russian readiness for a fait accompli political settlement backed by a threat to 

use nuclear weapons if the United States and Allies were to launch a major counteroffensive or 

threaten its own nuclear response.277

These approaches suggest a strategically defensive mindset by a nation that understands it 

is globally outmatched, except in the first phase of a military conflict and in the nuclear realm. 

In any initial phase of a conflict, Russia would use both asymmetric and conventional surprise 

and confusion to leverage shock and speed as decisive force multipliers. For any major preplanned scenario, Russia would have to stage a discreet mobilization and call-up of reserves 

to buttress its standing forces. Another crucial consideration would be the role or non-role of 

major military powers such as increasingly global China as well as Iran, as they would likely 

have to assess their own future positions if Russia was isolated and defeated in a major conflict 

with the West.

One hindrance to Russia’s military buildup and modernization is the effects of ongoing 

sanctions and the overall weakened state of the Russian economy.278 This resulted in the announcement of a 5 percent reduction in the 2016 modernization budget,279 while debate about 

2017’s cuts ranged between 25 percent to a more modest 5 to 7 percent, depending on how one 

assesses Russian accounting procedures.280 In January 2019, the Defense Ministry announced 

that it planned to spend 1.44 trillion rubles ($21.5 billion) on military procurement in 2019. 

This figure is half of what the government had planned to spend in 2019.281 Unless Russia is able 

to diversify its economy, any military modernization will be hindered in the future.

Relatedly, since the Cold War, the diplomatic ties holding together much of global arms 

development and proliferation have been unraveling. At an impasse over missile defense and 

increased Russian obsession about strategic U.S. global conventional strike capabilities, the 

possibility for a tactical-to-strategic nuclear exchange triggered by an accident or incident is 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

now greater than during the Cold War.282 As mentioned, major nuclear treaties have ended or 

been eroded in recent years. Besides actively working to reduce nuclear arsenals and to moderate the development of new destabilizing weapons, these treaty regimens were also confidencebuilding measures that reduced tensions and enhanced understanding between the United 

States and Soviet Union/Russia. The same could be said for U.S. and Russian (diminished but 

still active) cooperative space programs.

Where is all this headed? The United States and Russia remain at odds both officially and 

in much of the written and spoken media. Russia continues to work to divide Western Allies 

and partners politically, domestically, and economically (principally through energy deliveries). 

Its domestic disinformation machine, modulated directly by the Putin regime, is a good way 

to track the nature of the currently troubled relationship. Tangible lines of stress, confrontation, and even potential cooperation are well demarcated. While Eastern Ukraine simmers in 

Donetsk and Luhansk, further seizing and holding larger tracts of Ukrainian territory would require a large-scale use of conscripts against an improved Ukrainian military that would extract 

high financial and domestic costs. Russia in a short, limited campaign such as an assault to connect to Crimea by land could emerge victorious against Ukraine, but would then be forced to 

confront a large, seething Slavic population, a ruined economy, and a hostile global community. 

Greater Russian pressure on Ukraine will only drive Western upgrades to the Ukrainian military, adding even more modern defensive weapons to Ukraine’s arsenal. Furthermore, Russia 

could see added sanctions by an increasingly resolute West punctuated by its airstrikes in Syria, 

and reinforced by the continued return of U.S. units and capabilities to Europe.

The Russians also know that if they try to destabilize the Baltic states with a variation of 

their hybrid Crimea operation, they will at some point face the invocation of NATO’s Article 

5. The Baltic states could be overrun by Russia in 48 to 72 hours, but the results would be too 

unpredictable for even Putin’s regime to calculate. This would also open a NATO-enabled and 

expensive partisan ulcer on the Baltic periphery that Russia could not afford to maintain over 

time. It would also shake Sweden’s and Finland’s neutrality, bringing the two closer to Russia’s 

Western foes.

As discussed, a Russian intervention in Belarus would not necessarily be successful long 

term and would once again confirm Western doubts about the revisionist nature of the Russian 

regime. An adventure in Transnistria would also bring more trouble than progress for Russia. 

Russia could easily subvert Moldova, but again, to what end? To support any such endeavor, 

Russia would be forced to use its main units in an area bounded by NATO and Ukrainian forces. 

And then there is an angry and increasingly unpredictable Turkey, a strategic nation that, de-
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spite recent unsettling events, is still a NATO Ally with a strong military. Even after its internal 

failed coup and warming relations with Russia, Turkey will always—due to its difficult history, 

geography, and increasingly conservative Sunni religious orientation—present challenges for 

Moscow.

Internal Concerns

Any complete geostrategic discussion about the Russian Federation must address its unpredictable internal characteristics. Domestically, despite a generally supportive population 

that occasionally breaks into patriotic, and more narrowly, nationalistic outbursts, many citizens gradually appear to be losing their patience with the regime. Quite fundamentally, large 

segments of the population, old and young, were outraged by the regime proposal announced 

in June 2018 during the palliative of the World Cup that the retirement age for men would 

be raised from 60 to 65 years old and for women 53 to 60. Recoiling from the intensity of the 

protests, the regime in late August softened its position, announcing that the retirement age for 

women would be revised to 55.283 It had to be unnerving to the regime that according to the 

generally balanced Levada polling service, over 89 percent of the population was somewhat or 

strongly against this declaration and support for the mainstream United Russia party that swept 

Putin to presidential victory plummeted in its wake.284 This “reform” has mutated into a major 

issue for the regime as it strikes at the core of Russian concerns about its low-life expectancy (67 

for men and 77 for women), endemic health issues, and sense for its hard-working people of a 

longstanding “social contract” with the regime.285

Despite a strong effort to manage post-2014 inflation (as of August 2018, the ruble had rebounded by 65 percent from its 2015 low, and unemployment hovers between 4 and 5 percent), 

life is tough for the majority of the Russian populace. As Russia economically muddles through, 

the sanctions seem to bite more as an irritant than as decisively coercive as they looked between 

2014–2016. Russia appears to be exercising its own national “resilience” as workarounds proliferate, including a burgeoning greenhouse agricultural effort, while imports of foodstuffs and 

material seep to Russia through its broad borders from China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and 

sub rosa even from Europe. Nonetheless, there is less of everything than before the Ukraine invasion and much of the gains of the pre-2014 Putin regime have been marginalized or reduced. 

The gray zone conflict in Eastern Ukraine continues to sap Russian will and resources, and even 

the heretofore successful but open-ended mission to prop up the Asad regime in Syria faces 

growing critics. Offsetting this somewhat for the near term is a renewed sense of Russian pride, 

viability, and ascendency best manifested by the popular support for the banned Russian squad 
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in the South Korean Winter Olympics and highly successful summer 2018 World Cup held in 

12 cities throughout western Russia that garnered it favorable reviews from the hundreds of 

thousands of international tourists that attended this massive event.

Undoubtedly, since Putin’s ascent to power in 2000 in the rubbled wake of the post-Soviet 

Yeltsin years, the Russian economy, fueled by high oil prices and a sturdier leadership helm, 

has made significant gains. In 2000, Russia was essentially bankrupt.286 From 2000 to 2008, real 

incomes in Russia rose by 250 percent and real wages tripled, while poverty and unemployment 

rates dropped by 50 percent.287 Despite beginning the difficult road to economic recovery, the 

policies that enabled this growth have been met with sporadic discontent, as they allowed for a 

new wave of oligarchs and moneyed interests to gain great political influence and wealth.288 It is 

no secret that Russia has among the highest number of billionaires by country in the world.289

Russian economic policy has been further scrutinized in the face of crippling sanctions, 

as they have affected a majority of the country. Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the 

ruble lost 20 percent in value against the U.S. dollar by August of 2016, after losing 44 percent 

against it in 2015.290 One response to sanctions was to ban EU food products; this has hiked the 

cost of food in Russia considerably,291 as goods like produce are scarcely developed and native to 

Russia, creating a shortage. GDP per capita dropped from $15,500 in 2013 to $9,000 in 2017.292

Economic growth decreased by 3.7 percent in 2015.293

In good news for Russia, the International Monetary Fund projected that the economy 

will grow between 1.5 and 1.8 percent from 2018 to 2020,294 with the World Bank framing 

Russia as now having a moderate recovery.295 How this growth will respond to challenges, like 

continuously high poverty and unemployment rates, remains to be seen. So far, it has not been 

enough to stem rising discontent over how the Putin regime has handled itself. Protests ignited on March 28 and June 12, 2017, inspired by dissident Alexei Navalny’s exposing the gross 

corruption—the Achilles’ Heel—of the Russian regime via YouTube and the Internet. Demonstrators—while lower in number than in 2017—hit the street in April 2018 protesting Putin’s 

new 6-year presidential term.296 Corruption appears to have struck a sensitive chord among an 

otherwise supportive younger Russian populace, many of whom may viscerally revere their 

president, but are emotively angered by the displays of corruption by regime members and 

the moneyed elite.297 They again protested in the thousands when the state attempted to force 

the popular Internet messaging app Telegram to give Russian security services access to normally encrypted private conversations. While seeking to deny access to Telegram, the state also 

blocked millions of IP addresses. In the ensuing drama, many Russians turned to proxies and 

virtual private networks to work around the ban, highlighting how Internet-connected much of 
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Russia is, and the sensitivity of its population, especially youth, with the regime interfering with 

their internet access and privacy.298

Moreover, the current Russian millennials have not been able to benefit from the “get rich 

quick” opportunities of the “anything goes 1990s” and the early post-2000 phases of Putin’s oilfueled prosperity in which a new class of oligarchs and moneyed interests were created. In contrast to the political and financial successes of the oligarchs, the youth unemployment rate was at 

15.48 percent in 2016.299 Managing Russia’s youth expectations is potentially very dangerous for 

a Russian regime that builds its narrative on patriotism and Russianness—after all, as one narrative goes, how can a Russian leader or financier be both a true patriot and egregiously corrupt?

These fundamental domestic concerns increased in severity in the runup to the March 

2018 Russian presidential election. In December of 2017, Russia’s Central Election Commission 

moved to prevent Navalny from registering as a candidate, citing his controversial corruption 

convictions that many believe were fabricated by the regime.300 During 2017, Navalny was arrested three times, moves that buttressed the legal framework to prevent his candidacy from 

moving forward.301 Putin soon after announced his run for reelection as an independent,302

instead of as a member of the United Russia or the People’s Front parties, in order to market 

himself as a candidate for all Russians.303 This was likely a move to consolidate his grip on power, 

even though as of June 2017 he maintained an 87 percent rating on his handling of foreign affairs.304 Putin’s reelection in 2018 was likely seen by the regime as a mandate to continue pursuing his foreign policy agenda in Ukraine, Syria, and other primarily—but not exclusively—FSU 

states and conflicts.

The corruption issues have abated somewhat since Putin’s resounding reelection, primarily because the regime with the World Cup successfully redirected the population’s focus from 

media-accentuated ire stemming from the rapid succession of difficult foreign policy setbacks, 

ranging notably from the Olympic ban, Wagner contractor fiasco, fallout from the Skripal poisoning, and allied air strikes in Syria—as well as increased sanctions that Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov exclaimed as “Genocide by Sanctions” in the beginning of 2018.305

With the 66-year-old Putin’s reelection in March 2018 for another 6-year term to 2024, this 

could be his last term in office, although, as in 2012, the succession rules could be rewritten for 

yet another 6-year-term to 2030. He is likely already planning what his role and life will look like 

after his career ends, as well as the legacy that he seeks to leave behind. For example, where will 

he safely retire? How? Under what circumstances? How will he protect his considerable financial 

assets from scrutiny if an opposition candidate comes to power? While hazardous to speculate, 

one option could be that he creates a new role for himself where he still maintains a degree of 
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influence on politics. He already appears to be managing the influence of rising political stars 

within and without the Kremlin, who will begin to wrestle for Putin’s seat.306 For example, two 

names on opposite poles of the political spectrum, Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu and Ksenia Sobchak, daughter of Anatoly Sobchak, the former St. Petersburg mayor who was an early 

patron of Putin, are mentioned as possible heirs apparent; however, the field is unformed and 

opaque, just as it was in 2000 when few anticipated Putin’s ascendency to president. Notably, 

while there are numerous possible candidates well left of Putin who desire reform, dangerously 

there will likely be those far right who are more reactionary and therefore could be even more 

dangerous than the difficult but sane Putin who is, after almost two decades, “the devil we know.”

The lack of clarity regarding what Russia will look like after Putin only shows the danger of 

having one person control a political environment for so long; the battle for succession will likely be ugly and fraught with uncertainty and byzantine power struggles. Unless dramatic changes 

occur, a credible, regulated democratic process will likely not play a large role in choosing the 

next successor. All this will have major consequences for Russia generationally, complicating 

any optimistic assessment out to 2040–2050. 

The Renewed Foundational Role of Religion

Religion in Russia, especially the renewed role of the Russian Orthodox Church, has become a central social aspect of the post-Soviet era. As such, addressing its role in contemporary 

Russia is essential. It is important to note that religion in Russia, along with Russia’s increasingly 

polyglot population, is surprisingly inclusive, unless faiths are excessively proselytizing or express positions inimical to the regime. For example, Islam in Russia, still largely secular despite 

a dangerous and growing Sunni radical fringe, remains a political target of the Putin regime.

