Review of the Transportation Security 

Administration’s Management Controls 

Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Audits 

OIG-06-18 December 2005 
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

DHS oversight responsibility to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the 

department. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

management controls over its screener recruitment program during calendar year 2002. It is based 

on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, 

and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed according to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that 

this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 

 

 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................................. 1 

Background.......................................................................................................................................... 3 

TSA Management Controls To Federalize the Airport Screener Workforce... ................................... 5 

Federalization Planning Process ............................................................................................................6 

Increased Funding Needs.......................................................................................................................8 

Costs of Temporary Assessment Centers ............................................................................................10 

 Set Criteria for Selection of Assessment Center Locations...........................................................10 

 Establishment of Approximately 150 Temporary Assessment Centers ........................................12 

Improved Program and Contract Management....................................................................................12 

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................14 

Recommendations................................................................................................................................15 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ..................................................................... 16 

Appendix B: Management Comments..................................................................................... 18 

Appendix C: Congressional Request for OIG Review ..............................................................22 

Appendix D: Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Total Costs ..............................24 

Appendix E: Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Hired .............26 

Appendix F: Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Assessed........28 

Appendix G: NCS Pearson Contract Modifications and Funding .............................................30 

Appendix H: Major Contributors To This Report.................................................................... 31 

Appendix I: Report Distribution............................................................................................. 32 

Abbreviations 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency 

ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FAM Federal Air Marshall 
OIG Audit 

Report

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 1

Executive Summary 

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)1

, which established the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and required TSA to hire a 

federalized airport screener workforce within a mandated one-year time 

period. With no prior experience with a large-scale recruitment program, only 

a few personnel, and no established requirements concerning project 

management, TSA successfully recruited more than 56,000 airport screeners. 

Troubled by press reports of wasteful government spending by the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) recruitment contractor, 

NCS Pearson, Senators Dorgan and Wyden requested2

 us to perform a review 

of TSA’s management and oversight of the recruitment program. 

Specifically, Senators Dorgan and Wyden expressed concerns about the 

following issues: 

• Cost of TSA’s recruitment activities performed at various resort hotels, 

including the Wyndham Peaks Resort and Golden Door Spa located in 

Telluride, Colorado; 

• TSA’s oversight of the recruitment program; 

• Criteria governing the assessment center selection process; and 

• Responsibility for selection of assessment center locations used for 

recruitment purposes. 

The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), which had already been 

engaged by TSA, conducted an incurred cost audit of the contract. However, 

DCAA could not determine the reasonableness, allowability, and allocability 

of NCS Pearson’s contract costs. Although DCAA identified deficient 

expenses in the categories of labor, travel, and other direct costs, totaling $298 

million, a lack of information from NCS Pearson and TSA limited its ability 

to express an opinion. As a result, DCAA issued a disclaimed audit report in 

May 2004. In December 2004, based, in part, on DCAA’s report, TSA and 

NCS Pearson settled the contract at the then ceiling price of $741 million, 

$144 million less than the total invoiced amount. Certain matters associated 

with NCS Pearson’s contract costs are still under investigation. 

 

1

 Public Law 107-71. 

2

 See Appendix C for the request letter. 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 2 

We relied exclusively on DCAA’s compilation of invoiced costs to determine 

site specific and unspecified assessment center costs, and we express no 

opinion on the individual cost elements billed by NCS Pearson. This report 

focuses solely on TSA’s management of the airport federalization process; not 

NCS Pearson’s performance on the contract or the reasonableness of its 

incurred costs. 

TSA faced a formidable challenge: hire a federalized screener workforce 

within 1-year from the agency’s inception. As a brand new agency, TSA did 

not have the staff or infrastructure necessary to plan and manage actions and 

contracts, such as the NCS Pearson contract, needed to complete the 

federalization process within this timeframe. As a result, TSA made critical 

decisions without the benefit of sound acquisition planning or adequate cost 

control. 

TSA had not finalized screener staffing requirements prior to the contract 

solicitation phase and recommended that bidders use a nationwide estimate of 

28,000 to 50,000 screeners in preparing their bids. In response to TSA’s 

solicitation, NCS Pearson’s proposal, on which TSA’s initial contract with 

NCS Pearson was based, was to hire 30,000 screeners using Pearson’s 

existing systems and office locations to process and hire the screeners. 

However, within a month of awarding the contract, TSA concerns about NCS 

Pearson’s existing assessment center capacity, in conjunction with TSA’s 

decision to have assessment centers located within two hours driving time of 

the prospective screeners’ local airports, caused TSA to significantly change 

the contract’s scope. Without any apparent analysis of the cost impact, TSA 

dramatically changed its recruitment approach and directed the contractor to 

establish approximately 150 temporary assessment centers. 

The establishment of temporary assessment centers; delays and revisions in 

issuance of the airport federalization schedule and staffing requirements, 

including the requirement for a ready pool of approved applicants beyond 

those initially hired; and higher than expected applicant rejection rates 

significantly impacted NCS Pearson’s costs to establish and operate the 

assessment centers. By the contract’s end, NCS Pearson had assessed more 

than nine times the number of screeners originally estimated in less than half 

the time originally allotted. Consequently, the increased candidate volume 

increased the size of assessment centers needed and the length of time those 

centers had to be available. These factors contributed to increasing contract 

costs from the original estimate of $104 million to a final settlement amount 

of $741 million. 

Factors such as the increased staffing requirements would have increased 

contract costs even if Pearson’s proposed approach had been used, and we 

have no way to estimate with certainty what the final recruitment cost would 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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have been had TSA used NCS Pearson’s existing systems and assessment 

centers. Apart from this consideration, and without addressing the impact of 

other actions NCS Pearson may or may not have taken, we believe TSA’s 

planning and management issues contributed to the increased costs. In 

addition, TSA’s delay in recording contractual obligations may have put them 

at increased risk for Antideficiency Act violations. 

TSA has made significant progress in the development of project management 

and acquisition polices and procedures since the airport federalization process 

in December 2002. TSA’s policy and procedure changes, together with other 

procurement related improvements that DHS has agreed to make on a 

department wide basis should help to prevent such circumstances from 

occurring in the future. Nevertheless, TSA needs to continue to strengthen its 

policies, procedures, and controls. We are recommending that TSA continue 

its efforts to improve its policies and procedures as they relate to controlling 

contract costs and providing effective project management. We also are 

recommending that TSA strengthen and formalize its policies and procedures 

governing funds certification, status of funds reporting, and recordation 

practices. TSA concurred with both recommendations. 

