[Cite as In re Disqualification of Bruns, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-1308.]

IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF BRUNS.

IN RE D.G.

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Bruns, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-1308.]

Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Affiant had standing as a 

“party to the proceeding” under R.C. 2701.03(A) to seek judge’s 

disqualification from presiding over juvenile-court delinquency proceeding 

in which affiant’s child was the alleged delinquent child—Affiant failed to 

show that judge is interested in underlying case or “otherwise is

disqualified” under R.C. 2701.03(A)—Disqualification denied.

(No. 24-AP-006—Decided March 5, 2024.)

ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Montgomery County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 23JC3115.

____________

KENNEDY, C.J.

{¶ 1} Robin Mapp, the mother of the alleged delinquent child in the 

underlying case, has filed an affidavit of disqualification pursuant to R.C. 2701.03 

seeking to disqualify Judge Julie Bruns of the Montgomery County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, from presiding over the case. Judge Bruns filed 

a response to the affidavit of disqualification.

{¶ 2} This matter presents the threshold question whether Mapp, as the 

mother of the alleged delinquent child, has standing to seek Judge Bruns’s 

disqualification. R.C. 2701.03(A) permits “any party to the proceeding or the 

party’s counsel” to file an affidavit of disqualification against a judge of the court 

of common pleas. As explained below, because the applicable statutes and court 

rules give to or impose on parents certain rights and duties in juvenile-court 

delinquency proceedings, Mapp is considered a party to the underlying delinquency 
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case for the limited purpose of filing an affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 

2701.03. Therefore, Mapp has standing to file the affidavit of disqualification.

{¶ 3} Turning to the merits of the affidavit of disqualification, Mapp has not 

established that the judge should be disqualified. Therefore, the affidavit of 

disqualification is denied. The case shall proceed before Judge Bruns.

Trial-Court Proceedings

{¶ 4} On June 24, 2023, Mapp’s child, D.G., was charged with two counts 

of aggravated robbery, both felonies of the first degree, and was remanded to a 

detention facility. On July 5, the complaint was amended to add two firearm 

specifications, one for each count of aggravated robbery.

{¶ 5} On July 25, D.G.’s attorney withdrew from the representation.

{¶ 6} On August 10, D.G.’s new attorney requested a competency 

evaluation for D.G. After the court’s psychologist completed an evaluation, D.G.’s 

attorney requested a second competency evaluation, which Judge Bruns allowed. 

The court scheduled a competency hearing for November 15. On request of D.G.’s 

attorney, the court rescheduled the hearing for November 29.

{¶ 7} At the November 29 hearing, Judge Bruns found D.G. competent and 

scheduled a preliminary conference for December 8. The judge later rescheduled 

the preliminary conference for December 12 because Mapp was unavailable on 

December 8.

{¶ 8} During the December 12 conference, D.G.’s family requested 

removal of his attorney. Based on the attorney’s representation that he had a 

breakdown in communication with Mapp, the judge granted that request.

{¶ 9} On December 13, the court appointed a new attorney for D.G. and 

scheduled a conference for January 8, 2024.

{¶ 10} On January 8, the state of Ohio requested that the court appoint a 

guardian ad litem for D.G. because of an alleged breakdown in communication 
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between D.G. and Mapp. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for D.G. and 

scheduled another conference for January 24.

{¶ 11} On January 12, Mapp filed this affidavit of disqualification.

{¶ 12} Because the question of standing asks whether an individual is 

entitled to have a court hear a controversy, a threshold issue here is whether Mapp 

is qualified to file an affidavit of disqualification against Judge Bruns under R.C. 

2701.03(A).

Standing to File an Affidavit of Disqualification

{¶ 13} Standing to file an affidavit of disqualification is conferred by 

statute. In re Disqualification of Gallagher, 173 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2023-Ohio-2977, 

228 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 26. R.C. 2701.03(A) provides that “[i]f a judge of the court of 

common pleas allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the court, 

allegedly is related to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding 

pending before the court or a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified 

to preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or 

the party’s counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk” of this 

court. (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 14} Under this plain and unambiguous language, only a “party to the 

proceeding or the party’s counsel” may file an affidavit of disqualification. Id. 

