2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-18-2004

Spruill v. Gillis

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 02-2659

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-2659

 

ROBERT SPRUILL,

 Appellant

v.

FRANK GILLIS; GOOLIER, C.O.;

MCGLAUGHLIN, M.D.; BROWN, P.A.

_________________

On Appeal From The United States

District Court For

The Middle District Of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3:01-CV-1625)

District Judge: Honorable Thomas I.

Vanaskie, Chief Judge 

_________________

Argued January 13, 2004

Before: ALITO, CHERTOFF, and

BECKER Circuit Judges.

(Filed: June 18, 2004)

ERIC R. SONNENSCHEIN (Argued)

Covington & Burling 

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20004 

Attorney for Appellant

MICHAEL A. FARNAN (Argued)

Department of Corrections 

Office of Chief Counsel 

P.O. Box 598 

Camp Hill, PA 17011

Attorney for Appellees Gillis and Goolier

ALAN S. GOLD (Argued)

Sean Robins

Gold, Butkovitz & Robins 

7837 Old York Road 

Elkins Park, PA 19027

Attorney for Appellees McGlaughlin and

Brown

______________________

 OPINION

______________________

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal raises important questions

of construction of the Prison Litigation

Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No.

104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 at 66 (1996).

Plaintiff Robert Spruill is an inmate in the

custody of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections. Spruill filed a civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

four defendants at the State Correctional

Insti tutio n at C oal T o w nship ,

Pennsylvania: two prison officials (Frank

Gillis and Stephen Gooler1); a prison

doctor (Dr. Shawn McGlaughlin); and a

 

1

Spruill in his complaint spells the

name “Goolier,” but we will use the

correct spelling, “Gooler.”
2

prison physician’s assistant(BrianBrown).

In his complaint, Spruill alleges that, as a

result of the deliberate indifference of the

defendants, his serious back condition was

left untreated, or was inadequately treated,

resulting in excruciating pain and

susceptibility to other injuries. Pursuant to

Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grievance System

Policy (the “Grievance System Policy”),

Spruill filed a series of three inmate

grievances, and he ultimately received

some measure of medical care. In his

grievances, Spruill did not seek money

damages, but in the instant suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, he does seek money

damages for the alleged violation of his

rights under the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), enacted as part

of the PLRA, provides that a prisoner may

not bring a § 1983 suit with respect to

prison cond itions “u nti l su c h

administrative remedies as are available

are exhausted.” Because Spruill had failed

to seek money damages in his grievances,

the District Court concluded that he had

failed to meet the exhaustion requirement

of § 1997e(a), and therefore dismissed

Spruill’s suit in its entirety. The District

Court also held in the alternative that

Spruill’s failure to name Brown in his

grievances constituted a failure to exhaust

his claims against Brown. Spruill appeals

the dismissal of his claims against Gooler,

Dr. McGlaughlin, and Brown. He does

not appeal the dismissal of his suit against

Gillis.

Courts have only recently begun to

define the contours of the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement, and we have not

had occasion to pass on whether the

exhaustion requirement is merely a

termination requirement or also includes a

procedural default component—that is,

whether a prisoner may bring a § 1983 suit

so long as no grievance process remains

open to him, or whether a prisoner must

properly (i.e., on pain of procedural

default) exhaust administrative remedies

as a prerequisite to a suit in federal court.

This case requires us to confront that issue,

and we hold that § 1997e(a) includes a

procedural default component. We further

hold that the determination whether a

prisoner has “properly” exhausted a claim

(for procedural default purposes) is made

by evaluating the prisoner’s compliance

with the prison’s a dministrative

regulations governing inmate grievances,

and the waiver, if any, of such regulations

by prison officials.

Applying this framework to Spruill’s

grievances under the Grievance System

Policy, we hold that (1) Spruill was not

required to seek money damages in his

grievances, and therefore has not

procedurally defaulted his claim for money

damages; (2) Spruill was required to name

Brown in his grievances, but that the

officials handling Spruill’s grievances

waived his default on this requirement;

and (3) Spruill exhausted the

administrative remedies under the

Grievance System Policy.

Finally, turning to the merits-based

arguments that the defendants advance as

alternate grounds for affirmance of the

District Court, we conclude that Spruill
3

does not state a claim for deliberate

indifference against Gooler, but that his

allegations against Dr. McGlaughlin and

Brown are sufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss. We will therefore affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand for

further proceedings against Dr.

McGlaughlin and Brown.

I. Facts and Procedural History

As this case comes to us on the District

Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we

must accept as true the facts as pled in

Spruill’s complaint. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of

Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v.

Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir.

2002). Given that the exhaustion issue

turns on the indisputably authentic

documents related to Spruill’s grievances,

we hold that we may also consider these

without converting it to a motion for

summary judgment.2 See Steele v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1212

(10th Cir. 2003) (quoting GFF Corp. v.

Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130

F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting

that “a defendant may submit an

indisputably authentic [document] to the

court to be considered on a motion to

dismiss”)). We now chronicle the facts as

set forth in Spruill’s complaint.

A. Spruill’s Complaint

Spruill is currently incarcerated at the

State Correctional Institution at Chester,

Pennsylvania (“SCI-Chester”), but he has

been housed in at least two other facilities.

His complaint alleges that, shortly after he

was transferred to the State Correctional

Institution at Coal Township, Pennsylvania

(“SCI-Coal”) in May 2001, the defendants

were deliberately indifferent to his medical

needs and subjected him to unnecessarily

painful medical treatment. Named as

defendants in the complaint are Frank

Gillis, the Superintendent at SCI-Coal;

Lieutenant Steven Gooler, the Unit

Manager of the Restricted Housing Unit

(RHU) at SCI-Coal, where Spruill was

housed during the events at issue; Dr.

Shawn McGlaughlin, a prison physician;

and Brian Brown, a physician’s assistant.

On May 2, 2001, Spruill was

transferred from the State Correctional

Institution at Rockview (SCI-Rockview),

Pennsylvania to SCI-Coal, where he was

housed in the RHU. Upon his arrival,

Spruill immediately requested to see a

medical staff member about severe pain he

was experiencing in his lower back area

and his right leg. “Several hours later,” he

 

2

Strictly speaking, the motion acted on

by the District Court should not have

been captioned as a Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but rather as

a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for

judgment on the pleadings, because we

have held that failure to exhaust

administrative remedies under § 1997e(a)

is an affirmative defense. See Ray v.

Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). 

There is no material difference in the

applicable legal standards, so for the sake

of familiarity, we shall use the “motion

to dismiss” formulation of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b).
4

was interviewed by a nurse. After Spruill

described his pain, and stated that he

“suffers from a chronic and debilitating

lower back disorder, spondylotic spinal

stenosis with recurrent compression of L3

and/or L4 nerve root on right,” the nurse

said, “There is nothing I can do, you will

need to sign up for sick call.”

Spruill signed up for sick call on May

3, but the next morning, he fell due to a

severe pain in his leg and back, striking the

left side of his face on the metal toilet in

his cell. Spruill believes he was knocked

unconscious and also injured his right

thumb. That same day, May 4, he

informed the nurse of his fall, his

additional injuries, and continuous back

pain; the nurse said that she would inform

the doctor. Spruill also informed Gooler

about his fall, to which Gooler responded,

“so, what do you want me to do?” Spruill

filed an official inmate grievance on May

4 complaining about the fall and new

injury. Gooler did not notify health care

providers once he was informed of

Spruill’s injuries; at that point, Spruill had

yet to be examined by a medical doctor.3

 

3The grievance filed by Spruill dated

May 4, 2001, reads as follows:

On the above stated date at

approx. 5:35 a.m., this writer

attempted to get up out of the bed. 

I took perhaps approximately 3 to

4 short steps, wherein, at that

juncture, this writer received

and/or experienced an extremely

sharp pain in the lower back & as

well as severe pain up and down

the front and back sides of the

right leg. It was at that point this

writer fell to the floor in a forceful

manner, hitting the left side of my

face on the edge of the “metal”

toilet in the cell. This writer did

as well also jammed and/or

injured his right thumb in the

same fall. This writer has reason

to believe that he may have passed

out due to the forceful blow he

received to the left side of his face

when he fell. This writer has

made repeated request, prior, to

see the doctor, only to be told that

the doctor does not visit the RHU. 

To date, and even in light of this

writer’s sick call request and most

recent fall incident, this writer has

yet to be examined by this

institution’s doctor and/or RHU

security staff. This writer also

informed RHU Lt. Goolier, about

the aforementioned fall. His reply

was: so, what do you want me to

do. The writer finds Lt. Goolier

said remarks to be highly

unprofessional. He is required to

notify medical respecting this

writer’s fall and blow to the head. 

What must I do, die, before I can

get medical attention?

In response to the prompt on the

grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken

and staff you have contacted, before

submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:
5

On May 5, Dr. McGlaughlin came to

Spruill’s cell regarding the sick call

request. Dr. McGlaughlin refused to

examine Spruill and stated that Spruill

would never go to the infirmary. Spruill

filed a second grievance on May 6

complaining that McGlaughlin had failed

to conduct a physical examination of him.4

Spruill was seen by the physician’s

assistant, Brown, on May 7. At that

encounter, Brown accused Spruill of

faking his injuries and did not examine

him. On May 9, Spruill complained to the

nurse that the pain medication he was

prescribed for his back5 “wasn’t working,”

and later that morning Spruill experienced

another “extremely sharp pain” in his

Submitted sick call request(s)

about back pain, spoke to the

nurse(s) about my back pain and

seeing the doctor—they said that

it was nothing they could do, and

that the doctor will not come to

the RHU to see me. I spoke to Lt.

Goolier about my situation, he

demonstrated no “care” or

concern regarding my health

and/or well being.

 

4The grievance filed by Spruill dated

May 6, 2001, reads as follows:

This writer avers the following: I

was seen on 5-5-2001, by a

member of the medical staff

whom identified himself as the

institutional medical “doctor.” I

explained to the doctor that I

suffer from a “chronic back

disorder” and currently experience

severe pain around my lower back

& right leg. And that I had fallen

in the cell the day prior, “hitting

my face on the metal toilet & also

hurting my right hand in said fall. 

Moreover, I advised the doctor

that my fall was directly related to

my not being able to walk—due to

the continued severe pain I am

having. More pointedly, the

aforementioned doctor never once

conducted a physical examination

in which to determine the full

extent of my pre-existing back

condition or the injuries I

sustained relative to my fall on 5-

4-2001. In addition, said doctor’s

visit to the RHU with me lasted

approximately 30 seconds maybe

less. To date, I am still

experiencing a considerable

amount of pain.

In response to the prompt on the

grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken

and staff you have contacted, before

submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:

Spoke to nurses and RHU staff

members who stated there’s

nothing they can do. I will need

to submit a grievance.

 

5

It is not clear from Spruill’s

complaint whether this medication was

prescribed by an SCI-Coal physician, or

by a physician from SCI-Rockview, from

which Spruill had just been transferred.
6

lower back and leg which caused him to

fall again. Spruill submitted another sick

call request, and was seen on May 10 by

Brown in response to that request. Spruill

told Brown that “the current medication

was not working to reduce his pain,” but

Brown did not take any actions to help

him. Spruill submitted another sick call

request on May 11, following which he

was seen by Dr. McGlaughlin on May 12.

Dr. McGlaughlin stated that he did not

believe there was anything wrong with

Spruill’s back, and accused Spruill of

“playing games.” Spruill filed a third

grievance that day.6

On May 14, Dr. McGlaughlin had

Spruill brought into the medical

examinatio n r oom, wh e r e Dr.

McGlaughlin deliberately bent and twisted

Spruill’s legs “as if he was trying to shape

a pretzel.” Dr. McGlaughlin did not

examine Spruill’s face or thumb for

injuries sustained on the morning of May

4.

The grievances were consolidated and

denied upon Initial Review, and Spruill

filed administrative appeals. The first

appeal was denied, and Spruill filed a final

appeal, which was also denied. The stated

 

6The grievance filed by Spruill dated

May 12, 2001, reads as follows:

This writer avers that at

approximately 8:34 a.m. on the

above indicated date, SCI-Coal

Chief Medical Director Dr.

McGlaughlin, came to my cell

regarding my sick call request. 

Dr. McGlaughlin stated to me:

that I had been evaluated back in

“February 2001,” by Dr. Osgood,

who has said that I am pain-free,

and that there’s nothing wrong

with my back.

