UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4995

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHARLES ALLEN HALL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger, 

District Judge. (3:09-cr-00019-MR-1)

Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: October 15, 2012

Before TRAXLER, Chief Circuit Judge; DUNCAN and DAVIS, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge 

Traxler and Judge Davis joined.

ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH 

CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Melissa Louise Rikard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Claire J. 

Rauscher, Executive Director, Angela Parrott, Assistant Federal 

Defender, Cecilia Oseguera, Assistant Federal Defender, FEDERAL 

DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North 

Carolina, Matthew Segal, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH 

CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne 
2

M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Charles Allen Hall appeals his conviction 

and sentence on one count of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on the 

ground that state authorities violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights. He further contends that the district court erroneously 

admitted unduly prejudicial evidence. In the alternative, Hall 

requests that we vacate the district court’s order requiring him 

to reimburse court-appointed attorneys’ fees, as well as his

sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”). For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm Hall’s conviction. However, 

we vacate the district court’s reimbursement order and remand 

for resentencing as to that issue only.

I.

A.

We briefly summarize the relevant facts. On April 8, 

2008, Officer Calvin Helms of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

Department went with three other officers to Hall’s Charlotte, 

North Carolina residence to arrest him for a misdemeanor charge 

arising from the purported theft of catalytic converters. 

Officer Helms was aware that Hall had a lengthy criminal 

history, including fifteen felony convictions and one hundred 

arrests. Upon arriving at Hall’s residence, the officers 
4

recognized his vehicle in the driveway, as some of the officers 

had seen Hall driving the vehicle in the past. After the 

officers knocked and announced their presence at both the front 

and back doors, a man who the officers knew was not Hall, and 

who was later identified as Thomas Phillips, opened the back 

door. An officer asked Phillips whether Hall was there. 

Phillips mumbled something incomprehensible in response--

possibly “hold on” or “no”--before shutting the door. J.A. 99. 

The officers continued knocking but received no further

response. Officer Helms then contacted his supervisors and 

apprised them of the situation. In light of Hall’s criminal 

history, the officers decided to request the assistance of a 

SWAT team to execute the arrest warrant.

Over the next few hours, a SWAT team deployed to 

Hall’s residence, set up a command post, and used loudspeakers

to call for Hall to come out of the house. Hall did not come 

out, but four other occupants emerged: Hall’s wife, Sheena Hall; 

her two children; and Phillips. Ms. Hall told the officers that 

her husband was not inside. According to the officers, Phillips 

told them that Hall was in the house. At the later suppression 

hearing, Phillips disputed that he told the officers Hall was 

inside; however, the district court credited the officers’ 

testimony. When Hall did not respond or emerge, SWAT team 

members entered the house and searched for Hall but did not find 
5

him.

During the search, the officers located two firearms, 

including a rifle that had been placed in an air duct large

enough for a person to fit inside that ran underneath the house. 

An officer had opened the air duct to see if Hall was hiding in 

it. That officer immediately “located a brown or tan rifle 

bag,” about three feet long, six to eight inches high, and 

narrowed in a triangular manner on one end, laying lengthwise 

down the duct. J.A. 585-86. He pulled the bag out of the air 

duct and set it on the ground. At trial, the officer testified 

that he referred to it as a “rifle bag” because he owns several 

such bags himself. He further described it as “just a large 

canvas or cloth like bag that’s long enough for a rifle to fit 

into with a strap across the top,” J.A. 185, and explained that 

“[y]ou could feel the weight of it being heavier on one side 

versus the other when I lifted it out, typical of a rifle bag 

with a rifle inside of it. I have several at home, same exact 

set up,” J.A. 586. Other officers later opened the bag and 

found a rifle.

After the initial search, one of the officers 

interviewed Phillips again, and reported that Phillips was 

adamant that Hall was inside. The SWAT team then conducted a 

second search, and officers located Hall in a crevice inside the 

attic wall. An officer later testified at trial that he saw 
6

Hall and said, “Let me see your hands,” whereupon Hall swore at 

him and spat at him and other officers. J.A. 151-52.

B.

On February 17, 2009, Hall was charged in the Western 

District of North Carolina with being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hall filed a 

motion to suppress, arguing, inter alia, that (1) officers could 

not enter a house to arrest the subject of a misdemeanor 

warrant; (2) officers did not have adequate “reason to believe” 

Hall was inside; (3) officers exceeded the scope of a protective 

sweep; and (4) the duration of the search was constitutionally 

unreasonable. The magistrate judge conducted two suppression 

hearings, after which he recommended that Hall’s motion be 

denied. Hall filed written objections to that recommendation. 