Chief justices “have ‘strictly enforced’ this statutory language and have 

consistently found that ‘individuals who do not qualify as a “party” or “party’s 

counsel” do not have standing to file an affidavit of disqualification.’ ” Gallagher 

at ¶ 26, quoting In re Disqualification of Grendell, 137 Ohio St.3d 1220, 2013-

Ohio-5243, 999 N.E.2d 681, ¶ 2; see also In re Disqualification of Leach, __ Ohio 

St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4776, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 4. For purposes of R.C. 2701.03(A), a 

“party’s counsel” includes counsel of record in the underlying case from which the 

judge’s disqualification is sought or an attorney retained by a party in the 
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underlying case to file an affidavit of disqualification in this court. Gallagher at 

¶ 29-34.

{¶ 15} “In general, a ‘party’ is defined as ‘[o]ne by or against whom a 

lawsuit is brought; anyone who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a 

right to control the proceedings, make a defense, or appeal from an adverse 

judgment.’ ” In re Disqualification of Berhalter, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio4881, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 21, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1350-1351 (11th 

Ed.2019). Because the underlying delinquency complaint was not brought by or 

against Mapp, it would be unusual to consider her a party—at least in the traditional 

sense—to her child’s juvenile-delinquency proceeding. However, Mapp has an

interest in her minor son’s custody and care; as explained below, applicable statutes 

and court rules confer rights and duties on parents in delinquency proceedings.

{¶ 16} For example, when a child is admitted to a place of detention, an 

informal detention hearing shall be held within 72 hours of admission to determine 

whether detention is required. R.C. 2151.314(A). Notice of the time, place, and 

purpose of the detention hearing must be given to the child’s parents. Id. If a parent 

is not notified and did not appear or waive appearance at the hearing, upon the filing 

of an affidavit stating these facts, the court shall rehear the matter without 

unnecessary delay. Id.

{¶ 17} After a complaint is filed, the court shall promptly issue a summons 

to the child and to “the parents * * * and any other persons that appear to the court 

to be proper or necessary parties to the proceedings, requiring them to appear before 

the court at the time fixed to answer the allegations of the complaint.” R.C. 

2151.28(C)(1). If the complaint alleges a child to be delinquent, “the court shall 

require the parent * * * to attend all proceedings of the court regarding the child.” 

R.C. 2151.35(A)(1). And if the parent fails to so attend, “the court may find the 

parent * * * in contempt.” Id.
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{¶ 18} A child and “the child’s parents” are “entitled to representation by 

legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings under [Chapter 2151] or Chapter 2152 

of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2151.352, held unconstitutional as applied in In re 

Adoption of Y.E.F., 163 Ohio St.3d 251, 2020-Ohio-6785, 171 N.E.3d 302. And 

the child’s parents “shall be entitled to visit such child at any reasonable time, be 

present at any hearing involving the child, and be given reasonable notice of such 

hearing.” Id. Before a juvenile court conducts a hearing to transfer a child charged 

with delinquency to the adult division, the court “shall give notice in writing of the 

time, place, and purpose of any hearing * * * to the child’s parents * * * at least 

three days prior to the hearing.” R.C. 2152.12(G). Additionally, “when a child has 

been committed” by the authority of the juvenile court, the court “shall issue an 

order * * * requiring that the parent, guardian, or person charged with the child’s 

support pay for the care, support, maintenance, and education of the child.” R.C. 

2151.36.

{¶ 19} The Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure reflect the will of the General 

Assembly and expressly include in the definition of “party” a “child who is the 

subject of a juvenile court proceeding” and “the child’s parent or parents.” Juv.R. 

2(BB). The rules further require that a juvenile-court complaint contain the name 

and address of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian or state that the name or 

address is unknown, Juv.R. 10(B)(2), and that the court cause the issuance of a 

summons directed to the parents, Juv.R. 15(A).

{¶ 20} Because parents must be served in juvenile-delinquency 

proceedings, lower courts have concluded that parents are necessary parties in 

delinquency cases. See, e.g., In re Jordan, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2001-T-0067, 

2002-Ohio-2820, ¶ 7 (“Parents are considered to be necessary parties to any 

proceeding concerning their child and must be served”), citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 

1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); In re Brunner, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 

02CA2865, 2003-Ohio-2590, ¶ 13 (same); In re Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
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76429, 2000 WL 739457, *3 (June 8, 2000) (same); In re Koogle, 2d Dist. Greene 

Nos. CA-82-68 and CA-82-93, 1983 WL 2461, *2 (June 16, 1983) (same).

{¶ 21} Because of a parent’s special status in juvenile-court delinquency 

proceedings, Mapp is considered a “party to the proceeding” for the limited purpose 

of filing an affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 2701.03.

{¶ 22} Based on the foregoing, Mapp has standing to file the affidavit of 

disqualification in her child’s delinquency proceeding. Therefore, I turn to the 

allegations in the affidavit of disqualification.

Affidavit-of-Disqualification Proceedings

{¶ 23} R.C. 2701.03(A) provides that if a judge of a court of common pleas 

“allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the court, allegedly is related 

to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending before 

the court or a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to preside in a 

proceeding pending before the court,” then that party or the party’s counsel may 

file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of this court.

{¶ 24} Under that statute, Mapp makes two allegations against Judge Bruns. 

Mapp alleges that Judge Bruns has a “vested interest” in the underlying case and 

that Judge Bruns should be disqualified for other reasons. The judge denies that 

there are any grounds for her disqualification.

Interest

{¶ 25} In support of the allegation that the judge has an interest in the 

underlying case, Mapp points to statements made by the judge. Mapp asserts that 

on December 12, 2023, the judge said that the court would not be releasing D.G. 

from detention “regardless of the evaluations or if he took a plea deal.” Mapp also 

claims that on January 8, 2024, the judge threatened her because Mapp would not 

approve the plea agreement offered to D.G. by the state, and Mapp claims that the 

judge said that Mapp needs a translator to understand the terms of the proposed plea 

agreement.
January Term, 2024

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{¶ 26} In response, Judge Bruns denies having any interest in the juvenilecourt proceeding. The judge also denies prejudging any issue in the case, 

threatening Mapp in any way, and interfering with D.G.’s decision whether to 

accept a plea deal from the state.

Otherwise Disqualified under R.C. 2701.03(A)

{¶ 27} In support of the allegation that the judge is disqualified for other 

reasons, Mapp asserts that the judge has deprived D.G. of a quick and speedy trial 

and has violated his right to counsel by appointing ineffective attorneys. Mapp also 

seeks the judge’s disqualification because Mapp named the judge in a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus that she filed on D.G.’s behalf in the Second District Court 

of Appeals. Additionally, Mapp avers that an appearance of impropriety exists 

“because the alleged plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State of Ohio.”

{¶ 28} In response, the judge states that although the right to a speedy trial 

is not applicable in the underlying juvenile-court proceeding, the court has been 

vigilant about attempting to move the case forward. A trial date has not yet been 

scheduled because of the issues raised in the underlying proceeding.

{¶ 29} D.G.’s former attorney sought two competency evaluations. The 

matter was scheduled for a competency hearing when D.G.’s attorney requested a 

continuance of the proceeding. Shortly thereafter, D.G.’s family requested the 

removal of D.G.’s attorney, which the judge granted, ordering the appointment of 

new counsel. In January 2024, the state requested the appointment of a guardian 

ad litem for D.G. because of a breakdown in communication between the child and 

Mapp. The judge granted the request and appointed a guardian ad litem for D.G. 

The judge also states that D.G. has been detained since his arrest based in part on 

the serious nature of the charges.

{¶ 30} With respect to D.G.’s right to counsel, the judge states that she has 

appointed him two highly competent and experienced attorneys and a highly 

competent guardian ad litem.
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{¶ 31} Lastly, the judge denies that any appearance of impropriety exists.

