Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

FEMA’s Preparedness for 
 

the Next Catastrophic Disaster -


An Update 
 

OIG-10-123 September 2010 
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

September 27, 2010 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report presents the results of our assessment of FEMA’s preparedness for the next 

catastrophic disaster. It is based on interviews with employees and officials, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 
 

Inspector General 
 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................1 
 

Background......................................................................................................................................4 
 

Results of Review ............................................................................................................................8 
 

Overall Planning ........................................................................................................................9 
 

Coordination and Support........................................................................................................15 
 

Emergency Communications...................................................................................................19 
 

Logistics...................................................................................................................................24 
 

Evacuations..............................................................................................................................28 
 

Housing....................................................................................................................................32 
 

Disaster Workforce ..................................................................................................................37 
 

Mission Assignments...............................................................................................................42 
 

Acquisition Management.........................................................................................................46 
 

Mitigation.................................................................................................................................50 
 

Conclusion and Recommendations................................................................................................55 
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..................................................................................56 
 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.....................................................................58 
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .....................................................60 
 

Appendix C: Selected Reports.................................................................................................71
 


Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report......................................................................76 
 

Appendix E: Report Distribution.............................................................................................77 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 
 

Abbreviations 

ADD Automated Deployment Database 

COTR Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative 

CSP Cadre-Specific Plan 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DMSWG Distribution Management Strategy Working Group 

DRWD Disaster Reserve Workforce Division 

eCAPS Enterprise Coordination and Approvals Processing System 

EMI Emergency Management Institute 

ESF Emergency Support Function 

FCC Federal Communications Commission 

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GSA General Services Administration 

HSSAI Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute 

IT Information Technology 

LMD Logistics Management Directorate 

LSCMS Logistics Supply Chain Management System 

MA Mission Assignment 

MAWG Mission Assignment Working Group 

MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support 

NAPA National Academy of Public Administration 

NFIP National Flood Insurance Program 

NRF National Response Framework 

OCPO Office of the Chief Procurement Officer 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PFO Principal Federal Official 

P.L. Public Law 

PNP Protection and National Preparedness 

TAV Total Asset Visibility 
OIG 
 Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

In March 2008, we issued a report in response to a request from the House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to perform a high-level 

assessment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

preparedness to handle a future disaster. We reported that the agency had 

made progress in all of the key preparedness areas we reviewed, although 

in some areas the progress was modest or limited. 

The primary objective of this assessment was to determine the progress 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency has made in the key 

preparedness areas. We reviewed pertinent reports, including those of our 

office and the Government Accountability Office, as well as congressional 

testimony. We interviewed agency officials and evaluated documents 

provided by them. Within each of the ten key preparedness areas, we 

collaborated with agency officials to confirm that the critical components 

identified in 2008 were still relevant or to update the critical components. 

We assessed the agency’s progress in each of the areas against a fourtiered scale: substantial progress, moderate progress, modest progress, 

and limited or no progress. 

Given the scope and limitations of our review, we did not perform an indepth assessment of each of the ten key preparedness areas. We used the 

critical components within each area, as well as our broader knowledge of 

the key preparedness areas, to gauge the agency’s overall progress. In 

response to our draft report, the agency provided information on specific 

activities underway. While we incorporated this information where 

appropriate, our assessment remains a high-level assessment. We 

recognize the importance of the many agency programs in various stages 

of development and implementation, and we will consider these programs 

as we plan future audits. 

Overall, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has made 

substantial progress in one of the ten key areas, moderate progress in 

seven areas, and modest progress in two areas (see figure 1). It would 

benefit from increased oversight of key preparedness areas to ensure that 

implementation of initiatives is sustained. 

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Page 1 
 
Concerns that are common to our review of the critical components 

include: (1) the need for more effective coordination with state, local, and 

tribal governments; (2) the need for information technology systems that 

are updated and integrated agency-wide; (3) too few experienced staff to 

handle the increasing workload; and (4) funding that is not adequate to 

maintain initiatives, meet the costs of disasters, and recruit, train, and 

retain staff. 

It should be noted that we and the Government Accountability Office have 

made many recommendations in our audits of agency operations that 

involve the key preparedness areas mentioned in this report. Many of 

these recommendations remain open. (See appendix C for a list of recent 

Office of Inspector General and Government Accountability Office 

reports.) We will continue to work with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency to ensure that corrective action plans are submitted 

and that progress is made in fully implementing report recommendations. 

In addition, we plan to report the status of recommendations in our 

semiannual report. 

In our 2008 report, we made recommendations in most of the critical areas 

discussed above. We recommended: (1) improving the agency’s overall 

awareness of its readiness for a catastrophic disaster; (2) developing and 

sustaining systems to track the progress of major programs, initiatives, and 

other activities; and (3) regularly sharing reports on the status of such 

activities with key stakeholders. We reiterate those recommendations, 

which remain open, and will continue to work with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency to ensure progress is made toward better 

preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster. 

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Figure 1. Scorecard for Select Federal Emergency Management Agency Preparedness 

Areas 

2008 2010 

Key Preparedness Areas Progress Progress 

OVERALL PLANNING 

• Develop a strategy to guide the integration of prevention, response, and 

recovery efforts 

• Complete assessments of capabilities and readiness at the national, state, and 

local levels 

• Enhance community disaster preparedness 

• Enhance catastrophic disaster preparedness at all levels 

Moderate 

Moderate 

Modest 

Moderate 

Moderate 

Moderate 

Modest 

Moderate 

Modest 

Moderate 

COORDINATION AND SUPPORT Moderate Moderate 

• Implement the National Response Framework and specific operations plans Modest Modest 

• Clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Principal Federal Moderate Substantial 

Official and Federal Coordinating Officer 

• Provide law enforcement access to FEMA records Substantial Substantial 

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS (New critical components in 2010) Moderate Substantial 

• Coordinate communications support for state, local, and tribal responders Substantial 

during Stafford Act incidents 

• Manage the deployment and operation of communications assets Substantial 

• Manage emergency communications grants Moderate 

LOGISTICS (One new critical component in 2010) 

• Establish total asset visibility through the Logistics Supply Chain 

Management System 

• Establish a national supply chain strategy 

Moderate 

Moderate 

Moderate 

Moderate 

Moderate 

EVACUATIONS (New critical components in 2010) 

• Augment state, tribal, and local emergency evacuation plans and operations 

• Establish the capability to implement a federally supported or federalized 

evacuation 

Modest Moderate 

Moderate 

Moderate 

HOUSING Modest Moderate 

• Develop a National Disaster Housing Strategy Modest Moderate 

• Develop plans to purchase, track, and dispose of temporary housing units Modest Moderate 

• Strengthen state and local commitment to house affected citizens Modest Modest 

DISASTER WORKFORCE 

• Adopt a Strategic Human Capital Plan 

• Manage the disaster workforce and integrate workforce management tracking 

systems 

Modest 

Moderate 

Modest 

Modest 

Moderate 

Modest 

MISSION ASSIGNMENTS Limited Modest 

• Improve guidance for mission assignments (i.e., regulations, policies, and Modest Moderate 

operating procedures) 

• Improve staffing and training Limited Modest 

• Enhance management of mission assignments Limited Limited 

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT Moderate Moderate 

• Have predisaster contracts in place Moderate Substantial 

• Recruit, train, and retain sufficient acquisition staff Moderate Moderate 

• Provide for postaward oversight Modest Modest 

MITIGATION (New preparedness area in 2010) Moderate 

• Develop an integrated National Hazard Mitigation Strategy Modest 

• Improve local hazard mitigation planning process Moderate 

• Improve hazard mitigation operations and outcomes Moderate 

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Background 

In responding to natural or manmade emergency situations, current 

doctrine dictates that the government agencies and organizations most 

local to the situation act as first responders. When state and local 

governments become overwhelmed by the size or scope of the disaster, 

state officials may request assistance from the federal government, so 

federal agencies must always be prepared to provide support when needed. 

In 1979, President Carter issued an Executive Order that created the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and merged many of 

the separate disaster-related federal functions. Following the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public 

Law [P.L.] 107-296) (Homeland Security Act) realigned FEMA and made 

it part of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

FEMA’s statutory authority comes from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 

Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (P.L. 100-707) 

(Stafford Act), which was signed into law in 1988 and amended the 

Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-288). To access federal assistance 

under the Stafford Act, generally, states must make an emergency or 

major disaster declaration request that is reviewed by FEMA for 

presidential approval. The Stafford Act also permits FEMA to anticipate 

declarations and prestage federal personnel and resources when a disaster 

threatening human health and safety is imminent, but not yet declared. 

Between January and May 2010, FEMA responded to more than 40 

presidentially declared emergencies and disasters. Since 1980, the 

average number of events to which FEMA responds each year has risen 

from 25 to about 70. Figure 2 shows the number of presidentially declared 

emergencies and disasters from January 1980 through December 2009. 

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Figure 2. Presidentially Declared Emergencies and Disasters, 1980 Through 2009 

0 

10 

20 

30 

40 

50 

60 

70 

1980 1990 2009 

Source: FEMA. 

FEMA spends an average of $4.3 billion each year on responding to 

disasters.1 Most of the money is spent on direct disaster assistance 

programs such as Individual Assistance (e.g., temporary housing), Public 

Assistance (e.g., debris removal and repair of damaged public property), 

and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (e.g., retrofitting buildings to 

make them resistant to earthquakes or strong winds). These programs are 

intended to address the short-, medium-, and long-term impacts of a 

disaster on individuals and communities. Figure 3 reflects FEMA’s 

budgetary resources, including the Disaster Relief Fund, from FY 2005 

through FY 2009. 

1

 The fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget request includes a $5.1 billion supplemental appropriation for costs associated 

with previous catastrophic disasters. 

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Figure 3. FEMA’s Budgetary Resources, FY 2005 Through 2009 

0 

10 

20 

30 

40 

50 

60 

70 

80 

90 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 

Source: DHS Annual Financial Report Data. Budgetary resources include unobligated balances 

carried forward; recoveries of prior year obligations; current year budget authority; and 

nonexpenditure transfers. 

In December 2009, FEMA implemented a new organizational structure 

designed to help it achieve its emergency management mandate more 

effectively. The new structure is intended to help strengthen key functions 

that had been previously fragmented across multiple organizational 

divisions and enable FEMA to better support the disaster management 

efforts of citizens and first responders. Figure 4 shows the new 

organizational structure. 

Since 1993, FEMA has been called upon to help support many routine 

natural disasters that historically would have been handled entirely by 

state and local governments. At the same time, some state and local 

governments cut funding to their own emergency management programs, 

thereby rendering themselves less prepared to handle routine disasters like 

floods, fires, or storms. As a relatively small federal agency, many of 

FEMA’s staff are “dual-hatted.” During nondisaster times, their primary 

roles may be to support planning and preparedness efforts. When a 

disaster hits, however, they may be working in the field on response and 

recovery. As more disasters are declared and disasters stay open for 

longer periods of time, more FEMA staff resources are diverted from 

planning and preparedness efforts. 

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Figure 4. FEMA Organization as of February 2010 

Source: FEMA. 

In March 2008, we performed a high-level assessment of FEMA’s 

preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster. We reported that FEMA 

had made moderate progress in five of nine key preparedness areas, 

modest progress in three areas, and limited progress in one area.2 From 

November 2009 to May 2010, we conducted fieldwork to assess FEMA’s 

current state of preparedness in these areas. We also included an 

assessment of Mitigation in this current review. 

2 FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster (OIG-08-34), March 2008. 

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Results of Review 

We assessed FEMA’s progress to improve preparedness in the following key areas: 

• Overall Planning 

• Coordination and Support 

• Emergency Communications 

• Logistics 

• Evacuations 

• Housing 

• Disaster Workforce 

• Mission Assignments 

• Acquisition Management 

• Mitigation 

Overall, FEMA has made substantial progress in one of the ten key areas, moderate 

progress in seven areas, and modest progress in two areas. FEMA would benefit from 

increased oversight of key preparedness areas to ensure that initiatives are being 

implemented. 

Concerns that are common to our review of the critical components include: (1) the need 

for more effective coordination with state, local, and tribal governments; (2) the need for 

information technology (IT) systems that are updated and integrated agency-wide; (3) too 

few experienced staff to handle the increasing workload; and (4) funding that is not 

adequate to maintain initiatives, meet the costs of disasters, and recruit, train, and retain 

staff. 

FEMA continues to make progress in leading the federal effort in responding to 

catastrophic disasters. FEMA can build on this progress by maintaining its momentum in 

continuing to develop and implement the critical components of the ten key preparedness 

areas discussed in this report. 

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Overall Planning 
 

Limited or No Progress 

Modest Progress Moderate Progress 

Substantial Progress 

Background 

FEMA’s Protection and National Preparedness (PNP) is responsible for leading 

America’s efforts to enhance preparedness to prevent, protect from, respond to, 

and recover from natural and manmade disasters. It strives to ensure that the 

Nation is prepared through a comprehensive cycle of planning, organizing, 

equipping, training, and exercising. 

In our 2008 report, we assessed five critical areas of Overall Planning. For this 

update, we combined two of the previously assessed critical areas because of their 

similarities. We combined the “Enhance preparedness at all levels” and “Enhance 

preparedness for the management and resolution of catastrophic events” areas into 

the critical area “Enhance catastrophic disaster preparedness at all levels.” In 

2008, we assessed FEMA’s progress in both of these areas as moderate. 

This assessment of Overall Planning focuses on FEMA’s efforts to: 

•	 Develop a strategy to guide the integration of prevention, response, and 

recovery efforts; 

•	 Complete assessments of capabilities and readiness at the national, state, 

and local levels; 

•	 Enhance community disaster preparedness; and 

•	 Enhance catastrophic disaster preparedness at all levels. 

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Develop a strategy to guide the Complete assessments of 

integration of prevention, capabilities and readiness at the 

response, and recovery efforts national, state, and local levels 

Modest Moderate

Enhance community Enhance catastrophic disaster 

 disaster preparedness preparedness at all levels 

Modest Moderate 

Critical Components 

Develop a strategy to guide the integration of prevention, response, and recovery 

efforts (Modest) – Our 2008 report rated FEMA’s progress in this critical area as 

moderate, given that the strategy and guidance for integration of prevention, 

response, and recovery efforts was under development and would soon be 

implemented. 

The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) 

directed FEMA to integrate its emergency preparedness, protection, response, 

recovery, and mitigation responsibilities and to develop and coordinate the 

implementation of a risk-based, all-hazards strategy for preparedness. However, 

FEMA’s PNP has yet to complete the development and implementation of a 

strategy and guidance for the integration of prevention, response, and recovery 

efforts.3

 In April and October 2009, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) reported that the PNP had not developed a strategic plan.4

 In the interim, 

PNP used its annual operating plan, which aligns with FEMA’s strategic plan, to 

3 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Section 503 (2) (D), directed the FEMA 

Administrator to integrate the agency’s emergency preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation 

responsibilities to confront effectively the challenges of a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other manmade 

disaster. 

4 National Preparedness, FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and 

Assessment Effort (GAO-09-369), April 2009. Emergency Management, Preliminary Observations on FEMA’s 

Community Preparedness Programs Related to the National Preparedness System (GAO-10-105T), October 2009. 

At the time of these reports, PNP was known as the National Preparedness Directorate. 

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guide its integration strategy. However, the GAO report noted that the annual 

operating plan does not have key elements of an effective national strategy, such 

as how to gauge progress. 

FEMA officials indicated that PNP is in the process of developing a strategic plan 

that will strengthen the integration of each of the directorate’s divisions and 

include specific goals, timelines, milestones, and measurements of progress. PNP 

plans to develop a new version of its strategic plan and begin implementation by 

the end of December 2010. However, the timeline for completing the strategic 

plan will hinge primarily on the completion of the new Presidential Policy 

Directive on National Preparedness, which is currently in draft, and the 

recommendations of the National Preparedness Task Force. Specifically, PNP 

has taken the following actions on its strategic plan: 

•	 Creating a community of division-level leadership to help guide and 

execute the new strategy being developed; 

•	 Performing inventories and analyses to lay the foundation for the strategy 

that aligns PNP-wide activities to the strategic focus; and 

•	 Identifying a three-phased approach to strategic planning. (Currently, the 

first round of review for Phase I: “Creating Strategic Focus” is 

underway.) 

