2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
10-20-2004 

# S t eele v . E r ie P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-3353

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion
" S t e e le v . E r ie " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s . P ape r 206. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/206NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________ NO. 03-3353

____________ THOMA S STEELE Appellant v. THE CI TY OF E RIE ; E DWARD J. SPAGE L, JR, CORPORA L; JOHN DOE

____________ On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt for the We stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. Civi l No. 01-cv- 00338) Distric t Judg e: Ho n. Sea n J. M cLa ugh lin

____________ Submitte d Pursuant to Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

October 8, 2004 BE FO RE : SL OV ITE R, V AN AN TW ER PE N a nd C OW EN , Circuit Judges (Fil ed : October

20, 2004)

____________ OPI NION

____________ VA N A NT W ER PE N, Circuit Judge Thomas Steele ( hereina fter “ Appellant ”) brought suit against the City of Eri e and investigati ng officer

Corporal Edward Spagel , Jr . under 42 U.S. C. §1983. He all eged four causes of acti on: (1) arres t without probable c ause; ( 2) generalfail ure of the Cityof1 This driver’s side re ar view m irror was later determ ined to hav e com e from either a

Chevrolet

Cavalier or a Ponti ac Sunbird, model ye ars 1988 t o 1994. 2 Eri e t o pr ope rl y tr ai n, sup er vi se anddi sc ip li ne i ts off ic er s; (3 ) v ar io us s ta te to rt cl ai ms stemm ing fro m h is arrest; an d (4) f ailure o f Co rpora l Spa gel’s su perv isors to appropri atel y supe rvise , control and di scipl ine him (a John Doe claim). The Distri ct Court granted summary j udgment in favor of Erie and Corpor al Spagel . Appell ant now argues on ly two issues on ap peal: that the D istrict Court erred in gran ting summ ary judgment when it

found, as a matter of l aw, that probable c ause exis ted to arrest him; and that the District Cou rt erred in granting su mm ary judgmen t when it found that A ppellant’s plea t o two summary offe nses prec luded his §1983 clai m arisi ng from any a llege d malicious prosecution. We now affirm the D istri ct Court’s ruli ngs as to both these points.

I. Factual and P rocedura l History We sh al l b ri efl y re vi ew the e ss entia l f act s of th is cas e. Some ti me af te r 1 :0 0 a. m. on October 9, 1999, two pedestrians were i njured i n a hit- and-run acc ident at the inter secti on of West 26 th Street and CherryStreet

in Erie , Pennsy lvania . CorporalSpagel
wa s assign ed as the prim ary inves tigator o f this ac ciden t. Soon after t

he accident , the victi ms of the hit -and-run stated that theywere hit by an eastbound white car they i dentif ied as pos sibl y a Grand Am. A black, driver ’s si de rear vi ew mirror was found at the scene
. 1 Spagel soon after learned that a woman, tentatively identified by a tavern patron o nly as “Lisa,” had stop ped at the n earby Dairy2 Appellant repres ented t o Corporal Spagelthat he had driven westbound that e vening. 3 M art tw o ho urs a fter the a ccid ent a nd h ad in qui red abo ut th e ac cide nt an d th e vic tims
. The Dairy Mart clerk notice d the woman drove a white c ar with s ome damage to the fron t. Corp oral S page l was unab le to disc over any furth er info rmatio n per taining to “L isa.” On Novem ber 11, 1999, Corporal Spagellearne d from a Wesley vill e Police officer that Appel lant ha d had his driver’ s side rear vie w mirror re placed on hi s 1989 Chevrolet Cav alier. Co rpora l Spa gel co ntacte d A ppella nt, wh o den ied hitting anyone but d id acknowledge his presence i n the vic init y of 26 th Street

and CherryStreet

at the appr oxim ate time of the accid ent. 2 Appellant stated he beli eved the mir ror had been knocked off the ni ght of the accident by anot her pedest