Disqualification of a Common-Pleas-Court Judge

{¶ 32} As set forth above, R.C. 2701.03(A) provides two specific grounds 

and a catchall provision for the disqualification of a judge of the court of common 

pleas. Granting or denying an affidavit of disqualification turns on whether the 

chief justice determines that the allegations of interest, bias, prejudice, or 

disqualification set forth in the affidavit exist. R.C. 2701.03(E).

{¶ 33} The burden falls on the affiant to submit “specific allegations on 

which the claim of interest, bias, prejudice, or disqualification is based and the facts 

to support each of those allegations.” R.C. 2701.03(B)(1). Therefore, “[a]n 

affidavit must describe with specificity and particularity those facts alleged to 

support the claim.” In re Disqualification of Mitrovich, 101 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-

Ohio-7358, 803 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 4.

{¶ 34} Mapp alleges two bases for the disqualification of Judge Bruns—the 

judge has an interest in the case and the judge should be disqualified for other 

reasons.

{¶ 35} The term “interest” is not defined in R.C. 2701.03. The Code of 

Judicial Conduct requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding 

in which the judge “[h]as more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially 

affected by the proceeding,” Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(2)(c), or “the judge knows that 

he or she * * * has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a 

party to the proceeding,” Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(3).

{¶ 36} A judge “otherwise is disqualified” under R.C. 2701.03(A) when 

one of the express bases for disqualification—interest, relation to a party, bias, or 

prejudice—does not apply but other grounds for disqualification exist. See In re 

Disqualification of Schooley, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4332, __ N.E.3d __, 

¶ 19. For example, the statute speaks in terms of actual bias and prejudice; 

“[n]evertheless, even in cases in which no evidence of actual bias or prejudice is 
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apparent, a judge’s disqualification may be appropriate to avoid an appearance of 

impropriety or when the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial system 

is at issue,” In re Disqualification of Crawford, 152 Ohio St.3d 1256, 2017-Ohio9428, 98 N.E.3d 277, ¶ 6. In addition, an ex parte communication between a judge 

and a party can be grounds for the judge’s disqualification when the communication 

either was initiated by the judge or addressed substantive matters in the pending 

case. In re Disqualification of Calabrese, 100 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2002-Ohio-7475, 

798 N.E.2d 10, ¶ 2. Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 sets forth additional circumstances under 

which a judge should be disqualified, including the economic interests of the 

judge’s family members and the judge’s likely being a material witness concerning 

the matter in controversy.

{¶ 37} These examples are not exhaustive, but they illustrate that a judge 

may be “otherwise * * * disqualified” when the specific grounds for 

disqualification set forth in R.C. 2701.03(A) are not applicable.

Analysis

{¶ 38} As explained below, Mapp has not established that Judge Bruns’s 

disqualification is warranted.

Interest

{¶ 39} Mapp’s allegation of interest is based on one thing the judge would 

not do—release D.G. from detention—and one thing the judge allegedly did do—

threaten Mapp for not approving the plea deal. But Mapp does not explain how 

either of these actions shows that the judge has a personal interest in the case.

{¶ 40} Therefore, this allegation lacks merit.

Otherwise Disqualified under R.C. 2701.03(A)

{¶ 41} Mapp has also not proven that the judge is otherwise disqualified.

{¶ 42} Mapp states that the judge should be disqualified because the judge 

has deprived D.G. of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and to effective 

assistance of counsel. Moreover, Mapp claims that the judge should be disqualified 
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because the judge is named in a habeas corpus case and “because the alleged 

plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State of Ohio.”

{¶ 43} The chief justice’s authority in an affidavit-of-disqualification 

proceeding is limited. The chief justice lacks authority “to resolve legal issues that 

are subject to appellate review.” Schooley, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4332, __ 

N.E.3d __, at ¶ 23. The questions whether a juvenile is entitled to a speedy trial, 

whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, and whether appointed counsel 

provided effective representation are matters for appellate review and therefore 

“not proper subjects in an affidavit of disqualification,” id. at ¶ 24.

