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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

RODNEY ALLAN ROBINSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

January 2, 2018

v No. 335043

Huron Circuit Court

ERICA RENEE ROBINSON, LC No. 14-205610-DM

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and FORT HOOD JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order amending the parties’ judgment of 

divorce. Specifically, on appeal plaintiff challenges the trial court’s child support order. We 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties’ judgment of divorce was entered on December 11, 20151 and directed the 

parties to provide financial information to the Friend of the Court (FOC) so that it could make a 

recommendation regarding child support. On January 28, 2016, the FOC sent a letter to the 

parties informing them of its child support recommendations to the trial court. Enclosed were 

three child support recommendations for the trial court to choose from; the three 

recommendations were based on three potential income values for defendant. For plaintiff’s 

income, the FOC used a three-year average income in calculating the child support 

recommendations because plaintiff, who is a farmer, had yearly income that varied on the basis 

of crop sales. In this case, the FOC averaged plaintiff’s annual incomes from 2012, 2013, and 

2014, and used that average as plaintiff’s income in the child support calculations.

Plaintiff filed objections to the recommendations, and a hearing based on the objections

was held on March 21, 2016. Before the hearing, plaintiff filed an emergency motion to adjourn

the hearing because his accountant could not attend the hearing. The trial court proceeded with 

the hearing without ruling on plaintiff’s motion to adjourn. During the hearing, plaintiff argued 

 1 The parties have two minor children, DRR (dob 4/16/2005) and CJR (dob 4/2/2011).
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that only his annual income for 2015 should have been used in calculating his child support 

instead of the three-year average income from 2012 to 2014 because crop prices were higher

from 2012 to 2014 and plaintiff’s 2015 income was most current. However, the trial court 

determined that using the three-year average income was appropriate for calculating child 

support, and stated that it did not include 2015 in the three-year average because using the 

incomes from 2012 to 2014 was more accurate.

2

 The trial court ultimately adopted child support 

recommendation “A,” which set plaintiff’s child support obligation at $1,675 per month for the 

two minor children. 

On April 11, 2016, plaintiff sent a letter to the FOC requesting further information for the 

basis of its child support recommendations. In response, as relevant to this appeal, the FOC 

provided a list of the tax deduction expenses from 2012 to 2014 that it included in plaintiff’s 

income for purposes of calculating his child support. The trial court’s uniform child support 

order was entered on April 25, 2016 and reflected plaintiff’s child support obligation as $1,675 

per month for the two minor children. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 

on May 13, 2016, arguing that his income and child support amount were improperly calculated. 

The trial court denied the motion, noting that pursuant to its March 21, 2016 order, the FOC was 

authorized “to conduct an annual income review, based on the written request of either party, on 

or after January, 2017[.]” 

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Whether the trial court properly applied the Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF) 

to the facts of the case is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Borowsky v 

Borowsky, 273 Mich App 666, 672; 733 NW2d 71 (2007) (citation omitted). “This Court also 

reviews de novo the proper interpretation of the MCSF and the applicable statutes.” Id. (citation 

omitted.) 

Where the MCSF commits a matter to the discretion of the trial court, this Court 

will review the trial court’s exercise of discretion for abuse. An abuse of 

discretion occurs when a court selects an outcome that is not within the range of 

reasonable and principled outcomes. Finally, to the extent that the trial court 

made factual findings in determining the amount of support under the child 

support formula, those findings are reviewed for clear error. [Id. (citations 

omitted).]

B. CALCULATION OF CHILD SUPPORT

 2 In entering its ruling, the trial court noted its familiarity with farm operations and “[t]he income 

of a farmer,” which it described as greatly fluctuating, given the trial court’s “history as a longtime resident of the county.” 
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“[O]nce a trial court decides to order the payment of child support, the court must ‘order 

child support in an amount determined by application of the child support formula . . . .’” Id. at 

673, quoting MCL 552.605(2). “A trial court must strictly comply with the requirements of the 

MCSF in calculating the parents’ support obligations unless it ‘determines from the facts of the 

case that application of the child support formula would be unjust or inappropriate . . . .’” Id.,

quoting MCL 552.605(2). 

Plaintiff first argues that his 2015 income should have been included in calculating the 

three-year average income that the trial court used to determine plaintiff’s child support amount. 

“The first step in determining the parents’ support obligation under the MCSF is to determine 

each parent’s net income[.]” Borowsky, 273 Mich App at 673. Each parent’s net income is 

determined in order to “establish, as accurately as possible, how much money a parent should 

have available for support.” 2013 MCSF 2.01(B). “Net income” is defined as “all income minus 

the deductions and adjustments permitted by [the MCSF].” 2013 MCSF 2.01(A). The 2013 

MCSF instructs the FOC that “[w]here income varies considerably year-to-year due to the nature 

of the parent’s work, use three years’ information to determine that parent’s income.” 2013 

MCSF 2.02(B) (emphasis added).

In compliance with the 2013 MCSF, the FOC appropriately used a three-year average 

income for plaintiff in calculating the child support recommendations where plaintiff, as a 

farmer, had income that varied from year to year on the basis of his crop sales. 2013 MCSF 

2.02(B). The FOC averaged plaintiff’s annual incomes from 2012, 2013, and 2014, and the trial 

court adopted that average value. Plaintiff argues that his 2015 income should have been 

included in the calculation of the average because the MCSF does not specify which three years 

must be used, and he asserts that the three most recent years (including 2015) should have been

used because the goal of the MCSF is to determine current income. However, the MCSF does 

not mandate that the three most recent years be used in the average income calculation. 2013 

MCSF 2.02(B). Therefore, determining which three years of income to use in the average 

calculation is a matter left to the trial court’s discretion. See Peterson v Peterson, 272 Mich App 

511, 518; 727 NW2d 393 (2006) (stating that “[t]his Court must ensure compliance with the 

plain language of the MCSF Manual[,]” and that courts may not read language into the MCSF 

that is not there). Because the MCSF gives the trial court discretion regarding which three years 

to use in the average income calculation, the trial court’s decision to use the years of 2012, 2013, 

and 2014 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Borowsky, 273 Mich App at 672 (recognizing 

that where the MCSF commits matters to the discretion of the trial court, the trial court’s 

decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

Although plaintiff argues that the trial court did not provide any specific reasons for not 

including the 2015 income in the average and ignored the possibility of including the 2015 

income in the average, the trial court did in fact state its reason for not including plaintiff’s 2015 

income. The trial court recognized that using the incomes from 2012 to 2014 to determine child 

support was more accurate and advisable under the circumstances of this case, particularly where 

these divorce proceedings had been pending since October 1, 2014. Additionally, the FOC had 

noted that only plaintiff’s personal tax return was provided to the FOC, but “the Robinson Farms 

Partnership return [was] also required.” Therefore, on these facts, the trial court’s decision to not 

include plaintiff’s 2015 income in the average calculation was reasoned and fell within the range 
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of principled outcomes, and the child support award was properly entered. See Borowsky, 273 

Mich App at 672.

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court should not have included three of plaintiff’s tax 

deductions for business expenses as part of plaintiff’s income for purposes of calculating child 

support. Plaintiff specifically argues that the following tax deductions should not have been 

considered part of his income: depreciation and section 179 expenses,3 office supply expenses, 

and phone expenses. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court should not have added back deductions 

for those expenses because the trial court did not make findings regarding whether any of the 

expenses were “consistent with the nature of the business” and therefore not to be included as 

income. 2013 MCSF 2.01(E)(4)(e). These issues were not presented to the trial court for 

consideration, and are therefore not preserved. Fast Air, Inc v Knight, 235 Mich App 541, 549; 

599 NW2d 489 (1999). Specifically, although provided with the FOC recommendations 

concerning child support on or about January 29, 2016, plaintiff did not contact the FOC 

concerning how child support was calculated until April 11, 2016, after the trial court’s March 

21, 2016 hearing on his objections to the recommendations for child support. Moreover, 

plaintiff’s objections to the child support recommendations, as well as his motion for 

reconsideration, did not specifically touch on these issues. Accordingly, we decline to address 

these unpreserved issues on appeal. 

C. DENIAL OF ADJOURNMENT

This Court will review the trial court’s decision on a motion seeking an adjournment for 

an abuse of discretion. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008) (recognizing 

that a motion for continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). “An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the decision results in an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.”

Keinz v Keinz, 290 Mich App 137, 141; 799 NW2d 576 (2010) (citation omitted).

“A motion for adjournment must be based on good cause, and a court, in its discretion, 

may grant an adjournment to promote the cause of justice.” Zerillo v Dyksterhouse, 191 Mich 

App 228, 230; 477 NW2d 117 (1991); see also MCR 2.503(D)(1). “An adjournment may be 

granted on the ground of unavailability of a witness or evidence only if the court finds that the 

evidence is material and that diligent efforts have been made to produce the witness or 

evidence.” MCR 2.503(C)(2). Further, “cases where a denial [of adjournment] was proper have 

always involved some combination of numerous past continuances, failure of the movant to 

exercise due diligence, and lack of any injustice to the movant.” Tisbury v Armstrong, 194 Mich 

App 19, 20; 486 NW2d 51 (1991) (citation omitted). “A denial because of the absence of a 

witness is proper where the movant fails to provide an adequate explanation and show that 

diligent efforts were made to secure the presence of the witness.” Id.

 3 The parties do not dispute that section 179 of the Internal Revenue Service Tax Code permits 

businesses to deduct the full purchase price of equipment that qualifies pursuant to the IRS Tax 

Code. 
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Plaintiff filed an emergency motion to adjourn the March 21, 2016 hearing because his 

accountant could not attend the hearing and would not be able to do so until after April 15, 2016, 

presumably after the completion of tax season. The trial court proceeded with the hearing 

without expressly ruling on plaintiff’s motion to adjourn, and it continued to proceed with the 

hearing after plaintiff’s counsel reiterated the request for an adjournment during the hearing. 

Notably, plaintiff did not offer any argument or evidence to demonstrate that diligent efforts 

were made to secure the presence of his accountant at the hearing. Tisbury 194 Mich App at 20; 

see also MCR 2.503(C)(2). For example, plaintiff did not establish when he retained the 

accountant, when he requested that the accountant attend the hearing, when the accountant

informed plaintiff that he could not attend, or why plaintiff waited until shortly before the 

hearing to request the adjournment. Additionally, during the hearing on his objections, 

plaintiff’s counsel qualified the request for an adjournment, specifically asking the trial court 

“for an adjournment for a CPA if [y]our Honor feels it’s necessary.” 

Further, we are not persuaded that plaintiff suffered injustice as a result of the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to adjourn. Tisbury 194 Mich App at 20. Plaintiff argues that he suffered 

injustice because his income was improperly calculated, and he never had an opportunity to have 

his accountant testify to correct the inaccuracies. However, we disagree that plaintiff’s income 

was improperly calculated, and the alleged mistakes concerning the tax deductions for expenses 

included in the income calculation first came to plaintiff’s attention by way of the FOC’s April 

14, 2016 letter, well after the March 21, 2016 hearing on plaintiff’s objections to the child 

support recommendations. Therefore, plaintiff is hard-pressed to assert that his accountant

would have been of assistance in correcting any alleged mistakes that had not been discovered. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s arguments concerning this issue are without merit. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood