U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–993 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

SURVEILLANCE, SUPPRESSION, AND MASS 

DETENTION: XINJIANG’S HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 26, 2018 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Senate House 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey, Cochairman 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

TIM WALZ, Minnesota 

TED LIEU, California 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Not yet appointed 

ELYSE B. ANDERSON, Staff Director 

PAUL B. PROTIC, Deputy Staff Director 

(ii) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS

Page 

Opening Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, a U.S. Senator from Florida; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China ...................................... 1 

Christino III, Anthony, Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office of 

Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, 

U.S. Department of Commerce ........................................................................... 4 

Currie, Ambassador Kelley E., Representative of the United States on the 

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States Mission 

to the United Nations .......................................................................................... 6 

Smith, Hon. Christopher, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China ...................................... 11 

Hoja, Gulchehra, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia ............................ 25 

Thum, Rian, Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans ..................... 26 

Batke, Jessica, Senior Editor, ChinaFile and former research analyst at the 

Department of State ............................................................................................ 27 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Christino III, Anthony ............................................................................................. 43 

Currie, Kelley E. ...................................................................................................... 44 

Hoja, Gulchehra ....................................................................................................... 48 

Thum, Rian .............................................................................................................. 50 

Batke, Jessica ........................................................................................................... 56 

Rubio, Hon. Marco ................................................................................................... 64 

Smith, Hon. Christopher ......................................................................................... 65 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Article entitled ‘‘New Evidence for China’s Political Re-education Campaign 

in Xinjiang,’’ submitted by Senator Rubio ......................................................... 68 

Article entitled ‘‘Apartheid with Chinese Characteristics,’’ submitted by Senator King ............................................................................................................... 74 

Article entitled ‘‘What Really Happens in China’s Re-education Camps,’’ submitted by Rian Thum ........................................................................................... 80 

Letter to Secretary Pompeo, submitted by Senator Rubio ................................... 82 

Witness Biographies ................................................................................................ 84 

(iii) 

(1) 

SURVEILLANCE, SUPPRESSION, AND MASS 

DETENTION: XINJIANG’S HUMAN RIGHTS 

CRISIS 

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2018 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, 

Washington, DC. 

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in 

room 124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Marco Rubio, 

Chairman, presiding. 

Present: Representative Smith, Cochairman, Senator King, Representative Lieu, Senator Cotton, and Senator Daines. 

Also Present: Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, Representative of 

the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the 

United Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations; Anthony Christino III, Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office 

of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and 

Security, United States Department of Commerce; Gulchehra Hoja, 

Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia; Rian Thum, Associate 

Professor, Loyola University New Orleans; and Jessica Batke, Senior Editor, ChinaFile and former research analyst at the Department of State. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Chairman RUBIO. Good morning. This hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China will come to order. The title 

of this hearing is ‘‘Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: 

Xinjiang’s Human Rights Crisis.’’ 

We have two panels testifying today. The first panel will feature 

Ambassador Kelley Currie, the Representative of the United States 

on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United 

States Mission to the United Nations; and Anthony Christino III 

who is the Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security at the U.S. Department of Commerce. 

We’ll have a second panel—Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service 

journalist, Radio Free Asia; Rian Thum, an associate professor at 

Loyola University New Orleans; and Jessica Batke, Senior Editor 

at ChinaFile and a former research analyst at the U.S. Department 

of State. 

I want to thank you for being here. I know one of our initial 

panel witnesses is delayed, as happens in this great city that we 

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call our nation’s capital. But we are going to begin, and we will accommodate that accordingly. 

I want to begin by noting that this hearing is set against the 

backdrop this week of Secretary Pompeo and Ambassador for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback convening the firstever State Department Ministerial to Advance International Religious Freedom, an event which has brought together senior representatives from more than 70 governments around the world to 

discuss areas of collaboration and partnership in the cause of religious freedom globally. 

Secretary Pompeo penned an opinion piece in USA Today earlier 

this week highlighting the Ministerial and the importance of advancing religious freedom globally. Of note, he specifically mentioned Ms. Gulchehra and family. 

While the Chinese government and the Communist Party are 

equal opportunity oppressors targeting unregistered and registered 

Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Falun Gong practitioners, and others with harassment, detention, imprisonment and more, the current human rights crisis unfolding in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region targeting Muslim minority groups is arguably among 

the worst, if not the most severe, instances in the world today of 

an authoritarian government brutally and systematically targeting 

a minority faith community. This is an issue that the Commission 

has been dealing with for some time. 

In April, we wrote U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad 

urging him to prioritize this crackdown in his interactions with the 

Chinese government and to begin collecting information to make 

the case for possible application of Global Magnitsky sanctions 

against senior government and Party officials in the region, including Chen Quanguo, the current Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary. 

The Commission’s forthcoming Annual Report, set to be released 

this October, will prominently feature the grave and deteriorating 

situation we will cover here today. 

While our expert witnesses will discuss the situation in greater 

detail, I want to take a few minutes to paint a picture of life in 

Xinjiang. 

For months now, there have been credible estimates of between 

800,000 and 1 million people from this region being held at political 

reeducation centers or camps which are fortified with barbed wire, 

bombproof surfaces, reinforced doors, and guard rooms. Security 

personnel at these facilities, at these camps, have subjected detainees to torture, to medical neglect and maltreatment, to solitary confinement, to sleep deprivation, to lack of adequate clothing in cold 

temperatures, and other forms of abuse resulting in the death of 

some of these detainees. 

According to one news source, ‘‘The internment program aims to 

rewire the political thinking of detainees, erase their Islamic beliefs 

and reshape their very identities. The camps have expanded rapidly over the past year, with almost no judicial process or legal paperwork. Detainees who most vigorously criticize the people and 

things they love are rewarded, and those who refuse to do so are 

punished with solitary confinement, with beatings and food deprivation.’’ That was a quote from the media coverage of this. 

3 

Some local officials in the region have used chilling political rhetoric to describe the very purpose of the arbitrary detentions of 

Uyghur Muslims and members of other Muslim ethnic minority 

groups. These are the terms they’ve used: ‘‘eradicating tumors’’ or 

spraying chemicals on crops to ‘‘kill the weeds.’’ One expert who is 

testifying today described Uyghur Xinjiang as ‘‘a police state to 

rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South 

African apartheid.’’ 

While the Chinese government has repeatedly denied knowledge 

of the camps, a groundbreaking report by Adrian Zenz, a scholar 

at the European School of Culture and Theology, published through 

the Jamestown Foundation in May, found that Chinese authorities 

were soliciting public bids for the construction of additional camps 

and the addition of security elements to existing facilities. 

I would submit this report for the record and would also note the 

Google Earth footage behind me, which clearly shows the construction of these camps over the span of several months. 

[The submitted document appears in the Appendix.] 

Those not subject to ‘‘transformation through education’’—as they 

call it—in these detention facilities still face daily intrusions in 

their home life. This includes compulsory ‘‘home stays,’’ wherein 

Communist Party officials and government workers are sent to live 

with local Uyghur and Kazakh families. 

The data-driven surveillance in Xinjiang is assisted by iris and 

body scanners, voice pattern analyzers, DNA sequencers, and facial 

recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, or in train stations. Two large Chinese firms, Hikvision and Dahua Technology, 

have profited greatly from the surge in security spending, reportedly winning upwards of $1.2 billion in Chinese government contracts for large-scale surveillance projects. 

Authorities employ hand-held devices to search smartphones for 

encrypted chat apps and require residents to install monitoring applications on their cell phones. More traditional security measures 

are also employed. That includes extensive police checkpoints. 

The rise in security personnel is also accompanied by the proliferation of ‘‘convenience police stations,’’ a dense network of street 

corner, village, or neighborhood police stations that enhances authorities’ ability to closely surveil and police local communities. 

Just this month, reports emerged of officials, in a humiliating 

public act, cutting the skirts and even long shirts of Uyghur women 

on the spot, as they walked through local streets. They did so as 

a means of enforcing a ban on ethnic minorities wearing long 

skirts. 

And yesterday there was an analysis released by the NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders indicating that 21 percent of arrests 

in China last year were in Xinjiang, which has only 1.5 percent of 

the population—21 percent of the arrests last year in all of China 

concentrated in an area with 1.5 percent of the population. The 

number of arrests increased 731 percent over the previous year and 

that does not include the detentions of those in the ‘‘political reeducation centers,’’ which are carried out extralegally. 

Radio Free Asia has led the way in reporting on this crisis. And 

that has not come without a cost. Developments in Xinjiang have 

had a direct impact on U.S. interests, most notably the detention 

4 

of dozens of family members of U.S.-based Uyghur journalists employed by Radio Free Asia, as well as the detention of dozens of 

family members of prominent Uyghur rights activist Rebiya 

Kadeer, in an apparent attempt by the Chinese government to silence effective reporting and rights advocacy. We are delighted that 

RFA journalist Gulchehra Hoja can join us today to speak to her 

personal experience in this regard. 

The Commission has convened a series of hearings focused on the 

‘‘long arm’’ of China, and that dimension certainly exists as it relates to the Uyghur diaspora community, including right here in 

the United States. 

With that, I want to welcome our witnesses. Why don’t I start 

with you, Mr. Christino, since Ambassador Currie—— 

STAFFER. She’s here. 

Senator RUBIO. I know. But I want to give her a second to catch 

up. I saw her walk in. 

Why don’t we start with you. I was late a few minutes as well. 

I know it takes time to put it all together. 

So, welcome. Thank you for being here today. 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY CHRISTINO III, DIRECTOR OF THE 

FOREIGN POLICY DIVISION, OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND TREATY COMPLIANCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY 

AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Mr. CHRISTINO. Thank you, Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, 

and other Members of the Commission on China for convening this 

hearing today on this important topic. Today I will discuss the role 

of the Bureau of Industry and Security regarding export license requirements for China. 

Under the Export Administration Regulations, known as the 

EAR, a Bureau of Industry and Security license is required for the 

export or reexport of most items on the Commerce Control List to 

China. Items on the CCL are identified by their individually assigned Export Control Classification Numbers according to the reasons for control, such as crime control and detection, known as 

Crime Control. 

The Commerce Control List is also comprised of items controlled 

by the multilateral export control regimes such as the Wassenaar 

Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as well as items 

controlled unilaterally for foreign policy reasons. And here I would 

draw the distinction with the crime controls—they are in fact unilateral, unlike controls over nuclear items and other items that 

would be of concern for security reasons to our international partners, and therefore controlled on one of the regimes. 

In support of U.S. foreign policy specifically to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, the United States 

controls items on the Commerce Control List as required by Section 

6(n) of the Export Administration Act, as amended. As set forth in 

the Export Administration Regulations, the U.S. Government requires a license to export most crime control and detection instruments, equipment, related technology, and software to all destinations other than our closest allies such as NATO members Australia, Japan, etc. Additionally, a license is required to export cerVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:20 Mar 31, 2019 Jkt 081003 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\DSHERMAN1\DESKTOP\30933.TXT DAVID
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tain crime-control items, including restraint-type devices such as 

handcuffs and discharge-type arms such as stun guns, to all destinations with the single exception of Canada. 

The Export Administration Regulations impose limited controls 

on some items not on the Commerce Control List. Items subject to 

Commerce licensing jurisdiction under our regulations, but not specifically identified on the Control List, are designated as EAR99. 

Such items generally do not require a license for export or reexport 

to China unless destined to weapons of mass destruction-related 

end uses or end users, or unless the items are part of a transaction 

involving a restricted party identified on one of several lists maintained by agencies of the U.S. Government, including the Bureau 

of Industry and Security’s entity list, the Department of State’s restricted list, and the Department of the Treasury’s specially designated nationals list. 

Items controlled for crime-control reasons are added to or removed from the CCL based on continuous review of the merits of 

maintaining the controls and the effectiveness of the controls. Section 6 of the EAR prohibits the imposition of foreign policy controls 

including crime-control items unless certain determinations are 

made and certain factors reported to Congress, such as the determination that the controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy objective, a description of consultative efforts with industry and other supplier countries, and determinations related to 

the economic impact on U.S. business and industry. 

There is a specific crime control licensing review policy related 

to China. The U.S. Government considers applications to export or 

reexport most crime-control items favorably on a case-by-case basis 

unless there is civil disorder in a country or the sale involves a region of concern or there is evidence that the government may have 

violated human rights. 

The purpose of the controls is to deter the development of a consistent pattern of human rights abuses, distance the United States 

from such abuses, and avoid contributing to disorder in a country 

or region. Now we maintain a general policy of denial for certain 

items: Applications to export crime-control items to countries that 

are not otherwise subject to sanctions or comprehensive embargoes 

but are identified by the Department of State as human rights violators, receive additional scrutiny and are generally denied. There 

are specific controls related to legislation popularly referred to as 

Tiananmen Square sanctions. 

I’d like to conclude by just noting that we do not receive very 

many applications for exports to China. We did receive 25 last calendar year—21 were for the return of defective items manufactured 

in China. They were returned to the original Chinese manufacturers. There were nine denials, including applications for stun guns, 

optical sighting devices, pepper spray, etc., and voiceprint software, 

which I know was of interest. 

I am happy to answer any questions you have on my testimony 

or anything relevant to the Export Administration Regulations and 

the controls we maintain specific to China and crime-control items. 

Thank you. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. 

6 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christino appears in the Appendix.] 

Chairman RUBIO. Ambassador Currie. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KELLEY E. CURRIE, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ECONOMIC 

AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNITED 

STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

Ambassador CURRIE. Thank you so much, Senator Rubio. I apologize. I think you know we have the IRF (International Religious 

Freedom) Ministerial going on this week and between that and trying to get down here from New York this morning, it was a little 

bit difficult. But I do want to express our appreciation for you and 

the Commission holding this very important hearing today. 

I am pleased to be able to appear before the Commission on behalf of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and discuss our concerns regarding the growing human rights crisis in Xinjiang, with 

a particular focus on how this crisis is being addressed—or not— 

at the United Nations. I would like to submit my full remarks for 

the record and just give a brief summary of them. 

The United States is deeply troubled by the Chinese government’s worsening crackdown on Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since April 

2017, the Xi Jinping leadership, under the guise of fighting ‘‘terrorism,’’ ‘‘secession,’’ and ‘‘religious extremism,’’ has greatly intensified the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing repressive policies against mainstream nonviolent Muslim cultural and religious 

practices in Xinjiang. 

The stated goal of the current campaign is to ‘‘sinicize religion’’ 

and ‘‘adapt religion to a socialist society,’’ suggesting that Beijing 

believes it now possesses the political, diplomatic, and technological 

capabilities to transform religion and ethnicity in Chinese society 

in a way that its predecessors never could, even during the peak 

horrors of the Cultural Revolution and other heinous Maoist campaigns intended to remake Chinese society. 

The scope of this campaign is truly breathtaking. Authorities 

now prohibit ‘‘abnormal’’ beards, the wearing of veils in public, and 

classify refusal to watch state television as a crime, refusal to wear 

shorts, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, refusal to eat pork, 

fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, and practicing traditional funeral rituals as potential signs that individuals harbor extreme religious views. 

Chinese authorities have banned parents from giving their children a number of traditional Islamic names, including Muhammad, 

Islam, Fatima, and Aisha, and have reportedly required children 

under age 16 who have Islamic names to change them. Of particular concern, since 2015 Chinese authorities have increasingly 

criminalized or punished the teaching of Islam to young people, 

even by their parents, adopting at least six new laws or regulations 

to put parents and religious leaders at legal risk if they promote 

nonviolent Muslim scripture, rituals, and clothing to children. 

Chinese authorities also continue to crack down in particular on 

the use of Uyghur and other minority languages at universities and 

in classroom instruction. 

7 

As you noted, we now believe, based on a wide array of evidence, 

that the number of individuals detained in re-education centers for 

violating these strictures since April 2017 numbers in at least the 

hundreds of thousands, possibly millions. There are even disturbing reports that young children have been sent to state-run orphanages if only one of their parents is detained in internment 

camps. We call on China to end these counterproductive policies 

and free all those arbitrarily detained. 

As you noted, with many things related to China’s human rights 

abuses, the repression does not stop at the Chinese border. The detention and persecution of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in 

Xinjiang has compelled them to stop communicating with their 

family and friends abroad. We also are concerned by reports of Chinese authorities harassing Uyghurs abroad to compel them to act 

as informants, return to Xinjiang, or remain silent about the situation. 

Chinese authorities appear to be targeting law-abiding 

Uyghurs—including nonviolent activists and advocates for human 

rights at home and abroad—as terrorist threats based solely on the 

basis of their political, cultural, and religious beliefs and practices. 

Given the disturbing and severe nature of this crisis, it’s worth 

asking why the pre-eminent human rights bodies of the United Nations haven’t taken up this issue, exposed it, and demanded 

changes in China’s policies. Part of the answer certainly lies in 

China’s membership on the Human Rights Council and as a permanent member of the Security Council, as well as in its ability to 

portray itself as a member of the ‘‘Global South’’ in the Group of 

77. 

During the question and answer period I would be happy to give 

more examples of how this is working at the UN and share with 

you some of the particular experiences we’ve had, including with 

the attempts by the Chinese to silence Uyghur activists who wish 

to speak in UN forums, such as Dolkan Isa, during the recent 

forum on indigenous peoples, and even shut down human rights organizations and civil society organizations that sponsor individuals 

such as Mr. Isa and their attempt to speak. 

I know I have run out of time, and I will leave that to the Q & 

A. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to talk about these important issues. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you for making the trip down here. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Currie appears in the 

Appendix.] 

Chairman RUBIO. I want to start with just an editorial statement 

and then go into a couple of questions. And I don’t even know how 

to do this while still containing my anger. 

We are a free society—let me just start there—in the United 

States. As just an example, what you have just described here, 

what we are going to hear today is stuff from—like a horrible 

movie. These are crazy things—things that we’ve read about that 

used to happen thousands of years ago or things that happened 

under these regimes in a science fiction novel. 

I mean, talking about forcing people to eat certain foods that violate the dietary laws of their religion, controlling what people name 

8 

their children, trying to strip their identity from them, both religious and ethnic. The list goes on. These are some of the most horrifying things that are happening in the world today. That it 

doesn’t lead newscasts in the country and around the world in and 

of itself is problematic. 

And then in this free country that we have—this is what I was 

alluding to at the beginning—we have multinational corporations 

who have every right—and I do not criticize them for this. They 

have every right to be involved civically in our country. When 

things happen in America and they don’t like it, they stop selling 

products, they boycott cities and towns. They’ve done all sorts of 

things and it’s their right to do so. 

These are the same companies that are up here every day in 

Washington, D.C. lobbying for us not to raise these issues so they 

can have access to China’s 1.4/1.3 billion-person marketplace. And 

I just think it’s hypocritical for American corporations and multinationals doing business in China who are fully prepared to boycott 

American cities and American communities because they don’t like 

things that are happening here to be okay, to turn a blind eye to 

what is happening and not criticize the government of China and 

the Communist Party because they don’t want to jeopardize their 

ability to sell products in that country. 

It’s an outrage. It’s an embarrassment. And I hope—again, I 

doubt this is going to make it onto the CBS evening news or any 

of the cable news shows tonight, but this is outrageous and it’s 

hypocritical. And the international organizations that stand by and 

say nothing—why? Because China went into somebody’s country 

and built a road or a bridge or maybe bribed them and gave them 

a billion dollars to be quiet and go along. 

This is sick. And I just don’t understand why there isn’t more 

coverage of this and why there isn’t more understanding of who 

we’re dealing with here and what they’re up to and what they do. 

And the next time someone comes to me and says, Well, you don’t 

understand China, their peaceful rise, and this, that, and the 

other—I have no problem. I have tremendous admiration for the 

ancient culture and history of China and of its people. And I want 

China to be a key player in the world. We would love to have some 

help in dealing with all of the challenges on this planet. It would 

be great to have another superpower to partner with. 

But this is what these people do with the power they have now. 

Imagine what they will do when that power grows militarily, economically, and geopolitically. Because if this is how you treat your 

own people, how do you expect them to treat people in some other 

part of the world? And I hope people wake up and understand what 

we’re confronting here and the grave crisis that it presents. 

In that vein, Mr. Christino, as you know, Representative Smith 

and I wrote a letter. I have the letter here. It is dated May 9, 

2018—to Secretary Ross. We were asking for answers about the 

sale by U.S. companies, American companies selling surveillance 

and crime-control technology that is being used by Chinese security 

forces and by their police. We specifically raised concerns about a 

company named Thermo Fisher Scientific which is a company in 

Massachusetts which reportedly is selling DNA sequencers with 

9 

advanced microprocessors to the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and its Public Security Bureaus across China. 

The reply we got from Commerce noted that these DNA sequencers have a legitimate end use, and I am sure they have a legitimate end use. But they also have an illegitimate end use. So what 

other recourse do we have if we know that this material is being 

used in this manner—what other recourse do we have other than 

to restrict their sale? Despite the fact that they may have some legitimate use—theoretically, there is a legitimate use for any product that is sold abroad. But we don’t sell these products because 

they are misused by the people who are buying them. Why do we 

continue to allow the sale of American technology to be used to 

commit this level of atrocities? 

Mr. CHRISTINO. Sir, I can point out to you that we have two 

types of controls relative to the Export Administration Regulations: 

controls over items, such as the DNA sequencer itself. And as you 

correctly pointed out, due to the multiple uses of it and the fact 

that it’s not used solely or primarily as a crime detection instrument, we do not control the sequencer itself. There are certainly 

numerous uses in basic science and medicine, including in China. 

So to try to control the export of the item to China would be problematic at best. 

The other type of control we have under the Export Administration Regulations is a control over the activities of entities that act 

in a manner that’s inconsistent with U.S. national security or foreign policy. Certainly human rights violations are a concern with 

regard to U.S. foreign policy. And we do have a process related to 

end-user review. You mentioned the public security bureaus. We do 

have the opportunity to review; we are reviewing as a result of the 

information raised to us by this commission. 

We are reviewing whether or not the evidentiary basis is there, 

we’re relying on interagency partners to look at whether it is appropriate, through the end-user review committee, to place these 

entities on the entity list. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, just on the issue of whether or not the end 

user is using it this way, the Department of State is seated right 

next to you, and they just testified publicly how this information 

is being used. So I think we have an interagency process right here 

in this committee. And I hope it is taken seriously. 

On the issue of the product itself, virtually any product that is 

sold abroad has a legitimate use. Guns have legitimate uses, rockets, and we restrict the sale of those to certain people. We don’t sell 

rockets, guns, tear gas, and crowd suppressant to a certain group 

because they have a history of oppressing people. 

Is your testimony that you don’t have the statutory authority to 

restrict these products based on the way the law is written today? 

Do you need a change in the law to be able to restrict that or is 

it sort of internally a policy determination at this time that it isn’t 

wise to restrict the sale of these items because they have a broader 

legitimate use in China? 

Mr. CHRISTINO. We have the appropriate authority both over 

items and over the activities of entities that receive U.S. items. The 

problematic nature of this challenge is that if you were to try and 

control DNA sequencers exported to China, you would have to be 

10 

able to make a determination—rather, the bureau and the department would need to be able to make a determination that such controls would be effective and would not adversely affect legitimate 

U.S. business interests in terms of selling these for the numerous 

uses in basic science or in medicine. And then you would also have 

to deal with potential diversion concerns over legitimate sales. 

We’re looking at controls not just over the DNA sequencers but 

over other items that may be used, to determine if there is sufficient information to warrant a control over the item. But the interagency discussion which includes various bureaus at the State Department is at this point more focused on the entities. 

Chairman RUBIO. Well, I don’t have a problem with restricting 

the entities, but those are easy to evade. In China, the Communist 

Party controls anything. So whoever you sell it to can easily transfer it for that use. I know you don’t make this decision. Therefore, 

I’m not trying to beat up on you personally because you’re here to 

represent the policy of the Commerce Department. 

But I do want to say this . . . it sounds like your answer was, 

These companies have legitimate business interests and make 

money in China selling these DNA sequencers in the whole country, and most of the things they sell in the country are used legitimately. And we don’t want to unnecessarily burden their ability to 

make a profit just because a small but significant percentage of 

their sales might be being used in this way. 

If that is the direction we’re going, I just find that to be unacceptable. It’s true—they can buy this from other countries, and 

other companies want to sell it to them. I think for us it comes 

down to the purpose of whether or not we want companies housed 

in the United States benefiting from American research, from our 

laws, from our freedom, from the protection of our rule of law in 

this country, to somehow be complicit in what is happening here, 

and in how their technology is being used. And the fact that they 

are making some money in China is to my mind not something 

that should counterbalance that concern. Again, I know you don’t 

make the decision, but I hope you report it back. 

Ambassador Currie, you’re sitting here today. Does the State Department believe that DNA sequencers and other materials are 

being used in ways that we find to be a grotesque violation of 

human rights? 

Ambassador CURRIE. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

We do believe that the security state in Xinjiang is excessive and 

is perhaps one of the most repressive in the world at this time. We 

acknowledge that the system does include thousands of security 

cameras, including in mosques, facial recognition software, obligatory content monitoring apps on smartphones, and GPS devices in 

cars, widespread new police outposts, as you noted, and the embedding of Party personnel in homes, and the compulsory collection of 

vast biometric datasets on ethnic and religious minorities throughout the region, including DNA and blood samples, 3D photos, iris 

scans, and voiceprints. 

We note that Human Rights Watch has documented that many 

of these DNA samples were collected deceptively as part of what 

regional officials called a ‘‘health campaign.’’ That is a report by 

11 

Human Rights Watch, not the U.S. Government, but it’s in my testimony, so I believe that we must find it somewhat credible. 

And the surveillance system has spurred experts in general security and experts in Xinjiang to label it as one of the most intrusive 

security police states in the world. There are also grave concerns 

that there’s an intention to migrate this system from Xinjiang out 

more broadly into the rest of China, as this system, the grid system 

that’s in place in Xinjiang, migrated first from Tibet into Xinjiang. 

It started out in Tibet and was kind of rolled out as a pilot there, 

and then built on, scaled up, in Xinjiang. 

Chairman RUBIO. Okay. My question was whether using DNA sequencers in a way that violates human rights—my take on what 

you just answered—and I know it’s the—you need to recite the policy of the administration. I think your answer was yes. And all I 

ask is, Can the State Department please tell that to the Commerce 

Department so that they—— 

Ambassador CURRIE. We will absolutely engage in interagency 

discussions with the Commerce Department about appropriate uses 

of technology, and—— 

Chairman RUBIO. Just tell Commerce that DNA sequencers are 

being used to violate human rights in a grotesque way so hopefully 

they can get moving on denying this. I don’t care how much money 

Thermo—whatever their name is—Fisher—that company, Thermo 

Fisher Scientific. 

Are you ready? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Cochairman SMITH. First of all, thank you, Chairman Rubio, for 

pulling together this extremely important hearing. 

What’s happening against the Muslim Uyghurs—we know that 

Rebiya Kadeer’s entire family is incarcerated. When she got out, 

came here—she came and testified at one of my hearings, and just 

bowled us all over with her courage, her willingness to sacrifice. At 

that time, at least two of her family were incarcerated as a hedge 

by the Chinese dictatorship to say, You say anything, we will hold 

it against them. 

