DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to 

Implement Section 428 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 

OIG-04-33 August 2004 

Office of Inspections, Evaluations, & Special Reviews 

Clark Kent Ervin

Inspector General

Offi ce of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports 

prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the program or operation under review. It 

is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, 

and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my 

Contents

 Introduction......................................................................................................................................3

 Results in Brief ................................................................................................................................3

 Background ......................................................................................................................................7

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology...................................................................................................8

Findings

Deployment of Visa Security Offi cers .................................................................................9

VSO and Consular Offi cer Training ..................................................................................11

 Consular Officer Performance Standards ...........................................................................13

Role of Foreign Nationals..................................................................................................13

Assignment of Visa Security Offi cers ................................................................................14

Visa Security Operations in Saudi Arabia ..........................................................................17

Appendices 

Appendix A: Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ........................................24

 Appendix B: Management Comments ..................................................................................29

 Appendix C: OIG Evaluation of Management Comments ....................................................39

 Appendix D: Recommendations............................................................................................45

Appendix E: Major Contributors to this Report....................................................................47

 Appendix F: Report Distribution ..........................................................................................48

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 1 
Contents

Abbreviations 

BTS Directorate for Border and Transportation Security 

CBP Customs and Border Protection - a BTS component 

CIS Citizenship and Immigration Services - a DHS component 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOS Department of State 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

ICASS International Cooperative Administrative Support Services 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement - a BTS component 

INS Immigration & Naturalization Service 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

NSEERS National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 

NTC National Targeting Center, Reston, Virginia – a CBP component 

OIE Office of International Enforcement - a BTS component 

OIG Office of Inspector General - a DHS component 

PCS Permanent Change of Station (assignment) 

TDY Temporary Duty (assignment) 

TPO Transition Planning Offi ce 

VSO Visa Security Offi cer 

VSU Visa Security Unit - an ICE component 

Page 2 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Offi ce of Inspector General 

Introduction 

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) planning and implementation of Section 428 of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, (the Act). Section 428, titled “Visa Issuance,” 

vests in the Secretary of Homeland Security “all authorities” to issue regulations, 

administer, and enforce all immigration and nationality laws. Section 428 

provides for the assignment of Visa Security Officers (VSO) to embassies and 

consulates to oversee the security of the visa issuance process. Within DHS, the 

responsibility for managing Section 428 issues rests predominantly within the 

Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate. 

Results in Brief 

The VSO program as it currently is managed prevents BTS from realizing the 

potential value of stationing VSOs at U.S. embassies and consulate offi ces to 

review visa applications. Because BTS uses temporary duty officers who have 

not received specialized training in VSO duties and foreign language training, 

do not have all of the necessary skills, and do not have adequate administrative 

support, the full intelligence and law enforcement value that VSOs could add to 

the existing inter-agency country teams cannot be achieved. 

DHS has made progress in meeting Section 428 requirements. Specifically it has: 

• Negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the 

Department of State (DOS) to delineate their respective roles and 

responsibilities in implementing Section 428 requirements. 

• Selected and deployed DHS personnel to Saudi Arabia on temporary 

assignments to begin the visa review process. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 3 
• Approved the formation of two internal organizations to manage the 

Section 428 requirements. 

However, DHS has not yet implemented all of Section 428. Specifically, DHS did 

not: 

• Comply with the requirement to have DHS personnel in place in Saudi 

Arabia to review visa applications by January 24, 2003.1 Temporary 

personnel arrived on August 31, 2003. 

• Develop a plan to provide homeland security training to DOS consular 

officers, so that such officers are more likely to spot factors that would 

deter them from issuing a visa to someone who might be a terrorist. 

• Devise training plans to instruct DHS employees assigned to U.S. 

embassies and consular posts in foreign languages, interview and fraud 

detection techniques, and foreign country conditions. 

• Establish, in coordination with DOS, performance standards to evaluate 

consular offi cers. 

• Publish the study of the role of foreign national employees in reviewing 

and approving visas, as required by Section 428(g)(2). 

• Specify criteria to select other consular posts for the assignment of 

DHS employees, or submit the report required by Section 428(e)(4) to 

Congress. 

• Submit the report describing the implementation of Section 428 to 

Congress, as required by Section 428(e)(7). 

Many of the delays can be attributed to the significant amount of time taken to 

negotiate the DHS-DOS MOU that delineated the roles and responsibilities of the 

two departments.2 Much of the work could have been initiated without awaiting 

the execution of an MOU because many aspects of DHS’ new responsibility do 

1 We received differing opinions about the effective date for the implementation of the Act. The date stated here was derived from language 

in the Act, which required implementation within 60 days of the passage of the Act. The Act was passed on November 25, 2002. However, 

DHS was not formally established until March 1, 2003, making implementation of provisions of the Act difficult. Nevertheless, we believe 

the law required the implementation of this provision of Section 428 by January 25, 2003. 

2 The signing of the MOU was announced on September 29, 2003.

Page 4 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
not require DOS participation or consent. The MOU may serve a future purpose 

to resolve serious controversies that cannot be resolved by less formal means, but 

it should not have been a reason for delaying action. 

Other signifi cant findings resulting from our evaluation are: 

• The Act requires BTS to develop programs of “homeland security 

training” for consular officers. This training is not further defi ned in 

the Act, and BTS officials we interviewed had differing interpretations 

of what might be appropriate. BTS has not yet developed a training 

program for consular offi cers. 

• The use of temporarily assigned (TDY) officers to staff the visa security 

offices in Riyadh and Jeddah rather than officers on permanent (PCS) 

assignments has reduced the effectiveness of the operation due to the 

high turnover of offi cers. 

• Nine of the ten TDY officers who have served or are serving in Saudi 

Arabia do not read or speak Arabic. This limits their effectiveness and 

reduces their contribution to the security of the visa process. 

• The lack of sufficient current funding for the visa security activity has 

resulted in BTS Visa Security Officers’ (VSO) in Saudi Arabia working 

without adequate administrative support. 

• With no clear vision how to add value to the existing consular process, 

the BTS VSOs in Saudi Arabia are mainly, but not exclusively, occupying 

themselves entering visa applicant data into DHS databases to conduct 

queries, conveying the results of the queries to the DOS offi cers, and 

examining the passports and application papers that the DOS consular 

officers have already scrutinized. 

• The Act’s requirement that in Saudi Arabia - and only in Saudi Arabia 

- VSOs review all visa applications compels the VSOs there to expend 

considerable time and effort screening the many applications from 

children and certain third-country nationals who are of little homeland 

security interest. 

• BTS and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies have not 

reviewed thousands of visa application submitted and approved during 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 5 
the two years prior to the September 11th attacks for possible connection 

to terrorism. 

We recognize the enormous challenges faced by BTS in establishing itself and 

its new missions in such a short time. We further understand that many of the 

Section 428 requirements levied against BTS were unfunded. BTS offi cials 

said that they have had numerous discussions with congressional staff about the 

funding that BTS needs to meet the extensive responsibilities required by Section 

428’s mandate to establish a global visa security operation. Nevertheless, funding 

for many of the required programs has not yet been provided. 