Background 

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act3 (ATSA) on November 19, 2001. 

The ATSA established TSA as an operating administration of the Department 

of Transportation, responsible for all types of transportation security. To 

increase aviation security, ATSA specifically required TSA to recruit and hire 

a federalized passenger and baggage screener workforce by November 19, 

2002, and December 31, 2002, respectively, at all passenger airports 

nationwide. The federalization process would systematically replace private 

contract screeners with newly hired federal workers. 

On January 18, 2002, TSA issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the 

recruitment, assessment, and hiring of the federalized screener workforce and 

to provide HR support services. The RFP did not specify the number of 

screeners TSA needed to hire, and the agency received several questions 

requesting clarification of the staffing requirement. TSA responded that it 

could not yet determine the number of positions needed and recommended 

that offerors use a nationwide estimate of 28,000 to 50,000 plus screeners. 

TSA also disclosed that it intended to hire an undetermined number of other 

support, management, and law enforcement personnel. 

As expected by TSA, the proposals received showed extreme price variances. 

Offerors made various assumptions about the level of work necessary to meet 

 

3

 Public Law 107-71. 
________________________________________________ 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 4 

the proposed contract’s requirements. Proposed hours, average loaded labor 

rates, and other direct costs fluctuated significantly among proposals. After 

reviewing all proposals, TSA selected NCS Pearson. According to TSA, NCS 

Pearson had extensive experience testing and hiring large numbers of 

personnel for various commercial companies and government agencies and 

appeared to have the best technical approach using its extensive assessment 

center locations throughout the United States. 

Since many of the airport federalization requirements remained unknown at 

the time of the award, TSA could not realistically negotiate a firm fixed priced 

contract. Firm fixed priced contracts generally present relatively lower 

performance and cost risks for the government since the contractor is 

responsible for specific performance at a predetermined cost. On February 

25, 2002, TSA awarded NCS Pearson a labor hour contract with a contract 

ceiling of $104 million for recruitment of the federalized workforce, as NCS 

Pearson had proposed. A labor hour contract is a type of time and materials 

contract used in situations where the type or total amount of resources 

necessary cannot be predicted with any reasonable degree of confidence. 

Time and material contracts function much like cost type contracts, and are 

considered to carry the most performance and cost risk for the government. 

Accordingly, close government supervision and direction is critical to 

ensuring that the contractor achieves the desired results at a reasonable cost. 

Using fixed labor categories and rates to manage and track its costs, NCS 

Pearson proposed to hire 30,000 screeners over a 32-week period from its 

existing assessment center network, at a cost of $104 million. NCS Pearson 

assumed that it would need to screen approximately 35,000 applicants to find 

30,000 qualified screeners. 

The independent assessment center process established by NCS Pearson at 

TSA’s direction was designed to process applicants at one location in a single 

day. After applicants passed an on-line preassessment center screening 

process, NCS Pearson scheduled applicants for a two-phased on-site 

assessment. The first assessment phase consisted of three computer tests and 

an initial interview. Candidates who successfully passed Phase 1 continued 

through Phase 2, consisting of numerous physical and medical tests. 

Applicants who successfully completed both phases were qualified for hire by 

TSA. TSA made contingent job offers to these qualified candidates, subject to 

appropriate background checks. 

By December 31, 2002, NCS Pearson had qualified approximately 129,000 

candidates and TSA had hired 56,267 passenger and baggage screeners to 

work at approximately 433 airports. The contract ceiling grew from 

$104 million to $741 million during the performance period. 

The Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG) 

expressed concerns over NCS Pearson’s cost growth. In response, TSA 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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initiated a DCAA cost audit in September 2002. DCAA could not determine 

the contract’s cost reasonableness and issued a disclaimed audit opinion in 

May 2004. 

Although the DCAA reported that it was not able to obtain sufficient, 

evidential matter from NCSP and TSA on which to base an audit opinion, it 

provided comments concerning deficiencies in the invoiced costs. 

Specifically, DCAA identified “deficient expenses,”4

 totaling $298 million, 

regarding in-house, interdivisional, and subcontractor labor; travel; and other 

direct costs invoiced by NCS Pearson. TSA used DCAA’s report findings to 

develop a settlement position and, in December 2004, it settled with NCS 

Pearson at the contract ceiling of $741 million. Certain matters are still under 

investigation, and the agreement did not settle or preclude any other claims 

the federal government may have against NCS Pearson or anyone else. 

TSA Management Controls to Federalize the Airport Screener 

Workforce 

TSA did not have the infrastructure, including people, policies, and 

procedures, to properly plan for and manage the task of hiring screeners 

within the mandated deadline. With only 12 employees at its inception in 

November 2001, TSA relied extensively on loaned executives from various 

government and private sources to supplement staff. Initially, TSA utilized a 

“Go-Team” structure to manage the federalization process. The “Go-Teams” 

consisted of working groups responsible for concurrent rollout projects 

relating to individual ATSA requirements. The “Go-Teams” generally 

reported to one or more of the original 12 employees. Senior Department of 

Transportation management officials also provided support for the “GoTeams.” Although the “Go-Teams” coordinators met regularly to discuss 

issues encountered during the airport federalization process, the magnitude of 

the mission required more coordination than the “Go-Team” structure could 

provide. Further, TSA had no acquisition or implementation plan to 

coordinate the various ATSA requirements. 

In June 2002, seven months after the agency’s inception, TSA established a 

high-level program management team, called the dedicated workforce 

transition team (transition team) headed by a loaned executive from private 

industry. The loaned executive said he hired a program management 

consulting firm specializing in government projects to aid him with 

management oversight and to advise him on government limitations and 

restrictions. 

 

4

 Deficient expenses are costs that have inadequate supporting documentation that limits the auditor from rendering an 

opinion on the reasonableness, allowability, or allocability of those costs. 
________________________________________________ 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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However, by the time TSA formed the transition team and hired the 

management consulting firm, only about six months remained to execute the 

federalization process. Many prior decisions had already been implemented, 

such as the significant changes in the NCS Pearson’s contract scope, that had 

to be managed. Despite the formation of the transition team and the hiring of 

the management consulting firm, TSA continued to react to daily events 

instead of properly planning and managing the federalization process. Senior 

program management overseeing the federalization process included many 

loaned executives with extensive experience in private industry. However, 

they had little or no federal acquisition process training or experience. 

