Review of TSA Screening Practices in

Houston, Texas

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of Inspector General

Office of Audits

OIG-04-48 September 2004

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Counsel to the Inspector 

General, has reviewed this report and excised information according to Freedom 

of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended.

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Offi ce of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report represents an abbreviated version of our classifi ed review of the Transportation 

Security Administration’s screening practices in Houston, Texas. It is based on interviews with 

employees and offi cials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of 

applicable documents.

The recommendations herein, if any, have been developed to the best knowledge available to the 

OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope 

that this report will result in more effective, effi cient, and economical operations. I express my 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Offi ce of Inspector General

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

Review of TSA Screening Practices in Houston, Texas Page 1

OIG

Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General

Introduction

In response to a request from the Ranking Member of the House Select 

Committee on Homeland Security, we inquired into allegations related to the 

TSA passenger screening security program at the George Bush Intercontinental 

(Bush) and William P. Hobby (Hobby) Airports in Houston, Texas. The request 

was prompted by a TV news report citing statements by screeners at both airports 

that, among other things, TSA management encouraged screeners to ignore alarms 

signaling potentially dangerous items in checked bags.

We observed screening operations for passengers and checked baggage at both 

Houston airports. Also, we interviewed:

• Federal Security Directors (FSDs) and Assistant FSDs for Screening at 

both Houston airports, 

• Seven screeners, eight lead screeners, and seven supervisors at Bush 

Airport, and 

• Ten screeners, eight lead screeners, and three supervisors at Hobby 

Airport. 

We also considered the results of our other work relating to screener operations, 

including recently completed covert testing of screeners at 15 domestic airports 

and TSA’s pilot airport screener program.

Results in Brief

With one exception, which occurred after our initial visit to the airport, we found 

no conclusive evidence that TSA airport managers and supervisors purposely 

directed or encouraged screeners to ignore alarms, standard operating procedures, 

or alternative operating procedures for screening checked baggage allowed under 

TSA guidelines. However, screeners whom we interviewed at both airports 
Page 2 Review of TSA Screening Practices in Houston, Texas

said that inconsistent direction from their managers and supervisors was a 

problem. Inconsistent direction from managers and supervisors creates confusion, 

suspicion, and stress. 

While many other allegations could not be substantiated, some allegations relating 

to inadequate screener staffing and training also appear to be valid. In a classified 

report on Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures at 15 Domestic Airports, 

we recommended improvements in training, equipment and technology, policy 

and procedures, and management and supervision. In addition, as a result of our 

reviews of the Houston airport allegations, and publicly reported incidents at other 

airports, we are recommending that TSA provide clear and consistent guidance 

and training on what TSA managers, supervisors, and baggage handlers are to 

do in specific situations. We will continue to monitor screener performance at 

domestic airports as part of our oversight of screener operations. 

TSA agreed with our recommendation and will continue to monitor and 

investigate screening procedures at the Houston airports to ensure compliance.
Review of TSA Screening Practices in Houston, Texas Page 3

Department of Homeland Security

The Secretary

Deputy Secretary

Under Secretary for Border & Transportation Security

Chief of Staff

General Counsel

DHS OIG Liaison

DHS Public Affairs

Transportation Security Administration

Assistant Secretary

Audit Liaison

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

House Select Committee on Homeland Security

 Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate

Appendix A

Report Distribution
Page 4 Review of TSA Screening Practices in Houston, Texas

Additional Information and Copies

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at www.

dhs.gov/oig.

OIG Hotline

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.