No. 91-582 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1992 

RAVALLI COUNTY BANK, 

a Montana Banking Corporation, fr .. q >! * : ,, '*-% >>*"?'a, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, a: * ;s h .&,* !,2 14.. $6, :, :i ; 

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Ji1p.j = <i 1992; 

JAY M. GASVODA, a/k/a JAY M. 

GASVODA CONSTRUCTION, d/b/a . r (a ,, 

GASVODA CONSTRUCTION, SALLY A. L.'f .q.'>i kbA 

Ci.k:~i;: (IF s~~~~~,;- 

GASVODA, and ROLAND L. SAUTER, La,:C. ,- -0ilCij SiA'l'c: OF t~,ONrAK.R 

d/b/a BILLINGS TRUCK SALVAGE, 

Defendants and Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Ravalli, 

The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

Lewis E. Brueggemann: Brueggemann Law Office, 

Billings, Montana. 

For Respondent: 

Thomas P. Koch; Koch, McKenna, Goheen & Weber, 

Hamilton, Montana. 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: March 26, 1992 

Decided: June 4, 1992 
Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from an order of the Fourth Judicial 

~istrict Court, Missoula County, Montana, which granted respondent, 

Ravalli County Bank (the Bank), summary judgment against the 

counterclaim of appellant, Roland L. Sauter (Sauter). We reverse 

and remand. 

The case at bar stems in part from two previous cases. In 

those cases Sauter filed suit in Justice Court against Jay M. 

Gasvoda (Gasvoda) , d/b/a 3 .M. C. Ranch, for Gasvoda * s non-payment of 

repairs Sauter made to Gasvodals truck. Sauter prevailed in both 

suits and obtained two judgments on May 26, 1985, totaling nearly 

$4,300. Subsequently, Sauter filed abstracts of judgments with the 

Ravalli County Clerk of Court against Gasvoda's real property. 

On April 17, 1985, approximately one month prior to Sauterls 

judgments against Gasvoda, the Bank, which previously made numerous 

loans to Gasvoda, obtained and recorded an additional mortgage on 

Gasvodafs real property in the amount of $14,872.31. 

Over five years later, in a letter dated April 20, 1990, Mr. 

L. Neeley (Neeley), the Vice-president of the Bank, refused to 

restructure Gasvodals mortgage due to existing exceptions, liens, 

and judgments on the property. The letter informed Gasvoda that 

foreclosure proceedings would commence on June 2, 1990, unless the 

exceptions were satisfied. In May of 1990, Sauter's counsel 

received a letter from Gasvoda asking that Sauter's judgments be 

settled for $2,000 to avoid foreclosure on June 1, 1990. 

On April 17, 1991, the Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings 

2 
on Gasvoda's April 17, 1985 mortgage. Sauter was also named as a 

defendant because of the judgment liens he held against Gasvoda. 

The complaint indicated that under the mortgage, Sauter's judgment 

liens were subordinate and inferior to the rights of the Bank. 

Sauter filed his answer and counterclaim on May 31, 1991, 

based on alternative theories of fraud. Sauter alleged that either 

the Bank conspired to aid and assist Gasvoda in the mortgage of his 

real property to the fraudulent detriment of Sauter, and\or the 

Bank was grossly negligent in not discovering Sauter's pending 

litigation against Gasvoda when it took an additional mortgage 

against Gasvoda's property on April 17, 1985. 

After Sauter responded to the Bank's request for admissions, 

all of which he denied, the Bank moved for summary judgment on 

Sauter's counterclaim. The motion for summary judgment was based 

on Sauter's denials to the request for admissions, an affidavit of 

Neeley, and supporting memoranda. After a hearing on the summary 

judgment motion on October 16, 1991, the District Court found no 

genuine issues of material fact and granted the Bank's notion for 

summary judgment. Sauter now appeals the order of the District 

Court. 

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in 

granting summary judgment against Sauter's counterclaim for fraud 

when it failed to specify grounds on which to base such a 

conclusion. 

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of 

material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; also see Cereck v. 

Albertson's Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409, 411, 637 P.2d 509, 510. 

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of 

proof to show that no genuine issues of material fact exist. 

Westmont Tractor Co. v. Continental I, Inc. (1986), 224 Mont. 516, 

521, 731 P.2d 327, 330. Once the moving party meets the burden, 

the non-moving party must establish that genuine issues of material 

fact exist. Simmons v. Jenkins (1988), 230 Mont. 429, 432, 750 

When granting summary judgment the trial court tfshall specify 

the grounds therefor with sufficient particularity as to apprise 

the parties and the appellate court of the rationale underlying the 

ruling and this may be done in the body of the order or in an 

attached opinion. Rule 52 (a) , M.R. Civ.P. 

In Johnston v, American Reliable Ins. Co, (1991) , 248 Mont. 

227, 810 P.2d 1189, we encountered a situation similar to the case 

at bar with regard to the district court granting summary judgment. 

In Johnston, we remanded with instructions and stated: 

The District Court did not specify the grounds for either 

of the summary judgment rulings with sufficient 

particularity to apprise the parties and the appellate 

court of the rationale underlying the rulings. We 

therefore remand this cause to the District Court with 

instructions to specify the grounds for the rulings with 

sufficient particularity so as to apprise the parties and 

this Court of the rationale underlying its rulings. 

Johnston, 248 Mont. at 229-230, 810 P.2d at 1191. 

In the case at bar we arrive at the same conclusion. The 

District Court did not adhere to Rule 52 (a) , M. R. Civ. P. , when it 

failed to specify the grounds for the summary judgment ruling with 
sufficient particularity. Therefore, we remand this case to the 

District Court with instructions to proceed in accordance with this 

opinion. Reversed and remanded. 

~e concur: ,,/ 2 aZ,, Chief Justice