And now it is—as we all know—as bad as it was during World 

War II, where the Muslim Uyghurs are being discriminated 

against, thrown into prison, tortured and killed in a massive way. 

Back in 2006, I chaired a hearing to which I invited Google, 

Cisco, Microsoft and Yahoo about their surveillance. But in the 

case of Cisco, their sale of PoliceNet and other means by which the 

Communist dictatorship could surveil, and then apprehend, and 

then of course what follows then is torture and long prison sentences. 

One of the men that Yahoo coughed up was Shi Tao, who you 

all recall—I know you recall it—you’re shaking your head. I know 

you recall it well—a wonderful guy, a journalist who contacted a 

New York NGO and said, This is what we’re told we cannot do 

when Tiananmen Square’s anniversary comes around. 

And for that, he got 10 years. And who gave them that information? Yahoo—they gave personally identifiable information, which 

12 

then was used as actionable police state information, to not only 

get him, but then they collect other people—or arrest them, I 

should say. Then they interrogate them with torture, and then they 

cough up other names. 

So we’re bearing terrible fruit of inaction for years. And as the 

Chairman said, it’s gone far beyond PoliceNet—I am saying that, 

but it has gone far beyond the original tools of repression that a 

legitimate police force can and should use. And now it’s so far beyond that. 

I introduced a bill called the Global Online Freedom Act. One of 

the titles in that had to do with—just like we do with South Africa, 

prohibiting, proscribing certain police useable items that a repressive police state can use to gather up religious freedom activists, 

human rights activists, as in the case of the Uyghurs because of 

their ethnicity, and their religion, the Muslim Uyghurs. 

I couldn’t get the bill passed. The K Street lobbyists came, and 

they descended upon the Foreign Affairs Committee. When we had 

the markup, I had people on the Democrat side and some on the 

Republican side saying that I can’t—I couldn’t get the bill out of 

committee. 

Now we’ve got John Boehner, our former Speaker, joining in the 

chorus of lobbyists for a dictatorship. If he speaks truth to power 

behind closed doors, and more than that, that would be great. But 

if he then comes up here and just promotes the bottom line of Beijing, of Xi Jinping, who is now one of the rivals for Mao Zedong 

when it comes to human rights abuse, we have a problem. 

So, again, I would ask you again and plead with you, we’ve got 

to make sure, like we did with South Africa and others in the past, 

make sure all of these items—and when there’s a dual-use capability that seemingly is benign for a commercial use but also has 

a political or a police application, that we go all out to make sure 

that that is on an export control regime. 

So if you could speak to that, because I think we have been 

asleep at the switch. The Obama Administration, now Trump, during the Bush Administration, we could not get any traction. China 

has always been treated in a way that I have found baffling. 

The people of China are great people. They don’t have the government they deserve. They have a dictatorship that represses 

them. Why do we enable dictatorship by giving them these tools of 

repression? So if you’d like to respond to that? This is the consequence, I think, of gross inaction over the course of many years. 

Mr. CHRISTINO. Sir, we do control quite a bit of items that are 

used in the way you describe. We control fingerprint analyzers, 

automated fingerprint retrieval systems, voiceprint identification, 

along with the more traditional law enforcement items normally 

used by a police force. 

We also look very carefully at information technology items, including computer penetration forensics tools to try to ensure that 

we are appropriately controlling these items so they are not used— 

I should say misused—in the manner that you have described. 

We continue to work with our interagency partners, primarily 

the Department of State, specifically the Bureau of Human Rights 

and Labor, the East Asia Pacific Bureau, etc., to ensure that we 

are capturing the right items. And if we cannot capture the item, 

13 

that we are capturing the end use or the entities. So we’ll continue 

to do that. 

Ambassador CURRIE. Thank you, Chairman Smith. And thank 

you again for hosting this, for convening this important and very 

timely hearing today. 

At USUN, we’re focused on what we’re seeing as the end result 

of the—I think—the policy approach that you outlined of believing 

that China was going to rise peacefully and was going to engage 

in political reform as it opened up economically. That clearly has 

not happened. I think that that’s not a secret to anyone at this 

point, that that has not been the outcome that those who supported 

and advocated that policy desired. 

So now we are dealing with the consequences of a China that has 

grown rich and powerful and is increasingly authoritarian in its behavior both at home and abroad. What we’re seeing, which is incredibly disturbing for us and which we are trying to find ways to 

combat every day at USUN, goes beyond what we, I think, had become accustomed to in terms of defensive strategies where China 

would use its position and various bodies to block criticism of it in 

the Human Rights Council or in other places. What we’re now seeing is an effort by China to actually try to transform the entire normative framework of human rights. 

And when I say that, what I’m talking about is substituting what 

we all think of as the normative framework of human rights, of 

rights that attach at the individual level, basic God-given human 

rights—in the parlance of the American way of thinking about this, 

freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom of association—to transform the whole human rights system 

into what the Chinese characterize as one based on ‘‘win-win’’ cooperation or mutually beneficial cooperation between states and a 

system that prioritizes the concerns of governments, rather than 

prioritizing their responsibility to respect the human rights of their 

citizens. And what we’re seeing at the UN, both in New York and 

across the UN system, is deeply concerning in this regard. The Chinese are using all of the tools of state power, all of their capabilities, to try to undermine the normative framework of human 

rights. And they’re doing it in a way that is both blatant, as well 

as under the radar. 

So we are fighting back against it whenever we can. We are trying to block them from putting the language of ‘‘win-win’’ and mutually beneficial cooperation into resolutions at the UN, which they 

are doing across the board. We are trying to block them from using 

the development system of the UN to undermine efforts to promote 

good governance, anti-corruption, and human rights as part of the 

package of responsible development behavior, something that they 

are doing through a variety of means. And we are also fighting to 

make sure that voices of civil society can be heard at the UN, including people like Uyghur activist Dolkan Isa, who the Chinese 

have tried to block from participating in UN fora. 

So at USUN, we are, I think, very cognizant of the threat that 

the situation poses and are working very hard on a daily basis. Our 

biggest challenge right now is that we are relatively alone in this. 

And in a situation where you have got 193 member states, many 

of whom can be persuaded by some of the tools that Senator Rubio 

14 

mentioned, about the Belt and Road Initiative, about the amount, 

about the kind of relationships that the Chinese are building across 

the developing world, in particular, but not just the developing 

world. 

We are really struggling to gain traction in terms of getting other 

member states to join us in this effort to push back on even things 

as simple as the debt that the Chinese system is building, the 

unsustainable debt levels in development that the Chinese are creating with developing countries. 

So it is a massive struggle. This administration takes it very seriously, and everything from where you heard the White House 

push back on the Chinese political correctness with trying to force 

U.S. businesses to change their websites on Taiwan, to what we 

are doing every day at USUN. We are taking these threats seriously. We are looking for every opportunity to try to push back on 

them. And we are very serious about standing up for the human 

rights of the Chinese people, in particular, calling more attention 

to the situation in Xinjiang because it is deeply underreported, as 

Senator Rubio noted. 

Cochairman SMITH. I will be very brief because I know my time 

is running out or has run out. 

Ambassador Currie, thank you for your leadership. And Nikki 

Haley, please convey to her that I stand in great respect—I think 

we all do—for all of the work that she has done. She is often a lone 

voice, as our delegation and you have been tenacious. 

The redefinition of human rights is exactly what the Soviet 

Union tried to do in the 80s and 90s. They used to say, Oh, look 

America, you have a terrible problem of homelessness. Therefore, 

we have a better situation than you do because nobody’s on the 

street. Yeah, they’re all in the gulag or in the psychiatric hospital. 

But that said, we address our humanitarian needs, but as you 

pointed out, they’re not fundamental human rights—and they are 

seeking redefinition. 

Mr. Chairman, I held a series of hearings in my subcommittee— 

that’s the Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights Committee—on the influence of Chinese soft power, particularly this indebtedness issue, which is putting the African countries in huge 

debt where even more power can be exerted by the Chinese. And 

then they call in those chits in the UN, with just what you are 

finding—us standing alone on this. 

But hopefully for the Uyghurs and for the people suffering in the 

autonomous region, they will join us in that. They are even trying 

to influence Europe, amazingly. And they’re having an impact. 

So thank you for your leadership. 

Chairman RUBIO. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Well, first I want to thank both Chairman Smith 

and Chairman Rubio for their passion and attention to this issue. 

It’s troubling to say the least. 

The first thing I would do, Mr. Chairman, is submit for the 

record a long story that appeared in The Economist on May 31, 

that outlines this problem. I think this is a dramatic statement of 

exactly what we’re talking about and the horror of it. As I read it, 

all I could think of was my youthful reading of ‘‘1984’’ and ‘‘Brave 

15 

New World.’’ It is technology turned on its head to enslave people 

instead of to liberate them. 

I was also recently reading about the period of the 1930s and the 

reluctance of America principally, but other countries, to recognize 

what was going on in Germany. There was an almost deliberate 

blind eye turned to what was being done. And of course, it wasn’t 

until a decade later that we realized the full horror of the Holocaust. I’ve often thought of the difficulty that that question presents; What if we had known in detail, specifically in the 30s, what 

was going on in Germany? What then would our obligations have 

been? 

It seems to me that we are at a similar moment, only we have 

more information. We know what’s going on. We don’t know the 

exact details, but we know about reeducation camps, we know 

about—as the Chairman recited—people being forced to change 

their names, violate religious practices, modern-day apartheid. We 

do know about it. So what do we do? 

So, Ambassador, I appreciate your coming, number one, and I appreciate the statements that you’ve made. But it seems to me that 

what we really need is a—it’s not as if we have no relations with 

China. We have detailed interconnections, trade, culture, many exchanges, ambassadors, the whole deal. What can we do? What are 

the levers that we have? Because I don’t want somebody reading 

the history of this period and looking back 30 years from now or 

50 years from now and saying, America tolerated a holocaust or 

something similar. What are the levers of power that we have that 

we can exert in this situation in order to try to bring this country, 

this wonderful country to its senses in terms of what they are 

doing to these people? 

Ambassador, give me a laundry list. 

Ambassador CURRIE. I wish I had a laundry list. Right now what 

we can do at USUN is help to shine a light on the situation. I think 

that the severity, the scope, and the magnitude of this situation 

have really only become clear—I would say—in the past few 

months. We had been hearing stories more or less sporadically that 

this was happening, but some of the research that Senator Rubio 

cited, the looking at the tender offers, and understanding, being 

able to map those things, and then as the stories—the Chinese 

have done an excellent job of attempting to keep this under wraps, 

of not allowing reporters to go into Xinjiang and actually report directly on what is happening, including our diplomats. So it has 

been a serious challenge to really get a handle on the scope and 

severity of this. 

So I am not saying that as an excuse that—we are just now really starting to understand the scope of it. So we are starting to 

shine a light on it and looking for more opportunities to do that. 

And this hearing is an important one today. 

Senator KING. But I think developing a laundry list is important. 

Ambassador CURRIE. And we have the tools. The tools are the 

tools in the human rights world. They exist. It’s always a matter 

of political will for us about where we choose to use them. 

I think today’s Ministerial on International Religious Freedom 

where this topic will be discussed—it was mentioned in Secretary 

Pompeo’s op-ed yesterday. It was mentioned, and it will be menVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:20 Mar 31, 2019 Jkt 081003 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\DSHERMAN1\DESKTOP\30933.TXT DAVID
16 

tioned this week during the Ministerial. And I think that, for us, 

part of it at this point is educating, frankly speaking, a number of 

countries that are not as aware as we are at this point of what is 

going on, because when I raised it with colleagues at the UN, many 

of my colleagues, including in the Muslim world, have no idea this 

is even happening. 

Senator KING. I think that is an important point because if there 

is anything we have learned in the last 20 years about sanctions, 

for example, they are much more effective if they are multilateral, 

much more effective. And I think a very important point is to talk 

to the rest of the world and say, it’s nice that they are offering to 

build you a bridge, but understand that it comes with a price and 

the price may be paid by innocent people in this province of China. 

So I think that’s an important part, but I hope that you will— 

that the administration will develop a set of options, policy options 

that can begin to not only express disapproval or shine a light on 

the problem, but really have some direct impact because this 

doesn’t reflect well on the Chinese people. 

It mars what would otherwise be something that might be positive in terms of assisting undeveloped parts of the world. But if it’s 

done at the price of having to tolerate this, it’s certainly not in the 

interests of the people of China or the people of the world. 

Mr. Christino, I think if anything has come through, I hope, this 

morning, it’s that we feel very strongly that, to the extent of your 

authority, we have really got to have renewed attention to the export of technology that is being used to develop what appears now 

to be the world’s most advanced police state. I mean, the idea of 

having people that move in, that adopt a family, police stations 200 

meters apart, thousands if not millions of surveillance cameras, iris 

scans, blood samples taken under false pretenses. I mean, this is 

really the stuff of science fiction, and horrible science fiction at 

that. 

So I don’t want it to be business as usual at your office. This is 

a new challenge, as the Ambassador said. It has come into focus 

in the last several months, the last year. So I hope your office will 

renew its attention to this and be much more alert to the potential 

use of this technology. And my view is, even if there is a legitimate 

use for it, if it can be used for this purpose, it should be under additional scrutiny if not outright sanction by your office. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman RUBIO. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. I’ll just continue where Senator King left off. 

Even if there is a legitimate use to it, why would we sell it to 

China? Why would we authorize it to be sold to China? I mean, 

they’re not France. They’re not Sweden. So I don’t think we should 

sell it to China regardless, even if there is a legitimate use. And 

if the administration can’t do it with existing authorities, then perhaps Congress should explore giving you more authorities to do so. 

Mr. Christino, I know you have a lot of experience in this field. 

Did we sell crowd control and policing equipment and technology 

to the Soviet Union when it existed? 

Mr. CHRISTINO. No, sir. 

Senator COTTON. Why would we sell it to China now since China 

is our number one geopolitical rival going forward in the coming 

17 

decades. They’re plainly using this kind of technology in Xinjiang 

to oppress their own people and to build their national power in a 

way to challenge us. I mean, one of the reasons China has been 

able to turn its focus outward onto the blue seas and challenge us 

inside the first island chain and in the South China Sea is that 

they’ve gained greater control of their internal borders, especially 

in Xinjiang and Tibet. 

I turn now, Ambassador Currie, to you, and something you said 

earlier—I want to just explore a little bit further and ask if you 

could elaborate and talk about the concept of a pilot program. Some 

of these techniques were first piloted in Tibet. Now they’ve been 

rolled out on a greater and more advanced scale in Xinjiang, potentially going to the rest of China. 

Could you elaborate, please, on that? 

Ambassador CURRIE. Certainly, Senator Cotton. 

I think our understanding is that after the 2008 events in Lhasa 

and the protests that took place then across the Tibetan Plateau, 

the Chinese authorities came in with a much more aggressive approach to policing and social control in Tibet. And they began both 

with policing, with the closely spaced police stations, the intense 

surveillance, and the control over religious institutions and cultural 

institutions, the massive political education, the pressure on state 

employees from teachers to policemen to doctors of Tibetan extraction who were forced to take political education classes, much more 

intensive management of monasteries in Tibet. 

They fused that approach with what we might call communitybased policing if it were being done for a proper purpose, but which 

in this case is really just community-based oppression—they fused 

that with a technological edge in Xinjiang and doubled down on it. 

And they added some very particular aspects to it in terms of the 

legal restrictions that they’ve passed into regulations and have 

made more of a—put it under law, which is something that the 

Chinese like to do to kind of create a thin veneer of legality over 

the forms of oppression that they’re using against these minority 

communities. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you for that. I suspect that is what is 

going to happen. It will be rolled out substantially throughout the 

country. 

Also another issue that was touched upon briefly earlier, the Belt 

and Road Initiative—pretty tall mountains down there in Tibet. It 

is hard to get a road through there. So the road in the Belt and 

Road Initiative, presumably is going primarily through Xinjiang 

province into Central Asia and then perhaps all the way into Europe. How closely connected is the oppression that we see in 

Xinjiang province to that Belt and Road Initiative, which of course 

is a direct challenge to the United States’ position as the world’s 

leading economy and the global military superpower? 

Ambassador CURRIE. Security along the belt and road is a major 

human rights challenge, not just inside China’s borders but across 

them. They definitely are insistent on having a high degree of security through key corridors, and Xinjiang is one of those key corridors. 

Part of it—it goes beyond, also, the repression directed at the 

Muslim minority communities in Xinjiang. And what we’re seeing 

18 

in addition to the repression directed at those communities is the 

continued incentivization of in-migration and other activities to encourage the growth of the non-Uyghur, non-Kazakh, non-Muslim 

population. 

Senator COTTON. By in-migration—to call a spade a spade—you 

mean, essentially, colonization, right? 

Ambassador CURRIE. That is—it could be characterized—— 

Senator COTTON. The data I have here in front of me says that 

in 1949, Xinjiang had 7 percent Han Chinese. Today it’s up to 40 

percent. 

Ambassador CURRIE. Some experts have characterized it as colonization, yes. What we’ve seen there is also that the Chinese residents of Xinjiang tend to dominate the businesses. They get the 

state contracts, and they are involved in the actual infrastructure 

development that is linked to the Belt and Road. 

Senator COTTON. Again, to call a spade a spade, the Chinese 

there are dominating the businesses. They are dominating the 

businesses because the Chinese Communist Party is empowering 

them to have those businesses and disempowering all the nativeborn Muslim Uyghurs or Kazakhs, or other minorities in Xinjiang? 

Ambassador CURRIE. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. One final question. We talked earlier about the 

loss of a market for American companies and things like crowd control or policing technique, or more cutting-edge technology that can 

be used for those things like DNA mapping and facial recognition 

technology. One common argument you hear from American companies is, Well, if we do not sell it to them, someone is going to 

sell it to them, right? It reminds me of the old line that a communist’s definition of a capitalist is a man who will sell us the rope 

with which we hang him. 

But I just want to ask you, who are the countries whose companies could pick up that business? And maybe, Mr. Christino, this 

is better directed to you as well. If we stop selling this kind of technology to China, in which countries around the world are the companies located that would pick up that business from American 

companies? 

Mr. CHRISTINO. Well, with regard specifically to the DNA sequencers that were mentioned prominently earlier during the hearing, they’re made essentially all over the world. It’s relatively simple technology. It’s not very cutting-edge technology. It has been 

around for at least 30 years. Some of the main manufacturers are 

actually in China itself. And you don’t even need the item, the sequencer, in many cases. As we see on TV all the time, there’s a 

great deal of advertising for DNA analysis. It’s simply a swab and 

send. So there’s plenty of opportunity for the Chinese security services to continue to do what they’re doing without U.S. items. 

Senator COTTON. Ambassador Currie, do you have any response 

to that one? 

Ambassador CURRIE. I would agree with my colleague that the 

Chinese, not just in this area of technology, but they, as part of the 

Made in China 2025 Drive and 2050 Drive, they have definitely— 

the goal there is to make China technologically self-sufficient so 

that even if we do put export controls on all manner of things, then 

19 

they would be able to produce them domestically without having to 

rely on external sources for items such as this. 

Senator COTTON. OK. Thank you both. 

Chairman RUBIO. I have just two quick comments and a quick 

question. Then I know Congressman Smith does as well before we 

turn to our second panel. We want to thank you both for being 

here. 

Your answer to Senator Cotton’s last question almost sounds 

like, They’re going to do it anyway, so we might as well allow our 

companies to make some money on it. And I’m not saying that’s 

what your intention is in representing it that way, but that’s sort 

of the logical conclusion of it. This technology is widely available. 

This is not going to be able to stop them from doing it. And what 

I hope you’ll take back to Commerce is, I don’t believe that any of 

us who are calling for this technology, like the DNA sequencer, to 

be prohibited believe that doing so will prohibit them—or stop 

them from doing this. We just don’t want American companies to 

be participants in it. 

And I think that’s the bigger point for us as a nation. You can 

buy crowd control equipment. China will sell you crowd control 

equipment. They’ll sell you anything. They don’t care about your 

human rights record, democracy, anything like that. If you have 

the cash, they’ll sell it to you. That does not mean that we go— 

we still deny the sale of certain equipment. And it brings to light 

another point, and that is our laws have to keep pace with our 

technology. What is used to control crowds today is different from 

what it may have been 10, 15, 20 years ago. And that includes 

technological advances. 

To that point—did you want to add something on that point? 

Senator KING. Well I just wanted to point out that this is exactly 

the argument that was made in Britain to justify the sale of Rolls 

Royce engines to the Luftwaffe in 1935. It was a bad argument 

then, and it’s a bad argument now because the issue you are talking about is complicity. I don’t want to be complicit in this. 

Chairman RUBIO. Agreed. 

And talking about the other thing that I think this brings to 

light is, if you read through the regs and how they describe crowd 

control and suppression, it’s all 20th century technology and it’s 

still used. But in the 21st century, technology increasingly plays a 

role. 

I’ll give you one example; the use of intense security measures 

to surveillance technology. We know, for example, the Chinese are 

now using in a particular region, in specific, facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, and in train stations. 

It appears focused on using much of the surveillance and data 

collected to monitor and repress Uyghurs. In fact, the authorities 

reportedly integrate a lot of this surveillance. So they’re taking 

data from all sorts of things—the computer, smartphones, closed 

circuit cameras, license plates, ID cards, individual family planning 

and banking records, information on their international travel— 

they’re taking all of this information and they’re running it 

through something that’s called the Integrated Joint Operations 

Platform. And they’re using that data—all of that data—to identify 

20 

people that they think should be subject to investigation and potential detention. 

In essence, how they’re defining who to put in these camps is the 

process of an algorithm that’s looking at all of this data they’re collecting on people and deciding from it who they should be detaining. And here’s why I point that out. A key component of that in 

the 21st century is going to be artificial intelligence, the ability to 

learn from the gathering of data the way a human would and improve it each and every time. And I raise that only because there’s 

a tremendous irony in this room here today. That picture that we 

have of a camp and how it grew comes from Google Earth. 

Google recently dropped out of a contract with the Department 

of Defense, on Project Maven, artificial intelligence—because its 

employees do not want to be involved with the American Government and the DoD working on the use of artificial intelligence to 

potentially harm people. 

At the same time, Google has opened up an AI China Center. 

And basically anything you do in China that’s technological, if you 

think you’re going to constrain it to just the private sector, you’re 

crazy. All of it will be shared with the military and with the repressive forces that are doing this. And Google has no excuse. They 

know that this is happening because they’ve got pictures of it. 

That’s Google Earth. 

So that’s just one more example of the hypocrisy of an American 

company that knows this is happening, doesn’t want to give AI 

technology to the military because God forbid we may use it one 

day to target a terrorist or someone who wants to harm America, 

but has no problem opening up a center of AI in China knowing 

full well that anything you do in China—if it’s a benefit to the military, they’re going to use it. If it’s a benefit to their security services, they’re going to use it. 

And my last question—this is a question. We’ve raised the issue 

of Global Magnitsky sanctions; the purpose of Global Magnitsky 

sanctions was to be able to identify an individual doing horrible 

things and be able to impose sanctions upon them. We clearly know 

horrible things are happening here to the Uyghurs in their area. 

And we know that there are individuals who are at least making 

the decision, and most certainly individuals that are applying those 

decisions. 

What is happening within State now? Is there consideration 

being made? Is there deliberation? Is there talk? What are the 

chances of being able to apply Global Magnitsky sanctions to individuals that we know are in charge of these regions and, at the 

highest levels, have to be held responsible for what’s happening? 

Ambassador CURRIE. Well as you know, Global Magnitsky is a 

rolling determination dataset where we are constantly looking at 

individuals who are involved with either serious corruption issues 

or gross human rights abuses. It’s an interagency process. It’s not 

the State Department alone that manages that process. In fact, the 

final determination and the final check on that is actually with the 

Treasury Department. But it is an interagency process, and the 

State Department does play an important role in identifying targets and helping to move them through the process, build the data 

packages around Global Magnitsky. 

21 

I cannot speak to specific individuals that may be being chosen 

or being looked at for sanctions, but what I can say is that we do 

see the Global Magnitsky sanctions as an important tool to help 

identify abusers and bring them—and use the ability of the United 

States to sanction those individuals, limit their access to the U.S. 

financial system and block them from being able to—in some cases, 

even seize assets that they may have in the U.S. financial system. 

If there are suggestions that the Commission has for individuals 

that the Department should be looking at, I would encourage you 

to forward those to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor, because they generally start the process rolling with determinations, and I’d be happy to take anything back that you have. 

Chairman RUBIO. Well, you can count on—we most certainly 

have ideas about individuals and it’s probably not a complete list. 

We’re open to adding more people as this continues. My only 

takeaway is, as you go back, and however this form reaches the decision-makers in the interagency, to the extent that the Department of State is involved in the interagency, we just—I can’t speak 

for everyone else, but I think there’d be a consensus on the Commission and across Congress that if ever there was a model case 

for how we intended Global Magnitsky to be used as a tool, this 

would be it . . . because there is most clearly abuse happening. 

Wherever there is abuse, there are abusers. And in the case of 

China, those abusers—if they’re high enough in government—are 

almost guaranteed to not just have U.S. visas, but either they or 

their families have some access to either the U.S. financial system, 

our universities, and are enjoying—that’s just the way it works for 

high-ranking individuals. They like to travel the world, and they 

like to spend money in the U.S. So if ever there was an example 

of where Magnitsky could be powerful in making a statement about 

where we stand on this issue, we believe this is one of them, and 

we will most certainly continue to push for it and offer suggestions 

about individuals. 

Congressman Smith, you have the final questions. 

Cochairman SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Just let me add my strong endorsement to what you just said 

about Global Magnitsky. I am the author of the Belarus Democracy 

Act of 2004—great pushback when we did it. Lukashenko, the dictator in Belarus, was sanctioned along with about 200 other people. 

I went there twice, went to Minsk. The first time he called me 

‘‘public enemy number one,’’ but one by one every political prisoner 

got out of prison. And it applied not just to him, but to his family 

and to other families of his group that were committing gross 

human rights violations. 

So it does work. The Global Magnitsky Act, and the Magnitsky 

Act itself, targeted toward Russia, is a tool of surpassing capability. 

I hope we would do a data call to our embassy in Beijing, to our 

Ambassador Branstad and say, Give us the names—it’s got to really come—if they’re not going to initiate it, and they probably won’t, 

it will come from Washington, I would hope, and say, Who is responsible for this horrific carnage being imposed upon the Muslim 

Uyghurs? 

Rebiya Kadeer, who is here, her courage is—she should win the 

Nobel Peace Prize for her courage. As a matter of fact, in the past, 

22 

many of us have asked that that happen, and she should be 

present as well. 

I cannot tell you how concerned all of us are. We’ve got six Radio 

Free Asia families who are missing or are incarcerated as part of 

this massive World War II-type roundup. This is now similar to 

what the Nazis did in terms of the massiveness of gathering people 

for torture and the like. 

So the Magnitsky Act is just sitting there like low-hanging fruit, 

tools that absolutely have to be deployed. And make up a list, like 

I said—the second time I met with Lukashenko, he was all sweetness and light. He’s still a dictator. But all the political prisoners 

have been released, to the best of our knowledge. 

On another related issue—in 2000, I wrote the Admiral Nance/ 

Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act. One of the provisions we put 

in there said that anyone who is complicit with forced abortion or 

forced sterilization, which during the Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal was properly construed to be a crime against humanity for 

its Nazi usage against Poles and others; it is just as much a crime 

against humanity today. 

