Sex Offender Registration 

and Notification 

in the United States

Current Case Law and Issues

March 2019
Sex Offender Registration and Notification in the United States: Current Case Law and Issues March 2019

Contents

I. Overview of U.S. Sex Offender Registration.........................................................................1

Registration is a Local Activity.................................................................................................1

Federal Minimum Standards ...................................................................................................1

National Sex Offender Public Website .....................................................................................1

Federal Law Enforcement Databases...................................................................................... 2

Federal Corrections ................................................................................................................. 3

Federal Law Enforcement and Investigations......................................................................... 3

II. Who Is Required to Register? .......................................................................................... 3

‘Conviction’.............................................................................................................................. 3

‘Sex Offenders’......................................................................................................................... 4

‘Catch-All’ Provisions .............................................................................................................. 4

Comparable Convictions from Other Jurisdictions ................................................................ 4

Elements vs. Facts ................................................................................................................... 5

Recidivists................................................................................................................................ 5

III. Registration of Juvenile Offenders .................................................................................. 5

Juvenile Registration Requirements Vary Across Jurisdictions............................................. 6

Issues Unique to Juvenile Adjudications ................................................................................ 6

Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act........................................................................................... 6

IV. Military Registration........................................................................................................ 6

V. Retroactive Application & Ex Post Facto Considerations.....................................................7

United States Supreme Court.................................................................................................. 8

Federal Courts .........................................................................................................................8

Significant State Court Decisions ............................................................................................ 8

Additional Court Opinions ...................................................................................................... 8

VI. Other Constitutional Issues ............................................................................................. 9

Varied Successful Challenges .................................................................................................. 9

Interaction Between SORNA and State Law..........................................................................10

Jury Determination of Obligation to Register as a Sex Offender...........................................10

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ...........................................................................................10

VII. Sex Offender Registration and Notification in Indian Country...................................... 11

Tribal Residents and State Registration Responsibilities ...................................................... 11

VIII. Failure to Register .......................................................................................................12

Failure to Register as a ‘Continuing Offense’ .........................................................................12

Failure to Register as a ‘Strict Liability’ Offense ....................................................................12

‘Incarceration’ as It Affects Registration Responsibilities .....................................................12
Sex Offender Registration and Notification in the United States: Current Case Law and Issues March 2019

Notice......................................................................................................................................12

Prosecution Based on Failure to Update Information ...........................................................12

Venue......................................................................................................................................12

IX. Residency Restrictions....................................................................................................13

X. Miscellaneous .....................................................................................................................13

Defamation.............................................................................................................................13

Fair Credit Reporting Act .......................................................................................................13

Federally Assisted Housing ....................................................................................................14

Homeless & Transient Offenders ...........................................................................................14

Immigration & Deportation ...................................................................................................14

Impeachment..........................................................................................................................15

Sentencing Enhancement Under Federal Law.......................................................................15

XI. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................15

Endnotes ....................................................................................................................................16

Disclaimer: The U.S. Department of Justice makes no claims, promises or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness or adequacy of the contents of this update, and expressly disclaims liability for errors 

and omissions in the contents of this update. The information appearing in this update is for general 

informational purposes only and is not intended to provide legal advice to any individual or entity. We 

urge you to consult with your own legal advisor before taking any action based on information appearing 

in this update.
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I. Overview of U.S. Sex Offender Registration

Sex offender registration and notification schemes have existed in the United States for 

decades. These systems are loosely referred to as sex offender registries. We begin this summary 

with an outline of those systems.

Registration is a Local Activity

In the United States, sex offender registration is conducted at the local level. Generally, 

sex offenders in the United States are required to register with law enforcement in each state, 

locality, territory or tribe where they reside, work or attend school.1 Every U.S. state, the District 

of Columbia, the five principal U.S. territories and approximately 150 federally recognized Indian 

tribes have their own sex offender registration and notification systems.2 Every one of these systems has its own nuances and distinct features. Every jurisdiction (state, territory and tribe) 

makes its own determinations about who is required to register, what information offenders must 

provide, which offenders are posted on the jurisdiction’s public registry website, and so forth. 

Although the federal government does not directly administer sex offender registries, it is 

involved in sex offender registration and notification in meaningful ways.3

Federal Minimum Standards

Congress has enacted various measures setting “minimum standards” for jurisdictions to 

implement in their sex offender registration or notification systems.4 The first of these was passed 

in 1994 and is commonly referred to as the “Wetterling Act.” This Act established a set of minimum standards for registration systems for the states.5 Two years later, Congress passed “Megan’s 

Law” as a set of minimum standards for community notification.6 The current set of standards —

the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) — was passed in 2006.7

If a state, tribe or territory chooses not to substantially implement SORNA’s standards, 

the jurisdiction risks losing 10 percent of its Edward R. Byrne Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne 

JAG) funds.8 As of March 1, 2019, 17 states, four territories and over 130 federally recognized 

Indian tribes have substantially implemented SORNA.9 Among jurisdictions that have substantially implemented SORNA, registration and notification laws vary.10 Practitioners are advised to 

become familiar with the specific registration and notification systems in all jurisdictions where 

they plan to work.

National Sex Offender Public Website

The National Sex Offender Public Website (NSOPW), located at www.nsopw.gov, was created by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2005 and is administered by the Office of Sex Offender 

Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office).11 NSOPW 

works much like a search engine: Jurisdictions connect their public sex offender registries to 

NSOPW by way of a web service or automated upload to enable NSOPW to query the jurisdictions’ 

websites. Only information that is publicly listed on a jurisdiction’s public sex offender registry 

website will display in NSOPW’s search results. The Department of Justice does not administer 

the registration information searched for or displayed on NSOPW, and only ensures that jurisdictions’ registries can be queried through and results displayed on NSOPW.12
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Note that some jurisdictions do not post information about all of their registered offenders on their public registry website: A search of NSOPW is not a comprehensive search of all registered offenders nationwide.

The National Sex Offender Public Website

www.nsopw.gov

Federal Law Enforcement Databases

Federal databases are utilized by law enforcement across the country to access accurate 

information about registered sex offenders. Registering agencies and other law enforcement entities submit the information necessary to populate these databases:13

• The National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR) is a law-enforcement only database that is a 

file of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database managed by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) division. It

was created in the late 1990s to store data on every registered sex offender in the United 

States, and to provide law enforcement nationwide access to that data.14

• The Next Generation Identification (NGI) system officially replaced the legacy fingerprint 

database at the FBI (IAFIS) in 2014.15 NGI fingerprint records are linked to the offender’s 

corresponding NSOR record at CJIS.

• The National Palm Print System (NPPS) is the database for palm prints housed at the FBI.

• The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) is the national DNA database administered by 

the FBI.

SORNA requires that jurisdictions submit information on all of their registered sex offenders to NSOR, and ensure that all of their offenders’ fingerprints have been submitted to NGI, 

palm prints to NPPS and DNA profiles to CODIS.16
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Federal Corrections

The federal government is also involved with sex offenders housed in federal correctional 

institutions. Specifically, some federal government agencies are required to notify local law enforcement when a sex offender is released from federal custody. Military detention issues are discussed in the section on military registration.

The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) does not register sex offenders prior to their release from 

incarceration, as registration is primarily a function of state, territory and tribal governments. 

However, 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c) requires that BOP or a federal probation officer notify the chief law 

enforcement officer and registration officials of the appropriate state, tribe or local jurisdiction 

whenever a federal prisoner required to register under SORNA is released from custody.17 In 2014, 

BOP issued guidelines governing its release of sex offenders.18

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), as an agency of the Department of the Interior, is not 

governed by the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c). There are no generally applicable statutory or administrative requirements for the BIA-operated detention centers (approximately one-quarter of 

the 90 BIA detention centers) to notify local law enforcement when a sex offender is released from 

custody.19

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) is generally responsible for detaining and deporting undocumented individuals who are present within the United States. In 2015, DHS issued 

a rule amending its Privacy Act provisions to permit the transfer of information from DHS to any 

sex offender registration agency about an offender who is released from DHS custody or removed 

from the United States.20 Like the Bureau of Prisons and BIA detention facilities, offenders are 

not registered prior to their release from ICE custody.

Federal Law Enforcement and Investigations

SORNA designated the United States Marshals Service as the lead agency in investigations 

of suspected violations of the federal failure to register statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2250. To further its 

investigative capacity, the USMS established the National Sex Offender Targeting Center in 

2009.21

II. Who Is Required to Register?

Nearly all registration requirements in the United States are initially triggered by a conviction of a criminal offense. Most jurisdictions limit their registration and notification systems 

to persons convicted of sex offenses and nonparental kidnapping of a minor. Some states also 

include other offenders in their registration and notification systems, or have separate offender 

registries for nonsexual offenses.22

‘Conviction’

When a person is found guilty and sentenced for a sex offense, SORNA requires that the 

person be subject to sex offender registration and notification requirements. However, certain 

findings other than guilty can also trigger a registration requirement. Withheld adjudications have 
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been held to require registration under SORNA.23 In some jurisdictions, registration is required 

when a person has been civilly committed, received a withheld adjudication, found “Not Guilty by 

Reason of Insanity” or incompetent to stand trial, or when ordered to register by a probation officer.24 In addition, some jurisdictions require registration even if an offender has been pardoned 

for the underlying offense,25 had their underlying complaint dismissed and pleas vacated under a 

special statutory procedure,26 had their conviction for a sex offense vacated on double jeopardy 

grounds,27 and, in some jurisdictions, an offender can remain on the public registry website even 

if that offender no longer has any meaningful ties to the jurisdiction.28

‘Sex Offenders’

Federal courts have interpreted SORNA as directly imposing a duty on a person to attempt 

to register if they meet the federal definition of “sex offender.”29 SORNA’s standards call for jurisdictions to register all persons who have been convicted of a tribal, territory, military, federal or 

state sex offense.30 In addition, certain foreign sex offense convictions will also trigger a registration requirement under SORNA.31 In practice, a jurisdiction generally will not register an offender 

unless that jurisdiction’s laws require that the offender be registered.32 At least one state has 

concluded that if a person has ever been required to register as a sex offender pursuant to federal 

law, that person is required to register in the state.33 In addition, at least one state imposes the 

registration requirements of the originating state, even if the receiving state’s requirements are 

less stringent.34

Kidnapping

The inclusion of kidnapping offenses in sex offender registration systems is a legacy of the 

first federal legislation regarding sex offender registration in 1994.35 Inclusion of kidnapping offenses in a jurisdiction’s sex offender registry has been largely upheld by the courts.36

‘Catch-All’ Provisions

When jurisdictions specifically outline the offenses that require registration, there is little 

question as to who is required to register. Many jurisdictions also include catch-all provisions, 

which, in varying forms, require any person convicted of an offense that is “by its nature a sex 

offense” to register. One court concluded that the state need only prove by “clear and convincing” 

evidence that an offender engaged in sexual contact to qualify under its catch-all registration provision,37 while another held that such proof must meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.38