We are recommending that BTS: 

1. Develop programs to provide homeland security training for consular 

officers, as well as training for consular officers in interview and fraud 

detection techniques; 

2. Develop a program to provide foreign language training for VSOs; 

3. Develop performance standards to evaluate consular offi cers in 

coordination with DOS;

4. Develop criteria for assigning VSOs to other countries; 

5. Assign responsibility for developing and publishing the report that 

explains the decisions not to assign VSOs to all other countries; 

6. Conduct a study of the personnel management techniques used by other 

agencies with a global workforce, and evaluate the ways to facilitate the 

overseas rotation of DHS employees; 

7. Discontinue the practice of filling VSO positions with temporarily 

assigned offi cers; 

8. Establish criteria for selecting VSOs based on required experience and 

skills; 

9. Establish a funding mechanism to ensure that the visa security operation 

receives all required support, and that DOS is reimbursed promptly for 

the support that it provides; 

Page 6 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
10. Seek amendment to Section 428(i) to limit the scope of visa application 

reviews in Saudi Arabia; 

11. Examine visa applications submitted in Saudi Arabia in the two year 

period prior to September 11, 2001; and, 

12. Automate the visa name check process to eliminate redundant data entry. 

Background 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS. Section 428 of the 

Act, which pertains to visas, requires DHS to assume six specifi c visa related 

responsibilities: 

1. Assign DHS employees to Saudi Arabia to review all visa applications 

prior to adjudication by consular offi cers.3 

2. Develop programs of homeland security training for DOS consular 

offi cers.4 

3. Ensure that DHS employees and, as appropriate, consular offi cers, are 

provided training, including training in foreign languages, interview 

techniques, and fraud detection techniques, in conditions in the particular 

country where each employee is assigned, and in other appropriate areas 

of study.5 

4. Develop performance standards to be used when the Secretary of State 

evaluates the performance of consular offi cers.6 

5. Study the role of foreign nationals in the granting and refusing of visas 

and other documents authorizing entry of aliens into the United States.7 

3

 Sec. 428 (i). 

4

 Sec. 428 (b) (1). 

5

 Sec. 428 (e) (6). 

6

 Sec. 428 (e) (3). 

7

 Sec. 428 (g) (1). 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 7 
6. Assign DHS employees to diplomatic and consular posts at which visas 

are issued, unless the Secretary determines that such assignment at a 

particular post would not promote homeland security.8 

Section 428 also requires that DHS send to Congress: 

1. An annual report describing the basis for each determination not to assign 

DHS employees to a diplomatic or consular post.9 

2. A report, jointly with the Secretary of State, not later than one year after 

enactment of the Act on the implementation of subsection (e), which 

relates to the assignment of DHS employees to embassies abroad, and 

conveying any legislative proposals necessary to further the objectives of 

subsection (e).10 

3. A report, to be issued not later than one year after enactment of the Act, 

on a study of the role of foreign service nationals in the granting or 

refusing of visas.11 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We conducted this evaluation to determine whether BTS implemented all 

Section 428 requirements and to assess the effectiveness of the VSO program 

implemented in Saudi Arabia. We began our review in July 2003 and circulated 

a draft report for comments in November 2003. In December 2003 we were 

informed of an October 31, 2003, reorganization of the offices involved in 

executing the DHS 428 activities. This reorganization necessitated additional 

fieldwork. We conducted interviews with DHS officials including the Under 

Secretary for BTS, the director of the Visa Security Unit (VSU) at Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the head of the BTS Office of International 

Enforcement (OIE). We reviewed DHS documents in Washington, D.C. and in 

Saudi Arabia. We also reviewed information from DOS and the White House 

Homeland Security Council. While in Saudi Arabia, we met with the temporary 

8

 Sec. 428 (e) (1). 

9

 Sec. 428 (e) (4). 

10 Sec. 428 (e) (7). 

11 Sec. 428 (g) (2). 

Page 8 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
VSOs assigned to Riyadh and Jeddah, DOS officials, and other members of the 

U.S. embassy community. 

Deployment of Visa Security Offi cers 

BTS did not comply in a timely fashion with the requirement in Section 428(i) 

that it place VSOs in Saudi Arabia to review all visa applications prior to 

adjudication by DOS. According to Section 428(i), on-site reviews by DHS 

personnel were to begin “after the enactment of this Act.” The Act became 

effective on January 24, 2003, 60 days after the President signed it. However, 

BTS VSOs did not deploy to Saudi Arabia until the end of August 2003. DHS 

officials told us that the department waited for the DHS-DOS MOU to be 

approved before assigning BTS personnel to Saudi Arabia. When the decision 

was made to send a temporary team in August 2003, we were told that the offi cers 

would participate in the visa review process “only in an advisory capacity” until 

the DHS-DOS MOU was signed. The officers assumed their full responsibilities 

at the end of September 2003 when the DHS-DOS MOU was signed. 

Planning and Preparation 

In late 2002, the White House Office of Homeland Security established the DHS 

Transition Planning Office (TPO) that, in turn, formed an international sub-group 

to address the international aspects of the Act. In January 2003, members of 

the sub-group led an assessment team of senior employees from the agencies 

that would transfer to DHS on a visit to Saudi Arabia. The purpose of their trip 

was to study how Section 428(i), which requires DHS visa screening in Saudi 

Arabia, could be implemented at the embassy in Riyadh and at the consulate 

general in Jeddah. The assessment team included employees from Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service, the White House Offi ce 

of Homeland Security, and the Transportation Security Administration. A senior 

officer from the DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs accompanied the group. The 

team made several recommendations on how DHS personnel should function in 

embassies and consulates and reported its findings to the TPO. The team’s report 

addressed in broad terms questions of office space, reporting relationships, and 

desired qualifications for personnel chosen to perform the work, such as language 

ability and professional experience. 

In July 2003, BTS convened an Interagency International Affairs Working Group 

and interviewed volunteers willing to serve temporarily in Saudi Arabia until 

permanent employees could be chosen and trained. Three officers formerly with 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 9 
INS were deployed to Saudi Arabia at the end of August 2003 in TDY status. 

Two of these officers were already assigned overseas and the third was assigned 

domestically. 

DHS–DOS Memorandum of Understanding 

Development of the MOU began before the effective date of the Act as Offi ce of 

Homeland Security staff circulated drafts; the DHS TPO began working on these 

drafts in January 2003. In July and August 2003, we were told that completion of 

the MOU was imminent. It was signed eventually on September 29, 2003. 

DHS and DOS officials told us that negotiating the MOU was a priority because 

without an MOU, the exact delineation of responsibilities between the two 

departments would be too unclear to enable the participants to address Section 

428 issues. Also, officials stated that the MOU would establish mechanisms 

for the departments to communicate with each other on Section 428 issues. 

Specifically, DHS officials told us that implementing the subsections regarding the 

study of the role of foreign nationals and assignment of DHS staff to Saudi Arabia 

was conditional upon a signed inter-agency MOU. One official believed that 

only when the MOU went into force would DHS be required to review all visa 

applications in Saudi Arabia. Several officials who we interviewed were parties to 

the MOU negotiations. They reported that DHS and DOS attorneys who led the 

inter-agency negotiations shared the view that DHS could not comply with these 

subsections until an MOU was completed. Even accepting this view, important 

preparatory work could have begun while the MOU negotiations were in progress. 

The Act did not make any of the Section 428 requirements conditional upon 

the development of the MOU. The Act contains only one mention of an MOU 

between DHS and DOS, at 428 (e) (8), which provides that subsection (e) 

becomes effective either one year after enactment, or upon completion of an 

MOU, whichever occurs earlier. We do not make a recommendation regarding 

the delayed deployment of VSOs to Saudi Arabia. However, we address the 

issues associated with the use of temporarily assigned VSOs later in our report. 