FEMA officials emphasized that the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the 

Bottom-Up-Review, the Presidential Policy Directive on National Preparedness, 

and recommendations of the National Preparedness Task Force will have 

significant implications for the agency and the national preparedness system. 

Complete assessments of capabilities and readiness at the national, state, and local 

levels (Moderate) – FEMA used the Cost to Capabilities initiative and the Gap 

Analysis Program to conduct capabilities and readiness assessments.5 The Cost to 

Capabilities initiative was intended to optimize the impact of homeland security 

grant dollars on preparedness efforts, and the Gap Analysis Program was designed 

to improve operational readiness by reducing response and recovery capability 

shortfalls throughout all levels of government. 

FEMA conducted gap analyses in 2008 and 2009 for FEMA Regions I, II, III, IV, 

and VI. Once the gaps were identified, FEMA worked closely with the states to 

mitigate the shortfalls. For example, in May 2009, a state in FEMA Region I 

reported that it would be unable to meet transportation and evacuation needs if a 

Category 3 hurricane made landfall. FEMA is working with the state to provide 

technical assistance in developing and refining its evacuation plans. 

5

 The Post-Katrina Act requires the FEMA Administrator to establish a comprehensive assessment to assess, on an 

ongoing basis, the Nation’s prevention capabilities and overall preparedness, including operational readiness. 

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In July 2009, the FEMA Administrator issued a moratorium on new information 

requests from state, tribal, and local governments. This suspension of data 

collection applies to the Cost to Capabilities initiative and the Gap Analysis 

Program. The FEMA Administrator directed PNP to gather all the reporting 

information required by directorates and develop a consolidated process that 

eliminates duplication and minimizes the burden on state, local, and tribal 

partners. The Reporting Requirements Working Group was formed in August 

2009, composed of FEMA representatives and officials from state, local, tribal, 

and territorial governments. The working group meets regularly, and a proposal 

to streamline reporting requirements is due to the FEMA Administrator this fiscal 

year. 

PNP is also leading an effort to update the status of catastrophic planning in all 50 

states and 75 of the Nation’s largest urban areas. This update was undertaken at 

the direction of Congress and was due in April 2010.6 As of May 2010, FEMA 

was finalizing the report. 

Enhance community disaster preparedness (Modest) – Although FEMA 

emphasizes the importance of individual and community preparedness, significant 

challenges remain. Our 2008 report rated FEMA’s progress in this critical area as 

moderate, as efforts were underway to coordinate and integrate community 

disaster preparedness through the Citizen Corps Program and the Ready 

Campaign. However, in January 2010, GAO reported that FEMA has been 

unable to measure performance effectively for these programs.7 FEMA is in the 

process of developing a corrective action plan to address GAO’s concerns. 

The Citizen Corps Program is intended to make communities safer, stronger, and 

better prepared to respond to disasters of all kinds through education, training, and 

volunteer service. The program uses the number of local volunteer organizations 

registered nationwide as its principal performance measure, but the GAO report 

said that FEMA does not verify that registration data are accurate. FEMA 

officials said that a survey tool to assess the activities of Citizen Corps Councils 

nationwide has been developed and is awaiting approval from the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB). 

The Ready Campaign is a national public service advertising campaign designed 

to educate citizens to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks and other 

emergencies. GAO determined that FEMA has been unable to control the 

distribution of the Ready Campaign messages or measure whether the messages 

are changing individuals’ behavior. 

6

 Conference Report (111-298) accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010. 7 Emergency Preparedness, FEMA Faces Challenges Integrating Community Preparedness Programs into Its 

Strategic Approach (GAO-10-193), January 2010. 

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In 2008, we noted that various offices within DHS are responsible for elements of 

community preparedness, which was a challenge. However, since 2008, several 

programs, such as the Ready Campaign and faith-based community initiatives, 

have been transferred to FEMA. 

In January 2009, FEMA hosted a summit to generate ideas for creating a culture 

of preparedness. Government and nongovernment experts in emergency 

management, sociology, psychology, mass communications, and commercial 

marketing attended the summit. FEMA used the results from the summit and 

findings from a FEMA report titled Personal Preparedness in America: Findings 

from the 2009 Citizen Corps National Survey to draft a Community Preparedness 

Strategic Approach to promote a culture of preparedness.8 

In October 2009, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) 

reported that FEMA has taken significant steps to integrate preparedness and 

develop more robust regional offices.9 However, the report concluded that while 

progress has been made: (1) preparedness is not fully integrated across FEMA; (2) 

FEMA’s regional offices do not yet have the capacity required to ensure that the 

Nation is fully prepared; and (3) stakeholders are not yet full partners with FEMA 

in national preparedness. 

Enhance catastrophic disaster preparedness at all levels (Moderate) – FEMA has 

made progress enhancing catastrophic preparedness, particularly at the regional 

level. FEMA officials told us that several regional planning initiatives have been 

undertaken since 2008, including the Hawaii Hurricane Plan, the San Francisco 

Bay Area Earthquake Plan, the Northwest Nevada Earthquake Plan, and the 

Florida Hurricane Plan. Planning initiatives currently underway include the 

Southern California Earthquake Planning Initiative, the Guam Typhoon Planning 

Initiative, the Gulf Coast Hurricane Planning Initiative, and the New Madrid 

Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake Planning Initiative. 

In April 2010, Secretary Napolitano announced the creation of a National 

Preparedness Task Force charged with making recommendations for all levels of 

government regarding: (1) disaster and emergency guidance and policy; (2) 

federal grants; and (3) federal requirements, including measuring efforts. The 

task force includes federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local government officials, 

nongovernmental organization officials, and private sector officials. The task 

force will conduct regular meetings and expects to deliver recommendations in 

September 2010. 

PNP is also working to complete FEMA’s first National Preparedness Report, 

which will describe federal, state, and local preparedness levels and identify 

nationwide trends that can inform decisionmakers on what actions are needed to 

8 Personal Preparedness in America: Findings from the 2009 Citizen Corps National Survey, December 2009. 9

 NAPA, FEMA’s Integration of Preparedness and Development of Robust Regional Offices, October 2009. 

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further enhance our Nation’s preparedness for 4 of the 15 National Planning 

Scenarios: Improvised Explosive Device, Improvised Nuclear Device, Pandemic 

Influenza, and Hurricane. The draft National Preparedness Report is in the 

clearance phase with OMB. In May 2010, PNP conducted the 2010 National 

Level Exercise to test its catastrophic planning efforts. The exercise tested the 

response capabilities to an improvised nuclear device detonation. 

FEMA officials stated that FEMA regional offices encourage constant dialogue 

with state and local governments and reap the benefits of a better awareness of 

what is happening in the states. FEMA officials also credited the collaboration 

between the federal government and state and local governments through various 

working groups and task forces with helping to bring together different 

perspectives. An example of collaboration is the emergency planning guide 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, which PNP developed in coordination 

with state and local governments. The guide, finalized in March 2009, provides 

response and recovery planning guidance to state, territorial, tribal, and local 

governments. 

Continuing Concerns 

The Post-Katrina Act reaffirmed FEMA’s mission and set forth requirements that 

remain to be completed, including the development of a strategy to integrate 

prevention, response, and recovery efforts. Despite the important role of 

individuals and communities in preparing for a disaster, FEMA faces numerous 

challenges in measuring the effectiveness of its efforts to enhance individual and 

community preparedness. 

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Coordination and Support 
 

Background 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, efforts were undertaken to 

develop a national planning framework for emergency management. The result 

was the creation of the National Response Plan. The National Response Plan was 

used in response to Hurricane Katrina, but it fell far short of the seamless, 

coordinated effort that had been envisioned. Problems ranging from poor 

coordination of federal support to confusion about the roles and authorities of 

incident managers to inadequate information sharing among responders plagued 

the response to this catastrophic disaster. 

DHS issued the National Response Framework (NRF) in January 2008 to replace 

the National Response Plan. The NRF is intended to guide how the Nation 

conducts all-hazards response and describes key lessons learned from hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, focusing particularly on how the federal government is 

organized to support communities and states in catastrophic incidents. 

To determine FEMA’s readiness to support communities and states in response to 

a future catastrophic disaster, we reassessed the critical components evaluated in 

our 2008 report: 

•	 Implement the NRF and specific operations plans; 

•	 Clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Principal Federal 

Official (PFO) and Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO); and 

•	 Provide law enforcement access to FEMA records in support of 

Emergency Support Function-13 (ESF-13), Public Safety and Security. 

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Critical Components 

Implement the NRF and specific operations plans (Modest) – The NRF was 

implemented in March 2008, but federal operations plans that describe detailed 

resource, personnel, and asset allocations necessary to respond to incidents 

representing the gravest dangers facing the United States have not yet been 

completed. 

Since superseding the National Response Plan, the NRF has been used in more 

than 160 presidentially declared disasters and emergencies. FEMA includes the 

NRF Resource Center on its website to help stakeholders across the Nation 

understand domestic incident response roles, responsibilities, and relationships in 

order to respond more effectively to any type of incident. The Resource Center 

includes documents and guides pertaining to the National Incident Management 

System, the support annexes, briefings, and job aids. According to FEMA 

officials, the NRF will undergo a scheduled review this year and be updated in 

2011 to include lessons learned and best practices. 

The NRF describes planning as the cornerstone of national preparedness and a 

critical element to respond to a disaster or emergency. It also lists 15 National 

Planning Scenarios that represent a minimum number of credible scenarios 

depicting the range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters and related 

impacts facing our Nation. Operations plans for these scenarios are particularly 

important because they identify detailed resources, personnel, assets and specific 

roles, responsibilities, and actions for each federal department and agency 

responding to an incident or emergency. Our recent audit of federal incident 

management planning efforts determined that although planning has progressed 

for certain scenarios, much work remains to complete operations plans for all 15 

scenarios.10 Moreover, a senior DHS official said that planning was put on hold 

in July 2009 owing to the review of Homeland Security Presidential Directive–8 

by the Domestic Readiness Group and National Security Council. 

Clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the PFO and FCO 

(Substantial) – FEMA has made progress in clarifying the roles of key senior 

10 DHS Progress in Federal Incident Management Planning (OIG-10-58), March 2009. 

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federal officials who typically may be deployed with a federal incident 

management team. The NRF describes the roles of both the PFO and FCO and 

their responsibilities and authorities during an incident. It underscores that the 

PFO does not have directive authority over an FCO or any other federal or state 

official. Rather, “the PFO promotes collaboration and, as possible, resolves any 

Federal interagency conflict that may arise.” It also underscores that the FCO is 

specifically appointed by the President to coordinate federal support in the 

response to and recovery from emergencies and major disasters by executing 

Stafford Act authorities, including commitment of FEMA resources and the 

mission assignment of other federal departments or agencies. To further clarify 

that the FCO is the primary federal representative with whom the state, tribal, and 

local response officials interface, Congress included in the DHS Appropriations 

Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-83) prohibitions on the use of funds for any position 

designated as a PFO for Stafford Act–declared disasters or emergencies. It is 

important to note, however, that the DHS Secretary retains the authority to 

appoint a representative who functionally reports through the FCO; however, the 

NRF has not yet been updated to reflect this clarification. Additionally, FEMA 

Administrator Fugate, in testimony on May 6, 2010, declared that DHS will 

follow existing federal law and no longer appoint PFOs in disasters and 

emergencies that fall under the Stafford Act. Further, the department will not 

object to keeping the prohibition against such appointments in law.11 In August 

2010, FEMA reported that it is no longer referring to incident commanders or 

team leaders as PFOs. 

Provide law enforcement access to FEMA records (Substantial) – Since our last 

assessment, FEMA has made progress in improving law enforcement access to its 

disaster recovery assistance files by updating its system-of-records notice relating 

to FEMA disaster recovery assistance files. However, the protocols, procedures, 

and processes for facilitating law enforcement access to these records are not fully 

in place. 

To remedy information-sharing problems encountered following Hurricane 

Katrina and to facilitate law enforcement access to FEMA disaster recovery 

assistance files for investigating fraud, locating missing children, and identifying 

the whereabouts of sex offenders and fugitive felons, FEMA executed agreements 

with the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

U.S. Marshals Service.12 Additionally, in November 2007 FEMA appointed a 

11 Testimony of W. Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator, at the hearing, “Priorities For Disasters and Economic 

Disruption: The Proposed FY 2011 Budgets for FEMA and the Economic Development Administration” before the 

Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives. Washington, DC, May 6, 2010.

12 These agreements remain in effect, and in September 2009, FEMA updated its system-of-records notice for its 

disaster recovery assistance files to expand access to “appropriate federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, international, 

or foreign law enforcement authority or other appropriate agency charged with investigating or prosecuting such a 

violation or enforcing or implementing a law, rule, regulation, or order, so long as such disclosure is proper and 

consistent with the official duties of the person receiving the information.” 

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law enforcement advisor to the administrator to fill a position created by the PostKatrina Act. The advisor is to provide FEMA with a law enforcement perspective 

on agency plans and policies and support FEMA’s growing interaction with law 

enforcement associations. Although FEMA’s law enforcement advisor was aware 

of the agreements executed in 2006 and 2007 with the Department of Justice, he 

said he would not be involved in any future policy review unless specifically 

asked by FEMA’s Office of Chief Counsel. 

FEMA officials told us that they are 90% complete with establishing the 

protocols, procedures, and processes for providing appropriate law enforcement 

access to FEMA disaster recovery assistance records, to include Interagency 

Security Agreements with the Department of Justice and others needing access. 

FEMA anticipates that standard operating procedures will be in place by the end 

of this fiscal year. 

Continuing Concerns 

Federal operations plans for all 15 National Planning Scenarios are still needed 

because they guide other preparedness activities and contribute to the unity of 

effort by providing a common blueprint for activity in an emergency. We 

consider completion of these plans, particularly by agencies designated in the 

NRF as coordinators or primary agencies, as a foundational element for both 

preparedness and response. Additionally, FEMA should update the NRF to 

remedy confusion about the role, authority, and responsibilities of the PFO and to 

ensure that all NRF stakeholders are aware of the intent of Congress. Finally, it is 

important that the FEMA law enforcement advisor and his staff be kept aware of 

and regularly consulted on the execution of future law enforcement agreements 

and FEMA’s implementation of protocols, procedures, and processes to provide 

access to appropriate law enforcement entities. 

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Emergency Communications 
 

Background 

Disaster emergency communication is the means of transmitting and receiving 

voice, data, and video messages; information; and images critical to the 

management of an incident in which communications infrastructure has been 

abnormally impacted or lost. The ability of the disaster response community to 

communicate during an incident is essential to successful response and recovery 

efforts. It is generally recognized that the inability to communicate effectively 

was a major impediment to operations following the September 11, 2001 attacks 

and Hurricane Katrina. Critical emergency communications areas include the 

ability to maintain communications in the disruptive environment of catastrophic 

disasters (continuity), the ability to communicate across different organizations 

(interoperability), and the system’s ability to handle the increased demand that 

often accompanies disasters (capacity). 

Many agencies have a role in emergency communications. The NRF’s 

Emergency Support Function for Communications (ESF-2) identifies eight federal 

agencies with primary or supporting roles. DHS and other federal agencies have 

recently developed strategic guidance and pursued significant efforts, such as the 

National Emergency Communications Plan and the Emergency Communications 

Preparedness Center. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in 

conjunction with DHS, has been working to establish a nationwide interoperable 

network to increase emergency responders’ communications capacity. 

Three organizational components within DHS are responsible for emergency 

communications: (1) the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office 

of Emergency Communications; (2) the Science & Technology Directorate; and 

(3) FEMA’s Response Directorate’s Disaster Emergency Communications 

Division. In the past, there was confusion over which of these three elements led 

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DHS’ efforts in this area. In July 2009, Secretary Napolitano designated the 

Office of Emergency Communications to lead DHS’ efforts to advance 

interoperable emergency communications. Notwithstanding the recent 

designation, FEMA has important responsibilities in this area. 