Comparable Convictions from Other Jurisdictions

A more difficult situation arises when a convicted sex offender moves from one jurisdiction 

to another, and the new jurisdiction has to make a determination as to whether the person is 

required to register there. Most jurisdictions require registration if a person was convicted of an 

out-of-state offense that is “comparable,” “similar” or “substantially similar” to one or more of the 

receiving jurisdiction’s registerable offenses.39 When a state’s registration system treats persons 

convicted of in-state offenses differently from those convicted out-of-state, equal protection problems may arise.40 On occasion, offenders have had their convictions expunged, but still might face 

registration requirements in other states; at least one state has issued an Attorney General opinion determining that “out-of-state offenders whose convictions have been expunged must register 

...[so long as] they were required to register” in another jurisdiction as a sex offender.41
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While most states have a centralized process for determining whether an out-of-state offender is required to register, some do not. In one recent case, a state’s reliance on the determination of a local sheriff as to whether an out-of-state conviction was “substantially similar” to a 

registerable state offense was held to violate procedural due process, because those determinations could vary from sheriff to sheriff within the state.42

Elements vs. Facts

Determinations of whether an offense is registerable under SORNA, or fits under one of 

these catch-all or comparable provisions, has led to a great deal of litigation.43 Some jurisdictions 

look at the elements of the offense of conviction, while others also look at the underlying facts.44

Often, courts take an expansive view of which offenses trigger registration requirements; sometimes, however, the approach can be quite narrow.45

Recidivists

In many states, as under SORNA’s requirements, an offender who has been convicted of 

more than one sex offense is subject to heightened registration requirements. One court has held 

that two (or more) offenses do not need to arise out of separate proceedings to trigger increased 

requirements.46

III. Registration of Juvenile Offenders

State juvenile justice systems within the United States have handled juvenile sex offender 

registration in different ways. For example, at the time of SORNA’s passage, 36 states required 

certain juveniles adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses to register as sex offenders, while the remainder did not require any such juveniles to register. SORNA’s minimum standards require registration for certain juvenile offenders adjudicated delinquent of serious sex offenses.47 However, 

SORNA does not require jurisdictions to disclose information about juveniles adjudicated delinquent on their public registry websites.48

In 2016, the Supplemental Guidelines for Juvenile Registration under the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act were published in the Federal Register.49 In the event that a 

jurisdiction does not exactly conform with SORNA’s juvenile registration requirements, the Juvenile Supplemental Guidelines permit the SMART Office to expand its inquiry in the process of 

determining if a jurisdiction has substantially implemented SORNA’s juvenile registration provisions. Specifically, the Juvenile Supplemental Guidelines allow the SMART Office to review the 

following:

(i) Policies and practices to prosecute as adults juveniles who commit serious sex offenses; 

(ii) Policies and practices to register juveniles adjudicated delinquent for serious sex offenses; and 

(iii) Other policies and practices to identify, track, monitor or manage juveniles adjudicated delinquent for serious sex offenses who are in the community and to ensure that 

the records of their identities and sex offenses are available as needed for public safety 

purposes.50
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Juvenile Registration Requirements Vary Across Jurisdictions

Despite SORNA’s requirement that juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain offenses 

register as a sex offender, the implementation of this provision varies across jurisdictions.51 Some 

jurisdictions do not register any juveniles at all; some limit the ages of the offenders who might 

be registered; some limit the offenses for which they might be registered; and others limit the 

duration, frequency or public availability of registration information.52 Some jurisdictions have 

mandatory registration provisions for certain juveniles, some are discretionary, and some have a 

hybrid approach.53 At least one jurisdiction required a person who committed an offense at age 

12 — who would not have been required to register under SORNA had an adjudication occurred 

at the time of the offense — to register as an adult because the conviction for that offense did not 

occur until after the individual was 18.54

As with adult registration requirements, registration requirements for juveniles are generally triggered by the equivalent of a conviction for a sex offense in juvenile court, which is typically referred to as an “adjudication of delinquency.” Most jurisdictions mandate registration for 

juveniles transferred and convicted for sex offenses in adult court. In addition, one federal circuit 

court has held that a person previously adjudicated delinquent of a SORNA-registerable offense 

in state court can be ordered to register as a sex offender as a mandatory condition of probation 

for a subsequent, unrelated federal conviction.55

Because of the varying nature of juvenile justice systems across jurisdictions, problems 

often arise when a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent in one jurisdiction and then moves to another.56 Many of these issues mimic those discussed in the “Who Is Required to Register?” section.

Issues Unique to Juvenile Adjudications

There are some issues unique to juvenile court cases. When a jurisdiction requires that 

juveniles be subjected to registration requirements more onerous than those imposed on adults 

convicted of the same offense, equal protection issues exist.57 In two states, courts ruled that the 

automatic lifetime registration requirement as applied to adjudicated juveniles unconstitutionally 

violated due process and, in one of those states, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.58 However, when a juvenile court judge refuses to order a juvenile to register, as required 

by statute, a writ of mandamus may be successfully pursued by the state.59 

Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act

There are particular issues that are present when a person is ordered to register by a federal court because of a federal adjudication of delinquency for a sex offense.60 In particular, multiple courts have held that it is not a contravention of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act confidentiality provisions to require such individuals to register as a sex offender.61

IV. Military Registration

Prior to 2015, no provision of federal law (since the passage of SORNA) generally enabled or permitted federal authorities to register sex offenders such that the information from 

those registrations would be submitted to any national database. However, in 2015, Congress 

amended SORNA to require the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide information to 

NSOR and NSOPW on any sex offender who is adjudged by courts-martial or released from a 

military corrections facility.62 In 2016, DoD issued an instruction establishing policies for the 
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“identification, notification, monitoring and tracking of DoD-affiliated personnel” who are 

registered sex offenders.63

Offenders convicted by military tribunals of registerable sex offenses are generally required under SORNA to register with any jurisdiction where they live, work or go to school.64

Through a series of statutory and administrative cross-references, SORNA requires that persons 

convicted of a Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) offense listed in Department of Defense 

Instruction 1325.07 must register as a sex offender.65

Given the unique structure of the military justice system, SORNA jurisdictions must determine which military convictions will be recognized as registerable offenses — and how they will 

be categorized. For example, a state-level requirement to register based on a conviction of a sex 

offense in “federal court” was held to also include a court-martial from a military court.66 Issues 

also arise when trying to compare uniquely military offenses that might have a sexual component 

— such as “Conduct Unbecoming an Officer” — to jurisdiction-level sex offenses. In at least one 

state, an offender convicted under article 134 of the UCMJ for an offense relating to child pornography was required to register because the offense of conviction was determined to be a “like violation” to a state offense.67

If a person resides, works or attends school on a military base, depending on the source 

and how the federal government obtained the land where the base is located, a state or territory 

might not have jurisdiction over matters occurring thereon. In other words, the base may be a 

“federal enclave” where only federal law applies.68 Therefore, in some locations there may be sex 

offenders present on military bases who are not required to register with the state because they 

live, work and attend school solely on land considered to be a federal enclave. 

In part because of this problem, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress took steps 

to address the issue of convicted sex offenders in the military.69 A person required to register as a 

sex offender is no longer permitted to enlist or be commissioned as an officer in the Armed 

Forces.70 The Army requires that anyone convicted of a sex offense be processed for administrative separation.71 Further, the Army prohibits overseas assignments for any soldier convicted of a 

sex offense.72

Certain branches have also adopted policies and procedures to independently track and 

monitor sex offenders who are active duty members, civilian employees, contractors or dependents of active duty members located on U.S. military installations at home and abroad.73 For example, the Army now requires all sex offenders who reside or are employed on an Army installation (including those outside of the continental United States) to register with the installation 

provost marshal.74

V. Retroactive Application & Ex Post Facto Considerations

One of the first issues to be litigated as sex offender registration systems were established 

across the country was whether or not an offender who had been convicted prior to the passage of 

the laws requiring registration could be required to register.75 Numerous challenges to the retroactive application of registration laws were heard throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
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United States Supreme Court 

In 2003, the United States Supreme Court seemingly settled the issue in the case of Smith 

v. Doe, a challenge from a sex offender in Alaska who argued that the imposition of registration

requirements on him violated the ex post facto clause of the Constitution.76 The court held that 

registration and notification — under the specific facts of that case — were not punitive, and therefore could be retroactively imposed as regulatory actions.77

While the issue was settled for a time, subsequent litigation has ensued based on increased 

sex offender registration and notification requirements in many jurisdictions since the Doe decision.78 In a series of recent cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Supreme Court has declined 

to take a fresh look at any ex post facto implications raised by the increasing requirements that 

have been placed on registered sex offenders over the past 16 years since the Doe case.79

Federal Courts

From the Smith v. Doe decision until 2017, federal courts had nearly universally held that 

sex offender registration and notification schemes did not violate the ex post facto clause.80 However, in Doe v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in an as-applied challenge that

Michigan’s SORNA-implementing law is punitive and, therefore, could not be applied retroactively.81 In addition, in Alabama a federal court held that the retroactive application of certain 

provisions regarding homeless offenders and in-state travel notifications violated the ex post facto 

clause.82

Significant State Court Decisions

Eight state supreme courts in recent years have held that the retroactive application of 

their sex offender registration and notification laws violate their respective state constitutions.83

Other state courts have found issues with the retroactive application of their sex offender registration laws in less sweeping fashion.84 Conversely, many courts continue to stand by the reasoning of the Smith v. Doe case in affirming the retroactive application of sex offender registration 

laws.85 However, at least one state that has found an ex post facto violation as applied to its own 

offenders does not apply to persons convicted in another state who then relocate.86

Occasionally an offender’s registration requirements might begin — or become more onerous — when laws are amended after the date of an offender’s sentencing. Some courts require 

the specific performance of a plea agreement or court order when sex offender registration was 

not specifically ordered by the sentencing court, was bargained away as part of plea negotiations 

or when an offender was given a specific classification or tier at sentencing.87 However, many 

states continue to require registration and notification under such circumstances. For example, 

California held that a defendant was properly subjected to community notification in 2004 even 

though he had entered a plea agreement in 1991 that was silent on the issue.88

Additional Court Opinions 

A federal court enjoined the enactment of Nevada’s SORNA-implementing legislation 

based on ex post facto concerns for a number of years.89 In Kentucky, one court has held that 

increasing the penalties for a failure to register does not violate the ex post facto clause.90 In other 

states, some offenders have been able to be removed from the registry when the statute is changed 

in a way that benefits them.91
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VI. Other Constitutional Issues

Nearly all persons required to register as sex offenders must do so because they have been 

convicted of a criminal offense. Accordingly, by the time a person is actually required to register, 

a number of constitutional protections have already been afforded — namely, those which inure 

to a defendant throughout the course of a criminal trial and sentencing. 