In addition: Coal’s Chief Medical

Director stated to this writer that

this: “brings an end to your little

back playing games.” This writer

contends that Dr. McGlaughlin’s

remarks as stated herein above

were highly unprofessional in this

particular instance, since he has

never conducted any physical

examination on this writer.

To date, this writer remains in

constant sever[e] pain. And Dr.

McGlaughlin’s continued

course of treatment that he knows

is painful & ineffective may soon

entail a substantial risk of me

seriously harming myself in this

cell “falling.”

In response to the prompt on the

grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken

and staff you have contacted, before

submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:

Spoke to officer Shay—“Pod

officer” who indicated that it is

very little if anything at all he

could do, the matter will need to

be addressed by medical or by

way of the grievance system.
7

reasons behind the denials were that

Spruill was, at the time, receiving

appropriate medical care. As our

rescription of the grievances demonstrates,

see supra notes 3, 4 & 6, Spruill did not

seek monetary relief from the prison, nor

do the grievances identify Brown by name

or by description.

B. Proceedings in the District Court

Spruill filed the present suit seeking

monetary and injunctive relief. Because

Spruill had by then been transferred to

SCI-Chester, the District Court held that

his claim for injunctive relief against

officials at SCI-Coal was moot under

Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-

07 (3d Cir. 1993). The District Court

granted all four defendants’ motions to

dismiss on several grounds, holding, inter

alia, that (1) Spruill’s failure to seek

money damages in his grievances

constituted a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies; (2) because

Spruill received adequate medical

treatment, he had stated no claim for a

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights;

and (3) Spruill had failed to exhaust his

claim against Brown because the

grievances did not name Brown.

C. This Appeal

Spruill appeals the dismissals of Lt.

Gooler, Dr. McGlaughlin, and Brown, but

does not appeal the dismissal of

Superintendent Gillis. The District Court

had jurisdiction over this action pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, as a suit

arising under a federal law securing civil

rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Spruill filed a

timely notice of appeal from the final order

dismissing the action and we have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

exercise plenary review over a district

court’s decision to grant a motion to

dismiss. Broselow v. Fisher, 319 F.3d

605, 607 (3d Cir. 2003). To the extent that

our review turns on the statutory

construction of the exhaustion requirement

in § 1997e(a), our review is also plenary.

Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347,

1352 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “the

scope of § 1997e(a)’s applicability, which

is a question of law” is subject to plenary

review); see also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d

65, 66 (3d Cir. 2000).

The defendants advance several

grounds on which to affirm the judgment

of the District Court. First, they argue that

Spruill’s failure to seek money damages in

his grievances precludes him from now

seeking damages in federal court. Second,

Brown argues that Spruill’s failure to

name him in the grievances is a failure to

exhaust. Third, all defendants argue that

Spruill has not alleged facts sufficient to

establish a violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights.7 We will treat each of

these arguments in turn.

II. Exhaustion Under the PLRA

 

7Gooler captions this issue as a

qualified immunity defense, which it is

not. The substance of his argument is

that Spruill’s complaint does not

establish that Gooler acted with a mental

state of deliberate indifference.
8

A. The CRIPA

In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil

Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act

(CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349

(1980). CRIPA § 7 (originally codified at

42 U.S.C. § 1997e) took several steps to

foster the development of administrative

grievance systems in prisons: First, it

directed the Attorney General to

promulgate, after consultation with others,

“minimum standards for the development

of a plain, speedy, and effective system for

the resolution of [inmate] grievances.”

CRIPA § 7(b)(1). Second, it directed the

Attorney General to set up a certification

program for inmate grievance systems.

CRIPA § 7(c). Third, it gave District

Courts discretion to continue (i.e. stay) §

1983 cases brought by prisoners “in order

to require exhaustion of such plain,

speedy, and effective administrative

remedies as are available.” CRIPA § 7(a).

The Supreme Court “described this

provision as a ‘limited exhaustion

requirement.’” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 523-24 (2002) (quoting McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1992));

see also Concepcion, 306 F.3d at 1352.

B. The PLRA

This regime of discretionary

continuance to exhaust administrative

remedies lasted until the 1996 enactment

of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of

1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321

at 66 (1996). Section 803(d) of the PLRA

amended CRIPA § 7 to, inter alia, remove

the standards-setting and certification roles

of the Attorney General, and replace the

discretionary continuance provision with a

mandatory dismissal provision:

No action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under

section 1979 of the Revised

Statutes of the United States (42

U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal

law, by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are

exhausted.

PLRA § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a) and amending CRIPA § 7(a)).

As the Supreme Court explained in Nussle:

[This] exhaustion provision differs

markedly from its predecessor.

Once within the discretion of the

district court, exhaustion in cases

covered by § 1997e(a) is now

mandatory. All “available”

remedies must now be exhausted;

those remedies need not meet

federal standards, nor must they be

“plain, speedy, and effective.”

Even when the prisoner seeks relief

not available in grievance

proceedings, notably money

damages, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to suit. And unlike the

prev io us prov ision, w hic h

encompassed only § 1983 suits,

exhaustion is now required for all

“action [s] . . . brought with respect

to prison conditions,” whether

under § 1983 or “any other Federal

law.”

534 U.S. at 524 (citing Booth v. Churner,
9

532 U.S. 731, 739-41 & n.5).

Several courts have recounted the

legislative history of the PLRA, and we

need not do so once again. See, e.g.,

Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 598-99

(7th Cir. 2003) (Ripple, J., concurring in

the judgment); Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d

95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d sub nom.

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002);

Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-

25 (11th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court

summarized the objectives of the

exhaustion requirement of the PLRA in

Nussle:

Beyond doubt, Congress enacted §

1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and

improve the quality of prisoner

suits; to this purpose, Congress

afforded corrections officials time

and opportunity to address

complaints internally before

allowing the initiation of a federal

case. In some instances, corrective

action taken in response to an

inmate’s grievance might improve

prison administration and satisfy

the inmate, thereby obviating the

need for litigation. In other

instances, the internal review might

“filter out some frivolous claims.”

And for cases ultimately brought to

court, adjudication could be

facilitated by an administrative

record that clarifies the contours of

the controversy.

534 U.S. at 524-25 (quoting and citing

Booth, 532 U.S. at 737). With this

background to guide us, we turn next to

interpreting § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion

requirement.

C. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

We have previously addressed the

applicability of § 1997e(a) to actions by

prisoners who have filed suit in federal

court before pursuing all avenues of relief

available to them within their prison’s

inmate grievance system. In Nyhuis, 204

F.3d 65, we held that an inmate seeking

relief that the prison’s administrative

grievance system cannot provide (in

Nyhuis, it was money damages) must

nonetheless pursue the grievance process

to its end before coming to federal court.

We concluded that the PLRA “make[s]

exhaustion of all administrative remedies

mandatory.” Id. at 67 (emphasis added).

The question we now consider is whether

“all administrative remedies” are

exhausted whenever there is no further

process available to the inmate within the

grievance system (which would happen if,

say, an inmate fails to file an

administrative appeal), or whether it is

necessary that the inmate reach this

endpoint having availed himself of every

process at every turn (which would require

all appeals to be timely pursued, etc.). Put

another way, we ask whether the PLRA

requires simple exhaustion or something

more—“proper” exhaustion, as it were.

To borrow terms from other areas of the

law that recognize an exhaustion

requirement, we consider whether the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is merely

a termination requirement, or also includes

a procedural default component.
10

We recognize that there is an emerging

split among the circuits on whether the

PLRA includes a procedural default

component. Compare Ross v. County of

Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181,1186 (10th Cir.

2004) (“[T]he PLRA, like 28 U.S.C. §

2254, contains a procedural default

concept w ithin its exha ustio n

requirement.”), and Pozo v. McCaughtry,

286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.) (same), cert.

denied 537 U.S. 949 (2002), with Thomas

v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 723 (6th Cir.

2003) (“[W]e hold that so long as an

inmate presents his or her grievance to

prison officials and appeals through the

available procedures, the inmate has

exhausted his or her administrative

remedies, and a prison’s decision not to

address the grievance because it was

untimely under prison rules shall not bar

the federal suit.”).

1. The Procedural Default Component of

the PLRA

The Supreme Court has observed in the

federal habeas corpus context that an

exhaustion requirement without a

procedural default component is quite

toothless. To “protect the integrity of the

federal exhaustion rule, [federal habeas

courts] ask not only whether a prisoner has

exhausted his state remedies, but also

whether he has properly exhausted those

remedies, i.e., whether he has fairly

presented his claims to the state courts.”

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999) (quotation marks and citations

omitted) (emphasis in original).

[A] habeas petitioner who has

failed to me et the State’s

procedural requirements for

presenting his federal claims has

deprived the state courts of an

opportunity to address those claims

in the first instance. A habeas

petitioner who has defaulted his

federal claims in state court meets

the technical requirements for

exhaustion; there are no state

remedies any longer “available” to

him. In the absence of the

independent and adequate state

ground doctrine in federal habeas,

habeas petitioners would be able to

avoid the exhaustion requirement

by defaulting their federal claims in

state court.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732

(1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26, n.28

(1982)).

The value of a procedural default rule

for enforcing an exhaustion requirement is

obvious. For example, both state criminal

processes and prison administrative

grievance systems normally include time

bars; without the backstop of a procedural

default rule, an aggrieved prisoner could

evade § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement

by simply letting the time to present his

grievance expire, and a habeas petitioner

could likewise evade 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)’s exhaustion requirement by not

timely appealing within the state court

system. There are many other points at

which an aggrieved prisoner or a habeas

petitioner could similarly deprive the

prison grievance system or state court
11

system, respectively, of the opportunity to

fairly consider his claim.

The analogy is far from perfect,

though. For one thing, the Supreme Court

has consistently located the procedural

default component of federal habeas law in

the “independent and adequate state

ground” doctrine, see, e.g., Lee v. Kemna,

534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002); Coleman, 501

U.S. at 729, a doctrine that, in the habeas

context at least, “is grounded in concerns

of comity and federalism,” id. at 730; see

also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

453 (2000); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520

U.S. 518, 523 (1997). It is at least possible

that the comity-and-federalism rationale

(and hence the “independent and adequate

state ground” rule) applies with greater

force to defaults in state judicial

proceedings than it does to defaults in state

administrative proceedings. Another

problem with uncritically importing

principles from federal habeas doctrine

into this context is that in other federal

statutory schemes—most prominently,

employment discrimination claims under

the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (ADEA)—the Supreme Court has not

interpreted an exhaustion-like requirement

to imply a procedural default component.8

 

8

Section 14(b) of the ADEA, 29

U.S.C. § 633(b), provides that, in states

that have a “State authority” authorized

to enforce state laws against age

discrimination (known as “deferral

states”), an ADEA private plaintiff may

not bring a federal lawsuit “before the

expiration of sixty days after proceedings

have been commenced [before the State

authority].” In Oscar Mayer & Co. v.

Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979), the Supreme

Court concluded that this provision

(which is parallel to § 706(c) of Title

VII, see Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 755-

56) makes “resort to administrative

remedies in deferral States by individual

claimants . . . mandatory, not optional.” 

Id. at 758. In substance, then, section

14(b) implies a sort of exhaustion

requirement, because aggrieved parties in

deferral states must at least commence

the available state administrative

proceedings. The Oscar Mayer Court

went on, however, to also hold that

section 14(b) does not authorize the

denial of federal relief in the face of a

state procedural default. 441 U.S. at

758-65. Thus, section 14(b) does not bar

a suit by an ADEA plaintiff in a deferral

state who does not avail himself of the

available state administrative process, or

only seeks to invoke that process after a

state time limit for doing so has expired. 

In short, the Court explained, “state

procedural defaults cannot foreclose

federal relief.” Id. at 762. Thus, the

ADEA has an exhaustion requirement

but no procedural default component.

But like the federal habeas corpus

analogy, the Oscar Mayer analogy is

imperfect. Oscar Mayer emphasizes that

relief before a state agency is based on

state law, and “independent [of] federal

relief.” 441 U.S. at 761. Thus, ADEA

relief operates substantively in parallel

with state relief, even though section
12

The competing analogies of federal

habeas corpus and federal civil rights law

are developed in greater detail in the

majority and dissenting opinions in the

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s

opinion on the same exhaustion question

we consider here. See Thomas, 337 F.3d

720 (Moore, J.); id. at 737 (Rosen, J.,

dissenting in part and concurring in the

judgment). Suffice it to say that we find

neither position entirely satisfactory. But

the foregoing discussion at least suggests

that an exhaustion rule can (though need

not) be fairly read to include a procedural

default component. Therefore, the best

course, we think, is to examine Congress’s

policy objectives in enacting § 1997e(a),

and to evaluate whether those are better

served by a procedural default rule, or the

absence of one.