This report focuses on FEMA’s areas of responsibility. Title 6 of the U.S. Code 

directs FEMA to provide funding, training, exercises, technical assistance, 

planning, and other assistance to build tribal, local, state, regional, and national 

communications capabilities to respond to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or 

other manmade disaster.13 FEMA’s Office of National Preparedness and 

Protection, Grants Program Directorate is responsible for administering the 

Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program. Consequently, we 

updated our criteria from the 2008 report to assess FEMA’s progress in the 

following critical areas: 

•	 Coordinate communications support for state, local, and tribal responders 

during Stafford Act incidents; 

•	 Manage the deployment and operation of communications assets; and 

•	 Manage emergency communications grants. 

Critical Components 

Coordinate communications support for state, local, and tribal emergency 

responders during Stafford Act incidents (Substantial) – FEMA’s Disaster 

Emergency Communications Division of the Response Directorate has been 

actively coordinating federal communications support for state, tribal, and local 

responders. The Disaster Emergency Communications Division is working with 

the National Communications System to revise the overarching ESF-2 standard 

operating procedures. Once the revision has been finalized, the division will 

revise its internal standard operating procedures to align with the ESF-2 standard 

operating procedures. FEMA officials said that coordination between the two 

offices is a continuous process with frequent meetings. However, there continues 

to be some confusion among the Disaster Emergency Communications Division, 

13 Title 6 U.S.C., sections 313(b)(2)(G); 314(a)(7); and 579(c)(1). 

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the National Communications System, and other federal ESF-2 partners. This 

was evident during disaster response operations in American Samoa. 

FEMA recently entered into an interagency agreement with the FCC to provide 

incident-area impact analysis in the immediate aftermath of an incident. FEMA 

can mission assign the FCC to deploy equipment and technicians to disaster areas 

to identify commercial, public safety, and critical infrastructure communications 

outages. Using this information, ESF-2 can coordinate the restoration of these 

communications systems. Identifying these outages is of vital importance to 

FEMA in ensuring that public welfare and evacuation information is disseminated 

to the disaster area in a timely and accurate manner. 

Recognizing the importance of a rapid response to an incident, FEMA has 

developed 11 pre-scripted mission assignments with the FCC, the U.S. Coast 

Guard, the Department of Defense, the National Communications System, and the 

U.S. Forest Service. The U.S. Coast Guard has agreed to provide mobile 

communication teams to support first responders and to coordinate initial 

operations in response to a disaster. The U.S. Forest Service will provide 

telecommunications equipment and personnel to support response operations, and 

the Department of Defense will provide 24-hour voice, data, and video 

communications solutions. These pre-scripted mission assignments provide 

FEMA with the communications equipment and personnel necessary for rapid 

response to an incident. 

Working with federal, state, tribal, and local responders, FEMA helped to 

establish in each of its ten regions the congressionally mandated Regional 

Emergency Communications Coordination Working Groups, which are headed by 

local responders and consist of their federal, state, and local counterparts. The 

working groups assess the status of local emergency communications systems and 

report annually to federal stakeholders. FEMA told us that nine regions have 

completed their annual reports. When all reports are complete, FEMA will 

compile the submissions into a national report. FEMA is also assisting regional 

and state jurisdictions to develop emergency communications plans that allow 

FEMA to be better prepared to pre-position and deploy needed communications 

assets during catastrophic incidents. To date, 27 states and 4 regions have 

emergency communications plans. 

FEMA has participated in multiple emergency communications exercises. FEMA 

officials said that they recently participated in an interoperable radio exercise with 

the U.S. Secret Service; a joint exercise with the Transportation Security 

Administration and the U.S. Army using the Military Affiliate Radio System as a 

backup in case of widespread devastation, as occurred after Hurricane Katrina; 

and an exercise with the U.S. Coast Guard. FEMA will also participate in the 

2011 National Level Exercise focusing on a catastrophic earthquake in the New 

Madrid Seismic Zone. Before the exercise, states will provide information on the 

types of communications assets they own. FEMA will conduct a scenario-based 

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impact assessment using the information provided and present the assessment 

results to the states so they can exercise based on the results. The Regional 

Emergency Communications Coordination Working Groups will work with state 

and local representatives to identify continuity exercises within the region that 

include communications as a component. Finally, FEMA recently participated in 

an ESF-2 exercise that simulated operations during the response and recovery 

phases after an earthquake in Salt Lake City, Utah. Participants included DHS; 

the Department of Defense; the General Services Administration (GSA); the U.S. 

Forest Service; and state, county, and city officials. FEMA officials said that the 

exercise provided a better understanding of the roles, capabilities, and authorities 

of, and coordination with, ESF-2 departments and agencies, and state and local 

agencies and officials. 

Manage the deployment and operation of communications assets (Substantial) – 

FEMA has effectively deployed communications assets to the state and local 

emergency community through the Mobile Emergency Response Support 

(MERS) detachments. MERS detachments are comprised of trained professionals 

and specialized equipment, including interoperable high frequency, very high 

frequency, ultra high frequency, and 700/800 megahertz communications 

systems, as well as satellite systems. MERS communications assets can establish 

or reestablish connectivity with public safety wireless systems and command and 

control networks. MERS detachments can also interconnect and wire facilities 

within the disaster region and install computer, telephone, and video networks. 

MERS detachments have been deployed in connection with major incidents 

almost continuously over the past year. Domestically, detachments deployed to 

several states, including most recently to North Dakota and South Dakota. During 

the international response effort in Haiti, FEMA sent several detachments to 

support urban search and rescue teams and other responders. MERS detachments 

also deployed in response to a tsunami in American Samoa and a typhoon in 

Guam. 

Although MERS deployments have been successful, there have been some minor 

concerns. For example, during the deployment to American Samoa, there was 

confusion regarding who could contact MERS assets for information. FEMA is 

addressing this question with the National Communications System and its ESF-2 

partners. In the after-action report for the Haiti deployment, FEMA identified the 

need for enhanced logistical support for deployed MERS detachments, 

specifically the acquisition of appropriate portable shelter equipment, and the 

need for updated policy and procedures related to the movement of FEMA assets 

outside the continental United States. 

Manage emergency communications grants (Moderate) – FEMA has made 

progress in managing emergency communications grants to enhance state and 

local capabilities. From FY 2004 through FY 2008, the last year for which 

complete figures are available, DHS awarded more than $3 billion in grants to 

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enhance state and local interoperable communications efforts. In addition, FEMA 

is administering, on behalf of the Department of Commerce, the Public Safety 

Interoperable Communications Grant Program, which is funded through proceeds 

from the auction of analog television frequency spectrum. This grant program, 

totaling almost $1 billion, is designed to improve state and local public safety 

agencies’ emergency communications. DHS has provided technical assistance 

and guidance to states and territories to develop Statewide Communications 

Interoperability Plans, which are a requirement for receiving grant funds. By 

April 2008, all 56 states and territories had a DHS-approved plan. 

To measure the effectiveness of grants, in 2008 FEMA developed a Cost to 

Capability initiative. Following an agency-wide moratorium on new requests for 

information from state and local governments, the Cost to Capability initiative 

was suspended in November 2009. Therefore, there is currently no system in 

place to measure the impact of grants. However, FEMA’s Reporting 

Requirements Working Group is developing a data collection system intended 

eventually to measure the effectiveness of several programs, including 

communications grants. 

Continuing Concerns 

Despite a robust program to coordinate and deploy communications support for 

federal, state, tribal, and local responders during Stafford Act incidents, FEMA 

has yet to field a system to measure the impact of communications-related grants. 

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Logistics
 


Modest Progress 

Substantial Progress 

Moderate Progress 

Limited or No Progress 

Background 

The Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) is the agency’s major program 

office responsible for policy, guidance, standards, execution, and governance of 

logistics support, services, and operations. Its mission is to plan, manage, and 

sustain the national logistics response and recovery operations in support of 

domestic emergencies and special events. LMD is organized around four core 

competencies: 

• Logistics Operations 

• Logistics Plans and Exercises 

• Distribution Management 

• Property Management 

FEMA’s logistics responsibilities include acquiring, receiving, storing, shipping, 

tracking, sustaining, and recovering commodities, assets, and property. 

LMD’s ability to track commodities is one of the keys to fulfilling its mission. 

The disasters of 2004 and 2005 highlighted inconsistencies stemming from 

multiple, independent computer and paper-based systems and highlighted a need 

for standardized policies and procedures. 

After Hurricane Katrina, FEMA identified areas for improving its end-to-end 

supply chain and established the Total Asset Visibility (TAV) program to 

implement processes and automate the flow of commodity information. 

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FEMA management is focused on improving the logistics core competencies to a 

level that will respond effectively and efficiently to a catastrophic disaster. We 

assessed two critical areas to measure FEMA’s progress to: 

•	 Establish total asset visibility through the Logistics Supply Chain 
 

Management System (LSCMS); and 
 

•	 Establish a national supply chain strategy. 

Establish total asset visibility Establish national supply chain through the Logistics Supply strategy (New Rating) Chain Management System 

Moderate Moderate

Critical Components 

Establish total asset visibility through the Logistics Supply Chain Management 

System (Moderate) – Prior to 2004, FEMA had invested in multiple systems to 

support its unique inventory needs, but they were not integrated and were 

duplicative. In response, FEMA began to implement the TAV program in FY 

2005. Since implementation, TAV has undergone two phases of development. 

TAV-Phase 1 was a pilot program that involved improving the visibility of select 

assets for two FEMA regions and distribution centers supporting the hurricaneprone Gulf Coast states. This phase of TAV was deployed in time to support the 

2006 hurricane season and to allow FEMA to begin integrating modern logistics 

processes and applications with existing FEMA processes. At the end of FY 

2009, FEMA transitioned from TAV-Phase 1 to the LSCMS (TAV-Phase 2). 

LMD implemented a number of LSCMS milestones during the current fiscal 

year, including: 

•	 Wireless Enterprise Procurement - wireless package; 

•	 Warehouse Management - functional design; and 

•	 Trading Partner Management - development. 

According to FEMA, every element of LSCMS is fully functional but not 

completely implemented. The entire application is scheduled to be implemented 

by the end of calendar year 2010. 

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LSCMS is expected to be interoperable with federal, state, county, municipal, 

tribal government, and nongovernmental organizations’ disaster management 

supply chain processes and systems. The final product and implementation will 

encompass all aspects of FEMA operations, including inventory management, 

requisitions, order management, fulfillment, shipping, transportation 

management, situational awareness and reporting, and retrograde processes. 

New LSCMS initiatives include change management, training, acceptance, and 

accountability. Officials said that FEMA is addressing change management 

across all ten regions by increasing communications throughout FEMA and by 

providing role-based training. 

Establish a national supply chain strategy (Moderate) – During a disaster, when 

state and local governments’ capabilities are exceeded, the state may request 

FEMA’s assistance. The specific type and quantity of commodities and support 

assets needed will vary, but experience indicates that some common needs include 

water (usually bottled), emergency meals, cots, blankets, tarps, and generators. 

FEMA has determined that pre-positioning commodities is neither logistically 

prudent nor an effective use of taxpayer funds. FEMA has focused on eliminating 

potential waste by: 

•	 Changing LMD business practices and procedures; 

•	 Strengthening public and private sector solutions and relationships with 

partners such as the Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, American Red Cross, and GSA; and 

•	 Implementing a continuous process review and developing standard 

operating procedures at all FEMA Distribution Centers. 

To develop a more responsive, flexible, and sustainable supply chain management 

strategy, LMD established the following workgroups: 

•	 The Distribution Management Strategy Working Group (DMSWG) 

supports LMD as the National Logistics Coordinator, which collaborates 

with other federal agencies, public and private sector partners, 

nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders, ensuring a fully 

coordinated and effective service and support capability. The outcomes 

associated with this effort include addressing an excess capacity 

distribution strategy. 

•	 The Resource Management Group, a component of the DMSWG, focuses 

on coordinating collaborative logistics and sourcing decisions. 

•	 The Commodity Group, also a component of the DMSWG, focuses on 

sourcing strategy and defining inventory levels throughout the logistics 

disaster response partner community. 

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FEMA supported the United States response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake within 

72 hours and provided water, meals, cots, blankets, tarps, plastic sheets and Joint 

Field Office kits. FEMA coordinated and moved more than 190 tractor-trailers of 

supplies to support the disaster response. 

Continuing Concerns 

FEMA personnel said that two of the primary challenges to improving the 

LSCMS business process are retaining sufficient staffing and implementing 

change management across all ten regions. Although LSCMS has been available, 

the primary methods of information transfer continued to be email, phone calls, 

and spreadsheets. Customer satisfaction surveys from 2008 and 2009 show low 

systems usage among logistics professionals in the field. 

FEMA has improved its logistics systems and processes; however, LSCMS is not 

yet fully implemented and may not be fully effective until disaster response 

personnel have adopted all aspects of the new business process, as discussed in 

our recent report.14 

14 FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters (OIG-10-101), July 2010. 

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Evacuations 
 

Background 

Emergency evacuations are the responsibility of state and local governments. 

However, if state and local emergency management systems become 

overwhelmed, FEMA has several specific responsibilities. According to the 

National Response Framework’s Mass Evacuation Incident Annex, FEMA will: 

(1) primarily augment state, tribal, and local government plans and operations; 

and (2) be capable of implementing a federally supported or federalized 

evacuation. FEMA is responsible for providing direction, guidance, and technical 

assistance on state and local evacuation plans that contain integrated information 

on transportation operations, shelters, and other elements of a successful 

evacuation. FEMA is also required to work with state, tribal, and local authorities 

to support contraflow planning, where the normal flow of traffic is reversed to aid 

in an evacuation, and is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources are 

available for evacuation efforts. 

Our 2008 report assessed two specific initiatives involving evacuations: (1) the 

Gulf Coast Mass Evacuation Capability Enhancement Initiative; and (2) the Gap 

Analysis Program. For this report, we expanded our focus to include FEMA’s 

full responsibilities and authorities outlined in the Post-Katrina Act. We reviewed 

FEMA’s efforts to: 

•	 Augment state, tribal, and local emergency evacuation plans and 

operations; and 

•	 Establish the capability to implement a federally supported or federalized 

evacuation. 

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Critical Components 

Augment state, tribal, and local emergency evacuation plans and operations 

(Moderate) – We assessed FEMA’s progress in this area, focusing on the Gulf 

Coast Mass Evacuation Capability Enhancement Initiative, the Gap Analysis 

Program, the Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative, and evacuation planning 

workshops sponsored by FEMA. Through these initiatives and others, FEMA has 

worked with at least 35 states and territories on evacuation planning since 2008. 

FEMA launched the Gulf Coast Mass Evacuation Capability Enhancement 

Initiative in 2007 to develop an organized plan for evacuating the Gulf Coast 

region and to have state-to-state agreements in place for transporting and 

sheltering evacuees. Evacuations in response to Hurricane Gustav in 2008 

demonstrate that FEMA’s efforts are having an impact. During the response, 

15,000 Louisiana residents were transported by bus to shelters in evacuee host 

states; 2,025 were relocated by rail to Tennessee; and 5,050 were flown to 

Arkansas, Kentucky, or Tennessee. 

The initiative has continued with the expanded goal of developing regional 

hurricane operations plans and federal support plans for several states. FEMA 

officials provided the Texas and Louisiana Federal Support Plans, the Arkansas 

Aviation Operations Plan, the South Carolina Motor Coach Evacuation Concept 

of Operations Plan, and the FEMA Region VI 2009 Hurricane Contingency Plan 

as evidence of progress in this area. 

The Gap Analysis Program was designed to improve operational readiness by 

reducing response and recovery capability shortfalls throughout all levels of 

government. The 2008 Gap Analysis, which included an analysis of evacuation 

capabilities in 19 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 

Virgin Islands, indicated that 5 states have no gaps and would not require federal 

assistance. FEMA is working with other states to mitigate gaps that were 

identified. For example, one state needs federal assistance to evacuate 17,000 

residents with special medical needs. FEMA, the Department of Defense, and the 

state developed a draft Air Evacuation Plan to mitigate this gap. 

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The 2009 Gap Analysis is not as informative as the 2008 analysis, because data 

collection was suspended in response to a moratorium issued by the FEMA 

Administrator, as discussed in previous sections. FEMA officials said that states 

can now use their tool of choice to assess capabilities. FEMA is continuing to use 

previously collected data to determine evacuation staffing estimates, and FEMA’s 

regional planners continue working with the states. 

