IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-10939

Summary Calendar

ALBERT G. HILL, III, Individually, and as a Beneficiary of the Margaret 

Hunt Trust Estate, derivatively on behalf of the Margaret Hunt Trust Estate, 

Individually, as a beneficiary of the Haroldson Lafayette Hunt Jr. Trust 

Estate and derivately on Behalf of the Haroldson,

Plaintiff – Appellant

v.

WILLIAM SCHILLING, Individually and In His Capacity as a Member of the 

Advisory Board MHTE and a Member of the Advisory Board of the HHTE; 

IVAN IRWIN, JR.; ALBERT G. HILL, JR.; ALINDA H. WIKERT; LYDA 

HILL; HEATHER V. WASHBURNE; ELISA M. SUMMERS; WILLIAM 

HERBERT HUNT, In His Capacity as the Personal Representative of the 

Estate of Tom Hunt; BRETT RINGLE, Individually and in His Capacity as a 

Member of the Advisory Board of the MHTE; MARGARET KELIHER, 

Individually and in Her Capacity as Trustee of the MHTE and a Member of 

the Advisory Board of the HHTE,

Defendants – Appellees

v. 

Campbell Harrison & Dagley, L.L.P.; Calloway, Norris, Burdette, & Weber, 

P.L.L.C.,

Intervenors – Appellees 

 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 21, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 13-10939

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:07-CV-2020

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Albert G. Hill III (“Hill”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion 

to enforce the settlement agreement and compel production of copies of the 

books and records. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1935, H.L. Hunt formed irrevocable trusts for six of his children. Two 

of those trusts give rise to this lawsuit: the Margaret Hunt Trust Estate 

(“MHTE”) and the Haroldson L. Hunt, Jr. Trust Estate (“HHTE”). The Articles 

of Agreement and Declaration of Trust creating each of the MHTE and the 

HHTE were essentially identical. 

Margaret Hunt Hill was the beneficiary of the MHTE. Ordinarily the 

MHTE would pass to Margaret’s three children. But before her death her son, 

Albert G. Hill Jr. (“Hill Jr.”), executed an instrument disclaiming his interest 

to his three children, including Hill. Hill Jr. later rescinded the disclaimer, 

purporting he was incompetent when he signed the disclaimer in 2005 and an 

“updated” disclaimer in 2007. 

On November 8, 2007 Hill filed a suit in Texas state court against his 

father, Hill Jr., alleging that he and others committed violations of the federal 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), fraud, breach 

of fiduciary duty, and other torts in connection with the MHTE and HHTE. 

Hill sought different forms of relief, including enforcement of his father’s 

disclaimer, a declaration that he was a beneficiary of both the MHTE and 

HHTE, monetary damages, and an accounting of both trusts. The Defendants, 

Hill Jr. and the others associated with the RICO claims, removed the action to 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 

During the almost three years of litigation, in which exhaustive 

discovery occurred, the MHTE’s trustee produced thousands of financial and 

accounting documents. After years of litigation, Hill and the former MHTE 

and HHTE trustees entered into a written Global Settlement and Mutual 

Release Agreement (“settlement agreement”), filed with the district court on 

May 14, 2010. The settlement agreement divided the MHTE, pro rata, into 

separate sub-trusts for all beneficiaries, including Hill. Each sub-trust was to 

be separately administered by a new successor trustee; the successor trustees 

were to administer according to the 1935 Articles of Agreement of the MHTE. 

The Articles of Agreement of the MHTE state the duties of the trustee, 

who, among other things, is required to

keep, or cause to be kept, faithful records and books of account,

reflecting at all times the true conditions of the affairs of said 

Trust Estate, which said records and books of account shall at 

all times be open for the inspection of the other two members 

of the Advisory Board, and as near after the close of each 

calendar year as is reasonably possible the Trustee shall have 

said books and records audited by a Certified Public 

Accountant and a report of said audit files as a part of the 

archives and permanent records of said Trust Estate . . . .

Further, the Articles state that when a trustee is replaced, the successor 

trustee “shall succeed to the same rights and powers and be subject to the same 

duties and liabilities of his predecessor.” 

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The settlement agreement does not require the former MHTE trustees 

to hand over any additional MHTE documents to any beneficiary or successor 

trustee of the MHTE New Hunt Trusts, and specifically prohibits the successor 

trustees from investigating the prior management of the MHTE trustees. 