Beginning with the 1917 revolution, religion was heavily suppressed, though it discreetly 

flickered in many Soviet homes and makeshift houses of worship across the vast empire. Institutions such as the Orthodox Church were forced underground or into exile. The one exception to 

this was when Josef Stalin permitted worship services to be resurrected as part of the patriotic 

core of Mother Russia during the Great Patriotic War.307 After the Cold War, the role of religion 

significantly shifted. Putin has come to accept the Orthodox Church as a legitimate organization, likely in no small part because it benefits him politically to do so.308

Putin assuredly recognizes that even though religion was banned during the Soviet Union 

era, many Russians in their homes and a few select churches still discreetly practiced their religion, as one author personally observed in 1989 Kalinin.309 The Orthodox Church today is seen 

by most as a trusted institution within Russia and an upholder of morals and traditional values 
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that increasingly run counter to much of Western-promulgated liberal democratic expression, 

and it has been picked up by several increasingly “illiberal” democratic states in Eastern Europe.310 As a result, Putin, likely increasingly a believer himself, allies himself with Orthodox 

leadership and attends important religious services in order to further legitimize his rule. This 

has helped him institute more socially conservative domestic policy and consolidate his position as a near Czar-like figurehead of Russia.

With his support, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu has built a robust military chaplain 

corps that deploys with Russian troops.311 Putin likely believes that if he is seen close to Orthodox leadership, he can maintain a higher approval rating, especially in the face of controversial 

policies. While the church is currently rock solid in the people’s esteem and core, in the long 

term the church could lose significant legitimacy if the recent wave of anti-corruption protests 

gains traction against it due to its reported excesses.312 The church will, however, continue to be 

a societal bastion for ethnic Russians in the FSU and southern Russia, particularly if the overall 

demographic inevitably tilts even more heavily to the burgeoning and increasingly less secular 

Muslim minority. 

Notably, the Russian Orthodox Church has come under recent difficulty in Ukraine. Incendiary to Putin was the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I's, approval 

of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s request for autocephaly (independence) from the Russian 

Orthodox Church in October of 2018. In January 2019, this separation became official. Ukrainian churches have had to choose to either associate with the Kiev Patriarchate or Moscow 

Patriarchate, the latter of which severed ties with Istanbul after autocephaly was approved. For 

Ukraine, the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church furthers its independence from 

Russia.313 Yet for Russia, this is concerning. If such a powerful institution like the Russian Orthodox Church is unable to maintain influence over what the government views as ethnic Russians in Ukraine, the possibility increases that in the future the Russian government will not be 

able to use traditional institutions to maintain its popularity and support.

Religiosity in Russia is expanding outside the purview of the Orthodox Church. While 

statistics are unreliable, estimates of the Russian Orthodox population reveal approximately 15 

to 20 percent are true believers and worshipers, with up to 75 percent overall associating themselves with the church. Muslims account for an estimated 8 percent of the population, of which 

over 90 percent are Sunni.314 Putin and his regime consider increasing Muslim self-identification and rapid demographic growth to be threats to his consolidation on power and, more worrisome, the long-term survival of Russia.315 Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia has cracked 

down on the approximate 300,000 to 450,000 Tatars remaining in the region, and authorities are 
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attempting to shut down the Tatar Mejlis, a legislative body that seeks to gain rights this sizable 

minority.316 Senior figures have been arrested by Russian authorities, and mosques across the 

region are under surveillance.317

In Chechnya, the hard-headed Russian proxy and Muslim Ramzan Kadyrov continues to 

be accused of human rights abuses and practicing his own brand of “traditional values” Chechen style.318 Russian concerns regarding IS recruitment and Chechen insurgency have given 

Kadyrov and his security team carte blanche to conduct local counterinsurgency operations.319

With insurgencies currently in stasis, the traditionally fiercely independent violence-prone 

Caucasus societies such as Chechnya and Dagestan are risk-prone considering their growing 

Muslim demographics, youth bulge, and poor living conditions. Coupled with likely disgruntled returning jihadists from Iraq and Syria, this will likely create major future problems for 

Russian stability. It is likely that any IS recruitment and insurgencies will only be strengthened 

by poorly managed federal crackdowns that also focus on the soft power, quality-of-life issues 

within these seemingly intractable Caucasus mountain regions.

Strategic Deception and the Gray Zone

It is evident that the Russians, as the Soviets before them, are acutely aware of their material, societal, and geographical contradictions and vulnerabilities. Enabled by new age cyber 

technologies and a relentless 24/7 media cycle, Russia has learned to somewhat mitigate its 

perceived vulnerabilities by leveraging these new age characteristics into a “Strategic Front” of 

disinformation and deception that in peacetime erode and corrode the resolve and confidence 

of its potential adversaries in a way that modern open societies find difficult to respond to.

Therefore, the use of disruptive, nonattributable, cyber-enabled gray zone tactics will be 

limited only by imagination and capability.320 An intent to societally disrupt perceived foes and 

competitors has been proved. In the contemporary information environment, only coordinated 

and creatively specific defensive measures with a major society-wide emphasis on education 

starting with young students can be effective inoculating tools within this informational ecosystem.

The disinformation onslaught on primarily Western institutions by Russia and other 

threats is particularly effective because they rely on a degree of ambiguity to avoid international approbation and likely economic punishment, or worse, a military response from their 

opponents. If international law has not clearly been violated, it is harder for the international 

community itself to craft a legitimate and legal response to action. In Ukraine, this looked like 

sending “little green men” into Crimea instead of the overt Russian military, giving Russia plau-
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sible deniability.321 Outside of covert military campaigns, Russia relies on disinformation to 

disrupt the flow of information to individuals around the world. Disinformation is not a new 

concept for Russia—the Soviet Union used similar methods conceptually to combat ideological 

challenges from the outside world; it is just that enabling technologies and “delivery systems” 

are different today.322 What used to be “whispering campaigns” that moved gossip, rumors, and 

the era’s “fake news” in days, weeks, and months are delivered today in just seconds, minutes, or 

hours, making swift defense and mitigation extraordinarily difficult. The government controls 

its media arms and spins a pro-Russian narrative that is difficult to counteract domestically, and 

no real alternative exists. Despite state measures such as restraining the Telegram messaging 

app, the Russian Internet is still connected via creative workarounds to the greater world.323

Such tactics have leveraged cyber warfare as a key and versatile weapons system capable of 

disrupting military operations while also striking deep into the heart of a nation’s body politic. 

As part of Russia’s belief that there exists a gray zone of a constant state of conflict and siege in 

traditional peacetime, it assumes that all powerful countries are developing cyber capabilities to 

wreak havoc on their foes.324 Over the past few years, Russia has worked to recruit elite computer scientists and hackers to create the cyber infrastructure necessary to affect NATO Allies and 

partners in particular.325 Attacks against these countries have been attributed to Russian military 

and intelligence services or to groups believed to be sponsored by the former. In perhaps what 

could be considered the operational dawn of nonattributed state-directed cyberattacks, Estonia 

in 2007 suffered a wave of attacks that severed its international Internet communications and 

targeted the Web sites of the Estonian Parliament, banks, and political parties, among others,326

paralyzing many for at least 24 hours. Similar entities in Georgia were targeted in 2008 during 

the Russo-Georgian conflict.327 Ukraine has been the target of attacks since 2013, as hackers 

target critical Ukrainian infrastructure, including its power grid in 2015.328 More recently, the 

United States had its own rude shock and resultant “wake up” as the target of such meddling by 

Russian hackers during the 2016 Presidential election.

With social media and the 24-hour news cycle, cross-border disinformation campaigns 

have become even more prevalent transnationally, as well as more difficult to detect and counter. 

How this will look in the next generation with the operationalization of artificial intelligence and 

other quantum technologies not yet foreseen or invented is arguably our new arms race. These 

emergent—and emerging—technologies must be arrested now by credible “arms control” style 

mechanisms that control the most “lethal” of state-sponsored capabilities and levy punitive international measures for noncompliance on whatever is internationally agreed upon. Meanwhile, a 
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strong, focused U.S. and allied cyber deterrent must be further developed to make clear that this 

is not a domain our foes would want to engage us within.

Still, 2 years after the 2016 U.S. election, social media companies are revealing the extent of 

Russia’s presence in election-related material and developing strategies to prevent interference 

in the future upcoming American elections. In addition to U.S. sanctions, other countries are 

taking steps against Russia. France and Great Britain successfully lobbied Facebook to disable 

thousands of fake accounts used to influence voters.329 The German cabinet enacted legislation 

to impose up to multimillion-dollar fines on social media companies that fail to remove “hate 

speech.”330 If Russia does not curtail its activity in this arena, the international response will only 

intensify and unify in a manner that will further stress Russia.

While discussing the gray zone disinformation continuum between war and peace, we 

must never lose sight of the aforementioned possibility of a full-throated preemptive cyber 

“Pearl Harbor” style first strike proceeding multispectrum surprise military operations if tensions rise to preconflict levels. All the work in the societal gray zone leading up to any such 

strike would be intended to soften, weaken, and confuse resolve, while a full attack would be 

aimed to drastically blind, cripple, and paralyze any cogent initial phase defense while making 

effective political and military command and control decisions, including marshalling consensus for swift response, extremely difficult.331

The United States and Russia

Despite initial Russian optimism regarding a budding friendship or partnership between 

Presidents Trump and Putin, as confirmed before the July 2018 summit, the American public 

sees Russia quite negatively. In February of 2017, 70 percent of Americans viewed Russia either 

very or mostly unfavorably.332 In turn, as of August 2017, just 29 percent of Russians view the 

United States favorably.333 As of March 2018, Putin’s favorability in the United States, never high, 

was at 16 percent.334 In contrast, as of August 2017, Trump’s popularity in Russia was at 53 percent, though it has dipped since then.335 The investigation on Russian interference in the 2016 

Presidential election carries on, much to the chagrin of Putin and the Trump administration; 

the latter finds it difficult to transition away from the focus of the investigation to any steady 

policy agenda.

In August 2017, President Trump signed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act. Along with a stiff increase in sanctions, this bill limited how much Americans can 

invest in Russian energy companies. After Congress passed the bill, but before Trump had signed 

it, Russia responded preemptively by forcing the United States to reduce the level of staff at the 
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U.S. Embassy and consulates in Russia as part of an apparent retaliation for the December 2016 

Obama administration expulsion of 35 Russian diplomats in Washington, DC, and the closure of 

two related facilities. The Kremlin also blocked access to two U.S. facilities in Russia—a country 

house and a Moscow warehouse.336 Adding fuel to the diplomatic fire was the coordinated Western response after the March 2018 Skripal poisoning in Salisbury that led to another round of 

more individually targeted sanctions and, in March 2018, the tit-for-tat expulsion of 60 Russian 

and 60 American diplomats and the reciprocal closure of both the Russian consulate in Seattle 

and U.S. consulate in St. Petersburg.337 In an ongoing investigation, in June 2018, two more individuals in the United Kingdom were poisoned with the same Russian-designed Novichok agent 

as the Skripals, with one ultimately succumbing to the poison.338

Relations became even more strained after the Syrian regime’s likely chemical strike in 

Douma on April 4, 2018, resulting in retaliatory U.S., French, and British airstrikes against Russia’s ally. This kinetic back and forth will likely continue to hamper any substantial collaboration 

in the short term even in the face of mutual concerns like Syria. Additionally, the contentious 

withdrawal by the Trump administration from the Iran nuclear deal—an initiative that Russia 

signed along with China and U.S. allies France, the United Kingdom, and Germany in 2015—

has added regional fuel to the fire. The most notable actions were after Iranian provocation—the 

major May 2018 Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nodes in southern Syria risking direct IranianIsraeli military confrontation on Syrian soil where the Russian military and its proxies are currently operating.339 Any further cooperation regarding Syria beyond the current U.S.-Russian 

military deconfliction network already in place is still to be determined in the aftermath of the 

controversial Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki, where Syria was apparently discussed.

Encouraging, however, during this tense, frayed period was that again in December 2018 

NATO commander, U.S. General Curtis Scaparrotti, USA, met for the second time with Russian 

Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov in Baku, Azerbaijan, for mutually frank 

talks.340 General Dunford has also met Gerasimov four times for direct, candid talks, most recently in Vienna on March 4, 2019.

Policy Recommendations for Consideration

In spite of all the well-advertised operations and declarations, Russia is in a strategic bind. 

If it continues to use military force as a preferred policy tool to exert its influence and change 

the status quo in the name of protecting ethnic Russian populations and maintaining unwilling buffer states, it will likely fail as a nation. The increasingly unpopular and bloody strife in 

Eastern Ukraine—essentially akin to a society weakening “Northern Ireland on steroids”—will 
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limp along in an increasingly expensive and frozen status.341 Syria, despite battlefield victories, 

remains a public relations and moral challenge internationally and will continue to be difficult 

and expensive for Russia due to its unpredictability and volatility. Russians are growing weary 

of war and desire Putin focus more internally on economic growth especially oriented toward 

Asia. In order to manage its interests worldwide, Russia will have to rely on international cooperation in conflicts like Syria, and ultimately building credible ties with the United States and 

its EU/NATO partners.

To navigate the complex relationship between Russia and the United States, we offer the 

following recommendations for consideration by U.S. policymakers:

■ Pursue a pragmatic dual-track policy regarding the Russian Federation. First, push 

back hard on transgressions against NATO Allies and partners and breaches of international law. Second, rebuild direct, cogent conduits between high-level governmental and 

bipartisan political entities—including key U.S. and Russian civilian, defense, and operational military leadership—to increase understanding on issues, activities, and incidents 

that could reduce the dangerous trust deficit between our nuclear-tipped nations.

■ Continue to firmly support and reassure Allies and partners by working closely with 

NATO framework nations such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to maintain and enhance NATO and EU cooperation and cohesion. Work to shore up shaken 

allied confidence in U.S. foreign policy. In the same vein, maintain strong relations and 

assurance with non-NATO global allies such as Japan, South Korea, Israel, and Australia.