Federalization Planning Process 

Generally, legislative deadlines, rather than detailed requirements or cost 

analyses, drove TSA’s management decisions. TSA began the process of 

hiring a federalized screener workforce without the ability or time for an 

adequate planning process to consider and address critical program elements, 

such as cost, schedule, and performance requirements. In essence, TSA 

started the acquisition process without understanding how many screeners 

were needed, whether it had sufficient budget authority to hire those 

screeners, what the contractor could realistically provide within limited 

timeframes, or how other options, such as establishing independent 

assessment centers, could affect cost and schedule. 

During the solicitation phase, TSA acknowledged that it had not finalized 

staffing requirements and recommended that offerors use a nationwide 

estimate of 28,000 to 50,000 plus screeners. According to TSA officials, the 

hiring numbers had not been finalized with either OMB or Congress at that 

time. TSA also disclosed that it intended to hire an undetermined number of 

support, administrative, and law enforcement positions to serve as 

administrative staff at the airports. In response to TSA’s solicitation, NCS 

Pearson proposed, in February 2002, to hire approximately 30,000 screeners 

over a 32-week period according to a federalization schedule to be provided 

by TSA. Numerous other bidders proposed a wide variety of approaches. 

TSA told us that it chose NCS Pearson based on its technical merits and 

company’s prior performance. 

TSA began the airport federalization process and awarded the NCS Pearson 

contract without having the ability or time to develop a formal project 

management plan, an acquisition plan, or an acquisition baseline. These plans 

should have contained detailed information concerning the number of 

screeners needed, the airport federalization schedule, and the program budget 

and cost constraints for the recruitment program. Furthermore, the plans 

should have identified the interdependency between various contractual 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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actions, established an optimal integrated work schedule among all the 

contractors, and set baselines for monitoring contract performance. 

TSA did not provide NCS Pearson an airport federalization schedule until 

June 14, 2002, because the redesign of airport security checkpoints and the 

installation of security equipment were not complete. Major discussions 

occurred between TSA, the Office of Management and Budget, and various 

contractors concerning the right mix of screeners and explosive and trace 

detection equipment to use at each airport. Staffing models, which 

recommended staffing levels ranging between 60,000 and 90,000 during the 

federalization process, constantly changed in an attempt to find the right 

balance between technology, human capital, and congressional limitations. 

These factors impacted the federalization dates and the staffing requirements, 

as well as the location, size, and space requirements for establishing 

independent assessment centers. Consequently, NCS Pearson could not start 

opening assessment centers and recruiting and hiring screeners until almost 

halfway through the contract term. 

Even after issuance, the airport federalization schedule and the number of 

screeners per airport constantly fluctuated, which impacted NCS Pearson’s 

assessment center selection. Delays in the federalization schedule ranged up 

to 85 days at individual airports, with an average delay of approximately one 

month for all airports. Additionally, staffing changes became significant at 

the individual airport category level. For example, TSA increased the 

staffing requirements at larger airports5

 by 18 percent, while decreasing 

staffing requirements at the smaller airports6

 by 56 percent. This increased 

the number of assessments for the larger airports by approximately 39,000 

while concurrently decreasing the number of assessments for the smaller 

airports by approximately 43,000. 

Overall, the number of applicants to be qualified grew from NCS Pearson’s 

original proposal of 30,000 to approximately 129,0007

 over the 10-month 

contract period, about 330 percent. By the time NCS Pearson received the 

airport federalization schedule in June 2002, TSA had set the staffing 

requirements at approximately 58,000. TSA also required NCS Pearson to 

establish an employment ready pool for subsequent attrition hiring. To meet 

TSA’s revised requirements, NCS Pearson had to qualify 129,000 personnel 

for 433 airports in approximately 13 weeks—less than 100 days. From these 

qualified applicants,8

 TSA hired more than 56,000 screeners and placed the 

remainder in a ready pool for subsequent hiring opportunities. 

 

5

Category X and I airports represent larger airports, with 2.5 million or more annual planned flights. 

6

 Category II, III, and IV airports represent the smaller airports, with less than 2.5 million annual planned flights 7

 At the contract’s inception, a qualified candidate was offered a screener position. As the contract progressed, TSA 

decided to establish a ready pool to handle future attrition. A qualified candidate that had successfully passed the 

assessment center process could be offered a screener position or placed in the ready pool as a qualified potential hire. 8

 A qualified applicant was an applicant that had successfully completed the assessment center process and met TSA’s 

hiring standards. 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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Increased Funding Needs 

TSA knew as early as April 2002 that the cost of the NCS Pearson contract 

would exceed its initial $104 million estimate and could cost as much as 

$542 million based on NCS Pearson cost proposals. In July 2002, NCS 

Pearson submitted an additional cost estimate of $531 million.9

 By this time, 

NCS Pearson had established several temporary assessment centers, incurred 

significant costs, and notified TSA that it was working at risk. Working at risk 

means that the contractor may not receive reimbursement for the work 

performed. The NCS Pearson contract had a Limitation of Funds Clause that 

provided for incremental funding of the contract. Under this clause, the 

Government was not obligated to reimburse the contractor for costs incurred 

in excess of the total amount allotted by the Government to the contract, and 

change orders were not considered an authorization to exceed the amount 

allotted by the Government, unless they contained a statement increasing the 

amount allotted. 

TSA did not add funds to the contract to cover the estimated cost at that time. 

TSA personnel advised us that they had concerns about the reasonableness of 

the cost estimate provided by NCS Pearson. However, TSA program 

managers directed the contractor to continue working without funding and to 

do whatever was necessary, including working outside the contract’s scope 

without prior approval, to meet the deadline. TSA’s contracting officer did 

not formally approve the scope change by modifying the contract until 

September 6, 2002. At that time, TSA increased the contract ceiling to $154 

million and prepared a justification for other than full and open competition 

based on unusual and compelling urgency. 