Organizational Changes 

Even while DHS was planning to implement Section 428 requirements, its 

internal organization was evolving. In September 2003, DHS approved the 

formation of an Office of International Enforcement (OIE) within BTS. OIE 

officers told us that once OIE was fully established and funded, it would be 

Page 10 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
responsible for all Section 428 requirements. OIE’s responsibilities were to 

include developing a plan to train DOS consular officers; developing a plan to 

train DHS personnel assigned to U.S. embassies and consulates; and, developing 

a plan to assign DHS personnel to some U.S. embassies and consulates. OIE also 

would supervise those DHS employees detailed from ICE and CBP to be assigned 

to U.S. embassies and consulates overseas. 

However, an important change occurred on October 31, 2003, when DHS 

approved a comprehensive reorganization of its international activities that 

significantly diminished OIE’s role in Section 428 operations. By memorandum, 

the DHS Secretary announced that OIE would remain small, with seven to nine 

people, as operational responsibilities and daily policy making decisions would 

be assumed by another new BTS organization. According to the reorganization 

plan, OIE maintained general oversight responsibility for BTS international policy 

matters and would be responsible for international technical assistance and shared 

administrative services. 

The October 31, 2003, memorandum also established the ICE International 

Office, which includes the VSU. According to the memorandum, the VSU will 

assume responsibility for daily operational and policy decisions with respect 

to the implementation of Section 428 and the DHS-DOS MOU. Specifi cally, 

the VSU will direct the activities of visa security offi cers.12 Four offi cers 

detailed from their regular duty stations currently staff the VSU, located at ICE 

headquarters. Since its establishment, a senior officer, on TDY, has led the VSU. 

The VSU director reports to the Deputy Assistant Director for International 

Affairs, who in turn reports to the director of the Office of Investigations. 

VSO and Consular Offi cer Training 

Homeland Security Training for Consular Offi cers 

The Act contains two provisions mandating that DHS train consular offi cers. The 

first, in Section 428(b)(1), deals with the issue broadly in terms of describing the 

shared responsibilities of DHS and DOS for visa issuance. It authorizes DHS 

to develop “homeland security training programs,” not further defined, to be 

provided to DOS consular officers in addition to consular training provided by the 

Secretary of State. The second, more limited provision in the Act relating to DHS 

12 As of April 2004, visa security operations are conducted only at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and the Consulate General in Jeddah. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 11 
training for consular officers is in Section 428(e)(2), which describes the activities 

of VSOs at those consular posts to which they are assigned. In Saudi Arabia, the 

temporarily assigned DHS officers have provided informal fraud training on a 

one-on-one basis to the DOS consular officers in Riyadh and Jeddah. 

While DHS officials are aware of the broad requirement to train all consular 

officers, DHS does not have a plan to do so. DHS has not defined the purpose, 

scope, and objectives of future consular training, nor has it developed a 

curriculum for a homeland security training program for consular offi cers. 

Language, Interviewing, and Document Fraud Detection Training 

Again, DHS officials are aware of the requirement in Section 428 (e) (6) to 

provide foreign language, country studies, and interview and fraud detection 

techniques training to DHS VSOs and DOS consular officers, but it has not 

developed a plan to provide such training. As of March, 2004, DHS has not 

developed a specific curriculum for the required training and has not identifi ed 

personnel to receive the training. 

Since mid-2003, DHS has held meetings to begin designing a curriculum for such 

training. Among the participants were officers subsequently assigned to OIE, and 

representatives from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. One offi cial 

interviewed said that the DHS personnel already abroad may be brought back to 

the United States in small groups during 2004 for a course that would familiarize 

them with the whole range of Section 428 responsibilities. 

DOS has well developed training programs for foreign languages and foreign area 

studies at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center in Arlington, Virginia. 

The DHS-DOS MOU makes these facilities available to DHS employees. As 

yet, DHS has not developed plans to use this training resource and, we were 

told, language training may not be part of a VSO’s pre-assignment training. 

While DHS personnel in Saudi Arabia informally share their expertise with DOS 

consular officers in methods to detect counterfeit documents, a curriculum for 

training in interview and fraud detection techniques has not been developed. 

Funding for training and other costs associated with overseas deployment of 

DHS staff is not yet available, since DHS’ budget for fiscal year (FY) 2004 was 

prepared before the establishment of OIE and the ICE VSU. As a result, there 

is no identified funding for visa security operations this fiscal year. In its April 

2004 congressional testimony, ICE requested $10 million for funding the visa 

Page 12 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
security program in FY 2005, and sought the establishment of 90 new permanent 

positions.13 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 1: Develop a curriculum of homeland security training for 

consular officers consistent with the requirement in Section 428 (b) (1) of the Act. 

Recommendation 2: Develop a training program for VSOs that includes foreign 

languages, country studies, and interview and fraud detection techniques. 

Consular Offi cer Performance Standards 

DHS, in coordination with DOS, has not established performance standards to 

evaluate consular officers. The Act mandates that DHS develop performance 

standards to be used when the Secretary of State evaluates the performance of 

consular officers. No DHS component has been assigned this task. While the 

MOU contains coordination mechanisms to be used by the departments to consult 

with each other on Section 428 issues, it does not contain substantive provisions 

regarding development of performance standards. 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 3: In coordination with DOS, develop performance standards 

to evaluate consular offi cers. 

Role of Foreign Nationals 

DHS failed to meet the November 25, 2003, submission deadline for a report to 

Congress that studied of the role of foreign national employees in the granting 

and refusing of visas. Most federal agencies staff their overseas offices with both 

U.S. and foreign national employees. They provide administrative support, local 

expertise, language skills, and operational continuity. 

13 Hearing on Border Enforcement, and Immigration Services: Testimony of The Honorable Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. March 30, 2004, testimony before Homeland Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate 

Appropriations Committee. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 13 
Section 428(g) requires that DHS study the role of foreign national employees 

in the granting and refusing of visas and other documents authorizing entry of 

aliens into the United States and requires that a report be issued not later than 

one year after enactment of the Act. While Section 428(g) makes no mention of 

DOS participation in the study, DHS officials said that no meaningful or accurate 

study could be conducted without DOS assistance because most of the foreign 

nationals are DOS employees. DHS officials concluded that DOS assistance 

would be facilitated by the execution of the MOU. Since execution of the MOU 

was believed to be imminent during the summer of 2003, tentative plans were 

developed to conduct the study. A draft of the study was completed in November 

2003 and circulated for final comments within DHS. In December 2003 it was 

sent to DOS for comments. In February 2004 it was released to the Offi ce of 

Management and Budget (OMB) for review. In late May 2004, the report was 

still pending clearance at OMB. It was finally released in July 2004. 

Assignment of Visa Security Offi cers 

DHS did not meet the November 25, 2003, deadline for submitting a report to 

Congress on the rationale for not assigning VSOs to U.S. embassies and consular 

offi ces.14 Moreover, DHS has not established formal written criteria to select 

additional countries where VSOs will be assigned. 

Section 428(i) requires that DHS assign VSOs to Saudi Arabia to review all visa 

applications before consular officers adjudicate the applications. Section 428(e) 

authorizes the Secretary to assign VSOs to other countries unless he determines 

that such assignments would not promote homeland security. In addition, 

Section 428(e) requires an annual report to Congress describing the basis for each 

determination not to assign DHS employees to a diplomatic or consular post. 

We were told that the selection process involves evaluating current intelligence, 

historical connections to terrorism, visa volume, and several other factors to 

decide where the next group of visa security offices will be opened. We were 

unable to determine which DHS element will be responsible for formalizing the 

criteria or preparing the report to Congress, or when the report will be written. 

