In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-1221

LISA ULREY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM REICHHART and

SCHOOL BOARD OF MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:16-cv-257-JD — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019

____________________

Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lisa Ulrey served as the 

assistant principal of the Manchester Junior-Senior High 

School until November 4, 2014, when she resigned during a 

meeting with William Reichhart, the school district’s superintendent. Ulrey brings two claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against Reichhart and the school board. First, she 

claims that Reichhart violated her rights under the First 
2 No. 19-1221

Amendment by retaliating against her for her speech about a 

student discipline issue. Second, she contends that the defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by coercing her to resign, depriving her of her property interest in her 

job without due process of law. The district court granted 

summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. We affirm. Undisputed facts show that Ulrey spoke about the discipline issue in her capacity as an employee, so the First 

Amendment did not protect her speech. Ulrey also failed to 

present evidence sufficient to support a finding that her resignation was involuntary.

I. Claim for First Amendment Retaliation

Citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by 

accepting public employment, but legal doctrine in this field 

tries to maintain a careful balance between the interests of the 

employee as a citizen and the interests of the employer-government in serving the public. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231 

(2014), citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 

(1968). The First Amendment claim here arises from a disagreement between plaintiff Ulrey and defendant Reichhart 

concerning student discipline. Because we review a grant of 

summary judgment against Ulrey, we recount facts in the 

light reasonably most favorable to her. See Healy v. City of Chicago, 450 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).

In August 2014, Superintendent Reichhart granted an 

adult student permission to possess cigarettes (though not to 

smoke them) on school grounds. Ulrey learned of that decision and disagreed with it. Without approaching Reichhart 

first, Ulrey called the president of the school board, Sally 

Krouse. Krouse in turn emailed Reichhart to express her concern about his decision. Reichhart then rebuked Ulrey for 
No. 19-1221 3

going over his head, threatening to reprimand her formally if 

she did not apologize. She did apologize. She claims in this 

lawsuit, however, that Reichhart forced her to resign three 

months later to retaliate against her for her call to Krouse.

In maintaining the critical balance under the Pickering and 

Lane line of cases, the threshold question in a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation suit is whether the employee’s speech was constitutionally protected. E.g., Swetlik v. 

Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). If Ulrey’s call to 

Krouse had been protected speech, then we would need to 

decide whether Ulrey presented evidence that her call motivated Reichhart to inflict on her deprivations likely to deter 

speech. Id.

We do not need to reach those issues, however, because 

Ulrey’s speech was unprotected as a matter of law. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (noting that the “inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not 

fact”). Ulrey’s claim fails at this first step. The undisputed 

facts show that she spoke to Krouse as an employee, not a private citizen. “In order for a public employee to raise a successful First Amendment claim for her employer’s restriction of 

her speech, the speech must be in her capacity as a private 

citizen and not as an employee.” McArdle v. Peoria School Dist. 

No. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). The test for distinguishing private speech from employee speech is whether the 

employees speak “pursuant to their official duties.” Spiegla v. 

Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).

Ulrey argues that reporting the superintendent’s alleged 

misconduct or violation of district policy on tobacco fell outside her official duties. Since the Supreme Court decided 
4 No. 19-1221

Garcetti, however, we have repeatedly rejected such claims for 

a whistleblower carve-out from the category of unprotected 

employee speech. In Garcetti, the employee wrote a memorandum detailing governmental misconduct. The Supreme Court 

held that his speech was unprotected because the memorandum “was written pursuant to [his] official duties.” 547 U.S. 

at 421. Garcetti suggested that “legislative enactments” such 

as “whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes,” rather 

than the First Amendment, ought to protect employees 

obliged to report official misconduct as part of their job. Id. at 

425.

Shortly after Garcetti was decided, we applied it to a case 

like Ulrey’s. In Spiegla, a prison guard stationed at the main 

gate reported her supervisor for letting a vehicle pass without 

the required search for contraband. See 481 F.3d at 962–63. We 

held that the guard “spoke as an employee, not a citizen, because ensuring compliance with prison security policy was 

part of what she was employed to do.” Id. at 966. The fact that 

her statements “highlighted potential misconduct by prison 

officers” did not affect the analysis under Garcetti. Id. at 967.

As the district court recognized, we have applied this reasoning in many different employment contexts. See, e.g., Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016) (police 

officer reporting misconduct of co-worker); McArdle, 705 F.3d 

at 753 (school principal reporting misconduct of district academic officer); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 

2008) (professor reporting misconduct of dean); Vose v. 

Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (police supervisor reporting misconduct of detectives); see also Ulrey v. Reichhart, 

2018 WL 6435652, at *4–6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2018).
No. 19-1221 5

This line of decisions—which Ulrey failed to acknowledge 

or address in the district court and on appeal, even after the 

district court relied upon them—required summary judgment for defendants. Even if Superintendent Reichhart violated school district policy by making an exception allowing 

an adult student to possess cigarettes when he attended 

school, Ulrey’s speech fell within her official duties. Her written job description included duties to “coordinate and administer student attendance and discipline policies,” just as the 

guard in Spiegla was paid to monitor vehicles coming into the 

prison. Ulrey’s complaint to the school board president fell 

within the scope of her job and was unprotected employee 

speech, not protected citizen speech.