FEMA’s Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative is designed to conduct analyses 

and develop plans for mass evacuation, sheltering, and response to catastrophic 

disasters. In April 2009, GAO reported that FEMA had engaged in significant 

planning efforts regarding threats that are specific to certain regions, such as 

hurricanes and earthquakes, through this initiative, but that planning efforts were 

ongoing and had not been concluded.15 Examples of catastrophic disaster plans 

that incorporate evacuation plans include Northern California and Southern 

California Catastrophic Earthquake Plans, a Hawaii All-Hazards Concept Plan, 

and a New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake Contingency Plan. 

FEMA officials said that planning for the New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic 

Earthquake will be complete this year. Planning efforts included earthquake 

response capability assessments for each of the eight New Madrid Seismic Zone 

states and planning sessions with the counties and states through FEMAsupported workshops. Representatives of federal, state, tribal, local, and county 

emergency management and responder organizations, as well as the private and 

nonprofit sectors, participate in these workshops. 

FEMA has also conducted a series of workshops in support of evacuation 

planning. For example, in January 2009 FEMA held a Gulf Coast contraflow 

evacuation workshop for federal and state entities to review hurricane contraflow 

evacuation operations throughout the Gulf Coast region. FEMA also plans to 

conduct a workshop in 2010 to support state and regional planning efforts for a 

mass evacuation. 

Establish the capability to implement a federally supported or federalized 

evacuation (Moderate) – A large-scale federally supported evacuation has not 

been needed since Hurricane Katrina, but FEMA has provided evacuation support 

to state, tribal, and local governments during recent incidents, including 

hurricanes Gustav and Ike. FEMA is also finalizing a national system for states to 

track evacuees. Additionally, FEMA published a Mass Evacuation Incident 

Annex in June 2008. However, the Operational Supplement to the Annex that is 

intended to provide additional guidance for mass evacuations has not yet been 

finalized. 

15 National Preparedness, FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and 

Assessment Efforts (GAO-09-369), dated April 2009. 

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According to a senior FEMA official, the Gulf Coast Evacuation Plan was 

successfully implemented in 2008 during Hurricane Gustav to evacuate residents 

from New Orleans using air, bus, and rail transportation. Residents considered 

this evacuation more orderly and better organized than the evacuation for 

Hurricane Katrina. Former FEMA Administrator David Paulison pointed out that 

FEMA had altered its procedures to avoid repeating errors made during Hurricane 

Katrina. During Katrina, buses and ambulances did not arrive until after the 

storm made landfall. FEMA now has in place prearranged contracts for 

ambulances and other emergency transportation services. 

A senior FEMA official reported to Congress in February 2009 that FEMA is now 

much better prepared to coordinate medical special needs evacuations with the 

Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, and state 

governments. For Hurricane Gustav, FEMA reported that more than 600 

prearranged ambulances were available to Louisiana, and that special Department 

of Defense aircraft were deployed to help evacuate critically ill patients. FEMA 

also activated its ground and air ambulance evacuation services contract and its 

contract with Amtrak. For Hurricane Ike, federal assets were standing by 

prelandfall to support air evacuations. More than 400 Transportation Security 

Administration personnel also deployed to assist with planned evacuations. 

FEMA began developing a National Mass Evacuation Tracking System to track 

individuals as they arrive at or depart from certain locations, such as shelters. 

However, funding for system development was cut in 2008 and development did 

not resume until the spring of 2009. Several states and cities are testing the 

system, and FEMA officials stated that it will be ready by the 2010 hurricane 

season. FEMA is offering the system to states free of charge; however, FEMA 

cannot compel states to use the system. 

Continuing Concerns 

FEMA has made progress in both critical areas, but its preparedness to support a 

regional or large-scale evacuation outside the Gulf region remains a concern. 

FEMA has augmented state and local evacuations planning and operations and 

enhanced its own capabilities to implement a federally supported evacuation. 

However, FEMA officials said that they need more staff and funding for the 

Planning Division, and we are concerned that the Operational Annex to the Mass 

Evacuation Incident Annex in the National Response Framework has not been 

completed. 

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Housing 
 

Background 

In a presidentially declared disaster, FEMA administers the temporary housing 

response for individuals and households. Disaster housing assistance may include 

the use of financial resources and direct support from FEMA and other federal 

agencies; local, tribal, and state governments; and voluntary agencies. In the past, 

FEMA was criticized for its inability to provide immediate, short-term housing 

assistance to disaster survivors and to transition people needing it to more 

permanent forms of housing. As a result of congressional legislation, FEMA 

developed and released the National Disaster Housing Strategy to guide future 

disaster housing assistance efforts. 

Since our 2008 report, FEMA has made strides toward implementing a 

comprehensive strategy for managing disaster housing resources. However, 

limited federal, state, and agency coordination; constant housing plan revisions; 

and limited federal funding have hindered final National Disaster Housing 

Strategy implementation efforts. 

Overall, FEMA disaster housing progress is rated as moderate; however, we 

anticipate additional progress as FEMA continues to refine and implement its 

future housing strategy and mission. We reviewed FEMA’s current progress in 

three critical housing components: 

•	 Develop a National Disaster Housing Strategy; 

•	 Develop plans to purchase, track, and dispose of temporary housing units; 

and 

•	 Strengthen state and local commitment to house affected citizens. 

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Critical Components 

Develop a National Disaster Housing Strategy (Moderate) – In response to the 

Post-Katrina Act, FEMA released the National Disaster Housing Strategy in 

January 2009. The strategy was developed as a combined effort of FEMA and its 

federal partner agencies, and incorporated feedback from volunteer organizations, 

private sector businesses, and individuals. The strategy summarizes FEMA’s 

disaster housing process, including sheltering and housing capabilities, principles, 

and policies. It outlines a number of potential housing programs that can assist 

disaster survivors in finding interim housing. In September 2009, we issued a 

report stating that the National Disaster Housing Strategy is a positive yet interim 

step forward.16 

The strategy has several components. First, it requires the creation of a National 

Disaster Joint Housing Task Force. The task force is charged with developing a 

Disaster Housing Implementation Plan that translates the strategy’s goals into 

measurable actions and milestones; a Comprehensive Concept of Operations that 

integrates and synchronizes existing housing capabilities across all levels of 

government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector; and a 

Catastrophic Concept of Operations that addresses the unique requirements for a 

large-scale disaster. A current example of a unique disaster requirement would be 

the American Samoa permanent housing construction pilot program, which was 

developed as a result of the September 29, 2009 tsunami that struck American 

Samoa. 

OMB approved the Disaster Housing Implementation Plan on March 16, 2010. 

The Comprehensive Concept of Operations is scheduled to be completed and 

released immediately following the release of the National Disaster Recovery 

Framework. 

FEMA has also developed a Non-congregate Housing Program that uses hotels 

and motels or federally owned unoccupied housing units as a sheltering resource. 

16 Management Advisory Report: FEMA’s Housing Strategy for Future Disasters (OIG-09-111), September 2009. 

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Each option has unique challenges. FEMA has a contract to place disaster 

survivors in an average of 1,250,000 hotel or motel rooms per night for an 

extended period. The program allows for sheltering a maximum of 500,000 

disaster-affected households after a catastrophic event. However, the program’s 

success depends on leveraging the full capabilities of the federal government 

along with state and local governments, the private sector, community members, 

and the disaster survivors. An additional constraint to this program is the 

unknown readiness and availability of FEMA-identified hotel/motel sheltering 

option components. Nationwide, FEMA has identified approximately 46,715 

federally owned unoccupied housing units. These units are readily available; 

however, this option has potential unit habitability and readiness concerns. 

Disaster survivors must be willing to relocate to areas where housing is available, 

and states must agree to accept these survivors. 

Develop plans to purchase, track, and dispose of temporary housing units 

(Moderate) – Since 2008, FEMA has developed extensive plans to purchase, 

track, and dispose of temporary housing units. 

Numerous concerns arose over FEMA’s use of travel trailers after Hurricane 

Katrina. In March 2009, FEMA testified that it will consider the use of travel 

trailers only as a last resort.17 However, FEMA will consider a state’s specific 

request for travel trailers during extraordinary disaster conditions when no other 

forms of interim housing are available. FEMA managers will apply the following 

conditions: (1) Travel trailers may be authorized only for use on private property; 

(2) FEMA will not authorize travel trailers for use in group sites; (3) FEMA will 

authorize travel trailer use for a maximum of 6 months’ occupancy, and only 

when the level of damage to the occupant’s predisaster dwelling can be repaired 

in less than 6 months; (4) FEMA will provide travel trailers that are within 

formaldehyde levels the state has determined to be acceptable; and (5) FEMA will 

provide units with air exchange controls that meet or exceed FEMA 

specifications. 

In light of the decision to consider travel trailers as a last resort housing option, 

FEMA has been assessing new and innovative forms of temporary alternative 

housing through several programmatic actions. In 2006, Congress appropriated 

$400 million for a FEMA-operated 4-year Alternative Housing Pilot Program. 

Through an interagency agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development, this program is designed to identify and evaluate better ways to 

house disaster survivors. For example, in Texas, FEMA has developed a housing 

unit that can be assembled in less than 10 hours and can be stored flat for reuse. 

17 Written testimony of Nancy Ward (then Acting Administrator of FEMA). The title of the hearing: “A New Way 

Home: Findings from the Disaster Recovery Subcommittee Special Report and Working with the New 

Administration on a Way Forward” before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate. Washington, DC, March 18, 2009. 

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A final report to Congress on the Alternative Housing Pilot Program is due 

December 31, 2011. 

In 2008, FEMA awarded provisional contracts to seven alternative housing 

manufacturers to install temporary housing units for students attending classes at 

FEMA’s National Emergency Training Center in Emmitsburg, MD. The 

Recovery Division’s Joint Housing Solutions Group continues to monitor and 

evaluate each unit for future suitability to house disaster survivors. 

For FY 2010, FEMA has a baseline inventory of 4,000 ready-for-dispatch 

temporary housing units. In January 2010, FEMA began an effort to sell more 

than 101,000 excess temporary housing units through GSA online auctions.18 

When the GSA auction closed on January 29, 2010, FEMA had sold most of its 

excess inventory; however, bidders are still in the process of removing the 

housing units. By the end of 2011, FEMA is scheduled to close all supporting 

storage sites. 

Strengthen state and local commitment to house affected citizens (Modest) – 

Since 2008, FEMA has developed two approaches to strengthen how state and 

local governments assist disaster survivors with temporary housing. However, 

each approach has specific limitations, such as insufficient numbers of 

experienced disaster housing staff, limited federal and state funding, and poor 

coordination with state and local governments. 

In its Disaster Housing Practitioner’s Guide, FEMA said that each state should 

create and maintain a standing disaster housing taskforce. FEMA will assist 

states by providing best practices information, operational guidance, and a 

standardized housing plan template that can be tailored to unique disaster housing 

needs. In 2007, the first State-Led Disaster Housing Taskforce was convened in 

response to the California wildfires. FEMA sent headquarters-based subject 

matter experts to provide technical support when disasters struck American 

Samoa, Iowa, Louisiana, and Texas. However, FEMA has only limited 

headquarters and regional staff to fully execute an expert-based disaster housing 

mission for every disaster. Typically, states do not have disaster housing experts. 

FEMA officials told us that additional federal funding is needed to develop the 

federal and state disaster housing expertise. 

Also, the Housing Strategy stated that when it is necessary to build temporary 

group housing sites, state and local government are responsible for identifying 

public land that is suitable for a group site or, when publicly owned land is 

unavailable, for identifying other sites for FEMA to lease. In this case, FEMA 

emphasizes the role of state and local governments in providing shelter for their 

18 In response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, FEMA purchased 143,699 temporary housing units for a total 

price of over $2.6 billion, an average of more than $18,000 per unit. As a result of the 2010 GSA auctions, more 

than 101,000 of these excess units were sold at an average price of $1,309 per unit. 

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residents. Given the current budget climate, some state and local governments 

may not fulfill these responsibilities; FEMA will need to encourage the state and 

local role in developing and implementing housing solutions. 

Continuing Concerns 

Since 2008, FEMA has made moderate progress toward developing a 

comprehensive National Disaster Housing Strategy. However, we are concerned 

that FEMA has not clearly defined its roles and responsibilities with regard to the 

long-term housing needs of disaster survivors (i.e., beyond the standard 18 

months of assistance). 

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Disaster Workforce 
 

Background 

The need for a trained, effective disaster workforce is one issue mentioned 

consistently in reports regarding FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 

FEMA’s disaster workforce consists mainly of reservists who serve temporarily 

during a disaster. FEMA struggled to provide adequate numbers of staff in 

response to Hurricane Katrina and did not have the automated support needed to 

deploy more than 5,000 disaster personnel on short notice. New hires did not 

receive adequate training during FEMA’s accelerated orientation process, and 

FEMA did not have a central training records management system. The shortage 

of qualified staff for key positions responding to Hurricane Katrina negatively 

impacted the effectiveness of FEMA’s response and recovery operation. 

The Post-Katrina Act provides for rebuilding FEMA’s permanent and reserve 

workforces through tools such as a strategic human capital plan, structured career 

paths, and recruitment and retention bonuses. The act also requires a plan to 

establish and implement a surge workforce, including an adequate number of 

trained personnel to meet specific response team capabilities. 

As FEMA and DHS have evolved, the disaster workforce structure and systems 

have not kept pace. Since 1992, FEMA has initiated 12 studies to look at the use 

and structure of its disaster workforce; however, FEMA has not implemented all 

of the recommendations from those studies. 

We reviewed two critical areas identified as weaknesses after Hurricane Katrina 

to assess FEMA’s efforts to: 

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•	 Adopt a Strategic Human Capital Plan; and 

•	 Manage the disaster workforce and integrate workforce management 

tracking systems. 

Critical Components 

Adopt a Strategic Human Capital Plan (Moderate) – In May 2008, FEMA 

published the “Strategic Human Capital Plan 2008–2012,” which established 

FEMA’s plans for staffing standards, a restructured workforce composition, new 

core competencies, and professional development.19 This is FEMA’s first official 

plan for managing, strengthening, and building a forward-leaning workforce. The 

strategic plan includes five key strategic initiatives aimed at recruiting and 

maintaining a strong, competent, and credible workforce: 

•	 Understanding the composition and character of the workforce; 

•	 Rightsizing the agency; 

•	 Building core competencies; 

•	 Training and professionally developing the workforce; and 

•	 Building the culture of the new FEMA. 

Our 2008 report stated that FEMA completed an assessment of its legacy Disaster 

Assistance Employee program and published the report FEMA: A New Disaster 

Reserve Workforce Model. The report included 25 recommendations, and FEMA 

management identified 9 recommendations that would produce the greatest 

positive near-term effects (see table 1). The remaining 16 recommendations 

would be incorporated as a result of completing the first 9 or implemented over a 

longer period. 

19 FEMA Strategic Human Capital Plan 2008–2012 (FEMA P-692), May 2008. 

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Table 1. Top Nine Recommendations from FEMA: A New Disaster Reserve 

Workforce Model 

Recommendation Status 

New Office of FEMA Reserves Organization Completed 

Office of FEMA Reserves Management Positions Completed 

Cross-Functional Strategic & Operational Plans Completed 

Policy Development and Compliance Completed in Part 

Policy Communication and Development 

Processes 

Completed in Part 

Position Specific Training and Credentialing 

Requirement 

Completed in Part 

Reserve Workforce Planning Tool Completed in Part 

Decision-making Structure Completed in Part 

Standard Reservists Levels Completed in Part 

Source: FEMA: A New Disaster Reserve Workforce Model. 

In September 2008, Disaster Reserve Workforce Division staff established an ad 

hoc working group with counterparts in the Transportation Security 

Administration and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to develop a 

concept of operations for the Surge Capacity Force described in section 624 of the 

Post-Katrina Act. The first draft of the concept of operations was completed in 

December 2008. Senior FEMA and DHS management have not approved the 

draft plan. 