We believe that Congress’s policy

objectives will be served by interpreting §

1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement to

include a procedural default component.

Based on our earlier discussion of the

PLRA’s legislative history, see supra Part

III.B, Congress seems to have had three

interrelated objectives relevant to our

inquiry here: (1) to return control of the

inmate grievance process to prison

administrators; (2) to encou rage

development of an administrative record,

and perhaps settlements, within the inmate

grievance process; and (3) to reduce the

burden on the federal courts by erecting

barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.

Each of these goals is better served by

interpreting § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion

language to include a procedural default

component than by interpreting it merely

to require termination of all administrative

grievance proceedings.

All three goals are obviously served by

a procedural default rule because such a

rule prevents an end-run around the

exhaustion requirement, and thereby

creates an overwhelming incentive for a

prisoner to pursue his claims to the fullest

within the administrative grievance

system. There are subtler benefits too: A

procedural default rule enhances the

integrity of prison administration because

it ensures prisoner compliance with the

specific requirements of the grievance

system. A procedural default rule ensures

that an administrative record will be

developed in the best fashion (i.e., under a

grievance system designed to create just

such a record), and that the possibility of

settlement will be explored within a

14(b) encourages that, procedurally, they

be pursued consecutively. In contrast, §

1997e(a) is addressed only to “[§ 1983

and] any other Federal law.” While

relief is to be pursued consecutively

under § 1997e(a) (first in the prison

grievance system, and then in federal

court), the substantive rights are

exclusively federal in character. If the

PLRA charged state prison authorities

with remedying only state law, we might

find the parallel to the ADEA more

persuasive; but in the PLRA regime state

prison authorities are called upon to

remedy violations of federal law.
13

framework where prison administrators

will be receptive to settlement. Finally,

Congress wanted to erect any barrier it

could to suits by prisoners in federal court,

and a procedural default rule surely

reduces caseloads (even though it may be

a blunt instrument for doing so).

2. Measuring Procedural Default

Having concluded that, as a matter of

statutory construction, § 1997e(a) includes

a procedural default component, we must

identify the source of the rules that a

prisoner must follow to avoid procedurally

defaulting his claim. Judge Easterbrook

has aptly referred to this question as “the

choice of law issue.” Strong v. David, 297

F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002). He

elaborates:

Very few courts have addressed

what things an administrative

grievance must contain, and none

has attended to the choice-of-law

issue. Courts—and presumably

litigants too—have assumed that

the general objectives that inspired

§ 1997e(a) also determine how a

prisoner must go about exhausting

state remedies. The sixth circuit,

for example, demands that the

administrative grievance name each

person who ultimately becomes a

defendant. Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d

493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2001). In

contrast, the eleventh circuit

requires only that a prisoner include

in a grievance all the information

the prisoner reasonably can be

expected to know; failing to

identify a specific person does not

prevent a later suit against that

person. Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d

1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 2000).

Presumably the sixth circuit

likewise would require legal claims

to be identified, while the eleventh

would not. Yet both of these

decisions skip over a vital question:

what body of law governs the

specificity inquiry?

Id.

We agree that this is a critical question:

Is procedural default under § 1997e(a)

governed by express federal law, federal

common law, or by the “law” of the state

prison grievance system (as stated in this

case in the Grievance System Policy)? By

“federal common law” we refer to some

putative set of rules, or at least general

standards, for assessing whether a

grievance was timely, included a

sufficiently detailed factual account,

requested appropriate relief, etc. At all

events, we agree with Judge Easterbrook’s

conclusion that prison grievance

procedures supply the yardstick for

measuring procedural default. Accord

Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025. This result is

more in harmony with Congressional

policy than creating ad hoc federal

common law, and it is also fairer to

inmates.

To begin with, there simply is no

express federal law describing the

procedural requirements with which

prisoners must comply in satisfying §

1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement. See
14

Strong, 297 F.3d at 649. As between

crafting judge-made law on this subject

and looking to state prison grievance

procedures, the latter will far better serve

the policy interests of the PLRA. We have

repeatedly noted above that the legislative

history is clear that the PLRA was

intended to return control of prisons to

wardens; one aspect of this was a

comprehensive program of returning

control of the grievance process.

Mandatory exhaustion (with a procedural

default component) ensures that inmate

grievances will be addressed first within

the prison’s own system—in this respect,

the PLRA is thus appropriately

defederalizing. Moreover, Congress

repealed the portions of CRIPA that

established federal standards-setting and

certification for prison grievance systems.

It would be anomalous, to say the least, to

refuse to give effect to the very rules that

the PLRA encourages state prison

authorities to enact.9 Indeed, the

unintended result of making federal

common law on this subject might even be

that prisons would acquiesce in that

federal common law by incorporating it

into their grievance systems.

We also believe that, from a notice and

due process point of view, it is fairer to

hold inmates to a single, consistent set of

procedural rules in pursuing their

grievances. If we were to create our own

common law on the subject, we would in

effect be asking prisoners to both comply

with prison grievance procedures (to

ensure that the prison will hear their

grievances), while keeping an eye on a

separate set of federal requirements (to

ensure that they will preserve a remedy in

federal court if it comes to it). The better

approach is to have federal courts

recognize prisoners’ procedural defaults

within the applicable prison grievance

system.10

 

9

Simply because the rules are

procedural does not somehow lessen the

importance to the prison authority of

having federal courts honor them. Cf.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730 (explaining

that when a federal habeas court ignores

a state procedural ground for rejecting a

federal claim, “the habeas court ignores

the State’s legitimate reasons for holding

the prisoner”).

 

10To be sure, we have previously

suggested that in enacting the PLRA,

“Congress intended to save courts from

spending countless hours, educating

themselves in every case, as to the

vagaries of prison administrative

processes, state or federal.” Nyhuis, 204

F.3d at 74. This arose, however, in a

discussion of the reasons that § 1997e(a)

does not include a futility exception

(which would require federal courts to

make predictive inquiries about what

grievances might or might not be futile). 