Before the district court entered its final judgment, both parties submitted 

final judgment proposals. Hill attempted to add new terms to the agreement. 

Namely, he sought to have the agreement require the MHTE trustee and 

advisory board members to grant complete access to MHTE’s books and records 

for inspection by Hill and/or his representatives. In November 2010, the 

district court approved the settlement agreement, rejected Hill’s new terms, 

adopted a provision prohibiting any new trustees from investigating past 

conduct, provided for broad general mutual releases, and entered final 

judgment.

In December 2010, the former trustees of the MHTE divided the MHTE 

into separate trusts in accordance with the settlement agreement and final 

judgment. After the district court rejected Hill’s request to alter or amend the 

final judgment to request the former MHTE trustees to give an accounting for 

the period of May to December 2010, Hill filed an appeal to this court alleging 

that the final judgment differed from the settlement agreement. In the 

meantime, Hill learned that the district judge, who presided over the case since 

2007, had an undisclosed conflict of interest due to his wife’s ownership of stock 

in ExxonMobil Corporation. Hill moved to recuse this judge in March 2012. 

The district court denied this motion, and Hill appealed the denial to this court. 

This court consolidated the two issues and affirmed the district court. 

While the previous appeal was pending, Hill filed a motion to enforce the 

final judgment and to compel the transfer of books and records of the former 

MHTE to successor trustees or, in the alternative, for relief from final 

judgment under Rule 60(b) in the district court. Hill admitted that this motion, 

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filed before his motion to recuse the district judge, was aimed at obtaining 

copies of the books and records of Hunt Petroleum, an entity later acquired by 

Exxon. His motions were thus aimed at uncovering evidence in support of his

recusal motion. His motion to enforce final judgment also contradicted his 

previous position, that the final judgment did not grant him access to inspect 

the MHTE books and records. The motion to enforce and compel was denied 

by a magistrate judge, due to the pending motion to recuse. The case was 

reassigned to a second district judge, who also rejected Hill’s objections to the 

magistrate judge’s ruling, finding that neither the settlement agreement nor 

the final judgment required the production of books and records of the former 

MHTE for inspection. The court emphasized that the initial district judge had

previously rejected adding Hill’s provision to require the accounting or 

inspection rights to the final judgment. He also denied Hill’s alternative 

request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). After the issuance of this 

order, the second district judge recused himself sua sponte.

Hill appeals the denial of the motion to enforce and compel and files a 

complaint speculating about the second district judge’s reason for recusing 

himself after denying Hill’s motion to enforce and compel. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The principal issue on appeal is whether the successor trustees have a 

right to obtain copies of the “archives and permanent records” of the MHTE 

based on the MHTE’s Articles of Agreement, the settlement agreement, and 

the final judgment. Trust agreements and settlement agreements are 

interpreted as contracts. Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 

1999); In re Raymark Indus., Inc., 831 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1987). The 

construction of an unambiguous contract is a question of law, which we review 

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de novo. Guidry v. Halliburton Geophysical Servs., Inc., 976 F.2d 938, 940 (5th 

Cir. 1992).

To determine whether reversal or vacation of a district judge’s sua sponte 

recusal is necessary, we consider the risk (1) of injustice to the parties in this 

case; (2) that denial of relief will create injustice in other cases; and (3) of 

undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. Patterson v. Mobil 

Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 485 (5th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

I. Right to Access and Copy Records

Appellees, the former MHTE and HHTE trustees, contend that the 

waiver doctrine precludes Hill from appealing the district court’s denial of his 

motion to enforce and compel. “The [waiver] doctrine promotes procedural 

efficiency and ‘prevents the bizarre result that a party who has chosen not to 

argue a point on a first appeal should stand better as regards the law of the 

case than one who had argued and lost.’” Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 

F.3d 225, 239-40 (5th Cir. 2012). 

As noted above, Hill requested that complete access to the MHTE’s books 

and records be added as a term to the settlement agreement. The district court 

rejected Hill’s proposed amendment and entered final judgment, which we 

affirmed in Hill’s first appeal. To the extent that Hill’s appeal argues that the 

right to have access to the documents should have been included in the final 

judgment, or that it was contemplated in the settlement agreement, his 

argument is waived. 

But Hill restyles the current appeal as one challenging the district 

court’s denial of his motion to enforce and compel the final judgment. While 

his prior appeal argued that a right to access the documents was wrongfully 

excluded from the settlement agreement, he now contends that the right to 

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inspect and have access to the books is part of the agreement, and that he is

merely seeking enforcement of the final judgment. As such, the waiver 

doctrine does not preclude Hill’s current appeal. Nonetheless, Hill’s challenges 

to the district court’s denial of his motion to enforce and compel are without 

merit. 

We hold that Hill cannot now claim that a provision granting him access 

to the MHTE books and records is part of the agreement because such a 

provision was not actually contemplated by the parties. “As long as the 

[settlement and trust] as a whole [are] coherent, ambiguities can be resolved 

as a matter of law, without looking beyond the four corners of the document.” 

Carpenters Amended and Restated Health Benefit Fund v. Holleman Constr. 

Co., 751 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1985). The duty of the MHTE trustee to keep 

books and records was extended to the MHTE successor trustees, as stated in 

plain language from the MHTE Articles of Agreement. But there is no express 

language that indicates that the successor trustee must be given the same set 

of books, records, and archives maintained by the former trustees. Nothing in 

the record indicates that the parties think that the agreement is ambiguous on 

this point. Indeed, that Hill tried to add a provision granting him access to 

MHTE’s books and records is evidence that he knew such a provision was not 

part of the final judgment and settlement agreement as written.

Hill contends that Texas law mandates his ability to access MHTE’s 

books and records. Texas statutory law does not require such a result. Hill 

relies on a section of the Texas code that states that “[u]nless otherwise 

provided in the trust instrument or by order of the court appointing a successor 

trustee, the successor trustee has the rights, powers, authority, discretion, and 

title to trust property conferred on the trustee.” Tex. Prop. Code § 113.084. 

But he does not cite to any authority to support his position that courts 

interpret this statutory language to compel his access to MHTE documents on 

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these facts. And even accepting Hill’s interpretation of Texas law, the district 

court “otherwise provided” that Hill would not be able to access MHTE’s 

documents by entering final judgment on a settlement agreement that 

consciously excluded such a right. 

Finally, Hill cites to Texas Property Code § 112.057, arguing that Texas 

law permits a trustee to divide a trust only if the terms of the separate trusts 

are identical to the terms of the original trust. It follows, he claims, that 

because the former trustees had access to these records, the successor trustees 

should also have access because the successor trustees step into the role of the 

former trustees. This argument fails. First, Hill downplays the amount of 

documents received during discovery, including financial statements from 

KPMG. Second, the statutory language crucial to Hill’s argument is not found 

in the applicable 2010 version of § 112.057. The language he relied on, that 

“the terms of the separate trusts must be identical to the terms of the original 

trust” is not present in the relevant 2010 version of Texas Property Code 

§ 112.057, but rather was part of the 2005 version. Finally, § 112.054(b) 

provides that “[t]he court shall exercise its discretion to order a modification or 

termination . . . in the manner that most conforms as nearly as possible to the 

probable intention of the settlor.” This section also does not expressly state or

infer that the MHTE Articles of Agreement require the former trustees to give 

the successor trustees access to the permanent records. Because Texas law 

does not require a different result, we decline to modify the district court’s final 

judgment enforcing a settlement agreement that consciously excluded Hill’s 

right to access MHTE’s books and records.

II. Recusal and Undisclosed Conflict

In the alternative, Hill contends that because the second district judge 

recused himself two months after his only substantive ruling, and because no 

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new parties or causes of action were added, the judge’s conflict existed at the 

time of his order. Hill argues that we should remand the case because his 

recusal following his substantive order meant that he made his ruling under 

an “undisclosed conflict.” We disagree. 

First, Hill does not even attempt to identify what the conflict could be, 

or why we should doubt the validity of his order. He recused himself sua sponte

under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), and followed the standard practice of not 

disclosing his reason for recusal. We decline Hill’s invitation to speculate as to 

why the judge recused himself, and when his “undisclosed conflict” first arose. 

Second, “we do not automatically vacate the rulings issued after [the judge] 

should have recused himself.” Patterson, 335 F.3d at 485. Even if the district 

judge was operating under a conflict, it still would not have an effect on the 

denial of Hill’s motion because two judges prior to him had issued the same 

order.

 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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