■ Continue to reinforce Europe militarily. Position defensive forces in Central and Eastern European countries that feel threatened by Russia. Do not emplace major additional 

forces east of the Vistula River or Baltic States unless further Russian military actions 

drive this necessity. With allied and host-nation approval, return a full U.S. division headquarters with enablers to Germany with a forward command post in western Poland. 

Additionally, place a U.S. corps forward-liaison and planning element, collocated with a 

NATO headquarters in Central or Western Europe, that is designated to a specific corps 

in the continental United States. Regularly stress these entities with enhanced rotational exercises and deployments. Add a U.S.-flagged combat engineer company to each of 

the three composite NATO battalions in the Baltic states. Bring more tactical aviation 

and naval capability into the European theater. Continue to frequently stage units from 
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the United States to participate in clearly defensive exercises within NATO, including its 

southeastern tier with member Balkan and Black Sea nations. Ensure all forward-based 

ground units have a short-range air defense capability. Deter, remove, or mitigate any viable early stage offensive military option from the Russian strategic calculus.

■ Buttress nuclear deterrence and assurance. Rebuild eroded U.S.-Russia arms control 

and confidence-building regimens. This was possibly the key potential “actionable” item 

that came out of the July 2018 Trump-Putin summit. INF, however, will fully expire in 

August 2019 if resolution is not reached concerning suspected Russian treaty violations. 

Unless Russia remains intransigent, work to save the INF and modify it to prevent it from 

totally failing, thereby preventing the reintroduction of an entire class of destabilizing 

medium-range nuclear weapons. Consider bringing in China, though it would be highly 

unlikely they would assent. Reinforce the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 

START) and its provisos to limit strategic nuclear weapons so it survives past 2021. Update the Treaty on Open Skies to include verification procedures that are clear to all parties. Formally address and codify in focused fora key aspects and concerns about strategic 

stability, especially the threat posed by long-range precision conventional weapons and 

potentially a new generation of weapons including hypersonic and nuclear-powered missiles. Patiently and transparently chisel away at missile defense concerns.

■ Team together to limit nuclear proliferation as attempted by North Korea and Iran. 

With its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the United States must reaffirm its commitment to diplomatically working with its allies—Russia and China—to ensure a nuclear-free Iran and North Korea. Do not withdraw forces from South Korea. The current 

high-level diplomacy between President Trump and Kim Jung-un will be central in determining the course of overall global nuclear weapons proliferation.

■ Improve strategic messaging. Aggressively counter Russian narratives seeking to justify 

actions or divide Western opinion in a more responsive and coordinated manner. Agree 

to exchange observers for major exercises.

■ Rediscover and “de-demonize” one another. With limited and sporadic official, political, military, and societal interaction since 2014, both societies have dangerously hardened 

toward one another. Carefully, mechanisms—such as bipartisan congressional delegations 
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and Russia’s State Assembly interaction and senior and operational leader linkages globally—must be restored. Few to none of most U.S. or Russian defense establishments have 

had counterparts in place since 2014. An entire demystifying and confidence-building 

network of U.S. and Russian interlocutors must be rebuilt.

■ Offer exchanging modest observer missions among Russia-controlled CSTO, Chinaled SCO, and NATO.

■ Continue to work with European allies on ways to provide clearly defensive armaments 

to threatened partner states, as the Javelin antitank missile was provided to Ukraine in 

2018.342 In tandem with such, establish direct conduits with Russian political and military leaders to unambiguously explain that if NATO Allies and partners are not attacked, 

Russian equipment will not be knocked out. Ensure that this message reaches the Russian public.

■ Continue to communicate to Russian officials why a strong NATO is important for 

Russia. Make clear in every venue that Russian attempts to erode and undermine peaceful 

Western stability-focused institutions, such as the EU or NATO, will, in the long term, 

only end badly for a fundamentally vulnerable Russia that risks being engulfed by looming generational threats from the south and east. Russia, therefore, should not also want 

an unstable, anxious, and possibly reactionary Europe to its west.

■ Enhance full-spectrum cyber capabilities for deterrence. Emphasize to other cyber nations that the United States will aggressively respond with the full range of possible options to proven state-sponsored cyber attacks. Collectively avoid at all costs opening a 

state-sponsored cyber “Pandora’s Box” while at the same time be ready with a strong cyber 

response capability for any scenario that Russia or any other cyber-capable state or entity 

envisions and actively prepares for.

■ Maintain sanctions and political marginalization until Russian offensive cyber, gray 

zone disinformation, political destabilization efforts, and nonattributed military activities 

deescalate and cease in Ukraine and other “stressed” nations. Review “offramps” in certain 

sectors for sanctions and other measures if malign Russian activities verifiably relent.
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■ Build redundant political and military conduits and offramps globally, including between global U.S. combatant commands and Eurasia-wide Russian military districts, to 

ensure both countries have rapid regional conduits that could swiftly mitigate incidents 

and crises before inadvertently falling into strategic brinksmanship.

■ Coordinate U.S. national and theater policy and activities to ensure that they do not 

inadvertently drive China and Russia—not traditional allies—into a transactional and 

temporal military pact.

■ Work with the Russians, our coalition, and regional partners to ensure that the Iranians 

do not become more militantly expansionist in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Arabian 

Peninsula while also enabling international terror.

■ Dialog frankly and directly with the Russians about their long-term designs and concerns regarding Afghanistan. Other than disrupting U.S. and coalition efforts, what are 

the core reasons for their liaison with the Taliban? Do they really want us out of that troubled land? What would come next, and are they—and China—generationally prepared for 

such, including the possible destabilization of Central Asia and the even more dangerous 

Indo-Pakistan relations?

■ Despite current tensions, strive to deepen the fledgling cooperative arrangements—

mostly operations and crisis deconfliction—between Russia and the United States—in 

Syria. As a confidence-building and practical next step, consider collocating U.S. and Russian military personnel, working shoulder to shoulder 24/7, at an agreed-upon location in 

the region to deconflict and, when politically feasible, coordinate operations. The bloody 

lesson learned on February 7, 2018, by the overly aggressive Russian Wagner contractors 

in Syria should be a cautionary note to all. Both nations have long-term interests there 

that converge more than diverge.

■ Remember Bosnia in the 1990s. Strive to build a strong, enabled, and inclusive regional 

peace solution for Syria with the same focus and determination as occurred with the 1995 

Dayton Accords in Bosnia.343

■ Reinforce the U.S. role in a flawed and frustrating United Nations. As a major donor, 

continue to push for internal UN reform. Press Russia and China to promulgate and sup-
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port positive UN international actions including joint peacekeeping operations in areas 

of mutual concern.

■ The United States and Russia should maintain their generally constructive bilateral cooperation in the High North, especially via the U.S. Coast Guard and its counterpart in 

the FSB, the Coast Guard of the Border Service.344 Use the Arctic, where interests should 

be clear, as a platform for cooperation. Work to curtail added militarization of the High 

North that adds to tensions and saps resources from Arctic nations with more pressing 

concerns elsewhere. Fund as a priority the six Polar-class icebreakers that the Coast Guard 

requires for is Arctic and Antarctic missions.345

■ Strive to maintain strong links with the Turkish military during this period of strained 

political relations.

■ Carefully build nascent links as pressure-relenting conduits between U.S. and Russian 

veteran organizations that, while having different worldviews, share common challenges.

■ Reiterating the first point: Rebuild atrophied personal links and conduits between key 

Western and Russian political and military leaders, despite inevitable disagreements and 

disinformation. Seek areas where mutual interests converge and develop initiatives that 

build closer cooperation and trust. Establish a network of crisis “first responders” on both 

sides that could rapidly intervene at the regional level in the event of a fast-breaking accident or incident.

Conclusion

This broad survey attempts to address from a global perspective the staggering and expensive amount of activities and challenges internally, regionally, and internationally that geographically vulnerable Russia is currently contending with across its vulnerably vast, demographically challenged nation.346

Looking out a generation to 2040–2050, any status quo remains ominous for Russia as 

current demographic, economic, political, and security trends play out. It is our opinion that 

Russia will fail in its current construct if it persists in a state of constant confrontation with the 

United States and the West. Mending this relationship offers the only viable long-term course 

for a coherent social and economic future. The West has a hand in this as well. While Alexander 

Dugin writes of Russia’s Eurasian destiny, geostrategically, Russia east of the Urals will likely 
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face increasingly seething borders to its south and, at best, nervously subordinate relations with 

resource rapacious and vastly populated China.347

All of Russia’s long-term vital signs are trending negatively into the next generation. What 

comes next? If the United States and Russia, despite their huge trust deficit, focus on shared core 

interests, with a reasonable appreciation for the concerns and interests of each other, a stable 

relationship could be regained. Despite the cynical, disruptive Russian assault on the American 

body politic during the 2016 American Presidential campaign, a fresh, pragmatic reexamination of just a few of the mutually worrisome issues that divide the two countries could be a 

much-needed catalyst to jumpstart this process and better demystify and “de-demonize” each 

other. Arms control, the Arctic, and improved counterterrorism cooperation come to mind. 

Not to attempt such measures only puts both nuclear-tipped nations and attendant allies onto 

an even more dangerous course toward near inevitable conflict. Without such, there is also a 

clear danger that Putin’s conflation of Russia’s interests with those of his regime may drive him 

to more and greater military-backed adventurism.

Continued Russian military use of force as an increasingly preferred policy tool of choice 

in the face of inexorable economic decline will raise the chances of open conflict with the 

West—an outcome that for all sides would represent a policy and strategy failure of the first 

order. Managing this risk must rest unswervingly at the very top of Washington’s foreign policy and national security agenda. This task requires equal doses of firmness and pragmatism; 

U.S. alliances and partnerships must be stoutly upheld, while Russia’s core concerns—but not 

spheres—about its periphery and insistence on recognition of its great power status should be 

acknowledged. Over time, rapprochement and economic reintegration with the West represent 

Russia’s best option. Without such pragmatism, the future generation of the Russian state, and 

therefore the stability of the international order and the entire world writ large, will be at peril.
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Notes 1 Stephen Pifer, “The Trump-Putin Summit Produces Little; What Can Come Next?” 

Brookings Institute blog, July 18, 2018, available at <www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/18/the-trump-putin-summit-produces-little-what-can-come-next/>.

2 “U.S. to Withdraw from Missile Treaty in 60 days Unless Russia Reverses Course, Pompeo 

Says,” CNN, December 4, 2018, available at <www.cnn.com/2018/12/04/politics/pompeo-us-russiainf-withdrawal/index.html>.

3Richard Galpin, “MH-17 Missile ‘Came from Russia’; Dutch-Led Investigators Say,” BBC, 

September 28, 2016, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37495067>.

4 “Collective Defence—Article 5,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 12, 2018, available at <www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_110496.htm>.

5 E.L., “The Economist Explains: Why the Oil Price Is Falling,” The Economist, December 8, 

2014, available at <www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/12/economist-explains-4>.

6 Michael Birnbaum, “Ruble Stabilizes in Russian Crisis, but Putin and Kremlin Remain at 

Risk,” Washington Post, December 17, 2014, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/rubleswings-against-dollar-putting-pressure-on-russias-putin/2014/12/17/f8328bd8-8578-11e4-abcf-5a3d7b3b20b8_story.html>.

7 Howard Amos, “Russian Protests, December 10 as It Happened,” Telegraph (London), December 10, 2011, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8976814/Russianprotests-live.html>. 

8 David Herzenhorn, “Ukraine Says It Captured Two Russian Soldiers,” New York Times, May 

18, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/world/europe/ukraine-captured-two-russiansoldiers.html?_r=0>.

9 Anna Borshchevskaya, How Russia Views the Iran Nuclear Talks, Policywatch 2383 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, March 12, 2015), available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/

policy-analysis/view/how-russia-views-the-iran-nuclear-talks>.

10 Gordon G. Chang, “China and Russia, Axis of Weak States,” World Affairs, March/April 

2014, available at <www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china-and-russia-axis-weak-states>.

11 Tom Kutsch, “The Risks of Russia’s Intervention in Syria,” al Jazeera, October 2, 2015, 

available at <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/2/the-risks-of-russias-intervention-in-syria.

html>.

12 Jonathan Marcus, “Russia S-400 Syria Missile,” BBC, December 1, 2015, available at 

<www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34976537>.

13 Mike Eckel, “Russia’s Shock and Awe,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 7, 2015, 

available at <www.rferl.org/content/russia-syria-shock-awe-military-air-strikes-information-warfare/27293854.html>.

14 “Russia to Send Its Aircraft Carrier to Eastern Mediterranean,” Associated Press, September 

21, 2016, available at <www.foxnews.com/world/2016/09/21/russia-to-send-its-aircraft-carrier-toeastern-mediterranean.html>.

15 Alec Luhn, “Vladimir Putin Announces Russian Withdrawal from Syria during Visit to 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

Airbase,” Telegraph (London), December 2017, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/11/

vladimir-putin-announces-russian-withdrawal-syria-visit-airbase/>.

16 Erin Cunningham and Louisa Loveluck, “Russia Strikes Back as Syrian Rebels Take Credit 

for Shooting Down Fighter Jet, Killing Pilot,” Washington Post, February 3, 2018, available at <www.

washingtonpost.com/world/russian-pilot-killed-after-jet-is-downed-by-syrian-rebels/2018/02/03/

a91e6ec8-08fa-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html>.

17 Ilker Girit, “Two Russian Pilots Killed In Mortar Attack on Russian Base,” Anadolu 

Agency, January 4, 2018, available at <http://aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/2-russian-pilots-killed-inmortar-attack-on-syria-base/1022210>.