We are comfortable that evaluating a

procedural default in the course of an

existing and fully developed grievance

will be an order of magnitude less

complex and less fact-intensive than

ascertaining whether a prisoner’s

undeveloped grievance would be futile.
15

Finally, we note that just as procedural

default in the federal habeas corpus

context must be predicated on an adequate

(and independent) state ground, see Ford

v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991),

so too must a prison grievance system’s

procedural requirements not be imposed in

a way that offends the Federal Constitution

or the federal policy embodied in §

1997e(a). We made the same observation

(albeit in somewhat different terms) in

Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 77-78, where we

explained that the policy of § 1997e(a) is

that “compliance with the administrative

remedy scheme will be satisfactory if it is

substantial.” As the next Part makes clear,

though, we have no occasion in this case to

further elaborate on this aspect of

§1997e(a).

D. Exhaustion of Spruill’s Claims

The first “exhaustion” question is

whether Spruill has exhausted his

administrative remedies in the literal

sense—whether further avenues of relief

are available to him within the prison’s

inmate grievance process. None are. DCADM-804 Part VI provides for three

stages of review within Pennsylvania’s

Grievance System: Initial Review (DCADM-804 Part VI.B), which addresses the

inmate’s filed grievance; the first appeal

from the Initial Review, known as Appeal

to Facility Manager (DC-ADM-804 Part

VI.C); and a second and final appeal, the

Appeal to Secretary’s Office of Inmate

Grievances and Appeals (DC-ADM-804

Part VI.D). Spruill’s grievances went

through all stages and were denied. He

has no further administrative process

available.

We turn, then, to the procedural default

component. Unlike federal habeas corpus

procedural default inquiries under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and Coleman, where the

federal court typically will have the benefit

of a state-court ruling on whether a

petitioner has procedurally defaulted his

federal claim under state procedural law, a

court reviewing a prisoner’s § 1983 claim

for compliance with § 1997e(a) will have,

at best, a ruling from a prison grievance

appellate body on whether the prisoner

complied with the prison grievance

system’s procedural rules.11 At worst, the

state administrative body will not have

passed at all on the prisoner’s procedural

compliance vel non, and the federal court

must undertake an independent procedural

default inquiry. This is what we must do

here, for no ruling from the prison

administrators addresses the procedural

implications of Spruill’s failure to

specifically ask for money damages or his

failure to name Brown in his grievances.

Because this exercise is essentially a

matter of statutory construction—it turns

 

11Aside from our comments above

about the need for administrative

grievance systems to comport with the

Federal Constitution and the federal

policy of § 1997e(a) to be given effect,

we express no view as to whether, or

under what standard, any such state

administrative determinations of

procedural default would be reviewable

by a federal court.
16

on the interpretation of the Grievance

System Policy—it is a question of law over

which we have plenary review. See Stokes

v. Dist. Attorney, 247 F.3d 539, 540-41 (3d

Cir. 2001). It is therefore appropriate for

this Court to undertake the inquiry in the

first instance. See Hudson United Bank v.

LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151,

159 (3d Cir. 1998) (“When a district court

has failed to reach a question below that

becomes critical when reviewed on appeal,

an appellate court may sometimes resolve

the issue on appeal rather than remand to

the district court. This procedure is

generally appropriate when the factual

record is developed and the issues provide

purely legal questions, upon which an

appellate court exercises plenary review.”

(citations omitted)).

1. Spruill’s Failure to Ask for Money

Damages

We have reproduced in full the texts of

Spruill’s three grievances. See supra notes

3, 4 & 6. None requests money

damages—or any other specific relief for

that matter. As noted above, the

defendants assert that Spruill cannot now

in federal court seek money damages. As

we concluded in the discussion above, we

must look to the rules governing the

prison’s grievance system to ascertain

whether Spruill has procedurally defaulted

his claim for monetary relief. The portion

of the Grievance System Policy that details

what “shall,” “should,” and “may” be

included in a grievance reads:

The inmate shall include a

statement of the facts relevant to

the claim. The text of the

grievance shall be legible,

presented in a courteous manner,

and the statement of facts shall

not exceed two (2) pages. The

inmate should identify any persons

who may have information that

could be helpful in resolving the

grievance. The inmate should also

include information on attempts to

resolve the matter informally. The

inmate may also specifically state

any claims he/she wishes to make

conc ernin g violation s o f

Department directives, regulations,

court orders, or other law. The

inmate may include a request for

compensation or other legal relief

normally available from a court.

DC-ADM 804, Part VI.A.1.d (emphasis in

original).

The verbs in this paragraph establish

three tiers of grievance components: items

that are mandatory (“shall”); items that are

required to the extent practicable

(“should”); and items that are optional

(“may”). A request for money damages

falls in the third category. Since an

optional procedural provision cannot give

rise to a procedural default, it appears that

Spruill is not now precluded from seeking

money damages.

There is, however, a possible

alternative reading: The sentence at issue

may be addressed not to the written

contents of a grievance, but rather to the

scope of relief available within the

grievance system. This is not an
17

unreasonable matter for a prison grievance

system policy to address; indeed, it was the

absence of a mechanism to recover

monetary relief—in a prior version of the

very grievance system here at issue—that

generated the controversy in Booth, 532

U.S. 731 (holding that the unavailability of

monetary relief through a prison grievance

system does not excuse a prisoner seeking

only money damages from the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement). See also id. at

734 & n.1 (noting that Pennsylvania’s

grievance system did not provide for

recovery of money damages at the time of

Booth’s grievance, but that it had since

been modified to permit such recovery).

Interpreting the provision above as

establishing the scope of available

relief—and implicitly requiring that the

prisoner identify the relief he

seeks—would lead to the conclusion that

Spruill did procedurally default his claim

for monetary relief.

We reject this scope-of-available-relief

reading for several reasons. First,

grammatically the regulation reads “may

include a request for” and not “may

request.” Second, the sentence appears as

part of a regulation directing the contents

of the written grievance, not one that

otherwise sets the scope of permissible

relief. Third, the form itself on which

grievances are filed does not include any

prompt for stating the relief sought.

Furthermore, the regulation does not read

like a regulation that could give rise to a

procedural default for failure to plead

properly for relief. The regulation quoted

above is far cry from, say, a regulation that

reads, “If the inmate desires compensation

or other legal relief normally available

from a court, the inmate shall request the

relief with specificity in his/her initial

grievance.”