rian whil e Appellant

had been driving hom e. Corpo ral Spagel also noticed othe r damag e to the front en d of A ppellant’s car duri ng the conver sati on, which Appell ant attri buted to a deer st rike occ urri ng the
sam e day as th e acc ident. Af ter revie win g his in vestiga tion fin ding s, Co rpora l Spa gel co mp leted a n aff idavit of p roba ble ca use a nd so ugh t an arre st wa rrant fo r Ap pellan t. Now here in this aff idavit did CorporalSpagel menti on “Lisa” or that Appel lant ha d stated he was trave ling i n a westerl y di recti on the eveni ng of the acci dent. The warrant was i ssued, and Appellant was arrested. Appell ant was charge d with seven vi olati ons of the Penns yl vania Motor3 The Comm onwealth nolle pr osequied the remaining five charges. 4 Vehicle Code, and pleaded no contest to two summary offenses. 3 On or about October 15, 2001, Appell ant fi led thi s suit in feder al Dist

rict Court for the Western Distri ct of Pennsy lvania , al leging hi s four caus es of action. On the recommendation of

a Magistrate Judge, t

he District Court

granted Appel lees’ motion for summary judgment as to all clai ms.

II. Standard of Revi ew The Distri ct Court ha d juri sdiction over t his matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343(a)( 3) & (a)( 4) and 42 U.S.C. §1983 . We now exerc ise jurisd iction o ver this appeal of a final district court order un der 28 U.S.C. §1291 . This Court ’s revi ew of the Dis trict C our t’s su mm ary jud gm ent o rde r in f avo r ofAp pelle es is p lena ry. See Torres v. M cLa ugh lin , 163 F.3d 169, 170 (3d. Cir. 1998 ).

III. Discussi on ProbableCause to Arr est Appel lant We first resolve Appell ant’s clai m that no probable cause existed to jus tify the issuan ce of an arre st wa rrant. Appellant

here cl aims that

the Dist rict Court erred in grant

ing summary judgment as a matt er of la w with regard t o his §1983 cl aims. Whil e general ly “the quest ion of5

probable c ause in a §1983 damage suit i s one for the jury ,” Montgomery v. De Simone , 159 F.3d 120, 124 ( 3d. Cir. 1998), a di stri ct court may concl ude, as a matter of l aw, that the ev idenc e, wh en vie we d in the light m ost fav orab le to the plaintiff , reason ably wo uld sup por t a fin din g of pro bab le ca use , and ma y ente r sum ma ry judg me nt ac cor din gly. See She rwo od v . Mu lvihill , 133 F.3d 396, 401 (3d. Cir. 1997 ). It i s well- establ ished t

hat probabl e cause exi sts where “ facts a nd circumst ances [are] s uffici ent to warr ant a prude nt man in bel ieving t hat the [suspect ] had committed or was committi ng an offense. ” Sharrar v. Fels ing , 1 28 F .3 d 81 0, 818 (3 d. Ci r. 199 7) . A s
we have stated b efore , in orde r to suc ceed in cha llengin g a w arrant f or w ant of prob able cause, a litigant i n Appellant ’s posi tion must prove that

a warrant was obt ained by “knowingly and deliberately , or with a reckless regard for the truth, mak[ing] false statements or omi ssions that c reate [d] a fal sehood” and that “such s tate ments or omissi ons are mate rial
... to a fi nding of probabl e cause. ” Wilson v. Russo , 212 F.3d 781, 787 (3d. Cir . 2000). Appellant does not meet

this standar d. Af ter revie win g the re cord and s crutiniz ing C orpo ral Sp agel’s affid avit of prob able cause, we ar e sati sfied t hat, as a matt er of la w, probable c ause exis ted at the ti me he petit ioned for t

he arres t warrant . At the time Corpora l Spagel s ought the warr ant, he had
a s usp ect who ( 1) admi tted t o be in g i n t he v ic in it y of t he a cci den t a t t

he appr oxi mat e t ime the acci dent occurred, ( 2) drove a car of si milar make and c olor as that i dentif ied bythe victi ms, and (3) whose car was damaged in a manner consistent with t