When a contract contains a Limitation of Funds Clause that provides for 

incremental funding, appropriations law stipulates that an agency does not 

incur an obligation on a labor hour contract until the contracting officer signs 

the modification increasing the funding. However, once the agency becomes 

aware that the contractor is incurring costs in excess of the limitation of funds 

clause, the agency should promptly obtain funding and programming 

information pertinent to the contract’s continuation and decide whether to 

allocate additional funds to the effort, bring the work to a halt, or take other 

appropriate action.10 

TSA did not promptly respond to NCS Pearson’s notifications that it had 

exceeded the contract ceiling or to its revised cost estimates showing 

 

9

 NCS Pearson’s July 2002 cost estimate did not provide sufficient detail to determine the basis for the $11 million cost 

reduction from the April 2002 cost proposal. 

10 Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. §32.704. 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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significant cost increases. For example, by September 26, 2002, TSA knew 

that it would need at least an additional $200 million to cover NCS Pearson’s 

incurred costs through the end of the month. In response to increased pressure 

from NCS Pearson to increase the contract’s ceiling and funding levels, TSA 

modified the contract on October 4, 2002, and again on November 4, 2002. 

These modifications incrementally funded the contract up to $620 million and 

increased the contract’s total ceiling to $660 million. See Appendix G for a 

list of NCS Pearson contract modifications and funding. 

TSA said that its evaluation and decision-making process was impeded by 

NCS Pearson’s failure to provide sufficient documentation for the costs. We 

cannot say whether NCS Pearson’s actions hindered TSA’s ability to monitor 

contract costs. Whatever the cause, the delay placed TSA at risk of having 

insufficient funds to cover contract performance in the event that the costs 

were ultimately allowed. 

Once the contract was modified, TSA also encountered a delay in recording 

actual obligations in the accounting system. Contract obligations exceeded 

the obligations recorded in the financial system by as much as $303 million, 

and contract obligations continued to exceed the recorded obligations through 

at least September 30, 2003, as shown in the following chart. 

Cumulative End-of-Month Contract Obligations and Recorded Obligations for 

NCS Pearson Contract, February 2002 through September 2003 

$0

$100,000,000

$200,000,000

$300,000,000

$400,000,000

$500,000,000

$600,000,000

$700,000,000

$800,000,000

Feb-02

Mar-02

Apr-02

May-02

Jun-02

Jul-02

Aug-02

Sep-02

Oct-02

Nov-02Dec-02

Jan-03

Feb-03

Mar-03

Apr-03

May-03

Jun-03

Jul-03

Aug-03

S

Month/Yr ep-03

Dollars

Contract Obligations Recorded Obligations

Proper evaluation of contract funding requirements and recording practices 

are essential to sound funds control. GAO’ s Principles of Federal 

Appropriations Law warns managers that failure to record legitimate 

obligations makes it impossible to determine the precise status of the 

appropriation and may result in violating the Antideficiency Act. 

TSA agreed that weaknesses existed with its funds control during the 

federalization period. Since that time, it has established a centralized funds 

certification process, implemented a system that allows offices with budget 

authority to generate daily status of funds reports, and has reduced the average 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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time for recording obligations to two business days. TSA has committed to 

finalizing a Management Directive concerning the funds certification process 

and closely monitoring the recordation function. 

Costs of Temporary Assessment Centers 

TSA did not adequately consider the monetary and technical costs associated 

with reproducing NCS Pearson’s existing infrastructure and business 

processes in temporary locations. Although TSA believed that time was of 

the essence and that meeting the legislative mandate justified making quick 

decisions, TSA acknowledged that it performed no cost-benefit analyses to 

support the establishment of temporary assessment centers. Furthermore, file 

documentation showed no analysis of whether NCS Pearson’s existing 

assessment center capacity, availability, or locality could meet any of TSA’s 

needs. Although we cannot quantify the cost impact of establishing 

independent assessment centers compared to using NCS Pearson’s existing 

assessment centers, we believe that proceeding with this decision resulted in a 

constructive change11 to the contract that significantly increased its scope and 

potential overall cost. 

TSA acknowledged it did not properly manage the assessment centers and the 

contract. When TSA awarded the contract on February 25, 2002, TSA’s one 

contracting officer was also responsible for numerous other high dollar 

contracts key to the agency’s mission. By June 2002, the acquisition office 

had grown to 13 employees, with the majority comprised of contract 

specialists. Nevertheless, this staffing level was still not adequate to handle 

the volume of mission critical contracts underway and contributed to the lack 

of project management and contract oversight during the federalization 

process. 

Criteria for Selection of Assessment Center Locations 

TSA wanted a localized recruitment program to reduce the impact on 

incumbent screeners and other applicants. TSA wanted to ensure standardized 

applicant testing at assessment centers located within a 2-hour drive time from 

the applicant’s local airport. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 

the Federal Air Marshall (FAM) recruitment program used such an approach. 

Under the FAM recruitment program, FAA collocated the testing and medical 

assessment centers, streamlined the assessment center process, and allowed 

single day assessments. Within one month of contract award, TSA decided to 

follow the FAM recruitment program approach and directed NCS Pearson to 

 

11 A constructive change occurs when a contracting officer directs a contractor to perform work not required by the 

contract, but no formal change order or contract modification is issued. 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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establish temporary assessment centers separate from its existing testing and 

medical assessment center network. Assessment center candidates passing the 

computerized testing portion could then immediately proceed to the medical 

testing portion without leaving the examination area. 

Based on using the FAM model, TSA developed the following criteria for 

NCS Pearson’s use in assessment center selection: 

• Cost: Government rates for lodging. 

• Space: Adequate meeting space for conference, testing, and medical 

facilities. 

• Connectivity: T-1 lines or other high-speed capability for transmitting 

test results, personnel information, and digital fingerprints and 

photographs. 

• Availability: Assessment centers had to be available for the extended 

time periods required by the airport federalization schedule. 

• Proximity: Assessment center had to be located within a 

2- hour drive time from the local airports for which NCS Pearson was 

hiring. 

Once NCS Pearson received a specific airport’s federalization date and 

staffing numbers, it established the temporary assessment center using TSA’s 

specified location requirements and timeframe. According to TSA and NCS 

Pearson personnel, NCS Pearson received little prior notification of 

federalization dates and sometimes had only a few days to find a location and 

establish an assessment center. 

