U.S. Department of Justice 

AttarAe:,c \\'erlc Predtiet // Mtt; CeA1:ttiA Ma1:ertal Prn1:eeted UAder Fed. R. Crhtt. P. 6(e) 

Report On The Investigation Into 

Russian Interference In The 

2016 Presidential Election 

Volume I of II 

Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III 

Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) 

Washington, D.C. 

March 2019 
U.S. Department of Justice 

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U.S. Department of Justice 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME I 

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I .......................................................................................................... 1 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME 1. ................................................ , ............................................. 4 

I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION ......................................................................... , ....... 11 

II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN ..................................................... 14 

A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency ................................................................. 15 

B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin ................................................. 16 

C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections .................................................................................. 19 

1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014 ....................... , .............. 19 

2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts ..................... 22 

3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook. ..................................................................... 24 

4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter ......................................................................... 26 

a. Individualized Accounts ................................................................................... 26 

b. IRA Botnet Activities ...................................................................................... 28 

5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies .......................................................... 29 

6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons .......................................................... 31 

7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign ........................................... 33 

a. Trump Campaign Promotion ofIRA Political Materials ................................. 33 

b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies ................. 35 

Ill. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS ..................................................................... 36 

A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign ....................................................... 36 

1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign ............................................................. 36 

2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks ................... .................................. 38 

a. Initial Access .................................................................................................... 3 8 

b. Implantation ofMalware on DCCC and DNC Networks ................................ 38 

c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks .. .................................. 40 

B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials ...................................................................... 41 

I. DCLeaks ............................................................................................................... 41 

2. Guccifer 2.0 ............................................ ............................................................... 42 

3. Use of WikiLeaks .................................. : .............................................................. 44 

a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign ............... 44 

b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks ........................... 45 
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c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks .................................. 45 

d. · WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen 

Materials ........................................................................................................ 48 

C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations ............................................................................. 49 

l. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims ............ 49 

2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections ................................... 50 

D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials .................................. 51 

l. .............................................................................................. 51 

a. Background ...................................................................................................... 51 

b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks ................................................ 52 

C. Harm to Ongoing Matter .................... 54 

d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails .................... 58 

e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks ................................................ 59 

2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials ......................... 61 

a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) .................................................... 61 

b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails ...................................... 62 

IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN ................ 66 

A. Campaign Period (September 2015 - November 8, 2016) ......................................... 66 

1. Trump Tower Moscow Project ............................................................................. 67 

a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) ............ 67 

b. Communications with LC. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi 

Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015) ............................................................ 69 

c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-

January 2016) ................................................................................................ 70 

i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization .... 70 

ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia ......................................... 72 

d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump 

(December 2015-June 2016) ......................................................................... 76 

i. Sater' s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia ........................................ 76 

ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia ............................ 78 

2. George Papadopoulos ........................................................................................... 80 

a. Origins of Campaign Work .............................................................................. 81 

b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts ........................................................................ 82 

c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting ......................................................... 85 

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d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of 

Clinton Emails ............................................................................................... 86 

e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign .................................... 89 

f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt" ........................................................... 93 

g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact.. ..................................................... 94 

3. Carter Page ............................................................................................................ 9 5 

a. Background ...................................................................................................... 96 

b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work ............................................................. 97 

c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow ........................................................ 98 

d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign ............................. 102 

4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest ...................................... 103 

a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign ......................... 103 

b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel 

..................................................................................................................... 105 

c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI ....................................... 107 

d. Jared Kushner' s Continuing Contacts with Simes ......................................... 108 

5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower ..................................... , ......................... 110 

a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting ....................................................................... 110 

i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr .................................................................. 110 

ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign ................................... 114 

b. TheEventsofJune9, 2016 ............................................................................ 116 

i. Arrangements for the Meeting ................................................................ 116 

ii. Conduct of the Meeting .......................................................................... 117 

c. Post-June 9 Events ......................................................................................... 120 

6. Events at the Republican National Convention .................................................. 123 

a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. 

Gordon the Week of the RNC ..................................................................... 123 

b. Change to Republican Party Platform ............................................................ 124 

7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak ................................ : ............................ 127 

a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the 

Ambassador's Residence ............................................................................. 127 

b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak ...... 127 

8. Paul Manafort ...................................................................................................... 129 

a. Paul Manafort' s Ties to Russia and Ukraine .................................................. 131 

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1. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work ......................................................... 131 

11. Political Consulting Work ..................................................................... 132 

iii. Konstantin Kilimnik .............................................................................. 132 

b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign .............. 134 

i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign ......................................................... 134 

ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts .......................................... 135 

iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin 

Kilimnik in the United States ................................................................ 138 

c. Post-Resignation Activities ............................................................................ 141 

B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts .......................................................... 144 

1. Immediate Post-Election Activity ....................................................................... 144 

a. Outreach from the Russian Government.. ..................................................... . 145 

b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels ....... 146 

2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration ...... 147 

a. Background .................... ................ ................................................................ 14 7 

b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming 

Administration ............................. ................................................................ 149 

c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles ................................ 151 

i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with 

Dmitriev .......................................................... ....................................... 151 

11. The Seychelles Meetings ......................................................... ............... 153 

iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip .... 155 

d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding 

U .S.-Russia Relations .................................................................................. 156 

3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in 

Trump Tower Following the Election ................................................................. 159 

4. Jared Kushner' s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov ................................................... 161 

5. Petr A ven' s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team ........................................ 163 

6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich ............. 166 

7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn ................................................... 167 

a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements ................................................... 167 

b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia ....................................................................... 168 

V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS ........................................................................ 174 

A. Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign ............................................... 174 

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B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations .............................................................. 175 

1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy .................................................... 175 

a. Background .................................................................................................... 175 

b. Charging Decision As to ....... 176 

2. Potential Section 1030 Violation By .............................. 179 

C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts ............................................................. 180 

1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion ............................................. 180 

2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951). 181 

a. Governing Law ............................................................................................... 181 

b. Application ..................................................................................................... 182 

3. Campaign Finance .............................................................................................. 183 

a. Overview Of Governing Law ........................................................ ............... .. 184 

b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting ....... ......................................... 185 

i. Thing-of-Value Element ......................................................................... 186 

ii. Willfulness ............................................................................................. 187 

iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information ...................................... 188 

c. Application to WikiLeaks 

1. 

....................................................................... 189 

ii. Willfulness ..................................................... .............. .......................... 190 

iii. Constitutional Considerations ................................................................ 190 

iv. Analysis .................................................................... 190 

4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation ....................................... 191 

a. Overview Of Governing Law ............................................................... .......... 191 

b. Application to Certain Individuals ................................................................. 192 

i. George Papadopoulos ............................................................... .......... ..... 192 

11. ................. ............................................... .. . .......... 194 

111. Michael Flynn ....................................................................................... 194 

iv. Michael Cohen ...................................................................................... 195 

............................ .............. .................................... 196 

vi. Jeff Sessions ........................................................................................... 197 

vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation ....................................... 198 

V. 

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I 

This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which 

states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he ... shall provide the Attorney 

General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special 

Counsel] reached." 

The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and 

systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In 

June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that 

Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials-hacks 

that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government-began that same month. 

Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in 

October and November. 

In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's first release of stolen documents, a foreign 

government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy 

advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign 

government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that 

it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to 

Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July 

31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign 

were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities. 

That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government "directed 

recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political 

organizations," and, " [t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election 

process." After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia 

for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were 

examining Russia's interference in the election. 

Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017 

appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel 

authorized him to investigate "the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 

presidential election," including any links or coordination between the Russian government and 

individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. 

As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's investigation established that 

Russia interfere~ in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a 

Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. 

Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian intelligence 

service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers 

working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also 

identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although 

the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump 

presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit 
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electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not 

establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian 

government in its election interference activities. 

* * * 

Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the 

results of our investigation and the Special Counsel's charging decisions, and we then provide an 

overview of the two volumes of our report. 

The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be 

supp01ted by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out 

the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other 

instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with 

confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events 

occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there 

was no evidence of those facts. 

In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted 

a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of "collusion." In so doing, 

the Office recognized that the word "collud[ e ]" was used in communications with the Acting 

Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation's scope and that the term has 

frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a specific 

offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal 

criminal law. For those reasons, the Office's focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability 

was on conspiracy as defined in federal law. In connection with that analysis, we addressed the 

factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign "coordinat[ ed]"-a term that appears 

in the appointment order-with Russian election interference activities. Like collusion, 

"coordination" does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. We understood 

coordination to require an agreement-tacit or express- between the Trump Campaign and the 

Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking 

actions that were informed by or responsive to the other's actions or interests. We applied the term 

coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the 

Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities. 

* * * 

The report on our investigation consists of two volumes: 

Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's 

interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign. 

Section I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and III describe the principal ways 

Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. Section IV describes links between the Russian · 

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government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special 

Counsel's charging decisions. 

Volume II addresses the President's actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia' s 

interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the 

Special Counsel' s investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations 

that guided that investigation. 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I 

RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN 

The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference 

operations identified by the investigation- a social media campaign designed to provoke and 

amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, 

Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Y evgeniy Prigozhin and companies he 

controlled. Pri ozhin is widel re orted to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin 

In mid-2014, the IRA sent em lo 

mission with instructions 

The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. 

political system through what it termed "information warfare." The campaign evolved from a 

generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a 

targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. 

The IRA' s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the 

names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United 

States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and 

made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The 

investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the 

IRA. Section II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media 

campaign. 

RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS 

At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus ·on supporting candidate Trump in 

early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions 

(hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian 

intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian 

Army (GRU) carried out these operations. 

In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign 

volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU 

hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 

(DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole hundreds of thousands 

of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. Around the time that the DNC 

announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network, the GRU 

began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and 

"Guccifer 2.0." The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks. 

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The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign") 

showed interest in WikiLeaks' s releases of documents and welcomed their otential to damage 

candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, llfilllillliliilfll~llliillllllilllilli forecast to 

senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate 

Clinton. WikiLeaks' s first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate Trump 

announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server 

used b Clinton when she was Secreta of State he later said that he was s · eakin sarcasticall . 

WikiLeaks began releasing 

Podesta' s stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released 

video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section lII of this Report details the Office's 

investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign 

supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails. 

RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN 

The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of 

contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. 

The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring 

or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation 

established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and 

worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from 

information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that 

members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its 

election interference activities. 

The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the 

Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign 

officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking 

improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia 

and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which 

are summarized below in chronological order. 

2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization 

real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter 

oflntent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization 

executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian 

government press secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through 

at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump. 

Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact 

with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to 

Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told 

Papadopoulos that the Russian government had "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands 

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of emails. One week later, in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a 

representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from 

the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of 

information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of time and for several months 

thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting 

between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting took place. 

Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of 

2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President. On 

June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald 

Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email 

proposing the meeting had described as "official documents and information that would 

incriminate Hillary." The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as "part of Russia and its 

government's support for Mr. Trump." The written communications setting up the meeting 

showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist 

candidate Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer's presentation did not provide such 

information. 

Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC 

announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to 

opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents. 

In July 2016, Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity 

to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived and worked 

in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United States, Page became acquainted 

with at least two Russian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with 

conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow and his 

advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself 

from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign. 

July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the 

DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing 

information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public reporting that U.S. 

intelligence agencies had "high confidence" that the Russian government was.behind the theft of 

emails and documents from the DNC. And within a week of the release, a foreign government 

informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the 

Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign 

government rep01ting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the 

Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. 

Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York 

City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties 

to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for 

Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a "backdoor" way for 

Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate 

Trump's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the 

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Trump Campaign and Manafort's strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. 

Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik, 

and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting. 

Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in 

graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less 

than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that 

had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions 

were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere 

in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement "that the Russian 

Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, 

including from US political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked 

materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, "are intended to 

interfere with the US election process." 

Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government 

officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new 

administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The 

Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the President-Elect and to 

arrange a call with President Putin. Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there. 

Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, was among 

the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early December, a 

business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an 

associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in 

January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, 

another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served 

on the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated on a short 

written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been 

cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and 

Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. 

On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having 

interfered in the election. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian 

Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the 

sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in 

response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move 

on delay (by V. Putin)." The next day, on December 31 , 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him 

the request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result 

of Flynn's request. 

* * * 

On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump 

on a joint assessment-drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and 

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National Security Agency-that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the 

election through a variety of means to assist Trump's candidacy and harm Clinton's. A 

declassified version of the assessment was publicly released that same day. 

Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees-the 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC)-announced that they would 

conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the 

election. Then-FBI Director James Corney later confirmed to Congress the existence of the FBI's 

investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March 20, 2017, in 

open-session testimony before HPSCI, Corney stated: 

I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part 

of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts 

to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the 

nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and 

the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the 

campaign and Russia's efforts .... As with any counterintelligence investigation, 

this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed. 

The investigation continued under then-Director Corney for the next seven weeks until May 9, 

2017, when President Trump fired Corney as FBI Director-an action which is analyzed in 

Volume II of the rep01t. 

On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel 

and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Corney had confirmed in his congressional 

testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within 

the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the 

investigation. 

President Trump reacted negatively to the Special Counsel's appointment. He told advisors 

that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have Attorney General Jefferson (Jeff) Sessions 

unrecuse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counsel removed, and engaged in 

efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it, 

including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. Those and related actions 

are described and analyzed in Volume II of the report. 

* * * 

THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S CHARGING DECISIONS 

In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume 1 of the report, the Office 

determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law 

chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual § 9-27.000 et seq. 

(2018). The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if 

so, whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction; 

8 
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and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately 

served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual § 9-

27 .220. 

Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions, 

which contain three main components. 

First, the Office determined that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016 

U.S. presidential election-the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operationsviolated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media 

campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by 

undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign 

influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internet 

Research Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence officers who 

carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of 

individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws, 

the federal computer-intrusion statute, and the have been so char ed. See United States v. 

Ne ksho, et al., No. 18-cr-215 D.D.C .. 

Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to 

the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was 

not sufficient to support criminal charges. Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to 

charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian 

principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks' s releases of hacked 

materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation. Further, the evidence 

was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with 

representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election. 

Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump 

Campaign lied to the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated 

individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian 

election interference. The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal falsestatements statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about 

his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George 

Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to 

investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the 

professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton .in the form of 

thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen leaded uilt to 

makin false statements to Con ress about the Trum Moscow ro · ect. 

9 
U.S. Department of Justice 

AttorAe:y• Work Proa1:1et // Miey CotttaiA Material PFOteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications 

with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine. 

* * * 

The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly repot1ed to involve 

potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established that interactions 

between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign officials both at the candidate's April 

2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, D.C., and during the week of the Republican National 

Convention were brief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that 

one Campaign official's efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing 

assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia. The 

investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September 

2016 at Sessions's Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential 

campaign. 

The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete 

picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked 

their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office's 

judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other 

witnesses and information-such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be 

members of the media-in light of internal Depa11ment of Justice policies. See, e.g. , Justice 

Manual§§ 9-13.400, 13.410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was 

presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter ( or 

"taint") team. Even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes 

provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges 

described above. And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as 

well-numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United 

States. 

Further, the Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct 

we investigated-including some associated with the Trump Campaign---deleted relevant 

communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature 

encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records. In 

such cases, the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to 

contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared 

inconsistent with other known facts. 

Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office 

believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps, 

the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional 

light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report. 

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Atten'ley Werk Predttet /,' Ma:,· Cet'itaifl: Mct1:erial Preteeted Uneer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) 

I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION 

On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein-then serving as Acting 

Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General 

Jeff Sessions on March 2, 2016-appointed the Special Counsel "to investigate Russian 

interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters." Office of the Deputy Att'y 

Gen., Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference 

with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May 17, 2017) ("Appointment Order"). 

Relying on "the authority vested" in the Acting Attorney General, "including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 

510, and 515," the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel "in 

order to discharge [the Acting Attorney General's] responsibility to provide supervision and 

management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the 

Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election." Appointment Order 

(introduction). "The Special Counsel," the Order stated, "is authorized to conduct the investigation 

confirmed by then-FBI Director James B. Corney in testimony before the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017," including: ' 

(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals 

associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and 

(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and 

(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). 

Appointment Order ,r (b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel "the authority to investigate 

and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the 

Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, 

and intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). The authority to investigate "any matters 

that arose . .. directly from the investigation," Appointment Order ,r (b)(ii), covers similar crimes 

that may have occurred during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special 

Counsel's appointment. "If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate," the 

Order further provided, "the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from 

the investigation of these matters." Id. ,r ( c ). Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable 

"Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations." Id. ,r (d). 

The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel's 

investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. A memorandum dated August 2, 2017, 

explained that the Appointment Order had been "worded categorically in order to permit its public 

release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals." It then 

confirmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate 

allegations that three Trump campaign officials-Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George 

Papadopoulos- "committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government officials 

with respect to the Russian government's efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election." 

The memorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate certain other 

matters, including two additional sets of allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from 

payments he received from the Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans 

11 
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from a bank whose CEO was then seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations 

that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli 

government; and four sets of allegations involving Michael Flynn, the former National Security 

Advisor to President Trump. 

On October 20, 2017, the Acting Attorney General confirmed in a memorandum the 

Special Counsel's investigative authority as to several individuals and entities. First, "as part of a 

full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 

presidential election," the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate "the pertinent activities 

of Michael Cohen, Richard Gates, , Roger Stone, and I" "Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals," the memorandum 

stressed, "does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has 

committed a crime." Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the 

Special Counsel's authority to investigate " leads relate[d] to Cohen' s establishment and use of 

Essential Consultants LLC to, inter alia, receive funds from Russian-backed entities." Third, the 

memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate individuals and entities 

who were possibly engaged in "jointly undertaken activity" with existing subjects of the 

investigation, including Paul Manafort. Finally, the memorandum described an FBI investigation 

opened before the Special Counsel's appointment into "allegations that [then-Attorney General 

Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]" and confirmed the Special 

Counsel's authority to investigate that matter. 

The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority "to 

exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney." 28 C.F.R: 

§ 600.6. Like a U.S. Attorney's Office, the Special Counsel's Office considered a range of 

classified and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office's Russia 

investigation, and the Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions 

of federal crimes (assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted prosecution). 

There was substantial evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of 

the investigation in May 2017 because the FBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian 

election interference for nearly 10 months. The Special Counsel's Office exercised its judgment 

regarding what to investigate and did not, for instance, investigate every public report of a contact 

between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals and entities. 

The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian 

government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain proceedings associated 

with the Office's work remain ongoing. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components 

of the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix D lists those transfers. 

Two district courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel's authority to investigate 

Russia election interference and links and/or coordination with the Trump Campaign. See United 

States v. Manafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 79-83 (D.D.C. 2018); United States v. Manafort, 321 F. 

Supp. 3d 640, 650-655 (E.D. Va. 2018). In the course of conducting that investigation, the Office 

periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the 

Special Counsel's authority established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with 

12 
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Att6rHey 1ilt6rk Pr6dttet // M!t)· C61\taiA Material Pr6teeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee) 

the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law 

enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI. 

Appendix D summarizes those referrals. 

* * * 

To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special 

Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attorneys-five of whom joined the 

Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice 

components. These attorneys were assisted by a filter team of Department lawyers and FBI 

personnel who screened materials obtained via court process for privileged information before 

turning those materials over to investigators; a support staff of three paralegals on detail from the 

Department's Antitrust Division; and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget, 

finance, purchasing, human resources, records, facilities, security, information technology, and 

administrative support. The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and 

worked alongside approximately 40 FBI agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, a 

paralegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the Special Counsel's investigation. 

Those "assigned" FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times; the matters on 

which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel. 1 

During its investigation the Office issued more than 2,800 subpoenas under the auspices of 

a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia; executed nearly 500 search-and-seizure warrants; 

obtained more than 230 orders for communications records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); obtained 

almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers; made 13 requests to foreign governments 

pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties; and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses, 

including almost 80 before a grand jury. 

* * * 

From its inception, the Office recognized that its investigation could identify foreign 

intelligence and counterintelligence information relevant to the FBI's broader national security 

mission. FBI personnel who assisted the Office established procedures to identify and convey 

such information to the FBI. The FBI's Counterintelligence Division met with the Office regularly 

for that purpose for most of the Office's tenure. For more than the past year, the FBI also 

embedded personnel at the Office who did not work on the Special Counsel's investigation, but 

whose purpose was to review the results of the investigation and to send-in writing-summaries 

of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field Offices. 

Those communications and other correspondence between the Office and the FBI contain 

information derived from the investigation, not all of which is contained in this Volume. This 

Volume is a summary. It contains, in the Office's judgment, that information necessary to account 

for the Special Counsel's prosecution and declination decisions and to describe the investigation's 

main factual results. 

1 FBI personnel assigned to the Special Counsel's Office were required to adhere to all applicable 

federal law and all Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, and policies. An FBI attorney worked on 

FBI-related matters for the Office, such as FBI compliance with all FBI policies and procedures, including 

the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). That FBI attorney worked under FBI 

legal supervision, not the Special Counsel's supervision. 

13 
U.S. Department of Justice 

AUorttey Work Proattet // Mtt'.)1 Cotttttitt Mttterittl Prnteetea Uttaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN 

The first form of Russian election influence came principally from the Internet Research 

Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and 

companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord 

Catering (collectively "Concord").2 The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large 

U.S. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.3 These operations 

constituted "active measures" (aKTMBHbie Meporrprumu1), a term that typically refers to operations 

conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs.4 

The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014. 

Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages 

designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed divisive U.S. 

political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these 

social media accounts became a means to reach large U.S. audiences. IRA employees travelled to 

the United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and 

photographs for use in their social media posts. 

IRA employees posted derogatory information about a number of candidates in the 2016 

U.S. presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump 

Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry 

out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. 

persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their 

Russian association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with the Trump 

Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the 

staging of political rallies.5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons 

knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference operation. 

By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S. 

persons through their social media accounts. Multiple IRA-controlled Facebook groups and 

2 The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measw-es 

operations targeting the United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those rep01ts, 

and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and FBI. 

3 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

see also SM-2230634, serial 44 (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numbers 

identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given the context. The report contains 

additional law enforcement sensitive information. 

4 As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges 

against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the 

United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Volume I, Section V.A, infra; Indictment, United States 

v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1 :18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), Doc. I ("Internet Research Agency 

Indictment"). 

14 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Att:srAe~· Wark Prsdttet // Mtty CsAta.iA Mttterittl Prsteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

Instagram accounts had hundreds of thousands of U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter 

accounts separately had tens of thousands of followers, including multiple U.S. political figures 

who retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative testified that 

Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that collectively made 80,000 

posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as 

126 million persons through its Face book accounts. 6 In January 2018, Twitter announced that it 

had identified 3,814 IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1 .4 million 

people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an iRA-controlled account.7 

A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency 

Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing 

Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter I ! " " I I 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

anization also led to a more detailed or anizational structure. 

6 Social Media Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel ofFacebook) ("We 

estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's 

80,000 posts over the two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by people on 

Facebook, and, as a result, three times more people may have been exposed to a story that originated from 

the Russian operation. Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served 

content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period."). The Facebook 

representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately 

120,000 pieces of content during that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via 

Instagram. 

7 Twitter, Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan. 31, 2018). 

8 See SM-2230634, serial 92. 

9 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

-

10 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

11 See SM-2230634, serial 86 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

15 
U.S. Department of Justice 

A«:eme:,· Wefk Pfedttet // Ma:,· Cefl:taifl: Matefial Pfeteeted Ufl:def Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

. , I . I .. .. . .. .. . - .. .. . . . Harm to Ongoing Matter 

aHarm to Ongoing Matter 

of 2014, the IRA be an to hide its fundin and activities. 

I I. • I • . I• I ! I I.. • I 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin 

Until at least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord companies 

funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the head of Concord. 

13 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

14 See, e.g., SM-2230634, serials 9, 113 & 180 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

-· 15 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

131 & 204. 

17 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

18 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

16 
U.S. Department of Justice 

AUeni:ey 1Nerk Predt1et // May Cetttatt, Matet·ial Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee) 

sources have reported on Prigozhin's ties to Putin, and the two have appeared together in public 

photographs.22 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

1t1Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

11Harm to Ongoing Matter 

11Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

19 U.S. Treasury Deprutment, "Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with 

Russia's Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine" (Dec. 20, 2016). 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

22 See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by US., Is Known 

as "Putin's Cook", New York Times (Feb. 16, 2018). 

24 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

see also SM17 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attertte, Werk Pred1:1et // Mtty Cetttttifl Mttterittl Prnteeted Under Fed. R.. Crim:. P. 6(e) 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

aHarm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

26 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

27 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

28 The term "tro 11" refers to internet users- in this context, paid operatives-who post inflammatory 

or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites. 

18 
I 

U.S. Department of Justice 

,<W:erttey Wer:lc Preettet // Moy Cetttoifl Moteriol Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

• :6_ a • • a a I I. • 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

In May 

2016, IRA employees, claiming to be U.S. social activists and administrators ofFacebook groups, 

recruited U.S. persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read "Happy 

55th Birthda Dear Boss," as an homa e to Pri ozhin whose 55th birthda was on June 1, 2016 . 

31 

Harr,, ,v '-'' ll::jVI I 'l::I 1v1a,u:;r 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections 

1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014 

I I. • I 

! ... • ... • .... " • " I" : I I 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

subdivided the Translator Department into different 

responsibilities, ranging from operations on different social media platforms to analytics to 

29 Investigative Technique See SM-2230634, 

serials 131 & 204. 

30 See SM-2230634, serial 156. 

31 Internet Research Agency Indictment ,r 12 b; see also 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID 

1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) & 

19 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attorttey Work Prodttet // May Cotttaitt Material Proteetet:1 Under Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) 

graphics and IT. 

. 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

I, • · I 

Harm to 

Ongoing Matter 

34 See SM-2230634, serial 204 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

20 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Atterney Werk Predttet // Ma:y CentttiH Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

37 

IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-gathering missions. In 

June 2014, four IRA employees applied to the U.S. Department of State to enter the United States, 

while lying about the purpose of their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party.38 

Ultimately, two IRA employees-Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova-received visas and 

entered the United States on June 4, 2014. 

••• ". . • ,,. ,:,!,, . " ..... - . - . . Harm to Ongoing Matter 

· Harm to Ongoing Matter 

35 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

37 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

38 See SM-2230634, serials 150 & 172 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

21 
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U.S. Department of Justice 

Atten1e;· 'Nerk Predttet // Ma;· Cel'lttl:il'I Material Prnteeted Under Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts 

Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on 

different U.S. social media platforms. The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the 

social media accounts as "specialists."42 Starting as early as 2014, the IRA' s U.S. operations 

included social media specialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.43 The IRA later 

added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts.44 

Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts 

of U.S. persons.

45 By early 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public 

social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots 

organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations. 

For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, @TEN_ GOP, purported to be connected to the 

Tennessee Republican Party.

46 More commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names of 

fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as antiimmigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and 

political activists. 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

45 See, e.g., Facebook ID 100011390466802 (Alex Anderson); Facebook ID 100009626173204 

(Andrea Hansen); Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams); Facebook ID 100013640043337 

(Lakisha Richardson). 

46 The account claimed to be the "Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans" and made posts 

that appeared to be endorsements of the state political party. See, e.g., @TEN_GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet 

("Tennessee GOP backs @rea!DonaldTrump period #makeAmericagreatagain #tngop #tennessee #gop"). 

22 
State and romoted various criti ues of her candidac . The IRA also used other techni 

U.S. Department of Justice 

A:tterHe~· 'Net"lc Preettet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea Unaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016. Inifll 2016 

internal reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group "Secured Borders," the 

47 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

48 See, e.g. , SM-2230634 serial 131 

49 The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced her 

presidential campaign. IRA-controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton's record as Secretar of 

50 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

23 
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author criticized the "lower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton" and reminded 

the Facebook specialist " it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton."51 

3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

I 

I 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

during the 2016 campaign covered a range of political issues and included purported conservative 

52 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

53 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

54 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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groups (with names such as "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Immigrants," "Secured Borders," and 

"Tea Party News"), purported Black social justice groups ("Black Matters," "Blacktivist," and 

"Don't Shoot Us"), LGBTQ groups ("LGBT United"), and religious groups ("United Muslims of 

America"). 

Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing number of materials supporting 

the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016, the 

operational account "Matt Skiber" began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook 

groups asking them to help plan a "pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower."55 

To reach larger U.S. audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that 

promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook, 

the IRA purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately 

$100,000.56 

During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA-purchased advertisements explicitly 

supported or opposed a presidential candidate or promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA 

( discussed below). As early as March 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly 

opposed the Clinton Campaign. For example, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an 

advertisement depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, "If one day God lets 

this liar enter the White House as a president - that day would be a real national tragedy."57 

Similarly, on April 6, 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements for its account "Black Matters" 

calling for a "flashmob" of U.S. persons to "take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or 

#nohillary2016."58 IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few 

exceptions, negative.59 

IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely supported his 

campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing the Trump Campaign was 

purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an advertisement for its Instagram account "Tea 

Party News" asking U.S. persons to help them "make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters" 

by uploading photos with the hashtag "#KIDS4TRUMP."60 In subsequent months, the IRA 

purchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the 

Facebook groups "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Invaders," and "Secured Borders." 

55 5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 

5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 

56 Social Media Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook). 

57 3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575. 

58 4/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6043740225319. 

59 See SM-2230634, serial 213 (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger 

set provided by Facebook). 

60 4/19/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045151094235. 

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Collectively, the IRA's social media accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons. 

Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. For example, 

at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA's "United Muslims of 

America" Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the "Don't Shoot Us" Facebook group had 

over 250,000 followers, the "Being Patriotic" Facebook group had over 200,000 followers, and 

the "Secured Borders" Facebook group had over 130,000 followers.61 According to Facebook, in 

total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, 

and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S persons and "may have reached an estimated 126 

million people."62 

4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter 

.- .. , .. ' .... • • • ••• 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

ti •.•• •"!" •• •. ••·•·• 

, . , . • . Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Separately, the IRA operated a network of automated Twitter accounts 

( commonly referred to as a bot network) that enabled the IRA to amplify existing content 

on Twitter. 

a. Individualized Accounts 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

• Harm to Ongoing Matter 

61 See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America); Facebook ID 

l 157233400960126 (Don't Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Bein Patriotic; Facebook ID 

757183957716200 Secured Borders). 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

62 Social Media Influence in the 2016 US Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/ 17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel ofFacebook). 

63 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

64 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

65 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

26 
66 

U.S. Department of Justice 

A-Ftat=Ae~· Werk Predttet// Mtty Coruttifl Mttterittl Proteet:ed UAder Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

The IRA operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its Facebook 

accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with 

U.S. Twitter users directly (through public tweeting or Twitter's private messaging). 

The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the 

election. Individualized accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential election included 

@TEN_ GOP ( described above); @jenn _ abrams ( claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with 

70,000 followers); @Pamela_Moore13 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000 

followers); and @America:__Ist_ (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers).

67 In May 

2016, the IRA created the Twitter account @march_for_trump, which promoted IRA-organized 

rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described below).

68 

Using these accounts and others, the IRA provoked reactions from users and the media. Multiple 

IRA-posted tweets gained popularity.70 U.S. media outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled 

accounts and attributed them to the reactions of real U.S. persons.71 Similarly, numerous high66 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

67 Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS (an account with 3,800 followers 

that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material). 

68 See @march_for_trump, 5/30/16 Tweet (first post from account). 

7

° For example, one IRA account tweeted, "To those people, who hate the Confederate flag. Did 

you know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery, it was all about money." The tweet received over 

40,000 responses. @Jenn_Abrams 4/24/17 (2:37 p.m.) Tweet. 

71 Josephine Lukito & Chris Wells, Most Major Outlets Have Used Russian Tweets as Sources for 

Partisan Opinion: Study, Columbia Journalism Review (Mar. 8, 2018); see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain 

#NewYorkValues to Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); People Are Slamming 

the CIA/or Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump, U.S. News & World Report (Dec. 12, 2016). 

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profile U.S. persons, including former Ambassador Michael McFaul,

72 Roger Stone,73 Sean 

Hannity,74 and Michael Flynn Jr.,75 retweetcd or responded to tweets posted to these IRAcontrolled accounts. Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA 

tweets (discussed below). 

b. IRA Botnet Activities 

In January 2018, Twitter publicly identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the 

IRA.79 According to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these 

accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, "approximately 8.4% of which were election- · 

72 @Mcfaul 4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams). 

73 @RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moorel3); @RogerJStoneJr 4/26/16 

Tweet (same). 

74 @seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_ Moore 13). 

75 @mflynnJR 6/22/17 Tweet ("RT@Jenn_Abrams: This is what happens when you add the voice 

over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs ... "). 

76 A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts controlled as a group to send 

specific automated messages. On the Twitter network, botnets can be used to promote and republish 

("retweet") specific tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences. 

77 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

78 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

79 Eli Rosenberg, Twitter to Tell 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians. Some Signs Show 

the Problem Continues, Washington Post (Jan. 19, 2019). 

28 
U.S. Department of Justice 

A4teffle)' \llel'k Pt'edttet // May Cetttail'l Matet'ial Pt'eteeted U!'lder Fed. R. Ct'im. P. 6(e) 

related."80 Twitter also announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who 

Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.81 

5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies 

The IRA organized and promoted political rallies inside the United States while posing as 

U.S. grassroots activists. First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas 

(Facebook groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The 

IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media account asking 

them to attend the event. From those who responded with interest in attending, the IRA then sought 

a U.S. person to serve as the event's coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would 

tell the U.S. person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict 

or because they were somewhere else in the United States.82 The IRA then further promoted the 

event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them to speak with the coordinator.83 

After the event, the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the IRA's social media 

accounts. 84 

The Office identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of 

a rally was a "confederate rally" in November 2015. 85 The IRA continued to organize rallies even 

after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendance at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to 

have drawn few (if any) pa1tici2ants while others drew hundreds The reach and success of these 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

80 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). Twitter 

also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government, which tweeted 

more than a million times in the ten weeks before the election. 

81 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). 

82 8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 

... 83 See, e.g. , 7/21/16~gmail.com to ; 7/21/16 Email, 

joshmilton024@gmail.com to84 @march_for_trump 6/25/16 Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower). 

85 Instagram ID 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post ("Good evening buds! Well I am 

planning to organize a confederate rally[ . . . ] in Houston on the 14 of November and I want more people 

to attend."). 

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30 
• • • 

11

11

1

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Atleiffle)1 Werk Preidttet // May Cmttail'l Material Preiteeted UF1der Fed. R. Cril'l'l:. P. 6Ee) 

From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign, 

almost all of the U.S. rallies organized by the IRA focused on the 

U.S. election, often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing 

the Clinton Campaign. Pro-Trump rallies included three in New 

York; a series of pro-Trump rallies in Florida in August 2016; and a 

\ ~ .., - series of pro-Trump rallies in October 2016 in Pennsylvania. The ... \. 

Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign, which MINERS FOR TRUMP posted about the Miami rally on candidate Trump's Facebook 

BRING BACK OUR JOBS account (as discussed below).86 

HELP MR. TRUMP FIX IT! . . .. . . . . • • • • • • • •• 

WHEN IIC!llelli: Iii :Tf.1 t I , , t · 

WH ERE : 111 11· 11/1, ,·111 :,11 1,1;H Harm to Ongoing Matter 

\l1\l:l:llfl\' l'I ;\/A 1'1 11 ·/ 

/I IHll~\l'l'I N! :I: 111 , 

IRA Poster for Pennsylvania 

Rallies organized by the IRA 

6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons 

IRA employees frequently used Investigative Technique Twitter, Facebook, and 

lnstagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S. 

For example, the IRA targeted the family ofand a number of black social justice activists 

ersons from across the olitical s ectrum. 

86 The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts. 

See, e.g., Facebook ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being 

Patriotic); Twitter Account @march_for_trump; beingpatriotic@gmail.com. (Rallies were organized in 

New York on June 25, 2016; Florida on August 20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October 2, 2016.) 

87 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

88 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

31 
U.S. Department of Justice 

At1:aft'le~· Wafk Pfadttet // May CaAtaiA Material Prateetetl Under Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

while posing as a grassroots group called "Black Matters US."89 In February 2017, the persona 

"Black Fist" (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted 

by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to offer classes sponsored by 

Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote 

IRA-generated content,90 as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking 

around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask). 91 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

aHarm to Ongoing Matter 

aHarm to Ongoing 

Matter 

as the IRA's online audience became larger, the IRA tracked U.S. 

persons with whom they communicated and had successfully tasked with tasks ran in from 

or anizin rallies to takin ictures with certain olitical messa es . 

89 3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 

6051652423528, 10/26/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID 

& ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks). 

90 8/19/16 Face book Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 

91 12/8/16 Email, robot@craigslist.org to beingpatriotic@gmail.com (confirming Craigslist 

advertisement). 

92 8/18-19/16 Twitter DMs, @march_for_trump & 

ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) & 

(arranging to pay for plane tickets and for a 

Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) & 

(discussing payment for rally supplies); 8/18/16 Twitter DM, 

(discussing payment for construction materials). 

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7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign 

The investigation identified two different forms of connections between the IRA and 

. members of the Trump Campaign. (The investigation identified no similar connections between 

the IRA and the Clinton Campaign.) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the 

Trump Campaign promoted-typically by linking, retweeting, or similar methods of repostingpro-Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-controlled social media 

accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA employees represented themselves as U.S. persons 

to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and 

coordination on IRA-organized political rallies inside the United States. 

a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials 

Among the U.S. "leaders of public opinion" targeted by the IRA were various members 

and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, Trump Campaign affiliates promoted dozens of 

tweets, posts, and other political content created by the IRA. 

Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter account @TEN_GOP were cited or retweeted by 

multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr.,96 Eric 

96 See, e.g , @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Thousands of 

names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #Voterfraud. #DrainTheSwamp."); 

@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/ 16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING: #VoterFraud by counting tens of 

thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida."); 

@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: This vet passed away last month before he could 

vote for Trump. Here he is in his #MAGA hat. #voted #ElectionDay."). Trump Jr. retweeted additional 

@TEN_ GOP content subsequent to the election. 

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AtterHe'.')'· 'Nerlc PFOtittet // Mey CeHtaiH Material Preteeteti UHtier Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) 

Trump,97 Kellyanne Conway,98 Brad Parscale,99 and Michael T. Flynn. 100 These posts included 

allegations of voter fraud, 101 as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled 

classified information.102 

- A November 7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled 

Twitter account @Pamela_ Moore 13 was retweeted by THANK YOU for your support Miami! My learn jusl sha1ed pholos lrom YQU1 

TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY. yes1e1da.y! I bve you - and lhe re is no question Donald J. Trump Jr. • TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMEAICA GREAT AGAIN! 103 

On September 19, 2017, President Trump's personal .. 

account @realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from 

the IRA-controlled account @ l0_gop (the backup 

account of @TEN_ GOP, which had already been 

deactivated by Twitter). The tweet read: "We love you, 

Mr. President!"104 

IRA employees monitored the reaction of the Trump 

Campaign and, later, Trump Administration officials to their 

tweets. For example, on August 23, 2016, the IRAcontrolled persona "Matt Skiber" Facebook account sent a 

message to a U.S. Tea Party activist, writin.g that "Mr. 

Trump posted about our event in Miami! This is great!" 105 

The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate 

Trump's Facebook account, which included a post about the Screenshot of Trump Facebook 

August 20, 2016 political rallies organized by the IRA. Account (from Matt Skibe,) 

97 @EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press 

conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption & #VoterFraud #debatenight #TrumpB"). 

98 @KellyannePolls 11/6/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_ GOP: Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold Hillary to 

same standards as my son on Classified info' #hillarysemail #WeinerGate."). 

99 @parscale 10/15/16 Tweet ("Thousands of deplorables chanting to the media: 'Tell The Truth!' 

RT if you are also done w/ biased Media! #Friday Feeling"). 

100 @GenFlynn 11/7/16 (retweeting @TEN_GOP post that included in part "@rea!DonaldTrump 

& @mike_pence will be our next POTUS & VPOTUS."). 

101 @TEN_GOP 10/11/16 Tweet ("North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over the age of 110!!"). 

102 @TEN_GOP 11/6/16 Tweet ("Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold Hillary to same standards as my 

son on classified info #hillaryemail #WeinerGate."'). 

103 @DonaldJTrumpJr 11 /7 /16 Tweet ("RT @Pamela _Moore 13: Detroit residents speak out against 

the failed policies of Obama, Hillary & democrats .... "). 

104 @rea!DonaldTrump 9/19/17 (7 :33 p.m.) Tweet ("THANK YOU for your support Miami! My 

team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WA YING DAY, yesterday! I love you- and there is no 

question - TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!"). 

105 8/23/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 

34 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Atten1.e,· Werk Prea1:1et // May CeHtttiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

I• 

b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies 

Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted different U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump 

Campaign in an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States. In 

all cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be U.S. political activists working on 

behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA's contacts included requests for signs 

and other materials to use at rallies, 107 as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate 

Iogistics.108 While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for 

example, agreeing to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not identified evidence 

that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals. 

* * * 

In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election 

through the "active measures" social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization 

funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. As explained further in Volume I, Section 

V.A, infra, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that Prigozhin, his companies, and 

IRA employees violated U.S. law through these operations, principally by undermining through 

deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. 

elections. 

107 See, e.g., 8/16/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to -@donaldtrump.com (asking for 

~Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/18/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to 

-@donaldtrump.com (a-kin for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/12/16 Email, 

joshmilton024@gmail.com to @donaldtrump.com (asking for "contact phone numbers for Trump 

Campaign affiliates" in various Florida cities and signs). 

108 8/15/16 Email, to joshmilton024 

locations to the "Florida Goes Trump," list); 8/16/16 Email, to 

joshmi1ton024@gmail.com (volunteering to send an email blast to followers). 

35 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attem1:ey Work Prod1:1et /,' M1ty Cot1t1tit1 Mftteri1tl Proteeted Ut1der Fed. R. Crifl'I. P. 6(e) 

, the Trump Campaign 

about WikiLeaks's activities. The investigation was unable to resolve 

WikiLeaks's release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7, 

2016, the same day a video from years earlier was published of Trump using graphic language 

about women. 

III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS 

Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation' s Main Intelligence Directorate 

of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations, e·mployees, 

and volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign 

chairman John Podesta. Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National 

Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign 

employees, advisors, and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents 

from the compromised email accounts and networks. 109 The GRU later released stolen Clinton 

Campaign and DNC documents through online personas, "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0," and later 

through the organization WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to 

interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign. 

A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign 

1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign 

Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton 

Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units 26165 and 74455. 110 Military Unit 26165 is a GRU 

cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental 

organizations outside of Russia, including in the United States. 111 The unit was sub-divided into 

departments with different specialties. One department, for example, developed specialized 

malicious software "malware" , while another de artment conducted large-scale spearphishing 

campaigns. 112 jfllllililliliilllilli lilillllll~ a bitcoin mining operation to 

109 As discussed in Section V below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from 

the hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371. See Volume I, Section V.B, infra; Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, No. 

I :18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018), Doc. 1 ("Netyksho Indictment"). 

110 Netyksho Indictment ,r 1. 

111 Separate from this Office's indictment of GRU officers, in October 2018 a grand jury sitting in 

the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 with 

hacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other international sport 

associations. United States v. Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa.). 

112 A spearphishing email is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source, and 

solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or network, or causes the recipient to 

36 
U.S. Department of Justice 

MorAey Work Prodttet // Ma:,· CoAiait\ Material Protected UAder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

secure bitcoins used to purchase computer infrastructure used in hacking operations. 113 

Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber 

operations. Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documents stolen by Unit 26165, the promotion 

of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by 

the GRU. Officers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of 

elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology 

related to the administration of U.S. elections.114 

Beginning in mid-March 2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the 

DCCC and DNC, as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign: 115 

Unit Investigative Technique 26165 used 

began before the GRU had obtained any credentials or gained access 

to these networks, indicating that the later DCCC and DNC intrusions were not crimes of 

opportunity but rather the result of targeting. 116 

GRU officers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email 

accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers. Between March 10, 2016 and March 

15, 2016, Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email 

accounts at hillaryclinton.com. Starting on March 15, 2016, the GRU began targeting Google 

email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller number of dnc.org 

email accounts. 117 

The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerous email accounts of 

Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, including campaign chairman John Podesta, junior 

volunteers assigned to the Clinton Campaign's advance team, informal Clinton Campaign 

advisors, and a DNC employee. 118 GRU officers stole tens of thousands of emails from 

spearphishing victims, including various Clinton Campaign-related communications. 

download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network. Netyksho Indictment 

~ 10. 

113 Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems. Ill 1111 kept its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform CEX.io. To make 

purchases, the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source 

of funds. Netyksho Indictment~ 62. 

114 Netyksho Indictment~ 69. 

115 Netyksho Indictment~ 9. 

116 See SM-2589105, serials 144 & 495. 

118 Investigative Technique 

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2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks 

a. Initial Access 

By no later than April 12, 2016, the GRU had gained access to the DCCC computer 

network using the credentials stolen from a DCCC employee who had been successfully 

spearphished the week before. Over the ensuing weeks, the GRU traversed the network, 

identifying different computers connected to the DCCC network. By stealing network access 

credentials along the way (including those of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the 

system), the GRU compromised approximately 29 different computers on the DCCC network. 119 

Approximately six days after first hacking into the DCCC network, on April 18, 2016, 

GRU officers gained access to the DNC network via a virtual private network (VPN) connection120 

between the DCCC and DNC networks. 121 Between April 18, 2016 and June 8, 2016, Unit 26165 

compromised more than 30 computers on the DNC network, including the DNC mail server and 

122 shared file server. 

b. Implantation of Ma/ware on DCCC and DNC Networks 

Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two types of customized 

malware, 123 known as "X-Agent" and "X-Tunnel"; Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool; and 

rar.exe, a tool used in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for exfiltration. X-Agent 

was a multi-function hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and 

gather other data about the infected computers (e.g., file directories, operating systems). 124 XTunnel was a hacking tool that created an encrypted connection between the victim DCCC/DNC 

computers and GRU-controlled computers outside the DCCC and DNC networks that was capable 

of large-scale data transfers. 125 GRU officers then used X-Tunnel to exfiltrate stolen data from the 

victim computers. 

120 A VPN extends a private network, allowing users to send and receive data across public 

networks (such as the internet) as if the connecting computer was directly connected to the private network. 

The VPN in this case had been created to give a small number of DCCC employees access to certain 

databases housed on the DNC network. Therefore, while the DCCC employees were outside the DNC's 

private network, they could access parts of the DNC network from their DCCC computers. 

Investigative Technique 

Investigative Technique 

123 "Malware" is short for malicious software, and here refers to software designed to allow a third 

party to infiltrate a computer without the consent or knowledge of the computer's user or operator. 

124 Investigative Technique 

125 Investigative Technique 

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To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the DCCC and DNC networks, Unit 26165 officers 

set up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted 

malware. 126 The first set of GRU-controlled computers, known by the GRU as "middle servers," 

sent and received messages to and from malware on the DNC/DCCC networks. The middle 

servers, in turn, relayed messages to a second set of GRU-controlled com;§'ters, labeled internally 

by the GRU as an "AMS Panel." The AMS Panel jjjff 11'•§\1flffl 1

•j'1·- served as a 

nerve center through which GRU officers monitored and directed the malware's operations on the 

DNC/DCCC networks. 127 

! . • . • • • 

: Investigative Technique 

Investigative Technique 

Investigative Technique 

126 In connection with these intrusions, the GRU used computers (virtual private networks, 

dedicated servers operated by hosting companies, etc.) that it leased from third-party providers located all 

over the world. The investi ation identified rental a reements and payments for computers located in, inter 

alia, -~-~-Ii IIMliilili all of which were used in the operations 

targeting the U.S. election. 

127 Netyksho Indictment ,r 25. 

128 Netyksho Indictment ,r 24( c ). 

129 Netyksho Indictment ,r 24(b ). 

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The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of files containing keylogging 

sessions captured through X-Agent. These sessions were captured as GRU officers monitored 

DCCC and DNC employees' work on infected computers regularly between April 2016 and June 

2016. Data captured in these key logging sessions included passwords, internal communications 

between employees, banking information, and sensitive personal information. 

c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks 

Officers from Unit 26165 stole thousands of documents from the DCCC and DNC 

networks, including significant amounts of data pertaining to the 2016 U.S. federal elections. 

Stolen documents included internal strategy documents, fundraising data, opposition research, and 

emails from the work inboxes of DNC employeesY0 

The GRU began stealing DCCC data shortly after it gained access to the network. On April 

14, 2016 (approximately three days after the initial intrusion) GRU officers downloaded rar.exe 

onto the DCCC's document server. The following day, the GRU searched one compromised 

DCCC computer for files containing search terms that included "Hillary," "DNC," "Cruz," and 

"Trump." 131 On April 25, 2016, the GRU collected and compressed PDF and Microsoft documents 

from folders on the DCCC's shared file server that pertained to the 2016 election.132 The GRU 

appears to have compressed and exfiltrated over 70 gigabytes of data from this file server.133 

The GRU also stole documents from the DNC network shortly after gaining access. On 

April 22, 2016, the GRU copied files from the DNC network to GRU-controlled computers. Stolen 

documents included the DNC' s opposition research into candidate Trump.

134 Between 

approximately May 25, 2016 and June 1, 2016, GRU officers accessed the DNC's mail server 

from a GRU-controlled computer leased inside the United States.135 During these connections, 

130 Netyksho Indictment ,i,i 27-29; Investigative Technique 

131 Investigative Technique 

Investigative Technique 

Investigative Technique 

· Investigative Technique 

SM-2589105-HACK, serial 5. Investigative Technique 

135 Investigative Technique 

- See SM-2589105-GJ, serial 649. As part of its investigation, the FBI later received images ofDNC 

servers and copies of relevant traffic logs. Netyksho Indictment ,i,i 28-29. 

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Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which were later 

released by WikiLeaks in July 2016. 136 

B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials 

The GRU's operations extended beyond stealing materials, and included releasing 

documents stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the 

anonymous release through two fictitious online personas that it created-DCLeaks and Guccifer 

2.0-and later through the organization WikiLeaks. 

1. DCLeaks 

The GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit 26165 

registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the registrant.137 Unit 26165 

paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that it had mined. 138 The dcleaks.com landing page 

pointed to different tranches of stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. Other 

dcleaks.com pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the 

sender, recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of releases, pages were 

sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public. 

Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleaks.com, 

including documents stolen from a number of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign. 

These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts (in particular, Google 

and Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaks victims 

included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC employee and Clinton Campaign 

employee, and four other campaign volunteers. 139 The GRU released through dcleaks.com 

thousands of documents, including personal identifying and financial information, internal 

correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files and 

information. 140 

136 Netyksho Indictment ,i 29. The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May 

25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email server. 

Netyksho Indictment ,i 45. 

137 Netyksho Indictment ,i 35. Approximately a week before the registration of dcleaks.com, the 

same actors attem ted to re ister the website electionleaks.com using the same domain registration service. 

138 See SM-2589105, serial 181; Netyksho Indictment ,i 2l(a). 

140 See, e.g., Internet Archive, "htt s://dcleaks.com/" archive date Nov. 10, 2016). Additionally, 

DCLeaks released documents relating to , emails belonging 

to_, and emails from 2015 relating to Republican Party employees (under the portfolio name 

"The United States Republican Party"). "The United States Republican Party" portfolio contained 

approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACs, campaigns, state parties, and businesses 

dated between May and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same 

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GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily 

used to promote releases of materials. 141 The Facebook page was administered through a small 

number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts. 142 

GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account @dcleaks_, 

and the email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com to communicate privately with reporters and 

· other U.S. persons. GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access 

to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com 

website that had not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU officers operating 

under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a non-public DCLeaks webpage to a U.S. 

reporter via the Facebook account. 143 Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU officers sent 

reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of 

the dcleaks.com website. 144 

The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017. 

2. Guccifer 2.0 

On June 14, 2016, the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC 

network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the cyber-response team 

alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as "Fancy Bear") were 

responsible for the breach. 145 Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15, 2016, 

GRU officers using the persona Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up 

to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and 

managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English, 

including "some hundred sheets," "illuminati," and "worldwide known." Approximately two 

hours after the last of those searches, Guccifer 2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC 

server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases 

that the GRU officers had searched for that day. 146 

Tennessee-based web-hosting company, called Smartech Corporation. William Bastone, RNC E-Mail Was, 

In Fact, Hacked By Russians, The Smoking Gun (Dec. 13, 2016). 

141 Netyksho Indictment ,r 38. 

142 See, e.g., Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan). 

143 7/14/16 Facebook Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID 

144 See, e . . , 9/14/16 Twitter DM, ; 9/14/16 Twitter OM, 

@dcleaks _ to . The messages read: "Hi https://t.co/QTvKUjQcOx pass: 

KvFsgo/o* 14@gPgu& enjoy;)." 

145 Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, 

CrowdStrike Blog (June 14, 2016). CrowdStrike updated its post after the June 15, 2016 post by Guccifer 

2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion. 

146 Netyksho Indictment ,r,r 41-42. 

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That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog to begin 

releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks. The 

Guccifer 2.0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC 

in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016. 147 Released documents 

included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing 

potential criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents (such as recommendations on 

how to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and 

fundraising documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states 

(e.g., Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential 

election. 

Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release 

documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. Specifically, on June 27, 2016, 

Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide "exclusive 

access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton's staff." 148 The GRU later sent the 

reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an 

archive of emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016. 149 That 

the Guccifer 2.0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website 

tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of 

people.1so 

The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August 2016. For 

example, on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a candidate for the U.S. Congress 

documents related to the candidate's opponent.1st On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona 

transferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U.S. 

blogger covering Florida politics. 1

s2 On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a U.S. 

reporter documents stolen from the DCCC pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement.1

s

3 

147 Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2.0 blog occurred on June 15, 2016; June 20, 2016; June 

21, 2016; July 6, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016; August 15, 2016; August 21, 2016; August 31, 

2016; September 15, 2016; September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016; and October 18, 2016. 

~~ccifer20@aol.fr to (subject "leaked emails"); ■ 

149 6/27/16 Email, uccifer20@aol.fr to 

; see also 612 7 /16 

(subject "leaked emails"); 

project"). 

(sub' ect "leaked emails" ; 

uccifer20@aol.fr to 

( claiming DCLeaks was a "Wikileaks sub 

150 Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an 

apparent effort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were operated by the same 

organization, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent the repm1er an email stating that DCLeaks was a "Wikileaks 

sub project" and that Guccifer 2.0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with "closed access" to 

give reporters a preview of them. 

151 Netyksho Indictment ,r 43(a). 

152 Netyksho Indictment ,r 43(b ). 

153 Netyksho Indictment ,r 43(c). 

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In early August 2016, Twitter's suspension of the 

Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account. After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer 2.0 wrote 1;c•)Wp ,,ia private message, "thank u for writing back ... do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the 

docs i posted?" On August 17, 2016, the GRU added, "please tell me if i can help u anyhow . .. 

it would be a great pleasure to me." On September 9, 2016, the GRUi;(T);f posing as 

Guccifer 2.0-referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked • "what do u 

think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign." -

responded, "pretty standard."155 The investigation did not identify evidence of other 

communications between- and Guccifer 2.0. 

3. Use of WikiLeaks 

In order to expand its interference in the 20 I 6 U.S. presidential election, the GRU units 

transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton 

Campaign to WikiLeaks. GRU officers used both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to 

communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter private messaging and through encrypted channels, 

including possibly through WikiLeaks's private communication system. 

. a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign 

WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian Assange, privately expressed opposition to 

candidate Clinton well before the first release of stolen documents. In November 2015, Assange 

wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that "[w]e believe it would be much better 

for GOP to win ... Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in their worst 

qualities. . . . With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities., 

dems+media+neoliberals will be mute . ... She' s a bright, well connected, sadisitic sociopath."156 

In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a searchable archive of approximately 30,000 Clinton 

emails that had been obtained through FOIA litigation. 157 While designing the archive, one 

WikiLeaks member explained the reason for building the archive to another associate: 

154 

155 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

156 1 l/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et al. Assange 

also wrote that, "GOP will generate a lot oposition [sic], including through dumb moves. Hillary will do 

the same thing, but co-opt the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition. Hence biliary has greater freedom 

to statt wars than the GOP and has the will to do so." Id. 

157 WikiLeaks, "Hillary Clinton Email Archive," available at https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/. 

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[W]e want this repository to become "the place" to search for background on hillary's 

plotting at the state department during 2009-2013. . . . Firstly because its useful and will 

annoy Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the US 

election, because eit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks. 158 

b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks 

Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through dcleaks.com in June 

2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible 

coordination in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016, @dcleaks _ sent a direct 

message to @WikiLeaks, noting, "You announced your organization was preparing to publish 

more Hillary's emails. We are ready to support you. We have some sensitive information too, in 

particular, her financial documents. Let's do it to ether. What do ou think about ublishin our 

info at the same moment? Thank ou."159 

Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persona 

Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22, 

2016, seven days after Guccifer 2.0's first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used 

Twitter's direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest that 

Guccifer 2.0 "[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have 

a much higher impact than what you are doing." 160 

On July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter's private 

messaging function, writing, "if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic] 

days prefab le [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind 

her after." The Guccifer 2.0 persona responded, "ok ... i see." WikiLeaks also explained, "we 

think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary ... so conflict between bernie and 

hillary is interesting." 161 

c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks 

Both the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications, which has limited the 

Office's ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus, although it is clear that 

the stolen DNC and Podesta documents were transferred from the GRU to WikiLeaks, -

Investigative Technique 

158 3/14/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to Less than two weeks earlier, the same 

account had been used to send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton " in whitehouse with her 

bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees." 11/19/15 Twitter 

Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et al. 

159 6/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks. 

160 Netyksho Indictment ,r 47(a). 

161 7/6/16 Twitter DMs, @WikiLeaks & @guccifer_2. 

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The Office was able to identify when the GRU ( operating through its personas Guccifer 2.0 

and DCLeaks) transferred some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives set 

up by the GRU. Assan e had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embass in London, 

En land. 

On July 14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an 

email bearing the subject "big archive" and the message "a new attempt."163 The email contained 

an encrypted attachment with the name "wk dnc link I .txt.gpg."164 Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter 

account, GRU officers sent WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open it.165 On 

July 18, 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Gucci fer 2.0 account that it had 

"the 1 Gb or so archive" and would make a release of the stolen documents "this week." 166 On 

July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC 

computer networks. 167 The Democratic National Convention began three days later. 

Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona 

DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016, @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks, "hi there! I'm from DC 

Leaks. How could we discuss some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via 

your secured chat but getting no response. I've got something that might interest you. You won't 

be disappointed, I promise." 168 The WikiLeaks account responded, "Hi there," without further 

elaboration. The @dcleaks_ account did not respond immediately. 

The same day, the Twitter account@guccifer_2 sent @dcleaks_ a direct message, which 

is the first known contact between the personas. 169 During subsequent communications, the 

163 This was not the GRU's first attempt at transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29, 2016, the 

GRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email accou~ted file to a WikiLeaks email account. 

6/29/16 Email, guccifer2@mail.com ~ (The email appears to have been 

undelivered.) 

164 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis). 

165 6/27/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 to @WikiLeaks. 

166 7/18/16 Twitter OM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks. 

167 "DNC Email Archive," WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016), available at https://wikileaks.org/dnc-emails. 

168 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks. 

169 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @guccifer _ 2 to @dcleaks _. 

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Guccifer 2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and 

arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails. 170 

An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen 

Podesta emails show a creation date of September 19, 2016. 171 Based on information about 

Assange's computer and its possible operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the 

stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for 

the DNC emails). 172 The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from 

Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had a creation date of 

October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments were separately staged by 

WikiLeaks on its site. 173 

Beginning on September 20, 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in 

a brief exchange. On September 22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com 

sent an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject "Submission" and the message "Hi from 

DCLeaks." The email contained a PGP-encr ted with the filename 

"wiki_mail.txt.gpg." 174 lllliliiliiiiil. lliiljiillllllilili The email, however, bears a 

number of similarities to the July 14, 2016 email in which GRU officers used the Guccifer 2.0 

persona to give WikiLeaks access to the archive of DNC files. On September 22, 2016 (the same 

day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account dcleaks sent a sin le messa e to 

WikiLeaks with the strin of characters 

The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through 

intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified 

A d M "'ll M h w·kiL k . t h h . t d "th th t fi fth 

Investigative Technique 

170 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28; 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @G uccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks. 

171 See SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64 Investigative Technique 

At the time, certain Apple operating systems used a setting that left a 

downloaded file's creation date the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would 

explain why the creation date on WikiLeaks's version of the files was still September 19, 2016. See SM2284941, serial 62 Investigative Technique 

173 When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer system 

appears to have treated each attachment as a new file and given it a new creation date. See SM-2284941, 

serials 63 & 64. 

174 See 9/22/16 Email, dcleaksproject@gmail.com 

175 Ellen Nakashima et al., A German Hacker Offers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of 

Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2018). 

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Investigative Technique . 

On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email 

account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails between October 7, 2016 and 

November 7, 2016. The releases included private speeches given by Clinton; 177 internal 

communications between Podesta and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign; 

178 

and correspondence related to the Clinton Foundation.179 In total, WikiLeaks released over 50,000 

documents stolen from Podesta's personal email account. The last-in-time email released from 

Podesta' s account was dated March 21, 2016, two days after Podesta received a spearphishing 

email sent by the GRU. 

d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials 

As reports attributing the DNC and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged, 

WikiLeaks and Assange made several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source 

of the materials that WikiLeaks was releasing. The file-transfer evidence described above and 

other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WikiLeaks's claims about the 

source of material that it posted. 

Beginning in the summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements 

about Seth Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements about 

Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails. On August 9, 2016, 

the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: "ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a 

US$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder ofDNC staffer Seth Rich." 180 

Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, "Why are you so interested in 

Seth Rich's killer?" and responded, "We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to 

alleged Wikileaks sources." The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by commenting, 

"I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you're suggesting a man 

who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered." Assange replied, "If there's someone 

who's potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious 

t 79 Netyksho Indictment ,r 43. 

180 @WikiLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet. 

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circumstances, it doesn't necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious 

matter ... that type of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us."181 

After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was 

behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by 

WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. 

congressman that the DNC hack was an "inside job," and purported to have "physical proof' that 

Russians did not give materials to Assange. 182 

C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations 

While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and 

WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign 

and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states. 

1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims 

On July 27 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton's 

personal office . Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that 

included the following: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails 

that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press." 183 The "30,000 

emails" were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored 

on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State. 

Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU officers targeted for the first 

time Clinton's personal office. After candidate Trump's remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent 

malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain including an email 

account belonging to Clinton aide The investigation did not find evidence of earlier 

GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was 

able to identify these email accounts, which were not public. 184 

181 See Assange: "Murdered DNC Staffer Was 'Potential' WikiLeaks Source, " Fox News (Aug. 25, 

2016)(containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly). 

182 M. Raju & Z. Cohen, A GOP Congressman's Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange, CNN 

(May 23, 2018). 

183 "Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails," YouTube Channel C-SPAN, 

Posted 7/27/16, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU (starting at 0:41). 

Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service 

copies of the DNC da 

databases (referred to 

On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate 

function designed to allow users to produce backups of 

as "snapshots"). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving 

49 
U.S. Department of Justice 

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them to - account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRUcontrolled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloudbased account. 185 

2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections 

In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also 

targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included 

U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and 

county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities. 186 The GRU also 

targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related 

software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.187 The 

GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the 

investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office 

did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other 

relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity. 

By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer 

networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental 

entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a 

technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local 

website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents). 188 In one instance 

in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State 

Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained 

access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters, 189 and 

extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified. 190 

GRU officers Investigative Technique scanned state and local websites for 

eriod in July 2016, GRU officers -

for vulnerabilities on websites of more than 

185 Netyksho Indictment ,i 34; see also SM-2589105-HACK, serial 29 Investigative Technique 

186 -· Netyksho Indictment ,i 69. 

188 Investigative Technique 

-

50 
U.S. Department of Justice 

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for vulnerabilities continued through the election. 

Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election 

administration and personnel a~ involved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU 

officers targeted employees of ..... , a voting technology company that developed software 

used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company 

network. Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email 

accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S. election. 191 

The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software 

(commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer.192 

The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this 

operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county 

government. The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not 

undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so. 

D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials 

The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases 

hout the summer and fall of 2016. 

1. 

a. Background 

I , Investigative Technique 

Investigative Technique 

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b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

On June 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to "have emails relating 

to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,"194 but provided no additional context. 

• • . . ... 

Gates recalled candidate 

• 

Harm to Ongoing.Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton emails had not been found. 196 

, ! Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

•; 

194 See Mahita Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic Convention, 

Time (July 27, 2016) (qu.oting the June 12, 2016 television interview). 

195 In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a superseding criminal 

information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure 

to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the 

United States, as well as making false statements to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United 

States v. Richard W Gates III, l: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 ("Gates Superseding Criminal 

Information"); Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W Gates III, 1: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), 

Doc. 205 ("Gates Plea Agreement"). Gates has provided information and in-comt testimony that the Office 

has deemed to be reliable. 

196 Gates I 0/25/18 302, at 1-2. 

197 As explained further in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, irifra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement 

with our Office. We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and 

before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only when his 

statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful 

responses may themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, 

even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible. His account appears here 

principally because it aligns with those of other witnesses. 

198 

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Michael Cohen, former executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special 

counsel to Donald J. Trump, 199 told the Office that he recalled an incident in which he was in 

candidate Trum 's office in Trum Tower 

Cohen further told the Office that, after WikiLeaks's subsequent release of stolen 

mails in July 2016, candidate Trump said to Cohen something to the effect of 1;c•m ■ 202 

199 In November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count 

information charging him with making false statements to Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § l00l(a) & 

(c). He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney's 

Office in the Southern District of New York, after a referral from this Office. In the months leading up to 

his false-statements guilty plea, Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and 

provided information that the Office has generally assessed to be reliable and that is included in this report. 

202 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at I 0. Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

203 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4. 

204 

20S 

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developments with WikiLeaks and separately told Gates to keep in touch-- about future 

WikiLeaks releases.206 

According to Gates, by the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a 

press strategy, a communications cam and messa in based on the ossible release of 

Clinton emails b WikiLeaks.207 I IQI 111 LV '-'ll~VII I~ HIQLL r 

208 ,: Harm to Ongoing Matter 

to LaGuardia Airport. 

Harm to ungomg Matter , shortly after the call 

candidate Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would be coming.209 

c. Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

• • • • • • • • • u • . - • • 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

207 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2. 

208 

209 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4. 

210 ,HOM 

211 

212 Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for 

Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained 

prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was not born in the United 

States. Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with 

Trump on the phone on at least six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3. 

213 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2; Corsi was first 

interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counsel's offices in Washington, D.C. He was 

accompanied by counsel throughout the interview. Corsi was subsequently interviewed on September 17, 

2018; September 21, 2018; October 31, 2018; November I, 2018; and November 2, 2018. Counsel was 

54 
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Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

111i1Harm to Ongoing Matter 

According to Malloch, Corsi asked him to put Corsi in touch with Assange, whom Corsi 

wished to interview. Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the "orbit" of 

U.K. politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them. 

Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made no actual attempt to connect 

Corsi with Assange.218 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

present for all interviews, and the interviews beginning on September 21, 2018 were conducted pursuant to 

a proffer agreement that precluded affirmative use of his statements against him in limited circumstances. 

214 

2 15 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 4. 

Malloch denied ever communicating with Assange 

est to contact Assange because he believed he had no 

55 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Att:arttey Wat1k Pt1adttet // Mtty Catttttitt Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) 

Malloch stated to investigators that beginnin 

multiple Face Time discussions about WikiLeaks · 

had made a connection to Assange and that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released 

prior to Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or 

around August or September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was 

coming, after which "we" were going to be in the driver's seat.221 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

1if11Harm to Ongoing Matter 

1i1Harm to Ongoing Matter 

111Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

111Harm to Ongoing Matter 

-Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

· Harm to Ongoing Matter 

in or about Au ust 2016, he and Corsi had 

223 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

224 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

225 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

226 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

227 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

228 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

aHarm to Ongoing 

Matter 

111Harm to Ongoing Matter 

aHarm to Ongoing Matter 

aHarm to Ongoing 

-

Matter 

230 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

231 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

234 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

235 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

236 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails 

On October 7 2016 four days after the Assange press conference 

, the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that 

captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to adversely 

affect the Campaign.239 Less than an hour after the video's publication, WikiLeaks released the 

first set of emails stolen by the GRU from the account of Clinton Campaign chairman 

John Podesta. 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

111Harm to Ongoing Matter 

-Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

1111Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Corsi said that, because he had no direct means o communicating with 

WikiLeaks, he told members of the news site WNO-who were participating on a conference call 

with him that day-to reach Assange immediately.244 Corsi claimed that the pressure was 

239 Candidate Trump can be heard off camera making graphic statements about women. 

240 

241 

242 

243 

on other individuals who were on the call-invitation, which Malloch was not. (Separate travel records show 

244 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated Harm to Ongoing Matter 

that he believed Malloch was on the call but then focused 

that at the time of the call, Malloch was aboard a transatlantic flight). Corsi at one point stated that after 

WikiLeaks 's release of stolen emails on October 7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with 

Assange. Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6. 

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enormous and recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming.245 Corsi 

stated that he was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when they 

did.246 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people 

on a WND conference call about the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet asking whether 

anyone could contact Assange, but then said that maybe he had done nothing.247 

The Office investigated Corsi' s allegations about the events of October 7 

248 little corroboration for his alle ations about the da . 

However, the phone records 

themselves do not indicate that the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the 

Access Hollywood sto , and the Office has not otherwise been able to identif the substance of 

the conversation. 

However, the Office 

has not identified any conference call participant, or anyone who spoke to Corsi that day, who says 

that they received non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having 

contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016 after a conversation with Corsi. 

e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks 

Donald Trump Jr. had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the 

campaign period. On September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks 

the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's "unprecedented and dangerous" ties 

245 During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may have sent out public tweets because 

he knew Assange was reading his tweets. Our Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets. 

246_ Corsi 9/21/18 302, at 6-7. 

247 Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6. 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

··Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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At:tarHey 'ille,rk Pratittet // Ma;· Ce,AtttiH Material Pre,teeteti UHtier Feti. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

to Russia, PutinTrump.org.252 WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: '"Let's bomb Iraq' Progress for 

America PAC to launch "PutinTrump.org' at 9:30am. Oops pw is 'putintrump' putintrump.org." 

Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump Jr., "A PAC run 

anti-Trump site putintrump.org is about to launch. The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We 

have guessed the password. It is 'putintrump.' See 'About' for who is behind it. Any 

comments ?"253 

Several hours later, Trump Jr. emailed a variety of senior campaign staff: 

Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it 

works and the about section they reference contains the next pie in terms of who is behind 

it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow 

them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are 

looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it' s a fully built out page claiming to 

be a PAC let me know your thoughts and ifwe want to look into it.254 

Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the "About" page for the unlaunched site PutinTrump.org. The 

next day (after the website had launched publicly), Trump Jr. sent a direct message to WikiLeaks: 

"Off the record, l don't know who that is but I'll ask around. Thanks."255 

On October 3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr., asking "you 

guys" to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target 

Julian Assange. Trump Jr. responded that he already "had done so," and asked, "what's behind 

this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?"256 WikiLeaks did not respond. 

On October 12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was "great to see you and your dad 

talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us 

wlsearch.tk."257 WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in "digging through" leaked 

emails and stated, "we just released Podesta emails Part 4."258 Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly 

tweeted the wlsearch.tk link.259 ' 

252 9/20/16 Twitter DM~hbein to @WikiLeaks; see JF00587 (9/21/16 Messages, 

-@jabber.cryptoparty.is ~@jabber.cryptoparty.is); Fishbein 9/5/18 302, at 4. When 

interviewed by our Office, Fishbein produced what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the 

participants discussed U.S. politics; one of the other participants had posted the website and password that 

Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks. 

253 9/20/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr. 

254 TRUMPORG _ 28 _ 000629-33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Conway et al. (subject 

"Wikileaks")). 

255 9/21/16 Twitter DM, @DonaldJTrumpJr to @WikiLeaks. 

256 10/3/16 Twitter DMs, @DonaldJTrumpJr & @WikiLeaks. 

257 At the time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign documents. 

258 10/12/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr. 

259 @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/14/16 (6:34 a.m.) Tweet. 

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2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials 

Throughout 2016, the Trump Campaign expressed interest in Hillary Clinton's private 

email server and whether approximately 30,000 emails from that server had in fact been 

permanently destroyed, as reported by the media. Several individuals associated with the 

Campaign were contacted in 2016 about various efforts to obtain the missing Clinton emails and 

other stolen material in support of the Trump Campaign. Some of these contacts were met with 

sk~pticism, and nothing came of them; others were pursued to some degree. The investigation did 

not find evidence that the Trump Campaign recovered any s~ch Clinton emails, or that these 

contacts were part of a coordinated effort between Russia and the Trump Campaign. 

a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) 

In the spring of 2016, Trump Campaign advisor Michael Caputo learned through a Floridabased Russian business partner that another Florida-based Russian, Henry Oknyansky (who also 

went by the name Henry Greenberg), claimed to have information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. 

Caputo notified Roger Stone and brokered communication between Stone and Oknyansky. 

Oknyansky and Stone set up a May 2016 in-person meeting.260 

Oknyansky was accompanied to the meeting by Alexei Rasin, a Ukrainian associate 

involved in Florida real estate. At the meeting, Rasin offered to sell Stone derogatory information 

on Clinton that Rasin claimed to have obtained while working for Clinton. Rasin claimed to 

possess financial statements demonstrating Clinton's involvement in money laundering with 

Rasin's companies. According to Oknyansky, Stone asked if the amounts in question totaled 

millions of dollars but was told it was closer to hundreds of thousands. Stone refused the offer, 

stating that Trump would not pay for opposition research.261 

Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Rasin's motivation was financial. According to 

Oknyansky, Rasin had tried unsuccessfully to shop the Clinton information around to other 

interested parties, and Oknyansky would receive a cut if the information was sold.

262 Rasin is 

noted in public source documents as the director and/or registered agent for a number of Florida 

companies, none of which appears to be connected to Clinton. The Office found no other evidence 

that Rasin worked for Clinton or any Clinton-related entities. 

In their statements to investigators, Oknyansky and Caputo had contradictory recollections 

about the meeting. Oknyansky claimed that Caputo accompanied Stone to the meeting and 

provided an introduction, whereas Caputo did not tell us that he had attended and claimed that he 

was never told what information Oknyansky offered. Caputo also stated that he was unaware 

Oknyansky sought to be paid for the information until Stone informed him after the fact.263 

26° Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at l. 

261 Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1-2. 

262 Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 2. 

263 Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at l. 

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The Office did not locate Rasin in the United States, although the Office confirmed Rasin 

had been issued a Florida driver's license. The Office otherwise was unable to determine the 

content and origin of the information he purportedly offered to Stone. Finally, the investigation 

did not identify evidence of a connection between the outreach or the meeting and Russian 

interference efforts. 

b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails 

After candidate Trump stated on July 27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would "find the 

30,000 emails that are missing," Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaign to find the 

deleted Clinton emails.264 Michael Flynn-who would later serve as National Security Advisor in 

the Trump Administration- recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly, and Flynn 

subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails.265 

Barbara Ledeen and Peter Smith were among the people contacted by Flynn. Ledeen, a 

long-time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clinton emails, provided updates to Flynn 

about her efforts throughout the summer of 2016.266 Smith, an investment advisor who was active 

in Republican politics, also attempted to locate and obtain the deleted Clinton emails.267 

Ledeen began her efforts to obtain the Clinton emails before Flynn's request, as early as 

December 2015.268 On December 3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails, 

stating, "Here is the proposal I briefly mentioned to you. The person I described to you would be 

happy to talk with you either in person or over the phone. The person can get the emails which 1. 

Were classified and 2. Were purloined by our enemies. That would demonstrate what needs to be 

demonstrated."269 

Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the "Clinton email server was, in 

all likelihood, breached long ago," and that the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian intelligence services 

could "re-assemble the server's email content."270 The proposal called for a three-phase approach. 

The first two phases consisted of open-source analysis. The third phase consisted of checking with 

certain intelligence sources "that have access through liaison work with various foreign services" 

to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. The proposal noted, "Even if a 

single email was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, it would 

be catastrophic to the Clinton campaign[.]" Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and 

264 Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 1-3. 

265 Flynn 5/1/18 302, at l-3. 

266 Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 7; Flynn 5/4/18 302, at 1-2; Flynn 11 /29/17 302, at 7-8. 

267 Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7. 

268 Szobocsan 3/29/17 302, at 1. 

269 12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith. 

270 12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith (attachment). 

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wrote, "we can discuss to whom it should be referred."271 On December 16, 2015, Smith informed 

Ledeen that he declined to participate in her "initiative." According to one of Smith's business 

associates, Smith believed Ledeen's initiative was not viable at that time.272 

Just weeks after Trump's July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails, however, Smith 

tried to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created a company, raised tens of thousands of 

dollars, and recruited security experts and business associates. Smith made claims to others 

involved in the effort (and those from whom he sought funding) that he was in contact with hackers 

with "ties and affiliations to Russia" who had access to the emails, and that his efforts were 

coordinated with the Trump Campaign.273 

On August 28, 2016, Smith sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject "Sec. 

Clinton's unsecured private email server" to an undisclosed list ofrecipients, including Campaign 

co-chairman Sam Clovis. The email stated that Smith was "u]ust finishing two days of sensitive 

meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above. It is clear that the 

Clinton's home-based, unprotected server was hacked with ease by both State-related players, and 

private mercenaries. Parties with varying interests, are circling to release ahead of the election."

274 

On September 2, 2016, Smith directed a business associate to establish KLS Research LLC 

in furtherance of his search for the deleted Clinton emails.275 One of the purposes ofKLS Research 

was to manage the funds Smith raised in support of his initiative.276 KLS Research received over 

$30,000 during the presidential campaign, although Smith represented that he raised even more 

277 money. 

Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative, including security experts to search for 

and authenticate the emails.

278 In early September 2016, as pait of his recruitment and fundraising 

effort, Smith circulated a document stating that his initiative was "in coordination" with the Trump 

Campaign, "to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization."279 The document 

listed multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign, including Flynn, Clovis, Bannon, 

271 12/3/15 Email, Smith to Szobocsan & Safron. 

272 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 1. 

273 8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 

274 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 

275 Incorporation papers ofKLS Research LLC, 7/26/17 

Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 2. 

276 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 3. 

277 Financial Institution Record of Peter Smith and KLS Research LLC, 10/31 /17 -

10/11/16 Email, Smith to 

278 Tait 8/22/17 302, at 3; York 7 /12/17 302, at 1-2; York 11/22/17 302, at 1. 

279 York 7 /13/17 302 (attachment KLS Research, LLC, "Clinton Email Reconnaissance Initiative," 

Sept. 9, 2016). 

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and Kellyanne Conway.280 The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least 

Flynn and Clovis about his search for the deleted Clinton emails,

281 but the Office did not identify 

evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed Smith's efforts. 

In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their 

respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, "wondering if you had some more detailed reports or 

memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our efforts since we 

last visited ... . We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it 

against the new data we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only.'"282 

Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the "dark 

web") that purpo1ted to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails 

and solicited contributions to fund that effort. Erik Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor 

to ascertain the authenticity of the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that 

the emails were not authentic.283 

A backup of Smith's computer contained two files that had been downloaded from 

WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta. The files on 

Smith's computer had creation dates of October 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release 

by WikiLeaks. Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not reflect 

when the files were downloaded to Smith' s computer. (It appears the creation date was when 

WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed in Volume I, Section III.B.3.c, supra.284) 

The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their 

release by WikiLeaks. 

Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton' s deleted 

emails until shortly before the election. For example, on October 28, 2016, Smith wrote that there 

was a "tug-of-war going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days," and 

that WikiLeaks "has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this 

allows little time for response prior to the U.S. election November 8."285 An attachment to the 

280 The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under "Independent 

Groups/Organizations/Individuals," and described him as an "established author and writer from the right 

on President Obama and Sec. Clinton." 

281 Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynn et al.; 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith 

(bee: Clovis et al.). 

282 9/16/16 Email, Ledeen to Smith. 

283 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 4-5. 

284 The forensic analysis of Smith's computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple 

operating system that would have preserved that October 2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded 

(no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). See Volume I, Section 111.B.3.c, supra. The 

Office tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the two files found on Smith's computer from 

WikiLeaks's site using the same Apple operating system on Smith's computer; both files were successfully 

downloaded and retained the October 2, 2016 creation date. See SM-2284941, serial 62. 

285 10/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 

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email claimed that WikiLeaks would release "All 33k deleted Emails" by "November 1st." No 

emails obtained from Clinton's server were subsequently released. 

Smith drafted multiple emails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian 

hackers. For example, in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had 

organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails, including parties 

with "ties and affiliations to Russia."286 The investigation did not identify evidence that any such 

meetings occurred. Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did 

not believe that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such 

connection.287 The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers 

or that Smith, Ledeen, or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained 

the deleted Clinton emails. 

* * * 

In sum, the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons 

affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as the computers of the DNC and DCCC. The GRU 

then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers, and 

disseminated that data through fictitious online personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0) and later 

through WikiLeaks. The investigation also established that the Trum Cam ai n dis la ed 

interest in the WikiLeaks releases, and that 

explained in Volume I, Section V.B, infra, the evidence was sufficient to support computerintrusion and other char es a ainst GRU officers for their role in election-related hackin . 

286 8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 

287 Safron 3/20/18 302, at 3; Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 6. 

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IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN 

The Office identified multiple contacts-"links," in the words of the Appointment Orderbetween Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The 

Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian 

interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the investigation 

examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the 

Trump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the 

Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available 

information, the investigation did not establish such coordination. 

This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals 

with ties to the Russian government, including some contacts with Campaign officials or associates 

that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts. Each subsection begins with an 

overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which are 

generally presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the Campaign and 

extending through the post-election, transition period. 

A. Campaign Period (September 2015 - November 8, 2016) 

Russian-government-connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in 

Trump's campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015.288 Because 

Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and 

entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked 

individuals and entities during the campaign period-the Trump Tower Moscow project, see 

Volume l, Section IV.A. I, infra-led to or involved coordination of election assistance. 

Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016, 

when Trump was moving toward- and eventually becoming-the Republican nominee for 

President. As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period: 

outreach to two of Trump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a 

representation that Russia had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume I, 

Sections IV.A.2 & IV.A.3); dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and 

has connections with its government (Volume I, Section IV.A.4); a meeting at Trump Tower 

between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was "part of 

Russia and its government's support for [Trump]" (Volume I, Section IV.A.5); events at the 

Republican National Convention (Volume I, Section IV.A.6); post-Convention contacts between 

Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to the United States (Volume I, Section 

IV.A.7); and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for 

a Russian oligarch and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume I, Section IV.A.8). 

288 For example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper 

Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person 

candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication's founder (and 

former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites-Trump2016.ru 

and DonaldTrump2016.ru. No interview took place. 

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1. Trump Tower Moscow Project 

The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as 

part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership 

(through subsidiary corporate structures) of property. In other cases, the Trump Organization has 

executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies, often local to the 

country where the project was located.289 

Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal 

in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. The project, 

commonly referred to as a "Trump Tower Moscow" or "Trump Moscow" project, anticipated a 

combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building. 

Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including thenpresident of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian 

counterparties. From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the 

Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the 

project's status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization.290 

a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) 

The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned 

and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after 

the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow.291 Donald J. Trump Jr. served as 

_the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emin Agalarov (son of Aras 

Agalarov) and Irakli "Ike" Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations,292 with 

the occasional assistance of Robe1t Goldstone.293 

In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed preliminary terms of 

289 See, e.g., Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 151-52 

(Sept. 7, 2017) ( discussing licensing deals of specific projects). 

290 As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.l, supra, in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to 

making false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower 

Moscow project. See Information ,r 7(a), United States v. Michael Cohen, 1 :18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 

2018), Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information"). 

291 See Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7, 

2017) ("Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr. Agalarov' s company, Crocus Group, began 

preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow."). As has been widely reported, the 

Miss Universe pageant-which Trump co-owned _at the time-was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus 

City Hall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Aras 

Agalarov's son Emin was a musical performer at the event, which Trump attended. 

292 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 2, 4-6; OSCKA V _00385 (12/6/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov). 

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an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project.294 On December 23, 2013, after discussions 

with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the 

organization received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives.295 

The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 2014.296 

From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group 

discussed development plans for the Moscow project. Some time before January 24, 2014, the 

Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be · 

constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called "Crocus City," which had also been the 

site of the Miss Universe pageant.297 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarov 

and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow.298 From March 2014 through July 2014, 

the groups discussed "design standards" and other architectural elements.299 For example, in July 

2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the 

"demographics of these prospective buyers" in the Crocus City area, the development of 

neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building.300 In 

August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded 

tower being built in Crocus City.301 

Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely 

fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group.302 Communications between the 

two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what appears to be the 

last communication is dated November 24, 2014.303 The project appears not to have developed 

past the planning stage, and no construction occurred. 

294 

295 OSC-KA V _00452 (12/23/13 Email, Trmnp Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov). 

296 See, e.g., OSC-KAV _011 58 (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. & E. Agalarov); OSCKAV _01147 (1/20/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.). 

297 See, e.g., OSC-KA V _00972 (10/14/ 14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group 

contractor about specifications); OSC-KA V _00540 (1/24/14 Email, McGee to Trump Jr. et al.). 

298 See OSC-KA V 00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. A~alarov to Ivanka Tn~ump Jr. & Kaveladze ); 

Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01 a.m.)jjjijfiU(\h'llffi@[lm•-- 299 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00791 (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.; OSC-KAV_00799 

(6/10/ 14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et al.); OSC-KA V _0081 7 (6/16/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze 

et al.). 

300 OSC-KAV 00870 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). 

301 OSC-KA V _00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). 

302 OSC-KA V _ 00903 (9/29/14 Email, Tropea to McGee & Kaveladze (noting last response was on 

August 26, 2014)); OSC-KAV _00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea & McGee (suggesting silence 

"proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project")); OSC-KA V _00972 (10/14/14 Email, 

McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications)). 

303 OSC-KA V _ 01140 ( 11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). 

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b. Communications with J.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi 

Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015) 

In the late summer of 2015, the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing 

a Trump Tower project in Moscow. In approximately September 2015, Felix Sater, a New Yorkbased real estate advisor, contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump 

Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.304 Sater had previously worked with the 

Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects. Sater had 

explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump 

Organization and therefore knew of the organization's general interest in completing a deal 

there.

305 Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow 

previously and had accompanied lvanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid2000s.306 

Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of I.C. Expert Investment Company (LC. Expert), a 

Russian real-estate development corporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov.

307 Sater 

had known Rozov since approximately 2007 and, in 2014, had served as an agent on behalf of 

Rozov during Rozov's purchase of a building in New York City.308 Sater later contacted Rozov 

and proposed that I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which l.C. Expert would 

license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own. 

Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another.employee of l.C. Expert.

309 

Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with l.C. 

Expert or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with 

I.C. Expert from candidate Trump, who was then president of the Trump Organization. Cohen 

provided updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016, assuring him 

the project was continuing.

31° Cohen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka 

Trump as to design elements (such as possible architects to use for the project311) and Donald J. 

Trump Jr. (about his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the project312) during the 

fall of 2015. . 

rovided information to our Office in two 2017 interviews conducted under a proffer 

agreement 

306 Sater9/19/17 302, at 1-2, 5. 

307 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 3. 

308 Rozov 1 /25/18 3 02, at 1. 

309 Rozov 1/25/18 302, at I; see also 11 /2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (sending letter of intent). 

31° Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-2, 4-6. 

31 1 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. 

312 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4-5. 