On September 29 and October 8, 2009, the district court entered 

orders overruling Hall’s objections, adopting the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation, and denying the motion to suppress. On 

the first day of trial, the district court heard additional 

testimony regarding the motion to suppress and reiterated its 

denial of that motion.

Hall also filed a motion in limine to preclude the use 

of what he deemed inadmissible propensity evidence under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, he objected to testimony 
7

from officers that Hall swore and spat at them when they found 

and arrested him.1 The district court ruled that such evidence 

was not 404(b) evidence, as it was inextricably intertwined with 

the events in question and was relevant and admissible. Hall 

again objected to the admission of this evidence at trial, and 

his objection was overruled.

After trial on October 19 and 20, 2009, a jury 

convicted Hall. On August 25, 2010, the district court 

sentenced Hall as an armed career criminal to 188 months 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release under the 

ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The district court found that Hall 

lacked “the ability to pay a fine or interest” under 18 U.S.C. § 

3572(a), but it ordered Hall to reimburse the United States for 

court-appointed attorneys’ fees, in the form of monthly 

installments in the amount of $50. It made no specific findings 

of fact in support of the reimbursement order. The district 

court entered judgment against Hall on September 11, 2010. This 

appeal followed.

 1 The government also referred to Hall’s conduct in this 

regard during its opening and closing statements.
8

II.

Hall makes the following arguments on appeal: that 

state authorities violated the Fourth Amendment by entering his

residence without “reason to believe” he was inside and by

searching the bag in which the rifle was found; that the 

district court erred in admitting evidence that Hall swore and 

spat at officers when they found him; that the district court 

violated the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, by 

ordering Hall to repay his court-appointed attorneys’ fees; and 

that the district court erred in sentencing him as an armed 

career criminal under the ACCA. We consider each contention in 

turn.

A.

We first address Hall’s contention that police 

violated the Fourth Amendment by entering his home without 

“reason to believe” he was inside.2

 On appeal from a district 

court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the court’s 

factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de 

 2 Although Hall also contends in general terms that “SWAT 

teams present acute Fourth Amendment concerns,” Appellant’s Br. 

at 19, he frames the argument in the context of the broader 

challenge to the officers’ “reason to believe” he was home when 

they entered his residence. He cites no authority, nor have we 

found any, for the proposition that a SWAT team may not be used 

to execute a misdemeanor warrant. To the contrary, given Hall’s 

criminal history, of which the officers were aware, the exercise 

of their discretion to call in a SWAT team seems appropriate.
9

novo. United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 

2005).

“[A]n arrest warrant founded on probable cause 

implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a 

dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to 

believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 

573, 603 (1980). It is well established that Payton requires 

that officers have a reasonable belief that the arrestee (1) 

lives in the residence, and (2) is within the residence at the 

time of entry. United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262 (4th 

Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 

(3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th 

Cir. 2001); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 

1995). Assuming the equivalence of the probable cause and 

reason to believe standards,3 the officers were required to have 

been aware of facts and circumstances sufficient to justify a 

reasonably cautious person in believing that Hall was in the 

home. Vasquez v. Snow, 616 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1980). “To 

 3 We note that the parties disagree about whether reasonable 

belief requires probable cause, or something less. We have 

previously acknowledged “the diverse views taken by our sister 

circuits,” and declined “to reach a conclusion as to whether 

‘reason to believe’ is as stringent as ‘probable cause.’” Hill, 

649 F.3d at 263. Here, too, we decline to resolve that issue, 

because we hold that the officers had probable cause to enter 

Hall’s home.
10

determine whether probable cause existed,” we “look to the 

totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time 

of the arrest.” United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 931 

(4th Cir. 1995). And “as to the second Payton prong, courts 

must be sensitive to common sense factors indicating a 

resident’s presence,” including “the possibility that the 

resident may be aware that police are attempting to ascertain 

whether or not the resident is at home.” United States v. 

Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995); cf. 3 Wayne R. 

LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.1 (4th ed. 2004) (“[T]he police 

need not possess ‘special knowledge’ that the defendant is at 

home in order to meet the probable cause test, for in the 

absence of facts tending to show that the defendant is not at 

home, it is reasonable to infer that he would be there.”).