In prosecutions for failure to register cases or civil challenges to registration requirements, 

offenders have launched unsuccessful challenges based on the following arguments: takings,92

double jeopardy,93 procedural due process,94 substantive due process,95 equal protection,96 the 

right to a trial by jury,97 right to travel,98 cruel and unusual punishment,99 full faith and credit,100

the supremacy clause,101 separation of powers,102 and federalism concerns.103 Another set of constitutional arguments are those advanced by the “sovereign citizen movement,” which, though 

creative, have proven unsuccessful.104

Varied Successful Challenges

Although, as noted above, the vast majority of constitutional challenges to sex offender 

registration and notification requirements are unsuccessful, there have been some notable decisions based on constitutional grounds. For example, a successful challenge was made in Maine 

utilizing the Bill of Attainder clause under Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution.105

There were two notable federal court decisions in 2017 where various provisions of state 

law were found to violate the Constitution. First, the United States Supreme Court held that a 

North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social media sites where 

minors are permitted (such as Facebook) violated the First Amendment.106 More than 1,000 people had previously been prosecuted under the law.107 Second, a federal court in Colorado found 

that the state’s sex offender registration and notification system violated both the Eighth and 14th 

Amendments.108

In addition to these two recent cases, state and federal courts have previously held the 

following: 

• The collection of internet identifiers violates the First Amendment109

• Being ordered to register as a sex offender triggers the protections of procedural due 

process110

• Publishing information about an offender’s “primary and secondary targets” violates 

due process111

• Being ordered to register as a parole condition violates due process when the underlying convictions are not sexual in nature112

• Requiring registration for a conviction for solicitation, and not prostitution, when each 

offense had the same elements, violates due process113

• A “three-strikes” sentence based on a failure to register conviction is cruel and unusual 

punishment114

• Mandatory life imprisonment for a second conviction of failure to register is cruel and 

unusual punishment115

• Requiring an offender to continue to register when he had been convicted of having 

consensual sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend (he was 18 at the time) and had his case 

successfully dismissed under a deferred disposition is cruel and unusual punishment116
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In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a portion of the state’s SORNAimplementing law because it violated the “single subject” rule of its constitution.117

Interaction Between SORNA and State Law

There have been some notable cases regarding the interaction between SORNA and the 

existing registration and notification laws in a state: Missouri has held that SORNA preempts 

state law to the extent that any state constitutional concerns are not implicated,118 and North Carolina concluded that SORNA is directly incorporated (in part) in to state law and that incorporation is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.119 In addition, Texas explicitly 

considers the federal duration of registration under SORNA in making a determination about 

whether an offender’s registration period can be terminated.120 The inclusion of an offense not 

required to be registered by SORNA in a state’s registration scheme was recently held to not violate an offender’s constitutional rights.121

Jury Determination of Obligation to Register as a Sex Offender

There are a number of Supreme Court cases that do not directly address sex offender registration, yet continue to have a bearing on litigation in the field.122 For example, the case of Apprendi v. New Jersey spurred a number of challenges to registration requirements; namely, contending that a jury should be required to determine whether an offender should be subject to the 

additional “punishment” of sex offender registration.123 The test as to whether sex offender registration constitutes “punishment” is the same as that used to determine whether something is “punitive” for purposes of an ex post facto analysis as discussed in the section on Retroactive Registration.124 To date, most challenges under Apprendi have been unsuccessful.125

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

One frequent argument in failure to register cases is that the offender had ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial for the underlying sex offense, because counsel did not advise 

them that they would be required to register as a sex offender. Most of these cases have focused 

on sex offender registration as a “collateral consequence” of conviction;126 other cases involving 

whether a guilty plea is knowing, voluntary and intelligent have also discussed the issue.127At least 

one court has concluded that the heightened registration and notification requirements imposed 

on sex offenders have rendered any registration requirement a “direct consequence,” rather than 

a “collateral consequence,” of conviction.128

While most courts do not find any constitutional violation in these circumstances, one 

court held that an affirmative misrepresentation that an offender would not have to register as a 

sex offender is ineffective assistance of counsel;129 another determined that incorrect advice to an 

offender regarding whether he would be required to register as a sex offender is ineffective assistance of counsel;130 a constitutional violation was found where counsel advised that an offender 

plead guilty to a charge of failure to register when the offender had never been convicted of an 

offense legally requiring registration; 131 and one recent case found that counsel’s failure to advise 

that an offender’s registration requirements had expired prior to his failure to register offense 

date was ineffective assistance of counsel.132

Padilla v. Kentucky

Padilla v. Kentucky133 held that counsel’s failure to correctly advise a client that a conviction would count as a deportable offense under the Immigration and Naturalization Act was 

deficient assistance under the Sixth Amendment.134 Since the decision in Padilla, a number of 
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cases have addressed the issue of whether counsel’s failure to advise their client that a conviction would result in sex offender registration also runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment; thus far, 

many of those challenges have been unsuccessful.135 However, in 2018 the Kentucky Supreme 

Court held that the provisions of Padilla require that defendants be permitted to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where their attorney failed to advise them of their registration 

responsibilities upon conviction.136 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the holding in Padilla does not apply retroactively.137

VII. Sex Offender Registration and Notification in Indian Country

SORNA created, for the first time under federal law, the possibility for certain federally 

recognized tribes to register sex offenders who live, work or attend school on tribal lands.138 Generally, the tribes eligible to opt-in as SORNA registration jurisdictions are those who are not PL280 tribes.139 As of March 1, 2019, there are approximately 155 federally recognized tribes operating as SORNA registration jurisdictions: They either have established — or are in the process of 

establishing — a sex offender registration and notification program.

The vast majority of the more than 130 tribes that have substantially implemented SORNA 

have used the Model Tribal Code, which was developed by Indian Law experts in conjunction with 

the SMART Office and fully covers all of SORNA’s requirements.140 Many tribes have passed more 

rigorous registration requirements than the states within which they are located — in particular, 

those tribes located within states that have not substantially implemented SORNA.141 For example, in addition to possible criminal sanctions for failure to register, tribes are also generally able 

to exclude any person (such as a convicted sex offender) from their lands altogether.142

There are legal issues unique to Indian Country that impact the registration of tribal sex 

offenders or the enforcement of sex offender registration requirements against persons who reside on tribal lands or were convicted by tribal courts. For example, because of the different 

standards regarding the right to counsel in some tribal courts, it was sometimes argued that 

prosecuting a person based in part on an underlying tribal conviction violates the Sixth Amendment. This could be an issue in failure to register prosecutions where an individual was required 

to register based on a sex offense conviction in tribal court. However, in United States v. Bryant143 the United States Supreme Court held that tribal court convictions obtained in proceedings that comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act may be used as predicate convictions in a 

subsequent federal prosecution.144

Tribal Residents and State Registration Responsibilities

Further complications may develop when an offender lives on tribal land but was convicted of a state or federal offense.145 One question that arises is whether an offender who exclusively lives, works and attends school on tribal land can be compelled to register with the state 

within which that tribal land is located. If the offender cannot be compelled to register with the 

state, it falls to the tribe to register the offender, if the tribe has opted-in to SORNA’s provisions 

and is operating as a registration and notification jurisdiction under its terms.

For example, in Washington state, an offender could not be convicted of failure to register

in state court when the trial court excluded evidence that he had registered with the Chehalis 

Tribe.146 In New Mexico, the state cannot impose a duty to register on enrolled tribal members 

living on tribal lands who have been convicted of federal sex offenses.147 In neighboring Arizona, 

persons living in Indian Country are required to keep their registration current with both the state 
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and the tribe.148 In Arizona, however, a tribal member residing on tribal land could not be prosecuted under state law for failure to register unless that tribe’s registration responsibilities had 

been delegated to the state via SORNA’s delegation procedure.149

VIII. Failure to Register

Nearly all jurisdictions that require sex offender registration also have a criminal penalty 

for failure to register as a sex offender. Such penalties may facilitate compliance with the sex offender registration process. The following are a sample of some of the prominent issues that arise 

in state-level failure to register prosecutions.

Failure to Register as a ‘Continuing Offense’

Many jurisdictions hold that a failure to register is a “continuing offense,” much like larceny or escape, such that a person cannot be prosecuted for multiple failures to register within a 

given time frame.150

Failure to Register as a ‘Strict Liability’ Offense

Many jurisdictions require a mens rea (i.e., criminal intent) of some sort be proven before a person can be convicted of failure to register,151 while others hold that it is a strict liability 

offense.152

‘Incarceration’ as It Affects Registration Responsibilities

Although offenders are not generally required to maintain their sex offender registration 

while incarcerated, offenders who are part of a state department of corrections residential work 

release program may have a duty to maintain their registration information while there.153

Notice

All jurisdictions require notice of registration requirements be given to sex offenders prior 

to them being held criminally liable for failure to register. That notice can be “imperfect,”154 or 

even constructive, and still be found sufficient and valid.155 However, there are situations where 

notice will be found insufficient.156

Prosecution Based on Failure to Update Information

Most jurisdictions require sex offenders to update their registration information when that 

registration information changes. In one state, the failure to provide an online identifier supported a conviction for failure to update a registration.157 In another, however, a change of residence outside of the U.S. did not require the offender to update the state registry, and a failure to 

do so could not be prosecuted under state law.158

Venue

Generally speaking, the proper venue for a failure to register case is the jurisdiction in 

which the person has failed to comply with his registration requirements.159 In addition, at least 
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one state has held that there is no need to prove where an offender was during the time that he 

failed to register.160

IX. Residency Restrictions

SORNA does not address or require residency restrictions in any way. These residency 

restrictions are generally passed and enforced on a local or municipal level, although a state, tribe 

or territory can also pass such provisions.161 When a jurisdiction chooses to impose residency restrictions on registered sex offenders, such restrictions may prohibit registered sex offenders from 

residing within a certain perimeter of schools, day care centers, parks and other locations frequented by children. 