Manage the disaster reserve workforce and integrate workforce management 

tracking systems (Modest) – FEMA: A New Disaster Reserve Workforce Model 

recommended that FEMA establish a director-level office to improve the 

effectiveness and efficiency of professional operations and address disaster 

reserve workforce challenges. In response to this recommendation, FEMA 

launched the Disaster Reserve Workforce Division (DRWD) in FY 2008. A key 

aspect of DRWD’s mission is to assist in credentialing and deploying FEMA’s 

full-time workforce and Disaster Reserve Workforce. As of March 2009, the 

Disaster Reserve Workforce consists of 21 cadres located in all 10 FEMA regions 

and at FEMA headquarters. FEMA has 7,995 registered disaster reservists, of 

whom 1,322 are immediately deployable. 

In June 2008, DRWD launched an agency-wide credentialing effort, which 

resulted in the creation of FEMA’s Credentialing Program. The program is 

responsible for the design and implementation of a plan to standardize the 

recruiting, training, and credentialing of FEMA’s Disaster Reserve Workforce. In 

April 2009, FEMA developed the Agency-Wide Disaster Workforce 

Credentialing Plan, which contains the required processes that all cadres must 

implement in order to ensure that FEMA applies a consistent and fair process to 

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credential each cadre member.20 Before the program was developed, disaster 

workforce responsibilities and approaches were not standardized, resulting in 

inconsistent quality and efficiency in delivery of services. 

The Credentialing Program consists of 21 cadres. FEMA reported the following 

results: 

•	 Eleven cadres have a complete and approved Cadre-Specific Plan (CSP). 

Five of these eleven cadres have migrated to the existing credentialing 

framework; 

•	 Six cadres have a complete CSP that awaits approval; and 

•	 Four cadres have begun the initial planning in order to credential their 

disaster workers under the FEMA Qualification System. 

FEMA estimates that half of the Disaster Reserve Workforce will be credentialed 

by the second quarter of FY 2012 and all will be fully credentialed by FY 2013. 

Half of the full-time workforce will also be credentialed by FY 2013 and the rest 

by FY 2014. 

Even with the credentialing plans in place, training of newly hired disaster 

professionals continues to be a major challenge. FEMA’s Emergency 

Management Institute (EMI) has developed training courses consistent with the 

requirements in the credentialing plans but is still relying on the old model of 

training staff during deployment.21 FEMA attributes this to EMI’s training 

schedule, which is booked one year in advance. To further address training, 

FEMA is developing an orientation program and related materials to instruct 

newly hired disaster staff on standards of conduct, ethics, Equal Employment 

Opportunity, and other topics. FEMA expects to complete and disseminate the 

Disaster Assistance Employee orientation program by the end of FY 2010. 

DRWD uses the Automated Deployment Database (ADD) to identify and 

maintain a record of the personnel deployed during disasters, with Web ADD 

serving as its online interface. However, the use of Web ADD was suspended 

because it did not adequately monitor employee deployment readiness, length of 

deployment, or location, limiting FEMA managers’ ability to supervise the 

Disaster Relief Workforce. The inability to manage deployment information 

hinders the ability of FEMA staff to manage deployment and disaster activities. 

20 FEMA Agency-Wide Disaster Workforce Credentialing Plan (April 2009). 21 EMI is FEMA’s training institution in Emmitsburg, MD. 

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Continuing Concerns 

The DRWD is seeking to develop a new system to replace Web ADD and has 

tasked a contractor with performing a functional requirements analysis. The 

DRWD expects to have identified either a commercial-off-the-shelf or 

government-off-the-shelf product by spring 2011. 

Training courses consistent with the Credentialing Program will not be offered 

until FY 2011, and the new-hire orientation program is still under development. 

Deployed staff will have to rely on field training until EMI offers the new training 

courses. 

The FEMA workforce has undergone tremendous transformation stemming from 

changes in national laws, policies, and mission focus. The workforce has also 

experienced significant growth in size, workload, and composition to support 

increasing demands, changing processes, and advancing technologies. As a 

result, Congress determined that a baseline assessment of FEMA’s current federal 

workforce, including all disaster reservists, was warranted. In the last quarter of 

FY 2009, FEMA partnered with the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis 

Institute (HSSAI) and launched an agency-wide Integrated Strategic Workforce 

Planning Initiative to develop a capabilities-driven workforce planning effort 

designed to create the FEMA of the 21st century and beyond. The HSSAI 

assessment, which is the first phase of that initiative, assesses FEMA’s workforce 

in both steady state (normal day-to-day operations) and disaster situations (when 

responding to an active disaster).22 The results of this assessment were provided 

to Congress in May 2010. We will continue to review and assess this important 

initiative. 

22 HSSAI, Federal Emergency Management Agency Workforce Baseline Assessment (RP09-55-04), March 31, 2010. 

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Mission Assignments 
 

Background 

FEMA is responsible for coordinating the urgent, short-term emergency 

deployment of federal resources to address threats and for stewardship of the 

associated expenditures from the Disaster Relief Fund. FEMA uses mission 

assignments (MAs) to request disaster response support from other federal 

agencies.23 Past audits and reviews of MAs have concluded that FEMA’s 

management controls were generally not adequate to ensure that: 

•	 Deliverables (missions tasked) met requirements; 

•	 Costs were reasonable; 

•	 Invoices were accurate; 

•	 Federal property and equipment were adequately accounted for or 

managed; and 

•	 FEMA’s interests were protected. 

In our 2008 report, of all the areas reviewed, this area needed the most 

improvement. At that time, FEMA had initiated an ambitious project to 

reengineer the processes, relationships, and resources involved in managing MAs. 

An intra/interagency Mission Assignment Working Group (MAWG) was formed 

to review MA processes and procedures and develop recommendations for the 

management of MAs. This group developed processes, policies, and procedures 

that have increased FEMA’s MA effectiveness. 

23 A mission assignment is a work order issued by FEMA to another federal agency that directs the completion of a 

specific task to meet urgent, immediate, and short-term needs. The assigned federal agency must complete the 

mission assignment within 60 days after the declaration, unless FEMA extends the authorized performance period. 

Mission assignments can include a number of goods and services from a variety of agencies, ranging from 

emergency meals and water to mobile communication teams and medical evacuation of patients. 

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We reviewed three critical components to assess FEMA’s efforts to: 

•	 Improve guidance for mission assignments (i.e., regulations, policies, and 

operating procedures); 

•	 Improve staffing and training; and 

•	 Enhance management of mission assignments. 

Critical Components 

Improve guidance for mission assignments (Moderate) – FEMA has developed an 

intranet website for MAs that provides documents and guidance necessary to 

execute MAs during an emergency. It includes various reference materials, such 

as policies and procedures, MA authorities, and forms needed to execute MAs. 

The “Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment Catalogue” contains 237 pre-scripted 

MAs.24 An additional 64 are under development. Pre-scripted MAs provide 

standard “statements of work” and cost estimates developed before an actual 

emergency or disaster and are used to quickly execute MAs with other federal 

agencies. The pre-scripted MAs cover capabilities that are outside an agency’s 

regular or emergency authority, and involve known or frequently used resources. 

Not all MAs have pre-scripted language, as each disaster has unique 

requirements. FEMA developed a standard operating procedures manual for MAs 

that outlines policies, procedures, and processes used to collaborate with other 

federal agencies and organizations when responding to disasters. This manual is 

under revision; the previous version was never issued as final. 

Improve staffing and training (Modest) – In FEMA’s latest reorganization, MAs 

were assigned to the Facilities, Assets, and Contracts Management Branch in the 

Response Directorate. This Branch not only develops and manages pre-scripted 

24 Pre-scripted MAs are prearranged and preapproved agreements between FEMA and other federal agencies to (1) 

expedite deployment of response assets and (2) allow agencies to be more proactive in moving personnel, 

equipment, and supplies in anticipation of a disaster declaration. 

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MAs, but is also responsible for the Response Directorate’s contract oversight, 

space and office move management, and equipment and supplies purchase 

management. While FEMA has increased its MA staffing in the past few years, it 

relies heavily on contractors to supplement staff during periods of high activity. 

FEMA has developed employee task books for three MA positions (MA Manager, 

MA Specialist, and MA Action Tracker). These task books are posted on 

FEMA’s NRF site. FEMA’s training institute offers several courses that are 

designed for FEMA MA workers and for federal partners often tasked through 

MAs. However, due to budget constraints, recent course offerings have been 

cancelled. 

Previous reviews have recommended that FEMA establish and invest in MAs as a 

program area rather than a collateral functional process or duty that comes into 

play only during an incident response. The development of an MA program 

office, with a dedicated full-time staff and management team, established budget, 

and officially delegated authorities and responsibilities, would substantially 

improve all aspects of the MA process. 

Enhance management of mission assignments (Limited) – Managing and 

accounting for MA resources is crucial to managing the federal response to an 

incident. FEMA has established MA guidance but still faces challenges in its IT 

systems. 

FEMA has developed but not implemented an electronic action request form.25 

MA officials say they are having difficulties finding funding for updating any 

systems useful in tracking MAs. FEMA currently uses the Enterprise 

Coordination and Approvals Processing System (eCAPS). This system was 

designed with a focus on the administrative aspects of documenting, approving, 

and reporting on MAs, rather than tracking the actual work requested and 

performed or the status and outcomes of missions.26 Because of the proprietary 

nature of information presented in eCAPS, FEMA’s partners do not have access 

to this system. Once funding is made available, MA officials hope to move to a 

system that will allow more flexibility, while securing data. Additionally, other 

offices with disaster response functions use their own information systems, which 

do not interface with those used in MA and other offices. MA officials say the 

need for an integrated IT system hampers their progress in developing into a truly 

effective enterprise. 

25 This is the system states use during disaster response to request services and goods. The action request form is not
 


standardized throughout FEMA disaster response; each region has developed its own form. 
 26 FEMA’s Sourcing for Disaster Response Goods & Services (OIG-09-96), August 2009.
 


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Continuing Concerns 

FEMA management support will be required to implement the MAWG’s 

processes, policies, and procedures. A significant investment of personnel, 

training, time, and budget resources will be required to begin the reengineering 

efforts. Most importantly, MA needs to have reliable IT systems that are 

integrated with its federal partners’ systems, so that information is efficiently and 

effectively shared. After the revised infrastructure has been put into place, an MA 

program office will need resources to sustain the effort. 

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Acquisition Management 
 

Background 

Acquisition management is more than awarding a contract; it is the entire process 

that begins with identifying and clarifying a mission need and ends with the final 

closeout of an award. Without good acquisition management, response 

capabilities are weakened, taxpayer money is often wasted, and public trust in the 

government falls. 

FEMA’s acquisition function was heavily tasked in responding to hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita and suffered from several shortcomings. These shortcomings 

included a need for predisaster contracts, untrained staff, and insufficient planning 

for postaward monitoring and oversight. In recent years, FEMA management has 

focused on developing the acquisition function to a level that can respond 

effectively and efficiently to another catastrophic disaster. To assess FEMA’s 

progress in this area, we reviewed three critical components: 

• Have predisaster contracts in place; 

• Recruit, train, and retain sufficient acquisition staff; and 

• Provide for postaward oversight. 

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Critical Components 

Have predisaster contracts in place (Substantial) – Awarding contracts before a 

disaster gives FEMA time to run a full and open competition in order to ensure 

the best value to the government. Without predisaster contracts in place, FEMA 

is forced to award contracts on a noncompetitive basis or to less qualified vendors 

in order to support a prompt response. FEMA’s Office of the Chief Procurement 

Officer (OCPO) has developed a series of contracts for each of the FEMA 

directorates needing specific contract support during a disaster. The list of 

contracts is available on FEMA’s intranet and identifies what specifically is 

contracted for, the contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR) and 

contact number, and the responsible OCPO contracting official. 

OCPO officials stress the importance of the quality, rather than quantity, of 

predisaster contracts. Lessons learned from major disasters guide decisions on 

which contracts are no longer needed and the best sources for goods and services. 

For example, FEMA strives to avoid competing with cities and states for 

resources that are available via existing contracts, or for assets that are part of a 

limited pool, such as ambulances and buses. 

OCPO has also created an Acquisition Program and Planning Division, which 

functions as the primary link between acquisitions and the program areas that 

generate requirements, to assist with predisaster contracts. This has proven 

successful, as the program areas now have dedicated contracting support. OCPO 

needs to issue formal guidance requiring FCOs, contracting officers, and purchase 

cardholders to use the predisaster contracts when acquiring goods and services. 

Recruit, train, and retain sufficient acquisition staff (Moderate) – Currently, 

OCPO has 214 positions authorized, 137 of which are filled. Finding qualified 

candidates and filling open positions continues to be a challenge throughout the 

government. While FEMA and other agencies needing acquisition staff in the 

GS-1102 job series have received direct hire authorization, all are recruiting from 

the same pool of candidates for both trainee and experienced staffs. The 

acquisition staffing shortages have led some agencies to offer higher pay for 

journey-level staff. This has caused accelerated turnover as staff change agencies 

for promotions. DHS has implemented an intern program in acquisitions to 

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increase GS-1102 staff. FEMA has benefited from this program but still needs 

additional contracting personnel. 

Because of competition among agencies that post their openings on usajobs.gov, 

OCPO is considering using monster.com for posting acquisition openings, 

especially for regional positions. A problematic software system that caused 

delays in hiring has been discontinued, and a few new hires are on board and 

others are expected to be working soon. 

Provide for postaward oversight (Modest) – Contracting responsibilities do not 

end with the issuance of an award. In fact, one of the most important aspects of 

the job, contract monitoring and oversight, begins after the award has been made. 

A lack of postaward oversight has been a continuing problem for FEMA. 

OCPO’s Acquisition Policy and Legislation Division has issued directives and 

standard operating procedures to provide additional guidance to staff on contract 

maintenance and monitoring. Policies exist that detail the contents of contract 

files, outline the process for transferring contract files from one contracting 

officer to another, and call for internal reviews of contract files. 

In September 2009, the FEMA Administrator signed a management directive 

establishing a COTR Tiered Certification Program, which has resulted in better 

contractor performance and increased value for taxpayers. The number of trained 

COTRs has increased from 700 to 1,450 since our last report. 

A topic FEMA highlighted in 2008 was the upcoming transition to PRISM as the 

system of record for contract management. FEMA officials said many existing 

contracting documentation problems would be corrected once FEMA adopted 

PRISM as its system of record for contract management. At that time, FEMA 

was using ProTrac. The PRISM transition did not occur because of a contract 

protest outside of FEMA’s control. Until PRISM can be installed, FEMA 

continues to use an upgraded version of ProTrac. This version provides FEMA 

with additional tools to improve contract management, but despite improvement 

to the available IT systems, FEMA still experiences contract management issues. 

Continuing Concerns 

While FEMA has made progress in a number of areas and has improved its 

acquisition management function, many concerns remain. FEMA said many 

more predisaster contracts are in place. However, some Joint Field Office 

officials and contracting personnel still contract separately for the same goods 

rather than using the established contracts. 

OCPO officials acknowledged that hiring continues to be a major concern. The 

vacancy rate is almost 36%, although the rate is unusually high because of 

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recently authorized positions and past problems with a software program. There 

are too few people to meet the government-wide need for acquisition personnel. 

FEMA is unable to retain experienced personnel, who obtain promotions by 

moving to other agencies. FEMA-specific incentives are not in place to attract or 

retain personnel. 

Even though OCPO has hired a number of contracting employees, a FEMA 

official said new contracting personnel often have less than three years of 

experience. It is critical that FEMA have an effective training regimen for these 

new employees. 

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Mitigation 
 

Modest Progress 

Substantial Progress 

Moderate Progress 

Limited or No Progress 

Background 

FEMA leads and supports a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management 

system to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect the Nation from all 

hazards. Mitigation, considered the cornerstone of emergency management, 

attempts to prevent hazards from developing into disasters or to reduce the effects 

of disasters when they occur. The mitigation phase differs from the other phases 

of emergency management in that it focuses on long-term actions to reduce or 

eliminate risk from hazards and their effects. 