The two cases that Ulrey relies on do not help her position. 

In both Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), and Chrzanowski v. 

Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013), the plaintiffs’ speech was 

protected because they spoke as citizens, in non-employee capacities, not because they reported misconduct. In Lane, the 

Supreme Court held that sworn testimony given under subpoena in a criminal trial was citizen speech even though the 

plaintiff was testifying against a former co-worker about misconduct in their office. 573 U.S. at 239. Similarly, in 

Chrzanowski, we held that a prosecutor who testified against 

his supervisor before a grand jury and at trial spoke as a citizen. 725 F.3d at 739–40. These cases turned on the speech’s 

context, not its content. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical 

question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself 

ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not 

whether it merely concerns those duties.”); see also Swetlik, 

738 F.3d at 826 (observing that employee’s statements in police union meetings and grievances reporting police chief’s 

misconduct submitted by plaintiff in his capacity as a union 
6 No. 19-1221

member were not employee speech). Ulrey’s call to the school 

board president was not comparable to sworn testimony before a court or grand jury.

Ulrey raises one other point that, she argues, creates a dispute of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The 

adult student whom Reichhart had allowed to possess cigarettes attended a special program called “Squire Academy”—

named for the school mascot—that operated somewhat independently from the high school. Accepting Ulrey’s allegations 

as true, her authority to enforce the student handbook did not 

extend to Squire Academy students. Ulrey argues that her 

speech to Krouse thus fell outside her duties as assistant principal.

We disagree. This administrative division cannot bear the 

weight Ulrey places on it. Squire Academy occupied the same 

building complex as the high school, and Ulrey states that she 

had “administrative responsibility” over the “physical classroom” in which it met. Explaining her decision to call Krouse, 

Ulrey testified that “students should not be allowed to have 

tobacco on school property for any reason” because it was 

“against the student handbook.” She also confirmed that she 

was “angry because of [her] role in enforcing the handbook.” 

Squire Academy disciplinary decisions bore closely on 

Ulrey’s duties even if she lacked total control over them, and 

we do not parse the precise scope of employees’ duties as 

finely as Ulrey argues. See, e.g., Vose, 506 F.3d at 571 (holding 

that police officer’s report of misconduct in a separate unit of

the police department was employee speech). The district 

court correctly granted summary judgment on the First 

Amendment claim.
No. 19-1221 7

II. Claim for Denial of Due Process

Ulrey’s due-process claim stems from her resignation on 

November 4, 2014, three months after her call to the school 

board president. When a public employee has a property interest in his or her continued employment, typically shown 

by proving that the employee may be fired only for good 

cause, the state may not terminate the employment without 

due process of law. E.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 

681 (7th Cir. 2003); see generally Cleveland Board of Education 

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 

408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Reichhart and the School Board agree 

that Ulrey had a protected interest in continued employment. 

Indiana gives public school teachers and administrators statutory protections that spell out the details of procedures used 

to vindicate this due process right. See Ind. Code § 20-28-7.5-

1 et seq. (2014) (teachers); Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2 (2014) (principals and assistant principals).1

If Reichhart had tried to fire Ulrey, these procedural protections would have been available to her. She did not invoke 

these procedural protections because she resigned. The general rule is that an employee who resigns—voluntarily relinquishing her interest in continued employment—may not 

complain of a lack of due process. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 

447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of due-process 

claim by employee who resigned). There are narrow exceptions, however. In Palka we identified two types of 

 1 Principals and assistant principals like Ulrey work under the regular 

teacher’s contract. See Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2(1). Indiana substantially revised the grounds and procedures for cancelling teacher contracts in 2011, 

but those amendments are not relevant here. See Elliott v. Bd. of School 

Trustees of Madison Consol. Schools, 876 F.3d 926, 928–30 (7th Cir. 2017).
8 No. 19-1221

“involuntary resignation” that amount to termination: constructive discharge and coerced resignation. “Constructive 

discharge” is akin to a hostile work environment claim and 

may occur “when an employer makes employment so unbearable that an employee resigns.” Id.; see Pennsylvania State 

Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (explaining comparison to hostile work environment). Coerced resignation, 

on the other hand, is “characterized by the presence of a Hobson’s choice in which the employee must resign or suffer severe consequences, such as facing criminal charges.” Palka, 

623 F.3d at 453.

These two types of involuntary resignation are closely related. See Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405–06 (7th Cir. 

1988). The primary distinction may be temporal: Whereas 

constructive discharge results when an employee must endure intolerable working conditions over some period of 

time, a specific threat or misrepresentation concerning future 

harm can provoke a coerced resignation. See Graehling v. Village of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (likening 

coerced resignation to signing a resignation letter at gunpoint).