We know that China itself is missing 62 million women, girls, 

who have been eviscerated from their population by sex selection 

abortion. We know that it’s been used as a genocidal tool against 

the Tibetans and against the Uyghurs. Nobody ever seems to talk 

about it except the Chairman and me, perhaps a small number of 

others. It is like the topic that you don’t bring up because the 

choice community will look askance at this. These women are being 

horribly and forcibly aborted. Sometimes they bring—and it is 

being used as a tool of genocide to eliminate the Muslim Uyghurs 

in that country. 

You have an additional tool sitting there since 2000. It was not 

used by the Obama administration. I brought it up over and over 

again in hearings. I said you may disagree with me on the right 

to life and the fact that unborn children ought to be protected from 

the violence of abortion, but here we are talking about forced abortion. Can we not even have agreement there to try to protect people 

from this violence that is being imposed upon them? 

So you have another tool I would ask you to revisit, especially 

as it relates to the Muslim Uyghurs—because they are using it. I 

intervened in one case, brought to us by some good friends of a 

woman who had been brought in with about 25 to 30 cadres, family 

planning cadres, police escorts, to have her Muslim child aborted. 

I talked to the ambassador here—to China—talked to our ambassador, our U.S. Ambassador, and that one child got a reprieve and 

was saved. But one among millions being slaughtered. 

So please look at the Admiral Nance/Meg Donovan provision to 

see if that could be brought out and used, get the dust off of it because I think it’ll make a difference. And, again, like the Chairman 

said, the Magnitsky Act . . . you get a list of a couple of hundred— 

to start off with—names, and then they cannot come here. They 

cannot send their kids to NYU, which has a—I spoke at NYU a 

couple of years ago on human rights in Shanghai. Let’s get it all 

out there. Okay, you’re done. Your families don’t come here because 

of your egregious violations of human rights. 

23 

So please, Magnitsky—this is a textbook case of where it should 

be utilized. And I implore you, and again, the Chairman, I thank 

you for again pulling together this extremely important hearing. 

And, again, I do thank you, Ambassador, both of you, for your 

leadership at the UN. You’ve been extraordinary despite what the 

Human Rights Council does, which unfortunately majors in hypocrisy, focuses on Israel to the exclusion of the real human rights 

abuses, and Nikki Haley has called that out so courageously. And 

we thank her for that. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. 

And we have a second panel we want to get to as quickly as possible because I know Senator King needs to go. I know Congressman Smith has votes. But Senator Daines is here and I know he 

had a few questions for this panel before we turn it over. 

Would our next panelists start getting ready because we are 

going to jump into it pretty quick? 

Senator DAINES. Thank you, Chairman Rubio and Chairman 

Smith. I thank you for holding this hearing, and I want to thank 

the witnesses for coming here today. 

I spent more than half a decade in China in the private sector. 

In fact, I had two children born in Hong Kong. I lived in 

Guangzhou. I’ve led congressional visits to China every year since 

I’ve been in the United States Senate. I have had the opportunity 

to travel across the country in Xinjiang. I have been in U ̈ ru ̈mqi as 

well. I’ve seen the prominent Uyghur Muslim populations. I have 

been in Tibet and seen the Buddhist monks. I just recently was in 

Dandong along the North Korean border. This has allowed me to 

see firsthand the pervasive censorship and the challenges the Chinese people face, as well as the efforts made by the Chinese government to extend their influence beyond their borders. 

As your testimonies suggest, the State Department Human 

Rights Report and numerous others indicate the situation in 

Xinjiang is dire for its Uyghur population. Whether it’s pervasive 

surveillance, the destruction of thousands of mosques, or the detention of hundreds of thousands in so-called ‘‘reeducation camps,’’ as 

well as indefinite detentions, it’s critically important that we, as a 

nation founded on freedom and the rule of law, bring our influence 

to bear to advance human rights in China and around the world. 

Ambassador Currie, what do you see as China’s endgame as it 

relates to the persecution and the repression of its Uyghur population? Is this cultural, economic, religious, or some other combination? 

Ambassador CURRIE. Thank you for that question. 

We would say that it’s all of those things. It is a combination of 

those elements with an additional aspect of political control. What 

we see is an effort to sinicize religion and to bring—the Chinese 

Communist Party feels the need to control anything that is not 

under its immediate control. So it does put a lot of constraints on 

all religious activity in China. And because of the global nature, in 

particular of Islam and Christianity as well, those two religions 

tend to come in for particular scrutiny and particular suspicion 

from the authorities, and for a much more coercive and much more 

restrictive approach. 

24 

So I believe that in Xinjiang and in the case of the Uyghur population, in particular, there is an absolute—the State Department 

sees an effort to sinicize religion and to bring the practices of 

Uyghur Muslims into line with a level of religiosity that the Party 

finds acceptable. And bearing in mind that the Party is itself an 

atheist entity, we can surmise that that is a very low level of religiosity, and one that is very limited in terms of being—limited in 

terms of its international relations and connections outside of 

China. 

Senator DAINES. Ambassador Currie, are there any particular 

tools or technologies that would be helpful for the U.S. Government 

or NGOs to support to assist those persecuted populations? 

Ambassador CURRIE. The tools that the United States is using in 

terms of Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, getting the 

truth in to people, giving—and then making sure that we are also 

reporting on the situation there, are particularly important. Information is obviously critical here. 

Our ability to understand what is going on in Xinjiang is limited 

by the efforts of the Chinese government to cover up and mask 

what they’re doing. So the more that we can use information technology, both to inform our own population and our allies and other 

countries about what’s happening as well as to make the people of 

China aware of what is happening in other parts of the country as 

well as the concerns that are taking place outside of China regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities and that these practices are 

not consistent with respect for international human rights. 

I believe that those are the things that the U.S. Government can 

use to try to address the problem in terms of technology. Beyond 

that, I think that we are—a lot of it is about old-fashioned diplomacy and doing our jobs better of educating our colleagues at the 

UN, for instance, about the scope of what’s going on and just trying 

to work and grow the coalition of countries that are concerned 

around this issue. 

Senator DAINES. Yes, I remain very concerned since my visits out 

to western China a couple of years ago, the thousands of mosques 

that have been demolished. And whether it’s the Muslim people, 

Christian people, the level of persecution—by all accounts, all reports we’re receiving here—is reaching levels that are virtually unprecedented in modern history in China. 

It is extending here to the United States, hearing reports from 

Chinese students who are being called by professors back in China 

saying, Do not associate and go to faith-based activities. This is 

something that we haven’t seen, and I remain very, very concerned. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. 

Thank you both for being here. Ambassador Currie, thank you 

for making the trip. Thank you, Mr. Christino as well. We appreciate it. We are grateful. This was very insightful. Thank you. 

Our next panel will come forward. And as you guys get positioned, Members will fluctuate in and out. Congressman Smith had 

to leave. The House has votes. Members here have meetings and 

different activities. 

25 

We certainly don’t want to curtail your testimony. It is important 

to hear your stories. Know that your full testimony is going to be 

in the record. 

We are probably going to have a hard stop in this meeting at 

12:10 or 12:15. So the less—the shorter you can get those statements, the more time we can have to engage with you on some details that I think will be enlightening for the Commission and for 

our record. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman RUBIO. All right. Okay. 

Thank you all for being here. Ms. Hoja, we will begin with you 

and your testimony. Thank you for being here. I have read your 

full statement. It is very compelling. We want to hear more from 

you today and I look forward to engaging with you. Thank you for 

being here. 

STATEMENT OF GULCHEHRA HOJA, UYGHUR SERVICE 

JOURNALIST, RADIO FREE ASIA 

Ms. HOJA. Thank you. As-Salaam-Alaikum. Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Cochairman, and Members of the Commission, it’s my privilege to 

participate in today’s hearing on a topic that deeply affects me personally and professionally. 

My name is Gulchehra Hoja. I am a journalist with Radio Free 

Asia’s Uyghur Language Service, and I am a U.S. citizen. Given 

the time, I will not read my full statement, but share my story. 

I grew up in U ̈ ru ̈mqi, the capital of the Uyghur region in China, 

where I began my career in broadcast journalism before coming to 

the United States in 2001 to work for Radio Free Asia. It was a 

great sacrifice to leave my homeland. I left behind a successful career as a television journalist. I also left my home, my parents, my 

family, and my friends. But coming here guaranteed me freedom— 

something that could never be realized in China. Being part of 

Radio Free Asia—which reports on the true daily news happening 

in the Uyghur region—was the dream of a lifetime. 

As I testify before you today, it grieves me no end to say that 

my parents remain under threat, and more than two dozen of my 

relatives in China are missing—almost certainly held in what are 

called reeducation camps run by the Chinese government. 

I first heard that my brother Kaisar Keyum was detained at the 

end of September last year. Police had taken him when he was 

driving my mother to a doctor’s appointment, leaving her alone in 

the car without any explanation. She waited for her son who would 

never return. Kaisar was being held in one of the so-called reeducation centers in U ̈ ru ̈mqi. We have not seen him since. 

In February, my parents, both elderly and suffering from lifethreatening ailments, went missing. Not being able to talk with my 

mother and father, or to learn how they were doing, was almost too 

much to bear. I tried contacting other family but could not reach 

them. And I learned in February that my aunts, cousins, their children—more than 20 people had been swept up by authorities on 

the same day. No one has confirmed where they are being held, but 

I strongly suspect they are in the camps, which sources say hold 

more than 1 million Uyghurs in extremely poor conditions. 

26 

My parents were held in a medical facility in the detention 

camps. They were allowed to leave in March—maybe because of 

their poor health. Authorities have questioned my parents about 

me, where I am, and my work for an organization they claim is 

‘‘anti-China.’’ 

Many of my Uyghur colleagues at the RFA share the same situation. Their families are also missing, detained and jailed after receiving threats about their work at RFA. I hope and pray for my 

family to be let go and released, but I know even if that happens, 

they will still live under constant threat. Despite these threats, I 

know, and my colleagues know, that we must continue because of 

the important role we have as a source of truth for Uyghur people. 

I came to the United States to realize a dream, a dream of being 

able to tell the truth without fear. It may be difficult, but I will 

keep trying and I will never give up. 

Thank you so much. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Gulchehra Hoja appears in the Appendix.] 

Chairman RUBIO. Professor Thum. 

Mr. THUM. Thank you to the Chairs and to the committee for organizing this incredibly important hearing. 

STATEMENT OF RIAN THUM, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, LOYOLA 

UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS 

I would like to submit my written testimony for the record and 

just emphasize a few interpretive points here because we have a 

lot of the data on the table already. 

The first point I’d like to make is that this is an emergency that 

is developing as we speak. Those numbers of several hundred thousand to over a million Uyghurs, 5 to 10 percent of the Uyghur population disappearing into these internment camps, are based on estimates from January, data that came out in January about what 

happened in the previous year. We have had another six months. 

People have continued to disappear and very few people, usually 

sick people, have been released. 

We see new camps being built in the satellite imagery and we 

have new advertisements from the Xinjiang authorities asking for 

construction companies to build additional camps. The last one to 

appear is about a 400,000-square-foot facility that will probably 

come on line sometime between September and December. 

This enormous and growing scale is important not just in an absolute sense, where we have the feeling that maybe if it crosses a 

big enough number the world will care, but also as a proportion of 

the number of community members who disappear. This is something you can see on the streets in southern Xinjiang, in the closed 

buildings, the closed shops, the closed houses, people who’ve disappeared. You can see it in one county in Kashgar where 18 orphanages have been built—according to a Financial Times report— 

in the last year alone to house the children of those who have been 

sent to the detention camps. 

My second point that I want to make is about the goals of these 

camps, which is something that was asked about earlier. These 

camps serve multiple goals. They serve the explicit goal—which 

27 

many Chinese officials seem to really believe in—of changing the 

way people think through force, of purifying them of supposedly 

bad ideas and inculcating love for the Party and for Xi Jinping. 

They also serve to remove certain demographics from the population, especially 20- to 40-year-olds, which police have explicitly 

targeted. And, of course, they serve as the background disciplinary 

threat that upholds the totalitarian micromanagement of Uyghurs’ 

everyday activities and cultural expression. 

But the frightening thing is that what we know from history is 

that when you get large detention systems that are operating in 

legal gray zones, or in this case perhaps even an entirely extralegal zone, there is a lot of room for improvisation on the part of 

those who are running those camps. So the most frightening purpose is the one that hasn’t occurred yet. And while right now torture and deaths in the camp seem to be happening at pretty low 

levels, that can change. In fact, I don’t think we can rule out the 

possibility of mass murder. 

The third point I want to make—and I will do it briefly—is that 

the camps are not the only problem. Although I have emphasized 

it here because they are easy to summarize, if you take them out 

of the picture, we’re still looking at one of the most oppressive police states in the world with—as Senator Rubio mentioned—a system of racism very similar to apartheid. 

My last major point I want to make is about the deeper causes 

of this. This is a colonial settler operation. And it is—contrary to 

some opinions—not explicitly about religion per se. 

The Chinese Communist Party, despite being avowedly atheist, 

has a great deal of tolerance for what they see as Chinese religions 

being practiced by ethnic Chinese. When it comes to a foreign religion or a religion seen as Chinese, like Buddhism, practiced by 

non-Chinese, like Tibetans, that story changes. And it becomes 

even more intense when it’s Islam because the Chinese Communist 

Party over the last 20 years or so has adopted American and European discourses of Islamophobia which they picked up largely 

through cooperation with the U.S. global war on terror. 

Because of that, this is a deeply entrenched worldview of Chinese 

officials behind this, and I do not think, for that reason, that we 

can convince Chinese officials to change their path based on data 

about how it will improve the internal situation. I think instead— 

they think this is working. So we need to make this not a domestic 

issue, but a global issue. 

And I see that I am out of time, so I will end there. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Professor Rian Thum appears in the 

Appendix.] 

Chairman RUBIO. Ms. Batke. 

STATEMENT OF JESSICA BATKE, SENIOR EDITOR, CHINAFILE, 

AND FORMER RESEARCH ANALYST AT THE DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Ms. BATKE. Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, and distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to 

speak today. 

28 

I am here in a personal capacity, so I am only representing myself. Others have very ably already discussed what is happening in 

Xinjiang, so I won’t use my time on that. Instead, first I’d like to 

talk a little bit about terminology. I believe that if we are to treat 

what is happening in Xinjiang with the seriousness and alarm that 

it merits, we first need to accurately label what it is we are witnessing. 

Official Chinese sources refer to these as ‘‘transformation 

through education centers’’ or ‘‘counter-extremism centers.’’ And 

outside China, they are frequently called ‘‘reeducation camps.’’ 

But from what we’ve heard today, we know these are somewhat 

euphemistic characterizations and they do not clearly and precisely 

define what it is we are witnessing. Some observers have called 

them concentration camps based on a definition of the state—for 

reasons of state security, targeting particular ethnic and religious 

minorities and confining them into certain spaces. Other people 

have wondered whether these camps—because they are interning 

religious and ethnic minorities—could presage something much 

worse, like ethnic cleansing. 

And while I am not an expert in international law and I don’t 

feel I have standing to offer the legal term of art which most accurately defines what we’re seeing, I think the U.S. Government and 

the international community, in general, needs to think very hard 

about what is happening in these camps and what we should call 

them, and whether they are an early warning sign of something 

much worse to come. 

Turning to the Chinese leadership—despite a general lack of insight into Chinese leadership politics, Xinjiang Party Secretary 

Chen Quanguo’s role in this is unusually clear. His tenure coincides not only with the large-scale use of these camps, but as you 

noted, with the building of thousands of convenience police stations, with a massive increase in security personnel hiring and 

overall security spending, and as we know now, a massive increase 

in arrests as well. 

And this pattern of securitization, as was previously mentioned, 

echoes very clearly Chen Quanguo’s security policies in another 

ethnic minority region in China—Tibet—when he was Party Secretary there from 2011 to 2016. But though Chen has been directly 

responsible for overseeing these policies, neither Chen nor the policies themselves are sui generis. They clearly fit into a larger policy 

trend of criminalization of ethnic and religious identity, and that 

traces from central-level guidance, at least from 2014 if not earlier, 

down through regional regulations and local implementation. 

So what is the impact beyond Xinjiang? Domestically, surveillance capabilities and restrictive measures could be employed, and 

indeed, by some accounts they are already being employed, against 

other ethnic or religious minorities in China. 

Internationally, as we’ve discussed, Uyghurs in exile are not only 

surveilled, but they can be coerced into reporting on fellow 

Uyghurs back to Chinese state security authorities. Other governments have assisted China in forcibly repatriating ethnic minorities back to Xinjiang. 

29 

And finally, there is the issue of Chinese government pressure, 

even indirectly, often encouraging self-censorship among those of 

us who are here working and writing on China. 

So I am going to make a few policy recommendations. It is a mistake to think that staying silent on human rights in China is a 

neutral act. Instead, every instance of silence just resets Beijing’s 

expectations and it raises the psychic cost of reinjecting human 

rights back into the conversation later. Beijing still does care about 

its international reputation, meaning that both public and diplomatic pressure can be effective tools in encouraging change. 

My full recommendations are in my written statement, but I’ll 

just highlight a few of them here: 

• First, to maintain a clear, consistent, and full-throated public 

defense of human rights and religious freedom in Xinjiang in addition to direct diplomatic engagement. 

• To work with like-minded countries, particularly Muslim-majority countries, to coordinate an international response to the situation in Xinjiang and offer support to PRC citizens who have fled 

Xinjiang, whether here in the United States or elsewhere around 

the globe. 

• To limit private companies’ ability to provide training or equipment to Chinese state security agencies, and the Chair’s recent letter to Secretary Ross is very helpful in this regard. 

• And finally, to sanction relevant Chinese officials under the 

Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Any sanctions 

package should include Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. 

Sanctioning a sitting Politburo member who is one of the top 25 

leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in China would clearly 

convey the United States’ unequivocal condemnation of these 

camps. There is a list of additional leaders for your consideration 

in my written statement. 

Thank you for your time. I welcome your questions. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jessica Batke appears in the Appendix.] 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you all. Your testimony, while brief, has 

really gotten to the point. 

I want to start with the first one. You know, let me just make 

sort of an editorial comment at the front end. I know there’s a lot 

going on up here. Every morning brings news, depending on what’s 

going on on Twitter—statements, press, whatever it might be, 

but—and there is coverage here. There are people. There are some 

cameras and some journalists and others who might watch later. 

What we’ve heard described here today has both deep domestic 

and international implications of epic proportions. I know of few, 

if any, humanitarian outrages in the world that reach the level of 

what we’ve heard here described, and few in modern history that 

reach this level. And I daresay if this was happening in virtually 

any other part of the world, there’d be an incredible amount of outrage and coverage. And while I’m grateful to the journalists who 

are covering this today and those that may write about it, I am disappointed. Frankly, I am disappointed that there isn’t more interest, that there isn’t more coverage. This is horrifying. It certainly 

30 

is significantly more important for the future of the world and the 

21st century. 

You have a country that is in a full-scale effort to not just catch 

the United States but supplant us as the world’s premier economic, 

military, geopolitical, and technological power. And history has 

taught us that the most powerful country in the world in any given 

era shapes that era, shapes the global norms. It shapes the way 

the world looks, feels, and acts. 

I deeply believe that America’s rise, and particularly since the 

end of the Second World War, has led to the spread of concepts 

about liberty, freedom, democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity, and helped shape the post-World War II era. And so we 

have to fear that in a world that is shaped by a country—if that 

is what it reaches—that does this to their own people, you can only 

imagine what they would be willing to support, tolerate, and/or 

promote if they ever reach the same status. 

So I think this should inform our relationship and the urgency 

of all of our tasks with regard to our relationship with China. But 

focusing on this one in particular for a moment, let me first address those—and this is going to deal with your story, Ms. Hoja— 

of those who say to us—and I’ve had people tell me this—Human 

rights is important, but we have to be pragmatic and we can’t raise 

it in every forum, can’t talk about it all the time, and at the end 

of the day there are horrible things happening all over the world. 

We cannot tell other countries what to do all the time. We need to 

be focused on America and Americans. 

Your story is about America and Americans. You are a United 

States citizen. You work for Radio Free Asia. And you have testified here today that your brother, your elderly and infirm parents 

have been detained, that over 20 of your relatives, including aunts, 

cousins, children, have been detained. 

You have also testified here today, I believe in your written testimony—you may have said it verbally as well—that you know of 

other colleagues that have experienced the same. So here we have 

the testimony of a United States citizen working in a journalistic 

capacity whose family in another country has been harassed, detained, in some cases without any contact with their families, not 

knowing exactly what’s going on, because they don’t like what 

you’re saying in the United States—in the United States. A United 

States citizen’s family is being detained, harassed, and harmed in 

another country as an effort to silence you. 

And it is a testament to your bravery and courage that you have 

not been silenced and that you appear here today. I wonder how 

many have been silenced, and how many have chosen not to speak. 

And who can blame them? Who wants to put their family through 

this? 

You don’t have to name names, but I’m interested in you sharing 

with us for the record whether, in fact, your story is an isolated 

one, or are there, in fact, more people who find themselves in the 

circumstances you are in. Again, I will leave it up to them to identify who they are and so forth, but is yours the only story, or are 

other people going through the exact same thing you are facing 

right now, other U.S. citizens? 

31 

Ms. HOJA. Of course, there are—the Chinese government right 

now puts people in reeducation camps who have a friend or family 

members outside of China. They feel they will influence them. That 

is why. I don’t know the number, but I believe everyone, every 

Uyghur has somebody in the family or friends in the camps right 

now. You can ask any Uyghur, any, including my five other colleagues in our office. 

And Rebiya Kadeer is here. Her sons, daughters, even grandchildren are locked up. She doesn’t know where they are, how they 

are. And we recently confirmed Dolkan Isa’s mother passed away 

in the reeducation camps. 

So I wonder what evidence we have to prove again and again. So 

we’ve been trying to cover this darkness, the issues, for more than 

one year because the Chinese government, this Chen Quanguo, is 

using this policy harshly from the beginning of last year. But we 

have been—for example, for 17 years, I’ve been releasing every day, 

similar situations, similar human rights issues, abuses by the Chinese, but unfortunately, we are the only source. Radio Free Asia 

is the only voice to talk about ourselves. So is that enough? We 

don’t know—because I’m still here. I’m raising my voice because we 

don’t have a choice. We don’t have any other people to talk. So we 

are the hope. So I have to stand up. I cannot give up. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman RUBIO. I ask you this, and I don’t know if you even 

know the answer. You may not, and it does not mean there are not 

any people in these circumstances, but putting ourselves in that position, I think few people would have the courage that you have exhibited and the willingness to continue to speak, knowing the consequences of it. 

Are you aware of or do you fear, do you have any sense or any 

reason to believe that there are those who have chosen—no one 

blames them for it—who have chosen to stop speaking up for purposes of avoiding what’s happening to you? 

Ms. HOJA. Of course, like when I heard my brother was detained, 

I chose to not speak up, too, because my mother asked me—she 

said, Please, I already lost you. I do not want to lose my son, too. 

Because I have been, and we have been, my family could not unite 

in 17 years. I believe other Uyghurs have similar situations—somebody is locked up in the jail, or detained, or in reeducation camps. 

We don’t want to put them in further danger because of our acts 

or any word against China. 

Chairman RUBIO. In your time talking about these issues, highlighting them globally here in the United States, have you ever felt 

like media outlets, individuals, companies, whoever, have chosen to 

not speak about your cause for fear of the impact it might have on 

their ability to cover events in China or their ability to do business 

in China? In essence, they may not have relatives, but they may 

have other interests in China that they are afraid there will be retribution against them as a result, and therefore, they do not really 

want to get involved in your case. 

And listen, this could extend from a political figure who doesn’t 

want to touch it because they have a company in their home state 

who does a lot of business. It could be businesses. It could be media 

outlets who have a bureau and don’t want to lose access to a fastVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:20 Mar 31, 2019 Jkt 081003 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\DSHERMAN1\DESKTOP\30933.TXT DAVID
32 

growing and important country. I don’t know if at any point you’ve 

felt that there are those who have been complicit because of their 

own interests separate from having family. 

You don’t have to tell us who they are unless you want to. But 

I’m just curious whether that extends beyond simply those who 

have family members. 

Ms. HOJA. Yes, I know. If you want to interview someone who 

is involved in human rights issues, or other issues they are doing 

there, like investigations—some of them will say, Excuse me, right 

now I cannot speak. Those kinds of reactions we are facing all of 

the time. But I do not know the exact company or the person. 

Maybe our colleagues can follow up that question. 

Chairman RUBIO. And again, we would be interested in that. It 

can be done confidentially if you choose for us not to share it. But 

I think it’s part of the broader long arm of China, which I think 

goes well beyond—I mean, we have seen it at universities. There 

are universities in this country that will not provide you, sadly, a 

forum to say what you’ve just said because they’re going to lose 

their Confucius Institute funding, or they’re going to lose their 

campus in mainland China. And so they decide—— 

Ms. HOJA. Even some Uyghur researchers in other countries, 

they have an opportunity to speak. They have freedom, but they 

are afraid, too. 

Chairman RUBIO. All right. 

Ms. Batke and Professor Thum, I wanted to focus on two things. 

On our relationship with China, a lot has been said about what we 

can do. How can we influence behavior? 

It has been my experience that there are two things they seem 

to respond to and only two things. Number one is sort of sustained 

and committed pressure across the entire relationship, meaning the 

entire—you cannot just carve out pieces of it and say we’re going 

to deal with trade here but human rights over here. We’re going 

to deal with military affairs here but economics over here. 

They most certainly pressure—the strategy China seems to follow is not one of sweeping change, although when they see an opportunity, they seize it. It seems to be one of slow, steady, but consistent escalation. The South China Sea is an example. Every time, 

they push a little bit further, creating a new normal every step of 

the way. And they pressure across the board—so today is very enlightening. 

The administration had an opportunity to sanction ZTE. They 

did, basically issuing a death penalty—allowed them to come back 

into business by allowing them to buy chips from Qualcomm. 

Qualcomm had a pending deal in China, and the response of the 

Chinese after the ZTE thing got finalized is to continue to slowdance Qualcomm, an American company, until the point where 

they’ve abandoned their hopes of doing business in China. Basically, they continue to sustain their pressure while we have given 

concessions on some things. I hope that was enlightening for the 

administration. I know it’s unrelated directly to this topic. 

But the first is sustained and committed pressure across the relationship, and the second is something that Ms. Batke pointed out, 

and that is invoking international partners. They want to be—one 

of the goals of the Chinese Communist Party in the 21st century 

33 

is to remake the global order to benefit them, to replace the Western global order that was established after the Second World War, 

with one that has their imprint. And part of that is the perception 

and the receptivity that people may have to that, based on their 

perceptions of China. 

And so if their perception of the Chinese Communist Party is 

that it’s a country with a lot of money, a non-interference policy, 

that is there to help you build things and move ahead without having to put up with some of the restrictions that American aid or 

Western aid comes with . . . that makes them appear benevolent 

and peaceful and in many cases continues the whole ‘‘bide your 

time and hide your power’’ strategy that they followed for a very 

long time. 