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Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscow proposal with 

Giorgi Rtskhiladze, a business executive who previously had been involved in a development deal 

with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia. 313 Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in 

part because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with 

the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group.314 On September 22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary 

design study for the Trump Moscow project to Rtskhiladze, adding "I look forward to your reply 

about this spectacular project in Moscow." Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen's email to an associate 

and wrote, "[i]f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian 

Government and Mr. Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention."315 

On September 24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a 

proposed "[!Jetter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org," explaining that "[ w ]e need to send 

this letter to the Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and 

will pledge his support."316 In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladze provided a 

translation of the letter, which described the Trump Moscow project as a "symbol of stronger 

economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore 

United States and the Russian Federation."317 On September 27, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent another 

email to Cohen, proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with 

"Global Development Group LLC," which he described as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a 

Russian architect, and Simon Nizharadze.318 Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the 

proposal and instead continued to work with LC. Expert, the company represented by Felix Sater.31 9 

c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January 

2016) 

i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization 

Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November 2, 2015, the Trump Organization 

(through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and I.C. Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI) 

for a Trump Moscow property. The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov 

on behalf of I.C. Expert, was "intended to facilitate further discussions" in order to "attempt to 

313 Rtskhiladze was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. In 

approximately 2011, Silk Road Group and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreement to 

build a Trump-branded property in Batumi, Georgia. Rtskhiladze was also involved in discussions for a 

Trum -branded ro'ect in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Office twice interviewed Rtskhiladze, -

3 14 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12; see also Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 1. 

315 9/22/1 5 Email, Rtskhiladze to Nizharadze. 

316 9/24/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. 

317 9/24/1 5 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. 

3 18 9/27/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. 

3 19 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12. 

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enter into a mutually acceptable agreement" related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow. 320 

The LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components, 

and called for"[ a]pproximately 250 first class, luxury residential condominiums," as well as"[ o ]ne 

first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150 

hotel rooms."321 For the residential and commercial portions of the project, the Trump 

Organization would receive between 1 % and 5% of all condominium sales,322 plus 3% of all rental 

and other revenue. 323 For the project's hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base 

fee of 3% of gross operating revenues for the first five years and 4% thereafter, plus a separate 

incentive fee of 20% of operating profit. 324 Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would 

receive a $4 million "up-front fee" prior to groundbreaking.325 Under these terms, the Trump 

Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project, without assuming 

significant liabilities or financing commitments.326 

On November 3, 2015, the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI, Sater 

emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate 

Trump's chances at being elected, writing: 

Buddy our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of 

Putins team to buy in on this, I will manage this process .... Michael, Putin gets on stage 

with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow, and Donald owns the republican 

nomination. And possibly beats Hillary and our boy is in .. . . We will manage this process 

better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very 

shortly. That the game changer.

327 

Later that day, Sater followed up: 

Donald doesn't stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin 

only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good 

candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. "Business, politics, whatever it all is 

the same for someone who knows how to deal" 

320 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (attachment) (hereinafter "LOI"); see also I 0/13/15 Email, 

Sater to Cohen & Davis (attaching proposed letter of intent). 

321 LOI, p. 2. 

322 The LOI called for the Trump Organization to receive 5% of all gross sales up to $100 million; 

4% of all gross sales from $100 million to $250 million; 3% of all gross sales from $250 million to $500 

million; 2% of all gross sales from $500 million to $1 billion; and 1 % of all gross sales over $1 billion. 

LOI, Schedule 2. 

323 LOI, Schedule 2. 

324 LOI, Schedule 1. 

325 LOI, Schedule 2. 

326 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3. 

327 11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:14 p.m.). 

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I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference. 

If he says it we own this election. Americas most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald 

is a good guy to negotiate .... 

We can own this election. 

Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very close people, we can pull 

this off. 

Michael lets go. 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected. This is good really 

good.328 

According to Cohen, he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project 

to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or 

anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump 

Moscow project with him. However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the 

candidate suggested that his campaign would be a significant "infomercial" for Trump-branded 

prope1ties. 

329 

ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia 

Given the size of the Trump Moscow project, Sater and Cohen believed the project required 

approval (whether express or implicit) from the Russian national government, including from the 

Presidential Administration of Russia.330 Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the 

Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact.331 In early negotiations 

with the Trump Organization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his 

attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials. On October 12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote 

to Cohen that "all we need is Putin on board and we are golden," and that a "meeting with Putin 

and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [ of October]. "332 this meeting 

was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no direct interaction with the Russian 

333 government. 

Approximately a month later, after the LOI had been signed, Lana Erchova emailed lvanka 

Trump on behalf of Erchova's then-husband Dmitry Klokov, to offer Klokov's assistance to the 

Trump Campaign.334 Klokov was at that time Director of External Communications for PJSC 

Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission 

328 11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:40 p.m.). 

329 Cohen 9/12/ 18 302, at 3-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15. 

330 Sater 12/15/17 302, at 2. 

331 Sater 12/15/17 302, at 3-4. 

332 10/12/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (8:07 a.m.). 

333 

334 Ivanka Trump received an email from a woman who identified herself as "Lana E. Alexander," 

which said in part, "If you ask anyone who knows Russian to google my husband Dmitry Klokov, you' ll 

see who he is close to and that he has done Putin's political campaigns." 11/16/15 Email, Erchova to 

I. Trump. 

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company, and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy 

minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen.335 He told the Office that, after receiving 

this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov's name and concluded (incorrectly) 

that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter.336 

Between November 18 and 19, 2015,-Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call 

and exchanged several emails. Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a "trusted person" who 

could offer the Campaign "political synergy" and "synergy on a government level," Klokov 

recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary. 

Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the 

candidate and an individual Klokov described as "our person of interest."337 In an email to the 

Office, Erchova later identified the "person of interest" as Russian President Vladimir Putin. 338 

In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use 

a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project with local 

developers. Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified 

intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump-­

including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin-would need to be "in 

conjunction with the development and an official visit" with the Trump Organization receiving a 

formal invitation to visit. 339 (Klokov had written previously that "the visit [by candidate Trump 

to Russia] has to be informal.")340 

Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over 

a possible meeting between Trump and "the person of interest" from any existing business track. 341 

Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second 

email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have "phenomenal" impact " in a 

business dimension" and that the "person of interest['s]" "most important support" could have 

significant ramifications for the " level of projects and their capacity." Klokov concluded by telling 

335 11/16/15 Email, I. Trump to Cohen. 

336 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 17. During his interviews with the Office, Cohen still appeared to believe 

that the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian. The investigation, however, established that the email 

address used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov, as described above. 

337 11 /18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.). 

338 In July 2018, the Office received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova, in which 

she wrote that "[a]t the end of2015 and beginning of2016 I was asked by my ex-husband to contact lvanka 

Trump . .. and offer cooperation to Trump's team on behalf of the Russian officials." 7/27/18 Email, 

Erchova to Special Counsel's Office. The email claimed that the officials wanted to offer candidate Trump 

"land in Crimea among other things and unofficial meeting with Putin." Id. In order to vet the email's 

claims, the Office responded requesting more details. The Office did not receive any reply. 

339 11/18/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (7:15 a.m.). 

340 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.). 

341 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.) ("I would suggest separating your negotiations 

and our proposal to meet. I assure you, after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be 

completely different, having the most important support."). 

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Cohen that there was "no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of 

interest."342 Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that "[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks 

with VP's Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet."343 This email appears 

to be their final exchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought 

Klokov' s initial offer of assistance to the Campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the 

Trump Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he 

did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on the Moscow Project with 

Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government.344 

By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to 

use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government officials. Cohen 

told Sater that he was "setting up the meeting myself. "345 On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed 

the office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government's press secretary, indicating that he desired 

contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin's chief of staff. Cohen erroneously used the email address 

"Pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru" instead of "Pr _peskova@prpress.gov .ru," so the email apparently 

did not go through.346 On January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address 

(info@prpress.gov.ru) with the following message: 

Dear Mr. Peskov, 

Over the past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding 

the development of a Trump Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City. 

Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communication between our two sides has 

stalled. As this project is too important, I am hereby requesting your assistance. 

I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the 

specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals. 

I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon.347 

Two days later, Cohen sent an email to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, repeating his request to speak 

with Sergei Ivanov.348 

Cohen testified to Congress, and initially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a 

response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump 

Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements were false. In 

342 11/19/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40 a.m.). 

343 11/19/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56 p.m.). 

344 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 12. 

345 FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (6:17 p.m.)). 

346 1/11/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru (9: 12 a.m.). 

347 1/14/16 Email, Cohen to info@prpress.gov.ru (9:21 a.m.). 

348 1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru (10:28 a.m.). 

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fact, Cohen had received (and recalled receiving) a response to his inquiry, and he continued to 

work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016.349 

On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal 

assistant. Writing from her personal email account, Poliakova stated that she had been trying to 

reach Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided.350 Shortly after 

receiving Poliakova's email, Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes.351 Cohen described to 

Poliakova his position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Trump Moscow 

project, including information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump Organization 

had partnered. Cohen requested assistance in moving the project forward, both in securing land to 

build the project and with financing. According to Cohen, Poliakova asked detailed questions and 

took notes, stating that she would need to follow up with others in Russia.352 

Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from any other 

representative of the Russian government, nor did the Office identify any evidence of direct 

follow-up. However, the day after Cohen's call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him 

to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat .. . It's about Putin they called today."353 Sater 

then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project, 354 

along with a note to "[t]ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes 

you want and send it back to me."355 After a further round of edits, on January 25, 2016, Sater 

sent Cohen an invitation- signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ-to travel to 

"Moscow for a working visit" about the "prospects of development and the construction business 

in Russia," "the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower," and 

"the oppo1tunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump."356 According 

349 Cohen Information ,i,i 4, 7. Cohen's interactions with President Trump and the President's 

lawyers when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in Volume II. See Vol. II, Section 

11.K.3, infra. 

350 1/20/1 6 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5 :57 a.m.) ("Mr. Cohen[,] I can't get through to both your 

phones. Pis, call me."). 

35 1 Telephone records show a 20-minute call on January 20, 2016 between Cohen and the number 

Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Michael Cohen After 

the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list. 

1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.). 

352 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2-3. 

353 FS000l 1 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen). 

354 The invitation purported to be from Genbank, a Russian bank that was, according to Sater, 

working at the behest of a larger bank, VTB, and would consider providing financing. FS00008 (12/31/ 15 

Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). Additional information about Genbank can be found infra. 

355 FS000l I (1/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:44 p.m.)); 1/21/16 Email, Sater to Cohen 

(6:49 p.m.). 

356 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:01 p.m.) (attachment). 

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to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete 

proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project.357 

d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump 

(December 2015-June 2016) 

i. Sater 's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia 

The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen 

contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project. Beginning in late 2015, 

Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump 

Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financing 

partners. In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to 

Russia for meetings.358 On December 19, 2015, Sater wrote: 

Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other line. [

359] He needs a copy of your 

and Donald's passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations & 

Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower 

Moscow. Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue 

invite, so they are inviting commercially/ business. VTB is Russia's 2 biggest bank and 

VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business 

meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite 

& have visa issued.360 

In response, Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport.361 Cohen told the Office that at one 

point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Rhona Graff, Trump's executive 

assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later brought Trump's passport to Cohen's 

357 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-7. 

358 See, e.g., 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41 p.m.) ("Please scan and send me a copy of your 

passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs."). 

Call Records of Felix Sater 

Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank, a large bank with lending focused 

in Crimea, Ukraine. At the time that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen, Genbank was subject to 

U.S. government sanctions, see Russia/Ukraine-related Sanctions and Identifications, Office of Foreign 

Assets Control (Dec. 22, 2015), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20151222.aspx. Dvoskin, who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for 

criminal activity, was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene Slusker 

and Gene Shustar. See United States v. Rizzo, et al., 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003). 

360 12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (10:50 a.m.); FS00002 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Sater to 

Cohen, (10:53 a.m.). 

36 1 FS00004 (12/19/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); ERT_0198-256 (12/19/15 Text Messages, 

Cohen & Sater). 

76 

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office.362 The investigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwarded to Sater.363 

Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in 

connection with the Trump Moscow project. On April 20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, " [t]he People 

. wanted to know when you are coming?"364 On May 4, 2016, Sater followed up: 

I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after 

the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that' s it's probably after the 

convention. Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but 

the 2 big guys where [sic] the question. I said I would confirm and revert. . . . Let me 

know about If I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to 

speak to them and possibly fly over.365 

Cohen responded, "My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the 

convention."366 

The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen' s travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg 

International Economic Forum ("Forum"), an annual event attended by prominent Russian 

politicians and businessmen. Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate 

that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum.367 On May 5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen: 

Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's 

Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to 

either Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there. 

This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia wiU be there as well. 

He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to 

discuss[. ]

368 

The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel; Cohen 

wrote back, "[w]orks for me."369 

362 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. 

363 On December 21, 2015, Sater sent Cohen a text message that read, "They need a copy of DJT 

passport," to which Cohen responded, "After I return from Moscow with you with a date for him." FS00004 

(12/21/15 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). 

364 FS00014 (4/20/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (9:06 p.m.)). 

365 FS000l 5 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:38 p.m.)). 

366 FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (8:03 p.m.)). 

367 Sater 12/15/17 302, at 4. 

368 FS00016 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen (6:26 & 6:27 a.m.)). 

369 FS00016 (5/6/ 16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). 

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On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for 

the Forum, adding, "Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well."370 

On June 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the 

Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum.371 Sater also sent Cohen a 

Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos.372 According to Cohen, the 

invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned 

that Russian officials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him (as 

Sater had alleged), and so he decided not to go to the Forum.373 On June 14, 2016, Cohen met 

Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be 

traveling at that time. 374 

ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia 

The investigation identified evidence that, during the period the Trump Moscow project 

was under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts. 

First, in interviews with the Office, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling 

to Russia with Trump twice: once in late 2015; and again in spring 2016. 375 According to Cohen, 

Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project significantly. On one occasion, 

Trump told Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the 

candidate's schedule. Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, who suggested that they 

speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated, however, that he knew 

that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate's 

preexisting commitments to the Campaign.376 

Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St. Petersburg 

International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Mira Duma-a contact oflvanka Trump' s 

from the fashion industry-first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump 

from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.377 On January 14, 

2016, Rhona Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was "honored to be asked to 

participate in the highly prestigious" Forum event, but that he would "have to decline" the 

invitation given his "very grueling and full travel schedule" as a presidential candidate.378 Graff 

37° FS000 18 (6/9/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). 

371 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (2:10 p.m.). 

372 FS00018 (6/13/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (2:20 p.m.)); 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen. 

373 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-8. 

374 FS00019 (6/14/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater (12:06 and 2:50 p.m.)). 

375 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2. 

376 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 

377 12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 a.m.) (attachments); TRUMPORG_16_000057 

(1/7/16 Email, I. Trump to Graff(9:18 a.m.)). 

378 1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira. 

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asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff "send a formal note to the Deputy Prime 

Minister" declining his invitation; Duma replied that a formal note would be "great."379 

It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers 

from President Trump,380 Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on 

March 17, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St. Petersburg.381 Two 

weeks later, on March 31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump's signature a two-paragraph letter 

declining the invitation.382 The letter stated that Trump's "schedule has become extremely 

demanding" because of the presidential campaign, that he "already ha[ d] several commitments in 

the United States" for the time of the Forum, but that he otherwise "would have gladly given every 

consideration to attending such an important event."383 Graff forwarded the letter to another 

executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead 

for Trump to sign.384 

At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Foresman-a 

New York-based investment banker- began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting 

with candidate Trump. According to Foresman, he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian 

presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speak at the 

Forum.385 Foresman first emailed Graff on March 31, 2016, following a phone introduction 

brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced the television show The 

Apprentice). In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional 

expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early "private channel" between Vladimir 

Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush, and an "approach" he had received from "senior 

Kremlin officials" about the candidate. Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate, 

Corey Lewandowski, or "another relevant person" to discuss this and other "concrete things" 

Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over "unsecure email." 386 On April 4, 2016, Graff 

forwarded Foresman's meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another executive assistant 

to Trump.387 

379 1/15/16 Email, Mira to Graff. 

380 As explained in Volume II and Appendix C, on September 17, 2018, the Office sent written 

questions to the President's counsel. On November 20, 2018, the President provided written answers to 

those questions through counsel. 

381 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, 

Pait (e)) ("[D]ocuments show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the 

invitation."). 

382 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part 

(e)); see also TRUMPORG_l 6_000134 (unsigned letter dated March 31, 2016). 

383 TRUMPORG_16_000134 (unsigned letter). 

384 TRUMPORG_l6_000133 (3/31/16 Email, Graffto Macchia). 

385 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 3-4. 

386 See TRUMPORG_16_00136 (3/31/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); see also Foresman 10/17/18 

302, at 3-4. 

387 See TRUMPORG_ l6_00136 (4/4/16 Email, Graff to Macchia). 

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With no response forthcoming, Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff-first on April 26 

and again on April 30, 2016.388 Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April 26 

email ( as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski. 389 On May 2, 2016, Graff 

forwarded Foresman's April 30 email-which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald 

Trump Jr. or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that "should be 

conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts"-to 

policy advisor Stephen Miller.390 

No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump 

Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the 

Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election, when he interacted with 

the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration.39 1 When 

interviewed by the Office, Foresman denied that the specific "approach" from "senior Kremlin 

officials" noted in his March 31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to 

Roscongress. According to Foresman, the "concrete things" he referenced in the same email were 

a combination of the invitation itself, Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and 

Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (EastWest 

Institute). Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him 

to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Foresman also said that 

Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate 

withdrew from the race and the other politician's participation did not work out.392 Finally, 

Foresman claimed to have no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the 

reference to his involvement in the Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials 

to the Campaign. Foresman commented that he had not recognized any of the experts announced 

as Trump's foreign policy team in March 2016, and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with 

the candidate to share his professional background and policy views, including that Trump should 

decline Kobyakov's invitation to speak at the Forum. 

393 

2. George Papadopoulos 

George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March 

388 See TRUMPORG_16_00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); TRUMPORG_ 16_00141 

(4/30/16 Email, Foresman to Graff). 

389 See TRUMPORG_16_00139 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Foresman); TRUMPORG_16_00137 

( 4/27 /16 Email, Graff to Lewandowski). 

390 TRUMPORG_16_00142 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller); see also TRUMPORG_16_00143 

(5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller) (forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman). 

391 Foresman's contacts during the transition period are discussed further in Volume I, Section 

IV.B.3, infra. 

392 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 4. 

393 Foresman 10/17 /18 302, at 8-9. 

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2016 to early October 2016.394 In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based 

professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud's return from a trip to Moscow, that the 

Russian government had obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. 

One week later, on May 6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign 

government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that 

it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be 

damaging to candidate Clinton. 

Papadopoulos shared information about Russian "dirt" with people outside of the 

Campaign, and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official. 

Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he interacted told the Office that they did 

· not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughout the relevant period of time 

and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals 

to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. That meeting never 

came to pass. 

a. Origins of Campaign Work 

In March 2016, Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.395 

As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in 

a September 30, 2015 email, he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors.396 In 

late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential 

candidate Ben Carson. 397 

Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 20 I 6, Papadopoulos 

had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016.398 At that time, 

Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice 

(LCILP), which billed itself as a "unique institution . . . comprising high-level professional 

international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the 

practice of international law."399 Papadopoulos said that he had finished his role with the Carson 

394 Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summer and fall 

of 2017, after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in 

a January 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and 

communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev. 

Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with 

making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § lO0l(a). 

395 A Transcript of Donald Trump's Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board, 

Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016). 

396 7/15/15 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (6:57 a.m.); 9/30/15 Email, Glassner 

to Papadopoulos (7:42:21 a.m.). 

397 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. 

398 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2; 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris. 

399 London Centre oflnternational Law Practice, at https://www.lcilp.org/ (via web.archive.org). 

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campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring.400 In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join 

LCILP and arrived in London to begin work.401 

As he was taking his position at LCILP, Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager 

Corey Lewandowski via Linkedln and emailed campaign official Michael Glassner about his 

interest in joining the Trump Campaign.402 On March 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner 

another message reiterating his interest.403 Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos's interest 

to another campaign official, Joy Lutes, who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been 

told by Glassner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the Trump Campaign's national cochair and chief policy advisor .

404 

At the time of Papadopoulos's March 2 email, the media was criticizing the Trump 

Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks.405 

To address that issue, senior Campaign officials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together 

on short notice.406 After receiving Papadopoulos's name from Lutes, Clovis performed a Google 

search on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute, and believed that he 

had credibility on energy issues.407 On March 3, 2016, Clovis arranged to speak with 

Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor, 

and on March 6, 2016, the two spoke.408 Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a 

topic, and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the 

Campaign's foreign policy.409 At the end of the conversation, Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role 

as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, and Papadopoulos accepted the offer.410 

b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts 

Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor, Papadopoulos traveled 

400 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris. 

401 2/5/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (6:11:25 p.m.); 2/6/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos 

(5:34:15 p.m.). 

402 2/4/16 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1 :28 p.m.); 2/4/16 Email, 

Papadopoulos to Glassner (2:10:36 p.m.). 

403 3/2/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner (11: 17:23 a.m.). 

404 3/2/16 Email, Lutes to Papadopoulos (10:08:15 p.m.). 

405 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of2), at 4. 

406 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of2), at 4. 

407 

(6:05:47 p.m.). 

; 3/3/16 Email, Lutes to Clovis & Papadopoulos 

408 3/6/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (4:24:21 p.m.). 

409 Statement of Offense ,i 4, United States v. George Papadopoulos, 1: 17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 

2017), Doc. 19 ("Papadopoulos Statement of Offense"). 

4 10 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. 

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to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP.41 1 The purpose of the trip was to meet officials 

affiliated with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian 

government official.412 During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud. 

Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of 

Diplomacy in London, England.413 Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also affiliated 

with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him.414 Mifsud 

maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among 

his contacts was ,

415 a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out 

the Russian social media campaign (see Volume I Section II, supra). In January and February 

2016, Mifsud and - discussed possibly meeting in Russia. The 

investigation did not~ meeting. Later, in the spring of 2016, -

was also in contact - that was linked to an employee of the Russian 

Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian militarycontrolled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the 

course of the GRU's hack-and-release operations (see Volume I, Section III.B.1, supra). 

According to Papadopoulos, Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when 

they met in Rome.

416 After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign, 

however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos.417 The two discussed Mifsud's 

European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to 

introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian 

government.418 Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud's claim of substantial connections with 

Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such connections could 

increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.419 

411 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 5. 

412 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al., Joseph Mifsud: more 

questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) ("Link 

Campus University ... is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti."). 

413 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 5. 

414 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. 

, , , • Investigative Technique 

1Harm to Ongoing Matter 

416 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 5. 

4 17 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 5. 

41 8 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 2. 

419 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 5. 

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On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London.42 ° Four days later, candidate 

Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team 

chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as "an oil and energy consultant" and 

an "[e]xcellent guy."421 

On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London.422 Mifsud was 

accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a 

former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin.423 Papadopoulos understood at the 

time that Polonskaya may have been Putin's niece but later learned that this was not true.

424 During 

the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that 

the Russian ambassador in London was a friend of hers.

425 Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos 

expected Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that 

did not occur.426 

Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump 

Campaign's foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was "Meeting with 

Russian leadership--including Putin."427 The message stated in pertinent part: 

I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the 

director of the London Academy of Diplomacy--who introduced me to both Putin's niece 

and the Russian Ambassador in London--who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister.428 

The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to 

discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump. They are keen to host us in a "neutral" 

city, or directly in Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with 

us and Mr. Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving 

forward with this very important issue.429 

420 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. 

421 Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, Trump Questions Need for NATO, Outlines Noninterventionist 

Foreign Policy, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016). 

422 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; 3/24/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos. 

423 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. 

424 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 2/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Internet 

Search History (3/24/16) (revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24, 2016 for 

"putin's niece," "olga putin," and "russian president niece olga," among other terms). 

425 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. 

426 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 8 n. l. 

427 3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 a.m.). 

428 Papadopoulos's statements to the Campaign were false. As noted above, the woman he met was 

not Putin's niece, he had not met the Russian Ambassador in London, and the Ambassador did not also 

serve as Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister. 

429 3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 a.m.). 

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Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign's approach 

toward Russia-from one of engaging with Russia throu h the NA TO framework and takin a 

stron stance on Russian a ression in Ukraine, 

Clovis's response to Papadopoulos, however, did not reflect that shift. Replying to 

Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial 

email, Clovis wrote: 

This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we 

see how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any 

meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies, 

especially France, Germany and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are 

not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page. 

More thoughts later today. Great work.431 

c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting 

The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions 

and candidate Trump approximately one week later, on March 31, 2016, in Washington, D.C.432 

The meeting-which was intended to generate press coverage for the Campaign433-took place at 

the Trump International Hotel.434 Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event. At the meeting, 

Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table, while Trump sat at the other. As reflected in the 

photograph below (which was posted to Trump's Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between 

the two, two seats to Sessions's left: 

430 

431 3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos et al. (8:55:04 a.m.). 

432 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3. 

433 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16-17. 

434 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. 

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March 31, 2016 Meeting of Foreign Policy Team, with Papadopoulos (Fourth from Right of Candidate Trump) 

During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced 

themselves and briefly described their areas of experience or expertise.435 Papadopoulos spoke 

about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian 

officials.436 Specifically, Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in 

London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help 

arrange that meeting.437 

Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos's statement. Papadopoulos and 

Campaign advisor J.D. Gordon- who told investigators in an interview that he had a "crystal 

clear" recollection of the meeting-have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the 

idea of a meeting with Putin.438 Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of 

his efforts to arrange a meeting.439 Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions 

generally opposed the proposal, though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or 

the strength of the opposition he expressed.440 

d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of Clinton 

Emails 

Whatever Sessions's precise words at the March 31 meeting, Papadopoulos did not 

understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from 

435 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. 

436 Papadopoulos 8/ 10/17 302, at 4. 

437 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,i 9; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 14; Carafano 9/12/17 302, 

at 2; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1. 

438 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Gordon 9/7 /17 302, at 4-5. 

439 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3. 

440 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 17; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 5; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at l ; Carafano 

9/12/17 302, at 2. 

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making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. 

To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive 

of his efforts to arrange such a meeting.441 Accordingly, when he returned to London, 

Papadopoulos resumed those efforts.442 

Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek 

Russia contacts through Mifsud and, at times, Polonskaya.443 For example, within a week of her 

initial March 24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text messagewhich email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud-addressing 

Papadopoulos' s "wish to engage with the Russian Federation."444 When Papadopoulos learned 

from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him, he sent her an email seeking another 

meeting.445 Polonskaya responded the next day that she was "back in St. Petersburg" but "would 

be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos's] initiatives between our two countries" and "to meet 

[him] again."446 Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought "a good step" would be to introduce 

him to "the Russian Ambassador in London," and that he would like to talk to the ambassador, "or 

anyone else you recommend, about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia."447 

Mifsud, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April 11, 

2016. He wrote, "This is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai 

meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma. We will talk tomorrow."448 The two bodies referenced 

by Mifsud are part of or associated with the Russian government: the Duma is a Russian legislative 

assembly,449 while "Valdai" refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that "is 

close to Russia's foreign-policy establishment."450 Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he 

would see him "tomorrow."451 For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had "already alerted 

my personal links to our conversation and your request," that "we are all very excited the 

possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump," and that "[t]he Russian Federation would love 

to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced."452 

441 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, 

at 2. 

442 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,i 10. 

443 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,i,i 10-15. 

444 3/29/16 Emails, Mifsud to Polonskaya (3 :39 a.m. and 5 :36 a.m.). 

445 4/10/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2:45:59 p.m.). 

446 4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3: 11 :24 a.m.). 

447 4/11 /l 6 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (9:21 :56 a.m.). 

448 4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (11 :43 :53). 

449 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,i 10( c ). 

450 Anton Troianovski, Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to US. 

Nuclear Stance, Washington Post (Feb. 10, 2018). 

451 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (11 :51 :53 a.m.). 

452 4/12/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4:47:06 a.m.). 

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Papadopoulos's and Mifsud's mentions of seeing each other "tomorrow" referenced a 

meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning, April 12, 2016, at the Andaz Hotel in 

London. Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the Office,

453 and 

records from Papadopoulos's UK cellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the 

meeting took place.454 

Following the meeting, Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow.455 On April 18, 2016, 

while in Russia, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev, a member of the 

Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).456 Mifsud had described Timofeev as having 

connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),457 the executive entity in Russia 

responsible for Russian foreign relations.458 Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and 

Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting "the groundwork" for a 

"potential" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials.459 Papadopoulos 

told the Office that, on one Skype call, he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being 

monitored or supervised by an unknown third party, because Timofeev spoke in an official manner 

and Papadopoulos heard odd noises on the line.460 Timofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April 

25, 2016 email that he had just spoken "to Igor Ivanov[,] the President ofRIAC and former Foreign 

Minister of Russia," and conveyed Ivanov's advice about how best to arrange a "Moscow visit."461 

After a stop in Rome, Mifsud returned to England on April 25, 2016.462 The next day, 

Papadopoulos met Mifsud for breakfast at the Andaz Hotel (the same location as their last 

453 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 7. 

454 4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (5:44:39 a.m.) (forwarding Libya-related document); 

4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos & Obaid (10:28:20 a.m.); Papadopoulos Internet Search History 

(Apr. 11, 2016 10:56:49 p.m.) (search for "andaz hotel liverpool street"); 4/12/16 Text Messages, Mifsud 

& Papadopoulos. 

455 See, e.g., 4/18/16 Email, Mifsud t~ Papadopoulos (8:04:54 a.m.). 

456 Papadopoulos 8/ l 0/17 3 02, at 5. 

457 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 11. 

458 During the campaign period, Papadopoulos connected over Linkedln with several MF Aaffiliated individuals in addition to Timofeev. On April 25, 2016, he connected with Dmitry Andreyko, 

publicly identified as a First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in Ireland. In July 2016, he connected with 

Yuriy Melnik, the spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington and with Alexey Krasilnikov, 

publicly identified as a counselor with the MFA. And on September 16, 2016, he con~ 

Nalobin, also identified as an MFA official. See Papadopoulos Linkedln Connections~ 

459 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 11. 

460 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 10. 

46 1 4/25/16 Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (8:16:35 a.m.). 

462 4/22/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (12:41:01 a.m.). 

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meeting).463 During that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level 

Russian government officials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on the trip, 

he learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton. As Papadopoulos 

later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the form of " emails of Clinton," and that 

they "have thousands of emails."464 On May 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, 

Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had 

received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the 

anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.

465 

e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign 

While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials 

with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts. 

On April 25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote 

to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by 

Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready," and that "[t]he advantage of being in London 

is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities."466 On April 27, 2016, 

after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that "some 

interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right."

467 The 

same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling 

Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin 

wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right. "

468 

Papadopoulos' s Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued 

throughout the spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an 

email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski 

whether that was " something we want to move forward with."469 The next day, Papadopoulos 

forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email "Russia 

update."470 He included the same email in a May 21, 2016 message to senior Campaign official 

Paul Manafort, under the subject line "Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump," stating that 

"Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me 

463 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ~ 14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos. 

464 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense~ 14. 

465 This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials. ~ 

iHferfflatiat1. is lu 111 eHfareefflefl.t seHsitive (LES) sHs f!'lttst be trestes ueeersiHgly iH uHy e,cten1al 

sisseffliHstiatt. The foreign government conveyed this information to the U.S. government on July 26, 

2016, a few days after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its investigation of 

potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a few days later based on the information. 

466 4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (8: 12:44 p.m.). 

467 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (6:55:58 p.m.). 

468 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.). 

469 5/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 a.m.). 

470 5/5/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.). 

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to discuss."471 Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign official, without including 

Papadopoulos, and stated: "Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is · 

not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send 

any signal."472 

On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about 

a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski "want[ ed] to have a call about this topic" and whether "we 

were following up with it."473 After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "connect with" Clovis 

because he was "running point," Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that "the Russian MF A" was asking 

him "if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point."474 Papadopoulos wrote in an 

email that he "[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it 

and what message I should send (or to ignore)."475 

After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev,476 Papadopoulos sent one more 

email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski's last day as campaign manager.

477 The 

email stated that "[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs" had contacted him and asked whether, 

if Mr. Trump could not travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could 

attend meetings.478 Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was "willing to make the trip off the 

record if it's in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet specific people."

479 

Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign, Papadopoulos communicated 

with Clovis and Walid Phares, another member of the foreign policy advisory team, about an offthe-record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials or with 

Papadopoulos's other Russia connections, Mifsud and Timofeev.

480 Papadopoulos also interacted 

471 5/21/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30: 14 p.m.). 

472 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 19 n.2. 

473 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (3:08:18 p.m.). 

474 6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.); 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to 

Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). 

475 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos's email coincided in time 

with another message to Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting. First, on May 15, 2016, David Kleina distant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt-emailed Clovis about a potential 

Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. The email stated that Klein had contacted 

Lazar in February about a possible Trump-Putin meeting and that Lazar was "a very close confidante of 

Putin." DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 p.m.)). The investigation did not find 

evidence that Clovis responded to Klein's email or that any further contacts of significance came out of 

Klein's subsequent meeting with Greenblatt and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2. 

476 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 21 (a). 

477 

478 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1 :11 :11 p.m.). 

479 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1: 11: 11 p.m.). 

480 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 21; 7/14/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (11 :57:24 

p.m.); 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14:18 p.m.). 

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directly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary 

Group on Counterterrorism (TAG), a group for which Phares was co-secretary general.481 On July 

16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, D.C., where he sat next to 

Clovis (as reflected in the photograph below).482 

George Papadopoulos (far right) and Sam Clovis (second from right) 

Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit,483 

Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Phares 

during the event.484 Papadopoulos's recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after 

the TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Phares 

suggested meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat,485 and a July 12 message in the 

same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees "are very nervous 

about Russia. So be aware."486 Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud 

listing Phares and Clovis as other "participants" in a potential meeting at the London Academy of 

Diplomacy.487 

Finally, Papadopoulos's recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a 

481 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-1 7; 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic 

Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism. 

482 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism. 

483 

484 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17. 

485 7 /11/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos. 

486 7/12/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos (14:52:29). 

487 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (14:14:18). 

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journal that he kept at the time.488 Those notes, which are reprinted in part below, appear to refer 

to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the "office of Putin," and 

suggest that Phares, Clovis, and Papadopoulos ("Walid/Sam me") would attend without the official 

backing of the Campaign ("no official letter/no message from Trump").489 

September: 

Have an exploratory meeting 

te or lose. In September - if allowed 

they will blast Mr. Trump. 

We want the meeting in 

London/England 

Walid/Sam me 

No official letter/no message 

from Trump 

They are talking to us. 

-It is a lot of risk. 

-Office of Putin. 

-Explore: we are a campaign. 

offlsrael! EGYPT 

Willingness to meet the FM sp 

with Walid/Sam 

-FM coming 

-Useful to have a session with 

him. 

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Later communications indicate that Clovis determined that he (Clovis) could not travel. 

On August 15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple 

foreign governments, "even Russia[]," for "closed door workshops/consultations abroad," and 

asked whether there was still interest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos "to go on that trip."490 

Clovis copied Phares on his response, which said that he could not "travel before the election" but 

that he "would encourage [Papadopoulos] and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible."491 

488 Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 3. 

489 Papadopoulos declined to assist in deciphering his notes, telling investigators that he could not 

read his own handwriting from the journal. Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 21. The notes, however, appear 

to read as listed in the column to the left of the image above. 

490 8/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (11 :59:07 a.m.). 

491 8/15/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos (12:01 :45 p.m.). 

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Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign in early October 2016, after an 

interview he gave to the Russian news agency Inter/ax generated adverse publicity.492 

f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt" 

Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the Campaignspecifically, the then-Greek foreign minister-about Russia's obtaining Clinton-related emails.493 

In addition, a different foreign government informed the FBI that, 10 days after meeting with 

Mifsud in late April 2016, Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump Campaign had received 

indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous 

release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.494 (This conversation occurred 

after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta and stole his emails, and 

the GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC, see Volume l, Sections III.A & III.B, supra.) Such 

disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulos informed any Trump Campaign official 

about the emails. 

When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told 

the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos's sharing the information that Russia had 

obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign 

through the anonymous release of information about Clinton. Papadopoulos stated that he could 

not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately 

remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis 

that Papadopoulos thought "they have her emails."495 The Campaign officials who interacted or 

corresponded with Papadopoulos have similarly stated, with varying degrees of certainty, that he 

did not tell them. Senior policy advisor Stephen Miller, for example, did not remember hearing 

anything from Papadopoulos or Clovis about Russia having emails of or dirt on candidate 

Clinton.496 Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone, including Papadopoulos, having given him 

non-public information that a forei n overnment mi ht be in ossession of material dama in to 

492 George Papadopoulos: Sanctions Have Done Little More Than to Turn Russia Towards China, 

Interfax (Sept. 30, 2016). 

493 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 14-15; Def. Sent. Mem., United States v. George Papadopoulos, 

I :17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 45. 

494 See footnote 465 of Volume I, Section IV.A.2.d, supra. 

495 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11 /17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, 

at 2. 

496 S. Miller 12/14/17 302, at 10. 

497 

498 

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No documentary evidence, and nothing in the email accounts or other 

communications facilities reviewed by the Office, shows that Papadopoulos shared this 

information with the Campaign. 

g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact 

The Office investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos. The Office was 

not fully able to explore the contact because the individual at issue-Sergei Millian-remained 

out of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of 

the Office despite our repeated efforts to obtain an interview. 

Papadopoulos first connected with Millian via Linkedln on July 15, 2016, shmtly after 

Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clovis.500 Millian, an American citizen who is 

a native of Belarus, introduced himself "as president of [the] New York-based Russian American 

Chamber of Commerce," and claimed that through that position he had " insider knowledge and 

direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics."501 Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether 

he had heard of Millian.502 Although Timofeev said no,503 Papadopoulos met Millian in New York 

City.504 The meetings took place on July 30 and August 1, 2016.505 Afterwards, Millian invited 

Papadopoulos to attend-and potentially speak at-two international energy conferences, 

including one that was to be held in Moscow in September 2016.506 Papadopoulos ultimately did 

not attend either conference. 

On July 31 , 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian, Papadopoulos 

emailed Trump Campaign official Bo Denysyk to say that he had been contacted "by some leaders 

of Russian-American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr. Trump," and to 

ask whether he should "put you in touch with their group (US-Russia chamber of commerce)."507 

Denysyk thanked Papadopoulos "for taking the initiative," but asked him to "hold off with 

499 

500 7/15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos. 

501 7 /15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos. 

502 7/22/16 Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (7:40:23 p.m.); 7/26/16 Facebook 

Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (3:08:57 p.m.). 

503 7/23/16 Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (4:31:37 a.m.); 7/26/16 Facebook 

Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (3:37: 16 p.m.). 

504 7/16/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (7:55:43 p.m.). 

505 7/30/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:38 & 6:05 p.m.); 7/31/16 Text Messages, 

Millian & Papadopoulos (3:48 & 4:18 p.m.); 8/ 1/16 Text Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (8:19 p.m.). 

506 8/2/16 Text Messages, Millian & Papadopoulos (3 :04 & 3 :05 p.m.); 8/3/16 Facebook Messages, 

Papadopoulos & Millian (4:07:37 a.m. & 1:11:58 p.m.). 

507 7/31/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk (12:29:59 p.m.). 

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outreach to Russian-Americans" because "too many articles" had already portrayed the Campaign, 

then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as "being pro-Russian."508 

On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he 

would " share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work 

for the campaign."509 Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter.510 

On November 9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian 

in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian "billionaires 

who are not under sanctions."511 The meeting took place on November 14, 2016, at the Trump 

Hotel and Tower in Chicago.512 According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed partnering on 

business deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian's attitude toward him changed when 

Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing private-sector opportunities and was not interested 

in a job in the Administration.5 13 The two remained in contact, however, and had extended online 

discussions about possible business opportunities in Russia. 514 The two also arranged to meet at a 

Washington, D.C. bar when both attended Trump's inauguration in late January 2017.515 

3. Carter Page 

Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January 2016 to September 2016. He 

was formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March 

2016.516 Page had lived and worked in Russia, and he had been approached by Russian intelligence 

officers several years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign. During his time with the 

Campaign, Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his 

personal capacity. Russian intelligence officials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and 

2013 and Russian officials may have focused on Page in 2016 because of his affiliation with the 

Campaign. However, the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian 

government in its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. 

508 7 /31/16 Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos (21 :54:52). 

509 8/23/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (2:55:36 a.m.). 

510 Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 2. 

511 11/10/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (9:35:05 p.m.). 

512 11/14/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (1 :32: 11 a.m.). 

513 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 19. 

514 E.g., 11/29/16 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:09 - 5:11 p.m.); 12/7/16 

Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (5:10:54 p.m.). 

515 1/20/17 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (4:37-4:39 a.m.). 

516 Page was interviewed b 

Counsel's appointment. 

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a. Background 

Before he began working for the Campaign in January 2016, Page had substantial prior 

experience studying Russian policy issues and living and working in Moscow. From 2004 to 2007, 

Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Lynch's Moscow office.517 There, he worked on 

transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprom's 

deputy chief financial officer, Sergey Yatsenko.518 

In 2008, Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an in~ 

advisor firm focused on the ener sector in emerging markets.

519 -----

520 The company otherwise had no sources of income, and 

Page was forced to draw down his life savings to support himself and pursue his business 

venture.521 Pa e asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC as a senior advisor on a contin 

In 2008, Page met Alexander Bulatov, a Russian government official who worked at the 

Russian Consulate in New York. 523 Pa e later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelli ence 

officer, 524 

In 2013, Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the 

United States under diplomatic cover, formed a relationship with Page.525 Podobnyy met Page at 

an energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him.526 Podobnyy 

and Page also met in person on multiple occasions, during which Page offered his outlook on the 

future of the energy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energy business. 527 

In a recorded conversation on April 8, 2013, Podobnyy told another intelligence officer that Page 

was interested in business opportunities in Russia.528 In Podobnyy's words, Page "got hooked on 

517 Testimony of Carter Page, Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 40 (Nov. 2, 2017) (exhibit). 

518 Page 3/30/17 302, at 10. 

519 

520 

521 

523 

524 

525 Complaint ,r,r 22, 24, 32, United States v. Buryakov, 1: 15-

mj-215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 20 I 5), Doc. 1 ("Buryakov Complaint"). 

526 Buryakov Complaint ,r 34. 

527 Buryakov Complaint ,r 34. 

528 Buryakov Complaint ,r 32. 

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Gazprom thinking that if they have a project, he could ... rise up. Maybe he can .... [I]t' s obvious 

that he wants to earn lots of money."529 Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by "feed[ing] him 

empty promises" that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page.530 

Podobnyy told the other intelligence officer that his method of recruiting foreign sources was to 

promise them favors and then discard them once he obtained relevant information from them. 53 1 

In 2015, Podobnyy and two other Russian intelligence officers were charged with 

conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government.532 The criminal complaint 

detailed Podobnyy's interactions with and conversations about Page, who was identified only as 

"Male-1."533 Based on the criminal complaint's description of the interactions, Page was aware 

that he was the individual described as "Male-l." 534 Page later spoke with a Russian government 

official at the United Nations General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would 

understand he was "Male-I" from the Podobn laint. 535 Pa e told the official that he "didn't 

do anything" 536 

In interviews with the FBI before the Office's opening, Page acknowledged that he 

understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence 

services, but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them and 

that he did not view this relationship as a backchannel.537 Page told investigating agents that "the 

more immaterial non-public information I give them, the better for this country." 538 

b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work 

In January 2016, Page began volunteering on an informal, unpaid basis for the Trump 

Campaign after Ed Cox, a state Republican Party official, introduced Page to Trump Campaign 

officials.539 Page told the Office that his goal in working on the Campaign was to help candidate 

Trump improve relations with Russia.540 To that end, Page emailed Campaign officials offering 

his thoughts on U.S.-Russia relations, prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia, and 

529 Buryakov Complaint. 

530 Buryakov Complaint. 

531 Buryakov Complaint. 

532 See Buryakov Com laint; see also Indictment United States v. Buryakov, 1: 15-cr-73 (S.D.N. Y. 

537 Page 3/30/17 302, at 6; Page 3/31/17 302, at 1. 

538 Page 3/31/17 302, at 1. 

Feb. 9, 2015), Doc. 10; 

536 Page 3/16/17 302, at 4; 

539 Page 3/16/17 302, at 1; 

540 Page 3/10/17 302, at 2. 

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proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.541 

In communications with Campaign officials, Page also repeatedly touted his high-level 

contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior 

Russian governmental officials. For example, on January 30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior 

Campaign officials stating that he had "spent the past week in Europe and ha[ d] been in discussions 

with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin" who recognized that Trump could have a 

"game-changing effect ... in bringing the end of the new Cold War."542 The email stated that 

" [t]hrough [his] discussions with these high level contacts," Page believed that "a direct meeting 

in Moscow between Mr[.] Trump and Putin could be arran ed."543 Pa e closed the email b 

criticizin U.S. sanctions on Russia.544 

On March 21 , 2016, candidate Trump formally and publicly identified Page as a member 

of his foreign policy team to advise on Russia and the energy sector.546 Over the next several 

months, Page continued providing policy-related work product to Campaign officials. For 

example, in April 2016, Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speech that the 

candidate gave at the Mayflower Hotel,547 see Volume I, Section IV.A.4, infra. In May 2016, Page 

prepared an outline of an energy policy speech for the Campaign and then traveled to Bismarck, 

North Dakota, to watch the candidate deliver the speech.548 Chief policy advisor Sam Clovis 

expressed appreciation for Page's work and praised his work to other Campaign officials.549 

c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow 

Page's affiliation with the Trump Campaign took on a higher profile and drew the attention 

of Russian officials after the candidate named him a foreign policy advisor. As a result, in late 

April 2016, Page was invited to give a speech at the July 2016 commencement ceremony at the 

541 See, e.g., 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.; 3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching a 

following Washington's meddling" in Ukraine); 

"President's Daily Brief' prepared by Page that discussed the "severe de radation ofU.S.-Russia relations 

542 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al. 

543 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al. 

544 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al. 

545 

546 A Transcript of Donald 

Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016); 

547 

548 

with the Washington Post Editorial Board, 

549 See, e.g., 3/28/16 Email, Clovis to Lewandowski et al. (forwarding notes.prepared by Page and 

stating, "I wanted to let you know the type of work some of our advisors are capable of."). 

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New Economic School (NES) in Moscow. 550 The NES commencement ceremony generally 

featured high-profile speakers; for example, President Barack Obama delivered a commencement 

address at the school in 2009.551 NES officials told the Office that the interest in inviting Page to 

speak at NES was' based entirely on his status as a Trump Campaign advisor who served as the 

candidate's Russia expert.

552 Andrej Krickovic, an associate of Page's and assistant professor at 

the Higher School of Economics in Russia, recommended that NES rector Shlomo Weber invite 

Page to give the commencement address based on his connection to the Trump Campaign.553 

Denis Klimentov, an employee ofNES, said that when Russians learned of Page's involvement in 

the Trump Campaign in March 2016, the excitement was palpable.554 Weber recalled that in 

summer 2016 there was substantial interest in the Trump Campaign in Moscow, and he felt that 

bringing a member of the Campaign to the school would be beneficial. 555 

Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES, and he sought approval from 

Trump Campaign officials to make the trip to Russia. 556 On May 16, 2016, while that request was 

still under consideration, Page emailed Clovis, J.D. Gordon, and Walid Phares and suggested that 

candidate Trump take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow.557 On June 

19, 2016, Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the NES event and to reiterate 

that NES "would love to have Mr. Trump speak at this annual celebration" in Page's place.

558 

Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day, saying, "If you want to do this, 

it would be out side [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr. 

Trump will not be able to attend."559 

In early July 2016, Page traveled to Russia for the NES events. On July 5, 2016, Denis 

Klimentov, copying his brother, Dmitri Klimentov,560 emailed Maria Zakharova, the Director of 

the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information and Press Department, about Page's visit and 

his connection to the Trump Campaign.56 1 Denis Klimentov said in the email that he wanted to 

draw the Russian government's attention to Page's visit in Moscow.562 His message to Zakharova 

550 Page 3/16/ 17 302, at 2-3; Page 3/10/ 17 302, at 3. 

551 S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3. 

552 Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4-5; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3. 

553 See Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3. 

554 De. Klimentov 6/9/17 302, at 2. 

555 S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3. 

556 See 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et al. (referring to submission of a "campaign advisor request 

form"). 

557 ; 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et al. 

558 6/19/16 Email, Page to Gordon et al. 

559 6/19/16 Email, Lewandowski to Page et al. 

560 Dmitri Klimentov is a New York-based public relations consultant. 

561 7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated). 

562 7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated). 

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continued: "Page is Trump's adviser on foreign policy. He is a known businessman; he used to 

work in Russia ... . If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him."563 Dmitri 

Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page's visit to see if 

Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government officials.564 The following day, 

Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov-Zakharova email 

thread. Peskov wrote, "I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main 

one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin."565 

On July 7, 2016, Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow at NES. 566 In the 

speech, Page criticized the U.S. government's foreign policy toward Russia, stating that 

"Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often 

hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change."567 

On July 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement.568 After Page delivered 

his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady 

Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on 

Russia had hurt the NES. 569 Page and Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony, 

and Weber recalled that Dvorkovich made statements to Pa e about workin to ether in the 

future. 570 

Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends and associates he knew 

from when he lived in Russia, including Andrey Baranov, a former Gazprom employee who had 

become the head of investor relations at Rosneft, a Russian energy company.572 Page stated that 

he and Baranov talked about "immaterial non-public" information.573 Page believed he and 

Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned 

563 7 /5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated). 

564 Dm. Klimentov 11/27 /18 302, at 1-2. 

565 7 /6/16 Email, Peskov to Klimentov (translated). 

566 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3. 

567 See Carter W. Page, The Lecture of Trump's Advisor Carter Page in Moscow, YouTube 

Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July 7, 2016, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? 

time_continue=28&v= lCYF29saA9w. Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech and slides 

from the speech. See Carter Page, "The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential," Speech 

at National Economic Speech (July 7, 2016). 

568 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3. 

569 Page 3/16/ 17 302, at 3. 

570 S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4. 

571 

572 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 3; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2. 

573 Page 3/30/17 302, at 3. 

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the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing.574 Page recalled mentioning his 

involvement in the Trump Campaign with Baranov, although he did not remember details of the 

conversation.575 Page also met with individuals from Tatneft, a Russian energy company, to 

discuss possible business deals, including having Page work as a consultant.576 

On July 8, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several Campaign officials and 

stated he would send "a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received 

from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here. " 577 

On July 9, 2016, Page emailed Clovis, writing in pertinent part: 

Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke 

before the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr. 

Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the 

vast range of current international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of 

other sources close to the Presidential Administration, it was readily apparent that this 

sentiment is widely held at all levels of government.578 

The Office was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony about who Page 

may have met or communicated with in Moscow; thus, Page's activities in Russia-as described 

in his emails with the Campaign-were not fully explained. 

576 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 7; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2. 

577 

578 

579 

580 

581 

582 

7/8/ 16 Email, Page to Dahl & Gordon. 

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d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign 

In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page traveled to the Republican National 

Convention in Cleveland.583 While there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States 

Sergey Kislyak; that interaction is described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6.a, infra.584 Page later 

emailed Campaign officials with feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the 

Convention, and he wrote that Ambassador Kisl ak was ver worried about candidate Clinton's 

world views.585 

Following the Convention, Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russia foreign 

policy drew the media's attention and began to generate substantial press coverage. The Campaign 

responded by distancing itself from Page, describing him as an "informal foreign policy advisor" 

who did "not speak for Mr. Trump or the campaign."587 On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! News 

reported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private 

communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions policy under a possible 

Trump Administration.588 A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo! News that Page had "no role" in 

the Campaign and that the Campaign was "not aware of any of his activities, past or present."589 

On September 24, 2016, Page was formally removed from the Campaign.590 

Although Page had been removed from the Campaign, after the election he sought a 

position in the Trump Administration.59 1 On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to 

the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a 

Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with "top world leaders" and "effectively 

5

&

3 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3. 

5

&

4 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3. 

5&5 ; 7/23/16 Email, Page to Clovis; 7/25/16 Email, 

Page to Gordon & Schmitz. 

586 

587 See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Tom Hamburger, Trump Advisor's Public Comments, Ties to 

Moscow Stir Unease in Both Parties, Washington Post (Aug. 5, 2016). 

58& Michael Isikoff, US. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo! 

News (Sept. 23, 2016). 

5&9 Michael Isikoff, US. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo! 

News (Sept. 23, 2016); see also 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon (instructing that inquiries about 

Page should be answered with "[h]e was announced as an informal adviser in March. Since then he has 

had no role or official contact with the campaign. We have no knowledge of activities past or present and 

he now officially has been removed from all lists etc."). 

590 Page 3/16/17 302, at 2; see, e.g., 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & S. Miller (discussing 

plans to remove Page from the campaign). 

, "Transition Online Form," 11/14/ 16 -

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responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the 

Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas."592 Page received no response from the Transition Team. 

When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 2016, he met again with at least one 

Russian government official. That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth 

in Volume I, Section IV.B.6, infra. 

4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest 

Members of the Trump Campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the 

National Interest (CNI), principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Dimitri 

Simes. CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government. Simes 

was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. In April 

2016, candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event 

hosted by the National Interest, a publication affiliated with CNI. Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and 

Russian Ambassador Kislyak both attended the event and, as a result, it gained some attention in 

relation to Sessions's confirmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various 

other contacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters, including Russia. 

Jared Kushner also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign. The 

investigation did not identify evidence that the Campaign passed or received any messages to or 

from the Russian government through CNI or Simes. 

a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign 

CNI is a Washington-based non-profit organization that grew out of a center founded by 

former President Richard Nixon.593 CNI describes itself "as a voice for strategic realism in U.S. 

foreign policy," and publishes a bi-monthly foreign policy magazine, the National Interest.594 CNI 

is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose 

members at the relevant time included Sessions, who served as an advisor to candidate Trump on 

national security and foreign policy issues.595 

Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National 

Jnterest.596 Simes was born in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early 

1970s, and joined CNI' s predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endowment for International 

593 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2. 

594 About the Center, CNI, available at https://cftni.org/about/. 

595 Advisory Counsel, CNl, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20161030025331/ 

http://cftni.org/about/advisory-council/; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 3-4; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 4; Sessions 

1/17/18 302, at 16. 

596 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 2. 

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Peace.597 Simes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government 

officials,598 as does CNI collectively. As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie 

Corporation in 2015, CNI has "unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among 

Washington think tanks," 599 in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia 

and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as patt of so-called "Track 11" diplomatic 

· efforts.600 

On March 14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and 

its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the Time Warner Building in New York.601 The idea 

behind the event was to generate interest in CNI's work and recruit new board members for CNI.602 

Along with Simes, attendees at the event included Jared Kushner, son-in-law of candidate 

Trump.603 Kushner told the Office that the event came at a time when the Trump Campaign was 

having trouble securing support from experienced foreign policy professionals and that, as a result, 

he decided to seek Simes's assistance during the March 14 event.604 

Simes and Kushner spoke again on a March 24, 2016 telephone call,605 three days after 

Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short 

notice.606 On March 31, 2016, Simes and Kushner had an in-person, one-on-one meeting in 

Kushner's New York office.607 During that meeting, Simes told Kushner that the best way to 

handle foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign would be to organize an advisory group of 

experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent 

with Trump's voice.608 Simes believed that Kushner was receptive to that suggestion.609 

Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign 

regarding the Campaign's foreign policy positions. For example, on June 17, 2016, Simes sent 

J.D. Gordon an email with a "memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting" 

597 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 19. 

598 Simes 3/27 /18 302, at 10-15. 

599 C000l 1656 (Rethinking US-Russia Relations, CNI (Apr. 18, 2015)). 

600 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 29-30; Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at 3. 

601 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; C00006784 (3/11/16 Email, Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12 p.m.); cf 

Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at 1 (Kissinger was CNI's "Honorary Chairman of the Board"); Boyd 1/24/1 8 302, 

at 2; P. Sanders 2/15/18 302, at 5. 

602 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5-6; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 2. 

603 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302 at 2. 

604 Kushner 4/ 11/ 18 302, at 2. 

605 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6-7. 

606 see Volume I, Section IV.A.2, supra. 

607 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-9. 

608 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-8. 

609 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8; see also Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 2. 

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and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions. The memorandum proposed building 

a "small and carefully selected group of experts" to assist Sessions with the Campaign, operating 

under the assumption "that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign 

policy issues." The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign, including a "new 

beginning with Russia."610 

b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel 

During both their March 24 phone call and their March 31 in-person meeting, Simes and 

Kushner discussed the possibility of CNI hosting a foreign policy speech by candidate Trump.611 

Following those conversations, Simes agreed that he and others associated with CNI would 

provide behind-the-scenes input on the substance of the foreign-policy speech and that CNI 

officials would coordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff, including 

Sessions's chief of staff, Rick Dearborn.612 

In mid-April 2016, Kushner put Simes in contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller 

and forwarded to Simes an outline of the foreign-policy speech that Miller had prepared.

613 Simes 

sent back to the Campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI 

Executive Director Paul Saunders and board member Richard Burt.6 14 Simes received subsequent 

draft outlines from Miller, and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone about substantive 

changes to the speech.615 It is not clear, however, whether CNI officials received an actual draft 

of the speech for comment; while Saunders recalled having received an actual draft, Simes did not, 

and the emails that CNI produced to this Office do not contain such a draft.616 

After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNl's hosting the speech could be 

perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication, the 

National Interest, serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club.617 Kushner 

later requested that the event be moved to the Mayflower Hotel, which was another venue that 

Simes had mentioned during initial discussions with the Campaign, in order to address concerns 

about security and capacity.618 

61 ° C00008187 (6/17/16 Email, Simes to Gordon (3:35:45 p.m.)). 

611 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7. 

612 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8-11; C00008923 (4/6/16 Email, Simes to Burt (2:22:28 p.m.)); Burt 2/9/18 

302, at 7. 

613 C00008551 (4/17/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (2:44:25 p.m.)); C00006759 (4/14/16 Email 

Kushner to Simes & S. Miller (12:30 p.m.)). 

614 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 7; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8. 

615 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8. 

616 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8. 

6 17 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 8; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12; C00003834-43 (4/22/16 Email, Simes to 

Boyd et al. (8:47 a.m.)). 

618 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12, 18; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 11 . 

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On April 25, 2016, Saunders booked event rooms at the Mayflower to host both the speech 

and a VIP reception that was to be held beforehand.

619 Saunders understood that the receptionat which invitees would have the chance to meet· candidate Trump--would be a small event.620 

Saunders decided who would attend by looking at the list of CNI' s invitees to the speech itself and 

then choosing a subset for the reception.621 CNI's invitees to the reception included Sessions and 

Kislyak.622 The week before the speech Simes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to 

the speech, and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump.623 

When the pre-speech reception began on April 27, a receiving line was quickly organized 

so that attendees could meet Trump.624 Sessions first stood next to Trump to introduce him to the 

members of Congress who were in attendance.625 After those members had been introduced, 

Simes stood next to Trump and introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance, including 

Kislyak.626 Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly, but thought it clear that 

Kislyak and Trump had just met for the first time.627 Kislyak also met Kushner during the prespeech reception. The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two, during which Kushner 

recalled Kislyak saying, "we like what your candidate is saying ... it's refreshing."

628 

Several public reports state that, in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech 

reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time.629 Sessions stated to 

investigators, however, that he did not remember any such conversation.630 Nor did anyone else 

affiliated with CNI or the National Interest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between 

Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception.631 It appears that, if a conversation occurred at 

the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view, similar to the exchange 

between Kushner and Kislyak. 

6 19 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 11-12; C00006651-57 (Mayflower Group Sales Agreement). 

620 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12-13. 

621 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12. 

622 C00002575 (Attendee List); C00008536 (4/25/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (4:53:45 p.m.)). 

623 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 19-20. 

624 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21. 

625 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21. 

626 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21. 

627 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21. 

628 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 4. 

629 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Did Trump, Kushner, Sessions Have an Undisclosed Meeting With 

Russian?, NBC News (June 1, 2016); Julia Ioffe, Why Did Jeff Sessions Really Meet With Sergey Kislyak, 

The Atlantic (June 13, 2017). 

630 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22. 

631 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 14, 21; Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 3-4; Heilbrunn 

2/1/18 302, at 6; Statement Regarding President Trump's April 27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at the 

Center for the National Interest, CNI (Mar. 8, 2017). 

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The Office found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after 

the speech, or would have had the opportunity to do so. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing 

Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon,632 and the only witness who accounted for Sessions's 

whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed 

for Capitol Hill.633 Saunders recalled, based in part on a food-related request he received from a 

Campaign staff member, that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the 

airport. 634 

c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI 

In the wake of Sessions' s confirmation hearings as Attorney General, questions arose about 

whether Sessions's campaign-period interactions with CNI apart from the Mayflower speech 

included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters. 

With respect to Kislyak contacts, on May 23, 2016, Sessions attended CNI 's Distinguished Service 

Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C.635 Sessions attended a pre-dinner 

reception and was seated at one of two head tables for the event. 636 A seating chart prepared by 

Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have 

responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event.637 Sessions, however, did not 

remember seeing, speaking with, or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner.638 Although CNI board 

member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner,639 Simes, Saunders, and Jacob 

Heilbrunn--editor of the National Interest-all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May 

23 event.64 ° Kislyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the Office 

obtained. 

In the summer of 2016, CNI organized at least two dinners in Washington, D.C. for 

Sessions to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals.64 1 The dinners included CNIaffiliated individuals, such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. ambassador to 

Afghanistan and Iraq and the person who had introduced Trump before the April 27, 2016 foreign632 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 22; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7. 

633 Luff 1 /30/18 302, at 4. 

634 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 15. 

635 Sessions 1/17 /18 302, at 22; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17. 

636 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17; C00004779-80 (5/23/16 Email, Cantelmo to Saunders & Hagberg 

(9:30: 12 a.m.); C00004362 (5/23/16 Email, Bauman to Cantelmo et al. (2:02:32 a.m.). 

637 C00004362 (5/23/16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et al. (2:02:32 a.m.). 

638 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22. 

639 Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 4. 

640 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 23; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 18; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7. 

641 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 19; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-1 0; Khalilzad 1/9/ 18 

302, at 5. 

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policy speech.642 Khalilzad also met with Sessions one-on-one separately from the,dinners.643 At 

the dinners and in the meetings, the participants addressed U.S. relations with Russia, including 

how U.S. relations with NATO and European countries affected U.S. policy toward Russia.644 But 

the discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia.645 Khalilzad, for example, recalled 

discussing "nation-building" and violent extremism with Sessions.646 In addition, Sessions asked 

Saunders ( of CNI) to draft two memoranda not specific to Russia: one on Hillary Clinton's foreign 

policy shortcomings and another on Egypt.647 

d. Jared Kushner's-Continuing Contacts with Simes 

Between the April 2016 speech at the Mayflower Hotel and the presidential election, Jared 

Kushner had periodic contacts with Simes.648 Those contacts consisted of both in-person meetings 

and phone conversations, which concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in the 

Campaign and how to move forward with the advisory group of foreign policy experts that Simes 

had proposed.649 Simes recalled that he, not Kushner, initiated all conversations about Russia, and 

that Kushner never asked him to set up back-channel conversations with Russians.650 According 

to Simes, after the Mayflower speech in late April, Simes raised the issue of Russian contacts with 

Kushner, advised that it was bad optics for the Campaign to develop hidden Russian contacts, and 

told Kushner both that the Campaign should not highlight Russia as an issue and should handle 

any contacts with Russians with care.651 Kushner generally provided a similar account of his 

interactions with Simes.652 

Among the Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17, 2016, at Simes' s request, 

in Kushner's New York office. The meeting was to address foreign policy advice that CNI was 

providing and how to respond to the Clinton Campaign's Russia-related attacks on candidate 

642 Butt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 1-2, 5. 

643 Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 5-6. 

644 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31; Burt 2/9/ 18 302, at 9-1 O; Khalilzad 1 /9/18 302, at 5. 

645 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 20. 

646 Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 6. 

647 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 19-20. 

648 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. 

649 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. 

650 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. 

651 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. During this period of time, the Campaign received a request for a highlevel Campaign official to meet with an officer at a Russian state-owned bank "to discuss an offer [that 

officer] claims to be canying from President Putin to meet with" candidate Trump. NOSC00005653 

(5/17/16 Email, Dearborn to Kushner (8: 12 a.m.)). Copying Manafort and Gates, Kushner responded, "Pass 

on this. A lot of people come claiming to carry messages. Very few are able to verify. For now I think we 

decline such meetings. Most likely these people go back home and claim they have special access to gain 

importance for themselves. Be careful." NOSC00005653 (5/17/16 Email, Kushner to Dearborn). 

652 Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 11-13. 

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Trump.653 In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a "Russia Policy Memo" laying out 

"what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia."654 In a cover email transmitting that memo and 

a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned "a well-documented story of highly 

questionable connections between Bill Clinton" and the Russian government, "parts of [which]" 

(according to Simes) had even been "discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and 

shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency."655 Kushner 

forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick 

Gates, with the note "suggestion only."656 Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his 

assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.657 (Manafort was on the verge of leaving the 

Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only 

with Kushner). 

During the August 17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information 

that he had romised.658 Simes told Kushner that, 

Simes claimed that he had received this information from former 

CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S. 

intelligence sources, not from Russians.660 

Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the 

Campaign because it was, in Simes's words, "old news."661 When interviewed by the Office, 

Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about 

the Clintons given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes 

information that could be "operationalized" for the Trump Campaign.662 Despite Kushner's 

653 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27 /18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12; C00007269 

(8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et al.); DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafmt 

(5:57:15 p.m.)). 

654 C00007981-84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). The memorandum 

recommended "downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time" and suggested that "some 

tend to exaggerate Putin's flaws." The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russianrelated questions in the framework of "how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national 

interests" and that a Trump Administration "not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." The 

memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including 

questions about Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea. 

655 C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). 

656 DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S. Miller et al. (11 :30: 13 a.m.)). 

657 DJTFP00023484 (8/1 1/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)). 

658 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12. 

659 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27 /l 8 302, at 6. 

660 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30. 

661 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6. 

662 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12. 

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reaction, Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign 

policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions.663 

5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower 

On June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with 

a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the 

Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr. in an email from Robert 

Goldstone, at the request of his then-client Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate developer 

Aras Agalarov. Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr. that the "Crown prosecutor of Russia ... offered 

to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would 

incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as "part of Russia and its government's support 

for Mr. Trump." Trump Jr. immediately responded that "if it's what you say I love it," and arranged 

the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls. 

Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisor Jared Kushner to 

attend the meeting, and both attended. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it 

occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an 

upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the meeting to 

Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of 

learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he 

was made aware of the meeting--or its Russian connection-before it occurred. 

The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously 

worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout 

this period of time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided 

to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to support those claims, but 

Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates then turned to a critique of 

the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on 

Russian officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children. Trump Jr. 

suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected. After the 

election, Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump 

Transition Team did not engage. 

a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting 

i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr. 

Aras Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members of 

the Russian government, including Russia's Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika.664 Aras Agalarov 

is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian 

government construction contracts and that- as discussed above, Volume I, Section IV.A.I, supra 

663 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30. 

at 4. 

664 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, 

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-worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a 

potential Trump Moscow real-estate project.665 The relationship continued over time, as the parties 

pursued the Trump Moscow project in 2013-2014 and exchanged gifts and letters in 2016.

666 For 

example, in April 2016, Trump responded to a letter from Aras Agalarov with a handwritten 

note.667 Aras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump's campaign, passed on "congratulations" for 

winning in the primary and-according to one email drafted by Goldstone-an "offer" of his 

"support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,] especially with 

reference to U.S./Russian relations."668 

On June 3, 2016, Emin Agalarov called Goldstone, Emin's then-publicist.669 Goldstone is 

·a music and events promoter who represented Emin Agalarov from approximately late 2012 until 

late 2016.670 While representing Emin Agalarov, Goldstone facilitated the ongoing contact 

Goldstone recalled that the information that mi ht interest the Trum s involved Hillar Clinton 

between the Trumps and the Agalarovs-includin an invitation that Trum sent to Putin to attend 

the 2013 Miss Universe Pa eant in Moscow.671 

Goldstone understood a 

Russian political connection, and Emin Agalarov indicated that the attorney was a prosecutor. 73 

674 

Kaveladze 

Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 10; -

Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 5-6; 4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone. 

667 RG000033-34 (4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone (attachment)). 

669 Call Records of Robert Goldstone 

Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 6. 

670 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-2; Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, 

at 3. 

671 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-5; DJTJR00008 

(2/29/19 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at 2; 

TR UMPORG _ 18_001 3 25 ( 6/21/13 Email, Goldstone to Graft); TRUMPORG _ 18_001013 ( 6/24/13 Email, 

Goldstone to Graff); TRUMPORG 18 001014 (6/24/13 Email, Graff to Shugart); 

TRUMPORG_l8_001018 (6/26/13 Email, Graffto Goldstone); TRUMPORG_l8_001022 (6/27/13 Email, 

Graff to L. Kelly); TRUMPORG_18_001333 (9/12/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart); 

MUO00004289 (7/27/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart). 

672 

673 

674 

see Goldstone 2/,8/ 18 302, at 6-7. 

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675 

The mentioned by Emin Agalarov was Natalia 

Veselnitskaya. From approximately 1998 until 2001, Veselnitskaya worked as a prosecutor for 

the Central Administrative District of the Russian Prosecutor's Office,677 and she continued to 

perform government-related work and maintain ties to the Russian government following her 

departure.678 She lobbied and testified about the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial 

sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian officials and which was named for a Russian tax 

specialist who exposed a fraud and later died in a Russian prison.679 Putin called the statute "a 

purely political, unfriendly act," and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U.S. 

officials from entering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens.680 

Veselnitskaya performed legal work for Denis Katsyv,681 the son of Russian businessman Peter 

Katsyv, and for his company Prevezon Holdings Ltd., which was a defendant in a civil-forfeiture 

action alleging the laundering of proceeds from the fraud exposed by Magnitsky.682 She also 

675 

676 In December 2018, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment 

charging Veselnitskaya with obstructing the Prevezon litigation discussed in the text above. See Indictment, 

United States v. Natalia Vladimirovna Veselnitskaya, No. 18-cr-904 (S.D.N.Y.). The indictment alleges, 

among other things, that Veselnitskaya lied to the district court about her relationship to the Russian 

Prosecutor General's Office and her involvement in responding to a U.S. document request sent to the 

Russian government. 

677 Veselnitska a 11/20/17 Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 2;-

678 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017) 

at 33; Keir Simmons & Rachel Elbaum, Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr. 

Info on Clinton, NBC News (July 11, 2017); Maria Tsvetkova & Jack Stubbs, Moscow Lawyer Who Met 

Trump Jr. Had Russian Spy Agency As Client, Reuters (July 21, 2017); Andrew E. Kramer & Sharon 

LaFraniere, Lawyer Who Was Said to Have Dirt on Clinton Had Closer Ties to Kremlin than She Let On, 

New York Times (Apr. 27, 2018). · 

679 See Pub. L. No. 112-208 §§ 402, 404(a)(l), 126 Stat. 1502, 1502-1506. Sergei Magnitsky was 

a Russian tax specialist who worked for William Browder, a former investment fund manager in Russia. 

Browder hired Magnitsky to investigate tax fraud by Russian officials, and Magnitsky was charged with 

helping Browder embezzle money. After Magnitsky died in a Russian prison, Browder lobbied Congress 

to pass the Magnitsky Act. See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Turning Tables in Magnitsky Case, Russia 

Accuses Nemesis of Murder, New York Times (Oct. 22, 2017); Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Before 

the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), Exhibits at 1-4; Rosie Gray, Bill Browder 's Testimony 

to the Senate Judiciary Committee, The Atlantic (July 25, 2017). 

680 Ellen Barry, Russia Bars 18 Americans After Sanctions by US, New York Times (Apr. 13, 2013); 

Tom Porter, Supporters of the Magnitsky Act Claim They 've Been Targets of Russian Assassination and 

Kidnapping Bids, Newsweek (July 16, 2017). 

681 Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), 

at 21. 

682 See Veselnitskaya Deel., United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-cv-6326 (S.D.N.Y.); 

see Prevezon Holdings, Second Amended Complaint; Prevezon Holdings, Mem. and Order; Prevezon 

Holdings, Deposition of Oleg Lurie. 

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appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in 

Moscow offering "confidential information" from "the Prosecutor General of Russia" about 

"interactions between certain political forces in our two countries."

683 

I 

Shortly after his June 3 call with Emin Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr.684 The 

email stated: 

Good morning 

Emln just called-and asked me to contact you with something very Interesting. 

The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this morning and in their meeting offered lo provide the Trump campaign with 

some official documents and information that would incriminate HIiiary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father. 

This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and Its government's support for Mr. Trump -helped along by 

Aras and Emin. 

What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emin about it directly? 

I can also send this Info to your father via Rhona, but it Is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first. 

Best 

Rob Goldstone 

Within minutes of this email, Trump Jr. responded, emailing back: "Thanks Rob I appreciate that. 

I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I just speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time 

and if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next 

week when I am back?"685 Goldstone conveyed Trump Jr.'s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing 

that Trump Jr. "wants to speak personally on the issue."686 

On June 6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone ifthere was "[a]ny news," and Goldstone 

explained that Trump Jr. was likely still traveling for the "final elections ... where [T]rurnp will 

be 'crowned' the official nominee."687 On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump Jr. and 

asked when Trump Jr. was "free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info."688 Trump Jr. asked if 

683 See Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at 1-2 & lA (undated one-page document given to congressional 

delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in the 

Russian legal system. See Federal Law on the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation ( 1992, 

amended 2004). 

684 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to 

Donald Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11 :00) Tweet. 

685 DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11 :00) 

Tweet; RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone). 

686 RG000062 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone & Trump Jr.). 

687 RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone); RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to 

A. Agalarov). 

688 RG000065 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to 

Trump Jr.). 

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they could "speak now," and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov.689 

On June 6 and June 7, Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had multiple brief calls.690 

Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a 

meeting in New York with the Trump Organization.691 Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized 

U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras 

Agalarov.692 Kaveladze told the Office that, in a second phone call on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov 

asked Kaveladze ifhe knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis 

for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's business card. According to Kaveladze, Aras Agalarov said 

the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to 

translate. 693 

ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign 

On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and said that "Emin asked that I schedule a 

meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow."694 

Trump Jr. replied that Manafort (identified as the "campaign boss"), Jared Kushner, and Trump 

Jr. would likely attend.695 Go~d to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner 

would attend.696 Kaveladze ---"puzzled" by the list of attendees and that he 

checked with one of Emin Agalarov's assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who said that the purpose 

of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey "negative information on Hillary Clinton."697 

Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not recall having known or said that.698 

Early on June 8, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3 :00 p.m. 

689 DJTJR00445 

and Trump Jr.); 

690 DJTJR00499 ); Call Records 

693 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6. 

694 DJTJR00467 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trum 

Tweet; RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.);

695 DJTJR00469 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11 :00) 

Tweet; RG000071 6/7/16 Email, Trum Jr. to Goldstone); OSC-KAV _00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to 

Kaveladze); 

696 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 7; 

697 

KA V _00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze). 

698 Beniaminov 1 /6/18 302, at 3. 

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meeting the following day with Trump Jr.699 Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of 

his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under 

the subject line "FW: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential," adding a note that the "[m]eeting 

got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices."70 ° Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, 

informing her that the "[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now."701 Manafort responded, "See you 

then. P. "702 

Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the 

Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of 

senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about 

the Clinton Foundation.703 Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a 

group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend. 704 Gates recalled that 

the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, 

Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the 

meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful.705 Hicks denied any 

knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,706 and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 

meeting came up at all earlier that week.707 

Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump' s office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr. 

told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward. 708 

Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.709 From the tenor 

of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his 

father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.710 In an interview with the 

Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the 

699 NOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas). 

700 NOSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort); DJTJR00485 (6/8/16 

Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort). 

701 NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas). 

702 6/8/16 Email, Manafo1t to Trump Jr. 

703 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March l 302 refers to "June 

19," that is likely a typographical error; external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants 

occurred on June 6. See NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et al.). 

704 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting 

indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. See Neil 

MacFarquhar, A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?, 

New York Times (July 16, 2017). 

705 Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. 

706 Hicks 12/7117 302, at 6. 

707 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8. 

708 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6. 

709 Cohen 8/7 /18 302, at 4-5. 

71 ° Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 15-16. 

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emails or the upcoming meeting.711 Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone 

informing candidate Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jr.712 President Trump has stated to 

this Office, in written answers to questions, that he has "no recollection of learning at the time" 

that his son, Manafort, or "Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 

concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton."713 

b. The Events of June 9, 2016 

i. Arrangements for the Meeting 

Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, for appellate proceedings in the Prevezon 

civil forfeiture liti ation.714 That da , Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin, a Soviet-born U.S. 

lobbyist, and when she learned that he was in New York, invited him 

to lunch. Akhmetshin told the Office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky 

Act and had worked on the Prevezon litigation.

716 Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a 

7 11 Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29, 84, 94-95 

(Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not under oath, but Trump Jr. was advised 

that it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation. 

Id. at 10-11. 

712 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10. 

713 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Patts (a)­

(c)). We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous 

knowledge of the June 9 meeting. On June 7, 2016 Trump announced his intention to give "a major speech" 

"probably Monday of next week"-which would have been June 13-about "all of the things that have 

taken place with the Clintons." See, e.g., Phillip Bump, What we know about the Trump Tower meeting, 

Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9 meeting, Trump changed the subject of his planned 

speech to national security. But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was 

connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that 

meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting 

on June 12, could well have caused the change. The President's written answers to our questions state that 

the speech's focus was altered ''[i]n light of' the Pulse nightclub shooting. See Written Responses, supra. 

As for the original topic of the June 13 speech, Trump has said that "he expected to give a speech referencing 

the publicly available, negative inf01mation about the Clintons," and that the draft of the speech prepared 

by Campaign staff"was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the 

book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer." Written Responses, supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did 

speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing from the Clinton Cash book. See 

Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the Election, politico.com (June 22, 2016). 

714 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017) 

at 41 , 42; Alison Frankel, How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into US. for Trump Tower Meeting? 

Reuters, (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranish et al., Russian Lawyer who Met with Trump Jr. Has Long History 

Fighting Sanctions, Washington Post (July 11 , 2017); see OSC-KA VOOl 13 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to 

Kaveladze); RG000073 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; see also 

Prevezon Holdings Order (Oct. 17, 2016). 

715 

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Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitska 

Prevezon case, also attended the lunch.71 7 

meeting 

asked Akhmetshin what she should tell him. According to several participants in the lunch, 

Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and 

the Ziff brothers (Americans with business in Russia , and those individuals subse uentl makin 

olitical donations to the DNC.719 

The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting.721 

ii. Conduct of the Meeting 

Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, while Kaveladze, 

Samochomov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskaya.722 The Office spoke to 

every participant except Veselnitska a and Trum Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntaril 

interviewed b the Office 

Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not 

say anything about the subject of the meeting.725 Participants agreed that Veselnitskaya stated that 

the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton 

Campaign.

726 She asserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering 

717 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 7; Samochornov 7 /13/17 

302, at 2, 4; 

r 

subject matter of the Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch. 

■ Samochomov 7/12/17 302, at 4. In her later Senate statement and interactions with the press, 

Veselnitskaya produced what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting. 

720 

721 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. 

722 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. 

723 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 9. 

724 

725 

726 

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in both the United States and Russia,727 

728 According to Akhmetshin, Trump Jr. asked follow-up 

questions about how the alleged payments could be tied specifically to the Clinton Campaign, but 

Veselnitskaya indicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the United States.729 

Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump Jr. asked what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became 

aggravated and asked " [w]hat are we doing here?"730 

Akhmetshin then spoke about U.S. sanctions imposed under the Magnitsky Act and 

Russia's response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian children.

731 Several participants recalled 

that Trump Jr. commented that Trump is a private citizen, and there was nothing they could do at 

that time.732 Trump Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in 

government.733 Notes that Manafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of the conversation, 

although not all of its details.734 

At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating "waste of time," 

followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that 

732 E.g., Akhmetshin 11/14/ l 7 302, at 12-13; 

733 Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at 12-13; Samochornov 

7/13/17 302, at 3. Trump Jr. confirmed this in a statement he made in July 2017 after news of the June 

20 16 meeting broke. Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee US. Senate 

Washington DC, 115th Cong. 57 (Sept. 7, 2017). 

734 Manafort's notes state: 

Bill browder 

Offshore - Cyprus 

133m shares 

Companies 

Not invest - loan 

Value in Cyprus as inter 

Illici 

Active sponsors ofRNC 

Browder hired Joanna Glover 

Tied into Cheney 

Russian adoption by American families 

PJM-SJC-00000001-02 (Notes Produced to Senate Judiciary Committee). 

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they call him to give him an excuse to leave.

735 Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the 

meeting before it concluded; Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press in 

July 2017.736 

Veselnitskaya's press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from 

other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection 

to the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the 

Clinton Campaign when she met with Trump Campaign officials.737 Veselnitskaya's November 

2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9 

meeting was not to connect with "the Trump Campaign" but rather to have "a private meeting with 

Donald Trump Jr.-a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my 

colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and 

interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress."738 In other words, Veselnitskaya 

claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. No witness, however, recalled any 

reference to Congress during the meeting. Veselnitskaya also maintained that she "attended the 

meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv," the pr,eviously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but 

she did not "introduce [her]self in this capacity."739 

In a July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr. stated that while he had no way to gauge the 

reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting, 

if "someone has information on our opponent ... maybe this is something. I should hear them 

out."740 Trump Jr. fu1ther stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he 

should "listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say."741 Depending on what, if any, 

information was provided, Trump Jr. stated he could then "consult with counsel to make an 

informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration."742 

735 NOSC00003992 (6/9/16 Text Message, Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 9; 

Vargas 4/4/18 302, at 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16 

Email, Kushner to Cain). 

736 Samochornov 7 /12/17 302, at 4; Kushner 4/11/18 

302, at 9-10; see also Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 48-49 

(Sept. 7, 2017). . 

737 Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC News 

(July 11, 2017). 

738 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 

115th Cong. }O(Nov 20, 2017). 

739 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 

115th Cong. 21 (Nov. 20, 2017). 

740 Sean Hannity, Transcript-Donald Trump Jr, Fox News (July 11, 2017). 

741 Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16 (Sept. 7, 2017). 

742 Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17 (Sept. 7, 

2017). 

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Jr.743 After the June 9 meetin According to 

Goldstone, 744 and he told Trump Jr. 

told Emin A alarov 

745 

Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze to 

report in after the meeting, but before Kaveladze could call, Aras Agalarov called him.

747 With 

Veselnitskaya next to him, Kaveladze reported that the meeting had gone well, but he later told 

Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was 

not with lawyers and they were "preaching to the wrong crowd."748 

c. Post-June 9 Events 

Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election 

to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the 

Magnitsky Act.749 On November 23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setting up another 

meeting "with T people" and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on 

June 9.75 ° Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone, stating that "Mr. A," which Goldstone 

understood to mean Aras Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting.751 Goldstone emailed the 

document to Rhona Graff, saying that "Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in 

the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team. If needed, a lawyer representing the case is 

Goldstone 2/8/18 302, 

(and one text message shows) that, shortly after the DNC 

e ts co ecting the DNC hacking announcement to the June 9 

OSC-KA V _00029 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E. 

Agalarov & Kaveladze (10:09 a.m.)). The investigation did not identify evidence connecting the events of 

June 9 to the GRU's hack-and-dump operation. OSC-KA V _00029-30 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E. 

Agalarov). 

746 

747 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records ofike. Kaveladze 

748 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze 

On June 14, 2016 Kaveladze's teenage daughter emailed asking how the June 9 meeting had gone, and 

Kaveladze responded, "meeting was boring. The Russians did not have an bad info on Hilar " OSCKA V _00257 (6/14/16 Email, I. Kaveladze to A. Kaveladze; 

749 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11; 

750 OSC-KA V 00138 11/23/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); 

RG000196 (11/26-29/16 Text Messages, Goldstone & Kaveladze); 

120 

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in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team."752 According 

to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting, but 

Goldstone did not make the request.753 The investigation did not identify evidence of the transition 

team following up. 

Participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting began rece1vmg inqumes from attorneys 

representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017. 754 On approximately 

June 2, 2017, Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, general counsel of the Trump Organization, 

about his participation in the June 9 meeting.

755 The same day, Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya's 

name to Garten, identifying her as the "woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting 

from Moscow. "756 Later in June 2017, Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garten and 

Alan Futerfas, outside counsel for the Trump Organization (and, subsequently, personal counsel 

for Trump Jr.).757 On June 27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject "Trump 

attorneys" and stated that he was "interviewed by attorneys" about the June 9 meeting who were 

"concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia-which he has always denied 

meeting."758 Goldstone stressed that he "did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible 

meeting."759 Emin Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kaveladze.760 

The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017. In a July 9, 2017 text message to Emin 

Agalarov, Goldstone wrote "I made sure I kept you and your father out of [t]his story,"76 1 and "[i]f 

contacted I can do a dance and keep you out of it."762 Goldstone added, "FBI now investigating," 

and "I hope this favor was worth for your dad-it could blow up."763 On July 12, 2017 Emin 

Agalarov complained to Kaveladze that his father, Aras, "never listens" to him and that their 

752 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11; DJTJR00l 18 (11/28/16 

Email, Goldstone to Graff). 

753 

754 

755 

756 RG000256 (6/2/17 Email, Goldstone to Garten). 

757 

758 RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov). 

760 OSC-KA V _01190 (6/27/17 Text Message, E. Agalarov to Kaveladze). 

761 RG000286-87 (7/9/17 Text Messages, E. Agalarov & Goldstone); 

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relationship with "mr T has been thrown down the drain."764 The next month, Goldstone 

commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June 9 meeting had generated, 

stating that his "reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father 

insisted on even though Ike and Me told him would be bad news and not to do."765 Goldstone 

added, "I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father. So am painted as some 

mysterious link to Putin."766 

After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began, representatives from the Trump 

Organization again reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017, Futerfas sent Goldstone an email 

with a proposed statement for Goldstone to issue, which read: 

As the person who arranged the meeting, I can definitively state that th~ statements I have 

read by Donald Trump Jr. are 100% accurate. The meeting was a complete waste of time 

and Don was never told Ms. Veselnitskaya' s name prior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnitskaya 

mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted 

20 to 30 minutes at most. There was never any follow up and nothing ever came of the 

meeting.767 

statement drafted by Trump Organization representatives was 

768 He proposed a different statement, asserting that he had been 

Emin Agalarov - to facilitate a meeting between a Russian 

attorney (Natalia Veselnitzkaya [sic]) and Donald Trump Jr. The lawyer had apparently stated 

that she had some information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia, which she believed Mr. 

Trump Jr. might find interesting."769 Goldstone never released either statement.770 

On the Russian end, there were also communications about what participants should say 

about the June 9 meeting. Specifically, the organization that hired Samochornov- an antiMagnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon-offered to pay 

$90,000 of Samochornov' s legal fees.771 At Veselnitskaya's request, the organization sent 

Samochornov a transcript of a Veselnitskaya press interview, and Samochornov understood that 

the organization would pay his legal fees only if ·he made statements consistent with 

Veselnitskaya's.772 Samochornov declined, telling the Office that he did not want to perjure 

the 

asked "by [his] client in Moscow -

764 OSC-KAV 01197 (7/11-12/17 Text Messages, Kaveladze & E. Agalarov); 

765 Investigative Technique 

766 Investigative Technique 

767 7 /10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten. 

768 

769 7 /10/ 17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten. 

770 

772 

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himself.773 The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya's request to Samochornov stated that he 

did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya' s answers but, in hindsight, 

recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of 

assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnitskaya's account.774 

Volume II, Section 11.G, infra, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump Jr., 

and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June 9 meeting. 

6. Events at the Republican National Convention 

Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the week 

of the Republican National Convention. The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief 

and non-substantive. During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention, 

J.D. Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed 

amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing "lethal" assistance 

to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordon requested that platform committee 

personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only "appropriate" assistance be provided 

to Ukraine. The original sponsor of the "lethal" assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her 

(the sponsor) that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to 

dilute the language. Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he 

acknowledged it was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the 

subject matter. The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the 

candidate to make that proposal. Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the 

proposed language was inconsistent with Trump's position on Ukraine. 

a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the 

Week of the RNC 

In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy 

event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in 

Cleveland, Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention (RNC or 

"Convention").775 Approximately 80 foreign ambassadors to the United States, including Kislyak, 

were invited to the conference.776 

On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference.777 In 

his speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the United States should have better relations with 

773 Samochornov 7 /13/17 302, at 1. 

774 

775 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Allan Smith, We Now Know More About 

why Jeff Sessions and a Russian Ambassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention, Business Insider 

(Mar. 2, 2017). 