14 We received differing opinions about the effective date for the implementation of the Act. The date stated here was derived from 

language in the Act, which required implementation within 60 days of the passage of the Act. The Act was passed on November 25, 2002. 

However, DHS was not formally established until March 1, 2003, making implementation of provisions of the Act difficult. Nevertheless, 

we believe the law required that DHS implement this provision of Section 428 by November 25, 2003, the one year anniversary of the 

passage of the Act. 

Page 14 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
While the visa security program eventually could have many offices around the 

world, DHS has not determined how many will eventually be created, or when. 

In May 2004, the Under Secretary for BTS informed us that DHS is conducting a 

review of DHS operations overseas. The review, in which BTS is participating, 

will examine personnel issues, including the possibility of a foreign service for 

DHS. DHS has made plans to establish five additional visa security offi ces before 

the end of 2004. BTS informed us that it has prepared NSDD-3815 requests for the 

next group of VSO positions to be created abroad. 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 4: Develop written criteria for assigning VSOs to other 

countries. 

Recommendation 5: Assign responsibility to develop and publish the report to 

Congress required by Section 428(e)(4). 

The Civil Service And International Personnel Mobility 

BTS does not have a personnel management plan to address the needs of a global 

workforce and has not established a mechanism to facilitate overseas rotations of 

BTS employees. Because there are visa activities in almost every country with 

which the United States maintains diplomatic relations, the requirement to station 

VSOs around the world could lead to the assignment of BTS personnel to many, 

or even most, of the U.S. diplomatic posts abroad. 

We interviewed several employees who had been assigned overseas under the 

authority of the Office of International Affairs of the former INS. They said that 

INS sometimes had diffi culty staffing its overseas posts. Management had to let 

some positions remain vacant for extended periods of time while replacement 

officers were sought. Since Civil Service rules do not generally allow forced 

transfers, INS management often was unable to select its best officers for foreign 

assignment, or to compel the officers who did seek such assignments to serve out 

the full term of their assignment. 

Another significant challenge was re-integrating employees when their foreign 

tours approached conclusion. When the time came for the overseas employees to 

15 National Security Decision Directive 38 established the procedure by which federal agencies other than the Department of State create 

new positions for their personnel at an embassy or consulate in a foreign country. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 15 
return to the United States, positions at the former office often were unavailable. 

The domestic positions previously encumbered by those assigned overseas had 

been permanently filled by other employees. Officers assigned abroad were 

sometimes at a disadvantage competing for new domestic vacancies. Domestic 

managers, when filling vacancies in their offices, were not required to give hiring 

preference to personnel overseas and often promoted from within. This resulted 

in foreign assignments being extended repeatedly until a suitable opening arose in 

the domestic office to which the employee wished to return. 

Federal agencies find it easier to invest time and money training employees when 

they can expect a significant return on their investment. Language training for 

VSOs, for example, would be easier to justify if the officer will serve more than 

one tour abroad. Language training is very expensive—Arabic language training 

programs at the Foreign Service Institute or the Defense Language Institute last 

more than a year. Students must be paid and housed during the long training 

period. VSOs over time will develop a professional expertise that would be 

very valuable to DHS if it could be preserved. New VSOs could be trained by 

experienced VSOs who served two or three foreign assignments over the course 

of their careers. 

ICE officials told us that they do not believe the benefit of training such a cadre of 

officers is worth the potential cost to ICE’s domestic law enforcement operations. 

They do not want to create two different types of agents, those with mainly 

domestic experience and those with primarily overseas experience. There is, one 

official said, “no interest in creating a Foreign Legion.” In our interviews with the 

Under Secretary for BTS and the director of OIE, we heard similar views. 

Many federal agencies with a global workforce, such as the Departments of 

State, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Central Intelligence Agency, have adapted 

a “foreign service” model to staff overseas posts. This involves creating and 

training a designated group of employees expected to be mobile and international; 

creating a fair and effective assignment system to facilitate their movements; 

investing in language and other special training for the overseas mission; and 

synchronizing their resumption of domestic duties with the movement of other 

employees. We do not maintain that the “foreign service” model is the best 

solution to the DHS overseas personnel challenge; however, given the need DHS 

will have to maintain a robust, professional, and international posture involving 

many DHS elements, it should be studied and considered as a possible solution to 

maintaining an effective long-term, overseas operation. 

Page 16 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 6: Conduct a study of the personnel management techniques 

used by other agencies with global workforces and evaluate ways to facilitate the 

overseas rotations of DHS employees. 

Visa Security Operations in Saudi Arabia 

The visa security operation as it is currently managed is not as effective or as 

efficient as it should be. Lacking funds, housing, administrative support, offi ce 

space, and specialized VSO training, the assigned officers cannot fully provide 

security enhancements for the visa application process. Because VSOs were 

spending significant portions of their time as data entry operators, they did not 

always have time to perform investigative and intelligence analysis functions. 

In addition, the officers assigned to Saudi Arabia do not always have current 

experience or skill sets. 

Temporarily Assigned VSOs 

As of March 2004, of the ten VSOs currently or previously assigned to Saudi 

Arabia, only one served more than 90 days. The VSO operation has been staffed 

by a succession of temporary personnel because the Act did not provide new 

positions for VSOs and funds were not provided to pay the costs of transferring 

employees to Saudi Arabia. The VSOs are detailed from their permanent duty 

stations for TDY assignment. The costs of temporarily assigning the VSOs 

to Saudi Arabia are, in part, being borne by the TDY officers’ permanent duty 

stations. 

Little institutional memory has been developed as a consequence of the rapid 

turnover of personnel. Each new VSO starts from the beginning to learn the 

job and the work environment. One of the volunteers had never worked outside 

the United States and was unfamiliar with the structure of an embassy. Another 

VSO had had no prior experience with visas and lacked any familiarity with the 

visa application and issuance process. Others have come to the job without any 

background in criminal investigation, which ICE considers an essential element of 

the VSO function. 

Because the officers are assigned only temporarily, DOS issues them offi cial—not 

diplomatic—passports. Because of their TDY status, they are denied diplomatic 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 17 
status and, consequently, they are treated as foreign visitors by the government 

of Saudi Arabia. This has an impact on their ability to perform their duties. The 

government of Saudi Arabia places severe restrictions on the activities of foreign 

visitors that make it impossible for the TDY officers to transact business at a 

bank, rent a car, obtain a driver’s license, or purchase a mobile telephone. These 

are not just personal inconveniences. TDY officers are not as mobile or as able 

to communicate as are their embassy colleagues. Given the sensitive nature of 

the duties that VSOs perform, they should be accorded the protections of the 

international conventions on diplomatic and consular relations. 

While the VSOs probably will continue to be temporarily assigned for the 

immediate future, BTS could save money by housing the TDY offi cers in 

rented housing rather than hotels. The embassy estimated that DHS could 

save approximately $80,000 per year if it rented housing for the TDY offi cers, 

assigning two officers to each house. 

We recognize the imperative of deploying VSOs to Saudi Arabia quickly, and 

acknowledge the positive actions taken by BTS to meet the statutory mandate. 

However, continuing to use TDY officers to fill the VSO positions, without regard 

to their qualifications, is not conducive to developing an effective or effi cient 

long-term visa security operation. BTS should begin to fill the VSO positions 

with permanently assigned officers as soon as possible. The Under Secretary 

indicated that this is BTS’ intention, and that future VSO assignments will be 

long-term transfers, not temporary assignments. 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 7: Discontinue the practice of filling the VSO positions 

with temporarily assigned officers and move toward filling the positions with 

permanently assigned offi cers. 