If the perception of them is that they do bad deals, they take advantage of their partners and they violate people’s rights . . . if it’s 

a negative perception about the things they do, they’re very sensitive to that because it goes right to the heart of their ability to 

remake the geopolitical system. And that’s why they are so fearful 

of sustained—of our ability to invoke global partnerships to confront them and why it’s important that we continue to do so. It’s 

a little hard to do when you are fighting with some of the people 

that might join us in that, on trade, but hopefully that will be resolved so that we can do that. 

So here are my two questions. The first is, Why is it so important? I know why it was important in the context of the Cold War 

and the Soviet Union—that in every instance virtually every American President, in addition to raising Soviet expansionism and nuclear weapons threats, always raised the cause of human rights. 

If I were standing here today and said, Look, China is too powerful . . . they’re too rich. We’ve got to do business with them. We 

can’t afford to mess all of that up by raising these human rights 

issues—I’ve already outlined why I think it’s important, and that 

is to sustain pressure across the relationship. But in your view, beyond the moralistic and humanitarian rationale, from a geopolitical 

rationale, why is it important that the United States, in every instance, raise these issues in every forum in which we engage them 

and—that’s question 1. 1(A) is, Why is it important that it be public? Because the other thing we get is, We’re going to raise it with 

them, but in private, because they don’t like to lose face. They don’t 

want to be embarrassed. So why is it important that we raise it 

geopolitically, just from sheer national interest, and why is it important that some of that or a lot of it be done publicly as opposed 

to in private one-on-one meetings? If you could both comment on 

that. 

Mr. THUM. I think, as Jessica Batke pointed out, when things are 

not raised repeatedly, there is a reset of the norm. And you have 

to claw back that little part of the discourse to get it back on the 

table. And then that comes at a cost. 

So I agree that it’s important to raise this at every moment. And 

there actually is a legislative opportunity here. There’s a law on 

the books from the late 90s that says that Tibet has to be raised 

in certain circumstances, and it would be very valuable, I think, to 

add the Xinjiang issue to that piece of legislation. I would add, 

though, that it’s quite dangerous to link this Uyghur and Xinjiang 

34 

issue to geopolitics. I heard the words ‘‘blue seas’’ earlier, which invokes this kind of balance where if we intervene in Xinjiang, then 

that affects this global military strategic situation. That plays in 

very neatly to the Chinese Communist Party’s story about why 

they are engaged in this kind of activity and why they don’t have 

to listen when people in the rest of the world say that this violates 

international norms. 

So I would hope we—— 

Chairman RUBIO. ‘‘Story’’ meaning that the West is trying to constrain and contain them from their rise? 

Mr. THUM. The West is trying to constrain and contain, and even 

that the West might have some sort of secret joy when there’s unrest or trouble in Xinjiang and that this can be used as a pressure 

point on China in our geopolitical rivalry. So if we don’t separate 

those concerns, we’re going to have a great deal of trouble getting 

all of our international partners on board in undermining the 

CCP’s narrative on why this is happening. And I’ll also say just 

briefly—— 

Chairman RUBIO. I don’t think you are saying it shouldn’t be 

raised in every forum, but I take what you’re saying as, it should 

be its own separate category within the broader engagement, 

meaning you don’t trade human rights for a better trade deal. 

Mr. THUM. That’s—yes, sure. I would accept that. I would also 

say that we are thinking somewhat small here. Senator King 

raised the long-standing criticism of America’s activities in regard 

to 1930s Germany. I would remind everyone that that supposedly 

insufficient reaction included Roosevelt recalling our Ambassador 

from Berlin. We are behind the curve on that reaction which is considered historically now to be insufficient. 

Dr. Batke raised the issue of terminology and pointed out that 

these nightmare words of the 20th century—concentration camp, 

apartheid, gulag, all started out their careers as euphemisms that 

were designed to hide the terrors. That’s the point we are at now. 

But one day Xinjiang’s reeducation camps, under one name or another, are going to join that list of widely recognized atrocities. And 

I think we have a responsibility to act boldly to address that issue. 

Ms. BATKE. I would second everything Dr. Thum just said. In 

terms of why it is important to keep bringing it up all the time, 

beyond what he just said, there’s this issue of the exporting of Chinese norms—as you were talking about—across the world. And I 

think that one thing that is important to remind other people is 

China touts itself as this country that does not interfere in the internal affairs of another. 

But beyond the moral imperative of bringing this up, it’s important to remember that when we don’t, we are allowing them to 

interfere in our internal affairs and decide how we decide to bring 

up and frame things. And that’s a point that I think can be brought 

up again to other countries in terms of why they should also be 

speaking up, because those norms are also being reset and exported to those countries. 

In terms of why it’s important to keep these things public, 

cordoning off these conversations into only private discussions allows them to confine that discussion and allows them to walk away 

from things without any sense of shame or embarrassment. InterVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:20 Mar 31, 2019 Jkt 081003 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\DSHERMAN1\DESKTOP\30933.TXT DAVID
35 

national pressure is effective. And I would point to the case of Liu 

Xia who was just recently released from house detention in Beijing 

and allowed to go to Germany. And that was a two-pronged effort. 

That was a lot of quiet diplomacy behind the scenes but also a sustained and public campaign keeping her case in the public eye. 

Chairman RUBIO. And just on the public front versus private, on 

an individual basis, if there is an individual case somewhere in the 

world and progress can be made because there’s some internal political reason why they’ve got to be able to save face—that’s one 

thing. But we are talking about detention, and frankly in my view, 

the torture, humiliation, and abuse of hundreds of thousands of 

people—more, actually. 

And that’s why—there is not one individual that they could 

somehow just—this is one person. And I am not downplaying that 

one particular case, but that’s what we do on this Commission. It’s 

overwhelming. We could—volumes of names if that’s what we 

choose to do in that regard. 

I do want to ask both of you—the second part about invoking 

international partners to confront it. It is my view that if something even a quarter as bad as this were occurring in virtually any 

Western democracy now or various other countries around the 

planet, it would not just get more media coverage, but it would be 

widely condemned in every international forum. There would be 

widespread action against it. I mean, it would be intolerable. 

Why isn’t this occurring in the same way? What have they done 

or what is happening that has prevented this from reaching that 

level of international attention? I suspect I know the answer, but 

I would love to see if you agree. So I’m not going to tell you my 

answer until you tell me yours. 

Ms. BATKE. Sure. I would say, quite baldly, money talks. China 

is very effective at going to countries one-on-one and making clear 

that they are happy to use their economic leverage as necessary to 

get their silence. I think this is really clear in the case of the 

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. They’ve only issued two statements about what’s happening in Xinjiang: one right after the 

U ̈ ru ̈mqi riots in 2009, and one in 2015. But they said nothing since 

all of this has been happening in the last year. I strongly suspect 

that that has to do with economic concerns on their part. 

Mr. THUM. Yes, I don’t have much to add to that. I think you’re 

right. This would be roundly condemned if it happened virtually 

anywhere else. It would be a major news item. And I agree that 

this is about money and China’s economic clout. It’s not helped by 

major powers like the U.S. retreating from human rights concerns 

and putting economic concerns first. But yes, that’s absolutely what 

it is. 

Chairman RUBIO. It strikes me—and that’s my assessment as 

well. I mean, that is how I feel as well, and it is not—obviously, 

money does talk, and Chinese investment abroad isn’t simply into 

roads and bridges. I mean, they fund political parties. They fund 

individuals. There are all sorts of things that come about as a result of this, and that leverage is one they made very clear. 

We’ve also seen them, for example, cut off tourism to South 

Korea, allow agricultural products from the Philippines to rot at 

36 

the port, deny rare earth minerals to Japan—all in retribution for 

decisions that were made in those countries. 

So taking that as a factor, you basically testified here today that 

the reason why certain countries cannot internally make a political 

decision to confront this in international forums is because the Chinese are using leverage. We’ve heard how they go after the family 

members of United States citizens as leverage to try to silence criticism of their practices. 

And I think that’s a pretty stark example of how hypocritical 

they are when they talk about their policy of noninterference when 

they are directly interfering in the affairs of other countries, because they are interfering with citizens of other countries by going 

after their families. They are interfering with their political leaders 

by threatening to cut them off from essential aid and help. They 

are shaping and interfering quite directly. So the hypocrisy of that 

is extraordinary. 

I have one more question. We do need to wrap up. 

Dr. Batke, I wanted to ask you about the testimony that you 

gave regarding the Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and 

his role within the leadership and the role that he plays in the repressive measures. You pointed to him as sort of the one individual 

that we should be looking at and—in your view, what would be the 

psychological—we would have to view what the economic impact of 

it is and the like. But you have talked about it and you have described it as a pretty significant escalatory measure, one that 

would get attention because for the first time you are not going 

after a country or even a party, but a specific individual. 

I know I am asking you to speculate, but what impact do you 

think that would have internally among them, knowing now that, 

if they are participants in this sort of activity, they are now individually going to be named internationally as complicit in these activities? 

Ms. BATKE. You’re right. I cannot speculate about what’s going 

on in their heads directly. I don’t think that it would necessarily 

stop people from choosing to participate. And as much as we talk 

about repression, I think also there’s a lot to be said about the 

choices of people in government in terms of whether they feel like 

they can completely step back from what they’ve been asked to do. 

So I don’t know that it would prevent other young people from joining the government and choosing to do this. But I do think it would 

be an incredibly powerful symbolic step, particularly because Chen 

Quanguo is so high up in the Chinese Communist Party, rather 

than going after someone who is very low level, running maybe a 

camp or something. Although I think we should name and shame 

those people as well. This actually would show that the U.S. Government is unequivocally condemning these camps and is willing to 

raise it to a very high political level to do it. 

Chairman RUBIO. My last two questions, and I’ll be brief. 

On the first—you were here for the first panel. You saw the back 

and forth with the Commerce Department—and again, I’m paraphrasing. But what I took from it is two things. Number one is our 

laws may potentially need to be updated to include new things, 

such as these repressive tools. I mean these tools that did not exist 

before. 

37 

But the other thing I took from it is we have to make—I am 

paraphrasing, but the way I took it was, we look at this product, 

the DNA sequencer. They’re easy to do. They’re not really that 

complex, although if there was not something unique about them, 

they wouldn’t have to buy them from this company in Massachusetts. But nonetheless, they’re not that advanced. China makes 

them. Plenty of other countries make them. They can find them 

anywhere in the world anyway. And they have a legitimate purpose. 

If we deny it, they’re still going to keep doing what they’re doing. 

The only consequence will be that some American company will not 

be able to make money off of it. So since they’re going to do it anyway, we might as well continue to make a profit. 

In addition to the immorality of that and the notion about whether we want to be complicit in it, isn’t that exactly what they’re 

counting on, the idea that they know that one of the most powerful 

constituencies in America is business interests who, frankly, don’t 

feel like they have a human rights obligation. They feel like they 

have a fiduciary obligation to their owners or shareholders to return a profit. And as a result, for them, they bring pressure to bear 

on the United States. 

I see this in multiple realms, by the way, not just with regard 

to China. But one of the most consistent arguments you always get 

is of the business community coming back and saying, you’re hurting us. We have a good thing going, and this huge market, and if 

you do this, you are going to hurt an American company. The Chinese government clearly understands that leverage point and they 

use it. Do they not? 

Ms. BATKE. Yes. 

Chairman RUBIO. Does anyone disagree with that? 

Mr. THUM. I agree with that, and the conclusion that leads me 

to is that whatever action the U.S. Government takes is going to 

come at a cost. It’s going to come at a cost to American citizens, 

and it’s going to come at a cost to the options on the table for the 

U.S. Government. This is about political will. 

Chairman RUBIO. All right. My final question is, if you’re sitting 

in the Chinese Communist Party headquarters today and you’re reviewing this policy, you probably aren’t even aware that we are 

having this hearing, but the people who are in the embassy here 

are, and they are annoyed by it. They don’t like this commission. 

They most certainly don’t like me, and they get irritated when 

these things come up. But by and large, the world will go on, and 

tomorrow morning this is not going to lead headlines here, or anywhere, for that matter. The work continues. There are people that 

are certainly being intimidated by it. 

In essence, they’re sitting there thinking to themselves, this stuff 

is working. No one’s condemning us internationally. We’re continuing to do what we’re doing. We’re getting better at it every single day. As time goes on, it’ll get easier as young people get disconnected from their heritage and their families. 

Yes, they will have some commission hearings and a couple of 

senators and congressmen will write letters. And maybe they will 

cut us off from a DNA sequencer one day, and maybe a couple of 

38 

our individuals might get sanctioned, but that’s a small price to 

pay for the big picture. 

It’s working. That’s the saddest part of all. This strategy they are 

carrying out is working. That would be their view. And unless we 

change that dynamic or at least raise the price for it, this will continue. It will grow. It will become more widespread. In essence, it’ll 

become the new normal. It will become baked in to the reality. 

Am I wrong in that horrible assessment? 

Mr. THUM. I think you’re right about the attitude that they have 

toward this. And you’re right about the threat that this becomes 

baked in to a larger order. We see, for example, some of these technologies used in Xinjiang being exported to South America. But I 

don’t think this is a hopeless cause because China’s expanding influence around the world depends a great deal on its reputation. 

For that reason, its leaders are very sensitive about its global reputation. 

So the more that we can do publicly, and in particular, in partnership with other countries around the world, to expose what’s 

going on and to shame the Chinese state for engaging in this kind 

of behavior, the greater the cost will be. I think it’s a mistake to 

consider decision making at that level as something where they’re 

certain about what they are doing. They see this as a balance of 

costs and benefits. And if we can add to the cost side, we may very 

well be able to shape the situation. 

Chairman RUBIO. And I don’t disagree with your assessment that 

this is not a hopeless cause. In fact, I only think it becomes a hopeless cause if we accept it as a fact that we have to deal with. 

I raise the fact that it is working for the following reason, and 

that is, we can have a lot of commission meetings. We’re going to 

issue our report, we’re going to file bills, we’re going to write letters, we’re going to give speeches, and we are going to highlight 

this as much as we can. But this needs to be prioritized at the 

highest levels of our engagement both with China and the international community. 

Congress is an important part of it, and we can even be the catalyst for it. But there is no replacing executive-level attention to this 

as part of the overall framework of our interaction with the international community and with China. And that is the only way that 

ultimately, we are going to see that cost-benefit analysis adjusted. 

Congress can be a catalyst for it. Individual senators and congressmen can be a catalyst for it, but the execution of it will require us to have sustained—across both parties, across a sustained 

period of time, across multiple presidential administrations—attention to this. This cannot be a one-off issue. And that’s the only way 

to keep it from becoming hopeless. That’s why I asked that, because if we want some sense of urgency, we shouldn’t think that 

simply shining a light on it alone is going to change that dynamic. 

We need the top people in our government not just to be aware 

of this but to be outraged by it, and to embrace it as part of our 

overall narrative. That’s what we’re hoping to do. And that’s what 

I hope the first panel took back. 

So I want to thank you all for being here, particularly you, Ms. 

Hoja. Thank you for being a part of this. I know this is an ongoing 

issue for you. After we leave this hearing here today, you live with 

39 

this reality. But I thank you for your courage, your bravery, and 

your willingness to stand here today and provide that testimony. 

Thank you all for being a part of it. I know it takes time away from 

your other endeavors to be a part of this. 

The record on this hearing will remain open for 48 hours in case 

some of you would like to submit additional information for the 

record so it can be a part of our record and maybe even make it 

into our report before we issue it in October. And there may be 

some follow-up questions from Members. If you have time to answer, we’d love to have that. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the hearing was concluded.] 

A P P E N D I X 

(43) 

1 50 U.S.C. §§ 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015). 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY CHRISTINO III 

Thank you Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, and Members of the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China for convening this hearing today on this important 

topic. Today I will be discussing the role of the Bureau of Industry and Security 

in regard to export license requirements for China. 

Under the Export Administration Regulations (the EAR), a Bureau of Industry 

and Security (BIS) license is required for the export or reexport of most items on 

the Commerce Control List (CCL) to China. Items on the CCL are identified by their 

individually assigned Export Control Classification Number according to their reasons for control. The CCL is comprised of items controlled by the multilateral export 

control regimes (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group) as well as items controlled unilaterally 

for foreign policy reasons. 

In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights 

throughout the world, the United States unilaterally controls items on the CCL for 

crime-control reasons, as required by Section 6(n) of the Export Administration Act 

of 1979, as amended 1 (the EAA). As set forth in the EAR, the U.S. Government requires a license to export most crime-control and detection instruments, equipment, 

related technology, and software to all destinations other than Australia, India, 

Japan, New Zealand, and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Additionally, a license is required to export certain crime-control items, including restraint-type devices (such as handcuffs) and discharge-type arms (such as stun 

guns), to all destinations except Canada. 

The EAR imposes some limited controls on items not on the CCL. Items subject 

to Commerce licensing jurisdiction under the EAR but not specifically identified on 

the CCL are designated EAR99. Such items generally do not require a license for 

export or reexport to China unless destined for certain WMD-related end uses or 

end users, or unless the items are part of a transaction involving a restricted party 

identified on one of several lists of sanctioned or restricted entities maintained by 

agencies of the U.S. Government, including BIS, the Department of State, and the 

Department of the Treasury. 

Items controlled for crime-control reasons are added to or removed from the CCL 

based upon continuous review of the merits of maintaining the controls and the effectiveness of the controls. Section 6 of the EAA prohibits the imposition of foreign 

policy controls, including on crime-control items, unless certain determinations are 

made and certain factors reported to Congress, such as determinations that the controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy objective, descriptions of consultation efforts with industry and other supplier countries, determinations related 

to the economic impact on U.S. industry and efforts to achieve the purpose of the 

controls through alternative means, descriptions of foreign availability, and determinations regarding the ability to effectively enforce the controls. 

CRIME CONTROL LICENSING REVIEW POLICY

The U.S. Government considers applications to export or reexport most crime-control items favorably, on a case-by-case basis, unless there is civil disorder in the 

country or the sale involves a region of concern, or there is evidence that the government may have violated human rights. The purpose of these controls is to deter the 

development of a consistent pattern of human rights abuse, distance the United 

States from such abuse, and avoid contributing to civil disorder in a country or region. The U.S. Government maintains a general policy of denial for specially designed implements of torture, regardless of the intended destination. 

44 

Applications to export crime-control items to countries that are not otherwise subject to sanctions or comprehensive embargoes, but that are identified by the Department of State as human rights violators, receive additional scrutiny in the license 

review process. The Department of State reviews all license applications for these 

countries on a case-by-case basis and makes recommendations to Commerce. 

SPECIFIC LICENSING REVIEW POLICY FOR CHINA FOR CRIME-CONTROL ITEMS

Following the 1989 military assault on demonstrators by the Chinese government 

in Tiananmen Square, the U.S. Government imposed constraints on the export to 

China of crime-control and detection instruments and equipment on the CCL under 

Section 902(a)(4) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 

1991, Public Law 101–246. 

In fiscal year 2017, the Department of Commerce approved 25 licenses to China 

of crime-control items, 21 of which were for the return of defective rifle scopes and 

one license for the return of defective shotguns to their original Chinese manufacturers for refund or replacement, and three were for biometric identification equipment for a third country’s visa system operating at its own diplomatic facilities in 

China. There were nine denials, including applications for cattle prods and stun 

guns, optical sighting devices, pepper spray, fingerprint powder, dyes and inks, and 

voiceprint software, to Chinese security agencies, manufacturing and development 

firms, and resellers. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify here today. I will be happy to take 

your questions. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KELLEY E. CURRIE

Thank you, Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith and other members of the Commission for convening this important hearing today. I am pleased to be able to appear 

before the Commission on behalf of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and discuss our concerns regarding the growing human rights crisis in Xinjiang, with a 

particular focus on how this crisis is being addressed—or not—at the United Nations, including through its various human rights mechanisms and deliberative bodies. I would like to submit my full remarks for the record. 

As Secretary Pompeo noted yesterday in his op-ed welcoming the first ever U.S.- 

sponsored Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, the State Department recently 

hosted six journalists from Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Service to hear directly from 

them about the situation on the ground in Xinjiang. What RFA, as well as the 

Uyghur Service at VOA, have documented over the past year is truly disturbing. 

Their reporting indicates that Chinese authorities are likely detaining hundreds of 

thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in what can only be described 

as internment camps across Xinjiang. There, they are subjected to ‘‘political reeducation’’ designed to undermine their distinct Uyghur identity. One of these journalists, Gulchehra Hoja, will testify in the next panel, and will undoubtedly tell you 

about how 23 of her family members—twenty-three—have been detained and how, 

since their detention, the authorities have provided little to no information about 

her family’s well-being. 

According to a growing number of credible reports by media and human rights 

organizations, a version of Gulchehra’s story is becoming the norm for nearly every 

Uyghur living outside China who has family still in Xinjiang. In fact, having a family member overseas appears to be a key trigger for increased scrutiny for Uyghurs 

living in Xinjiang. Likewise, having studied, traveled or worked overseas, appearing 

to be an observant Muslim, and having an above average education also seem to 

be among the reasons that certain individuals are subject to intensive scrutiny by 

the authorities, including detention in the camps. Think about that: over the past 

year, hundreds of thousands of law-abiding Uyghur citizens of China—men, women, 

and even children—have disappeared into state custody, with barely any notice from 

the international community. That is why this hearing is so timely and important. 

The United States is deeply troubled by the Chinese government’s worsening 

crackdown on Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region. Since April 2017 the Xi Jinping leadership, under the guise of 

fighting ‘‘terrorism,’’ ‘‘secession,’’ and ‘‘religious extremism,’’ has greatly intensified 

the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing repressive policies against mainstream, non-violent Muslim cultural and religious practices in Xinjiang. The stated 

goal of the current campaign is to ‘‘sinicize religion’’ and ‘‘adapt religion to a socialist society,’’ suggesting that Beijing wagers that it now possesses the political, diplomatic, and technological capabilities to transform religion and ethnicity in Chinese 

45 

society in a way that its predecessors never could, even during the peak horrors of 

the Cultural Revolution and other heinous Maoist campaigns intended to remake 

Chinese society. 

The scope of this campaign is truly breathtaking: authorities now prohibit ‘‘abnormal’’ beards and the wearing of veils in public, and classify refusal to watch state 

television, refusal to wear shorts, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, refusal to eat 

pork, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, or practicing traditional funeral 

rituals, as potential signs that individuals harbor extreme religious views. Chinese 

authorities have banned parents from giving their children a number of traditional 

Islamic names, including ‘‘Muhammad,’’ ‘‘Islam,’’ ‘‘Fatima,’’ and ‘‘Aisha,’’ and have 

reportedly required children under age 16 who have Islamic names to change them. 

Of particular concern, since 2015 Chinese authorities have increasingly criminalized 

or punished the teaching of Islam to young people—even by their parents—adopting 

at least six laws or regulations which put parents and religious educators at legal 

risk for promoting non-violent Muslim scripture, rituals, and clothing to children. 

Chinese authorities also continue to crack down in particular on the use of Uyghur 

and other minority languages at universities and in classroom instruction. 

Failing to comply with these restrictions, or activities such as communicating with 

relatives abroad and studying in foreign countries, has reportedly led to the detention of a large number of Uyghurs and other Muslims, including families and children, in facilities for purported ‘‘patriotic reeducation.’’ Detainees are required to 

learn the Chinese language, recite Chinese and Xinjiang laws and policies, watch 

pro-government propaganda videos, express their gratitude to the Communist Party 

and General Secretary Xi Jinping, and renounce their ethnic identities, religious beliefs, and mainstream cultural and religious practices. Detainees are granted no due 

process or contact with their families, and periods of detention have ranged from 

several months to indefinite detention in many cases. A wide array of evidence indicates that the number of individuals detained in such reeducation centers since 

April 2017 numbers at least in the hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions. 

There are even disturbing reports that young children have been sent to state-run 

orphanages if even one of their parents is detained in the internment camps. Notable detainees reportedly include well-known Uyghur athletes, prominent 

businesspersons, scholars, and students. There have been credible reports of at least 

two dozen deaths in these camps, including senior citizens who were incarcerated, 

including the widely revered 82-year-old Uyghur religious scholar Muhammed Salih 

Hajim. We call on China to end these counterproductive policies and free all those 

arbitrarily detained. 

To guarantee that this suppression continues beyond the internment camps into 

the daily lives of all Uyghurs, Chinese authorities have constructed a highly intrusive, high-tech surveillance system in Xinjiang, which many experts fear will be extended throughout China. This system includes thousands of surveillance cameras, 

including in mosques; facial recognition software; obligatory content-monitoring 

apps on smartphones and GPS devices on cars; widespread new police outposts with 

tens of thousands of newly hired police, and even Party personnel embedded in people’s homes; and compulsory collection of vast biometric datasets on ethnic and religious minorities throughout the region, including DNA and blood samples, 3D 

photos, iris scans, and voiceprints. Human Rights Watch has documented that many 

of these DNA samples were collected deceptively as part of what regional officials 

called a Xinjiang-wide ‘‘health’’ campaign. This surveillance system has spurred security experts and Xinjiang specialists to label it one of the world’s most intrusive 

police states. 

As with many things related to China’s human rights abuses, the repression does 

not stop at the Chinese border. The detention and persecution of Uyghur and other 

Muslim minorities in Xinjiang has compelled them to stop communicating with their 

family and friends based abroad, including in the United States, for fear of retribution by authorities. We have received reports that U.S. lawful permanent residents 

and family members of U.S. citizens have been detained in these detention centers 

for indefinite periods. We have also received reports that U.S. citizens have been 

detained and interrogated while visiting Xinjiang. In addition to the cases of the 

RFA journalists mentioned earlier, we note that more than thirty relatives of Ms. 

Rebiya Kadeer have been disappeared or detained. This treatment of U.S. citizens, 

U.S. LPRs, and their family members is unacceptable, and we unequivocally condemn these actions by the Chinese government. China must provide information 

about the locations and medical condition of those detained and immediately release 

them if there is no evidence of actual criminal activity. We also have demanded 

that, at a minimum, China should meet its obligations under international law to 

provide consular access, not to mention minimum standards of due process, to those 

it has detained. 

46 

We also are concerned by reports of Chinese authorities harassing Uyghurs 

abroad in order to compel them to act as informants against other Uyghurs, return 

to Xinjiang or remain silent about the situation there, sometimes by detaining their 

family members. This includes harassment of American citizens, LPRs, and individuals legally residing in the United States. China has applied similar pressure to 

dual nationals or family members of citizens in other countries. Dating back to at 

least 2003, China has pressured other countries to forcibly return Uyghurs, at times 

claiming that individuals are members of ‘‘extremist groups’’ without credible evidence. China has also abused the INTERPOL Red Notice system, inappropriately 

placing international security travel notices on religious and political dissidents. We 

applaud governments that have resisted Chinese pressure and upheld their commitments to international human rights. 

What is happening in Xinjiang is not just a human rights matter; it is also a security issue. China, like every other country, has the right to protect its security. But 

for these measures against violent extremism to be effective, they must promote 

good governance, inclusion, and respect for the rights of its minority citizens. However, draconian, indiscriminate, and disproportionate controls on ethnic minorities’ 

expressions of their cultural and religious identities have the potential to incite 

radicalization and violence. Chinese authorities appear to be targeting law-abiding 

Uyghurs—including non-violent activists and advocates for human rights—as terrorist threats on the basis of their political, cultural, and religious beliefs and practices, even if they do not advocate violence. 

