This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-0736

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Dennis John Edmondson,

Appellant.

Filed March 4, 2024

Affirmed

Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CR-21-4933

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, 

St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Florey, 

Judge.

∗

 

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REYES, Judge

Appellant challenges his sentence following his conviction of second-degree

unintentional murder, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by determining 

that appellant’s imperfect self-defense argument did not warrant a downward durational 

departure. We affirm. 

FACTS

The following facts are undisputed. On August 29, 2021, appellant Dennis John 

Edmondson visited a gas station in St. Paul that D.K. and her friend M.S. were also visiting. 

While there, M.S. approached appellant and tried to sell him clothing. D.K. reported that 

appellant became upset, aggressive, and held a gun inside his pocket and stated, “I will 

shoot you,” before getting into a black car that then left the gas station. 

D.K. and M.S. followed the car from the gas station and observed appellant holding

a black handgun outside the front passenger-side window. D.K. saw that a red Jeep had 

pulled up next to the black car at an intersection and then heard gunshots from different 

firearms, saw three flashes inside the Jeep, and witnessed the Jeep crash. D.K. and M.S.

pulled over to help the Jeep’s five juvenile occupants. The driver of the Jeep, L.B.-L., had 

been shot in the head and later died after paramedics transported him to a hospital. The 

black car drove away. 

Law enforcement spoke with the other Jeep occupants, including J.W.B., J.M.B., 

I.C., and T.T., and learned that the Jeep had been at the gas station before the shooting. 

None of the Jeep’s occupants reported any interaction with appellant while at the gas 
3

station. J.W.B. reported that a black car had followed them from the gas station and that 

he saw an older black male, later identified as appellant, pointing a gun out the passengerside car window and at the Jeep. J.W.B. told the other Jeep occupants what he saw before 

appellant started to shoot at the Jeep. J.W.B. also reported that, after the Jeep crashed, 

D.K. and M.S. stopped to help them and told them that appellant had also pointed a gun at 

them. J.M.B., I.C., and T.T.’s statements to law enforcement corroborated much of 

J.W.B.’s rendition of the events. 

The next day, law enforcement stopped and detained K.W., who was in a 

relationship with appellant and driving the car when appellant shot L.B.-L. K.W. reported

to them that she, appellant, and appellant’s six-year-old son were at the gas station when 

appellant grabbed a handgun from inside the car and argued with a woman who was trying 

to sell him clothes, but that appellant did not argue with the Jeep’s occupants. K.W.

reported that, after both vehicles left the gas station, the Jeep “sped past them,” was 

“driving crazy,” and that the Jeep driver spat out the window at their car while they were 

at a stoplight. Appellant asked the Jeep driver “what he was doing,” and the Jeep “took 

off.” At the next stoplight, the Jeep passengers kept looking over at the car and appellant 

yelled at them, “What the f--k are you looking at?” K.W. stated that she heard gunshots 

after the Jeep’s door began to open, that “[appellant] shot first because [we] thought the 

people in the Jeep were going to shoot at [us],” and that she also heard gunshots from the 

Jeep. 

Later that day, officers arrested appellant and recovered a handgun. Appellant’s 

rendition of the incident was similar to K.W.’s except that he stated that the woman who 
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approached him at the gas station was “foaming at the mouth,” and that, after leaving the 

gas station, he noticed that the woman was in a Jeep that he thought was trying to catch up 

to their car. Appellant said that he shot at the Jeep only after noticing a passenger open the 

Jeep’s door and saw a firearm and that his intention was not to kill anyone but simply to 

protect his family. 

On September 1, 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with three 

counts of second-degree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subds. 1(1), 1(2), and 2(1) 

(2020) (counts I, I, and III), and one count of ineligible person in possession of a firearm 

under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2(b) (2020) (count IV).1

 In November 2022, appellant 

pleaded guilty to count III in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charges. The 

parties agreed that appellant’s sentencing-guidelines range was between 204 and 288 

months and that the district court could sentence appellant to serve between 180 to 240 

months in prison at its discretion. The district court deferred accepting appellant’s plea so 

that it could “review the [presentence investigation (PSI) report] and listen to all of the 

arguments of counsel before making a final decision.” 

In January 2023, appellant filed a motion for a downward durational departure to a 

180-month sentence, arguing that his conduct amounted to imperfect self-defense or 

imperfect defense of others. 

At appellant’s sentencing hearing, the district court began by summarizing the terms 

of the parties’ plea agreement, then acknowledged that it had received appellant’s departure 

1 Appellant was ineligible to possess a firearm or ammunition due to four prior felony 

convictions. 
5

motion and that it had “reviewed the [PSI] and [was] prepared to impose sentence.” The 

district court heard L.B.-L.’s mother’s victim-impact statement and then gave appellant an 

opportunity to speak. Appellant expressed that he was “deeply sorry,” that his intent was 

to protect his family, and that he was going to learn from his mistakes. The state opposed 

appellant’s departure motion and requested that the district court impose a presumptive 

sentence of 240 months, consistent with the PSI report’s recommendation. The district 

court then accepted appellant’s guilty plea and adjudicated him guilty of count III. After 

discussing appellant’s departure motion, the district court denied the motion and sentenced 

appellant to a presumptive 240-month imprisonment with credit for 535 days served. 

This appeal follows. 