776 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Laura DeMarco, Global Cleveland and Sen. Bob Corker Welcome 

International Republican National Convention Guests, Cleveland Plain Dealer (July 20, 2016). 

777 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22. 

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Russia.778 During Sessions's speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have 

been asked by Kislyak.779 • When the speeches concluded, several ambassadors lined up to greet 

the speakers.780 Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said 

in the speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.781 Sessions separately spoke with between 

six and 12 ambassadors, including Kislyak.782 Although Sessions stated during interviews with 

the Office that he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that 

the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said 

some things about U.S.-Russia relations.783 

Later that evening, Gordon attended a reception as part of the conference.784 Gordon ran 

into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food, and they decided to sit at the same table to eat.785 

They were joined at that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump 

Campaign advisor Carter Page.786 As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon 

estimated to have been three to five minutes, during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant 

what he said in his speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.787 

b. Change to Republican Party Platform 

In preparation for the 2016 Convention, foreign policy advisors to the Trump Campaign, 

working with the Republican National Committee, reviewed the 2012 Convention's foreign policy 

platform to identify divergence between the earlier platform and candidate Trump's positions.788 

The Campaign team discussed toning down language from the 2012 platform that identified Russia 

as the country's number one threat, given the candidate's belief that there needed to be better U.S. 

relations with Russia. 789 The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the 

National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10, 2016, the evening before its 

778 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9. 

779 Sessions 1/17 /18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3. 

780 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3. 

781 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9. 

782 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3; see also Volume I, Section IV.A.4.b, supra 

( explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception 

held on April 26, 2016, at the Mayflower Hotel). 

783 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22. 

784 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10. 

785 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10. 

786 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; see also Volume I, Section IV.A.3.d, supra (explaining that Page 

acknowledged meeting Kislyak at this event). 

787 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10. 

788 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10. 

789 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10. 

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0 first meeting to propose amendments.7

~ 

Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the platform, 

the Trump Campaign could request changes, and members of the Trump Campaign attended 

committee meetings.791 John Mashburn, the Campaign's policy director, helped oversee the 

Campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings.792 He told the Office that he 

directed Campaign staff at the Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach 

and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes.

793 

On July 11, 2016, delegate Diana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment that 

included provision of armed support for Ukraine.794 The amendment described Russia's "ongoing 

military aggression" in Ukraine and announced "supp01t" for "maintaining (and, if warranted, 

increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully 

restored" and for "providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater 

coordination with NA TO on defense planning."795 Gordon reviewed the proposed platform 

changes, including Denman's. 

796 Gordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of 

Trump's stated position on Ukraine, which Gordon personally heard the candidate say at the March 

31 foreign policy meeting-namely, that the Europeans should take primary responsibility for any 

assistance to Ukraine, that there should be improved U.S.-Russia relations, and that he did not 

want to start World War III over that region.797 Gordon told the Office that Trump's statements 

on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored those positions to the point where 

Gordon felt obliged to object to the proposed platform change and seek its dilution.798 

On July 11 , 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform 

Subcommittee, Denman offered her amendment.799 Gordon and another Campaign staffer, Matt 

Miller, approached a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further 

discussion.800 Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing " lethal 

790 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 1 0; Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1-2. 

791 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 10. 

792 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 7-8. 

793 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10. 

794 DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 1; 

Denman 6/7 /17 302, at 2. 

795 DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22. 

796 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10-11. 

797 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11; Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 1-2, 5-6. 

798 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 5-6. 

799 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; see DENMAN 000014. 

800 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; Denman 12/4/ 17 302, at 2; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Hoff 

5/26/17 302, at 2. 

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defensive weapons to Ukraine."801 Miller did not have any independent basis to believe that this 

language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon's recollection of the candidate's 

views.802 

According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they 

had to clear the language and that Gordon was "talking to New York."803 Denman told others that 

she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike "lethal defense weapons" from the 

proposal but that she refused. 804 Demnan recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with 

candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true.805 Gordon denied having told 

Denman that he was on the phone with Trump, although he acknowledged it was possible that he 

mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter.806 Gordon's phone 

records reveal a call to Sessions's office in Washington that afternoon, but do not include calls 

directly to a number associated with Trump.807 And according to the President's written answers 

to the Office's questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the 

platform amendment. 808 

Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn, a senior foreign policy advisor, and 

Mashburn, the Campaign policy director. Gordon stated that he connected with both of them (he 

could not recall if by phone or in person) and apprised them of the language he took issue with in 

the proposed amendment. Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that 

all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation ("appropriate assistance").809 

Dearborn recalled Gordon warning them about the amendment, but not weighing in because 

Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign's foreign policy stance.810 Mashburn stated that 

Gordon reached him, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that 

the Campaign should not intervene.

811 

When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings, the subcommittee 

changed the amendment by striking the "lethal defense weapons" language and replacing it with 

80 1 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 3. 

802 M. Miller 10/25/ 17 302 at 3. 

803 Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2. 

804 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2. 

805 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2-3, 3-4; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2. 

806 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7. 

807 Call Records of J.D. Gordon . Gordon stated to the Office that 

his calls with Sessions were unrelated to the platform change. Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7. 

808 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, 

Part (f)). 

809 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6-7; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11. 

810 Dearborn 11 /28/17 302, at 7-8. 

811 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4. 

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"appropriate assistance."812 Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately 

agreed to replace the language about armed assistance with "appropriate assistance."8 13 The 

subcommittee accordingly approved Denman's amendment but with the term "appropriate 

assistance."814 Gordon stated that, to his recollection, this was the only change sought by the 

Campaign.815 Sam Clovis, the Campaign's national co-chair and chief policy advisor, stated he 

was surprised by the change and did not believe it was in line with Trump's stance.816 Mashburn 

stated that when he saw the word "appropriate assistance," he believed that Gordon had violated 

Mashburn's directive not to intervene.817 

7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak 

Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaign officials with 

responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio-among them Sessions and Gordon-in the weeks 

after the Convention. The Office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coordination 

between the Campaign and the Russian government. 

a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's 

Residence 

On August 3, 2016, an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United 

States wrote to Gordon " [ o ]n behalf of' Ambassador Kislyak inviting Gordon "to have 

breakfast/tea with the Ambassador at his residence" in Washington, D.C. the following week.818 

Gordon responded five days later to decline the invitation. He wrote, "[t]hese days are not optimal 

for us, as we are busily knocking down a constant stream of false media stories while also preparing 

for the first debate with HRC. Hope to take a raincheck for another time when things quiet down 

a bit. Please pass along my regards to the Ambassador." 819 The investigation did not identify 

evidence that Gordon made any other arrangements to meet ( or met) with Kislyak after this email. 

b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak 

Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions' s Senate 

office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak. 820 At the time, Sessions was a member of the 

812 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3; see Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2-3; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11 . 

8 13 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11 ; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 12. 

814 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3. 

81·5 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6. 

816 Clovis 10/3/17 302, at 10-11. 

81 7 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4. 

818 DJTFP00004828 (8/3/16 Email, Pchelyakov [embassy@russianembassy.org] to Gordon). 

819 DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to embassy@russianembassy.org). 

820 Luff 1 /30/18 302, at 5. 

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Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign officials in that capacity.82 1 But 

Sessions's staff reported, and Sessions himself acknowledged, that meeting requests from 

ambassadors increased substantially in 2016, as Sessions assumed a prominent role in the Trump 

Campaign and his name was mentioned for potential cabinet-level positions in a future 

Trump Administration. 822 

On September 8, 2016, Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office. 823 Sessions said 

that he believed he was doing the Campaign a service by meeting with foreign ambassadors, 

including Kislyak. 824 He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff: 

Sandra Luff, his legislative director; and Pete Landrum, who handled military affairs.825 The 

meeting lasted less than 30 minutes. 826 Sessions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missiledefense system to Iran, Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian 

aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova. 827 Kislyak offered 

explanations on these issues and complained about NA TO land forces in former Soviet-bloc 

countries that border Russia. 828 Landrum recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential 

campaign as "an interesting campaign,"829 and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the 

Russian government was receptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign.830 

None of the attendees, though, remembered any discussion of Russian election interference or any 

request that Sessions convey information from the Russian government to the Trump Campaign. 831 

During the meeting, Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U.S.-Russia relations with 

him over a meal at the ambassador's residence. 832 Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak 

extended the invitation. After the meeting ended, Luff advised Sessions against accepting the oneon-one meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an "old school KGB guy."833 Neither Luff 

nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made any further effort to dine 

821 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5. 

822 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/ 18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 3-5. 

823 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. 

824 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. 

825 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5-6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5 (stating he 

could not remember if election was discussed). 

826 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5. 

827 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5. 

828 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302 at 4-5. 

829 Landrum 2/27/1 8 302, at 5. 

830 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. Sessions also noted that ambassadors came to him for information 

about Trump and hoped he would pass along information to Trump. Sessions 1/17118 302, at 23-24. 

831 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27 / l 8 302, at 5. 

832 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4. 

833 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5. 

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or meet with Kislyak before the November 2016 election.834 Sessions and Landrum recalled that, 

after the election, some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak.835 

According to Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between 

Sessions and Kislyak, two other ambassadors, and the Governor of Alabama. 836 Sessions, 

however, was in New York on the day of the anticipated meeting and was unable to attend.837 The 

investigation did not identify evidence that the two men met at any point after their September 8 

meeting. 

8. Paul Manafort 

Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign, including a period as campaign chairman, 

from March to August 2016.838 Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for 

Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. 

Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin 

Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev and who 

the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. 

Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee, 

839 

to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign-including internal polling data, 

although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to 

share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such 

polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign. 

834 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5. 

835 Sessions 1/17 /l 8 302, at 23. 

836 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. 

837 Sessions 1/ 17/18 302, at 23. 

838 On August 21, 2018, Manafo1t was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on eight tax, 

Foreign Bank Account Registration (FBAR), and bank fraud charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort 

pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to 

commit offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign Agents 

Registration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness 

tampering). Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern 

District of Virginia, but as to which the jury hung. The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort's 

work in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work, as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended. 

On March 7, 2019, Manafort was sentenced to 47 months of imprisonment in the Virginia prosecution. On 

March 13, the district court in D.C. sentenced Manafo1t to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the 

Count 1 conspiracy (with 30 of those months to run concurrent to the Virginia sentence), and 13 months on 

the Count 1 conspiracy, to be served consecutive to the other two sentences. The two sentences resulted in 

a total term of 90 months. 

839 As noted in Volume I, Section III.D. l .b, supra, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in 

the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. He 

has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. See also 

Transcript at 16, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., l :17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 514 

("Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript") (court's explanation of reasons to credit Oates's statements in one 

instance). 

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Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and 

conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016, in New York 

City. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian 

President Viktor Y anukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was about a peace 

plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a "backdoor" means for Russia to 

control eastern Ukraine. Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an 

email to Manafort expressing the view-which Manafort later said he shared-that the plan' s 

success would require U.S. support to succeed: "all that is required to start the process is a very 

minor 'wink' ( or slight push) from [Donald Trump ]."840 The email also stated that if Manafort 

were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his 

reception in Russia "at the very top level." 

Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four 

occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2: December 2016 (the Kilimnik email 

described above); January 2017; February 2017; and again in the spring of 2018. The Office 

reviewed numerous Manafort email and text communications, and asked President Trump about 

the plan in written questions.841 The investigation did not uncover evidence ofManafort's passing 

along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or 

the Administration. The Office was not, however, able to gain access to all of Manafort' s 

electronic communications (in some instances, messages were sent using encryption applications). 

And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new 

Administration about the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan 

and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that 

the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement. 842 

The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's ur ose in sharin 

with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Manafort did not see 

a downside to sharing campaign information, and told Gates that his role in the Campaign would 

. . . .. . I I' · . . • 

Investigative Technique 

841 According to the President's written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating 

to him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Written 

Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 16-17 (Response to Question IV, Part (d)). 

842 Manafort made several false statements during debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Office 

determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The 

judge presiding in Manafort's D.C. criminal case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort 

intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning his 

interactions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the report 

refers at times to Manafort' s statements, it does so only when those statements are sufficiently corroborated 

to be trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of 

evidentiary value, or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to 

determine whether that explanation was credible. 

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be "good for business" and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed 

in the Ukraine. As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with 

him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a "disagreement"-a reference to 

one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort' s credibility and our 

limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik, 

the Office could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The 

Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort' s sharing polling data and 

Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the 

time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise 

coordinated with the Russian government on its election-interference efforts. 

a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine 

Manafort' s Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem from his 

consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political 

consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including through his company Dl\1P International 

LLC (DMI). Kilimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to 

communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. Kilimnik, who speaks and writes 

Ukrainian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort's communications with Deripaska and 

Ukrainian oligarchs. 

i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work 

In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who 

has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with 

Vladimir Putin.843 A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in 

2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits 

that the work could confer on "the Putin Government."844 Gates described the work Manafort did 

for Deripaska as "political risk insurance," and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install 

friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.845 Manafort's 

company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions 

of dollars by Deripaska as well.846 

In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners 

L.P. ("Pericles"), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner 

Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe.847 

Deripaska was the sole investor.848 Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led 

843 Pinchuk et al. , Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China, Reuters (June 8, 2018). 

844 6/23/05 Memo, Manafort & Davis to Deripaska & Rothchild. 

845 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 7. 

846 Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5; Manafort Income by Year, 2005 - 2015; Manafort Loans from 

Wire Transfers, 2005 - 2015. 

847 Gates 3/12/18 302, at 5. 

848 Manafort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11. 

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to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska.849 In pa1ticular, when the 

fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009, 

Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had "dried up."850 According to Gates, various 

interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to 

resolve the legal dispute. 851 As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others 

engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation. 

ii. Political Consulting Work 

Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov, a Ukrainian oligarch 

who hired Manafort as a political consultant.852 In 2005, Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in 

political work supporting the Party of Regions,853 a political party in Ukraine that was generally 

understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power, and 

its candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and 

trusted political advisor to Y anukovych during his time as President of Ukraine. Y anukovych 

served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests.854 

iii. Konstantin Kilimnik 

Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a 

longtime Manafort employee.855 Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his 

senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including 

Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs.856 Kilimnik also maintained a relationship with 

Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin,857 a Russian national who previously served in the defense 

attache office of the Russian Embassy to the United States.

858 

849 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9. 

850 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 6. 

851 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9-10. 

852 Manafort 7 /30/14 302, at 1; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2. 

853 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5-6. 

854 Gates 3/16/18 302, at 1; Davis 2/8/18 302, at 9; Devine 7/6/18 302, at 2-3. 

855 Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. 

Department of State. 

856 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8; Gates 1/3 1/18 302, at 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 

302, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11. 

857 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8. 

858 Boyarkin Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. 

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Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian 

"spy."859 The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.860 Several 

pieces of the Office's evidence-including witness interviews and emails obtained through courtauthorized search warrants-support that assessment: 

• Kilimnik was born on April 27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Ob last, then of the Soviet Union, 

and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.

861 Sam 

Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik,862 stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a 

translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian 

armament industry selling arms and military equipment. 863 

• U.S. government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United 

States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997. 864 

• Kilimnik worked for the International Republican Institute' s (IRI) Moscow office, where 

he did translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005.865 While 

another official recalled the incident differently,

866 one former associate of Kilimnik's at 

TRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian 

intelligence were too strong. The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that 

Kilimnik had links to the Russian government.867 

• Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI 

Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After 

Hawker's work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian 

859 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. 

860 The Office has noted Kilimnik's assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings. 

E.g. , Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., 1 :17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 

2017), Doc. 73, at 2 ("Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify"). 

861 12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. 

862 In August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign 

Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld 

documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian 

election interference. Plea Agreement, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1: 18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 

2018), Doc. 6; Statement of Offense, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1: 18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31 , 

2018), Doc. 7. 

863 Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5-6. 

864 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. 

865 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 1-2. 

866 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 2. 

867 Lenzi 1 /30/18 302, at 2. 

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government entity on a public-relations project that would promote, in Western and 

Ukrainian media, Russia's position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea. 868 

• Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a "spy," a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker, 

and Alexander van der Zwaan,869 an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for 

the Ukrainian Ministry of ForeignAffairs.870 

Investigative Technique 

b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign 

i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign 

Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March 

29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign's "Convention 

Manager."871 On May 19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief 

strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy 

campaign chairman.872 

Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump. 873 In 

early 2016, at Manafort' s request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Mana fort join the Campaign 

to manage the Republican Convention.874 Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately 

1980 until the mid-l 990s through various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in 

1982 when Trump hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying firm.875 Over the years, 

Manafort saw Trump at political and social events in New York City and at Stone's wedding, and 

Trump requested VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafort.876 

868 Hawker 1/9/18 302, at 13; 3/18/14 Email, Hawker & Tulukbaev. 

869 van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to making 

false statements to the Special Counsel's Office. Plea Agreement, United States v. Alex van der Zwaan, 

1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2018), Doc. 8. 

870 Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4; van der Zwaan 11/3/17 302, at 22. Manafort said in an interview that 

Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik's going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafort 10/16/18 

302, at 7. 

871 Press Release-DonaldJ. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager PaulJ. Manafort, 

The American Presidency Project - U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar. 29, 2016). 

872 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 8; Meghan Keneally, Timeline of Manafort 's role in the Trump Campaign, 

ABC News (Oct. 20, 2017). 

873 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8; Manafort 9/1 1/18 302, at 1-2; Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3. 

874 Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8. 

875 Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6. 

876 Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6. 

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According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in 

Florida to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time.877 Manafort agreed to work on the 

Campaign without pay. Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time, but resuscitating 

his domestic political campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future. Gates reported 

that Manafort intended, if Trump won the Presidency, to remain outside the Administration and 

monetize his relationship with the Administration. 878 

ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts 

Immediately upon joining the Campaign, Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review 

separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris 

Kolesnikov,879 the last three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc 

officials. 880 The memoranda described Manafort' s appointment to the Trump Campaign and 

indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates 

emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort' s appointment to Kilimnik for 

translation and dissemination.881 Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages 

had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends" 

the media coverage of his new role. 882 Kilimnik replied, "Absolutely. Every article." Manafort 

further asked: "How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation 

seen?" Kilimnik wrote back the same day, "Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor 

[Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."883 

Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be "good for 

business" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million 

he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine.884 Gates also explained to the 

Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help "confirm" that Deripaska had 

dropped the Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska ( as 

877 Gates 2/2/18 3 02, at IO. 

878 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4. 

879 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11. 

" 0 See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort's Trial Isn't About Russia, but It Will Be in the Air, New York 

Times (July 30, 2018); Tierney Sneed, Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting in 

Ukraine, Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov, How Pro-Russian Forces_ Will Take 

Revenge on Ukraine, Atlantic Council (Sept. 23, 2018); Sergii Leshchenko, Ukraine's Oligarchs Are Still 

Calling the Shots, Foreign Policy (Aug. 14, 2014); Interfax-Ukraine, Kolesnikov: Inevitability of 

Punishment Needed for Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine, Kyiv Post (June 23, 2018); Igor Kossov, 

Kyiv Hotel Industry Makes Room for New Entrants, Kyiv Post (Mar. 7, 2019); Markian Kuzmowycz, How 

the Kremlin Can Win Ukraine's Elections, Atlantic Council (Nov. 19, 2018). The Opposition Bloc is a 

Ukraine political party that largely reconstituted the Party of Regions. 

881 3/30/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik. 

882 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik. 

883 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik. 

884 Gates 2/2/18 3 02, at 10. 

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discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against 

Manafort.

885 Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that Deripaska 

could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be 

helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other 

ways as well. 886 Gates stated, however, that Manafort never told him anything specific about what, 

if anything, Manafort might be offering Deripaska. 887 

Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send 

Kilimnik Campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kilimnik, in turn, could share 

it with Ukrainian oli archs. 888 Gates understood that the information would also be shared with 

Deripaska . 

889 Gates reported to the Office 

that he did not know why Manafort wanted him to send polling information, but Gates thought it 

was a way to showcase Manafort's work, and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs after the 

Trump Campaign ended. 890 Gates said that Manafort's instruction included sending internal 

polling data prepared for the Trump Campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio.891 Fabrizio had worked 

with Manafort for years and was brought into the Campaign by Manafort. Gates stated that, in 

accordance with Manafort's instruction, he periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp; 

Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis. 892 Gates further told the Office that, after 

Manafort left the Campaign in mid-August, Gates sent Kilimnik polling data less frequently and 

that the data he sent was more publicly available information and less internal data. 893 

with multiple emails that 

Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between late July and mid-August of 2016. 

Those emails referenced "internal polling," described the status of the Trump Campaign and 

885 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11 ; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2. 

886 Gates 2/2/18 3 02, at 12. 

887 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12. 

888 Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17; Gates 9/27 /18 302 (serial 740), at 2. In a later interview with the 

Office, Gates stated that Manafmt directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May 7, 2016 meeting 

between Manafmt and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8.b.iii, infra. Gates 

11/7/18 302, at 3. 

889 Gates 9/27/18 302, Part II, at 2; 

890 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 10; Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17. 

891 Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2; Gates 2/7/18 302, at 15. 

892 Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17. 

893 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 11-12. According to Gates, his access to internal polling data was more 

limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaign at that point. 

894 

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and assessed Trump's prospects for 

Gates to send Kilimnik internal data, 

The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the 

communications with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates's account. For example, in 

response to a July 7, 20 I 6, email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort' s failed Deripaskabacked investment, Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on "this issue 

with our friend."897 Gates stated that "our friend" likely referred to Deripaska,

898 and Manafort 

told the Office that the "issue" (and "our biggest interest," as stated below) was a solution to the 

Deripaska-Pericles issue.899 Kilimnik replied: 

I am carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest. 

Our friend [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in 

his boss' [Deripaska's] mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to 

you pretty soon, understanding all the time sensitivity. I am more than sure that it will be 

resolved and we will get back to the original relationship with V. 's boss [Deripaska].900 

Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's "boss," a reference to 

Deripaska, "that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate."901 Manafort has alleged to 

the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an 

example: why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate.902 Manafort 

said he never gave Deripaska a briefing.903 Manafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would 

want to use Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and 

elsewhere.904 

895 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Dirkse; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Schultz; 8/18/ 16 Email, Kilimnik 

to Marson; 7/27/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/ 18/ 16 Email, Kilimnik to 

Jackson; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Mendoza-Wilson; 8/19/16 Email, Kilimnik to Patten. 

896 

897 7/7/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik. 

898 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13. 

899 Manafort 9/ 11/18 302, at 6. 

900 7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort. 

901 7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13. 

902 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6. 

903 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6. 

904 Manafort 9/ 11 /18 302, at 6. 

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iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik 

in the United States 

Manafort twice met with Kilimnik in person during the campaign period-once in May 

and again in August 2016. The first meeting took place on May 7, 2016, in New York City.905 In 

the days leading to the meeting, Kilimnik had been working to gather information about the 

political situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from a trip that former Party of 

Regions official Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to Moscow-a trip that likely included meetings 

between Boyko and high-ranking Russian officials.906 Kilimnik then traveled to Washington, D.C. 

on or about May 5, 2016; while in Washington, Kilimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State 

Department employees.907 

Late on the evening of May 6, Gates arranged for Kilimnik to take a 3:00 a.m. train to meet 

Mana fort in New York for breakfast on May 7. 908 According to Manafort, during the meeting, he 

and Kilimnik talked about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump 

Campaign, expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and 

elsewhere.909 Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort's position on 

the Campaign was an opportunity, but Kilimnik did not ask for anything. 91 ° Kilimnik spoke about 

a plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base 

for the Opposition Bloc.911 Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after the meeting with 

Manafort. 

Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City 

on the evening of August 2, 2016. The events leading to the meeting are as follows. On July 28, 

2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow.

912 The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort 

requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day.913 In an 

email with a subject line "Black Caviar," Kilimnik wrote: 

I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We 

spent about 5 hours talking about his story, and I have several important messages from 

him to you. He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it 

by you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it. ... It has to do about the future of his 

905 Investigative Technique 

906 4/26/16 Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 6-7; 

Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3. 

907 5/7/16 Email, Kilimnik to Charap & Kimmage; 5/7/16 Email, Kasanofto Kilimnik. 

908 5/6/16 Email, Manafort to Gates; 5/6/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik. 

909 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. 

910 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. 

91 1 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. 

912 7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to katrin@yana.kiev.ua (2: 17:34 a.m.). 

913 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.111.). 

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country, and is quite interesting.914 

Manafort identified "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" as Yanukovych. He 

explained that, in 2010, he and Y anukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election. 

Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately $30,000 to 

$40,000.915 Manafort's identification ofYanukovych as "the guy who gave you your biggest black 

caviar jar" is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow-where Yanukovych resided-when 

Kilimnik wrote "I met today with~ a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik 

referred to Yanukovych as "BG,"-916 Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July 29 

email, "Tuesday [August 2] is best . .. Tues or weds in NYC."9 17 

Three days later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that 

same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed "about 2 hours" for their meeting "because it is a long 

caviar story to tell."918 Kilimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August 2 at 7:30 p.m., and 

he and Manafort agreed to a late dinner that night.919 Documentary evidence- including flight, 

phone, and hotel records, and the timing of text messages exchanged920-confirms the dinner took 

place as planned on August 2.921 

As to the contents of the meeting itself, the accounts of Manafort and Gates-who arrived 

late to the dinner-differ in certain respects. But their versions of events, when assessed alongside 

available documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten, indicate 

that at least three principal topics were discussed. 

First, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in 

Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region ofDonbas,922 

914 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.). 

915 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 3. 

916 7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik; Investigative Technique 

917 7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik. 

918 7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik. 

919 7/3 1/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik. 

92° Kilimnik 8/2/16 CBP Record; Call Records of Konstantin Kilimnik 

- ; Call Records of Rick Gates ; 8/2-3/16, Kilimnik Park Lane Hotel 

Receipt. 

921 Deripaska' s private plane also flew to Teterboro Airport in New Jersey on the evening of August 

2, 2016. According to Customs and Border Protection records, the only passengers on the plane were 

Deripaska's wife, daughter, mother, and father-in-law, and separate records obtained by our Office confirm 

that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight to New York. 

922 The Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, which are located in the Donbas region of 

Ukraine, declared themselves independent in response to the popular unrest in 2014 that removed President 

Yanukovych from power. Pro-Russian Ukrainian militia forces, with backing from the Russian military, 

have occupied the region since 2014. Under the Yanukovych-backed plan, Russia would assist in 

withdrawing the military, and Donbas would become an autonomous region within Ukraine with its own 

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and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.923 

That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a "backdoor" means for Russia to control 

eastern Ukraine.924 Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would 

have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace 

plan, and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and 

Ukraine to support the plan.925 Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik 

that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall Kilimnik askin 

Manafort 926 to reconsider the Ian after their Au ust 2 meetin . Manafort said 

that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending-years later-an "urgent" 

request when Yanukovych needed him.927 When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on 

or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan 

again in that email.928 

~ary 2017 meetings with Manafort 

Manafort ultimately acknowled ed Kilimnik also raised the eace Ian in 

.......... 929 

Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's 

plan to win the election.930 That briefing encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal 

polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of "battleground" states, which 

Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.931 Manafort did not 

refer ex licit! to "battle round" states in his tellin of the Au ust 2 discussion, 

prime minister. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the 

region as prime minister of the republic, and facilitate the reintegration of the re~aine with the 

support of the U.S. and Russian presidents. As noted above, according to ~ the written 

documentation describin the Ian, for the lan to work, both U.S. and Russian support were necessary. 

2/21/18 Email, Manafort, Ward, & Fabrizio, at 3-5. 

925 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4. 

926 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4. 

927 

302, at 4. 

Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/12/18 

928 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4; Investigative Technique 

929 Documentary 

evidence confirms the peace-plan discus~ions in 2018. 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward (forwarding email 

from Manafort); 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio. 

930 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. 

931 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 3, 5. 

932 

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Third, according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed 

two sets of financial disputes related to Mana fort's previous work in the region. Those consisted 

of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for 

his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment.933 

After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both. stated that they left separately from Kilimnik 

because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his 

connections to Kilimnik.934 

c. Post-Resignation Activities 

Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two 

weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political 

consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, 

Manafort continued to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election. 

Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump,935 and some 

of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016, 

Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the 

Campaign make the case against Clinton "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment" 

and that "Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible 

way - by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."936 Later, in a 

November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled "Securing the Victory," Manafort stated that he was 

"really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory," and 

that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by "mov[ing] immediately 

to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that 

the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results."

937 

Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the Office that, in the 

wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an Administration job. Manafort instead 

preferred to stay on the "outside," and monetize his campaign position to generate business given 

his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.938 Manafort 

appeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and 

China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entaii.939 

Manafort' s activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia. The 

933 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2-4; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7. 

934 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. 

935 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 12. 

936 NOSC000215 l 7-20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafo11 to Kushner). 

937 NOSC00021573-75 (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner). 

938 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4. 

939 Manafo11 9/12/18 302, at 1. 

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first meeting, which took place in Madrid, Spain in January 2017, was with Georgiy Oganov. 

Oganov, who had previously worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States, was a senior 

executive at a Deripaska company and was believed to report directly to Deripaska.940 Manafort 

initially denied attending the meeting. When he later acknowledged it, he claimed that the meeting 

had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit.941 Other evidence, 

however, provides reason to doubt Manafort's statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the 

Pericles lawsuit. In particular, text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kilimnik 

suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin-not Manafort's counsel-had arranged the meeting between 

Manafort and Oganov.942 Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be "not 

about money or Pericles" but instead "about recreating [the] old friendship"-ostensibly between 

Manafort and Deripaska-"and talking about global politics."943 Manafort also replied by text that 

he "need[s] this finished before Jan. 20,"944 which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles 

before the inauguration. 

On January 15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed K.T. 

McFarland, who was at that time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was 

formally appointed to that position on January 20, 2017.945 Manafort's January 15 email to 

McFarland stated: "I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my 

travels over the last month."946 Manafort told the Office that the email referred to an issue 

regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month.947 

Either way, McFarland- who was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafort inquiryappears not to have responded to Manafort. 948 

Manafort told the Office that around the time of the Presidential Inauguration in January, 

he met with Kilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hotel in 

Alexandria, Virginia.949 During this meeting, Kilimnik again discussed the Y anukovych peace 

plan that he had broached at the August 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8, 2016 message 

found in Kilimnik' s DMP email account.950 In that December 8 email, which Manafort 

94° Kalashnikova 5/17/18 302, at 4; Gary Lee, Soviet Embassy's Identity Crisis, Washington Post 

(Dec. 20, 1991); Georgy S. Oganov Executive Profile & Biography, Bloomberg (Mar. 12, 2019). 

941 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7. 

942 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik. 

943 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik; Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 5. 

944 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik. 

945 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn. 

946 1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn. 

947 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7. 

948 1 /15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18-19. 

949 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7; Manafort 9/21/18 

302, at 3; 1/19/17 & 1/22/17 Kilimnik CBP Records, Jan. 19 and 22, 2017; 2016-1 7 Text Messages, 

Kilimnik & Patten, at 1-2. 

950 Investigative Technique 

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acknowledged having read,951 Kilimnik wrote, "[a]ll that is required to stait the process is a very 

minor 'wink' (or slight push) from DT"-an apparent reference to President-elect Trump-"and 

a decision to authorize you to be a 'special representative' and manage this process." Kilimnik 

assured Manafort, with that authority, he "could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia 

[Y anukovych] guarantees your reception at the very top level," and that "DT could have peace in 

Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration."952 

On February 26, 2017, Manafort met Kilimnik in Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown from 

Moscow.956 In his first two interviews with the Office, Manafort denied meeting with Kilimnik 

on his Madrid trip and then-after being confronted with documentary evidence that Kilimnik was 

in Madrid at the same time as him-recognized that he met him in Madrid. Manafort said that 

Kilimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called "black ledger" payments to 

Manafort that was bein conducted b Ukraine's National Anti-Corru tion Bureau.957 

Manafort remained in contact with Kilimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018. 

951 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6; 

952 Investigative Technique 

956 2/21 /17 Email, Zatynaiko to Kilimnik. 

957 Manafort 9/13/18 302, at I. 

958 In resolving whether Manafort breached 

his cooperation plea agreement by lying to the Office, the district court found that Manafort lied about, 

among other things, his contacts with Kilimnik regarding the peace plan, including the meeting in Madrid. 

Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript, at 29-31, 40. 

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Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office,

959 and 

the Ukraine peace plan. In early 2018, Manafort retained his longtime polling firm to craft a draft 

poll in Ukraine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kilimnik, and worked 

with Kilimnik to formulate the polling questions.960 The primer sent to the pollsters specifically 

called for the United States and President Trump to support the Autonomous Republic of Donbas 

with Yanukovych as Prime Minister,961 and a series of questions in the draft poll asked for opinions 

on Yanukovych's role in resolving the conflict in Donbas.962 (The poll was not solely about 

Donbas; it also sought participants' views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as they pertained to 

the 2019 Ukraine presidential election.) 

The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to 

the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration. Kilimnik continued his efforts 

to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch (e.g., U.S. Department of State) into the summer 

of 2018.963 

B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts 

Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Beginning immediately after the 

election, individuals connected to the Russian government started contacting officials on the 

Trump Campaign and Transition Team through multiple channels-sometimes through Russian 

Ambassador Kislyak and at other times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through 

U.S. persons not formally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team. The most senior levels of the 

Russian government encouraged these efforts. The investigation did not establish that these efforts 

reflected or constituted coordination between the Trump Campaign and Russia in its electioninterference activities. 

1. Immediate Post-Election Activity 

As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President, Russian government 

officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new 

Administration. They appeared not to have preexisting contacts and struggled to connect with 

senior officials around the President-Elect. As explained below, those efforts entailed both official 

contact through the Russian Embassy in the United States and outreaches-sanctioned at high 

levels of the Russian government-through business rather than political contacts. 

959 Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, at 2; Superseding Indictment ,r,r 48-51, 

United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., 1: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018), Doc. 318. 

960 2/12/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort & Ward; 2/16/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort; 2/19/18 

Email, Fabrizio to Ward; 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio. 

961 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio (7:16:49 a.m.) (attachment). 

962 3/9/18 Email, Ward to Manafort & Fabrizio (attachment). 

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a. Outreach from the Russian Government 

At approximately 3 a.m. on election night, Trump Campaign press secretary Hope Hicks 

received a telephone call on her personal cell phone from a person who sounded foreign but was 

calling from a number with a DC area code.964 Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the 

person, she could make out the words "Putin call."965 Hicks told the caller to send her an email.966 

The following morning, on November 9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian 

Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line, 

"Message from Putin."967 Attached to the email was a message from Putin, in both English and 

Russian, which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to convey to the President-Elect.968 In the message, Putin 

offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he "look[ ed] forward to 

working with [Trump] on leading Russian-American relations out of crisis."969 

Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, "Can you look into this? Don't want to get 

duped but don't want to blow off Putin!"97 ° Kushner stated in Congressional testimony that he 

believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the 

Russian Ambassador, whom Kushner had previously met in April 2016.971 Unable to recall the 

Russian Ambassador's name, Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he had consulted 

previously about Russia, see Volume I, Section IV.A.4, supra, and asked, "What is the name of 

Russian ambassador?"972 Kushner forwarded Simes's response-which identified Kislyak by 

name-to Hicks.973 After checking with Kushner to see what he had learned, Hicks conveyed 

Putin's letter to transition officials.974 Five days later, on November 14, 2016, Trump and Putin 

spoke by phone in the presence of Transition Team members, including incoming National 

Security Advisor Michael Flynn.975 

964 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3. 

965 Hicks 12/8/17 3 02, at 3. 

966 Hicks 12/8/17 3 02, at 3. 

967 NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.)). 

968 NOSC00044381-82 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.)). 

969 NOSC00044382 (11/9/16 Letter from Putin to President-Elect Trump (Nov. 9, 2016) 

(translation)). 

970 NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Hicks to Kushner (10:26 a.m.)). 

971 Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017). 

972 NOSC00000058(11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (10:28 a.m.)); Statement of Jared Kushner 

to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017). 

973 NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Hicks (11 :05 :44 a.m.)). 

974 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3-4. 

975 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-10; see Doug G. Ware, Trump, Russia 's Putin Talk about Syria, Icy 

Relations in Phone Call, UPI (Nov. 14, 2016). 

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b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels 

As Russian officials in the United States reached out to the President-Elect and his team, a 

number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make 

contact. Petr Aven, a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest commercial bank, 

described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the 

tlurry of Russian activity.

976 · 

Aven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who 

regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as "oligarchs."977 

Aven told the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, including in the fourth quarter 

(Q4) of 2016, shortly after the U.S. presidential election.978 Aven said that he took these meetings 

seriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings 

were implicit directives, and that there would be consequences for A ven if he did not follow 

through.979 As was typical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting 

with Putin's chief of staff, Anton Vaino.980 

According to A ven, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin,

98 1 Putin raised the 

prospect that the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russian interests, including 

sanctions against Aven and/or Alfa-Bank.982 Putin suggested that Aven needed to take steps to 

protect himself and Alfa-Bank.983 Aven also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by 

the Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration.984 

According to Aven, Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and 

generally did not know the people around the President-Elect.985 

976 A ven rovided information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer, Ill 

977 A ven 8/2/18 3 02, at 7. 

978 

979 Aven 8/2/18 302, at2-3. 

980 and interview with the Office, 

A ven referred to the high-ranking Russian government officials using numbers (e.g., Official 1, Official 2). 

Aven separately confirmed th.rough an attorney proffer that Official 1 was Putin and Official 2 was Putin's 

chiefofstaff, Vaino. See Affidavit of Ryan Junck (Aug. 2, 2018) (hard copy on file). 

981 At the time of his Q4 2016 meeting with Putin, A ven was generally aware of the press coverage 

about Russian interference in the U.S. election. According to Aven, he did not discuss that topic with Putin 

at any point, and Putin did not mention the rationale behind the threat of new sanctions. Aven 8/2/18 302, 

at 5-7. 

982 

983 

984 

985 

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Aven told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank 

shareholders from potential sanctions, and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the 

incoming Administration to establish a line of communication.986 A ven described Putin 

responding with skepticism about Aven's prospect for success.987 According to Aven, although 

Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team, Aven understood 

that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised. 988 A ven' s efforts are 

described in Volume I, Section IV.B.5, infra. 

2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration 

Aven's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kirill 

Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected 

to Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in 

the months after the election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United 

Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump transition officials, 

and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a 

Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon.989 In addition, the UAE national 

security advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick 

Gerson, in late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson 

worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev 

implied he cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the 

inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. 

a. Background 

Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, 

the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011.990 Dmitriev reported 

directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his "boss."991 

RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds. 992 Dmitriev 

regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed 

989 Nader provided information to the Office in multi le interviews, all but one of which were 

conducted under a proffer agreement . The 

Bannon was interviewed by the Office, 

under a proffer agreement. 

investi ators also interviewed Prince under a proffer agreement. 

99 ° Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available at 

https://rdif.ru/Eng_person _ dmitriev _ kiri II/. See also Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available 

at https://rdif.ru/Eng_About/. 

99 1 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. See also, e.g., 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 

Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 

992 

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(Crown Prince Mohammed), in connection with RDIF's dealings with the UAE.993 Putin wanted 

Dmitriev to be in charge of both the financial and the political relationship between Russia and the 

Gulf states, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spoke English fluently. 994 

Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin's interlocutor in the Gulf region, and would relay 

Dmitriev's views directly to Crown Prince Mohammed.995 

Nader developed contacts with both U.S. presidential campaigns during the 2016 election, 

and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do so.996 According to Nader, Dmitriev said that his 

and the government of Russia's preference was for candidate Trum to win and asked Nader to 

assist him in meetin members of the Trum Cam ai n.997 

Nader did not 

introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the Trump Campaign before the election.999 

Erik Prince is a businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated 

with the Trump Campaign, including Steve Bannon, Donald Trump Jr., and Roger Stone.

1005 

Prince did not have a formal role in the Campaign, although he offered to host a fundraiser for 

993 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2; Nader 1/23/18 302, at 2-3; 5/3/16 Email, Nader to Phares; .. 

994 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2. 

995 Nader 1 /22/18 302, at 3. 

996 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3; 

998 

999 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3. 

1000 

1001 

1002 

1003 

1004 

1005 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1-5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21. 

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Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian 

election interference to Bannon. 1006 

After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at Trump Tower, primarily 

to meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn and others. 1007 Prince and Bannon 

would discuss, inter alia, foreign policy issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who 

should be appointed to fill key natio~sitions.1008 Although~ 

affiliated with the transition, Nader---received assurances -

that the incoming Administration considered Prince a trusted associate. 10 

b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration 

, ! A I Investigative Technique 

• n • • 

Investigative Technique 

Investigative Technique 

I • . • • • . • . . . . . 

. . . .. • Investigative Technique 

• ' Investigative Technique 

1006 Prince 4/4/18 302, at l, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 19-20; 10/18/16 

Email, Prince to Bannon. 

1007 Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 6; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 5; Flynn 1/24/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, 

at 11; Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5, 8; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 20-21; 11/12/16 Email, Prince to Corallo. 

1008 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5; Bannon 2/ 14/18 302, at 21. 

101 1 Investigative Technique 

Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6; 1111 

l012 Investigative Technique 

Investigative Technique 

10 14 Investigative Technique 

10 15 Investigative Technique 

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Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who was in New York, to request a meeting 

with the "key people" in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the "[g]reat 

results."1016 He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that "we want to start 

rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. We understand all of the 

sensitivities and are not in a rush."1017 Dmitriev and Nader had previously discussed Nader 

introducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the Trump Campaign. 1018 Dmitriev also 

told Nader that he would ask Putin for permission to travel to the United States, where he would 

be able to speak to media outlets about the positive impact of Trump's election and the need for 

reconciliation between the United States and Russia. 

101 9 

Later that day, Dmitriev flew to New York, where Peskov was separately traveling to 

attend the chess tournament. 1020 Dmitriev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and 

noted that, if there was "a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp," he "would love to start 

building for the future.'' 1021 Dmitriev also asked Nader to invite Kushner to the event so that he 

(Dmitriev) could meet him. 1022 Nader did not pass along Dmitriev's invitation to anyone 

connected with the incoming Administration. 1023 Although one World Chess Federation official 

recalled hearing from an attendee that President-Elect Trump had stopped by the tournament, the 

investigation did not establish that Trump or any Campaign or Transition Team official attended 

the event. 1024 And the President's written answers denied that he had. 1025 

Nader stated that Dmitriev continued to press him to set up a meeting with transition 

officials, and was particularly focused on Kushner and Trump Jr. 1026 Dmitriev told Nader that 

. . 

1016 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (9:34 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 4. 

1017 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11 :58 p.m.). 

1018 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3. 

1019 11/9/16 Text Messa e, Dmitriev to Nader 10:06 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to 

Nader (10:10 a.m.); 

1020 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:08 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to 

Nader (3:40 p.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5. 

1021 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (7: 10 p.m.). 

1022 11/10/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (5:20 a.m.). 

1023 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6. 

1024 Marinello 5/31/18 302, at 2-3; Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6. 

1025 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17-18 (Response to Question V, 

Part (a). 

1026 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6; 

1111 1027 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6; 

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According to Nader, Dmitriev was very 

anxious to connect with the incoming Administration and told Nader that he would try other routes 

to do so besides Nader himself. 1030 Nader did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyone 

associated with the incoming Administration during Dmitriev' s post-election trip to New York. 103 1 

In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming 

Administration officials with Nader in January or February. 1032 Dmitriev sent Nader a list of 

publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump "in case they 

[were] helpful." 1033 

c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles 

i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev 

Nader traveled to New York in early January 2017 and had lunchtime and dinner meetings 

with Erik Prince · on January 3, 2017. 1034 Nader and Prince discussed Dmitriev .

1035 Nader 

informed Prince that the Russians were looking to build a link with the incoming Trump 

Administration.1036 he told Prince that Dmitriev had been ushin Nader to 

e · omin Administration 

. 

1037 Nader suggested, in light of Prince's 

and Dmitriev meet to discuss issues of 

mutual concern. 1038 Prince told Nader 

that he needed to think further about it and to check with Transition Team officials. 1039 

After his dinner with Prince, Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev, 

and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met "with some key people within the family 

and inner circle"- a reference to Prince-and that he had spoken at length and positively about 

1028 

1029 

1030 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6. 

1031 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-7. 

1032 12/8/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (12: 10:31 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 11. 

1033 12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12: 10:31 a.m.); 12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to 

Nader (12:10:57 a.m.). 

1034 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 8. 

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Dmitriev. 1040 Nader told Dmitriev that the people he met had asked for Dmitriev's bio, and 

Dmitriev replied that he would update and send it. 1041 Nader later received from Dmitriev two 

files concerning Dmitriev: one was a two-page biography, and the other was a list of Dmitriev's 

positive quotes about Donald Trump. 1042 

The next morning, Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him 

to Prince.1043 Nader wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions "to be used with some 

additional details for them" (with "them" referring to members of the incoming 

Administration). 1044 Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour of receiving 

them. 1045 Prince stated that, while he was at Trump Tower that day, he spoke with Kellyanne 

Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while waiting to see Bannon. 1046 Cell-site 

location data for Prince's mobile phone indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for 

approximately three hours.

1047 Prince said that he could not recall whether, durin those three 

hours, he met with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him. 1048 

Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January 7, 2017. 1050 The following day, Nader 

wrote to Dmitriev that he had a "pleasant surprise" for him, namely that he had arranged for 

Dmitriev to meet "a Special Guest" from "the New Team," referring to Prince. 1051 Nader asked 

Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev 

agreed.1052 

The f9llowing day,~urance from Nader that the Seychelles meeting 

would be worthwhile. 1053 ---Dmitriev was not enthusiastic about the idea of 

meeting with Prince, and that Nader assured him that Prince wielded influence with the incoming 

1040 1/4/17 Text Message, Nader to Prince; 1/4/17 Text Messa es, Nader to Dmitriev (5:24 a.m. -

5:26 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 8-9; 

1041 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (7:24:27 a.m.). 

1042 1/4/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (7:25-7:29 a.m.) 

1043 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince. 

1044 1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince; 

1045 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 1-3. 

1046 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2-3. 

1047 Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone Investigative Technique 

1048 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3. 

1049 

1050 1/5/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince. 

10 51 1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (6:05 - 6: 10 p.m.). 

1052 1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (6: 10 - 7:27 p.m.). 

1053 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader. 

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Administration. 1054 Nader wrote to Dmitriev, "This guy [Prince] is designate·d by Steve [Bannon] 

to meet you! I know him and he is very very well connected and trusted by the New Team. His 

sister is now a Minister of Education."1055 According to Nader, Prince had led him to believe that 

Bannon was aware of Prince's upcoming meeting with Dmitriev, and Prince acknowledged that it 

was fair for Nader to think that Prince would pass information on to the Transition Team. 1056 

Bannon, however, told the Office that Prince did not tell him in advance about his meeting 

with Dmitriev. 1057 

ii. The Seychelles Meetings 

Dmitriev arrived with his wife in the Seychelles on January 11, 2017, and checked into the 

Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince Mohammed and Nader were staying. 1058 Prince arrived 

that same day.1059 Prince and Dmitriev met for the first time that afternoon in Nader's villa, with 

Nader present. 1060 The initial meeting lasted approximately 30-45 minutes. 1061 

Prince described the eight 

years of the Obama Administration in negative terms, and stated that he was looking forward to a 

new era of cooperation and conflict resolution. 1063 According to Prince, he told Dmitriev that 

Bannon was effective if not conventional, and that Prince provided policy papers to Bannon. 1064 

1054 

1055 1/9/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (2:12:56 p.m.); Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13; Ill 

1056 Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3. 

1057 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 25-26. 

1058 1/10/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (2:05:54 - 3:30:25 p.m.); 1/1 1/17 Text Messages, 

Dmitriev & Nader (2: 16: 16 - 5:17:59 p.m.). 

1059 1/7/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince. 

1060 1/11/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (5:18:24 - 5:37:14 p.m.); 

1062 

1063 

1064 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4. 

1065 

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topic of Russian interference in the 2016 election did not come up. 

Prince added that he would inform Bannon about his meeting with Dmitriev, and that if there was 

interest in continuin the discussion, Bannon or someone else on the Transition Team would do 

so.1011 

Afterwards, Prince returned to his room, where he learned that a Russian aircraft carrier 

had sailed to Libya, which led him to call Nader and ask him to set up another meeting with 

Dmitriev. 1073 According to Nader, Prince called and said he had checked with his associates back 

home and needed to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was "off the table."1074 Nader wrote to 

Dmitriev that Prince had "received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately," 

and arranged for himself, Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons 

property. 101s 

At the second meeting, Prince told Dmitriev that the United States could not acce 

Russian involvement in Lib a because it would make the situation there much worse. 1076 

1066 

1067 

1068 

1069 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4-5. 

1070 

1072 

1073 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4; 

1075 1/11/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (9: 13 :54 -

10:24:25 p.m.). 

Prince, 

however, denied that and recalled that he was making these remarks to Dmitriev not in an official capacity 

for the transition but based on his experience as a former naval officer. Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4. 

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1077 

After the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had 

transpired. 1078 Dmitriev told Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two 

reasons: first, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more 

authority within the incoming Administration than Prince had. 1079 Second, he had hoped to have 

a discussion of greater substance, such as outlinin a strate ic roadmap for both countries to 

follow. 1080 Dmitriev told Nader that Prince's comments -

were insulting 1

081 

Hours after the second meeting, Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the 

Seychelles.1082 As described further below, investigators were unable to obtain the content of these 

or other messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify evidence 

of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles. 

iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip 

After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his 

discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was 

interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration. 1083 On January 12, 2017, 

Prince contacted Bannon's personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week. 1084 

Several days later, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon's schedule. 1085 

Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon's home after returning to the United States in 

mid-January and briefed him about several topics, including his meeting with Dmitriev .

1086 Prince 

told the Office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign 

wealth fund and was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.1087 

Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot ofDmitriev's Wikipedia page dated January 16, 2017, 

1079 Nader 1/22/1 8 302, at 9, 15; 

- 1080 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15. 

1081 

1083 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1 0; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4; 

1084 1/ 12/17 Text Messages, Prince to Preate. 

1085 1/15/17 Text Message, Prince to Preate. 

1086 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 

1087 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 

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and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Bannon. 1088 Prince also believed he 

provided Bannon with Dmitriev's contact information. 1089 According to Prince, Bannon instructed 

Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev, and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a 

priority for Bannon.

1090 Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively 

uninterested. 1091 

Bannon, by contrast, told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding 

Dmitriev, RDIF, or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin. 1092 

Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have remembered it, 

and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place. 1093 

The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently 

clarified by reviewing their communications, because neither one was able to produce any of the 

messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince's phone 

contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and 

Bannon exchanged dozens of messages.1094 Prince denied deleting any messages but claimed he 

did not know why there were no messages on his device before March 2017. 1095 Bannon's devices 

similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannon also stated he did not 

know why messages did not appear on his device. 1096 Bannon told the Office that, during both the 

months before and after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal Blackberry and 

personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince), and he took no 

steps to preserve these work communications.1097 

d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.­

Russia Relations 

Dmitriev's contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by 

Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE national security advisor introduced 

Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York. 1098 

Gerson stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump 

1088 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5; 1/16/17 Image on Prince Phone (on file with the Office). 

1089 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 

1090 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 

1091 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. 

1092 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11. 

1093 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11. 

1094 Call Records of Erik Prince 

1095 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 6. 

1096 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 36. 

1097 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11. 

1098 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1, 3; 11/26/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/25/17 Text Message, 

Dmitriev to Nader. 

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Campaign other than occasional casual discussions about the Campaign with Kushner. 1099 After 

the election, Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings for transition officials with 

former UK prime minister Tony Blair and a UAE delegation led by Crown Prince Mohammed. 1100 

When Dmitriev and Gerson met, they principally discussed potential joint ventures 

between Gerson's hedge fund and RDIF. 1101 Dmitriev was interested in improved economic 

cooperation between the United States and Russia and asked Gerson who he should meet with in 

the incoming Administration who would be helpful towards this goal. 1102 Gerson replied that he 

would try to figure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted that 

confidentiality would be required because of the sensitivity of holding such meetings before the 

new Administration took power, and before Cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the 

Senate. 1103 Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn who the "key person or people" 

were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns, and economic matters. 1104 

Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a 

reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia. He noted in a text message to Gerson 

that if Russia was "approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can 

have Major Breakthroughs quickly."1105 Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in December 2016 

about what such a reconciliation plan would include. 1106 Gerson told the Office that the Transition 

Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev, and that he did so on his 

own initiative and as a private citizen.1107 

On January 9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be 

worthwhile, Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could "share it with Jared 

( or somebody else very senior in the team) - so that they know that we are focused from our side 

on improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that."1108 Dmitriev also 

asked Gerson if he knew Prince, and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time 

1099 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1. 

1100 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 21. 

1101 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3-4; see, e.g. , 12/2/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 12/14/16 Text 

Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 1/3/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 12/2/16 Email, Tolokonnikov to 

Gerson. 

1102 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 

1103 12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev. 

1104 12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev. 

1105 12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. 

11 06 12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson. 

1107 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at I. 

1108 1/9/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/ 17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader. 

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with.1109 After his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to 

meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting. 1110 

On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-Russia reconciliation that 

he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points: (1) 

jointly fighting terrorism; (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts; (3) 

developing "win-win" economic and investment initiatives; (4) maintaining an honest, open, and 

continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement; and (5) ensuring proper communication and 

trust by "key people" from each country. 1111 On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the 

document to Kushner. 1112 Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time. 1113 Gerson explained 

that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev's being well 

connected. 1114 Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right 

people. 1115 Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex 

Tillerson; according to Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it. 1116 On 

January 19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document, telling him that this was 

"a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our 

friends. Please share with them - we believe this is a good foundation to start from." 1117 

Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering 

it. 1118 On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his "boss"-an apparent reference to 

Putin-was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal. 1119 Dmitriev said, " [w]e do 

not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss asked me to 

try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible."1120 He informed Gerson that 

Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information 

was "very confidential."1121 

The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his "boss" again yesterday who 

had "emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication 

1109 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 4. 

1110 1 /18/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson. 

1111 1/16/17 Text Messages; Dmitriev & Gerson. 

1112 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2. 

1113 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3. 

11 14 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18.302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/ 18 302, at 22. 

1115 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3. 

1116 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 32. 

1117 1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11: 11 :56 a.m.). 

1118 1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2. 

1119 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 

1120 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 

1121 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 

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channel to avoid bureaucracy." 1122 On January 28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted 

"to see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the 2 pager I 

sent you in the telephone call that will happen at 12 EST,"1123 an apparent reference to the call 

scheduled between President Trump and Putin. Nader replied, "Definitely paper was so submitted 

to Team by Rick and me. They took it seriously!"1124 After the call between President Trump and 

Putin occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that "the call went very well. My boss wants me to 

continue making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good and 

important." 1125 Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev 

replied that the document they had drafted together "played an important role." 1126 

Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with one another in approximately 

March 2017, when the investment deal they had been working on together showed no signs of 

progressing.

1127 

3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn m 

Trump Tower Following the Election 

On November 16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant to Kushner, received a 

request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. 1128 That same day, Vargas sent 

Kushner an email with the subject, "MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey 

Ivanovich Kislyak .... " 1129 The text of the email read, "RE: setting up a time to meet w/you on 

12/1. LMK how to proceed." Kushner responded in relevant part, "I think I do this one -- confirm 

with Dimitri [Simes of CNI] that this is the right guy ." 1130 After reaching out to a colleague of 

Simes at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushner that Kislyak was "the best go-to guy for routine 

matters in the US," while Yuri Ushakov, a Russian foreign policy advisor, was the contact for 

"more direct/substantial matters." 11 31 

Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive who had previously tried to transmit 

to candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia, see Volume I, Section 

IV.A.l.d.ii, supra, may have provided similar information to the Transition Team. According to 

1122 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:04:41 p.m.). 

1123 1/28/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (I'l :05:39 a.m.). 

1124 1/28/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (11: 11 :33 a.m.). 

1125 1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11 :06:35 a.m.). 

1126 1/28/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. 

1127 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 4; 3/21/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev. 

11 28 Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees ("Kushner Stmt. "), at 6 (7 /24/17) 

(written statement by Kushner to the Senate Judiciary Committee). 

1129 NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (6:44 p.m.)). 

1130 NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (9:54 p.m.)). 

1131 11/17/16 Email, Brown to Simes (10:41 a.m.); Brown 10/13/17 302, at 4; 11/17/16 Email, 

Vargas to Kushner (12:3 1:18). 

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Foresman, at the end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor 

Michael Flynn and his designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman 

for his thoughts on Kislyak. Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that, while Kislyak was 

an important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to Putin. 1132 Foresman subsequently 

traveled to Moscow, inquired of a source he believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from 

that source that Ushakov would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. national security 

advisor. 1133 Foresman acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake that inquiry in 

Russia but told the Office that he nonetheless felt obligated to report the information back to Flynn, 

and that he worked to get a face-to-face meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do 

so.1134 Email correspondence suggests that the meeting ultimately went forward, 1135 but Flynn has 

no recollection of it or of the earlier December meeting.1136 (The investigation did not identify 

evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with Ushakov after being given his name. 1137) 

In the meantime, although he had already formed the impression that Kislyak was not 

necessarily the right point of contact, 

1138 Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had 

requested on November 16. It took place at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016. 1139 At 

Kushner' s invitation, Flynn also attended; Bannon was invited but did not attend.

1140 During the 

meeting, which lasted approximately 30 minutes, Kushner expressed a desire on the part of the 

incoming Administration to start afresh with U.S.-Russian relations. 1141 Kushner also asked 

Kislyak to identify the best person (whether Kislyak or someone else) with whom to direct future 

discussions-someone who had contact with Putin and the ability to speak for him. 1142 

The three men also discussed U.S. policy toward Syria, and Kislyak floated the idea of 

having Russian generals brief the Transition Team on the topic using a secure communications 

line. 1143 After Flynn explained that there was no secure line in the Transition Team offices, 

1132 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17. 

1133 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17-18. 

1134 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 18. 

1135 RMF-SCO-00000015 (1/5/17 Email, Foresman to Atencio & Flaherty); RMF-SCO-00000015 

(1/5/17 Email, Flaherty to Foresman & Atencio). 

1136 9/26/18 Attorney Proffer from Covington & Burling LLP (reflected in email on file with the 

Office). 

1137 Vargas 4/4/18 302, at 5. 

1138 Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 4. 

1139 AKIN_GUMP _BERKOWITZ_0000016-019 (11/29/16 Email, Vargas to Kuznetsov). 

114° Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2; NOS00004240 (Calendar Invite, Vargas to Kushner & Flynn). 

1141 Kushner Strut. at 6. 

1142 Kushner Strut. at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18. 

1143 Kushner Stmt. at 7; Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 18; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2. 

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Kushner asked Kislyak if they could communicate using secure facilities at the Russian 

Embassy. 1144 Kislyak quickly rejected that idea. 1145 

4. Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov 

On December 6, 2016, the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner's assistant to set up a 

second meeting between Kislyak and Kushner. 1146 Kushner declined several proposed meeting 

dates, but Kushner's assistant indicated that Kislyak was very insistent about securing a second 

meeting. 1147 Kushner told the Office that he did not want to take another meeting because he had 

already decided Kislyak was not the right channel for him to communicate with Russia, so he 

arranged to have one of his assistants, A vi Berkowitz, meet with Kislyak in his stead. 1148 Although 

embassy official Sergey Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it "important" to 

"continue the conversation with Mr. Kushner in person,"1149 Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet 

· instead with Berkowitz once it became apparent that Kushner was unlikely to take a meeting. 

Berkowitz met with Kislyak on December 12, 2016, at Trump Tower. 1150 The meeting 

lasted only a few minutes, during which Kislyak indicated that he wanted Kushner to meet 

someone who had a direct line to Putin: Sergey Gorkov, the head of the Russian-governmentowned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB). 

Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov. 1151 The one-on-one meeting took place the next day, 

December 13, 2016, at the Colony Capital building in Manhattan, where Kushner had previously 

scheduled meetings. 1152 VEB was (and is) the subject of Department of Treasury economic 

sanctions imposed in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea. 1153 Kushner did not, however, 

recall any discussion during his meeting with Gorkov about the sanctions against VEB or sanctions 

more generally. 1154 Kushner stated in an interview that he did not engage in any preparation for 

1144 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18. 

1145 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18. 

1146 Kushner Strut. at 7; NOSC00000123 (12/6/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (12: 11 :40 p.m.)). 

1147 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (10:41 

p.m.)). 

1148 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; Kushner Stmt. at 7; DJTFP_SCO_01442290 (12/6/16 Email, 

Berkowitz to 

1149 DJTFP SCO 01442290 (12/7/16 Email to Berkowitz (12:31 :39 p.m.)). 

1150 Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 7; AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_O0000l-04 (12/12/16 Text 

Messages, Berkowitz & 202-701-8532). 

1151 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Berkowitz). 

1152 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Berkowitz). 

1153 Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and Energy 

Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those Undermining Ukraine's 

Sovereignty, United States Department of the Treasury (Jul. 16, 2014). 

1154 Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 20. 

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the meeting and that no one on the Transition Team even did a Google search for 

1155 Gorkov's name. 

At the start of the meeting, Gorkov presented Kushner with two gifts: a painting and a bag 

of soil from the town in Belarus where Kushner's family originated. 1156 

The accounts from Kushner and Gorkov differ as to whether the meeting was diplomatic 

or business in nature. Kushner told the Office that the meeting was diplomatic, with Gorkov 

expressing disappointment with U.S.-Russia relations under President Obama and hopes for 

improved relations with the incoming Administration. 11 57 According to Kushner, although Gorkov 

told Kushner a little bit about his bank and made some statements about the Russian economy, the 

two did not discuss Kushner's companies or private business dealings of any kind. 1158 (At the time 

of the meeting, Kushner Companies had a debt obligation coming due on the building it owned at 

666 Fifth Avenue, and there had been public reporting both about efforts to secure lending on the 

property and possible conflicts of interest for Kushner arising out of his company's borrowing 

from foreign lenders. 1159) 

In contrast, in a 2017 public statement, VEB suggested Gorkov met with Kushner in 

Kushner' s capacity as CEO of Kushner Companies for the purpose of discussing business, rather 

than as part of a diplomatic effort. In particular, VEB characterized Gorkov's meeting with 

Kushner as part of a series of "roadshow meetings" with "representatives of major US banks and 

business circles," which included "negotiations" and discussion of the "most promising business 

lines and sectors."1160 

Foresman, the investment bank executive mentioned in Volume l, Sections IV.A. I and 

IV.B.3, supra, told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEB deputy chairman Nikolay 

Tsekhomsky in Moscow just before Gorkov left for New York to meet Kushner. 1161 According to 

Foresman, Gorkov and Tsekhomsky told him that they were traveling to New York to discuss postelection issues with U.S. financial institutions, that their trip was sanctioned by Putin, and that they 

would be reporting back to Putin upon their return. 1162 

1155 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19. Berkowitz, by contrast, stated to the Office that he had googled 

Gorkov's name and told Kushner that Gorkov appeared to be a banker. Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 8. 

1156 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19-20. 

1157 Kushner Stmt. at 8. 

1158 Kushner Stmt. at 8. 

1159 See, e.g. , Peter Grant, Donald Trump Son-in-Law Jared Kushner Could Face His Own Conflictof-Interest Questions, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 29, 2016). 

1160 Patrick Reevell & Matthew Mosk, Russian Banker Sergey Gorkov Brushes off Questions About 

Meeting with Jared Kushner, ABC News (June 1, 2017). 

1161 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 14-15. 

1162 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 15-16. 

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The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and 

Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated), focused 

on business (as VEB's public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of 

those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner 

and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting. 

Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, "Hi, 

please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!"' 163 

Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts. 1164 

On February 8, 2017, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up 

another meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed. 1165 According 

to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding 

the Russia investigation, and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request. 1166 

5. Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team 

In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in Volume I, 

Section IV.B.1.b, supra, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate "all-hands" oligarch 

meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen. 1167 As in Aven's one-on-one 

meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of 

forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions. 1168 

After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, A ven tried to establish a connection to the 

Trump team. A ven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump 

Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (L 1 ), another company headed 

by Aven, and had done work for Alfa-Bank. 1169 Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador 

to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his 

primary roles with Alfa-Bank and Ll was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the 

United States and other Western countries. 1170 

While at a Ll board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016, Aven pulled Burt 

aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed 

1163 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_00000ll (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz 

(9:56 a.m.)). 

1164 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_00000ll-15 (12/19/16 - 2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenko 

& Berkowitz). 

1165 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_00000lS (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz 

(10:41 a.m.)). 

1166 Berkowitz 3/22/ 18 302, at 4-5. 

Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2. 

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interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump Transition 

Team. 1171 Aven asked for Burt's help in contacting members of the Transition Team. 1172 Although 

Burt had been responsible for helping Aven build connections in the past, Burt viewed Aven's 

request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with Aven. 1173 

Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at Volume I, Section IV.A.4, 

supra), 1174 decided to approach CNI president Dimitri Simes for help facilitating A ven' s request, 

recalling that Simes had some relationship with Kushner. 1175 At the time, Simes was lobbying the 

Trump Transition Team, on Burt's behalf, to appoint Burt U.S. ambassador to Russia.1176 

Burt contacted Simes by telephone and asked if he could arrange a meeting with Kushner 

to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming 

Administration. 1177 Simes told the Office that he declined and stated to Burt that setting up such 

a channel was not a good idea in light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the 

U.S. presidential election. 1178 According to Simes, he understood that Burt was seeking a secret 

channel, and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian 

government and the incoming Administration. 1179 Based on what Simes had read in the media, he 

stated that he already had concerns that Trump's business connections could be exploited by 

Russia, and Simes said that he did not want CNI to have any involvement or apparent involvement 

in facilitating any connection. 1180 

In an email dated December 22, 2016, Burt recounted for Aven his conversation with 

Simes: 

Through a trusted third party, I have reached out to the very influential person I mentioned 

in Luxembourg concerning Project A. There is an interest and an understanding for the 

need to establish such a channel. But the individual emphasized that at this moment, with 

so much intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of cyber-hacking 

(and who ordered what), Project A was too explosive to discuss. The individual agreed to 

discuss it again after the New Year. I trust the individual 's instincts on this. 

1173 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 4. 

1174 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 5. 

1175 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3. 

1176 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3. 

1177 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4. 

1178 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4. 

1179 Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5. 

1180 Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5. 

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If this is unclear or you would like to discuss, don't hesitate to call. 1181 

According to Burt, the "very influential person" referenced in his email was Simes, and the 

reference to a "trusted third party" was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. "Project A" 

was a term that Bmt created for Aven's effort to help establish a communications channel between 

Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what A ven was 

requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia's influence in the U.S. presidential 

election. 1182 According to Burt, his report that there was " interest" in a communications channel 

reflected Simes's views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt 

acknowledged that he added some "hype" to that sentence to make it sound like there was more 

interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed. 1183 

Aven replied to Burt's email on the same day, saying "Thank you. All clear." 1184 

According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue. 1185 Burt 

spoke to A ven some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the Trum 

~hat the current environment made it impossible, 

team, 

11 86 Burt did not recall discussing Aven's request with Simes again, nor did 

he recall speaking to anyone else about the request. 1187 

and A ven recounted his lack of success. 1189 

In the first quarter of 2017, A ven met again with Putin and other Russian officials. 1188 At 

that meeting, Putin asked about Aven' s attem t to build relations with the Trum Administration 

- 1190 Putin continued to inquire about Aven's efforts to connect to the Trump 

Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings. 1191 

Aven also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI. 1192 As part 

of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked 

to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration.1193 

1181 12/22/16 Email, Burt to Aven (7:23 p.m.). 

1182 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3. 

1183 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4. 

1184 12/22/16 Email, Aven to Butt (4:58:22 p.m.). 

1185 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7. 

1186 

1187 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4. 

1188 

I 189 

I 190 

1191 

1192 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8. 

1193 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; 

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According to A ven, the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear 

to care.

1I94 

6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich 

In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump 

Campaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Pa e a ain visited Moscow in an 

attem t to ursue business o ortunities.II95 

According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort' s 

associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his 

connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, 

Kilimnik wrote, "Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to 

Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine." 1197 

On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and 

Andrej Krickovic. I 198 Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town 

and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant 

for a few minutes to meet with Page. 1I99 Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump's election and 

expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia. 1200 Dvorkovich 

asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition 

to be in a discussion of future coo eration. 1201 

1194 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; 

1195 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Among 

other meetings, Page contacted Andrey Baranov, head of investor relations at Rosneft, ~ 

the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. ----

1197 Investigative Technique 

1198 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 8. 

1199 Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; 

1200 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; 

1202 

1203 

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7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn 

Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the Transition Team's primary 

conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive 

matters during the transition period: a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian 

government's reaction to the United States's imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in 

the 2016 election.1207 Despite Kushner' s conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside 

the Russian government, the Transition Team turned to Flynn's relationship with Kislyak on 

both issues. As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke by phone to K.T. McFarland, his incoming deputy, 

to prepare for his call to Kislyak; McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior 

members of the Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago at the time. Although transition officials at Mara-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did 

not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. Flynn 

asked Kislyak not to escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December 29, 

2016, and Kislyak later reported to Flynn that Russia acceded to that request. 

a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements 

On December 21, 2016, Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security 

Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinian territory'. 1208 The Security 

Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day.

1209 

There was speculation in the media that the Obama Administration would not oppose the 

resolution. 1210 

1204 

1205 

1206 

1207 As discussed further in Volume I, Section V.C.4, infra, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false 

statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, about these communications with Ambassador 

Kislyak. Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, No. l:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 

3. Flynn's plea agreement required that he cooperate with this Office, and the statements from Flynn in 

this report reflect his cooperation over the course of multiple debriefings in 2017 and 2018. 

1208 Karen DeYoung, How the US. Came to Abstain on a UN. Resolution Condemning Israeli 

Settle'!1ents, Washjngfon Post (Dec. 28, 2016). 

1209 Karen De Young, How the US. Came to Abstain on a UN. Resolution Condemning Israeli 

Settlements, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016). 

12 10 Michelle Nichols & Lesley Wroughton, US. Intended to Allow Passage of UN. Draft Critical 

of Israel, Reuters (Dec. 21 , 2016). 

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According to Flynn, the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and 

wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution. 1211 On December 22, 2016, multiple members 

of the Transition Team, as well as President-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign government 

officials to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat 

the resolution. 1212 Kushner led the effort for the Transition Team; Flynn was responsible for the 

Russian government. 1213 Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December 

22, Flynn called Kislyak. 1214 According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the 

Transition Team's opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the 

resolution. 1215 Later that day, President-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah 

al-Sisi about the vote. 1216 Ultimately, Egypt postponed the vote.1217 

On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the 

resolution. 1218 Throughout the day, members of the Transition Team continued to talk with foreign 

leaders about the resolution, with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian 

government through Kislyak. 1219 When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn 

that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it. 1220 The resolution later 

passed 14-0, with the United States abstaining. 1221 

b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia 

Flynn was also the Transition Team member who spoke with the Russian government when 

the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to 

Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President 

Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12:01 a.m. the following day and 

1211 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12; Flynn 11/17117 302, at 2. 

1212 Flym1 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2. 

1213 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/22/16 

Email, Kushner to Flynn; 12/22/16 Email, McFarland to 

1214 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn 

et al. 

1215 Statement of Offense 13( d), United States v. Michael T. Flynn, No. 1: l 7-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 

1, 2017), Doc. 4 ("Flynn Statement of Offense"); Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-13. 

1216 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13. 

1217 UN Vote on Israeli Settlement Postponed, "Potentially Indefinitely", Reuters (Dec. 22, 2016). 

1218 Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows Censure Over Settlements, 

New York Times (Dec. 23, 2016). 

1219 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/23/16 Email, Flynn to Kushner et 

al. 

122° Flynn Statement of Offense 13(g). 

122 1 Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International 

Law, Security Council Reaffirms, 7853rd Meeting (PM), United Nations Security Council (Dec. 23, 2016). 

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imposed sanctions on nine Russian individuals and entities. 1222 On December 29, 2016, the Obama 

Administration also expelled 35 Russian government officials and closed two Russian 

government-owned compounds in the United States. 1223 

During the rollout of the sanctions, President-Elect Trump and multiple Transition Team 

senior officials, including McFarland, Steve Bannon, and Reince Priebus, were staying at the Mara-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida. Flynn was on vacation in the Dominican Republic, 1224 but 

was in daily contact with McFarland. 1225 

The Transition Team and President-Elect Trump were concerned that these sanctions 

would harm the United States's relationship with Russia. 1226 Although the details and timing of 

sanctions were unknown on December 28, 2016, the media began reporting that retaliatory 

measures from the Obama Administration against Russia were forthcoming. 1227 When asked about 

imposing sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election, 

President-Elect Trump told the media, "I think we ought to get on with our lives." 1228 

Russia initiated the outreach to the Transition Team. On the evening of December 28, 

2016, Kislyak texted Flynn, "can you kindly call me back at your convenience."1229 Flynn did not 

respond to the text message that evening. Someone from the Russian Embassy also called Flynn 

the next morning, at 10:38 a.m., but they did not talk. 1230 

The sanctions were announced publicly on December 29, 2016. 1231 At 1 :53 p.m. that day, 

McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple Transition Team members and advisors about 

the impact the sanctions would have on the incoming Administration. 1232 At 2:07 p.m., a Transition 

Team member texted Flynn a link to a New York Times article about the sanctions. 1233 At 2:29 

1222 Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant 

Malicious Cyber-EnabledActivities, The White House, Office ofthe Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016). 

1223 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and 

Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016). 

1224 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 14; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 3-8; Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 5. 

1225 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 1; McFarland 11/22/17 302, at 3-9. 

1226 Flynn 11/17 /l 7 302, at 3. 

1227 Christine Wang, US to announce new sanctions against Russia in response to election hacking, 

CNBC (Dec. 28, 2016). 

1228 John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: "Get on with our lives", 

Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016). 

1229 SF000006 (12/28/16 Text Message, Kislyak to Flynn). 

123

° Call Records of Michael T. Flynn 

123 1 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2-3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-5. 

1232 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to O'Brien et al.; 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al. 

1233 SF00000t (12/29/16 Text Message, Flaherty to Flynn). 

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p.m., McFarland called Flynn, but they did not talk. 1234 Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon 

discussed the sanctions. 1235 According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would 

hurt their ability to have good relations with Russia, and that Russian escalation would make things 

more difficult. 1236 McFarland believed she told Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak 

later that night. 1237 McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus, 

and likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night. 1238 At 3: 14 p.m., 

Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland, "Time for a call???"1239 

The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a 

Transition Team senior official, to which Flynn responded, "Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian 

AMBO reaching out to me today." 1240 

Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he 

had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago.1241 He first spoke with Michael Ledeen, 1242 a Transition 

Team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20 minutes. 1243 

Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to 

communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions. 1244 On that call, McFarland and Flynn discussed the 

sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming Trump Administration's foreign policy 

goals. 1245 McFarland and Flynn also discussed that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did 

not want Russia to escalate the situation. 1246 They both understood that Flynn would relay a 

message to Kislyak in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand.

1247 

1234 Call Records of K.T. McFarland 

1235 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6. 

1236 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6. 

1237 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6. 

1238 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6. 

1239 SF00000l (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty). 

1240 SF00000l (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty). 

124 1 Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3. 

1242 Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen, the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate 

Hillary Clinton's missing emails are described in Volume I, Section III.D.2, supra. 

1243 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3; Call Records of Michael Ledeen 

1244 Fl nn 11/17 /17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense 

; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn 

1245 Flynn 11/17117 302, at 3-4 

1246 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3( c); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-

7. 

1247 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7. 

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Immediately after speaking with McFarland, Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak. 1248 

Flynn discussed multiple topics with Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video 

teleconference between President-Elect Trump and Putin, an upcoming terrorism conference, and 

Russia's views about the Middle East. 1249 With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that 

Russia not escalate the situation, not get into a "tit for tat," and only respond to the sanctions in a 

reciprocal manner.1250 

Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that 

day. In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus, at 4:43 p.m., McFarland 

sent an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the group that "Gen 

[F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening." 1251 Less than an hour later, McFarland 

briefed President-Elect Trump. Bannon, Priebus, Sean Spicer, and other Transition Team members 

were present. 1252 During the briefing, President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did 

"it," meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election. 1253 McFarland said 

yes, and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians.1254 McFarland also 

discussed potential Russian responses to the sanctions, and said Russia's response would be an 

indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward. 1255 President-Elect Trump opined that the 

sanctions provided him with leverage to use with the Russians. 1256 McFarland recalled that at the 

end of the meeting, someone may have mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was 

speaking to the Russian ambassador that evening. 1257 

After the briefing, Flynn and McFarland spoke over the phone. 1258 Flynn reported on the 

substance of his call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions. 1259 According to 

McFarland, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be 

escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming Administration.

1260 

McFarland also gave Flynn a summary of her recent briefing with President-Elect Trump. 1261 

1248 Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3(d). 

1249 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3(c); 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to 

McFarland. 

125° Flynn 11/17 /17 302, at 1; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3(d). 

1251 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al. 

1252 12/29/16 Email, Westerhoutto Flaherty; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 

1253 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 

1254 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 

1255 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 

1256 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 

1257 McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 7. 

1258 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 

1259 Flynn 11/17 /17 302, at 4; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3(e). 

1260 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8. 

1261 McFarland 12/22/1 7 302, at 8. 

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The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that 

Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions. 1262 Putin superseded that comment two hours later, 

releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions 

at that time. 1263 Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. 

Putin)." 1264 Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with 

Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other Transition 

Team members. 1265 The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics 

discussed with Kislyak. 1266 Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of 

sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration's 

foreign policy.

1267 

On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received 

at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the 

request. 1268 Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with 

Kislyak. 1269 According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better 

relationship and that the relationship was back on track. 127 ° Flynn also told McFarland that he 

believed his phone call had made a difference. 1271 McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in 

response. 1272 Flynn spoke with other Transition Team members that day, but does not recall 

whether they discussed the sanctions. 1273 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the 

next day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with Kislyak. 1274 Bannon, 

1262 Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of 

Russian diplomats, Moscow, December 20, 2016, The Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation 

(Dec. 30, 2016 (5:32 a.m.)). 

1263 Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, Kremlin, Office of the President (Dec. 

30, 2016 (7:15 a.m.)). 

1264 @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11:41 a.m.) Tweet. 

1265 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al. 

1266 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al. 

1267 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4. 

1268 Call Records of Michael T. Flynn ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at l ; 

Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense iJ3(g). 

1269 Call Records of Michael T. Flynn ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; 

Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 

1270 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 

127 1 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 

1272 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 

1273 Flynn 11/17 /17 302, !1t 5-6. 

1274 Flynn 11/21/17 3 02, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; Flynn 1 /19/17 302, at 5; Flynn Statement 

of Offense ,r 3(h). 

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for his part, recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said that he did not remember discussing 

sanctions with him. 1275 

Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak, and the 

handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration, is provided 

in Volume II of this report. 

* * * 

In sum, the investigation established multiple links between Trump Campaign officials and 

individuals tied to the Russian government. Those links included Russian offers of assistance to 

the Campaign. In some instances, the Campaign was receptive to the offer, while in other instances 

the Campaign officials shied away. Ultimately, the investigation did not establish that the 

Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference 

activities. 

1275 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9. 

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V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS 

The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office "to prosecute federal 

crimes arising from [its] investigation" of the matters assigned to it. In deciding whether to 

exercise this prosecutorial authority, the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal 

Prosecution set forth in the Justice (formerly U.S. Attorney's) Manual. In particular, the Office 

has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a 

federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain 

a conviction for such an offense. Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018). Where the answer to those 

questions was yes, the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial 

federal interest, the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and 

there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. Id. 

As explained below, those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two sets of 

Russian nationals for their roles in er etratin the active-measures social media cam ai n and 

similarly determined that the contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-linked individuals 

either did not involve the commission of a federal crime or, in the case of campaign-finance 

offenses, that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. At the 

same time, the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution supported charging 

certain individuals connected to the Campaign with making false statements or otherwise 

obstructing this investigation or parallel congressional investigations. 

A. Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign 

On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an 

indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities-including the Internet 

Research Agency (IRA) and Concord Management and Consulting LLC (Concord)- with 

violating U.S. criminal laws in order to interfere with U.S. elections and political processes.1276 

The indictment charges all of the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count 

One), three defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and •bank fraud (Count Two), and 

five defendants with aggravated identity theft (Counts Three through Eight). Internet Research 

Agency Indictment. Concord, which is one of the entities charged in the Count One conspiracy, 

entered an appearance through U.S. counsel and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds. 

In orders and memorandum opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the district 

court denied Concord's motions to dismiss. United States v. Concord Management & Consulting 

LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018). United States v. Concord Management & Consulting 

LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018). As of this writing, the prosecution of Concord remains 

ongoing before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The other defendants remain 

at large. 

12 76 A more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate 

memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the indictment. 

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Although members of the IRA had contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump 

Campaign, the indictment does not charge any Trump Campaign official or any other U.S. person 

with participating in the conspiracy. That is because the investigation did not identify evidence 

that any U.S. person who coordinated or communicated with the IRA knew that he or she was 

speaking with Russian nationals engaged in the criminal conspiracy. The Office therefore 

determined that such persons did not have the knowledge or criminal purpose required to charge 

them in the conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count One) or in the separate count alleging 

a wire- and bank-fraud conspiracy involving the IRA and two individual Russian nationals (Count 

Two). 

The Office did, however, charge one U.S. national for his role in supplying false or stolen 

bank account numbers that allowed the IRA conspirators to access U.S. online payment systems 

by circumventing those systems' security features. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded 

guilty, pursuant to a single-count information, to identity fraud, in violation of 18 U .S.C. 

§ 1028(a)(7) and (b)(l)(D). Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 

(D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2018), Doc. 10. The investigation did not establish that Pinedo was aware of the 

identity of the IRA members who purchased bank account numbers from him. Pinedo's sales of 

account numbers enabled the IRA members to anonymously access a financial network through 

which they transacted with U.S. persons and companies. See Gov't Sent. Mem. at 3, United States 

v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2018), Doc. 24. On October 10, 2018, Pinedo 

was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, to be followed by six months of home confinement, 

and was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service. 

B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations 

1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy 

a. Background 

On July 13, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment 

charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various 

U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S. persons, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft and conspiring to commit 

money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ I 028A 

and l 956(h) (Counts Two through Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of 

U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in violation 

of18U.S.C. §§ 1030and371 (CountEleven). Netyksholndictment. 1277 Asofthiswriting,all 12 

defendants remain at large. 

The Netyksho indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with 

others to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential 

election, steal documents from those computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents to 

interfere in the election. Netyksho Indictment ,r 2. The indictment also describes how, in staging 

1277 The Office provided a more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case in 

meetings with the Office of the Acting Attorney General before the indictment. 

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the releases, the defendants used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through 

WikiLeaks. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that 

the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC. Netyksho Indictment ,i 48. In addition, on 

October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton 

Campaign chairman John Podesta after a successful spearphishing operation. Netyksho 

Indictment ,i 49. 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

b. Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

-Harm to Ongoing Matter 

1278 The Office also considered, but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing 

and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the National 

Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover 

"goods, wares, or merchandise," and lower coutts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to 

tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). See 

United States v. Yijia Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344-48 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (collecting cases). One of those 

post-Dowling decisions-United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)-specifically held that 

the NSPA does not reach "a computer program in source code form," even though that code was stored in 

tangible items (i.e., a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Id. at 1302-03. Congress, in turn, cited the 

Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) that "would ensure that 

the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft 

of physical items [is] protected." S. Rep. 104-357, at 7 (1996). That sequence of events would make it 

difficult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute 

"goods, wares, or merchandise" within the meaning of the NSPA. 

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-Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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2. Potential Section 1030 Violation B 

See United States v. 

Willis, 4 76 F .3d 1121, 1125 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) ( explaining that the 1986 amendments to Section 

1030 reflect Congress's desire to reach "' intentional acts of unauthorized access-rather than 

mistaken, inadvertent or careless ones"') (quoting S. Rep. 99-432, at 5 (1986)). In addition, the 

computer likely qualifies as a "protected" one under the statute, which 

reaches "effectively all comp s ith Internet access." United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 

859 9th Cir. 2012 en bane . 

Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, however, the Office determined that 

prosecution of this potential violation was not warranted. Those Principles instruct prosecutors to 

consider, among other things, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the person's culpability in 

connection with the offense, and the probable sentence to be im osed if the rosecution is 

successful. Justice Manual 9-27.230. 

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lained below, the Office evaluated 

C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts 

As explained in Section IV above, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of 

numerous links (i.e., contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or 

claiming to have ties to the Russian government. The Office evaluated the contacts under several 

sets of federal laws, including conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate 

in the United States. After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges 

under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section IV above-with the 

exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on 

behalf of Ukraine. 

One of the interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individualsthe June 9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising 

derogatory information on Hillary Clinton-implicates an additional body of law: campaignfinance statutes. Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources 

raise difficult statutory and constitutional questions. As ex 

those questions in connection with the June 9 meeting 

The Office ultimately concluded that, even if the principal legal questions were resolved favorably 

to the government, a prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Campaign officials or 

individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law. 

Finally, although the evidence of contacts between Campaign officials and Russiaaffiliated individuals may not have been sufficient to establish or sustain criminal charges, several 

U.S. persons connected to the Campaign made false statements about those contacts and took other 

steps to obstruct the Office's investigation and those of Congress. This Office has therefore 

charged some of those individuals with making false statements and obstructing justice. 

1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion 

As an initial matter, this Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the 

collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of "collusion," but through the lens 

of conspiracy law. In so doing, the Office recognized that the word "collud[ e ]" appears in the 

Acting Attorney General's August 2, 2017 memorandum; it has frequently been invoked in public 

reporting; and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law, see, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown & 

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). But collusion is not a specific offense or 

theory of liability found in the U.S. Code; nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. To the 

contrary, even as defined in legal dictionaries, collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as 

that crime is set forth in the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Black's Law 

Dictionary 321 (10th ed. 2014) (collusion is "[a]n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain 

something forbidden by law"); 1 Alexander Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 311 (1871) 

("An agreement between two or more persons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ 

such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object."); 1 Bouvier 's Law Dictionary 352 

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(1897) ("An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms 

of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law."). 

For that reason, this Office's focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was 

on conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonly discussed term "collusion." The Office 

considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia-linked 

individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy-either under statutes that have their 

own conspiracy language (e.g. , 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 195l(a)), or under the general conspiracy 

statute (18 U.S.C. § 371). The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume 

I, Section IV, supra, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal 

criminal law- including foreign-fnfluence and campaign-finance laws, both of which are 

discussed further below. The Office therefore did not charge any individual associated with the 

Trump Campaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts, either 

under a specific statute or under Section 371 's offenses clause. 

The Office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with a conspiracy under 

Section 371 's defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a 

lawful function of the U.S. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest means. See 

Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 

182, 188 (1924); see also United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 34 7 F. Supp. 3d 38, 

46 (D.D.C.2018). The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign officialsor between such officials and Russia-linked individuals-to interfere with or obstruct a lawful 

function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period. And, as discussed in 

Volume I, Section V.A, supra, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign 

official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the 

Office charged, namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in Volume I, Section II, supra. 

Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with 

conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section 

IV above. 

2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951) 

The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under 

federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, or work done for, a foreign government. 

a. Governing Law 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a 

foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant 

must act on behalf of a foreign government (as opposed to other kinds of foreign entities), the acts 

need not involve espionage; rather, acts of any type suffice for liability. See United States v. 

Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 715 (7th 

Cir. 2009); United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 581 (7th Cir. 2005). An "agent of a foreign 

government" is an " individual" who "agrees to operate" in the United States "subject to the 

direction or control of a foreign government or official." 18 U.S.C. § 951 ( d). 