he damage incurred4 This damage included not only damage to the automobil e’s body , but a lso the driver ’s side re ar view mirro r wh ich w as left a t the sce ne of the ac ciden t. 5 Ap paren tly, Corpo ral Sp agel f oun d no furthe r evide nce tying the ph antom “Lisa ” to the acci dent. When asked at deposi tion, Corporal Spagelconsidered her to be a “person of inte rest,” no t a susp ect. 6 in st riki ng a pedestrian. 4 Such evidence per suades us t hat the Distri ct Court was cor rect to find t hat a prude nt poli ce officer in CorporalSpagel’s position would concl ude that there was pr obable caus e to arrest Appell ant, the only suspect under inves tigat

ion at t he time. 5 Appellant

makes much of the fact s omitted by Corpor al Spagel (namelyany refere nce to “Lisa ” or A ppella nt’s claim ed w estw ardly trave l directio n), and sum marily concludes t

hat thi s evidence is suff icie ntly exculpat ory to counselagainst a findi ng of probab le cause. W hile this evidence m ay have prov ed usefu l in establishing a juror’s reasonabl e doubt at

tri al, it i s not of suc h quantum as to amount to a mate rialomissi on on the part of Corporal Spage l. Nothi ng in our j urispr udence requi res a pol ice offi cer seeking an arrest

warrant t o present

everyscintill a of information acqui red duri ng an inves tigation to satisfy the stand ard fo r a find ing o f pro bable caus e, as lon g as h is submissi on is made in obj ecti velygood faith. Final ly , Appell ant has not present ed any evidence demonst

rati ng that, had Corporal Spage l li sted every bi t of inf ormation concerni ng his i nvesti gation, probable c ause would have di ssolved. Therefore, it i s clear

to us that, as a matt er of la w, probable c ause to ar rest the Ap pellan t existed , and th e D istrict Co urt pro perly gran ted su mm ary judgm ent.7 Nolo Contendere Plea Barring Recovery Under §1983 Since it has been det ermined that probabl e cause exi sted at the ti me the warrant
wa s issu ed, n o §1 983 actio n lies
. See Montgomery v. De Simone , 159 F.3d at 124 (holdi ng that, in order

to prevai l in a §1983 mal icious prosecution claim, abse nce of probab le cause fo r initiation of proceed ings mu st be show n). Neve rtheless, we w ill turn briefl y t o Appellant ’s ass erti on that t he District Court

incorrectl y found t

hat his plea of nolo contendere to two summaryoffenses bar red recove ry under §1983. In He ctor v. W att , 235 F.3d 154 ( 3d. Cir. 2000), we held t hat a pl ainti ff clai ming malici ous prosecut

ion must pr ove actual

innocence as an element of his prima faci e cas e. See Id. at

156 . When, as here, a pros ecutor s eeks a grant of nolle pr

osequi for charges as par t of a com pro mis e, dis mis sal o f tho se c har ges is no t an in dica tion of a ctua l inn oce nce . See Hilfir

ty v. Shipman , 91 F .3d 5 73, 5 80 ( 3d. C ir. 19 96) , citi ng Restate ment (Second) of To rts, §6 60, c mt. c . Appell ant’s own testi mony, gi ven at hi s September 10, 2002 deposition, i ndicat es to us t hat the Commonw ealth’s will ingness to nolle pr osequi five of the sev en co unts b roug ht aga inst him wa s the re sult of a plea barg ain, no t a fatal d efec t in the C om mo nw ealth ’s ca se a gain st him
. Cf. Haefner v. Burkey , 626 A.2d. 519, 521 (1993) ( nolle pr

osequi of charges bec ause of ins uffici ent evi dence). It i s unclear to us how exactlyAppellant

can clai m he “was successfulin his chall enge to the charges t hat he w as inv olved in a hit-a nd-ru n acc ident,” a t least to th e deg ree req uired to succ essfu lly8

bring a mal icious prosecution claim. Without more, the revel ation t

hat a pl ea agreement has been reached d oes not de mon strate the actual innoc ence that is requ ired under Hector
. Therefore, we believe t hat the Distri ct Court properlyinter preted Hilfirty and Haefner , and that it

arri ved at the conclusi on demanded by our holding i n Hector
. We a ff

irm t he ju dgm en t o f the Dis tric t C our t b el ow.