Today's Strategic Environment: Increasingly Complex and Dangerous

For decades, the United States led the world in efforts to reduce the role and number of 

nuclear weapons. Successive treaties enabled reductions in accountable strategic U.S. 

nuclear warheads, first to 6,000, and ultimately to 1,550. Thousands of shorter-range 

nuclear weapons not covered by any treaty were almost entirely eliminated from the 

U.S. nuclear arsenal. Overall, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile has drawn down by 

more than 85 percent from its Cold War high. Many hoped conditions had been set 

for even deeper reductions in global nuclear arsenals.

Unfortunately, the United States and our allies now face a security environment 

with increased complexity and worsening strategic threats. Today’s central 

challenge to our security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition 

with Russia and China. While the United States has focused on maintaining 

its existing nuclear systems, Russia and China have increased the role of 

nuclear weapons in their strategies and have been actively increasing the 

size and sophistication of their nuclear forces. Further, North Korea’s 

nuclear capabilities threaten our allies and homeland and add to an 

already complex strategic picture.

Nuclear Deterrence is the Bedrock of U.S. National Security

Given the strategic environment, nuclear deterrence is more important now than at 

any time since the end of the Cold War. A potential nuclear attack against the United 

States and its allies is the most serious threat to our security. Our nuclear arsenal is the 

nation’s ultimate insurance policy against such an attack. Nuclear forces, along with our 

conventional forces and other instruments of national power, also help prevent competition 

and conflict from escalating to large-scale conventional warfare. For these reasons, nuclear 

deterrence is the #1 priority mission of the Department of Defense. 

For any President, the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated only in the most extreme 

circumstances to protect our vital interests and those of our allies and partners. Effective deterrence 

requires a credible nuclear posture—a credibility based on effective nuclear capabilities and the 

resolve to use them if required. Our nuclear posture does not imply we seek to fight or win a nuclear 

war, but rather strengthens deterrence and helps ensure nuclear weapons are never employed.

U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY

Russia has been developing, testing, and fielding new systems 

for its nuclear triad over the past decade. This includes new 

road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines and 

missiles, bomber aircraft, and cruise missiles. Russia is also 

actively testing never-before-seen nuclear weapon capabilities, 

such as hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, 

and nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicles.

China is developing, testing, and fielding new generations of 

land-based ballistic missiles, increasing the range of its 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and pursuing a new bomber. 

China is also expending significant resources on advanced 

nuclear-capable systems and hypersonic vehicles. 

North Korea has conducted six increasingly sophisticated 

nuclear tests and three ICBM flight tests that demonstrated its 

ability to strike the U.S. homeland.
DoD NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE FUNDING

196219651968

1971

1974

1977

1980198319861989199219951998

2001

2004

2007

2010

2013

2016

2019

202220252028

2031

2034

2037

2040

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

PERCENT OF DoD BUDGET

FISCAL YEAR

1962:

TOTAL TRIAD: 17.1%

of DoD Budget

1984:

TOTAL TRIAD: 10.6%

of DoD Budget

2029:

Peak Recapitalization of 

Nuclear Enterprise Funding,

including 100% of B-21 funding

TOTAL TRIAD: 6.4%

of DoD Budget

Peak Recapitalization:

3.7% of DoD Budget

Sustainment:

2.7% of DoD Budget

REPLACING THE TRIAD WILL COST 3.7% OF THE DOD BUDGET AT ITS PEAK

SIZE and AGE of the 

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE, 1945-2017

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015

Average Warhead Age

Fiscal Year

Warheads

Total Warheads

as of 2017: 3,822 

Average Warhead Age:

26.62 years

U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL REDUCED BY 85% SINCE END OF COLD WAR
FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST for NUCLEAR FORCES HIGHLIGHTS

(Procurement, RDT&E, and MILCON)