18 “U.S. Dollar to Russian Ruble Spot Exchange Rates for 2013,” PoundSterlingLive.com, 

2018, available at <www.poundsterlinglive.com/bank-of-england-spot/historical-spot-exchange-rates/

usd/USD-to-RUB-2013>.

19 “Crude Oil Prices: 70-year Historical Chart,” MacroTrends.net, 2019, available at <www.

macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart>.

20 Natalia Antonova, “Why Russia Fears Ukraine,” The Moscow Times, August 28, 2014, 

available at <www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/why-russia-fears-ukraine/506072.html>.

21 Hannah VanHoose, “Understanding the Russian Response to the Intervention in Libya,” 

Center for American Progress, April 12, 2011, available at <www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2011/04/12/9529/understanding-the-russian-response-to-the-intervention-in-libya/>.

22 Andrew Osborne, “Vladimir Putin Lashes Out at America for Killing Khaddafi and Backing 

Protests,” Telegraph (London), December 15, 2011, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8958475/Vladimir-Putin-lashes-out-at-America-for-killing-Gaddafi-and-backingprotests.html>.

23 Janet Reitman, “Putin Clamps Down: A Chilling Report from Moscow,” Rolling Stone, 

April 30, 2014, available at <www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/putin-clamps-down-a-chillingreport-from-moscow-20140430>.

24 Michael Crowley, “Why Putin Hates Hillary,” Politico.com, July 25, 2016, available at 

<www.politico.com/story/2016/07/clinton-putin-226153>.

25 Andrei Korybko, “Hybrid Warfare and U.S. Geostrategy,” GlobalResearch.ca, October 

16, 2016, available at <www.globalresearch.ca/hybrid-warfare-and-us-geostrategy/5551303>; David 

Herszenhorn and Ellen Barry, “Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest over Vote,” New York Times, 

December 8, 2012, available at <www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/europe/putin-accuses-clintonof-instigating-russian-protests.html>.

26 Peggy McNerny, “Putin Regime Unable to Change Course,” UCLA International Institute, 

March 16, 2015, available at <www.international.ucla.edu/Institute/Article/151035>.

27Charles Clover, “The Unlikely Origins of Russian Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 

2016, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/27/geopolitics-russia-mackinder-eurasia-heartland-dugin-ukraine-eurasianism-manifest-destiny-putin/>.

28 Ibid.

29Reid Standish, “Putin’s Eurasian Dream Is over Before It Began,” Foreign Policy, January 6, 

2015, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/putins-eurasian-dream-is-over-before-it-began/>.
71

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

30Catherine Putz, “Remember the Eurasian Economic Union?” The Diplomat, January 13, 

2018, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/remember-the-eurasian-economic-union/>.

31 “Russia,” NationsEncyclopedia.com, available at <www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Russia.html>.

32 Joseph Chamie and Barry Mirkin, “Russian Demographics: The Perfect Storm,” Yale Global 

Online, December 11, 2014, available at <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/russian-demographicsperfect-storm>.

33 Kurt Hepler, “Russia’s Far East, Future Opportunities and Challenges,” The Kennan 

Institute of the Wilson Center, October 11, 2015, available at <www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/therussian-far-east-future-opportunities-and-challenges-to-russias-window-the-pacific>.

34 “Russia Population 2016,” WorldPopulationReview.com, September 27, 2018, available at 

<http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/russia-population/>.

35 “Brain Drain is Sapping Russia of Its Talent,” Stratfor.com, June 30, 2016, available at 

<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/brain-drain-sapping-russia-its-talent>.

36 “Russia Population 2016.”

37 Ibid.

38 M. Zuhdi Jasser, “Russia Should Embrace Its Religious Diversity,” The Moscow Times, 

July 26, 2015, available at <www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/,article/russia-should-embrace-itsreligious-diversity-op-ed/526235.html>.

39 Deborah Gordon, “Opportunities and Challenges Facing Russian Oil,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 28, 2013, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/28/

opportunities-and-challenges-confronting-russian-oil/#>.

40 Jacob Shapiro, “An Oil Price Increase Is Not Enough for Russia,” GeopoliticalFutures.com, 

January 18, 2018, available at <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/oil-price-increase-not-enough-russia/>.

41 Elena Mazneva et al., “OPEC, Russia Signal Global Oil Alliance May Endure Past 2018,” 

Bloomberg, January 21, 2018, available at <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-21/saudi-oilminister-says-opec-allies-should-cooperate-past-2018>.

42 David Francis, “The Race for Arctic Oil: Russia vs. U.S.,” The Week, February 27, 2014, 

available at <http://theweek.com/articles/450318/race-arctic-oil-russia-vs>.

43 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Russia, the Sick Man of Europe,” The Public Interest 37 (Winter 

2005), 3–20, available at <www.nationalaffairs.com/storage/app/uploads/public/58e/1a5/07e/58e1a507

eb0a7457327949.pdf>.

44Chaney Kalinich, “Russia: The Sickness of a Nation,” Yale Global Health Review, December 21, 2016, available at <https://yaleglobalhealthreview.com/2016/12/21/russia-the-sickness-of-anation/>.

45 Joseph Chamie and Barry Mirkin, “Russian Demographics: The Perfect Storm,” Yale Global 

Online, December 11, 2014, available at <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/russian-demographicsperfect-storm>. 

46 “China Emulates Russian Military Strategy in the Pacific,” Russia Beyond blog, August 20, 

2015, available at <http://rbth.com/blogs/2015/08/20/china_emulates_russian_miitary_strategy_in_

the_pacific_48627.html>.
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47 S. Sevastyanov and A. Kravchuk, “The Russian Approach to National Security in the Arctic,”

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 29, no. 1 (2017), 131–149.

48 Nikolay Murashkin, “Russia-Japan Summit, Putin, Abe Inch Closer to Normalizing Ties,” 

Russia Beyond blog, April 27, 2017, available at <www.rbth.com/opinion/2017/04/28/russia-japansummit-putin-abe-inch-closer-towards-normalizing-ties_752994>.

49 Justin McKurry, “Russia Says It Will Build on Southern Kurile Islands Seized from Japan,” 

Guardian (London), June 9, 2015, available at <www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/09/russiabuild-southern-kuril-islands-seized-moscow-tokyo-abe>; and Motoko Rich, “Meeting Between Japan 

and Russia Ends with Stalemate on Disputed Islands,” New York Times, December 16, 2016, available 

at <www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/world/asia/japan-russia-abe-putin.html?_r=0>.

50 Peter Zwack, conversation with Russian think tank analyst in Vladivostok, November 15, 

2018.

51Bill Emmott, “Tones of Reconciliation Gives Abe’s Japan a Chance to Rearm,” Australian

(New South Wales), December 15, 2016, available at <www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/tonesof-reconciliation-give-japans-abe-chance-to-rearm/news-story/a3f884277ac0dfda2479492a1505b12d>.

52 David Kramer, “Russia Isn’t the Answer to U.S. Problems with North Korea,” Foreign 

Policy, September 28, 2017, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/28/russia-isnt-the-answerto-americas-problems-with-north-korea/>.

53 Jon Sharman, “Hundreds of Russians Are Told to Move away from the North Korean 

Border,” Independent (London), August 31, 2017, available at <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

asia/vladimir-putin-north-korea-russia-citizens-move-away-border-south-korea-china-a7922621.html>; 

Andrew Higgins, “North Koreans in Russia Work ‘Basically in the Situation of Slaves,’” New York 

Times, July 11, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/world/europe/north-korea-russiamigrants.html>.

54 One of the authors was present at the April 2017 Moscow Security Conference where he 

witnessed firsthand this public statement made by senior Russian and Chinese defense officials.

55Carl Petit, “How the Soviet Union Launched North Korea’s Dynasty,” OZY.com, April 

19, 2018, available at <www.ozy.com/flashback/how-the-soviet-union-launched-north-koreas-dynasty/85416>.

56 Andrew Osborne, “Russia Throws North Korea Lifeline to Stymie Regime Change,” Reuters, October 4, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-russia-analysis/

russia-throws-north-korea-lifeline-to-stymie-regime-change-idUSKBN1C91X2>.

57Choe Sang-un, “South Korea Leader Floats 3-Way Meeting with Trump and Kim Jong Un,” 

New York Times, March 21, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/moon-jaein-meeting-kim-jong-un-trump.html>.

58 John Hudson and Ellen Nakeshima, “Russians Secretly Offered the North Koreans a 

Nuclear Power Plant, Officials Say,” Washington Post, January 29, 2019, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russia-secretly-offered-north-korea-a-nuclear-power-plantofficials-say/2019/01/29/d1872588-a99b-4b68-ba34-9ce1bc95b573_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_

term=.78a19f1e09a9>.

59 Alexander Gabuev, “Can Russia and China Join Efforts to Counter THAAD,” Carnegie 
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Russian Geostrategic Challenges

Moscow Center, March 27, 2017, available at <http://carnegie.ru/2017/03/27/can-russia-and-chinajoin-efforts-to-counter-thaad-pub-68410>.

60 Direct discussion with author at Moscow Security Conference in April 2017.

61 Liz Bagot and Josh Wilson, “The Russian Far East, Gateway to Asia,” School of Russian 

and Asian Studies, May 31, 2016, available at <www.sras.org/russian_far_east>.

62 Dmitry Scherbakov, “Charms of Blowing Up, Far East Plus 2,” Eastrussia blog, November 

3, 2018, available at <www.eastrussia.ru/en/material/prelesti-razduvaniya-dalniy-vostok-plyus-2/>.

63 “China, Russia: An End to an Island Dispute,” Stratfor.com, July 17, 2008, available at 

<www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-russia-end-island-dispute>.

64 “Russia, China Agree to Natural Gas Deal,” Stratfor.com, May 21, 2014, available at 

<www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-china-agree-natural-gas-deal-0>.

65 Dragos Turnoveanu, “Russia, China and the Far East,” The Diplomat, January 20, 2016, 

available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/russia-china-and-the-far-east-question/>.

66 Howard Amos, “Chinese Thirst Drives Illegal Logging in Russian Far East,” The Moscow 

Times, December 5, 2012, available at <www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/chinese-timber-hunger-drives-illegal-logging-in-russias-far-east/472587.html>.

67 Igor Denisov, “Aigun, Russia and China’s ‘Century of Humiliation,’” Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, June 10, 2015, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/10/aigunrussia-and-china-s-century-of-humiliation/i9o6>.

68 Tao Wang, “The Great Russia-China Oil Alliance Is Here: Why It Matters,” The National 

Interest, September 30, 2016, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-great-russiachina-oil-alliance-here-why-it-matters-17883?page=2>.

69 “Understanding the Russian Sphere of Influence,” UKEssays.com, March 23, 2015, available at <www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/understanding-the-russian-sphere-of-influence-politicsessay.php>.

70 Neil Buckley, “Once Repressive Uzbekistan Begins a Post-Karimov Opening,” Financial 

Times, February 13, 2018, available at <www.ft.com/content/6c37419c-0cbf-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09>.

71 Neil MacFarquhar, “Long-Time President of Kazakhstan Surprises Region by Resigning,” 

New York Times, March 19, 2019, available at <www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/world/asia/kazakhstannazarbayev-resigns.html>.

72 World Population Review, “Kazakhstan Population 2018,” November 8, 2018, available at 

<http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kazakhstan-population/>.

73 Alexander Cooley and Marlene Laruelle, The Changing Logic of Russian Strategy in Central Asia: From Privileged Sphere to Divide and Conquer, Program on New Approaches to Russian 

Security (PONARS) Policy Memo 261 (Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, July 

2013), available at <www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/changing-logic-russian-strategy-central-asia-privileged-sphere-divide-and-rule>. Uzbekistan withdrew in 2012.

74 Joel Wuthnow and Philip Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: 

Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 10 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 

March 2017), available at <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1125539/

chinese-military-reforms-in-the-age-of-xi-jinping-drivers-challenges-and-implic/>.
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75 Kathrin Hille, “Putin-Xi Embrace Masks Misgivings on Belt and Road Project,” Financial Times (London), May 14, 2017, available at <www.ft.com/content/d9122d30-386d-11e7-821a6027b8a20f23>.

76 Arif Bagbaslioglu, “Beyond Afghanistan NATO’s Tangled Partnership with Central Asia 

and South Caucasus: A Tangled Partnership,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 5, no. 1 (October 2013), 

88‒96, available at <www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366513000274>.

77 Andrew C. Kuchins and Thomas M. Sanderson, The Northern Distribution Network and 

Afghanistan: Geopolitical Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, January 2010), available at <http://csis.org/files/publication/091229_Kuchins_

NDNandAfghan_Web.pdf>.

78 Nicholas van Twickel, “Ulyanovsk Hub Not Getting Much Use by NATO,” The Moscow 

Times, February 21, 2013, available at <www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ulyanovsk-hub-notgetting-much-use-by-nato/475885.html>.

79 Dan Murphy, “Why Closure of Kyrgyzstan Airbase Is Point of No Return for Afghan War,” 

Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 2014, available at <www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/

Backchannels/2014/0605/Why-closure-of-Kyrgyzstan-air-base-is-point-of-no-return-for-Afghan-war>.

80 Olga Dzyubenko, “U.S. Vacates Base in Central Asia as Russia’s Clout Rises,” Reuters, 

June 3, 2014, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-usa-manas/u-s-vacates-base-incentral-asia-as-russias-clout-rises-idUSKBN0EE1LH20140603>.

81 Samuel Ramani, “Understanding the Russia-Taliban Connection,” The Diplomat, August 4, 

2017, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/understanding-the-russia-taliban-connection/>.

82 Dawood Azami, “Is Russia Arming the Afghan Taliban,” BBC, April 2, 2018, available at 

<www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41842285>.

83 Krishnadfev Calamur, “Is Russia really Arming the Taliban,” The Atlantic, August 25, 2017, 

available at <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/russia-taliban-weapons/537807/>.

84 Discussions in Beijing, December 11–15, 2018, by the author and three other researchers 

with the People’s Liberation Army’s National Defense University and five other research organizations.

85 Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, 

Risks, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 12 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, October 2017).

86 Johannes Feige, “China’s Road to Closer Ties with Russia,” The Diplomat, August 3, 2016, 

available at <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/chinas-road-to-closer-ties-with-russia/>. 

87 Michael Cecire, “Georgia Misses Chance on Russia Overreach in Abkhazia, South Ossetia,” 

World Politics Review, February 6, 2015, available at <www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15032/

georgia-misses-chance-on-russia-overreach-in-abkhazia-south-ossetia>.

88 “Russian 102nd Military Base,” 2013, available at <www.digplanet.com/wiki/

Russian_102nd_Military_Base>.

89 Felicity Capon, “Russia Arming Armenia and Azerbaijan as Hostilities Increase,” Newsweek, February 17, 2015, available at <www.newsweek.com/russia-arming-armenia-and-azerbaijanhostilities-increase-307443>.

90 Stephen Sestanovich, “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Council of Foreign Relations Global 

Conflict Tracker, January 5, 2018, available at <www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/con-
75

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flict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict>.

91 Serzh Sargsyan, “Armenian PM Resigns after Days of Protests,” BBC News, April 23, 2018, 

available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17398605>.

92 Natasha Turk, “Armenia’s Protestors just removed Its Russia-Friendly Prime Minister—

Moscow Is Definitely Nervous,” CNBC, April 24, 2018, available at <www.cnbc.com/2018/04/24/

armenias-protesters-just-removed-its-russia-friendly-prime-minister.html>.

93Robert Coalson, “Armenia Looks West, Tries to Loosen Moscow’s Grip,” Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, April 9, 2016, available at <www.rferl.org/content/armenia-russia-relationseu/25005446.html>.

94 Semeh Idiz, “Russia’s Recognition of Armenian Genocide Strains Ties with Turkey,” 

al-Monitor.com, April 28, 2015, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/turkeyrussia-armenia-ties-lost-magic.html>.

95 Liz Fuller, “The Unstoppable Rise of Ramzan Kadyrov,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

January 19, 2015, available at <www.rferl.org/content/profile-ramzan-kadyrov-chechnya-russia-putin/26802368.html>.

96Brandee Leon, “A View of Chechens in Syria,” TheStrategyBridge.org, June 22, 2014, 

available at <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2014/06/22/a-view-of-chechens-in-syria>.

97 Lawrence A. Franklin, “Dagestan: New Epicenter of Terrorism in Russia,” The Gatestone 

Institute, February 14, 2014, available at <www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4172/dagestan-terrorism-russia>.

98 Ivan Kurilla, Southern Russia: The Heartland or Russia’s Soft Underbelly, PONARS Policy 

Memo 120 (Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, April 2000), available at <www.

gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0120.pdf>.

99 Jack Moore, “ISIS Tells Vladimir Putin: We are Coming to Russia to Free Chechnya,” 

International Business Times (London), September 3, 2014, available at <www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-tellvladimir-putin-we-are-coming-russia-free-chechnya-1463874>.

100 “Three Days in Hell: Russians Mourn Beslan School Victims, 10 years on,” RT.com, September 1, 2014, available at <www.rt.com/news/183964-beslan-school-hostage-crisis/>.

101 “2,200 Russian Jihadists Fight in Syria, Iraq—Russian Foreign Ministry,” RT.com, July 7, 

2015, available at <www.rt.com/news/272299-russia-jihadists-syria-iraq/>.

102 “End Abuse and Detention of Gay Men in Chechnya, UN Human Rights Experts Tell 

Russia,” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, April 13, 2017, available at <www.

ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21501>.

103 “Russian LGBT Network Reports Arrests, Torture and Deaths Part Chechnya ‘Gay Purge’ 

Accusations,” Euronews, January 15, 2019.

104 The Right Honorable Lord of Baglan, “Putin’s Gamble in Syria,” Chatham House, October 

6, 2015, available at <www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/putin-s-gamble-syria>.

105Bruce Riedel, “Vlad and Yuri: How Putin Is Applying the Lessons of Afghanistan to Syria,” 

al-Monitor.com, October 5, 2015, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/contents/articles/originals/2015/10/putin-follows-kgb-boss-yuri-andropov.html>.

106 Redline is the authors’ word usage.
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107 Alexey Eremenko, “Why Russia’s Vladimir Putin Is Standing by Syria’s President Asad,” 

NBC, September 26, 2015, available at <www.nbcnews.com/news/world/why-russias-vladimir-putinstanding-syrias-embattled-bashar-assas-n432936>.

108 Samuel Ramani, “Why Russia and Israel Are Cooperating in Syria,” Huffington Post, June 

23, 2016, available at <www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-russia-and-israel-are-cooperating-in-syria_

us_576bdb68e4b083e0c0235e15>.

109 Imran Rahman-Jones, “Why Does Russia Support Syria and President Asad,” BBC, April 

11, 2017, available at <www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/39554171/why-does-russia-support-syria-andpresident-Asad>.

110 Anne Gearan, “U.S., Russia Reach Agreement on Seizure of Syria’s Chemical Arsenal,” 

Washington Post, September 14, 2013, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-russiareach-agreement-on-seizure-of-syrian-chemical-weapons-arsenal/2013/09/14/69e39b5c-1d36-11e3-

8685-5021e0c41964_story.html>.

111Ben Hubbard, “As Trump Seeks Way Out of Syria, New Attack Pulls Him Back In,” New 

York Times, April 8, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syria-trumpAsad.html>.

112 Lizzie Dearden, “Russia Launches First Air Strikes in Syria as Non-ISIS Rebels Claim 

They Are Being Targeted,” Independent (London), September 30, 2015.

113 Josh Cohen, “Russia’s Vested Interests in Supporting Asad,” The Moscow Times, October 

23, 2014, available at <www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-s-vested-interests-in-supporting-Asad/509979.html>.

114 Egor Lazerev and Anna Biryukova, “Twenty Million Muslims Seething about Putin Bombing Syria,” Washington Post, March 7, 2016, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/03/07/are-russias-20-million-muslims-seething-about-putin-bombing-syria/>.

115 Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded,” Foreign 

Affairs, May/June 2016, 26.

116 Jonathan Altman, “Russian A2/D2 in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 1 (Winter 2016), 75.

117 Aria Bendix, “Safe Zones in Syria,” The Atlantic, May 4, 2017, available at <www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/05/russia-iran-and-turkey-agree-on-safe-zones-in-syria/525486/>.

118 Andrew Roth, “Syria Shows That Russia Built an Effective Military: Now How Will 

Putin Use It?” Washington Post, March 18, 2016, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/

syria-shows-that-russia-built-an-effective-military-now-how-will-putin-use-it/2016/03/17/aeaca59eeae8-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html?utm_term=.1652c1ca1a8d>.

119Roger McDermott, “Gerasimov Revamps Russian Military Hard Power, Based on Syria 

Lessons,” Eurasia Monitor 14, no. 14 (February 7, 2017), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/

gerasimov-revamps-russian-military-hard-power-based-syria-lessons/>.

120 Alec Luhn, “Russia’s Campaign in Syria Leads to Arms Sale Windfall,” Guardian (London), March 29, 2016, available at <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/29/russias-campaign-insyria-leads-to-arms-sale-windfall>.

121 Ali Alfoneh, “Irans’s Shia Foreign Legions,” Carnegie Endowment, January 30, 2018, 
77

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/30/tehran-s-shia-foreign-legions-pub-75387>.

122 Johua Yaffa, “Putin’s Shadow Army suffers a setback in Syria,” The New Yorker, February 

16, 2018, available at <www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/putins-shadow-army-suffers-a-setbackin-syria>.

123 David Brennan, “A Total F***-Up: Russian Mercenaries Lament Strike That Killed Dozens,” Newsweek, February 23, 2018, available at <www.newsweek.com/total-f-russian-mercenariessyria-lament-us-strike-killed-dozens-818073>.

124 Dmitry Gorenburg and Michael Kofman, “There Is No Withdrawal of Russian Forces from 

Syria,” War on the Rocks, March 18, 2016, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/there-isno-russian-withdrawal-from-syria/>.

125 Andrew Osborn, “Putin, in Syria, Says Mission Accomplished, Orders Partial Russian 

Pull-Out,” Reuters, December 11, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriarussia-putin/putin-in-syria-says-mission-accomplished-orders-partial-russian-pull-out-idUSKBN1E50

X1?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews>.

126 “Russian Military Needed in Syria Long Term, Asad Says,” The Moscow Times, July 27, 

2018, available at <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-military-needed-in-syria-long-termAsad-says-62363>.

127 Juda Ari Gross, “Israel’s Air Superiority Clouded by New Russian Missiles in Syria,” Times 

of Israel (Jerusalem), December 1, 2015, available at <www.timesofisrael.com/israels-air-superiorityin-syria-clouded-by-russian-s-400/>.

128Charles Lister, “The Israeli Strike on Syria Monday: A Message for Iran, Russia—and Trump,” The Daily Beast, April 9, 2018, available at <Beastfile:///Users/PBZ/Desktop/Israeli%20Airstrike%20on%20Syria%20Monday_%20A%20Message%20to%20Iran,%20

Russia%E2%80%94and%20Trump.htm>.

129 William Roberts, “Analysis: Trump’s Withdrawal from Iran Deal Isolates U.S.,” al Jazeera, 

May 9, 2018, available at <www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/analysis-trump-withdrawal-iran-nucleardeal-isolates-180509051651635.html>.

130 Josef Federman, “Israel Hits Dozens of Iranian Targets in Syria after Barrage,” Associated Press, May 10, 2018, available at <www.yahoo.com/news/israel-strikes-dozens-iranian-targetssyria-044915343.html>.

131 Discussion in Moscow by lead author with senior Russian think tank analyst, May 30, 

2018.

132 Dan Williams, “Israel Signals Free Hand in Syria as U.S., Russia Expand Truce,” Reuters, 

November 12, 2017, available at <www.yahoo.com/news/israel-signals-free-hand-syria-u-russia-expand-121234133.html>.

133 Dan Williams and Gleb Stolyarov, “Israel to Russia: Asad’s Safe from Us, but Iran Must 

Quit Syria,” Reuters, July 18, 2018 <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-israel/israel-torussia-Asads-safe-from-us-but-iran-must-quit-syria-idUSKBN1K11RX>.

134 Judah Ari Gross, “Liberman: Israel Would Destroy Syrian S-300s If They Attacked Our 

Jets,” Times of Israel (Jerusalem), April 24, 2018, available at <www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-israel-would-destroy-syrian-s-300-if-it-attacked-our-jets/>.
78 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

135 Alexei Druzhinin, “Why the Iran-Russia Relationship Is So Uneasy,” Newsweek, October 

21, 2016, available at <www.newsweek.com/why-iran-russia-relationship-so-uneasy-511331>.

136 Patrick Markey, “Putin, Egypt’s Sisi Discuss Restart of Flights, Sign Nuclear Deal,” 

Reuters, December 11, 2018, available <www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia/russias-putin-andegypts-sisi-discuss-middle-east-tensions-in-cairo-idUSKBN1E51BR>.

137 Lincoln Pigman and Kyle Orton, “Inside Putin’s Libyan Power Play,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2017, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/14/inside-putins-libyan-power-play/>.

138 Henry Mayer, “Putin Hosts Saudi King in Landmark Russia Visit,” Bloomberg, October 

4, 2017, available at <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-05/saudi-king-seeks-oil-pactextension-on-epochal-russia-visit>; “Russia Confirms Sale of S-400 Missile System to Saudi Arabia,” 

RT.com, October 9, 2017, available at <www.rt.com/business/406116-russia-saudi-arabia-s400-delivery/>.

139 “Putin Says Washington Bears a ‘Certain Responsibility’ for Khashoggi,” Politico, October 

18, 2018, available at <www.politico.com/story/2018/10/18/putin-blame-us-khashoggi-913130>.

140 “Fifth Round of Syrian Peace Talks Underway at Astana,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty, July 4, 2017, available at <www.rferl.org/a/syria-astana-talks-continue-sdf-breaches-raqqawall/28595257.html>.

141 Stephanie Nebehay, “Putin Must Nudge Syria into UN Peace Deal, Mediator Says,” 

Reuters, December 13, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-talks/putinmust-nudge-syria-into-u-n-peace-deal-mediator-says-idUSKBN1E72TM>.

142 Karl-Heinz Kamp, “From Wales to Warsaw: NATO’s Future beyond the Ukraine Crisis,” 

American Foreign Policy Interests 36, no. 6 (2014), 362.

143 Andrew Monaghan, “Russian State Mobilization: Moving the State onto a War Footing,” 

Chatham House Research Event, London, June 3, 2016, available at <www.chathamhouse.org/event/

russian-state-mobilization-moving-country-war-footing>.

144 David Matsaberidze, “Russia v. EU/US through Georgia and Ukraine,” Connections 14, no. 

2 (Spring 2015), 79.

145 Michael Weiss, “Rights in Russia: Navalny and the Opposition,” World Affairs 176, no. 4 

(November 2013), 73.

146 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of Russia,” President of 

Russia Official Web site, April 25, 2005, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931>.

147 Anne Applebaum, “The Worst of the Madness,” review of Bloodlands: Europe Between 

Hitler and Stalin, by Timothy Snyder, and Stalin’s Genocides, by Norman M. Naimark, The New York 

Review of Books, November 11, 2010, available at <www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/11/11/worstmadness/>.