Hazards typically fall into three broad categories: natural, technological, and 

manmade. Natural hazards are generally associated with weather and geological 

events, such as floods, hurricanes, tornados, or earthquakes. Technological 

hazards refer to human activities such as dam and levee construction or the 

manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous materials. Manmade 

hazards are typically associated with criminal or terrorist attacks using weapons 

such as explosive, biological, or chemical agents. 

Mitigating a hazard can involve both structural and process measures. Structural 

mitigation measures are generally technology-based solutions such as building 

flood levees and designing new or retrofitting existing buildings to make them 

more resistant to hazards. Process measures include policy-based measures such 

as enacting land use ordinances that prohibit residential development in floodprone areas or requiring hazard insurance for structures susceptible to hurricanes. 

The principal federal statutes guiding disaster mitigation at the state and local 

levels are the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-448), the Stafford 

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Act, and the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-390). The National Flood 

Insurance Act established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which 

encourages local governments to mitigate flood risks through local regulation and 

financial incentives. The Stafford Act is the country’s basic disaster relief law 

and authorizes disaster programs implemented by FEMA. The Disaster 

Mitigation Act established the requirement for state and local hazard mitigation 

plans as a precondition for receipt of federal hazard mitigation project funds. 

FEMA’s Mitigation Directorate manages a range of programs designed to reduce 

future losses to homes, businesses, schools, public buildings, and critical facilities 

from natural disasters. It also provides building design guidance for mitigating 

multihazard events and promotes state and local multihazard mitigation planning. 

To assess FEMA’s progress in this area, we reviewed the following critical 

components: 

•	 Develop an integrated National Hazard Mitigation Strategy; 

•	 Improve local hazard mitigation planning process; and 

•	 Improve hazard mitigation operations and outcomes. 

Critical Components 

Develop an integrated National Hazard Mitigation Strategy (Modest) – The 

FY 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review defines broad national 

objectives for mitigation:27 

•	 Reduce the vulnerability of individuals and families: Improve individual 

and family capacity to reduce vulnerabilities and withstand disasters. 

•	 Mitigate risks to communities: Improve community capacity to withstand 

disasters by mitigating known and anticipated hazards. 

The challenge for FEMA is to translate these objectives into an integrated national 

hazard mitigation strategy. Our October 2009 report stated that a coordinated 

27 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, February 2010. 

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risk-based, all-hazards mitigation strategy mandated by the Post-Katrina Act had 

yet to be developed.28 We recommended that FEMA use the established network 

of mitigation partners along with enhanced collaboration with DHS components, 

other federal agencies, and private sector stakeholders to develop and implement a 

risk-based, all-hazards mitigation strategy. FEMA is striving to accomplish this 

by working through the White House sponsored Long-Term Disaster Recovery 

Working Group to address pre- and post-disaster all-hazards mitigation. FEMA 

has also collaborated with the National Emergency Management Association to 

develop a strategic white paper, Recommendations for an Effective National 

Mitigation Effort, which outlines principles and approaches for hazard mitigation 

at the national, state, local, and tribal levels. 

Improve local hazard mitigation planning process (Moderate) – The Disaster 

Mitigation Act established requirements for state and local hazard mitigation 

plans. In the subsequent decade, FEMA has effectively promoted mitigation 

planning, and as of March 2009, 50 states, 6 territories, 33 tribal governments, 

and 18,000 local jurisdictions had approved local mitigation plans, covering 

approximately 77% of the Nation’s population. 

The challenge going forward is to improve the quality and impact of this 

mitigation planning enterprise and, ultimately, to reduce disaster losses and 

expenditures below what they would have been otherwise. The long-term nature 

of most mitigation planning makes it hard to measure effectiveness, and FEMA is 

working with DHS Centers of Excellence and independent researchers to develop 

better measurement frameworks and tools. 

State and local hazard mitigation officials continue to report large gaps in the 

capacity and will of communities to plan and implement mitigation strategies. 

One consequence of the lack of local capacity is a costly reliance on external 

consultants to develop and write hazard mitigation plans. Further, the intent of 

local planning is to engage local stakeholders in the planning process, because 

they are in the best position to identify and address local risks and vulnerabilities. 

Improve hazard mitigation operations and outcomes (Moderate) – FEMA faces a 

number of challenges in its efforts to improve hazard mitigation operations and 

outcomes. The most important challenge is the scope and complexity of the 

mitigation landscape—literally thousands of entities and individuals must work 

together in a loosely coordinated effort to achieve nationally significant results. 

Mitigation stakeholders, including flood plain managers, risk managers, insurers, 

property developers, homeowners, government officials, environmentalists, and 

the public at large, bring conflicting priorities and interests to any discussion of 

mitigation. 

28 FEMA’s Progress in All-Hazards Mitigation (OIG-10-03), October 2009. 

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A second major challenge is that FEMA is limited by statute to the promotion of 

effective mitigation and does not have the authority to compel property owners to 

mitigate floods or other hazards. This is true even when hazard mitigation 

appears desperately needed, as in the case of repetitively flooded properties that 

drain resources from the NFIP. 

In the face of these systemic challenges, however, FEMA has achieved a number 

of mitigation successes, strengthening resilience in communities across the United 

States. Most important, the NFIP currently has more than 5.6 million policies in 

force, protecting property owners against building and contents damage from 

flooding. 

More than 21,000 communities across the United States and its territories 

participate in the NFIP by adopting and enforcing flood plain management 

ordinances to reduce future flood damage. In exchange, the NFIP makes federally 

backed flood insurance available to homeowners, renters, and business owners in 

these communities. Community participation in the NFIP is voluntary. Buildings 

constructed in compliance with NFIP building standards suffer approximately 

80% less damage annually than those not built in compliance. FEMA estimates 

that $1.2 billion in flood losses are avoided annually because communities have 

implemented flood plain management requirements. 

In addition to providing flood insurance and reducing flood damages through 

flood plain management regulations, the NFIP identifies and maps the Nation’s 

flood plains. Mapping flood hazards creates broad-based awareness of the 

hazards and provides the data needed for flood plain management programs and 

to actuarially rate new construction for flood insurance. 

Although it has achieved significant successes in its 42-year history, the NFIP 

also faces a number of systemic challenges that pose financial and operational 

risks to FEMA and the American taxpayer. These challenges, which we, the 

GAO, and others have discussed in depth include: (1) a lack of geographical 

balance (68% of policies are written in five states); (2) a lack of financial balance 

(the NFIP bears the underwriting risk while paying private insurers up to twothirds of all premium revenue to write policies and process claims); (3) a lack of 

market penetration (fewer than 50% of property owners nationally in 100-year 

flood plains carry flood insurance); (4) extreme vulnerability to catastrophic 

disasters (post-Katrina claims payouts exceeded the total amount of all claims 

paid in the history of the NFIP from 1978 to 2004); and (5) a lack of consensus 

and funding among FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and levee districts 

regarding how and when to upgrade and accredit levees. The history of the NFIP 

has shown that these issues are likely to continue to challenge the NFIP and its 

stakeholders in the years ahead. 

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Continuing Concerns 

Opportunities for improvement can be found in all phases of the mitigation 

planning and implementation process. These opportunities are generally known 

to primary mitigation stakeholders at the federal, state, and community levels, but 

will require focused, systematic effort to achieve. The key for FEMA will be to 

integrate these diverse stakeholders into the effort, and to coordinate and access 

the full range of mitigation resources. There are a number of opportunities for 

improvement, including the following: 

•	 Continue working with the Long-Term Disaster Recovery Working 

Group, the National Emergency Management Association, and other 

stakeholders to develop an integrated national hazard mitigation strategy. 

•	 Continue standing up the NFIP Reform Working Group to involve 

multiple stakeholders in shaping the future NFIP. 

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Conclusion and Recommendations 

FEMA is under increasing pressure to provide more assistance to state, local, and tribal 

governments whose diminishing resources in tough economic times are quickly 

overwhelmed by large and catastrophic disasters. It is more important than ever that 

FEMA be prepared to assist state, local, and tribal first responders. 

FEMA has made progress in all of the areas we reviewed, although in some areas this 

progress has been modest. In a number of other preparedness areas, FEMA identified 

corrective actions, but implementation has not yet begun. FEMA would benefit from 

increased oversight of key preparedness areas to ensure that implementation of initiatives 

is sustained. 

The following concerns are common to our review of the critical components: 

•	 The need for more effective coordination with state, local, and tribal 

governments; 

•	 The need for IT systems that are updated and integrated agency-wide; 

•	 Too few experienced staff to handle the increasing workload; and 

•	 Funding that is not adequate to maintain initiatives; meet the costs of disasters; 

and recruit, train, and retain staff. 

FEMA is an agency that is in a constant state of flux. With so much change, it is often 

difficult for staff to determine the agency’s current priorities. Plans, initiatives, draft 

guidance, and working groups often, understandably, take a back seat to disaster response 

and recovery, and momentum toward finalization and implementation of key initiatives is 

slowed or lost. In light of FEMA’s increased involvement in routine disasters, coupled 

with the recent economic downturn, which has resulted in some state and local 

governments reducing their emergency management funding, we remain concerned about 

whether FEMA has sufficient staff focused on planning and preparedness efforts. 

We and the GAO have made many recommendations in our audits of FEMA operations 

that involve the key preparedness areas mentioned in this report. Many of these 

recommendations remain open. (See appendix C for a list of recent OIG and GAO 

reports.) We will continue to work with FEMA to ensure that corrective action plans are 

developed and that progress is made in fully implementing report recommendations. In 

addition, we plan to report the status of recommendations in our semiannual report. 

Our 2008 report, FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster, made 

recommendations that touched on most of the critical areas discussed above. We 

recommended: (1) improving the agency’s overall awareness of its readiness for a 

catastrophic disaster; (2) developing and sustaining systems to track the progress of major 

programs, initiatives, and other activities; and (3) regularly sharing reports on the status 

of such activities with key stakeholders. We reiterate the recommendations, which 

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remain open, and will continue to work with FEMA to ensure that progress is made 

toward better preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

FEMA provided written comments on the draft of this report and concurred with the three 

recommendations. We consider the three recommendations resolved but open, pending 

receipt and review of FEMA’s corrective action plan. FEMA also provided technical 

comments, which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate. (FEMA’s written 

comments are in appendix B.) 

FEMA provided updated information subsequent to OIG fieldwork, interviews, and 

message meetings with high-level FEMA officials. While we have incorporated this 

information where appropriate, we did not validate this additional information or adjust 

our assessment of FEMA’s progress in the ten key preparedness areas. 

FEMA provided specific comments in eight of ten preparedness areas. Our analysis of 

FEMA’s comments in three areas is provided below: 

Overall Planning: FEMA stated that the draft report does not reflect the full extent to 

which FEMA’s assessment of the nation’s preparedness has improved over the last two 

years. Specifically, FEMA said that we did not mention several reports that it deemed 

important. However, the reports were not provided, and their importance was not 

stressed during OIG interviews and message meetings with high-level officials. On page 

14 of our draft report, we stated that FEMA was working to complete the draft National 

Preparedness Report. At the time of our assessment, the draft report was in the clearance 

phase with OMB. 

Also, FEMA said that we should have included the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness 

Grant Program in our report because the program is a major effort with numerous 

initiatives focusing on planning for catastrophic events. However, FEMA did not provide 

documentation to support the implementation of specific program initiatives. 

Logistics: FEMA contended that it has made substantial progress establishing a national 

supply chain strategy, one of the critical components we assessed. With its comments, 

FEMA provided us with presentations on a tiered sourcing concept and concepts of 

resource support for the 2009 and 2010 hurricane seasons. We appreciate this additional 

information. However, even considering this information, FEMA’s progress in this area 

does not rise to the level of substantial implementation. While we acknowledge that 

numerous working groups and teams have been created to support the national supply 

chain strategy, full scale implementation of the strategy has not yet occurred. 

Evacuations: FEMA noted that the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program 

is designed to support planning for catastrophic events, including evacuation planning. 

FEMA said that 10 of 11 sites have projects related to evacuation planning efforts for 

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their regions. However, FEMA has not provided specific documentation supporting 

implementation of evacuation planning efforts. 

Also, FEMA stated that it did not understand why its preparedness to support a regional 

or large-scale evacuation remains a concern after the successful evacuation in response to 

Hurricane Gustav. The concern persists for several reasons, including the need for 

increased staff and funding in the Planning Division, the need to complete the 

Operational Annex to the Mass Evacuation Incident Annex in the National Response 

Framework, and the challenges inherent in evacuations of large metropolitan areas. 

In addition, FEMA provided comments in five areas: Emergency Communications, 

Housing, Disaster Workforce, Acquisition Management, and Mitigation. We believe that 

the report was responsive to FEMA’s observations in these areas. FEMA did not provide 

comments in two areas: Coordination and Support, and Mission Assignments. 

We look forward to working with FEMA as corrective action plans are developed to 

address the recommendations in this report. 

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We conducted a high-level “scorecard” assessment of FEMA’s 

preparedness to respond to the next catastrophic disaster. Together with 

FEMA officials, we identified ten key areas as those most vital to FEMA’s 

preparedness: 

•	 Overall Planning 

•	 Coordination and Support 

•	 Emergency Communications 

•	 Logistics 

•	 Evacuations 

•	 Housing 

•	 Disaster Workforce 

•	 Mission Assignments 

•	 Acquisition Management 

•	 Mitigation 

Within each area, numerous critical actions need to take place before 

FEMA is sufficiently prepared for a catastrophic disaster. To use our time 

and resources wisely, we collaborated with FEMA officials to select two 

to four critical components within each key area. Most of the critical 

components we assessed in 2010 were the same as in 2008. For a few 

areas, components were revised based on collaboration with FEMA 

officials and the current level of agreed-upon importance. We: 

•	 Interviewed FEMA officials to obtain information and supporting 

documentation; 

•	 Reviewed reports and testimony from our office, GAO, Congress, 

and others regarding FEMA’s readiness (see appendix C); 

•	 Reviewed documents provided by FEMA, including plans, 
 

policies, organization charts, and self-assessments; 
 

•	 Reviewed applicable laws, such as the Stafford Act (P.L. 100-707), 

Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296), and Post-Katrina Act (P.L. 

109-295); and 

•	 Conducted message meetings with FEMA officials from April 29 

to May 21, 2010, to discuss review results. 

Our ratings for the ten key areas are based on a four-tiered system ranging 

from “limited or no progress” to “substantial progress.” Throughout this 

report, we based our ratings on the following criteria: 

Limited or No Progress: There is an awareness of the critical issues 

needing to be addressed, but specific corrective actions have not been 

identified. Within this phase, interim steps include a problem analysis, 

discussion of corrective actions, and development of a strategic plan. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 
Modest Progress: Corrective actions have been identified, but 

implementation is not yet underway. Within this phase, interim steps 

include selecting corrective actions, obtaining management approval, 

planning for implementation, and securing funding commitments from 

DHS for each action. 

Moderate Progress: Implementation of corrective actions is underway, but 

few if any have been completed. 

Substantial Progress: Most or all of the corrective actions have been 

implemented. 

The 2010 ratings were assessed independently from the 2008 ratings. 

We used the critical components, as well as our broader knowledge of the 

key areas, to gauge FEMA’s overall progress. For ease of understanding, 

we used the same rating categories used to rate the critical components 

within each area; however, we adapted the criteria to present a better 

picture of FEMA’s overall progress. For example, to achieve moderate 

progress overall, FEMA would have to identify and complete more than a 

few corrective actions. To achieve a rating of substantial progress overall, 

FEMA would have to complete most corrective actions in the key 

preparedness area. 

We conducted our review between November 2009 and May 2010 under 

the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the 

President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Major OIG contributors 

to the review are identified in appendix D. 

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u.s. I)opam"o"l Of lIo",oI."d Mour;l)"

Wash;"!:lon, DC 2().l72

~_"~D"~FEMA

AUG 6 1010

MEMORANDUM FOR: Matt Judueki

Assistantlnspcctor Gencral

Office of Emcrgeney Management Oversight

Officc of Inspector Gcncral

FROM: David 1. Kaufman N'L--

Director 11

ORice of Policy and Program Analysis

SUBJECT: Commcnts on OIG DraH Report, FEMA's Preparednessjor tile

Nexi C{//(ISII'opfric Disas/er An Upda/c

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Office of Inspector General's

(OIG's) subject draft audit report. As the Federal Emer&cncy Managcmcnt A&cncy (FEMA)

works toward refining its programs, the OIG's independent analysis of pro~,'Talll performance

greatly benefits our ability to continuously improve our activities.