NCS Pearson used Helms Briscoe, a travel and event arrangement firm, to 

identify potential assessment center sites based on TSA’s criteria. TSA did 

not specifically select the location of the temporary assessment centers, but 

was aware of the selection process, as well as the selected hotels, and 

expressed no concern regarding the use of resorts and other high cost 

temporary assessment center locations. 

The selection of the Wyndham Peaks Resort in Telluride, Colorado, illustrates 

how the process worked. Newspaper articles criticizing TSA’s recruitment 

program cited NCS Pearson’s use of the Wyndham Peaks Resort for 

recruitment efforts as an example of wasteful government spending at the 

taxpayer’s expense. The Wyndham served as the assessment center where 51 

screeners were hired for five local airports: 

• Four Corners Regional Airport (Category IV)12

• Telluride Regional Airport (Category IV) 

• Durango-La Plata County Airport (Category III) 

 

12 Category II, III, and IV airports represent the smaller airports, with less than 2.5 million annual planned flights. 
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TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

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• Cortez Municipal Airport (Category IV) 

• Alamosa-San Luis Valley Airport (Category IV) 

According to TSA files, NCS Pearson selected the Wyndham site because it 

met the space, availability, and connectivity requirements. Helms Briscoe 

reviewed 13 hotels in four cities using TSA’s criteria before recommending 

the Wyndham as the assessment center site. These cities included Telluride, 

Colorado; Durango, Colorado; Farmington, New Mexico; and Cortez, 

Colorado. Most hotels could not meet the extended time period required by 

the airport federalization schedule. Additionally, many hotels did not have or 

could not install T-1 lines within the timeframes required. 

DCAA identified approximately $1.7 million in invoiced costs for the 

Telluride, Colorado recruitment trip. This equates to $10,984 per person 

assessed and $39,727 per person hired at the Wyndham site. 

Establishment of Approximately 150 Temporary 

Assessment Centers 

By the end of the federalization process, NCS Pearson had established 

approximately 150 temporary assessment sites used to hire more than 56,000 

screeners. As of July 2004, costs billed by NCS Pearson for site-specific 

temporary assessment centers totaled $435 million,13 with individual 

assessment center costs ranging from $204,000 to $30 million. For detailed 

listings of the top twenty assessment centers ranked by highest total cost, 

highest cost per person hired, and highest cost per person assessed, refer to 

Appendices D through F. 

A strong correlation exists between the number of applicants assessed and 

assessment center costs. Applicant rejection rates were higher than 

anticipated and greatly increased the number of applicants assessed and the 

length of time the centers remained opened. The original contract pricing 

assessment-to-hire ratio estimate of 6:5 ended up closer to approximately 29:5 

in practice. By the contract’s end, NCS Pearson assessed approximately 

328,000 candidates to meet TSA’s staffing requirements14—more than 9 times 

its original estimate, thus greatly increasing overall costs. 

Improved Program and Contract Management 

TSA has made changes to its recruitment program since it completed the 

initial hiring phase. Current screener hiring occurs due to attrition, is 

significantly lower in volume, and is not mainly controlled by congressional 

deadlines. However, the follow-on recruitment contractor, CPS, still faces 

 

13 Excludes assessment center costs for pilot program. 

14 Staffing requirements consisted of qualifying 129,000 screeners for hiring and establishment of a ready pool. 
________________________________________________ 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 13 

challenges in the recruitment process, such as frequent changes to staffing 

requirements and a lack of predictable airport attrition rates. According to 

CPS, the frequency of these changes makes it difficult to plan and execute the 

appropriate recruiting and outreach activities and to develop a hiring plan that 

allows time to assess an adequate number of candidates at each airport. 

TSA’s acquisition office also continues to grow. As of January 2005, TSA’s 

acquisition office had grown to 73 contracting personnel. In addition, TSA 

has formed an integrated project management team led by an experienced, 

certified project manager to provide oversight of the follow-on recruitment 

contractor. This team includes TSA personnel from program operations, 

budget, and acquisition offices. This team provides detailed direction to the 

contractor and actively reviews daily, weekly, and monthly reports concerning 

contract performance. 

In addition, TSA has developed and implemented several program 

management and acquisition policies since the airport federalization process 

in December 2002 for strengthening project management and contract 

planning and oversight throughout the acquisition lifecycle. In conjunction 

with DHS requirements, TSA has begun implementing certification 

requirements for program managers and contracting professionals. All 

program managers and contracting professionals must be certified at a level 

commensurate with the responsibilities of their position. The certification 

processes consider the level of education, training, and work experience of 

program managers and contracting professionals to determine their eligibility 

for certification and the appropriate certification level. 

TSA has also established an Acquisition and Program Management Support 

Division (PM Support Division) that provides program management support 

and develops acquisition policy relating to the acquisition life cycle process. 

For example, the PM Support Division has developed and implemented policy 

guidance requiring acquisition plans for contracting actions exceeding 

$5 million. Further, a management directive requires program offices to 

develop mission needs statements that detail TSA’s capability shortfalls to 

meet mission requirements. 

The DHS Investment Review Board (IRB) provides acquisition oversight of 

major acquisition investments and conducts portfolio management. The DHS 

Investment Review Process directive requires that the IRB review and 

approve all DHS acquisitions exceeding $50 million (level 1 acquisition). All 

level 1 acquisition projects must include critical planning documents, such as 

a mission needs statement, a program plan, a risk management plan, an 

acquisition plan, an operational requirements plan, an alternatives analysis, 

and an acquisition baseline. Program managers must review and revise the 

documents at each key decision point, as necessary, and submit the 

information to the IRB. The IRB will use the documentation to monitor 
________________________________________________ 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 14 

initiatives, direct corrective actions, and determine when an investment is 

ready to proceed to the next phase. 

GAO and OMB best practices identify a comprehensive planning phase as a 

core part of the acquisition process and critical to the successful completion of 

acquisition projects. These practices include identifying program needs that 

align with specific agency goals, determining necessary resources it lacks to 

achieve results, and evaluating alternative approaches to achieve the desired 

results. The DHS program manager certification requirements and the 

investment review process will help TSA improve its project management and 

acquisition planning. 

Conclusion 

TSA faced a formidable challenge to hire a federalized airport screener 

workforce within a one year Congressional mandate. With no prior 

experience with a large-scale recruitment program, limited personnel, and no 

established requirements or procedures concerning project management, TSA 

successfully recruited more than 56,000 airport screeners within the mandated 

period. 