In sum, Spruill cannot be said to have

failed to follow the regulations—and thus

procedurally defaulted—in this respect.

Nothing in the Grievance System Policy

would have put Spruill on notice that he

had to ask for money damages—or any

particular form of relief at all. Therefore

we conclude that he has satisfied §

1997e(a), and we cannot affirm the District

Court’s dismissal on thisfailure-to-exhaust

ground.

2. Spruill’s Failure to Name Brown in

His Grievances

The passage quoted above regarding

the contents of the grievance is also the

only section of the Grievance System

Policy requiring that the grievance identify

specific persons. On this matter, the text is

mandatory, or nearly so: “The inmate shall

include a statement of the facts relevant to

the claim. . . . The inmate should identify

any persons who may have information

that could be helpful in resolving the

grievance. The inmate should also include

information on attempts to resolve the

matter informally.” DC-ADM 804, Part

VI.A.1.d. To the extent that Brown’s

identity is a “fact[] relevant to the

claim”—and it is—it was mandatory for

Spruill to include it. To the extent that

Brown was a “person[] who may have

information” or someone with whom

Spruill made “attempts to resolve the
18

matter informally”—and he was—Spruill

was required to identify Brown if

practicable. Spruill did not, and has

offered no explanation for his failure to do

so. Any grievance against Brown would

now be time-barred. See DC-ADM 804,

Part VI.A.1.e (“Grievances must be

submitted by the inmate . . . within fifteen

(15) working days after the events on

which the claims are based.”). Thus

Spruill has procedurally defaulted a claim

against Brown by failing to identify him.

But the prison’s grievance process

excused this procedural default: The

grievance officer’s “Initial Review

Response” (the first-level determination

under the Grievance System Policy)

identified Brown by name. Although the

response identified Brown only as

someone who had seen Spruill in the

course of his medical visits, it is not to be

expected that a response rejecting Spruill’s

grievances on the merits would identify

any malfeasance on Brown’s part. The

purpose of the regulation here is to put the

prison officials on notice of the persons

claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing. As

such, the prison can excuse an inmate’s

failure to do so by identifying the

unidentified persons and acknowledging

that they were fairly within the compass of

the prisoner’s grievance.

The point is close, but we conclude that

the prison grievance officer’s recognition

that Brown was involved in the events that

Spruill complained of excused any

procedural defects in Spruill’s initial

grievances. Spruill’s grievances and suit

are not about specific instances of

insulting treatment by Brown—there

would be no constitutional violation there

anyway. Rather, the grievances and the

suit are about a larger-scale denial of

adequate medical care, in which prison

officials clearly knew Brown was alleged

to be implicated. Thus we reject the

District Court’s dismissal of Spruill’s suit

against Brown on these grounds.

* * *

In closing this Part, we stress that

under § 1997e(a), the warden is

responsible for the grievance system. If

the warden (or whoever the appropriate

state official may be) is dissatisfied with

the procedural default rulings in this Part,

he or she may alter the grievance system to

require more (or less) of inmates by way of

exhaustion. Such measures, we reiterate,

must be consistent with the Federal

Constitution and the federal policy

embodied in § 1997e(a) to be enforced as

grounds for procedural default in a

subsequent federal lawsuit. As we

observed in Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 77, “if in

the long run, something of a cooperative

ethos can be achieved between inmate and

jailer, the internal administrative process

could prove a less hostile and adversarial

forum than that of federal court.” We are

likewise hopeful that our holdings today

on procedural default and waiver will not

engender a prison grievance review culture

marked by technicalities, but will instead

foster the cooperative resolution of

legitimate grievances by further

encouraging prisoners to avail themselves

of the forum usually best suited to redress

those grievances.
19

III. Spruill’s Eighth Amendment Claims

Because there is no exhaustion or

procedural default bar to Spruill’s suit, we

turn to the merits of his Constitutional

claims. We have on several occasions

discussed the conditions under which

deprivation of medical treatment violates

a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right not

to be subjected to cruel and unusual

punishment. “Only ‘unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain’ or ‘deliberate

indifference to the serious medical needs’

of prisoners are sufficiently egregious to

rise to the level of a constitutional

violation.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d

103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153

(1976))). Allegations of medical

malpractice are not sufficient to establish

a Constitutional violation. See id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106); Monmouth

County Correctional Institutional Inmates

v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir.

1987) (MCCII) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at

106 & n.14; Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428

F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970)); see also Daniels

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (holding

that negligence is not compensable as a

Constitutional deprivation). “[M]ere

disagreement as to the proper medical

treatment” is also insufficient. MCCII,

834 F.2d at 346 (citing Bowring v.

Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977);

Massey v. Hutto, 545 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir.

1976) (per curiam)).

As we explained in White, the Estelle

“deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs” standard is clearly met when a

doctor is “intentionally inflicting pain on

[a] prisoner[].” 897 F.2d at 109. In

MCCII, we identified several other

scenarios that satisfy Estelle. Most

relevant to this case are (1) “[w]here

prison authorities deny reasonable requests

for medical treatment . . . and such denial

exposes the inmate ‘to undue suffering or

the threat of tangible residual injury,’”

MCCII, 834 F.2d at 346 (quoting Westlake

v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir.

1976)), and (2) “where ‘knowledge of the

need for medical care [is accompanied by

the] . . . intentional refusal to provide that

care,’” id. (quoting Ancata v. Prison

Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th

Cir. 1985)) (alterations in original).

The Estelle standard “‘requires

deliberate indifference on the part of the

prison officials and it requires the

prisoner’s medical needs to be serious.’”

Id. (quoting West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158,

161 (3d Cir. 1978)). Spruill’s complaint

satisfies the second prong. First, his back

condition itself has allegedly required

significant and continuous medication, and

has caused him excruciating pain. Second,

within the brief period described in his

complaint, Spruill claims to have fallen or

collapsed from the pain twice (first on

May 4, and again on May 9), exposing

himself to further injury. The extreme

pain and real possibility of permanent

injury could qualify Spruill’s condition as

a serious medical need. Naturally, this

will need to be fleshed out with further

evidence (e.g., expert medical testimony),

but at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the

complaint is certainly adequate in this
20

respect. The closer question is whether

Spruill has alleged facts supporting the

inference that Gooler, Dr. McGlaughlin,

and Brown were deliberately indifferent

(or intentionally malicious) with respect to

his condition. For reasons that will

become apparent, we treat Gooler first,

and then Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown

together.