Recommendation 8: Establish criteria for selecting VSOs based on required 

experience and skill sets to support the visa security operation. 

Embassy Support for VSO Operations 

As of March 2004, DHS had not paid for all of the administrative support services 

provided by DOS. In addition, there is other essential support that the VSOs 

required but, because of the lack of funding, DOS does not provide. This support 

includes housing, dedicated transportation and drivers, and cell phones. DHS’ FY 

Page 18 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
2004 budget did not include funds for reimbursing DOS for providing support for 

the visa security operations. Uneconomical practices result from the lack of DHS 

funding, such as placing employees in hotels because of the absence of funding 

to procure permanent, leased housing. BTS made a request to reprogram some 

FY 2004 DHS funds to support the current operations of the VSU, especially the 

VSO offices in Saudi Arabia. The Under Secretary said that this request has been 

pending with DHS management for several months. 

All agencies operating at an embassy participate in the common funding of 

shared administrative services though the Interagency Cooperative Administrative 

Support Services (ICASS). One-time costs can occur, such as when an embassy 

needs to remodel its offices to make room for a new agency. The construction 

or renovation expenses are typically charged to the benefiting agency. Few 

embassies have excess office space and significant reconstruction can be required 

to accommodate new staff, especially in the highly restricted and tightly secured 

“Controlled Access Area” (CAA) where classified information is handled. 

The U.S. Embassy in Riyadh estimated that the start-up costs for the visa security 

offices in Saudi Arabia were $189,000. These costs do not include renovations or 

personnel costs, just office equipment, office furniture, and office supplies. The 

embassy also estimates that when DHS is fully staffed, the annual ICASS bill for 

administrative support will be $491,000. 

It is difficult to forecast the expenses for renovations and reconstruction without 

knowing the specific countries to which VSOs will be assigned. DHS will need 

to plan each new visa security office well in advance of its actual opening, enter 

into a dialogue with the affected embassy, obtain estimates for the required 

renovations, and then prepare a budget request. A possible alternative that might 

permit timelier establishment of the VSO program would be for DHS to seek 

funding in advance for an “embassy office space renovation fund,” and then report 

to Congress as it is used and requires replenishment. 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 9: Establish a funding mechanism to ensure that the visa 

security operations receive all required support and that DOS is promptly 

reimbursed for the support that it provides. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 19 
Scope of Visa Application Reviews 

VSOs in Saudi Arabia spend a significant amount of time reviewing applications 

of little homeland security interest, such as those of children, certain thirdcountry nationals, or aliens already denied visas by DOS. Only 55 percent of the 

visa applications processed in Saudi Arabia in the past year were Saudi Arabian 

citizens. The rest were third country nationals, the largest contingent of whom are 

Filipinos. Section 428(i) requires that DHS review all visa applications in Saudi 

Arabia and does not give it the authority to set aside applications in any category 

in order to concentrate on higher risk applications. In every other country, Section 

428(e) permits DHS to decide which applications would best benefi t from VSO 

review. 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 10: Propose a technical correction to Section 428(i) to align 

it with Section 428(e) and permit DHS to review only those applications with 

homeland security interest in Saudi Arabia. 

Consular officials in Riyadh said that in the months following the September 

11 attacks, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigators visited the 

embassy and examined the visa applications of several hundred individuals on 

a list they had brought with them. The list included names of the September 11 

attackers—15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis—and others suspected of terrorist 

involvement. 

According to the DOS consular officials, however, there has been no examination 

by law enforcement or intelligence agencies of thousands of other Saudi visa 

applications that pre-date the September 11 attacks. These officials opined that 

a review of the applications might uncover information of intelligence or law 

enforcement value. Analysis, for example, might identify young Saudi males who 

may have been associates, or may have come from the families, tribes, or villages 

of the hijackers. Consular officials pointed out that these visa applications could 

contain information about other terrorist conspirators who may still have valid 

U.S. visas or who may remain in the United States. DOS has moved many of the 

visa applications to archives in the United States, but large numbers remain in 

temporary storage in Riyadh’s visa section. 

Our interviews with DHS, FBI, and intelligence officials in Riyadh confi rmed 

that no thorough examination of pre-September 11 visa records has been made. 

Page 20 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
They said that combing through these thousands of old applications for possible 

commonalities with the hijackers would require a very large amount of time and 

would be an unwise diversion from their higher priority counterterrorism efforts 

already under way. 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 11: Evaluate the possible benefit of analyzing the existing 

visa applications in DOS files of young Saudi males who were issued visas in the 

two year period prior to September 11, 2001. BTS should coordinate with DOS, 

the FBI, and other federal agencies, as necessary, before making a determination 

about whether, or how, to proceed to analyze the applications. 

 Language Training 

Even though Section 428 requires language training for VSOs, ICE has not 

decided whether to provide it. The costs, and the personnel complications 

of assigning officers to long-term training, are indeed daunting. The need to 

establish the first visa security office in 2003 gave DHS no option but to seek 

volunteers to serve on a temporary basis. Only one of the ten officers who served 

in Saudi Arabia in the past year spoke Arabic. 

We are concerned that the precedent established by sending the fi rst VSOs to 

Saudi Arabia without language training may become the accepted practice. In our 

opinion, this would deprive the visa security operation of much of its potential. 

Further, adopting this practice would clearly violate the training provisions 

of Section 428 and the DHS-DOS MOU. Section 6b of the MOU lists the 

qualifications for overseas DHS personnel, which include providing the VSOs 

with the ability to speak the host country language. 

We observed VSOs at work in Saudi Arabia and were struck by how diffi cult 

it was for the VSOs to perform their tasks while relying on local employees to 

translate documents and conversations for them. While the experience they 

bring from their prior assignments makes them adept at spotting some fraudulent 

documents, they clearly would contribute more if they could read and speak the 

local language. 

Earlier in our report, we made a recommendation concerning language training 

(Recommendation 2). We made that recommendation based on requirements 

established by Section 428 and the DHS-DOS MOU. Our observations of the 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 21 
VSOs working in Saudi Arabia only confirmed the importance of having VSOs in 

those positions with the necessary language skills. 

Database Queries 

There is no consolidated DHS “lookout list” or “watch list.” VSOs in Saudi 

Arabia screen visa applications against a multitude of DHS databases, some of 

which are merely case file management systems containing little genuinely useful 

information. VSOs enter the visa applicants’ biographic information manually to 

conduct the queries. The same biographic information was previously collected 

and entered into DOS data systems by the consular officers during the visa 

application process. However, the DHS and DOS data systems do not share 

this information. Even if the initiation of the name checks were automated, 

personnel must have immigration experience and a working knowledge of the 

DHS databases to interpret the results of the DHS queries due to the technical 

complexity of the DHS data systems. 

During the first few months of operation, the VSOs entered the applicants’ names 

and biographic data manually into DHS databases. This entering and re-entering 

of applicant biographical data consumed almost all of the available manpower 

and left no time for analysis. A new procedure was developed that required the 

VSOs to enter each applicant’s name, date and place of birth, passport number, 

and other particulars into one local database. At the end of each day, the VSOs 

develop a spreadsheet that is e-mailed to the National Targeting Center (NTC) 

in Reston, Virginia. At NTC, analysts process the spreadsheet as if it were the 

passenger manifest of a hypothetical inbound flight and check it against most of 

the available name check systems and government databases. Analysts at NTC 

have greater access to DHS databases than the DHS overseas offices, and are 

able to interpret the results of the name searches. The analysts electronically 

send adverse query results to the VSOs in Saudi Arabia. The turn-around time— 

currently overnight—does not delay the timely processing of the visa applications 

in Saudi Arabia. 