In one recent case, a sex offender unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of a 

state’s residency restrictions, arguing that they interfered with his right to vote; his polling place 

was on the property of a high school and he was prohibited from being on school property.162

In North Carolina, one portion of the state’s residency restriction provisions was held to 

be unconstitutionally vague.163 Other significant opinions have been issued in previous years. For 

example, in California, certain residency restrictions were held unconstitutional as-applied on due 

process grounds.164 In New York and some other states, municipal residency restrictions have 

been invalidated because they were preempted by state law.165 In another case, a residency restriction was deemed to be punitive and therefore not retroactively applicable.166 The 11th Circuit 

recently permitted a case to proceed where the plaintiffs allege that Florida’s residency restrictions were punitive.167 More frequently, however, local residency restrictions have been upheld,168 such as in Colorado, where a local ordinance that in effect bars certain sex offenders from 

living within a city was not preempted by state law.169

X. Miscellaneous

The status of having been convicted of a sex offense, being required to register as a sex 

offender or having failed to register as a sex offender can trigger other legal issues in a variety 

of contexts.170

Defamation

Defamation is a civil tort action that can be pursued when someone’s reputation in the 

community has been injured by false or malicious statements.171 Some individuals have unsuccessfully made claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of defamation, when they were posted 

on the sex offender registry website without the due process provided by statute.172

Fair Credit Reporting Act

Certain people have had limited success in pursuing claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act when they have been incorrectly reported by a credit bureau as having prior sex offense 

convictions.173
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Federally Assisted Housing

One collateral consequence of a state-imposed lifetime sex offender registration requirement is that a person is no longer permitted to be admitted to any “federally assisted housing.”174

Some courts have held that once a person has been admitted to a federal program such as Section 8,175 they cannot be thereafter terminated because of a new, or newly discovered, lifetime sex 

offender registration requirement,176 while others take a different approach.177

A person may be prosecuted for perjury if they have lied on an application for Section 8 

housing about a lifetime registered sex offender living in the residence.178 One case permitted the 

termination of a beneficiary’s federal assistance based only on the fact that the address displayed 

on the jurisdiction’s public sex offender registry website for the individual was in a federally subsidized housing development.179

Homeless & Transient Offenders

Homeless or transient sex offenders engender litigation as states have tried to enforce 

registration requirements. Many states are rewriting their laws to clarify that these offenders 

are required to register.180 This issue came to the fore in Chicago, where there was a great deal 

of civil litigation based on the city’s policy to deny registration to any sex offender who lacked 

a fixed address.181

In most cases, an offender’s homelessness has not prevented a successful prosecution for 

failure to register, although sometimes statutory or evidentiary problems have arisen.182 Differing 

check-in requirements for homeless offenders as opposed to offenders who have a residence address have been affirmed.183 Homeless offenders have also been successfully prosecuted for failing 

to update their “residence” location.184 In one case, a court found that when an offender repeatedly 

uses a “mail drop” address as his legal address, he “resides” at that location for the purposes of a 

prosecution for failure to register as a sex offender.185 In another, when an offender still technically lived at the same address, even though he lived in an outbuilding or his truck rather than the 

main residence, he could not be prosecuted for a failure to update his residence address.186 However, in an attempt to prosecute a long-haul trucker for failure to register, a conviction could not 

be had, even when he had prolonged absences from his registered residence.187

Immigration & Deportation

The Adam Walsh Act requires that a person convicted of a specified offense against a minor is not entitled to file a petition to sponsor a fiancé(e) or family member unless the Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security determines that the offender poses no risk to the person 

on whose behalf the petition is filed.188

Convictions for failure to register have triggered subsequent deportation proceedings in 

some cases. There is currently a circuit split as to whether a conviction for a state failure to register

offense is a crime involving “moral turpitude” under the immigration code such that a person is 

removable because of that conviction.189

When a naturalized U.S. citizen received his citizenship at least in part because he concealed a prior serious sex offense conviction, he can be denaturalized and have his citizenship 

revoked.190 A recent case also held that the possible penalty of deportation, when combined with 

a maximum period of incarceration of six months, triggers the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
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trial.191 In addition, difficulties may arise when a U.S. citizen, convicted of a sex offense and required to register, attempts to renounce their citizenship.192

Impeachment

Generally speaking, rules of evidence permit attacking the credibility of a witness by way 

of introducing evidence of certain prior convictions. In one state, a conviction for failure to register was determined to be a “crime of deception,” rendering it admissible in a subsequent criminal 

trial to impeach the defendant’s testimony.193

Sentencing Enhancement Under Federal Law

Under federal law, additional punishment can result if certain crimes are committed while 

an offender is required to register as a sex offender. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2260A, the commission of 

certain offenses against a minor while the perpetrator is required to register as a sex offender 

under any law will result in a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence to run consecutively to any 

other sentences imposed.194 The retroactive application of these provisions does not violate the ex 

post facto clause.195

XI. Conclusion

The statutes, regulations and laws addressing sex offender registration and notification in 

the United States are varied and complex. While this summary seeks to provide updated and accurate information, practitioners are advised to conduct their own research to confirm that they 

are utilizing the most current information available and applicable in their jurisdiction. 

For any questions about SORNA itself or for more information about any of the SMART 

Office projects described in this resource, please feel free to contact the SMART Office at 

asksmart@usdoj.gov or visit our website at www.smart.gov.
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Endnotes

1 Colleges and universities must also annually include in a security report a statement advising the campus community of the location where information about registered sex offenders on campus may be obtained. Institutional Security Policies and Crime Statistics, 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(b)(12).

2 Federally recognized tribes located in PL-280 states typically have their registration functions handled 

by the state wherein their lands are located. 34 U.S.C. § 20929(a)(2)(A), citing Pub. L. No. 83-280, c. 505, 

67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162). 

3 Cong. Research Service Report 7-5700, Federal Involvement in Sex Offender Registration and Notification: Overview and Issues for Congress, In Brief (March 25, 2015), available at 

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43954.pdf. 

4 For a comprehensive legislative history of federal sex offender registration and notification legislation, 

see Lori McPherson, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) At 10 Years: History, 

Implementation, and the Future, 64 Drake L. Rev. 741 (2016), available at lawreviewdrake.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/mcpherson-final.pdf.

5 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 

103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994). This was an incentive-based system, where states would be penalized (via loss of federal grant funds) for failure to implement its terms. The five principal U.S. territories 

(American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands) were included under Wetterling’s requirements by way of Final Guidelines issued in April 1996. 

Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 15,110 (April 4, 1996).

6 In the same way that the Wetterling Act’s provisions were incentive-based (see supra text accompanying note 5), so were the provisions of Megan’s Law.

7 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901-20945. All United States Code references are current as of January 2019. SORNA 

was reclassified from Title 42 of the U.S. Code to Title 34 in 2017. Editorial Reclassification: Title 34, United 

States Code, uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/t34/index.html; SMARTWatch Dispatch, Editorial 

Reclassification of SORNA: SORNA Provisions Moved from Title 42 to Title 34, www.smart.gov/pdfs/Dispatch-Title34-Oct2017.pdf.

Three sets of guidelines have been issued to assist in the implementation of SORNA. The National 

Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030 (July 2, 2008) [hereinafter 

Final Guidelines]; Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76 Fed. Reg. 

1630 (Jan. 11, 2011); Supplemental Guidelines for Juvenile Registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,552 (Aug. 1, 2016). Guidelines provisions, standing alone, generally do not create an additional basis for criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, United States v. Belaire, 

480 Fed. Appx. 284 (5th Cir. 2012) (defendant could not be prosecuted for failing to update “temporary 

lodging” information when neither originating nor destination state required such information to be provided). 

8 For any state or territory, the penalty is contained in 34 U.S.C. § 20927: 

For any fiscal year after the end of the period for implementation, a jurisdiction that fails, 

as determined by the Attorney General, to substantially implement this title shall not receive 

10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction 

under subpart 1 of part E of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

If the 10 percent penalty is assessed, the jurisdiction can apply for reallocation of those funds to use 

for purposes of implementing SORNA.

For tribes that elect to function as registration jurisdictions, the penalty contained in 34 U.S.C. § 

20927 may apply, if the tribe qualifies for that funding, which is determined by formula. However, there is 

a separate and significant penalty for noncompliance by tribes contained in 34 U.S.C. § 20929: For any 

federally recognized tribe that the Attorney General determines has “not substantially implemented the 

requirements of [SORNA] and is not likely to become capable of doing so within a reasonable amount of 

time,” the statute creates automatic delegation of SORNA functions: 
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. . . to another jurisdiction or jurisdictions within which the territory of the tribe is located 

[and requires the tribe] to provide access to its territory and such other cooperation and 

assistance as may be needed to enable such other jurisdiction or jurisdictions to carry out 

and enforce the requirements of [SORNA].

9 Current as of March 1, 2019. For the current list of implemented jurisdictions, please visit 

www.smart.gov/newsroom_jurisdictions_sorna.htm. For a comprehensive report on the efforts and challenges in implementing SORNA, see GAO-13-211, Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Jurisdictions Face Challenges to Implementing the Act, and Stakeholders Report Positive and Negative Effects 

(2013), available at www.gao.gov/assets/660/652032.pdf.

10 Official reviews detailing systems of each jurisdiction are available at www.smart.gov/sorna-map.htm. 

In addition, the SMART Office maintains the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) State 

and Territory Implementation Progress Check, www.smart.gov/progress_check, which provides a brief 

overview of each state’s SORNA implementation status.

11 The precursor of NSOPW was NSOPR (the National Sex Offender Public Registry), which was the official name of the website from its administrative creation in 2005 until the passage of SORNA in 2006 

when it was renamed the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice Activates National Sex Offender Public Registry 

Website (July 20, 2005), available at www.amberalert.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/ojp_05_0720.htm. By July 2006, all 50 states were linked to NSOPR. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, All 50 States Linked to Department of Justice National Sex Offender Public Registry Website (July 3, 2006), available at www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/July/06_ag_414.html. 

12 The SMART Office administers the Tribe and Territory Sex Offender Registry System (TTSORS), a system developed for federally recognized tribes and territories that had not previously operated a sex offender 

registration system or website. All of the information in TTSORS is supplied and administered by the jurisdictions. More information about TTSORS is at www.smart.gov/pdfs/TTSORSFactSheet.pdf.

13 For example, a local police department might submit an offender’s fingerprints to the FBI at the time 

of arrest.

14 See Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 

Stat. 3093.

15 NGI Officially Replaces IAFIS—Yields More Search Options and Investigative Leads, and Increased 

Identification Accuracy (Oct. 24, 2014), www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/cjis-link/ngi-officially-replaces-iafisyields-more-search-options-and-investigative-leads-and-increased-identification-accuracy.

16 In many cases, an offender will have had their fingerprints, palm prints or DNA submitted prior to the 

registration process, as part of their arrest, sentencing, incarceration or at some other point in the processing of their case. Registration agencies are not required to submit duplicate entries to federal databases 

where a fingerprint, palm print or DNA record already exists. Final Guidelines, supra note 7, at 38,057.

17 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c). The Bureau of Prisons is a Department of Justice subdivision and part of the Executive Branch. Federal probation officers are governed by the Administrative Office of the United States 

Courts, a Judicial Branch office.

18 Program Statement 5110.15, Notification Requirements Upon Release of Sex Offenders, Violent Offenders, and Drug Traffickers (May 16, 2014), available at www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5110_017.pdf. The 

form utilized by BOP to provide notice of registration responsibilities to its prisoners upon release can be 

found at www.bop.gov/policy/forms/BP_A0648.pdf. 

19 BIA recently updated its enforcement handbook to require its Office of Justice Services to assist tribes 

who are operating SORNA registration and notification systems. SO-17.4: Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act, Office of Justice Services Enforcement Handbook (4th ed.). 20 Notice of Amendment of Privacy Act System of Records, 80 Fed. Reg. 24,269 § HH (April 30, 2015). 