Given the severity of this crisis, it is worth asking: why haven’t the pre-eminent 

human rights bodies of the United Nations taken up this issue, exposed it, and demanded changes in China’s policies? Part of the answer certainly lies with China’s 

membership on the UN’s Human Rights Council, its role as a permanent member 

of the Security Council, and its ability to continue to portray itself as a developing 

country from the ‘‘Global South’’ in alignment with the Group of 77. From its perch 

on the HRC, China is able to effectively block any action on its appalling human 

rights record in Xinjiang, as well as scrutiny of the broader human rights crackdown 

under way in China. Likewise, by severely limiting access for special rapporteurs, 

human rights experts and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 

the Chinese limit the discourse around these abuses. As a veto-wielding member of 

the Security Council, China effectively shuts down not only any discussion of its 

human rights abuses, but uses its position to shield other bad actors from criticism 

and generally block efforts to raise human rights issues in the Council. In doing so, 

China gains favor with other countries that have poor human rights records—of 

which there remain far too many in the UN—and these help block criticism of 

China in the General Assembly and other forums. 

Perhaps more disturbing than these defensive strategies, however, is China’s ongoing, comprehensive effort to re-write the entire normative framework of international human rights in a manner that is more aligned with its authoritarian political system and the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. This effort includes 

an emphasis on the ‘‘right to development’’ versus fundamental civil and political 

rights, and the promotion of ‘‘win-win’’ cooperation on human rights that privileges 

the interests of governments over their basic obligation to respect inherent human 

rights that attach at the individual level. A key aspect of this effort is China’s ability to obfuscate its intentions behind talk of ‘‘mutually beneficial cooperation’’ and 

a ‘‘shared future of all humanity’’ that appeals to other governments who dislike 

being criticized for human rights violations. The Chinese took a major step forward 

at the March 2018 session of the UN Human Rights Council, when the Council 

passed a Chinese resolution promoting ‘‘win-win cooperation’’ on human rights. The 

United States was the only vote against the resolution. At the same session, I listened in horror as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights praised the good 

intentions he saw behind Xi Jinping’s ‘‘win-win’’ slogans, seemingly oblivious to the 

threat they pose to the very notion of respect for individual human rights. Instead, 

he offered only a wan concern about the ‘‘mismatch’’ between the aspirations of 

‘‘win-win’’ and its implementation on the ground—as if they were not fruit of the 

same poisonous tree. In the same speech, Prince Zeid expressed strong concerns 

about ‘‘hate speech’’ and other perceived human rights abuses in the U.S. It was 

nothing short of surreal. 

In April, I had the opportunity to hear directly about the situation in Xinjiang 

from Mr. Dolkan Isa, who is the president of the World Uyghur Congress. He was 

in New York to attend the annual meeting of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples. Mr. Isa is a quiet and diligent person, now a naturalized German citizen, who carefully and deliberately explains the repression that his community in 

Xinjiang is experiencing—despite the fact that his own family has been targeted by 

the authorities and he has essentially lost communication with them. We had our 

47 

discussion about this situation while we sat in a small lounge outside the UN Security Council. The fact that Mr. Isa was even able to sit in that lounge, inside the 

walls of the UN, was a minor miracle given the extent to which Chinese authorities 

have gone to block him from entering the premises over the years. In April 2017, 

while attempting to attend the same Forum as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization delegation, Mr. Isa was forcibly removed from the 

UN premises after representatives of the Chinese mission to the UN alleged he was 

a security threat. The Chinese authorities provided no evidence to back up their 

claims but UN security removed Mr. Isa nonetheless. This shocking behavior was 

subsequently documented in a report on reprisals against human rights activists by 

the UN Secretary General. This report, which criticized the manner in which UN 

security responded and called for changes to the way the UN handled such allegations, was released one month before the 2018 Indigenous Peoples Forum. Yet the 

Chinese mission in New York attempted again this year to block Mr. Isa from participating as an NGO delegate, accusing him of involvement in terrorist financing 

and recruitment, while again providing no evidence. After a lengthy delay and several interventions from the U.S. and German missions on Mr. Isa’s behalf, he was 

finally allowed to participate on the final day of the Forum. 

Having been thwarted in their efforts to block Mr. Isa’s participation, the Chinese 

delegation then went after the German NGO that had sponsored his participation— 

the Society for Threatened Peoples. They used their position as a member of the UN 

committee that accredits civil society participation to attempt to revoke the Society’s 

consultative status. In their remarks to the Committee, the Chinese referred to Mr. 

Isa as a terrorist and a separatist who threatened Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. Let that sink in for a moment—China, a permanent member of the 

UN Security Council, a nuclear power with one of the biggest armies in the world— 

is threatened by a mild-mannered German citizen who talks about China’s treatment of the Uyghur people. 

Once again, the U.S. and German missions pushed back and we ultimately overcame Chinese efforts to intimidate the NGO. Afterwards, several NY-based colleagues expressed surprise that the normally careful and disciplined Chinese delegation would go to such extreme lengths—including a highly public fight with the 

United States in the NGO Committee—to block the participation of a previously little-known activist in a relatively obscure UN event. But those who follow human 

rights issues in China were not the least bit surprised to see the Chinese attempt 

to use the NGO Committee or any other part of the UN as a tool to carry out reprisals against an individual who has spoken out about China’s human rights record, 

in particular China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims. 

With China facing both its Universal Periodic Review and a period review in the 

Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination later this year, 

there will be more opportunities to call attention to the situation in Xinjiang, as well 

as the ongoing abuses in Tibet and Inner Mongolia and the general crackdown 

under way against human rights defenders, lawyers and other dissidents across 

China. The question is: Will others join us? So far the silence has mostly been deafening. 

I want to conclude my remarks by talking about a case that is close to my heart: 

the Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti. Ilham was an economics professor at Minzu University who wrote blog posts and articles asserting Uyghurs’ rights to genuine autonomy under Chinese law, which resulted in his arrest and a life sentence in prison 

in 2014 on charges of separatism. He was the kind of moderate voice who advocated 

for improved understanding between Han Chinese and Uyghurs while also encouraging the Chinese authorities to respect Uyghurs’ linguistic, cultural, and religious 

rights. He was a friend to Chinese human rights lawyers, Tibetan writers, and 

American scholars. His lovely daughter Jewher is today a student at Indiana University. He was supposed to travel with her and take up a teaching post there, but 

instead Chinese authorities pulled him off a plane and took him to prison. Today, 

he is serving a life sentence for separatism. We remain deeply concerned about the 

ongoing detention of Ilham Tohti, not just because of the issues around his arbitrary 

detention and unfair trial, as well as his worsening medical condition as he serves 

his absurd sentence, but because of the broader implications of China’s targeting of 

him and moderate voices like him—the very people who could help to build a truly 

multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, stable and prosperous society in Xinjiang and 

throughout China. 

As a small tribute to Ilham and those like him who are suffering for trying to 

improve human rights in Xinjiang and China, I would like to read a Chinese poem 

written in the aftermath of Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo’s death a little 

more than one year ago. This poem could just as easily apply to Ilham Tohti and 

48 

the other voices calling for moderation, peaceful coexistence and respect for human 

rights that the Chinese government is attempting to silence in Xinjiang: 

The world should know what is happening in Xinjiang, and USUN is committed 

to working toward that end—to watering the seeds, wherever they are. We face an 

uphill climb to do so at the United Nations, but we look forward to working with 

Congress, our colleagues in the administration, and with other countries who are 

committed to human rights, to ensure that China is not able to bury these abuses 

in the ground. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GULCHEHRA HOJA

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cochairman, and distinguished members of the Commission, 

it’s my privilege to participate in today’s hearing on a topic that deeply affects me 

personally and professionally as a reporter working for an organization with a congressional mission of bringing reliable news and information to people in China. 

My name is Gulchehra Hoja, I’m a journalist with Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur language service, and I’m a U.S. citizen. I grew up in U ̈ ru ̈mqi, the capital of the 

Uyghur region in China, where I began my career in broadcast journalism before 

coming to the United States in 2001 to work for Radio Free Asia (RFA). It was a 

great sacrifice to leave my homeland, where I had enjoyed success as a television 

journalist and where my parents, family and friends would remain. But coming here 

guaranteed me freedom—something that could never be realized in China. There, 

censorship and the pressure to toe the official line make truthful, objective journalism impossible. Being part of RFA, which broadcasts trustworthy news daily into 

Xinjiang, was for me the dream of a lifetime. Through this outlet, I could share this 

newfound freedom with those loved ones left behind. What I didn’t know then was 

the price for making this dream a reality. Nor did I know that it would be my family 

who would be forced to pay dearly for my freedom to live and work as a journalist 

in the United States. 

As I testify before you here today, it grieves me no end to say that my parents 

remain under threat, and more than two dozen of my relatives in China are missing—almost certainly held in reeducation camps run by authorities in the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). 

I last saw my mother when she visited me here in the United States in 2005. 

Only one of my three children has ever met my parents—my oldest daughter, when 

she visited them with my husband in 2008. I had no choice but to miss that family 

trip. Because of my work, it’s too dangerous for me to go back to China. 

For the 17 years since I’ve worked for RFA, local police and authorities have harassed my family. They’ve watched their every step, monitored their movements, and 

constantly questioned them about my whereabouts and whether I plan to return. 

The treatment my family has had to endure is because of my decision to come to 

America. Authorities considered it a betrayal. When I left the XUAR I had established myself by launching and hosting the first children’s program in the Uyghur 

Region for Xinjiang TV. (To this day, I hear from Uyghurs living in China that they 

saw me on television when they were children.) Chinese state media officials recognized my appeal with Uyghur audiences and rewarded me with national recognition 

and elevated status. But I always knew in my heart, as someone who witnessed repression in daily life for Uyghurs, that this success was not enough. I wanted to 

use my voice to bring issues into the light. Without even knowing it then, I wanted 


insert folio 7 here 30993.007
49 

to be a real journalist—one who is unafraid to ask questions and unafraid to seek 

answers. I was raised by educated parents who taught me to value culture, history, and 

most of all, open and free dialogue. It troubled me to witness how Chinese authorities not only downplayed these aspects of Uyghur identity—including religion and 

language—on state media, but also sought to erase them entirely. When I first 

heard Radio Free Asia during a trip to Europe, I knew right away that I had found 

my calling. To hear a report about a protest by Uyghurs in Germany against Beijing’s restrictive policies in the XUAR that would otherwise never be reported on, 

let alone known inside China, was amazing. Shortly after, I contacted the director 

of RFA Uyghur and asked about working for the broadcaster. He warned that I 

would have to give up everything if I were to leave China and work for the organization. It was a difficult choice, I told him, but it would be hard to live with myself 

if I didn’t make it. 

Since coming to RFA, I have felt fortunate to continue my work as a member of 

the world’s only Uyghur language news service outside of China. For the roughly 

12 million Uyghurs living in China’s Northwest, one of the world’s most restricted 

media environments, my colleagues and I are the only credible source for in-depth 

news and information of what’s happening in their towns, cities, and villages. RFA 

first reported on the July 2009 unrest in U ̈ ru ̈mqi, the following 10-month communication blackout in the region, the harsh restrictions preventing Uyghurs from observing the holy month of Ramadan and practicing their faith, the banning of the 

Uyghur language being taught in many schools, and the mass arrests and disappearances of men suspected of participating in protests and unrest. I have followed these stories with concern for my loved ones back home. 

But early last year, my worries grew as my colleagues and I uncovered even more 

disturbing evidence that China was building a security state of vast reach and 

scope. We reported on the wide-sweeping use of technology to track Uyghurs, the 

building of convenience police stations that dot the streets of Kashgar and U ̈ ru ̈mqi, 

even in mosques and elementary schools, and the confiscation of passports to bar 

any travel or movement out of the region for most Uyghurs. Chinese authorities 

showed barely any restraint in rounding up people, taking their smartphones, and 

contacting and detaining their family members. Authorities even began recalling 

hundreds of Uyghurs studying abroad in Egypt and detaining them upon their return. These individuals were being held in ‘‘reeducation centers’’—mostly in 

Kashgar, where thousands of people would be held at a time, with little if any contact with friends and family outside. 

My worries proved true when I first heard that my brother Kaisar Keyum was 

detained at the end of September last year. Police had taken him when he was driving my mother to a doctor’s appointment, leaving her alone in a car without explanation as she waited for her son who’d never return. Other family had to come get 

her. Kaisar was being held, my family learned later, in one of the so-called reeducation facilities. We have not seen him since. 

In February, my parents, both elderly and suffering from life-threatening ailments, went missing. Not being able to talk with my mother and father or to learn 

how they were doing was almost too much to bear. Being almost 7,000 miles away, 

I felt helpless—even more than when my brother was taken. I tried contacting other 

family but could not reach them. I learned in February that my aunts, cousins, their 

children—more than 20 people—had been swept up by authorities. I found out later 

that all had been detained on the same day. No one has confirmed their whereabouts. But I strongly suspect they are being held in these camps, which sources 

say hold over 1 million Uyghurs—men and women, youngsters and the elderly—in 

cramped and squalid conditions. My parents, whom I later discovered were held in 

medical facilities in detention camps, were allowed to leave in March—probably because of their poor health. Authorities had questioned my parents about me, my 

whereabouts, and my working for an organization they allege is ‘‘anti-China.’’ 

Nobody should suffer such treatment. But at least five of my colleagues at Radio 

Free Asia have also faced similar situations where family members in China have 

been detained. Often they too have heard reports of authorities questioning family 

and friends about their work for an ‘‘anti-Chinese’’ organization. Like me, they know 

little if anything about their relatives—whether they are well or even alive. It’s a 

cruel irony that we as journalists can find out so much about what’s happening inside China’s Northwest, yet so little about our own families and loved ones. We are 

afraid to ask our friends and others there because any contact and communication 

could endanger them as well. 

Despite these threats, I know—and my colleagues know—that we must continue 

for the sake of not letting a light be swallowed in the darkness, extinguished forever. We ask only that the United States and the international community make 

50 

clear in their dealings with China that this treatment of our families in our former 

homeland is unacceptable. I hope and pray for my family to be let go and released, 

but I know even if that happens, they will still live under constant threat. I came 

to the United States to realize a dream—a dream of being able to tell the truth 

without fear. And it may be difficult, but I’ll keep trying and I’ll keep working. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RIAN THUM

MASS INTERNMENT, FORCED INDOCTRINATION, AND CULTURAL CLEANSING: CHINESE

GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD MUSLIM MINORITIES IN XINJIANG


insert folio 11 here 30993.011 insert folio 12 here 30993.012
51 


insert folio 13 here 30993.013

construction of detention centers. In April the government requested construction bids for a new 

re-education camp of over 390,000 square feet, including an 86,000-square-foot underground 

facility. If this camp is built according to the same schedule as similar projects, it will come into 

service sometime between September and December of this year. So this is a problem that 

appears to be expanding even as we speak. 

The effects of this mass-internment program are obvious on the streets of cities in Uyghurmajority areas, where many houses and shops stand locked and empty. The state has instituted a 

parallel program of orphanage construction, to handle the large number of children left behind 

when parents disappear into internment camps. One county built eighteen orphanages in 2017. In 

some places the new construction is insufficient, and orphanages arc suffering from 

overcrowding. Those who have so far managed to stay out of the internment camps go about 

their daily activities under a shadow of fear, knowing that the tiniest misstep can lead to their 

disappearance. 

The following actions have been documented as causes tor enforced disappearance into the 

internment camps: expressing interest in travel abroad, encouraging a relative to travel abroad, 

returning to China from travel abroad, receiving a call from someone on a black list, praying 

with feet apart, giving up smoking, failing to greet officials, not using one's phone actively, 

being a Uyghur born in the 1980s or 1990s, possessing unapproved literature or sermons, having 

been present at a certain sermon delivered several years earlier, and being unable to speak 

Chinese. 

Growth of repression since 1990 

Chinese officials see the Uyghurs generally as a threat to both the territorial integrity of the 

People's Republic of China and to the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

Longstanding and widespread Uyghur dissatisfaction with Chinese rule has led to dissent, 

protests, rebellions, attacks on officials, and, in rare cases, terrorist attacks on ethnic Chinese 

civilians. Uyghur discontent is rooted in state-condoned racial discrimination, anger over 

outsider rule, and state attacks on Uyghur culture. In addition to policies that target Uyghurs 

directly, restrictions on personal freedoms that are technically in force throughout the People's 

Republic of China (such as the banning of religious participation for people under the age of 18 

and controls on speech) are enforced far more rigorously for Uyghurs. The ruling Communist 

Party of China (CCP) has tended to respond to Uyghur dissatisfaction and resistance with 

increasing limitations on Uyghurs' movement, speech, cultural expression, and worship, along 

with harsh punishments for perceived disloyalty to the CCP. Since about I 990, after a brief 

loosening of controls in the 1980s, restrictions on Uyghurs have steadily increased over time. 

Repression and surveillance ofUyghurs accelerated after July 5, 2009, when police tried to 

disperse a peaceful Uyghur protest in the provincial capital of Urumqi, and protesters turned 

violent, killing hundreds of ethnic Chinese bystanders. In the aftemmth, authorities shut down 

the internet throughout the province for ten months, flooded the region with troops from the 

paramilitary People's Armed Police, established checkpoints both in and between towns, 

blanketed major cities with security cameras, and began to require rural Uyghurs to apply for a 

special permit (ii,H<;; ~~·,a "People's Convenience Card'') to traveL 
52 


insert folio 14 here 30993.014

Under pressure to achieve "social stability," local officials throughout the region began 

experimenting with new kinds of restrictions and policies to encourage assimilation to ethnic 

Chinese culture. These included banning certain names tor children, such as Muhammad, 

offering cash rewards for inter-ethnic marriages, forced line dancing competitions (supposedly to 

undermine fundamentalist Islam), and shutting down local holy places. Prayer in public places 

was banned, as was most private education, including Uyghur language education. House-tohouse searches for banned books and other purportedly subversive materials became common. 

State-employed Uyghurs and school children were forced to sign pledges of loyalty to the CCP. 

None of these policies applied to ethnic Chinese. 

Sharp turn to a police state from 2016 

In August of 2016, Xinjiang received a new otricial, Chen Quanguo, in the top position of 

regional party secretary. Chen Quanguo was transferred from Tibet, where he had earned a 

reputation for successfully suppressing Tibetans' dissent through the securitization of society. In 

Xinjiang he expanded the harsh policies he had used in Tibet. Chen initiated the building of 

thousands of new police stations throughout the region, spaced every 500 meters or less in towns 

and cities. The state published contract offers for artificial intelligence systems and facial 

recognition software to link data from ubiquitous security cameras with other data collected on 

citizens. Uyghurs were ordered to submit all electronic devices to their local police station for 

inspection. All Uyghurs' passports were confiscated, to be returned only by special application to 

one's local police station. 

Uyghurs currently must pass through checkpoints with facial recognition software when entering 

various places, including public transport stations, bookstores, and markets. Particularly at 

roadblock checkpoints, they are often required to surrender smart phones. Police download the 

contents of the phone, check that it is running mandatory state spyware, and look for content 

deemed subversive. Discovery of content not approved by the state can lead to prison sentences 

or indefinite detention in the re-education camps. 

Mass internment camps for minorities 

Beginning in late 2016, Chen Quanguo oversaw the construction of a massive network of secret, 

extra-judicial internment camps, in which Uyghurs are subject to forced indoctrination. Police in 

many areas have told reporters that they have been given quotas for the number of people to be 

interned. In one part of Qaraqash, the quota is 40%. Officials who oversaw detentions in another 

village near Khotan reported in state media that 20% of the population was sent to the camps for 

re-education. Police in Tuwet township reported that just over 10% of the population had been 

imprisoned or sent to re-education camps. These villages are the only ones for which we have 

credible data on the proportion of the population interned. Similar percentages are likely for 

other areas. 

The diiliculty in obtaining definitive statistics about the number of people interned in the camps 

stems from efforts by the Chinese government to hide the camps from international scrutiny. A 

Chinese diplomat in Kazakhstan told foreign journalists that these camps do not exist. Foreign 

journalists arc not allowed to live in Xinjiang, and when they visit the region they are typically 

followed, harassed, and brict1y detained by Chinese police. A few visitors have managed to 

discreetly photograph the exterior of some camps, but none have been able to enter the camps or 
53 


insert folio 15 here 30993.015

elicit comprehensive data on the camps from Chinese officials. The existence of the camps is 

explicitly confirmed. however, by county-level governments in Xinjiang, who have on occasion 

promoted their "successes" in opening or operating the internment camps in local online media. 

In a few cases, cited above, police officials have, at great risk to themselves, answered phone 

calls from Radio Free Asia's journalists and divulged local statistics about internee numbers or 

discussed the kinds of behaviors used to select individuals for internment. 

The selection of victims for internment is limited in the first place by ethnicity. There are no 

known reports of ethnic Chinese being placed in the camps, only members of the Uyghur, 

Kazakh, and Kirghiz ethnic groups. The racially and ethnically targeted nature of policing in 

Xinjiang is further demonstrated by a leaked form used by police to evaluate the trustworthiness 

of residents in a neighborhood in Xinjiang. The form yields a numerical score. Subjects receive 

an automatic I 0% deduction for being Uyghur. They receive a further deduction if they have 

connections abroad. Various government bodies in Xinjiang have publicly solicited bids for 

computer systems that integrate this kind of data with surveillance data from cameras, 

checkpoints, and house-to-house searches, in order to flag individuals for detention using 

artificial intelligence that supposedly predicts anti-Chinese activities. This kind of system, 

known as an ''integrated joint operations platform" is already in usc in at least one district. 

Those taken to the camps do not seem to be charged with any crime and their families are not 

notified. Very few reports of people being released have emerged since the camps became active 

in spring 2017, and the length of planned internment is unknown. A small number of internees 

have been released for unknown reasons and described their experiences to journalists. 

Experiences vary from one location to another, but all are characterized by forced indoctrination 

and attempted inculcation of love for the CCP and its leader, Xi Jinping. Reported indoctrination 

methods include ideological study sessions, self criticisms (writing and/or orally presenting long 

confessions of one's purportedly subversive thoughts and actions), marching in place, slogan 

memorization and chanting, watching videos about religious practices, forced renunciation of 

Islam, Chinese language study, and memorization of Confucian texts. Some former internees 

report beatings, torture, and suicide attempts. Deaths in the internment camps have also been 

reported, with corpses showing signs of violence. Those who have been released are often 

reluctant to describe their experiences because of explicit or implied threats that their family 

members will be sent to the camps in retaliation. 

Prominent Uyghurs who are regarded as opinion leaders of one kind or another have been 

particularly targeted. The most famous Uyghur pop music star, Ablajan Awut Ayyup, has been 

disappeared, as has the most famous Uyghur folk musician, Abdurehim Heyit. Leading 

intellectuals, including professors, authors, and poets, have disappeared in large numbers. The 

most successfullJyghur professional soccer player was interned upon returning from soccer 

training abroad. 

State goals 

The explicit goals of the re-education camps, commonly called "Education Transformation 

Centers'' or "Eliminating Extremism Education Centers" is to transform the thoughts and beliefs 

of internees. Many Chinese officials seem to genuinely believe that such forced indoctrination 

can produce docile subjects, or even successfully inculcate a love for the party. In some places 
54 


insert folio 16 here 30993.016

security officials are also using the camps to physically remove people they find suspicious from 

society, preventing them from acting on their discontent with Chinese rule by locking them up. 

And of course the camps serve an important disciplinary purpose. The threat of internment is 

what empowers the Chinese state to micro-manage the most mundane daily activities ofUyghurs 

and re-cngineer Uyghur culture. Uyghurs have little choice but to comply with officials' every 

demand, and to do so with outward enthusiasm. But officials' current goals for the camps may 

not be the most important factors. Particularly in a system not bound by legal procedures, as this 

one is not, the purposes to which internment camps are put can change. For example, in the event 

of an uptick in violent resistance by a small subset of Uyghurs, it is possible that the camps could 

be put to darker uses. Even extermination cannot be ruled out as a possibility, particularly given 

the language that some officials have used to describe the camps, describing them as places that 

·'eradicate tumors" or function like spraying chemicals on crops to kill the weeds. 

More than re-education camps alone 

I have emphasized the re-education camps here because their most basic effects are easy to 

quantify and describe in a short space, but it is important to remember that they are only one 

piece of a larger effort to assimilate Uyghurs to Chinese culture, to purge purportedly 

untrustworthy people from society, and to eliminate all hints of dissent. Xinjiang may be the 

most closely surveilled place on the planet. Its government is pursuing an explicit policy of 

Sinicisation and eliminating education in the Uyghur language. Even if the camps were 

dismantled tomorrow, Xinjiang would remain a police state to rival North Korea, with a 

formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid. Its population would continue to 

suffer under a mass trauma much like China's own Cultural Revolution. Any efforts to address 

the situation should target the entire apparatus, not merely the re-education camps. 

Causes 

The current situation is ultimately a product of colonial rule, in which ethnic Chinese control the 

land of indigenous Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others. More narrowly, Chinese policies to enforce 

the colonial order are shaped by racism and Islamophobia. It is important to note that the Chinese 

Communist Party's attacks on Uyghur religious practices are not primarily a result of 

Communist ideological positions on religion and atheism, even though in many cases the Party 

cites such ideology to justify its actions. To begin with, there is very little that is communist 

about today's CCP aside from its name and its occasional lip service to Marxist ideologies it no 

longer makes any effort to implement. On the contrary, the Party is quite content to ignore 

religious affairs if the religion in question is the correct kind. Confucius temples, for example, 

are operating freely in China. 

Chinese officials' belief that Islamic ideas arc the driving force behind Uyghur dissent, and thus 

the belief that they need to uproot Uyghur culture and religious practices, gained strength under 

the int1uence of the United States' so-called ''Global War on Terror.'' Previous CCP diagnoses of 

Uyghur discontent had focused on Uyghur ethno-nationalism. After 2001, Chinese officials and 

media increasingly adopted Western-style Islamophobic perspectives, associating Islam uniquely 

with terrorist violence and imagining Islam as a monolithic religion tied to Middle Eastern 

cultures. While the Chinese Communist Party is entirely responsible for its repression of the 

Uyghurs, many aspects of the repression have been shaped by discriminatory Islamophobia 

borrowed from the US. 
55 


insert folio 17 here 30993.017

Ideas that Uyghurs are inherently violent and untrustworthy, due both to their ethnicity and their 

Islamic faith, are now deeply entrenched in Chinese officialdom. At the same time, the CCP has 

promoted a new kind of nationalism in recent years, based less on the idea of a superior 

Communist system, but instead on ethno-nationalist loyalty to an abstract notion of China. That 

picture of China is based on the Han, the majority ethnic group, and leaves limited space for 

minorities like the Uyghurs and Kazakhs. There is also a widespread Chinese belief that Chen 

Quanguo's policies are working, and that no violent attacks have taken place under Chen's 

administration (this is untrue). 