A. Claims Against Gooler

Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3d

Cir. 1993), resembles the case at bar in

that the plaintiff-prisoner (Durmer) sued

both medical and non-medical prison

officials. With respect to the non-medical

prison officials, Barker and Fauver, we

explained:

[W]e believe that summary

judgment was proper with respect

to defendants Barker and Fauver.

The only allegation against either

of these two defendants was that

they failed to respond to letters

Durmer sent to them explaining his

predicament. Neither of these

defendants, however, is a

physician, and neither can be

considered deliberately indifferent

simply because they failed to

respond directly to the medical

complaints of a prisoner who was

already being treated by the prison

doctor.

Id. at 69 (footnote omitted). Although

Durmer was decided at the summary

judgment stage, its holding can be readily

imported into the motion-to-dismiss stage:

If a prisoner is under the care of medical

experts (Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown in

this case), a non-medical prison official

will generally be justified in believing that

the prisoner is in capable hands. This

follows naturally from the division of

labor within a prison. Inmate health and

safety is promoted by dividing

responsibility for various aspects of inmate

life among guards, administrators,

physicians, and so on. Holding a nonmedical prison official liable in a case

where a prisoner was under a physician’s

care would strain this division of labor.

Moreover, under such a regime, nonmedical officials could even have a

perverse incentive not to delegate

treatment responsibility to the very

physicians most likely to be able to help

prisoners, for fear of vicarious liability.

Accordingly, we conclude that, absent

a reason to believe (or actual knowledge)

that prison doctors or their assistants are

mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a

non-medical prison official like Gooler

will not be chargeable with the Eighth

Amendment scienter requirement of

deliberate indifference. Thus dismissal of

Spruill’s claims against Gooler after the

point at which Spruill was first under

medical care is appropriate because Spruill

bears the burden of proving (and hence

pleading) facts supporting the defendants’

mental states, see Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t

of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir.

2001), and he has failed to so plead with

respect to Gooler.12

 

12We do not find our admonition in

Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233-34
21

With respect to Spruill’s claims against

Gooler in the period before he was under

medical care—i.e., from his May 2 arrival

at SCI-Coal, through his fall and face

injury on May 4, to Dr. McGlaughlin’s

first visit to his cell on May 5—we also

conclude that Spruill has not stated a claim

against Gooler. First, Spruill did sign up

for sick call on May 3, and he was seen by

an (unidentified) nurse on May 4; hence he

was receiving a minimal measure of

medical attention. Second, Spruill does

not allege that his condition was so dire

and obvious that Gooler’s failure to

summon immediate medical attention on

May 4 (and to instead let the sick call

process run its course) amounted to

deliberate indifference. The facts as

Spruill himself describes them simply do

not amount to the MCCII examples of

“deny[ing] reasonable requests for medical

treatment . . . expos[ing] the inmate to

undue suffering” or “knowledge of the

need for medical care” coupled with an

“intentional refusal to provide that care.”

834 F.2d at 346 (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Therefore, Spruill has

not stated a claim against Gooler and we

will affirm the judgment of the District

Court dismissing the suit against Gooler.

B. Claims Against Dr. McGlaughlin and

Brown

Though Spruill’s allegations about Dr.

McGlaughlin’s and Brown’s course of

treatment (or nontreatment) pale next to

the allegations in such cases as White, 897

F.2d 103, Spruill’s complaint nonetheless

sufficiently attributes a mental state of

deliberate indifference (or worse) to both

Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown. Especially

when read in light of Alston, 363 F.3d at

233-34 & n.6, several excerpts from

Spruill’s complaint suffice to make the

point: Spruill asserts that due to Dr.

McGlaughlin’s and Brown’s “lack of

proper medical care, the plaintiff was

subjected to the possible risks of a

permanent disability or an fatal or serious

injury.” We have held that “the threat of

tangible residual injury” can establish

deliberate indifference. MCCII, 834 F.2d

at 346 (quoting Westlake, 537 F.2d at

860). Spruill further claims that Dr.

M cG laugh lin and B row n acte d

“maliciously and sadistically,” and that

those actions were “intended to inflict pain

on the plaintiff without any medical

justification.” If proven, intentional

conduct of this sort plainly makes out an

Eighth Amendment violation. And finally,

& n.6 (3d Cir. 2004), applicable to this

specific point. In Alston, we reaffirmed

that pro se complaints (especially from

civil rights plaintiffs) should be read

liberally, and noted that prisoners in

particular are often at an informational

disadvantage that may prevent them from

pleading the full factual predicate for

their claims. Id. Spruill’s complaint is

lacking not because it fails to allege

specific facts to support Gooler’s mental

state (which, at all events, would be

unnecessary under our notice pleading

standard, see id.), but rather because it

does not so much as suggest that Gooler

was aware of the alleged inadequacies in

Spruill’s medical treatment.
22

according to Spruill, Brown and Dr.

McGlaughlin refused to examine him on

multiple occasions and Dr. McGlaughlin

instead accused him of “playing games”;

when Dr. McGlaughlin ultimately did

examine him, he twisted Spruill’s legs “as

if he was trying to shape a pretzel,” and

Spruill “repeatedly told Defendant

McGlaughlin that the examination was

causing additional pain to his back and

leg.”

In sum, Spruill has connected his

factual allegations to the alleged mental

states of Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown.

That he believes their actions were not

only deliberately indifferent, but malicious

and sadistic, reinforces the sufficiency of

his complaint. Since at this stage we are

making no judgment about what actually

happened, but only about the sufficiency

of the pleadings, we must take Spruill’s

factual allegations, and the reasonable

inferences therefrom, as true. We will

therefore reverse the District Court’s

dismissal of Spruill’s suit against Dr.

McGlaughlin and Brown.

IV. Conclusion

The judgment of the District Court

with respect to Gooler will be affirmed on

the ground that Spruill has failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted for

a violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights by Gooler. With respect to Dr.

McGlaughlin and Brown, we hold that

Spruill has met the exhaustion requirement

of § 1997e(a), and that he has stated a

claim for violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights. We will therefore

reverse the judgment of the District Court,

and remand for further proceedings, with

respect to Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown.
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