The NTC procedure works so well that it might be a model for other visa security 

offices. If this process were expanded to new visa security operations in other 

countries, DHS must ensure that NTC is staffed and provided resources to handle 

the additional workload. It requires about one hour at NTC each day to process 

the two incoming spreadsheets from Riyadh and Jeddah, review the “hits,” search 

the computer files to verify and augment the information, and record the analyst’s 

comments on the outgoing spreadsheet. Saudi Arabia is a relatively low volume 

Page 22 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
visa operation, even if visa demand were to return to pre-9/11 levels. If the 

next four or five countries added to the program produce higher volumes of visa 

applications, the visa name check workload at NTC could increase signifi cantly. 

Assigning officers to overseas locations to repeat data entry of information 

already collected and transmitted to Washington, D.C. by the DOS consular 

officers is not an efficient use of DHS resources. The purpose for sending these 

officers overseas is to provide investigative and intelligence analysis support to 

the visa application process. The BTS Under Secretary said that BTS agrees that 

the database work would best be performed by consular officers, freeing VSOs to 

focus on analysis of terrorist threats to the visa process. 

Before the visa security operation expands to other countries, DHS and DOS 

should explore ways to automate the database queries and free the VSOs for 

greater priority duties. One possibility would be for DOS to create a computer 

program that enables its data systems, either at the visa issuing post or in 

Washington, D.C., to generate a properly formatted query and transmit it directly 

to NTC. The results would be sent back to the VSOs at the overseas locations. A 

second option would be to build on the existing process wherein some of the data 

that DOS collects is passed to DHS’ Automated Biometric Identifi cation System 

(IDENT) for fingerprint matching. This existing process could be used to pass the 

necessary data directly to the NTC. 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security: 

Recommendation 12: Develop an interface between BTS and DOS computer 

systems that permits a fast and efficient method to automate the visa security 

name check process and eliminate the duplicative data entry for database checks. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 23 
Appendix A 

Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) 

(a) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘consular office’’ has the meaning given that 

term under section 101(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(9)). 

(b) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 104(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 

U.S.C. 1104(a)) or any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (c) of this 

section, the Secretary— 

(1) shall be vested exclusively with all authorities to issue regulations with respect to, administer, 

and enforce the provisions of such Act, and of all other immigration and nationality laws, 

relating to the functions of consular officers of the United States in connection with the granting 

or refusal of visas, and shall have the authority to refuse visas in accordance with law and to 

develop programs of homeland security training for consular officers (in addition to consular 

training provided by the Secretary of State), which authorities shall be exercised through the 

Secretary of State, except that the Secretary shall not have authority to alter or reverse the 

decision of a consular officer to refuse a visa to an alien; and 

(2) shall have authority to confer or impose upon any officer or employee of the United States, 

with the consent of the head of the executive agency under whose jurisdiction such offi cer or 

employee is serving, any of the functions specified in paragraph (1). 

(c) AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Secretary of State may direct a 

consular officer to refuse a visa to an alien if the Secretary of State deems such refusal necessary 

or advisable in the foreign policy or security interests of the United States. 

(2) CONSTRUCTION REGARDING AUTHORITY.—Nothing in this section, consistent with 

the Secretary of Homeland Security’s authority to refuse visas in accordance with law, shall be 

construed as affecting the authorities of the Secretary of State under the following provisions of 

law: 

(A) section 101(a)(15)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(A)). 

(B) section 204(d)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1154) (as it will take 

effect upon the entry into force of the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in 

Respect to Inter-Country adoption). 

Page 24 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Appendix A 

Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

(C) section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(bb) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)( 

B)(i)(IV)(bb)). 

(D) section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI)). 

(E) section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II)). 

(F) section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(C)). 

(G) section 212(a)(10)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(10)(C)). 

(H) section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)). 

(I) section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)). 

(J) section 237(a)(4)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(C)). 

(K) section 401 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 

U.S.C. 6034; Public Law 104–114). 

(L) section 613 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and DOS, the Judiciary and Related 

Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(b) of division A of Public Law 

105–277) (Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999); 112 

Stat. 2681; H.R. 4328 (originally H.R. 4276) as amended by section 617 of Public Law 106–553. 

(M) section 103(f) of the Chemical Weapon Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 

2681–865). 

(N) section 801 of H.R. 3427, the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, as enacted by reference in Public Law 106–113. 

(O) section 568 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 

Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107–115). 

(P) section 51 of the DOS Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2723). 

(d) CONSULAR OFFICERS AND CHIEFS OF MISSIONS.— 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 25 
Appendix A 

Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section may be construed to alter or affect— 

(A) the employment status of consular officers as employees of the Department of State; or 

(B) the authority of a chief of mission under section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 

U.S.C. 3927).

(2) CONSTRUCTION REGARDING DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY.—Nothing in this 

section shall be construed to affect any delegation of authority to the Secretary of State by 

the President pursuant to any proclamation issued under section 212(f) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), consistent with the Secretary of Homeland Security’s 

authority to refuse visas in accordance with law. 

(e) ASSIGNMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY EMPLOYEES TO DIPLOMATIC AND 

CONSULAR POSTS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary is authorized to assign employees of the Department to each 

diplomatic and consular post at which visas are issued, unless the Secretary determines that such 

an assignment at a particular post would not promote homeland security. 

(2) FUNCTIONS.—Employees assigned under paragraph (1) shall perform the following 

functions: 

(A) Provide expert advice and training to consular officers regarding specific security threats 

relating to the adjudication of individual visa applications or classes of applications. 

(B) Review any such applications, either on the initiative of the employee of the Department or 

upon request by a consular officer or other person charged with adjudicating such applications. 

(C) Conduct investigations with respect to consular matters under the jurisdiction of the 

Secretary. 

(3) EVALUATION OF CONSULAR OFFICERS.—The Secretary of State shall evaluate, in 

consultation with the Secretary, as deemed appropriate by the Secretary, the performance of 

consular officers with respect to the processing and adjudication of applications for visas in 

accordance with performance standards developed by the Secretary for these procedures. 

(4) REPORT.—The Secretary shall, on an annual basis, submit a report to Congress that 

describes the basis for each determination under paragraph (1) that the assignment of an 

Page 26 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Appendix A 

Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

employee of the Department at a particular diplomatic post would not promote homeland 

security. 

(5) PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT; PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST LOOKOUT 

COMMITTEE.—When appropriate, employees of the Department assigned to perform functions 

described in paragraph (2) may be assigned permanently to overseas diplomatic or consular posts 

with country-specific or regional responsibility. If the Secretary so directs, any such employee, 

when present at an overseas post, shall participate in the terrorist lookout committee established 

under section 304 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 

1733). 

(6) TRAINING AND HIRING.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall ensure, to the extent possible, that any employees of 

the Department assigned to perform functions under paragraph (2) and, as appropriate, consular 

officers, shall be provided the necessary training to enable them to carry out such functions, 

including training in foreign languages, interview techniques, and fraud detection techniques, in 

conditions in the particular country where each employee is assigned, and in other appropriate 

areas of study. 

(B) USE OF CENTER.—The Secretary is authorized to use the National Foreign Affairs 

Training Center, on a reimbursable basis, to obtain the training described in subparagraph (A). 

(7) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the 

Secretary of State shall submit to Congress— 

(A) a report on the implementation of this subsection; and

(B) any legislative proposals necessary to further the objectives of this subsection.

