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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40730

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARK EDWARD FOSTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 458

Filed: April 17, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. 

Order relinquishing jurisdiction and executing unified sentence of six years, with 

two years determinate, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

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Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Mark Edward Foster pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. Idaho Code 

§ 18-8307. The district court sentenced Foster to a unified term of six years, with two years 

determinate, but suspended the sentence and placed Foster on probation. Subsequently, Foster 

admitted to violating several terms of his probation. The district court revoked probation, 

executed Foster’s underlying sentence, and retained jurisdiction. Upon review of Foster’s period 

of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. Foster appeals, contending 

the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and by failing to sua sponte 

reduce Foster’s sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction.
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The decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish 

jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and 

will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 

711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. 

App. 1990). Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of 

review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well 

established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 

P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 

871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 

When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. 

Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

Assuming Foster may appeal the district court’s failure to reduce a sentence sua sponte 

upon relinquishment of jurisdiction, see Hood, 102 Idaho at 712, 639 P.2d at 10; Thorgaard v. 

State, 125 Idaho 901, 905, 876 P.2d 599, 602 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 

382, 385, 582 P.2d 728, 731 (1978) overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 

138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001)), we find no abuse of discretion in the relinquishment of jurisdiction 

without modification of the initial sentence. Accordingly, the order relinquishing jurisdiction 

and requiring execution of Foster’s initial sentence is affirmed.