On these facts, we hold that the officers had reason 

to believe that Hall was inside the house at the time of entry.4

 

 4 Hall argues that, for purposes of determining whether 

officers had “reason to believe” he was inside, officers 

“constructively entered” the residence and arrested him when 

SWAT team members began using loudspeakers, but before they 

physically entered the home. In so arguing, Hall relies on 

several out-of-circuit cases involving the use of forceful SWAT 

methods designed to lure a potential arrestee out of his home so 

police could arrest him in “public” without a warrant. See, 

e.g., United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1451 (10th Cir. 

1989) (finding that Payton is violated when “there is such a 

show of force that a defendant comes out of a home under 

coercion and submits to being taken in custody”). We decline to 

adopt the constructive entry analysis where, as here, officers 

(Continued)
11

Officers knew the house was Hall’s residence and possessed 

several pieces of information suggesting he was at home. First, 

officers recognized Hall’s vehicle in the driveway. Second, 

officers knew someone was in the house and not responding to 

their knocks. Further, Hall’s wife and two of her children 

ultimately emerged, as did Phillips, who reported, as credited 

by the district court, the fact of Hall’s presence inside. 

Therefore, officers had “reason to believe” Hall was inside the 

residence at the time of entry under Payton.

B.

Hall next contends that officers violated the Fourth 

Amendment by conducting a search of the bag that was ultimately 

found to contain a rifle. The government contends that the 

seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine.

Whether the plain view exception to the warrant 

requirement supports an officer’s search of a container is a 

question of law that we review de novo. United States v. 

Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1994).5 Officers may 

 

had an arrest warrant for Hall and did not use the SWAT team to 

lure Hall outside to make a warrantless arrest.

5 When a defendant fails to raise an issue before the 

district court with sufficient specificity, our review of the 

claim is for plain error only. United States v. Baptiste, 596 

(Continued)
12

conduct a warrantless search of a container seized in plain view 

only when its contents are a “foregone conclusion.” Id. at 197

(citation omitted). In Williams, we held that when a 

container’s “distinctive configuration proclaims its contents, 

the container supports no reasonable expectation of privacy and 

the contents can be said to be in plain view.” Id. (citation 

omitted). “In determining whether the contents of a container 

are a foregone conclusion, the circumstances under which an 

officer finds the container may add to the apparent nature of 

its contents.” Id. For example, in Williams, we upheld a

warrantless search where “compelling circumstances existed that 

[led] us to conclude” that “cellophane wrapped packages found in 

Williams’ suitcase ‘spoke volumes as to [their] contents--

particularly to the trained eye of the officer.’ For instance, 

from the appearance and size of the packages, . . . it was 

reasonable to assume” that they contained contraband. Id. at 

197-98 (citation omitted). We further noted the officer’s “firm 

belief, based on his ten years’ experience, that packages 

appearing in this manner always contained narcotics.” Id. at 

 

F.3d 214, 220 (4th Cir. 2010). The government contends that we 

should review for plain error only because Hall did not 

challenge the officer’s testimony that he knew the rifle bag 

found in the air duct contained a rifle. Because we hold that, 

even reviewed de novo, the warrantless search of the bag was 

lawful, we need not resolve this issue.
13

198.

Significantly for our analysis, the Supreme Court has

specifically cited a gun case as an example of a container that 

may be seized under the plain view exception. Arkansas v. 

Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) (“[S]ome containers 

(for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very 

nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy 

because their contents can be inferred from their outward 

appearance.”) (emphasis added). Although we have not previously 

applied the plain view exception to a gun case, other circuits 

have done so. See United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 775 

(8th Cir. 2008) (holding that “because gun cases vary in 

characteristics, [and] each case must be evaluated on its own 

facts,” the test is whether “the container at issue is readily 

identifiable as a gun case by its distinctive 

configuration”); United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 24 (1st 

Cir. 2005) (upholding search of clearly labeled gun case when 

the case “reasonably appeared to contain a gun,” and when “as a 

convicted felon, [the defendant] was prohibited from possessing 

one”); cf. United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954, 956-57 (10th 

Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply the exception to the search of a 

“hard plastic case” which “did not reveal its contents to the 

trial court,” but withholding judgment as to “the well-known 

soft, zippered gun cases” because “soft-sided gun cases could 
14

self-reveal the presence of a weapon inside”).