TSA faced critical decisions daily and did not always fully analyze the impact 

of its decisions on the federalization process. Limited funding and a lack of 

sound funds control became problems. Furthermore, TSA staffing levels were 

not adequate to handle the volume of mission critical contracts underway and 

contributed to the lack of management oversight during the federalization 

process. 

TSA has taken significant steps to improve acquisition planning and program 

management. Additionally, we recently assessed DHS’s overall procurement 

and program management operations and made several recommendations to 

the Secretary, including the need to address the staffing level of procurement 

offices in the department. These additional policies and procedures will help 

TSA to strengthen project management and use procurement activities more 

effectively. However, TSA needs to further improve its acquisition policies 

and procedures in certain areas, particularly: (1) increasing emphasis on 

defining requirements, (2) performing cost-benefit and alternative analyses, 

and (3) estimating life cycle costs. We will continue to monitor TSA’s 

procurement and project management operations. 

We focused our audit on TSA’s management of the airport federalization 

process. We did not consider actions by NCS Pearson that may have 

contributed to increased costs. We did not express an opinion on the 

contract’s individual cost elements or determine the cost of other screener 

recruitment approaches. Contract scope changes identified during our audit 
________________________________________________ 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 15 

would have increased contract costs regardless of the recruitment 

methodology. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that: 

1. TSA's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Acquisition, Chief Procurement 

Executive, Office of Acquisitions, further improve TSA acquisition policies 

and procedures to control contract costs and provide effective project 

management as indicated in the conclusion section of the report. 

2. TSA’s Assistant Administrator for Finance and Administration and Chief 

Financial Officer, Office of Finance and Administration, strengthen and 

formalize TSA’s policies and procedures governing funds certification, status 

of funds reporting, and recordation practices, consistent with OMB and DHS 

guidelines. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA concurred with our recommendation to continue to improve TSA 

acquisitions policies and procedures to control contract costs and to provide 

effective project management. In its response to our report, TSA highlighted 

additional actions it has taken to improve its overall program and contract 

management. These include development of an integrated program 

management policy, assignment of expert program management support 

personnel to each program, development of acquisition issue workshops for 

program offices, and implementation of an acquisition program status system. 

TSA will continue to work with DHS to implement a contract oversight 

program that provides a system of internal controls. A copy of TSA’s 

response is included as Appendix B. 

We consider the recommendations resolved and will close the 

recommendations when TSA completes its planned actions and addresses the 

areas identified in this report, such as improving its policies and procedures 

concerning defining requirements, performing cost-benefit and alternative 

analyses, and estimating life cycle costs. 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 16 

The audit objective was to determine the efficacy of TSA’s management and 

oversight of its screener recruitment program. Specifically, we focused on the 

following congressional concerns regarding the cost recruitment activities 

performed at various nationwide resort hotels: 

• Cost of TSA’s recruitment activities performed at various resort hotels, 

including the Wyndham Peaks Resort and Golden Door Spa located in 

Telluride, Colorado; 

• Oversight of TSA’s past and current recruitment program; 

• Criteria governing the assessment center selection process; and 

• Officials responsible for selection of assessment center locations used 

for recruitment purposes 

We focused our audit on TSA’s management of the airport federalization 

process, not on NCS Pearson’s incurred costs. We did not express an opinion 

on the contract’s individual cost elements or determine the cost of other 

screener recruitment approaches. Contract scope changes identified during 

our audit would have increased contract costs regardless of the recruitment 

methodology. 

In an attempt to reconstruct TSA’s decision-making process, we reviewed 

contract files, contractor files, staffing numbers, federalization schedules, 

emails, and miscellaneous file documentation. Data limitations from TSA and 

NCS Pearson impacted our ability to validate the accuracy of much of this 

information. Basic information, such as the number of screeners actually 

hired at specific airports as of December 31, 2002, existed, but was not readily 

retrievable. TSA compiled the staffing information at our request and we did 

not test its accuracy. Many of the management decisions were orally 

communicated or sent via email. Little file documentation exists to show 

accountability for decisions, such as when and who made the actual decision 

to establish temporary assessment center sites. As a result, we could not 

identify any one official or officials responsible for making the decision to 

establish temporary assessment center sites. 

To gain an understanding about TSA’s oversight of the recruitment program, 

the criteria governing the assessment center process, and the personnel 

directing contract decisions, we interviewed people involved in the initial 

federalization process. This included the former Deputy Secretary for the 

Department of Transportation, several members of the initial recruitment GoTeam, and several members of the dedicated workforce transition team. We 

also interviewed numerous personnel from the office of acquisition, policy, 

legal, budget, and program management. In addition, we interviewed NCS 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 17 

Pearson and the follow-on contractors, Accenture,15 and CPS Services, Inc.16 

We also reviewed TSA’s acquisition and project management policies and 

procedures, relevant sections of the ATSA, the Federal Acquisition 

Regulations, and the Federal Aviation Administration’s Acquisition 

Management System. 

We relied exclusively on DCAA’s May 2004 compilation of invoiced costs to 

determine site specific and unspecified assessment center costs. DCAA began 

an incurred cost audit of the NCS Pearson contract in August 2002. While 

DCAA could validate that NCS Pearson spent the amount of invoiced costs, it 

could not determine the allocability, allowability, and reasonableness of 

contract costs due to a lack of certain information from NCS Pearson and 

TSA. As a result, DCAA issued a disclaimed audit opinion in May 2004. 

Using DCAA’s report, as well as additional documentation provided by NCS 

Pearson after the DCAA audit, TSA developed a negotiation position and 

settled the contract at $741 million. 

We used information from DCAA, TSA, and NCS Pearson to compile and 

compute the information contained in appendices D through F. Using a list of 

assessment centers containing basic logistical information from NCS Pearson, 

we identified the DCAA site-specific cost associated with each assessment 

center. We then used information provided by NCS Pearson and TSA to 

identify the number of candidates assessed and hired, respectively. Once we 

identified the site-specific cost, number of candidates assessed, and number of 

candidates hired per assessment center, we calculated a site-specific cost per 

person assessed and hired. We allocated a portion of those costs invoiced by 

NCS Pearson that were not included in site-specific costs (unspecified costs) 

to the site-specific cost per person assessed and hired to determine a total cost 

per person assessed and hired. We ranked total costs per person assessed and 

hired to show the top 20 for each specific category. Data displayed in the 

appendices represents the best available information at the time of our review. 