ICE-ERO uses the SORNA Exchange Portal to provide notifications to jurisdictions when a sex offender is 

released from ICE-ERO custody. For additional information about the SORNA Exchange Portal, see

www.smart.gov/pdfs/SORNA_Portalfactsheet.pdf. 
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 21 The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) operates the Sex Offender Tracking Team (SOTT). SOTT publishes a biannual survey of the number of registered sex offenders in the 

United States. https://api.missingkids.org/en_US/documents/Sex_Offenders_Map.pdf. 

22 See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-280 (registry of persons convicted of offenses with a deadly weapon); In re M.A., 

43 N.E.3d 86 (Ill. 2015) (13-year-old added to Illinois’ murderer and violent offender against youth registry); 

State v. Brown, 399 P.3d 872 (Kan. 2017) (describing Kansas’ drug offender registry); Mont. Code § 46-23-

502(13) (definition of “violent offense” for Montana’s violent offender registry); State v. Galloway, 50 N.E.3d 

1001 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (discussing Ohio’s arson registry); Bivens v. State, 2018 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 34 

(Oct. 11, 2018) (Oklahoma’s methamphetamine registry); Ben Winslow, Governor Signs More Bills into Law, 

Including ‘White Collar Crime Registry,’ FOX 13 NOW (March 24, 2015), available at 

fox13now.com/2015/03/24/governor-signs-more-bills-into-law-including-white-collar-crime-registry/ (Utah).

23 See United States v. Bridges, 901 F. Supp. 2d 677 (W.D. Va. 2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 2014) 

(withheld adjudication in Florida registerable under SORNA); People v. McCulley, 2018 Colo. App. LEXIS 

950 (June 28, 2018) (successful deferred judgment is considered a conviction); Roe v. Replogle, 408 

S.W.3d 759 (Mo. 2013) (suspended imposition of sentence is a conviction under SORNA).

24 See Mayo v. People, 181 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008) (civil commitment triggered requirement to register); 

Price v. State, 43 So.3d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (withheld adjudication); State v. Cardona, 986 N.E.2d 66 

(Ill. 2013) (a finding of “not not guilty” for an incompetent defendant sufficient to require registration); In re

Kasckarow, 32 N.E.3d 927 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015) (nolo contendere plea and withheld adjudication in Florida registerable in New York); Walters v. Cooper, 739 S.E.2d 185 (N.C. Ct. App.) (prayer for judgment continued on a 

charge of sexual battery is a final conviction triggering requirement to register); State v. Townsend, 2017 Tenn. 

Crim. App. LEXIS 277 (April 13, 2017) (nolo contendere plea followed by diversion of sentencing is not a conviction triggering registration requirement). But see United States v. Moore, 449 Fed. Appx. 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (probation condition requiring registration for a tier I offender more than 15 years after the conviction was invalid).

25 In re Edwards, 720 S.E.2d 462 (S.C. 2011). But see State v. Davis, 814 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. 2018).

26 People v. Hamdon, 225 Cal. App. 4th 1065 (2014) (procedure under California Penal Code 1203.4a);

Witten v. State, 145 So. 3d 625 (Miss. 2014) (procedure under California Penal Code 1203.4a).

27 Montoya v. Driggers, 320 P.3d 987 (N.M. 2014).

28 Doe v. O’Donnell, 924 N.Y.S.2d 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). But see Stallworth v. State, 160 So.3d 1161 

(Miss. 2015) (expungement of underlying conviction from Maryland entitles the defendant to relief from 

registration responsibilities in Mississippi).

29 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1). The bulk of these cases have been appeals of convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 

and interpret the “initial registration” requirement contained in 34 U.S.C. § 20913. See Carr v. United 

States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010).

30 “Sex Offense” is defined in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A). For guidance on which persons convicted of UCMJ 

offenses are required to register, see United States v. Jones, 383 Fed. Appx. 885 (11th Cir. 2010) and the 

“Military Registration” section of this update.

31 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(B). See McCarty v. Roos, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48363 (D. Nev., Apr. 8 2014) 

(describing the standard for registering a Japanese conviction under SORNA); Board of Examiners v. 

D’Agostino, 130 A.D.3d 1449 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (Cambodian conviction registerable in New York). 

32 In other words, there will be situations where SORNA imposes a registration requirement directly on an offender, but the jurisdiction where that offender lives, works or attends school refuses to register him, because the 

jurisdiction’s laws do not require registration for the offense of conviction. See Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 94 A.3d 

791 (Md. 2014) (state is not required to register an offender if the state’s laws do not require it).

33 Doe v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. 2012) (“the [state] registration requirements apply to any person 

who ‘has been’ required to register as a sex offender pursuant to federal law. Consequently, even if Doe 

presently is not required to register pursuant to SORNA, he ‘has been’ required to register as a sex offender 

and, therefore, is required to register [with the state]”) (offender convicted in 1983 required to register, 

even though Missouri law only requires registration of persons convicted on or after January 1, 1995).

34 Oulman v. Setter, 2014 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 842 (Aug. 4, 2014) (Colorado registration requirements imposed on offender who relocated to Minnesota).
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 35 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No.

103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994).

36 See Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 2010) (nonparental false imprisonment is registerable); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 548 S.W.3d 881 (Ky. 2018) (attempted kidnapping of a minor is registerable); 

Moffitt v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 247 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (citing the legislative history of the Wetterling Act to support registration for kidnapping); People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2009) (nonparental 

kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment is registerable); State v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90 (Wisc. 2010) (nonparental false imprisonment is registerable).

37 State v. Norman, 824 N.W.2d 739 (Neb. 2013).

38 In re K.B., 285 P.3d 389 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).

39 See Doe v. Board, 925 N.E.2d 533 (Mass. 2010) (Maine conviction for unlawful sexual contact registerable in Massachusetts); Skaggs v. Neb. State Patrol, 804 N.W.2d 611 (Neb. 2011) (California conviction 

registerable in Nebraska); Lozada v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 719 S.E.2d 258 (S.C. 2011) 

(Pennsylvania conviction for unlawful restraint registerable as kidnapping in South Carolina). But see State 

v. Doe, 425 P.3d 115 (Alaska 2018) (Washington and California convictions not registerable in Alaska); State 

v. Frederick, 251 P.3d 48 (Kan. 2011) (Minnesota adjudication for criminal sexual conduct not registerable 

in Kansas because it is not a conviction under Kansas law); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 11 N.E.3d 

153 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (federal conviction for kidnapping of a minor not registerable in Massachusetts); 

State v. Orr, 304 P.3d 449 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (conviction for taking indecent liberties with children in 

North Carolina not registerable in New Mexico); People v. Diaz, 2017 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2852 (April 13, 

2017) (Virginia conviction for murder of a child, without any sexual conduct or motivation, did not require 

registration in New York); Miller v. Gywn, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (May 23, 2018) (Maryland conviction based on Alford plea registerable in Tennessee); Dep’t Pub. Safety v. Anonymous, 382 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. 

App. 2012) (Massachusetts conviction for indecent assault and battery not registerable in Texas); Ex parte 

Harbin, 297 S.W.3d 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (California conviction for annoying or molesting a child 

not registerable in Texas); State v. Howe, 212 P.3d 565 (Wash. 2009) (California conviction for lewd acts 

upon a child not registerable in Washington); State v. Werneth, 197 P.3d 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (Georgia conviction for child molestation not registerable in Washington).

40 See Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2008) (Pennsylvania’s disparate treatment of 

in-state and out-of-state offenders violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment).

41 Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 09-01 (Jan. 8, 2009), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2009/op09-001.pdf.

42 Meredith v. Stein, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190204 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 7, 2018).

43 See United States v. Vanderhorst, 688 Fed. Appx. 185 (4th Cir. 2017) (18 U.S.C. § 1592 registerable under 

SORNA even though it is not listed); United States v. Schofield, 802 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 2015) (18 U.S.C. § 1470 

registerable under SORNA, even though it is not listed); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(same); United States v. Hahn, 551 F. 3d 977 (10th Cir. 2008) (probation conditions properly required registration in a fraud case when there was a prior state conviction for a sex offense); United States v. Byun, 539 F.3d 

982 (9th Cir. 2008) (conviction for alien smuggling which had underlying facts of sex trafficking properly triggered registration); United States v. Jensen, 278 Fed. Appx. 548 (6th Cir. 2008) (conspiracy to commit sexual 

abuse is a registerable offense); State v. Hall, 294 P.3d 1235 (N.M. 2013) (California conviction for annoying or 

molesting children not registerable in New Mexico without evidence of actual conduct comparable to New Mexico offense, regardless of the elements of the offense). But see United States v. Jimenez, 275 Fed. Appx. 433 (5th 

Cir. 2008) (where only evidence of sexual misconduct was three unsubstantiated police reports, registration requirement was inappropriate); State v. Coman, 273 P.3d 701 (Kan. 2012) (bestiality is not a registerable offense); 

State v. Haynes, 760 N.W.2d 283 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (bestiality not registerable). 

44 See, e.g., Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 925 N.E.2d 533 (Mass. 2010) (may not consider facts underlying the conviction); Commonwealth v. Sampolski, 89 A.3d 1287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (looking to the 

elements of the offense).

45 See, e.g., State v. Duran, 967 A.2d 184 (Md. 2009) (determining that indecent exposure was not registerable because the lewdness element of the crime incorporated conduct that was not sexual in addition to 

that which could be sexual).
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 46 Ward v. State, 288 P.3d 94 (Alaska 2012). But see Commonwealth v. Wimer, 99 N.E.3d 778 (Mass. 

2018). SORNA’s provisions for enhanced tiering of recidivists are found in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(C) & § 

20911(4)(C).

47 SORNA’s minimum standards require that jurisdictions register juveniles who were at least 14 years 

old at the time of the offense and who have been adjudicated delinquent for committing (or attempting or 

conspiring to commit) a sexual act with another by force, by the threat of serious violence or by rendering 

unconscious or drugging the victim. “Sexual Act” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246.

48 Supplemental Guidelines issued in 2011 give jurisdictions full discretion over whether they will post 

information about juveniles adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses on their public registry website. Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76 Fed. Reg. 1630 (Jan. 11, 2011), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-01-11/pdf/2011-505.pdf. 

49 Supplemental Guidelines for Juvenile Registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,552 (Aug. 1, 2016), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-

08-01/pdf/2016-18106.pdf.

50 Id. See also, SMARTWatch Dispatch, Juvenile Registration and SORNA (Sept. 2016), 

www.smart.gov/pdfs/juvenile-dispatch-final-2016.pdf.

51 A survey of the varying juvenile registration responsibilities imposed by each state can be found in A 

Snapshot of Juvenile Registration and Notification Laws: A Survey of the United States (2011), 

www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/SNAPSHOT_web10-28.pdf. 

52 See, e.g., Clark v. State, 957 A.2d 1 (Del. 2008) (lifetime registration requirement for juvenile was not 

contravened by requirement to consider the best interests of the child in fashioning a disposition). Some 

states go beyond SORNA’s requirements. See, e.g., State v. I.C.S., 145 So.3d 350 (La. 2014) (defendants who 

committed sex offenses prior to age 14, were not transferrable to adult court at that age, and whose offenses 

did not require registration upon a juvenile adjudication of delinquency were prosecuted in adult court in 

their 20s for those offenses and required to register); In re J.L., 800 N.W.2d 720 (S.D. 2011) (14-year-old 

boy adjudicated delinquent for nonforcible sex with his 12-year-old girlfriend was ordered to register for 

life).