{¶ 44} Moreover, “[i]t is well established that a judge will not be 

disqualified solely because a litigant in a case pending before the judge has filed a 

lawsuit against that judge.” In re Disqualification of Pokorny, 135 Ohio St.3d 1268, 

2013-Ohio-915, 986 N.E.2d 993, ¶ 4. However, “it does necessarily follow that a 

judge should never be disqualified on the grounds that he or she is involved in an 

unrelated lawsuit with a litigant. Each case must be determined on its own merits 

and based on the nature of the perceived conflict.” In re Disqualification of 

Favreau, 145 Ohio St.3d 1212, 2015-Ohio-5666, 47 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 5.

{¶ 45} In her petition for a writ of habeas corpus for D.G., Mapp cites the 

judge’s actions in the underlying case. “The fact that a party has brought suit 

against a judge is especially unlikely to be deemed to provide a cognizable ground 

for seeking that judge’s disqualification * * * where the judge has been sued * * * 

as a result of her rulings in the case.” Flamm, Recusal and Disqualification of 

Judges, Section 60.3, at 932-934 (2018); see also In re Disqualification of Saffold, 

155 Ohio St.3d 1272, 2018-Ohio-5258, 121 N.E.3d 387, ¶ 5. Therefore, Mapp’s 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus for D.G. does not require Judge Bruns’s 

disqualification from the underlying juvenile-court case.

{¶ 46} Lastly, “[t]he proper test for determining whether a judge’s 

participation in a case presents an appearance of impropriety is * * * an objective 
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one. A judge should step aside or be removed if a reasonable and objective observer 

would harbor serious doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” In re Disqualification 

of Lewis, 117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-7359, 884 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 8. Mapp’s 

only evidence to support the allegation that an appearance of impropriety exists is 

her statement that “the alleged plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State 

of Ohio.” Judge Bruns maintains that she is fair and impartial.

{¶ 47} All judges are accorded a “presumption of impartiality.” In re 

Disqualification of Celebrezze, 101 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2003-Ohio-7352, 803 N.E.2d 

823, ¶ 7. A judge’s subjective belief about his or her own impartiality is generally 

not a decisive factor in whether to grant an affidavit-of-disqualification request, but 

a judge’s personal assessment is entitled to some weight. Lewis at ¶ 11, citing

Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, 158, Section 5.6.2 (1996). The question whether 

a judge’s impartiality can “reasonably be questioned” is resolved by considering 

the facts as they existed at the time of the judge’s statements or actions.

{¶ 48} The affiant has the burden “to not only identify specific allegations 

of bias but to ensure the ‘allegations could be verified by the record.’ ” In re 

Disqualification of Schroeder, 172 Ohio St.3d 1238, 2023-Ohio-3171, 225 N.E.3d 

1064, ¶ 49, quoting In re Disqualification of Sheward, 136 Ohio St.3d 1262, 2013-

Ohio-4244, 995 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 6. “When necessary, an affiant should submit 

evidence beyond the affidavit to support the allegations contained therein.” In re 

Disqualification of Trimmer, 164 Ohio St.3d 1212, 2021-Ohio-2320, 172 N.E.3d 

192, ¶ 5. “[I]t is not the chief justice’s duty in deciding an affidavit of 

disqualification to further investigate an affiant’s claims or obtain evidence on the 

affiant’s behalf.” In re Disqualification of Knece, 138 Ohio St.3d 1274, 2014-Ohio1414, 7 N.E.3d 1213, ¶ 11.

{¶ 49} Here, Mapp has failed to prove the allegation that the judge is 

otherwise disqualified to preside over the underlying case. Her statement alone is 

insufficient to overcome the presumption of impartiality afforded to Judge Bruns.
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{¶ 50} Therefore, this allegation lacks merit.

Conclusion

{¶ 51} The affidavit of disqualification is denied. The case shall proceed 

before Judge Bruns.

_________________