We conducted our audit between April 2003 and July 2005. The audit was 

conducted according to generally accepted government auditing standards and 

pursuant to our authority under the IG Act of 1978 as amended. 

 

15 Accenture manages TSA’s human resource management system. 

16 CPS Services, Inc. performs the recruitment and assessment portion of TSA’s continued screener hiring process. 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 18 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 19 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 20 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 21 

. 
Appendix C 

Congressional Request for OIG Review 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 22 
Appendix C 

Congressional Request for OIG Review 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 23 
Appendix D 

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Total Costs 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 24

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Total Costs17

Location Airport Code 

Candidates 

Assessed 

Candidates 

Hired 

Site Specific 

Total Cost 

Total Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed Prior to Allocation of 

Unspecified 

Costs 

Unspecified 

Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed 

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Assessed 

Total Cost P

Person Hire

Prior to 

Allocation 

Unspecifie

Costs 

NYC, NY 

JFK, EWR, HVN, HPN, ISP, LGA, SWF 23,688 4,093 $29,522,804 $1,246 $1,243 $2,489 $7,213 

Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX DFW, DAL, SPS, ACT 12,211 1,808 $16,168,564 $1,324 $1,243 $2,567 $8,943 Los Angeles, CA LAX, ONT, BUR 17,846 3,272 $14,410,791 $808 $1,243 $2,051 $4,404 Rosemont/Chicago, IL ORD, MCW 15,025 2,690 $11,502,998 $766 $1,243 $2,009 $4,276 Boston, MA BOS, MHT, ORH, BED 7,676 1,293 $11,048,289 $1,439 $1,243 $2,682 $8,545 Fort Lauderdale/ Dania, FL MIA, FLL, PBI 16,231 2,865 $9,976,698 $615 $1,243 $1,858 $3,482 Atlanta, GA ATL, AHN 11,485 1,357 $9,972,733 $868 $1,243 $2,111 $7,349 Bloomington/ Minneapolis, MN MSP, DLH 4,668 968 $9,400,594 $2,014 $1,243 $3,257 $9,711 Reston, VA IAD 3,100 686 $8,761,376 $2,826 $1,243 $4,069 $12,772 Charlotte, NC 

CLT, CAE, GSP, GSO, HKY 6,144 882 $8,068,127 $1.313 $1,243 $2,556 $9,148 

Philadelphia, PA 

PHL, RDG, ACY, MDT, ABE, TTN, LNS 6,018 1,181 $7,277,757 $1,209 $1,243 $2,452 $6,162 

Orlando, FL MCO, MLB, SFB 7,642 1,411 $7,119,427 $932 $1,243 $2,175 $5,046 Honolulu, HI HNL 3,959 667 $6,519,798 $1,647 $1,243 $2,890 $9,775 

17 Costs were calculated using total invoiced costs of $867 million instead of the $741 million agreed to at settlement. 
Appendix D 

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Total Costs 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 25

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Total Costs17

Location Airport Code 

Candidates 

Assessed 

Candidates 

Hired 

Site Specific 

Total Cost 

Total Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed Prior to Allocation of 

Unspecified 

Costs 

Unspecified 

Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed 

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Assessed 

Total Cost P

Person Hire

Prior to 

Allocation 

Unspecifie

Costs 

Houston, TX 

HOU, BPT, EFD, IAH, LCH, CLL 7,107 1,330 $6,395,891 $900 $1,243 $2,143 $4.809 

Detroit, MI DTW, LAN, FNT, TOL 5,024 1,220 $5,800,886 $1,155 $1,243 $2,398 $4,755 Denver, CO 

DEN, COS, PUB, FNL, CYS, AKO 4,802 1,217 $5,585,444 $1,163 $1,243 $2,406 $4,590 

Washington, DC DCA, HGR 3,035 534 $5,546,350 $1,827 $1,243 $3,070 $10,386 Springfield, MA 

BDL, GON, ALB, CEF, PVD 4,393 767 $5,421,251 $1,234 $1,243 $2,477 $7,068 

Pittsburgh, PA 

PIT, DUJ, CBE, JST, AOO, LBE, UNV, FKL, YNG 4,195 659 $5,231,145 $1,247 $1,243 $2,490 $7,938 

Rochester, NY 

UCA, BUF, ITH, SYR, ELM, IAG, ROC 5,507 465 $5,114,646 $929 $1,243 $2,172 $10,999 
Appendix E 

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Hired 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 26

18 Costs were calculated using total invoiced costs of $867 million instead of the $741 million agreed to at settlement. 

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Hired18

Location Airport Code 

Candidates 

Assessed 

Candidates 

Hired 

Site Specific 

Total Cost 

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Assessed 

Prior to 

Allocation of 

Unspecified 

Costs 

Unspecified 

Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed 

Total Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed 

Total Cos

Per Perso

Hired Prio

to 

Allocatio

of 

Unspecifi

Costs 

Topeka, KS FOE, MCI 73 4 $544,705 $7,462 $1,243 $8,705 $136,176 Barrow, AK BRW 35 2 $242,224 $6,921 $1,243 $8,164 $121,112 Dutch Harbor, AK DUT 49 9 $505,878 $10,324 $1,243 $11,567 $56,209 Watertown/ Massena, NY MSS, ART, OGS 404 25 $1,400,573 $3,467 $1,243 $4,710 $56,023 Hyannis, MA 

HYA, ACK, MVY, PVC 370 33 $1,815,287 $4,906 $1,243 $6,149 $55,009 

Duck Key, FL EYW 65 27 $1,462,730 $22,504 $1,243 $23,747 $54,175 Lanai City, HI LNY 56 14 $728,141 $13,003 $1,243 $14,246 $52,010 Houghton Lake, MI CMX 78 10 $481,384 $6,172 $1,243 $7,415 $48,138 Nome, AK OME, OTZ 37 8 $350,715 $9,479 $1,243 $10,722 $43,839 Eureka, CA ACV 100 16 $661,399 $6,614 $1,243 $7,857 $41,337 Sheridan, WY 

SHR, WRL, GCC, COD 289 32 $1,276,002 $4,415 $1,243 $5,658 $39,875 
Appendix E 

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Hired 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 27