We arc happy to notc that sincc your rcport in March 2008, 010-08-34, FE,\;/A 's Prcpwcdllcss

jor Ihe Next Calasll'Ophic Disasler, we have improved our performance in four of the nine

preparedness areas (Emergency Communications, Evacuations, I-lousing, and Mission

Assignments) you chose to evaluate and rcmained steady in the remaining areas. One new area,

Mitigation has been added for this current review. Overall, we are very pleased thnt you have

recognized our efforts and consider this to be a very favorable report.

FEMA concurs with the draft report's three recommendations which arc reiterations ofthose

contained in your 2008 report. We have implemented many of the previous OIG

recommcndations citcd in Appcndix C of your rcport and continuc to develop corrcctive action

plans for others. Clearly these efforts have led to the improved "scores" recorded in this updated

rcport.

Our following comments. many containing updated infonnation for your eonsidcration when

preparing thc final report, are organized by the prcparedncss arcas in your report. Technical

comments havc been provided under separate cover.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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2

Overall Planning

The draft report does not reflect the full extent to which FEMA's assessment of our nation's

preparedness has improved over the past two years. For example, in this section the draft

specifies the Cost to Capabilities initiative and Gap Analysis Programs (GAP) but does not

mention the last three annual State Preparedness Reports, the most recent ofwhich has evolved

to a capabilities-based, quantitative self-assessment of each State's preparedness. It also does

not reference the draft National Preparedness Report, which is currently in concurrence. These

reports demonstrate that FEMA has substantially improved our assessments of

capabilities/readiness at the national, state, and local levels.

With respect 10 the draft report's statement regarding an effort to update the status of

catastrophic planning, more current infonnation is now available. Protection and National

Preparedness (PNP) has completed a review ofthe current status of catastrophic planning in all

50 states, silt territories.' districts, and 75 of the Nation's largest urban areas. This analysis shows

that, while significant progress has been made in core aspects of planning, there remains a gap in

planning for the unique issues faced during catastrophic events.

Similarly, with respect to the information about Citizen Corps Councils, more updated

information is available. Eltpanded online data collection tools to assess the activities ofCitizen

Corps Councils and Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) programs nationwide have

been developed and were approved on February 12, 2010 by the Office ofManagement and

Budget (OMB). FEMA is in the process of conducting outreach and technical assistance on the

tools and is eltpecting to launch the tools in September 201 O. Once the registration process is

complete, anticipated by the end ofNovember 2010, FEMA eltpects to contact the identified

sponsoring organization for an appropriate sample size to verify the CouncillCERT program and

to confirm the listed point of contact. Eltpanded data collection will allow FEMA to maintain a

greater understanding of both activity levels and challenges facing local councils and CERT

programs in the activities they conduct to engage the community in planning for disasters and to

prepare individuals and organizations. States will maintain their role in the approval process for

re-registered Councils and the CERT Program. By December 30, 2010 FEMA will release a

report ofthe data contained in the new Council and CERT program registries. FEMA believes in

the importance of presenting the public with accurate information and will work. to ensure the

accuracy ofthe registry data ofCitizen Corps Councils and CERT Programs on an ongoing

basis.

We also wish to point out that community preparedness is integrated throughout FEMA's

primary strategic tools including The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR): A

Strategic Framework/or a Secure Homeland, released by the Department of Homeland Security

in February 2010. The QHSR offers a vision for a secure homeland and a resilient people where

resilience is defined as the need to "foster individual, community, and system robustness,

adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery." The FEMA Administrator's Intent for Building

the FY 2012-2016 Future Year Homeland Security Program, also released in February 2010,

echoes this theme of integrating participation from all sectors and from the public at large. In

addition, the National Protection Directorate (NPD) strategic plan will identify partnerships

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3

throughout the Agency to ensure a "whole ofAgency" effort on pre-incident preparedness

actions. The NPD strategic plan will incorporate the elements identified in the Community

Preparedness Strategic Approach, as well as the 2009 NPD Operating Plan, the FEMA Strategic

Plan and other relevant documents. NPD plans 10 have a strategic plan developed by the end of

Calendar Year 2010.

Your draft report also fails to mention the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program

(RCPGP). This is a major effort underway with 11 Urban Area Security Initiatives to focus on

planning for catastrophic events. The RCPGP provides funding and resources for the full·

spectrum of catastrophic planning activities. The RCPOP is focused on the local and regional

levels of government, and requires a chartered Regional Catastrophic Planning Team to address

the challenges faced when planning for these events. Significant progress has been made to date

in creating relationships, conducting joint planning, and producing products useful to the

participants and the nation at large.

While the Overall Planning Section is rightfully concentrated on PNP, Response Catastrophic

Planning efforts have been ongoing and are now a priority ofthe Administrator and ofthe Office

ofResponse and Recovery. The following bullets reflect strong progress, continued success, and

a path forward towards catastrophic planning by the Response Directorate and its Planning

Division:

o Response is currently working to align existing federal response planning initiatives such

as the Gap Analysis Program (GAP), catastrophic planning, evacuation planning, and

emergency communications planning into a coordinated operational planning effort.

o These planning initiatives are now merged into one Planning Division which will provide

technical assistance planning teams to assist with national and regional plan development.

o The Planning Division is working closely with both Logistics and Recovery Directorates.

o The Response Directorate is working with the National Preparedness Directorate to align

the grant program initiatives with Regional, State, and local planning.

o In 2010, Response published a document intended to ensure plan consistency. The

Regional Catastrophic Planning Guide serves as a "how to" for FEMA regional planners

involved in any type of collaborative planning effort with Federal, state, territorial, and

tribal partners.

o Our largest catastrophic planning initiative, the New Madrid Seismic Zone, is on target to

be completed by September 2010.

Emergency Communications

We submit the following additional infonnation on the Regional Emergency Communications

Coordination Workgroups (RECCWGs) referenced in this section ofthe draft report. These ten

Workgroups have been established to address interoperable emergency communications

concerns:

o RECCWGs are mandated planning and coordinating bodies responsible for providing

a forum to assess and address the survivability, sustainability, operability, and

interoperability of emergency communications systems at all levels of government.

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4

o RECCWGs provide insight into regional preparedness efforts by serving as a

mechanism for state, local, and tribal agencies to support FEMA and other Federal

agencies in defining and integrating emergency communications support during an

incident.

Updated infonnation is also available regarding the status of emergency communications plans.

To date 31 stales and 9 regions have emergency communications plans with 4 more state plans

slated to be completed this fiscal year and the one remaining regional plan in its final stages.

The remaining state plans will be completed at a rate of6 per year under the current budget. We

are also doing an annex for American Samoa which had not been planned but additional

resources were identified to support the Tsunami alert and warning system initiative.

With respect to progress in the emergency communications area, we would point to the Public

Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) Grant Program, which is administered by the

Department of Commerce (DOC) in consultation with Department ofHomeland Security

(DHS)/FEMA, as a leading example of a Federal program that supports emergency

communications activities. More than 90 percent ($811 million) ofPSIC funds were designated

by State and local agencies for acquisition and deployment of equipment that will increase

emergency communications interoperability. Jurisdictions invested in all frequency bands

(specifically, VHF, UHF, 700 MHz, and 800 MHz) and relied heavily on advanced and

standards-based (such as Project 25 [P25]) technology, including Internet Protocol (IP), satellite,

and video for public safcty purposes.

In consideration ofthe available Federal funding support for emergency communications

technology, DHSIFEMA and the DHS Office of Emergency Communication (OEC) opted to

maximize the impact ofthe Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP)

funding by focusing on strengthening state and local governance structures, to enable them to:

(a) implement a statewide plan; (b) ensure that those plans align with national goals and

objectives; (c) effectively manage large communications projects; and (d) improve emergency

communications capabilities.

Logistics

The draft report indicates that FEMA has only made moderate progress since the 2008 audit in

establishing a national supply chain strategy. Significant progress has been made on maturation

ofthe national supply chain by building strong partnerships and developing clearly identified

sourcing strategies for "routine" through catastrophic events. Consequently it is our position that

we have made substantial progress in this area since 2008. All of our efforts have been

consistent with the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Refonn Act of 2006 (PKEMRA)

mandate requiring the Administrator to develop an efficient, transparent, and flexible logistics

system for procurement and delivery of goods and services necessary for an effective and timely

response to major disasters, acts ofterrorism, and other emergencies and for real-time visibility

of items at each point throughout the logistics system. This legislation precipitated the National

Logistics Coordinator (NLC) concept that is currently incorporated in the National Response

Framework, Emergency Support Function, ESF #7 (Logistics Management and Resource

Support), and the accompanying ESF #7 Annex.

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5

Specifically, our national supply chain strategy is based upon a tiered sourcing concept that

aligns with the incident magnitude (copy ofthis information 10 be provided under separate

cover). OUf deliberate planning efforts for effective supply chain support begin with our

Regional Planning Assistant Team (RPAT). This learn consists ofHeadquarters Logistics

Planners who are individually assigned to each of our ten regions. The team works through our

regional Logistics Chiefs. who work with their respective siaies to develop regional logistics

support requirements. Once developed, the Resource Management Group (RMG), as mentioned

in the OIG report, develops the definitive sourcing plan for each state. Both our 2009 and 2010

Hurricane Season Concept ofResource Support Briefs (copies to be provided under separate

cover) are the direct outcomes afthis process. Additionally, this concept was used to support

two ofthe most challenging supply chain scenarios since Katrina, Haiti and Samoa. As

described in the FEMA Tiered Sourcing StrategyIPlanning document, the total cost of2008

logistics support (including Hurricanes Gustav and Ike) exceeded $1 billion and 2009 (including

the American Samoa Tsunami) over $42 million. The complexity, scale and efficiency ofservice

and support provided during 2008 and 2009, could not have been accomplished without a highly

effective national supply chain strategy.

Additionally, this report should note and emphasize that FEMA routinely collaborates with both

DHS Science & Teclmology (S&n and the FEMA Office ofthe Chief Infonnation Officer

(CIO). Specifically, the FEMA OCIO has appointed a dedicated Delivery Manager to the

Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS) Program. Additionally, FEMA conducts

weekly 3Q-minute Executive Briefings which the CIO personally attends. FEMA also conducts

bi-weekly meetings which the project managers, along with OCIO key players attend. The

FEMA CIO attends and co-chairs this meeting.

Evacuations

This section in the draft report mentions the Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative but nothing

about the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program. As discussed above, the RCPGP

is designed to support planning for catastrophic events to include evacuation planning. To date,

ten ofthe eleven sites have projects relating to evacuation planning efforts for their regions.

Also, the National Plan Review mentions several elements of progress regarding evacuation

plamting that should be included in this section. For example, the Evacuation Plamting

Technical Assistance program created in 2007 has been delivered 15 times since its inception

and also states and urban areas have indicated an increased confidence in their Public Protection

and Evacuation appendices.

We would also like to point out additional infonnation regarding GAP. The GAP mission has

remained the same; however, the fonner program has been integrated with a holistic approach

and in a new functional organizational framework to achieve the same mission. GAP is now

considered a tool not a program or how we develop a plan. It is an analytical tool to help

develop initial mission analysis and staff estimates, which are both key steps in plan

development. FEMA will continue to develop interagency and regional plans in FY2010 and

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6

FY2011. The staffing estimate and capability assessment process is an imperative step in the

development ofthese plans.

Finally, we do not understand why OUf preparedness to support a regional or large-scale

evacuation still remains in question. Over 2 million people were successfully evacuated during

the 2008 hurricane season with Gustav and Ike.

Housing

FEMA requests that you add the following information to your Housing section: "In addition to

the progress FEMA has made towards improving the interagency and intergovernmental

coordination of disaster housing through the progress ofthe National Disaster Housing Task

Force, FEMA has also worked to clarify the roles and responsibilities of Individual Assistance:

(lA) persolU1cl and key external stakeholders through its IA Disaster Housing Concept of

Operations (DHOPS CONOPS). The DHOPS CONOPS will identify and explain the major

program activities associated with providing FEMA disaster housing program while

documenting each activities purpose, intended sequence, preferred methodology, and

perfonnance targets."

With respect to your discussion regarding the Non-congregate Housing Program, we request that

you include the following: "FEMA has also developed a Non-congregate Housing Program that

allows for sheltering 500,000 disaster-affected households after a catastrophic event. This Noncongregate Housing Program uses hotels and motels or federally-owned unoccupied housing

units as a sheltering resource. Each option has unique challenges.

FEMA maintains a contract to place disaster survivors in hoteVmotel rooms for an extended

period. The vendor has access to a network of 14,000 participating hotels across the entire

nation, and has proven capability of housing more than 93,000 households in a single night.

However, hotels are not a long-term solution; they are a transition to longer term housing

resources. The program's success depends on the ability to register disaster survivors quickly

and on the existence of available hotel/motel resources where disaster victims have relocated.

In support ofsheltering individuals in federally-owned and unoccupied housing units, FEMA has

worked with other federal partners to identify approximately 46,715 units nationwide. Although

these units are available, there are several constraints on this program. States must be willing

and able to receive disaster survivors, disaster survivors must be willing to relocate to areas

where this housing is available, and available units may not be ready for immediate occupancy

without first being repaired."

While the report indicates that "FEMA has only limited headquarters and regional staffto fully

execute an expert-based disaster housing mission for every disaster," we wish to point out that

we are currently hiring and training more full time staff in the regional offices to increase

capacity in this area.

With respect to encouraging the state and local role in developing and implementing housing

solutions, the National Disaster Housing Task Force will work in conjunction with the FEMA

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regional offices to encoUl1l.ge and provide technical assistance 10 slales for developing their

State- Led Disaster Housing Task Forces (SLDHTF). The goal is to develop SLDHTFs in all

states.

Pisaster Worlc(orce

FEMA notes the following four significant developments regarding the disaster workforce:

IntegJ1ltion ofthe Disaster Reserve Workforce Division (DRWD) and the Office ofthe Chief

Component Hwnan Capital Officer (OCCHCO) • as mentioned in the OlG draft report,

establishing and fully staffing a reserve-only program office was noted in the 2007 Agency

assessment as the highest priority action which would transfonn the Disaster Reserve Workforce.

While the assessment provided management with an initial focus for our efforts - the Disaster

Reserve Workforce·· we also identified shonfalls in the efforts and resources to sustain FEMA's

full-time workforce, which also deploys during active disasters. In addition, it resulted in the

duplication of efforts by the Disaster Reserve Workforce and Hwnan Capital Divisions, which

maintained separate budget management, policy development, and infonnalion systems

functions. In February 2010, as part ora broader Headquarters realigrunent, the Disaster Reserve

Workforce and Human Capital Divisions were integrated into a new OCCHCO. As a result. the

Disaster Workforce Division now oversees the readiness and deployment functions for the entire

disaster workforce offull-time and Reserve employees. while at the same time a critical mass of

staffing in the budget, policy and system areas are able to provide more effective services to both

the institutional workforce and the deployable workforce.

Agency-Wide Credentialing Program - FEMA recognizes the need to prepare and deploy disaster

workers who perfonn at expected standards of perfonnance. While the existing credentialing

program represents a vital first step forward, FEMA'5 credentialing program must be

reconfigured to meet the demands of emerging operating doctrine, as well as to provide unity of

effort with all levels ofthe emergency management community at the federal, stale, local, tribal,

and private sector levels.

In March 2010, FEMA began working on broadening the oversight ofits Agency-wide

credentialing program. Oversight of credentialing FEMA employees was transferred to the

Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness. This change brings under one

organizational "hat" a wide array of credentialing initiatives for which FEMA is responsible, and

places them in the entity which ensures unity of efforts in line with the National Response

Framework.

In addition to changes in program oversight, FEMA will begin moving from the existing

approach to one which requires demonstrated perfonnance in training and in the field in order to

be credentialed. This is an approach which incorporates best practices from the model employed

by the National Wildfire Control Group.