Such notions interact with other longer-term phenomena, such as CCP concern over the 

alternative systems of authority that religions and non-Han culture might provide. They are also 

amplified by a general turn toward greater authoritarianism and restrictions on dissent under 

CCP chairman Xi Jinping. Chen Quanguo's new Xinjiang strategy aligns quite neatly with this 

transformation. Finally, China's new-found global political and economic clout has allowed the 

CCP to ignore growing international outrage over its Xinjiang policies. The recent retreat by 

some arms of the US Government from human rights promotion have further abetted CCP 

impunity, something I hope this hearing will help to rectify. 

Non-Chinese scholars who specialize in the study of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang have long argued 

that the way to achieve peace in Xinjiang is to crack down on anti-minority racism, to give 

Uyghurs equal access to employment, and to ease cultural restrictions on Uyghurs; in short, to 

address the many grievances Uyghurs have with Chinese rule. CCP officials have now embraced 

the opposite approach, eliminating virtually all space for Uyghurs to lead normal lives, and they 

think it is working. 
56 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JESSICA BATKE


insert folio 18 here 30993.018

Statement of Jessica Batke' 

Senior Editor, ChinaFile 

Former Research Analyst at the Department of State 

Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you 

for holding a hearing on this important subject, and thank you for inviting me to 

participate. I am here today in my personal capacity and do not represent any 

organization or entity other than myself. 

I will only briefly touch on the many ways in which human rights in Xinjiang continue to 

deteriorate; there is a wealth of well-sourced and reliable reporting that will provide more 

detail than I can here today, and I believe my fellow panelists will offer some of this 

necessary detail as well. Therefore, I will focus on how we in the international 

community discuss what is happening in Xinjiang, how the Party-state's policies towards 

Uyghurs and other Muslims in the region tit into the context of Chinese leadership 

politics, and the implications of these policies outside of Xinjiang. Finally, I will make 

some recommendations about what the U.S. Government should do in the face of the 

Party-state's escalating campaign to forcibly sever Xinjiang's ethnic minority Muslims' 

ties to their religion, cultural practices, and ethnic identity. This includes holding 

individuals within the Chinese Party-state personally and directly responsible for the 

policies being enacted in Xinjiang. 

The Worsening Situation in Xinjiang 

The Party-state's policies related to Xinjiang have become startlingly more repressive in 

the last two years, even for a region that was already under more intensive digital and 

physical controls than most other areas of China. In particular, two interrelated efforts 

have signaled a dramatic increase in repression. 

The first is the recall and forcible repatriation of ethnic Uyghur and other predominantly 

Muslim minority Chinese citizens from abroad. Beginning in early 2017, Chinese 

authorities began to order ethnic minority Muslim citizens studying abroad to return to 

Xinjiang, sometimes detaining family members back home until they did so. Some of 

those who returned were reportedly detained. held incommunicado, or sentenced to 

prison. 1 In the summer of 2017, local security personnel in Egypt detained, and in some 

cases forcibly repatriated, dozens of students who had not heeded the call to retum. 2 

The second is the rounding up of those same populations in Xinjiang to put them into 

what are frequently called "re-education camps." It is worth taking a moment to consider 

'The opinions and characterizations in this testimony are those of the author, and do not necessarily 

represent official positions of the United States Govemment. 
57 


insert folio 19 here 30993.019

the nomenclature we use when discussing these camps. Ofticial Chinese sources refer to 

them as "transformation through education" and ·'counter-extremism training'' centers. In 

many cases, this is a euphemistic characterization. Though we do not know what is 

happening in each of these facilities, in at least some of these facilities, detainees are 

subject to waterboarding. being kept in isolation without food and water, and being 

prevented from sleeping. They are interrogated about their religious practices and about 

having made trips abroad. They arc forced to apologize f(Jr the clothes they wore or f(Jr 

praying in the wrong place at the wrong time.3 

Some detainees arc apparently held simply because they do not speak Mandarin 

Chinese.4 In other cases, individuals are detained because local police must meet a 

detention quota: at least two villages have reportedly had this quota set at 40 percent of 

the local population. 5 

Using the Chinese euphemisms for these camps, or even the more suggestive term "reeducation camps," does not clearly and precisely define what it is we are currently 

witnessing. Some observers have chosen to call them "concentration camps," based on a 

definition that describes them as places that confine members of ethnic and religious 

minorities that the state has targeted as such for the professed goal of state security. 6 As 

expert Dr. Sean Roberts recently wrote, "llistorically. we have seen that the internment of 

large segments of a country" s population on the basis of ethnicity and religion can give 

rise to apartheid or, worse, ethnic cleansing and genocide. CJivcn the politically charged 

nature of the terms ethnic cleansing and genocide. reporters and scholars have been 

reticent to apply them to the current policies in Xinjiang, but it is also irresponsible to 

ignore early warning signs.''7 

I am not an expert in international law and therefore cannot offer the legal term of art that 

most accurately captures the situation in Xinjiang as we know it. But I do believe that we 

can only treat the phenomenon with the seriousness and alarm that it merits if we first 

label it accurately. Therefore, I encourage further thought and discussion about how the 

U.S. Government and the international community more generally should refer to these 

camps. 

No matter what they arc called, these camps do not represent the full scope of day-to-day 

repression that we see in Xinjinng. Omnipresent security checks, digital and biometric 

surveillance. and the policing of individuals' clothing and hair are just some of the ways 

in which residents of Xinjiang experience restrictions on their individual rights even 

outside these camps.s Recent reports indicate that the state may also be rapidly 

constructing crematoria in dil1erent areas of Xinjiang. This could well be for the 

government's stated purpose of environmental conservation: it could also be a way to 

subvert Muslim burial traditions and assert the Party-state's authority in all aspects of 

area Muslims' cultural and religious practicesY 

The Party-state· s actions outside the camps clearly violate ethnic and religious 

minorities' human rights and deserve our attention. In addition, I encourage observers, 

particularly those with international legal expertise, to think about the full scope and 
58 


insert folio 20 here 30993.020

nature of PRC policies in Xinjiang and consider whether we should take them as an early 

warning signal of something much worse. 

How Docs Xinjiang's Current Leadership Fit in to the Broader Pattern of State-Led 

Repression in the Region? 

Though as a rule we have very little insight into top CCP leadership deliberations and 

personal preferences, careful observation of personnel appointments and policy trends 

docs allow for some judgments about individual leaders' roles; in this regard, current 

Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo's inJlucncc on the region's policies is unusually 

evident. Chen is undoubtedly responsible for some of the significant changes in security 

and treatment of ethnic minorities in China. The timing of his tenure in Xinjiang, 

beginning in August 20 I 6, coincides neatly with the large-scale use of the camps 

discussed above. And with perhaps only a few exceptions, the timing of the recalls and 

repatriations of Chinese citizens abroad-said to have begun in early 20 I 7--also tit in 

this timeframc (though it is very unlikely that a provincial-level party secretary has the 

unilateral authority to order security operations overseas). 

These moves echo Chen's security policies in his prior position as the Party secretary of 

Tibet (20 11-2016 ). It was on his watch that 21,000 government employees were stationed 

in villages and monasteries throughout Tibet to carry out security and propaganda work, 

and that ·'convenience police stations" sprang up throughout the region to ensure 

adequate surveillance of the local population. 10 Indeed. almost immediately after Chen 

arrived in Xinjiang in 2016. the region instituted a similar building spree-along with a 

massive increase in security personnel hiring and overall security spending in the 

region. 11 

Though Chen has been directly responsible for overseeing these policies. neither the 

policies nor Chen himself arc sui generis. They tit clearly into a longer policy trend of 

increased securitization, criminalization of ethnic and religious identity, and the 

rcfi·aming by the CCP ofnoneonfonning behavior as '·extremism." At least since 2014, 

when the CCI' leadership held its second Central Xinjiang Work Conference. central 

PRC policy guidance and regional policy documents shilled fi·om an emphasis on 

economic development to security and counter-extremism. Rcgionwidc counterextremism regulations that went into effect in 2017 were the result of a two-year-long 

dratling process. 12 "Education through transformation" centers were already being 

opened in Xinjiang as early as 2015. 13 Whether he himself is the progenitor of 

increasingly repressive measures no"v employed in Xinjiang, or whether he is simply the 

most ruthless tool by which to implement them, the policies he is enacting are the logical 

endpoint of the patiy's broader policy trajectory. 

Beyond the Xinjiang Party Secretary, there are two main constellations of bureaucratic 

agencies that have inf1uence over and responsibility for policy and implementation in 

Xinjiang: those engaged in "United Front'' work. and those in the ''Politics and Law" 

ambit. These constellations comprise both Party and state bodies, though now more than 

ever the Party is clearly the center of gravity. In addition, there is the Central Committee 
59 


insert folio 21 here 30993.021

Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group, formed in 2000, that brings together leaders 

fi·orn both of these policy hierarchies--as well as trom others-to provide guidance on 

Xinjiang policy. 

• The l initcd Front Work Department (UFWD). a Party entity, is under the 

leadership of the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 

Conference, who also sits on the most powerful policymaking body in the PRC. 

the Politburo Standing Committee. Beyond its own "Xinjiang Bureau," the 

UFWD oversees the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and the State 

Administration lor Religious Affairs (which was recently absorbed into the 

UFWD itsell), both of which have a role in Xinjiang-related policy. 14 

• The Central Committee Politics and Law Commission (PLC) is a Party body that 

oversees the country's security apparatus as well as its justice system, and as such 

has as its members the heads of all the relevant state agencies in charge of 

implementing its policies. The head of the PLC generally moves up to this 

position after serving as Minister of Public Security, and is concurrently the First 

Political Commissar of the People's Armed Police, a paramilitary organization 

that is a major component of Xinjiang"s security strategy. 

• The Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group is one of a 

number of''lcading small groups,'' or policy advisory bodies, in the PRC Partystate. Since 2012. the head of the CPPCC (and a Politburo Standing Committee 

member) has been head ol'thc Xinjiang Small Group, an indication of the 

importance the central leadership accords Xinjiang-related issues. 

The Impact Bevond Xicii.illlg 

There are a number of ways in vvhich Beijing's policies toward Xinjiang have 

implications outside the region. The intensive surveillance capabilities deployed in the 

region could readily be expanded for use throughout mainland China. Some reports 

suggest this could already be starting in the neighboring province of Gansu, with local 

Hui Muslims worried that .. they're going to implement the Xinjiang model here." 15 

Outside the PRC, Uyghurs in exile, including those who have f1ed the current wave of 

repression. arc not only surveilled but can be coerced into reporting on fellow Uyghurs 

by Chinese state security authorities who threaten family members back in Xinjiang. 16 

Other members of the diaspora, including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz who have received 

Kazakh or Kyrgyz citizenship. are at risk of being detained in these camps if they make a 

return visit to China. 17 

As previously mentioned. other governments have already assisted in forcibly 

repatriating China's ethnic minority citizens back to Xinjiang. By deferring to China's 

wishes with regard to its f1eeing religious and ethnic minorities, compliant governments 

undermine broader internationalnonns regarding protections for human rights and 

religious freedom. They also contribute to the normalization of China's use of its 

''internal afTairs" as the justification for interfering in the "internal affairs" of other 

sovereign nations. 
60 


insert folio 22 here 30993.022

Beyond the most obvious impact on current or former PRC citizens. Chinese government 

pressure also has the effect of encouraging self-censorship among foreign academics and 

China-watchers. I myself am saddened at the prospect that this testimony may foreclose 

the possibility of me traveling to China for some time to come; I have spent much of my 

adult life studying and working on China and the possibility that I will find my visa 

cancelled based on my participation today is distressing. This type oflooming threat 

allows Beijing to limit factual discussion of the conditions in Xinjiang, even among noncitizens and even on foreign soil, often without having to directly intervene. 

Policv Recommendations 

It is a mistake to think that staying silent on human rights in China is a neutral act. 

Instead, every instance of silence simply resets Beijing's expectations and increases the 

psychic cost of re-injecting human rights into the conversation. Silence can be interpreted 

as tacit approval. Further, Beijing does still care about its international reputation, 

meaning both public and diplomatic pressure can be effective tools in encouraging 

change. 18 The United States only abets the CCP when it does not forcefully speak out for 

human rights in China. 

My recommendations fall under several broad categories: taking a firm position on the 

human rights situation in Xinjiang that is consistent with the U.S. government's values 

and respect for human rights; publicly and precisely communicating that position, 

including in coordination with like-minded countries whenever possible; and leveraging 

available legal mechanisms to apply targeted pressure to the PRC and to individuals 

within the Party-state responsible for the abuses in Xinjiang. 

I urge Congress and the Administration to: 

• Maintain a clear, consistent, and full-throated public defense of human rights and 

religious freedom in Xinjiang in addition to direct diplomatic engagement. 

International pressure can be etTective, but it must be consistent over time and be 

conveyed through multiple channels. It also gives potential allies confidence that 

the U.S. government will be there with them if they take a public stand. 

• Work with like-minded countries to issue joint statements and otherwise 

coordinate an international response to the situation in Xinjiang. Critically, this 

should include engagement with Muslim-majority countries and international 

institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. 

• Be rigorous and accurate in official statements describing what is happening in 

Xinjiang, particularly with regard to the large-scale detention of ethnic and 

religious minorities on the basis of that status, and avoid using PRC euphemisms 

or other indirect language. 

• Similarly, not simply repeat PRC language with regard to terrorism or terrorist 

group designations; seek additional clarification from independent sources of 

information and from U.S. intelligence experts. 

• Offer support to PRC citizens who have fled Xinjiang, whether here in the United 

States or elsewhere around the globe. This includes pressing third countries that 
61 


insert folio 23 here 30993.023

have detained Uyghurs or other minorities to ensure they provide access to a full 

and impartial hearing of any asylum claims and do not simply repatriate 

individuals to China without further investigation or consideration. It also 

includes raising the cases of exile Uyghurs' family members who are detained in 

Xinjiang. 

• Use their power, through mechanisms such as the International Traffic in Arms 

Regulations, to limit the ability of private U.S. individuals and companies to 

provide security training or materiel to Chinese state security agencies and 

affiliated entities, particularly those that have a role in repressing ethnic and 

religious minorities in China. 19 Special attention should be paid to the connections 

between such transactions and China's Belt and Road Initiative, of which 

Xinjiang is a key component; security-related procurement and training for the 

Belt and Road Initiative can easily be employed for repressive ends in Xinjiang 

even if that is not their stated purpose. 

• Use their power, through mechanisms such as the Export Administration 

Regulations, to limit the ability of U.S. companies to sell surveillance equipment 

and technology to Chinese state security agencies and affiliated entities; the 

chairs' recent letter to the Secretary of Commerce requesting additional 

information about the tracking of such sales is very helpful in this regard. 

• Sanction relevant Chinese officials under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 

Accountability Act. Any sanctions package should include Xinjiang Party 

Secretary Chen Quanguo. Sanctioning a sitting Politburo member, one of the top 

25 leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, would clearly convey the United 

States Government's unequivocal condemnation of the camps. A wide range of 

additional central and regional leaders can and should be held to account for this 

large-scale violation of human rights. 20 

Thank you for your time. I welcome your questions. 

1 Shohret Hoshur, Gulchehra Hoja, and Esct Sulaiman, "Uyghurs Studying Abroad Ordered Back to 

Xinjiang Under Threat to Families," Radio Free Asia, May 9, 2017, 

http:i/www.rfa.org/english/news/uvghuriordercd-050920 l7155554.html; Shohret Hoshur, "China Detains 

12-Year-Old Uyghur Boy on Return to Xinjiang From Egypt," Radio Free Asia, July 24,2017, 

http://www.rfa.orglenglish/news/uvghuriboy-072420 17153914.html; Shohret Hoshur, "Xinjiang 

Authorities Sentence Uyghur Scholar to 10 Years in Prison," Radio Free Asia, August 9, 2017. 

http://www.rfa.org/cnglish/ncws/uyghurischolar-080920 l7151559.html. 2 Jessica Balke, "China is Forcing Uighurs Abroad to Return Home. Why Aren't More Countries Refusing 

to Help?" ChinaFile, August 14, 2017, http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/ehinaforcing-uighurs-abroad-return-home-why-arent-more-countries. 

1 Simon Denyer, "Former inmates of China's Muslim 'reeducation' camps tell of brainwashing, tot1ure," 

The Washington Post, May 17, 2018, !1Jtp0L'YY0Y~!Y_as_hingl.QnPQ.9_\&omf.W_QrJ9!115l?.J?.'!fific/forn1Cf-inmateso kh i nas-mu s I i m-re-educa ti on-<;am ps,_1el!-,_Q.[:Q!:alm.Yash_irtg:(Q.t1tt£?1~J~!.Q5Ll.§i.J1!23 3 0-'8-~8 50- I l e8-8b92-

±5..t4:!]aaeDc story.html?utm tenn~.d7ed03ce3226; Wong Lok-to and Qiao Long, "China Locks Up, 

Tortures Muslims in 'Re-education Camps,"' Radio Free Asia, June 27, 2018, 

iJ.1!ru: '/www .rt>1.0rg/ english/ news/ u ygh u rjs:_ hi na-locks_::!dp-tortures-muslim s-in-re-education-campsQ6272018150827.html; Bruce Pannier, "Kazakh Man Recounts 'Reeducation' ln Western Chinese Camp," 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April26, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-recounts-reeducation-in-
62 


insert folio 24 here 30993.024

western_:<::_bincs~:camp/29194106.html; Gerry Shih, "China's mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural 

Revolution," Associated Press, May 18, 2018, https:!lapncws.com/6t!,Jjl296tb 19,4f85ba69a8babd972e4b. 4 Shih, "China's mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution." 5 Shohret Hoshur, "Nearly Half of Uyghurs in Xinjiang's Hotan Targeted For Re-Education Camps," Radio 

Free Asia, October 9, 2017, !J.tlm;,://www.rfa.oro/cnglish/ncws/uvghur/camps-l 00920 17164000.html; 

Shohret Hoshur, "One in 10 Uyghur Residents of Xinjiang Township Jailed or Detained in 'Re-Education 

Camp,"' Radio Free Asia, June 29,2018, https:!/www.rfa.org/eng,lish/ns:w,Juyghurltarget062920 1813"506.htmL 6 Mehmet Tohti, "Uyghurs: Victims of 21st Century Concentration Camps," The Diplomat, May 18,2018, 

h1Jm;://thediplomat.com/20 18/05/uyghurs-victims-of-2 I st-century-concentration-camps/; "Concentration 

Camp," Encyclopaedia Britannica, https:/lwww.britannica.com/topic/concentration-camp. 7 Sean R. Roberts, "How Should the World Respond to Intensifying Repression in Xinjiang?" ChinaFile, 

June 4, 2018, http:/iwww.chinafile.com/convet:sation/how-should-world-resrumd-intensifying-repressionxinjiang. 

8 "China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions," Human Rights Watch, December 13,2017, 

h1!J)_;;;L}yww.hrw.on!lnews/:f_QJ7 /12/13/chiq_'!;:minQ!:i!y-region-colle<;ls-dna-millions; "Ban on Islamic 

Clothing in Xinjiang," Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, February 27, 2018, 

Imps: iiv,;_'~IYAill11llahJiQ!l.rnaLorg/20 18102Ll;lan-on-islamic-c1Qthing-in-xin j ial]gj1tm I; Josh Chin and 

Clement BUrge, "Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life," The 

Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2017, 

!J!tpJ>JDYW'Y.J:\I!!.L<::_QJn/art ic les/twel ve-d avs-in-xi n j ian g-how-ch inas-survei llance-state-overwhe lms-da i Jylite- I ~[370015~': Megha Rajagopalan, "This Is What A 21st-Century Police State Really Looks Like," 

BuzzFeed News, October 17, 2017. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/the-police-state-of-thefuture-is-already-here. 

9 Gulchehra Hoja, "Xinjiang Rapidly Building Crematoria to Extinguish Uyghur Funeral Traditions," 

Radio Free Asia, June 26, 2018, h1!J2s://www.rfa.org/englishinews/uvghur/crematoriumsQli;Z_620 1815 1126.htmL 10 "China: Tibetan Monasteries Placed Under Direct Rule," Human Rights Watch, March 16,2012, 

https://www.hrw.org/news/20 12/03/ 16/~hina-tibetan-monastcrics-placed:under-direct-ru le; "China: 

Alarming New Surveillance, Security in Tibet," Human Rights Watch, March 20,2013, 

Imps:! lwww. hrw .org/news/20 13/0 3!201 china-alarming -new-survei I lance-security-tibet 11 Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, "Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization 

Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang," China Brief, September 21, 2017, https:/ljamestown.org/program/chenll'llLnguo-the-strongman-behind-beijingssecuritization-stra!f,gy:jl)-tibet-and-xinjiang/; Adrian Zenz and 

James Leibold, "Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State," China Brief, March 14,2017, 

https:l/jamestown.org/programlxinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/. 

12 Jessica Batke, ·'Central and Regional Leadership for Xinjiang Policy in Xi's Second Term," China 

Leadership Monitor, No. 56, https://www.hoover.org/sites/defaultlfiles/research/docs/clm56jb.pdf 13 '•tti:f¥!2.:?iH?"tt&lffii{t";j'j(i'f!j{{-trr,i'Ali:lll$1:%Jt" (Yuli County Holds Ceremony to Inaugurate 

"Counter-Extremism" Transformation Through Education Center), Yuli county government website, June 9, 

2016, last accessed at http://webcache.googleusercontentcom/search?q=cachc:-

tll Kllt7NMJ:w.yuli.gov.cn!lteml71624.aspx+&cd=l &hl=en&ct~clnk&gi~us. 

14 Marcel Angliviel de Ia Beaumelle, "The United Front Work Department: 'Magic Weapon' at Home and 

Abroad," China Brief, July 6, 2017, lillJ2;[1/jamestown,Q.rglpr9£Ill'Tiiunited-front-work-dcpartment-m~ 

~Ql2Q!1:-1lQ.ttWabroad/. 

15 "Is China's atheist Communist Party trying to eradicate Islam?" South China Morning Post, July 16, 

20 I 8, https:l/www.scmp.com/ncws/chinaipolicie.:;:pQiiticslarticlei2.1 554.~8/chinas-atheist-communist-partylLYing-cradicate-islam. 

16 Megha Rajagopalan, "They Thought They'd Left The Surveillance State Behind. They Were Wrong." 

BzczFeed News, July 9, 2018, l]ttps:/iwww.buzzteed.com/meghara/china-uighur-spiessurveill.anc_e]J!J!ll tennc'.c1'21bwJ'>JI!.\lP#. vbOx 12G4b5, 17 Bruce Pannier, "Kazakhstan Confronts China Over Disappearances," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

June 1, 2018, https://w'Y.lUfiTlQJ:gLa/gishlog-ovozi-kazakhstan-confronts-china-overdisappearances/29266456.html; Bruce Pannier, "China's Other New Security Concern·- Its Ethnic 

Kyrgyz," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 25,2017, https://www.rferl.Qrgiaigishlog-ovozi-chinaethnic-kyrgy7J286973 14.htmL 
63 


insert folio 25 here 30993.025

--------------------- ------------------------

" Mimi Lau, "The quiet diplomats: how Germany kept up pressure on China to free Liu Xia," South China 

Morning Post, July 22, 2018, https:l/www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politicslarticle/2156280/quietdiplomats-how-germany-kept-pressure-china-rree. 

19 Marc Fisher, ian Shapira, and Emily Rauhala, "Behind Erik Prince's China Venture," The Washington 

Post, May 4, 2018, !lllil.s:llwww._IY<)2)1ingtQt!Q92!.com/m:_\\fs/wor!<JL~p/20 l8!Q2f04/fe®rr:eia-warr_0r-goes, 

tJl:ffiwa -d lli.:.IT!.k.:n.Jin£C:Sl:9SS-a -1ind7utm tenn :c;?e 8a l!S'}l?(29d l . 20 Though by no means exhaustive, the following list includes positions in the Party and state hierarchy that 

play a role in setting and implementing Xinjiang policy, as discussed in Batke, "Central and Regional 

Leadership for Xinjiang Policy in Xi's Second Tetm": 

UfWD Head; 

UFWD Executive Deputy Director; 

UFWD Xinjiang Bureau staff; 

Ministry of Public Security Executive Vice Minister with a seat on the Xinjiang Leading Small 

Group; 

National Development and Reform Commission Deputy Head with a seat on the Xinjiang Leading 

Small Group: 

CPPCC Committee for Ethnic and Religious Affairs Head; 

State Administration for Religious Atlairs Head; 

State Ethnic Af1airs Commission Head; 

People's Armed Police Commander; 

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Committee Secretary; 

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Commander and Deputy Pat1y Committee Secretary; 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Deputy Party Secretary and Chairman; 

XUAR UFWD Head; 

XUAR Politics and Law Commission Head. 
64 

1http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-life-like-in-xinjiang-reeducation-camps-china-2018-5 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO

Good morning. This is a hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China. The title of this hearing is ‘‘Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: 

Xinjiang’s Human Rights Crisis.’’ 

We will have two panels testifying today. The first panel will feature: 

• Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, Representative of the United States on the 

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States Mission to 

the United Nations, and • Anthony Christino III, Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce. 

The second panel will include: 

• Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia, • Rian Thum, Associate Professor at Loyola University New Orleans, and • Jessica Batke, Senior Editor at ChinaFile and former research analyst at the 

U.S. Department of State. 

Thank you all for being here. 

I want to begin by noting that this hearing is set against the backdrop this week 

of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Ambassador for International Religious 

Freedom Sam Brownback convening the first ever State Department Ministerial to 

Advance International Religious Freedom, which has brought together senior representatives from more than 70 governments around the world to discuss areas of 

collaboration and partnership in the cause of religious freedom globally. 

Secretary Pompeo penned an op-ed in USA Today earlier this week highlighting 

the Ministerial and the importance of advancing religious freedom globally. He specifically mentioned Ms. Gulchehra’s family. 

The Chinese government and Communist Party are equal opportunity oppressors—targeting unregistered and registered Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Falun 

Gong practitioners, and others with harassment, detention, imprisonment, and 

more. 

The current human rights crisis unfolding in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

Region targeting Muslim minority groups is arguably among the worst, if not the 

most severe, instances in the world today of an authoritarian government brutally 

and systematically targeting a minority faith community. This is an issue which the 

Commission has been seized with for some time. 

In April, we wrote U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad urging him to 

prioritize this crackdown in his dealings with the Chinese government and to begin 

collecting information to make the case for possible application of Global Magnitsky 

sanctions against senior government and Party officials in the region including 

Chen Quanguo, the current Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary. 

The Commission’s forthcoming Annual Report, set to be released in October, will 

prominently feature the grave and deteriorating situation in Xinjiang. 

While our expert witnesses will discuss the situation in greater detail, I want to 

take a few minutes to paint a picture of life in Xinjiang. 

For months now, there have been credible estimates of between 800,000 and 1 

million people from Xinjiang being held at ‘‘political reeducation’’ centers or camps 

which are fortified with barbed wire, bombproof surfaces, reinforced doors, and 

guard rooms. 

Security personnel have subjected detainees to torture, medical neglect and maltreatment, solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, lack of adequate clothing in cold 

temperatures, and other forms of abuse, resulting in the death of some detainees. 