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The crime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States 

as an unregistered foreign-government agent. 18 U.S.C. § 95l(a). The statute does not require 

willfulness, and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense. United 

States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 998-99 (11th Cir. 2008); Duran, 596 F.3d at 1291-94; Dumeisi, 

424 F.3d at 581. 

The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) generally makes it illegal to act as an agent 

of a foreign principal by engaging in certain (largely political) activities in the United States 

without registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621. The triggering agency 

relationship must be with a foreign principal or "a person any of whose activities are directly or 

indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a 

foreign principal." 22 U.S.C. § 61 l(c)(l). That includes a foreign government or political party 

and various foreign individuals and entities. 22 U.S.C. § 611(6). A covered relationship exists if 

a person "acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant" or "in any other capacity at the 

order, request, or under the [foreign principal's] direction or control." 22 U.S.C. § 61 l(c)(l). It 

is sufficient if the person "agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds 

himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign 

principal." 22 U.S.C. § 61 l(c)(2). 

The triggering activity is that the agent "directly or through any other person" in the United 

States (1) engages in "political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign principal," which 

includes attempts to influence federal officials or the public; (2) acts as "public relations counsel, 

publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such 

foreign principal"; (3) " solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or 

other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal"; or ( 4) "represents the interests 

of such foreign principal" before any federal agency or official. 22 U .S.C. § 611 ( c )(1 ). 

It is a crime to engage in a " [ w ]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation 

thereunder." 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(l). It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or 

omissions of material facts in FARA registration statements or supplements. 22 U.S.C. 

§ 618(a)(2). Most violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment and a $10,000 

fine. 22 U.S.C. § 618. 

b. Application 

The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort's and Richard Oates's 

pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated FARA. Manafort and Gates were 

charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal 

informations in the District of Columbia prosecution.

1280 The evidence underlying those charges 

is not addressed in this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate 

1280 Gates Superseding Criminal Information; Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Richard W 

Gates III, 1: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 203; Waiver of Trial by Jury, United States v. Richard 

W Gates III, l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 204; Gates Plea Agreement; Statement of Offense, 

United States v. Richard W Gates III, l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206; Plea Agreement, 

United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1 :17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 422; Statement of Offense, 

United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. , 1: l 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 423. 

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prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment 

in that case. 

In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violations involving Michael 

Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a country other than Russia (i.e., Turkey) 

and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that 

accompanied his guilty plea to a false-statements charge. Statement of Offense, United States v. 

Michael T Flynn, No. l:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 ("Flynn Statement of 

Offense"). 1281 

The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any 

individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the 

meaning of FARA or, in terms of Section 951, subject to the direction or control of the government 

of Russia, or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, 

and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian overnrnent-or at its direction control, or 

As a result, the Office did not charge any other Trump Campaign official with violating 

FARA or Section 951, or attempting or conspiring to do so, based on contacts with the Russian 

government or a Russian principal. 

Finally, the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors-George 

Papadopoulos-acted as an agent of, or at the direction and control of, the government of Israel. 

While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search 

warrants were obtained in part on that basis), the Office ultimately determined that the evidence 

was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under FARA or Section 951. 

3. Campaign Finance 

Several areas of the Office's investigation involved efforts or offers by foreign nationals to 

provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that 

information to the public, to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below, the 

Office considered whether two of those efforts in particular- the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump 

1282 On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued warrants based 

on a finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 (b ), 

1805(a)(2)(A). The FISC's probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than the 

one governing the Office's decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible 

evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the 

Russian Federation during the period at issue. Cf United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir. 

2013) ( explaining that probable cause requires only "a fair probability," and not "certainty, or proof beyond 

a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance of the evidence"). 

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the campaign-finance laws. The Office determined that the evidence was not sufficient to charge 

either incident as a criminal violation. 

a. Overview Of Governing Law 

"[T]he United States has a compelling interest ... in limiting the participation of foreign 

citizens in activities of democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence 

over the U.S. political process." Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(Kavanaugh, J., for three-judge court), ajf'd, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). To that end, federal campaignfinance law broadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations, 

expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local candidate elections, 

and prohibits anyone from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such contributions or donations. As 

relevant here, foreign nationals may not make- and no one may "solicit,' accept, or receive" from 

them-"a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value" or "an express or implied 

promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election." 

52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(l)(A), (a)(2). 1283 The term "contribution," which is used throughout the 

campaign-finance law, "includes" "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or 

anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal 

office." 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, "the value of [volunteer] 

services." 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(B)(i). 

Foreign nationals are also barred from making "an expenditure, independent expenditure, 

or disbursement for an electioneering communication." 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(l)(C). The term 

"expenditure" "includes" "any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of 

money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for 

Federal office." 52 U.S.C. §,30101(9)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, news stories and 

non-partisan get-out-the-vote activities. 52 U.S.C. § 3010 I (9)(B)(i)-(ii). An " independent 

expenditure" is an expenditure "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified 

candidate" and made independently of the campaign. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17). An "electioneering 

communication" is a broadcast communication that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for 

Federal office" and is made within specified time periods and targeted at the relevant electorate. 

52 u.s.c. § 30104(f)(3). 

The statute defines "foreign national" by reference to FARA and the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, with minor modification. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (cross-referencing 22 U.S.C. 

§ 61 l(b)(l)-(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20), (22)). That definition yields five, sometimesoverlapping categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities 

relevant for present purposes-namely, foreign governments and political parties, individuals 

1283 Campaign-finance law also places financial limits on contributions, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a), and 

prohibits contributions from corporations, banks, and labor unions, 52 U.S.C. § 3011 S(a); see Citizens 

United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). Because the conduct that the Office investigated involved 

possible electoral activity by foreign nationals, the foreign-contributions ban is the most readily applicable 

provision. 

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outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents, and certain non-U.S. entities located 

outside of the U.S. · 

A "knowing □ and willful[]" violation involving an aggregate of $25,000 or more in a 

calendar year is a felony. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)(A)(i); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 

(noting that a willful violation will require some "proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law"); 

United States v. Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d 573, 577 (E.D. Va. 2013) (applying willfulness 

standard drawn from Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998)); see also Wagner v. 

FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 19 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en bane) (same). A "knowing[] and willful[]" violation 

involving an aggregate of $2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than $25,000, is a 

misdemeanor. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)(A)(ii). 

b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting 

The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in 

connection with the June 9 meeting described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra. The Office 

concluded that, in light of the government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent 

("knowing" and "willful"), and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information, 

criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that "the admissible evidence will 

probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction." Justice Manual§ 9-27.220. 

In brief, the key facts are that, on June 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump 

Jr., to pass along from Emin and Aras Agalarov an "offer" from Russia's "Crown prosecutor" to 

"the Trump campaign" of "official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and 

her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to [Trump Jr. 's] father." The email described 

this as "very high level and sensitive information" that is "part of Russia and its government's 

support to Mr. Trump-helped along by Aras and Emin." Trump Jr. responded: "if it's what you 

say I love it especially later in the summer." Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had follow-up 

conversations and, within days, scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was 

attended by Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner. The communications setting up the meeting and 

the attendance by high-level Campaign representatives support an inference that the Campaign 

anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information from official Russian sources that 

could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects. 

This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on contributions and 

donations by foreign nationals, 52 U.S.C. § 3012 l(a)(l )(A). Specifically, Goldstone passed along 

an offer purportedly from a Russian government official to provide "official documents and 

information" to the Trump Campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election. 

Trump Jr. appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those 

materials. Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner 

and Mana fort were aware of that purpose and attended the June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt 

of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources. 

The Office considered whether this evidence would establish a conspiracy to violate the 

foreign contributions ban, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 ; the solicitation of an illegal foreignsource contribution; or the acceptance or receipt of "an express or implied promise to make a 

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[foreign-source] contribution," both in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 3012l(a)(l)(A), (a)(2). There are 

reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a "thing of value" within the 

meaning of these provisions, but the Office determined that the government would not be likely to 

obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons: first, the Office did not obtain admissible 

evidence likely to meet the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these 

individuals acted "willfully," i.e., with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct; and, 

second, the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation, see 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)(A)(i). 

i. Thing-of Value Element 

A threshold legal question is whether providing to a campaign "documents and 

information" of the type involved here would constitute a prohibited campaign contribution. The 

foreign contribution ban is not limited to contributions of money. It expressly prohibits "a 

contribution or donation of money or other thing of value." 52 U.S.C. § 3012l(a)(l)(A), (a)(2) 

(emphasis added). And the term "contribution" is defined throughout the campaign-finance laws 

to "include[]" "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value." 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 

The phrases "thing of value" and "anything of value" are broad and inclusive enough to 

encompass at least some forms of valuable information. Throughout the United States Code, these 

phrases serve as "term[ s] of art" that are construed "broad[ly]." United States v. Nilsen, 967 F .2d 

539, 542 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("thing of value" includes "both tangibles and intangibles"); 

see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 20l(b)(l), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes); id. § 641 (theft of government 

property). For example, the term "thing of value" encompasses law enforcement reports that 

would reveal the identity of informants, United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979); 

classified materials, United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 1991); confidential 

information about a competitive bid, United States v. Matzkin, 14 F .3d 1014, I 020 ( 4th Cir. 1994); 

secret grand jury information, United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680 (6th Cir. 1985); and 

information about a witness's whereabouts, United States v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 

1980) (per curiam). And in the public corruption context, " 'thing of value' is defined broadly to 

include the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received." United States 

v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731,744 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations recognize the value to a campaign of at 

least some forms of information, stating that the term "anything of value" includes "the provision 

of any goods or services without charge," such as "membership lists" and "mailing lists." 11 

C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(l). The FEC has concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of 

activists. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 338 

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the FEC's findings). Likewise, polling data provided to a campaign 

constitutes a "contribution." FEC Advisory Opinion 1990-12 (Strub), 1990 WL 153454 (citing 11 

C.F.R. § 106.4(6)). And in the specific context of the foreign-contributions ban, the FEC has 

concluded that "election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns," including "flyers, 

advertisements, door hangers, tri-folds, signs, and other printed material," constitute "anything of 

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value," even though "the value of these materials may be nominal or difficult to ascertain." FEC 

Advisory Opinion 2007-22 (Hurysz), 2007 WL 5172375, at *5. 

These authorities would support the view that candidate-related opposition research given 

to a campaign for the purpose of influencing an election could constitute a contribution to which 

the foreign-source ban could apply. A campaign can be assisted not only by the provision offunds, 

but also by the provision of derogatory information about an opponent. Political campaigns 

frequently conduct and pay for opposition research. A foreign entity that engaged in such research 

and provided resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election, and 

a greater tendency to ingratiate the donor to the candidate, than a gift of money or tangible things 

of value. At the same time, no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of 

uncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could amount 

to a contribution under campaign-finance law. Such an interpretation could have implications 

beyond the foreign-source ban, see 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) (imposing monetary limits on campaign 

contributions), and raise First Amendment questions. Those questions could be especially difficult 

where the information consisted simply of the recounting of historically accurate facts. It is 

uncertain how courts would resolve those issues. 

ii. Willfulness 

Even assuming that the promised "documents and information that would incriminate 

Hillary" constitute a "thing of value" under campaign-finance law, the government would 

encounter other challenges in seeking to obtain and sustain a conviction. Most significantly, the 

government has not obtained admissible evidence that is likely to establish the scienter requirement 

beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove that a defendant acted "knowingly and willfully," the 

government would have to show that the defendant had general knowledge that his conduct was 

unlawful. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 123 (8th ed. Dec. 

2017) ("Election Offenses"); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation 

requires "proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law"); Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 577 

("knowledge of general unlawfulness"). "This standard creates an elevated scienter element 

requiring, at the very least, that application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear. When 

there is substantial doubt concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter, the 

offender is more likely to have an intent defense." Election Offenses 123. · 

On the facts here, the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful. 

The investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar 

with the foreign-contribution ban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context. 

The government does not have strong evidence of surreptitious behavior or effo11s at concealment 

at the time of the June 9 meeting. While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent 

disclosure of the nature of the June 9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a 

showing of scienter, see Volume II, Section II.G, infra, that concealment occurred more than a 

year later, involved individuals who did not attend the June 9 meeting, and may reflect an intention 

to avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality. Additionally, in light 

of the unresolved legal questions about whether giving "documents and information" of the sort 

offered here constitutes a campaign contribution, Trump Jr. could mount a factual defense that he 

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did not believe his response to the offer and the June 9 meeting itself violated the law. Given his 

less direct involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a similar 

defense. And, while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns, the Office has not 

developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of these legal issues. 

iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information 

The Office would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

value of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2,000 threshold for a criminal 

violation, as well as the $25,000 threshold for felony punishment. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l). 

The type of evidence commonly used to establish the value of non-monetary contributions-such 

as pricing the contribution on a commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost 

or the cost of distribution-would likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting. 

Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign, it appears that the 

information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable. And while value in a conspiracy 

may well be measured by what the participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement, 

see, e.g., United States v. Tombrello, 666 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1982), Goldstone's description 

of the offered material here was quite general. His suggestion of the information's value-i.e., 

that it would "incriminate Hillary" and "would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father"-was nonspecific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given 

Goldstone's lack of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be 

delivered could be reflected in Trump Jr.'s response ("if it's what you say I love it") (emphasis 

added). 

Accordingly, taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable mental state in a 

campaign-finance prosecution and the difficulty in establishing the required valuation, the Office 

decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign 

officials for the events culminating in the June 9 meeting. 

c. Application to Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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ii. Willfulness 

As discussed, to establish a criminal campaign-finance violation, the government must 

prove that the defendant acted "knowingly and willfully." 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)(A)(i). That 

standard requires proof that the defendant knew generally that his conduct was unlawful. Election 

Offenses 123. Given the uncertainties noted above, the "willfulness" requirement would pose a 

substantial barrier to prosecution. 

iii. Constitutional Considerations 

, the First Amendment could ose constraints on a 

iv. Analysis as to mllllll 

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4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation 

The Office determined that certain individuals associated with the Campaign lied to 

investigators about Campaign contacts with Russia and have taken other actions to interfere with 

the investigation. As explained below, the Office therefore charged some U.S. persons connected 

to the Campaign with false statements and obstruction offenses. 

a. Overview Of Governing Law 

False Statements. The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to 

government investigators is 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As relevant here, under Section 1001(a)(2), it is a 

crime to knowingly and willfully "make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement 

or representation" "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive ... branch of the 

Government." An FBI investigation is a matter within the Executive Branch's jurisdiction. United 

States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984). The statute also applies to a subset of legislative 

branch actions-viz., administrative matters and "investigation[s] or review[ s ]" conducted by a 

congressional committee or subcommittee. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(l) and (2); see United States v. 

Pickett, 353 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

Whether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators, the 

government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non-jurisdictional elements: 

the statement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; the defendant knew both that it was false and that 

it was unlawful to make a false statement; and the false statement was material. See, e.g., United 

States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1222 n.27 (9th Cir. 2017) (listing elements); see also Ninth Circuit 

Pattern Instruction 8.73 & cmt. (explaining that the Section 1001 jury instruction was modified in 

light of the Department of Justice's position that the phrase "knowingly and willfully" in the statute 

requires the defendant's knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful). In the D.C. Circuit, the 

government must prove that the statement was actually false; a statement that is misleading but 

"literally true" does not satisfy Section 1001 (a)(2). See United States v. Milton, 8 F .3d 39, 45 

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(D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 832-33 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For that 

false statement to qualify as "material," it must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable 

of influencing, a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is addressed. See 

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 701 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). 

Perjury. Under the federal perjury statutes, it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath 

before a grand jury to knowingly make any false material declaration. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The 

government must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under 

Section 1623(a): the defendant testified under oath before a federal grand jury; the defendant's 

testimony was false in one or more respects; the false testimony concerned matters that were 

material to the grand jury investigation; and the false testimony was knowingly given. United 

States v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The general perjury statute, 18 

U.S.C. § 1621, also applies to grand jury testimony and has similar elements, except that it requires 

that the witness have acted willfully and that the government satisfy "strict common-law 

requirements for establishing falsity." See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 & n.6 (1979) 

(explaining "the two-witness rule" and the corroboration that it demands). 

Obstruction of Justice. Three basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes 

pertinent to this Office's charging decisions: an obstructive act; some form of nexus between the 

obstructive act and an official proceeding; and criminal (i.e., corrupt) intent. A detailed discussion 

of those elements, and the law governing obstruction of justice more generally, is included in 

Volume II of the report. 

b. Application to Certain Individuals 

i. George Papadopoulos 

Investigators approached Papadopoulos for an interview based on his role as a foreign 

policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and his suggestion to a foreign government representative 

that Russia had indicated that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of 

information damaging to candidate Clinton. On January 27, 2017, Papadopoulos agreed to be 

interviewed by FBI agents, who informed him that the interview was part of the investigation into 

potential Russian government interference in the 2016 presidential election. 

During the interview, Papadopoulos lied about the timing, extent, and nature of his 

communications with Joseph Mifsud, Olga Polonskaya, and Ivan Timofeev. With respect to 

timing, Papadopoulos acknowledged that he had met Mifsud and that Mifsud told him the Russians 

had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of "thousands of emails." But Papadopoulos stated multiple 

times that those communications occurred before he joined the Trump Campaign and that it was a 

"very strange coincidence" to be told of the "dirt" before he started working for the Campaign. 

This account was false. Papadopoulos met Mifsud for the first time on approximately March 14, 

2016, after Papadopoulos had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the 

Campaign. Mifsud showed interest in Papadopoulos only after learning of his role on the 

Campaign. And Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing "dirt" on candidate 

Clinton in late April 2016, more than a month after Papadopoulos had joined the Campaign and 

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been publicly announced by candidate Trump. Statement of Offense ,r,r 25-26, United States v. 

George Papadopoulos, No. 1: 17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017), Doc. 19 ("Papadopoulos Statement 

of Offense"). 

Papadopoulos also made false statements in an effort to mmumze the extent and 

importance of his communications with Mifsud. For example, Papadopoulos stated that 

" [Mifsud]'s a nothing," that he thought Mifsud was "just a guy talk[ing] up connections or 

something," and that he believed Mifsud was "BS'ing to be completely honest with you." In fact, 

however, Papadopoulos understood Mifsud to have substantial connections to high-level Russian 

government officials and that Mifsud spoke with some of those officials in Moscow before telling 

Papadopoulos about the "dirt." Papadopoulos also engaged in extensive communications over a 

period of months with Mifsud about foreign policy issues for the Campaign, including efforts to 

arrange a "history making" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials. In 

addition, Papadopoulos failed to inform investigators that Mifsud had introduced him to Timofeev, 

the Russian national who Papadopoulos understood to be connected to the Russian Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, despite being asked if he had met with Russian nationals or " [a]nyone with a 

Russian accent" during the campaign. Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r,r 27-29. 

Papadopoulos also falsely claimed that he met Polonskaya before he joined the Campaign, 

and falsely told the FBI that he had "no" relationship at all with her. He stated that the extent of 

their communications was her sending emails-"Just, 'Hi, how are you?' That's it." In truth, 

however, Papadopoulos met Polonskaya on March 24, 2016, after he had joined the Campaign; he 

believed that she had connections to high-level Russian government officials and could help him 

arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia. During the campaign he emailed and spoke with 

her over Skype on numerous occasions about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia. 

Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r,r 30-31. 

Papadopoulos's false statements in January 2017 impeded the FBI's investigation into 

Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Most immediately, those statements 

hindered investigators' ability to effectively question Mifsud when he was interviewed in the lobby 

of a Washington, D.C. hotel on February 10, 2017. See Gov't Sent. Mem. at 6, United States v. 

George Papadopoulos, No. 1 :17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2017), Doc. 44. During that interview, 

Mifsud admitted to knowing Papadopoulos and to having introduced him to Polonskaya and 

Timofeev. But Mifsud denied that he had advance knowledge that Russia was in possession of 

emails damaging to candidate Clinton, stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed 

cybersecurity and hacking as a larger issue and that Papadopoulos must have misunderstood their 

conversation. Mifsud also falsely stated that he had not seen Papadopoulos since the meeting at 

which Mifsud introduced him to Polonskaya, even though emails, text messages, and other 

information show that Mifsud met with Papadopoulos on at least two other occasions-April 12 

and April 26, 2016. In addition, Mifsud omitted that he had drafted (or edited) the follow-up 

message that Polonskaya sent to Papadopoulos following the initial meeting and that, as reflected 

in the language of that email chain ("Baby, thank you!"), Mifsud may have been involved in a 

personal relationship with Polonskaya at the time. The false information and omissions in 

Papadopoulos's January 2017 interview undermined investigators' ability to challenge Mifsud 

when he made these inaccurate statements. 

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Given the seriousness of the lies and omissions and their effect on the FBI's investigation, 

the Office charged Papadopoulos with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001. Information, United States v. George Papadopoulos, No. l:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 

2017), Doc. 8. On October 7, 2017, Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea 

agreement. On September 7, 2018, he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment, a $9,500 fine, 

and 200 hours of community service. 

ii. -

iii. Michael Flynn 

Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017, four days after he 

had officially assumed his duties as National Security Advisor to the President. During the 

interview, Flynn made several false statements pertaining to his communications with the Russian 

ambassador. 

First, Flynn made two false statements about his conversations with Russian Ambassador 

Kislyak in late December 2016, at a time when the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia 

for interfering with the 2016 presidential election and Russia was considering its response. See 

Flynn Statement of Offense. Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from 

escalating the situation in response to the United States's imposition of sanctions. That statement 

was false. On December 29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak to request Russian restraint. Flynn made 

the call immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T. McFarland) about 

what to communicate to Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after the Kislyak call to 

report on the substance of that conversation. Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not 

remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate 

its response to the U.S. sanctions as a result of Flynn's request. On December 31, 2016, Flynn in 

fact had such a conversation with Kislyak, and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the 

call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak. See Flynn Statement of Offense ,r 3. 

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Second, Flynn made false statements about calls he had previously made to representatives 

of Russia and other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations 

Security Council on December 21, 2016. Specifically, Flynn stated that he only asked the 

countries' positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that he did not request that any 

of the countries take any particular action on the resolution. That statement was false. On 

December 22, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak, informed him of the incoming Trump Administration's 

opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. Flynn 

also falsely stated that Kislyak never described Russia's response to his December 22 request 

regarding the resolution. Kislyak in fact told Flynn in a conversation on December 23, 2016, that 

Russia would not vote against the resolution if it came to a vote. See Flynn Statement of Offense 

,r 4. 

Flynn made these false statements to the FBI at a time when he was serving as National 

Security Advisor and when the FBI had an open investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 

presidential election, including the nature of any links between the Trump Campaign and Russia. 

Flynn's false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that 

ongoing investigation. Flynn Statement of Offense ,r,r 1-2. They also came shortly before Flynn 

made separate submissions to the Depa1tment of Justice, pursuant to FARA, that also contained 

materially false statements and omissions. Id. ,r 5. Based on the totality of that conduct, the Office 

decided to charge Flynn with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U .S.C. 

§ l00l(a). On December 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that 

charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his FARA filing. See id.; Plea 

Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, No. l:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3. 

Flynn is awaiting sentencing. 

iv. Michael Cohen 

Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel to the Trump 

Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organization. Information ,r 1, United 

States v. Cohen, No. 1 :18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information"). From 

the fall of 2015 through approximately June 2016, Cohen was involved in a project to build a 

Trump-branded tower and adjoining development in Moscow. The project was known as Trump 

Tower Moscow. 

In 2017, Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), both of which were 

investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible links between 

Russia and the presidential campaigns. In late August 2017, in advance of his testimony, Cohen 

caused a two-page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow. 

Cohen Information ,r,r 2-3. The letter contained three representations relevant here. First, Cohen 

stated that the Trump Moscow project had ended in January 2016 and that he had briefed candidate 

Trump on the project only three times before making the unilateral decision to terminate it. 

Second, Cohen represented that he never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the project 

and never considered asking Trump to travel for the project. Third, Cohen stated that he did not 

recall any Russian government contact about the project, including any response to an email that 

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he had sent to a Russian government email account. Cohen Information ,i 4. Cohen later asked 

that his two-page statement be incorporated into his testimony's transcript before SSCI, and he 

ultimately gave testimony to SSCI that was consistent with that statement. Cohen Information ,i 5. 

Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen's two-page statement was false and 

misleading. Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and 

included more than three progress reports from Cohen to Trump. Cohen had discussed with Felix 

Sater his own travel to Russia as part of the project, and he had inquired about the possibility of 

Trump traveling there- both with the candidate himself and with senior campaign official Corey 

Lewandowski. Cohen did recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian 

government spokesman Dmitry Peskov-in particular, that he received an email reply and had a 

follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016. 

Cohen Information ,i 7. Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time, and 

admitted that he made them in an effort (1) to minimize the links between the project and Trump 

(who by this time was President), and (2) to give the false impression that the project had ended 

before the first vote in the Republican Party primary process, in the hopes of limiting the ongoing 

Russia investigations. Id. 

Given the nature of the false statements and the fact that he repeated them during his initial 

interview with the Office, we charged Cohen with violating Section 1001. On November 29, 2018, 

Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him 

with making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 100l(a)(2) and (c). Cohen Information. The case was transferred to the 

district judge presiding over the separate prosecution of Cohen pursued by the Southern District 

of New York (after a referral from our Office). On December 7, 2018, this Office submitted a 

letter to that judge recommending that Cohen's cooperation with our investigation be taken into 

account in sentencing Cohen on both the false-statements charge and the offenses in the Southern 

District prosecution. On December 12, 2018, the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of 

imprisonment on the false-statements count, to run concurrently with a 36-month sentence 

imposed on the other counts. 

v. litialllll 

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vi. Jeff Sessions 

As set forth in Volume I, Section IV.A.6, supra, the investigation established that, while a 

U.S. Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted 

with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July 

2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions' s Senate office in September 2016. The investigation also 

established that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump's 

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foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., in April 2016, and that it is 

possible that they met briefly at that reception. 

The Office considered whether, in light of these interactions, Sessions committed perjury 

before, or made false statements to, Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney 

General. In January 2017 testimony during his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response 

to a question about Trump Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had 

"been called a surrogate at a time or two in that campaign and I didn't have - did not have 

communications with the Russians." In written responses submitted on January 17, 2017, Sessions 

answered "[n]o" to a question asking whether he had "been in contact with anyone connected to 

any part of the Russian government about the 2016 election, either before or after election day." 

And, in a March 2017 supplement to his testimony, Sessions identified two of the campaign-period 

contacts with Ambassador Kislyak noted above, which had been reported in the media following 

the January 2017 confirmation hearing. Sessions stated in the supplemental response that he did 

"not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador, or any other representatives of the 

Russian government, regarding the political campaign on these occasions or any other occasion." 

Although the investigation established that Sessions interacted with Kislyak on the 

occasions described above and that Kislyak mentioned the presidential campaign on at least one 

occasion, the evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sessions gave knowingly false answers to 

Russia-related questions in light of the wording and context of those questions. With respect to 

Sessions's statements that he did "not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador . .. 

regarding the political campaign" and he had not been in contact with any Russian official "about 

the 2016 election," the evidence concerning the nature of Sessions's interactions with Kislyak 

makes it plausible that Sessions did not recall discussing the campaign with Kislyak at the time of 

his statements. Similarly, while Sessions stated in his January 2017 oral testimony that he "did 

not have communications with Russians," he did so in response to a question that had linked such 

communications to an alleged "continuing exchange of information" between the Trump 

Campaign and Russian government intermediaries. Sessions later explained to the Senate and to 

the Office that he understood the question as narrowly calling for disclosure of interactions with 

Russians that involved the exchange of campaign information, as distinguished from more routine 

contacts with Russian nationals. Given the context in which the question was asked, that 

understanding is plausible. 

Accordingly, the Office concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Sessions 

was willfully untruthful in his answers and thus insufficient to obtain or sustain a conviction for 

perjury or false statements. Consistent with the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office 

therefore determined not to pursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that 

decision in March 2018. 

vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation 

The Office considered whether, during the course of the investigation, other individuals 

interviewed either omitted material information or provided information determined to be false. 

Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office did not seek criminal charges against 

any individuals other than those listed above. In some instances, that decision was due to 

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evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity. In others, the Office determined that the witness ultimately 

provided truthful information and that considerations of culpability, deterrence, and resourcereservation wei hed a ainst rosecution. See Justice Manual 9-27.220 9-27.230. 

-

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Report On The Investigation Into 

Russian Interference In The 

2016 Presidential Election 

Volume II of II 

Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III 

Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.B(c) 

Washington, D.C. 

March 2019 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME II 

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME IT ......................................................................................................... 1 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME TI ............................................................................................. 3 

I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES ................................................................ 9 

A. Legal Framework of Obstruction_ of Justice ................................................................... 9 

B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations .............................................................. 12 

II. FACTUAL RES UL TS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION ...................................................... 15 

A. The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump ................. 15 

1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia .............. 16 

2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks' s Release of Hacked Emails ........... 17 

3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to 

Aid Candidate Trump ........................................................................................... 18 

4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or 

Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election ................................ 21 

B. The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn .................. 24 

1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia 

with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak ........................................................... 24 

2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's 

Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens 

Election-Interference Investigations ..................................................................... 27 

3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to 

Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI ................................ 29 

4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn ............. 31 

5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President 

Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Corney ....................................................... 32 

6. Flynn's Resignation .............................................................................................. 36 

7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Corney ................................... 38 

8. The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating 

Flynn ........ ....................................................................... ..... ................................. 41 

9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness 

Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak .............. 42 

C. The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBl's Russia 

Investigation ................................................................................................................. 48 

I. Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation ..................... 48 
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2. FBI Director Corney Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia 

Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI ........................................................... 52 

3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public 

Statements that he had No Connection to Russia ................................................. 55 

4. The President Asks Corney to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russia 

Investigation .......................................................................................................... 57 

D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director 

Corney .......................................................................................................................... 62 

1. Corney Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to 

Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation ............. 62 

2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Corney ...................................... 64 

E. The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel.. ........................................... 77 

1. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction .............. 78 

2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts ofinterest... .......... 80 

3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction 

of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the 

Special Counsel Removed .................................................................................... 84 

F. The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation .......................... 90 

1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions 

to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation ......................................................... 90 

2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski ..................................................... 92 

3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview ....... 93 

4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation ....................... 94 

G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, 

2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials ............................... 98 

1. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June 

9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting ............................................................................. 98 

2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose 

Information About the June 9 Meeting .... ........................................................... 100 

3. The President Directs Trump Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the 

June 9 Meeting .................................................................................................... 101 

4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting ............................................... 103 

H. The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over 

the Investigation ......................................................................................................... 107 

1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal. ................... 107 

2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations 

Covered by his Recusal. ....... ............................................................................... 109 

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I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the 

Special Counsel .......................................................................................................... 113 

1. .The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel... .......... 113 

2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports ..................... 114 

J. The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort,litlllll ····· ........................... 120 

1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn .................................................................... 120 

2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort ..................................................................... 122 

3. Harm to Ongoing Matter ···································· ................................... 128 

K. The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen .................................................. 134 

l. Candidate Trump' s Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower 

Moscow Project .................................................................................................. 134 

2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line" Distancing Candidate 

Trump From Russia ............................................................................................ 138 

3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump 

Tower Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line ............................... 139 

4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen .......................................... 144 

5. The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the 

Government. ........................................................................................................ 148 

L. Overarching Factual Issues ........................................................................................ 156 

III. LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE 

PRESIDENT ............................................................................................................................ 159 

A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions 

to the Conduct Under Investigation ........................................................................... 160 

1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive 

Acts ..... .. ........................................................................................................... 160 

2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512( c )(2) .................. 162 

3. The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing 

Its Text. .............................................................................................................. 164 

4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section 

1512( c )(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation .......................... 165 

5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this 

Investigation ........................................................................................................ 167 

B. Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to 

Presidential Conduct .................................................................................................. 168 

1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential 

Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes ............................................. 169 

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2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress 

May Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the 

President's Official Powers ................................................................................. 171 

a. The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In 

This Context ................................................................................................... 172 

b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's 

Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited ..................... 173 

c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial 

Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source .................................... 176 

3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes 

Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties ................................. 178 

IV. CONCLUSION ......... ················································································ ................................ 182 

iv 
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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II 

This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which 

states that, " [a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he ... shall provide the Attorney 

General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special 

Counsel] reached." 

Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the 

ongoing FBI investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related 

matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. The Order appointing the 

Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the 

FBI's Russia investigation, including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection 

with Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel's jurisdiction also covered potentially 

obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel's investigation itself. This Volume of our report 

summarizes our obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President. 

We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice investigation, 

and then provide an overview of this Volume: 

First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to 

initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial 

judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that "the indictment 

or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the 

executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions" in violation of "the 

constitutional separation of powers."1 Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the 

Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, see 28 U.S.C. § 515; 

28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising 

prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC's constitutional view, we recognized that a federal 

criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President's capacity to 

govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct.2 

Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted, 

it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President's term is permissible.

3 The OLC 

opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office.4 And if 

individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at 

this time. Given those considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in 

1 A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 

222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.). 

2 See U.S. CONST. Art. I § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6; cf OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussing relationship 

between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President). 

3 OLC Op. at 257 n.36 ("A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of 

immunity"). 

4 OLC Op. at 255 ("Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not 

preclude such prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by 

resignation or impeachment"). 
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safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thorough factual 

investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary 

materials were available. 

Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice 

Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply 

an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes. The 

threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person's conduct 

"constitutes a federal offense." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual§ 9-27.220 (2018) (Justice 

Manual). Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges 

can be brought. The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a 

speedy and public trial, with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An 

individual who believes he was wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. In 

contrast, a prosecutor's judgment that crimes were committed, but that no charges will be brought, 

affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator.

5 

The concerns about the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case 

of a sitting President, where a federal prosecutor's accusation of a crime, even in an internal report, 

could carry consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice. OLC noted similar 

concerns about sealed indictments. Even if an indictment were sealed during the President's term, 

OLC reasoned, "it would be very difficult to preserve [an indictment's] secrecy," and if an 

indictment became public, "[t]he stigma and opprobrium" could imperil the President's ability to 

govern."6 Although a prosecutor's internal report would not represent a formal public accusation 

akin to an indictment, the possibility of the report's public disclosure and the absence of a neutral 

adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining "that the 

person's conduct constitutes a federal offense." Justice Manual § 9-27.220. 

Fourth, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President 

clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the 

applicable legal standards, however, we are unable to reach that judgment. The evidence we 

obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from 

conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does 

not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him. 

* * * 

This report on our investigation consists of four parts. Section I provides an overview of 

obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary 

considerations. Section II sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and 

analyzes the evidence. Section III addresses statutory and constitutional defenses. Section IV 

states our conclusion. 

5 For that reason, criticisms have been lodged against the practice of naming unindicted coconspirators in an indictment. See United States v.Briggs,514 F.2d 794,802 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The courts 

have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons of crime while affording 

them no forum in which to vindicate themselves."); see also Justice Manual § 9-11.130. 

6 OLC Op. at 259 & n.38 (citation omitted). 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II 

Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the President that 

related to the Russian-interference investigations, including the President's conduct towards the 

law enforcement officials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events. 

FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION 

The key issues and events we examined include the following: 

The Campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump. During the 2016 

presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian government's apparent support for 

candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that 

were reported to have been hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia 

was responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials privately 

sought information about any further planned WikiLeaks 

releases. Trump also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late 

as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be 

built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election, the President expressed concerns 

to advisors that reports of Russia's election interference might lead the public to question the 

legitimacy of his election. 

Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017, 

incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President, other 

administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak 

about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. On January 27, 

the day after the President was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar 

statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Corney to a private dinner at the White 

House and told Corney that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day after the President 

requested Flynn's resignation, the President told an outside advisor, "Now that we fired Flynn, the 

Russia thing is over." The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue. 

Later that afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting 

with Corney. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said, "I hope you can 

see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. T hope you can let this 

go." Shortly after requesting Flynn's resignation and speaking privately to Corney, the President 

sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating 

that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. McFarland declined 

because she did not know whether that was true, and a White House Counsel's Office attorney 

thought that the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered. 

The President's reaction to the continuing Russia investigation. Tn February 2017, 

Attorney General Jeff Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from campaignrelated investigations because of his role in the Trump Campaign. Tn early March, the President 

told White House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing. And after Sessions 

announced his recusal on March 2, the President expressed anger at the decision and told advisors 

that he should have an Attorney General who would protect him. That weekend, the President 

took Sessions aside at an event and urged him to "unrecuse." Later in March, Corney publicly 

3 
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disclosed at a congressional hearing that the FBI was investigating "the Russian government's 

efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," including any links or coordination between 

the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. In the following days, the President reached 

out to the Director of National Intelligence and the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) to ask them what they could do to publicly dispel 

the suggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort. 

The President also twice called Corney directly, notwithstanding guidance from McGahn to avoid 

direct contacts with the Department of Justice. Corney had previously assured the President that 

the FBI was not investigating him personally, and the President asked Corney to " lift the cloud" 

of the Russia investigation by saying that publicly. 

The President's termination of Comey. On May 3, 2017, Corney testified in a 

congressional hearing, but declined to answer questions about whether the President was 

personally under investigation. Within days, the President decided to terminate Corney. The 

President insisted that the termination letter, which was written for public release, state that Corney 

had informed the President that he was not under investigation. The day of the firing, the White 

House maintained that Corney's termination resulted from independent recommendations from the 

Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General that Corney should be discharged for mishandling 

the Hillary Clinton email investigation. But the President had decided to fire Corney before 

hearing from the Department of Justice. The day after firing Corney, the President told Russian 

officials that he had "faced great pressure because of Russia," which had been "taken off' by 

Corney's firing. The next day, the President acknowledged in a television interview that he was 

going to fire Corney regardless of the Department of Justice's recommendation and that when he 

"decided to just do it," he was thinking that "this thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story." 

In response to a question about whether he was angry with Corney about the Russia investigation, 

the President said, "As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done properly," 

adding that firing Corney "might even lengthen out the investigation." 

The appointment of a Special Counsel and efforts to remove him. On May 17, 2017, the 

Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation appointed a Special Counsel to conduct the 

investigation and related matters. The President reacted to news that a Special Counsel had been 

appointed by telling advisors that it was "the end of his presidency" and demanding that Sessions 

resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, but the President ultimately did not accept it. The 

President told aides that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and suggested that the Special 

Counsel therefore could not serve. The President's advisors told him the asserted conflicts were 

meritless and had already been considered by the Department of Justice. 

On June 14, 2017, the media reported that the Special Counsel's Office was investigating 

whether the President had obstructed justice. Press reports called this "a major turning point" in 

the investigation: while Corney had told the President he was not under investigation, following 

Corney's firing, the President now was under investigation. The President reacted to this news 

with a series of tweets criticizing the Department of Justice and the Special Counsel's 

investigation. On June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn at home and directed him to call 

the Acting Attorney General and say that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and must be 

removed. McGahn did not carry out the direction, however, deciding that he would resign rather 

than trigger what he regarded as a potential Saturday Night Massacre. 

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Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation. Two days after directing McGahn 

to have the Special Counsel removed, the President made another attempt to affect the course of 

the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with 

his former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, a trusted advisor outside the government, and 

dictated a message for Lewandowski to deliver to Sessions. The message said that Sessions should 

publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal from the Russia investigation, the investigation 

was "very unfair" to the President, the President had done nothing wrong, and Sessions planned to 

meet with the Special Counsel and "let [him] move forward with investigating election meddling 

for future elections." Lewandowski said he understood what the President wanted Sessions to do. 

One month later, in another private meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the 

President asked about the status of his message for Sessions to limit the Special Counsel 

investigation to future election interference. Lewandowski told the President that the message 

would be delivered soon. Hours after that meeting, the President publicly criticized Sessions in an 

interview with the New York Times, and then issued a series of tweets making it clear that 

Sessions's job was in jeopardy. Lewandowski did not want to deliver the President's message 

personally, so he asked senior White House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions. 

Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and did not follow through. 

Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence. In the summer of 2017, the President 

learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower 

between senior campaign officials, including Donald Trump Jr., and a Russian lawyer who was 

said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as "part of Russia and its 

government's support for Mr. Trump." On several occasions, the President directed aides not to 

publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the emails would not 

leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. Before the emails 

became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump Jr. by deleting a line that 

acknowledged that the meeting was with "an individual who [Trump Jr.] was told might have 

information helpful to the campaign" and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions 

of Russian children. When the press asked questions about the President's involvement in Trump 

Jr.' s statement, the President's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had played any 

role. 

Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation. In early 

summer 2017, the President called Sessions at home and again asked him to reverse his recusal 

from the Russia investigation. Sessions did not reverse his recusal. In October 2017, the President 

met privately with Sessions in the Oval Office and asked him to "take [a] look" at investigating 

Clinton. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation 

agreement, the President met with Sessions in the Oval Office and suggested, according to notes 

taken by a senior advisor, that if Sessions unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia 

investigation, he would be a "hero." The President told Sessions, "I'm not going to do anything 

or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly." In response, Sessions volunteered 

that he had never seen anything " improper" on the campaign and told the President there was a 

"whole new leadership team" in place. He did not unrecuse. 

Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special 

Counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that the President had directed McGahn to 

5 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attot1Aey Wot1k Protittet // Muy CoHtuiA Muteriul Proteeteti UAtiet' Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

have the Special Counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather 

than carry out the order. The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House 

officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had not been ordered to 

have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn told those officials that the media reports were 

accurate in stating that the President had directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. 

The President then met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the 

reports. In the same meeting, the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special 

Counsel about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahn took notes 

of his conversations with the President. McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered 

happening and perceived the President to be testing his mettle. 

Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort,~. After Flynn withdrew from a joint defense 

agreement with the President and began cooperating with the government, the President's personal 

counsel left a message for Flynn's attorneys reminding them of the President's warm feelings 

towards Flynn, which he said "still remains," and asking for a "heads up" if Flynn knew 

"information that implicates the President." When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no 

longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel 

said he would make sure that the President knew that Flynn's actions reflected "hostility" towards 

the President. During Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal. trial was 

deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated 

unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was convicted, the President called 

Manafort "a brave man" for refusin to "break" and said that "fli in " "almost ou ht to be 

Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The President' s conduct towards Michael Cohen, a 

former Trump Organization executive, changed from praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized 

the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project, to castigation of Cohen when 

he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the 

Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate 

Trump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia 

to advance the deal. In 2017, Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project, 

including stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed 

travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a "party line" that Cohen said was developed to 

minimize the President's connections to Russia. While preparing for his congressional testimony, 

Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, 

said that Cohen should "stay on message" and not contradict the President. After the FBI searched 

Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not 

"flip," contacted him directly to tell him to "stay strong," and privately passed messages of support 

to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if 

he stayed on message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the 

government in the summer of 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a "rat," and 

suggested that his family members had committed crimes. 

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Overarching factual issues. We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about 

these facts, but the evidence we obtained supports several general statements about the President' s 

conduct. 

Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-ofjustice cases. First, the investigation concerned the President, and some of his actions, such as 

firing the FBI director, involved facially lawful acts within his Article II authority, which raises 

constitutional issues discussed below. At the same time, the President's position as the head of 

the Executive Branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official 

proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses-all of which is relevant to a potential 

obstruction-of-justice analysis. Second, unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of 

justice to cover up a crime, the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was 

involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction 

statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of 

the President's intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct. Third, 

many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with 

the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, took place in public view. That 

circumstance is unusual, but no principle of law excludes public acts from the reach of the 

obstruction laws. If the likely effect of public acts is to influence witnesses or alter their testimony, 

the harm to the justice system's integrity is the same. 

Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts, the overall pattern of 

the President's conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature of the President's 

acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. In particular, the actions we investigated 

can be divided into two phases, reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. The first 

phase covered the period from the President's first interactions with Corney through the President's 

firing of Corney. During that time, the President had been repeatedly told he was not personally 

under investigation. Soon after the firing of Corney and the appointment of the Special Counsel, 

however, the President became aware that his own conduct was being investigated in an 

obstruction-of-justice inquiry. At that point, the President engaged in a second phase of conduct, 

involving public attacks on the inve~tigation, non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both 

public and private to encourage witnesses not to cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about 

the nature of the President's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the 

evidence. 

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES 

The President's counsel raised statutory and constitutional defenses to a possible 

obstruction-of-justice analysis of the conduct we investigated. We concluded that none of those 

legal defenses provided a basis for declining to investigate the facts. 

Statutory defenses. Consistent with precedent and the Department of Justice's general 

approach to interpreting obstruction statutes, we concluded that several statutes could apply here. 

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(b)(3), 1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c)(2) is an omnibus 

obstruction-of-justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or 

contemplated official proceedings. No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowing the 

provision to cover only conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence. Sections 

1503 and 1505 also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury, 

7 
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Attemey Werle Predttet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted UH.tier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings, and they are supplemented by a provision 

in Section 1512(6) aimed specifically at conduct intended to prevent or hinder the communication 

to law enforcement of information related to a federal crime. 

Constitutional defenses. As for constitutional defenses arising from the President's status 

as the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts 

have not. definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the 

framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues. The 

Department of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is 

subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury 

because that conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority. With respect to whether the 

President ca,n be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the 

Constitution, we concluded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his 

authority in order to protect the integrity of the administration of justice. 

Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and 

permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers. 

The separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including 

those of courts and grand juries, from corrupt, obstructive acts regard less of their source. We also 

concluded that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corrupt acts 

does not undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. The term 

"corruptly" sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an 

intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty 

and the rights ofothers. A preclusion of"corrupt" official action does not diminish the President's 

ability to exercise Article II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not 

demand freedom for the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal 

punishment, avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, 

a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than 

hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. It also aligns with the President's 

constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. Finally, we concluded that in the rare case in 

which a criminal investigation of the President's conduct is justified, inquiries to determine 

whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should not impermissibly chill his performance 

of his constitutionally assigned duties. The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction 

laws to the President's corrupt exercise of the powers of office accords with our constitutional 

system of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law. 

CONCLUSION 

Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw 

ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. The evidence we obtained about the 

President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were 

making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a 

thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, 

we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach 

that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a 

crime, it also does not exonerate him. 

8 
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Atteme~· Werk Pt'eettet // Mtty CeHtttiri Mtttet'ittl Prnteetee UriE:iet' Fee. R. Crim.. P. 6(e) 

I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES 

A. Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice 

The May 17, 2017 Appointment Order and the Special Counsel regulations provide this 

Office with jurisdiction to investigate "federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent 

to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, 

destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Because of that 

description of our jurisdiction, we sought evidence for our obstruction-of-justice investigation with 

the elements of obstruction offenses in mind. Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the 

elements of such offenses, although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that 

govern a prosecutorial decision under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual 

§ 9-27.000 et seq. (2018). 

Here, we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction 

statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that 

arise in an inquiry into official acts by the President. Those issues are discussed in a later section 

of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the President's counsel have raised. See 

Volume II, Section III.B, irifra. 

Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes: ( 1) an 

obstructive act; (2) a nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding; and (3) a corrupt 

intent. See, e.g. , 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(c)(2). We describe those elements as they have ' 

been interpreted by the courts. We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), and describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to 

obstruct justice, see 18 U.S.C. §§ I 503, 1512(c)(2). 

Obstructive act. Obstruction-of-justice law "reaches all corrupt conduct capable of 

producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered, regardless of the means 

employed." United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984) (interpreting 18 

U .S.C. § 1503). An "effort to influence" a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct 

justice even if the effort was "subtle or circuitous" and "however cleverly or with whatever 

cloaking of purpose" it was made. United States v. Roe, 529 F.2d 629,632 (4th Cir. 1975); see 

also United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). The verbs '"obstruct or impede' 

are broad" and "can refer to anything that blocks, makes difficult, or hinders." Marinello v. United 

States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). 

An improper motive can render an actor's conduct criminal even when the conduct would 

otherwise be lawful and within the actor's authority. See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 

631 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for "litigationrelated conduct"); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F .2d 980, 992 (1st Cir. 1987) ("any act by any 

party-whether lawful or unlawful on its face-may abridge § 1503 if performed with a corrupt 

motive"). 

Nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding. Obstruction-of-justice law 

generally requires a nexus, or connection, to an official proceeding. In Section 1503, the nexus 

must be to pending "judicial or grand jury proceedings." United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 

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599 (1995). In Section 1505, the nexus can include a connection to a "pending" federal agency 

proceeding or a congressional inquiry or investigation. Under both statutes, the government must 

demonstrate "a relationship in time, causation, or logic" between the obstructive act and the 

proceeding or inquiry to be obstructed. Id. at 599; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 

544 U.S. 696, 707-708 (2005). Section I 5 I 2(c) prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official 

proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 15 l 5(a)(l )(A). "For 

purposes of' Section 1512, "an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted 

at the time of the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 15 l 2(f)(l ). Although a proceeding need not already be in 

progress to trigger liability under Section 1512(c), a nexus to a contemplated proceeding still must 

be shown. United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Petruk, 781 

F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); 

United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). The nexus requirement narrows the 

scope of obstruction statutes to ensure that individuals have "fair warning" of what the law 

proscribes. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The nexus showing has subjective and objective components. As an objective matter, a 

defendant must act "in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice," such that the statute "excludes 

defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably 

be successful." Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 ( emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). 

"[T]he endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due 

administration of justice." Id. at 599 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a 

subjective matter, the actor must have "contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding." 

Petruk, 781 F .3d at 445-446 .. A defendant need not directly impede the proceeding. Rather, a 

nexus exists if "discretionary actions of a third person would be required to obstruct the judicial 

proceeding if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the third party would act on the [defendant's] 

communication in such a way as to obstruct the judicial proceeding." United States v. Martinez, 

862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Corruptly. The word "corruptly" provides the intent element for obstruction of justice and 

means acting "knowingly and dishonestly" or "with an improper motive." United States v. 

Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 508 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 

(I 0th Cir. 2013) (to act corruptly means to "act[] with an improper purpose and to engage in 

conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct" the 

relevant proceeding) (some quotation marks omitted); see 18 U .S.C. § 1515(6) ("As used in section 

1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing 

another."); see also Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (interpreting "corruptly" to mean 

"wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil" and holding that acting "knowingly ... corruptly" in 18 

U.S.C. § 1512(6) requires "consciousness of wrongdoing"). The requisite showing is made when 

a person acted with an intent to obtain an "improper advantage for [him]self or someone else, 

inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d 

ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F .3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 

616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this definition as the 

" longstanding and well-accepted meaning" of "corruptly"). 

Witness tampering. A more specific provision in Section 151 2 prohibits tampering with a 

witness. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(6 )(I), (3) (making it a crime to "knowingly use[] intimidation ... 

or corruptly persuade[] another person," or "engage[] in misleading conduct towards another 

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person," with the intent to "influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official 

proceeding" or to "hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer . . . 

of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense"). To 

establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to 

investigators in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his conduct. United States v. 

Ed/ind, 887 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Sparks, 791 F.3d 1188, 1191-1192 

(10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 23-26 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. 

LaShay, 417 F .3d 715, 718-719 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Burns, 298 F .3d 523, 539-540 

(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 1999). The 

"persuasion" need not be coercive, intimidating, or explicit; it is sufficient to "urge," "induce," 

" ask[]," "argu[ e ]," "giv[ e] reasons," Sparks, 791 F .3d at 1192, or "coach[] or remind[] witnesses 

by planting misleading facts," Ed/ind, 887 F.3d at 174. Corrupt persuasion is shown "where a 

defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness 

believe the story and testify to it." United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1986); see 

United States v. Gabriel, 125 F .3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). It also covers urging a witness to recall 

a fact that the witness did not know, even if the fact was actually true. See LaShay, 417 F .3d at 

719. Corrupt persuasion also can be shown in certain circumstances when a person, with an 

improper motive, urges a witness not to cooperate with law enforcement. See United States v. 

Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cr. 1998) (telling Secretary "not to [say] anything [to the FBI] 

and [she] would not be bothered"). 

When the charge is acting with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication 

of information to law enforcement under Section l 512(b)(3), the "nexus" to a proceeding inquiry 

articulated in Aguilar-that an individual have " knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the 

judicial proceeding," 515 U.S. at 599-does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at the 

communication of information to investigators, not at impeding an official proceeding. 

Acting "knowingly ... corruptly" requires proof that the individual was "conscious of 

wrongdoing." Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (declining to explore "[t]he outer limits of 

this element" but indicating that an instruction was infirm where it permitted conviction even if 

the defendant "honestly and sincerely believed that [the] conduct was lawful"). It is an affirmative 

defense that "the conduct consisted solely oflawful conduct.and that the defendant' s sole intention 

was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully." 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e). 

Attempts and endeavors. Section I 512( c )(2) covers both substantive obstruction offenses 

and attempts to obstruct justice. Under general principles of attempt law, a person is guilty of an 

attempt when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that 

constitutes a substantial step towards that goal. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 

102, 106-107 (2007). "[T]he act [must be] substantial, in that it was strongly corroborative of the 

defendant's criminal purpose." United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). While 

"mere abstract talk" does not suffice, any "concrete and specific" acts that corroborate the 

defendant's intent can constitute a "substantial step." United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1198-

1205 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, " soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an 

element of the crime" may qualify as a substantial step. Model Penal Code § 5 .01 (2)(g); see United 

States v. Lucas, 499 F .3d 769, 781 (8th Cir. 2007). 

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The omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 prohibits an "endeavor" to obstruct justice, which 

sweeps more broadly than Section 1512's attempt provision. See United States v. Sampson, 898 

F.3d 287,302 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988) 

( collecting cases). "It is well established that a[ n] [obstruction-of-justice] offense is complete 

when one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice; the 

prosecution need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or 

impeded." United States v. Davis, 854 F .3d 1276, 1292 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations 

After the appointment of the Special Counsel, this Office obtained evidence about the 

following events relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the President: 

(a) The President's January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Corney in which 

the President reportedly asked for Corney's loyalty, one day after the White House had 

been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former National Security 

Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador; 

(b) The President's February 14, 2017 meeting with Corney in which the President reportedly 

asked Corney not to pursue an investigation of Flynn; 

(c) The President's private requests to Corney to make public the fact that the President was 

not the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the President regarded as a cloud; 

(d) The President's outreach to the Director of National Intelligence and the Directors of the 

National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI's Russia 

investigation; 

(e) The President's stated rationales for terminating Corney on May 9, 2017, including 

statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBT's Russia 

investigation was a factor in Corney's termination; and 

(f) The President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June 9, 2016 Trump 

Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the 

meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the 

Trump Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton. 

Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional 

principles (discussed below in Volume II, Section III, infra), we determined that there was a 

sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues 

involving the President. 

Many of the core issues in an obstruction-of-justice investigation turn on an individual's 

actions and intent. We therefore requested that the White House provide us with documentary 

evidence in its possession on the relevant events. We also sought and obtained the White House's 

concurrence in our conducting interviews of White House personnel who had relevant information. 

And we interviewed other witnesses who had pertinent knowledge, obtained documents on a 

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voluntary basis when possible, and used legal process where appropriate. These investigative steps 

allowed us to gather a substantial amount of evidence. 

We also sought a voluntary interview with the President. After more 

discussion, the President declined to be interviewed. 

During the course of our discussions, 

the President did agree to answer written questions on certain Russia-related topics, and he 

provided us with answers. He did not similarly agree to provide written answers to questions on 

obstruction topics or questions on events during the transition. Ultimately, while we believed that 

we had the authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the President's 

testimony, we chose not to do so. We made that decision in view of the substantial delay that such 

an investigative step would likely produce at a late stage in our investigation. We also assessed 

that based on the significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President's actions 

and his public and private statements describing or explaining those actions, we had sufficient 

evidence to understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the President's 

testimony. The Office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in 

Appendix C, infra, in a note that precedes the President's written responses. 

In assessing the evidence we obtained, we relied on common principles that apply in any 

investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence. See, 

e.g., United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1305 (I Ith Cir. 2016) ("[G]uilty knowledge can 

rarely be established by direct evidence .... Therefore, mens rea elements such as knowledge or 

intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United 

States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The government's case rested on 

circumstantial evidence, but the mens rea elements of knowledge and intent can often be proved 

through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." ) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The principle that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence 

is a necessity in criminal cases, given the right ofa subject to assert his privilege against compelled 

self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and therefore decline to testify. Accordingly, 

determinations on intent are frequently reached without the opportunity to interview an 

investigatory subject. 

Obstruction-of-justice cases are consistent with this rule. See, e.g., Ed/ind, 887 F.3d at 

174, 176 (relying on "significant circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] was conscious of her 

wrongdoing" in an obstruction case; "[b]ecause evidence of intent will almost always be 

circumstantial, a defendant may be found culpable where the reasonable and foreseeable 

consequences of her acts are the obstruction of justice") (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and 

punctuation omitted); Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 173-174. Circumstantial evidence that illuminates 

intent may include a pattern of potentially obstructive acts. Fed. R. Evid. 404(6) ("Evidence of a 

crime, wrong, or other act ... may be admissible . . . [to] prov[ e] motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident."); see, e.g., United 

States v. Frankhauser, 80 F .3d 641 , 648-650 ( I st Cir. 1996); United States v. Arnold, 773 F .2d 

823, 832-834 (7th Cir. 1985); Cintolo, 818 F .2d at 1000. 

Credibility judgments may also be made based on objective facts and circumstantial 

evidence. Standard jury instructions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in 

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assessing credibility. These include whether a witness had a reason not to tell the truth; whether 

the witness had a good memory; whether the witness had the opportunity to observe the events 

about which he testified; whether the witness's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses; 

and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony. See, e.g., 

First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 1.06 (2018); Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions 

(Criminal Cases) § 1.08 (2012); Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.0 l (2012). 

In addition to those general factors, we took into account more specific factors in assessing 

the credibility of conflicting accounts of the facts. For example, contemporaneous written notes 

can provide strong corroborating evidence. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 232 (1975) 

(the fact that a "statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report ... would tend 

strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview"). Similarly, a witness's 

recitation of his account before he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witness's 

credibility. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (l 995) (" A consistent statement that 

predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a 

consequence of that motive."). Finally, a witness's false description of an encounter can imply 

consciousness of wrongdoing. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(noting the "well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence-often strong 

evidence-of guilt"). We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of 

our investigation. 

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II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION 

This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We first provide an overview 

of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, and how candidate Trump 

responded. We then tum to the key events that we investigated: the President's conduct concerning 

the FBI investigation of Michael Flynn; the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's 

Russia investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination of FBI Director Corney; 

efforts to terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to curtail the scope of the Special Counsel's 

investigation; efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower 

meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General 

unrecuse; and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses. 

We summarize the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory 

obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and intent. We focus on 

elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has "jurisdiction .. . to investigate ... federal 

crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's 

investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of 

witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal 

obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and 

analyzed them within an elements framework-while refraining from reaching ultimate 

conclusions about whether crimes were committed, for the reasons explained above. This section 

also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those 

defenses are analyzed in Volume II, Section III, iefra. 

A. The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump 

During the 2016 campaign, the media raised questions about a possible connection between 

the Trump Campaign and Russia.

7 The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically 

damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump 

responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement 

in Russia-even though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late 

as June 2016. Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same 

time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information about any 

further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted about possible 

links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect continued to deny any 

connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election 

interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election.

8 

7 This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the information 

contained in the stories, but rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context. Volume 

I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media 

during the campaign. 

8 As discussed in Volume I, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals 

with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence 

was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with 

representatives ofthe Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election. 

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1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia 

On June 16, 2015, Donald J. Trump declared his intent to seek nomination as the 

Republican candidate for President.9 By early 2016, he distinguished himself among Republican 

candidates by speaking of closer ties with Russia, 10 saying he would get along well with Russian 

President Vladimir Putin, 11 questioning whether the NATO alliance was obsolete, 12 and praising 

Putin as a "strong leader."13 The press reported that Russian political analysts and commentators 

perceived Trump as favorable.to Russia.14 

Beginning in February 2016 and continuing through the summer, the media reported that 

several Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia. For example, the press reported 

that campaign advisor Michael Flynn was seated next to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala in Moscow 

in December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly on RT as an analyst.15 The press also 

reported that foreign policy advisor Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gas company, 

16 and 

that campaign chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the "Russian-backed former Ukrainian 

president Viktor Yanukovych."17 In addition, the press raised questions during the Republican 

9 @realDonaldTrump 6/16/15 (11 :57 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

10 See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) (Trump: "I think 

it would be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got along"); Presidential Candidate 

Donald Trump News Conference, Hanahan, South Carolina, C-SPAN (Feb. 15, 2016) ("You want to make 

a good deal for the country, you want to deal with Russia."). 

11 See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN (July 8, 2015) ("I think I get along with [Putin] 

fine."); Andrew Rafferty, Trump Says He Would "Get Along Very Well" With Putin, NBC (July 30, 2015) . 

(quoting Trump as saying, "I think I would get along very well with Vladimir Putin."). 

12 See, e.g.,@realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 (7:47 a.m. ET); @realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 

(7:59 a.m. ET). 

13 See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) ("[Putin] is a 

strong leader. What am I gonna say, he's a weak leader? He's making mincemeat out of our President."); 

Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Vandalia, Ohio, C-SPAN (Mar. 12, 2016) ("I said [Putin] was a strong 

leader, which he is. I mean, he might be bad, he might be good. But he 's a strong leader."). 

14 See, e.g., Andrew Osborn, From Russia with love: why the Kremlin backs Trump, Reuters (Mar. 

24, 2016); Robert Zubrin, Trump: The Kremlin's Candidate, National Review (Apr. 4, 2016). 

15 See, e.g., Mark Hosenball & Steve Holland, Trump being advised by ex-US. Lieutenant General 

who favors closer Russia ties, Reuters (Feb. 26, 2016); Tom Hamburger et al., Inside Trump's financial ties 

to Russia and his unusual flattery of Vladimir Putin, Washington Post (June 17, 2016). Certain matters 

pertaining to Flynn are described in Volume I, Section TV.B.7, supra. 

16 See, e.g., Zachary Mider, Trump's New Russia Advisor Has Deep Ties to Kremlin's Gazprom, 

Bloomberg (Mar. 30, 2016); Julia Iofee, Who is Carter Page?, Politico (Sep. 23, 2016). Certain matters 

pertaining to Page are described in Volume l, Section IV.A.3, supra. 

17 Tracy Wilkinson, In a shift, Republican platform doesn't call for arming Ukraine against Russia, 

spurring outrage, Los Angeles Times (July 21, 2016); Josh Ragin, Trump campaign guts GOP 's antiRussia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post (July 18, 2016). 

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National Convention about the Trump Campaign's involvement in changing the Republican 

platform's stance on giving "weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces." 18 

2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails 

On June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the 

Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government 

hackers had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents. 19 

On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted 

thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations.20 Soon thereafter, 

Hillary Clinton's campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails 

and arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump.21 On July 26, 2016, the New York 

Times reported that U.S. "intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have 'high 

confidence' that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the 

Democratic National Committee.',22 

Within the Trum Cam ai n, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks.23 

discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks 

would release the hacked material. Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the 

possibility of upcoming releases~. Michael Cohen, then-executive vice resident of the 

Trum Or anization and s ecial counsel to Trum , recalled hearin 

Cohen recalled that Trump responded, "oh good, alright," 

18 Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP 's anti-Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post, 

Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform events are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6, 

supra. 

19 Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CrowdStrike (June 15, 

2016) (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing provided by 

CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research 

on Trump, Washington Post (June 14, 2016). 

20 Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about Clinton 

and internal deliberations, Washington Post (July 22, 2016). 

21 Amber Phillips, Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats ' emails to help Donald 

Trump, Washington Post (July 24, 2016). 

22 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C. , 

New York Times (July 26, 2016). 

23 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at I. 

24 Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see also Volume I, Section 

III.D. l, supra. 

25 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see also Volume I, Section III.D. l, supra. According to Cohen, after 

WikiLeak~tolen DNC emails on July 22, 2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the 

effect of,~ Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Cohen's role in the candidate's and later 

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and Harm to Ongoing Matter 26 

; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that 

oke to Trump~;;;;~;~;~;;~;.,;~; 

Manafort should keep Trump u~ty campaign manager 

Rick Gates said that Man~ssure about - information and that 

Manafort instructed Gates~ status updates on u com in releases.28 Around 

the same time Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport 

, and shortly after the call ended, Trum2 told Gates that more releases of damaging 

information would be coming.29 i:§jih•§l•Uf•MhflrlfDiM - were discussed within the 

Campaign,3° and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a communications strategy 

based on the possible release of Clinton emails by WikiLeaks.31 

3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid 

Candidate Trump 

In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July 22, 2016 release of hacked DNC emails, the 

Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. 

On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted that it was "[c]razy" to suggest that Russia was "dealing with 

Trump"32 and that "[f]or the record," he had "ZERO investments in Russia." 33 

In a press conference the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized "this whole thing 

with Russia" as "a total deflection" and stated that it was "farfetched" and "ridiculous."34 Trump 

said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven, but stated that it would 

give him "no pause" if Russia had Clinton's emails.35 Trump added, "Russia, if you're listening, 

I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded 

President's activities, and his own criminal conduct, is descriped in Volume II, Section ILK, infra, and in 

Volume I, Section IV.A. I, supra. 

26 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8. 

27 . As explained in footnote 197 of Volume 

I, Section III.D. l.b, supra, this Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it aligns 

with those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent. 

formed in June/Jul timeframe based on claims b 

. 

28 Gates l 0/25/18 302, at 4. 

29 Gates I 0/25/ 18 302, at 4. 

30 Bannon 1/18/ l 9 3 02, at 3. 

31 Gates4/11/18302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18302, at2(messa~ 

Assan eon June 12, 2016, ----

). 

32 @rea!DonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet. 

33 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet. 

34 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-S PAN (July 27, 2016). 

35 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). 

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mightily by our press."36 Trump also said that "there's nothing that I can think of that I' d rather 

do than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now," and in response to a 

question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting 

sanctions, Trump replied, "We 'll be looking at that. Yeah, we'll be looking."37 

During the press conference, Trump repeated "I have nothing to do with Russia" five 

times.38 He stated that "the closest [he] came to Russia" was that Russians may have purchased a 

home or condos from him.39 He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 

2013 he had be.en interested in working with Russian companies that "wanted to put a lot of money 

into developments in Russia" but " it never worked out."40 He explained, "[t]rankly, I didn't want 

to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had a major developer ... that wanted to develop 

property in Moscow and other places. But we decided not to do it."41 The Trump Organization, 

however, had been pursuing a building project in Moscow-the Trump Tower Moscow projectfrom approximately September 2015 through June 2016, and the candidate was regularly updated 

on developments, including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and 

by Trump himself to finalize it.42 

Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump's denial of 

any business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue.43 Trump told Cohen that Trump 

Tower Moscow was not a deal yet and said, "Why mention it if it is not a deal?"44 According to 

Cohen, at around this time, in response to Trump's disavowal of connections to Russia, campaign 

36 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). Within five hours 

of Trump's remark, a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with Hillary 

Clinton for possible hacks. See Volume I, Section III, supra. In written answers submitted in this 

investigation, the President stated that he made the "Russia, if you're listening" statement "in jest and 

sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective observer." Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 

2018), at 13 (Response to Question II, Part ( d) ). 

37 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). In his written 

answers submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that "we'll be looking" at 

Crimea and sanctions "did not communicate any position." Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 

20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part (g)). 

38 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). 

39 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). 

40 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). 

41 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). 

42 The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in detail in 

Volume I, Section TV.A. I, supra, and Volume TI, Section TT.K, infra. 

43 Cohen 9/18/ 18 302, at 4. 

44 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4-5. 

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advisors had developed a "party line" that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections 

to Russia.45 

In addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to reports 

of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian 

contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation 

to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak's residence because the timing was "not optimal" in view 

of media reports about Russian interference.46 On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to resign 

amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine and links to 

Russian business.47 And when the media published stories about Page's connections to Russia in 

September 2016, Trump Campaign officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and 

told the press that he had played "no role" in the Campaign.

48 

On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian 

intelligence agency from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.49 The same day, the federal 

government announced that "the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails 

from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations." 50 The government 

statement directly linked Russian hacking to the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering 

with the presidential election, and concluded "that only Russia's senior-most officials could have 

authorized these activities" based on their "scope and sensitivity."51 

On October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating Russia's 

hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that the hacked emails were 

going to be released.52 Vice Presidential Candidate Mike Pence was asked whether the Trump 

45 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at I; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3-5. The formation of the "party line" is 

described in greater detail in Volume II, Section Il.K, infra. 

46 DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to Pchelyakov) (stating that "[t]hese days are not 

optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a stream of false media stories"). The invitation and 

Gordon's response are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.7.a, supra. 

47 See, e.g., Amber Phillips, Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, Washington 

Post (Aug. 19, 2016) ("There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into 

[Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine."); Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump 

Aide Paul Manafort Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events 

involving Manafort are discussed in Volume 1, Section IV.A.8, supra. 

48 Michael Isikoff, U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo News 

(Sep. 23, 2016); see, e.g. , 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon; 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon 

& S. Miller; Page 3/16/17 302, at 2. 

49 @WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet. 

50 Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 

51 Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). 

52 John Wagner & Anne Gearan, Clinton campaign chairman ties email hack to Russians, suggests 

Trump had early warning, Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016). 

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Campaign was "in cahoots" with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information 

and responded, "Nothing could be further from the truth."53 

4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections 

with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election 

On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later, Russian officials 

told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump's "immediate 

entourage" during the campaign.

54 In response, Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign 

spokesperson, said, "We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with 

any foreign entities before yesterday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders." 55 Hicks 

gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and Russia: "It never 

happened. There was no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the 

campaign."56 

On December 10, 2016, the press reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had "concluded 

that Russia interfered in last month's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the 

White House."57 Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, "I think it's 

ridiculous. I think it's just another excuse."58 He continued that no one really knew who was 

responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the intelligence community had "no idea if it's Russia 

or China or somebody. It could be somebody sitting in a bed some place."59 The President-Elect 

53 Louis Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks, Politico (Oct. 14, 2016). 

54 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New 

York Times (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, "[t]here 

were contacts" and "[ cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian 

representatives"); Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway, 

Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov saying, "I don't say that all of them, but a whole array 

of them supported contacts with Russian representatives"). 

55 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New 

York Times (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Hicks). 

56 Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway, 

Associated Press (Nov. I 0, 2016) (quoting Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she 

spoke with Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably Kushner 

and Bannon to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or pushback from any of them. Hicks 

12/8/17 302, at 4. 

57 Damien Gayle, CIA concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election, say reports, 

Guardian (Dec. 10, 2016). 

58 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ 

Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11 , 2016). 

59 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ 

Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11 , 2016). 

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also said that Democrats were "putting D out" the story of Russian interference "because they 

suffered one of the greatest defeats in the history of politics."60 

On December 18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was "distorted by the 

Russian intervention" and questioned whether Trump Campaign officials had been "in touch with 

the Russians."61 The same day, incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fox News 

Sunday and declined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligence community's 

determination that Russia intervened in the election.62 When asked about any contact or 

coordination between the Campaign and Russia, Priebus said, "Even this question is insane. Of 

course we didn't interface with the Russians."63 Priebus added that "this whole thing is a spin job" 

and said, "the real question is, why the Democrats ... are doing everything they can to de legitimize 

the outcome of the election?"64 

On December 29, 2016, the Obama Administration announced that in response to Russian 

cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election, it was imposing sanctions and other measures on 

several Russian individuals and entities.65 When first asked about the sanctions, President-Elect 

Trump said, "I think we ought to get on with our lives."66 He then put out a statement that said 

"It's time for our country to move on to bigger and better things," but indicated that he would meet 

with intelligence community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference.67 

The briefing occurred on January 6, 2017.68 Following the briefing, the intelligence community 

released the public version of its assessment, which concluded with high confidence that Russia 

had intervened in the election through a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton's 

6

° Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ 

Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. l l, 2016). 

61 David Morgan, Clinton campaign: It's an 'open question' if Trump team colluded with Russia, 

Reuters Business Insider (Dec. 18, 2016). 

62 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff 

Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016). 

63 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff 

Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016). 

64 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday," Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff 

Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016). 

65 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and 

Harassment, White House (Dec. 29, 2016); see also Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces 

measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016). 

66 John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: 'Get on with our lives,' 

Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016). 

67 Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016 election 

interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016). 

68 Comey 11/15/17302,at3. 

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electability.69 The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian 

government had developed a clear preference for Trump.70 

Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British 

intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia 

connections under the headline "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia."71 In a 

press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release "an absolute disgrace" and 

said, " I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we've 

stayed away . . .. So I have no deals, I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals 

in Russia very easily ifwe wanted to, I just don't want to because I think that would be a conflict."72 

Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian 

connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian 

interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory.73 Hicks, for example, said that 

the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his "Achilles heel" because, 

even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking 

away from what he had accomplished.74 Sean Spicer, the first White House communications 

director, recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the 

legitimacy of his election.75 Gates said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack 

on the legitimacy of his win.

76 And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence assessment came 

out, the President-Elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win.

77 

69 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 

US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017). 

70 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia 's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 

US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017). 

71 Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed (Jan. 10, 

2017). 

72 Donald Trump's News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, New York Times (Jan. 11, 

2017), available at https://www.nytimes.com/20 17/01 / 11/us/politics/trump-press-conferencetranscript. htm I. 

73 Priebus I 0/ 13/ 17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/ 16/ I 7 302, at 6; Bannon 2/14/18 

302, at 2; Gates 4/ 18/ I 8 302, at 3; see Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2 (the President believed that the purpose of 

the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency). 

74 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18. 

75 Spicer 10/17/17 302, at 6. 

76 Gates 4/18/ 18 302, at 3. 

77 Priebus I 0/13/ 17 302, at 7. 

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B. The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn 

Overview 

During the presidential transition, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn had 

two phone calls with the Russian Ambassador to the United States about the Russian response to 

U.S. sanctions imposed because of Russia's election interference. After the press reported on 

Flynn's contacts with the Russian Ambassador, Flynn lied to incoming Administration officials 

by saying he had not discussed sanctions on the calls. The officials publicly repeated those lies in 

press interviews. The FBI, which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters, 

interviewed him about the calls in the first week after the inauguration, and Flynn told similar lies 

to the FBI. On January 26, 2017, Department of Justice (DOJ) officials notified the White House 

that Flynn and the Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had been 

interviewed by the FBT. The next night, the President had a private dinner with FBI Director James 

Corney in which he asked for Corney's loyalty. On February 13, 2017, the President asked Flynn 

to resign. The following day, the President had a one-on-one conversation with Corney in which 

he said, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go." 

Evidence 

1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with 

Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak 

Shortly after the election, President-Elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael 

Flynn as his National Security Advisor.78 For the next two months, Flynn played an active role on 

the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) coordinating policy positions and communicating with 

foreign government officials, including Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey 

Kislyak.79 

On December 29, 2016, as noted in Volume II, Section TT.A.4, supra, the Obama 

Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian 

individuals and entities.80 That day, multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails about the 

sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming Administration, and Flynn informed 

members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian Ambassador later in the day.81 

78 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 7; President-Elect Donald.I Trump Selects US. Senator Jeff Sessions for 

Attorney General, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and 

US. Rep. Mike Pompeo as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, President-Elect Donald J. Trump 

Press Release (Nov. 18, 2016); see also, e.g., Bryan Bender, Trump names Mike Flynn national security 

adviser, Politico, (Nov. 17, 2016). 

79 Flynn 11 /16/17 302, at 8-14; Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 3-5. 

80 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and 

Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016). 

81 12/29/16 Email, O'Brien to McFarland et al.; 12/29/16 Email, Bossert to Flynn et al.; 12/29/16 

Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.; SF00000 I (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty) ("Tit for tat w 

Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today."); Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 2. 

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Flynn, who was in the Dominican Republic at the time, and K.T. McFarland, who was slated to 

become the Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida with 

the President-Elect and other senior staff, talked by phone about what, if anything, Flynn should 

communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.

82 McFarland had spoken with incoming 

Administration officials about the sanctions and Russia's possible responses and thought she had 

mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak.83 Based on 

those conversations, McFarland informed Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Mar-aLago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.84 At 4:43 p.m. that afternoon, McFarland sent 

an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group that "Gen [F]lynn is talking 

to russian ambassador this evening."85 

Approximately one hour later, McFarland met with the President-Elect and senior officials 

86 and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses. Incoming Chief of Staff 

Reince Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions 

situation could be "cooled down" and not escalated.87 McFarland recalled that at the end of the 

meeting, someone may have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the 

Russian Ambassador that evening.88 McFarland did not recall any response by the PresidentElect.89 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect viewed the sanctions as an attempt by the Obama 

Administration to embarrass him by delegitimizing his election.90 

Immediately after discussing the sanctions with McFarland on December 29, 2016, Flynn 

called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in a reciprocal manner, 

without escalating the situation.91 After the call, Flynn briefed McFarland on its substance.92 

Flynn told McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory 

because Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration.93 On December 30, 

2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures 

82 Statement of Offense at 2-3, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, 1: l 7-cr-232 (0.0.C. Dec. 1, 

2017), Doc. 4 (Flynn Statement of Offense); Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at 3-4; Flynn 11/20/ 17 302, at 3; 

McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7. 

83 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-7 (recalling discussions about this issue with Bannon and Priebus). 

84 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at 3-4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7. 

85 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al. 

86 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 

87 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3. 

88 McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 7. Priebus thought it was possible that McFarland had mentioned 

Flynn's scheduled call with Kislyak at this meeting, although he was not certain. Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 

3. 

89 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. 

90 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3. 

91 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4. 

92 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7-8; Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at 4. 

93 McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 8. 

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in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead "plan ... further steps to restore RussianUS relations based on the policies of the Trump Administration."94 Following that announcement, 

the President-Elect tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin) - I always knew he was very 

smart! " 95 

On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn's request had been 

received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request.96 

Later that day, Flynn told McFarland about this follow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia's 

decision not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn' s request.97 McFarland recalled 

that Flynn thought his phone call had made a difference.98 Flynn spoke with other incoming 

Administration officials that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions.

99 

Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions issue with incoming Administration official 

Stephen Bannon the next day. 10° Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's 

conversations with Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had "stopped the train on Russia's 

response" to the sanctions. 101 On January 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and 

thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific 

recollection of telling the President-Elect about the substance of his calls with Kislyak. 102 

Members of the intelligence community were surprised by Russia's decision not to retaliate 

in response to the sanctions. 103 When analyzing Russia's response, they became aware of Flynn's 

discussion of sanctions with Kislyak. 104 Previously, the FBI had opened an investigation of Flynn 

based on his relationship with the Russian govemment. 

105 Flynn's contacts with Kislyak became 

a key component of that investigation.

106 

94 Statement by the President of Russia, President of Russia (Dec. 30, 2016) 12/30/16. 

95 @realDonaldTrump 12/30/ I 6 (2:41 p.m. ET) Tweet. 

96 Flynn 1 /19/ 18 3 02, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3. 

97 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 3; Flynn 11 /17/ 17 302, at 6; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10; Flynn 

Statement of Offense, at 3. 

98 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 1 O; see Flynn 1 /19/ 18 302, at 4. 

99 Flynn 11 /17117 302, at 5-6. 

10° Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 4-5. Bannon recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said he did not 

remember discussing sanctions with him. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9. 

101 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at I; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 5. 

102 Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 6; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6. 

to 3 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2. 

to4 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2. 

105 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2-3; Corney 11 /15/17 302, at 5. 

106 McCord 7/ 17/17 302, at2-3. 

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2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment 

of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens ElectionInterference Investigations 

On January 6, 2017, as noted in Volume II, Section 11.A.4, supra, intelligence officials 

briefed President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community's 

assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election. 107 When the briefing 

concluded, Corney spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified, personally 

sensitive allegations compiled by Steele.108 According to a memorandum Corney drafted 

immediately after their private discussion, the President-Elect began the meeting by telling Corney 

he had conducted himself honorably over the prior year and had a great reputation. 109 The 

President-Elect stated that he thought highly of Corney, looked forward to working with him, and 

hoped that he planned to stay on as FBI director. 

11° Corney responded that he intended to continue 

serving in that role. 

111 Corney then briefed the President-Elect on the sensitive material in the 

Steele reporting.112 Corney recalled that the President-Elect seemed defensive, so Corney decided 

107 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 

I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 

1-2): 

108 Corney 11/15/ 17 302, at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select 

Intelligence Committee, I I 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James 8. Corney, former 

Director of the FBI, at 1-2). 

109 Corney 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1. Corney began drafting the memorandum summarizing the 

meeting immediately after it occurred. Corney 11/15/17 302, at 4. He finished the memorandum that 

evening and finalized it the following morning. Corney 11/15/17 302, at 4. 

11° Corney 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1; Corney 11/15/17 302, at 3. Corney identified several other 

occasions in January 2017 when the President reiterated that he hoped Corney would stay on as FBI director. 

On January 11 , President-Elect Trump called Corney to discuss the Steele reports and stated that he thought 

Corney was doing great and the President-Elect hoped he would remain in his position as FBI director. 

Corney 11/15/17 302, at 4; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence 

Committee, 1 I 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI), CQ 

Cong. Transcripts, at 90. ("[D]uring that call, he asked me again, 'Hope you're going to stay, you're doing 

a great job.' And I told him that I intended to."). On January 22, at a White House reception honoring law 

enforcement, the President greeted Corney and said he looked forward to working with him. Hearing on 

Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 20 I 7) 

(testimony of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 22. And as discussed 

in greater detail in Volume II, Section 11.D, infra, on January 27, the President invited Corney to dinner at 

the White House and said he was glad Corney wanted to stay on as FBI Director. 

111 Corney 1 /7117 Memorandum, at 1; Corney l l /15/ 17 302, at 3. 

112 Corney 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1-2; Corney I 1/15/17 302, at 3. Corney's briefing included the 

Steele reporting's unverified allegation that the Russians had compromising tapes of the President involving 

conduct when he was a private citizen during a 2013 trip to Moscow for the Miss Universe Pageant. During 

the 2016 presidential campaign, a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump. On October 30, 20 I 6, 

Michael Cohen received a text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said, "Stopped flow of 

tapes from Russia but not sure if there's anything else. Just so you know .... " 10/30/16 Text Message, 

Rtskhiladze to Cohen. Rtskhiladze said "tapes" referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be 

held by persons associated with the Russian real estate conglomerate Crocus Group, which had helped host 

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to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally. 113 Corney recalled he did not 

want the President-Elect to think of the conversation as a "J. Edgar Hoover move." 114 

On January 10, 2017, the media reported that Corney had briefed the President-Elect on 

the Steele reporting, 

115 and BuzzFeed News published information compiled by Steele online, 

stating that the information included "specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations 

of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives." 116 The next day, the President-Elect 

expressed concern to intelligence community leaders about the fact that the information had leaked 

and asked whether they could make public statements refuting the allegations in the Steele 

reports. 117 

In the following weeks, three Congressional committees opened investigations to examine 

Russia's interference in the election and whether the Trump Campaign had colluded with 

Russia. 118 On January 13, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCT) announced 

that it would conduct a bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election, including any 

"links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns."119 On January 25, 

2017, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSC[) announced that it had been 

conducting an investigation into Russian election interference and possible coordination with the 

political campaigns. 120 And on February 2, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee announced that 

it too would investigate Russian efforts to intervene in the election. 12 1 

the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia. Rtskhiladze 4/4/ l 8 302, at 12. Cohen said he spoke to Trump 

about the issue after receiving the texts from Rtskhiladze. Cohen 9/ 12/ 18 302, at 13. Rtskhiladze said he 

was told the tapes were fake, but he did not communicate that to Cohen. Rtskhiladze 5/ l 0/ 18 302, at 7. 

113 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 3-4; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select 

Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former 

Director of the FBI, at 2). 

114 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 3. 

115 See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to 

compromise him, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017; updated Jan. 12, 2017). 

116 Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed News 

(Jan. 10, 2017). 

117 See 1 / 1 l /17 Email, Clapper to Corney ("He asked ifT could put out a statement. He would prefer 

of course that I say the documents are bogus, which, of course, I can't do."); 1/ 12/ 17 Email, Corney to 

Clapper ("He called me at 5 yesterday and we had a very similar conversation."); Corney 11/15/17 302, at 

4-5. 

11 8 See 2016 Presidential El.ection Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (first published Oct. 12, 20 17; 

updated Mar. 1, 2019) (summarizing starting dates of Russia-related investigations). 

119 Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities, SSCI (Jan. l 3, 2017). 

120 Joint Statement on Progress of Bipartisan HP SCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures, HP SCI 

(Jan. 25, 2017). 

121 Joint Statement from Senators Graham and Whitehouse on Investigation into Russian Influence 

on Democratic Nations' Elections (Feb. 2, 2017). 

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3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to 

Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI 

On January 12, 2017, a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak 

communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced the Russia sanctions. 122 The 

column questioned whether Flynn had said something to "undercut the U.S. sanctions" and 

whether Flynn's communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act. 123 

President-Elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published and expressed anger 

about it. 124 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked, "What the hell is this all about?"125 

Priebus called Flynn and told him that the President-Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn's 

conversations with Kislyak. 126 Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had 

spoken to the "boss" and said Flynn needed to "kill the story." 127 Flynn directed McFarland to 

call the Washington Post columnist and inform him that no discussion of sanctions had occurred. 128 

McFarland recalled that Flynn said words to the effect of, "I want to kill the story." 129 McFarland 

made the call as Flynn had requested although she knew she was providing false information, and 

the Washington Post updated the column to reflect that a "Trump official" had denied that Flynn 

and Kislyak discussed sanctions. 130 

When Priebus and other incoming Administration officials questioned Flynn internally 

about the Washington Post column, Flynn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with 

Kislyak.131 Flynn repeated that claim to Vice President-Elect Michael Pence and to incoming press 

secretary Sean Spicer. 132 In subsequent media interviews in mid-January, Pence, Priebus, and 

122 David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017). 

123 David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017). 

The Logan Act makes it a crime for "[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he may be" to "without 

authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence or 

intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or 

controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 953. 

124 Priebus l/ 18/ 18 302, at 6. 

125 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 6. 

126 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 6. 

127 Flynn 11/2 I / 17 302, at I; Flynn 11 /20/17 302, at 6. 

128 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13. 

129 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12. 

130 McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 12-13; McFarland 8/29/17 302, at 8; see David Ignatius, Why did 

Obama dawdle on Russia 's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017). 

13 1 Flynn 11117/17 302, at I, 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 7; Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 7-8; S. Miller 

8/3 I /17 3 02, at 8-1 I. 

132 Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at I, 8; Flynn 1/ 19/18 302, at 7; S. Miller 8/31/17 302, at 10- 11. 

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Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions, basing those denials on their 

conversations with Flynn. 133 

The public statements of incoming Administration officials denying that Flynn and Kislyak 

had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials, who were aware that the statements were 

not true. 134 Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues-who in turn had 

unwittingly misled the American public-creating a compromise situation for Flynn because the 

Department of Justice assessed that the Russian government could prove Flynn lied. 135 The FBI 

investigative team also believed that Flynn's calls with Kislyak and subsequent denials about 

discussing sanctions raised potential Logan Act issues and were relevant to the FBI's broader 

Russia investigation. 136 

On January 20, 2017, President Trump was inaugurated and Flynn was sworn in as 

National Security Advisor. On January 23, 2017, Spicer delivered his first press briefing and stated 

that he had spoken with Flynn the night before, who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were 

about topics unrelated to sanctions. 137 Spicer's statements added to the Department of Justice's 

concerns that Russia had leverage over Flynn based on his lies and could use that derogatory 

information to compromise him. 138 

On January 24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI. 139 During 

the interview, which took place at the White House, Flynn falsely stated that he did not ask Kislyak 

to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the 

Obama Administration. 140 Flynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up 

conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those 

sanctions as a result of Flynn's request.141 

133 Face the Nation Interview with Vice President-Elect Pence, CBS (Jan. 15, 2017); Julie 

Hirschfield Davis et al., Trump National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions 

Were Imposed, Washington Post (Jan. 13, 2017); Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Jan. 

15, 2017). 

134 Yates 8/15/17 302, at2-3; McCord 7/17/17 302, at3-4; McCabe 8/17/ 17 302, at 5 (DOJ officials 

were "really freaked out about it"). 

135 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 3; McCord 7/17/ 17 302, at 4. 

136 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5-6. 

137 Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Jan. 23, 2017). 

138 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 4; Axelrod 7/20/17 302, at 5. 

139 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. 

14° Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. 

141 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. On December 1, 2017, Flynn admitted to making these false 

statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § I 001 , which makes it a crime to knowingly and 

willfully "make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" to federal law 

enforcement officials. See Volume I, Section IV.A.7, supra. 

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Atton'te,• Work P!'otittet // May CoHtttifl Matel'ittl Proteeteti UHE:ier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Conc_erns About Flynn 

On January 26, 2017, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel 

Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in 

person. 142 Later that day, Yates and Mary McCord, a senior national security official at the 

Department of Justice, met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office 

attorney James Burnham. 143 Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President 

denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynn in a potentially 

compromised position because the Russians would know he had lied. 144 Yates disclosed that Flynn 

had been interviewed by the FBI. 145 She declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn 

had performed during that interview, 

146 but she indicated that Flynn's statements to the FBI were 

similar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed 

sanctions.147 McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not 

pinned Flynn down in lies, 148 but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the 

National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn's FBI interview and 

his contacts with Kislyak. 149 

That afternoon, McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to 

discuss concerns about Flynn. 

150 McGahn described what Yates had told him, and the President 

asked him to repeat it, so he did. 151 McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of 

Flynn, he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but that there 

may not have been a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § I 001. 152 The President asked about Section 

1001, and McGahn explained the law to him, and also explained the Logan Act. 153 The President 

142 Yates 8/ 15/17 302, at 6. 

143 Yates 8/15/ 17 302, at 6; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6; SCR0l5 000198 (2/15/17 Draft 

Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President). 

144 Yates 8/15/ 17 302, at 6-8; McCord 7/17/ 17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11 /3/17 302, at 4; 

SCRO l 5_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President). 

145 McGahn 11/30/ 17 302, at 5; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7; Burnham 

11/3/17 302, at 4. 

146 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7. 

147 SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4. 

148 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5. 

149 SCR0l5_000198 (2/ 15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); McGahn 1 1 /30/17 302, at 6, 8. 

150 McGahn 11 /30/17 302, at 6; SCR0l5_000278 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum 

re: "Flynn Tick Tock") (on January 26, "McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS"); SCR015_000198 

(2/15/ 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President). 

151 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6. 

152 McGahn I 1/30/17 302, at 7. 

153 McGahn I 1/30/17 302, at 7. 

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instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed 

that they not discuss it with any other officials. 154 Priebus recalled that the President was angry 

with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White House and said, "not again, this guy, this 

stuff." I 55 

That evening, the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what 

they thought about FBI Director Comey. 156 According to Director of National Intelligence Dan 

Coats, who was at the dinner, no one openly advocated terminating Corney but the consensus on 

him was not positive. 157 Coats told the group that he thought Corney was a good director. 158 Coats 

encouraged the President to meet Corney face-to-face and spend time with him before making a 

159 decision about whether to retain him. 

5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President Trump 

has Dinner with FBI Director Corney 

The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and Eisenberg discussed the results of 

Eisenberg's initial legal research into Flynn's conduct, and specifically whether Flynn may have 

violated the Espionage Act, the Logan Act, or 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 160 Based on his preliminary 

research, Eisenberg informed McGahn that there was a possibility that Flynn had violated 18 

U.S.C. § 1001 and the Logan Act. 16 1 Eisenberg noted that the United States had never successfully 

prosecuted an individual under the Logan Act and that Flynn could have possible defenses, and 

154 McGahn 11 /30/17 302, at 7; SCRO 15_000 I 98-99 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the 

Office of the Counsel to the President). 

155 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 8. Several witnesses said that the President was unhappy with Flynn 

for other reasons at this time. Bannon said that Flynn's standing with the President was not good by 

December 2016. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 12. The President-Elect had concerns because President Obama 

had warned him about Flynn shortly after the election. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 

7 (President Obama's comment sat with President-Elect Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said 

that the President had become unhappy with Flynn even before the story of his calls with Kislyak broke 

and had become so upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence briefings. Priebus 

1/18/18 302, at 8. Hicks said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets 

sent by Flynn and his son, and she described Flynn as "being on thin ice" by early February 2017. Hicks 

12/8/17 302, at 7, 10. 

156 Coats 6/ 14/17 302, at 2. 

157 Coats 6/14/ 17 302, at 2. 

158 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2. 

159 Coats 6/14/17 3 02, at 2. 

160 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8. 

161 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9. 

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told McGahn that he believed it was unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge 

under the circumstances. 162 

That same morning, McGahn asked Yates to return to the White House to discuss Flynn 

again. I63 In that second meeting, McGahn expressed doubts that the Department of Justice would 

bring a Logan Act prosecution against Flynn, but stated that the White House did not want to take 

action that would interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn. 164 Yates responded that 

Department ofJustice had notified the White House so that it could take action in response to the 

infonnation provided.165 McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying 

information the Department of Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with Kislyak. 166 

Also on January 27, the President called FBI Director Corney and invited him to dinner 

that evening.

167 Priebus recalled that before the dinner, he told the President something like, "don't 

talk about Russia, whatever you do," and the President promised he would not talk about Russia 

at the dinner.

168 McGahn had previously advised the President that he should not communicate 

directly with the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political interference 

in law enforcement. 169 When Bannon learned about the President's planned dinner with Corney, 

he suggested that he or Priebus also attend, but the President stated that he wanted to dine with 

Corney alone.17° Corney said that when he arrived for the dinner that evening, he was surprised 

and concerned to see that no one else had been invited. 171 

162 SCR0l5_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); Eisenberg 11 /29/17 302, at 9. 

163 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); McGahn 11/30/ 17 302, at 8; Yates 8/15/ 17 302, at 8. 

164 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; McGahn 11 /30/17 302, at 8. 

165 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; Burnham 11 /3/17 302, at 5; see SCR015_00199 (2/15/17 Draft 

Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President) ("Yates was unwilling to confirm or 

deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not 

object to the White House taking action against Flynn."). 

166 Yates 9/15~17 302, at 9; Burnham 11 /3/17 302, at 5. In accordance with McGahn's request, the 

Department of Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewed the information in 

early February. Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at I (documenting 

2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg). 

167 Corney 11 / 15/17 302, at 6; SCR0l2b_000O0I (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17); Hearing on 

Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) 

(Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 2-3). 

168 Priebus I 0/ 13/17 302, at 17. 

169 See McGahn I 1 /30/1 7 302, at 9; Dhillon 11 /2 1 / 17 302, at 2; Bannon 2/ 12/ 18 302, at 17. 

170 Bannon 2/ 12/1 8 302, at 17. 

171 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 

I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 

3); see Corney 11/15/17 302, at 6. 

33 
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Attorney Work Proeit:iet // May CoHtaiH Material Pwteeteti UHtier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Corney provided an account of the dinner in a contemporaneous memo, an interview with 

this Office, and congressional testimony. According to Corney's account of the dinner, the 

President repeatedly brought up Corney's future, asking whether he wanted to stay on as FBI 

director. 172 Because the President had previously said he wanted Corney to stay on as FBI director, 

Corney interpreted the President's comments as an effort to create a patronage relationship by 

having Corney ask for his job. 173 The President also brought up the Steele reporting that Corney 

had raised in the January 6, 2017 briefing and stated that he was thinking about ordering the FBI 

to investigate the allegations to prove they were false. 174 Corney responded that the President 

should think carefully about issuing such an order because it could create a narrative that the FBI 

was investigating him personally, which was incorrect. 175 Later in the dinner, the President 

brought up Flynn and said, "the guy has serious judgment issues." 176 Corney did not comment on 

Flynn and the President did not acknowledge any FBI interest in or contact with Flynn. 177 

According to Corney's account, at one point during the dinner the President stated, "I need 

loyalty, I expect loyalty." 178 Corney did not respond and the conversation moved on to other 

topics, but the President returned to the subject of Corney's job at the end of the dinner and 

repeated, "I need loyalty." 179 Corney responded, "You will always get honesty from me."180 The 

172 Corney I 1/15/17 302, at 7; Corney 1/28/17 Memorandum, at I, 3; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBT, at 3). 

173 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select 

Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record ofJames B. Corney, former 

Director of the FBI, at 3). 

174 Corney 1 /28/ 17 Memorandum, at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate 

Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, 

former Director of the FBI, at 4). 

175 Corney 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate 

Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, 

former Director of the FBI, at 4). 

176 Corney 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 4; Corney 11/15/17 302, at 7 . 

177 Corney 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 4; Corney I 1/ 15/17 302, at 7. 

178 Corney 1/28/18 Memorandum, at 2; Corney 11/ 15/ 17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 3). 

179 Corney 1/28/ 17 Memorandum, at 3; Corney 11 / 15/ 17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 3-4). 

18° Corney 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Corney 11 / 15/ 17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 20 I 7) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 4). 

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Attel'fte'.>' 1.\'e,rk Pre1:h:1et // ~b,. Cet1tait1 Material Preteeteti Ut1tier Fet:i. R. Griff!. P. 6(e) 

President said, "That's what I want, honest loyalty." 181 Corney said, "You will get that from 

me." 1s2 

After Corney's account of the dinner became public, the President and his advisors disputed 

that he had asked for Corney's loyalty.183 The President also indicated that he had not invited 

Corney to dinner, telling a reporter that he thought Corney had "asked for the dinner" because "he 

wanted to stay on." I84 But substantial evidence corroborates Corney's account of the dinner 

invitation and the request for loyalty. The President's Daily Diary confirms that the President 

"extend[ed] a dinner invitation" to Corney on January 27. 185 With respect to the substance of the 

dinner conversation, Corney documented the President's request for loyalty in a memorandum he 

began drafting the night of the dinner; 186 senior FBI officials recall that Corney told them about 

the loyalty request shortly after the dinner occurred;187 and Corney described the request while 

181 Corney 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Corney 11 /15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 4). 

182 Corney 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Corney 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 4). 

183 See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Corney 

Demurred., New York Times (May 11 , 2017) (quoting Sarah Sanders as saying, "[The President] would 

never even suggest the expectation of personal loyalty"); Ali Vitali, Trump Never Asked for Corney's 

Loyalty, President's Personal Lawyer Says, NBC (June 8, 2017) ( quoting the President's personal counsel 

as saying, "The president also never told Mr. Corney, ' I need loyalty, T expect loyalty,' in form or 

substance."); Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (June 9, 2017) ("I hardly 

know the man. I'm not going to say 'I want you to pledge allegiance.' Who would do that? Who would 

ask a man to pledge allegiance under oath?"). In a private conversation with Spicer, the President stated 

that he had never asked for Corney's loyalty, but added that if he had asked for loyalty, "Who cares?" 

Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 4. The President also told McGahn that he never said what Corney said he had. 

McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17. 

184 Interview of Donald J Trump, NBC (May 11 , 2017). 

185 SCR012b_OOOOOI (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17) (reflecting that the President called Corney 

in the morning on January 27 and "[t]he purpose of the call was to extend a dinner invitation"). In addition, 

two witnesses corroborate Corney's account that the President reached out to schedule the dinner, without 

Corney having asked for it. Priebus l 0/13/17 302, at 17 (the President asked to schedule the January 27 

dinner because he did not know much about Corney and intended to ask him whether he wanted to stay on 

as FBI Director); Rybicki I 1/21/18 302, at 3 (recalling that Corney told him about the President's dinner 

invitation on the day of the dinner). 

186 Corney l l /15/17 302, at 8; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select 

Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former 

Director of the FBI, at 4). 

187 McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9-10; Rybicki 11/21/ 18 302, at 3. After leaving the White House, 

Corney called Deputy Director of the FBI Andrew McCabe, summarized what he and the President had 

discussed, including the President's request for loyalty, and expressed shock over the President's request. 

McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9. Corney also convened a meeting with his senior leadership team to discuss what 

the President had asked of him during the dinner and whether he had handled the request for loyalty 

properly. McCabe 8/17/17 302, at IO; Rybicki 11 /2 1/18 302, at 3. In addition, Corney distributed his 

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AttarHey 'Nark Praettet // May CaHtaiH Material Prateet:ed Utteer Fee. R. Cri!fl. P. 6(e) 

under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject 

to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § I 00 I. Corney's memory of the details of the dinner, 

including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout. 188 

6. Flynn's Resignation 

On February 2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn's 

calls with Kislyak. 189 Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes 

that could apply to Flynn's conduct, but he did not believe the White House had enough 

information to make a definitive recommendation to the President.190 Eisenberg and McGahn 

discussed that Eisenberg's review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary 

conclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act.I9I Because White 

House officials were uncertain what Flynn had told the FBI, however, they could not assess his 

exposure to prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 192 

The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the 

Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak. I93 Flynn recalled that 

the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations. 194 Flynn listed the 

specific dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of 

the dates he listed. I95 The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and Flynn 

responded that he might have talked about sanctions. 

I96 

memorandum documenting the dinner to his senior leadership team, and McCabe confirmed that the 

memorandum captured what Corney said on the telephone call immediately following the dinner. McCabe 

8/17/17 302, at 9-10. 

188 There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Corney wrote 

documenting his interactions with the President. For example, Corney recalled, and his memoranda reflect, 

that he told the President in his January 6, 2017 meeting, and on phone calls on March 30 and April 11, 

2017, that the FBI was not investigating the President personally. On May 8, 2017, during White House 

discussions about firing Corney, the President told Rosenstein and others that Corney had told him three 

times that he was not under investigation, including once in person and twice on the phone. Gauhar-000058 

(Gauhar 5/ 16/17 Notes). 

189 Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at 1 (documenting 2/2/17 

meeting with Eisenberg). 

190 Eisenberg 11 /29/ 17 302, at 6. 

191 Eisenberg 1 l /29/17 302, at 9; SCRO 15 _ 000200 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the 

Office of the Counsel to the President). 

192 Eisenberg 11 /29/ 17 302, at 9. 

193 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2. 

194 Flynn 11 /21/17 302, at 2. 

195 Flynn 11/2 1117 302, at 2. 

196 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2-3. 

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On February 9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with 

Kislyak the month before the President took office. 197 After the publication of that story, Vice 

President Pence learned of the Department of Justice's notification to the White House about the 

content of Flynn's calls. 198 He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the 

underlying information about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak. 199 FBI Deputy Director Andrew 

McCabe, who provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when 

they reviewed it, recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn's conduct violated the Logan 

Act.200 McCabe responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because 

it was a possibility.201 Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and 

Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions 

and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak.202 Flynn had also told White 

House officials that the FB[ had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation of him,

203 

but Eisenberg did not believe him.204 After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn, 

McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated and recommended that course of 

action to the President.205 

That weekend, Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago.206 Flynn recalled that on 

February 12, 2017, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One, the President asked him whether 

he had lied to the Vice President.207 Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his 

calls, but he did not think he lied.208 The President responded, "Okay. That's fine. T got it."209 

197 Greg Miller et al., National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian 

ambassador, despite denials, officials say, Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2017). 

198 SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); McGahn l l /30/17 302, at 12. 

199 SCR0\5_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 11-13; Priebus 10/ 13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11 /30/17 302, at 12. 

200 McCabe 8/17 /l 7 302, at 13. 

201 McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13. 

202 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12; Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/ 13/17 302, at 10; 

SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office ofthe Counsel to the President). 

203 McGahn 11 /30/17 302, at 11; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 11. 

204 Eisenberg l l /29/17 302, at 9. 

205 SCRO 15 _ 000202 (2/ 15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the 

President); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12. 

206 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8. 

207 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8. 

208 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8; Flynn 1/19/ l 8 302, at 9. 

209 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9. 

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On February 13, 2017, Priebus told Flynn he had to resign. 

21 ° Flynn said he wanted to say 

goodbye to the President, so Priebus brought him to the Oval Office.21 1 Priebus recalled that the 

President hugged Flynn, shook his hand, and said, "We'll give you a good recommendation. 

You're a good guy·. We'll take care ofyou."212 

Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel's Office and 

distributed to the White House communications team stated that McGahn had advised the 

President that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted, and the President had determined that the issue 

with Flynn was one of trust.213 Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign 

"not based on a legal issue, but based on a trust issue, [where] a level of trust between the President 

and General Flynn had eroded to the point where [the President] felt he had to make a change."214 

7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Corney 

On February 14, 2017, the day after Flynn's resignation, the President had lunch at the 

White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.21 5 According to Christie, at one point 

during the lunch the President said, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over."216 Christie 

laughed and responded, "No way."217 He said, "this Russia thing is far from over" and "[w]e'll be 

here on Valentine's Day 2018 talking about this."2 18 The President said, "[w]hat do you mean? 

Flynn met with the Russians. That was the problem. I fired Flynn. It's over." 219 Christie recalled 

responding that based on his experience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been 

investigated, firing Flynn would not end the investigation.220 Christie said there was no way to 

make an investigation shorter, but a lot of ways to make it longer.221 The President asked Christie 

what he meant, and Christie told the President not to talk about the investigation even if he was 

2 10 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9. 

211 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 10. 

212 Priebus 1 /18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11117/ 17 302, at 10. 

213 SCR004_00600 (2/16/ 17 Email, Burnham to Donaldson). 

214 Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017). After Flynn pleaded guilty 

to violating 18 U .S.C. § I 00 I in December 2017, the President tweeted, "I had to fire General Flynn because 

he lied to the Vice President and the FBI." @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (12: 14 p.m. ET) Tweet. The next 

day, the President's personal counsel told the press that he had drafted the tweet. Maegan Vazquez et al., 

Trump's lawyer says he was behind President's tweet about firing Flynn, CNN (Dec. 3, 2017). 

215 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 2-3; SCR0l2b_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17). 

216 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. 

217 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. 

218 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie said he thought when the President said "the Russia thing" 

he was referring to not just the investigations but also press coverage about Russia. Christie thought the 

more important thing was that there was an investigation. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4. 

2 19 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. 

22° Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. 

221 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. 

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frustrated at times.222 Christie also told the President that he would never be able to get rid of 

Flynn, "like gum on the bottom of your shoe."223 

Towards the end of the lunch, the President brought up Corney and asked if Christie was 

225 still friendly with him.224 Christie said he was. The President told Christie to call Corney and 

tell him that the President "really like[s] him. Tell him he's part of the team."226 At the end of the 

lunch, the President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey. 227 Christie had no 

intention of complying with the President's request that he contact Comey.

228 He thought the 

President's request was "nonsensical" and Christie did not want to put Corney in the position of 

having to receive such a phone call.229 Christie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass 

on that message .

230 

At 4 p.m. that afternoon, the President met with Corney, Sessions, and other officials for a 

homeland security briefing.231 At the end of the briefing, the President dismissed the other 

attendees and stated that he wanted to speak to Corney alone.232 Sessions and senior advisor to the 

President Jared Kushner remained in the Oval Office as other patticipants left, but the President 

222 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3-4. 

223 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie also recalled that during the lunch, Flynn called Kushner, 

who was at the lunch, and complained about what Spicer had said about Flynn in his press briefing that 

day. Kushner told Flynn words to the effect of, "You know the President respects you. The President cares 

about you. I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later." Kushner looked at the 

President when he mentioned the tweet, and the President nodded his assent. Christie 2/13/ 19 302, at 3. 

Flynn recalled getting upset at Spicer's comments in the press conference and calling Kushner to say he did 

not appreciate the comments. Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9. 

224 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4. 

225 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4. 

226 Christie 2/ 13/19 302, at 4-5. 

227 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5. 

228 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5. 

229 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5. 

23° Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5. 

231 SCRO I 26_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17); Corney 11/15/17 302, at 9. 

232 Corney 11115/17 302, at 1 0; 2/ 14/17 Corney Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 4); Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 18 (confirming 

that everyone was shooed out "like Corney said" in his June testimony). 

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excused them, repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey.233 At some point after others 

had left the Oval Office, Priebus opened the door, but the President sent him away.

234 

According to Corney's account of the meeting, once they were alone, the President began 

the conversation by saying, "I want to talk about Mike Flynn."235 The President stated that Flynn 

had not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians, but had to be terminated because he 

had misled the Vice President.236 The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified 

information, but the President returned to Flynn, saying "he is a good guy and has been through a 

lot."237 The President stated, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn 

go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go."238 Corney agreed that Flynn " is a good guy," 

but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn.239 Corney testified under oath that he 

took the President's statement "as a direction" because of the President's position and the 

circumstances of the one-on-one meeting. 

240 

233 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 10; Corney 2/14/17 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 4). Sessions recalled that the President asked 

to speak to Corney alone and that Sessions was one of the last to leave the room; he described Corney's 

testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as "pretty accurate." 

Sessions 1 / 17/18 302, at 6. Kushner had no recollection of whether the President asked Corney to stay 

behind. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 24. 

234 Corney 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2; Priebus I 0/13/ 17 302, at 18. 

235 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 10; Corney 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 4). 

236 Corney 2/14/ 17 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate 

Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, 

former Director of the FBI, at 5). 

237 Corney 1 l / 15/ 17 302, at IO; Corney 2/14/ 17 Memorandum, at 2; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 5). 

238 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 

115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 

5); Corney 2/14/ 17 Memorandum, at 2. Corney said he was highly confident that the words in quotations 

in his Memorandum documenting this meeting were the exact words used by the President. He said he 

knew· from the outset of the meeting that he was about to have a conversation of consequence, and he 

remembered the words used by the President and wrote them down soon after the meeting. Corney 11/1 5/17 

302, at 10-11. 

239 Corney 11/15/17 302, at IO; Corney 2/ 14/ 17 Memorandum, at 2. 

240 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 

115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 31) (testimony of James B. Corney, former Director 

of the FBI). Corney further stated, "I mean, this is the president of the United States, with me alone, saying, 

'l hope' this. I took it as, this is what he wants me to do." Id.; see also Corney 11/15/17 302, at 10 (Corney 

took the statement as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation). 

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Shortly after meeting with the President, Corney began drafting a memorandum 

documenting their conversation.241 Corney also met with his senior leadership team to discuss the 

President's request, and they agreed not to inform FBI officials working on the Flynn case of the 

President's statements so the officials would not be influenced by the request.242 Corney also asked 

for a meeting with Sessions and requested that Sessions not leave Corney alone with the President 

again.243 

8. The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn 

After Flynn was forced to resign, the press raised questions about why the President waited 

more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn and whether the President had 

known about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification.244 The press also 

continued to raise questions about connections between Russia and the President's campaign.245 

On February 15, 2017, the President told reporters, "General Flynn is a wonderful man. I think 

he's been treated very, very unfairly by the media."246 On February 16, 2017, the President held 

24 1 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 11; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select 

Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B. Corney, former 

Director of the FBI, at 5). 

242 Corney 11 / 15/17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4; Rybicki 6/22/17 302, at 1; Hearing on 

Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) 

(Statement for the record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 5-6). 

243 Corney 11/15/ 17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4-5; Rybicki 6/22/ 17 302, at 1-2; Sessions 

1/17/18 302, at 6 (confirming that later in the week following Corney's one-on-one meeting with the 

President in the Oval Office, Corney told the Attorney General that he did not want to be alone with the 

President); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 6 (within days of the February 14 Oval Office meeting, Corney told Sessions 

he did not think it was appropriate for the FBI Director to meet alone with the President); Rybicki 11/21/18 

302, at 4 (Rybicki helped to schedule the meeting with Sessions because Corney wanted to talk about his 

concerns about meeting with the President alone); Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the 

Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B. 

Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 6). 

244 See, e.g., Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017) (questions from 

the press included, "if [the President] was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Vice President, 

other officials here, and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians, why would he be kept 

on for almost three weeks?" and "Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russian 

ambassador]?"). Priebus recalled that the President initially equivocated on whether to fire Flynn because 

it would generate negative press to lose his National Security Advisor so early in his term. Priebus 1 /18/ 18 

302, at 8. 

245 E.g., Sean Sullivan et al., Senators from both parties pledge to deepen probe of Russia and the 

2016 election, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2017); Aaron Blake, 5 times Donald Trump's team denied contact 

with Russia, Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2017); Oren Darell, Donald Trump's ties to Russia go back 30 

years, USA Today (Feb. 15, 2017); Pamela Brown et al., Trump aides were in constant touch with senior 

Russian officials during campaign, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017); Austin Wright, Camey briefs senators amid furor 

over Trump-Russia ties, Politico (Feb. 17, 2017); Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for 

Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017). 

246 Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu ofisrael in Joint Press Conference, 

White House (Feb. 15, 2017). 

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a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn "didn' t tell the Vice President 

of the United States the facts, and then he didn't remember. And that just wasn't acceptable to 

me." 247 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak, but "it 

certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have directed him to do it if I thought 

he wasn't doing it. I didn't direct him, but I would have directed him because that's his job."248 

In listing the reasons for terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him.

249 

The President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, "I have nothing to do with 

Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything."250 The President also said he "had 

nothing to do with" WikiLeaks's publication of information hacked from the Clinton campaign.

251 

9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement 

Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak 

On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland that the President wanted her 

to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but they suggested to her that the Administration 

could make her the ambassador to Singapore.252 The next day, the President asked Priebus to have 

McFarland draft an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to call 

the Russian Ambassador about sanctions.

253 Priebus said he told the President he would only 

direct McFarland to write such a letter if she were comfortable with it.254 Priebus called McFarland 

into his office to convey the President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President 

did not direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak.255 McFarland told Priebus she did not know whether the 

President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and she declined to say yes or no 

247 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 

248 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). The President 

also said that Flynn's conduct "wasn't wrong - what he did in terms of the information he saw." The 

President said that Flynn was just "doing the job," and "if anything, he did something right." 

249 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017); Priebus 

1/18/18 302, at 9. 

250 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 

251 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). 

252 KTMF _ 00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, 

at 16-17. 

253 See Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11; see also KTMF _00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum 

for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 

254 Priebus 1 I I 8/ 18 302, at 1 1. 

255 KTMF _ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, 

at 17. 

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to the request.256 Priebus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with the President's 

request, and he recommended that she talk to attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office.257 

McFarland then reached out to Eisenberg.258 McFarland told him that she had been fired 

from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore 

but that the President and Priebus wanted a letter from her denying that the President directed 

Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak.259 Eisenberg advised McFarland not to write the 

requested letter.260 As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous "Memorandum for the 

Record" that she wrote because she was concerned by the President's request: "Eisenberg . .. 

thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea-from my side because the email would 

be awkward. Why would T be emailing Priebus to make a statement for the record? But it would 

also be a bad idea for the President because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment was in 

some way a quid pro quo."261 Later that evening, Priebus stopped by McFarland's office and told 

her not to write the email and to forget he even mentioned it.262 

Around the same time, the President asked Priebus to reach out to Flynn and let him know 

that the President still cared about him.263 Priebus called Flynn and said that he was checking in 

and that Flynn was an American hero. 264 Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn saying 

bad things about him.265 

On March 31, 2017, following news that Flynn had offered to testify before the FBI and 

congressional investigators in exchange for immunity, the President tweeted, "Mike Flynn should 

ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss), by media & Dems, of 

256 KTMF _00000047 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum_ for the Record) ("I said I did not know 

whether he did or didn't, but was in Maralago the week between Christmas and New Year's (while Flynn 

was on vacation in Carribean) and I was not aware of any Flynn-Trump, or Trump-Russian phone calls"); 

McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 17. 

257 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11. 

258 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 

259 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. 

26 ° KTMF _ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, 

at 17. 

261 KTMF _ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum for the Record); see McFarland 12/22/ 17 

302, at 17. 

262 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17; KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the 

Record). 

263 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9. 

264 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 9. 

265 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9-10. 

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historic proportion!"266 In late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a 

message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong.267 

Analysis 

In analyzing the President's conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following 

evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: 

a. Obstructive act. According to Corney's account of his February 14, 2017 meeting 

in the Oval Office, the President told him, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to 

letting Flynn go .... I hope you can let this go." In analyzing whether these statements constitute 

an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Corney's account of the interaction is accurate, 

and, if so, whether the President's statements had the tendency to impede the administration of 

justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal 

charge. 

After Corney's account of the President's request to "let[] Flynn go" became public, the 

President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times 

that he did not "shoo other people out of the room" when he talked to Corney and that he did not 

remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey.268 The President also publicly denied 

that he had asked Corney to "let[] Flynn go" or otherwise communicated that Corney should drop 

the investigation ofFlynn.269 In private, the President denied aspects of Corney's account to White 

House advisors, but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Corney 

and stated that Flynn was a good guy.270 Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates 

Corney's account. 

266 @realDonaldTrump 3/31 /l 7 (7:04 a.m. ET) Tweet; see Shane Harris at al., Mike Flynn Offers 

to Testify in Exchange for Immunity, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 30, 2017). 

267 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18. 

268 Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicks 

recalled that the President told her he had never asked Corney to stay behind in his office. Hicks 12/8/17 

302, at 12. 

269 In a statement on May 16, 2017, the White House said: "While the President has repeatedly 

expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President 

has never asked Mr. Corney or anyone else to end any investigation, including any investigation involving 

General Flynn .... This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President 

and Mr. Corney." See Michael S. Schmidt, Camey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn 

Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); @realDonaldTrump 

12/3/17 (6: 15 a.m. ET) Tweet ("I never asked Corney to stop investigating Flynn. Just more Fake News 

covering another Corney lie!"). 

270 Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Corney that Flynn was a good guy and 

he hoped "everything worked out for him." Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 19. McGahn recalled that the 

President denied saying to Corney that he hoped Corney would let Flynn go, but added that he was "allowed 

to hope." The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at 

8. 

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At:te!'fl:ey Wel'k P!'eattct // May Cefl:taiH Matcl'ial Pl'eteetea Ufl:der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ec) 

First, Corney wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the 

same day it occurred. Corney also told senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President 

that day, and their recollections of what Corney told them at the time are consistent with Corney's 

account.271 

Second, Corney provided testimony about the President's request that he " let[] Flynn go" 

under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to 

penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § I 00 l . Corney's recollections of the encounter have remained 

consistent over time. 

Third, the objective, corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to 

occur support Corney's description of the event. Corney recalled that the President cleared the 

room to speak with Corney alone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Office, that 

Kushner and Sessions lingered and had to be shooed out by the President, and that Priebus briefly 

opened the door during the meeting, prompting the President to wave him away. While the 

President has publicly denied those details, other Administration officials who were present have 

confirmed Corney's account of how he ended up in a one-on-one meeting with the President.272 

And the President acknowledged to Priebus and McGahn that he in fact spoke to Corney about 

Flynn in their one-on-one meeting. 

Fourth, the President's decision to clear the room and, in particular, to exclude the Attorney 

General from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Corney, which is 

consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Corney recalls, rather than a more 

innocuous conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General. 

Finally, Corney's reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President 

having asked him to "let[] Flynn go." Corney met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to 

keep the President' s statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn 

investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President's request. Corney also promptly 

met with the Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the President again, an account 

verified by Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki, and Jody Hunt, who was then the Attorney 

General's chief of staff. 

A second question is whether the President's statements, which were not phrased as a direct 

order to Corney, could impede or interfere with the FBI's investigation of Flynn. While the 

President said he "hope[d]" Corney could "let[] Flynn go," rather than affirmatively directing him 

to do so, the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Corney to close 

the FBl's investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Corney so that 

they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the 

President meant to make a request to Corney that he did not want anyone else to hear. Second, 

because the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he "hopes" a 

subordinate will do something, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the 

President wants. Indeed, the President repeated a version of"let this go" three times, and Corney 

271 Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13-14. 

272 See Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 18; Sessions I / 17/18 302, at 6. 

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testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the 

way Corney reacted at the time. 

b. Nexus to a proceeding. To establish a nexus to a proceeding, it would be necessary 

to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the 

investigation of Flynn was likely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution. 

At the time of the President's one-on-one meeting with Corney, no grand jury subpoenas 

had been issued as part of the FBI's investi ation into Fl nn. But Fl nn's lies to the FBI violated 

federal criminal law, , and resulted in Flynn's 

prosecution for violating 18 U .S.C. § 100 I. By the time the President spoke to Corney about 

Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that Flynn's statements 

to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had 

told the same version of events to the FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn's 

conduct could violate 18 U.S.C. § l 001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials 

reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February 10, 2017, they believed that 

Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak and concluded that he had been 

lying. In addition, the President's instruction to the FBI Director to "let[] Flynn go" suggests his 

awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution. 

c. Intent. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a 

personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn-for example, whether the President 

was aware of Flynn's communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred, such that 

the President knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials and that those lies had been 

passed on to the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and 

content of Flynn's calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be 

relied upon to establish the President's knowledge. In advance of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak, 

the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have 

mentioned that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak. Flynn told McFarland about the substance 

of his calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia's response, and Flynn 

recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how they had successfully "stopped the 

train on Russia's response" to the sanctions. It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have 

wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his 

request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate 

in response to the request, and the President was pleased by the Russian response, calling it a 

" [g]reat move." And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him 

about the calls with Kislyak. 

But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out of his 

calls with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect 

directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn. 

And in February 2017, the President asked Flynn what was discussed on the calls and whether he 

had lied to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigation 

accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn's 

discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those 

discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise 

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possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive 

to end the FBI's inquiry into Flynn's conduct. 

Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's 

broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would 

end "the whole Russia thing." Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress 

were raising questions about Russia's interference in the election and whether members of the 

President's campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President 

viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election. The President 

paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when 

the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak. Just hours before 

meeting one-on-one with Corney, the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an end to 

the Russia inquiries. And after Christie pushed back, telling the President that firing Flynn would 

not end the Russia investigation, the President asked Christie to reach out to Corney and convey 

that the President liked him and he was part of "the team." That afternoon, the President cleared 

the room and asked Corney to "let[] Flynn go." 

We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President's direction to Corney 

was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. In public statements the President repeatedly 

described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the 

President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President "care[d]" 

about him and felt bad for him. At the same time, multiple senior advisors, including Bannon, 

Priebus, and Hicks, said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was 

forced to resign and that the President was frequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed 

the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard, but from concern 

about the negative press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early 

in the Administration. And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of 

support for Flynn were motivated by the President's desire to keep Flynn from saying negative 

things about him. 

The way in which the President communicated the request to Corney also is relevant to 

understanding the President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation 

into Flynn, he told McGahn, Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the 

White House. The next day, the President invited Corney for a one-on-one dinner against the 

advice of an aide who recommended that other White House officials also attend. At the dinner, 

the President asked Corney for " loyalty" and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned 

that Flynn had judgment issues. When the President met with Corney the day after Flynn's 

termination- shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia 

investigation-the President cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General, so that he 

could again speak to Corney alone. The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Corney 

contravened the advice of the White House Counsel that the President should not communicate 

directly with the Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement 

activities. And the President later denied that he cleared the room and asked Corney to " let[] Flynn 

go"- a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise 

of prosecutorial discretion. 

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Finally, the President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the 

President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President's concern 

about being associated with Flynn's conduct. The evidence does not establish that the President 

was trying to have McFarland lie. The President's request, however, was sufficiently irregular 

that McFarland-who did not know the full extent of Flynn's communications with the President 

and thus could not make the representation the President wanted-felt the need to draft an internal 

memorandum documenting the President's request, and Eisenberg was concerned that the request 

would look like a quid pro quo in exchange for an ambassadorship. 

C. The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBl's Russia 

Investigation 

Overview 

In early March 2017, the President learned that Sessions was considering rec using from 

the Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal. After Sessions announced his recusal on 

March 2, the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately asked 

Sessions to "unrecuse." On March 20, 2017, Corney publicly disclosed the existence of the FBI's 

Russia investigation. In the days that followed, the President contacted Corney and other 

intelligence agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the 

President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort in order to "lift the cloud" 

of the ongoing investigation. 

Evidence 

1 . Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation 

Tn late February 2017, the Department of Justice began an internal analysis of whether 

Sessions should recuse from the Russia investigation based on his role in the 2016 Trump 

Campaign.

273 On March I, 2017, the press reported that, in his January confirmation hearing to 

become Attorney General, Senator Sessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian 

Ambassador Kislyak before the presidential election, leading to congressional calls for Sessions 

to recuse or for a special counsel to investigate Russia's interference in the presidential election.

274 

Also on March I, the President called Corney and said he wanted to check in and see how 

Corney was doing.

275 According to an email Corney sent to his chief of staff after the call, the 

President "talked about Sessions a bit," said that he had heard Corney was "doing great," and said 

that he hoped Corney would come by to say hello when he was at the White House.276 Corney 

273 Sessions 1/17/ I 8 302, at I; Hunt 2/ l /18 302, at 3. 

274 E.g. , Adam Entous et al., Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year, encounters he later 

did not disclose, Washington Post (Mar. 1, 2017). 

275 3/1/17 Email, Corney to Rybicki; SCR0l 26_000030 (President's Daily Diary, 3/1 /17, reflecting 

call with Corney at 11 :55 am.) 

276 3/1/17 Email, Corney to Rybicki; see Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the 

Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 86) (testimony 

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interpreted the call as an effort by the President to "pull [him] in," but he did not perceive the call 

as an attempt by the President to find out what Corney was doing with the Flynn investigation.277 

The next morning, the President called McGahn and urged him to contact Sessions to tell 

him not to recuse himself from the Russia investigation.278 McGahn understood the President to 

be concerned that a recusal would make Sessions look guilty for omitting details in his 

confirmation hearing; leave the President unprotected from an investigation that could hobble the 

presidency and derail his policy objectives; and detract from favorable press coverage of a 

Presidential Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in the week.

279 McGahn 

reached out to Sessions and reported that the President was not happy about the possibility of 

recusal.280 Sessions replied that he intended to follow the rules on recusal.281 McGahn reported 

back to the President about the call with Sessions, and the President reiterated that he did not want 

Sessions to recuse.282 Throughout the day, McGahn continued trying on behalf of the President to 

avert Sessions's recusal by speaking to Sessions's personal counsel, Sessions's chief of staff, and 

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and by contacting Sessions himself two more times.283 

Sessions recalled that other White House advisors also called him that day to argue against his 

recusal. 284 

That afternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse "from any existing or future 

investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United 

States."285 Sessions believed the decision to recuse was not a close call, given the applicable 

of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI) ("[H]e called me one day .... [H]e just called to check in 

and tell me I was doing an awesome job, and wanted to see how I was doing."). 

277 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 17-18. 

278 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16. 

279 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16-17; see SC_AD_00l23 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) ("Just in the 

middle of another Russia Fiasco."). 

280 Sessions 1/ 17 / 18 302, at 3. 

281 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 17. 

282 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 17. 

283 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 18-19; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1 /18 302, at 4; Donaldson 

1 1/6/17 302, at 8-1 0; see Hunt-000017; SC_ AD_ 00121 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). 

284 Sessions l/17/18302,at3. 

285 Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal, Department of Justice Press Release (Mar. 2, 

2017) ("During the course of the last several weeks, I have met with the relevant senior career Department 

officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns for 

President of the United States. Having concluded those meetings today, I have decided to recuse myself 

from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President 

of the United States."). At the time ofSessions's recusal, Dana Boente, then the Acting Deputy Attorney 

General and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, became the Acting Attorney General for 

. campaign-related matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at the 

Department of Justice. Id. ("Consistent with the succession order for the Department of Justice, ... Dana 

Boente shall act as and perform the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from 

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language in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which Sessions considered to be clear and 

decisive.

286 Sessions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was "very 

thin."287 Sessions got the impression, based on calls he received from White House officials, that 

the President was very upset with him and did not think he had done his duty as Attorney 

288 General. 

Shortly after Sessions announced his recusal, the White House Counsel's Office directed 

that Sessions should not be contacted about the matter.289 Internal White House Counsel's Office 

notes from March 2, 2017, state "No contact w/Sessions" and "No comms / Serious concerns about 

obstruction."290 

On March 3, the day after Sessions's recusal, McGahn was called into the Oval Office.291 

Other advisors were there, including Priebus and Bannon.292 The President opened the 

conversation by saying, "I don't have a lawyer."293 The President expressed anger at McGahn 

about the recusal and brought up Roy Cohn, stating that he wished Cohn was his attorney.294 

McGahn interpreted this comment as directed at him, suggesting that Cohn would fight for the 

which I have recused myself to the extent they exist."); see Exec. Order No. 13775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10697 

(Feb.14,2017). 

286 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 1-2. 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 provides that "no employee shall participate in a 

criminal investigation or prosecution ifhe has a personal or political relationship with ... [a]ny person or 

organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution," 

and defines "political relationship" as "a close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether 

or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from 

service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof. " 

287 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 2. 

288 Sessions I /17 /I 8 302, at 3. 

289 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11; SC_AD _00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). It is not clear whether 

the President was aware of the White House Counsel's Office direction not to contact Sessions about his 

recusal. 

290 SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the note "No comms / 

Serious concerns about obstruction" may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team 

saying "crazy things" and trying to spin Sessions's recusal in a way that would raise concerns about 

obstruction. McGahn l l/30/17 302, at 19. Donaldson recalled that "No comms" referred to the order that 

no one should contact Sessions. Donaldson 11 /6/17 302, at 11. 

29 1 McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 2. 

292 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. 

293 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. 

294 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. Cohn had previously served as a lawyer for the President during 

his career as a private businessman. Priebus recalled that when the President talked about Cohn, he said 

Cohn would win cases for him that had no chance, and that Cohn had done incredible things for him. 

Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. Bannon recalled the President describing Cohn as a winner and a fixer, someone 

who got things done. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 6. 

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President whereas McGahn would not.295 The President wanted McGahn to talk to Sessions about 

the recusal, but McGahn told the President that DOJ ethics officials had weighed in on Sessions's 

decision to recuse.296 The President then brought up former Attorneys General Robert Kennedy 

and Eric Holder and said that they had protected their presidents.297 The President also pushed 

back on the DOJ contacts policy, and said words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby 

and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?"

298 

Bannon recalled that the President was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him and that he screamed 

at McGahn about how weak Sessions was.299 Bannon recalled telling the President that Sessions's 

recusal was not a surprise and that before the inauguration they had discussed that Sessions would 

have to recuse from campaign-related investigations because of his work on the Trump 

Campaign.

300 

That weekend, Sessions and McGahn flew to Mar-a-Lago to meet with the President.30 1 

Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and suggested that 

Sessions should "unrecuse" from the Russia investigation.302 The President contrasted Sessions 

with Attorneys General Holder and Kennedy, who had developed a strategy to help their presidents 

where Sessions had not.303 Sessions said he had the impression that the President feared that the 

investigation could spin out of control and disrupt his ability to govern, which Sessions could have 

helped avert if he were still overseeing it.304 

On March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was 

asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn-indicating that the FBI was still actively 

investigating him.305 On March 6, the President told advisors he wanted to call the Acting Attorney 

295 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. 

296 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. 

297 McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 3. Bannon said the President saw Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder 

as Attorneys General who protected the presidents they served. The President thought Holder always stood 

up for President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him, and Robert Kennedy always had his 

brother's back. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. Priebus recalled that the President said he had been told his 

entire life he needed to have a great lawyer, a "bulldog," and added that Holder had been willing to take a 

contempt-of-Congress charge for President Obama. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. 

298 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3. 

299 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. 

300 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. 

301 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 5; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3. 

302 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at3-4. 

303 Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at3-4 

304 Sessions 1 /17/18 302, at 3-4. Hicks recalled that after Sessions recused, the President was angry 

and scolded Sessions in her presence, but she could not remember exactly when that conversation occurred. 

Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13. 

305 SC_AD _000 I 37 (Donaldson 3/5/17 Notes); see Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13. 

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General to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated, although it 

is not clear whether the President knew at that time of the FBI's recent request concerning Flynn.306 

2. FBI Director Corney Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia 

Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI 

On March 9, 2017, Corney briefed the "Gang of Eight" congressional leaders about the 

FBI's investigation of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S. 

subjects of the investigation.307 Although it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing 

at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn' s chief of staff, on March 12, 2017, 

state, "POTUS in panic/chaos ... Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related 

to Russia."308 The week after Corney's briefing, the White House Counsel's Office was in contact 

with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears to have 

received information about the status of the FBI investigation.309 

On March 20, 2017, Corney was scheduled to testify before HPSCI.310 In advance of 

Corney's testimony, congressional officials made clear that they wanted Corney to provide 

information about the ongoing FBI investigation.

311 Dana Boente, who at that time was the Acting 

Attorney General for the Russia investigation, authorized Corney to confirm the existence of the 

Russia investigation and agreed that Corney should decline to comment on whether any particular 

individuals, including the President, were being investigated.312 

306 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14; see SC_ AD_ 000168 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) ("POTUS wants 

to call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations]/ Is investigation I No/ 

We know something on Flynn/ GSA got contacted by FBI/ There's something hot"). 

307 Corney 11/15/17 302, at 13-14; SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et 

al.). 

308 SC_AD _00188 (Donaldson 3/12/18 Notes). Donaldson said she was not part of the conversation 

that led to these notes, and must have been told about it from others. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13. 

309 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14-15. On March 16, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was 

briefed by Senator Burr on the existence of "4-5 targets." Donaldson 11 /6/17 302, at 15. The "targets" 

were identified in notes taken by Donaldson as "Flynn (FBI was ~ooking for phone 

records"; "Comey~Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)";~ "Carter Page ($ 

game)"; and "Greek Guy" (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later charged with violating 18 

U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to the FBI). SC_AD_00l98 (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn 

both said they believed these were targets ofSSCI. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, 

at 4. But SSCI does not fotmally investigate individuals as "targets"; the notes on their face reference the 

FBI, the Department of Justice, and Corney; and the notes track the background materials prepared by the 

FBI for Corney's briefing to the Gang of8 on March 9. See SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, 

Gauhar to Page et al.); see also Donaldson 11 /6/17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had 

told McGahn those individuals were the FBI's targets). 

310 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence 

Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017). 

311 Corney 11 / 15/17 302, at 16; McCabe 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at I. 

3 12 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5; Corney I I /15/17 302, at 16-17. 

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In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the 

Department of Justice, Corney stated that he had "been authorized by the Department of Justice to 

confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian 

government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating 

the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian 

government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's effot1s. 

As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any 

crimes were committed."313 Corney added that he would not comment further on what the FBI 

was "doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining" because the investigation was ongoing and 

classified- but he observed that he had "taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the 

Department of Justice of briefing this Congress's leaders ... in a classified setting in detail about 

the investigation."314 Corney was specifically asked whether President Trump was "under 

investigation during the campaign" or "under investigation now."315 Corney declined to answer, 

stating, "Please don't over interpret what I've said as-as the chair and ranking know, we have 

briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we're doing, but I'm not 

gonna answer about anybody in this forum."316 Corney was also asked whether the FBI was 

investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting, and he declined to answer.

317 

According to McGahn and Donaldson, the President had expressed frustration with Corney 

before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse.318 The President had 

previously criticized Corney for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence 

briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Corney of leaking certain information 

to the media.319 McGahn said the President thought Corney was acting like "his own branch of 

government."320 

3 13 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence 

Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James 

B. Corney); Corney 11/15/17 302, at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (confirming that the Department of Justice 

authorized Corney's remarks). 

314 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence 

Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James 

B. Corney). · 

315 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence 

Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell). 

316 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence 

Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (testimony by FBI Director James 

B. Corney). 

317 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence 

Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 143) (testimony by FBI Director James 

B. Corney). 

318 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7. 

319 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 6-9. 

320 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7. 

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Press reports following Corney's March 20 testimony suggested that the FBI was 

investigating the President, contrary to what Corney had told the President at the end of the January 

6, 2017 intelligence assessment briefing.321 McGahn, Donaldson, and senior advisor Stephen 

Miller recalled that the President was upset with Corney's testimony and the press coverage that 

followed because of the suggestion that the President was under investigation.322 Notes from the 

White House Counsel's Office dated March 21, 2017, indicate that the President was " beside 

himself' over Corney's testimony.323 The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him 

to intervene with the Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was "getting 

hotter and hotter, get rid?"324 Officials in the White House Counsel's Office became so concerned 

that the President would fire Corney that they began drafting a memorandum that examined 

whether the President needed cause to terminate the FBI director.325 

At the President's urging, McGahn contacted Boente several times on March 21, 2017, to 

seek Boente's assistance in having Corney or the Department of Justice correct the misperception 

that the President was under investigation.326 Boente did not specifically recall the conversations, 

although he did remember one conversation with McGahn around this time where McGahn asked 

if there was a way to speed up or end the Russia investigation as quickly as possible.327 Boente 

said McGahn told him the President was under a cloud and it made it hard for him to govern.

328 

Boente recalled telling McGahn that there was no good way to shorten the investigation and 

attempting to do so could erode confidence in the investigation's conclusions.329 Boente said 

McGahn agreed and dropped the issue.330 The President also sought to speak with Boente directly, 

but McGahn told the President that Boente did not want to talk to the President about the request 

321 E.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., F.B.I. ls Investigating Trump's Russia Ties, Corney Confirms, New 

York Times (Mar. 20, 20 I 7); Andy Greenberg. The FBI Has Been Investigating Trump 's Russia Ties Since 

July, Wired (Mar. 20, 2017); Julie Borger & Spencer Ackerman, Trump-Russia collusion is being 

investigated by FBI, Corney confirms, Guardian (Mar. 20, 2017); see Corney 1/6/17 Memorandum, at 2. 

322 Donaldson 11 /6/17 302, at 16-17; S. Miller I 0/31/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 5-7. 

323 SC_AD_00213 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). The notes from that day also indicate that the 

President referred to the "Corney bombshell" which "made [him] look like a fool." SC_AD_00206 

(Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). 

324 SC_AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). 

325 SCR0l6_000002-05 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum). White House Counsel's 

Office attorney Uttam Dhillon did not recall a triggering event causing the White House Counsel's Office 

to begin this research. Dhmon I 1/21/17 302, at 5. Metadata from the document, which was provided by 

the White House, establishes that it was created on March 21, 2017. 

326 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-21; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 5-7. 

327 Boente 1/3 1/18 302, at 5. 

328 Boente 1/3 1 /I 8 302, at 5. 

329 Boente 1/3 1/18 302, at 5. 

330 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5. 

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to intervene with Comey.331 McGahn recalled Boente telling him in calls that day that he did not 

think it was sustainable for Corney to stay on as FBI director for the next four years, which 

McGahn said he conveyed to the President.332 Boente did not recall discussing with McGahn or 

anyone else the idea that Corney should not continue as FBI director.333 

3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public 

Statements that he had No Connection to Russia 

In the weeks following Corney's March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly asked 

intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a 

connection to the Russian election-interference effort. 

On March 22, 2017, the President asked Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats and 

CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Office after a Presidential Daily 

Briefing.334 According to Coats, the President asked them whether they could say publicly that no 

link existed between him and Russia.335 Coats responded that the Office of the Director ofNational 

Intelligence (ODNJ) has nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role to make a public 

statement on the Russia investigation.336 Pompeo had no recollection of being asked to stay behind 

after the March 22 briefing, but he recalled that the President regularly urged officials to get the 

word out that he had not done anything wrong related to Russia.337 

Coats told this Office that the President never asked him to speak to Corney about the FBI 

investigation.338 Some ODNI staffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coats 

described the meeting immediately after it occurred. According to senior ODNI official Michael 

Dempsey, Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation 

and asked him to contact Corney to see if there was a way to get past the investigation, get it over 

with, end it, or words to that effect.339 Dempsey said that Coats described the President's 

comments as falling "somewhere between musing about hating the investigation" and wanting 

Coats to "do something to stop it."340 Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he would not get 

involved with an ongoing FBI investigation.341 Edward Gistaro, another ODNI official, recalled 

331 SC_AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes); McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Donaldson 11/6/17 

302, at 19. 

332 McGahn 12/12/1 7 302, at 7; Burnham l l/03/17 302, at 11. 

333 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 3. 

334 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3; Culver 6/14/ I 7 302, at 2. 

335 Coats 6/ 14/17 3 02, at 3. 

336 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3. 

337 Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 1-3. 

338 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3. 

339 Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2. 

340 Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2-3. 

341 Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3. 

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that right after Coats's meeting with the President, on the walk from the Oval Office back to the 

Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask 

him what he could do to "help with the investigation."342 Another ODNI staffer who had been 

waiting for Coats outside the Oval Office talked to Gistaro a few minutes later and recalled Gistaro 

reporting that Coats was upset because the President had asked him to contact Corney to convince 

him there was nothing to the Russia investigation.343 

On Saturday, March 25, 2017, three days after the meeting in the Oval Office, the President 

called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of, 

" I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, 

they're all over me with this."344 Coats told the President that the investigations were going to go 

on and the best thing to do was to let them run their course.345 Coats later testified in a 

congressional hearing that he had "never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and 

shape-with shaping intelligence in a political way, or in relationship . . . to an ongoing 

investigation." 346 

On March 26, 2017, the day after the President called Coats, the President called NSA 

Director Admiral Michael Rogers.347 The President expressed frustration with the Russia 

investigation, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult.348 The President told 

Rogers "the thing with the Russians [ wa]s messing up" his ability to get things done with Russia.349 

The President also said that the news stories linking him with Russia were not true and asked 

Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories.350 Deputy Director of the NSA Richard 

Ledgett, who was present for the call, said it was the most unusual thing he had experienced in 40 

years of government service.351 After the call concluded, Ledgett prepared a memorandum that 

he and Rogers both signed documenting the content of the conversation and the President's 

request, and they placed the memorandum in a safe.352 But Rogers did not perceive the President's 

request to be an order, and the President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia 

342 Gistaro 6/ 14/ 17 302, at 2. 

343 Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2-3. 

344 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4. 

345 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4; Dempsey 6/ 14/ 17 302, at 3 (Coats relayed that the President had asked 

several times what Coats could do to help "get [the investigation] done," and Coats had repeatedly told the 

President that fastest way to "get it done" was to let it run its course) . 

. 346 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence 

Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 25) (testimony by Daniel Coats, Director 

ofNational Intelligence). 

347 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 3-4. 

348 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4. 

349 Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 1-2; see Rogers 6/12/ 17 302, at 4. 

350 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4-5; Ledgett 6/ 13/ l 7 302, at 2. 

351 Ledgett 6/ 13/ 17 302, at 2. 

352 Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2-3; Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4. 

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investigation itself.353 Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he 

had "never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or 

inappropriate" and did "not recall ever feeling pressured to do so."354 

In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President 

spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia 

investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations. 355 On at least 

two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no 

collusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued.356 Pompeo 

recalled that the President vented about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that 

there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him.357 Rogers recalled 

a private conversation with the President in which he " vent[ ed]" about the investigation, said he 

had done nothing wrong, and said something like the "Russia thing has got to go away."358 Coats 

recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times, and Coats said he finally 

told the President that Coats's job was to_ provide intelligence and not get involved in 

investigations. 

359 

4. The President Asks Corney to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russia 

Investigation 

On the morning of March 30, 2017, the President reached out to Corney directly about the 

Russia investigation.360 According to Corney's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the 

President said "he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making 

353 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2. 

354 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence 

Committee, 115th Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 20) (testimony by Admiral Michael 

Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency). 

355 Gistaro 6/ 14/ 17 302, at I, 3; Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2-3. 

356 Gistaro 6/ 14/ l 7 302, at I. 

357 Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2. 

358 Rogers 6/12/ 17 302, at 6. 

359 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3-4. 

360 SCRO l 2b_000044 (President's Daily Diary, 3/30/17, reflecting call to Corney from 8: 14 - 8:24 

a.m.); Corney 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1 ("The President called me on my CMS phone at 8: 13 am today . 

. . . The call lasted I I minutes (about IO minutes when he was connected)."; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 11 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 6). 

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that difficult."361 The President asked Corney what could be done to " lift the cloud."362 Corney 

explained "that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great 

benefit, if we didn't find anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do 

our work."363 Corney also told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI 

was not investigating the President personally.364 The President said several times, "We need to 

get that fact out."365 The President commented that if there was "some satellite" (which Corney 

took to mean an associate of the President's or the campaign) that did something, "it would be 

good to find that out" but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Corney 

"would find a way to get out that we weren't investigating hirn."366 After the call ended, Corney 

called Boente and told him about the conversation, asked for guidance on how to respond, and said 

he was uncomfortable with direct contact from the President about the investigation.367 

On the morning of April 11, 2017, the President called Corney again.368 According to 

Corney's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said he was " following up to 

see if[Corney] did what [the President] had asked last time-getting out that he personally is not 

under investigation."369 Corney responded that he had passed the request to Boente but not heard 

back, and he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a request would be to 

361 Corney 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1. Corney subsequently testified before Congress about this 

conversation and described it to our Office; his recollections were consistent with his memorandum. 

Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. 

(June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 6); Corney 

11/15/17 302, at 18. 

362 Corney 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1; Corney 11 /15/17 302, at 18. 

363 Corney 3/30/17 Memorandum, at I; Corney 11/15/17 302, at 18. 

364 Corney 3/30/ 17 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate 

Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, 

former Director of the FBI, at 6). 

365 Corney 3/30/ I 7 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate 

Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, 

former Director of the FBT, at 6). 

366 Corney 3/30/17 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate 

Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, 

former Director of the FBI, at 6-7). 

367 Corney 3/30/ 17 Memorandum, at 2; Boente I /3 1 / 18 302, at 6-7; Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 7). 

368 SCR012b _ 000053 (President's Daily Diary, 4/1 I /17, reflecting call to Corney from 8:27 - 8:3 1 

a.m.); Corney 4/11/17 Memorandum, at I ("I returned the president's call this morning at 8:26 am EDT. 

We spoke for about four minutes."). 

369 Corney 4/11/17 Memorandum, at I. Corney subsequently testified before Congress about this 

conversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo. Hearing on Russian Election 

Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for 

the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 7). 

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have the White House Counsel contact DOJ leadership.370 The President said he would take that 

step.371 The President then ~dded, "Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that 

thing, you know." 372 In a televised interview that was taped early that afternoon, the President was 

asked if it was too late for him to ask Corney to step down; the President responded, "No, it's not 

too late, but you know, I have confidence in him. We' ll see what happens. You know, it's going 

to be interesting."373 After the interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President's 

comment about Corney should be removed from the broadcast of the interview, but the President 

wanted to keep it in, which Hicks thought was unusual.374 

Later that day, the President told senior advisors, including McGahn and Priebus, that he 

had reached out to Corney twice in recent weeks.

375 The President acknowledged that McGahn 

would not approve of the outreach to Corney because McGahn had previously cautioned the 

President that he should not talk to Corney directly to prevent any perception that the White House 

was interfering with investigations.376 The President told McGahn that Corney had indicated the 

FBI could make a public statement that the President was not under investigation if the Department 

of Justice approved that action.377 After speaking with the President, McGahn followed up with 

Boente to relay the President's understanding that the FBI could make a public announcement if 

the Department of Justice cleared it.378 McGahn recalled that Boente said Corney had told him 

there was nothing obstructive about the calls from the President, but they made Corney 

uncomfortable.379 According to McGahn, Boente responded that he did not want to issue a 

statement about the President not being under investigation because of the potential political 

ramifications and did not want to order Corney to do it because that action could prompt the 

37° Corney 4/11/17 Memorandum, at I. 

371 Corney 4/11 /17 Memorandum, at I. 

372 Corney 4/ 11/17 Memorandum, at I. In a footnote to this statement in his memorandum, Corney 

wrote, "His use of these words did not fit with the flow of the call, which at that point had moved away 

from any request ofme, but I have recorded it here as it happened." 

373 Maria Bartiromo, Interview with President Trump, Fox Business Network (Apr. 12, 2017); 

SCR012b_000054 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30 - 12:55 

p.m.). 

374 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13. 

375 Priebus 10/ 13/17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. 

376 Priebus 10/13/ 17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9; see McGahn 11 /30/17 302, at 9; 

Dhillon 11 /21/17 302, at 2 (stating that White House Counsel attorneys had advised the President not to 

contact the FBI Director directly because it could create a perception he was interfering with investigations). 

Later in April, the President told other attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office that he had called 

Corney even though he knew they had advised against direct contact. Dhillon 11 /21/17 302, at 2 (recalling 

that the President said, "I know you told me not to, but I called Corney anyway."). 

377 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. 

378 McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 9. 

379 McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 9; see Boente 1 /3 1/ 18 302, at 6 (recalling that Corney told him after 

the March 30, 2017 call that it was not obstructive). 

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appointment of a Special Counsel.380 Boente did not recall that aspect of his conversation with 

McGahn, but did recall telling McGahn that the direct outreaches from the President to Corney 

were a problem.381 Boente recalled that McGahn agreed and said he would do what he could to 

address that issue.382 

Analysis 

In analyzing the President's reaction to Sessions's recusal and the requests he made to 

Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Corney, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of 

obstruction of justice: 

a. Obstructive act. The evidence shows that, after Corney's March 20, 2017 

testimony, the President repeatedly reached out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBT's 

investigation. But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches. 

Some ODNI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Office 

meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Corney and "stop" the investigation. But 

the first-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no 

memory of the specific meeting, but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the 

word out that the President had not done anything wrong related to Russia. Coats recalled that the 

President asked that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia, but 

did not ask him to speak with Corney or to help end the investigation. The other outreaches by the 

President during this period were similar in nature: The President asked Rogers if he could do 

anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Corney to 

make a public statement that would " lift the cloud" of the ongoing investigation by making clear 

that the President was not personally under investigation. These requests, while significant enough 

that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a written memorandum, were not 

interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the 

investigation. 

b. Nexus to a proceeding. At the time of the President's outreaches to leaders of the 

intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017, the FBI's Russia investigation did not 

yet involve grand jury proceedings. The outreaches, however, came after and were in response to 

Corney's March 20, 2017 announcement that the FBI, as a part of its counterintelligence mission, 

was conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. 

Corney testified that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign 

officials and would "include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed." 

c. Intent. As described above, the evidence does not establish that the President asked 

or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI's Russia investigationand the President affirmatively told Corney that if " some satellite" was involved in Russian 

election interference "it would be good to find that out." But the President's intent in trying to 

prevent Sessions's recusal, and in reaching out to Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Corney following 

380 McGahn 12/12/17302, at9-10. 

381 Boente 1 /31/18 302, at 7; McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 9. 

382 Boente 1/31/ 18 302, at 7. 

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Corney's public announcement of the FBT's Russia investigation, is nevertheless relevant to 

understanding what motivated the President's other actions towards the investigation. 

The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation's 

implications for his presidency- and, specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under 

investigation or had links to Russia. In early March, the President attempted to prevent Sessions's 

recusal, even after being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules. After 

Sessions recused, the White House Counsel's Office tried to cut off further contact with Sessions 

about the matter, although it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President. The 

President continued to raise the issue of Sessions's recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he 

pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse. The President also told advisors that he wanted 

an Attorney General who would protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric 

Holder to have protected their presidents. The Pr.esident made statements about being able to direct 

the course of criminal investigations, saying words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby 

and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?" 

After Corney publicly confirmed the existence of the FBT's Russia investigation on March 

20, 2017, the President was "beside himself' and expressed anger that Corney did not issue a 

statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. The 

President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to 

contact Boente to request that Corney make a clarifying statement. The President then asked other 

intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the 

President had links to Russia, but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the 

investigation. On March 30 and April I I, against the advice of White House advisors who had 

informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in 

an ongoing investigation, the President made personal outreaches to Corney asking him to "lift the 

cloud" of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally 

under investigation. 

Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia 

investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true 

based on Corney's representations. The President complained to advisors that if people thought 

Russia helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished. 

Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia 

investigation on his ability to govern. The President complained that the perception that he was 

under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly with Russia. 

The President told Coats he "can't do anything with Russia," he told Rogers that "the thing with 

the Russians" was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Corney that 

"he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult." 

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D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director 

Corney 

Overview 

Corney was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3, 2017. Leading up to that 

testimony, the President continued to tell advisors that he wanted Corney to make public that the 

President was not under investigation. At the hearing, Corney declined to answer questions about 

the scope or subjects of the Russia investigation and did not state publicly that the President was 

not under investigation. Two days later, on May 5, 2017, the President told close aides he was 

going to fire Corney, and on May 9, he did so, using his official termination letter to make public 

that Corney had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation. 

The President decided to fire Corney before receiving advice or a recommendation from the 

Department of Justice,. but he approved an initial public account of the termination that attributed 

it to a recommendation from the Department of Justice based on Corney's handling of the Clinton 

email investigation. After Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing 

to his recommendation, the President acknowledged that he intended to fire Corney regardless of 

the DOJ recommendation and was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision. 

The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister, "I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was 

crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off ..... I'm not 

under investigation." 

Evidence 

I. Corney Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to 

Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation 

On May 3, 2017, Corney was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the 

Senate Judiciary Committee.383 McGahn recalled that in the week leading up to the hearing, the 

President said that it would be the last straw if Corney did not take the opportunity to set the record 

straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under investigation.384 The President 

had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was 

hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders.385 At the 

hearing, Corney declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating 

"[t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation] 

exists," but that he was "not going to say another word about it" until the investigation was 

completed.386 Corney also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had "ruled 

383 Hearing on Oversight of the FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (May 3, 

2017). 

384 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 10-1 1. 

385 McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 7, 10-11 (McGahn believed that two foreign leaders had expressed 

sympathy to the President for being under investigation); SC_AD_00265 (Donaldson 4/11 / 17 Notes) ("P 

Called Corney - Day we told him not to? 'You are not under investigation' NK/China/Sapping 

Credibility"). 

386 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (CQ Cong. 

Transcripts, at 70) (May 3, 2017) (testimony by FBI Director James Corney). Corney repeated this point 

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out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target ofth[ e] criminal investigation," including 

whether the FBI had "ruled out the president of the United States."387 

Corney was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce 11 days before the 

presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation.388 Corney stated 

that it made him "mildly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election," 

but added that "even in hindsight" he "would make the same decision."389 He later repeated that 

he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had "done the 

right thing at each turn."390 

In the afternoon following Corney's testimony, the President met with McGahn, Sessions, 

and Sessions's Chief of Staff Jody Hunt.391 At that meeting, the President asked McGahn how 

Corney had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Corney had declined to answer 

questions about whether the President was under investigation.392 The President became very 

upset and directed his anger at Sessions.393 According to notes written by Hunt, the President said, 

"This is terrible Jeff. It's all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important 

appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed Holder. I appointed you and you 

recused yourself. You left me on an island. I can't do. anything."394 The President said that the 

recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his 

authority with foreign leaders.395 Sessions responded that he had had no choice but to recuse, and 

it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision.396 Hunt recalled that Sessions also stated at 

several times during his testimony. See id. at 26 (explaining that he was "not going to say another peep 

about [the investigation] until we' re done"); id. at 90 (stating that he would not provide any updates about 

the status of investigation "before the matter is concluded"). 

387 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017) 

(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 87-88) (questions by Sen. Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director James 8. 

Corney). 

388 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1 I 5th Cong. (May 3, 2017) 

(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 15) (question by Sen. Feinstein). 

389 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (May 3, 2017) 

(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at I 7) (testimony by FBI Director James 8. Corney). 

390 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (May 3, 2017) 

(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 92) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Corney). 

391 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8. 

392 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes); McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 6. 

393 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8-9. 

394 Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). Hunt said that he wrote down notes describing this meeting 

and others with the President after the events occurred. Hunt 2/ I /17 302, at 2. 

395 Hunt-000021-22 (Hunt 5/3/ 17 Notes) ("I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being 

investigated."); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8 (Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President 

that he was sorry the President was under investigation, which the President interpreted as undermining his 

authority); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8. 

396 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). 

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some point during the conversation that a new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the 

President should consider replacing Corney as FBI director.397 According to Sessions, when the 

meeting concluded, it was clear that the President was unhappy with Corney, but Sessions did not 

think the President had made the decision to terminate Comey.398 

Bannon recalled that the President brought Corney up with him at least eight times on May 

3 and May 4, 2017 .

399 According to Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: "He 

told me three times I'm not under investigation. He's a showboater. He's a grandstander. I don't 

know any Russians. There was no collusion."400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire 

Corney because "that ship had sailed."401 Bannon also told the President that firing Corney was 

not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he could fire the FBI director but could not 

fire the FBI.402 

2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Corney 

The weekend following Corney's May 3, 2017 testimony, the President traveled to his 

403 resort in Bedminster, New Jersey. At a dinner on Friday, May 5, attended by the President and 

various advisors and family members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller, 

the President stated that he wanted to remove Corney and had ideas for a letter that would be used 

to make the announcement.404 The President dictated arguments and specific language for the 

letter, and Miller took notes.405 As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter 

should start, "While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation 

concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship -

pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American 

public - including Os and Rs - have lost faith in you as Director of the FBT."406 Following the 

dinner, Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to 

support the President's arguments.407 Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of 

397 Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). 

398 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9. 

399 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. 

400 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. 

401 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. 

402 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20-21; see Priebus 10/ 13/17 302, at 28. 

403 S. Miller I 0/31 /17 302, at 4-5; SCR025_000019 (President's Daily Diary, 5/4/17). 

404 S. Miller I 0/31/17 302, at 5. 

405 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5-6. 

406 S. Miller 5/5/17 Notes, at I; see S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8. 

407 S. Miller I 0/31 /17 302, at 6. 

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edits on the draft letter.408 Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the 

White House what they were preparing because the President was worried about leaks.409 

In his discussions with Miller, the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open 

with a reference to him not being under investigation.410 Miller said he believed that fact was 

important to the President to show that Corney was not being terminated based on any such 

investigation.41 1 According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that 

Corney had been under a " review period" and did not have assurance from the President that he 

would be permitted to keep his job.412 

The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a 

way that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner: "Dear 

Director Corney, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that 1 

am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a 

Trump-Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that 

T, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have 

lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated."413 The four-page letter 

went on to critique Corney's judgment and conduct, including his May 3 testimony before the 

Senate Judiciary Committee, his handling of the Clinton email investigation, and his failure to hold 

leakers accountable.414 The letter stated that Corney had "asked [the President] at dinner shortly 

after inauguration to let [Corney] stay on in the Director's role, and [the President] said that [he] 

would consider it," but the President had "concluded that [he] ha[ d] no alternative but to find new 

415 leadership for the Bureau - a leader that restores confidence and trust." 

In the morning of Monday, May 8, 2017, the President met in the Oval Office with senior 

advisors, including McGahn, Priebus, and Miller, and informed them he had decided to terminate 

Comey.416 The President read aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with 

408 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 6-8. 

409 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 7. Miller said he did not want Priebus to be blindsided, so on Sunday 

night he called Priebus to tell him that the President had been thinking about the "Corney situation" and 

there would be an important discussion on Monday. S. Miller I 0/31/17 302, at 7. 

4 10 S. Miller 10/3 1/17 302, at 8. 

411 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8. 

412 S. Miller 10/31117 302, at 10. 

413 SCRO 13c _ 000003-06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Corney). 

414 SCRO13c_OOOO03-O6 (Draft Te1mination Letter to FBI Director Corney). Kushner said that the 

termination letter reflected the reasons the President wanted to fire Corney and was the truest representation 

of what the President had said during the May 5 dinner. Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 25. 

415 SCRO 13c_O0OOO3 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Corney). 

416 McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 1 I; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 24; S. Mil !er 10/31 /17 302, at 11 ; Dhillon 

1 1 /21 /t 7 302, at 6; Eisenberg I 1 /29/17 302, at 13. 

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Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion.417 The 

President told the group that Miller had researched the issue and determined the President had the 

authority to terminate Corney without cause.418 In an effort to slow down the decision-making 

process, McGahn told the President that DOJ leadership was currently discussing Corney's status 

and suggested that White House Counsel's Office attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod 

Rosenstein, who had recently been confirmed as the Deputy Attorney General.41 9 McGahn said 

that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity 

to find out what they thought about firing Comey.420 

At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel's 

Office attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House.421 McGahn said that the President had decided 

to fire Corney and asked for Sessions's and Rosenstein's views.422 Sessions and Rosenstein 

criticized Corney and did not raise concerns about replacing him.423 McGahn and Dhillon said the 

fact that neither Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Corney gave them peace of mind 

that the President's decision to fire Corney was not an attempt to obstruct justice.424 An Oval 

Office meeting was scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the 

issue with the President.425 

At around 5 p.m., the President and several White House officials met with Sessions and 

Rosenstein to discuss Comey.426 The President told the group that he had watched Corney's May 

41 7 S. Miller I 0/31 / 17 302, at I I ( observing that the President started the meeting by saying, "I'm 

going to read you a letter. Don't talk me out of this. I've made my decision."); Dhillon 11/21/ 17 302, at 6 

(the President announced in an irreversible way that he was firing Corney); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13 

(the President did not leave whether or not to fire Corney up for discussion); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 25; 

McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11-12. 

418 Dhillon 302 11/21/17, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13; McGahn 12/12/_l 7 302, at I 1. 

419 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12, 13; S. Miller 10/3 1/17 302, at 11; Dhillon 11 /21/17 302, at 7. 

Because of the Attorney General's recusal, Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia 

investigation upon his confirmation as Deputy Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) ("In case of a 

vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may 

exercise all the duties of that office"). 

420 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12. 

421 Dhillon 1 l/21/17 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 

Notes); see Gauhar-000056-72 (2/11/19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) ("Ms. 

Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May 

16, 2017."). 

422 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 

423 Dhillon l I /21 / 17 302, at 7-9; Sessions 1/ 17/ 18 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13. 

424 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Dhillon 11/21 / 17 302, at 9. 

425 Hunt-000026 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes); see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 

426 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 14; see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/ 16/ 17 

Notes). 

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3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was "not right" with Comey.427 The 

President said that Corney should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their 

views.428 Hunt, who was in the room, recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously 

recommended that Corney be replaced.429 McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his 

concerns about Corney's handling of the Clinton email investigation.430 

The President then distributed copies of the termination letter he had drafted with Miller, 

and the discussion turned to the mechanics of how to fire Corney and whether the President's letter 

should be used.43 1 McGahn and Dhillon urged the President to permit Corney to resign, but the 

President was adamant that he be ftred.432 The group discussed the possibility that Rosenstein and 

Sessions could provide a recommendation in writing that Corney should be removed.

433 The 

President agreed and told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum, but said he wanted to receive it first 

thing the next morning.

434 Hunt's notes reflect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his 

recommendation the fact that Corney had refused to confirm that the President was not personally 

under investigation.435 According to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein 's 

description of his meeting with the President, the President said, "Put the Russia stuff in the 

memo."436 Rosenstein responded that the Russia investigation was not the basis of his 

recommendation, so he did not think Russia should be mentioned.

437 The President told 

Rosenstein he would apprec iate it if Rosenstein put it in his letter anyway .

438 When Rosenstein 

427 Hunt-000026-27 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes). 

428 Sessions I/ 17 /18 302, at IO; see Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/ 16/17 Notes) ("POTUS to AG: What 

is your rec?"). 

429 Hunt-000027 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes). 

430 McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 14; Dhillon 11 /21 / 17 302, at 7. 

431 Hunt-000028 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes). 

432 McGahn 12/12/17302,at 13. 

433 Hunt-000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes). 

434 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/ 17 

Notes) ("POTUS tells DAG to write a memo"). 

435 Hunt-000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes) ("POTUS asked if Rod's recommendation would include 

the fact that although Corney talks about the investigation he refuses to say that the President is not under 

investigation . ... So it would be good if your recommendation would make mention of the fact that Corney 

refuses to say public[ly] what he said privately 3 times."). 

436 Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/ 17 Notes). 

437 Sessions 1/17/18 302 at 10; McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/ 16/17 

Notes). 

438 Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); McCabe 5/16/1 7 Memorandum 1; McCabe 9/26/17 

302,at 13. 

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left the meeting, he knew that Corney would be terminated, and he told DOJ colleagues that his 

own reasons for replacing Corney were " not [the President's] reasons."439 

On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending 

Corney's removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein, addressed to the Attorney General, titled 

"Restoring Public Confidence in the FBJ."440 McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ 

letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the President 

accepting the recommendation to terminate Comey.44 1 Notes taken by Donaldson on May 9 

reflected the view of the White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination 

letter should"[ n Jot [seethe] light of day" and that it would be better to offer"[ n ]o other rationales" 

for the firing than what was in Rosenstein's and Sessions's memoranda.442 The President asked 

Miller to draft a new termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Corney had 

informed the President three times that he was not under investigation.443 McGahn, Priebus, and 

Dhillon objected to including that language, but the President insisted that it be included.444 

McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that language to be the most important part of the letter to 

439 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) ("DAG reasons not their 

reasons [POTUS)"); Gauhar-000060 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes)(" 1

st draft had a recommendation. Took it out 

b/c knew decision had already been made."). 

440 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; 5/9/17 Letter, Sessions to President 

Trump ("Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the 

attached memorandum, I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the FBI."); 5/9/17 

Memorandum, Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, "The way the Director handled the conclusion of 

the email investigation was wrong. As a result, the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressional trust 

until it has a Director who understands the gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. Having 

refused to admit his errors, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary ·corrective actions."). 

441 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000031 (Hunt 5/9/ 17 Notes). 

442 SC_AD _00342 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes). Donaldson also wrote "[i]s this the beginning of the 

end?" because she was worried that the decision to terminate Corney and the manner in which it was carried 

out would be the end of the presidency. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25. 

443 S. Miller 10/3 1/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). 

444 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; S. Miller 10/3 1/17 302, at 12; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 8, 10; 

Priebus l 0/13/ I 7 302, at 27; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 14-15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/ 17 Notes). 

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the President.445 Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Corney should be permitted to 

resign, but the President refused.

446 

Around the time the President's letter was finalized, Priebus summoned Spicer and the 

press team to the Oval Office, where they were told that Corney had been terminated for the reasons 

stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions.447 To announce Corney's termination, the White 

House released a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President.448 In full, 

the statement read: "Today, President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Corney that 

he has been terminated and removed from office. President Trump acted based on the clear 

recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff 

Sessions."449 

That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with the 

President at the White House.450 The President told McCabe that he had fired Corney because of 

the decisions Corney had made in the Clinton email investigation and for many other reasons.

451 

The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Corney had told the President three times that 

he was not under investigation.452 The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the 

FBI disliked Corney and whether McCabe was part of the "resistance" that had disagreed with 

Corney's decisions in the Clinton investigation.

453 McCabe told the President that he knew Corney 

had told the President he was not under investigation, that most people in the FBI felt positively 

about Corney, and that McCabe worked "very closely" with Corney and was part of all the 

decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation.454 

445 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 10; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 15 (providing the view that the 

President's desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the "driving animus of 

the whole thing"); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 16 (Burnham knew the only line the President cared about was 

the line that said Corney advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not under 

investigation). According to Hunt's notes, the reference to Corney's statement would indicate that 

"notwithstanding" Corney's having informed the President that he was not under investigation, the 

President was terminating Corney. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the 

President wanted the language included so that people would not think that the President had terminated 

Corney because the President was under investigation. McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 15. 

446 McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 15; Donaldson 11/6/ 17 302, at 25; see SC_AD_00342 (Donaldson 

5/9/17 Notes) ("Resign vs. Removal. - POTUS/removal."). 

447 Spicer 10/16/ 17 302, at 9; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 16. 

448 Priebus I OJ 13/ l 7 302, at 28. 

449 Statement of the Press Secretary, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (May 9, 2017). 

450 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 4; SCR025_000044 (President's Daily Diary, 5/9/ 17); McCabe 5/10/1 7 

Memorandum, at 1. 

451 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/ 17 Memorandum, at I. 

452 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. 

453 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. 

454 McCabe 9/26/ 17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/ 10/ 17 Memorandum, at 1-2. 

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Later that evening, the President told his communications team he was unhappy with the 

press coverage of Corney's termination and ordered them to go out and defend him.

455 The 

President also called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting "killed" in the 

457 

press over Corney's termination.456 The President asked what he should do. Christie asked, 

"Did you fire [Corney] because of what Rod wrote in the memo?", and the President responded, 

"Yes."458 Christie said that the President should "get Rod out there" and have him defend the 

decision.459 The President told Christie that this was a " good idea" and said he was going to call 

Rosenstein right away.

460 

That night, the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the 

White House wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein's idea to fire Comey.461 

Rosenstein told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a "false story."462 

The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the 

coverage had been great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.463 Rosenstein 

responded that this was not a good idea because if the press asked him, he would tell the truth that 

Corney's firing was not his idea.464 Sessions also informed the White House Counsel's Office that 

evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum was being po1trayed as the reason for 

Corney's termination.465 

In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May 9, 2017, Spicer told reporters, 

"It was all [Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision."

466 That evening 

and the next morning, White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the 

455 Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 11; Hicks 12/8/17, at 18; Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 2. 

456 Christie 2/13/ I 9 302, at 6. 

457 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. 

458 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. 

459 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. 

46° Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. 

461 Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); Page Memorandum, at 3 (recording events of 5/16/17); 

McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 14. 

462 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 

463 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/ 16/ 17 Notes). 

464 Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/ 17 Notes). DOJ notes from the week of Corney's firing indicate 

that Priebus was "screaming" at the DOJ public affairs office trying to get Rosenstein to do a press 

conference, and the DOJ public affairs office told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not 

doing it. Gauhar-000071-72 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 

465 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/ 17 302, at26-27; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11. 

466 Jenna Johnson, After Trump fired Corney, White House staff scrambled to explain why, 

Washington Post (May 10, 2017) (quoting Spicer). 

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President's decision to terminate Corney was driven by the recommendations the President 

received from Rosenstein and Sessions.467 

In the morning on May 10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister 

Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office.468 The media 

subsequently reported that during the May 10 meeting the President brought up his decision the 

prior day to terminate Corney, telling Lavrov and Kislyak: "T just fired the head of the F.B.I. He 

was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off. ... I'm not 

under investigation."469 The President never denied making those statements, and the White House 

did not dispute the account, instead issuing a statement that said: "By grandstanding and 

politicizing the investigation into Russia's actions, James Corney created unnecessary pressure on 

our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued, 

and obviously, the termination of Corney would not have ended it. Once again, the real story is 

that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified 

information."470 Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with 

Lavrov, he did not look concerned and said of Corney, "he is crazy."471 When McGahn asked the 

President about his comments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Corney was fired 

because that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not under investigation so he 

could get more work done.

472 

That same morning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe.473 According to a 

memorandum McCabe wrote following the call, the President asked McCabe to come over to the 

White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to 

467 See, e.g., Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017); 

SCR013_001088 (5/10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheung et al.) (internal White House email describing 

comments on the Corney termination by Vice President Pence). 

468 SCR08_000353 (5/9/17 White House Document, "Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey 

Lavrov of Russia"); SCR08_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et al.). The meeting had been 

planned on May 2, 2017, during a telephone call between the President and Russian President Vladimir 

Putin, and the meeting date was confirmed on May 5, 2017, the same day the President dictated ideas for 

the Corney termination letter to Stephen Miller. SCR08_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et 

al.). 

469 Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing "Nut Job " Camey Eased Pressure From 

Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017). 

470 SCR08 _ 002 l I 7 (5/19/17 Email, Walters to Farhi (CBS News)); see Spicer I 0/ 16/ 17 302, at 13 

(noting he would have been told to "clean it up" if the repo1ting on the meeting with the Russian Foreign 

Minister was inaccurate, but he was never told to correct the reporting); Hicks 12/8/ 17 302, at 19 (recalling 

that the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the 

President had said similar things about Corney in an off-the-record meeting with reporters on May 18, 2017, 

calling Corney a "nut job" and "crazy"). 

471 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19. 

472 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 18. 

473 SCR025_000046 (President's Daily Diary, 5/10/17); McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1. 

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employees.474 The President said he had received "hundreds" of messages from FBI employees 

indicating their support for terminating Comey.475 The President also told McCabe that Corney 

should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington, D.C. on the FBI's airplane after he 

had been terminated and that he did not want Corney "in the building again," even to collect his 

belongings.476 When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President, without 

prompting, told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President, estimated that at least 80% of 

the FBI had voted for him, and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 presidential 

election.477 · 

In the afternoon of May 10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the 

President about his decision to fire Corney and then spoke to reporters in a televised press 

conference.478 Sanders told reporters that the President, the Department of Justice, and bipartisan 

members of Congress had lost confidence in Corney, " [a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of 

the FBI had lost confidence in their director. Accordingly, the President accepted the 

recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Corney from his position."479 

In response to questions from reporters, Sanders said that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to 

review Corney's performance and that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to come to the President 

on Monday, May 8 to express his concerns about Corney. When a reporter indicated that the "vast 

majority" of FBI agents supported Corney, Sanders said, "Look, we've heard from countless 

members of the FBI that say very different things. "48° Following the press conference, Sanders 

spoke to the President, who told her she did a good job and did not point out any inaccuracies in 

her comments.481 Sanders told this Office that her reference to hearing from "countless members 

of the FBI" was a "slip of the tongue."482 She also recalled that her statement in a separate press 

interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Corney was a comment she made 

"in the heat of the moment" that was not founded on anything.483 

Also on May I 0, 2017, Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed 

concern that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenstein had initiated the decision to 

474 McCabe 5/10/l 7 Memorandum, at 1. 

475 McCabe 5/ I 0/17 Memorandum, at I. 

476 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at I; Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at 2. Corney had been visiting the 

FBl's Los Angeles office when he found out he had been terminated. Corney 11 /15/17 302, at 22. 

477 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. McCabe's memorandum documenting his meeting with 

the President is consistent with notes taken by the White House Counsel's Office. See SC_AD_00347 

(Donaldson 5/10/17 Notes). · 

478 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4; Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May I 0, 2017). 

479 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May I 0, 2017); Sanders 7 /3/ 18 302, at 4. 

480 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SP AN (May I 0, 2017). 

481 Sanders 7 /3/18 302, at 4. 

482 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4. 

483 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 3. 

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fire Comey.484 The White House Counsel's Office agreed that it was factually wrong to say that 

the Department of Justice had initiated Corney's termination,

485 and McGahn asked attorneys in 

the White House Counsel's Office to work with the press office to correct the narrative.

486 

The next day, on May 11, 2017, the President participated in an interview with Lester Holt. 

The President told White House Counsel's Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the 

communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what 

really happened.487 During the interview, the President stated that he had made the decision to fire 

Corney before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. The President told Holt, "I was 

going to fire regardless of recommendation . . . . [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. But 

regardless of recommendation, I was going to fire Corney knowing there was no good time to do 

it."488 The President continued, "And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself-I said, 

you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. It's an excuse by the 

Democrats for having lost an election that they should've won."489 

In response to a question about whether he was angry with Corney about the Russia 

investigation, the President said, "As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done 

properly."490 The President added that he realized his termination of Corney "probably maybe will 

confuse people" with the result that it "might even lengthen out the investigation," but he "ha[d] 

to do the right thing for the American people" and Corney was "the wrong man for that position."491 

The President described Corney as "a showboat" and "a grandstander," said that "[t]he FBI has 

been in turmoil," and said he wanted "to have a really competent, capable director." 492 The 

President affirmed that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation.493 

On the evening of May 11 , 2017, following the Lester Holt interview, the President 

tweeted, "Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watching as the U.S. tears itself apart over a 

Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election."494 The same day, the media reported that the 

President had demanded that Corney pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly 

484 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11 /6/17 302, at 26; see Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 

11. 

485 Donaldson 11 /6/ 17 302, at 27. 

486 McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 17. 

487 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11. 

488 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11 , 2017) Transcript, at 2. 

489 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11 , 2017) Transcript, at 2. 

490 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 3. 

491 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 3. 

492 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11 , 2017) Transcript, at 1, 5. 

493 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11 , 2017) Transcript, at 7. 

494 @rea!DonaldTrump 5/11 /l 7 ( 4:34 p.m. ET) Tweet. 

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after being sworn in.

495 Late in the morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, "Again, the 

story that there was collusion between the Russians & Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems 

as an excuse for losing the election."496 The President also tweeted, "James Corney better hope 

that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!" and "When 

James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there 

is no collusion, when does it end?"497 

Analysis 

In analyzing the President's decision to fire Corney, the following evidence is relevant to 

the elements of obstruction of justice: 

a. Obstructive act. The act of firing Corney removed the individual overseeing the 

FBI's Russia investigation. The President knew that Corney was personally involved in the 

investigation based on Corney's briefing of the Gang of Eight, Corney's March 20, 2017 public 

testimony about the investigation, and the President's one-on-one conversations with Corney. 

Firing Corney would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect 

of interfering with or impeding the investigation-for example, if the termination would have the 

effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity 

to appoint a director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President 

perceived as more protective of his personal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that 

issue include whether the President's actions had the potential to discourage a successor director 

or other law enforcement officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation. The President fired 

Corney abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building, 

and criticized him publicly, calling him a " showboat" and claiming that the FBI was " in turmoil" 

under his leadership. And the President followed the termination with public statements that were 

highly critical of the investigation; for example, three days after firing Corney, the President 

referred to the investigation as a "witch hunt" and asked, "when does it end?" Those actions had 

the potential to affect a successor director's conduct of the investigation. 