As FEMA builds out this new "FEMA Qualification System," execution of the existing

credentialing program continues. At this time, FEMA reports the following updated status for

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the existing program documented in the bulleted lisl on page 44 ofthe draft report;

• Eleven cadres have a complete and approved Cadre-Specific Plan (CSP). Five ofthese

eleven cadres have migrated to the existing credentialing framework.

• Six cadres have a complete CSP that awaits approval.

• No cadres have a CSP that is actively in development.

• FoUl cadres have begun the initial planning in order to credential their disaster workers

under the FEMA Qualification System.

Impact ofDisaster Relief Funds Restrictions· a third development experienced subsequent to

DIG interviews conducted for this report was a shortfall in Disaster Relief Funds (DRF) that

negatively impacted all funding budgeted for the Disaster Reserve Workforce program in

FY2010. From February until July, as a responsible step ofstewardship, FEMA implemented

proactive, immediate needs funding guidance in order to extend the available balance of DRF

funding while waiting for supplemental funding. DRF funding is appropriated annually by

Congress to aid disaster survivors and help communities across the country recover. Congress

may offer supplemental appropriations, as needed, throughout a year to address additional needs.

As a result ofthese restrictions, all expenses charged to the Disaster Readiness and Support

account within the DRF were affected; including specific disaster-related functions such as the

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and certain categories of public assistance to states, local, and

tribal governments.

The impact of "immediate needs" funding restrictions on the Disaster Reserve Workforce

program has been severe. The program sent appro"imately 300 Reservists to credentialing-based

training in FY201 0, rather than the 2,000 it had planned. Contracting vehicles that provide the

technology infrastructure to effectively manage the disaster workforce could not be not approved

until late July 2010, when Congress approved a supplemental appropriation to replenish the DRF

and FEMA could lift its "immediate needs" funding restrictions.

Surge Capacity Force Concept ofOperations - subsequent to interviews by the OIG, FEMA

achieved a major milestone towards creation ofthe plan for a Surge Capacity Foree required by

Section 624 ofthe Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act.

On June 30, 201 0, the FEMA Administrator approved the draft concept of operations plan for the

Surge Capacity Force and forwarded it to DHS for review by all other DHS components. On a

parallel track during June 2010, the DHS Office ofthe ChiefHuman Capital Officer established

a working group ofhuman resource managers from the DHS components to identify ways to

avoid pitfalls experienced when FEMA has deployed employees from other federal agencies, as

documented in OIG reports such as OIG-07-051, Federal Emergency Management Agency's

Volunteer Service Program Following Hurricane Katrina, and 010-06-32, A Performance

Review ofFEMA 's Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina.

A Surge Capacity Force Concept ofOperations Plan, applicable to all DHS components, is

expected to be finalized in FY2011.

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9

Acquisition Management

The Office ofthe Chief Procurement Officer (OCrO) has placed the lisl of all pre-positioned

disaster response contracts on its Intranet site to provide easy access to those responding 10

disasters in the field. Additionally, aepo has provided to all Foocral Coordinating OffiC(.'TS

(FCOs) the prcposilioned contrat.1.lisl and additional infonnation in a customer-friendly fonnat

called the FCD ToolBox. The tool box. is also posted 10 OCPO's intranct site. FEMA must

balance the use of prepositioncd contracts with the requirements ofScQion 307 ofthe Stafford

Act that require FEMA to contract with local vendors to the maximum extent possible when

responding to a declared Major Disaster.

With respect 10 lhe need for additional staff, while your draft report indiClltcd that OCPO has a

36% vacancy ratc, the Acquisition Operations Division. under which the majority of contracting

officers and contract specialists are employed, has a 12% vacancy rate. Finding qualified

candidates and filling open positions continues to be a challc:nb'C" In an effort to improve the

situation. FEMA has 18 interns on board in \·arious stages of complL1.ion oftheir three-year

rotation. For other positions in OCPO. injob series such as 1101.340 and 343. no direct hiring

authority e:<iS15. leaving these positions to be filled through lengthy merit sysH:m competitive

recruitment process. For e:<ceptional applicants, recruitment bonuses arc used. Moreover,

retention bonuses are also used to retain highly qualified acquisition personnel.

Training is another priority ofthe OCPO and the Officc offers a robust series of courses through

each fiscal year to include DHS sponsored and Fedeml Acquisition Institute and Defense

Acquisition University no-cost acquisition training.

The numbcr of FEMA Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs) has increased

significantly (from 700 to [450) and the OCPO has institult:d a COTR Tiered Certification

Program which your report correctly identifies as having "resulted in better contractor

perfonnance and incrC3sed v(lluc for lu:<p3yers:' We wish to emphasize that there arc 57 COTRs

certified at the Tier III level, 56 certified at the Tier [[level and the remainc!l.'!" are Tier 1certified.

COTRs that arc Ticr 1[1 ccrtificd may be assigned 10 contracts of allY dollar value; Ticr II COTRs

may be assignl.oU 10 contracls up 10 S57 million; mnl Tier III COTRs may be assigned to contracts

UI) to S5 million. As the Tiered COTR initiative is rcilltivcly new, FEMA COTRs have [8

months from the date ofthe signed CaTR Directive 10 become certificd at the appropriate level

(March 28. 2011).

Moreover, the OCPO has taken a large step forward in increasing contract oversight and

administration of disaster contracts. aero has gained approval for 26 Direct Chllrgc CORE

employees that will constitute <I Disaster Acquisition Response Team (DART) whosc primary

focus will be to rcspond to disasters and provide contrnct administration and oversight ofthc

large disaster contracts in Ihe field. This staff will consist ofAdministrative Contracting Officers

and Quality Assurance Representatives who will providc consistent colltractlifccyelc support in

each disaster. This team's focus will also include the closing out of disaster contracts in an

effort to assist in the over.tll Disaster Closeout Process and return funds to the Disaster Relief

Fund. Mosl ofthe DART (23 ofthe 26 team mcmbers) will be located in Rcgions IV, VI and IX

where a large part of disaster activity occurs. However, the tcum will also S(.TVe thc disastcr

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contract administration and disaster contract close-out needs ofthe other regions. aepo expectS

the team to be hired and in place at their regional locations within the next few months.

In March 2010, OCPO's Acquisition Program and PlaJUling Division (APPO)"created a new

branch, the Business Management Operations Branch (BMOS), that is responsible for

overseeing FEMA's compliance with DHS's Directive 201-01: Acquisition Lifecycle

Management. In this capacity, the BMOS supports both FEMA's Head ofContracting Activity

and Component Acquisition Executive in meeting their obligations to oversee FEMA's

acquisition management activities for major acquisitions. In meeting its mission, the BMOS

provides the executive support to FEMA'5 Acquisition Review Board (ARB), serves as the

primary liaison to DHS's ARB and provides both acquisition oversight and technical assistance

to FEMA program offices in the execution of FEMA major acquisitions. The BMOB continues

to recruit and fill vacancies within the Branch, and establish operating procedures and working

relationships with FEMA programs.

With respect to the report's identification ofDHS infonnation technology system issues

impacting FEMA procurement, FEMA wishes to point out that even though the system's security

plan is still in the DHS approval process, the FEMA CIO has pennitled system upgrades as well

as the installation of new acquisition provisions and clauses. Rather than being six months to a

year behind in implementing new acquisition policies, the OCPO is able to install these new

acquisition policies within 30 to 60 days of publication.

Finally, in the draft report's COnlinuing Concerns for Acquisition Management, you state that

"FEMA has said that many more pre-disaster contracts are in place. However, some Joint Field

office officials and contracting personnel still contract separately for the same good rather than

using the established contracts." However, to comply with Section 307 ofthe Stafford Act,

FEMA is supposed to minimize the use of prepositioned contracts, so this statement appears to

be in conflict with the statutory mandate to use local finns.

Mitigation

The Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) in FEMA has worked to increase

progress in the critical components identified by OIG.

FIMA has worked with the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) to coauthor

a white paper - Recommendations/or an Effective National Mitigation Effort - BUilding stronger

partnerships, increased resilience, and disasler resistance/or a safer nation.

(http://www.nemaweb.org(?3I77) The principles ofthis white paper, which offers strategic

themes and elements of a national mitigation strategy, are being integrated into the ongoing

development ofthe National Recovery Framework and efforts to adapt to climate change.

FIMA has initiated a new program, Risk MAP (Mapping, Assessment and Planning), that

provides communities with flood infonnation and tools they can use to enhance their mitigation

plans and better protect their citizens. Through more accurate flood maps, risk assessment tools,

and outreach support, Risk MAP builds on Map Modernization and strengthens local ability to

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11

make informed decisions about reducing risk. The goals ofthis new program are laid out in the

RiskMAP multi year plan (http://www.fema.govllibrary/viewReoord.do?id-3587)

FIMA continues to make progress with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Reform

Workgroup. The Workgroup has established a three phase reform process: Phase I - capture

stakeholder concerns and recommendations from the NFIP Listening Session; Phase II - analyze

stakeholder feedback, develop evaluation criteria and create a portfolio of public policy

alternatives; and Phase III - evaluate public policy alternatives began in June 2010 and will last

18 to 24 months. Phase III will result in a comprehensive NFIP reform package that will be

delivered to Congress.

Thank you again for the opportunity 10 comment on this draft report and we look forward to

working with you on other issues as we both strive to improve FEMA.

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Appendix C 

Selected Reports 

Overall Planning 

DHS’ Progress in Federal Incident Management Planning 

(OIG-10-58), February 2010. 

Management Advisory Report: FEMA’s IMAT Program (OIG-10-32), 

January 2010. 

Emergency Preparedness: FEMA Faces Challenges Integrating 

Community Preparedness Programs into Its Strategic 

Approach (GAO-10-193), January 2010. 

National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to 

Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment 

Efforts (GAO-09-369), April 2009. 

National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and 

Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in 

the Revision Process (GAO-08-768), June 2008. 

Coordination and Support 

Disaster Recovery: Experiences from Past Disasters Offer Insights for 

Effective Collaboration after Catastrophic Events (GAO-09-

811), July 2009. 

Management Advisory Report: FEMA’s Response to Hurricane Ike 

(OIG-09-78), June 2009. 

National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve 

Capacity and Coordination between Government and 

Voluntary Sectors (GAO-08-369), February 2008. 

Homeland Security Information Network Could Support Information 

Sharing More Effectively (OIG-06-38), June 2006. 

Emergency Communications 

Emergency Communications: Establishment of the Emergency 

Communications Preparedness Center and Related 

Interagency Coordination Challenges (GAO-10-463R), March 

2010. 

Review of DHS’ Progress in Adopting and Enforcing Equipment 

Standards for First Responders (OIG-06-30), March 2006. 

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Logistics 

FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to 

Catastrophic Disasters (OIG-10-101), July 2010. 

FEMA’s Sourcing for Disaster Response Goods and Services (OIG09-96), August 2009. 

Logistics Information Systems Need to Be Strengthened at the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (OIG-08-60), May 2008. 

Evacuations 

Status of Implementation of GAO Recommendations on Evacuation of 

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations and Patients and 

Residents of Health Care Facilities (GAO-08-544R), April 

2008. 

Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness 

for Evacuations (GAO-07-44), December 2006. 

Housing 

Disaster Assistance: Federal Assistance for Permanent Housing 

Primarily Benefited Homeowners; Opportunities Exist to 

Better Target Rental Housing Needs (GAO-10-17), January 

2010. 

FEMA Temporary Housing Property Management Controls (OIG-10-

24), December 2009. 

Management Advisory Report: FEMA’s Housing Strategy for Future 

Disasters (OIG-09-111), September 2009. 

Improvements to Internal Controls for FEMA’s Individuals and 

Households Program Registration Process (OIG-09-110), 

September 2009. 

Audit of Application Controls for FEMA’s Individual Assistance 

Payment Application (OIG-09-104), September 2009. 

Final Letter Report: Potential Duplicate Benefits Between FEMA’s 

National Flood Insurance Program and Housing Assistance 

Programs (OIG-09-102), September 2009. 

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Disaster Housing: FEMA Needs More Detailed Guidance and 

Performance Measures to Help Ensure Effective Assistance 

after Major Disasters (GAO-09-796), August 2009. 

FEMA’s Temporary Housing Unit Program and Storage Site 

Management (OIG-09-85), June 2009. 

Management Advisory Report: Computer Data Match of FEMA and 

HUD Housing Assistance Provided to Victims of Hurricane 

Katrina and Rita (OIG-09-84), June 2009. 

FEMA Response to Formaldehyde in Trailers (OIG-09-83), June 2009. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Exit Strategy for 

Temporary Housing in the Gulf Coast Region (OIG-09-02), 

October 2008. 

FEMA’s Sheltering and Transitional Housing Activities After 

Hurricane Katrina (OIG-08-93), September 2008. 

Hurricane Katrina Temporary Housing Technical Assistance 

Contracts (OIG-08-88), August 2008. 

Management Advisory Report – FEMA Emergency Housing Units 

Property Management (OIG-08-33), March 2008. 

Review of FEMA’s Use of Proceeds From the Sales of Emergency 

Housing Units (OIG-08-23), February 2008. 

Disaster Workforce 

Challenges Facing FEMA’s Acquisition Workforce (OIG-09-11), 

November 2008. 

Mission Assignments 

Consolidated Report on DHS’ Management of 2005 Gulf Coast 

Hurricanes Mission Assignment Funding (OIG-09-89), July 

2009. 

U.S. Coast Guard’s Management of 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes 

Mission Assignment Funding (OIG-09-34), March 2009. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Management of 2005 Gulf 

Coast Hurricanes Mission Assignment Funding (OIG-08-80), 

July 2008. 

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Acquisition Management 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Disaster Contract Management 

(OIG-10-53), February 2010. 

Opportunities to Improve FEMA’s Disaster Closeout Process 

(OIG-10-49), January 2010. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support Hurricane 

Katrina Response Operations (OIG-09-77), June 2009. 

Challenges Facing FEMA’s Disaster Contract Management (OIG-09-

70), May 2009. 

Internal Controls in the FEMA Disaster Acquisition Process 

(OIG-09-32), February 2009. 

FEMA’s Implementation of Best Practices in the Acquisition Process 

(OIG-09-31), February 2009. 

Costs Incurred for Rejected Temporary Housing Sites (OIG-08-86), 

August 2008. 

Hurricane Katrina Multitier Contracts (OIG-08-81), July 2008. 

Hurricane Katrina: Ineffective FEMA Oversight of Housing 

Maintenance Contracts in Mississippi Resulted in Millions of 

Dollars of Waste and Potential Fraud (GAO-08-106), 

November 2007. 

Mitigation 

Gulf Coast Recovery: FEMA’s Management of the Hazard Mitigation 

Component of the Public Assistance Program (OIG-10-28), 

December 2009. 

FEMA’s Progress in All-Hazards Mitigation (OIG-10-03), October 

2009. 

Multiple Preparedness Areas 

Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security (OIG-10-16), November 2009. 

DHS Efforts to Address Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of Top 

Officials Exercises (OIG-09-53), April 2009. 

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Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 

Reform Act of 2006 (GAO-09-59R), November 2008. 

Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security (OIG-09-08), November 2008. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster (OIG-08-

34), March 2008. 

Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security (OIG-08-11), January 2008. 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in 

Response to Hurricane Katrina (OIG-06-32), March 2006. 

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Appendix D 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Donald Bumgardner, Lead Director 

Norman Brown, Director 

Kaye McTighe, Director 

Philip McDonald, Project Manager 

Craig Anderson, Supervisory Auditor 

Adrian Dupree, Supervisory Auditor 

Nigel Gardner, Supervisory Program Analyst 

Trudi Powell, Supervisory Auditor 

Soraya Vega, Supervisory Program Analyst 

Eric Young, Supervisory Auditor 

Douglas Campbell, Program Analyst 

Polin Cohanne, Senior Program Analyst 

Kimberly Gilliland, Program Analyst 

S. Ryan Hartong, Program Analyst 

Eric Hostelley, Program Analyst 

John Meenan, Program Analyst 

Nathaniel Nicholson, Auditor 

Puja Patel, Program Analyst 

Alexandra Vega, Program Analyst 

John Woo, Senior Auditor 

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Page 76 
Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

FEMA Administrator 

FEMA Audit Liaison (10-011-EMO) 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.