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Hired (cont’d

Location Airport Code 

Candidates 

Assessed 

Candidates 

Hired 

Site Specific 

Total Cost 

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Assessed 

Prior to 

Allocation of 

Unspecified 

Costs 

Unspecified 

Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed 

Total Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed 

Total Cos

Per Perso

Hired Prio

to 

Allocatio

of 

Unspecifi

Costs 

Kodiak, AK ADQ 85 9 $354,706 $4,173 $1,243 $5,416 $39,412 Casper, WY RIW, CPR 177 21 $817,066 $4,616 $1,243 $5,859 $38,908 Easton, MD SBY 124 18 $663,223 $5,349 $1,243 $6,592 $38,846 Scottsbluff, NE AIA, BFF, LBF, CDR 160 26 $947,010 $5,919 $1,243 $7,162 $36,423 Rapid City, SD RAP, PIR 355 37 $1,346,502 $3.793 $1,243 $5,036 $36,392 Bradford, PA BFD, JHW 357 19 $664,367 $1,861 $1,243 $3,104 $34,967 Telluride, CO 

DRO, ALS, TEX, CEZ, FMN 170 51 $1,656,021 $9,741 $1,243 $10,984 $32,471 

Rochester, MN RST, LSE 374 45 $1,402,261 $3,749 $1,243 $4,992 $31,161 Juneau, AK JNU 241 66 $2,043,296 $8,478 $1,243 $9,721 $30,959 
Appendix F 

 Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Assessed 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 28

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Assessed 19

Location Airport Code Candidates Assessed Candidates Hired Site Specific Total Cost 

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Assessed 

Prior to 

Allocation 

of 

Unspecified 

Costs 

Unspecified 

Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Assessed

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Hired Prior 

to 

Allocation 

of 

Unspecified 

Costs 

Duck Key, FL EYW 65 27 $1,462,730 $22,504 $1,243 $23,747 $54,175 Fairbanks, AK FAI 124 80 $2,381,953 $19,209 $1,243 $20,452 $29,774 Lanai City, HI LNY 56 14 $728,141 $13,003 $1,243 $14,246 $52,010 Dutch Harbor, AK DUT 49 9 $505,878 $10,324 $1,243 $11,567 $56,209 Steamboat Springs, CO HDN, RKS, LAR, VEL 82 37 $814,982 $9,939 $1,243 $11,182 $22,027 Telluride, CO 

DRO, ALS, TEX, CEZ, FMN 170 51 $1,656,021 $9,741 $1,243 $10,984 $32,471 

Nome, AK OME, OTZ 37 8 $350,715 $9,479 $1,243 $10,722 $43,839 Elko, NV EKO 78 23 $667,154 $8,553 $1,243 $9,796 $29.007 Juneau, AK JNU 241 66 $2,043,296 $8,478 $1,243 $9,721 $30,959 Topeka, KS FOE, MCI 73 4 $544,705 $7,462 $1,243 $8,705 $136,176 Barrow, AK BRW 35 2 $242,224 $6,921 $1,243 $8,164 $121,112 Maunaloa, Isl of Molokai, HI MKK 65 20 $444,043 $6,831 $1,243 $8,074 $22,202 Eureka, CA ACV 100 16 $661,399 $6,614 $1,243 $7,857 $41,337 Page, AZ CDC, PGA, SGU 92 27 $597,492 $6,494 $1,243 $7,737 $22,129 Houghton Lake, MI CMX 78 10 $481,384 $6,172 $1,243 $7,415 $48,138 Scottsbluff, NE AIA, BFF, LBF, CDR 160 26 $947,010 $5,919 $1,243 $7,162 $36,423 

19 Costs were calculated using total invoiced costs of $867 million instead of the $741 million agreed to at settlement 
Appendix F 

 Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Assessed 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 29

Top 20 Assessment Centers Ranked by Highest Cost Per Person Assessed 19

Location Airport Code Candidates Assessed Candidates Hired Site Specific Total Cost 

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Assessed 

Prior to 

Allocation 

of 

Unspecified 

Costs 

Unspecified 

Cost Per 

Person 

Assessed

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Assessed

Total Cost 

Per Person 

Hired Prior 

to 

Allocation 

of 

Unspecified 

Costs 

St. Croix-St. Thomas, VI STT, STX 536 169 $3,137,766 $5,854 $1,243 $7,097 $18,567 Ketchikan, AK KTN 66 23 $375,109 $5,683 $1,243 $6,926 $16,309 Williston/ Burlington, VT BTV, LEB, RUT 509 112 $2,774,923 $5,452 $1,243 $6,695 $24,776 Easton, MD SBY 124 18 $663,223 $5,349 $1,243 $6,592 $36,846 
Appendix G 

 NCS Pearson Contract Modifications and Funding 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 30 

Modification Number Modification Date Contract Ceiling Incremental 

Funding 

Contract Award 02-25-02 $103,449,011 $44,000,000 

Modification 1 05-20-02 $103,449,011 N/A 

Modification 2 06-14-02 $103,449,011 $23,000,000 

Modification 3 06-27-02 $103,449,011 N/A 

Modification 4 09-06-02 $153,519,011 $62,000,000 

Modification 5 09-30-02 $344,000,000 $63,000,000 

Modification 6 10-04-02 $344,000,000 $152,000,000 

Modification 7 11-04-02 $660,000,000 $276,000,000 

Modification 8 12-09-02 $660,000,000 $27,000,000 

Modification 9 12-19-02 $669,371,263 $9,371,263 

Modification 10 12-19-02 $669,371,263 $13,000,000 

Modification 11 03-10-03 $678,271,263 $8,900,000 

Modification 12 04-01-03 $741,471,263 $63,200,000 
Appendix H 

 Major Contributors To This Report 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 31 

Judy Leonhardt, Program Director, Management Services 

William Schroeder, Audit Supervisor 

Ruth Blevins, Senior Analyst 

Pat Gibson, Senior Analyst 

Douglas Thomas, Analyst 
Appendix I 

Report Distribution 

TSA’s Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program 

Page 32 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Assistant Secretary, TSA 

Under Secretary, Management 

Chief Procurement Officer 

Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary, Policy 

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs 

DHS OIG Liaison 

TSA Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

 Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

 

 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov/oig.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of 

Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, Attn: Office of Inspector 

General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to protect the 

identity of each writer and caller.