According to one news source, ‘‘The internment program aims to rewire the political thinking of detainees, erase their Islamic beliefs and reshape their very identities. The camps have expanded rapidly over the past year, with almost no judicial 

process or legal paperwork. Detainees who most vigorously criticize the people and 

things they love are rewarded, and those who refuse to do so are punished with solitary confinement, beatings and food deprivation.’’ 1

Some local officials in the region have used chilling political rhetoric to describe 

the purpose of the arbitrary detentions of Uyghur Muslims and members of other 

Muslim ethnic minority groups, such as ‘‘eradicating tumors’’ or spraying chemicals 

on crops to kill the ‘‘weeds.’’ One expert who is testifying today described Xinjiang 

Uyghur as ‘‘a police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the 

order of South African apartheid.’’ 

65 

2https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-stateoverwhelms-daily-life-1513700355 

While the Chinese government has repeatedly denied knowledge of the camps, a 

groundbreaking report by Adrian Zenz, a scholar at the European School of Culture 

and Theology, published through the Jamestown Foundation in May, found that 

Chinese authorities were soliciting public bids for the construction of additional 

camps and the addition of security elements to existing facilities. I submit this report for the record and would also note the Google Earth footage behind me, which 

clearly shows the construction of these camps over the span of several months. 

[The report appears in the Appendix.] 

Those not subject to ‘‘transformation through education’’ in detention still face 

daily intrusions in their home life, including compulsory ‘‘home stays,’’ wherein 

Communist Party officials and government workers are sent to live with local 

Uyghur and Kazakh families. 

The data-driven surveillance in Xinjiang is assisted by iris and body scanners, 

voice pattern analyzers, DNA sequencers, and facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, and in train stations. Two large Chinese firms, Hikvision and 

Dahua Technology, have profited greatly from the surge in security spending, reportedly winning upwards of $1.2 billion in government contracts for large-scale surveillance projects. Authorities employ hand-held devices to search smart phones for 

encrypted chat apps and require residents to install monitoring applications on their 

cell phones.2 More traditional security measures are also employed, including extensive police checkpoints. 

The rise in security personnel is also accompanied by the proliferation of ‘‘convenience police stations,’’ a dense network of street corner, village, or neighborhood police stations that enhance authorities’ ability to closely surveil and police local communities. 

Just this month, reports emerged of officials, in a humiliating public act, cutting 

the skirts and even long shirts of Uyghur women on the spot as they walked 

through local streets, as a means of enforcing a ban on ethnic minorities wearing 

long skirts. 

And yesterday there was an analysis released by the NGO Chinese Human Rights 

Defenders indicating that 21% of arrests in China last year were in Xinjiang, which 

has only 1.5% of the population. The number of arrests increased 731% over the previous year and does not include the detentions of those in the ‘‘political reeducation’’ 

centers which are carried out extralegally. 

Radio Free Asia has led the way in reporting on this crisis. And it has not come 

without a cost. Developments in Xinjiang have had a direct impact on U.S. interests, 

most notably the detention of dozens of family members of U.S.-based Uyghur journalists employed by Radio Free Asia, as well as the detention of dozens of family 

members of prominent Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, in an apparent attempt by the Chinese government to silence effective reporting and rights advocacy. 

We are delighted that RFA journalist Gulchehra Hoja is able to join us today to 

speak to her personal experience in this regard. 

The Commission has convened a series of hearings focused on the ‘‘long arm’’ of 

China, and that dimension certainly exists as it relates to the Uyghur diaspora community, including in the United States. 

Without objection, we’ll keep the hearing record open for 48 hours to submit additional relevant materials including a bipartisan letter to Secretary Pompeo that 

Senators Warner and Gardner are spearheading this week—which I am pleased to 

sign—regarding the cases of the RFA journalists’ family members. 

[The letter appears in the Appendix.] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH

I commend Senator Rubio for holding this hearing. There is a dire need to shine 

a light on the stunning and outrageous detention of nearly one million Uyghurs and 

other Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. 

What is clear from news reports is that Uyghurs are being detained in ‘‘reeducation centers’’ throughout Xinjiang. Those interned are being asked to renounce 

Islam, inform on their families for ‘‘extremism,’’ and parrot their love for Xi Jinping 

and the Communist Party. 

Whole families disappear, children are detained, students studying abroad and 

soccer players are detained because of their ‘‘foreign’’ contacts. There are reports of 

suicides and deaths and mistreatment in these detention centers. 

66 

Human rights champion Rebiya Kadeer’s whole family—sons, daughters-in-law, 

grandchildren have disappeared. The disappearance of the families of other Uyghurs 

has also happened—like Radio Free Asia’s heroic journalists. 

It is mind-boggling. The Chinese government is constructing a high-tech police 

state in Xinjiang whose goal is the forcible assimilation and ‘‘transformation’’ of entire ethnic minority populations and the ‘‘sinicization’’ of their religious beliefs and 

practices. In fact, retaining religious beliefs or attachment to culture and language 

makes one a suspect in Xinjiang. 

All this is being done in the name of counterterrorism and counterextremism. But 

China’s repression may just create the extremism that they fear. Over the past year, 

the world has started to see too many comparisons between the Nazis and the current Chinese government. First there was the death of Liu Xiaobo, the first Nobel 

Peace Prize laureate to die in state custody since Carl von Ossietzky died in Nazi 

internment. 

Now nearly one million are detained in what should be called concentration 

camps—the largest jailing of an ethnic and religious minority maybe since the Holocaust, certainly since the apartheid days in South Africa. ‘‘Reeducation’’ is not a new 

tactic in China. Tibetans, Falun Gong and other dissidents have experienced ‘‘reeducation through labor’’—but the size and scale of what is happening to the Uyghurs 

is audaciously repressive, even by China’s low standards. 

Where is the outrage? Where is the anger? I commend the State Department and 

Secretary Pompeo for their public statements. But why has the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation been silent? What have Turkey and other Turkic nations been 

doing to address this issue? 

We are at a critical point. Governments and parliamentarians need to condemn 

what is happening in Xinjiang. The UN must investigate and seek answers to what 

may be massive human rights abuses or worse. Businesses, non-governmental organizations, and academics that remain silent—because they want to remain in favor 

with the Chinese government and Communist Party—risk losing their integrity by 

doing so. 

The International Olympic Committee should be asked to reassess China’s hosting 

of the 2022 games if they maintain an apartheid-like police state targeting Muslim 

minorities. How can any law firm or lobby shop shill for the government of China 

while Uyghurs are so brutally and forcefully assimilated? Or when Tibetans, Christians, human rights lawyers, and Falun Gong are systematically repressed? 

I heard former Congressman Frank Wolf say recently that in the 1980s, no firm 

would have dared to work for the Soviet Union—but now China’s cash is too tempting to turn down even for some of my former House colleagues. Shame. Shame. It 

is really a shame. 

I wonder if the Congress should consider limiting U.S. Government contracts by 

the exact amount lobby firms receive from China, Russia, or some other authoritarian government. That would make for some interesting business choices. Either 

make no profit from your dealings with China or choose to represent an increasingly 

repressive and authoritarian Chinese government. 

No one should profit from representing authoritarian countries, particularly when 

they constantly seek to undermine U.S. values and interests. Chinese officials also 

should not profit from their complicity in torture and arbitrary detention. This is 

the exact reason the Congress passed the Global Magnitsky Act. 

The Senator and I have urged the State Department to consider levying 

Magnitsky sanctions on officials in Xinjiang. We will continue to do so and press 

for the use of this important tool to hold officials accountable. We urge anyone with 

specific and credible information about the complicity of Chinese government officials in human rights abuses in Xinjiang to send that information to us. We will 

make sure it gets to the State and Treasury Departments. 

I also think the sanctions available in the International Religious Freedom Act 

of 1998 should be considered, particularly broad economic sanctions targeting industries in Xinjiang that benefit China’s political leaders or other ‘‘state-owned entities.’’ We want to make sure that Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities do 

not suffer from such sanctions, but they do not much share in the wealth generated 

by Chinese populations right now. 

China has been designated as a ‘‘Country of Particular Concern’’ since 1999. That 

designation carries with it the possibility of economic sanctions. This lever should 

be used now because, in my opinion, what is happening in Xinjiang is currently the 

world’s worst religious freedom situation—the forced ‘‘sinicization’’ of Islam through 

detention and severe restrictions on religious belief and practice. Targeted and 

tough economic sanctions are the only way to convince China’s leaders that they 

have a clear interest in ending the repression of China’s Muslim minorities. 

67 

There is also an important role for the UN here. I am glad that Ambassador 

Currie is here with us today. What is happening in Xinjiang are clear violations of 

many international treaties and covenants to which China is a party. I realize that 

China’s veto on the UN Security Council will create obstacles to many UN investigations, as will their presence on the UN Human Rights Council, but we should be 

making them use their veto, we should consider requesting a briefing on the situation at the Security Council and work together with the OIC and other Muslim-majority countries to raise the issue within the UN system. At a time when the Chinese government is seeking to gain allies through its Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in Central Asia and Africa, it would seem the last thing they want is an 

international debate about their poor and abusive treatment of ethnic and religious 

minorities. 

Finally, I want to commend the exemplary work of Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur 

Service reporters. Despite unacceptable threats to their families, they have kept 

working and have provided us with an extraordinary record of events. Your courage 

and professionalism are admirable. Thank you. 

Senator, I commend you again for holding this important hearing to shine a light 

on an outrageous and horrible situation. We all need to believe in the power of light 

and sunshine because evil flourishes only in the dark. 

68 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUBIO


insert folio 1 here 30993.001
69 


insert folio 2 here 30993.002

Since summer of 2017, troubling reports in Western media outlets about large-scale detentions of ethnic Muslim 

minorities (including Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have 

multiplied (RFA (https:/lwww.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/shaoshuminzulhj-05042018200446.html), May 4). 

These reports include substantial anecdotal and eyewitness evidence describing a network of clandestine "reeducation camps" in which detainees can be held indefinitely without process or recourse (AP News 

(https://www.apnews.com/10207e125d564897934a27288855e34dl, December 17, 2017; Wall Street Journal 

(https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas:surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life1513700355). December 19, 2017). 

The existence of these camps is denied by the Chinese government. In February of this year, during an interview 

with the Almaty Tengri News, Zhang Wei, China's Consul General in Kazakhstan, issued what is to date the only 

statement by a Chinese public official on the reputed camp network. In reference to a CNN report on the camps, 

Zhang argued that "we do not have such an idea in China" (AKipress (https://akipress.com/news:602025l, 

February 7; CNN (httpsj /edition.cnn.com/2018/02/02/asia/china-xinjiang-detention-camps-intl/index.html), 

February 3). This article demonstrates that there is, in fact, a substantial body of PRC governmental sources that 

prove the existence of the camps. Furthermore. the PRC government's own sources broadly corroborate some 

estimates by rights groups of number of individuals interred in the camps. While estimates of internment numbers 

remain speculative, the available evidence suggests that a significant percentage of Xinjiang's Muslim minority 

population, likely at least several hundred thousand, and possibly just over one million, are or have been interned 

in political re-education facilities. 

Overall, it is possible that the region's re-education system exceeds the size of China's entire former "education 

through labor" system that was officially abolished in 2013. The article also examines the evolution of re-education 

in Xinjiang, empirically charting the unprecedented re-education drive initiated by the region's Party secretary, 

Chen Quanguo. Information from 73 government procurement and construction bids valued at around RMB 680 

million (approximately USD 108 million) along with public recruitment notices and other documents provide 

unprecedented insights into the evolution and extent of the region's re-education campaign. 

The Inception of "De-Extremlfication" through Re-Education in Xinjiang 

The concept of re-education has a long history in Communist China. In the 1950s, the state established the 

practices of "reform through labor" (~i&i!!!) and "re-education through labor" (~;;1)~.!1$). (1) Later, in the early 

2000s, the government initiated "transformation through education" (~mliit) classes for Falun Gong followers. 

[2) 

It was not until 2014 that the "transformation through education· concept in Xinjiang came to be systematically 

used in wider contexts than the Falun Gong, Party discipline or drug addict rehabilitation. Its application to Uyghur 

or Muslim population groups arose .in tandem with the "de-extremification" (i/i:&it) campaigns. a phrase first 

mentioned by Xinjiang's former Party secretary Zhang Chunxian in 2012 (Phoenix Information 

(http://www.360doc.com/content/15/1012/23/15549792 505230217.shtmll. October 12, 2015). 

In 2014, the re-education system started to evolve into a network of dedicated facilities. Konashahar (Shufu) 

County (Kashgar Prefecture) established a three-tiered "transformation through education base" (~T!Uii~) 

system as part of its "de-extremification" efforts (Xinjiang Daily (http://www.xjdaily.com.cn/tsnb/1150049.shtmll. 

November 18, 2014). It operated at county, township and village levels. A three-tiered re-education system based 

on these three levels is likewise mentioned in a 2017 government research paper described below, one whose 

ideas have apparently found widespread adoption (Harmonious Society Journal 

(http://www.doc88.com/p-2921386725182.html) via www.doc88.com, p.76, June 2017). 

The year 2015 also saw the first media report stating the actual capacity of a centralized re-education tadlity. 

Khotan City's "de-extremification education and training center" (i/i:t1Hii5it~lt~~iJII<P'C') was said to hold up to 

3,000 detainees whose thinking was "deeply affected" by "religious extremism" (Communist Partv News 

(http://cpc.oeople com.cn/n/2015/0917/c398213-27598576.html), October 17, 2015). 
70 


insert folio 3 here 30993.003

Chen Quanguo Puts Re-Education into Overdrive 

In August 2016, Chen Ouanguo became Xinjiang's new Party Secretary. He came into the job from a position as 

Party Secretary of Tibet, where he pacified the restive region through a combination of intense securitization and 

pervasive social control mechanisms (China Brief (https://jamestown.org/proqram/chen-guanguo-the-stronqmanbehind-beiiinqs-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/l, September 21, 2017). 

A number of separate reports place the onset of massive detentions among the Uyghur population soon thereafter, 

in late March 2017 (RFA (https://www rfa org/english/newsl\!yghur/detentions-01222018171657.htmll, January 22). 

This timing coincides neatly with the publication of "de-extremification regulations" (~ij!l!!i\3Z\~iEl1Ztit&llililft:1f., 

{9U) by the government of the XUAR (Xinjiang Government (http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/201 7/03/30/128831.htmll. 

March 29, 2017). Directive No. 14 in Section 3 of this document states that "de-extremification must do 

transformation through education (11J1:1'i'$~{t) well, jointly implementing individual and centralized education". 

A potentially influential document in this development was a research paper published by Xinjiang's Urumqi Party 

School (Harmonious Society Journal (http://www.doc88.com/p-2921386725182.html) via www.doc88.com, June 

2017). The paper recommends the creation of "centralized transformation through education training centers" in all 

prefectures and counties. It lists three types of re-education facilities: "centralized transformation through education 

training centers" (1l<P~il:1'i'~ftiaiJ II <P{I), "legal system schools" (il:itH~). and "rehabilitation correction 

centers" (}ijj~!1Jl'iiEl<P{,') . Government construction bids confirm this and indicate that these are sometimes part of 

large new compounds that also host criminal detention centers, police stations or even hospitals and supermarkets 

(see Table 1 (https://jamestown.org/progra!ll.§Lc.!l[79853-2D). 

In May 2017, the first official recruitment notices related to re-education appeared, although evidently most staff 

were recruited by other means. Karamay, a city in northern Xinjiang, listed 110 re-education center positions for 

four different "centralized transformation through education classes" (jl'Jl~i1:1'i'$~1tlll) as well as 248 police officers 

for police stations and "transformation through education bases" (11J1:1'i'~fti!l!ittll) (Zhonggong zhaojing 

(http:llzjks.offcn.comlfjxj/u14230.html), May 20, 2017; Zhonggong wanqxiao 

(http://www.eoffcn.com/ksz)$/gonggaol413713.hJmll. May 20, 2017). Lop and Yutian Counties in Khotan Prefecture 

advertised "transformation through education center" (itil:1'i'~ft<P{,') teaching positions (Shiye Danwei Zhaopin 

(http:llwww.shiyebian.neUxinxil217062.htmll, August 2, 2017). Staff and teacher recruitment notices for Xinjiang's 

numerous new "educational training centers" (1))(1'i'ililiJII'Jl,i)) often required no specific degree, skill, or teaching 

background. Instead, they frequently preferred recruits who demonstrated strong ideological conformity, army or 

police experience, or called for "training center policing assistants" In many instances, training center and police 

staff recruitments shared the same job posting, and bids show that "training center" compounds often have police 

stations. [3] 

The Costs and Design of Re-Education Facilities 

The start of Chen Quanguo's re-education initiative correlates closely with the release of detailed information in the 

form of government procurement and construction bids (*l!!illlli§ and lti§l:ljlj§). Nearly all bids were announced 

from March 2017, just prior to the re-education drive (Figure 1, based on I~ 

(httos:l/jamestown.orglprogramslcb/79853-2/l). Likewise, the values attached to these bids were by far highest in 

the months immediately after the start of the re-education campaign (Figure 2). While only a fraction of reeducation facility construction is reflected in these bids, they do indicate a pattern consistent with re-education 

policy and implementation. 
71 


insert folio 4 here 30993.004

Numbers of reooeducation ~lated e:overnment procurement bids in 

Xinjiang 

l4 ,------------------------------------------------------

12 !---------------------·----···-· ····--·-·~----·--·-·- ----··-

10 +----------------------------1-----------------------

Figure 1. SoU!ce: Government procurement bids (Table 1 fhltps://jamestown.orglproqramslcb/79853-2/J) 

Advertised value of ~education rela.tN rovernment procurement bids in 

nji.;~nc (million RMB) 

Figure 2. Source: Government procurement bids (Table 1 (hltps://jamestown.orqlproqramslcb/79853-21)). Values 

for some projects were not available. For others, advertised values pertained to the construction of several different 

facilities. In the latter cases, values for re-education facilities were estimated. 

Bid descriptions indicate both the construction of new as well as upgrades and enlargements of existing reeducation facilities (Table 1 (https:/ljamestown.orglprogramslcbf79853-2/l). Some pertain to adding sanitary 

facilities, warm water supplies and heating or catering facilities, indicating that existing buildings are being used to 

house more people for longer periods of time. Several planned facilities feature compound sizes exceeding 

10,000sqm. One bid combines vocational training and re-education facilities totaling 82,000sqm. A former detainee 

estimated that his re-education facility held nearly 6,000 detainees (RFERL (https:llwww.rferl.orglalkazakhrecounts-reeducation-in-western-chjnese-camp/291941 06.html), April 26). 

Many bids mandate the installation of comprehensive security features that turn existing facilities into prison-like 

compounds: surrounding walls, security fences, pull wire mesh, barbwire, reinforced security doors and windows, 

surveillance systems, secure access systems, watchtowers, and guard rooms or facilities for armed police. One bid 

emphasized that its surveillance system must cover the entire facility, leaving "no dead angles" (:Tu9EJll). Several 

facilities branded as vocational or other educational training facilities also carried bids calling for extensive security 

installations, with some mandating police stations on the same compound. 
72 


insert folio 5 here 30993.005

Overall, documentation assembled by the author lists 73 re-education facility related procurement bids valued at 

RMB 682 million in respect to their re-education components (Table 1 

(https://jamestown,Q[fl/Qrogramslcb/79853-2/)). [4] Nearly all of these were for regions with significant Uyghur or 

other Muslim minority populations. 

The scale of re-education facility construction can be reflected in local budget reports. For example, Akto County 

stated that in 2017 it spent RMB 383.4 million or 9.6 percent of its budget on security-related projects, including 

"transformation through education centers infrastructure construction and equipment purchase" (~!(I'J'$1ift'P{,,g 

~:liil:!:Dl!i~i5li'D~l!il:~l!i') (Akto Government (http://www.xjaktgov.cnlaktlc10014712018-

02102/content 16c45221 Od3345f1 a9e3abe8c92b0f65.shtmll. February 2). [5] 

While there is no published data on re-education detainee numbers, information from various sources permit us to 

estimate internment figures at anywhere between several hundred thousand and just over one million. The latter 

figure is based on a leaked document from within the region's public security agencies, and, when extrapolated to 

all of Xinjiang, could indicate a detention rate of up to 11.5 percent of the region's adult Uyghur and Kazakh 

population (!'!fO>wsweek Ja.Q_an (https:llwww.newsweekjapan.jp/storieslworld/2018/03/89-3 1.php), March 13). The 

lower estimate seerns a reasonably conservative figure based on correlating informant statements, Western media 

pieces and the comprehensive material presented in the long version of this article. It is therefore possible that 

Xinjiang's present re-education system exceeds the size of the entire former Chinese re-education through labor 

system. [6] 

Conclusions 

China's pacification drive in Xinjiang is, more than likely, the country's most intense campaign of coercive social 

reengineering since the end of the Cultural Revolution. The state's "war on terror" is arguably more and more a 

euphemism for forced ethnic assimilation. 

Despite the strain on the local economy and the potentially disastrous long-term consequences for ethnic relations, 

Beijing's support for Chen Quanguo's extreme de-extremification measures is unlikely to wane. Under Xi Jinping, 

"foreign" religions such as Islam or Christianity have been kept on ever-tighter leashes and directed to "Sinicize" in 

accordance with "socialist core values" (New York Times 

(https:llwww. nytimes.com/2017103/24/opinion/sunday/chinas-communists-embrace-religion. html), March 24, 2017). 

In that sense, Xinjiang's re-education drive is effectively part of a larger, more subtle nationwide campaign. 

Xinjiang's status as the "core hub" of Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative has seemingly made Beijing hell-bent on 

pursuing a definitive solution to the Uyghur question. The frequently highlighted "successes" of Xinjiang's reeducation system may lead the state to adopt it elsewhere. Just as Xmjiang has become China's testing ground for 

cutting-edge surveillance technology, the state may use the experiences gathered from large-scale re-education for 

its social reeng!neering efforts across the nation. 

As pointed out by the scholar James Millward, we would do well to ponder whether what is happening in Xinjiang 

will stay in Xinjiang (New York Times (https:i/www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/china-surveillancestate-uighurs.htmll, February 3). 

Adrian Zenz is researcher and PhD supervisor at the European School of Culture and Theology, Komia!, Germany. 

His research focus is on China's ethnic policy and public recruitment in Tibetan regions and Xinjiang. He is author 

of "Tibetan ness under Threat" and co-edited "Mapping Amdo: Dynamics of Change". 

Notes 

[1] See Muhlhahn, K., 2009. Criminal Justice in China: A History, pp.215-257. Deckwitz, S., 2012. Gulag vs. Laogai 

The Function of Forced Labour Camps in the Soviet Union and China. MA Thesis 

(https://dspace.library. uu. nlibitstream/handle/18 7 4/228062/gulagvslaqgai. pdf?sequenc.<Ell, Utrecht University. 
73 

© 2018 The Jamestown Foundation. All rights reserved. 


insert folio 6 here 30993.006
74 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KING

APARTHEID WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

CHINA HAS TURNED XINJIANG INTO A POLICE STATE LIKE NO OTHER

Totalitarian Determination and Modern Technology Have Produced a Massive Abuse 

of Human Rights 

[From The Economist, May 31, 2018] 

Hotan, Xinjiang Province.—‘‘The prophet Sulayman approached his son and said 

to him, ‘I have received a message from God. I want you to circle the Earth and 

see if there are more people who are alive in spirit or more people who are dead 

in spirit.’ After a period the son returned and said, ‘Father, I went to many places 

and everywhere I went I saw more people who were dead than those who were 

alive.’ ’’ 

Hasan shared that message on a WeChat social-messaging group in 2015, when 

he was 23. Born in Yarkand, a town in southern Xinjiang, Hasan had moved to the 

provincial capital, U ̈ ru ̈mqi, to sell jade and shoes and to learn more about Islam. 

He described himself to Darren Byler, an anthropologist from the University of 

Washington, as a Sufi wanderer, a pious man with a wife and small daughter, who 

prayed five times a day and disapproved of dancing and immodesty. 

But in January 2015 the provincial government was demanding that everyone in 

U ̈ ru ̈mqi return to their native home to get a new identity card. ‘‘I am being forced 

to go back,’’ Hasan complained to Mr. Byler. ‘‘The Yarkand police are calling me 

every day. They are making my parents call me and tell me the same thing.’’ Eventually, he and his family boarded a bus for the 20-hour journey home. It was hit 

by a truck. Hasan’s wife and daughter were killed. He was hospitalized. ‘‘It was the 

will of Allah,’’ he said. 

Hasan hoped the authorities would allow him to return to U ̈ ru ̈mqi because of his 

injuries. No chance. Having lost wife, child and livelihood, Hasan lost his liberty, 

too. A fortnight after his accident, he was sent to a reeducation camp for an indefinite period. There, for all his relatives know, he remains. 

Hasan is one of hundreds of thousands of Uighurs, a Turkic-language people, who 

have disappeared in Xinjiang, China’s northwestern province. It is an empty, farflung place; Hasan’s home town of Yarkand is as close to Baghdad as it is to Beijing. 

It is also a crucial one. The region is China’s biggest domestic producer of oil and 

gas, and much of the fuel imported from Central Asia and Russia passes through 

on its way to the industries of the east coast. It is now a vital link in the Belt and 

Road Initiative, a foreign policy which aims to bind the Middle East and Europe to 

China with ties of infrastructure, investment and trade. 

But on top of that it is the home of the Uighurs, the largest Muslim group in the 

country, and ethnically quite distinct from the Han Chinese. A recent history of 


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75 

Uighur unrest—in particular bloody inter-ethnic violence in U ̈ ru ̈mqi in 2009 that 

followed the murder of Uighurs elsewhere in China—and subsequent terrorism have 

sent the government’s repressive tendencies into overdrive. Under a new party boss, 

Chen Quanguo, appointed in 2016, the provincial government has vastly increased 

the money and effort it puts into controlling the activities and patrolling the beliefs 

of the Uighur population. Its regime is racist, uncaring and totalitarian, in the sense 

of aiming to affect every aspect of people’s lives. It has created a full-fledged police 

state. And it is committing some of the most extensive, and neglected, human-rights 

violations in the world. 

THE NOT-QUITE-GULAG ARCHIPELAGO

The government is building hundreds or thousands of unacknowledged reeducation camps to which Uighurs can be sent for any reason or for none. In some of 

them day-to-day conditions do not appear to be physically abusive as much as 

creepy. One released prisoner has said he was not permitted to eat until he had 

thanked Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, and the Communist Party. But there 

have been reports of torture at others. In January, 82-year-old Muhammad Salih 

Hajim, a respected religious scholar, died in detention in U ̈ ru ̈mqi. 

Kashgar, the largest Uighur city, has four camps, of which the largest is in Number 5 Middle School. A local security chief said in 2017 that ‘‘approximately 120,000’’ 

people were being held in the city. In Korla, in the middle of the province, a security 

official recently said the camps are so full that officials in them are begging the police to stop bringing people. 

As a result, more and more camps are being built: the reeducation archipelago 

is adding islands even faster than the South China Sea. Adrian Zenz of the European School of Culture and Theology in Kortal, Germany, has looked at procurement contracts for 73 reeducation camps. He found their total cost to have been 

682m yuan ($108m), almost all spent since April 2017. Records from Akto, a county 

near the border with Kyrgyzstan, say it spent 9.6% of its budget on security (including camps) in 2017. In 2016 spending on security in the province was five times 

what it had been in 2007. By the end of 2017 it was ten times that: 59bn yuan. 