(8) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This subsection shall take effect on the earlier of— 

(A) the date on which the President publishes notice in the Federal Register that the President 

has submitted a report to Congress setting forth a memorandum of understanding between the 

Secretary and the Secretary of State governing the implementation of this section; or 

(B) the date occurring 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 27 
Appendix A 

Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

(f) NO CREATION OF PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.—Nothing in this section shall be 

construed to create or authorize a private right of action to challenge a decision of a consular 

officer or other United States official or employee to grant or deny a visa. 

(g) STUDY REGARDING USE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Security shall conduct a study 

of the role of foreign nationals in the granting or refusal of visas and other 

documents authorizing entry of aliens into the United States. The study shall 

address the following: 

(A) The proper role, if any, of foreign nationals in the process of rendering decisions on such 

grants and refusals. 

(B) Any security concerns involving the employment of foreign nationals. 

(C) Whether there are cost-effective alternatives to the use of foreign nationals. 

(2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

shall submit a report containing the findings of the study conducted under paragraph (1) to the 

Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on International Relations, and the Committee on 

Government Reform of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary, the 

Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Government Affairs of the Senate. 

(h) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 

of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall submit to Congress a report on how the 

provisions of this section will affect procedures for the issuance of student visas. 

(i) VISA ISSUANCE PROGRAM FOR SAUDI ARABIA.—Notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, after the date of the enactment of this Act all third party screening programs in 

Saudi Arabia shall be terminated. On-site personnel of the Department of Homeland Security 

shall review all visa applications prior to adjudication. 

Page 28 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Appendix B 

Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Management Comments 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments 

Attachment B: Site Selection Criteria 

This attachment contained “For Official Use Only” information. We withheld the attachment at 

the request of BTS. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 39 
Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments 

We evaluated BTS’ written comments and have made changes to our draft report where 

we deemed appropriate. Below is a summary of BTS’ written response to the report’s 

recommendations and our analysis of their response. 

The BTS said that the following statements in our draft report were incorrect. 

“DHS did not implement all of Section 428. Specifically, DHS did not comply with the 

requirement to have DHS personnel in place in Saudi Arabia to review visa applications by 

January 24, 2003. Temporary personnel arrived on August 31, 2003.” 

We received differing opinions regarding the effective date of the implementation of Section 

428 requirements. The OIG’s Office of Counsel reviewed the Act and made a determination 

that the effective date was 60 days following the passage of the Act. The Act was passed on 

November 25, 2002, making the effective date January 24, 2003. We acknowledge that DHS 

was not formally established until March 1, 2003, making implementation of the Section 428 

requirements diffi cult. 

BTS’ response also discussed an apparent “legislative error” regarding the effective date of 

Section 428(i), which required that DHS personnel review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia. 

Section 428(e)(8) set the effective date of the deployment of DHS personnel to diplomatic 

and consular posts, other that Saudi Arabia, as the earlier of either the signing of an MOU 

between DHS and DOS, signed on September 29, 2003, or one year after the passage of the 

Act, November 25, 2004. According to BTS, Section 428(e)(8) was “misnumbered.” BTS 

believes that “subsection” actually was intended to mean “section” and it applied to the entirety 

of Section 428, thereby implying that the effective date of Section 428(i) was not until after the 

September 29, 2003 signing of the MOU. We never heard this discussion during the course of 

our interviews with BTS officials concerning the effective date. Further, this argument was never 

brought forward during our two meetings with the Under Secretary of BTS. 

Throughout its response to our draft report, BTS said that implementation of many of the Section 

428 requirements was contingent upon receiving dedicated funding for those requirements. We 

also recognize that many of the Section 428 requirements remain unfunded. We urge BTS to 

continue its aggressive efforts to identify its funding requirements to congress until this problem 

is resolved. 

Page 40 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments 

1. Develop a curriculum of homeland security training for consular officers consistent with 

the requirement in Section 428 (b) (1) of the Act. 

BTS agreed that a formal training program for consular officers was needed. VSU preliminarily 

identified three core areas of instruction that will include interviewing techniques, fraudulent 

document training and analysis, and counter-terrorism related training. 

BTS’ plan to develop a curriculum to train consular officers is responsive to this 

recommendation. 

Recommendation 1 – Resolved – Open. 

2. Develop a training program for VSOs that includes foreign languages, country studies, 

and interview and fraud detection techniques. 

BTS agreed with the need to provide VSO specific training to officers assigned to VSUs. 

BTS is developing a VSO training curriculum that includes courses in country studies, life 

and operations at overseas posts, a review of counterterrorism methods, formal visa security 

procedures, and a review of interview and fraud document techniques as a refresher to the 

extensive training these officers already have received. BTS also agrees, though funding has 

not been provided, that language training for VSOs was important and that it will be provided as 

funding permits. Further, BTS said that one of the criteria that it will use to select future VSOs 

will be language skills. 

BTS’s plan to develop the VSO training curriculum is responsive to this recommendation. With 

respect to language training, law enforcement officers and intelligence analysts assigned to a 

country in which they cannot speak or read the language cannot be as effective as possible. As 

we observed in Saudi Arabia, the VSOs were most effective when they could converse with hostcountry immigration and security officials and read traveler documents. Therefore, BTS should 

continue to pursue funding to support a VSO language training program. 

Recommendation 2 – Resolved – Open. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 41 
Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments 

3. In coordination with DOS, develop performance standards to evaluate consular offi cers. 

BTS said that it will establish appropriate performance standards for DOS’ use in evaluating 

consular officers. This effort is responsive to the recommendation. However, we do not agree 

that work on developing the performance standards needs to be delayed until the deployment 

of VSOs to the next five sites. BTS should begin this effort immediately with the assistance of 

DOS offi cials. 

Recommendation 3 – Resolved – Open. 

4. Develop written criteria for assigning VSOs to other countries. 

BTS developed site selection criteria that consider a range of quantitative and qualitative 

information to assess the overall requirement for a VSU at a given location. Further, it developed 

a site assessment process that involves an on-site visit and consultations with senior offi cials at 

the posts, including the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Regional Security Offi cer, 

the FBI Attaché, and Department of Defense. Using this process, BTS has selected five posts for 

the next assignment of VSOs. 

The development of site selection criteria and the process for making site assessments are 

responsive to this recommendation. No further action is required. 

Recommendation 4 – Closed. 

5. Assign responsibility to develop and publish the report to Congress required by Section 

428(e)(4). 

BTS submitted the annual report for OMB review on June 6, 2004. As of August 1, 2004, the 

annual report has not been presented to congress. BTS said that it will assign responsibility for 

drafting future annual reports. 

BTS’ actions and plans are responsive to this recommendation. However, the draft annual 

report did not meet the full intent of the Section 428 (e)(1) requirement, which “authorizes 

the assignment of VSOs to diplomatic and consular posts at which visas are issued unless the 

Secretary determines that such an assignment at a particular post would not promote 

homeland security [emphasis added].” Section 428(e)(4) requires a report “that describes the 

basis for each determination under paragraph (1) that the assignment of an employee of the 

Department at a particular diplomatic or consular post would not promote homeland security.” 

Page 42 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments 

While the draft report describes current visa security operations and discusses the general criteria 

used to select future VSU sites, it does not describe the specific information BTS used to select 

the next five VSU sites or, for example, why these sites promote homeland security more than 

other sites. Further, it does not describe why other sites were not selected. 