F-35 Dual-Capable Aircraft (certification) $71M $246M FY2024

B-21 Strategic Bomber $3B $20.1B Mid-2020s 

Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) ICBM $678M $11.3B FY2029

B61-12 Tailkit Assembly $108M $157M -- 

Long Range Standoff (LRSO) Cruise Missile $713M $2.4B Early-2030s

Columbia Class SSBN $2.2B $20.2B FY 2031

Low-yield Ballistic Missile $19.6M -- --

Sea-launched Cruise Missile $5M $5M TBD

PROGRAM

INITIAL

FY2020 FIELDING

FYDP

(2020–24)

W76-1 (SLBM) Complete

W76-2 (SLBM) FY2019 

B61-12 (Bomber/DCA) FY2020 

W88 Alt 370 (SLBM) FY2020

W80-4 (LRSO) FY2025 

W87-1 (ICBM) FY2030

WARHEADS

FIRST PRODUCTION

UNIT (FY)

After 25 years of primarily sustaining our 

Cold War-era systems as we steadily 

reduced their number, recapitalizing U.S. 

nuclear forces will require an increase in 

spending over the next 20 years. Most of 

the nation's nuclear delivery systems, 

built in the 1980s and prior, will reach 

their end-of-service life in the 2025-2035 

timeframe and cannot be sustained 

further. If not recapitalized, these forces 

will age into obsolescence. Our choice is 

not between replacing our Cold War 

systems or keeping them, but between 

replacing them or losing them altogether.

Russia has approximately 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons--of 

over a dozen different types—including nuclear torpedoes, nuclear air 

and missile defenses, nuclear depth charges, nuclear landmines, and 

nuclear artillery shells. None of these are limited by any arms control 

treaty. In contrast, the U.S. retains a small number of just one 

type—the B61 nuclear gravity bomb.

Russian Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons

RUSSIA and CHINA are EXPANDING THEIR NUCLEAR 

CAPABILITIES DESPITE U.S. RESTRAINT

Land Sea Air

Completely Fielded within 10 years

F=Fixed; M=Mobile

In Production within 10 years

In Research & Development within 10 years

RUSSIA CHINA

UNITED STATES DF-31A

ICBM (M)

DF-5B

ICBM (F)

DF-31AG

ICBM (M)

DF-26

IRBM (M)

DF-41

ICBM (M)

DF-5C

ICBM (F)

JL-3

SLBM

JL-2

SLBM

TBD

ALBM

H-6

Bomber

“Stealth”

Bomber

Jin

SSBN

Type 96

SSBN

GBSD

ICBM D5LE

SLBM

D5LE2

SLBM

LRSO

ALCM

F-35

Fighter

B-21

Bomber

Columbia

SSBN

SS-27M2

ICBM (F/M)

SSC-8

GLCM

LR NP

GLCM

SU-34

Fighter/

Bomber

PAK-FA

Fighter/

Bomber

PAK-DA

Bomber

Kinzhal

ALBM

BULAVA

SLBM

Borei

SSBN

“Next-Gen”

SSBN

STATUS-6

SS-N-30a

SLCM

ALBM: Air-Launched Ballistic Missle

ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IRBM: Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SRBM: Short-Range Ballistic Missile

ALCM: Air-Launched Cruise Missile

GLCM: Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

SLCM: Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile

SSBN: Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine

SLCM

NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS

NUCLEAR DELIVERY

SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CLAIMS and RESPONSES

Arms Race

CLAIM. The U.S. is creating—or accelerating—an arms race 

by pursuing its nuclear modernization program. 

RESPONSE. The U.S. is not engaging in an arms race. It is 

replacing aging, Cold War-era systems with modern 

systems—largely on a one-for-one basis. Our current nuclear 

forces deterred war for decades, but are well beyond their 

original design lives. While Russia and China have been 

developing and fielding new nuclear capabilities for a 

decade, the U.S. has focused on maintaining its existing 

systems. To ensure the continued credibility of the U.S. 

nuclear deterrent, our nuclear forces must be modernized or 

they will become ineffective.