Similarly, we find it plain that the soft bag found in 

the air duct contained a rifle for the following reasons: (1) 

the officer immediately recognized it as a “rifle bag” because 

of its specific dimensions, shape, and weight distribution; (2) 

the officer had prior experience with rifle bags, and had 

several such bags at home; and (3) the rifle bag was secreted in 

an air duct. We therefore hold that the search of the rifle bag 

was justified and a search warrant unnecessary.

C.

We next consider Hall’s argument that the district 

court erred in admitting evidence that Hall spat and swore at 

police officers when they found him. “We review a district 

court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and subject 

such rulings to harmless error review.” United States v. 

Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 2009).

Under the harmless error standard, we will not reverse 

if we can “say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that 

happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 

that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 

error.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 

(1946); see United States v. Mouzone, 687 F.3d 207, 213 (4th 

Cir. 2012).
15

Hall argues that evidence of his behavior at the time

of arrest was both extrinsic to the ultimate 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1) charge and irrelevant to prove Hall’s “guilty 

knowledge” of the firearms in his house. He contends the 

testimony was extremely prejudicial. Even assuming that Hall is 

correct and that the district court erred in admitting the 

evidence, we conclude that any resulting error was harmless. In

this case, there was overwhelming evidence that Hall was guilty 

of the charged offense: the jury heard evidence of where the two 

guns were found and also heard phone calls in which Hall 

referenced owning other firearms that the police did not find. 

Moreover, Hall does not contend that evidence that he was hiding 

in the attic wall when officers found him was improperly

admitted. Thus, we can say with fair assurance that the 

testimony that Hall swore and spat at officers when they found 

him, and the prosecution’s references to that conduct during 

opening and closing statements, did not substantially sway the 

judgment in this case.

D.

We next address Hall’s challenge to the district 

court’s order requiring him to repay his attorneys’ fees. A 

district court’s authority to order reimbursement of attorneys’
16

fees presents a question of statutory interpretation which we 

normally review de novo. United States v. Weaver, 659 F.3d 353, 

356 (4th Cir. 2011). Because Hall did not raise this challenge 

below, however, our review is for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

52(b). To establish plain error, Hall must show that an error 

occurred, that it was plain, that it affected his substantial 

rights, and that this court should exercise its discretion to 

correct the error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 

(1993). We have held “that an error is clear or equivalently 

obvious if ‘the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit 

establishes that an error has occurred.’” United States v. 

Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

“Notably, the error need not be plain at the time the district 

court erred as long as the error is plain at the time of 

appellate consideration.” Id. An error affects the defendant’s 

substantial rights if it has a prejudicial effect on the 

sentence imposed. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th 

Cir. 2010).

The Criminal Justice Act requires the government to 

provide adequate legal representation for criminal defendants 

unable to pay for such services when, like Hall, they are 

charged with a federal felony offense. 18 U.S.C. § 

3006A(a)(1)(A). That statute also provides that “[i]f at any 

time after the appointment of counsel . . . the court finds that
17

the person is financially able to obtain counsel or to make 

partial payment for the representation, it may . . . authorize 

payment as provided in subsection (f), as the interests of 

justice may dictate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c). Subsection (f) 

authorizes a court to order repayment of attorneys’ fees under 

certain circumstances:

Whenever . . . the court finds that funds are 

available for payment from or on behalf of a person 

furnished representation, it may authorize or direct 

that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney . . 

. or to the court for deposit in the Treasury as a 

reimbursement to the appropriation, current at the 

time of payment, to carry out the provisions of this 

section.

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f).

We recently held that a district court must base a 

reimbursement order under § 3006A(f) “on a finding that there 

are specific funds, assets, or asset streams (or the fixed right 

to those funds, assets, or asset streams) that are (1) 

identified by the court and (2) available to the defendant for 

the repayment of the court-appointed attorneys’ fees.” United 

States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 322 (4th Cir. 2012). In Moore, 

we vacated the reimbursement order because the district court 

failed to make findings that defendant Moore was “financially 

able . . . to make partial payment for the representation.” Id.

at 323 (citation omitted). The district court in Moore “simply 

adopted the probation officer’s standing $50 a month repayment 
18

plan” even though it “specifically found that Moore, who was 

clearly eligible for a court-appointed attorney, did ‘not have 

the ability to pay a fine or interest.’” Id. (citation 

omitted).

