DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Audit of Targeting Oceangoing 

Cargo Containers 

(Unclassified Summary) 

Office of Audits 

OIG-07-09 November 2006
 

 

 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

November 21, 2006 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report represents an abbreviated version of our official use only report assessing the Automated 

Targeting System used by Customs and Border Protection inspectors at ports to help select 

intermodal cargo containers for inspection. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of 

relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The information contained in this report has been developed to the best knowledge available to us, 

and had been discussed in draft with appropriate management officials. It is our hope that this report 

will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all 

of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
 

 

Audit OIG Report 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Introduction 

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has a leading position 

within the Department of Homeland Security in preventing terrorists and 

weapons of mass destruction from entering the country. As part of this 

responsibility, CBP has a mission to prevent oceangoing cargo containers 

from being used as a means to smuggle weapons of mass destruction, 

implements of terrorism, narcotics and contraband, and people into the 

country. But, at the same time, CBP has the obligation to not unduly impede 

the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Approximately 11 million oceangoing 

cargo containers arrive annually at seaports in the United States making it 

impossible to physically inspect each container without hampering the flow of 

commerce. Inspectors at overseas Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports 

and at U.S. seaports, both use the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to 

assess the risk associated with each container and assist in determining which 

containers will undergo inspections. 

This is the second audit performed in response to Public Law 108-293, 

enacted on August 9, 2004, titled Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 

Act of 2004. Section 809(g) of the Act requires the Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) to evaluate and report annually on the effectiveness of the 

cargo inspection targeting system for international intermodal cargo 

containers. For this report, we focused on the following questions: 

What are the intelligence sources available, and how is data received, 

used and shared? 

Have valid performance measures been developed to provide CBP 

with feedback on the effectiveness of the targeting system and are they 

verifiable? 

How do Automated Targeting System (ATS) targeting scores impact 

inspection activity? 

Are CBP targeters receiving the required ATS Training? 

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Background 

We issued our first audit report, titled Audit report Audit of Targeting 

Oceangoing Cargo Containers, OIG-05-26, July 2005, dealing with the ATS 

and its operating environment. That audit covered the vulnerabilities in the 

supply chain and areas for improvement in the targeting system. Specifically, 

we reported that improvements were needed in the data applied to ATS 

targeting rules, the use of inspection results to refine the ATS targeting rules, 

and the physical controls over containers. 

This audit was performed at various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

locations within the Washington, D.C. area, and three major ports of entry, 

and covered transactions and procedures current as of June 2005. We 

gathered information through structured interviews, document analysis, data 

collection instruments, and observation of operations. We identified other 

programs and initiatives by either CBP or other agencies that provide controls 

over the movement of containers and identified control weaknesses, along 

with plans to address those weaknesses. We reviewed local procedures and 

evaluation efforts, including self-inspection plans, to determine whether they 

contained controls to ensure that all containers received the intended 

inspection. We sampled and tested the inspection results data associated with 

the containers to confirm whether documentation supported the conduct of 

more rigorous inspections. We analyzed the inspection results data and scores 

associated with containers selected for more rigorous inspections to determine 

how they were distributed among these score ranges. We observed port 

operations and inspection processes and reviewed all available data relating to 

performing examinations and recording examination results, tracking 

containers, and assessing fines and penalties. We obtained a list of the 

required training courses; reviewed course manuals; evaluated the course 

content; reviewed training records at Headquarters and each port; and 

interviewed targeting personnel to ensure that targeters have completed the 

required training. 

Executive Summary 

CBP did not fully utilize other sources of intelligence information available. 

Intelligence information is utilized by CBP at both the Headquarters and port 

levels for targeting purposes. CBP’s targeting methodology also includes 

inspector-driven targeting along with the ATS. We observed that two 

available information/intelligence sources were not fully utilized. Also, 

differences in interpreting the Advance Targeting Unit (ATU) policy exist as 

to which CBP port personnel need to have security clearances to better affect 

the targeting mission. 

National ATS performance measures are still being developed for determining 

the effectiveness of the ATS oceangoing container targeting system. These 

measurements will help improve port performance evaluation procedures 

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related to identifying and reviewing shipments. Also, at the port level, 

controls over container movement and inspection need to be periodically 

reviewed and evaluated. 

The inspection process includes tracking containers and ensuring each 

container targeted for examination receives a timely and thorough inspection. 

With regard to inspection, additional guidance for inspection of shipments 

with elevated ATS scores is needed. Also, at the three ports, CBP stills needs 

to improve controls over containers requiring examination. Finally, during 

secondary level inspections, non-intrusive inspection imagery was not always 

available to CBP Officers. 

The ATS targeters are receiving or in the process of receiving the required Sea 

Cargo Targeting Training. CBP requires targeters to attend a training course, 

which provides specialized training in targeting sea-containerized cargo. The 

focus of the course is on the use of the various automated targeting systems, 

as well as paper manifest review methods. The course is designed to enhance 

the skills of officers as targeters in the primary mission to combat terrorism. 

We recommended that CBP (1) review the use of intelligence from available 

resources; (2) review security clearances; (3) improve port performance 

evaluation procedures; (4) refine policies and procedures for identifying and 

reviewing high-risk shipments; and (5) ensure that inspection imagery is 

provided to officers conducting secondary level inspections. CBP agreed with 

our recommendations and outlined planned corrective actions. 

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Appendix 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection 

Customs and Border Protection, Audit Liaison 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Chief Privacy Officer 

GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS’ OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

 Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the 

OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL 

STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, 

Building 410, Washington, DC 20528, fax the complaint to (202) 254-4292; or email 

DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer 

and caller.