53 See N.L. v. State, 989 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. 2013) (adjudicated juvenile may only be required to register 

after an evidentiary hearing, using the “clear and convincing” standard). For a complete summary of the 

juvenile registration schemes across the United States, see Smart Summary: Prosecution, Transfer, and 

Registration of Serious Juvenile Sex Offenders (2015), www.smart.gov/pdfs/SMARTSummary.pdf. 

54 State v. I.C.S., 145 So. 3d at 350.

55 United States v. Shannon, 511 Fed. Appx. 487 (6th Cir. 2013) (Ohio adjudication for gross sexual imposition triggered registration condition in subsequent sentencing for possession of a firearm by a felon).

56 See, e.g., Doe v. Peterson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180367 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2018) (juvenile adjudicated 

delinquent in Iowa and required to register under Iowa law can be registered in Nebraska even if Nebraskaadjudicated juveniles are not subject to registration requirements); In re Crockett, 159 Cal. App. 4th 751 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (juvenile adjudicated delinquent of sex offense in Texas was not required to register 

when he moved to California); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 827 (Ky. 2016) (juvenile adjudicated 

delinquent in Michigan required to register in Kentucky, even though Kentucky-adjudicated juveniles are 

not required to register), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Clemens, 915 N.W.2d 550, 559 (Neb. 

2018) (citing Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.510(b)(6)). 

57 See In re C.K., 182 A.3d 917 (N.J. 2018) (subjecting adjudicated juveniles to more onerous relief requirements than adults violated state constitutional provisions); In re Z.B., 757 N.W.2d 595 (S.D. 2008) 

(treating juvenile sex offenders convicted of the same crimes as adult sex offenders differently and more 

harshly than the adult sex offenders served no rational purpose and violated the Equal Protection Clause of 

the 14th Amendment).

58 In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) (due process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment); In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (procedural due process). Other courts have held that registration requirements as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense does not violate the 

Eighth Amendment. United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2013); People v. J.O., 2015 Colo. 

App. LEXIS 1319 (Aug. 27, 2015); In re T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 2018) (because juvenile court retains 
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discretion as to whether to order registration); see also In re Justin B., 747 S.E.2d 774 (S.C. 2013) (lifetime 

GPS monitoring of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense does not violate the Eighth Amendment).

59 Illinois ex. rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 2009).

60 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case where the Ninth Circuit had held that the 

juvenile registration provisions of SORNA were unconstitutional when applied retroactively. United States 

v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977 (2009), vacated and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011), appeal dismissed as 

moot, 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). In its decision, however, the Supreme Court did not in any way address 

the question of the constitutionality of the retroactive application of SORNA’s requirement that certain adjudicated juveniles register as sex offenders.

61 United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 

(9th Cir. 2012). The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042.

62 Military Sex Offender Reporting Act of 2015 (Title V of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 

2015), Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 502, 129 Stat. 227 (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 20931).

63 Registered Sex Offender (RSO) Management in DoD, Dep’t of Defense Instruction 5525.20 (2016), 

www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/552520_dodi_2016.pdf. This instruction 

repealed a memorandum previously issued in 2015: Registered Sex Offender (RSO) Identification, Notification, and Monitoring in DoD, Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 15-003 (March 26, 2015).

64 United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013). 

65 Administration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority, Dep’t of Defense Instruction 1325.07, Appx. 4 to Enc. 2 (2013), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/132507p.pdf?ver=2018-05-08-141542-293. Although the United States Coast 

Guard is technically a part of the Department of Homeland Security, this Instruction also governs their 

proceedings. Id. at 2.

66 Billingsley v. Alabama, 115 So.3d 192 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).

67 Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 23 N.E.3d 938 (Mass. 2015).

68 “Federal Enclave” is a legal term of art which refers to property that is either in whole or in part under 

the law enforcement jurisdiction of the United States Government. See generally the “Enclave Clause,” U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (“[The Congress shall have Power...] [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases 

whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and 

the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like 

Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall 

be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings”); see also 40 

U.S.C. § 3112 (2006) (concerning federal jurisdiction). A similar issue arises regarding offenders located 

within National Parks or other federally held land that holds the status of “federal enclave.”

69 The Department of Defense has also acted by way of investigations and regulatory actions. In 2014, 

the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a report regarding DoD’s compliance 

with SORNA. DODIG-2014-103, Evaluation of DoD Compliance with the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (August 29, 2014), available at web.archive.org/web/20170614201826/ 

http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2014-103.pdf.

70 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 523, 126 Stat. 1723 

(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 504 note); Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction Criteria, 32 C.F.R. § 

66.6(b)(8)(iii) (2015).

71 See, e.g., Army Regulation 135-178, § 12-4 (2017); Antonieto Rico, Army to Discharge Convicted Sex 

Offenders, Military Times (Nov. 20, 2013), web.archive.org/web/20131127165311/http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20131120/NEWS/311200024/Army-discharge-convicted-sex-offenders. 

72 Initiating Separation Proceedings and Prohibiting Overseas Assignment for Soldiers Convicted of Sex 

offenses, Army Directive 2013-21.

73 See Army Regulation 190-45, § 2-7 (2016), available at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/ 

DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6734_r190_45_Web_FINAL.pdf. This regulation was heavily revised in 2016 and 
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provides detailed information about the responsibilities of convicted soldiers, Provost Marshals and Directors of Emergency Services.

74 Registration of Sex Offenders on Army Installations (inside and outside the Continental United States), 

32 C.F.R. § 635.6 (2016). Provost Marshal officials have also been directed to seek to establish Memoranda 

of Understanding with state and local sex offender registration officials to facilitate the flow of information 

regarding sex offenders (along with other criminal justice information). Establishing Memoranda of Understanding, 32 C.F.R. § 635.20 (2015); see also Army Regulation 27-10, §§ 24-1 to 24-4 (2016) (Registration of Military Sexual Offenders), available at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/ 

DR_a/pdf/web/r27_10_FINAL.pdf. The Navy also has its own policies, Policy for Sex Offender Tracking, 

Assignment, and Installation Access Restrictions, CNIC Instruction 1752.1 (2011), www.cnic.navy.mil/content/dam/cnic/hq/pdfs/Instructions/01000%20Series/CNICINST%201752.1.pdf.

75 SORNA Guidelines require that jurisdictions register offenders whose “predicate convictions predate 

the enactment of SORNA or the implementation of SORNA in the jurisdiction” when an offender is —

(1) incarcerated or under supervision, either for the predicate sex offense or for some other crime;

(2) already registered or subject to a pre-existing sex offender registration requirement under the 

jurisdiction’s law; or

(3) re-enters the jurisdiction’s justice system because of a subsequent felony conviction.

The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 

38,046 (July 2, 2008); Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76 Fed. 

Reg. 1630, 1639 (Jan. 11, 2011), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-07-

02/pdf/E8-14656.pdf.

76 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1009 (2003). 

77 Id.

78 See, e.g., Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 2009) (person convicted after the initial passage of the 

law could be required to comply with amended requirements).

79 See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013) (assuming without deciding that Congress did not 

violate the ex post facto clause in enacting SORNA’s registration requirements); United States v. Juvenile 

Male, 564 U.S. 932 (2011) (declining to address whether SORNA’s requirements violated the ex post facto 

clause on grounds of mootness); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (declining to address the issue 

of whether SORNA violates the ex post facto clause).

80 See, e.g., Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 

2012); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011).

81 Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016).

82 McGuire v. Strange, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (M.D. Ala. 2015).

83 Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009); Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123 (Md. 2013); State v. 

Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011); Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) (detailing all case law from state courts regarding retroactive application of sex offender registration and notification statutes); Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). One additional case along these lines, 

Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006), has subsequently been rendered moot, Doe v. Keathley, 2009 

Mo. App. LEXIS 4 (Jan. 6, 2009). In 2016, an unusual series of cases in Kansas first held that the state’s 

registration system was punitive in effect — and thus retroactive application was unconstitutional — then 

overturned that decision. Doe v. Thompson, 373 P.3d 750 (Kan. 2016) (registration system is punitive); 

State v. Buser, 371 P.3d 886 (Kan. 2016) (same); State v. Redmond, 371 P.3d 900 (Kan. 2016) (same). But 

see State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192 (2016) (registration system does not violate the ex post facto 

clause).

84 The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that requiring lifetime registration without the opportunity 

for review violates the ex post facto provisions of the state’s constitution. Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077 (N.H. 

2015) (registration requirements can only be applied to the petitioner if he is “promptly given an opportunity for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he is permitted to demonstrate that he no longer poses a risk sufficient to justify continued registration ....[and] 
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must be afforded periodic opportunities for further hearings, at reasonable intervals, to revisit whether registration continues to be necessary to protect the public”). 

85 See, e.g., Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556 (10th Cir. 2016); State v. Yeoman, 236 P.3d 1265 (Idaho 2010); 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146 (Va. 2013); Kammerer v. State, 322 P.3d 827 (Wyo. 2014). In 

addition, one federal circuit concluded that retroactive application of New York’s registration amendments 

to an offender did not violate the ex post facto clause. Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014). 

86 State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2016).

87 Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. 2014) (defendant entitled to specific performance of 

his plea agreement, a component of whose negotiation was that he would not be required to register as a 

sex offender). But see United States v. Paul, 718 Fed. Appx. 360 (6th Cir. 2017) (trial court excused defendant from registration at sentencing but federal requirement to register still applied); Jensen v. State, 882 

N.W.2d 873 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (defendant not entitled to a 10-year registration duration, as ordered by 

the court per a plea agreement, when the determination of registration duration was vested in the state’s 

Department of Public Safety); Commonwealth v. Giannatonio, 114 A.3d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (extension 

of state duration of registration period did not violate ex post facto when conviction secured pursuant to 

federal plea agreement).

88 Doe v. Harris, 302 P.3d 598 (Cal. 2013).

89 ACLU v. Masto, 2:08-cv-00822-JCM-PAL (D. Nev., Oct. 7, 2008). 

90 Buck v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661 (Ky. 2010).

91 State v. Jedlicka, 747 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); see also Flanders v. State, 955 N.E.2d 732 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

92 Smith v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146 (Va. 2013); see also Does v. Wasden, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

84138 (D. Idaho May 17, 2018) (varied constitutional challenges).

93 Vazquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018); State v. Sparks, 657 S.E. 2d 655 (N.C. 2008); State v. 

Green, 230 P.3d 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

94 Murphy v. Rychlowski, 868 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2017); Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010) 

(defendant had a liberty interest in being free from registration requirements where he had not been convicted of a sex offense); State v. Arthur H., 953 A.2d 630 (Conn. 2008) (no due process hearing required); 

Doe v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 971 A.2d 975 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (presumption of dangerousness flowing from a rape conviction was permissible); Smith v. Commonwealth, supra note 92.