We hold that Moore controls our disposition of Hall’s 

challenge to the district court’s reimbursement order. This 

case is factually similar to Moore: the district court made no 

findings regarding Hall’s ability to pay, relied upon the 

probation officer’s standard monthly installment plan, and 

specifically found that Hall did not have the ability to pay a 

fine or interest. As such, the district court did not comply 

with the statutory mandate here.6

 For those reasons, we exercise 

our discretion to hold that the district court’s judgment at 

sentencing, insofar as it required a reimbursement of attorneys’

fees, was in error, and that the error was plain. We vacate 

that portion of the district court’s judgment requiring Hall to 

repay his court-appointed attorneys’ fees, and remand for 

resentencing consistent with this opinion, as to that issue 

only.

E.

Finally, we address Hall’s challenge to his 

 6 It bears noting that the district court did not have the 

benefit of our decision in Moore when it entered the 

reimbursement order.
19

classification as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). “We review legal issues such as whether a 

defendant’s previous conviction counted as an ACCA predicate de 

novo, and we review factual findings for clear error.” United 

States v. Washington, 629 F.3d 403, 411 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(citations omitted).

Hall submitted his own, supplemental brief to contest 

his sentence under the ACCA. He contends he has not been 

convicted of three prior violent felonies, as 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(1) requires, and therefore should not have been sentenced 

as an armed career criminal.

He first argues that his South Carolina third-degree 

burglary conviction is not a violent felony. “The Supreme Court 

has defined burglary as a violent felony under the ACCA only if 

the breaking and entering was what it terms generic burglary: 

‘any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having 

the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or 

remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a 

crime.’” See United States v. Foster, 662 F.3d 291, 292 (4th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 

(1990)).

Although Hall’s charging document from the burglary 

conviction does not specify the statute under which he was 

charged, we nevertheless conclude that his third-degree burglary 
20

conviction qualifies as a violent prior felony for ACCA 

purposes. There was no evidence of there being more than one 

third-degree burglary statute in South Carolina (§ 16-11-313) 

and the language of the indictment tracked this statute, which 

met the basic requirement for classifying a burglary as a 

qualifying violent felony for ACCA purposes: unlawful entry into 

a physical structure with the intent to commit a 

crime. See Foster, 662 F.3d at 292. Therefore, the court 

properly classified the burglary as a predicate ACCA felony.

Hall also contends that two of his predicate offenses

are actually one crime. The ACCA requires “that the three 

predicate offenses take place ‘on occasions different from one 

another.’” United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 335 (4th 

Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). In Letterlough, we laid out the 

factors a court should consider to determine whether the 

predicate offenses took place on different occasions, including 

“whether the offenses arose in different geographic locations; 

whether the nature of the offenses was substantively different; 

and whether the offenses involved multiple victims or multiple 

criminal objectives.” Id. at 335-36. We have previously found 

that “‘criminals who commit separate crimes against different 

individuals while on a spree, within a short period of time, 

provided that the perpetrator had the opportunity to cease and 

desist from his criminal actions at any time’” commit crimes on 
21

different occasions. United States v. Leeson, 453 F.3d 631, 

642-43 (4th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

The district court walked through each factor during 

Hall’s sentencing hearing, explaining its reasoning for finding 

that the two felonies Hall now challenges--a charge for breaking 

and entering and larceny, and a charge for aiding and abetting 

an assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer--constituted 

two separate offenses, even though the aiding and abetting 

felony arose when Hall fled the scene of the breaking and 

entering. S.J.A. 1072 (pre-sentence investigation report);

1003-05. A consideration of the Letterlough factors leads us to 

conclude that our holding in Leeson applies here. Hall’s 

breaking and entering and his assault on a police officer were 

committed in somewhat different geographic locations, the nature 

of the two offenses was substantially different, the victims of 

the crimes were distinct, and there were different criminal 

objectives to each crime. Further, there was a point after the 

breaking and entering, albeit brief, where Hall “‘had the 

opportunity to cease and desist from his criminal actions,’”

meaning the crimes occurred on different occasions. Leeson, 453 

F.3d at 643 (citations omitted). Therefore, the district court 

did not err in classifying Hall as an armed career criminal and 

so sentencing him under the ACCA.
22

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 

district court is

AFFIRMED IN PART, 

VACATED IN PART, 

AND REMANDED.