Before considering whether Ulrey can avoid summary 

judgment under either theory, we summarize the events that 

led up to Ulrey’s resignation on November 4, 2014. Where 

there are disputes, we credit Ulrey’s account because we are 

reviewing a grant of summary judgment against her. The 

problems apparently began with faulty processing of teaching licenses at nearby Manchester University, where Ulrey 

had studied for her most recent license renewal. In an October 

28 email, Reichhart notified all district teachers of potential 

errors on such licenses and stressed the serious nature of 
No. 19-1221 9

licensing defects. Later that morning, Ulrey logged on to a 

state website to check her own license. She discovered a problem and promptly notified her superiors, including Reichhart. 

The error related to Ulrey’s eligibility to hold an administrative license, which she needed to serve as an assistant principal. 

That same day, Reichhart called the state Department of 

Education with Ulrey present. A state official told them that 

the error could be resolved. The next morning, the official contacted Ulrey to ask permission to remove false entries, and she 

promptly agreed. Yet Reichhart’s concerns were not assuaged; he emailed Ulrey on October 31 because he could not 

find her corrected license online. That same day, he met in his 

office with Ulrey and two others: Nancy Alspaugh, the high 

school principal, and Scott Bumgardner, the business manager. In the meeting, Reichhart berated Ulrey for the error and 

implied that he did not believe it had been an honest mistake.

Tensions came to a head on November 4, when Reichhart 

again called a meeting with Ulrey, Alspaugh, and Bumgardner. Reichhart stated that he could not “get past” the licensing 

situation. According to her testimony, Ulrey was “baffled” 

and “asked him if he was asking for my resignation.” Reichhart replied that he was. He then handed her a letter of resignation he had already prepared for her. Ulrey signed the letter 

during the meeting. That same night, the school board approved Ulrey’s resignation on its consent agenda.

Ulrey argues that these facts present a genuine dispute as 

to whether her resignation was coerced. Ulrey does not commit herself to either legal test for involuntary resignation; rather, she asks us to consider what she describes as a “reasonable person” standard, arguing that a trier of fact must always 
10 No. 19-1221

determine the voluntariness of a resignation. Yet, as summarized above, the tests for constructive discharge and coerced 

resignation do not ask generically whether a reasonable employee would perceive a “free choice.” Ulrey needed to produce evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rule in her 

favor under one of the established formulas for involuntary 

resignation. For due-process purposes, there is a critical difference between a resignation and a discharge, and that difference must be protected by insisting that the exceptions for 

constructive discharges and coerced resignations be kept narrow. The test is not whether the employee who resigned was 

happy about resigning or even whether the employer asked 

for the resignation. 

Taking the exceptions in turn, Ulrey’s case is not a good fit 

for constructive discharge. She claims that she felt coerced to 

resign in a specific meeting with her supervisor, not that her 

conditions of employment became intolerable over time. A 

constructive discharge can result from a hostile work environment only if the environment is “even more egregious than 

that needed for a hostile work environment.” Thompson v. Memorial Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Ulrey has not presented evidence of conditions even approaching that high standard.2

 2 Constructive discharge can sometimes refer to a situation where “an 

employer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable 

employee that she will be terminated.” Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children & 

Family Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). But only at-will employees 

can show constructive discharge under this approach. Employees who enjoy due-process protections cannot assume that the start of termination 

proceedings will result in termination. See Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School
No. 19-1221 11

Ulrey’s theory also falls well short of creating a genuine 

dispute of material fact under a coerced resignation theory. 

The most a jury could infer is that Reichhart threatened to fire 

Ulrey because of the licensing errors. Reichhart, for instance, 

admits that he told Ulrey it was in her “best interest” to resign. 

But the possibility of eventual termination, without more, 

cannot render a resignation involuntary; otherwise, a due 

process violation would result whenever a public employee 

resigned rather than asserting his or her (usually extensive) 

procedural rights. See Palka, 623 F.3d at 453 (“That Palka decided to resign rather than risk an unfavorable Merit Board 

decision does not make his resignation involuntary.”).

In contrast, the rare, legally viable claims of coerced resignation have typically involved threats beyond termination, 

such as criminal prosecution or physical harm. See, e.g., Benuzzi v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 119 F. Supp. 3d 

917, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying motion for summary judgment where jury could find that plaintiff retired in response 

to threat of criminal prosecution); Lynd v. Bristol Kendall Fire 

Protection Dist., 2012 WL 3069391, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2012) 

(denying motion to dismiss; plaintiff alleged he resigned in 

response to threats to harm his family). We have also held that 

a material misrepresentation that induces resignation can 

constitute coercion. See Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112–13 

(7th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of summary judgment for employer on due-process claim where employee said she was 

threatened with loss of vested pension benefits if she did not 

resign and were instead fired); cf. Covington v. Dep’t of Health 

& Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (federal 

 

Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The only way to know how matters 

will turn out is to let the process run its course.”).
12 No. 19-1221

retirement considered involuntary if employee relies on misinformation, whether error is intentional, negligent, or innocent); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed. 

Cir. 1983) (same). Here, Ulrey offered to resign because Reichhart’s “vibes” and “physical demeanor” communicated his 

desire to fire her. That simply is not enough to treat defendants as if they had denied plaintiff the extensive procedural 

protections available to her if she had wanted to contest a possible termination.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.