148 “Russia’s Accusations,” NATO Fact Sheet, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, April 2014, 

1.

149 Peter Zwack, “The NATO-Russia Contingency Command,” Parameters (Spring 2004), 

available at <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bc2b/38b10a1ccf55cedb815193653f738bf9f491.pdf>.
79

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

150 “Ten Longest Land Borders in the World,” 10Most.com, November 22, 2015, available at 

<https://10mosttoday.com/10-longest-land-borders-in-the-world/>.

151 David Yost, “The Budapest Memorandum and Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine,” International Affairs 91, no. 3 (May 2015), 505.

152 James Hughes, “Russia and the Secession of Kosovo,” Europa-Asia Studies 65, no. 5 (July 

2013), 1005.

153 Ibid., 994.

154 Peter Zwack, “Swimming the Volga,” personal memoir, August, 2018.

155 Maria Lipman, “The Origins of Russia’s New Conflict with the West,” European Council 

of Foreign Affairs, November 14, 2014, available at <www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_origins_

of_russias_new_conflict_with_the_west330>.

156 Michael Ruhle, NATO Enlargement and Russia: Die-Hard Myths and Real Dilemmas, 

NDC Research Report (Rome: NATO Defense College, May 15, 2014), 3, available at <www.natolibguides.info/nato-russia/reports>.

157 Dave Majumbar, “Newly Declassified Documents: Gorbachev Told NATO Wouldn’t Move 

Beyond East German Border,” The National Interest, December 12, 2018, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/newly-declassified-documents-gorbachev-told-nato-wouldnt-23629>.

158 Mark Kramer and Sarotte Replies, “No Such Promise,” Foreign Affairs, November–December, 2014, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/no-such-promise>.

159 Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Russia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 

1996), available at <http://countrystudies.us/russia/>.

160 Ibid.

161 Michael Ruhle, “NATO Enlargement and Russia, Myths and Realities,” NATO Review, 

2015, available at <www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/russia-ukraine-nato-crisis/nato-enlargement-russia/

en/index.htm>.

162 “Seven New Members Join NATO,” Nato Update, March 29, 2004, available at <www.

nato.int/docu/update/2004/03-march/e0329a.htm>.

163 “Moscow Warns Montenegro of Possible Consequences of Joining NATO—Russian Foreign Ministry,” Interfax, November 23, 2015, available at <www.interfax.com/newsinf.

asp?id=635054>; and Alec Luhn, “Montenegro Finds Its at Heart of Tension with Russia as It Joins 

NATO,” Guardian (London), May 25, 2017, available at <www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/25/

montenegro-tensions-russia-joins-nato-member>.

164 Petr Bohacek, “Is Republika Srbska about to Be the Next Crimea?” Vice.com, March 26, 

2018, available at <www.vice.com/en_uk/article/av9wbz/secession-serbia-bosnia-hrzegovina>.

165 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “NATO to Sign Accession Pact with Macedonia, Paving 

Way for Membership,” February 2, 2019.

166Barbara Surk, “Russia Stirs Dissent in Balkans While NATO Keeps an Uneasy Peace,” 

New York Times, February 19, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/world/europe/russianato-balkans.html>.

167 Julia Petrovskaya, “Russia’s Kosovo Fixation” Intersection Online Journal, October 30, 
80 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

2015, available at <http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-europe/russias-kosovo-fixation>.

168 Ishaan Thahoor, “Don’t Forget How the Soviet Union Saved the World from Hitler,” Washington Post, May 8, 2015, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/08/

dont-forget-how-the-soviet-union-saved-the-world-from-hitler/?utm_term=.35305f561365>.

169 Nicholas Ross Smith, “The EU and Russia’s Conflicting Regime Preferences in Ukraine: 

Assessing Regime Promotion Strategies in the Scope of the Ukraine Crisis,” European Security 24, no. 

4 (April 2015), 528.

170 Dave Johnson, Russia’s Approach to Conflict—Implications for NATO’s Deterrence and 

Defence, NDC Research Paper No. 111 (Rome: NATO Defense College, April 2015).

171 Shairbek Dzhuraev, “A Smooth Succession, Uzbekistan’s Second President,” AroundtheCaspian.eu, May 14, 2017, available at <http://caspianet.eu/2017/05/14/smooth-succession-uzbekistans-second-president/>.

172 Igor Sutyagin, Russian Forces in Ukraine, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Briefing 

Paper (London: RUSI, March 2015), 1.

173 Ian Bremmer, “What MH17 Means for Russia-Ukraine,” Reuters, July 18, 2014, available 

at <http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2014/07/18/what-mh17-means-for-russia-ukraine/>.

174 Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded,” Foreign 

Affairs, May/June 2016, 26. 

175 Sergei Guriev, “Russia’s Constrained Economy: How the Kremlin Can Spur Growth,” 

Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, 19.

176 John C.K. Daly, “Russia Shutters Northern Distribution Network,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 15, 2015, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-shutters-northern-distributionnetwork/>.

177 Ibid.; and Guriev, “Russia’s Constrained Economy.”

178 Jeremy Bender, “This Chart Shows the Astounding Devastation of WWII,” Business 

Insider, May 29, 2014, available at <www.businessinsider.com/percentage-of-countries-who-diedduring-wwii-2014-5>.

179Charles Crabtree, “In Belarus, Europe’s Last Dictator Is Actually Allowing Protest. Here’s 

Why,” Washington Post, March 24, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/

wp/2017/03/24/belarus-is-allowing-protest-because-its-authoritarian-government-wants-westernsupport/?utm_term=.08e712d8e239>.

180 Peter Zwack, “Zapad 2017: Should We Fear Russia’s Latest Dress Rehearsal?” The National Interest, August 29, 2017, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/zapad-2017-shouldwe-fear-russias-latest-military-dress-22097?page=3>; and Bruce McClintock, “Zapad 2017: What It 

Reveals about the Prickly Russia-Belarus Relationship,” The National Interest, September 12, 2017, 

available at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/zapad-2017-what-it-reveals-about-the-prickly-russiabelarus-22271?page=2>.

181 Alexander Tabacknik, “The Transnistrian Challenge: Why Tensions Are Increasing Between Russia and Moldova,” London School of Economics blog, August 22, 2017, available at <http://

blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/08/22/the-transnistrian-challenge-why-tensions-are-escalating-between-russia-and-moldova/>.
81

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

182 Madalin Necsutu, “Dodon Response to Suspension Puzzles Moldova’s Socialists,” BalkanInsight.com, January 10, 2018, available at <www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dodon-response-tosuspension-puzzles-moldova-s-socialists-01-10-2018>.

183 Karina Lungu, “Transnistria: From Entropy to Exodus,” European Council of Foreign Relations, September 1, 2016, available at <www.ecfr.eu/article/essay_transnistria_from_entropy_to_exodus>.

184 Ibid.

185 “Russia fires on and seizes Ukrainian vessels,” The Economist, November 27, 2018, available at <www.economist.com/europe/2018/11/26/russia-fires-on-and-seizes-ukrainian-vessels>.

186 Stephen Kinzer, “NATO is Headed for a Very Messy Breakup,” Boston Globe, November 

11, 2017, available at <www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/11/11/nato-headed-for-very-messy-break/

amesBJsJk23e0GgnzgqqUK/story.html>.

187 Nick Tattersall, “As Turkey’s Coup Strains Ties with West, Détente with Russia Gains 

Pace,” Reuters, August 6, 2016, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-russia/asturkeys-coup-strains-ties-with-west-detente-with-russia-gathers-pace-idUSKCN10H05A>.

188 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looking to End Russian Gas Dependence,” Voice of America, December 14, 2015, available at <www.voanews.com/a/turkey-russia-gas-dependence/3102230.html>.

189 Wade Shepard, “How Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia Subverted Russia and Isolated 

Armenia with New Railway,” Forbes, October 30, 2017, <www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/10/30/new-silk-road-azerbaijan-georgia-and-turkey-unite-over-new-rail-line-armenia-furtherisolated/#1d7fadda3aff>.

190 Simon Tisdale, “Erdoghan Outgunned at Trump Meeting in Face of U.S.-Russia United 

Front,” Guardian (London), May 17, 2017, available at <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/17/

erdogan-outgunned-at-trump-meeting-in>.

191 Torrey Taussig, “The Serpentine Trajectory of Turkish-Relations Relations,” The Brookings 

Institute blog, October 4, 2017, available at <www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/04/

the-serpentine-trajectory-of-turkish-russian-relations/>.

192 Margaret Vice, “Publics Worldwide, Unfavorable to Russia,” Pew Research Center, August 

16, 2017, available at <www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putinrussia/>.

193 Mark Lanteigne, “U.S. Wary of Russia’s Arctic Military Build-up,” Arctic Deeply Journal

(February 13, 2017), available at <www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/community/2017/02/13/u-s-wary-ofrussias-arctic-military-buildup>; and John Pike, “Russian Arctic Security Command,” GlobalSecurity.

org, 2016, available at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/vo-northern.htm>.

194Brice Jones, “Russia Activates New Arctic Joint Strategic Command,” Jane’s Defense 

Weekly, December 2, 2014, available at <www.janes.com/article/46577/russia-activates-new-arcticjoint-strategic-command>.

195 Joel K. Bourne, Jr., “In the Arctic’s Cold Rush, There Are No Easy Gains,” National 

Geographic, March 2016, available at <www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/03/new-arcticthawing-rapidly-circle-work-oil/>.

196 Alexander Sergunin, “Is Russia Going Hard or Soft in the Arctic,” The Wilson Quarterly
82 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

(Summer/Fall 2017), available at <https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/into-the-arctic/is-russia-goinghard-or-soft-in-the-arctic/>.

197 Tom O’Connor, “Russia Leads World with New Nuclear Icebreaker Ship, Putin’s Latest 

Move,” Newsweek, September 28, 2017, available at <www.newsweek.com/russia-deploys-worldslargest-and-most-powerful-nuclear-icebreaker-ship-bring-670621>.

198 Andrew Osborn, “Putin’s Russia in Biggest Arctic Military Push Since Soviet Fall,” Reuters, January 30, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-insight/putins-russia-inbiggest-arctic-military-push-since-soviet-fall-idUSKBN15E0W0>.

199Cristopher Woody, “The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard Are Looking to Play Catch-Up in the 

Arctic, Business Insider, October 19, 2017, available at <www.businessinsider.com/the-us-navy-andcoast-guard-are-looking-to-play-catch-up-in-the-arctic-2017-10>.

200 “Major Icebreakers of the World,” USCG.mil, available at <www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/

DCO%20Documents/Office%20of%20Waterways%20and%20Ocean%20Policy/20170501%20

major%20icebreaker%20chart.pdf?ver=2017-06-08-091723-907>.

201 “China’s New Shipping Frontier,” Wall Street Journal, August 20, 2013, available at 

<www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-new-shipping-frontier-1377003055>.

202 Joseph Fleischman, “Russian Territorial Claim Collides with UN Convention of Law of 

the Sea,” North Carolina Journal of International Law blog, September 18, 2015, available at <http://

blogs.law.unc.edu/ncilj/2015/09/18/russian-territorial-claim-collides-with-convention-on-the-law-ofthe-sea/>.

203 Adam Lajeunesse, “Russia’s Arctic Militarization: A Reality Check,” Huffington Post, 

March 28, 2017, available at <www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/russias-arctic-militarization-a-realitycheck_us_58da6233e4b0f805b323b5c0>.

204Bourne, “In the Arctic’s Cold Rush, There Are No Easy Gains.”

205 Stephanie Pezard, “Friends If We Must: Russia and China in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, 

May 6, 2016, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/friends-if-we-must-russia-and-chinasrelations-in-the-arctic/>.

206 “Norway in Arctic Dispute with Russia over Rogozin Visit,” BBC, April 20, 2015, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32380101>.

207 “Svalbard,” The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2018), 

available at <www.cia.gov/Library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_sv.html>; and Atle 

Staalesen, “Russia’s Lavrov Attacks Norway, Says Relations on Svalbard Should Be Better,” Eye of 

the Arctic, August 19, 2017, available at <www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2017/10/19/russias-lavrovattacks-norway-says-relations-on-svalbard-should-be-better/>.

208 Thom Patterson, “The Downing of Flight 007: Thirty Years Later, a Cold War Tragedy Still 

Seems Surreal,” CNN, August 31, 2013, available at <www.cnn.com/2013/08/31/us/kal-fight-007-anniversary/index.html>.

209Charlotte Gao, “China Issues Its Arctic Policy,” The Diplomat, January 26, 2018, available 

at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/china-issues-its-arctic-policy/>.

210 “China Unveils Vision for ‘Polar Silk Road’ across Asia,” Reuters, January 26, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arctic/china-unveils-vision-for-polar-silk-road-across-arctic-
83

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

idUSKBN1FF0J8>.

211 “ExxonMobil Pulling Out of Arctic Projects with Rosneft,” Oil and Gas Journal, March 

1, 2018, available at <www.ogj.com/articles/2018/03/exxonmobil-pulling-out-of-arctic-projects-withrosneft.html>.

212 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Military Expenditure 

Database, available at <www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database>.

213 Joshua Yaffa, “Russia’s Madman Routine in Syria may have averted direct confrontation 

with the U.S. for now,” The New Yorker, April 14, 2018, available at <www.newyorker.com/news/

news-desk/russias-madman-routine-in-syria-may-have-averted-direct-confrontation-with-the-us-fornow-putin-trump>.

214 Mikhail Barabanov, Konstantin Makienko, and Ruslan Pukhov, “Military Reform: Toward 

the New Look of the Russian Army,” Analytical Report, Valdai Discussion Club, July 2012, 12.