For all this activity, the government has not officially confirmed that the camps 

exist. They are not governed by any judicial process; detentions are on the orders 

of the police or party officials, not the verdict of a court. A woman working as an 

undertaker was imprisoned for washing bodies according to Islamic custom. Thirty 

residents of Ili, a town near the Kazakh border, were detained ‘‘because they were 

suspected of wanting to travel abroad,’’ according to the local security chief. Other 

offences have included holding strong religious views, allowing others to preach religion, asking where one’s relatives are and failing to recite the national anthem in 

Chinese. 

A significant chunk of the total Uighur population is interned in this way. If the 

rate of detention in Kashgar applied to the province as a whole, 5% of the Uighur 

population of 10m would be detained. Other evidence suggests that this is quite possible. In February, Radio Free Asia, a broadcaster financed by an independent agency of the American government, cold-called 11 families at random in Araltobe, in 

the north of the province, far from the Uighurs’ heartland. Six said family members 


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76 

had been sent to camps. In a village later visited by Agence France Presse in 

Qaraqash county, near Hotan, a fifth of adults had been detained over four months. 

Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch, an advocacy group, reckons the overall 

number detained may be 800,000. Timothy Grose, a professor at Rose-Hulman University in Indiana, puts the total between 500,000 and 1m, which would imply that 

something like a sixth to a third of young and middle-aged Uighur men are being 

detained, or have been at some point in the past year. 

The Chinese government argues that harsh measures are needed to prevent violence associated with Uighur separatism. In 2013 a Uighur suicide-driver crashed 

his car into pedestrians in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. In 2014 a knife-wielding 

Uighur gang slaughtered 31 travellers at a train station in Kunming, Yunnan province, an incident some in China compared to the September 11th 2001 attacks on 

America. Unrest in Yarkand later that year led to a hundred deaths; an attack at 

a coal mine in Aksu killed 50 people. Kyrgyz authorities blamed Uighur terrorists 

for an attempt to blow up the Chinese embassy in Bishkek; Uighurs have been 

blamed for a bombing which killed 20 at a shrine in Bangkok popular with Chinese 

tourists. 

There are worrying links, as the Chinese authorities are keen to point out, between Uighur separatism and global jihad, especially in the Uighur diaspora, which 

is based in Turkey. Chinese and Syrian officials say 1,500 Uighurs have fought with 

Islamic State (IS) or Jabhat al-Nusra (part of al-Qaeda) in Syria. A group called the 

Turkestan Islamic Party, which demands independence for Xinjiang, is banned 

under anti-terrorist laws in America and Europe. In 2016 a defector from IS provided a list of foreign recruits; 114 came from Xinjiang. 

IN THE GRID

But the system of repression in the province goes far beyond anything that would 

be justified by such proclivities and affiliations. In Hotan there is a new police station every 300 meters or so. They are called ‘‘convenience police stations,’’ as if they 

were shops—and in fact they do offer some consumer services, such as bottled water 

and phone recharging. The windowless stations, gunmetal gray, with forbidding 

grilles on their doors, are part of a ‘‘grid-management system’’ like that which Mr. 

Chen pioneered when he was party boss in Tibet from 2011 to 2016. The authorities 

divide each city into squares, with about 500 people. Every square has a police station that keeps tabs on the inhabitants. So, in rural areas, does every village. 

At a large checkpoint on the edge of Hotan a policeman orders everyone off a bus. 

The passengers (all Uighur) take turns in a booth. Their identity cards are scanned, 

photographs and fingerprints of them are taken, newly installed iris-recognition 

technology peers into their eyes. Women must take off their headscarves. Three 

young Uighurs are told to turn on their smartphones and punch in the passwords. 

They give the phones to a policeman who puts the devices into a cradle that 

downloads their contents for later analysis. One woman shouts at a policeman that 

he is Uighur, why is he looking at her phone? 

There can be four or five checkpoints every kilometer. Uighurs go through them 

many times a day. Shops and restaurants in Hotan have panic buttons with which 

to summon the police. The response time is one minute. Apparently because of the 

Kunming knife attack, knives and scissors are as hard to buy as a gun in Japan. 

In butchers and restaurants all over Xinjiang you will see kitchen knives chained 

to the wall, lest they be snatched up and used as weapons. In Aksu, QR codes containing the owner’s identity-card information have to be engraved on every blade. 

Remarkably, all shops and restaurants in Hotan must have a part-time policeman 

on duty. Thousands of shop assistants and waiters have been enrolled in the police 

to this end. Each is issued with a helmet, flak jacket and three-foot baton. They 

train in the afternoon. In the textile market these police officers sit in every booth 

and stall, selling things; their helmets and flak jackets, which are uncomfortable, 

are often doffed. A squad of full-time police walks through the market making sure 

security cameras are working and ordering shop assistants to put their helmets 

back on. Asked why they wear them, the assistants reply tersely—‘‘security.’’ 

At the city’s railway station, travellers go through three rounds of bag checks before buying a ticket. On board, police walk up and down ordering Uighurs to open 

their luggage again. As the train pulls into Kashgar, it passes metal goods wagons. 

A toddler points at them shouting excitedly ‘‘Armoured car! Armoured car!’’ Paramilitary vehicles are more familiar to him than rolling stock. 

Uniformed shop assistants, knife controls and ‘‘convenience police stations’’ are 

only the most visible elements of the police state. The province has an equally extensive if less visible regime that uses yet more manpower and a great deal of technology to create total surveillance. 

77 

IMPROVING LIVES, WINNING HEARTS

Under a system called fanghuiju, teams of half a dozen—composed of policemen 

or local officials and always including one Uighur speaker, which almost always 

means a Uighur—go from house to house compiling dossiers of personal information. 

Fanghuiju is short for ‘‘researching people’s conditions, improving people’s lives, 

winning people’s hearts.’’ But the party refers to the work as ‘‘eradicating tumors.’’ 

The teams—over 10,000 in rural areas in 2017—report on ‘‘extremist’’ behavior such 

as not drinking alcohol, fasting during Ramadan and sporting long beards. They report back on the presence of ‘‘undesirable’’ items, such as Korans, or attitudes—such 

as an ‘‘ideological situation’’ that is not in wholehearted support of the party. 

Since the spring of 2017, the information has been used to rank citizens’ ‘‘trustworthiness’’ using various criteria. People are deemed trustworthy, average or 

untrustworthy depending on how they fit into the following categories: 15 to 55 

years old (i.e., of military age); Uighur (the catalogue is explicitly racist: people are 

suspected merely on account of their ethnicity); unemployed; have religious knowledge; pray five times a day (freedom of worship is guaranteed by China’s constitution); have a passport; have visited one of 26 countries; have ever overstayed a visa; 

have family members in a foreign country (there are at least 10,000 Uighurs in Turkey); and home school their children. Being labelled ‘‘untrustworthy’’ can lead to a 

camp. To complete the panorama of human surveillance, the government has a programme called ‘‘becoming kin’’ in which local families (mostly Uighur) ‘‘adopt’’ officials (mostly Han). The official visits his or her adoptive family regularly, lives with 

it for short periods, gives the children presents and teaches the household Mandarin. He also verifies information collected by fanghuiju teams. The programme appears to be immense. According to an official report in 2018, 1.1m officials have 

been paired with 1.6m families. That means roughly half of Uighur households have 

had a Han-Chinese spy/indoctrinator assigned to them. 

Such efforts map the province’s ideological territory family by family; technology 

maps the population’s activities street by street and phone by phone. In Hotan and 

Kashgar there are poles bearing perhaps eight or ten video cameras at intervals of 

100–200 meters along every street; a far finer-grained surveillance net than in most 

Chinese cities. As well as watching pedestrians the cameras can read car number 

plates and correlate them with the face of the person driving. Only registered owners may drive cars; anyone else will be arrested, according to a public security official who accompanied this correspondent in Hotan. The cameras are equipped to 

work at night as well as by day. 

Because the government sees what it calls ‘‘web cleansing’’ as necessary to prevent access to terrorist information, everyone in Xinjiang is supposed to have a 

spyware app on their mobile phone. Failing to install the app, which can identify 

people called, track online activity and record social-media use, is an offence. ‘‘WiFi sniffers’’ in public places keep an eye, or nose, on all networked devices in range. 

Next, the records associated with identity cards can contain biometric data including fingerprints, blood type and DNA information as well as the subject’s detention 

record and ‘‘reliability status.’’ The government collects a lot of this biometric material by stealth, under the guise of a public-health programme called ‘‘Physicals for 

All,’’ which requires people to give blood samples. Local officials ‘‘demanded [we] 

participate in the physicals,’’ one resident of Kashgar told Human Rights Watch, an 

NGO. ‘‘Not participating would have been seen as a problem . . . .’’ 

A system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), first revealed 

by Human Rights Watch, uses machine-learning systems, information from cameras, smartphones, financial and family-planning records and even unusual electricity use to generate lists of suspects for detention. One official WeChat report 

said that verifying IJOP’s lists was one of the main responsibilities of the local security committee. Even without high-tech surveillance, Xinjiang’s police state is formidable. With it, it becomes terrifying. 

78 

In theory, the security system in Xinjiang applies to everyone equally. In practice 

it is as race-based as apartheid in South Africa was. The security apparatus is deployed in greatest force in the southwest, where around 80% of Uighurs live. In a 

city like Shihezi, which is 95% Han, there are far fewer street checkpoints, if any, 

and a normal level of policing. Where there are checkpoints, Han Chinese are routinely waved through. Uighurs are always stopped. 

THE MINARETS TORN DOWN

Islam is a special target. In Hotan, the neighbourhood mosques have been closed, 

leaving a handful of large places of worship. Worshippers must register with the police before attending. At the entrance to the largest mosque in Kashgar, the Idh 

Kha—a famous place of pilgrimage—two policemen sit underneath a banner saying 

‘‘Love the party, love the country.’’ Inside, a member of the mosque’s staff holds 

classes for local traders on how to be a good communist. In U ̈ ru ̈mqi the remaining 

mosques have had their minarets knocked down and their Islamic crescents torn off. 

Some 29 Islamic names may no longer be given to children. In schools, Uighur-language instruction is vanishing—another of the trends which have markedly accelerated under Mr. Chen. Dancing after prayers and specific Uighur wedding ceremonies and funerary rites are prohibited. 

Unlike those of South Africa, the two main racial groups are well matched in size. 

According to the 2010 census, Uighurs account for 46% of the province’s population 

and Han Chinese 40% (the rest are smaller minorities such as Kazakhs and 

Kyrgyz). But they live apart and see the land in distinct ways. Uighurs regard 

Xinjiang as theirs because they have lived in it for thousands of years. The Han 

Chinese regard it as theirs because they have built a modern economy in its deserts 

and mountains. They talk of bringing ‘‘modern culture’’ and ‘‘modern lifestyle’’ to the 

locals—by which they mean the culture and lifestyle of modern Han China. 

So how have the Han and Uighur reacted to the imposition of a police state? Yang 

Jiehun and Xiao Junduo are Han Chinese veterans of the trade in Hotan jade 

(which the Chinese hold to be the best in the world, notably in its very pale ‘‘mutton-fat’’ form). Asked about security, they give big smiles, a thumbs-up and say the 

past year’s crackdown has been ‘‘really well received.’’ ‘‘In terms of public security, 


Insert folio 10 here 30993.010
79 

U ̈ ru ̈mqi is the safest it has ever been,’’ says Mr. Xiao, whose family came to the 

province in the 1950s, when the People’s Liberation Army and state-owned enterprises were reinforcing the border with the Soviet Union. ‘‘The Uighurs are being 

helped out of poverty,’’ he avers. ‘‘They understand and support the policy.’’ 

Not all Han Chinese in Xinjiang are quite as enthusiastic. Tens of thousands 

came to the province fairly recently, mostly in the 1990s, to seek their fortunes as 

independent traders and business people, rather than being transferred there by 

state-owned companies or the army. They approve of better security but dislike the 

damage being done to the economy—for example, the way movement controls make 

it harder to employ Uighurs. So far, this ambivalence is not seriously weakening 

the support among the Han and, for the government in Beijing, that is all that matters. It sees Xinjiang mainly as a frontier. The Han are the principal guarantors 

of border security. If they are happy, so is the government. 

The Uighur reaction is harder to judge; open criticism or talking to outsiders can 

land you in jail. The crackdown has been effective inasmuch as there have been no 

(known) Uighur protests or attacks since early 2017. It seems likely that many people are bowing before the storm. As Sultan, a student in Kashgar, says with a 

shrug: ‘‘There’s nothing we can do about it.’’ 

But there are reasons for thinking resentment is building up below the surface. 

According to anthropological work by Mr. Byler and Joanne Smith Finley of Newcastle University in Britain, a religious revival had been under way before the imposition of today’s harsh control. Mosques were becoming more crowded, religious 

schools attracting more pupils. Now the schools and mosques are largely empty, 

even for Friday prayers. It is hard to believe that religious feeling has vanished. 

More likely a fair bit has gone underground. 

And the position of Uighurs who cooperate with the Han authorities is becoming 

untenable. The provincial government needs the Uighur elite because its members 

have good relations with both sides. The expansion of the police state has added to 

the number of Uighurs it needs to co-opt. According to Mr. Zenz and James Leibold 

of La Trobe University in Melbourne, 90% of the security jobs advertised in 2017 

were ‘‘third tier’’ jobs for low-level police assistants: cheap, informal contracts which 

mainly go to Uighurs. But at the same time as needing more Uighurs, the authorities have made it clear that they do not trust them. Part of the repression has been 

aimed at ‘‘two-faced officials’’ who (the party says) are publicly supporting the security system while secretly helping victims. Simultaneously recruiting more Uighurs 

and distrusting them more creates an ever larger pool that might one day turn 

against the system from within. 

A Han businessman who travels frequently between U ̈ ru ̈mqi and Kashgar says 

he used to feel welcome in the south. ‘‘Now it has all changed. They are not afraid. 

But they are resentful. They look at me as if they are wondering what I am doing 

in their country.’’ One of the few detainees released from the camps, Omurbek Eli, 

told RFA that the authorities ‘‘are planting the seeds of hatred and turning [detainees] into enemies. This is not just my view—the majority of people in the camp feel 

the same way.’’ 

HASAN’S WARNING

China’s Communist rulers believe their police state limits separatism and reduces 

violence. But by separating the Uighur and Han further, and by imposing huge 

costs on one side that the other side, for the most part, blithely ignores, they are 

ratcheting up tension. The result is that both groups are drifting towards violence. 

Before he disappeared, Hasan, the self-styled Sufi wanderer, expressed Xinjiang’s 

plight. ‘‘To be Uighur is hard,’’ he wrote on WeChat in 2015. ‘‘I don’t even know 

what I am accused of, but I must accept their judgment. I have no choice. Where 

there is no freedom, there is tension. Where there is tension, there are incidents. 

Where there are incidents, there are police. Where there are police, there is no freedom.’’ 

80 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY RIAN THUM

WHAT REALLY HAPPENS IN CHINA’S ‘RE-EDUCATION’ CAMPS

[From The New York Times, May 15, 2018] 

(By Rian Thum) 1

What does it take to intern half a million members of one ethnic group in just 

a year? Enormous resources and elaborate organization, but the Chinese authorities 

aren’t stingy. Vast swathes of the Uighur population in China’s western region of 

Xinjiang—as well as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other ethnic minorities—are being detained to undergo what the state calls ‘‘transformation through education.’’ Many 

tens of thousands of them have been locked up in new thought-control camps with 

barbed wire, bombproof surfaces, reinforced doors and guard rooms. 

The Chinese authorities are cagey and evasive, if not downright dismissive, about 

reports concerning such camps. But now they will have to explain away their own 

eloquent trail of evidence: an online public bidding system set up by the government 

inviting tenders from contractors to help build and run the camps. 

Uighurs have more in common, culturally and linguistically, with Turks than Han 

Chinese, and many Uighurs are Muslim. Resentful of China’s heavy-handed rule in 

the region, some have resisted it, usually through peaceful means, but on occasion 

violently, by attacking government officials and, exceptionally, civilians. The state, 

for its part, fuels Islamophobia by labeling ordinary Muslim traditions as the manifestation of religious ‘‘extremism.’’ 

Over the last decade, the Xinjiang authorities have accelerated policies to reshape 

Uighurs’ habits—even, the state says, their thoughts. Local governments organize 

public ceremonies and signings asking ethnic minorities to pledge loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party; they hold mandatory reeducation courses and forced dance 

performances, because some forms of Islam forbid dance. In some neighborhoods, security organs carry out regular assessments of the risk posed by residents: Uighurs 

get a 10 percent deduction on their score for ethnicity alone and lose another 10 

percent if they pray daily. 

Uighurs had grown accustomed to living under an intrusive state, but measures 

became draconian after the arrival in late 2016 of a new regional party chief from 

Tibet. Since then, some local police officers have said that they struggled to meet 

their new detention quotas—in the case of one village, 40 percent of the population. 

A new study by Adrian Zenz, a researcher at the European School of Culture and 

Theology, in Korntal, Germany, analyzed government ads inviting tenders for various contracts concerning reeducation facilities in more than 40 localities across 

Xinjiang, offering a glimpse of the vast bureaucratic, human and financial resources 

the state dedicates to this detention network. The report reveals the state’s push 

to build camps in every corner of the region since 2016, at a cost so far of more 

than 680 million yuan (over $107 million). 

A bid invitation appears to have been posted on April 27—a sign that more camps 

are being built. These calls for tenders refer to compounds of up to 880,000 square 

feet, some with quarters for People’s Armed Police, a paramilitary security force. 

Local governments are also placing ads to recruit camp staff with expertise in criminal psychology or a background in the military or the police force. 

Evidence of these technical details is invaluable, especially considering the growing difficulties faced by researchers and reporters trying to work in Xinjiang. Several foreign journalists have produced important articles, despite police harassment 

and brief arrests; ethnic Uighur reporters, or their families, endure far worse. 

Given the risks, firsthand accounts from former detainees remain rare—although 

a few are starting to emerge. 

In February, a Uighur man studying in the United States gave Foreign Policy one 

of the most detailed descriptions of detention conditions published to date. He was 

arrested upon returning to China for a visit last year, and then held for 17 days 

on no known charge. He described long days of marching in a crowded cell, chanting 

slogans and watching propaganda videos about purportedly illegal religious activities. As he was being released, a guard warned him, ‘‘Whatever you say or do in 

North America, your family is still here and so are we.’’ 

——————— 1 Rian Thum is an associate professor of history at Loyola University New Orleans and the 

author of ‘‘The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History.’’ He has been conducting research in Xinjiang, 

China, for nearly two decades. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/opinion/china-reeducation-camps.html 

81 

Last month, an ethnic Kazakh man described to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 

his four-month stint in a camp in northern Xinjiang. He met inmates serving terms 

as long as seven years. He said he had been made to study how ‘‘to keep safe the 

domestic secrets’’ of China and ‘‘not to be a Muslim.’’ In these cases, as in many 

others, detainees were held incommunicado, their families left to wonder what had 

happened to them. 

And now these rare eyewitness accounts are being corroborated, if unwittingly, by 

the Chinese state itself, as it makes public calls for contracts to build even more 

detention camps. 

Many details of this carceral system are hidden, and remain unknown—in fact, 

even the camps’ ultimate purpose is not entirely clear. 

They serve as grounds for compulsory indoctrination. Some officials use them for 

prevention as well, to lock down people they presumptively suspect of opposing Chinese rule: In two localities the authorities have targeted people under 40, claiming 

that this age group is a ‘‘violent generation.’’ 

The camps are also tools of punishment, and of course, a threat. Few detainees 

are formally charged, much less sentenced. Some are told how long a term they will 

serve; others are simply held indefinitely. This uncertainty—the arbitrary logic of 

detention—instills fear in the entire population. 

Surveillance was markedly heightened during my last trip to Xinjiang in December—so much so that I avoided talking to Uighurs then for fear that just being in 

contact with a foreigner would get them sent away for reeducation. Meanwhile, my 

Uighur contacts outside China were pointing to the quota-based purges of the Communists’ Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957–1959 and ever-shifting rules during the 

Cultural Revolution to explain that even if Uighurs in Xinjiang today wanted to 

submit wholly to the security regime, they no longer knew how to. Joining the security services used to be a rare way to ensure one’s personal safety. Not anymore. 

Tens of thousands of families have been torn apart; an entire culture is being 

criminalized. Some local officials use chilling language to describe the purpose of detention, such as ‘‘eradicating tumors’’ or spraying chemicals on crops to kill the 

‘‘weeds.’’ 

Labeling with a single word the deliberate and large-scale mistreatment of an ethnic group is tricky: Old terms often camouflage the specifics of new injustices. And 

drawing comparisons between the suffering of different groups is inherently fraught, 

potentially reductionist. But I would venture this statement to describe the plight 

of China’s Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz today: Xinjiang has become a police state 

to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid. 

There is every reason to fear that the situation will only worsen. Several accounts 

of Uighurs dying in detention have surfaced recently—a worrisome echo of the established use of torture in China’s reeducation camps for followers of the spiritual 

movement Falun Gong. And judging by their camp-building spree in Xinjiang, the 

Chinese authorities don’t seem to think they have come close to achieving whatever 

their goal there is. 

82 

LETTER TO SECRETARY POMPEO SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUBIO


insert folio 26 here 30993.026

llntted ~rates Senate 

The Honorable Michael R. Pompeo 

Secretary of State 

U.S. Department of State 

2201 C Street. N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20520 

Dear Secretary Pompeo, 

V\.IASHlNGTOt\'. DC 

July 26. 2018 

We write to express our urgent concern about an almming situation affecting six U.S.-based 

journalists with Radio Free Asia's (RFA) Uyghur Service. As you may know. RFA is one of live 

media networks under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the U.S. agency responsible 

for international media. Its Uyghur-Janguage news service provides roughly 12 million of 

China's mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghur population with trustworthy, accurate news on 

the deteriorating human rights situation in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

(XUAR). 

RFA 's Uyghur Service journalists, most of them U.S. citizens and residents of Virginia. have 

relatives in China-including elderly parents-who have been detained, jailed, or forcibly 

disappeared in what appears to be an act of direct retaliation against these U.S. journalists for 

their work in exposing the deteriorating human rights situation in the XUAR. We are deeply 

concerned that these cases illustrate that a foreign nation is pursuing extreme measures in an 

attempt to interfere with Radio Free Asia's con!,'!'essionally mandated mission of bringing free 

press to closed societies. 

Most relatives are believed to be held in re-education centers or camps that began appem·ing in 

the XUAR in the spring of2017, but have greatly expanded since then. Media and think tank 

reports estimate that hundreds of thousands of individuals-men and women of all ages-have 

been arbitrarily detained in these facilities that operate much like open-air prisons under the 

ostensible purpose of rehabilitation. Tn recent months, reports and first-hand accounts have 

surfaced about their cramped, over-crowded and gulag-like conditions. and poor medical care. 

Radio Free Asia's in-depth journalism has provided some of the world's most effective reporting 

about the XUAR, a region increasingly restricted to outside news organizations, diplomats. and 

NGOs. RFA 's journalists understand that their work carries risks, but they also know that they 

are providing an important service through their work at RF A. It is an unfortunate irony that 

these same journalists who have already endured great risk and sacrifice have now become part 

of the stories that they report on. The tact that they have been targeted while living and working 

in the United States is even more troubling. 

In your capacity as the United States' senior diplomat, we urge you. at every opportunity, to raise 

this urgent issue in your diplomatic communications with your Chinese counterparts. seek 

answers as to the whereabouts and well-being of these missing, detained, and jailed relatives, and 
83 


insert folio 27 here 30993.027

appeal for these individuals to be unconditionally released. We ask you to make clear to the 

Chinese government that these cases are a priority for the U.S. Government. We also ask that 

you brief our offices within the next few weeks with an update on their cases, to include specifics 

about your engagement with the Chinese government to-date, and your plan for future 

engagement. 

Thank you in advance tor your consideration, and most of all, for your action. 

iJtl 

Mark 

vJ_ 

R. Warner 

IC 4/~ United States Senator 

---~) 

;~)_L Tim Kaine 

United States Senator 

Sincerely. 

~y~·~ United States Senator 

6~ 

/lii'"L 

Marco Rubio 

United States Senator 

Steve Daines 

United States Senator 
84 

Witness Biographies 

Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, Representative of the United States on the 

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States Mission 

to the United Nations 

Ambassador Kelley E. Currie currently serves as the Representative of the United 

States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, and Alternate 

Representative of the United States of America to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Ambassador Currie specializes in political reform, development and humanitarian assistance, human rights, and other non-traditional 

security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. She previously was a Senior Fellow with 

the Project 2049 Institute and held senior policy positions with the Department of 

State and several international and non-governmental human rights and humanitarian organizations. She also served as foreign operations appropriations associate 

and staff director of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus for Congressman John 

Porter of Illinois. She holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and a 

B.A. cum laude from the University of Georgia’s School of Public and International 

Affairs. She is married to Peter Currie and they have two children. 

Anthony Christino III, Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office of 

Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Anthony Christino is the Director of the Foreign Policy Division within the Office 

of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance of the Export Administration of the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the U.S. Department of Commerce. As such, 

he is responsible for licensing and the formulation of export control policy related 

to countries subject to sanctions and special controls. Mr. Christino has represented 

BIS in a wide variety of U.S. Government export control fora and numerous industry outreach programs as well as in bilateral and multilateral meetings with foreign 

governments. He holds a bachelor’s degree in international relations and a master’s 

degree in national security studies. 

Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia 

Gulchehra ‘‘Guli’’ Hoja is a broadcaster with Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Service, 

where she has worked since 2001. Prior to RFA, Ms. Hoja was a successful TV personality and journalist in China’s Uyghur Region. But after hearing RFA’s Uyghur 

Service, she decided to leave China and join the U.S. effort to provide the Uyghur 

people with trustworthy, uncensored journalism. At least two dozen of Ms. Hoja’s 

China-based relatives are missing, including her younger brother, who was detained 

last September, all presumed to be held in so-called ‘‘reeducation camps.’’ Her parents were detained in February but were released because of health issues. She has 

a bachelor’s degree in Uyghur language and literature from Xinjiang Normal University. Ms. Hoja is a U.S. citizen, and lives in Woodbridge, Virginia with her husband and three children. 

Rian Thum, Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans 

Dr. Thum is an Associate Professor of History at Loyola University in New Orleans and a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies. Dr. Thum’s research 

and teaching are generally concerned with the overlap of China and the Muslim 

World. His book, ‘‘The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History’’ (Harvard University Press, 

2014) received the American Historical Association’s Fairbank Prize and the American Anthropological Association’s Hsu Prize. 

Jessica Batke, Senior Editor, ChinaFile and former Research Analyst at 

the Department of State 

Jessica Batke is a ChinaFile Senior Editor and runs The China NGO Project. She 

is an expert on China’s domestic political and social affairs, and served as a Research Analyst at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research for 

nearly eight years prior to joining ChinaFile. In 2016, she was a Visiting Academic 

Fellow at MERICS in Berlin, where she published papers on Chinese leadership politics and created databases to catalogue hard-to-find, high-level Chinese policy documents and details about policy advisory groups. She is proficient in Mandarin. 

Æ