Also, while not required by Section 428, BTS missed an opportunity to present to congress 

the costs of deploying VSOs to the five selected sites. BTS contends throughout its response 

to our draft report that funding is a major impediment to fully complying with all Section 428 

requirements. Yet, in its report to congress, BTS does not describe the details of this signifi cant 

funding requirement. We strongly suggest that before the final annual report is issued to 

congress that BTS address these two concerns. 

Recommendation 5 – Resolved – Open. 

6. Conduct a study of the personnel management techniques used by other agencies with a 

global workforce and evaluate ways to facilitate the overseas rotations of DHS employees. 

BTS said that DHS currently is conducting a comprehensive assessment of its international 

operations to determine the best alignment and support of the department’s global mission. 

This action is responsive to our recommendation. The assessment should include an overseas 

rotation plan for personnel that promotes the timely and equitable assignment of qualifi ed 

personnel to overseas sites and their subsequent reassignment to the United States. 

Recommendation 6 – Resolved – Open. 

7. Discontinue the practice of filling the VSO positions with temporarily assigned offi cers 

and move toward filling the positions with permanently assigned offi cers. 

BTS agreed to discontinue its reliance on temporarily assigned staff. Until dedicated funding for 

the VSO program is secured, BTS plans to work with DHS and OMB to reprogram 

FY 2004 funds to enable the program to hire permanent assigned staff. 

BTS’ plan to discontinue the use of temporarily assigned officers is responsive to this 

recommendation. 

Recommendation 7 – Resolved – Open. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 43 
Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments 

8. Establish criteria for selecting VSOs based on required experience and skill sets to 

support the visa security operation. 

BTS developed a staffing model for VSUs and selection criteria for VSOs.16 BTS’ actions are 

responsive to this recommendation and no further action is required 

Recommendation 8 – Closed. 

9. Establish a funding mechanism to ensure that the visa security operations receive all 

required support and that DOS is promptly reimbursed for the support that it provides. 

BTS said that it has been aggressively pursuing dedicated funding for the VSU program and that 

a current budget reprogramming plan is with OMB awaiting approval. 

BTS’ on-going efforts to obtain funding are responsive to this recommendation. BTS noted that 

its account with DOS for the Saudi Arabia operation is now current. This status is a marked 

improvement since our visit to Saudi Arabia in March 2004. 

Recommendation 9 – Resolved – Open. 

10. Propose a technical correction to Section 428(i) to align it with Section 428(e) and 

permit DHS to review only those applications with homeland security interest in Saudi 

Arabia. 

BTS said that it does not plan to propose an amendment to modify Section 428(i). BTS believes 

that reviewing all visa applications is worthwhile and that the process to exclude those visa 

applications without homeland security interest would be too time consuming. 

While BTS non-concurred with this recommendation, we agree with BTS’ rationale for not 

seeking to amend the legislation. At our exit conference, BTS officials explained that because 

of the improvements in data processing made since our visit to Saudi Arabia in March 2004, 

separating applications in Saudi Arabia before review will reduce, not increase, the effi ciency 

and effectiveness of the VSOs. Further, they said that they intend to review all visa applications 

in other countries as the VSU program expands even though not required by Section 428. In 

addition, BTS officials believe that there are additional law enforcement benefits that can be 

gained by reviewing all visa applications. This recommendation requires no further action. 

Recommendation 10 – Closed. 

16 Based on additional information provided by BTS, we amended our draft report where we discuss the experience levels of the VSOs 

initially assigned to Saudi Arabia. 

Page 44 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Appendix C 

OIG Evaluation of Management Comments 

11. Evaluate the possible benefit of analyzing the existing visa applications in DOS fi les of 

young Saudi males who were issued visas in the two year period prior to 

September 11, 2001. BTS should coordinate with DOS, the FBI, and other federal agencies, 

as necessary, before making a determination about whether, or how, to proceed to analyze 

the applications. 

BTS agrees that there may be value in reviewing pre-September 11 visa applications. However, 

it is waiting to obtain enhanced access to the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). BTS does 

not know when it may begin the review. 

BTS’ intention to review the visa applications is responsive to this recommendation. However, 

we do not understand the need to delay the review pending enhanced access to CCD. BTS 

does not define the meaning of “enhanced access” or how this access will facilitate the review 

process. CCD contains only a portion of the data from the visa application. Other potentially 

valuable information is available only on the actual visa application. Therefore, a comprehensive 

review would require reviewing the actual visa applications. BTS should begin the review of 

these visa applications as soon as possible. Further delays will decrease the potential homeland 

security value of the information that they contain. 

Recommendation 11 – Resolved – Open. 

12. Develop an interface between BTS and DOS computer systems that permits a fast 

and efficient method to automate the visa security name check process and eliminate the 

duplicative data entry for database checks. 

BTS agreed that the data entry process needed to be streamlined and has developed an interim 

solution to reduce the amount of time VSOs must spend entering data. In addition, BTS plans to 

secure enhanced access to CCD for current and future VSU sites. 

BTS’ interim and long range plans to streamline the data entry process is responsive to this 

recommendation. 

Recommendation 12 – Resolved – Open. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 45 
Appendix D 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: Develop a curriculum of homeland security training for 

consular officers consistent with the requirement in Section 428 (b) (1) of the Act. 

Recommendation 2: Develop a training program for VSOs that includes foreign 

languages, country studies, and interview and fraud detection techniques. 

Recommendation 3: In coordination with DOS, develop performance standards 

to evaluate consular offi cers. 

Recommendation 4: Develop written criteria for assigning VSOs to other 

countries. 

Recommendation 5: Assign responsibility to develop and publish the report to 

Congress required by Section 428(e)(4). 

Recommendation 6: Conduct a study of the personnel management techniques 

used by other agencies with global workforces and evaluate ways to facilitate the 

overseas rotations of DHS employees. 

Recommendation 7: Discontinue the practice of filling the VSO positions 

with temporarily assigned officers and move toward filling the positions with 

permanently assigned offi cers. 

Recommendation 8: Establish criteria for selecting VSOs based on required 

experience and skill sets to support the visa security operation. 

Recommendation 9: Establish a funding mechanism to ensure that the visa 

security operations receive all required support and that DOS is promptly 

reimbursed for the support that it provides. 

Recommendation 10: Propose a technical correction to Section 428(i) to align 

it with Section 428(e) and permit DHS to review only those applications with 

homeland security interest in Saudi Arabia. 

Recommendation 11: Evaluate the possible benefit to be gained by analyzing 

the existing visa applications in DOS files of young Saudi males who were issued 

visas in the two year period prior to September 11, 2001. BTS should coordinate 

with DOS, the FBI, and other federal agencies, as necessary, before making a 

determination about whether, or how, to proceed to analyze the applications. 

Page 46 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Appendix D 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 12: Develop an interface between BTS and DOS computer systems that 

permits a fast and efficient method to automate the visa security name check process and 

eliminate the duplicative data entry for database checks. 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 47 
Appendix E 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Douglas Ellice, Senior Inspector

(202) 254-4181

Douglas.Ellice@dhs.gov

Kenneth McKune, Senior Inspector

(202) 254-4220

Ken.McKune@dhs.gov

Page 48 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

General Counsel 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

DHS Audit Liaison 

ICE Liaison 

Director, Office of International Affairs 

Commissioner, US Customs and Border Protection 

Assistant Secretary, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Department of State 

Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs 

Assistant Inspector General for Inspections 

Office of Management and Budget 

Homeland Bureau Chief 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees as appropriate 

An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 49 
Page 50 An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
An Evaluation of DHS Activities to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Page 51 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528, Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG 

seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.