215 “Russia: Putin Orders Creation of National Guard,” Situation Report, Stratfor.com, April 5, 

2016, available at <www.stratfor.com/situation-report/russia-putin-orders-creation-national-guard>.

216Barabanov, Makienko, and Pukhov, “Military Reform,” 32.

217 Ibid., 25.

218 Iva Savic, “The Russian Soldier Today,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (Spring/

Summer 2010), 223.

219 “РОССИЙСКАЯ АРМИЯ” [Russian Armed Forces], Levada Center, February 20, 2017, 

available at <www.levada.ru/2017/02/20/rossijskaya-armiya-2/>.

220 Savic, “The Russian Soldier Today,” 221.

221 “Putin: Russia Military ‘Will Stay’ in Syria—But Not Long-Term,” al Jazeera, June 

7, 2018, available at <www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/putin-russia-military-stay-syria-longterm-180607192645484.html>. 

222 Savic, “The Russian Soldier Today,” 219.

223 “Ukraine Crisis: Russian Special Forces Captured,” BBC, May 17, 2015, available at 

<www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32776198>.

224 Zwack, “Zapad 2017.”

225 Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Russia Overhauls Military Doctrine,” Defense News, January 10, 

2015, available at <www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/policy/2015/01/10/russia-military-doctrine-ukraine-putin/21441759/>; and Olga Oliker, “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security 

Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 7, 2016, available at <www.csis.org/

analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy>.

226 Andrew Monaghan, “Russian State Mobilization: Moving the State on to a War Footing,” 

Chatham House, May 20, 2016, available at <www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russian-state-mobilization-moving-country-war-footing>.

227 Nicholas Fedyk, “Russian ‘New Generation Warfare’: Theory, Practice, and Lessons for 

U.S. Strategists,” Small Wars Journal, May 4, 2017, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/

art/russian-%E2%80%9Cnew-generation%E2%80%9D-warfare-theory-practice-and-lessons-for-usstrategists-0>; and Michael Kofman, “The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian 

Strategy,” War on the Rocks, January 17, 2017, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/the-
84 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

moscow-school-of-hard-knocks-key-pillars-of-russian-strategy/>.

228 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern,” 

Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016.

229 Dave Majumdar, “Vostok 2018: Russia (with China Making a Guest Appearance) Set 

for Largest Wargames in Over Three Decades,” The National Interest, August 23, 2018, available at 

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/vostok-2018-russia-china-making-guest-appearance-set-largest-wargames-over-three-decades>.

230 Jim Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. 

Interests, RL34618 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 9, 2009), available at 

<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf>.

231 Jonathan Marcus, “Russia’s Missile Deployment in Kaliningrad Ups the Stakes for NATO,” 

BBC, October 9, 2016, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37600426>.

232 “Trump Administration Takes Aim at Russia and China in New Africa Strategy,” CNBC, 

December 13, 2018, available at <www.cnbc.com/2018/12/13/trump-administration-takes-aim-atrussia-and-china-in-new-africa-strategy.html>.

233 Joel D. Hirst, “A Guide to the ALBA,” America’s Quarterly, 2018, available at <www.

americasquarterly.org/hirst/article>.

234 “Russia in Latin America: A Summary Brief,” IBI Consultants, May 26, 2018.

235 Ibid.

236 Stephen Blank “Moscow Continues to Pay Close Attention to Latin America,” Eurasia 

Daily Monitor, February 2018, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-continues-payclose-attention-latin-america/>.

237Christina Silva, “A New Cold War: Is Russia Spying on the U.S. from a Nicaraguan Military Compound,” Newsweek, May 22, 2017, available at <www.newsweek.com/new-cold-war-russiaspying-us-nicaragua-military-compound-613427>.

238 “Russia in Latin America.”

239 Mary Anastasia O’Grady, “Kremlin Revenge in Guatemala,” Wall Street Journal, March 

26, 2018, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/kremlin-revenge-in-guatemala-1522005077>; and Mary 

Anastasia O’Grady, “Russia’s Dubious Guatemala Story,” Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2018, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/russias-dubious-guatemala-story-1523817541>.

240Benjamin Kentish, “Cuba Boosts Russia Links as Trump’s America Disconnects from 

Neighbor,” Independent (London), December 19, 2018, available at <www.independent.co.uk/news/

world/americas/cuba-russia-links-us-donald-trumps-restrictions-immigration-trade-sanctions-barackobama-a8118361.html>.

241 “Russia Ready to Strengthen Strategic Partnership with Cuba, Putin Says,” Tass Russian 

News Agency, April 19, 2018, available at <http://tass.com/politics/1000804>.

242 “Russia Considering Military Bases in Cuba And Vietnam,” BBC, October 7, 2016.

243 Nora Gamez Torres, “Goodbye Venezuala, Hello Russia: Can Vladimir Putin Save Cuba? 

Miami Herald, December 26, 2017, available at <www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/

americas/cuba/article191652654.html>.

244 John Campbell, “Putin’s Russia and Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations blog, August 13, 
85

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

2015, available at <www.cfr.org/blog/putins-russia-and-africa>.

245 Henry Foy, Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, and David Pillling, “Russia: Vladimir Putin’s Pivot to 

Africa,” Financial Times, January 22, 2019, available at <www.ft.com/content/a5648efa-1a4e-11e9-9e64-

d150b3105d21>.

246 “How Russia Moved into Central Africa,” Reuters, October 17, 2018, available at 

<www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-russia-insight/how-russia-moved-into-central-africa-idUSKCN1MR0KA>.

247 John Campbell, “Putin’s Russia and Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations blog, August 13, 

2015, available at <www.cfr.org/blog/putins-russia-and-africa>.

248 Ibid.

249 Foy, Astrasheuskaya, and Pilling, “Russia.”

250 Sarah Feuer and Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia Makes Inroads in North Africa,” Policy 

Watch 2884, November 2, 2017, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/

russia-makes-inroads-in-north-africa>.

251 “How Russia Moved into Central Africa.”

252 Foy, Astrasheuskaya, and Pilling, “Russia.”

253 Neil Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries,” The Atlantic, August 27, 2018, available at 

<www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/russian-mercenaries-wagner-africa/568435/>.

254 Mehmet Cem Oğultürk, “Russia’s Renewed Interests in the Horn of Africa as a Traditional 

and Rising Power,” Rising Powers Quarterly 2, no. 1 (February 2017), available at <http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/russias-renewed-interests-in-the-horn-of-africa-as-a-traditional-and-risingpower/>.

255Campbell, “Putin’s Russia and Africa.”

256 Emily Stewart, “Hawaii’s Missile Scare ‘Reminds Us How Precarious the Nuclear Age 

Is,’” Vox.com, January 14, 2018, available at <www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/14/16890148/

hawaii-missile-false-alarm>.

257 Simon Saradzhyan, “The Role of China in Russian Military Thinking,” The Belfer Center, 

May 4, 2010, available at <www.belfercenter.org/publication/role-china-russias-military-thinking>.

258 Matt Payton, “Norway Is Now a Nuclear Target over U.S. Marines Posted There, Senior 

Russian Politician Warns,” Independent (London), November 1, 2016, available at <www.independent.

co.uk/news/world/europe/norway-nuclear-target-us-marines-russia-politician-weapons-ax7390386.

html>.

259 David Majumar, “Novator 9M729: The Russian Missile That Broke INF Treaty’s Back? 

The National Interest, December 1, 2017, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/novator-9m729-the-russian-missile-broke-inf-treatys-back-23547>.

260 Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls Limited Nuclear Strike Deescalation,” Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists blog, March 13, 2013, available at <http://thebulletin.org/why-Russia-calls-limitednuclear-strike-deescalation>.

261 Hans M. Kristenson, “Russian Nuclear Forces: 2017,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, 

no. 2 (February 2017), 115–126, available at <www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.

1290375>.
86 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

262 Terrence Neilan, “Bush Pulls U.S. Out of ABM Treaty, Putin Calls It a Mistake,” New York 

Times, December 13, 2001, available at <www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls-outof-abm-treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html>.

263 Darryl Kimball, “U.S. Russia Arms Control Agreements at a Glance,” Arms Control Foundation, April 1, 2014, available at <www.brookings.edu/opinions/unilateral-withdrawal-from-the-abmtreaty-is-a-bad-idea/>.

264 “A Threat to Nuclear Arms Control,” New York Times, July 29, 2017, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2017/07/29/opinion/sunday/trump-nuclear-arms-control.html>.

265 “Russia Suspends Participation in CFE Treaty,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 12, 2007, available at <www.rferl.org/content/article/1079256.html>; Wade Boese, “Russia 

Unflinching on CFE Treaty Suspension,” Arms Control Association, June 11, 2008, available at <www.

armscontrol.org.act/2008_5/RussiaCFE>; Kathrin Hille and Neil Buckley, “Russia Quits Arms Pact as 

Estrangement with NATO Grows,” Financial Times (London), March 10, 2015, available at <www.

ft.com/content/f6c814a6-c750-11e4-9e34-00144feab7de>; and “Reducing Cooperative Arms Control; 

The End of Nunn Lugar?” The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, October 25, 2012, 

available at <https://armscontrolcenter.org/reducing-cooperative-threat-reduction-the-end-of-nunnlugar/>.

266 Jake Rudnitsky, “Russia to Limit U.S. Military Flyovers in Tit-for-Tat Response,” Bloomberg, December 27, 2017, available at <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-27/russia-to-limitu-s-military-flyovers-in-tit-for-tat-response>; Mark R. Wilcox, “Russia and the Treaty on Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)—A Paradigm Change?” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

24, no. 4 (2011), 568; and Ivo Daalder, “Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty Is a Bad idea,” Brookings 

Institute blog, April 30, 2001, available at <www.brookings.edu/opinions/unilateral-withdrawal-fromthe-abm-treaty-is-a-bad-idea/>.

267 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Withdraws from Plutonium Disposal Treaty,” New York Times, 

October 3, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/world/europe/russia-plutonium-nucleartreaty.html?_r=0>.

268 Strobe Talbott, “U.S.-Russia Arms Control Was Possible Once, It Is Possible Still,” 

Brookings Institute blog, December 12, 2017, available at <www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2017/12/12/u-s-russia-arms-control-was-possible-once-is-it-possible-still/>.

269 Juri Luik, “A Plausible Scenario for Nuclear War in Europe; and How to Deter It,” International Centre for Defense and Security (Estonia), June 15, 2017, available at <www.icds.ee/publications/article/a-plausible-scenario-of-nuclear-war-in-europe-and-how-to-deter-it/>.

270 Dmitry Adamsky, “If War Comes Tomorrow: Russian Thinking about Regional Nuclear 

Deterrence,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27, no. 1 (2014), 168.

271 Alistair Jamison, “Putin Unveils New Russian Nuclear Missile, Says It Renders Defenses 

‘Useless,’” NBC, March 1, 2018, available at <www.nbcnews.com/news/world/vladimir-putin-setstate-union-speech-election-looms-n852211>.

272 Peter Zwack, “A Reawakening Nuclear Nightmare,” CNN, February 28, 2016, available at 

<www.cnn.com/2016/10/28/opinions/reawakening-nuclear-nightmare-zwack/index.html>.

273 Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Putin Warns New Weapons Will Target U.S. If Missiles Are Deployed 
87

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

in Europe,” Chicago Tribune, February 21, 2019, available at <www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-putin-missile-underwater-drone-speech-20190220-story.html>.

274 Ibid.

275 Steve Gutterman, “The Week in Russia: Gerasimov’s Trojan Horse and a Tabloid’s Tip for 

Putin,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 8, 2019, available at <www.rferl.org/a/the-week-inrussia-gerasimov-s-trojan-horse-and-a-tabloid-s-tip-for-putin/29810690.html >.

276 Steven Covington, “The Culture of Russian Strategic Behind Russia’s Modern Approaches 

to Warfare,” Harvard Belfer Center, February 2016, available at <www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/

files/legacy/files/Culture%20of%20Strategic%20Thought%203.pdf>.

277 Steven Collins, “Russia and China Now Able to Sink all U.S. Aircraft Carriers,” Steven M. 

Collins blog, March 29, 2008, available at <http://stevenmcollins.com/WordPress/russian-and-chinanow-able-to-sink-all-american-aircraft-carriers/>.

278 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Impact of the Economic Crisis,” TheCIPHERBrief.com, April 8, 2016, 

available at <www.thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/impact-economic-crisis-1090>.

279 “In Russia, Defense Cuts Were Inevitable,” Stratfor.com, March 11, 2016, available at 

<www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-defense-cuts-were-inevitable>.

280 Mark Galeotti, “The Truth behind Russia’s Defense Budget,” European Council on Foreign 

Relations, March 24, 2017, available at <www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_truth_about_russias_

defence_budget_7255>.

281 “Russia’s Defense Spending Reveals a Big Problem for Its Plans to Upgrade Its Military,” 

Business Insider, January 17, 2019, available at <www.businessinsider.com/russian-defense-spendingindicate-hurdles-for-military-modernization-2019-1>.

282 Julian Borger, “Nuclear Weapons Risk Greater than in Cold War, Says Ex-Pentagon Chief,” 

Guardian (London), January 7, 2016, available at <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/07/nuclearweapons-risk-greater-than-in-cold-war-says-ex-pentagon-chief>.

283 “Russia’s Putin Softens Pension Reform after Outcry,” BBC, August 29, 2018, available at 

<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-45342721>.

284 Vladimir Milov, “Russian Pension Reform a Black Swan for Putin?” Free Russia blog, July 

31 2018, available at <www.4freerussia.org/russian-pension-reform-a-black-swan-for-vladimir-putin/>.