The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to 

prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI 

investigations run under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director. 

Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director, but 

could not fire the FBI. The White House issued a press statement the day after Corney was fired 

that said, "The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of 

Corney would not have ended it." Tn addition, in his May 11 interview with Lester Holt, the 

President stated that he understood when he made the decision to fire Corney that the action might 

prolong the investigation. And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even 

495 Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Camey Demurred., New 

York Times (May 11, 2017). 

496 @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (7:51 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

497 @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:54 a.m. ET) 

Tweet. 

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though McCabe told the President he had worked "very closely" with Corney and was part of all 

the decisions made in the Clinton investigation. 

b. Nexus to a proceeding. The nexus element would be satisfied by evidence showing 

that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was 

objectively foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminated Corney. 

Several facts would be relevant to such a showing. At.the time the President fired Corney, 

a grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury 

subpoenas had been issued. On March 20, 2017, however, Corney had announced that the FBI 

was investigating Russia's interference in the election, including "an assessment of whether any 

crimes were committed." It was widely known that the FBI, as part of the Russia investigation, 

was investigating the hacking of the DNC's computers-a clear criminal offense. 

In addition, at the time the President fired Corney, evidence indicates the President knew 

that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the 

President's February 14, 2017 request that Corney "let[] Flynn go." On March 5, 2017, the White 

House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records 

relating to Flynn- indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him. The same day, the 

President told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney General for the 

Russia investigation, to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated. 

On March 31, 2017, the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal jeopardy by 

tweeting that "Mike Flynn should ask for immunity" before he agreed to provide testimony to the 

FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a 

message to Flynn telling him that the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong, 

further demonstrating the President's awareness of Flynn's criminal exposure. 

c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President's decision 

to fire Corney was Corney's unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally 

under investigation, despite the President's repeated requests that Corney make such an 

announcement. In the week leading up to Corney's May 3, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee 

testimony, the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Corney did not set the record 

straight and publicly announce that the President was not under investigation. But during his May 

3 testimony, Corney refused to answer questions about whether the President was being 

investigated. Corney's refusal angered the President, who criticized Sessions for leaving him 

isolated and exposed, saying "You left me on an island." Two days later, the President told 

advisors he had decided to fire Corney and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a 

reference to the fact that the President was not being investigated: "While I greatly appreciate you 

informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated 

story on a Trump-Russia relationship .... " The President later asked Rosenstein to include 

"Russia" in his memorandum and to say that Corney had told the President that he was not under 

investigation. And the President's final termination letter included a sentence, at the President's 

insistence and against McGahn' s advice, stating that Corney had told the President on three 

separate occasions that he was not under investigation. 

The President's other stated rationales for why he fired Corney are not similarly supported 

by the evidence. The termination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster 

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cited Corney's handling of the Clinton email investigation, and the President told McCabe he fired 

Corney for that reason. But the facts surrounding Corney's handling of the Clinton email 

investigation were well known to the President at the time he assumed office, and the President 

had made it clear to both Corney and the President' s senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted 

Corney to stay on as director. And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Corney's handling of the 

Clinton investigation after the President had already decided to fire Corney. The President's draft 

termination letter also stated that morale in the FBI was at an all-time low and Sanders told the 

press after Corney's termination that the White House had heard from "countless" FBI agents who 

had lost confidence in Corney. But the evidence does not support those claims. The President told 

Corney at their January 27 dinner that "the people of the FBI really like [him]," no evidence 

suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Corney, and Sanders 

acknowledged to investigators that her comments were not founded on anything. 

We also considered why it was important to the President that Corney announce publicly 

that he was not under investigation. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the 

erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and 

foreign affairs, particularly in dealings with Russia. The President told Corney that the "cloud" of 

"this Russia business" was making it difficult to run the country. The President told Sessions and 

McGahn that foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to him for being under investigation and that 

the perception he was under investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues. 

The President complained to Rogers that "the thing with the Russians [ was] messing up" his ability 

to get things done with Russia, and told Coats, "I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd 

like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they're all over me with this." The President also 

may have viewed Corney as insubordinate for his failure to make clear in the May 3 testimony that 

the President was not under investigation. 

Other evidence, however, indicates that the President wanted to protect himself from an 

investigation into his campaign. The day after learning about the FBI's interview of Flynn, the 

President had a one-on-one dinner with Corney, against the advice of senior aides, and told Corney 

he needed Corney's "loyalty." When the President later asked Corney for a second time to make 

public that he was not under investigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying "Because I have 

been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know." After the President learned of 

Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation, the President was furious and said he wanted an 

Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder 

to have protected their presidents. The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney 

General "who to investigate." 

In addition, the President had a motive to put the FBI's Russia investigation behind him. 

The evidence does not establish that the termination of Corney was designed to cover up a 

conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As described in Volume I, the evidence 

uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were 

involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies, or that the 

President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official. But the evidence does 

indicate that a thorough FBI investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the 

President personally that the President could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise 

to personal and political concerns. Although the President publicly stated during and after the 

election that he had no connection to Russia, the Trump Organization, through Michael Cohen, 

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was repeatedly briefed on the ro ress of those efforts.498 

~s aware that • · 

was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump 

In addition, some witnesses said that 

. --at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence officials were behind the 

hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases.499 More 

broadly, multiple witnesses described the President's preoccupation with press coverage of the 

Russia investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his 

election.500 

Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the 

press and the public for Corney's termination. In the immediate aftermath of the firing, the 

President dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ 

recommendations, and White House press officials repeated that story. But the President had 

decided to fire Corney before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the 

President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Corney regardless of the Department 

of Justice's recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials made clear to him that they would 

resist the White House's suggestion that they had prompted the process that led to Corney's 

termination. The initial reliance on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the 

President had concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence does 

not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both. 

E. The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel 

Overview 

The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting 

the President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had 

failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the President 

ultimately did not accept. The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts 

of interest, but they responded that those claims were "ridiculous" and posed no obstacle to the 

Special Counsel's service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special 

Counsel's service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that the President was being personally 

investigated for obstruction of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets 

498 See Volume II, Section II.K. l, infra. 

499 See Volume l, Section ITLD.1, supra. 

500 In addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI 

investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President's intent in firing Corney was connected 

to other conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBT's Russian-interference investigation. In 

paiticular, Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump 

Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts uncovered in the Russia 

investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New 

York, ultimately led to the conviction of Cohen in the Southern District ofNew York for campaign-finance 

offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President. See Volume II, Section 

II.K.5, infra. The investigation, however, did not establish that when the President fired Corney, he was 

considering the possibility that the FBI's investigation would uncover these payments or that the President's 

intent in firing Corney was otherwise connected to a concern about these matters coming to light. 

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criticizing the Special Counsel's investigation. That weekend, the President called McGahn and 

directed him to have the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest. 

McGahn did not carry out the instruction for fear of being seen as triggering another Saturday 

Night Massacre and instead prepared to resign. McGahn ultimately did not quit and the President 

did not follow up with McGahn on his request to have the Special Counsel removed. 

Evidence 

I. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction 

On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller, ITT as 

Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russia investigation and matters that arose 

from the investigation.

501 The President learned of the Special Counsel's appointment from 

Sessions, who was with the President, Hunt, and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FBI 

Director.502 Sessions stepped out of the Oval Office to take a call from Rosenstein, who told him 

about the Special Counsel appointment, and Sessions then returned to inform the President of the 

news.503 According to notes written by Hunt, when Sessions told the President that a Special 

Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, "Oh my God. This 

is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. I' m fucked."504 The President became angry and 

lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation, stating, "How 

could you let this happen, Jeff?"505 The President said the position of Attorney General was his 

most important appointment and that Sessions had " let [him] down," contrasting him to Eric 

Holder and Robert Kennedy.506 Sessions recalled that the President said to him, "you were 

supposed to protect me," or words to that effect.507 The President returned to the consequences of 

the appointment and said, "Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counsels it ruins 

your presidency. It takes years and years and I won't be able to do anything. This is the worst 

thing that ever happened to me."508 

50 1 Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel 

to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17, 

2017). 

502 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt_2/l/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039 

(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). 

503 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039 

(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). 

504 Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). 

505 Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13-14. 

506 Hunt-000040; see Sessions 1/ 17/ 18 302, at 14. 

507 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 

508 Hunt-000040 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. Early the next morning, 

the President tweeted, "This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history!" 

@realDonaldTrump 5/ 18/17 (7:52 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

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The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General.509 Sessions agreed 

to submit his resignation and left the Oval Office.510 Hicks saw the President shortly after Sessions 

departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel's 

appointment.51 1 Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the 

Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign.512 

The next day, May 18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that 

discussed an investigation related to Corney's termination and directed the White House to 

preserve all relevant documents.513 When he received the letter, McGahn issued a document hold 

to White House staff and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while 

he sorted things out.514 

Also on May 18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated, "Pursuant to our 

conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer my resignation."515 Sessions, 

accompanied by Hunt, brought the letter to the White House and handed it to the President.516 The 

President put the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he 

wanted to continue serving as Attorney General.517 Sessions ultimately told the President he 

519 wanted to stay, but it was up to the President. 518 The President said he wanted Sessions to stay. 

At the conclusion of the meeting, the President shook Sessions's hand but did not return the 

resignation letter.520 

When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions's 

resignation letter, they became concerned that it could be used to influence the Department of 

Justice.521 Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the President to have the letter because it 

509 Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/ 17/ 18 302, at 14. 

5 10 Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 

5 11 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21. 

5 12 Hicks 12/8/ 17 302, at 21. The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7, 2016, as 

discussed in Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra. 

5 13 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; SCR015_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House 

Staff). 

514 McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at 9; SCRO 15_0001 75-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House 

Staff). The White House Counsel's Office had previously issued a document hold on February 27, 2017. 

SCRO 15_000171 (2/17 /17 Memorandum from McGahn to Executive Office of the President Staff). 

515 Hunt-000047 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning as 

Attorney General). 

516 Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 

517 Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 

518 Hunt-000048-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/I 8 302, at 14. 

519 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 

520 Hunt-000049 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). 

521 Hunt-000050-51 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). 

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would function as a kind of "shock collar" that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus 

said the President had "DOJ by the throat."522 Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they would 

attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting 

Sessions's resignation.

523 

On May 19, 2017, the President left for a trip to the Middle East.524 Hicks recalled that on 

the President's flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions's resignation 

letter from his pocket, showed it to a group of senior advisors, and asked them what he should do 

about it.525 During the trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to 

Sessions, but the President told him that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the 

residence.526 It was not until May 30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the 

President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, "Not accepted."

527 

2. The President Asse11s that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest 

In the days following the Special Counsel's appointment, the President repeatedly told 

advisors, including Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn, that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of 

interest.528 The President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director 

position sho11ly before being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law firm that 

represented people affiliated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating 

to his membership in a Trump golf course in Northern Virginia.529 The President's advisors pushed 

522 Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 21. 

523 Hunt-000051 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). 

524 SCR026_000110 (President's Daily Diary, 5/19/17). 

525 Hicks 12/8/ 17 3 02, at 22. 

526 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21. Hunt's notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus 

told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the 

President "slapped the desk" and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes, 

undated). 

527 Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resignation 

letter). Robert Porter, who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the 

President returned from the Middle East trip, the Presidenttook Sessions's letter out ofa drawer in the Oval 

528 Priebus 1/18/ 18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at I; McGahn 

12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 

529 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at JO. In October 2011, Mueller resigned his 

family's membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that "we 

live in the District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club" and that inquired "whether we 

would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee," which was paid in 1994. I 0/ 12/11 

Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded 

that the Muellers' resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be "placed on a 

waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned I first refunded basis" in accordance with the club's legal 

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back on his assertion of conflicts, telling the President they did not count as true conflicts.530 

Bannon recalled telling the President that the purported conflicts were "ridiculous" and that none 

of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special 

Counsel.531 As for Mueller's interview for FBI Director, Bannon recalled that the White House 

had invited Mueller to speak to the President to offer a perspective on the institution of the FBI.532 

Bannon said that, although the White House thought about beseeching Mueller to become Director 

again, he did not come in looking for the job.533 Bannon also told the President that the law firm 

position did not amount to a conflict in the legal community.534 And Bannon told the President 

that the golf course dispute did not rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was "ridiculous 

and petty."535 The President did not respond when Bannon pushed back on the stated conflicts of 

interest. 536 

On May 23, 2017, the Department of Justice announced that ethics officials had determined 

that the Special Counsel's prior law firm position did not bar his service, generating media reports 

that Mueller had been cleared to serve.537 McGahn recalled that around the same time, the 

President complained about the asserted conflicts and prodded McGahn to reach out to Rosenstein 

about the issue.538 McGahn said he responded that he could not make such a call and that the 

President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not a White House issue.

539 

Contemporaneous notes of a May 23, 2017 conversation between McGahn and the President 

reflect that McGahn told the President that he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest 

that the President not make such a call either.540 McGahn advised that the President could discuss 

the issue with his personal attorney but it would "look like still trying to meddle in [the] 

investigation" and "knocking out Mueller" would be "[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruction] of 

documents. 10/27/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further 

contact with the club. · 

530 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 3; Bannon I 0/26/18 302, at 13 (confirming that he, Priebus, and McGahn 

pushed back on the asserted conflicts). 

531 Bannon I 0/26/18 302, at 12-13. 

532 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 

533 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 

534 Bannon 10/26/ 18 302, at 12. 

535 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13. 

536 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 

537 Matt Zapotosky & Matea Gold, Justice Department ethics experts clear Mueller to lead Russia 

probe, Washington Post (May 23, 2017). 

538 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at I; McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at 1 0; Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 12. 

539 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 1. McGahn and Donaldson said that after the appointment of the Special 

Counsel, they considered themselves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President that 

inquiries related to the investigation should be brought to his personal counsel. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 

7; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5. 

540 SC_AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/3 1/17Notes). 

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just[ice]."541 McGahn told the President that his "biggest exposure" was not his act of firing 

Corney but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn."542 By the time McGahn 

provided this advice to the President, there had been widespread reporting on the President's 

request for Corney's loyalty, which the President publicly denied; his request that Corney "let[] 

Flynn go," which the President also denied; and the President's statement to the Russian Foreign 

Minister that the termination of Corney had relieved "great pressure" related to Russia, which the 

President did not deny.543 

On June 8, 2017, Corney testified before Congress about his interactions with the President 

before his termination, including the request for loyalty, the request that Corney " let[] Flynn go," 

and the request that Corney "lift the cloud" over the presidency caused by the ongoing 

investigation.544 Corney's testimony led to a series of news reports about whether the President 

had obstructedjustice.

545 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House 

Counsel's Office that investigators intended to interview intelligence community officials who had 

allegedly been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation.

546 

On Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive ofNewsmax Media 

and a longtime friend of the President's, met at the White House with Priebus and Bannon.547 

Ruddy recalled that they told him the President was strongly considering firing the Special Counsel 

541 SC_AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17Notes). 

542 SC AD 00361 (Donaldson 5/3 1 / 17 Notes). 

543 See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Corney 

Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017); Michael S. Schmidt, Corney Memorandum Says Trump 

Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017); Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told 

Russians That Firing 'Nut Job' Corney Eased Pressure From Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 

2017). 

544 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 

I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Corney, former Director of the FBI, at 

5-6). Corney testified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February 14, 2017 

meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May 12, 

2017, that stated "James Corney better hope that there are no ' tapes' of our conversations before he starts 

leaking to the press!," and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter "might prompt the 

appointment of a special counsel." Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select 

Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 55) (testimony by James B. 

Corney, former Director of the FBI). 

545 See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Corney lays out the case that Trump obstructed justice, Washington 

Post (June 8, 2017) ("Legal analysts said Corney's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the 

president obstructed justice."). 

546 6/9/17 Email, Special Counsel's Office to the White House Counsel's Office. This Office made 

the notification to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the 

interviews. On June 12, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Admiral Rogers in the presence of 

agency counsel. Rogers 6/12/17 302, at I. On June 13, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Ledgett. 

Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at I. On June 14, the Office interviewed Coats and other personnel from his office. 

Coats 6/14/17 302, at 1; Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at I; Culver 6/14/17 302, at I. 

547 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5. 

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and that he would do so precipitously, without vetting the decision through Administration 

officials.548 Ruddy asked Priebus if Ruddy could talk publicly about the discussion they had about 

the Special Counsel, and Priebus said he could.

549 Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up 

like the one that followed the termination of Corney did not happen.

550 Later that day, Ruddy 

stated in a televised interview that the President was "considering perhaps terminating the Special 

Counsel" based on purported conflicts of interest.551 Ruddy later told another news outlet that 

"Trump is definitely considering" terminating the Special Counsel and "it's not something that's 

being dismissed."552 Ruddy's comments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President 

was considering firing the Special Counsel.553 

White House officials were unhappy with that press coverage and Ruddy heard from 

friends that the President was upset with him.554 On June 13, 2017, Sanders asked the President 

for guidance on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible firing of the Special 

Counsel.555 The President dictated an answer, which Sanders delivered, saying that " [w]hile the 

president has every right to" fire the Special Counsel, "he has no intention to do so."556 

Also on June 13, 2017, the President's personal counsel contacted the Special Counsel's 

Office and raised concerns about possible conflicts.557 The President's counsel cited Mueller's 

previous partnership in his law firm, his interview for the FBI Director position, and an asserted 

personal relationship he had with Comey.558 That same day, Rosenstein had testified publicly 

before Congress and said he saw no evidence of good cause to terminate the Special" Counsel, 

including for conflicts of interest. 559 Two days later, on June 15, 2017, the Special Counsel's 

548 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5-6. 

549 Ruddy 6/6/ l 8 302, at 6. 

550 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6. 

551 Trump Confidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has "real conflicts" as special counsel, PBS 

(June 12, 2017); Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump ls Considering Firing Mueller 

as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017). 

552 Katherine Faulders & Veronica Stracqualursi, Trump friend Chris Ruddy says Spicer's 'bizarre' 

statement doesn't deny claim Trump seeking Mueller firing, ABC (June 13, 2017). 

553 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump ls Considering Firing 

Mueller as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017). 

554 Ruddy 6/6/ 18 302, at 6-7. 

555 Sanders 7 /3/ 18 302, at 6-7. 

556 Glenn Thrush et al., Trump Stews, Staff Steps In, and Mueller Is Safe for Now, New York Times 

(June 13, 2017); see Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6 (Sanders spoke with the President directly before speaking to 

the press on Air Force One and the answer she gave is the answer the President told her to give). 

557 Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes. 

558 Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes. 

559 Hearing on Fiscal 2018 Justice Department Budget before the Senate Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Science, 115th Cong. (June 13, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 

14) (testimony by Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General). 

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Office informed the Acting Attorney General's office about the areas of concern raised by the 

President's counsel and told the President's counsel that their concerns had been communicated to 

Rosenstein so that the Department of Justice could take any appropriate action.560 

3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of 

Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special 

Counsel Removed 

On the evening of June l 4, 20 l 7, the Washington Post published an article stating that the 

Special Counsel was investigating whether the President had attempted to obstructjustice.561 This 

was the first public report that the President himself was under investigation by the Special 

Counsel's Office, and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report.562 The Post story 

stated that the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders, including Coats 

and Rogers, about what the President had asked them to do in response to Corney's March 20, 

20 l 7 testimony; that the inquiry into obstruction marked "a major turning point" in the 

investigation; and that while "Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director 

James B. Corney starting in January that he was not personally under investigation," "[ o ]fficials 

say that changed shortly after Corney's firing." 563 That evening, at approximately l 0:3 l p.m., the 

President called McGahn on McGahn' s personal cell phone and they spoke for about l 5 

minutes.564 McGahn did not have a clear memory of the call but thought they might have discussed 

the stories reporting that the President was under investigation.565 

Beginning early the next day, June 15, 2017, the President issued a series of tweets 

acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it. He wrote: "They 

made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for 

obstruction of justice on the phony story. Nice";566 "You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH 

HUNT in American political history-led by some very bad and conflicted people! ";567 and 

"Crooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, 'bleached' emails, & had husband meet w/AG days 

560 Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/15/17 Notes. 

561 Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of justice, 

officials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017). 

562 CNN, for example, began running a chyron at 6:55 p.m. that stated: "WASH POST: MUELLER 

INVESTIGATING TRUMP FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE." CNN, (June 14, 2017, published 

online at 7: 15 p.m. ET). 

563 Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of justice, 

officials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017). 

564 SCR026_000183 (President's Daily Diary, 6/14/17) (reflecting call from the President to 

McGahn on 6/14/17 with start time 10:31 p.m. and end time 10:46 p.m.); Call Records of Don McGahn. 

565 McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 1-2. McGahn thought he and the President also probably talked about 

the investiture ceremony for Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, which was scheduled for the following 

day. McGahn 2/28/18 302, at 2. 

566 @rea!DonaldTrump 6/15/ l 7 (6:55 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

567 @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (7:57 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

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before she was cleared- & they talk about obstruction?"568 The next day, June 16, 2017, the 

President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: "After 7 months of investigations 

& committee hearings about my ' collusion with the Russians,' nobody has been able to show any 

proof. Sad!";569 and "I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me 

to fire the FBI Director! Witch Hunt."570 

On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the 

Special Counsel removed.571 McGahn was at home and the President was at Camp David. In 

interviews with this Office, McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on 

both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded 

him from serving as Special Counsel.573 

On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like, "You gotta do 

this. You gotta call Rod."574 McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could 

do.575 576 McGahn was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request. He and other 

advisors believed the asserted conflicts were "silly" and "not real," and they had previously 

communicated that view to the President.577 McGahn also had made clear to the President that the 

White House Counsel's Office should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts.578 

McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the 

Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge 

568 @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (3:56 p.m. ET) Tweet. 

569 @rea!DonaldTrump 6/16/17 (7:53 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

570 @realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (9:07 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

571 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at 10. 

572 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at I, 3; SCR026_000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (records 

showing President departed the White House at 11 :07 a.m. on June 17, 2017, and arrived at Camp David at 

11 :37 a.m.). 

573 McGahn 3/8/ l 8 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/1 4/ 17 302, at I 0. Phone records show that the President 

called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes. 

SCR026_000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 

6/17/17 with start time 2:23 p.m. and end time 2:46 p.m.); (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records 

do not show another call between McGahn and the President that day. Although McGahn recalled receiving 

multiple calls from the President on the same day, in light of the phone records he thought it was possible 

that the first call instead occurred on June 14, 2017, shortly after the press reported that the President was 

under investigation for obstruction of justice. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3. While McGahn was not certain 

of the specific dates of the calls, McGahn was confident that he had at least two phone conversations with 

the President in which the. President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special 

Counsel removed. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3. 

574 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at I. 

575 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. 

576 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. 

577 McGahn 3/8/ I 8 302, at 1-2. 

578 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2. 

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Robert Bork and not " Saturday Night Massacre Bork."579 McGahn considered the President's 

request to be an inflection point and he wanted to hit the brakes.580 

When the President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the 

Department of Justice, McGahn recalled that the President was more direct, saying something like, 

"Call Rod, tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel."581 McGahn 

recalled the President telling him "Mueller has to go" and "Call me back when you do it."

582 

McGahn understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by 

Rosenstein.583 To end the conversation with the President, McGahn left the President with the 

impression that McGahn would call Rosenstein. 584 McGahn recalled that he had already said no 

to the President's request and he was worn down, so he just wanted to get off the phone.585 

McGahn recalled feeling trapped because he did not plan to follow the President's directive 

but did not know what he would say the next time the President called.

586 McGahn decided he had 

to resign.

587 He called his personal lawyer and then called his chief of staff, Annie Donaldson, to 

inform her of his decision.588 He then drove to the office to pack his belongings and submit his 

resignation letter.589 Donaldson recalled that McGahn told her the President had called and 

demanded he contact the Department of Justice and that the President wanted him to do something 

that McGahn did not want to do. 590 McGahn told Donaldson that the President had called at least 

twice and in one of the calls asked "have you done it?"591 McGahn did not tell Donaldson the 

specifics of the President's request because he was consciously trying not to involve her in the 

579 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 

580 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 

581 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 

582 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2, 5; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3. 

583 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2, 5. 

584 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 

585 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 

586 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 

587 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 

588 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2-3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4; Call Records 

of Don McGahn. 

589 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2; Donaldson 4/2/ l 8 302, at 4. 

590 Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4. 

591 Donaldson 4/2/ 18 302, at 4. 

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investigation, but Donaldson inferred that the President's directive was related to the Russia 

investigation.592 Donaldson prepared to resign along with McGahn.593 

That evening, McGahn called both Priebus and Bannon and told them that he intended to 

resign.594 McGahn recalled that, after speaking with his attorney and given the nature of the 

President's request, he decided not to share details of the President's request with other White 

House staff.595 Priebus recalled that McGahn said that the President had asked him to "do crazy 

shit," but he thought McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President's request because 

McGahn was trying to protect Priebus from what he did not need to know.596 Priebus and Bannon 

both urged McGahn not to quit, and McGahn ultimately returned to work that Monday and 

remained in his position.597 He had not told the President directly that he planned to resign, and 

when they next saw each other the President did not ask McGahn whether he had followed through 

with calling Rosenstein.598 

Around the same time, Chris Christie recalled a telephone_call with the President in which 

the President asked what Christie thought about the President firing the Special Counsel.599 

Christie advised against doing so because there was no substantive basis for the President to fire 

the Special Counsel, and because the President would lose support from Republicans in Congress 

600 if he did so. 

Analysis 

In analyzing the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, 

the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: 

a. Obstructive act. As with the President's firing of Corney, the attempt to remove 

the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the 

592 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4-5. Donaldson said she believed 

McGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to drag her into the 

investigation. Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5; see McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 3 . 

593 Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5. 

594 McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at IO; Call Records of Don McGahn; McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 3-4; 

Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 6-7. 

595 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 4. Priebus and Bannon confirmed that McGahn did not tell them the 

specific details of the President's request. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. 

596 Priebus 4/3/ 18 3 02, at 7. 

597 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4. 

598 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3. 

599 Christie 2/13/ I 9 302, at 7. Christie did not recall the precise date of this call, but believed it was 

after Christopher Wray was announced as the nominee to be the new FBI director, which was on June 7, 

2017. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Telephone records show that the President called Christie twice after that 

time period, on July 4, 2017, and July 14, 2017. Call Records of Chris Christie. 

60° Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. 

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investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. Even if the removal 

of the lead prosecutor would not prevent the investigation from continuing under a new appointee, 

a factfinder would need to consider whether the act had the potential to delay further action in the 

investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the 

investigation. 

A threshold question is whetherthe President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special 

Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered 

McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly disputed these accounts, and 

privately told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the 

Department of Justice 's attention. See Volume II, Section II.I, infra. Some of the President's 

specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation. 

Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact 

directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed. 

First, McGahn's clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein 

not only that conflicts existed but also that "Mueller has to go." McGahn is a credible witness 

with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House.601 McGahn 

spoke with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times, making it 

unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the President's request. In response to that request, 

McGahn decided to quit because he did not want to participate in events that he described as akin 

to the Saturday Night Massacre. He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his 

office, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the President 

had asked him to "do crazy shit," and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those 

acts would be a highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to the Department of 

Justice. 

Second, in the days before the calls to McGahn, the President, through his counsel, had 

already brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice. Accordingly, 

the President had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues 

that already had been raised. 

Third, the President's sense ofurgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate 

action on a weekend-"You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod."-supp0ti McGahn's recollection 

that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel. 

Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted 

conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethical bar, it would have been unnecessary to set the 

process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn. 

Finally, the President had discussed "knocking out Mueller" and raised conflicts of interest 

in a May 23, 2017 call with McGahn, reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan 

to remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up to June 17, 2017, the President made 

clear to Priebus and Bannon, who then told Ruddy, that the President was considering terminating 

60 1 When this Office first interviewed McGahn about this topic, he was reluctant to share detailed 

information about what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning. See McGahn 12/14/17 

302 (agent notes). 

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the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his 

thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking 

an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a 

way to terminate the Special Counsel. 

b. Nexus to an official proceeding. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would 

be necessary to establish a nexus between the President's act of seeking to terminate the Special 

Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding. 

Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was 

under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a 

grand jury. On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his "biggest exposure" 

was not his act of firing Corney but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn." By 

early June, it was widely reported in t}:ie media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury 

subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn 

investigation.602 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House that 

investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency officials who allegedly had been asked by 

the President to push back against the Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017, news outlets began 

reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on 

widespread reporting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for 

Corney's loyalty; his request that Corney "let[] Flynn go"; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; and 

his termination of Corney and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had 

relieved "great pressure" related to Russia. And on June 16, 2017, the day before he directed 

McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his 

conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, "I am being investigated for 

firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director! " 

c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's attempts to remove the 

Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel's oversight of investigations that involved the 

President's conduct- and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated 

for potential obstruction of justice. 

Before the President terminated Corney, the President considered it critically important that 

he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated. 

As described in Volume TI, Section TI.D, supra, advisors perceived the President, while he was 

drafting the Corney termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out 

that he was not personally under investigation. When the President learned of the appointment of 

the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying 

"[t]his is the end of my Presidency." The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying "you 

were supposed to protect me." 

On June 14, 20 I 7, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was 

investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted 

602 See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., CNN exclusive-: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBJ's Russia 

investigation, CNN (May 9, 2017); Matt Ford, Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn Grand Jury, 

The Atlantic (June 2, 2017). 

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to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was the subject of widespread media 

attention. The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President 

to call McGahn and seek to have the Special Counsel removed. By mid-June, the Department of 

Justice had already cleared the Special Counsel's service and the President's advisors had told him 

that the claimed conflicts of interest were "silly" and did not provide a basis to remove the Special 

Counsel. On June 13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testified before Congress that no good 

cause for removing the Special Counsel existed, and the President dictated a press statement to 

Sanders saying he had no intention of firing the Special Counsel. But the next day, the media 

reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Special 

Counsel was interviewing witnesses about events related to possible obstruction- spurring the 

President to write critical tweets about the Special Counsel's investigation. The President called 

McGahn at home that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David. The evidence 

accordingly indicates that news that an obstruction investigation had been opened is what led the 

President to call McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated. 

There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made those calls to 

McGahn. The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told the 

President that the White House Counsel's Office-and McGahn himself-could not be involved 

in pressing conflicts claims and that the President should consult with his personal counsel if he 

wished to raise conflicts. Instead of relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims, 

the President sought to use his official powers to remove the Special Counsel. And after the media 

reported on the President's actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special 

Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in 

Volume II, Section II.I, infra. Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest the 

President's awareness that the direction to McGahn could be seen as improper. 

F. The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation 

Overview 

Two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the 

President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, 

the President met one-on-one with Corey Lewandowski in the Oval Office and dictated a message 

to be delivered to Attorney General Sessions that would have had the effect of limiting the Russia 

investigation to future election interference only. One month later, the President met again with 

Lewandowski and followed up on the request to have Sessions limit the scope of the Russia 

investigation. Lewandowski told the President the message would be delivered soon. Hours later, 

the President publicly criticized Sessions in an unplanned press interview, raising questions about 

Sessions's job security. 

1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to 

Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation 

On June 19, 2017, two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special 

Counsel removed, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign 

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manager Corey Lewandowski.603_ Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a 

"devotee" of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was 

"close."604 

During the June 19 meeting, Lewandowski recalled that, after some small talk, the 

President brought up Sessions and criticized his recusal from the Russia investigation.605 The 

President told Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if the President had known about the 

likelihood of recusal in advance, he would not have appointed Sessions.606 The President then 

asked Lewandowski to deliver a message to Sessions and said "write this down." 607 This was the 

first time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, and Lewandowski wrote as fast 

as possible to make sure he captured the content correctly.608 

The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publicly announcing: 

I know that I recused myself from certain things having to do with specific areas. But our 

POTUS . .. is being treated very unfairly. He shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel 

b/c he hasn't done anything wrong. I was on the campaign w/ him for nine months, there 

were no Russians involved with him. I know it for a fact b/c I was there. He didn't do 

anything wrong except he ran the greatest campaign in American history.609 

The dictated message went on to state that Sessions would meet with the Special Counsel to limit 

his jurisdiction to future election interference: 

Now a group of people want to subvert the Constitution of the United States. T am going 

to meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special 

Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that 

nothing can happen in future elections.610 

604 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7; Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 1 (describing Lewandowski as a "comfort to 

the President" whose loyalty was appreciated). Kelly said that when he was Chief of Staff and the President 

had meetings with friends like Lewandowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the 

residence to create distance from the West Wing. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7. 

605 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. 

606 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. 

607 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. 

608 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3. 

609 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2-3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 1-2. 

610 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 3. 

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The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the "most popular guy in 

the country."6 11 Lewandowski told the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions 

to do.6 12 

Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather than over the 

phone.613 He did not want to meet at the Department of Justice because he did not want a public 

log of his visit and did not want Sessions to have an advantage over him by meeting on what 

Lewandowski described as Sessions's turf. 614 Lewandowski called Sessions and arranged a 

meeting for the following evening at Lewandowski's office, but Sessions had to cancel due to a 

last minute conflict.6 15 Shortly thereafter, Lewandowski left Washington, D.C., without having 

had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President's message. 

6 16 Lewandowski 

stored the notes in a safe at his home, which he stated was his standard procedure with sensitive 

items.617 

2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski 

Following his June meeting with the President, Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn, 

then a senior White House official, and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions.618 

Dearborn agreed without knowing what the message was, and Lewandowski later confirmed that 

Dearborn would meet with Sessions for dinner in late July and could deliver the message then.619 

Lewandowski recalled thinking that the President had asked him to pass the message because the 

President knew Lewandowski could be trusted, but Lewandowski believed Dearborn would be a 

better messenger because he had a longstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn 

was in the government while Lewandowski was not.620 

On July 19, 2017, the President again met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office.621 

In the preceding days, as described in Volume IT, Section ILG, infra, emails and other information 

about the June 9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, 

and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July 19 meeting with Lewandowski, the 

611 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 4. 

612 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3. 

613 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3-4. 

614 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 

615 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 

616 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 

617 Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 4. 

618 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4; see Dearborn 6/20/ 18 302, at 3. 

619 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4-5. 

620 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4, 6. 

621 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; SCR029b_000002-03 (6/5/18 Additional Response to Special 

Counsel Request for Certain Visitor Log Information). 

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President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions.622 

Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon.

623 Lewandowski 

recalled that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him, Lewandowski should 

tell Sessions he was fired.624 

Immediately following the meeting with the President, Lewandowski saw Dearborn in the 

anteroom outside the Oval Office and gave him a typewritten version of the message the President 

had dictated to be delivered to Sessions.625 Lewandowski told Dearborn that the notes were the 

message they had discussed, but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message 

was from the President.626 The message "definitely raised an eyebrow" for Dearborn, and he 

recalled not wanting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it.627 

Dearborn also said that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him 

uncomfortable. 628 He recalled later telling Lewandowski that he had handled the situation, but he 

did not actually follow through with delivering the message to Sessions, and he did not keep a 

copy of the typewritten notes Lewandowski had given him.629 

3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview 

Within hours of the President's meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the President 

gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he criticized Sessions's decision to 

recuse from the Russia investigation.630 The President said that "Sessions should have never 

recused himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he took the 

job, and I would have picked somebody else."631 Sessions's recusal, the President said, was "very 

unfair to the president. How do you take a job and then recuse yourself? Ifhe would have recused 

himself before the job, I would have said, 'Thanks, Jeff, but I can' t, you know, I'm not going to 

622 Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 5. 

623 Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 5. 

624 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that in 

approximately May or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions's resignation. 

Priebus recalled that Lewandowski described his reaction as something like, "What can I do? I'm not an 

employee of the administration. I'm a nobody." Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 6. 

625 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. Lewandowski said he asked Hope Hicks to type the notes when 

he went in to the Oval Office, and he then retrieved the notes from her partway through his meeting with 

the President. Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. 

626 Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 3 02, at 5; Dearborn 6/20/ 18 3 02, at 3. 

627 Dearborn 6/20/ 18 302, at 3. 

628 Dearborn 6/20/ t 8 302, at 3. 

629 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3-4. 

630 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 

19, 2017). 

63 1 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 

19,2017). 

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take you.' It's extremely unfair, and that's a mild word, to the president."632 Hicks, who was 

present for the interview, recalled trying to "throw [herself] between the reporters and [the 

President]" to stop parts of the interview, but the President "loved the interview."633 

Later that day, Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President's New York 

Times interview.634 Lewandowski recalled telling Hicks about the President's request that he meet 

with Sessions and joking with her about the idea of firing Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions 

would not meet with him.635 As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowski told her the 

President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to 

do the "right thing" and resign.636 While Hicks and Lewandowski were together, the President 

called Hicks and told her he was happy with how coverage of his New York Times interview 

criticizing Sessions was playing out.637 

4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation 

Three days later, on July 21, 2017, the Washington Post repo1ted that U.S. intelligence 

intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russian 

ambassador, contrary to what Sessions had said publicly.

638 That evening, Priebus called Hunt to 

talk about whether Sessions might be fired or might resign.639 Priebus had previously talked to 

Hunt when the media had reported on tensions between Sessions and the President, and, after 

speaking to Sessions, Hunt had told Priebus that the President would have to fire Sessions if he 

wanted to remove Sessions because Sessions was not going to quit.640 According to Hunt, who 

took contemporaneous notes of the July 21 call, Hunt told Priebus that, as they had previously 

discussed, Sessions had no intention ofresigning.641 Hunt asked Priebus what the President would 

632 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 

19, 2017). 

633 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 23. 

634 Hicks 3/13/ 18 302, at 1 0; Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. 

635 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. 

636 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at l 0. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess 

appointment of a new Attorney General because the Senate was about to go on recess. Hicks 3/ 13/ 18 302, 

at I 0. Lewandowski recalled that in the afternoon of July 19, 2017, following his meeting with the 

President, he conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President. 

Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 7. 

637 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. 

638 Adam Entous et al., Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian 

ambassador, US. intelligence intercepts show, Washington Post (July 21, 2017). The underlying events 

concerning the Sessions-Kislyak contacts are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.4.c, supra. 

639 Hunt 2/1118 302, at 23. 

640 Hunt 2/1 /18 302, at 23. 

641 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1. 

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accomplish by firing Sessions, pointing out there was an investigation before and there would be 

an investigation after.

642 

Early the following morning, July 22, 2017, the President tweeted, "A new 

INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A.G. Jeff Sessions. 

These illegal leaks, like Corney's, must stop!"643 Approximately one hour later, the President 

tweeted, "So many people are asking why isn't the A.G. or Special Council looking at the many 

Hillary Clinton or Corney crimes. 33,000 e-mails deleted?"644 Later that morning, while aboard 

Marine One on the way to Norfolk, Virginia, the President told Priebus that he had to get Sessions 

to resign immediately.645 The President said that the country had lost confidence in Sessions and 

the negative publicity was not tolerable.646 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus, 

the President told Priebus to say that he "need[ ed] a letter of resignation on [his] desk immediately" 

and that Sessions had "no choice" but "must immediately resign."647 Priebus replied that if they 

fired Sessions, they would never get a new Attorney General confirmed and that the Department 

of Justice and Congress would turn their backs on the President, but the President suggested he 

could make a recess appointment to replace Sessions.648 

Priebus believed that the President's request was a problem, so he called McGahn and 

asked for advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was "all 

wrong."649 Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions's negative 

press and poor performance in congressional testimony, Priebus believed that the President's 

desire to replace Sessions was driven by the President's hatred of Sessions's recusal from the 

Russia investigation.650 McGahn told Priebus not to follow the President's order and said they 

should consult their personal counsel, with whom they had attorney-client privilege.65 1 McGahn 

642 Hunt 2/1 /18 302, at 23-24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1-2. 

643 @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (6:33 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

644 @realDonaldTrJ.!mp 7/22/17 (7:44 a.m. ET) Tweet. Three minutes later, the President tweeted, 

"What about all of the Clinton ties to Russia, including Podesta Company, Uranium deal, Russian Reset, 

big dollar speeches etc." @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:47 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

645 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 13-14. 

646 Priebus 1/18/ 18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4-5; see RP_ 000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes). 

647 RP _000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes). 

648 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. 

649 Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 4-5. 

650 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. 

65 1 RP _000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes); McGahn 12/ 14/ 17 302, at 11 ; Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 14. 

Priebus followed McGahn's advice and called his personal attorney to discuss the President's request 

because he thought it was the type of thing about which one would need to consult an attorney. Priebus 

1/18/18 302, at 14. 

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and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the 

President's order to fire Sessions.652 

That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions's 

resignation, using words to the effect of, "Did you get it? Are you working on it?"653 Priebus said 

that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions, 

although the President did not directly say so.654 Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out 

the President's directive, he told the President he would get Sessions to resign.655 Later in the day, 

Priebus called the President and explained that it would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because 

Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would also resign 

and the President would be unable to get anyone else confirmed.656 The President agreed to hold 

off on demanding Sessions's resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day, to prevent the 

shows from focusing on the firing.657 

By the end of that weekend, Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to 

ask Sessions to resign.

658 Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On 

the morning of Monday, July 24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to 

investigate Clinton and called him "beleaguered."659 On July 25, the President tweeted, "Attorney 

General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are Emails & DNC server) & Intel leakers!"660 The following day, July 26, the President tweeted, "Why 

didn't A.G. Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Corney friend who was in 

charge of Clinton investigation."661 According to Hunt, in light of the President's frequent public 

attacks, Sessions prepared another resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him 

in his pocket every time he went to the White House.

662 

652 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; RP_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) ("discuss resigning 

together"). 

653 Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4. 

654 Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 4. 

655 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. 

656 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. 

657 Priebus l /18/ 18 302, at 15. 

658 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. 

659 @realDonaldTrump 7/24/ 17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet ("So why aren't the Committees and 

investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russia 

relations?"). 

660 @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6: I 2 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly 

before this one asking "where is the investigation A.G." @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:03 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

661 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/ 17 (9:48 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

662 Hunt 2/ 1 / 18 302, at 24-25. 

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Analysis 

In analyzing the President's efforts to have Lewandowski deliver a message directing 

Sessions to publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future 

election interference, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: 

a. Obstructive act. The President's effort to send Sessions a message through 

Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation 

and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. 

The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President "shouldn't have a 

Special Prosecutor/Counsel" and that Sessions was going to "meet with the Special Prosecutor to 

explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election 

meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections." The President wanted 

Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ 

ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew "for a fact" that "there were no Russians 

involved with the campaign" because he "was there." The President further directed that Sessions 

should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation " because he hasn't done 

anything wrong." Taken together, the President's directives indicate that Sessions was being 

instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his 

campaign, with the Special Counsel being permitted to "move forward with investigating election 

meddling for future elections." 

b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President's 

initial one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June 19, 2017, the existence of a grand jury 

investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was ublic knowled e. B the time of the 

President's follow-u meetin with Lewandowski, 

See Volume II, Section 11.G, infra. To satisfy the nexus requirement, 

it would be necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would have the 

natural and probable effect of impeding that grand jury proceeding. 

c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's effort to have Sessions 

limit the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference was intended 

to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President' s and his campaign's conduct. 

As previously described, see Volume TT, Section II.B, supra, the President knew that the 

Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian 

interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election. The President further knew that the 

investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice. 

Those investigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel's jurisdiction were limited to future 

election interference only. 

The timing and circumstances of the President's actions support the conclusion that he 

sought that result. The President's initial direction that Sessions should limit the Special Counsel's 

investigation came just two days after the President had ordered McGahn to ~ave the Special 

Counsel removed, which itself followed public reports that the President was persona lly under 

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investigation for obstruction of justice. The sequence of those events raises an inference that after 

seeking to terminate the Special Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his campaign's 

conduct from the investigation's scope. The President raised the matter with Lewandowski again 

on July 19, 2017, just days after emails and information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between 

Russians and senior campaign officials had been publicly disclosed, generating substantial media 

coverage and investigative interest. 

The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence of his intent. Rather 

than rely on official channels, the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. The 

President selected a loyal "devotee" outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting 

an inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had 

previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The President 

also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, who had just testified publicly that there was no 

cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and 

redirect the Special Counsel's investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly 

take any action on it. 

The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the President's intent. The President 

followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting one month after he first dictated 

the message for Sessions, demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. And just hours after 

Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions, the 

President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked 

Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the 

President directed Priebus to obtain Sessions's resignation. That evidence could raise an inference 

that the President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated 

whether to comply with the President's direction that Sessions publicly announce that, 

notwithstanding his recusal, he was going to confine the Special Counsel's investigation to future 

election interference. 

G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, 2016 

Meeting Behveen Russians and Senior Campaign Officials 

Overview 

By June 2017, the President became aware of emails setting up the June 9, 2016 meeting 

between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary 

Clinton as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump." On multiple occasions 

in late June and early July 2017, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails, 

and he then dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by Donald Trump Jr. describing 

the meeting as about adoption. 

Evidence 

I. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June 9, 

2016 Trump Tower Meeting 

In mid-June 2017- the same week that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a 

message to Sessions- senior Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during 

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the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and 

a Russian attorney.663 As described in Volume I, Section TV.A.5, supra, the emails stated that the 

"Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia" had offered "to provide the Trump campaign with some official 

documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as part 

of "Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump."664 Trump Jr. responded, " [I]f it's what 

you say I love it,"665 and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several 

other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016.666 At the meeting, the Russian attorney 

claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and 

other Democrats, and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute 

that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory 

ban in Russia on U.S. adoptions of Russian children.667 

According to written answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this 

Office, the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails setting it up at the 

time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the election.

668 

The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from SSCI that called 

for the production of various information, including, "[a] list and a description of all meetings" 

between any "individual affiliated with the Trump campaign" and "any individual formally or 

informally affiliated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place 

between June 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017," and associated records.669 Trump 

Organization attorneys became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the first week of June 

2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants, and the Trump Organization 

attorneys provided the emails setting up the meeting to the President's personal counsel.670 Mark 

Corallo, who had been hired as a spokesman for the President's personal legal team, recalled that 

he learned about the June 9 meeting around June 21 or 22, 201 7. 671 Priebus recalled learning about 

the June 9 meeting from Fox News host Sean Hannity in late June 2017.672 Priebus notified one 

663 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2. 

664 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/ 11/17 (11:01 a.m. 

ET) Tweet. 

665 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (l 1:01 a.m. 

ET) Tweet. 

666 Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. 

667 See Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra (describing meeting in detail). 

668 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Parts (a) 

through (c)). The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June 9 meeting or 

other events after the election. 

669 DJTFP _SCO _pDF _00000001 -02 (5/17/17 Letter, SSCI to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.). 

670 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 12; 6/2/17 and 6/5/17 Emails, Goldstone & Garten; Raffel 2/8/18 302, 

at 3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 

671 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 3. 

672 Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 7. 

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of the President's personal attorneys, who told Priebus he was already working on it.673 By late 

June, several advisors recalled receiving media inquiries that could relate to the June 9 meeting.674 

2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose 

Information About the June 9 Meeting 

Communications advisors Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared 

Kushner and Ivanka Trump that the emails were damaging and would inevitably be leaked.675 

Hicks and Raffel advised that the best strategy was to proactively release the emails to the press.

676 

On or about June 22, 2017, Hicks attended a meeting in the White House residence with the 

President, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump.677 According to Hicks, Kushner said that he wanted to fill 

the President in on something that had been discovered in the documents he was to provide to the 

congressional committees involving a meeting with him, Manafort, and Trump Jr.678 Kushner 

brought a folder of documents to the meeting and tried to show them to the President, but the 

President stopped Kushner and said he did not want to know about it, shutting the conversation 

down.679 

On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner's attorney's office.680 She recalled 

being shocked by the emails because they looked "really bad."681 The next day, Hicks spoke 

privately with the President to mention her concern about the emai ls, which she understood were 

soon going to be shared with Congress.682 The President seemed upset because too many people 

knew about the emails and he told Hicks that just one lawyer should deal with the matter.683 The 

President indicated that he did not think the emails would leak, but said they would leak if everyone 

had access to them.684 

673 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. 

674 Corallo 2/ 15/ 18 3 02, at 3; Hicks 12/7/ 17 302, at 8; Raffel 2/8/ l 8 302, at 3. 

675 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 

676 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3, 5; Hicks 3/13/ l 8 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. 

677 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6-7; Hicks 3/ 13/ 18 302, at I. 

678 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. 

679 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at I. Counsel for Ivanka Trump provided an attorney 

proffer that is consistent with Hicks's account and with the other events involving lvanka Trump set forth 

in this section of the report. Kushner said that he did not recall talking to the President at this time about 

the June 9 meeting or the underlying emails. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 30. 

680 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1-2. 

681 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 

682 Hicks I 2/7117 3 02, at 8. 

683 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. 

684 Hicks 12/7 /l 7 302, at 8. 

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Later that day, Hicks, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump went together to talk to the President.685 

Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June 9 meeting was not a big deal and was about 

Russian adoption, but that emails existed setting up the meeting.686 Hicks said she wanted to get 

in front of the story and have Trump Jr. release the emails as part of an interview with "softball 

questions."687 The President said he did not want to know about it and they should not go to the 

press.688 Hicks warned the President that the emails were "really bad" and the story would be 

"massive" when it broke, but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and 

said he did not want details.689 Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document 

production was due. 69 ° Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President 

said, "then leave it alone."691 Hicks also recalled that the President said Kushner's attorney should 

give the emails to whomever he needed to give them to, but the President did not think they would 

be leaked to the press.692 Raffel later heard from Hicks that the President had directed the group 

not to be proactive in disclosing the emails because the President believed they would not leak.693 

3. The President Directs Trump Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the 

June 9 Meeting 

The following week, the President departed on an overseas trip for the G20 summit in 

Hamburg, Germany, accompanied by Hicks, Raffel, Kushner, and Tvanka Trump, among others.694 

On July 7, 2017, while the President was overseas, Hicks and Raffel learned that the New York 

Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting.695 The next day, Hicks told the President 

about the story and he directed her not to comment.696 Hicks thought the President's reaction was 

odd because he usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin.

697 Later that 

day, Hicks and the President again spoke about the story.698 Hicks recalled that the President asked 

685 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 2. 

686 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. 

687 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3. 

688 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. 

689 Hicks 3/13/ 18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. 

690 Hicks 3/ 13/ 18 302, at 3. 

691 Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 3. 

692 Hicks 12/7/ 17 3 02, at 9. 

693 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 5. 

694 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 6. 

695 Raffel 2/8/ 18 3 02, at 6-7; Hicks 3/ 13/ l 8 3 02, at 3. 

696 Hicks 12/7/ 17 302, at 10; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. 

697 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10. 

698 Hicks 3/13/ I 8 302, at 3. 

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her what the meeting had been about, and she said that she had been told the meeting was about 

Russian adoption.699 The President responded, "then just say that."700 

On the flight home from the G20 on July 8, 2017, Hicks obtained a draft statement about 

the meeting to be released by Trump Jr. and brought it to the President.701 The draft statement 

began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the 

meeting: "I was asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe 

pageant with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign."702 

Hicks again wanted to disclose the entire story, but the President directed that the statement not be 

issued because it said too much.703 The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a brief 

meeting and it was about Russian adoption.704 After speaking with the President, Hicks texted 

Trump Jr. a revised statement on the June 9 meeting that read: 

It was a short meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We discussed a program about 

the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years 

ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at 

that time and there was no follow up.

705 

Hicks's text concluded, "Are you ok with this? Attributed to you."706 Trump Jr. responded by 

text message that he wanted to add the word "primarily" before "discussed" so that the statement 

would read, "We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children."707 Trump 

Jr. texted that he wanted the change because "[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which was bs 

and some other nonsense which we shot down fast. "708 Hicks texted back, "I think that's right too 

but boss man worried it invites a lot of questions[.) [U]ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney] 

on that word Be I know it's important and I think the mention of a campaign issue adds something 

to it in case we have to go further." 709 Trump Jr. responded, "lfl don't have it in there it appears 

as though I'm lying later when they inevitably leak something." 710 Trump Jr. ' s statement-adding 

699 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at I 0. 

700 Hicks 3/13/ l 8 302, at 3; see Hicks 12/7/ 17 302, at I 0. 

701 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4. 

702 Hicks 7/8/17 Notes. 

703 Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks I 2/7117 302, at 11. 

704 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 11. 

705 SCRO 11 a_000004 (7/8/ 17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.). 

706 SCR01 la_000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.). 

707 SCRO 11 a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). 

708 SCROl la_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). 

709 SCRO 11 a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.). 

710 SCRO l la_000006 (7/8/ 17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). 

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the word "primarily" and making other minor additions-was then provided to the New York 

Times.

711 The full statement provided to the Times stated: 

It was a short introductory meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We primarily 

discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular 

with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it 

was not a campaign issue at the time and there was no follow up. I was asked to attend the 

meeting by an acquaintance, but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting 

with beforehand.712 

The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion 

of the Magnitsky Act or U.S. sanctions, which were the principal subjects of the meeting, as 

described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra. 

A short while later, while still on Air Force One, Hicks learned that Priebus knew about 

the emails, which further convinced her that additional information about the June 9 meeting would 

leak and the White House should be proactive and get in front of the story.713 Hicks recalled again 

going to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the June 9 meeting, 

but he again said no, telling Hicks, "You've given a statement. We're done."7 14 

Later on the flight home, Hicks went to the President's cabin, where the President was on 

the phone with one of his personal attorneys.715 At one point the President handed the phone to 

Hicks, and the attorney told Hicks that he had been working with Circa News on a separate story, 

and that she should not talk to the New York Times. 716 

4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting 

Before the President's flight home from the G20 landed, the New York Times published 

its story about the June 9, 2016 meeting.717 In addition to the statement from Trump Jr., the Times 

story also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President's legal team suggesting that 

the meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the firm that produced the Steele 

reporting.718 Corallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hour later that 

7 11 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; see Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin 

During Campaign, New York Times (July 8, 2017). 

712 See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New 

York Times (July 8, 2017). 

713 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 9-10. 

714 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 12; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10. 

7 15 Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 7. 

716 Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 7. 

717 See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New 

York Times (July 8, 2017); Raffel 2/8/18 302, at I 0. 

718 See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New 

York Times (July 8, 2017). 

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questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June 9 meeting to create the 

appearance of improper connections between Russia and Trump family members. 7 19 Hicks was 

upset about Corallo's public statement and called him that evening to say the President had not 

approved the statement.720 

The next day, July 9, 2017, Hicks and the President called Corallo together and the 

President criticized Corallo for the statement he had released.721 Corallo told the President the 

statement had been authorized and further observed that Trump Jr. 's statement was inaccurate and 

that a document existed that would contradict it.722 Corallo said that he purposely used the term 

"document" to refer to the emails setting up the June 9 meeting because he did not know what the 

President knew about the emails.723 Corallo recalled that when he referred to the "document" on 

the call with the President, Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said "it 

will never get out."724 Corallo took contemporaneous notes of the call that say: "Also mention 

existence of doc. Hope says ' only a few people have it. It will never get out."'725 Hicks later told 

investigators that she had no memory of making that comment and had always believed the emails 

would eventually be leaked, but she might have been channeling the President on the phone call 

because it was clear to her throughout her conversations with the President that he did not think 

the emaiis would leak.

726 

On July 11, 2017, Trump Jr. posted redacted images of the emails setting up the June 9 

meeting on Twitter; the New York Times reported that he did so "[a]fter being told that The Times 

was about to publish the content of the emails."727 Later that day, the media reported that the 

President had been personally involved in preparing Trump Jr.'s initial statement to the New York 

Times that had claimed the meeting "primarily" concerned "a program about the adoption of 

Russian children."728 Over the next several days, the President's personal counsel repeatedly and 

719 See Donald Trump Jr. gathered members of campaign/or meeting with Russian lawyer before 

election, Circa News (July 8, 2017). 

720 Hicks 3/ 13/ 18 302, at 8; Corallo 2/ 15/ l 8 302, at 6-7. 

721 Corallo 2/15/ 18 302, at 7. 

722 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7. 

723 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7-9. 

724 Corallo 2/15/ 18 302, at 8. 

725 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 8; Corallo 7/9/17 Notes ("Sunday 9th - Hope calls w/ POTUS on line"). 

Corallo said he is "I 00% confident" that Hicks said "It will never get out" on the call. Corallo 2/15/18 302, 

at 9. 

726 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 9. 

727 @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11 :01 a.m. ET) Tweet; Jo Becker et al., Russian Dirt on Clinton? 

'I Love It, 'Donald Trump Jr. Said, New York Times (July 11 , 2017). 

728 See, e.g., Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, Rancor at White House as Russia Story Refuses to 

Let the Page Turn, New York Times (July 11, 2017) (reporting that the President "signed off' on Trump 

Jr. 's statement). 

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inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump Jr. 's statement.729 After 

consulting with the President on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the 

media that the President "certainly didn't dictate" the statement, but that "he weighed in, offered 

suggestions like any father would do."730 Several months later, the President's personal counsel 

stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel's Office that "the President dictated a 

short but accurate response to the New York Times article on behalf of his son, Donald Trump, 

Jr."731 The President later told the press that it was "irrelevant" whether he dictated the statement 

and said, "It's a statement to the New York Times .... That's not a statement to a high tribunal of 

judges. " 732 

ecial Counsel's Office Trump Jr. 

related to the June 9 meeting and those who attended the 

On July 19, 2017, the President had his follow-up meeting with Lewandowski and then 

met with reporters for the New York Times. In addition to criticizing Sessions in his Times 

interview, the President addressed the June 9, 2016 meeting and said he "didn't know anything 

about the meeting" at the time.734 The President added, "As I've said-most other people, you 

know, when they call up and say, 'By the way, we have information on your opponent,' I think 

most politicians - I was just with a lot of people, they said ... , 'Who wouldn' t have taken a 

meeting like that?"'735 

Analysis 

In analyzing the President's actions regarding the disclosure of information about the June 

9 meeting, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: 

a. Obstructive act. On at least three occasions between June 29, 2017, and July 9, 

2017, the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June 

729 See, e.g., David Wright, Trump lawyer: President was aware of "nothing", CNN (July 12, 2017) 

(quoting the President's personal attorney as saying, "I wasn't involved in the statement drafting at all nor 

was the President."); see also Good Morning America, ABC (July 12, 2017) ("The President didn't sign 

off on anything . .. . The President wasn't involved in that."); Meet the Press, NBC (July 16, 2017) ("I do 

want to be clear-the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement."). 

730 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPA N (Aug. 1, 2017); Sanders 7 /3/18 302, at 9 

(the President told Sanders he "weighed in, as any father would" and knew she intended to tell the press 

what he ·said). 

731 1 /29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 18. 

732 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle (June 15, 2018). 

733 

734 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 

19,2017). 

735 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 

19, 2017). 

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9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. On June 29, Hicks 

warned the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were " really bad" and the story 

would be "massive" when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to "leave it alone." 

Early on July 8, after Hicks told the President the New York Times was working on a story about 

the June 9 meeting, the President directed her not to comment, even though Hicks said that the 

President usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin. Later that day, the 

President rejected Trump Jr. 's draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was 

with "an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign." The 

President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption 

(which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting). The statement dictated 

by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton. 

Each of these efforts by the President involved his communications team and was directed 

at the press. They would amount to obstructive acts only if the President, by taking these actions, 

sought to withhold information from or mislead congressional investigators or the Special Counsel. 

On May 17, 2017, the President's campaign received a document request from SSCI that clearly 

covered the June 9 meeting and underlying emails, and those documents also plainly would have 

been relevant to the Special Counsel's investigation. 

But the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the emails or 

other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special 

Counsel. The series of discussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and 

prevent their public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy. The only 

evidence ,we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congress or the 

Special Counsel is the conversation on June 29, 2017, when Hicks recalled the President 

acknowledging that Kushner's attorney should provide emails related to the June 9 meeting to 

whomever he needed to give them to. We do not have evidence of what the President discussed 

with his own lawyers at that time. 

b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President's 

attempts to prevent the public release of the emails regarding the June 9 meeting, the existence of 

a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge, and the 

President had been told that the emails were responsive to congressional inquiries. To satisfy the 

nexus requirement, however, it would be necessary to show that preventing the release of the 

emails to the public would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury 

proceeding or congressional inquiries. As noted above, the evidence does not establish that the 

President sought to prevent disclosure of the emails in those official proceedings. 

c. intent. The evidence establishes the President's substantial involvement in the 

communications strategy related to information about his campaign's connections to Russia and 

his desire to minimize public disclosures about those connections. The President became aware 

of the emails no later than June 29, 2017, when he discussed them with Hicks and Kushner, and 

he could have been aware of them as early as June 2, 2017, when lawyers for the Trump 

Organization began interviewing witnesses who participated in the June 9 meeting. The President 

thereafter repeatedly rejected the advice of Hicks and other staffers to publicly release information 

about the June 9 meeting. The President expressed concern that multiple people had access to the 

emails and instructed Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter. And the President 

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dictated a statement to be released by Trump Jr. in response to the first press accounts of the June 

9 meeting that said the meeting was about adoption. 

But as described above, the evidence does not establish that the President intended to 

prevent the Special Counsel's Office or Congress from obtaining the emails setting up the June 9 

meeting or other information about that meeting. The statement recorded by Corallo-that the 

emails "will never get out"-can be explained as reflecting a belief that the emails would not be 

made public if the President's press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to 

Congress and the Special Counsel. 

H. The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the 

Investigation 

Overview 

From summer 2017 through 2018, the President attempted to have Attorney General 

Sessions reverse his recusal, take control of the Special Counsel's investigation, and order an 

investigation of Hillary Clinton. 

Evidence 

1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal 

After returning Sessions's resignation letter at the end of May 2017, but before the 

President's July 19, 2017 New York Times interview in which he publicly criticized Sessions for 

recusing from the Russia investigation, the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse 

his recusal. In particular, at some point after the May 17, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel, 

Sessions recalled, the President called him at home and asked if Sessions would "unrecuse" 

himself. 736 According to Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions 

could direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the "gist" 

of the conversation was that the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from "all of it," including 

the Special Counsel's Russia investigation.737 Sessions listened but did not respond, and he did 

not reverse his recusal or order an investigation of Clinton.738 

In early July 2017, the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of 

Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand.

739 Porter recalled that the President asked him if Brand 

was good, tough, and "on the team." 740 The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was 

interested in being responsible for the Special Counsel's investigation and whether she would want 

736 Sessions I /17/18 302, at 15. That was the second time that the President asked Sessions to 

reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations. See Volume II, Section 11.C.1, supra (describing 

President's March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessions to unrecuse). 

737 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. 

738 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. 

739 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11 ; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. 

740 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/ 18 302, at 6. 

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to be Attorney General one day.741 Because Pmter knew Brand, the President asked him to sound 

her out about taking responsibility for the investigation and being Attorney General.742 

Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to "Keep in touch with 

your friend," in reference to Brand.743 Later, the President asked Porter a few times in passing 

whether he had spoken to Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable 

with the task. 744 In asking him to reach out to Brand, Porter understood the President to want to 

find someone to end the Russia investigation or fire the Special Counsel, although the President 

never said so explicitly.745 Porter did not contact Brand because he was sensitive to the 

implications of that action and did not want to be involved in a chain of events associated with an 

effort to end the investigation or fire the Special Counsel. 746 

McGahn recalled that during the summer of 201 7, he and the President discussed the fact 

that if Sessions were no longer in his position the Special Counsel would report directly to a nonrecused Attorney General.747 McGahn told the President that things might not change much under 

a new Attorney General.748 McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017, the President 

frequently brought up his displeasure with Sessions.749 Hicks recalled that the President viewed 

Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation as an act of disloyalty .

750 In addition to criticizing 

Sessions's recusal, the President raised other concerns about Sessions and his job performance 

with McGahn and Hicks.751 

741 Porter 4/13/ I 8 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. Because of Sessions 's recusal, if Rosenstein 

were no longer in his position, Brand would, by default, become the DOJ official in charge of supervising 

the Special Counsel's investigation, and if both Sessions and Rosenstein were removed, Brand would be 

next in line to become Acting Attorney General for all DOJ matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 508. 

742 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. 

743 SC_RRP000020 (Potter 7/10/17 Notes). 

744 Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at I 1-12. 

745 Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 11-12. 

746 Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 11-12. Brand confirmed that no one ever raised with her the prospect of 

taking over the Russia investigation or becoming Attorney General. Brand 1/29/ 19 302, at 2. 

747 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11. 

748 McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at 11. 

749 McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at 9. 

750 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. 

751 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; Hicks 3/13/ l 8 302, at 10. 

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2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations Covered 

by his Recusal 

Later in 2017, the President continued to urge Sessions to reverse his recusal from 

campaign-related investigations and considered replacing Sessions with an Attorney General who 

would not be recused. 

On October 16, 2017, the President met privately with Sessions and said that the 

Department of Justice was not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the 

Department should be investigating.752 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, who 

was at the meeting, the President mentioned Clinton's emails and said, "Don't have to tell us, just 

take [a] look."753 Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the 

Department of Justice would comply with that request. 754 Two days later, on October 18, 2017, 

the President tweeted, "Wow, FBI confirms report that James Corney drafted letter exonerating 

Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete. Many people not interviewed, 

including Clinton herself. Corney stated under oath that he didn't do this-obviously a fix? Where 

is Justice Dept?" 755 On October 29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was "ANGER & 

UNITY" over a "lack of investigation" of Clinton arid "the Corney fix," and concluded: "DO 

SOMETHTNG!"756 

On December 6, 2017, five days after Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his contacts with 

the Russian government, the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval Office at the end 

of a cabinet meeting.757 During that Oval Office meeting, which Porter attended, the President 

again suggested that Sessions could " unrecuse," which Porter linked to taking back supervision of 

the Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton.758 According to 

contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, the President said, "T don't know if you could un-recuse 

yourself. You'd be a hero. Not telling you to do anything. Dershowitz says POTUS can get 

involved. Can order AG to investigate. I don 't want to get involved. I'm not going to get involved. 

I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly."759 

According to Porter's notes, Sessions responded, "We are taking steps; whole new leadership 

752 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. 

753 SC RRP000024 (Porter 10/ 16/17 Notes); see Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. 

754 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. 

755 @realDonaldTrump 10/18/ 17 (6:21 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/18/17 (6:27 a.m. 

ET) Tweet. 

756 @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (9:53 a.m. ET) Tweet;@realDonaldTrump 10/29/ 17 (10:02 a.m. 

ET) Tweet; @rea!DonaldTrump 10/29/17 ( 10: 17 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

757 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6; see SC_ RRP000031 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) (" 12:45pm With the 

President, Gen. Kelly, and Sessions (who I pulled in after the Cabinet meeting)"); SC_RRP000033 (Porter 

12/6/17 Notes) ("Post-cabinet meeting - POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions. Asked me to stay. Also 

COS Kelly."). 

758 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12; Porter 4/ 13/ l 8 302, at 5-6. 

759 SC_ RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); see Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at 6; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12. 

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team. Professionals; will operate according to the law."760 Sessions also said, "I never saw 

anything that was improper," which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did not fit with the 

previous discussion about Clinton.761 Porter understood Sessions to be reassuring the President 

that he was on the President's team.762 

At the end of December, the President told the New York Times it was "too bad" that 

Sessions had recused himself from the Russia investigation.763 When asked whether Holder had 

been a more loyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him, the President 

said, "I don 't want to get into loyalty, but I will tell you that, I will say this: Holder protected 

President Obama. Totally protected him. When you look at the things that they did, and Holder 

protected the president. And (have great respect for that, I'll be honest."764 Later in January, the 

President brought up the idea ofreplacing Sessions and told Porter that he wanted to "clean house" 

at the Department of Justice.765 In a meeting in the White House residence that Porter attended on 

January 27, 2018, Porter recalled that the President talked about the great attorneys he had in the 

past with successful win records, such as Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg, and said that one of his 

biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys, citing 

Sessions as an example.766 The President raised Sessions's recusal and brought up and criticized 

the Special Counsel's investigation.767 

Over the next several months, the President continued to criticize Sessions in tweets and 

media interviews and on several occasions appeared to publicly encourage him to take action in 

the Russia investigation despite his recusal.768 On June 5, 2018, for example, the President 

760 SC_ RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); see Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6. 

761 SC_ RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 6. 

762 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6-7. 

763 Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes US. "Look Very 

Bad", New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017). 

764 Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes US. "Look Very 

Bad", New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017). 

765 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 14. 

766 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15. Contemporaneous notes Porter took of the conversation state, "Roy 

Cohn (14-0) / Jay Goldberg (12-0)." SC_RRP000047 (Potter 1/27/18 Notes). 

767 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15-16. 

768 See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump 2/28/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet ("Why is A.G. Jeff Sessions asking 

the Inspector General to investigate potentially massive FISA abuse. Will take forever, has no prosecutorial 

power and already late with reports on Corney etc. Isn't the I.G. an Obama guy? Why not use Justice 

Depattment lawyers? DISGRACEFUL!"); @realDonaldTrump 4/7/18 (4:52 p.m. ET) Tweet ("Lawmakers 

of the House Judiciary Committee are angrily accusing the Department of Justice of missing the Thursday 

Deadline for turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse, FBI, Corney, Lynch, 

McCabe, Clinton Emails and much more. Slow walking - what is going on? BAD!"); @realDonaldTrump 

4/22/18 (8:22 a.m. ET) Tweet (" 'GOP Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Corney and Hillary 

Clinton.' @FoxNews Good luck with that request!"); @realDonaldTrump 12/16/18 (3:37 p.m. ET) Tweet 

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tweeted, "The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues, all because Jeff Sessions didn' t tell me he was 

going to recuse himself. .. . I would have quickly picked someone else. So much time and money 

wasted, so many lives ruined ... and Sessions knew better than most that there was No 

Collusion!"769 On August 1, 2018, the President tweeted that '"Attorney General Jeff Sessions 

should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now."770 On August 23, 2018, the President publicly 

criticized Sessions in a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of 

Justice were politically motivated because Paul Manafo11 had been prosecuted but Democrats had 

not.771 The President said, "I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice 

Department, JeffSessions."772 That day, Sessions issued a press statement that said, "I took control 

of the Department of Justice the day I was sworn in .... While I am Attorney General, the actions 

of the Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations."

773 The 

next day, the President tweeted a response: '"Department of Justice will not be improperly 

influenced by political considerations.' Jeff, this is GREAT, what everyone wants, so look into 

all of the corruption on the 'other side' including deleted Emails, Corney lies & leaks, Mueller 

conflicts, McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, FISA abuse, Christopher Steele & his phony and corrupt 

Dossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance of Trump campaign, Russian collusion by 

Dems - and so much more. Open up the papers & documents without redaction? Come on Jeff, 

you can do it, the country is waiting!"774 

On November 7, 2018, the day after the midterm elections, the President replaced Sessions 

with Sessions's chief of staff as Acting Attorney General.775 

Analysis 

In analyzing the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse himself and regain control 

of the Russia investigation, the following considerations and evidence are relevant to the elements 

of obstruction of justice: 

a. Obstructive act. To determine if the President's effo11s to have the Attorney General 

unrecuse could qualify as an obstructive act, it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether 

those actions would naturally impede the Russia investigation. That inquiry would take into 

account the supervisory role that the Attorney General, if unrecused, would play in the Russia 

investigation. It also would have to take into account that the Attorney General's recusal covered 

("Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first 

place!"). 

769 @realDonaldTrump 6/5/18 (7:31 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

770 @realDonaldTrump 8/ 1 /18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

771 Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018). 

772 Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018). 

773 Sessions 8/23/18 Press Statement. 

774 @real Donald Trump 8/24/ 18 (6: 17 a.m. ET) Tweet;@ realDonaldTrump 8/24/ 18 (6:28 a.m. ET) 

Tweet. 

775 @realDonaldTrump 11/7/18 (2:44 p.m. ET) Tweet. 

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other campaign-related matters. The inquiry would not tum on what Attorney General Sessions 

would actually do if unrecused, but on whether the efforts to reverse his recusal would naturally 

have had the effect of impeding the Russia investigation. 

On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his 

recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and 

prosecution of Hillary Clinton. For example, in early summer 2017, Sessions recalled the 

President asking him to unrecuse, but Sessions did not take it as a directive. When the President 

raised the issue again in December 2017, the President said, as recorded by Porter, "Not telling 

you to do anything ... . I'm not going to get involved. I'm not going to do anything or direct you 

to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly." The duration of the President's efforts-which 

spanned from March 2017 to August 2018-and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized 

Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is 

relevant to assessing whether the President's effotts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as 

obstructive acts. 

b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by mid-June 2017, the existence 

of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. In addition, 

in July 2017, a different grand jury supervised by the Special Counsel was empaneled in the 

District of Columbia, and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August 

2017.776 Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have a foreseeable impact on 

those proceedings turns on much of the same evidence discussed above with respect to the 

obstructive-act element. 

c. Intent. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President's conduct toward 

Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and supervise it in a 

way that would restrict its scope. By the summer of 2017, the President was aware that the Special 

Counsel was investigating him personally for obstruction of justice. And in the wake of the 

disclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the 

campaign, see Volume IT, Section TI.G, supra, it was evident that the investigation into the 

campaign now included the President's son, son-in-law, and former campaign manager. The 

President had previously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announce that the 

Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions 

remained recused. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty, the President spoke to 

Sessions in the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if 

he unrecused. Porter linked that request to the President's desire that Sessions take back 

supervision of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton. The 

President said in that meeting that he "just want[ ed] to be treated fairly," which could reflect his 

perception that it was unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. But a 

principal effect of that act would be to restore supervision of the Russia investigation to the 

Attorney General-a position that the President frequently suggested should be occupied by 

someone like Eric Holder and Bobby Kennedy, who the President described as protecting their 

776 E.g., Del Quentin Wilbur & Byron Tau, Special Counsel Robert Mueller Impanels Washington 

Grand Jury in Russia Probe, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 3, 2017); Carol D. Leonnig et al., Special Counsel 

Mueller using grand jury in federal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation, Washington Post 

(Aug. 3, 2017). 

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presidents. A reasonable inference from those statements and the President's actions is that the 

President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could 

shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation. 

I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the 

Special Counsel 

Overview 

In late January 2018, the media reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered 

McGahn to have the Special Counsel fired based on purported conflicts of interest but McGahn 

had refused, saying he would quit instead. After the story broke, the President, through his 

personal counsel and two aides, sought to have McGahn deny that he had been directed to remove 

the Special Counsel. Each time he was approached, McGahn responded that he would not refute 

the press accounts because they were accurate in reporting on the President's effort to have the 

Special Counsel removed. The President later personally met with McGahn in the Oval Office 

with only the Chief of Staff present and tried to get McGahn to say that the President never ordered 

him to fire the Special Counsel. McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the President's 

direction to remove the Special Counsel was accurate. In that same meeting, the President 

challenged McGahn for taking notes of his discussions with the President and asked why he had 

told Special Counsel investigators that he had been directed to have the Special Counsel removed. 

Evidence 

I. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel 

On January 25, 2018, the New York Times reported that in June 2017, the President had 

ordered McGahn to have the Department of Justice fire the Special Counsel.777 According to the 

article, "[a]mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr. Mueller was examining a possible 

obstruction case, the president began to argue that Mr. Mueller had three conflicts of interest that 

disqualified him from overseeing the investigation."778 The article further reported that " [a]fter 

receiving the president's order to fire Mr. Mueller, the White House counsel ... refused to ask the 

Justice Department to dismiss the special counsel, saying he would quit instead."779 The article 

stated that the president "ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to 

resign rather than carry out the directive."780 After the article was published, the President 

777 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When 

White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25.2018). 

778 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When 

White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan.25.2018). 

779 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When 

White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan.25. 2018). 

780 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When 

White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan.25.2018). 

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dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters, saying, "Fake news, folks. Fake news. A 

typical New York Times fake story."781 

The next day, the Washington Post reported on the same event but added that McGahn had 

not told the President directly that he intended to resign rather than carry out the directive to have 

the Special Counsel terminated.

782 In that respect, the Post story clarified the Times story, which 

could be read to suggest that McGahn had told the President of his intention to quit, causing the 

President to back down from the order to have the Special Counsel fired. 783 

2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports 

On January 26, 2018, the President's personal counsel called McGahn 's attorney and said 

that the President wanted McGahn to put out a statement denying that he had been asked to tire 

the Special Counsel and that he had threatened to quit in protest.784 McGahn's attorney spoke with 

McGahn about that request and then called the President's personal counsel to relay that McGahn 

would not make a statement.785 McGahn 's attorney informed the President's personal counsel that 

the Times story was accurate in reporting that the President wanted the Special Counsel 

removed.786 Accordingly, McGahn's attorney said, although the article was inaccurate in some 

other respects, McGahn could not comply with the President's request to dispute the story.787 

Hicks recalled relaying to the President that one of his attorneys had spoken to McGahn's attorney 

about the issue.788 

781 Sophie Tatum & Kara Scannell, Trump denies he called for Mueller's firing, CNN (Jan. 26, 

2018); Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When 

White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25, 2018). 

782 The Post article stated, "Despite internal objections, Trump decided to assert that Mueller had 

unacceptable conflicts of interest and moved to remove him from his position. . . . In response, McGahn 

said he would not remain at the White House if Trump went through with the move .... McGahn did not 

deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave." Rosalind S. 

Helderman & Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to fire Mueller in June, bringing White House counsel to the 

brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018). 

783 Rosalind S. Helderman & Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to fire Mueller in June, bringing White 

House counsel to the brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018); see McGahn 3/8/17 302, at 3-4. 

784 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 3 ( agent note). 

785 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3 (agent note). 

786 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3-4 (agent note). 

787 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4 (agent note). 

788 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Hicks also recalled that the President spoke on the phone that day 

with Chief of Staff John Kelly and that the President said Kelly told him that McGahn had totally refuted 

the story and was going to put out a statement. Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 11. But Kelly said that he did not 

speak to McGahn when the article came out and did not tell anyone he had done so. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 

1-2. 

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Also on January 26, 2017, Hicks recalled that the President asked Sanders to contact 

McGahn about the story.

789 McGahn told Sanders there was no need to respond and indicated that 

some of the article was accurate.79 ° Consistent with that position, McGahn did not correct the 

Times story. 

On February 4, 20 l 8, Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had not heard the 

President say that he wanted the Special Counsel fired.791 After Priebus's appearance, the 

President called Priebus and said he did a great job on Meet the Press.792 The President also told 

Priebus that the President had "never said any of those things about" the Special Counsel.793 

The next day, on February 5, 2018, the President complained about the Times article to 

Porter. 794 The President told Porter that the article was "bullshit" and he had not sought to 

terminate the Special Counsel.795 The President said that McGahn leaked to the media to make 

himselflook good.796 The President then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make 

clear that the President never directed McGahn to fire the Special Counsel.797 Porter thought the 

matter should be handled by the White House communications office, but the President said he 

wanted McGahn to write a letter to the file "for our records" and wanted something beyond a press 

statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.798 The President referred to McGahn 

as a "lying bastard" and said that he wanted a record from him.

799 Porter recalled the President 

789 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Sanders did not recall whether the President asked her to speak to 

McGahn or if she did it on her own. Sanders 7 /23/ 18 302, at 2. 

790 Sanders 7 /23/18 302, at 1-2. 

791 Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Feb. 4, 2018). 

792 Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 10. 

793 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10. 

794 Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 16-17. Porter did not recall the timing of this discussion with the 

President. Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 17. Evidence indicates it was February 5, 2018. On the back of a pocket 

card dated February 5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion: 

"COS: (1) Letter from OM - Never threatened to quit- DJT never told him to fire M." SC_RRP000053 

(Porter Undated Notes). Porter said it was possible he took the notes on a day other than February 5. Porter 

4/13/ 18 302, at 17. But Porter also said that "COS" referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of 

Staff Kelly, Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17, and Kelly took notes dated February 5, 2018, that state "POTUS -

Don McGahn letter - Mueller + resigning." WH0000I 7684 (Kelly 2/5/18 Notes). Kelly said he did not 

recall what the notes meant, but thought the President may have "mused" about having McGahn write a 

letter. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 3. McGahn recalled that Poiter spoke with him about the President's request 

about two weeks after the New York Times story was published, which is consistent with the discussion 

taking place on or about February 5. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 

795 Pmter 4/13/18 302, at 17. 

796 Porter 4/ 13/18 3 02, at 17. 

797 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. 

798 Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 18. 

799 Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 18. 

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saying something to the effect of, "If he doesn't write a letter, then maybe I'll have to get rid of 

him."soo 

Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the President's message.

801 Porter told 

McGahn that he had to write a letter to dispute that he was ever ordered to terminate the Special 

Counsel.802 McGahn shrugged off the request, explaining that the media reports were true. 

McGahn told Porter that the President had been insistent on firing the Special Counsel and that 

McGahn had planned to resign rather than carry out the order, although he had not personally told 

the President he intended to quit.804 Porter told McGahn that the President suggested that McGahn 

would be fired ifhe did not write the letter.805 McGahn dismissed the threat, saying that the optics 

would be terrible if the President followed through with firing him on that basis.806 McGahn said 

he would not write the letter the President had requested.807 Porter said that to his knowledge the 

issue ofMcGahn's letter never came up with the President again, but Porter did recall telling Kelly 

808 about his conversation with McGahn. 

The next day, on February 6, 2018, Kelly scheduled time for McGahn to meet with him 

and the President in the Oval Office to discuss the Times article.809 The morning of the meeting, 

the President's personal counsel called ,McGahn's attorney and said that the President was going 

to be speaking with McGahn and McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the 

meeting. 810 

The President began the Oval Office meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times 

story did not " look good" and McGahn needed to correct it.811 McGahn recalled the President 

said, "I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire.' This story doesn't look good. You need to 

correct this. You're the White House counsel."812 

800 Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 17. 

801 Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 

802 Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 4. 

803 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 

804 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 

805 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 

806 Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at 17-18; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 

807 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 

808 Potter 4/13/18 302, at 18. 

809 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). McGahn recalled that, before 

the Oval Office meeting, he told Kelly that he was not inclined to fix the article. McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 4. 

810 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note); 2/26/19 Email, Counsel for Don McGahn to Special 

Counsel's Office ( confirming February 6, 2018 date of call from the President's personal counsel). 

81 1 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 

812 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 

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In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directly that he 

planned to resign, but said that the story was otherwise accurate.813 The President asked McGahn, · 

"Did I say the word 'fire'?"814 McGahn responded, "What you said is, 'Call Rod [Rosenstein], 

tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel. "'8 15 The President responded, 

"I never said that." 81 6 The President said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the conflicts issue 

with Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to do.81 7 McGahn told the President he did not 

understand the conversation that way and instead had heard, "Call Rod. There are conflicts. 

Mueller has to go." 818 The President asked McGahn whether he would "do a correction," and 

McGahn said no.819 McGahn thought the President was testing his mettle to see how committed 

McGahn was to what happened. 82 ° Kelly described the meeting as " a little tense."

821 

The President also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told Special Counsel's Office 

investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed. 822 McGahn 

responded that he had to and that his conversations with the President were not protected by 

attorney-client privilege.823 The President then asked, "What-about these notes? Why do you take 

notes? Lawyers don' t take notes. I never had a lawyer who took notes." 824 McGahn responded 

that he keeps notes because he is a "real lawyer" and explained that notes create a record and are 

not a bad thing.825 The President said, " I've had a lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. He did not 

take notes."826 

After the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn 

and the President "did have that conversation" about removing the Special Counsel.827 McGahn 

recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the President after the Oval Office that McGahn 

813 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 

814 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 

815 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 

81 6 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 

81 7 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5. 

8 18 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5. 

81 9 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 

820 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 

821 Kelly 8/2/ 18 302, at 2. 

822 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 

823 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 

824 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. McGahn said the President was referring to Donaldson's notes, which 

the President thought ofas McGahn's notes. McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5. 

825 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5. 

826 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5. 

827 Kelly 8/2/ 18 302, at 2. 

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had not backed down and would not budge.828 Following the Oval Office meeting, the President's 

personal counsel called McGahn' s counsel and relayed that the President was '"fine" with 

McGahn.829 

Analysis 

In analyzing the President's efforts to have McGahn deny that he had been ordered to have 

the Special Counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of 

justice: 

a. Obstructive act. The President's repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a record 

denying that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an 

obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying truthfully or to 

undermine his credibility as a potential witness ifhe testified consistently with his memory, rather 

than with what the record said. 

There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories 

were published in late January 2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had 

never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly 

understood that McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign. Tn addition, 

the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and 

in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the President said, "I never said to fire Mueller. I never 

said 'fire."' That evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade 

McGahn to change his story but was instead offering his own-but different-recollection of the 

substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them. 

Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President's conduct. As previously 

described, see Volume IT, Section ILE, supra, substantial evidence supports McGahn's account 

that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and 

context of the President's directive; the manner in which McGahn reacted; and the fact that the 

President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department 

of Justice, and should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather than brought to 

McGahn. In addition, the President's subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the 

Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. When first asked about the New York Times 

story, the President said, "Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake story." 

And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had 

used the word "fire," saying, "I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire"' and "Did T say the 

word 'fire'?" The President's assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed 

McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence. 

Tn addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn's memory of the June 

17, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Office 

828 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meeting with the 

President after the fact. Kelly 8/2/1 8 302, at 2. Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, "Don[:] Mueller 

discussion in June. - Bannon Priebus - came out okay." WH0000l7685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). 

829 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note). 

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meeting that McGahn's account differed and that McGahn was firm in his views. Shortly after the 

story broke, the President's counsel told McGahn 's counsel that the President wanted McGahn to 

make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded 

through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply 

with the President's request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the 

story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the 

President's order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a 

week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the 

President thought McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahn create a 

record denying that the President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. At that point, the President 

said he might "have to get rid of' McGahn ifMcGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and 

told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President's counsel, that the 

President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence 

indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not 

think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying 

facts that McGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to 

repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate. 

b. Nexus to an official proceeding. By January 2018, the Special Counsel's use of a 

grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President also 

was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because, among 

other reasons, on January 8, 20 I 8, the Special Counsel's Office provided his counsel with a 

detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President.830 The President knew that 

McGahn had personal knowledge of many of the events the Special Counsel was investigating and 

that McGahn had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval 

Office meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel's 

Office about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President challenged 

McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating 

unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates the President's awareness that the June 17, 

2017 events were relevant to the Special Counsel's investigation and any grand jury investigation 

that might grow out ofit. 

To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President's actions would have 

the natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the 

communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel 

investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to influence his prior 

statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and 

the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again 

on obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking 

to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further 

investigative interviews would not be shown. But the President's efforts to have McGahn write a 

letter "for our records" approximately ten days after the stories had come out- well past the typical 

830 1/29/ I 8 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 1-2 ("In our 

conversation of January 8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with 

the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of 

justice"; listing 16 topics). 

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time to issue a correction for a news story-indicates the President was not focused solely on a 

press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings 

arising from it. 

c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute 

that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of 

influencing McGahn 's account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President's 

conduct towards the investigation. 

Several facts support that conclusion. The President made repeated attempts to get 

McGahn to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence 

suggests that the President had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President 

had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with 

the President in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see how committed he was to 

his memory of what had occurred. The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing 

McGahn to alter his account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did 

not deny the story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the 

President's intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the 

prospect of the President's meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn's counsel and said that 

McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The President's 

counsel was well aware ofMcGahn's resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account 

of events despite the President's request. Finally, as noted above, the President brought up the 

Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and criticized him for 

telling this Office about the June 17, 2017 events. The President's statements reflect his 

understanding-and his displeasure-that those events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice 

inquiry. 

J. The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, ~ 

Overview 

In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other 

actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation, including Flynn, 

Manafort, 1;c•w "nd as described in the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a joint 

defense agreement with the President, the President's personal counsel stated that Flynn's actions 

would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the President. During Manafort's prosecution 

and while the jury was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafott was bein treated 

Evidence 

I . Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn 

As previously noted, see Volume II, Section 11.B, supra, the President asked for Flynn's 

resignation on February 13, 2017. Following Flynn's resignation, the President made positive 

public comments about Flynn, describing him as a "wonderful man," "a fine person," and a "very 

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good person."831 The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying 

that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.832 

In late November 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. On November 22, 2017, 

Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President.833 Flynn's counsel told 

the President's personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have 

confidential communications with the White House or the President.834 Later that night, the 

President's personal counsel left a voicemail for Flynn's counsel that said: 

I understand your situation, but let me see if I can't state it in starker terms. . . . [I]t 

wouldn't surprise me if you've gone on to make a deal with ... the government. ... [I]f 

. .. there's information that implicates the President, then we've got a national security 

issue, . . . so, you know, . . . we need some kind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of 

protecting all our interests ifwe can .... [R]emember what we've always said about the 

' President and his feelings toward Flynn and, that still remains .... 835 

On November 23, 2017, Flynn's attorneys returned the call from the President's personal 

counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail.836 Fly nn 's attorneys reiterated that they were no 

longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege.837 According to Flynn's 

attorneys, the President's personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.838 The 

President's personal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection ofFlynn's 

83 1 See, e.g. , Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2018) 

(stating that "Flynn is a fine person" and "I don't think [Flynn] did anything wrong. If anything, he did 

something right . .. You know, he was just doing his job"); Interview of Donald J Trump, NBC (May 11 , 

2017) (stating that Flynn is a "very good person"). 

832 See Priebus I /18/17 302, at 9-10 (the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was 

terminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him; 

Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him); McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, 

at 18 (about a month or two after Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with 

Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him); Flynn 

1/19/18 302, at 9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to 

relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3 

(describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner 

said, "You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I' II get the President to send 

out a positive tweet about you later," and the President nodded his assent to Kushner's comment promising 

a tweet). 

833 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/ 18 302, at 1. 

834 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/ 18 302, at I. 

835 11/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President's Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn. 

836 Counsel for Flynn 3/1 / 18 302, at 1. 

837 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 1. 

838 Counsel for Flynn 3/ 1 / 18 3 02, at I . 

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hostility towards the President and that he planned to inform his client of that interpretation. 

Flynn's attorneys understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their position 

because the President's personal counsel believed that Flynn would be disturbed to know that such 

a message would be conveyed to the President.840 

On December 1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements pursuant to a 

cooperation agreement.841 The next day, the President told the press that he was not concerned 

about what Flynn might tell the Special Counsel.842 In response to a question about whether the 

President still stood behind Flynn, the President responded, "We'll see what happens."

843 Over 

the next several days, the President made public statements expressing sympathy for Flynn and 

indicating he had not been treated fairly.844 On December 15, 2017, the President responded to a 

press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying, "I don't want to talk 

about pardons for Michael Flynn yet. We'll see what happens. Let's see. I can say this: When 

you look at what's gone on with the FBI and with the Justice Department, people are very, very 

angry."845 

2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort 

On October 27, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former 

deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts, and on February 22, 2018, a 

grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony 

839 Counsel for Flynn 3/1 / 18 302, at 2. Because of attorney-client privilege issues, we did not seek 

to interview the President's personal counsel about the extent to which he discussed his statements to 

Flynn's attorneys with the President. 

84° Counsel for Flynn 3/ 1 /18 302, at 2. 

84 1 Information, United States v. Michael T Flynn, 1: 17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 1; Plea 

Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, 1: 17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. I, 2017), Doc. 3. 

842 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2, 

2017). 

843 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn 's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2, 

2017). 

844 See @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (9:06 p.m. ET) Tweet ("So General Flynn lies to the FBI and 

his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBl holiday 'interrogation' with 

no swearing in and no recording, lies many times ... and nothing happens to her? Rigged system, or just 

a double standard?"); President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Dec. 4, 2017) ("Well, I feel badly 

for General Flynn. I feel very badly. He's led a very strong life. And I feel very badly."). 

845 President Trump White House Departure, C-SPAN (Dec. 15, 2017). 

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counts.846 The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as 

2005 and continued through 2018.847 

In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel 

and they were "going to take care of us."848 Mana fort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that 

he had been in touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should " sit tight" 

and "we'll be taken care of."849 Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and 

Manafort said no one used that word.850 

As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court, the President told Porter that he 

never liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the campaign.851 The 

President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort might be cooperating with the 

Special Counsel's investigation, and whether Manafort knew any information that would be 

harmful to the President.852 

In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that 

Manafort was being treated unfairly. On June I 5, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day 

on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered 

with witnesses while out on bail, the President told the press, "T feel badly about a lot of them 

846 Indictment, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, I: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. 

Oct, 27, 2017), Doc. 13 ("Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment"); Indictment, United States v. Paul J. 

Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, I: l 8-cr-83 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2018), Doc. 9 ("Manafort and Gates 

E.D. Va. Indictment") 

847 Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment; Manafort and Gates E.D. Va. Indictment. 

848 Gates 4/ 18/18 302, at 4. In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea 

agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit 

multiple offenses (i.e. , tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent 

of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our 

Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1: I 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 

23, 2018), Doc. 195; Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, l: I 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 

2018), Doc. 205. Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be 

reliable. 

849 Gates 4/ 18/18 302, at 4. 

850 Gates 4/ 18/ 18 302, at 4. Manafort told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to 

the President's personal counsel or suggested that they would be taken care of. Manafort also said he hoped 

for a pardon but never discussed one with the President, although he noticed the President's public 

comments about pardons. Manafort 10/ 1/ 18 302, at 11. As explained in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, supra, 

Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. The U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the 

grand jury. Order, United States v. Manafort, l: l 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 503. 

851 Porter 5/8/ 18 302, at 11. Priebus recalled that the President never really liked Manafort. See 

Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 11. Hicks said that candidate Trump trusted Manafort's judgment while he worked 

on the Campaign, but she also once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an eye on Manafort. Hicks 3/13/18 

302, at 16. 

852 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11 ; McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at 14. 

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because I think a lot of it is very unfair. I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12 

years. Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. But I feel so-I tell you, I feel a little 

badly about it. They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago? ... I feel badly 

for some people, because they've gone back 12 years to find things about somebody, and I don't 

think it's right."853 In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for 

Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation, the President said, 

"I don't want to talk about that. No, I don't want to talk about that. ... But look, I do want to see 

people treated fairly. That's what it's all about." 854 Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and 

the President tweeted, "Wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented 

Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn't know 

Manafort was the head of the Mob. What about Corney and Crooked Hillary and all the others? 

Very unfair!"855 

Immediately following the revocation ofManafort's bail, the President's personal lawyer, 

Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for 

Manafort. Giuliani told the New York Daily News that "[w]hen the whole thing is over, things 

might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons." 856 Giuliani also said in an interview that, 

although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel's investigation was 

ongoing, "when the investigation is concluded, he's kind of on his own, right?"857 In a CNN 

interview two days later, Giuliani said, " I guess I should clarify this once and for all. . . . The 

president has issued no pardons in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons 

in this investigation .... When it's over, hey, he's the president of the United States. He retains 

his pardon power. Nobody is taking that away from him."858 Giuliani rejected the suggestion that 

his and the President's comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a 

criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow, saying the comments were "certainly not 

intended that way."859 Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved 

in the investigation would not be "excluded from [ a pardon], if in fact the president and his advisors 

.. . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly."860 Giuliani observed that pardons 

were not unusual in political investigations but said, "That doesn't mean they're going to happen 

853 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018). 

854 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018). 

855 @rea!DonaldTrump 6/ 15/ 18 ( 1 :41 p.m. ET) Tweet. 

856 Chris Sommerfeldt, Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe 'might get cleaned up' with 'presidential 

pardons ' in light of Paul Manafort going to jail, New York Daily News (June 15, 2018). 

857 Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New Obstruction 

Charges, New York Times (June 15, 2018) (quoting Giuliani). 

858 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018); see Karoun Demitjian, 

Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafort after Mueller's probe, Washington Post (June 17, 2018). 

859 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 

860 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 

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here. Doesn't mean that anybody should rely on it. ... Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned 

yet. ,,s61 

On July 31, 2018, Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia, 

generating substantial news coverage.862 The next day, the President tweeted, "This is a terrible 

situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before 

it continues to stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry 

Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!"863 Minutes later, the President 

tweeted, "Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent 

and respected political leaders. He worked for me for a very short time. Why didn't government 

tell me that he was under investigation. These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion-a 

Hoax!"864 Later in the day, the President tweeted, "Looking back on history, who was treated 

worse, Alfonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and 'Public Enemy Number One,' or Paul 

Manafort, political operative & Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confinement- although 

convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian Collusion?"865 The President's tweets about the 

Manafort trial were widely covered by the press.866 When asked about the President's tweets, 

Sanders told the press, "Certainly, the President's been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort's been 

treated unfairly."867 

On August 16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began. 

At that time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation 

needed to be "done in the next two or three weeks,"868 and media stories reported that a Manafort 

acquittal would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and 

expense, whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature.869 

861 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 

862 See, e.g. , Katelyn Polantz, Takeaways from day one of the Paul Manafort trial, CNN (July 31, 

2018); Frank Bruni, Paul Manafort 's Trial Is Donald Trump's, Too, New York Times Opinion (July 31, 

2018); Rachel Weiner et al., Paul Manafort trial Day 2: Witnesses describe extravagant clothing purchases, 

home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018). 

863 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. Later that day, when Sanders was asked 

about the President's tweet, she told reporters, "It's not an order. It's the President's opinion." Sarah 

Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018). 

864 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

865 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (11 :35 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

866 See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump calls Manafort prosecution "a hoax," says Sessions 

should stop Mueller investigation "right now", Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018); Louis Nelson, Trump 

claims Manafort case has "nothing to do with collusion", Politico (Aug. I. 2018). 

867 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018). 

868 Chris Strohm & Shannon Pettypiece, Mueller Probe Doesn't Need to Shut Down Before 

Midterms, Officials Say, Bloomberg (Aug. 15, 2018). 

869 See, e.g., Katelyn Polantz et al., Manafort jury ends first day of deliberations without a verdict, 

CNN (Aug. 16, 2018); David Voreacos, What Mueller's Manafort Case Means f or the Trump Battle to 

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On August 17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the President commented on the trial from 

the South Lawn of the White House. In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted 

approximately five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel's investigation a 

"rigged witch hunt."870 When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the 

President said, "I don't talk about that now. I don' t talk about that."871 The President then added, 

without being asked a further question, "I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look 

at what's going on there. I think it's a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very 

short period of time. But you know what, he happens to be a very good person. And l think it's 

very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort."872 The President did not take further questions.873 

In response to the President's statements, Manafort's attorney said, "Mr. Manafort really 

appreciates the support of President Trump."874 

On August 21 , 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on 

August 21 , Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-finance 

violation that he said had occurred "in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for 

federal offtce."875 The President reacted to Manafort's convictions that day by telling reporters, 

"Paul Manafort's a good man" and "it's a very sad thing that happened."876 The President 

described the Special Counsel's investigation as "a witch hunt that ends in disgrace." 877 The next 

day, the President tweeted, " I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. 'Justice' 

took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike 

Michael Cohen, he refused to ' break'-make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for 

a brave man!"878 

In a Fox News interview on August 22, 2018, the President said: " [Cohen] makes a better 

deal when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of the reasons l respect Paul Manafort so 

much is he went through that trial- you know they make up stories. People make up stories. This 

Come, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2018); Gabby Morrongiello, What a guilty verdict for Manafort would mean 

for Trump and Mueller, Washington Examiner (Aug. 18, 2018). 

870 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 

87 1 President Trump Rem,irks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 

872 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 

873 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 

874 Trump calls Manafort "very good person, " All In with Chris Hayes (Aug. 17, 2018) (transcript); 

Manafort lawyer: We appreciate Trump 's support, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018) 

(https://www .cnn.com/videos/poli tics/2018/08/ 17 /paul-manafort-attorney-trump-j Uiy-del i berationsschneider-lead-vpx .cnn ). 

875 Transcript at 23, United States v. Michael Cohen, l: 18-cr-602 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018), Doc. 

7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript). 

876 President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug. 21, 2018). 

877 President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPA N (Aug. 21, 2018). 

878 @realDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

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whole thing about flipping, they call it, T know all about flipping."879 The President said that 

flipping was "not fair" and "almost ought to be outlawed."880 ln response to a question about 

whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, "T have great respect for 

what he's done, in terms of what he's gone through .... He worked for many, many people many, 

many years, and T would say what he did, some of the charges they threw against him, every 

consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does."88 1 Giuliani told journalists that the 

President "really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated" and that he and the President had 

discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort.882 The next day, Giuliani told 

the Washington Post that the President had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a 

pardon for Manafort and other aides, and had been counseled against considering a pardon until 

the investigation concluded.883 

On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia 

and signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperate with investigators.884 Giuliani was 

reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the 

President following Manafort's guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manafort's 

attorneys regularly briefed the President's lawyers on the topics discussed and the information 

Manafort had provided in interviews with the Special Counsel's Office.885 On November 26, 2018, 

the Special Counsel's Office disclosed in a public court filing that Manafort had breached his plea 

agreement by lying about multiple subjects.886 The next day, Giuliani said that the President had 

been "upset for weeks" about what he considered to be "the un-American, horrible treatment of 

879 Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded 

the previous day). 

88 ° Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded 

the previous day). 

881 Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded 

the previous day). 

. 882 Maggie Haberman & Katie Rogers, "How Did We End Up Here?" Trump Wonders as the White 

House Soldiers On, New York Times (Aug. 22, 2018). 

883 Carol D. Leonnig & Josh Dawsey, Trump recently sought his lawyers' advice on possibility of 

pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says, Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2018). 

884 Plea Agreement, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., l:l7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), 

Doc. 422. 

885 Karen Freifeld & Nathan Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller 

interviews, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt et al., Mana/art's Lawyer Said to Brief Trump 

Attorneys on What He Told Mueller, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2018); Dana Bash, Mana/art team briefed 

Giuliani on Mueller meetings, CNN, Posted 11/28/18, available at 

https:/ /www.cnn.com/videos/pol iti cs/2018/ 11 /28/manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-gi ul ianiupdated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx.cnn; see Sean Hannity, Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Fox News 

(Sept. 14, 2018) (Giuliani: "[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea 

agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with the Trump campaign .... Now, I know 

that because 1 've been privy to a lot of facts I can't repeat."). 

886 Joint Status Report, United States v. Paul J Mana/art, Jr., (D.D.C Nov. 26, 2018), Doc. 455. 

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Manafort."887 In an interview on November 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was "very 

brave" that Manafort did not " flip": 

If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuff is terrible. You flip and 

you lie and you get-the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people 

to flip. It's rare that they can't. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi-I don't know 

Corsi, but he refuses to say what they demanded.888 Manafort, Corsi . It's 

actually very brave.

889 

Tn response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, "It was never 

discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I take it off the table?"

890 

3. Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

aHarm to Ongoing Matter 

IIIHarm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

:•• Harm to Ongoing Matter 

887 Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge, CNN 

(Nov. 29, 2018). 

888 "Corsi" is a reference to Jerome Corsi, who was involved in efforts 

to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea 

offer fro~'s Office because he was "not going to sign a lie." Sara Murray & Eli 

Watkins,~ says he won't agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018). 

889 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says 

pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018). That same day, the President 

tweeted: "While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way, 

at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang ofDems is viciously telling witnesses 

to lie about facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!" @rea!DonaldTrump 11/28/ 18 

(8:39 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

890 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump: 

Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018). 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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Harm to Ongoing Matter 

raHarm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

1aHarm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

895 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

• 

- 896 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

: · Harm to Ongoing Matter 

· 

:•· Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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Harm to Ongoing Matter 

-Harm to Ongoing Matter 

111Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

900 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

·• Harm to Ongoing Matter 

• Harm to Ongoing Matter 

• 

1 • Harm to Ongoing Matter 

905 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

907 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

908 Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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Analysis 

In analyzing the President's conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, litlllll, the following 

evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: 

a. Obstructive act. The President's actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel's 

investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular 

witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing, 

delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement. 

With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging 

him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to 

cooperate with the government. When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense 

agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the 

government, the President's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel of the President's 

warm feelings towards Flynn and said "that still remains." But when Flynn's counsel reiterated 

that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the President's 

personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn's hostility 

towards the President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn's 

decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues, 

however, we could not determine whether the President was personally involved in or knew about 

the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn's counsel. 

With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the President's actions had the potential to 

influence Manafort's decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President and his 

personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Mana fort, 

while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to "flip" and cooperate with 

the government. On June 15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort's D.C. case was 

considering whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he "felt badly" for Manafort and 

stated, "I think a lot of it is very unfair." And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the 

President said, "I do want to see people treated fairly. That's what it's all about." Later that day, 

after Manafort's bail was revoked, t.he President called it a " tough sentence" that was "Very 

unfair!" Two days later, the President's personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the 

Special Counsel' s investigation could receive a pardon " if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors 

.. . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly"-using language that paralleled 

how the President had already described the treatment ofManafort. Those statements, combined 

with the President's commendation ofManafort for being a "brave man" who " refused to ' break'," 

suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Mana fort continued not to cooperate with 

the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation 

agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to investigators. 

The President's public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury 

deliberations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for 

example, the President called the prosecution a "terrible situation" and a " hoax" that "continues to 

stain our country" and referred to Manafort as a "Reagan/Dole darling" who was "serving solitary 

confinement" even though he was "convicted of nothing." Those statements were widely picked 

up by the press. While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and 

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are presumed to follow those instructions, the President's statements during the trial generated 

substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements 

or learned about them from others. And the President's statements during jury deliberations that 

Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and that " it's very sad what they've done to Paul 

Mana fort" had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President 

made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort. 

b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President's actions towards Flynn, Manafort, 

--appear to have been connected to pending or ~d official proceedings involving 

each individual. The President's conduct towards Flynn~ principally occurred when both 

were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel's Office and press reports speculated 

about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel's investigation. And the President's 

conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the official proceedings involving him. The 

President made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort's criminal 

trial. And the President's comments about the prospect of Manafort " flipping" occurred when it 

was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings. 

c. Intent. Evidence concerning the President's intent related to Flynn as a potential 

witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have evidence 

establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel's communications 

with Flynn's counsel stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement 

and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the 

President. And regardless of what the President' s personal counsel communicated, the President 

continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation 

agreement, stating that Flynn had "led a very strong life" and the President "fe[lt] very badly" 

about what had happened to him. 

Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President 

intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was 

convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day after 

Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term, the 

President said that Manafort was "a brave man" for refusing to "break" and that " flipping" "almost 

ought to be outlawed." At the same time, although the President had privately told aides he did 

not like Manafort, he publicly called Mana fort "a good man" and said he had a "wonderful family." 

And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the 

President did not respond directly and instead said he had "great respect for what [Manafort]'s 

done, in terms of what he's gone through." The President added that "some of the charges they 

threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does." In light of the 

President's counsel's previous statements that the investigations "might get cleaned up with some 

presidential pardons" and that a pardon would be possible if the President "come[s] to the 

conclusion that you have been treated unfairly," the evidence supports the inference that the 

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President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make 

cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary. 

We also examined the evidence of the President's intent in making public statements about 

Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports 

a conclusion that the President intended, at least in part, to influence the jury. The trial generated 

widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal 

would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel's investigation. By publicly stating on the second 

day of deliberations that Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and that " it's very sad what 

they've done to Paul Manafort" right after calling the Special Counsel's investigation a "rigged 

witch hunt," the President's statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to 

engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factfinder could infer that the President 

intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for the President's comments, including 

that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to 

influence public opinion. The President's comments also could have been intended to continue 

sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the President 

made his comments about Manafort being "a very good person" immediately after declining to 

answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort. 

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K. The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen 

Overview 

The President's conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our 

investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf 

of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times, 

including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. After the media 

began questioning Trump's connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a "party line" that publicly 

distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. Cohen continued to adhere 

to that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its 

Russia investigation. [n an attempt to minimize the President's connections to Russia, Cohen 

submitted a letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower 

Moscow project three times, that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia, that Cohen 

had not received a response to an outreach he made to the Russian government, and that the project 

ended in January 2016, before the first Republican caucus or primary. While working on the 

congressional statement, Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel, 

who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the 

statement short and "tight." After the FBI searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the 

President publicly asserted that Cohen would not "flip" and privately passed messages of support 

to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if 

he stayed on message, he would get a pardon or the President would do "something else" to make 

the investigation end. But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018, the 

President publicly criticized him, called him a "rat," and suggested his family members had 

committed crimes. 

Evidence 

1. Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement m the Trump Tower 

Moscow Project 

The President's interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of 

the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project. 

As described in detail in Volume I, Section IV.A. 1, supra, from September 2015 until at 

least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia, with 

negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and 

special counsel to Donald J. Trump.909 The Trump Organization had previously and 

909 In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception, 

including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, as described later 

in this section. When Cohen first met with investigators from this Office, he repeated the same lies he told 

Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project. Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 12- 17. But after Cohen pleaded 

guilty to offenses in the Southern District ofNew York on August 21, 2018, he met with investigators again 

and corrected the record. The Office found Cohen's testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be 

consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Office's investigation. 

The Office's sentencing submission in Cohen's criminal case stated: "Starting with his second meeting with 

the [Special Counsel's Office] in September 2018, the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for 

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unsuccessfully pursued a building project in Moscow.910 According to Cohen, in approximately 

September 2015 he obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump 

Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscow that licensed the Trump name 

911 912 and brand. Cohen thereafter had numerous brief conversations with Trump about the project. 

Cohen recalled that Trump wanted to be updated on any developments with Trump Tower Moscow 

913 and on several occasions brought the project up with Cohen to ask what was happening on it. 

Cohen also discussed the project on multiple occasions with Donald Trump Jr. and Ivanka 

Trump.914 

In the fall of 2015, Trump signed a Letter of Intent for the project that specified highly 

lucrative terms for the Trump Organization.915 In December 2015, Felix Sater, who was handling 

negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation, asked Cohen for a copy of his and 

Trump's passports to facilitate travel to Russia to meet with government officials and possible 

financing partners.916 Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of 

Trump's passport from Trump's personal secretary, Rhona Graff.917 

By January 2016, Cohen had become frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with 

Russian government officials, so Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of Dmitry 

his false statements concerning the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project, but also his broader efforts through 

public statements and testimony before Congress to minimize his role in, and what he knew about, contacts 

between the [Trump Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign. . . . The 

information provided by Cohen about the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project in these proffer sessions is 

consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the [Special Counsel's 

Office's] investigation .... The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel's Office], also 

corrected other false and misleading statements that he had made concerning his outreach to and contacts 

with Russian officials during the course of the campaign." Gov't Sentencing Submission at 4, United States 

v. Michael Cohen, I: I 8-cr-85O (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018), Doc. 14. At Cohen's sentencing, our Office further 

explained that Cohen had "provided valuable information ... while taking care and being careful to note 

what he knows and what he doesn't know." Transcript at 19, United States v. Michael Cohen, I: l 8-cr-85O 

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018), Doc. 17 (Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript). 

910 See Volume I, Section IV.A. I , supra (noting that starting in at least 2013, several employees of 

the Trump Organization, including then-president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Trump 

Tower Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties). 

91 1 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15. 

912 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2, 4. 

913 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4. 

914 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4, I 0. 

915 MDC-H-OOO618-25 (10/28/15 Letter oflntent, signed by Donald J. Trump, Trump Acquisition, 

LLC and Andrey Rozov, LC. Expert Investment Company); Cohen 9/ 12/18 302, at 3; Written Responses 

of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g)). 

916 MDC-H-OOO6OO ( 12/19/ 15 Email, Sater to Cohen). 

917 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. 

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Peskov, who was Putin's deputy chief of staff and press secretary.918 On January 20, 2016, Cohen 

received an email response from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's personal assistant, and phone records 

confirm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which Cohen described the 

Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in moving the project forward.919 Cohen 

recalled briefing candidate Trump about the call soon afterwards.92° Cohen told Trump he spoke 

with a woman he identified as " someone from the Kremlin," and Cohen reported that she was very 

professional and asked detailed questions about the project.921 Cohen recalled telling Trump he 

wished the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the woman from the 

Kremlin.922 

Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the project.923 The day after Cohen's call 

with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat 

... It's about Putin they called today."924 Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked the 

project and on January 25, 2016, sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow " for a working 

visit."925 After the outreach from Sater, Cohen recalled telling Trump that he was waiting to hear 

back on moving the project forward.926 

After January 2016, Cohen continued to have conversations with Sater about Trump Tower 

Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those discussions and the status 

of the project.927 Cohen recalled that he and Trump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and 

that Trump never discouraged him from working on the project because of the campaign.928 In 

March or April 2016, Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia.

929 Cohen also 

9 18 See FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); TRUMPORG_MC_000233 (1 / 11 /16 

Email, Cohen to pr _peskova@prpress.gof.ru); MDC-H-000690 (1 /14/16 Email, Cohen to 

info@prpress.gov.ru); TRUMPORG_MC_000235 (1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru). 

919 1/20/ 16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen; Call Records ofMichael Cohen. (Showing a 22-minute call 

on January 20, 2016, between Cohen and the number Poliakova provided in her email); Cohen 9/12/18 302, 

at 2-3. After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook 

contact list. 1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.). 

92

° Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 

921 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5-6; Cohen I l/12/18 302, at 4. 

922 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 

923 Cohen 9/ 12/ 18 302, at 5. 

924 FS0O0l l (1/21 /16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). 

925 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5; 1/25/ 16 Email, Sater to Cohen (attachment). 

926 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 

927 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6. In later congressional testimony, Cohen stated that he briefed Trump 

on the project approximately six times after January 2016. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump 

Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee, 116th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. 

Transcripts, at 24) (testimony of Michael Cohen). 

928 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6. 

929 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4. 

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recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr. in the spring-a conversation that Cohen said was not " idle 

chit chat" because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal.930 

Cohen recalled that around May 2016, he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility 

of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project.931 At that time, Cohen had 

received several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip. 932 On May 4, 2016, Sater 

wrote to Cohen, "T had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is 

before or after the convention ..... Obviously the premeeting trip (you only) can happen anytime 

you want but the 2 big guys [is] the question. I said I would confirm and revert."933 Cohen 

responded, "My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the 

convention."934 On May 5, 2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably 

read to Trump: 

Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is 

Russia's Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly 

introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev .... This is perfect. The entire business 

class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss including 

dates and subjects are on the table to discuss.935 

Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum with 

candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be 

there.936 Cohen remembered that Trump said that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen 

could " lock and load" on the deal.937 Tn June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg 

Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov.

938 

Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Trump at that time but did not tell him that the project 

was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again-off-again if it 

were revived.939 

During the summer of 2016, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he 

had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the 

status of the Trump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found "interesting."940 At some point 

93° Cohen 9/ 12/ 18 302, at 10. 

931 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 

932 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 

933 FS000 15 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen). 

934 FS000l5 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater). 

935 FS00016-17 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). 

936 Cohen 9/12/ l 8 302, at 7. 

937 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 

938 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7-8. 

939 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8. 

94° Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 

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that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the 

Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company 

had not secured a piece of property for the project.941 Trump said that was " too bad," and Cohen 

did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that.942 Cohen said that at no time during 

the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be 

943 abandoned. 

2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line" Distancing Candidate Trump 

From Russia 

As previously discussed, see Volume II, Section II.A, supra, when questions about possible 

Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump 

denied having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described 

as the "party line" or "message" to follow for Trump and his senior advisors.944 

After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close out certain deals in 

advance of the inauguration.

945 Cohen recalled that Trump Tower Moscow was on the list of deals 

to be closed out.946 In approximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the 

media about Trump Tower Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when those 

inquiries came in.947 Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow 

project might not be consistent with the "message" that the President-Elect had no relationship 

with Russia.948 

In an effort to "stay on message," Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump 

Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016.949 Cohen recalled that this 

was part of a " script" or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to 

941 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen could not recall the precise timing of this conversation, but said 

he thought it occurred in June or July 2016. Cohen recalled that the conversation happened at some point 

after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 

2. 

942 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 

943 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 

944 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at l; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3, 5; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. 

945 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2; see also Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 8-9. 

946 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2. 

947 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3. 

948 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. 

949 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5. The article was published on February 19, 2017, and reported that 

Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow "as recently as the fall of2015" 

but had come to a halt because of the presidential campaign. Consistent with Cohen's intended patty line 

message, the article stated, "Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project 

in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not 

feasible." Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump 

Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017). 

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dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia.95° Cohen said that he 

discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they 

were untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue.951 Cohen thought it was important to 

say the deal was done in January 2016, rather than acknowledge that talks continued in May and 

June 2016, because it limited the period when candidate Trump could be alleged to have a 

relationship with Russia to an early point in the campaign, before Trump had become the party's 

presumptive nominee.952 

3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower 

Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line 

In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and 

documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 

election.953 At that time, Cohen understood Congress's interest in him to be focused on the 

allegations in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian officials 

in Prague during the campaign.954 Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not concerned 

about those allegations, which he believed were provably false.955 On May 18, 2017, Cohen met 

with the President to discuss the request from Congress, and the President instructed Cohen that 

he should cooperate because there was nothing there.956 

Cohen eventually entered into a joint defense agreement (JOA) with the President and other 

individuals who were part of the Russia investigation.957 In the months leading up to his 

congressional testimony, Cohen frequently spoke with the President's personal counsel.958 Cohen 

95° Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5-6. 

951 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 6. 

952 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at I 0. 

953 P-SCO-000000328 (5/9/17 Letter, HPSCI to Cohen); P-SCO-000000331 (5/12/17 Letter, SSCI 

to Cohen). 

954 Cohen 11 /20/18 302, at 2-3. 

955 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2-3. 

956 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 11/20/19 302, at 3. 

957 Cohen 11 /12/18 302, at 2. 

958 Cohen 11 / 12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18, at 2-6. Cohen told investigators about his 

conversations with the President's personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and after this 

Office advised his counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any other privilege, 

including communications protected by a joint defense or common interest privilege. As a result, most of 

what Cohen told us about his conversations with the President's personal counsel concerned what Cohen 

had communicated to the President's personal counsel, and not what was said in response. Cohen described 

certain statements made by the President's personal counsel, however, that are set forth in this section. 

Cohen and his counsel were better positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any privilege protected 

those statements because they had knowledge of the scope of their joint defense agreement and access to 

privileged communications that may have provided context for evaluating the statements they shared. After 

interviewing Cohen about these matters, we asked the President's personal counsel if he wished to provide 

information to us about his conversations with Cohen related to Cohen's congressional testimony about 

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said that in those conversations the President's personal counsel would sometimes say that he had 

just been with the President.959 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel told him the 

JOA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on 

message the investigations would come to an end soon.960 At that time, Cohen's legal bills were 

being paid by the Trump Organization, 

961 and Cohen was told not to worry because the 

investigations would be over by summer or fall of 20 l 7.962 Cohen said that the President's 

personal counsel also conveyed that, as part of the JOA, Cohen was protected, which he would not 

be if he "went rogue."963 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel reminded him that 

"the President loves you" and told him that ifhe stayed on message, the President had his back.964 

In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit 

to Congress along with his document production.965 The final version of the statement contained 

several false statements about the project.966 First, although the Trump Organization continued to 

pursue the project until at least June 2016, the statement said, "The proposal was under 

consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By 

the end of January 2016, I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business 

reasons and should not be pursued further. Based on my business determinations, the Trump 

Organization abandoned the proposal."967 Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had 

discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said, "Despite 

overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered asking Mr. Trump to travel to Russia in connection with 

this proposal. I told Mr. Sater that Mr. Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a 

definitive agreement in place."968 Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status 

Trump Tower Moscow. The President's personal counsel declined and, through his own counsel, indicated 

that he could not disaggregate information he had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained 

from other parties in the IDA. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen's counsel to withhold 

communications that could be covered by privilege, the President's personal counsel's uncertainty about 

the provenance of his own knowledge, the burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support 

a claim of privilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included relevant statements 

Cohen provided in this report. If the statements were to be used in a context beyond this report, further 

analysis could be warranted. 

959 Cohen l 1 /20/18 302, at 6. 

96° Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2, 4. 

961 Cohen 11 /20/18 302, at 4. 

962 Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 8; Cohen 1 1 /20/18 302, at 3-4. 

963 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. 

964 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2. 

965 P-SCO-000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Michael Cohen's 

Counsel to Cohen). Cohen said it was not his idea to write a letter to Congress about Trump Tower Moscow. 

Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 7. 

966 P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 

967 P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 

968 P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 

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of the project and had numerous conversations about it, the statement said, "Mr. Trump was never 

in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a 

non-binding letter of intent in 2015."969 Fourth, although Cohen's outreach to Peskov in January 

2016 had resulted in a lengthy phone call with a representative from the Kremlin, the statement 

said that Cohen did "not recall any response to my email [to Peskov ], nor any other contacts by 

me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal."970 

Cohen's statement was circulated in advance to, and edited by, members of the JDA.97 1 

Before the statement was finalized, early drafts contained a sentence stating, "The building project 

led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials."972 In the final version of the 

statement, that line was deleted.973 Cohen thought he was told that it was a decision of the JOA to 

take out that sentence, and he did not push back on the deletion.974 Cohen recalled that he told the 

President's personal counsel that he would not contest a decision of the JDA.975 

Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement for Congress, he spoke with the 

President's personal counsel about a different issue that connected candidate Trump to Russia: 

Cohen's efforts to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin in New York during the 2015 United 

Nations General Assembly.976 In September 2015, Cohen had suggested the meeting to Trump, 

who told Cohen to reach out to Putin's office about it.977 Cohen spoke and emailed with a Russian 

official about a possible meeting, and recalled that Trump asked him multiple times for updates on 

the proposed meeting with Putin.978 When Cohen called the Russian official a second time, she 

told him it would not follow proper protocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohen relayed that 

969 P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 

970 P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 

971 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. Cohen also testified in Congress that the President's counsel 

reviewed and edited the statement. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House 

Oversight and Reform Committee, 116th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 24-25) (testimony 

by Michael Cohen). Because of concerns about the common interest privilege, we did not obtain or review 

all drafts of Cohen's statement. Based on the drafts that were released through this Office's filter process, 

it appears that the substance of the four principal false statements described above were contained in an 

early draft prepared by Cohen and his counsel. P-SCO-0000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 

Email and Attachment, Cohen's counsel to Cohen). 

972 P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Draft Statement of Michael Cohen); Cohen 11 /20/18 302, at 4. 

973 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. A different line stating that Cohen did "not recall any response to my 

email [to Peskov in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian 

government officials about the proposal" remained in the draft. See P-SCO-0000009478 (Statement of 

Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 

974 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. 

975 Cohen J l /20/18 302, at 5. 

976 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at I 0-11. 

977 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11 /12/ I 8 302, at 4. 

978 Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11 /12/18 302, at 5. 

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message to Trump.979 Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed TrumpPutin meeting when he testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting 

on Sean Hannity's radio show.98° Cohen recalled explaining to the President's personal counsel 

the "whole story" of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role 

in it.981 Cohen recalled that he and the President's personal counsel talked about keeping Trump 

out of the narrative, and the President's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and 

should not be included in his statement to Congress.

982 

Cohen said that his "agenda" in submitting the statement to Congress with false 

representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project 

and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential 

primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow, with the aim of limiting the 

ongoing Russia investigations.

983 Cohen said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to 

him by not contradicting anything the President had said.984 Cohen recalled he was concerned that 

ifhe told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about 

travel to Russia to pursue the project, he would contradict the message that no connection existed 

between Trump and Russia, and he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because 

the deal never happened.985 He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by 

individuals who knew it was false because he was sticking to the party line adhered to by the whole 

group.986 Cohen wanted the support of the President and the White House, and he believed that 

following the party line would help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressional 

investigations.987 

Between August 18, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage, and August 28, 

2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress, phone records reflect that Cohen spoke with 

the President's pcersonal counsel almost daily.988 On August 27, 2017, the day before Cohen 

979 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5. 

98° Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11. 

981 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 

982 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2; see Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11 (recalling that he was told that if he 

stayed on message and kept the President out of the narrative, the President would have his back). 

983 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8; Information at 4-5, United States v. Michael Cohen, I: l 8-cr-850 

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (Cohen Information). 

984 Cohen I 1/20/ 18 302, at 4. 

985 Cohen I I /20/18 302, at 4; Cohen 11/12/ 18 302, at 2-3, 4, 6. 

986 Cohen 9/12/l 8 302, at 9. 

987 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. 

988 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen 

(Reflecting three contacts on August 18, 2017 (24 seconds; 5 minutes 25 seconds; and IO minutes 58 

seconds); two contacts on August 19 (23 seconds and 24 minutes 26 seconds); three contacts on August 23 

(8 seconds; 20 minutes 33 seconds; and 5 minutes 8 seconds); one contact on August 24 (11 minutes 59 

seconds); 14 contacts on August 27 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; I minute 16 seconds; 1 minutes 35 

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submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the President's personal counsel had numerous 

contacts by phone, including calls lasting three, four, six, eleven, and eighteen minutes.989 Cohen 

recalled telling the President's personal counsel, who did not have first-hand knowledge of the 

project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement, 

including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with 

candidate Trump than the statement reflected.99° Cohen stated that the President's personal 

counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project 

did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and "tight" and the matter would 

soon come to an end.991 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel said "his client" 

appreciated Cohen, that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President, that there 

was no need to muddy the water, and that it was time to move on.992 Cohen said he agreed because 

it was what he was expected to do.993 After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements 

to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this Office sought to speak with the 

President's personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen, but counsel declined, citing 

potential privilege concerns.994 

At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a 

source for a Washington Post story published on August 27, 2017, that reported in depth for the 

first time that the Trump Organization was "pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower 

in Moscow" at the same time as candidate Trump was "running for president.in late 2015 and early 

2016."995 The article reported that "the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just 

before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said."996 Cohen 

recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased 

in January 2016.

997 

seconds; 6 minutes 16 seconds; I minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4 

minutes 56 seconds; 11 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds). 

989 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting 14 contacts on August 

27, 2017 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; 1 minute 16 seconds; I minutes 35 seconds; 6 minutes 16 

seconds; I minutes IO seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4 minutes 56 seconds; 11 

minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds)). 

99° Cohen 1 l /20/ 1 8 302, at 5. 

991 Cohen 1 I /20/18 302, at 5. Cohen also vaguely recalled telling the President's personal counsel 

that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President's personal counsel responded to the 

effect of "so what?" because the deal never happened. · Cohen 11 /20/18 302, at 5. 

992 Cohen 11 /20/ 18 302, at 5. 

993 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 

994 2/8/19 email, Counsel for personal counsel to the President to Special Counsel's Office. 

995 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business sought deal on a Trump 

Tower in Moscow while he ran/or president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017). 

996 Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he 

ran/or president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017). 

997 Cohen 9/18/ I 8 302, at 7. 

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On August 28, 2017, Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow 

project to Congress.998 Cohen did not recall talking to the President about the specifics of what 

the statement said or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tower Moscow.999 He 

recalled speaking to the President more generally about how he planned to stay on message in his 

testimony.

1000 On September 19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen 

orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, which criticized the allegations 

in the Steele material and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscow project "was terminated in 

January of 2016; which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first 

primary." 1001 Cohen said the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative 

and let other people who might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow 

the same message.1002 Cohen said his decision was meant to mirror Jared Kushner's decision to 

release a statement in advance of Kushner's congressional testimony, which the President's 

personal counsel had told Cohen the President liked. 1003 Cohen recalled that on September 20, 

2017, after Cohen's opening remarks had been printed by the media, the President's personal 

counsel told him that the President was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscow statement that had 

gone out.1004 

On October 24 and 25, 2017, Cohen testified before Congress and repeated the false 

statements he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow. 1005 Phone 

records show that Cohen spoke with the President's personal counsel immediately after his 

testimony on both days. 1006 

4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen 

In January 2018, the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $130,000 payment during 

the campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had 

998 P-SCO-000009477 - 9478 (8/28/17 Letter and Attachment, Cohen to SSCI). 

999 Cohen 11 /12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. 

100° Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. 

1001 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; see, e.g., READ: Michael Cohen 's statement to the Senate intelligence 

committee, CNN (Sept. 19, 2017). 

1002 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7. 

1003 Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 7; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6. 

1004 Cohen 11 /20/18 302, at 6. Phone records show that the President's personal counsel called 

Cohen on the morning of September 20, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 11 minutes, and that they 

had two more contacts that day, one of which lasted approximately 18 minutes. Call Records of Michael 

Cohen. (Reflecting three contacts on September 20, 2017, with calls lasting for 11 minutes 3 seconds; 2 

seconds; and 18 minutes 38 seconds). 

1005 Cohen Information, at 4; Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. 

House of Representatives, Interview of Michael Cohen (Oct. 24, 201 7), at I 0-11, 117-119. 

1006 Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting two contacts on October 24, 2017 (12 minutes 8 

seconds and 8 minutes 27 seconds) and three contacts on October 25, 2017 (1 second; 4 minutes 6 seconds; 

and 6 minutes 6 seconds)). 

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with the President before he ran for office.1007 This Office did not investigate Cohen's campaignperiod payments to women. 1008 However, those events, as described here, are potentially relevant 

to the President's and his personal counsel's interactions with Cohen as a witness who later began 

to cooperate with the government. 

On February 13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, "In a 

private transaction in 20 I 6, I used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of $130,000 to 

[the woman]. Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the 

transaction with [the woman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly or 

indirectly."1009 In congressional testimony on February 27, 2019, Cohen testified that he had 

discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed 

Cohen to say that the President "was not knowledgeable .. . of [Cohen's] actions" in making the 

payment. 1010 On February 19, 2018, the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story 

attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President's "fixer," Cohen received 

a text message from the President's personal counsel that stated, "Client says thanks for what you 

do." 1011 

On April 9, 2018, FBI agents working with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern 

District of New York executed search warrants on Cohen's home, hotel room, and office.1012 That 

day, the President spoke to reporters and said that he had "just heard that they broke into the office 

of one of my personal attorneys-a good man." 1013 The President called the searches "a real 

disgrace" and said, "It's an attack on our country, in a true sense. It's an attack on what we all 

1007 See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Lawyer Arranged $130,000 Payment for 

Adult-Film Star's Silence, Wall Street Journal (Jan. 12, 2018). 

1008 The Office was authorized to investigate Cohen's establishment and use of Essential 

Consultants LLC, which Cohen created to facilitate the $130,000 payment during the campaign, based on 

evidence that the entity received funds from Russian-backed entities. Cohen's use of Essential Consultants 

to facilitate the $130,000 payment to the woman during the campaign was part of the Office's referral of 

certain Cohen-related matters to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. 

1009 See, e.g., Mark Berman, Longtime Trump attorney says he made $130,000 payment to Stormy 

Daniels with his money, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2018). 

1010 Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform 

Committee, I W" Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 147-148) (testimony ofMichael Cohen). 

Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately five 

minutes on January 19, 2018, and for approximately seven minutes on January 30, 2018, and that Cohen 

called Melania Trump's cell phone several times between January 26, 2018, and January 30, 2018. Call 

Records of Michael Cohen. 

1011 2/19/18 Text Message, President's personal counsel to Cohen; see Jim Rutenberg et al., Tools 

of Trump's Fixer: Payouts, Intimidation and the Tabloids, New York Times (Feb. 18, 2018). 

1012 Gov't Opp. to Def. Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order, In the Matter of Search Warrants 

Executed on April 9, 2018, 18-mj-3161 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2018), Doc. 1 ("On April 9, 2018, agents from 

the New York field office of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation . . . executed search warrants for Michael 

Cohen's residence, hotel room, office, safety deposit box, and electronic devices."). 

1013 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House 

(Apr. 9, 2018). 

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stand for." 1014 Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was "an open book," 

that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to "come out," and that his false 

statements to Congress were "a big concern." 1015 . 

A few days after the searches, the President called Cohen.

1016 According to Cohen, the 

President said he wanted to "che~k in" and asked if Cohen was okay, and the President encouraged 

Cohen to "hang in there" and "stay strong." 1017 Cohen also recalled that following the searches he 

heard from individuals who were in touch with the President and relayed to Cohen the President's 

support for him. 1018 Cohen recalled that , a friend of the President's, reached out 

to say that he was with "the Boss" in M r La o nd t e President had said "he loves you" and 

not to worry. 1019 Cohen recalled that for the Trump 

Organization, told him, "the boss loves you." , a friend 

of the President's, told him, "everyone knows the boss has your back." 

On or about April l 7, 20 l 8, Cohen began speaking with an attorney, Robert Costello, who 

had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, one of the President's personal lawyers. 1022 

Costello told Cohen that he had a "back channel of communication" to Giuliani, and that Giuliani 

had said the "channel" was "crucial" and "must be maintained." 1023 On April 20, 2018, the New 

York Times published an article about the President's relationship with and treatment of Cohen. 1024 

The President responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not " flip" : 

The New York Times and a third rate reporter . . . are going out of their way to destroy 

Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will 'flip. ' They use nonexistent 'sources' and a drunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with a 

wonderful family. Michael is a businessman for his own account/lawyer who I have always 

liked & respected. Most people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble, everi 

10 14 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House 

(Apr. 9, 2018). 

1015 Cohen, 10/17/18 302, at 11. 

1016 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4. 

1017 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4. 

1018 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 

1019 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 

102° Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 

1021 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 

1022 4/17/18 Email, Citron to Cohen; 4/19/18 Email, Costello to Cohen; MC-SCO-001 (7/7/18 

redacted billing statement from Davidoff, Hutcher & Citroh to Cohen). 

1023 4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen. 

1024 See Maggie Haberman et al., Michael Cohen Has Said He Would Take a Bullet for Trump. 

Maybe Not Anymore., New York Times (Apr. 20, 2018). 

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if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don't see Michael doing that despite the 

horrible Witch Hunt and the dishonest media! 1025 

In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani. 1026 Costello told 

Cohen the conversation was "Very Very Positive[.] You are 'loved' ... they are in our corner ... . 

Sleep well tonight[], you have friends in high places."1027 

Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White 

House if he continued to toe the party line, and he determined to stay on message and be part of 

the team.1028 At the time, Cohen's understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump 

Organization, which he said was important to him. 1029 Cohen believed he needed the power of the 

President to take care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay on message. 

1030 

Cohen also recalled speaking with the President's personal counsel about pardons after the 

searches of his home and office had occurred, at a time when the media had reported that pardon 

discussions were occurring at the White House. 1031 Cohen told the President's personal counsel 

he had been a loyal lawyer and servant, and he said that after the searches he was in an 

uncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him. 1032 According to Cohen, the 

President's personal counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message, that the investigation 

was a witch hunt, and that everything would be fine. 1033 Cohen understood based on this 

conversation and previous conversations about pardons with the President's personal counsel that 

as long as he stayed on message, he would be taken care of by the President, either through a 

pardon or through the investigation being shut down. 1034 

1025 @realDonaldTrump 4121118 (9: 10 a.m. ET) Tweets. 

1026 4121/18 Email, Costello to Cohen. 

1028 Cohen 9112/18 302, at 11. 

1029 Cohen 9112118 302, at 10. 

103° Cohen 9/ 12/18 302, at IO. 

1031 Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 7. At a White House press briefing on April 23, 2018, in response to a 

question about whether the White House had "close[d] the door one way or the other on the President 

pardoning Michael Cohen," Sanders said, "It's hard to close the door on something that hasn't taken place. 

I don't like to discuss or comment on hypothetical situations that may or may not ever happen. I would 

refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything specific regarding that case, but we don't have 

anything at this point." Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Apr. 23, 2018). 

1032 Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 7; Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3. 

1033 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3. 

1034 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3-4. 

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On April 24, 2018, the President responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would 

consider a pardon for Cohen with, "Stupid question." 1035 On June 8, 2018, the President said he 

"hadn't even thought about" pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued, "It's far too early to 

be thinking about that. They haven't been convicted of anything. There's nothing to pardon." 1036 

And on June 15, 2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort, and Flynn in a 

press interview and said, " I feel badly about a lot of them, because I think a lot of it is very 

unfair." 1037 

5. The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government 

On July 2, 2018, ABC News reported based on an "exclusive" interview with Cohen that 

Cohen "strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and 

federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York--even if that puts President Trump in 

jeopardy."1038 That week, the media repotted that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team 

who previously had worked as a legal advisor to President Bill Clinton.

1039 

Beginning on July 20, 2018, the media reported on the existence of a recording Cohen had 

made of a conversation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman 

who said she had had an affair with Trump.1040 On July 21, 2018, the President responded: 

"Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer's office (early in the morning)­

almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client-totally unheard 

of & perhaps illegal. The good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong!"1041 On 

July 27, 2018, after the media reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald 

Trump Jr. told his father about the June 9, 2016 meeting to get "dirt" on Hillary Clinton, 1042 the 

President tweeted: "[S]o the Fake News doesn't waste my time with dumb questions, NO, I did 

NOT know of the meeting with my son, Don jr. Sounds to me like someone is trying to make up 

1035 Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France Before Restricted Bil.ateral 

Meeting, The White House (Apr. 24, 2018). 

1036 President Donald Trump Holds Media Availability Before Departing for the G-7 Summit, CQ 

Newsmaker Transcripts (June 8, 2018). 

1037 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, The White House (June 15, 2018). 

1038 EXCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his 'first 

loyalty', ABC (July 2, 2018). Cohen said in the interview, "To be crystal clear, my wife, my daughter and 

my son, and this country have my first loyalty." 

1039 See e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lanny Davis, 

Politico (July 5, 2018). 

1040 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to 

Playboy Model, New York Times (July 20, 2018). 

104 1 @r~alDonaldTrump 7/21/18 (8:10 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

1042 See, e.g., Jim Sciutto, Cuomo Prime Time Transcript, CNN (July 26, 20 18). 

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stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?). He even retained Bill 

and Crooked Hillary's lawyer. Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice!"1043 

On August 21, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight 

felony charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based on the payments he 

had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the 

President. 1044 During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked "at the direction of' the 

candidate in making those payments. 1045 The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's 

cooperation with Manafort's refusal to cooperate, tweeting, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort 

and his wonderful family. 'Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied 

tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break'-make up stories 

in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave man!"1046 

On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the President that 

included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen's written 

statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the President. 1047 Among other issues, 

the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with 

Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the 

President "at any time direct[ ed] or suggest[ ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscow project 

should cease," or whether the President was "informed at any time that the project had been 

abandoned."1048 

On November 20, 2018, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those 

questions about Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the 

timing of the candidate's discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he participated in 

any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued. 1049 Instead, the 

President's answers stated in relevant part: 

I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall; they were brief, and 

they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any 

discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with 

1043 @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET) 

Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56 a.m. ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press had 

reported that Cohen's financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators. 

See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model, 

New York Times (July 20, 2018). 

1044 Cohen Information. 

1045 Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript, at 23. 

1046 @realDonaldTrurnp 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

1047 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written 

questions for the President, with attachments). 

1048 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written 

questions for the President), Question III, Parts (a) through (g). 

1049 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018). 

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anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. T do not recall being aware 

at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian 

government official regarding the Letter oflntent. 1050 

On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress 

based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project. 1051 In a plea agreement with this 

Office, Cohen agreed to "provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which 

this Office deems relevant."1052 Later on November 29, after Cohen's guilty plea had become 

public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project, saying: 

I decided not to do the project. . . . I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have 

been nothing wrong ifI did do it. Ifl did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That 

was my business .... It was an option that I decided not to do .... I decided not to do it. 

The primary reason . . . T was focused on running for President. . . . I was running my 

business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn't have won, in 

which case I would've gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of 

opportunities? 1053 

The President also said that Cohen was "a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people 

that you watch-he is a weak person. And what he's trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So 

he's lying about a project that everybody knew about." 1054 The President also brought up Cohen's 

written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: "So here's the story: 

Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and/or 

Senate. It talked about his position."1055 The President added, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it 

doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign."1056 

In light of the President's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that he "decided 

not to do the project," this Office again sought information from the President about whether he 

participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including 

when he "decided not to do the project," who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated 

1050 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts 

(a) through (g)). 

105 1 Cohen Information; Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript. 

1052 Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1: l 8-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018). 

1053 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SP AN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President's 

remarks following·cohen's guilty plea, Cohen's August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, 

not the President, "decided to abandon the proposal" in late January 2016; that Cohen "did not ask or brief 

Mr. Trump ... before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal"; and that the decision 

· to abandon the proposal was "unrelated" to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D. 

Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 

1054 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). 

1055 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). 

1056 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). 

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the decision. 1057 The Office also again asked for the timing of the President's discussions with 

Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify "what period of the campaign" he 

was involved in discussions concerning the project. 1058 In response, the President's personal 

counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated that "the President 

has fully answered the questions at issue." 1059 

In the weeks following Cohen's plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office, 

the President repeatedly implied that Cohen's family members were guilty of crimes. On 

December 3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted, 

'"Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.' You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE, 

unrelated to Trump, things having to do with fraud, big loans, Taxis, etc., and not serve a long 

prison term? He makes up stories to get a GREAT & ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and 

get his wife and father-in-law (who has the money?) off Scott Free. He lied for this outcome and 

should, in m o inion serve a full and com lete sentence."1060 

On Decem her 12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. 1062 The next 

day, the President sent a series of tweets that said: 

I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law .... Those charges were just agreed to by 

him in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he 

did-including the fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook. As a lawyer, 

Michael has great liability to me! 1063 

On December 16, 2018, the President tweeted, "Remember, Michael Cohen only became a 'Rat' 

after the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable & unheard of until the Witch Hunt 

was illegally started. They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY'S OFFICE! Why didn't they break 

into the DNC to get the Server, or Crooked' s office?"1064 

In January 2019, after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a 

congressional hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen's 

1057 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel. 

1058 1/23/ 19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel. 

1059 2/6/ l 9 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office. 

1060 @rea!DonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:24 a.m. ET and l 0:29 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis added). 

1061 @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 ( 10:48 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

1062 Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript. 

1063 @realDonaldTrump 12/ 13/18 (8: 17 a.m. ET, 8:25 a.m. ET, and 8:39 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis 

added). 

1064 @realDonaldTrump 12/16/ 18 (9:39 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

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family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019, the President 

was asked whether he was worried about Cohen's testimony and responded: 

[I]n order to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says "I have an idea, I'll ah, tell-I'll give 

you some information on the president." Well, there is no information. But he should give 

information maybe on his father-in-law because that's the one that people want to look at 

because where does that money-that's the money in the family. And I guess he didn't 

want to talk about his father-in-law, he's trying to get his sentence reduced. So it's ah, 

pretty sad. You know, it's weak and it's very sad to watch a thing like that. 1065 

On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, "Kevin Corke, @FoxNews 'Don't forget, 

Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the 

Wall Street Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars .... ' Lying 

to reduce his jail time! Watchfather-in-law/" 1066 

On January 23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimony, citing threats against 

his family. 1067 The next day, the President tweeted, "So interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen, 

who sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of Crooked Hillary Clinton 

to represent him-Gee, how did that happen?" 1068 

Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's 

account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project well past January 

2016. Giuliani stated that " it's our understanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow 

project] went on throughout 2016. Weren't a lot of them, but there were conversations. Can't be 

sure of the exact date. But the president can remember having conversations with him about it. 

The president also remembers-yeah, probably up-could be up to as far as October, 

November." 1069 In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the President as saying 

that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were "going on from the day I 

announced to the day I won." 1070 On January 21, 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said: "My 

recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and 

candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow ' project' were hypothetical and not 

based on conversations I had with the president." 1071 

1065 Jeanine Pirro Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Jan. 12, 2019) (emphasis added). 

1066 @rea!DonaldTrump 1/18/ 19 ( 10:02 a.m. ET) Tweet (emphasis added). 

1067 Statement by Lanny Davis, Cohen's personal counsel (Jan. 23, 2019). 

1068 @realDonaldTrump 1/24/19 (7:48 a.m. ET) Tweet. 

1069 Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani, NBC (Jan. 20, 2019). 

1070 Mark Mazzetti et al., Moscow Skyscraper Talks Continued Through "the Day I Won, " Trump 

Is Said to Acknowledge, New York Times (Jan. 20, 2019). 

1071 Maggie Haberman, Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were "Hypothetical", 

New York Times (Jan. 2 1, 2019). In a letter to this Office, the President's counsel stated that Giuliani's 

pub! ic comments "were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or timing 

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Analysis 

In analyzing the President's conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant 

to the elements of obstruction of justice. 

a. Obstructive act. We gathered evidence of the President's conduct related to Cohen 

on two issues: (i) whether the President or others aided or participated in Cohen's false statements 

to Congress, and (ii) whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to 

prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to the government. 

i. First, with regard to Cohen's false statements to Congress, while there is 

evidence, described below, that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress 

about the Trump Tower Moscow project, the evidence available to us does not establish that the 

President directed or aided Cohen's false testimony. 

Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a "party line" that developed within 

the campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia. 

Cohen also recalled that, in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear 

that he would stay on message-which Cohen believed they both understood would require false 

testimony. But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen's 

testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false, and the President did 

not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the 

specifics of his planned testimony. During the time when his statement to Congress was being 

drafted and circulated to members of the JOA, Cohen did not speak directly to the President about 

the statement, but rather communicated with the President's personal counsel-as corroborated by 

phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and the President's personal 

counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and when he testified before Congress. 

Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the President's personal counsel on August 27, 

2017- the day before Cohen's statement was submitted to Congress- Cohen said that there were 

more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the 

statement reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen, 

the President's personal counsel-who did not have first-hand knowledge of the projectresponded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include 

those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short 

and tight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen's recollection 

of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen's 

draft statement that appeared to come from members of the JOA. For example, Cohen omitted 

any reference to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump 

and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of 

of conversations beyond that contained in the President's [ written responses to the Special Counsel's 

Office]." 2/6/19 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office. 

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the IDA to delete the sentence, "The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian 

government officials." 

The President's personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his 

conversations with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President 

was aware of the information Cohen provided to the President's personal counsel. The President's 

conversations with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege, 

and we did not seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. The absence of evidence 

about the President and his counsel's conversations about the drafting of Cohen's statement 

precludes us from assessing what, if any, role the President played. 

ii. Second, we considered whether the President took actions that would have 

the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal 

investigators or to Congress. 

Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately 

urged Cohen to stay on message and not " flip." Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel 

telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go " rogue." In the days and weeks 

that fol lowed the Apri 1 2018 searches of Cohen's home and office, the President told reporters that 

Cohen was a "good man" and said he was "a fine person with a wonderful family ... who I have 

always liked & respected." Privately, the President told Cohen to "hang in there" and "stay 

strong." People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that 

"the President loves you," "the boss loves you," and "everyone knows the boss has your back." 

Through the President's personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen "thanks 

for what you do" after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that, 

according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false. At that time, the Trump 

Organization continued to pay Cohen's legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also 

recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President's personal counsel, who told him 

to stay on message and everything would be fine. The President indicated in his public statements 

that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated publicly that " [m]ost people will flip if the 

Government lets them out of trouble" but that he "d[idn't] see Michael doing that." 

After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the 

President accused Cohen of "mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam 

(Taxi cabs maybe?)," called Cohen a "rat," and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that 

Cohen's family members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events 

could suppot1 an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages 

in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the 

provision of information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began cooperating. 

b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President's relevant"conduct towards Cohen 

occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel's Office, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney's 

Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen's conduct. The President 

acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate 

with the government investigations. 

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c. Intent. In analyzing the President's intent in his actions towards Cohen as a 

potential witness, there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to 

discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen's information would shed 

adverse light on the President's campaign-period conduct and statements. 

i. Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow 

project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit 

the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations-a goal that was in the President's interest, as 

reflected by the President's own statements. During and after the campaign, the President made 

repeated statements that he had "no business" in Russia and said that there were "no deals that 

could happen in Russia, because we've stayed away." As Cohen knew, and as he recalled 

communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen's pursuit of the Trump Tower 

Moscow project cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements. 

In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with 

candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow project, that the 

conversations continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trump possible 

travel to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off-hand, according to Cohen, 

because the project had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, text messages to and from 

Cohen and other records further establish that Cohen's efforts to advance the project did not end 

in January 2016 and that in May and June 2016, Cohen was considering the timing for possible 

trips to Russia by him and Trump in connection with the project. 

The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the 

time of Cohen's false statements to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the President in 

early 2017 following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, the day after 

he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress- which said the project "was terminated 

in January of 2016"-the President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with 

what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. And after Cohen's guilty plea, the President 

told reporters tha.t he had ultimately decided not to do the project, which supports the inference 

that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign 

in which the project was being pursued. 

ii. The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest 

that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump 

Tower Moscow project. At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from 

this Office about the project and other subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating 

with the government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress. 

Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided 

to the government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing 

and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had 

decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly 

stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon the project. The President then declined 

to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions. The content and 

timing of the President's provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the 

Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the 

information that Cohen could provide as a witness. 

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111. The President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed 

at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings 

with Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence 

that the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's stated belief 

that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser 

sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, 

refused to "break" and "make up stories in order to get a 'deal."' And after Cohen pleaded guilty 

to making false statements to Congress, the President said, "what [Cohen]'s trying to do is get a 

reduced sentence. So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about." But the President 

also appeared to defend the underlying conduct, saying, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't 

matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign." As described above, 

there is evidence that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump 

Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President's 

connections to Russia during the campaign. 

iv. Finally, the President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's 

family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as 

an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen 

or others. It is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen "ma[d]e[] 

up stories" in order to get a deal for himself and "get his wife and father-in-law .. . off Scott Free." 

It also is possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not intended 

to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting 

Cohen and deflecting attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters. But the 

President's suggestion that Cohen's family members committed crimes happened more than once, 

including just before Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen 

"should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence") and again just before Cohen was 

scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the statements supports an inference that they 

were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation. 

L. Overarching Factual Issues 

Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination 

decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts 

concerning the President's course of conduct. 

1. Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-ofjustice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. 

First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate 

the President's constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-of-justice issues. 

Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the President's Article II authority, which 

raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume II, Section III.B, infra. A factual analysis 

of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially lawful 

and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful 

means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses. 

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Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying 

crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper 

obstructive purpose, see, e.g. , United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1988), or that 

he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, see, e.g., United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 

558, 591 (2d Cir. 2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. 

See United States v. Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction 

sentencing guideline, that "obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the 

prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying 

crime"). Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal 

interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area, 

or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same 

regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong. 

In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an 

underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range 

of other possible personal motives animating the President's conduct. These include concerns that 

continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential 

uncertainty about whether certain events-such as advance notice of WikiLeaks's release of 

hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russianscould be seen as criminal activity by the President, his campaign, or his family. 

Third, many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of 

cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public 

view. While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a 

corrupt intent, the President's power to influence actions, persons, and events is enhanced by his 

unique ability to attract attention through use of mass communications. And no principle of law 

excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to 

intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony, the justice system's integrity is equally threatened. 

2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts- e.g., the President's 

statement to Corney about the Flynn investigation, his termination of Corney, and his efforts to 

remove the Special Counsel- it is important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole. 

That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be drawn 

about his intent. 

a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exetting 

undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and 

obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in 

which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions 

ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney 

General 's recusal; to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to 

direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing 

the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example, the President's 

direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by 

his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia 

investigation to prospective election-interference only-a temporal connection that suggests that 

both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. 

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The President' s efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is 

largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede 

to his requests. Corney did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's 

prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahn did not tell the Acting Attorney General 

that the Special Counsel must be removed, but was instead prepared to resign over the President's 

order. Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President's message to Sessions that he 

should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to 

recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the Special 

Counsel removed, despite the President's multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that 

pattern, the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the 

President's aides and associates beyond those already filed. 

b. In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President's actions can 

be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. In the 

first phase, before the President fired Corney, the President had been assured that the FBI had not 

opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make 

public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination 

letter to Corney after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful. 

Soon after he fired Corney, however, the President became aware that investigators were 

conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked a 

significant change in the President's conduct and the start of a second phase of action. The 

President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could 

possess evidence adverse to the President, while in private, the President engaged in a series of 

targeted efforts to control the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the 

Special Counsel; he sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself and limit the 

investigation; he sought to prevent public disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 meeting 

between Russians and campaign officials; and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses 

who might offer adverse information and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the 

government. Judgments about the nature of the President's motives during each phase would be 

informed by the totality of the evidence. 

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III. LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To 

THE PRESIDENT 

The President's personal counsel has written to this Office to advance statutory and 

constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of-justice statutes to the 

President's conduct. 1072 As a statutory matter, the President's counsel has argued that a core 

obstruction-of-justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512( c )(2), does not cover the President's actions.

1073 

As a constitutional matter, the President's counsel argued that the President cannot obstruct justice 

by exercising his constitutional authority to close Department of Justice investigations or terminate 

the FBI Director. 1074 Under that view, any statute that restricts the President's exercise of those 

powers would impermissibly intrude on the President's constitutional role. The President's 

counsel has conceded that the President may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve 

exercises of his Article JI authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning 

perjury.1075 But counsel has made a categorical argument that "the President's exercise of his 

constitutional authority here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot 

constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice."1076 

In analyzing counsel's statutory arguments, we concluded that the President's proposed 

interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2) is contrary to the litigating position of the Department of 

Justice and is not supported by principles of statutory construction. 

As for the constitutional arguments, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the 

courts have not definitively resolved these constitutional issues. We therefore analyzed the 

President's position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation 

of powers. Under that framework, we concluded, Article IT of the Constitution does not 

categorically and permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that 

we investigated. Rather, our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of-justice statutes can 

1072 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; see also 1/29/18 

Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal 

Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's 

Office, at 4. 

1073 2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2-9. Counsel has 

also noted that other potentially applicable obstruction statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1505, protect only 

pending proceedings. 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 7-8. 

Section 1512(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the 

person contemplated. See Volume II, Section III.A, supra. 

1074 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 1 ("[T]he President 

cannot obstruct ... by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers."). 

1075 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. 1. 

1076 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. I (dashes 

omitted); see also 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 4 ("[T]he 

obstruction-of-justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially 

lawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article TT discretionary authority to 

remove principal officers or carry out the prosecution function."). 

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validly prohibit a President's corrupt efforts to use his official powers to curtail, end, or interfere 

with an investigation. 

A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to 

the Conduct Under Investigation 

The obstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512( c )(2). Section I 512( c) provides: 

(c) Whoever corruptly-

(!) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or 

attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for 

use in an official proceeding; or 

(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts 

to do so, 

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 

The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section 1512( c )(2) states a broad, 

independent, and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice.1077 While defendants have 

argued that subsection (c)(2) should be read to cover only acts that would impair the availability 

or integrity of evidence because that is subsection (c)(l)'s focus, strong arguments weigh against 

that proposed limitation. The text of Section 1512( c )(2) confirms that its sweep is not tethered to 

Section 1512( c )(1 ); courts have so interpreted it; its history does not counsel otherwise; and no 

principle of statutory construction dictates a contrary view. On its face, therefore, Section 

1512( c )(2) applies to all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding, pending or contemplatedincluding by improper exercises of official power. In addition, other statutory provisions that are 

potentially applicable to certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction of 

proceedings that are pending before courts, grand juries, and Congress. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 

1505. Congress has also specifically prohibited witness tampering. See 18 U .S.C. § 1512(6 ). 

I. The Text of Section I 5 l 2{c){2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts 

Several textual features of Section 1512( c )(2) support the conclusion that the provision 

broadly prohibits corrupt means of obstructing justice and is not limited by the more specific 

prohibitions in Section 1512( c )(I), which focus on evidence impairment. 

First, the text of Section 1512( c )(2) is unqualified: it reaches acts that "obstruct[], 

influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding" when committed "corruptly." Nothing in Section 

1512(c)(2)'s text limits the provision to acts that would impair the integrity or availability of 

evidence for use in an official proceeding. In contrast, Section 1512(c)(I) explicitly includes the 

requirement that the defendant act "with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability 

1077 See U.S. Br., United States v. Kumar, Nos. 06- 5482-cr(L), 06-5654-cr(CON) (2d Cir. filed 

Oct. 26, 2007), at pp. 15-28; United States v. Singleton, Nos. H-04-CR-514SS, H-06-cr-80 (S.D. Tex. filed 

June 5, 2006). 

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for use in an official proceeding," a requirement that Congress also included in two other sections 

of Section 1512. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(2)(B)(ii) (use of physical force with intent to cause a 

person to destroy an object "with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use 

in an official proceeding"); 1512(6 )(2)(B) (use of intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, or 

misleading conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object "with intent to impair the 

integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding"). But no comparable intent 

or conduct element focused on evidence impairment appears in Section 1512( c )(2). The intent 

element in Section l 512(c)(2) comes from the word "corruptly." See, e.g., United.States v. 

McKibbins, 656 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The intent element is important because the word 

' corruptly' is what serves to separate criminal and innocent acts of obstruction.") (internal 

quotation marks omitted). And the conduct element in Section 1512( c )(2) is "obstruct[ing], 

influenc[ing], or imped[ing]" a proceeding. Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in 

the disparate inclusion and exclusion of evidence-impairment language. See Loughrin v. United 

States, 573 U.S. 351 , 358 (2014) ("[W]hen 'Congress includes particular language in one section 

of a statute but om its it in another' -let alone in the very next provision- th is Court ' presume[ s]' 

that Congress intended a difference in meaning") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 

23 (1983)); accord Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777(2018). 

Second, the structure of Section 1512 supports the conclusion that Section 1512( c )(2) 

defines an independent offense. Section 1512(c)(2) delineates a complete crime with different 

elements from Section I 5 I 2(c)(I )-and each subsection of Section 1512(c) contains its own 

"attempt" prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The two subsections 

of Section 1512(c) are connected by the conjunction "or," indicating that each provides an 

alternative basis for criminal liability. See Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357 ("ordinary use [of 'or'] is 

almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings") 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In Loughrin, for example, the Supreme Court relied on the use 

of the word "or" to hold that adjacent and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute, 18 

U .S.C. § 1344, state distinct offenses and that subsection 1344(2) therefore should not be 

interpreted to contain an additional element specified only in subsection 1344(1 ). Id.; see also 

Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 465-469 (2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the 

bank fraud statute "overlap substantially" but identifying distinct circumstances covered by 

each). 1078 And here, as in Loughrin, Section 1512(c)'s "two clauses have separate numbers, line 

breaks before, between, and after them, and equivalent indentation-thus placing the clauses 

visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have separate meanings." 573 U.S. at 359. 

Third, the introductory word "otherwise" in Section 1512( c )(2) signals that the provision 

covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed in Section 1512( c )(I). See Black's Law 

Dictionary 1101 (6th ed. 1990) ("otherwise" means "in a different manner; in another way, or in 

other ways"); see also, e.g., American Heritage College Dictionary Online ("I. In another way; 

1078 The Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretive principles in 

concluding that language that appeared in the first clause of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § I 084, restricting its 

prohibition against certain betting or wagering activities to "any sporting event or contest," did not apply 

to the second clause of the same statute, which reaches other betting or wagering activities. See 

Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling (Nov. 2, 2018), slip op. 7 (relying 

on plain language); id. at 11 (finding it not "tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier 'on any 

sporting event or contest' that appears in the first clause"); id. at 12 (relying on Digital Realty). 

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differently; 2. Under other circumstances"); see also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 

(1936) (characterizing "otherwise" as a "broad term" and holding that a statutory prohibition on 

kidnapping "for ransom or reward or otherwise" is not limited by the words "ransom" and 

"reward" to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits); Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190,200 (2d 

Cir. 2004) (construing "otherwise" in 28 U.S.C. § 2466(l)(C) to reach beyond the "specific 

examples" listed in prior subsections, thereby covering the "myriad means that human ingenuity 

might devise to permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court"); cf Begay v. United States, 

553 U.S. 137, 144 (2006) (recognizing that "otherwise" is defined to mean " in a different way or 

manner," and holding that the word "otherwise" introducing the residual clause in the Armed 

Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), can, but need not necessarily, "refer to a crime 

that is similar to the listed examples in some respects but different in others"). 1079 The purpose of 

the word "otherwise" in Section 1512( c )(2) is therefore to c larify that the provision covers 

obstructive acts other than the destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its 

integrity or availability, which is the conduct addressed in Section l 5 l 2(c)( I). The word 

"otherwise" does not signal that Section 1512( c )(2) has less breadth in covering obstructive 

conduct than the language of the provision implies. 

2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512(c)(2) 

Courts have not limited Section 1512( c )(2) to conduct that impairs evidence, but instead 

have read it to cover obstructive acts in any form. 

As one court explained, " [t]his expansive subsection operates as a catch-all to cover 

'otherwise' obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific offense like document 

destruction, which is listed in (c)(l)." United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 286 (7th Cir. 

2014) (some quotation marks omitted). For example, in United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d 

195 (D.D.C. 2009), the court rejected the argument that"§ 1512( c )(2)'s reference to conduct that 

'otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding' is limited to conduct that is 

similar to the type of conduct proscribed by subsection (c)(l)-namely, conduct that impairs the 

integrity or availability of 'record[s], documents[s], or other object[s] for use in an official 

proceeding." Id. at 224. The court explained that "the meaning of§ 1512(c)(2) is plain on its 

face." Id. (alternations in original). And courts have upheld convictions under Section l 512(c)(2) 

that did not involve evidence impairment, but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly 

thwarted arrests or investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 

2017) (police officer tipped off suspects about issuance of arrest warrants before "outstanding 

warrants could be executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury 

proceeding"); United States v. Ahrensfield, 698 F.3d 1310, 1324-1326 (10th Cir. 2012) (officer 

disclosed existence of an undercover investigation to its target); United States v. Phillips, 583 F .3d 

1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009) ( defendant disclosed identity of an undercover officer thus preventing 

him from making controlled purchases from methamphetamine dealers). Those cases illustrate, 

that Section 1512(c)(2) applies to corrupt acts- including by public officials-that frustrate the 

1079 In Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 15 (2011 ), the Supreme Court substantially abandoned 

Begay's reading of the residual clause, and in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Court 

invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Begay's analysis of the word "otherwise" is 

thus of limited value. 

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commencement or conduct of a proceeding, and not just to acts that make evidence unavailable or 

impair its integrity. 

Section 1512(c)(2)'s breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus 

clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which covers anyone who "corruptly ... obstructs, or impedes, or 

endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice." That clause of 

Section 1503 follows two more specific clauses that protect jurors, judges, and court officers. The 

omnibus clause has nevertheless been construed to be "far more general in scope than the earlier 

clauses of the statute." United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). "The omnibus clause 

is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due 

administration of justice." United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts 

have accordingly given it a "non-restrictive reading." United States v. Kumar, 617 F .3d 612, 620 

(2d Cir. 201 O); id. at 620 n.7 (collecting cases from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh 

Circuits). As one court has explained, the omnibus clause "prohibits acts that are similar in result, 

rather than manner, to the conduct described in the first part of the statute." United States v. 

Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978). While the specific clauses "forbid certain means 

of obstructing justice ... the omnibus clause aims at obstruction of justice itself, regardless of the 

means used to reach that result." Id. ( collecting cases). Given the similarity of Section 1512( c )(2) 

to Section 1503 's omnibus clause, Congress would have expected Section 1512(c)(2) to cover acts 

that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairment provisions-i.e., the result of obstructing 

justice-rather than covering only acts that were similar in manner. Read this way, Section 

1512( c )(2) serves a distinct function in the federal obstruction-of-justice statutes: it captures 

corrupt conduct, other than document destruction, that has the natural tendency to obstruct 

contemplated as well as pending proceedings. 

Section 1512( c )(2) overlaps with other obstruction statutes, but it does not render them 

superfluous. Section 1503, for example, which covers pending grand jury and judicial 

proceedings, and Section 1505, which covers pending administrative and congressional 

proceedings, reach "endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede" the proceedings-a broader test 

for inchoate violations than Section 1512(c)(2)'s "attempt" standard, which requires a substantial 

step towards a completed offense. See United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287,302 (2d Cir.2018) 

("[E]fforts to witness tamper that rise to the level of an ' endeavor' yet fall short of an 'attempt' 

cannot be prosecuted under§ 1512."); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th 

Cir. 1988) (collecting cases recognizing the difference between the "endeavor" and "attempt" 

standards). And 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which prohibits destruction of documents or records in 

contemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not require the "nexus" showing under 

Aguilar, which Section 1512( c )(2) demands. See, e.g., United States v. Yielding, 657 F .3d 688, 

712 (8th Cir.2011) ("The requisite knowledge and intent [ under Section 1519] can be present even 

if the accused lacks knowledge that he is likely to succeed in obstructing the matter."); United 

States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 376-377 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[I]n enacting§ 1519, Congress rejected 

any requirement that the government prove a link between a defendant's conduct and an imminent 

or pending official proceeding."). The existence of even "substantial" overlap is not "uncommon" 

in criminal statutes. Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 359 n.4; see Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 458-469; Aguilar, 515 

U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The fact that there is now some overlap between§ 1503 and 

§ 1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause 

of§ 1503 and the other provisions of§ 1503 itself."). But given that Sections 1503, 1505, and 

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1519 each reach conduct that Section 1512( c )(2) does not, the overlap provides no reason to give 

Section 1512( c )(2) an artificially limited construction. See Shaw, 13 7 S. Ct. at 469. 1080 

3. The Legislative History of Section l512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing Its 

Text 

"Given the straightforward statutory command" in Section l512(c)(2), "there is no reason 

to resort to legislative history." United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). In any event, the 

legislative history of Section 1512(c)(2) is not a reason to impose extratextual limitations on its 

reach. 

Congress enacted Section 1512( c )(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 

107-204, Tit. XI, § 1102, 116 Stat. 807. The relevant section of the statute was entitled 

"Tampering with a Record or Otherwise Impeding an Official Proceeding." 116 Stat. 807 

( emphasis added). That title indicates that Congress intended the two clauses to have independent 

effect. Section 1512( c) was added as a floor amendment in the Senate and explained as closing a 

certain "loophole" with respect to "document shredding." See 148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (July I 0, 

2002) (Sen. Lott); id. at S6549-S6550 (Sen: Hatch). But those explanations do not limit the enacted 

text. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) ("[l]t is not the law that a 

statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history."); see also 

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (20 18) ("Even if Congress did not 

foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair 

reading."). The floor statements thus cannot detract from the meaning of the enacted text. See 

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) ("Floor statements from two Senators 

.cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason to give greater 

weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses, which are 

memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text."). That principle has particular force where one 

of the proponents of the amendment to Section 1512 introduced his remarks as only "briefly 

elaborat[ing] on some of the specific provisions contained in this bill." 148 Cong. Rec. S6550 

(Sen. Hatch). 

Indeed, the language Congress used in Section 1512( c )(2)-prohibiting "corruptly ... 

obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding" or attempting to do so-­

parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen 

protections against witness tampering and obstruction of justice. While the earlier provision is not 

a direct antecedent of Section 15 12(c)(2), Congress's understanding of the broad scope of the 

1080 The Supreme Court's decision in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018), does not 

support imposing a non-textual limitation on Section I 512(c)(2). Marinello interpreted the tax obstruction 

statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), to require "a ' nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a particular 

administrative proceeding." Id. at 1109. The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar 

interpretation given to "other obstruction provisions," id. (citing Aguilar and Arthur Andersen), as well as 

considerations of context, legislative history, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. Id. 

at 1106-1108. The type of "nexus" element the Court adopted in Marinello already applies under Section 

1512(c)(2), and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section l 512(c)(2) 

language that is not there. See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 ( 1997) (the Court "ordinarily resist[ s] 

reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face."). 

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earlier provision is instructive. Recognizing that "the proper administration of justice may be 

impeded or thwarted" by a "variety of corrupt methods ... limited only by the imagination of the 

criminally inclined," S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1982), Congress considered a 

bill that would have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime, inter alia, when a person 

"corruptly .. . influences, obstructs, or impedes . . . [t]he enforcement and prosecution of federal 

law," "administration of a law under which an official proceeding is being or may be conducted," 

or the "exercise of a Federal legislative power of inquiry." Id. at 17-19 ( quoting S. 2420). 

The Senate Committee explained that: 

[T]he purpose of preventing an obstruction of or miscarriage of justice cannot be fully 

carried out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses. 

There must also be protection against the rare type of conduct that is the product of the 

inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice. 

Id. at 18. The report gave examples of conduct " actually prosecuted under the current residual 

clause [in 18 U.S.C. § 1503], which would probably not be covered in this series [of provisions] 

without a residual clause." Id. One prominent example was " [a] conspiracy to cover up the 

Watergate burglary and its aftermath by having the Central Intelligence Agency seek to interfere 

with an ongoing FBI investigation of the burglary." Id. (citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 

F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The report therefore indicates a congressional awareness not only that 

residual-clause language resembling Section 1512( c )(2) broadly covers a wide variety of 

obstructive conduct, but also that such language reaches the improper use of governmental 

processes to obstruct justice-specifically, the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by White House 

officials including the President himself. See Haldeman, 559 F .3d at 51, 86-87, 120-129, 162.

1081 

4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section 

1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation 

The requirement of fair warning in criminal law, the interest in avoiding due process 

concerns in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do not justify narrowing the reach of 

Section 1512( c )(2)' s text. 1082 

a. As with other criminal laws, the Supreme Court has "exercised restraint" in interpreting 

obstruction-of-justice provisions, both out ofrespect for Congress's role in defining crimes and in 

the interest of providing individuals with " fair warning" of what a criminal statute prohibits. 

Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703; 

1081 The Senate ultimately accepted the House version of the bill, which excluded an omnibus 

clause. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 382-383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (tracing history of the 

proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation). During the floor debate on the bill, 

Senator Heinz, one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation, explained that the omnibus clause 

was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely "duplicative" of other 

obstruction laws, 128 Cong. Rec. 26,810 (1982) (Sen. Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and 

1505. 

1082 In a separate section addressing considerations unique to the presidency, we consider principles 

of statutory construction relevant in that context. See Volume Tl, Section III.B.l, infra. 

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Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-602. In several obstruction cases, the Court has imposed a nexus test that 

requires that the wrongful conduct targeted by the provision be sufficiently connected to an official 

proceeding to ensure the requisite culpability. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1109; Arthur Andersen, 

544 U.S. at 707-708; Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600-602. Section 1512(c)(2) has been interpreted to 

require a similar nexus. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019); 

United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 

1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reich, 4 79 F .3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). To satisfy 

the nexus requirement, the government must show as an objective matter that a defendant acted 

"in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice," such that the statute " excludes defendants who have 

an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful." 

Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 599 ("the endeavor 

must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice") 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The government must also show as a subjective matter that 

the actor "contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding." Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445. Those 

requirements alleviate fair-warning concerns by ensuring that obstructive conduct has a close 

enough connection to existing or future proceedings to implicate the dangers targeted by the 

obstruction laws and that the individual actually has the obstructive result in mind. 

b. Courts also seek to construe statutes to avoid due process vagueness concerns. See, e.g., 

McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 

368, 402-404 (2010). Vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define a crime "with sufficient 

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and " in a manner that 

does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. at 402-403 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The obstruction statutes' requirement of acting "corruptly" satisfies that test. 

"Acting 'corruptly' within the meaning of§ 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper 

purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, 

impede or obstruct" the relevant proceeding. United States v. Gordon, 710 F .3d 1 124, I 151 (10th 

Cir. 2013) (some quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion in Aguilar did not address the 

defendant's vagueness challenge to the word "corruptly," 515 U.S. at 600 n. 1, but Justice Scalia's 

separate opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected the challenge, id. at 616-617 (Scalia, 

J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Statutory 

language need not be colloquial," Justice Scalia explained, and "the term ' corruptly' in criminal 

laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes an act done with an intent to give 

some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." Id. at 616 (internal 

quotation marks omitted; citing lower court authority and legal dictionaries). Justice Scalia added 

that "in the context of obstructing jury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is 

incredible." Id. at 617. Lower courts have also rejected vagueness challenges to the word 

"corruptly." See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 869 F.3d 490, 501-502 (7th Cir. 2017); United 

States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280-1281 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 

1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978). This well-established intent standard precludes the need to limit 

the obstruction statutes to only certain kinds of inherently wrongful conduct.1083 

1083 In United States v. Poindexter, 951 F .2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991 ), the court of appeals found the 

term "corruptly" in 18 U.S.C. § 1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to 

Congress. After suggesting that the word "corruptly" was vague on its face, 951 F.2d at 378, the court 

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c. Finally, the rule of lenity does not justify treating Section 1512( c )(2) as a prohibition on 

evidence impairment, as opposed to an omnibus clause. The rule of lenity is an interpretive 

principle that resolves ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of the less-severe construction. 

Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000). "[ A ]s [the Court has] repeatedly emphasized," 

however, the rule of lenity applies only if, "after considering text, structure, history and purpose, 

there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply 

guess as to what Congress intended." Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The rule has been cited, for example, in adopting a narrow 

meaning of"tangible object" in an obstruction statute when the prohibition's title, history, and list 

of prohibited acts indicated a focus on destruction of records. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. 

Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting "tangible object" in the phrase "record, 

document, or tangible object" in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 to mean an item capable of recording or 

preserving information).· Here, as discussed above, the text, structure, and history of Section 

l 5 I 2(c)(2) leaves no "grievous ambiguity" about the statute's meaning. Section l 512(c)(2) 

defines a structurally independent general prohibition on obstruction of official proceedings. 

5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation 

Regardless whether Section 1512( c )(2) covers all corrupt acts that obstruct, influence, or 

impede pending or contemplated proceedings, other statutes would apply to such conduct in 

pending proceedings, provided that the remaining statutory elements are satisfied. As discussed 

above, the omnibus clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) applies generally to obstruction of pending 

judicial and grand proceedings. 1084 See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 598 (noting that the clause is "far 

more general in scope" than preceding provisions). Section I 503(a)'s protections extend to 

witness tampering and to other obstructive conduct that has a nexus to pending proceedings. See 

Sampson, 898 F.3d at 298-303 & n.6 (collecting cases from eight circuits holding that Section 

1503 covers witness-related obstructive conduct, and cabining prior circuit authority). And 

Section 1505 broadly criminalizes obstructive conduct aimed at pending agency and congressional 

proceedings.1085 See, e.g., United States v. Rainey, 757 F.3d 234, 241-247 (5th Cir. 2014). 

concluded that the statute did not clearly apply to corrupt conduct by the person himself and the "core" 

conduct to which Section 1505 could constitutionally be applied was one person influencing another person 

to violate a legal duty. Id. at 379-386. Congress later enacted a provision overturning that result by 

providing that "[a]s used in [S]ection 1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, 

personally or by influencing another, including by making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, 

concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information." 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Other courts 

have declined to follow Poindexter either by limiting it to Section 1505 and the specific conduct at issue in 

that case, see Brenson, 104 F.3d at 1280-1281; reading it as narrowly limited to ce1tain types of conduct, 

see United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629-630 (D.C. Cir. I 996); or by noting that it predated Arthur 

Andersen's interpretation of the term "corruptly," see Edwards, 869 F.3d at 501-502. 

1084 Section \ 503(a) provides for criminal punishment of: 

Whoever ... corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 

communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or 

impede, the due administration of justice. 

1085 Section 1505 provides for criminal punishment of: 

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Finally, 18 U.S.C. § l 512(b)(3) criminalizes tampering with witnesses to prevent the 

communication of information about a crime to law enforcement. The nexus inquiry articulated 

in Aguilar-that an individual has "knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial 

proceeding," 515 U.S. at 599- does not apply to Section 1512(6)(3). See United States v. Byrne, 

435 F .3d I 6, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2006). The nexus inquiry turns instead on the actor's intent to prevent 

communications to a federal law enforcement official. See Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 

673-678 (2011 ). 

* * * 

In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512( c )(2) and the other obstruction statutes, an 

argument that the conduct at issue in th is investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction 

laws lacks merit. 

B. Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to 

Presidential Conduct 

The President has broad discretion to direct criminal investigations. The Constitution vests 

the "executive Power" in the President and enjoins him to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 

executed." U.S. CONST. ART IT, §§ 1, 3. Those powers and duties form the foundation of 

prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (Attorney 

General and United States Attorneys "have this latitude because they are designated by statute as 

the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that 

the Laws be faithfully executed."'). The President also has authority to appoint officers of the 

United States and to remove those whom he has appointed. U.S. CONST. ART II,§ 2, cl. 2 (granting 

authority to the President to appoint all officers with the advice and consent of the Senate, but 

providing that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, the 

heads of departments, or the courts of law); see also Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company 

Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 492-493, 509 (2010) (describing removal authority as 

flowing from the President's "responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed"). 

Although the President has broad authority under Article II, that authority coexists with 

Congress's Article I power to enact laws that protect congressional proceedings, federal 

investigations, the courts, and grand juries against corrupt efforts to undermine their functions. 

Usually, those constitutional powers function in harmony, with the President enforcing the 

criminal laws under Article IT to protect against corrupt obstructive acts. But when the President' s 

official actions come into conflict with the prohibitions in the obstruction statutes, any 

constitutional tension is reconciled through separation-of-powers analysis. 

Whoever corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, 

obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending 

proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due 

and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is 

being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the 

Congress. 