95 Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2014) (requiring sexually violent predators to check in every 

90 days did not violate substantive due process); Woe v. Spitzer, 571 F. Supp. 2d 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (when 

amended statute extended the registration period by 10 years three days before petitioner’s registration 

requirement expired, there was no protected liberty interest).

96 Doe v. Jindal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100408 (E.D. La., Sept. 7, 2011); State v. Dickerson, 97 A.3d 15 

(Conn. App. Ct. 2014). California has a long line of cases litigating equal protection issues in sex offender 

registration cases, based on People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2006), which was overruled in Johnson 

v. Dep’t of Justice, 341 P.3d 1075 (Cal. 2015).

97 See Thomas v. United States, 942 A.2d 1180 (D.C. 2008) (underlying misdemeanor charges which required registration upon conviction were “petty” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, and a jury trial was 

not required); In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204 (R.I. 2008). But see Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 

2008) (because of the seriousness of the consequences of being designated a sex offender, jury trial must 

be afforded when there is a special allegation of sexual motivation in a misdemeanor case).

98 Doe v. Jindal, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155908 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2015); State v. Smith, 344 P.3d 1244 

(Wash. Ct. App. 2015).

99 Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 2017) (requiring sex offender to obtain 

driver’s license which indicates he is a sex offender does not violate the Eighth Amendment or due process 

clause); People v. Nichols, 176 Cal. App. 4th 428 (3d Dist. 2009) (28 years to life sentence for failure to 

register under California’s three-strikes law did not violate the Eighth Amendment); State v. Kinney, 417 

P.3d 989 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018); People v. T.D., 823 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (requiring a juvenile 

to register was not cruel and unusual punishment), dismissed as moot, 821 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012); State 
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v. Blankenship, 48 N.E.3d 516 (Ohio 2015) (tier II registration requirements for an offense committed when 

the offender was 21 and the victim was 15 is not cruel and unusual punishment). 

100 Rosin v. Monken, 599 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2010) (an offender convicted in New York was promised in his 

plea agreement that he would never have to register as a sex offender, but when he moved to Illinois and 

was required to register under its laws, it was not a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see Burton 

v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (state unsuccessfully argued that the Full Faith and Credit 

clause should apply).

101 United States v. King, 431 Fed. Appx. 630 (10th Cir. 2011).

102 State v. Caton, 260 P.3d 946 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 273 P.3d 980 (Wash. 2012).

103 In Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011), on remand at 681 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted 

on other grounds, 568 U.S. 1140 (2013), the Supreme Court granted standing to sex offenders to challenge SORNA on 10th Amendment grounds where previously they had no standing to do so, but no challenges on those grounds have been successful at the circuit level thus far. Thus far, 10th Amendment challenges raised under Bond have been unsuccessful. See United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2012); 

United States v. Smith, 504 Fed. Appx. 519 (8th Cir. 2012).

104 Proponents of the sovereign citizen movement “believe they are not subject to federal or state statutes 

or proceedings, reject most forms of taxation as illegitimate, and place special significance on commercial 

law.” United States v. Harding, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62471 (W.D. Va., May 1, 2013) (18 U.S.C. § 2250 

prosecution), quoting United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2012). In Harding the defendant argued 

that the federal court did not have jurisdiction over him, citing the Organic Act of 1871, the fact that his 

name was listed in all caps on the indictment, that there was no corpus delicti for the offense, and that the 

federal court was an “Admiralty Court” because the flag in the courtroom had fringe on it. Id. at *3-*15.

105 Doe XLVI v. Anderson, 108 A.3d 378 (Me. 2015) (holding, in part, that a guilty plea is not a “criminal 

trial”). 

106 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730 (2017).

107 Id. at 1731.

108 Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017).

109 Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013) (statute prohibiting sex offenders from using social 

networking websites, instant messaging services and chat programs violated the First Amendment); Doe v. 

Neb., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Ne. 2012) (requirement to provide internet identifiers found unconstitutional on First Amendment and other grounds); Doe v. Shurtleff, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73787 (D. Utah 

Sept. 25, 2008), vacated after legislative changes, 628 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2010); Harris v. State, 985 

N.E.2d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (statute prohibiting use of a social networking site by a registered sex offender violated the First Amendment).

110 Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011). Massachusetts requires a due process hearing before 

an offender is ordered to comply with its full registration requirements, including those convicted prior to 

the registration statute’s effective date. See the procedure followed in Massachusetts, where the Sex Offender Registry Board must find that the offender poses a danger to the community before requiring registration: 803 CMR 106(B), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/lawlib/800-

899cmr/803cmr1.pdf. In Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 41 N.E.3d 1058 (Mass. 2015), the court held 

that the burden of proof for classification was no longer by a “preponderance of the evidence” but was constitutionally required to be by the higher standard of “clear and convincing evidence.” Applying community 

notification retroactively to Massachusetts’ existing Level 2 offenders was held to violate due process. Moe 

v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 6 N.E.3d 530 (Mass. 2014).

111 State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935 (Utah 2008) (“target” information could include, among other things, a 

description of the offender’s preferred victim demographics).

112 Ex parte Evans, 338 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

113 Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995 (E.D. La. 2012).

114 Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2008).

115 Bradshaw v. State, 671 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. 2008).

116 People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
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 117 Commonwealth v. Nieman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013).

118 Doe v. Keathley, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 4 (Jan. 6, 2009). But see State v. Hough, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2012); Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (stating without deciding that the 

federal duty to register could apply if the offender engaged in interstate travel).

119 In re McClain, 741 S.E.2d 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (North Carolina’s registration law directly incorporates the clean record provisions of SORNA); see In re Hall, 768 S.E.2d 39 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (using 

SORNA’s tiering structure).

120 Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. §§ 62.402 & 62.405.

121 Thomas v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 248 So.3d 786 (Miss. 2018) (state’s requirement that a parental kidnapping offense be registered was permissible because SORNA’s standards are a floor, not a ceiling).

122 While beyond the scope of this update, other cases such as Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 

U.S. 519 (2012), and Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013), are having an impact on certain prosecutions 

under 18 U.S.C. § 2250.

123 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

124 However, the fact that a state has found its sex offender registration and notification system “punitive” does not render any person registered under it “in custody” for purposes of a Habeas Corpus petition. Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 Fed. Appx. 690 (10th Cir. 2016) (offender registered in Oklahoma). 

125 See People v. Mosley, 344 P.3d 788 (Cal. 2015) (residency restrictions are not punishment for the purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis); People v. Rowland, 207 P.3d 890 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Meredith, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 324 (April 8, 2008).

126 The American Bar Association’s Collateral Consequences Project, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org, has produced a standing resource which lists all collateral consequences that flow at the federal and state level for convictions of certain crimes. Users may select “sex offenses” as a search term and 

view all of the collateral consequences which may be imposed on persons so convicted.

127 See United States v. Cottle, 355 Fed. Appx. 18 (6th Cir. 2009); Mireles v. Bell, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

2451 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2008); State v. Flowers, 249 P.3d 367 (Idaho 2011); Magyar v. State, 18 So.3d 807 

(Miss. 2009) (citing thorough collection of controlling case law across the country); People v. Gravino, 928 

N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 2010) (guilty plea); People v. Nash, 48 A.D.3d 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); see also United 

States v. Molina, 68 M.J. 532 (U.S.C.G. CCA 2009) (mutual misunderstanding of registration requirement 

was grounds for withdrawing a guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement); People v. Bowles, 89 

A.D.3d 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (offender has the right to the effective assistance of counsel in a risk level 

assessment hearing).

128 United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (substantial basis to question the providence of guilty 

plea when the judge failed to ensure that the defendant understood the registration requirements associated 

with a plea of guilty). The Riley decision was clarified in United States v. Talkington, 73 M.J. 212 (2014), as 

applying only to considerations raised by the Padilla case and its progeny regarding the voluntariness of 

guilty pleas, and is further clarified in Washington v. United States, 74 M.J. 560 (A.C.C.A. 2014), as not 

applying retroactively.

129 United States v. Rose, 2010 CCA LEXIS 251 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 2010). Contra Edmonds v. 

Pruett, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116736 (E.D. Va. Aug. 20, 2014).

130 People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).

131 People v. Armstrong, 50 N.E.3d 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); see also United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 

734 (5th Cir. 2018).

132 Ex Parte Dauer, 2018 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 212 (Tex. Crim. App. March 21, 2018).

133 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

134 Id.

135 Rodriguez-Moreno v. Oregon, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151123 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 2011) (failure to advise of 

registration requirements is not ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Cowart, 28 N.E.3d 862 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2015) (trial court failure to admonish regarding registration requirements is not constitutionally 

deficient); Embry v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.3d 264 (Ky. 2015); Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. 
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2016) (distinguishing between deportation and predatory-offender registrations). Contra Taylor v. State, 

698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); People v. Dodds, 7 N.E.3d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); People v. Fonville, 

supra note 130; State v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267 (Utah 2014).

136 Commonwealth v. Thompson, 548 S.W.3d 881 (Ky. 2018).

137 Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013).

138 34 U.S.C. § 20929.

139 See 34 U.S.C. § 20929(b)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 1162.

140 smart.gov/pdfs/Model-Tribal-Code_508.pdf. 

141 For example, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR) was one of the first 

tribes to implement SORNA, and met all of SORNA’s requirements in doing so, see Substantial Implementation Report: Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation at 

www.smart.gov/pdfs/sorna/ConfTribes-UmatillaIndianReservation.pdf. CTUIR is located entirely within 

Oregon, which falls short of many of SORNA’s provisions. Maxine Bernstein, Sex Offenders in Oregon: 

State Fails to Track Hundreds, The Oregonian (Oct. 2, 2013), available at www.oregonlive.com/sexoffenders/special-presentation/ (Oregon only posts 2.5 percent of its registered sex offenders on its public 

sex offender registry website).

142 See United States v. Nichols, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118129 (D. S.D. Aug. 20, 2014) (tribes have the 

inherent power to exclude outsiders from their territory).

143 136 S.Ct. 1954 (2016).

144 The Indian Civil Rights Act is found at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304. 

145 In United States v. Red Tomahawk, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103077 (D. N.D. June 20, 2018), the court 

held that a person convicted of a tier I federal offense (and a 15-year SORNA registration requirement) 

who had a 25-year registration requirement with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe could not be prosecuted 

for a federal failure to register when that 15-year registration requirement had elapsed.

146 State v. Cayenne, 2018 Wash. App. LEXIS 1447 (Wash. Ct. App. June 26, 2018).

147 State v. Atcitty, 215 P.3d 90 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).

148 United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. 

DeJarnette, 741 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2013).

149 State v. John, 308 P.3d 1208 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). If such an offender had an independent registration 

responsibility because they worked or attended school on state lands in Arizona, they would be subject to 

the state’s registration laws and any failure to register (based on the requirements triggered by employment 

and/or school attendance) could therefore be prosecuted by the state.

150 See United States v. Ogburn, 590 Fed. Appx. 683 (9th Cir. 2015); State v. Cook, 187 P.3d 1283 (Kan. 

2008); Longoria v. State, 749 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 

151 In re C.P.W., 213 P.3d 413 (Kan. 2009); People v. Haddock, 48 A.D.3d 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).

152 State v. T.R.D., 942 A.2d 1000 (Conn. 2008). When a crime is a strict liability offense, its elements do 

not include a need to prove mens rea or criminal intent.

153 State v. Wiles, 873 N.W.2d 301 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).

154 Petway v. State, 661 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (prerelease notice of registration requirements is 

not a prerequisite to the obligation to register); Barrientos v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7712 (June 24, 

2013) (primarily Spanish-speaking defendant properly convicted even when all notices were in English and 

he claimed he did not understand his responsibilities).

155 See United States v. Benevento, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Nev. 2009); State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479, 

488 (N.C. 2005) (“the pervasiveness of sex offender registration programs [combined with additional factors in this case] certainly constitute circumstances which would lead the reasonable individual to inquire 

of a duty to register in any state upon relocation”). North Carolina subsequently included a mens rea requirement into its failure to register statute. 2006 N.C. Session Laws, ch. 247, codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

14-208.11.
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 156 State v. Binnarr, 733 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 2012) (notice of changed registration responsibilities sought to 

be proven by way of an unreturned letter, without more, does not prove actual notice sufficient to prosecute 

for failure to register).

157 State v. White, 58 A.3d 643 (N.H. 2012) (defendant failed to report the creation of a MySpace account).

But see People v. Ellis, 162 A.D.3d 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (a Facebook account was not an internet identifier under state law).

158 State v. Lee, 286 P.3d 537 (Idaho 2012). While this was a state court prosecution, the provisions of 

International Megan’s Law amended the federal Failure to Register statute in order to prosecute individuals 

who fail to provide advance notice of international travel. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(b). 

159 However, in United States v. Haslage, 853 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2017), the court held that venue for a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 was only proper in the state where the offender traveled, then failed to register 

— not the state where the offender had originally registered. But see United States v. Holcombe, 883 F.3d 

12 (2d Cir. 2018).

160 State v. Peterson, 186 P.3d 1179 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).

161 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5; Idaho Code § 18-8329; 57 Okla. Stat. § 590.

162 Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2018).

163 Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 2016) (prohibition on being present at “any place where minors 

gather for regularly scheduled educational, recreational, or social programs” is impermissibly vague).

164 In re Taylor, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015).

165 Doe v. City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d 18 (Mass. 2015); G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway, 951 A.2d 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. 

App. Div. 2008) (New Jersey law preempted municipal residency restrictions); People v. Diack, 26 N.E.3d 

1151 (N.Y. 2015) (New York law preempts local residency restriction provisions). Contra United States v. 

King, 431 Fed. Appx. 630 (10th Cir. 2011) (Oklahoma’s residency restrictions did not present an obstacle to 

complying with federal sex offender registration requirements).

166 See Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437 (Ky. 2009) (Kentucky’s residency restrictions exceeded 

the nonpunitive purpose of public safety and thus violated the ex post facto clause); see also Duarte v. City 

of Lewisville, 858 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2017) (standing granted in challenge to residence restrictions suit but 

all claims dismissed).

167 Doe v. Miami-Dade County, 846 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2017).

168 State v. Stark, 802 N.W.2d 165 (S.D. 2011) (discussing state-level loitering and safety zone provisions).

169 Ryals v. City of Englewood, 364 P.3d 900 (Colo. 2016). But see Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 

(D. Colo. 2017) (relying in part on certain localities’ residency restriction provisions in finding that Colorado’s registration scheme violated the Eighth and 14th Amendments).

170 The fact that a person has been convicted of a sex offense involving children can result in the revocation 

of a person’s Certified Shorthand Reporter’s License, Sonntag v. Stewart, 53 N.E.3d 46 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015), 

or their amateur radio license, FCC Reverses ALJ’s Decision, Revokes Convicted Sex Offender’s Ham License, ARRL.org, www.arrl.org/news/fcc-reverses-alj-s-decision-revokes-convicted-sex-offender-s-amateur-radio-license (Nov. 13, 2014). In at least one state, there is a statutory presumption against any registered sex offender being granted unsupervised visitation, custody or residential placement of a child. 13 Del. 

Code Ann. § 724A.

171 See Black’s Law Dictionary (Abr. 6th ed., 1991) at p. 288.

172 Balentine v. Tremblay, 554 Fed. Appx. 58 (2d Cir. 2014).

173 Meyer v. Nat’l Tenant Network Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2014).

174 42 U.S.C. § 13663; see also When Must I Prohibit Admission of Sex Offenders?, 24 C.F.R. § 5.856

(2001); To What Criminal Records and Searches Does this Subpart Apply?, 24 C.F.R. § 5.901 (2001); 

What Special Authority is there to Obtain Access to Sex Offender Registration Information?, 24 C.F.R. § 

5.905 (2001); Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, 24 C.F.R. § 578.93(b)(4) (2012); Denial of Admission 

for Criminal Activity or Drug Abuse by Household Members (2001) 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(4); Denial of 

Admission and Termination of Assistance for Criminals and Alcohol Abusers, 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2) 
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(2015). HUD issued guidance in 2012 describing the duties of owners, agents, and public housing authorities with regards to admitting registered sex offenders. State Registered Lifetime Sex Offenders in Federally Assisted Housing, portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=12-28pihn12-11hsgn.pdf. This 

guidance was drafted in part as a response to a 2009 HUD Office of Inspector General’s report. HUD Subsidized an Estimated 2,094 to 3,046 Households that Included Lifetime Registered Sex Offenders, Audit 

Rep’t No. 2009-KC-0001 (Aug. 14, 2009), www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/Internal/2009/ig0970001.pdf. 

175 “Section 8” refers to the housing assistance provisions contained in the United States Housing Act of 

1937, ch. 896, Title I, § 8 (Sept. 1, 1937), as amended.

176 Miller v. McCormick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D. Me. 2009). But see State Registered Lifetime Offenders 

in Federally Assisted Housing, United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, Notice PIH 2012-

28/H 2012-11 (June 11, 2012), portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=12-28pihn12-11hsgn.pdf

(persons that are a sex offender subject to a lifetime registration requirement who are wrongfully admitted 

to Section 8 housing are subject to termination procedures).

177 Bostic v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 162 A.3d 170 (D.C. 2017).

178 Johnson v. California, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101623 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2011).

179 Henley v. Housing Auth. of New Orleans, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62255 (E.D. La. May 1, 2013).

180 Santos v. State, 668 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. 2008) (registration requirements unconstitutionally vague); Rodriguez v. State, 108 A.3d 438 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (weekly registration requirement for homeless

offenders not unconstitutional); State v. Crofton, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 1283 (June 2, 2008) (weekly 

registration requirement for homeless offenders permissible).

181 See Beley v. City of Chicago, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163919 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 27, 2015), summary judgment 

granted, partial summary judgment denied 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28167 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017); Saiger 

v. City of Chicago, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83206 (N.D. Ill., June 19, 2014) (permitting plaintiff’s Due Process 

claim to proceed); Derfus v. City of Chicago, 42 F. Supp. 3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2014), summary judgment 

granted, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44529 (N.D. Ill. April 6, 2015); People v. Wlecke, 6 N.E.3d 745 (Ill. App. Ct.

2014) (offender who lacked identification and was turned away from registering could not be convicted for 

failure to register).

182 See People v. Deluca, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2014) (even though shelter had limited 

hours, it counted as a “residence” for the purposes of registration); People v. Allman, 321 P.3d 557 (Colo. 

Ct. App. 2012) (offender used his car as a residence when working away from “home” during the week, was 

a “residence” for purposes of the statute); Branch v. State, 917 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (homeless 

defendant was successfully prosecuted for failure to register when he failed to inform authorities that he 

had left a shelter); Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (offender kicked out of house by 

wife and staying with friends had to update his registration every time he moved); Tobar v. Commonwealth, 

284 S.W.3d 133 (Ky. 2009) (when offender did not notify authorities of leaving homeless shelter, conviction 

for failure to register was proper); State v. Samples, 198 P.3d 803 (Mont. 2008) (when offender failed to 

notify authorities of leaving shelter, conviction was proper); Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 40 A.3d 1201 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2009) (where defendant was unable to rent a room at his intended residence he had a duty to 

inform registry officials of a change of address); Breeden v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2150 (March 26, 

2008) (offender who moved out of hotel into car in parking lot of hotel properly convicted and sentenced 

to 55 years). But see Commonwealth v. Bolling, 893 N.E.2d 371 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (offender did not 

need to update his address when he found a friend willing to take him in for a few days); State v. Dinkins, 

810 N.W.2d 787 (Wis. 2012) (offender was charged with failure to register, prior to release from incarceration, for failure to provide a residence address, and this was not permissible).

183 Lamberty v. State, 108 A.3d 1225 (Del. 2015).

184 McRae v. State, 2015 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1261 (Oct. 16, 2015).

185 United States v. Pendleton, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85347 (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2009).

186 State v. Edwards, 87 A.3d 1144 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).

187 Nikolaev v. State, 474 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App. 2014).

188 Bakran v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 894 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2018); Struniak v. Lynch, 159 

F. Supp. 3d 643 (E.D. Va. 2016). For the full text of the requirement, see 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). 
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Interoffice Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Assoc. Dir. Of Domestic Operations, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. to Reg’l Dirs. et al. (July 28, 2006), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-

2008/2006/adamwalshact072806.pdf; see also Suhail v. United States Att’y Gen., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

152884 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2015); In re Aceijas-Quiroz, 26 I. & N. Dec. 294 (BIA 2014); In re Introcaso, 

2014 26 I. & N. 304 (BIA 2014).

189 Bushra v. Holder, 529 Fed. Appx. 659 (6th Cir. 2013) (conviction for failure to register is a crime involving moral turpitude). Contra Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. 2014); Efagene v. Holder, 642 

F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011); Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other 

grounds by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009). A conviction for possession of 

child pornography was recently held to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Moreno v. Att’y Gen., 887 

F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2018).

190 News Release, Repeat Sex Offender from Mexico Denaturalized in Houston (June 29, 2017), 

www.ice.gov/news/releases/repeat-sex-offender-mexico-denaturalized-houston. 

191 Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018).

192 Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

193 Tristan v. State, 393 S.W. 3d 806 (Tex. App. 2012). Contra Dingman v. Cart Shield USA, LLC, 2013 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 93551 (S.D. Fla., July 3, 2013) (failure to register not proven to involve a dishonest act or false 

statement).

194 Statute addressed in United States v. Walizer, 600 Fed. Appx. 546 (9th Cir. 2015). In Alleyne v. United 

States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), the Supreme Court concluded that “any fact that increases the mandatory 

minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.” Id.

195 United States v. Hardeman, 704 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2013).