285 Andrei Nikarichev, “Russia Ruling Party Approval Plummets Amid Retirement Age Hike,” 

The Moscow Times, July 31, 2018, available at <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-ruling-partyapproval-plummets-amid-retirement-age-hike-62400>.

286 “Economic Changes in Russia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, available 

at <www.csis.org/programs/russia-and-eurasia-program/russia-and-eurasia-past-projects/economicchange-russia>.

287 Simeon Djankov, “Russia’s Economy under Putin: From Crony Capitalism to State Capitalism,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2015, available at <https://piie.com/

sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb15-18.pdf>.

288 Ibid.

289 “List of Countries by the Number of Billionaires,” Wikipedia, available at <https://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_the_number_of_billionaires>.
88 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

290 Tim Daiss, “Prolonged Sanctions Rip into Russian Economy, Causing Angst for Putin,” 

Forbes, August 19, 2016, available at <www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/08/19/prolonged-sanctions-rip-into-russia-causing-angst-for-putin/2/>.

291 Edward Hunter Christie, “Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?” NATO Review 

Magazine, available at <www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-theyworked/EN/index.htm>.

292 Julia Ioffe, “What Russia’s Latest Protests Mean for Putin,” The Atlantic, March 27, 

2017, available at <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/navalny-protests-russia-putin/520878/>.

293Rebecca Nelson, U.S. Sanctions and Russia’s Economy, R43895 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 17, 2017), available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43895.

pdf>.

294 “Russia Economic Report,” The World Bank, available at <www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer>.

295 “Russian Economy Returns to Modest Growth in 2017, Says World Bank,” press release, 

November 29, 2017, available at <www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/11/29/rer-38>.

296 Sheena McKenzie, “Russia Protests: Opposition Leader Navalny Released from Police 

Custody,” CNN, May 6, 2018.

297 “Navalny Video Accusing Medvedev of Corruption Posted on Government Websites,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 11, 2017, available at <www.rferl.org/a/navalny-video-medvedevcorruption-posted-goverment-websites/28541102.html>.

298 “Al Jazeera Protest in Moscow Against Telegram App Ban,” al Jazeera, May 1, 2018, 

<www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/protest-moscow-telegram-app-ban-180430124103204.html>.

299 “Russia Youth Unemployment Rate,” YCharts.com, 2017, available at <https://ycharts.

com/indicators/russia_youth_unemployment_rate>.

300 “He Who Shall Not Be Named: The Kremlin’s Last Words on Navalny’s Election Bid,” The 

Moscow Times, January 17, 2018, available at <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/how-the-kremlinresponded-to-navalny-59303>.

301 “Kremlin Critic Alexei Navalny Jailed for Third Time This Year,” Guardian (London), 

October 2, 2017, available at <www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/02/russian-opposition-leaderalexei-navalny-returns-to-jail>.

302 “Putin Says Will Run as Independent Candidate for New Kremlin Term,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-opposition/putin-says-will-run-asindependent-candidate-for-new-kremlin-term-idUSKBN1E812L>.

303 “Putin Likely to Run as Independent in 2018 Election,” The Moscow Times, July 6, 2017, 

available at <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/putin-likely-to-run-as-independent-in-2018-presidential-election-58309>.

304 Margaret Vice, “President Putin: The Russian Perspective,” Pew Research Center, June 20, 

2017, available at <www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/20/president-putin-russian-perspective/>.

305 “Lavrov: Russia-West Relations Lower than during Cold War,” Tass News Agency, April 

16, 2018, available at <http://tass.com/politics/1000039>.
89

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

306 Neil MacFarquhar, “Putin’s Re-Election Is assured: Let the Succession Fight Begin,” New 

York Times, December 11, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/world/europe/russiavladimir-putin-election.html>.

307 Julia Ponomareva, “Military Chaplains: Serving God and Mother Russia,” RussiaBeyond.

com, May 21, 2013, available at <www.rbth.com/society/2013/05/21/military_chaplains_serving_for_

god_and_mother_russia_26187.html>.

308 Tom Kershaw, “The Religion and Political Views of Vladimir Putin,” Hollow Verse blog, 

January 16, 2013, available at <https://hollowverse.com/vladimir-putin/>.

309 Zwack, “Swimming the Volga.”

310 Andrew Higgins, “In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines with Firepower,” New 

York Times, September 13, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/russiaorthodox-church.html>.

311 Ibid. and Ponomareva, “Military Chaplains.”

312 Sergei Chapnin, “The Russian Church: Profiting from Orthodoxy,” Public Orthodoxy 

blog, March 30, 2017, available at <https://publicorthodoxy.org/2017/03/30/russian-church-protestssilence/>.

313 “Ukrainian Orthodox Church Officially Gains Independence from Russian Church,” NPR, 

January 5, 2019, available at <www.npr.org/2019/01/ /682504351/ukrainian-orthodox-church-officially-gains-independence-from-russian-church>.

314 “Russia,” The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2018), 

available at <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>.

315 Marlene Laruelle, “How Islam will Change Russia,” The Jamestown Foundation, September 15, 2016, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/marlene-laruelle-how-islam-will-changerussia/>.

316 Leonid Peisakhin and Noam Lupi, “Why Are Crimean Tatars So hostile to Russia?” 

Washington Post, September 5, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/

wp/2017/09/05/what-shapes-political-activism-for-crimean-tatars-the-familys-experience-under-sovietrule-is-a-huge-factor/?utm_term=.e1e06fc73e6e>.

317 Luke Coffey, “Russia Continues to Oppress Crimea’s Tatars,” al Jazeera, March 19, 

2016, available at <www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/russia-continues-oppress-crimeatatars-160308054208716.html>.

318 Peter Finn, “Putin Removes Chechen President, Appoints Ally,” Washington Post, 

February 16, 2007, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/15/

AR2007021501940.html>.

319 Zachary Laub, “Instability in Russia’s North Caucasus Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 13, 2005, available at <www.cfr.org/backgrounder/instability-russias-north-caucasusregion>.

320 Fred Dews, “Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on the 4+1 Framework, and Meeting Transnational Threats,” Brookings Institute blog, February 24, 2017, available at <www.brookings.edu/blog/

brookings-now/2017/02/24/joint-chiefs-chairman-dunford-transnational-threats/>.

321 Nora Bensahel, “Darker Shades of Gray: Why Gray Zone Conflicts Will Become More 
90 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

Frequent and Complex,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 13, 2017, available at <www.fpri.

org/article/2017/02/darker-shades-gray-gray-zone-conflicts-will-become-frequent-complex/>.

322 Neil MacFarquhar, “A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories,” New York 

Times, August 28, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/russia-swedendisinformation.html>.

323 Andrew Weiss, “Vladimir Putin’s Political Meddling Revives Old KGB Tactics,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 17, 2017, available at <http://carnegieendowment.

org/2017/02/17/vladimir-putin-s-political-meddling-revives-old-kgb-tactics-pub-68043>.

324 Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare (Arlington, VA: 

CNA, March 2017), available at <www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-014231-1Rev.pdf>. 

325 Ibid.; MacFarquhar, “A Powerful Russian Weapon.”

326Connell and Vogler, Russian’s Approach to Cyber Warfare.

327 Ibid.

328 Ibid.

329Cathy O’Neill, “Russia Used Facebook to Spy on the Macron Campaign in France,” 

FortuneTech.com, July 27, 2017, available at <http://fortune.com/2017/07/27/facebook-russia-francemacron/>.

330 Natasha Lomas, “Germany’s Social Media Hate Speech Law Is Now in Effect,” TechCrunch.com, October 2, 2017, available at <https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/02/germanys-social-media-hate-speech-law-is-now-in-effect/>.

331 Emily O. Goldman and Michael Warner, Why a Digital Pearl Harbor Makes Sense, and Is 

Possible (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2017).

332 “Russia,” Gallup.com, available at <http://news.gallup.com/poll/1642/russia.aspx>.

333 “Russian and American View of Each Other Improve,” Pew Research Center, August 15, 

2017, available at <www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putinrussia/pg_2017-08-16_views-of-russia_008/http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/16/publics-worldwideunfavorable-toward-putin-russia/>.

334 Kristen Bialek, “Putin Remains Overwhelmingly Unpopular in the United States,” Pew 

Research Center, August 16, 2018, available at <www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/26/putinremains-overwhelmingly-unpopular-in-the-united-states/>.

335 Tom O’Connor, “Trump’s Approval Rating in Russia More Than Twice Putin’s in the 

U.S.,” Newsweek, August 28, 2017, available at <www.newsweek.com/trump-approval-rating-russiamore-twice-putin-us-651144>.

336 “U.S. sanctions Are ‘Trade War’ on Russia, Says PM Medvedev,” BBC, August 3, 2017, 

available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40809715>.

337 Patrick Wintour, “Russia Expels Diplomat in Tit-for-Tat Actions for Salisbury Attack,” 

Guardian (London), March 29, 2018, available at <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/29/

russia-accuses-uk-of-violating-international-law-skripal-case>.

338 Tyler Durden, “UK Confirms Novichok in Latest Poisoning Same as Used on the Skripals,” 

ZeroHedge.com, July 7, 2018, available at <www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-07-05/uk-confirms-novichok-involved-latest-poisoning-same-used-skripals>.
91

Russian Geostrategic Challenges

339 Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal That He Long Scorned,” New York 

Times, May 8, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html>.

340 Vladimir Soldatkin, “Top Russian-NATO Generals Hold Rare Face-to-Face Meeting,” 

Reuters, April 19, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-nato/toprussian-nato-generals-hold-rare-face-to-face-meeting-idUSKBN1HQ12L>.

341 John Dorney, “The Northern Ireland Conflict, 1968–1998: An Overview,” TheIrishStory.

com, February 9, 2015, available at <www.theirishstory.com/2015/02/09/the-northern-ireland-conflict1968-1998-an-overview/#.W2LFmNgzZbU>.

342 Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Is Sending Deadly Javelin Missiles to Ukraine,” Popular 

Mechanics, January 4, 2018, available at <www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a14532152/

the-us-is-sending-deadly-javelin-missiles-to-ukraine/>.

343 “Negotiating the Dayton Peace Accords,” Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 

n.d., available at <https://adst.org/2014/11/the-dayton-peace-accords/>.

344 Atle Staalesen, “FSB Builds New Coast Guard Icebreaking Vessel,” The Barents Observer, 

October 20, 2016, available at <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/10/fsb-builds-newice-breaking-coastguard-vessel>.

345 Jane Di Pane, “The Coast Guard Needs Six New Icebreakers to Protect U.S. Interests in 

the Arctic And Antarctic,” The Heritage Foundation, April 9, 2018, available at <www.heritage.org/

defense/report/the-coast-guard-needs-six-new-icebreakers-protect-us-interests-the-arctic-and>.

346 Abbot Gleason, “Eurasia: What Is It? Is It?” Journal of Eurasian Studies 1, no. 1 (2010), 

available at <www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366509000037>.

347 Henry Meyer, “The One Russian Linking Putin, Erdoghan, and Trump,” Bloomberg, February 2, 2017, available at <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-03/who-is-alexander-duginthe-man-linking-putin-erdogan-and-trump>.
92 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 29

About the Authors

Brigadier General Peter B. Zwack, USA (Ret.), is the Senior Russia Eurasia Fellow in the 

Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. He regularly writes, teaches, and consults within the Department of Defense, 

interagency community, think tanks, academia, and the private sector on contemporary Russian and Eurasian security issues and leadership lessons learned.

From 2012 to 2014, BG Zwack served as the U.S. Senior Defense Official and Attaché to 

the Russian Federation. By interacting with Russians at multiple levels since 1989, including 

defense, security, academia, policy, veterans, and private citizens, BG Zwack developed a unique 

hands-on perspective on Russia and Eurasian security affairs, especially during the turbulent 

period that included the recent strife in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

BG Zwack enlisted in the Army in 1980 and received his commission via Officer Candidate School (OCS). He subsequently served 34 years as a Military Intelligence and Eurasian Foreign Area Officer, working in diverse and challenging duty and deployment locations including 

Afghanistan, Kosovo, Russia, South Korea, and West Germany. He commanded at multiple echelons, including the 66th Military Intelligence Group, was the Intelligence Chief (G2) for U.S. 

Army Europe from 2006 to 2008, and was the Senior Army Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan 

from 2008 to 2009.

Inducted into the OCS Hall of Fame in 2018, BG Zwack was also honored as the Action 

Officer of the Year by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1999. He is a proud recipient of the Bronze Star, 

Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, as well as numerous other awards and citations.

BG Zwack speaks Russian, German, Italian, and some French.

Marie-Charlotte Pierre is a Research Intern in CSR. Ms. Pierre will be completing a Master of Arts in Security Policy Studies in the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George 

Washington University in May 2019. She is also a finalist for the Class of 2019 Presidential Management Fellowship. Ms. Pierre holds a Bachelor of Science in Political Science from Clemson 

University.


Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

DR. R. KIM CRAGIN

Senior Research Fellow

DR. G. ALEXANDER CROWTHER

Senior Research Fellow

DR. T.X. HAMMES

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. FRANK G. HOFFMAN

Distinguished Research Fellow

COL ROBERT M. KLEIN, USA

Senior Military Fellow

DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB

Distinguished Research Fellow

COL ABIGAIL LINNINGTON, USA, PH.D.

Senior Military Fellow

MR. BRYCE S. LOIDOLT

Research Fellow

DR. THOMAS F. LYNCH III

Director

DR. JAMES J. PRZYSTUP

Senior Research Fellow

COL JOSE E. SUMANGIL, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

BRIGADIER GENERAL PETER B. ZWACK, 

USA (RET.)

Senior Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit inss.ndu.edu.