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The President's counsel has argued that "the President's exercise of his constitutional 

authority ... to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations ... cannot constitutionally 

constitute obstruction of justice."1086 As noted above, no Department of Justice position or 

Supreme Court precedent directly resolved this issue. We did not find counsel's contention, 

however, to accord with our reading of the Supreme Court authority addressing separation-ofpowers issues. Applying the Court's framework for analysis, we concluded that Congress can 

validly regulate the President's exercise of official duties to prohibit actions motivated by a corrupt 

intent to obstruct justice. The limited effect on presidential power that results from that restriction 

would not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions. 

1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential 

Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes 

Before addressing Article II issues directly, we consider one threshold statutoryconstruction principle that is unique to the presidency: "The principle that general statutes must 

be read as not applying to the President if they do not expressly apply where application would 

arguably limit the President's constitutional role." OLC, Application of 28 USC. § 458 to 

Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350, 352 (1995). This "clear 

statement rule," id., has its source in two principles: statutes should be construed to avoid serious 

constitutional questions, and Congress should not be assumed to have altered the constitutional 

separation of powers without clear assurance that it intended that result. OLC, The Constitutional 

Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 178 (1996). 

The Supreme Court has applied that clear-statement rule in several cases. In one leading 

case, the Court construed the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., not to apply 

to judicial review of presidential action. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801 (1992). 

The Court explained that it "would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it 

intended the President's performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion." 

Id. at 801. In another case, the Court interpreted the word "utilized" in the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act (F ACA), 5 U.S.C. App., to apply only to the use of advisory committees 

established directly or indirectly by the government, thereby excluding the American Bar 

Association's advice to the Department of Justice about federal judicial candidates. Public Citizen 

v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455, 462-467 (1989). The Court explained 

that a broader interpretation of the term "utilized" in F ACA would raise serious questions whether 

the statute " infringed unduly on the President's Article II power to nominate federal judges and 

violated the doctrine of separation of powers." Id. at 466-467. Another case found that an 

established canon of statutory construction applied with "special force" to provisions that would 

impinge on the President's foreign-affairs powers if construed broadly. Sale v. Haitian Centers 

Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 ( 1993) (applying the presumption against extraterritorial application 

to construe the Refugee Act of 1980 as not governing in an overseas context where it could affect 

"foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility"). See Application 

1086 6/23/ 17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. I. 

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of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 353-354 

(discussing Franklin, Public Citizen, and Sale). 

The Department of Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle to interpret certain 

statutes as not applying to the President at all, similar to the approach taken in Franklin. See, e.g., 

Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, 

Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President's 

Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to 

the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974) (criminal conflict-of-interest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 208, 

does not apply to the President). Other OLC opinions interpret statutory text not to apply to certain 

presidential or executive actions because of constitutional concerns. See Application of 28 U.S. C. 

§ 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 350-357 (consanguinity 

limitations on court appointments, 28 U.S.C. § 458, found inapplicable to "presidential 

appointments of judges to the federal judiciary"); Constraints Imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1913 on 

Lobbying Efforts, 13 Op. O.L.C. 300, 304-306 (1989) (limitation on the use of appropriated funds 

for certain lobbying programs found inapplicable to certain communications by the President and 

executive officials). 

But OLC has also recognized that this clear-statement rule "does not apply with respect to 

a statute that raises no separation of powers questions were it to be applied to the President," such 

as the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential 

Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11. OLC explained that " [a]pplication 

of § 20 I raises no separation of powers question, let alone a serious one," because [t]he 

Constitution confers no power in the President to receive bribes." Id. In support of that conclusion, 

OLC noted constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President's compensation while 

in office, "which is what a bribe would function to do," id. (citing U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 1, cl. 7), 

and the express constitutional power of "Congress to impeach [and convict] a President for, inter 

alia, bribery," id. (citing U.S. CONST. ART II,§ 4). 

Under OLC's analysis, Congress can permissibly criminalize ce1tain obstructive conduct 

by the President, such as suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, or fabricating evidence, 

because those prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers questions. See Application of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11. The 

Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such conduct, and those actions would 

transgress the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. 

ART IT, §§ 3. In view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the 

President, Franklin's holding that the President is entirely excluded from a statute absent a clear 

statement would not apply in this context. 

A more limited application of a clear-statement rule to exclude from the obstruction statutes 

only certain acts by the President- for example, removing prosecutors or ending investigations 

for corrupt reasons- would be difficult to implement as a matter of statutory interpretation. It is 

not obvious how a clear-statement rule would apply to an omnibus provision like Section 

1512( c )(2) to exclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only when carried out in the President's 

conduct of office. No statutory term could easily bear that specialized meaning. For example, the 

word "corruptly" has a well-established meaning that does not exclude exercises of official power 

for corrupt ends. Indeed, an established definition states that "corruptly" means action with an 

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intent to secure an improper advantage "inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." 

BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added). And it would be contrary 

to ordinary rules of statutory construction to adopt an unconventional meaning of a statutory term 

only when applied to the President. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008) 

(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting proposal to "giv[e] the same word, in the same statutory 

provision, different meanings in different factual contexts"); cf Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462-

467 (giving the term "utilized" in the F ACA a uniform meaning to avoid constitutional questions). 

Nor could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background interpretive 

presumption, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in Sale. The principle that 

courts will construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional questions " is not a license for the 

judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature." Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 

59-60 ( 1997). "It is one thing to acknowledge and accept ... well defined ( or even newly 

enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite 

another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly 

as they are written, but are subject to case-by-case exceptions." Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 

398, 406 (1998). 

When a proposed construction "would thus function as an extra-textual limit on [a statute's] 

compass," thereby preventing the statute "from applying to a host of cases falling within its clear 

terms," Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357, it is doubtful that the construction would reflect Congress's 

intent. That is particularly so with respect to obstruction statutes, which "have been given a broad 

and all-inclusive meaning." Rainey, 757 F .3d at 245 ( discussing Sections 1503 and 1505) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, since no established principle of interpretation would 

exclude the presidential conduct we have investigated from statutes such as Sections 1503, 1505, 

I 512(b), and l 512(c)(2), we proceed to examine the separation-of-powers issues that could be 

raised as an Article II defense to the application of those statutes. 

2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May 

Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President's 

Official Powers 

When Congress imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article II powers, the limitation's 

validity depends on whether the measure "disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches." 

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). "Even when a branch does 

not arrogate power to itself, ... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair 

another in the performance of its constitutional duties." Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 

757 (1996). The "separation of powers does not mean," however, "that the branches 'ought to 

have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other."' Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 

681,703 (1997) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) 

(emphasis omitted)). In this context, a balancing test applies to assess separation-of-powers issues. 

Applying that test here, we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of-justice 

statutes applicable to corruptly motivated official acts of the President without impermissibly 

undermining his Article II functions. 

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a. The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies 

In This Context 

A congressionally imposed limitation on presidential action is assessed to determine "the 

extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 

functions," and, if the "potential for disruption is present[,] ... whether that impact is justified by 

an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." 

Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,753-

754 (1982); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-707 (l 974). That balancing test applies to 

a congressional regulation of presidential power through the obstruction-of-justice laws. 1087 

When an Article II power has not been "explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution 

to be within the sole province of the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within 

the general grant to the President of the 'executive Power,"' the Court has balanced competing 

constitutional considerations. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 

judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.). As Justice Kennedy noted in Public 

Citizen, the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on "the President's power to remove 

Executive officers, a power [that] ... is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the 

Constitution (as is the appointment power), but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant 

of the 'executive Power."' Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (l 988), and Myers v. 

United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-116 ( 1926)). Consistent with that statement, Morrison sustained 

a good-cause limitation on the removal of an inferior officer with defined prosecutorial 

responsibilities after determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the 

President's ability to perform his Article II functions. 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696. The Court 

has also evaluated other general executive-power claims through a balancing test. For example, 

the Court evaluated the President's claim of an absolute privilege for presidential communications 

about his official acts by balancing that interest against the Judicial Branch's need for evidence in 

a criminal case. United States v. Nixon, supra (recognizing a qualified constitutional privilege for 

presidential communications on official matters). The Court has also upheld a law that provided 

for archival access to presidential records despite a claim of absolute presidential privilege over 

the records. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443-445, 451-455. The analysis in 

those cases supports applying a balancing test to assess the constitutionality of applying the 

obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential exercises of executive power. 

Only in a few instances has the Court applied a different framework. When the President's 

power is " both 'exclusive' and 'conclusive' on the issue," Congress is precluded from regulating 

its exercise. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, I 35 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). In Zivotofsky, for example, the 

Court followed "Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite framework" in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 

v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and held that the President's 

1087 OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the President is not subject to criminal 

prosecution while in office, relying on many of the same precedents discussed in this section. See A Sitting 

President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 237-238, 244-245 

(2000) (relying on, inter alia, United States v. Nixon, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and Clinton v. Jones, and quoting 

the legal standard from Administrator of General Services v. Nixon that is applied in the text). OLC 

recognized that "[t]he balancing analysis" it had initially relied on in finding that a sitting President is 

immune from prosecution had "been adopted as the appropriate mode of analysis by the Court." Id. at 244. 

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authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive. Id. at 2083, 2094. See also Public Citizen 491 

U.S. at 485-486 (Kennedy, J ., concurring in the judgment) ( citing the power to grant pardons under 

U.S. CONST., ART. TT,§ 2, cl. 1, and the Presentment Clauses for legislation, U.S. CONST., ART. T, 

§ 7, Cls. 2, 3, as examples of exclusive presidential powers by virtue of constitutional text). 

But even when a power is exclusive, "Congress' powers, and its central role in making 

laws, give it substantial authority regarding many of the policy determinations that precede and 

follow" the President's act. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087. For example, although the President's 

power to grant pardons is exclusive and not subject to congressional regulation, see United States 

v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-148 (1872), Congress has the authority to prohibit the corrupt 

use of"anything of value" to influence the testimony of another person in a judicial, congressional, 

or agency proceeding, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)-which would include the offer or promise of a 

pardon to induce a person to testify falsely or not to testify at all. The offer of a pardon would 

precede the act of pardoning and thus be within Congress's power to regulate even if the pardon 

itself is not. Just as the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 6, cl. I, absolutely protects 

legislative acts, but not a legislator' s "taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a 

certain way ... for it is taking the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal 

act," United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) ( emphasis omitted), the promise of a 

pardon to corruptly influence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act. The 

application of obstruction statutes to such promises therefore would raise no serious separationof-powers issue. 

b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's 

Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited 

Under the Supreme Court's balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues, the 

first task is to assess the degree to which applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential 

actions affects the President's ability to carry out his Article II responsibilities. Administrator of 

General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. As discussed above, applying obstruction-of-justice statutes 

to presidential conduct that does not involve the President's conduct of office-such as influencing 

the testimony of witnesses-is constitutionally unproblematic. The President has no more right 

than other citizens to impede official proceedings by corruptly influencing witness testimony. The 

conduct would be equally improper whether effectuated through direct efforts to produce false 

testimony or suppress the truth, or through the actual, threatened, or promised use of official 

powers to achieve the same result. 

The President's action in curtailing criminal investigations or prosecutions, or discharging 

law enforcement officials, raises different questions. Each type of action involves the exercise of 

executive discretion in furtherance of the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 

executed." U.S. CONST., ART. II, § 3. Congress may not supplant the President's exercise of 

executive power to supervise prosecutions or to remove officers who occupy law enforcement 

positions. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-727 (1986) ("Congress cannot reserve for 

itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by 

impeachment. ... [Because t]he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute 

the laws, ... [t]his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws .. ·. is 

constitutionally impermissible."). Yet the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not aggrandize power 

in Congress or usurp executive authority. Instead, they impose a discrete limitation on conduct 

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only when it is taken with the "corrupt" intent to obstruct justice. The obstruction statutes thus 

would restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstruct official 

proceedings for the improper purpose of protecting his own interests. See Volume IT, Section 

TII.A.3, supra. 

The direct effect on the President' s freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited 

one. A preclusion of "corrupt" official action is not a major intrusion on Article II powers. For 

example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act 

with the intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, or 

preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official action 

undertaken for such personal purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhanded 

administration of the law. And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have 

unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions, with no limits whatsoever, in order to 

carry out his Article II functions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 4 70 U.S. 821 , 833 ( 1985) ("Congress 

may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive 

priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases 

it will pursue."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 (" [t]o read the Art. II powers of the 

President as providing an absolute privilege [to withhold confidential communications from a 

criminal trial] . .. would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely 

impair the role of the courts under Art. III"). 

Nor must the President have unfettered authority to remove all Executive Branch officials 

involved in the execution of the laws. The Constitution establishes that Congress has legislative 

authority to structure the Executive Branch by authorizing Congress to create executive 

departments and officer positions and to specify how inferior officers are appointed. E.g. , U.S. 

CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); ART. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Opinions Clause); 

ART. TI, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 499. While the 

President' s removal power is an important means of ensuring that officers faithfully execute the 

law, Congress has a recognized authority to place certain limits on removal. Id. at 493-495. 

The President's removal powers are at their zenith with respect to principal officers-that 

is, officers who must be appointed by the President and who report to him directly. See Free 

Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493, 500. The President's "exclusive and illimitable power of 

removal" of those principal officers furthers "the President's ability to ensure that the laws are 

faithfully executed." Id. at 493, 498 (internal quotation marks omitted); Myers, 272 U.S. at 627. 

Thus, "there are some ' purely executive' officials who must be removable by the President at will 

if he is able to accomplish his constitutional role." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690; Myers, 272 U.S. at 

134 (the President's "cabinet officers must do his will," and " [t]he moment that he loses confidence 

in the intelligence, ability, judgment, or loyalty of any one of them, he must have the power to 

remove him without delay"); cf Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) 

(Congress has the power to create independent agencies headed by principal officers removable 

only for good cause). In light of those constitutional precedents, it may be that the obstruction 

statutes could not be constitutionally applied to limit the removal of a cabinet officer such as the 

Attorney General. See 5 U.S.C. § 101; 28 U.S.C. § 503. In that context, at least absent 

circumstances showing that the President was clearly attempting to thwart accountability for 

personal conduct while evading ordinary political checks and balances, even the highly limited 

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regulation imposed by the obstruction statutes could possibly intrude too deeply on the President's 

freedom to select and supervise the members of his cabinet. 

The removal of inferior officers, in contrast, need not necessarily be at will for the President 

to fulfill his constitutionally assigned role in managing the Executive Branch. "[I]nferior officers 

are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by other officers appointed by 

the President with the Senate's consent." Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 510 (quoting Edmond 

v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme 

Court has long recognized Congress's authority to place for-cause limitations on the President's 

removal of"inferior Officers" whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department. U.S. 

CONST. ART. II, § 2, cl. 2. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) ("The 

constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment [ of inferior officers in the heads 

of departments] implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as 

Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed") (quoting lower court decision); 

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n. 27 (citing Perkins); accord id. at 723-724 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 

(recognizing that Perkins is "established" law); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493-

495 ( citing Perkins and Morrison). The category of inferior officers includes both the FBI Director 

and the Special Counsel, each of whom reports to the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 

5 I 5(a), 531; 28 C.F .R. Part 600. Their work is thus "directed and supervised" by a presidentiallyappointed, Senate-confirmed officer. See In re: Grand Jury Investigation, _ F .3d _, 2019 WL 

921692, at *3-*4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an "inferior officer" 

for constitutional purposes). 

Where the Constitution permits Congress to impose a good-cause limitation on the removal 

of an Executive Branch officer, the Constitution should equally permit Congress to bar removal 

for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. Limiting the, range of permissible reasons for 

removal to exclude a "corrupt" purpose imposes a lesser restraint on the President than requiring 

an affirmative showing of good cause. It follows that for such inferior officers, Congress may 

constitutionally restrict the President's removal authority if that authority was exercised for the 

corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. And even if a particular inferior officer's position might be 

of such importance to the execution of the laws that the President must have at-will removal 

authority, the obstruction-of-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid 

removal for a corrupt reason.

1088 A narrow and discrete limitation on removal that precluded 

corrupt action would leave ample room for all other considerations, including disagreement over 

policy or loss of confidence in the officer's judgment or commitment. A corrupt-purpose 

prohibition therefore would not undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II 

functions. Accordingly, because the separation-of-powers question is "whether the removal 

restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his 

constitutional duty," Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691, a restriction on removing an inferior officer for a 

' 088 Although the FBT director is an inferior officer, he is appointed by the President and removable 

by him at will, see 28 U.S.C. § 532 note, and it is not clear that Congress could constitutionally provide the 

FBI director with good-cause tenure protection. See OLC, Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the 

Term of the FBI Director, 2011 WL 2566125, at *3 (O.L.C. June 20, 2011) ("tenure protection for an officer 

with the FBT Director's broad investigative, administrative, and policymaking responsibilities would raise 

a serious constitutional question whether Congress had 'impede[d] the President's ability to perform his 

constitutional duty' to take care that the laws be faithfully executed") ( quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 ). 

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corrupt reason-a reason grounded in achieving personal rather than official ends-does not 

seriously hinder the President's performance of his duties. The President retains broad latitude to 

supervise investigations and remove officials, circumscribed in this context only by the 

requirement that he not act for corrupt personal purposes.1089 

c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and 

Judicial Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source 

Where a law imposes a burden on the President's performance of Article II functions, 

separation-of-powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure "is justified by an 

overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." 

Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. Here, Congress enacted the obstruction-ofjustice statutes to protect, among other things, the integrity of its own proceedings, grand jury 

investigations, and federal criminal trials. Those objectives are within Congress's authority and 

serve strong governmental interests. 

i. Congress has Article I authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it 

to all persons-including the President. Congress clearly has authority to protect its own 

legislative functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact-gathering and 

lawmaking efforts. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 206-207 (1957); Chapman 

v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, 130 ( 1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system 

of federal courts, which includes the power to protect the judiciary against obstructive acts. See 

U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, els. 9, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To constitute Tribunals 

inferior to the supreme Court" and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 

carrying into Execution the foregoing powers"). The long lineage of the obstruction-of-justice 

statutes, which can be traced to at least 183 I , attests to the necessity for that protection. See An 

Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, 4 Stat. 487-488 § 2 (1831) (making 

it a crime if"any person or persons shall corruptly ... endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede 

any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or 

shall, corruptly ... obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration 

of justice therein"). 

ii. The Article TII courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against 

obstructive acts, whatever their source. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Nixon, 

a "primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch" is "to do justice in criminal prosecutions." 

418 U.S. at 707; accord Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 

U.S. 367, 384 (2004). In Nixon, the Court rejected the President's claim of absolute executive 

privilege because "the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably 

1089 The obstruction statutes do not disqualify the President from acting in a case simply because 

he has a personal interest in it or because his own conduct may be at issue. As the Department of Justice 

has made clear, a claim of a conflict of interest, standing alone, cannot deprive the President of the ability 

to fulfill his constitutional function. See, e.g., OLC, Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential 

Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 O.L.C. Op. at 356 (citing Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office 

of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems 

Arising out of the President's Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the TwentyFifth Amendment to the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974)). 

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relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely 

impair the basic function of the courts." 407 U.S. at 712. As Nixon illustrates, the need to 

safeguard judicial integrity is a compelling constitutional interest. See id. at 709 (noting that the 

denial of full disclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communications threatens 

" [t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system"). 

iii. Finally, the grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from 

corrupt acts. Serious federal criminal charges generally reach the Article III courts based on an 

indictment issued by a grand jury. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) ("The 

Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process."). And the grand jury's 

function is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V . ("[n]o person shall be held 

to answer" for a serious crime "unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury"). " [T]he 

whole theory of [the grand jury's] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional 

government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people," 

United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), "pledged to indict no one because of prejudice 

and to free no one because of special favor." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). 

If the grand jury were not protected against corrupt interference from all persons, its function as 

an independent charging body would be thwarted. And an impartial grand jury investigation to 

determine whether probable cause exists to indict is vital to the criminal justice process. 

* * * 

The final step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separationof-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority 

notwithstanding the potential impact on Article II functions. See Administrator of General 

Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696; United States v. Nixon, 

418 U.S. at 711-712. In the case of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, our assessment of the 

weighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited 

restrictions contained in those statutes on the President's official conduct to protect the integrity 

of important functions of other branches of government. 

A general ban on corrupt action does not unduly intrude on the President's responsibility 

to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. ART IT, §§ 3. 1090 To the contrary, 

the concept of "faithful execution" connotes the use of power in the interest of the public, not in 

the office holder's personal interests. See 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English 

Language 763 (1755) ("faithfully" def. 3: " [w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance"). And 

immunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt 

obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impair Congress's power to enact laws "to 

promote objectives within [its] constitutional authority," Administrator of General Services, 433 

U.S. at 425- i.e. , protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article TTI 

courts and grand juries. 

1090 As noted above, the President's selection and removal of principal executive officers may have 

a unique constitutional status. 

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Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argument that the 

President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct 

justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article TI powers. 

1091 

3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would 

Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties 

Applying the obstruction statutes to the President's official conduct would involve 

determining as a factual matter whether he engaged in an obstructive act, whether the act had a 

nexus to official proceedings, and whether he was motivated by corrupt intent. But applying those 

standards to the President's official conduct should not hinder his ability to perform his Article II 

duties. Cf Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752-753 & n.32 (taking into account chilling effect on 

the President in adopting a constitutional rule of presidential immunity from private civil damages 

action based on official duties). Several safeguards would prevent a chilling effect: the existence 

of settled legal standards, the presumption of regularity in prosecutorial actions, and the existence 

of evidentiary limitations on probing the President's motives. And historical experience confirms 

that no impermissible chill should exist. 

a. As an initial matter, the term "corruptly" sets a demanding standard. It requires a 

concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an " improper advantage for [him]self 

or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." BALLENTINE'S LAW 

DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F .3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir.2015); 

Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That standard 

parallels the President's constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. And 

virtually everything that the President does in the routine conduct of office will have a clear 

governmental purpose and will not be contrary to his official duty. Accordingly, the President has 

no reason to be chilled in those actions because, in virtually all instances, there will be no credible 

basis for suspecting a corrupt personal motive. 

That point is illustrated by examples of conduct that would and would not satisfy the 

stringent corrupt-motive standard. Direct or indirect action by the President to end a criminal 

investigation into his own or his family members' conduct to protect against personal 

embarrassment or legal liability would constitute a core example of corruptly motivated conduct. 

So too would action to halt an enforcement proceeding that directly and adversely affected the 

President's financial interests for the purpose of protecting those interests. In those examples, 

1091 A possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would not substitute for potential 

criminal liability after a President leaves office. Impeachment would remove a President from office, but 

would not address the underlying culpability of the conduct or serve the usual purposes of the criminal law. 

Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independent role in 

addressing an official's conduct, distinct from the political remedy of impeachment. See U.S. CONST. ART. 

l, § 3, cl. 7. Impeachment is also a drastic and rarely invoked remedy, and Congress is not restricted to 

relying only on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC 

has recognized. A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 

at 255 ("Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such 

prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or 

impeachment."). 

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official power is being used for the purpose of protecting the President's personal interests. In 

contrast, the President's actions to serve political or policy interests would not qualify as corrupt. 

The President's role as head of the government necessarily requires him to take into account 

political factors in making policy decisions that affect law-enforcement actions and proceedings. 

For instance, the President's decision to curtail a law-enforcement investigation to avoid 

international friction would not implicate the obstruction-of-justice statutes. The criminal law 

does not seek to regulate the consideration of such political or policy factors in the conduct of 

government. And when legitimate interests animate the President's conduct, those interests will 

almost invariably be readily identifiable based on objective factors. Because the President's 

conduct in those instances will obviously fall outside the zone of obstruction law, no chilling 

concern should arise. 

b. There is also no reason to believe that investigations, let alone prosecutions, would 

occur except in highly unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe that 

obstruction occurred. Prosecutorial action enjoys a presumption of regularity: absent "clear 

evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official 

duties." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 

U.S. I, 14-15 (1926)). The presumption of prosecutorial regularity would provide even greater 

protection to the President than exists in routine cases given the prominence and sensitivity of any 

matter involving the President and the likelihood that such matters will be subject to thorough and 

careful review at the most senior levels of the Department of Justice. Under OLC's opinion that a 

sitting President is entitled to immunity from indictment, only a successor Administration would 

be able to prosecute a former President. But that consideration does not suggest that a President 

would have any basis for fearing abusive investigations or prosecutions after leaving office. There 

are "obvious political checks" against initiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of a former 

President. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 448 (considering political checks 

in separation-of-powers analysis). And the Attorney General holds "the power to conduct the 

criminal litigation of the United States Government," United States v. Nixon, 4 I 8 U.S. at 694 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 516), which provides a strong institutional safeguard against politicized 

investigations or prosecutions. 1092 

1092 Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of Justice officers and line prosecutors 

against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts. Prosecutors are generally barred from 

participating in matters implicating their personal interests, see 28 C.F.R. § 45.2, and are instructed not to 

be influenced by their "own professional or personal circumstances," Justice Manual § 9-27.260, so 

prosecutors would not frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and 

personally motivated. And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible 

officials at the Department of Justice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an investigation absent 

a credible factual basis. Those facts distinguish the criminal context from the common-law rule of 

prosecutorial immunity, which protects against the threat of suit by "a defendant [who] often will transform 

his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions." Imbler v. 

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,425 (1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, the existence of civil immunity 

does not justify criminal immunity. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) ("Whatever may be 

the case with respect to civil liability generally, ... we have never held that the performance of the duties 

of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise 

criminal deprivation of constitutional rights.") (citations omitted). 

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These considerations distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that, 

in part because inquiries into the President's motives would be "highly intrusive," the President is 

absolutely immune from private civil damages actions based on his official conduct. 457 U.S. at 

756-757. As Fitzgerald recognized, "there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages 

than, for example, in criminal prosecutions." Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37; see Cheney, 542 

U.S. at 384. And private actions are not subject to the institutional protections of an action under 

the supervision of the Attorney General and subject to a presumption of regularity. Armstrong, 

517 U.S. at 464. 

c. In the rare cases in which a substantial and credible basis justifies conducting an 

investigation of the President, the process of examining his motivations to determine whether he 

acted for a corrupt purpose need not have a chilling effect. Ascertaining the President's 

motivations would turn on any explanation he provided to justify his actions, the advice he 

received, the circumstances surrounding the actions, and the regularity or irregularity of the 

process he employed to make decisions. But grand juries and courts would not have automatic 

access to confidential presidential communications on those matters; rather, they could be 

presented in official proceedings only on a showing of sufficient need. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712; In 

re Sealed Case, 121 F .3d 729, 754, 756-757 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Administrator of General 

Services, 433 U.S. at 448-449 (former President can invoke presidential communications privilege, 

although successor's failure to support the claim "detracts from [its] weight"). 

In any event, probing the President's intent in a criminal matter is unquestionably 

constitutional in at least one context: the offense of bribery turns on the corrupt intent to receive 

a thing of value in return for being influenced in official action. 18 U.S.C. § 20l(b)(2). There can 

be no serious argument against the President's potential criminal liability for bribery offenses, 

notwithstanding the need to ascertain his purpose and intent. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 3; ART. IT, 

§ 4; see also Application of 28 US. C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 

Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11 ("Application of§ 20 I [to the President] raises no separation of powers 

issue, let alone a serious one."). 

d. Finally, history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chilling effect justifies 

exempting the President from the obstruction laws. As a historical matter, Presidents have very 

seldom been the subjects of grand jury investigations. And it is rarer still for circumstances to 

raise even the possibility of a corrupt personal motive for arguably obstructive action through the 

President's use of official power. Accordingly, the President's conduct of office should not be 

chilled based on hypothetical concerns about the possible application of a corrupt-motive standard 

in this context. 

* * * 

In sum, contrary to the position taken by the President' s counsel, we concluded that, in 

light of the Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues, we had a valid basis 

for investigating the conduct at issue in this report. In our view, the application of the obstruction 

statutes would not impermissibly burden the President's performance of his Article II function to 

supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers. And the 

protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person-including the 

President-accords with the fundamental principle of our government that "[n]o [person] in this 

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country is so high that he is above the law." United States v. Lee, I 06 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); see 

also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 697; United States v. Nixon, supra. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw 

ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. The evidence we obtained about the 

President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were 

making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a 

thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, 

we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach 

that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a 

crime, it also does not exonerate him. 

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Appendix A 
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U.S. Department of Justice 

AMerHey \llerk Predttet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted U1~der Fed. R. Cl'itfl. P. 6(e) 

(©ffice of tqe :!E)eputtJ J\ttortteJJ ®enera-1 

~uel1i11sfn1t, ~.<!l.. 20530 

ORDER.NO. 3915-2017 

APPOfNTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL 

TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 

2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED MATTERS 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Acting Attorney General, including 28 U.S,C. 

§§ 509, 5 I 0, and 5 I 5, in order to discharge my responsibility to provide supervision and 

management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the 

Russian govemment's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, I hereby order as 

follows: 

(a) Robert S. Mueller II[ is appointed to serve as Special Counsel for the United States 

Department of Justice. 

(b) The Special Counsel is authorized to conduct the investigation continued by then-FBI 

Director James B. Corney in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence on March 20, 2017, including: 

(i) any links and/or coordination belwecn the Russian government and individuals 

associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and 

(ii) any matters that arose or may nrisc directly from the investigation; and 

(iii) any other matters within the scope of 2~ C.F.R. § 600.4(a). 

(c) If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate, the Special Counsel is 

authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters. 

(d) Sections 600.4 through 600.IO of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations are 

applicable to the Special Counsel. 

~n/t-2- Date -

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U.S. Department of Justice 

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AppendixB 
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Attomey Work Product/,' May COF1tain Material Proteetecl Uncler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 
U.S. Department of Justice 

At:t:orflc)' Work Proauet II Ma)' CoHtaifl Material Protcetca UHElcr Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(c) 

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY 

The following glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities 

referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be comprehensive and is intended 

only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of the report. 

Agalarov, Aras 

Agalarov, Emin 

Akhmetov, Rinat 

Akhmetshin, Rinat 

Aslanov, 

Dzheykhun (Jay) 

Assange, Julian 

Aven, Petr 

Bannon, Stephen 

(Steve) 

Baranov, Andrey 

Berkowitz, A vi 

Boente, Dana 

Bogacheva, Anna 

Bossert, Thomas 

(Tom) 

Referenced Persons 

Russian real-estate developer ( owner of the Crocus Group); met Donald 

Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped arrange 

the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya 

and Trump Campaign officials. 

Performer, executive vice president of Crocus Group, and son of Aras 

Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower 

between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. 

Former member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to 

conduct work for Ukrainian political pai1y, the Party of Regions. 

U.S. lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the 

June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump 

Campaign officials. 

Head of U.S. department of the Internet Research Agency, which 

engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in 

the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

Founder of WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents 

stolen from entities and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party. 

Chairman of the board of Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the 

Presidential Transition Team in connection with anticipated post-election 

sanctions. 

White House chief strategist and senior counselor to President Trump 

(Jan. 2017-Aug.2017); chief executive of the Trump Campaign. 

Director of investor relations at Russian state-owned oil company, 

Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page. 

Assistant to Jared Kushner. 

Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 - Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy 

Attorney General (Feb. 2017 - Apr. 2017). 

Internet Research Agency employee who worked on "active measures" 

social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016 U.S. presidential 

election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014. 

Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a 

senior official on the Presidential Transition Team. 

B-1 
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At1:on10y 'Nork Produet // May Contain Material Proteeted Uncler Fed. R. Cril'l'I. P. 6(e) 

Boyarkin, Viktor 

Boyd, Charles 

Boyko, Yuriy 

Brand, Rachel 

Browder, William 

(Bill) 

Bulatov, Alexander 

Burchik, Mikhail 

Burck, William 

Burnham, James 

Burt, Richard 

Bystrov, Mikhail 

Calamari, Matt 

Caputo, Michael 

Chaika, Yuri 

Christie, Chris 

Clapper, James 

Clovis, Samuel Jr. 

Coats, Dan 

Cobb,Ty 

Cohen, Michael 

Corney, James Jr. 

Employee of Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. 

Chairman of the board of directors at the Center for the National Interest, 

a U.S.-based think tank with operations in and connections to Russia. 

Member of the Ukrainian political party Opposition Bloc and member of 

the Ukrainian parliament. 

Associate Attorney General (May 2017 - Feb. 2018). 

Founder of Hermitage Capital Management who lobbied in favor of the 

Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian 

officials. 

Russian intelligence official who associated with Carter Page in 2008. 

Executive director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an 

"active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. 

presidential election. 

Personal attorney to Don McGahn, White House Counsel. 

Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office who attended January 

2017 meetings between Sally Yates and Donald McGahn. 

Former U.S. ambassador who had done work Alfa-Bank and was a board 

member of the Center for the National Interest. 

General director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an 

"active measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. 

presidential election. 

Chief operating officer for the Trump Organization. 

Trump Campaign advisor. 

Prosecutor general of the Russian Federation who also maintained a 

relationship with Aras Agalarov. 

Former Governor of New Jersey. 

Director of National Intelligence (Aug. 2010 - Jan. 2017). 

Chief policy advisor and national co-chair of the Trump Campaign. 

Director of National Intelligence. 

Special Counsel to the President (July 2017 - May 2018). 

Former vice president to the Trump Organization and special counsel to 

Donald Trump who spearheaded an effo11 to build a Trump-branded 

property in Moscow. He admitted to lying to Congress about the project. 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 4, 2013 - May 9, 

2017). 

B-2 
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Attorfte)' '.\'erk Product// Ma)' Co1,tai1, Material Protected U1,der Fed. R. Criltl.. P. 6(e) 

Conway, Kellyanne Counselor to President Trump and manager of the Trump Campaign. 

Corallo, Mark Spokesman for President Trump's personal legal team (June 2017 - July 

2017). 

Corsi, Jerome 

Costello, Robert 

Credico, Randolph 

(Randy) 

Davis, Richard 

(Rick) Jr. 

Dearborn, Rick 

Dempsey, Michael 

Denman, Diana 

Deripaska, Oleg 

Dhillon, Uttam 

Dmitriev, Ki rill 

Donaldson, Annie 

Dvorkovich, Arkady 

Dvoskin, Evgeney 

Eisenberg, John 

Erchova, Lana 

(a/k/a Lana 

Alexander) 

Attorney who represented he had a close relationship with Rudolph 

Giuliani, the President's personal counsel. 

Radio talk show host who interviewed Julian Assange in 2016. 

Partner with Pegasus Sustainable Century Merchant Bank, business 

partner of Paul Manafort, and co-founder of the Davis Manafort lobbying 

firm. 

Former White House deputy chief of staff for policy who previously 

served as chief of staff to Senator Jeff Sessions. 

Office of Director of National Intelligence official who recalled 

discussions with Dan Coats after Coats's meeting with President Trump 

on March 22, 2017. 

Delegate to 2016 Republican National Convention who proposed a 

platform plank amendment that included armed support for Ukraine. 

Russian businessman with ties to Vladimir Putin who hired Paul 

Manafort for consulting work between 2005 and 2009. 

Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office (Jan. 2017- June 2018). 

Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDlF); met with Erik 

Prince in the Seychelles in January 2017 and, separately, drafted a U.S.­

Russia reconciliation plan with Rick Gerson. 

Chief of staff to White House Counsel Donald McGahn (Jan.2017 - Dec. 

2018). 

Deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and chairman of the 

board of directors of the New Economic School in Moscow. He met with 

Carter Page twice in 2016. 

Executive of Gen bank in Crimea and associate of Felix Sater. 

Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office and legal counsel for the 

National Security Council. 

Ex-wife of Dmitry Klokov who emailed Ivanka Trump to introduce 

Klokov to the Trump Campaign in the fall of 2015. 

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Fabrizio, Anthony 

(Tony) 

Fishbein, Jason 

Flynn, Michael G. 

(a/k/a Michael 

Flynn Jr.) 

Flynn, Michael T. 

Foresman, Robert 

(Bob) 

Futerfas, Alan 

Garten, Alan 

Gates, Richard 

(Rick) III 

Gerson, Richard 

(Rick) 

Gistaro, Edward 

Glassner, Michael 

Goldstone, Robert 

Gordon, Jeffrey 

(J.D.) 

Gorkov, Sergey 

Graff, Rhona 

Partner at the research and consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee & Associates. 

He was a pollster for the Trump Campaign and worked with Paul 

Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the election. 

Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent 

WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on 

September 20, 2016. 

Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017-Feb. 

13, 2017). 

National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 - Feb. 13, 2017), Director of 

the Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012-Aug.7, 2014), and Trump 

Campaign advisor. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about 

communications with Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in December 2016. 

Investment banker who sought meetings with the Trump Campaign in 

spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the election met 

with Michael Flynn. 

Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal 

counsel for Donald Trump Jr. 

General counsel of the Trump Organization. 

Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural 

Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. 

He pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate 

U.S. laws, as well as making false statements to the FBI. 

New York hedge fund manager and associate of Jared Kushner. During 

the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev on a proposal for 

reconciliation between the United States and Russia. 

Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration. 

Political director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George 

Papadopoulos to others in the Trump Campaign. 

Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald Trump Jr. to arrange 

the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya 

and Trump Campaign officials. 

National security advisor to the Trump Campaign involved in changes to 

the Republican party platform and who communicated with Russian 

Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National Convention. 

Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank, 

who met with Jared Kushner during the transition period. 

Senior vice-president and executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the 

Trump Organization. 

B-4 
U.S. Department of Justice 

/\Horney \l/01·k Prodttet // May Cot1⁄2taitt Material Prntectcd Uttdcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c) 

Hawker, Jonathan 

Heilbrunn, Jacob 

Hicks, Hope 

Holt, Lester 

Hunt, Jody 

Ivanov, Igor 

Ivanov, Sergei 

Kasowitz, Marc 

Katsyv, Denis 

Katsyv, Peter 

Kaveladze, IrakJi 

(Ike) 

Kaverzina, Irina 

Kelly, John 

Khalilzad, Zalmay 

Kilimnik, 

Konstantin 

Kislyak, Sergey 

Klimentov, Denis 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Public relations consultant at FTI Consulting; worked with Davis 

Manafort International LLC on public relations campaign in Ukraine. 

Editor of the National Interest, the periodical that officially hosted 

candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy speech. 

White House communications director (Aug. 2017 - Mar. 2018) and 

press secretary for the Trump Campaign. 

NBC News anchor who interviewed President Trump on May 11, 2017. 

Chief of staff to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Feb. 2017 - Oct. 2017). 

President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former 

Russian foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that 

Ivanov advised on arranging a "Moscow visit" for the Trump Campaign. 

Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime 

minister, and former FSB deputy director. In January 2016, Michael 

Cohen emailed the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov. 

President Trump's personal counsel (May 2017 - July 2017). 

Son of Peter Katsyv; owner of Russian company Prevezon Holdings Ltd. 

and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya. 

Russian businessman and father of Denis Katsyv. 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Vice president at Crocus Group and Aras Agalarov's deputy in the United 

States. He participated in the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower 

between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. 

Employee of the internet Research Agency, which engaged in an "active 

measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. 

presidential election. 

White House chief of staff (July 2017 - Jan.2019). 

U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and former U.S. ambassador. 

He met with Senator Jeff Sessions during foreign policy dinners put 

together through the Center for the National Interest. 

Russian-Ukrainian political consultant and long-time employee of Paul 

Manafort assessed by the FBI to have ties to Russian intelligence. 

Former Russian ambassador to the United States and current Russian 

senator from Mordovia. 

Employee of the New Economic School who informed high-ranking 

Russian government officials of Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow. 

B-5 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Atlorrrn)' Werle Prodttet // May CoHtaiH Material Proteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Klimentov, Dmitri 

Klokov, Dmitry 

Kobyakov, Anton 

Krickovic, Andrej 

Krylova, 

Aleksandra 

Kushner, Jared 

Kuznetsov, Sergey 

Landrum, Pete 

Lavrov, Sergey 

Ledeen, Barbara 

Ledeen, Michael 

Ledgett, Richard 

Lewandowski, 

Corey 

Luff, Sandra 

Lyovochkin, Serhiy 

Magnitsky, Sergei 

Brother of Denis Klimentov who contacted Kremlin press secretary 

Dmitri Peskov about Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow. 

Executive for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System 

and former aide to Russia's minister of energy. He communicated with 

Michael Cohen about a possible meeting between Vladimir Putin and 

candidate Trump. 

Advisor to Vladimir Putin and member of the Roscongress Foundation 

who invited candidate Trump to the St. Petersburg International 

Economic Forum. 

Professor at the Higher School of Economics who recommended that 

Carter Page give a July 2016 commencement address in Moscow. 

Internet Research Agency employee who worked on "active measures" 

social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election; 

traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014. 

President Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor to the President. 

Russian government official at the Russian Embassy to the United States 

who transmitted Vladimir Putin's congratulations to President-Elect 

Trump for his electoral victory on November 9, 2016. 

Advisor to Senator Jeff Sessions who attended the September 2016 

meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. 

Russian minister of foreign affairs and former permanent representative 

of Russia to the United Nations. 

Senate staffer and associate of Michael Flynn who sought to obtain 

Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign 

period. 

Member of the Presidential Transition Team who advised on foreign 

policy and national security matters. 

Deputy director of the National Security Agency (Jan.2014-Apr. 2017); 

present when President Trump called Michael Rogers on March 26, 2017. 

Campaign manager for the Trump Campaign (Jan. 2015 - June 2016). 

Legislative director for Senator Jeff Sessions; attended a September 2016 

meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. 

Member of Ukrainian parliament and member of Ukrainian political 

party, Opposition Bloc Party. 

Russian tax specialist who alleged Russian government corruption and 

died in Russian police custody in 2009. His death prompted passage of 

B-6 
U.S. Department of Justice 

AUor1rn)1 Work Prodttet // May Cm1taitt Material Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Malloch, Theodore 

(Ted) 

Manafort, Paul Jr. 

Mashburn, John 

McCabe, Andrew 

McCord, Mary 

McFarland, 

Kathleen (K.T.) 

McGahn, Donald 

(Don) 

Medvedcv, Dmitry 

Melnik, Yuriy 

Mifsud, Joseph 

Miller, Matt 

Miller, Stephen 

Millian, Sergei 

Mnuchin, Steven 

Miiller-Maguhn, 

Andrew 

Nader, George 

Netyksho, Viktor 

the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel sanctions on 

Russian officials. 

Chief executive officer of Global Fiduciary Governance and the 

Roosevelt Group. He was a London-based associate of Jerome Corsi. 

Trump campaign member (March 2016-Aug. 2016) and chairman and 

chief strategist (May 2016 - Aug. 2016). 

Trump administration official and former policy director to the Trump 

Campaign. 

Acting director of the FBI (May 2017 - Aug. 2017); deputy director of 

the FBI (Feb. 2016 - Jan. 2018). 

Acting Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 2016- May 2017). 

Deputy White House National Security Advisor (Jan. 2017 - May 2017). 

White House Counsel (Jan. 2017 - Oct. 2018). 

Prime Minister of Russia. 

Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., who 

connected with George Papadopoulos on social media. 

Maltese national and former London-based professor who, immediately 

after returning from Moscow in April 2016, told George Papadopoulos 

that the Russians had "dirt" in the form of thousands of Clinton emails. 

Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the meeting of the 

National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016. 

Senior advisor to the President. 

Founder of the Russian American Chamber of Commerce who met with 

George Papadopoulos during the campaign. 

Secretary of the Treasury. 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Member of hacker association Chaos Computer Club and associate of 

Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks. 

Advisor to the United Arab Emirates's Crown Prince who arranged a 

meeting between Kirill Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transition 

period. 

Russian military officer in command of a unit involved in Russian hackand-release operations to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

B-7 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Att:erne)" Werle Prnelttet // Ma)' CeRtaiR Material Prnteeteel UReief Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Oganov, Georgiy 

Oknyansky, Henry 

(a/k/a Henry 

Greenberg) 

Page, Carter 

Papadopoulos, 

George 

Parscale, Bradley 

Patten, William 

(Sam) Jr. 

Peskov, Dmitry 

Phares, Walid 

Pinedo, Richard 

Podesta, John Jr. 

Podobnyy, Victor 

Poliakova, Elena 

Polonskaya, Olga 

Pompeo, Michael 

Porter, Robert 

Priebus, Reince 

Prigozhin, Yevgeniy 

Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of investment company 

Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early 2017. 

Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory 

information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in 

May 2016. 

Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated proRussian views and made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow. 

Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who received information 

from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had "dirt" in the form of thousands of 

Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about his contact 

with Mifsud. 

Digital media director for the 2016 Trump Campaign. 

Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin Kilimnik. 

Deputy chief of staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential 

administration. 

Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general 

of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG). 

U.S. person who pleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity 

fraud. 

Clinton campaign chairman whose email account was hacked by the 

GRU. WikiLeaks released his stolen emails during the 2016 campaign. 

Russian intelligence officer who interacted with Carter Page while 

operating inside the United States; later charged in 2015 with conspiring 

to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. 

Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen's 

outreach about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 20 16. 

Russian national introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud 

as an individual with connections to Vladimir Putin. 

U.S. Secretary of State; director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Jan. 

2017 - Apr. 2018). 

White House staff secretary (Jan. 2017 - Feb. 2018). 

White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 - July 2017); chair of the 

Republican National Committee (Jan. 2011-Jan. 2017). 

Head of Russian companies Concord-Catering and Concord Management 

and Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency, 

which engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to 

interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

B-8 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attorne)' Work Produet // May CoHtaifl Material Proteeted URder Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

Prikhodko, Sergei 

Prince, Erik 

Raffel, Josh 

Rasin, Alexei 

Rogers, Michael 

Rosenstein, Rod 

Rozov, Andrei 

Rtskhiladze, Giorgi 

Ruddy, Christopher 

Rybicki, James 

Samochornov, 

Anatoli 

Sanders, Sarah 

Huckabee 

Sater, Felix 

Saunders, Paul J. 

Sechin, Igor 

Sessions, Jefferson 

III (Jeff) 

Shoygu, Sergey 

Simes, Dimitri 

First deputy head of the Russian Government Office and former Russian 

deputy prime minister. In January 2016, he invited candidate Trump to 

the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. 

Businessman and Trump Campaign supporter who met with Presidential 

Transition Team officials after the election and traveled to the Seychelles 

to meet with Kirill Dmitriev in January 2017. 

White House communications advisor (Apr. 2017 - Feb. 2018). 

Ukrainian associate of Henry Oknyansky who claimed to possess 

derogatory information regarding Hillary Clinton. 

Director of the National Security Agency (Apr. 2014 - May 2018). 

Deputy Attorney General (Apr. 2017 - present); Acting Attorney General 

for the Russian election interference investigation (May 2017 - Nov. 

2018). 

Chairman of LC. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real-estate 

development corporation that signed a letter of intent for the Trump 

Tower Moscow project in 2015. 

Executive of the Silk Road Transatlantic Alliance, LLC who 

communicated with Cohen about a Trump Tower Moscow proposal. 

Chief executive of Newsmax Media and associate of President Trump. 

FBI chiefofstaff(May 2015- Feb. 2018). 

Translator who worked with Natalia Veselnitskaya and attended a June 

9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump 

Campaign officials. 

White House press secretary (July 2017 - present). 

Real-estate advisor who worked with Michael Cohen to pursue a Trump 

Tower Moscow project. 

Executive with the Center for the National Interest who worked on 

outlines and logistics of candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy 

speech. 

Executive chairman of Rosneft, a Russian-stated owned oil company. 

Attorney General (Feb. 2017 - Nov. 2018); U.S. Senator (Jan. 1997 -

Feb. 2017); head of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisory team. 

Russian Minister of Defense. 

President and chief executive officer of the Center for the National 

Interest. 

B-9 
U.S. Depa11ment of Justice 

Atterne)1 Werlt Predttet // May Ce11tB:i11 Material Preteeted U11der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Smith, Peter 

Spicer, Sean 

Stone, Roger 

Tillerson, Rex 

Timofeev, Ivan 

Trump, Donald Jr. 

Trump, Eric 

Trump, Ivanka 

Ushakov, Yuri 

Viktorovich 

Vaino, Anton 

Van der Zwaan, 

Alexander 

Vargas, Catherine 

Vasilchenko, Gleb 

Veselnitskaya, 

Natalia 

Weber, Shlomo 

Yanukovych, Viktor 

Investment banker active in Republican politics who sought to obtain 

Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign 

period. 

White House press secretary and communications director (Jan. 2017 -

July 201 7). 

U.S. Secretary of State (Feb. 2017 - Mar. 2018). 

Director of programs at the Russian International Affairs Council and 

program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in 

2016 with George Papadopoulos, attempting to arrange a meeting 

between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. 

President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump 

Organization; helped arrange and attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at 

Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign 

officials. 

President Trump's son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump 

Organization. 

President Trump's daughter; advisor to the President and former 

executive vice president of the Trump Organization. 

Aide to Vladimir Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United 

States; identified to the Presidentia l Transition Team as the proposed 

channel to the Russian government. 

Chief of staff to Russian president Vladimir Putin. 

Former attorney at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP; worked 

with Paul Manafort and Rick Gates. 

Executive assistant to Jared Kushner. 

Internet Research Agency employee who engaged in an "active 

measures" socia l media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. 

presidential election. 

Russian attorney who advocated for the repeal of the Magnitsky Act and 

was the principal speaker at the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower 

with Trump Campaign officials. 

Rector of the New Economic School (NES) in Moscow who invited 

Carter Page to speak at NES commencement in July 2016. 

Former president of Ukraine who had worked with Paul Manafort. 

B-10 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attorne)' Wol'lt Prod1:1et // Ma)' CorHaiR Mate,•ial Prnteeted URder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

Yates, Sally Acting Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2017 - Jan. 30, 2017); Deputy 

Attorney General (Jan. 10, 2015 - Jan. 30, 2017). 

Yatsenko, Sergey Deputy chief financial officer of Gazprom, a Russian state-owned energy 

company, and associate of Carter Page. 

Zakharova, Maria Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair's Information and 

Press Department who received notification of Carter Page's speech in 

July 2016 from Denis Klimentov. 

Zayed al Nahyan, 

Mohammed bin 

Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) armed forces. 

Entities and Organizations 

Alfa-Bank Russia's largest commercial bank, which is headed by Petr Aven. 

Center for the National U.S.-based think tank with expertise in and connections to Russia. 

Interest (CNI) CNI's publication, the National Interest, hosted candidate Trump's 

foreign policy speech in April 2016. 

Concord Umbrella term for Concord Management and Consulting, LLC and 

Concord Catering, which are Russian companies controlled by 

Yevgeniy Prigozhin. 

Crocus Group or A Russian real-estate and property development company that, in 

Crocus International 2013, hosted the Miss Universe Pageant, and from 2013 through 2014, 

worked with the Trump Organization on a Trump Moscow project. 

DCLeaks Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen 

documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. 

Democratic Political committee working to elect Democrats to the House of 

Congressional Representatives; hacked by the GRU in April 2016. 

Campaign Committee 

Democratic National Formal governing body for the Democratic Party; hacked by the GRU 

Committee in April 2016. 

Duma Lower House of the national legislature of the Russian Federation. 

Gazprom Russian oil and gas company majority-owned by the Russian 

government. 

Global Energy Capital, Investment and management firm founded by Carter Page. 

Global Partners in Event hosted in partnership with the U.S. Department of State and the 

Diplomacy Republican National Convention. In 2016, Jeff Sessions and J .D. 

Gordon delivered speeches at the event and interacted with Russian 

Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. 

B-11 

LLC 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attorne)" Wol'lt Predttet // Mey Cofltttifl Meteriel Proteeted U1~der Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) 

Guccifer 2.0 

I.C. Expert Investment 

Company 

Internet Research 

Agency (IRA) 

KLS Research LLC 

Kremlin 

LetterOne 

Link Campus 

University 

London Centre of 

International Law 

Practice (LCILP) 

Main Intelligence 

Directorate of the 

General Staff (GRU) 

New Economic School 

in Moscow (NES) 

Opposition Bloc 

Party of Regions 

Pericles Emerging 

Market Partners LLP 

Prevezon Holdings Ltd. 

Roscongress 

Foundation 

Rosneft 

Russian Direct 

Investment Fund 

Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen 

documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. 

Russian real-estate and development corporation that signed a letter of 

intent with a Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump 

Moscow property. 

Russian entity based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that 

engaged in an "active measures" social media campaign to interfere in 

the 20 I 6 V,S. presidential election. 

Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter 

Smith to further Smith's search for Hillary Clinton emails. 

Official residence of the president of the Russian Federation; it is used 

colloquially to refer to the office of the president or the Russian 

government. 

Company that includes Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board members. 

During a board meeting in December 2016, Aven asked for Burt's help 

to make contact with the Presidential Transition Team. 

University in Rome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was 

introduced to Joseph Mifsud. 

International law advisory organization in London that employed 

Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos. 

Russian Federation's military intelligence agency. 

Moscow-based school that invited Carter Page to speak at its July 2016 

commencement ceremony. 

Ukrainian political party that incorporated members of the defunct 

Party of Regions. 

Ukrainian political party of former President Yanukovych. It was 

generally understood to align with Russian policies. 

Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and his 

business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund. 

Russian company that was a defendant in a U.S. civil action alleging 

the laundering of proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky. 

Russian entity that organized the St. Petersburg International 

Economic Forum. 

Russian state-owned oil and energy company. 

Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in 2011 

and headed by Kirill Dmitriev. 

B-12 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attorney \\'erk Prodttet // Ma)· C0Htait1 ~foterial Proteeted Ut1de1• Ped. R. Cri1T1. P. 6(e) 

Russian International Russia-based nonprofit established by Russian government decree. It 

Affairs Council is associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its members 

include Ivan Timofeev, Dmitry Peskov, and Petr Aven. 

Silk Road Group Privately held investment company that entered into a licensing 

agreement to build a Trump-branded hotel in Georgia. 

St. Petersburg Annual event held in Russia and attended by prominent Russian 

International Economic politicians and businessmen. 

Forum 

Tatneft Russian energy company. 

Transatlantic European group that sponsored a summit between European 

Parliamentary Group Parliament lawmakers and U.S. persons. George Papadopoulos, Sam 

on Counterterrorism Clovis, and Walid Phares attended the TAG summit in July 2016. 

Unit 26165 (GRU) GRU military cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political, 

governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia. 

It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and organizations, 

as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in order to interfere 

in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

Unit 74455 (GRU) GRU military unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber 

operations. It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and 

organizations, as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in 

order to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

Valdai Discussion Club Group that holds a conference attended by Russian government 

officials, including President Putin. 

WikiLeaks Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online, 

including data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government 

entities. Released data stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S. 

presidential election. 

B-13 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attorne)' 'Norlc Prodttet // May Cm1taifl Material Proteeted URder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

Index of Acronyms 

CNI Center for the National Interest 

DCCC Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 

DNC Democratic National Committee 

FBI 

FSB 

GEC 

Federal Bureau oflnvestigation 

Russian Federal Security Service 

Global Energy Capital, LLC 

GRU Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff 

HPSCI U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

HRC Hillary Rodham Clinton 

IRA Internet Research Agency 

LCILP London Centre of International Law Practice 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NES New Economic School 

NSA National Security Agency 

ODNI 

PTT 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Presidential Transition Team 

RDIF Russian Direct Investment Fund 

RIAC Russian International Affairs Council 

SBOE State boards of elections 

sco Special Counsel's Office 

SJC U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee 

SSCI 

TAG 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism 

VEB Vnesheconombank 

B-14 
U.S. Department of Justice 

AMorttcy Werle Proauet // Ma)' Contain Material Protected UHder Fca. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

AppendixC 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attomey Wm•k Pfoe:lttet // Mtty Cofltttifl Mttterittl Pfoteetee:I Ut1e:ler Fee. R. Cfim. P. 6(e) 
U.S. Department of Justice 

i'\Jterfle~· Werk Preattet // May CeHtttifl Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

APPENDIXC 

INTRODUCTORY NOTE 

The President provided written responses through his personal counsel to questions 

submitted to him by the Special Counsel's Office. We first explain the process that led to the 

submission of written questions and then attach the President's responses. 

Beginning in December 2017, this Office sought for more than a year to interview the 

President on topics relevant to both Russian-election interference and obstruction-of-justice. We 

advised counsel that the President was a " subject" of the investigation under the definition of the 

Justice Manual-"a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation." 

Justice Manual § 9-11.151 (2018). We also advised counsel that"[ a]n interview with the President 

is vital to our investigation" and that this Office had "carefully considered the constitutional and 

other arguments raised by . .. counsel, and they d[id] not provide us with reason to forgo seeking 

an interview." 1 We additionally stated that "it is in the interest of the Presidency and the public 

for an interview to take place" and offered "numerous accommodations to aid the President's 

preparation and avoid surprise."2 After extensive discussions with the Department of Justice about 

the Special Counsel's objective of securing the President's testimony, these accommodations 

included the submissions of written questions to the President on certain Russia-related topics. 3 

We received the President's written responses in late November 2018.4 In December 2018, 

we informed counsel of the insufficiency of those responses in several respects.5 We noted, among 

other things, that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he "does not 'recall' or 

' remember' or have an ' independent recollection"' of information called for by the questions. 6 

Other answers were "incomplete or imprecise." 7 The written responses, we informed counsel, 

"demonstrate the inadequacy of the written format, as we have had no opportunity to ask followup questions that would ensure complete answers and potentially refresh your client's recollection 

or clarify the extent or nature of his lack of recollection."8 We again requested an in-person 

interview, limited to certain topics, advising the President's counsel that "[t]his is the President' s 

1 5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President's Personal Counsel, at 1. 

2 5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsels's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at l ; see 7/30/18 

Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at I (describing accommodations). 

3 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at I (submitting 

written questions). 

4 11/20/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel's Office (transmitting 

written responses of Donald J. Trump). 

5 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 3. 

6 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 3. 

7 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 3; see (noting, 

"for example," that the President "did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested that 

discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease ... but he has since made public comments 

about that topic"). 

8 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 3. 

C-1 
U.S. Department of Justice 

A1:terHe~· Werk Preclttet // May CeHtaiH Material Proteetecl UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

opportunity to voluntarily provide us with information for us to evaluate in the context of all of 

the evidence we have gathered."9 The President declined. 10 

Recognizing that the President would not be interviewed voluntarily, we considered 

whether to issue a subpoena for his testimony. We viewed the written answers to be inadequate. 

But at that point, our investigation had made significant progress and had produced substantial 

evidence for our report. We thus weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutional litigation, 

with resulting delay in finishing our investigation, against the anticipated benefits for our 

investigation and report. As explained in Volume II, Section H.B., we determined that the 

substantial quantity of information we had obtained from other sources allowed us to draw relevant 

factual conclusions on intent and credibility, which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence 

and assessed without direct testimony from the subject of the investigation. 

* * * 

9 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President's Personal Counsel. 

10 12/12/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel's Office, at 2. 

C-2 
U.S. Department of Justice 

AttorHey Work Proettet // May CeHtaiH Mat:erial Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED UNDER OATH BY PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP 

I. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower 

a. When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner 

was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially 

negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the 

information from and the substance of the discussion. 

b. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 

between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the 

emails reflected in Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with 

Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016. 

i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these 

communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with 

you, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). 

ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected 

in Exhibit A? 

iii. When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was 

described as being part of Russia and its government's support for your 

candidacy? 

iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or 

any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you 

communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and 

why you took that action. 

c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a 

meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, 

Natalia Veselnitskaya (the 11June 9 meeting"). 

i. Other than as set forth in your answers to I.a and l.b, what, if anything, 

were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the 

scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, 

when, and what you were informed about the meeting. 

ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9 

meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian 

government? Describe who you learned this information from and the 

substance of the discussion(s). 

iii. What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? 

Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was 

discussed at the meeting, who the conversation was with, when it 

occurred, and the substance of the statements they made about the 

meeting. 

C-3 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Attort'iey Work Proattet // Ma)'' Cotttaitt Material Proteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part, 

adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who you had that 

discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion. 

d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day 

were you in Trump Tower? 

i. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared 

Kushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those 

conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June 

9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the 

conversation. 

e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of 

the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, 

and the substance of the communication. 

f. Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, 

or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, 

Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took 

place after June 9, 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to 

assist the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, 

when, and the substance of what you learned. 

g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part, "I am going to give 

a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing 

all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons." 

i. Why did you make that statement? 

ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons? 

iii. What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be? 

iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 

meeting? 

v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who? 

vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 

2016? 

h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or 

the Russian government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of 

Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the information, when you were 

informed, and the content of such discussion(s). 

i. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign 

government or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, 

wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to your campaign, 

including by way of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If 

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U.S. Department of Justice 

Attel'fl:e~· '.\'e,rk Preclttet // Ma)' CeAtaiA Material Pre,teetecl UAcler Fecl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

yes, describe the source{s) of the information, when you were informed, and the 

content of such discussion(s). 

II. Russian Hacking/ Russian Efforts Using Social Media / Wikileaks 

a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated 

the computer network of the Democratic National Committee {DNC) and that 

Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 

14, 2016, were you provided any information about any potential or actual 

hacking of the computer systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic 

Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, 

or individuals associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided 

this information, when, and the substance of the information. 

b. On July 22, 2016, Wikileaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by 

Democratic party officials. 

i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that 

Wikileaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had 

possession of or planned to release emails or information that could help 

your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you 

discussed this issue with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). 

ii. After the release of emails by Wikileaks on July 22, 2016, were you told 

that Wikileaks possessed or might possess additional information that 

could be released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this 

information, when, and what you were told. 

c. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly, 

between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and {a) 

Wikileaks, {b) Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of Wikileaks, {d) Guccifer 

2.0, (e) representatives of Guccifer 2.0, or {f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, 

describe who provided you with this information, when you learned of the 

communications, and what you know about those communications. 

d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you're listening, I 

hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will 

probably be rewarded mightily by our press." 

i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, 

entity, or individual? 

ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have 

with anyone else about the substance of the statement? 

iii. Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that 

Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email 

accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided 

this information, when, and what you were told. 

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Atlef'fle)1 \ltet'k Pt1eclttet // Moy CeHtttiH Motet1iol Prnteetecl UHE:ier Fee. R. Ct1iffl. P. 6(e) 

e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were 

released by WikiLeaks. 

· i. Where were you on October 7, 2016? 

ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 

release that Wikileaks possessed or might possess emails related to John 

Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this, when, and what you were 

told. 

iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including 

Roger Stone, reaching out to Wikileaks, either directly or through an 

intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes, identify the person and 

describe the substance of the conversations or contacts. 

f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger 

Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with Wikileaks, Guccifer 2.0, 

or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes, 

describe who had such contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when 

you became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts. 

g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you 

communicate with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) 

with Mr. Stone. 

i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making 

to assist your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr. 

Stone? 

ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss Wikileaks with you or, as far as you were aware, 

with anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you 

were told, from whom, and when. 

iii. Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about contacts he had with Wikileaks 

or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases of 

information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when. 

h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential 

pardon or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had 

the discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). 

i. Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those 

in Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the 

organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with, 

when, and the content of the discussion(s). 

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Ill. The Trump Organization Moscow Project 

a. In October 2015, a "Letter of Intent," a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was 

signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the "Trump 

Moscow project"). 

i. When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow 

project? By whom? What were you told about the project? 

ii. Did you sign the letter of intent? 

b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: 

"To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about 

this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding 

letter of intent in 2015." Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or 

anyone else associated with the Trump Organization, about the Trump Moscow 

project, including who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the 

discussion(s). 

c. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and 

any Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, 

regarding the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this 

information to you, when, and the substance of what you learned. 

d. Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a 

potential trip to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the 

Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the 

substance of the discussion(s). 

e. Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow 

project should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been 

abandoned? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the 

discussion(s), and why that decision was made. 

f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided 

publicly or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual 

investments or business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the 

Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the 

substance of the discussion(s). 

g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have 

any other prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements 

with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If 

yes, describe the business interests, investments, or arrangements. 

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U.S. Department of Justice 

Atleme~· Werk Pretlttet // May Ce!ltttill Material Preteetee U!leer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(c) 

IV. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign 

a. Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to 

the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information 

from, when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's 

connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your 

decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role. 

b. Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your 

campaign to Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this information 

from, when, the substance of what you were told, what you understood the 

purpose was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you 

responded to learning this information. 

c. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your 

campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to 

any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or 

Russian governments? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, 

when, the substance of the discussion(s), what you understood the purpose was 

of sharing the internal campaign information, and how you responded to learning 

this information. 

d. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any positions 

Ukraine or Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he 

communicated those positions to you and the substance of those 

communications. 

e. During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with 

you or senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had 

conversations with on this topic, when, and what you were told. 

f. What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform 

regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to 

the convention, what information did you have about this platform provision? 

After the platform provision was changed, who told you about the change, when 

did they tell you, what were you told about why it was changed, and who was 

involved? 

g. On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize 

Crimea as Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: "We'll be looking 

at that. Yeah, we'll be looking." Did you intend to communicate by that statement 

or at any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or 

recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected? 

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At:terHe~· '+\'erk Pt'eattet // Mtty CeHtttiH Mttterittl Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Ct'iffi. P. 6(e) 

i. What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing 

Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you 

spoke with about this topic, when, the substance of the discussion{s). 

V. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition 

a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10, 

2016? If yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you 

told about about why your presence was requested? 

i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you 

had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the 

event. 

b. Following the Obama Administration's imposition of sanctions on Russia iri 

December 2016 {"Russia sanctions"), did you discuss with Lieutenant General 

{LTG) Michael Flynn, K.T. McFarland, Steve Bannon, Reince Priebus, Jared Kushner, 

Erik Prince, or anyone else associated with the transition what should be 

communicated to the Russian government regarding the sanctions? If yes, 

describe who you spoke with about this issue, when, and the substance of the 

discussion{s). 

c. On December 29 and December 31, 2016, LTG Flynn had conversations with 

Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about the Russia sanctions and Russia's 

response to the Russia sanctions. 

i. Did you direct or suggest that LTG Flynn have discussions with anyone from 

the Russian government about the Russia sanctions? 

ii. Were you told in advance of LTG Flynn's December 29, 2016 conversation 

that he was going to be speaking with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, describe 

who told you this information, when, and what you were told. If no, when 

and from whom did you learn of LTG Flynn's December 29, 2016 

conversation with Ambassador Kislyak? 

iii. When did you learn of LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak's call on 

December 31, 2016? Who told you and what were you told? 

iv. When did you learn that sanctions were discussed in the December 29 and 

December 31, 2016 calls between LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak? 

Who told you and what were you told? 

d. At any time between December 31, 2016, and January 20, 2017, did anyone tell 

you or suggest to you that Russia's decision not to impose reciprocal sanctions 

was attributable in any way to LTG Flynn's communications with Ambassador 

Kislyak? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, and the 

substance of what you were told. 

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Attoffley Work Protittet // Mtty CotttttiH Mttterittl Proteeteti UAtier Fee. R. CrirA. P. 6(e) 

e. On January 12, 2017, the Washington Post published a column that stated that 

LTG Flynn phoned Ambassador Kislyak several times on December 29, 2016. After 

learning of the column, did you direct or suggest to anyone that LTG Flynn should 

deny that he discussed sanctions with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, who did you 

make this suggestion or direction to, when, what did you say, and why did you 

take this step? 

i. After learning of the column, did you have any conversations with LTG 

Flynn about his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak in December 2016? 

If yes, describe when those discussions occurred and the content of the 

discussions. 

f. Were you told about a meeting between Jared Kushner and Sergei Gorkov that 

took place in December 2016? 

i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the 

discussion(s}, and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting. 

g. Were you told about a meeting or meetings between Erik Prince and Kiri II Dmitriev 

or any other representative from the Russian government that took place in 

January 2017? 

i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the 

discussion(s}, and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting(s). 

h. Prior to January 20, 2017, did you talk to Steve Bannon, Jared Kushner, or any 

other individual associated with the transition regarding establishing an unofficial 

line of communication with Russia? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, 

the substance of the discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of 

such an unofficial line of communication. 

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AMenwy Werk Preattet // Ma:,· Contain Mate1•ial Preteetea Unaer Feel. R. Ct1ittt. P. 6(e) 

RESPONSES OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP 

I. June 9. 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower 

a. When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was 

considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative 

information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the 

substance of the discussion. 

b. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, 

among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected in. 

Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with Rob Goldstone and £min 

Agalarov between )une 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016. 

i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these 

communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with you, 

when, and the substance of the discussion(s), 

11. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in 

Exhibit A? 

iii. When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved cir was described as 

being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy? 

1v. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any 

portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you 

communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you 

took that action. 

c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a meeting 

at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia 

Yeselnitskaya (the "June 9 meeting"). 

i. Other than as set fotth in your answers to I.a and l.b, what, if anything, were you 

told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a 

meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, when, and what you were informed 

about the meeting. 

ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were 

Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government? Describe 

who you learned this information from and the substance of the discussion(s). 

6 

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iii. What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each 

conversation in which you were told about whal was discussed at lhe meeting, who 

the conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements 

lhey made about the meeting. 

iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part, adoption 

and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who you had that discussion with, when, 

and the substance of the discussion. 

d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day were you 

in Trump Tower? 

1. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr. , Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner 

on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings 

include any reference to any aspect of the June 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you 

spoke with and the substance of the conversation. 

e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the 

Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the 

substance of the communication. 

f. Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr. , Paul Manaforl, or Jared 

Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya, 

Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took place after June 9, 20 l 6 and 

concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign? If yes. describe 

who you learned this information from , when, and the substance of what you learned. 

g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part,'·[ am going to give a major 

speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things 

that have taken place with the Clintons.'' 

1. Why did you make that statement? 

ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Cl intons? 

111. What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be? 

iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting? 

v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who? 

vt. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016? 

h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian 

7 

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AtteirRey \Ve,rk Preifittet // MB:)' CeiRtB:iR MateriB:I Pre,teetefi Uttfier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 

government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes, 

describe the source(s) of the information. when you were informed, and the content of such 

discussion(s). 

1. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or 

foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or 

offered to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to 

provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the 

information, when you were informed, and the content of such discussion(s). 

Response to Question l, Parts (a) through (c) 

I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared 

Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative 

information about Hillary Clinton. Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9, 

2016 meeting had taken place, that the referenced emails existed. or that Donald J. Trump, Jr., had 

other communications with Emin Agalarov or Robert Goldstone between June 3, 2016 and June 

9, 2016. 

Response to Question I, Part {d) 

I have no independent recollection of what portion of these four days in June of2016 I spent in 

Trump Tower. This was one of many busy months during a fast-paced campaign, as the primary 

season was ending and we were preparing for the general election campaign. 

I am now aware that my Campaign's calendar indicates that I was in New York City from June 6 

- 9, 2016. Calendars kept in my Trump Tower office reflect that I had various calls and meetings 

scheduled for each of these days. While those calls and meetings may or may not actually have 

taken place, they do indicate that I was in Trump Tower during a portion of each of these working 

days, and I have no reason to doubt that I was. When I was in New York City, I stayed at my 

Trump Tower apartment. 

My Trump Organization desk calendar also reflects that I was outside Trump Tower during 

portions of these days. The June 7, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to leave Trump Tower 

in the early evening for Westchester where I gave remarks after winning the California, New 

Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries held that day. The June 8, 

2016 calendar indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon to attend a ceremony at my son's 

school. The June 9, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a 

fundraising luncheon at the Four Seasons Hotel. At this point, I do not remember on what dales 

these events occurred, but I do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as 

scheduled on my calendar. 

Widely available media reports, including television footage, also shed light on my activities 

during these days. For example, I am aware that my June 7, 2016 victory remarks at the Trump 

8 

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AMerRe)· '.\'erk Preclttet // Ma)' Cm~tttil'l Mtttel'ittl Preteetecl Uftcler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) 

National Golf Club in Briarcliff Manor, New York, were recorded and published by the media. 1 

remember winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening. 

At this point in time, I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul 

Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016. My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet 

with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do not recall if that meeting took place. It was 

more than two years ago, at a time when I had many calls and interactions daily. · 

Response to Question I, Part (e) 

I have no independent recollection of any communications I had with the Agalarov family or 

anyone r understood to be a representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016 and before 

the end of the campaign. While preparing to respond to these questions, I have become aware of 

written communications with the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, and 

largely authored by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you. 

In general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories, emails about a 

painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to have delivered to Trump Tower as a birthday 

present, and emails regarding delivery of a book written by Aras Agalarov. The documents reflect 

that the deliveries were screened by the Secret Service. 

Response to Question I, Part (t) 

I do not recall being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump, Jr., 

Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Robert 

Goldstone, Natalia Yeselnitskaya (whose name I was not familiar with), or anyone I understood 

to be a Russian official. 

Response to Question I, Part (g) 

In remarks I delivered the night I won the California, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and 

South Dakota Republican primaries, I said, "I am going to give a major speech on probably 

Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with 

the Clintons." In general, l expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative 

information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton's failed policies, the 

Clintons' use of the State Department to further their interests and the interests of the Clinton 

Foundation, Mrs. Clinton's improper use of a private server for State Department business, the 

destruction of 33,000 emails on that server, and Mrs. Clinton's temperamental unsuitability for the 

office of President. 

In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that the Campaign 

documents already produced to you reflect the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for 

the speech I expected to give "probably" on the Monday fol lowing my June 7, 2016 comments. 

These documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by Campaign staff 

9 

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with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including, 

in particular, information from the book CUnton Cash by Peter Schweizer. 

The Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June 12, 

2016. In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed more specifically to national security and 

terrorism than to the Clintons. That speech was delivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of 

Politics in Manchester, New Hampshire, and, as reported, opened with the following: 

This was going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad a President, 

especially in these times of Radical Islamic Terrorism, she would be. Even her 

former Secret Service Agent, who has seen her under pressure and in times of stress, 

has stated that she lacks the temperament and integrity to be president. There will 

be plenty of oppo1tunity to discuss these important issues at a later time, and I will 

deliver that speech soon. But today there is only one thing to discuss: the growing 

threat of terrorism inside of our borders. 

I continued to speak about Mrs. Clinton's failings throughout the campaign, using the information 

prepared for inclusion in the speech to which I referred on June 7, 2016. 

Response to Question I, Part (h) 

I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian 

government "suppotted" my candidacy or "opposed" the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. However, 

I was aware of some reports indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements 

about me. 

Response to Question I, Part (i) 

I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign 

leader had provided, wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign. 

II. Russian Hacking / Russian Efforts Using Social Media / WikiLeaks 

a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the 

computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian 

intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 20 I 6, were you 

provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer systems or 

email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), 

the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals associated with the Clinton 

campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and the substance of the 

information. 

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b. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic 

party officials. 

1. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks, 

Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or planned 

to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton 

campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when, and the 

substance of the discussion(s). 

11. After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that 

WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be 

released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, 

when, and what you were told. 

c. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly, between 

Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a) WikiLeaks, (b) 

Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Gucci fer 2.0, (e) representatives 

of Gucci fer 2.0, or (f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with 

this information, when you learned of the communications, and what you know about those 

communications. 

d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope 

you' re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded 

mightily by our press." 

1. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity, 

or individual? 

ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have with 

anyone else about the substance of the statement? 

iii. Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that Russia was 

attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary 

Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and 

what you were told. 

e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by 

WikiLeaks. 

i. Where were you on October 7, 20 I 6? 

ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that 

WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes, 

describe who told you this, when, and what you were told. 

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iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger 

Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an intermediary, on or 

about October 7, 2016? If yes, identify the person and describe the substance of the 

conversations or contacts. 

f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone, 

having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, or DCLeaks 

regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes, describe who had such 

contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when you became aware of the contacts, 

and the substance of the contacts. 

g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you communicate 

with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone. 

1. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to assist 

your campaign, and what requests. if any, did you make of Mr. Stone? 

ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with 

anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were told, from 

whom. and when. 

iii. Did Mr. Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks or any 

intermediary of WikiLeaks. or about forthcoming releases of information? If yes, 

describe what Stone told you and when. 

h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon or 

other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the discussion(s) with, 

when, and the content of the discussion(s). 

i. Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in 

Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization 

of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with, when, and the content 

of the discussion(s). 

Response to Question II, Part (a) 

I do not remember the date on which it was publicly reported that the DNC had been hacked, but 

my best recollection is that I learned of the hacking at or shortly after the time it became the subject 

of media reporting. I do not recall being provided any information during the campaign about the 

hacking of any of the named entities or individuals before it became the subject of media reporting. 

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Response to Question U, Part (b) 

I recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable media reporting about 

the possible hacking and release of campaign-related information and there was a lot of talk about 

this matter. At the time, I was generally aware of these media reports and may have discussed these 

issues with my campaign staff or others, but at this point in time - more than two years later - I 

have no recollection of any particular conversation, when it occurred, or who the participants were. 

Response to Question II, Part (c) 

I do not recall being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals 

named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be a representative of WikiLeaks or any of 

the other individuals or entities referred to in the question. 

Response to Question II, Part (d) 

I made the statement quoted in Question II (d) in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any 

objective observer. The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing of the 

July 27, 2016 press conference, and I refer you to the publicly available transcript and video of 

that press conference. I do not recall having any discussion about the substance of the statement in 

advance of the press conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign of any efforts by 

Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her 

campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media repo11ing and I have no recollection of any 

particular conversation in that regard. 

Response to Question II, Part (e) 

I was in Trump Tower in New York City on October 7, 2016. I have no recollection of being told 

that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of 

Mr. Podesta's emails was reported by the media. Likewise, I have no recollection of being told 

that Roger Stone, anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone, or anyone associated with my 

campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016. 

Response to Question II, Part (0 

I do not recall being told during the campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my 

campaign had discussions with any of the entities named in the question regarding the content or 

timing of release of hacked emails. 

Response to Question ll, Part (g) 

I spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no 

recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June 1.2016 and 

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November 8, 2016. I do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of 

Mr. Stone having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign, although I 

was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and campaign-related discussion at 

the time. 

Response to Question II, Part (h) 

I do not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon or action to 

benefit Julian Assange. 

Response to Question II, Part (i) 

I do not recall being aware during the campaign of specific effo11s by foreign individuals or 

companies to assist my campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of 

rallies. 

III. The Trump Organization Moscow Project 

a. In October 2015, a "Letter of Intent," a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was signed 

for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the "Trump Moscow project"). 

1. When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow project? 

By whom? What were you told about the project? 

ii. Did you sign the letter of intent? 

b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: "To the 

best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal 

other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015." 

Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump 

Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with, when, and 

the substance of the discussion(s). 

c. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any 

Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding 

the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this info1mation to you, when, 

and the substance of what you learned. 

d. Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip 

to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project? 

If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). 

e. Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project 

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should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned? If 

yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and why that 

decision was made. 

f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly or 

in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals 

the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the Trump Moscow project? If yes, 

describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). 

g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have any other 

prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements with Russia or any 

Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If yes, describe the business 

interests, investments, or arrangements. 

Response to Question III, Parts (a) through (g) 

Sometime in 2015, Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility of a Trump Organization project 

in Moscow. As I recall, Mr. Cohen described this as a proposed project of a general type we have 

done in the past in a variety of locations. I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your 

questions as Exhibit B which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was consistent with 

our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around the world. 

I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and they were 

not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and 1 do not recall any discussion of travel 

to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with anyone else at the Trump 

Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications 

between Mr. Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government official regarding the Letter of 

Intent. In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that Mr. 

Cohen sent an email regarding the Letter of Intent to "Mr. Peskov" at a general, public email 

account, which should show there was no meaningful relationship with people in power in Russia. 

I understand those documents already have been provided to you. 

I vaguely remember press inquiries and media reporting during the campaign about whether the 

Trump Organization had business dealings in Russia. I may have spoken with campaign staff or 

Trump Organization employees regarding responses to requests for information, but 1 have no 

current recollection of any particular conversation, with whom L may have spoken, when, or the 

substance of any conversation. As I recall , neither I nor the Trump Organization had any projects 

or proposed projects in Russia during the campaign other than the Letter of Tntent. 

IV. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign 

a. Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the 

Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and 

the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or 

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Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If 

yes, describe that role. 

b. Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your campaign to 

Oleg Deripaska? lf yes, describe who you learned this information from , when, the 

substance of what you were told, what you understood the purpose was of sharing such 

information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you responded to learning this information. 

c. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign 

sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located 

in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments? If yes, 

identify who provided you with this information, when, the substance of the discussion(s), 

what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign information, and 

how you responded to learning this information. 

d. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly. any positions Ukraine or 

Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he communicated those 

positions to you and the substance of those communications. 

e. During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or 

senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had conversations with on this 

topic, when, and what you were told. 

f. What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding 

arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to the convention, what 

information did you have about this platform provision? After the platform provision was 

changed, who told you about the change, when did they tell you, what were you told about 

why it was changed, and who was involved? 

g. On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as 

Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: "We' ll be looking at that. Yeah, 

we'll be looking." Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time 

during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or recognize Russia's annexation 

of Crimea if you were elected? 

1. What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia's 

annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you spoke with about this 

topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s). 

Response to Question IV, Parts (a) through (d) 

Mr. Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate work for prior presidential candidates, 

including Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bob Dole. I knew that Mr. 

Manafort had done international consulting work and, at some time before Mr. Manafort left the 

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campaign, I learned that he was somehow involved with individuals concerning Ukraine, but I do 

not remember the specifics of what I knew at the time. 

l had no knowledge of Mr. Manafort offering briefings on the progress of my campaign to an 

individual named Oleg Deripaska, nor do I remember being aware of Mr. Manafort or anyone else 

associated with my campaign sending or directing others to send internal Trump Campaign 

information to anyone I knew to be in Ukraine or Russia at the time or to anyone I understood to 

be a Ukrainian or Russian government employee or official. I do not remember Mr. Manafort 

communicating to me any particular positions Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to 

support. 

Response to Question IV, Part (e) 

I do not recall being told during the campaign of efforts by Russian officials to meet with me or 

with senior members of my campaign. In the process of preparing to respond to these questions, I 

became aware that on March 17, 2016, my assistant at the Trump Organization, Rhona Graff, 

received an email from a Sergei Prikhodko, who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister of 

the Russian Federation, Foundation Roscongress, inviting me to participate in the St. Petersburg 

International Economic Forum to be held in June 2016. The documents show that Ms. Graff 

prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation. I understand these documents 

already have been produced to you. 

Response to Question IV, Part (t) 

I have no recollection of the details of what, when, or from what source I first learned about the 

change to the platform amendment regarding arming Ukraine, but I generally recall learning of the 

issue as pa1t of media reporting. I do not recall being involved in changing the language to the 

amendment. 

Response to Question IV, Part (g) 

My statement did not communicate any position. 

V. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition 

a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala oo November JO, 2016? If 

yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you told about about 

[sic] why your presence was requested? 

1. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you had with 

any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the event. 

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Response to Question V, Part (a) 

I do not remember having been asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala, and I did not 

attend the event. During the course of preparing to respond to these questions, I have become 

aware of documents indicating that in March of 2016, the president of the World Chess Federation 

invited the Trump Organization to host, at Trump Tower, the 2016 World Chess Championship 

Match to be held in New York in November 2016. r have also become aware that in November 

2016, there were press inquiries to my staff regarding whether I had plans to attend the tournament, 

which was not being held at Trump Tower. I understand these documents have already been 

provided to you. 

Execut d on N Ofl&M,lf.rc,J,.0, 2018 

President of the United States 

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U.S. Department of Justice 

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APPENDIXD 

SPECIAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE TRANSFERRED, REFERRED, AND COMPLETED CASES 

This appendix identifies matters transferred or referred by the Special Counsel's Office, as 

well as cases prosecuted by the Office that are now completed. 

A. Transfers 

The Special Counsel's Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination 

between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain 

matters assigned to the Office by the Acting Attorney General have not fully concluded as of the 

date of this report. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office 

has transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Department of Justice 

and the FBI. Those transfers include: 

1. United States v. Bijan Rafiekian and Kami! Ekim Alptekin 

US. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 

(Awaiting trial) 

The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other 

things, possible criminal conduct by Michael Flynn in acting as an unregistered agent for the 

Government of Turkey. See August 2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. 

Mueller, III. The Acting Attorney General later confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to 

investigate Rafiekian and Alptekin because they "may have been jointly involved" with Flynn in 

FARA-related crimes. See October 20, 2017 Memorandum from Associate Deputy Attorney 

General Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein. 

On December 1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with making 

false statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States. 

As part of that plea, Flynn agreed to a Statement of the Offense in which he acknowledged that 

the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) documents he filed on March 7, 2017 "contained 

materially false statements and omissions." Flynn's plea occurred before the Special Counsel had 

made a final decision on whether to charge Rafiekian or Alptekin. On March 27, 2018, after 

consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel' s Office referred 

the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin to the National Security Division (NSD) for any action 

it deemed appropriate. The Special Counsel's Office determined the referral was appropriate 

because the investigation of Flynn had been completed, and that investigation had provided the 

rationale for the Office's investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin. At NS D's request, the Eastern 

District of Virginia continued the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin. 

2. United States v. Michael Flynn 

US. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia 

(A waiting sentencing) 

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3. United States v. Richard Gates 

U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia 

(Awaiting sentencing) 

4. United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (Russian Social Media Campaign) 

U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia 

National Security Division 

(Post-indictment, pre-arrest & pre-trial 1

) 

5. United States v. Konstantin Kilimnik 

U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia 

(Post-indictment, pre-arrest) 

6. United States v. Paul Manafort 

U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia 

U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 

(Post-conviction) 

7. United States v. Viktor Netyksho, et al. (Russian Hacking Operations) 

U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

National Security Division 

(Post-indictment, pre-arrest) 

8. United States v. William Samuel Patten 

U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia 

(Awaiting sentencing) 

The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate aspects of 

Patten's conduct that related to another matter that was under investigation by the Office. The 

investigation uncovered evidence of a crime; the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of 

Columbia handled the prosecution of Patten. 

9. Harm to Ongoing Matter 

(Investigation ongoing) 

The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other 

things, crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received from the Ukrainian 

government before and during the tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych. See August 2, 2017 

Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller, Ill. The Acting Attorney General 

1 One defendant, Concord Management & Consulting LLC, appeared through counsel and is in pretrial litigation. 

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, ! Harm to Ongoing 

Matter 

On October 27, 2017, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of 

Columbia with various crimes (including FARA) in connection with work they performed for 

Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. On February 22, 2018, Manafort and Gates were 

charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various other crimes in connection with the 

payments they received for work performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. 

During the course of its , the Special Counsel's Office developed substantial 

evidence with respect to individuals and enti ies that wer 

On February 23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multiobject conspiracy and to making false statements; the remaining charges against Gates were 

dismissed.

3 Thereafter, in consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special 

Counsel's Office closed the and referred them 1if•rn• for further 

investigation as it deemed appropriate. The Office based its decision to close those matters on its 

mandate, the indictments.ofManafort, Gates's plea, and its determination as to how best to allocate 

its resources, among other reasons; 

the investigation of those closed matters. 

At Harm to Ongoing Matter d 

10. United States v. Roger Stone 

US. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia 

(Awaiting trial) 

1 I. Harm to Ongoing Matter 

(Investigation ongoing) 

B. Referrals 

During the course of the investigation, the Office periodically identified evidence of 

potential criminal activity _that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel's jurisdiction 

established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy 

Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, 

principally other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Those referrals, listed 

3 Manafort was ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded guilty 

in the District of Columbia. See Vol. I, Section IV.A.8. The trial and plea happened after the transfer 

decision described here. 

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alphabetically by subject, are summarized below. 

2. Michael Cohen 

During the course of the investigation, the Special Counsel's Office uncovered evidence 

of potential wire fraud and FECA violations pertaining to Michael Cohen. That evidence was 

referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the FBI's New 

York Field Office. 

4. lirllllll 

5. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 

During the course of the FARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, the Special 

Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of potential FARA violations pertaining to 

Gregory Craig, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Skadden), and their work on behalf 

of the government of Ukraine. 

After consultation with the NSD, the evidence regarding Craig was 

referred to NSD, and NSD elected to partne_r with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern 

District of New York and the FBI's New York Field Office. NSD later elected to partner on the 

Craig matter with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. NSD retained and 

handled issues relating to Skadden itself. 

6. 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

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Harm to Ongoing Matter 

Harm to Ongoing Matter 

C. Completed Prosecutions 

In three cases prosecuted by the Special Counsel's Office, the defendants have completed 

or are about to complete their terms of imprisonment. Because no further proceedings are likely 

in any case, responsibility for them has not been transferred to any other office or component. 

1. United States v. George Papadopoulos 

Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (December 7, 2018) 

2. United States v. Alex van der Zwaan 

Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (June 4, 2018) 

3. United States v. Richard Pinedo 

Post-conviction, Currently in Residential Reentry Center (release date May 13, 2019) 

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