[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13889

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

REGINALD WOODS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:97-cr-00159-RDP-GMB-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13889

Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Reginald Woods appeals the district court’s denial of his motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as 

modified by the First Step Act of 20181, as well as his motion for 

reconsideration. Woods argues that his long sentence constitutes 

an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release and that 

the district court improperly used a provision from 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3852(c)(1)(B) to deny his motion for reconsideration. He also argues that our decision in United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021), was wrongly decided

and that the district court had discretion to consider what qualifies 

as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. For 

the reasons stated below, we disagree and affirm the district court.

I. 

Several standards of review are relevant here. We review a

determination about a defendant’s eligibility for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction de novo. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1251. However, we

review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 

908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if it 

applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in 

1 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.

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20-13889 Opinion of the Court 3

making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly 

erroneous.” Id. (quoting Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 

1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019)). Under an abuse of discretion standard, 

“we cannot reverse just because we might have come to a different 

conclusion had it been our call to make.” Id. at 912 (quoting Sloss 

Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 934 (11th Cir. 2007)). “To 

obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on multiple, independent grounds, [the defendant] must convince us that 

every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.” 

United States v. Maher, 955 F.3d 880, 885 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 

2014)). 

We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 

(11th Cir. 2004). Although motions for reconsideration of a district 

court order in a criminal action are not expressly authorized by the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, both “the Supreme Court 

and this Court have permitted motions for reconsideration in criminal cases.” United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1199 (11th Cir. 

2010). A motion for reconsideration may not be used to relitigate 

old matters or present arguments or evidence that could have been 

raised prior to the entry of judgment. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 

F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010). 

We liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se defendants. 

United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 792 (11th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, we deem abandoned issues and contentions not raised by 

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a defendant in his initial brief. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 

708, 713 (11th Cir. 2010). And we do not consider arguments made 

for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief. United States v. Montenegro, 1 F.4th 940, 944 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021).

II.

District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term 

of imprisonment but may do so to the extent permitted under 

§ 3582(c)’s provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. 

Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 

2635 (2021). As amended by § 603(b) of the First Step Act, that section now provides, in relevant part, that:

the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau 

of Prisons [(“BOP”)], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring 

a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 

days from the receipt of such a request by the warden 

of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may 

reduce the term of imprisonment . . . , after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the 

extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 

reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent 

with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

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As we recently explained, to grant a reduction under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), district courts must find that three necessary conditions are satisfied, which are (1) “support in the § 3553(a) factors,” 

(2) “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” and (3) “adherence to 

[U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.13’s policy statement.” United States v. Tinker, 14 

F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). District courts do not need to 

address these three conditions in any particular sequence, as the 

absence of even one forecloses a sentence reduction. Id. at 1238. 

In Bryant, we held that the policy statement in § 1B1.13 is 

applicable to all motions filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A), including 

those filed by prisoners, and thus, district courts cannot reduce a 

sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A) unless it would be consistent with 

§ 1B1.13. 996 F.3d at 1262. The policy statement requires, in relevant part, that “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any 

other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). 

Here, Woods’s argument that Bryant was wrongly decided

and created an unconstitutional delegation of power is foreclosed 

by our prior panel precedent rule. Under our prior panel precedent 

rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels 

unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this [C]ourt sitting en banc.” 

United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). A 

subsequent panel cannot overrule a prior panel even if it believes 

that the prior panel was wrong. United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 

1316, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 1998). Bryant has not been overruled or 

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abrogated, and there is no exception to the prior panel precedent 

rule for reasons overlooked by the prior panel. See United States 

v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2022). Further, Woods 

abandoned any argument that the district court wrongly determined that he was a danger to the community by failing to raise 

the issue in his initial brief, and thus, his claim fails because he cannot show one of the necessary conditions for compassionate release. Accordingly, we need not reach whether he established an 

“extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release or whether 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors supported his release. 

Next, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reconsider because his motion raised the same 

arguments that he had made in his motions for compassionate release—i.e., that his long sentence, stacked 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentences, rehabilitation, sickle cell disease and the low quality of care 

by the BOP, and his mother’s age were reasons for his compassionate release—none of which impacted the court’s dangerousness 

finding. Further, the evidence that he submitted, including character letters, education history, and his “male pattern risk scoring” 

assessment, all could have been submitted before judgment was 

entered. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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