CLAIM. The W76-2 warhead will lower the threshold for 

nuclear use.

RESPONSE. By providing the U.S. an assured ability to 

respond in kind to a low-yield nuclear attack, the W76-2 

discourages an adversary from pursuing such an attack and 

therefore strengthens deterrence. Having credible response 

options to a nuclear attack of any magnitude ensures no 

adversary mistakenly believes the U.S. would be deterred from 

responding to a low-level nuclear attack for fear of escalation. 

Although low-yield capabilities are not new, the W76-2 

strengthens deterrence by ensuring these options remain 

effective in the face of improving air and missile defense 

capabilities. By deploying the W76-2, we deter the use of 

low-yield weapons by adversaries and help ensure conflict is 

prevented in the first place. 

Low-Yield Submarine Launched Ballistic 

Missile (SLBM) Warhead (W76-2)

CLAIM. Adopting a no-first-use policy avoids miscalculation 

and reduces the likelihood of nuclear war.

RESPONSE. A no-first-use policy could invite attack or 

coercion and incentivize U.S. allies to pursue their own nuclear 

weapons. Such a policy increases the risk of nuclear war by 

changing how adversaries and allies view the credibility of the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent and our resolve to use it when 

threatened. It would undermine the U.S. nuclear umbrella we 

extend to our allies and signal to potential adversaries that the 

U.S. may not defend our allies and vital interests with every 

means at our disposal.

No First Use

CLAIM. The ability of U.S. ICBMs to quickly respond to an 

attack is dangerous and risks miscalculation or accidental 

launch. We should eliminate ICBMs and rely on submarines 

and bombers.

RESPONSE. Eliminating or de-alerting ICBMs may create 

incentives for adversaries to attempt a first strike. U.S. 

nuclear forces—including our ICBM force—are configured to 

maximize their deterrent effect and minimize the possibility of 

accident or mistake. The three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad 

are complementary, with each component offering unique 

strengths. Together, the triad ensures the U.S. can effectively 

withstand and respond to any attack. Tightly controlled 

command and control means that ICBMs, like all U.S. nuclear 

weapons, can only be launched upon direction from the 

President. And with 400 deployed ICBMs, no adversary can 

disarm the U.S. nuclear deterrent without attacking hundreds 

of targets simultaneously—helping ensure no adversary is 

tempted to try. 

The Triad

CLAIM. The U.S. nuclear modernization plan is unaffordable 

and needs to be scaled back to only what we need. We need 

a more narrow and sensible approach to nuclear deterrence.

RESPONSE. The U.S. has reduced the size of its nuclear 

weapons stockpile by 85% from its Cold War high, has 

eliminated many types of nuclear weapons entirely, and 

spends less than 3% of DoD’s budget on sustaining its 

nuclear forces. The annual cost for modernizing and 

sustaining our nuclear forces will peak at 6.4% of the DoD 

budget in 2029. The U.S. has only what it needs for a credible 

nuclear deterrent, and has no plans to pursue certain exotic 

nuclear capabilities still fielded by Russia. Our posture and 

modernization program reflect much more continuity than 

change. Nuclear attack is the only existential threat to the 

U.S.—we can afford to spend a small fraction of our military 

budget to deter it. 

The Cost and Scope of Nuclear Forces

CLAIM. The Administration opposes arms control, is 

unwilling to pursue new arms control agreements, and is 

undermining existing agreements.

RESPONSE. The U.S. has always desired and pursued arms 

control that enhances the security of the U.S. and its 

allies—this policy has not changed. Arms control can be an 

effective tool for managing competition and reducing risk of 

war. The United States remains committed to pursuing 

verifiable measures that effectively promote our security, 

but believes that remaining in treaties that are brazenly 

violated by the other parties, or do not otherwise contribute 

to peace or security, only increases the risk of miscalculation 

and conflict. 

Arms Control