DECISION

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion 

for a downward durational departure and by determining that (1) appellant was the initial 

aggressor in the incident and (2) there existed a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid 

danger. We are not persuaded.

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony 

offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2022). Absent “identifiable, substantial, and 

compelling circumstances,” a district court must order the presumptive sentence provided 

in the sentencing guidelines. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020); see also State v. Pegel, 

795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). “Substantial and compelling circumstances” 

may support a durational departure if the defendant’s conduct is significantly more or less 

serious than the typical offense. State v. Abrahamson, 758 N.W.2d 332, 337-38 (Minn. 
6

App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). “A durational departure must be based on 

factors that reflect the seriousness of the offense, not the characteristics of the offender.” 

State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). 

If substantial and compelling circumstances exist, “[t]he decision whether to depart 

from [the] sentencing guidelines rests within the discretion of the [district] court and will 

not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Oberg, 627 N.W.2d 721, 

724 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 22, 2001). “A district court abuses its 

discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law” or when its factual 

findings are clearly erroneous because they are not supported by the record. State v. 

Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). An appellate court cannot interfere with a 

district court’s exercise of discretion “as long as the record shows the [district] court

carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a 

determination.” Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255 (quotation omitted). Only in rare cases will an 

appellate court reverse a district court’s imposition of a presumptive sentence. State v. 

Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2009).

The sentencing guidelines establish a “nonexclusive list of factors that may be used 

as reasons for departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3 (2020). A mitigating factor may 

include that “[o]ther substantial grounds exist that tend to excuse or mitigate the offender’s 

culpability, although not amounting to a defense.” Id., 2.D.3.a.(5). Although Minnesota 

does not recognize imperfect self-defense, State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Minn. 

1996), it can be considered as a mitigating factor. See State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 

329 (Minn. App. 2015) (affirming district court’s upward durational sentencing departure 
7

and acknowledging that district court considered mitigating factors that included 

appellant’s imperfect self-defense claim), aff’d, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). District 

courts may also consider aggravating factors. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b. 

Imperfect self-defense may apply to cases when “one, but not all, of the elements of 

self-defense have been met.” Thompson, 544 N.W.2d at 12. To establish a claim of selfdefense, a defendant must show

(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the 

defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he 

was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) the 

existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the 

absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the 

danger.

State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 324 (Minn. 2012). 

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by “misappl[ying] the 

law on self-defense” and by making clearly erroneous findings because the record does not 

support that he was the initial aggressor in the shooting or that the events leading up to it

were precipitated by his threatening M.S. with a gun. During the sentencing hearing, the 

district court began by acknowledging that it had the discretion to consider imperfect selfdefense to mitigate appellant’s sentence, but that it could also consider aggravating factors. 

The district court found that two aggravating factors offset appellant’s imperfect selfdefense argument: (1) that the PSI report supported that appellant “brandished the gun at 

the gas station, arguably fanning flames of anger before [appellant] even left,” which 

created “a very plausible argument that [appellant was] the main instigator” and (2) that 

appellant’s prior felony convictions precluded him from possessing a gun. 
8

The record and caselaw support the district court’s determination. First, the district 

court appropriately stated the law on imperfect self-defense and its discretion to consider 

mitigating and aggravating factors. Second, the record is clear that appellant was ineligible 

to possess a gun. Simply put, if appellant had not had a gun, he could not have shot L.B.-

L. Third, the record supports the district court’s finding that appellant was the initial 

aggressor. The PSI report provides that the gas station surveillance video showed that

appellant retrieved a handgun and placed it in his waistband after speaking with M.S. D.K.

stated that appellant was upset and aggressive and stated “I will shoot you” while holding 

a gun inside his pocket. D.K. and J.W.B. reported to law enforcement that appellant held

a black handgun outside the car’s passenger-side window before the shooting. K.W.’s 

report supports that appellant initiated verbal interactions with the Jeep’s occupants twice 

before shooting L.B.-L., and all parties agreed that appellant fired the first shot. Moreover, 

appellate courts generally uphold a district court’s decision to deny a downward departure 

when a self-defense claim is unclear. State v. McKissic, 415 N.W.2d 341, 345-46 (Minn. 

App. 1987); State v. King, 367 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Minn. App. 1985).

Appellant also argues that the district court “erred by determining that there existed 

a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid danger to [appellant] and his family” because he 

could not avoid the risk of hitting another vehicle or being shot by attempting to leave the 

scene. However, the record supports that the district court denied appellant’s departure 

motion based on reasons other than appellant’s failure to retreat. Although the district court 

did mention appellant’s duty to retreat during the sentencing hearing, the record supports 
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that it was in reference to the illegality of appellant having a gun and that, without the gun, 

retreat would have been appellant’s only option. 

Further, this court has stated that “the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in 

a particular case does not obligate the [district] court to place defendant on probation or 

impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.” Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253-54 (quotation 

omitted). Here, the record supports that, even if appellant’s claim for imperfect selfdefense was a substantial and compelling mitigating circumstance, the district court 

properly exercised its discretion by denying appellant’s departure motion. The district 

court carefully considered the law, the relevant evidence presented, the reasons for and 

against departure, and ultimately determined that a downward durational departure was not 

justified. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255; State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. 

App. 1985). We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court. 

Affirmed.