UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ROSANA VIGIL-LAZO, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 13-9594 (Petition for Review)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before MATHESON , PORFILIO , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.
Rosana Vigil-Lazo, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Ap peals (BIA) affirming a decision by the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her applicati ons for asylum, restriction on removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - I. Background Ms. Vigil-Lazo entered th e United States illegally in March 2007. She was charged with being subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i), as an alien who did not possess a valid en try document at the time of application for admission. Ms. Vigil-Lazo conceded remo vability as charged, but re quested asylum, restriction on removal, and protection under the CAT. She alleged that she had been, and would continue to be, persecuted in El Salv ador by members of the Mara gang. Ms. Vigil-Lazo had a hearing on her app lications for relief be fore an IJ. She testified that she met and began dating David Molina when she was thirteen years old, but did not know at the time that he was a gang member. When she was eighteen, she moved in with him. She tes tified that Mr. Molina was abusive and beat her because he was jealous, distrustful, a nd often drunk or high on drugs. On one occasion his beating caused her to miscarry a pregnancy, and another time, he cut her hand with a knife. She ultimately decided to leave Mr. Molina because of the abuse and moved in with her uncle. After she moved away from Mr. Molina, she testified that three letters were placed at her uncle’s doorstep in January and February 2007. The first one demanded rent money of $50 and was signed by the “Mar a.” She did not pay the money. The second letter asked for $100 in rent money for the Mara gang, and again she did not pay the money. The third letter stated th at because Ms. Vigil-Lazo did not pay the money, she was required to join the Ma ra gang and as a me mber, she would be- 3 - sexually abused by other gang members. She did not join the gang. After receiving the letters, Ms. Vigil- Lazo decided to leave El Salva dor, and she came to the United States in March 2007. Ms. Vigil-Lazo testified that the gang asks anyone who has money to pay rent and if people pay the money, they are pr otected and nothing happ ens to them as long as they keep paying the rent. She testified that she did not report any of the letters to the police because sh e believed the police would not help her, and she thought reporting the incidents would only cause mo re problems. On cross-examination, Ms. Vigil-Lazo was asked whether the poli ce would protect a woman if they were notified about a domestic abuse situation. She testified th at she thought they would, but she did not know “how sure it would be.” Admin. R. at 264. In his decision denying relief, the IJ de termined that Ms. Vigil-Lazo had not shown she had been or would be persecuted in El Salvador on account of a protected ground, and therefore she was not eligible for asylum or re striction on removal. The IJ also denied Ms. Vigil-Lazo’s CAT clai m, finding that although “the government of El Salvador is less than completely effectiv e in protecting against domestic abuse,” there was no evidence showing the governme nt acquiesces in the torture of its citizens or would acquies ce in her torture. Id . at 175. In her appeal to the BI A, Ms. Vigil-Lazo retained new counsel, and she argued that her former counsel provide d ineffective representation. In dismissing the appeal, the BIA agreed with the IJ th at Ms. Vigil-Lazo fa iled to meet her burden of proof for- 4 - asylum, restriction on removal or CAT re lief. The BIA further determined that Ms. Vigil-Lazo had not established ineffe ctive assistance of counsel and resulting prejudice. Ms. Vigil-Lazo now petitions for review of the BIA’s decision. 1
II. Discussion “We review the BIA’s legal determinati ons de novo and its fi ndings of fact for substantial evidence.” Dallakoti v. Holder , 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010). We are limited to reviewing issues related to Ms. Vigil-Lazo’s order of removal that have been administratively exhausted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available . . . as of right”); see also Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder , 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010) (“To satisfy § 1252(d)(1 ), an alien must present the same specific legal theory to the BIA before he or sh e may advance it in court.”). Ms. Vigil-Lazo begins by asserting that she is a “‘Followin g to Join’” child, who is trying to reach her father, who enj oys Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in the United States. Pet’r Br. at 20. She contends that “the IJ should have considered the totality of [her] ci rcumstances including family unity in the Asylum adjudication.” Id . She further argues that the princi ples of family unity should apply to her case, and that the IJ should have considered the possibility of humanitarian

1 In her appellate brief, Ms. Vigil-Lazo does not challenge the BIA’s denial of restriction on removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Cons equently, she has waived that issue. See Krastev v. INS , 292 F.3d 1268, 1280 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Issues not raised on appeal are deemed to be waived.”).- 5 - relief. But Ms. Vigil-Lazo did not rais e any of these argumen ts before the IJ or the BIA. She has therefore failed to exhaust her administ rative remedies, and we lack jurisdiction to consider these arguments. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Garcia-Carbajal , 625 F.3d at 1237. Ms. Vigil-Lazo also argue s that she is entitled to relief under the CAT because it is more likely than not she will be tortured upon removal. 2 In order to establish eligibility for relief under the CAT, the to rture must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acqui escence of a public offi cial or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that the record did not c ontain any evidence that the government of El Salvador acquiesces in the torture of individuals or would acquiesce in Ms. Vigil-Lazo’s tortur e if she were returned to El Sa lvador. Ms. Vigil-Lazo cites no record evidence to demonstr ate that the BIA erred.

2 Although Ms. Vigil-Lazo mentions her asylum claim in her appellate brief and makes the conclusory asserti on that she is part of a gr oup that should be protected through asylum, namely former spouses of gang members, see Pet’r Br. at 16, 20, she does not offer any substantive argument as to how the BIA erred in denying her asylum claim. Instead, she focuses her argument on the denial of her CAT claim. See id . at 22-26. She does contend that “the IJ summarized the esta blished record to avoid ‘protected class’ status,” id . at 23, which might be considered a challenge to the denial of her asylum clai m. But this argument is not adequately developed and is not supported by any cita tions to legal authority or the record. See id . Under these circumstances, we conclude that Ms. Vigi l-Lazo has waived a ny challenge to the denial of her asylum claim because it has been inadequately briefed. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998).- 6 - Next, Ms. Vigil-Lazo contends that her due process rights were violated because she was not advised sh e would be subject to the te n-year bar on re-entry if she departs the United States or is removed. In her brief to the BIA, Ms. Vigil-Lazo argued that the failure of her former couns el and the IJ to advise her about the ten-year re-entry bar constitu ted both ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of due process. The BIA determined that Ms. Vigil-Lazo did no t present “sufficient argument or evidence” to establish ineffec tive assistance of counsel and a denial of due process. Admin. R. at 4- 5. In her brief, Ms. Vigil- Lazo no longer contends that her former counsel was inef fective, but cast s this issue only as a due process violation. “[A]liens do not have a constitutional ri ght to enter or remain in the United
States . . . .” Arambula-Medina v. Holder , 572 F.3d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 2009). “[A]n alien in removal proceedings is enti tled only to the Fift h Amendment guarantee of fundamental fairness, or in other words, only to procedural due process, which provides the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Alzainati v. Holder , 568 F.3d 844, 851 (10th Ci r. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To prevail on a due proces s claim, an alien must establish not only error, but prejudice.” Id

. Even assuming that the IJ had a duty to advise her of the re -entry bar and that the failure to do so ri ses to the level of a due proces s violation, Ms. Vigil-Lazo has failed to identify any result ing prejudice. Although she ar gues that her removal will- 7 - separate her from her parents for ten years or more, she has not argued, much less demonstrated, that knowing abou t the re-entry bar would ha ve made any difference in her removal proceedings. Ms . Vigil-Lazo fought her re moval by requesting the only relief and protection for which she was eligible, and she does not explain how awareness of the consequences of her unl awful presence in the United States would have had an effect on he r removal proceeding. Cf. United States v. Aguirre-Tello , 353 F.3d 1199, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2004) (holdi ng that in order to prevail on a due process claim, an alie n must show that there is a re asonable likelihood he would have obtained the requested relief had the IJ sp ecifically advised him about that relief). Ms. Vigil-Lazo had a full and fair opportu nity to be heard before the agency, and she has not identified or explained how prior notice of the ten-year re-entry bar would have changed the outcome of her case . We therefore agre e with the BIA that she has failed to establis h a due process violation. Finally, Ms. Vigil-Lazo argues that her removal will violate the Eighth Amendment, but she did not raise that ar gument before the BIA and therefore we lack jurisdiction to review it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Garcia-Carbajal , 625 F.3d
at 1237. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss fo r lack of jurisdiction the arguments that Ms. Vigil-Lazo failed to exhaust with the administrative ag ency. We deny the- 8 - remainder of the petition for review. We grant Ms. Vigil-Lazo’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayme nt of costs or fees.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge