Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human

Exploration and Utilization of Space

Proceedings and Research Plan

NASA/CP—2003-212103

April 2003

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NASA/CP—2003-212103

April 2003

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Glenn Research Center

Proceedings of a conference held at and sponsored by the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Glenn Research Center

Cleveland, Ohio

June 25–26, 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human

Exploration and Utilization of Space

Proceedings and Research Plan
Available from

NASA Center for Aerospace Information

7121 Standard Drive

Hanover, MD 21076

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, VA 22100

Available electronically at http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov

Contents were reproduced from author-provided

presentation materials.
NASA/CPó2003-212103 iii

Preface 

The purpose of the workshop documented in this publication was to bring together personnel 

responsible for the design and operations of the International Space Station (ISS) and the fire protection 

research community to review the current knowledge in fire safety relative to spacecraft. From this 

review, research needs were identified that were then used to formulate a research plan with specific 

objectives. The time and effort spent by the presenters, working group moderators, and participants to 

attend this workshop and share their knowledge in fire safety is greatly appreciated. I would also like to 

thank Ms. Christine Gorecki and Ms. Sandi Jones of the National Center for Microgravity Research in 

Fluids and Combustion for coordinating the local arrangements and travel of all the attendees. Their 

efforts ensured that participants arrived ready to address the significant concerns of fire safety in 

spacecraft. 

In this document, I have attempted to capture the very informative and lively discussions that 

occurred in the plenary sessions and the working groups. I hope that it will be useful to readers and serve 

as a significant step in assuring fire protection for the crews of current and future spacecraft. 

Gary A. Ruff 

Workshop Technical Coordinator 

Spacecraft Fire Safety Project Scientist 

NASA John H. Glenn Research Center 

NASA/CPó2003-212103 v 

Table of Contents 

Page 

Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................vii 

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................1 

 Synopses of Previous Workshops on Spacecraft Fire Safety .................................................................1 

Approach .......................................................................................................................................................3 

Summary of the Working Groups .................................................................................................................4 

 Smoke and Fire Detection.......................................................................................................................4 

 Fire Prevention and Material Flammability............................................................................................7 

 Fire and Post-Fire Response .................................................................................................................10 

Spacecraft Fire Safety Research Plan..........................................................................................................14 

References ...................................................................................................................................................15 

AppendixóPlenary Presentations...............................................................................................................17 

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

 Dr. Gary A. Ruff, NASA Glenn Research Center ................................................................................19

 Spacecraft Fire Safety: A Human Space Flight Program Perspective 

 Dr. Michael D. Pedley, NASA Johnson Space Center .........................................................................27

Control of Materials Flammability Hazards

 Dr. Dennis E. Griffin, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center................................................................35 

 Overview of ISS U.S. Fire Detection and Suppression System

 Ms. Alana Whitaker, NASA Johnson Space Center.............................................................................49 

 An Introduction to Mars ISPP Technologies

 Dr. Dale E. Lueck, NASA Kennedy Space Center...............................................................................65 

List of Attendees .........................................................................................................................................79 

NASA/CPó2003-212103 vii

Executive Summary 

On June 25ñ26, 2001, 64 people representing combustion research and fire prevention professionals 

from NASA, industry, military, and academia met in Cleveland, Ohio, to participate in a workshop 

entitled ìResearch Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space.î The 

objective of this workshop was to bring together experts in various disciplines related to spacecraft fire 

safety to (1) identify research needed to ensure fire safety in future shuttle and International Space Station 

(ISS) systems and payloads, (2) promote ISS fire safety through proposals for innovative designs, 

operations, and validation procedures, (3) identify areas of concern inherent to prolonged human-crew 

missions in Earth orbit and beyond, and (4) anticipate research required to plan and design spacecraft and 

habitats for long-duration space missions and planetary exploration. The outcome of this workshop was a 

list of immediate and long-term areas of concern regarding fire safety in manned spaceflight. 

Workshop attendees participated in one of three working groups depending on their area of expertise 

and interest. These working groups had the following focus areas: 

 1. Fire Prevention and Material Flammability 

 2. Smoke and Fire Detection 

 3. Fire and Post-Fire Response 

Each of the working groups began their deliberations by assessing the current knowledge and ìstate of the 

artî in their respective focus areas. At the discretion of the working group chairs, short presentations were 

made to review current research in the appropriate areas. Based on this assessment, topics requiring 

additional information and/or technical understanding to guide flight system design and flight procedures 

were identified. The working groups then suggested research directions and topics to obtain the required 

data. The findings of each working group were presented to the workshop attendees during the closing 

session and opened for discussion. The working group moderators provided written documentation of the 

conclusions of their group in addition to their presentations. After the workshop, a 10-year research plan 

was developed that incorporated the inputs provided during the workshop. The overall objective of the 

research conducted in this plan is to provide data for the rational design of fire safety systems for manned 

spacecraft and significantly improve crew and system safety from fires. 

NASA/CPó2003-212103 1 

Introduction 

Space travel is an inherently dangerous activity making crew health and safety of primary concern in 

the space program. The vehicle structure and the crew are exposed to high levels of stress, and the hostile 

external environment makes escape and rescue nearly impossible. Many potential hazards can arise in 

space operations, among which are fire, atmospheric contamination, injury, explosion, loss of pressure, 

and meteoroid and debris penetration. These are examples of prompt-effect hazards, that is, those 

requiring immediate response for alleviation. Space operations are also subject to delayed-effect hazards, 

which are those requiring less urgent or timely response, such as contamination, hidden damage, and 

corrosion. Fire is one of the foremost prompt-effect hazards, but it also contributes to the delayed-effect 

hazards. Hence, fire-protection strategies must cover the restoration, repair, and cleanup activities after a 

fire event in addition to the obvious prevention and control before and during a fire. 

Probably the most important factor distinguishing spacecraft fire protection from terrestrial 

procedures in extreme environments (e.g., submarines and aircraft) is the strong influence of the lowgravity environment that dominates fire and particulate behavior and control in spacecraft. The substantial 

upward buoyant flow generated by large density gradients in fires at 1-g is practically eliminated in 

spacecraft. Heat and mass-transport rates ñ and consequently ignition, flammability, fire characteristics, 

and flame-spread rates ñ vary considerably from those experienced in conventional, terrestrial fires. At 

partial gravity levels, the effects of buoyancy, convection, and diffusion can combine to produce unique 

combustion results. Thus, fire prevention, detection, and suppression practices for spacecraft and 

extraterrestrial habitats must be developed specifically to respond to the unique aspects of microgravity 

combustion. 

Synopses of Previous Workshops on Spacecraft Fire Safety 

At least three workshops to assess existing knowledge in spacecraft fire safety and guide research 

efforts have been held in the last sixteen years. The participants of the current workshop did not 

specifically review the outcomes of these previous workshops, so comparison of the outcomes can be 

viewed as an evolution of the research needs brought about by continuing advances in knowledge and 

new mission objectives. In fact, some of the participants of the current workshop also attended one or 

more of the previous workshops and they have helped shape the spacecraft fire safety research that has 

been conducted over the last fifteen years. A short synopsis of these previous workshops is given below. 

In 1986, a workshop entitled ìSpacecraft Fire Safetyî was held with the results published in NASA 

CP 2476 (Ref. 1) and a conference paper (Ref. 2). This workshop, held in Cleveland, Ohio and sponsored 

by NASA Lewis Research Center, began with a symposium with ten original survey papers on the 

following ten topics related to fire safety. 

 1. Techniques for fire detection 

 2. Fire-related standards and testing 

 3. Fire extinguishment and inhibition in spacecraft environments 

 4. Inerting and atmospheres 

 5. Fire-related medical science 

 6. Aircraft fire safety research 

 7. Space Station internal environmental and safety concerns 

 8. Microgravity combustion fundamentals 

 9. Spacecraft material flammability testing and configurations 

 10. Ignition and combustion of metals in oxygen 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 2 

At the conclusion of these lectures, five forums were convened to develop recommendations for research 

and technology. These forums and the recommendations from each are given below: 

Fire detection and ignition

a. Study of detection of overheated and smoldering components, with emphasis on the development 

of heat-sensitive coatings 

b. Improvement of sensing systems, and incorporation of multiple fire-signature decision software 

c. Development of central detector systems for command of localized sensing stations 

d. Study of fire signatures expected in low gravity and nonstandard atmospheres 

e. Inventory of spacecraft equipment and procedures to anticipate hazards and locate sensors 

Fire extinguishment

a. Fundamental research on combustion and suppression in microgravity and space-unique 

environments 

b. Testing and evaluation of candidate suppressants 

c. Development of specific extinguishment and inerting techniques for hazardous areas of the 

spacecraft 

d. Planning for post-fire atmosphere cleanup 

e. Establishment of cooperative working groups to pursue analogies between space and submarine 

research 

Human responses to combustion products and inert atmospheres

a. Revision of material acceptance standards to test toxicology of emission products 

b. Emphasis on human responses in establishing fire safety policies 

c. Study of combustion, pyrolysis, and extinguishment products expected in microgravity 

d. Update of human tolerance limits to pollutants and reduced-oxygen atmospheres 

e. Designation and training of at least one spacecraft crew member as a fire marshal on each mission 

Spacecraft materials and configurations

a. Further flammability testing in low-gravity environments 

b. Further testing on overheating and product generation from common materials 

c. Further long-term material testing to include aging effects 

d. Establishment of data banks to share and correlate space, aircraft, and ground fire models 

Selection of spacecraft atmospheres

a. Research and technology programs on alternative spacecraft cabin atmospheres 

b. Research on combustion, pyrolysis, and smoldering in all atmospheres 

c. Establishment of data banks to collect knowledge on fire behavior in unusual environments 

d. Further research on atmospheric contamination by extinguishants 

A second workshop was held at the University of California, Los Angeles, on October 31ñ 

November 1, 1991 to review progress and topics related to the Risk-Based Fire Safety Experiment 

Project. This project was sponsored the NASA In-Space Technology Experiment Program (IN-STEP) and 

its principal goal was to develop and perform experiments based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment needs 

that will be used in models to quantify fire risk in humans-crew spacecraft (Ref. 3). The presentations and 

subsequent discussions were intended to guide the UCLA and NASA investigators on the state of 

knowledge and perceived needs in spacecraft fire safety and its risk management. The workshop 

consisted of formal presentations on current safety practices related to design-to-preclude strategies and 

material selection, probabilistic risk assessments, combustion science in spacecraft environments, and the 

specific hazard of smoke in spacecraft. While hardcopies of the presentations can be found in the 

workshop report (Ref. 3), the general findings were (1) that Probabilistic Safety Assessment methods 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 3 

would be a great value to the design and operation of future manned spacecraft, (2) the importance of 

understanding and testing of smoldering as a likely fire scenario in space, and (3) the need for smoke 

damage modeling to better predict damage by this mechanism. 

A third workshop entitled ìResearch for Space Exploration: Physical Sciences and Process 

Technologies,î sponsored by the Microgravity Research Division of NASA was held in Cleveland in 

1997. The broad research priorities for spacecraft fire safety developed in this workshop are documented 

in reference 4 and were as follows: 

1. Research on electrical system diagnostics to provide an early, pre-incident warning to 

breakdowns, possibly resistivity or continuity checks. 

2. Determination of flammability, flame spread, flame luminosity, limiting oxygen, and soot sizes 

under various atmospheres for thick materials and polymers at 1/3 g. 

3. Determination of flame sizes, soot sizes, and flammability from thick materials with imposed heat 

flux under microgravity conditions. 

4. Determination of combustion limits, ignitability, and flame luminosity of premixed methane and 

oxygen for propulsion and fire safety. 

5. Research on fundamental behavior of various gaseous, liquid suppressants, and solid-surface fires 

at 1/3 g and microgravity with modeling and experiment verification. 

While many of these remain as relevant research areas, the missions for which fire safety research is 

required are constantly evolving. Instead of developing knowledge of fire safety procedures and systems 

for the initial occupancy of the International Space Station, we are now concerned with maintaining, 

validating, and improving fire safety on the ISS throughout its lifetime while providing maximum 

flexibility in the types of experiments and operations that can be conducted. We must also look forward to 

the special fire safety requirements for travel to and habitation of the Moon and Mars. Research needs for 

these applications may include: 

• Evaluation of fire initiation hazards arising from waste disposal, trash storage, laundry, household 

activities, and the storage of fuel gas and oxygen systems 

• Development of technology for the efficient detection systems required for long-duration 

missions in terms of rapid response, discrimination, false-alarm rejection, multiple-sensor logic, 

etc. 

• Identification and evaluation of new suppression agents and techniques required for long-range 

missions, Lunar or Martian habitation, and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) extinguishment 

• Identification of fire safety issues in ISRU operations such as operations at high temperature and 

pressures, oxygen handling, propellant storage, and safety in welding and thermal operations 

Approach 

To identify and address these issues, researchers and specialists from academia, industry, national 

laboratories, and NASA who work in the various theme areas of spacecraft fire safety such as applied 

combustion science and technology; environment control and life support; material flammability testing 

and fire prevention; spacecraft, habitat, and ISS design; and fire detection and suppression have been 

invited to this workshop. The workshop consisted of: 

• Brief presentations reviewing spacecraft fire safety objectives in NASAís Bio-Astronautics 

Initiative, current spacecraft fire safety research, and goals for the workshop 

• Three simultaneous working groups each led by moderators who were responsible for 

directing and focusing the discussion on the theme area 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 4 

• Presentation of the recommendations and prioritizations for future research by the discussion 

group leaders to the workshop participants 

The three working groups had the following theme areas: 

1. Fire Prevention and Material Flammability 

2. Smoke and Fire Detection 

3. Fire and Post-Fire Response 

Group leaders and co-leaders for each group were identified prior to the workshop. In consultation with 

the workshop technical organizer, participants were placed into one of the three working groups to allow 

them to prepare for the discussions. All participants were notified of their assignments and fellow group 

members in advance of the workshop. The group leaders were tasked with moderating the discussion and 

providing a written synopsis of the discussion and findings of their group as well as copies of their oral 

presentation prior to leaving the workshop. These summaries were used to produce the reports presented 

in the next section. 

Summary of the Working Groups 

The summaries of the three working groups are presented in this section. These summaries have been 

developed from the written reports supplied by the working group leaders as well as the oral presentations 

of the findings delivered to all participants during the closing session of the workshop. The working 

groups had freedom in developing and evaluating topics during their deliberations. To ensure that no 

information or continuity of thought was lost while preparing these summaries, no effort was made to 

standardize the format of the results from the groups. 

Smoke and Fire Detection 

Moderators: Dr. David L. Urban, NASA Glenn Research Center 

 Dr. Tom Cleary, National Institute of Standards and Technology 

This group consisted of 15 participants (see List of Attendees). The group began its work by 

brainstorming ideas for issues and concerns and, from these, identifying research areas. These were then 

sorted and presented to all workshop participants during the closing session. 

By nature, smoke and fire detection is a technology-driven aspect of fire protection. Improvements in 

sensor technology can be implemented in a fire or smoke detector to allow them to respond faster and 

more reliably to a fire threat. However, advancement in technology is a necessary but not sufficient step 

for the improvement of smoke and fire detectors. Designers must also know what these sensors should be 

looking for. For example, the Comparative Soot Diagnostics (CSD) experiment that flew in the Glovebox 

on STS-75 demonstrated that the microgravity performance of the fire detectors could be different from 

their 1-g performance. This performance difference was attributed to the growth of larger smoke particles 

in 0-g because of the increased residence time in high smoke concentration regions (Ref. 5).

Issues and Concerns

 The group began by formulating consensus statements and issues that served as a starting point for 

discussions. First, there was a generally recognized paucity of data to guide the development of fire 

detection systems in spacecraft. This was one of the greatest concerns of this working group. Therefore, 

the group focused on defining the issues and concerns related to the design and operation of fire detection 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 5 

systems on spacecraft to identify data required to provide the needed data. This list of issues and concerns 

were postulated in the form of questions related to the operation of current systems and are identified in 

Table 1. They are divided into issues relating to the detector operation, crew response, and some general 

issues. These issues existed primarily because of the lack of knowledge of one or more fundamental 

aspects of fire behavior in a low-gravity, spacecraft environment. 

 Relationships between the identified issues and concerns were then examined to identify areas of 

research required to address these concerns. This analysis resulted in the identification of three major and 

three minor research areas, again posed as research questions. In these research areas, specific types of 

data or analyses were identified that would address the research question. Research that was most critical 

to address the issues was identified as near-term. 

Table 1. Issues and Concerns for Smoke and Fire Detection Systems

Smoke and Fire Detection

1. What should we detect? 

2. Where do we put the detectors? 

3. Does the detector produce frequent nuisance alarms?

4. Will it detect all types of fires? 

5. How does the sensor respond to reduced visibility?

Crew Response

6. Is detection quick enough to give crew adequate time to respond? 

7. How does the crew know where the fire is? 

8. How should the crew respond, how will they respond? 

9. Can the sensor give an indication of the indicate danger level?

10 What capability is required for post-fire sensing (toxicity & corrosion)?

General

11. Will current systems/procedures work? 

12. What are the risks outside of the crew cabin? 

13. What is the effect of partial gravity on fire signature and detector response?

Issue

Research Questions

1. What are we looking for? 

 a. Target and high-risk fire definitions 

 b. Fire signatures 

 c. Threshold settings and background levels 

 d. What arenít we looking for? 

2. When and how do we respond? 

 a. Levels of response/automation 

 b. Nuisance levels (impact on human response) 

 c. Human factors 

3. How do we design and place detectors? 

 a. Technology/modality 

 b. Air flow in modules 

 c. Automation (detection and response) 

 d. Sampling 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 6 

 e. Integration into ISS 

 f. Requirements 

 g. Risk Assessment 

 h. Annunciation technique 

4. What post-fire detection is needed? 

5. What fire detection/protection systems are required for uninhabited regions of spacecraft? 

6. How are the fire signatures and detector response different in partial-gravity environments? 

Of these research questions identified above, the first three were considered as the highest priority. 

The group also realized that technology exists to address these questions but had yet to be applied to this 

task. To address ìWhat are we looking for?î The working group felt that the identification of a target or 

high-risk fire and the determination of fire signatures was the most immediate, near-term research that 

should be accomplished. In research question 2, all three sub-areas, i.e., evaluation of the level of 

response and degree of automation that should be used to respond to a fire, the elimination of nuisance 

alarms, and other human factors related to the response of the crew to a fire were identified as potential 

near-term research areas. 

Enabling Technologies

 The greatest enabling technology for improved smoke and fire detection are the development of 

small, robust sensors that can detect very small amounts of a wide variety of fire signatures. This includes 

sensors that measure CO, CO2, HCl, hydrocarbons, and smoke. These sensors can be made in several 

forms including solid-state MEMS sensors, and various gas absorption techniques. Each method has its 

advantages and disadvantages but they are still under development. Concurrent development of these 

systems is being done so that their response to an actual fire can be adequately evaluated. 

 Many of these technologies will allow a fire or smoke detector to be considerably smaller and use less 

power than existing instruments. This could allow a distributed network of detectors operated by a 

distributed intelligence system. A system of this type composed of different types of detectors could have 

a very low incidence of nuisance alarms, more rapidly locate the fire, and even dispense suppressant to a 

specified location. 

 In the course of these discussions, the group realized the dichotomy between physical factors and 

human factors in fire and smoke detection. Human factors were given less consideration by the group not 

because of its relative unimportance but because the group felt that their expertise did not allow them to 

adequately address these issues. 

Summary and Conclusions

There was general agreement that current detection systems are based upon inadequate knowledge of 

the types of fire signatures for spacecraft materials, the effect of low gravity on fire signatures, and the 

transport of fire precursors within a spacecraft. Current systems have been designed using current 

knowledge but are generally unverified in a zero-g environment. Because existing systems only respond 

to smoke, they are susceptible to dust and the risk of nuisance alarms is significant. Each alarm requires 

valuable crew time to respond and evaluate the alarm. Repeated nuisance alarms over time could increase 

the crewís response time. The existing systems also have a poor track record in detecting small transients 

that could indicate a fire precursor. There is also no data with which to predict performance during larger 

events. 

Detection in large cabin volumes and standoffs is a concern because of the sparsely located detectors 

within the open cabin volumes. Ventilation systems within a volume will eventually draw air through a 

detector but the transport of smoke is not evaluated. 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 7 

Further improvements in detection will require implementation of hybrid detection systems consisting 

of sensors for species and particles. Which species these sensors should look for and what combination of 

sensors should be placed in what locations will have to be determined by future tests. Finally, there are 

ignition sources other than electrical sources that must receive consideration. Spontaneous ignition is a 

potential risk and detection in waste systems may not be adequate. 

Fire Prevention and Material Flammability 

Moderators: Professor James Tíien, Case Western Reserve University 

 Dr. Dennis E. Griffin, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 

 This working group consisted of 24 participants (see List of Attendees). The group began by 

identifying outstanding issues related to fire prevention and material flammability. They focused 

primarily on issues related to ISS and Shuttle systems because these systems are well-defined with respect 

to materials used, testing procedures, etc. The issues identified by the group are as follows: 

1. Fire scenarios for ISS/Shuttle 

2. Testing/screening methods 

3. Development of new materials 

4. Flammability at elevated oxygen levels (>30%) 

5. ISRU processes and storage 

Within each of these issues, the group recommended research areas and identified the highest priority 

research that should be conducted. Desired outcomes from the research were also identified. The 

information for each of the issues will be discussed in the following sections. 

Issue 1: Fire Scenarios for ISS/Shuttle

The discussion centered on the most likely ignition mechanisms for manned spacecraft compartment 

fires. The following is a list of potential fire sources and scenarios in manned spacecraft for which the 

group felt there was a need for investigation. Particularly, they were concerned about determining the 

potential for and mitigation of fires from each of these sources. They are listed below in no particular 

order of priority: 

1. Pressurized gaseous oxygen systems 

 High pressure oxygen systems (up to 6000 psia) exist that are subject to numerous ignition 

mechanisms, including ìflow friction,î compression heating, particle impact, 

contamination/kindling chain reactions, mechanical impact, friction, etc. 

2. Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG) 

 SFOG units have been responsible for two recorded fire events on Mir. 

3. Overheating of electrical cable 

 Overheating of electrical cables and components (pyrolysis events) have been reasonably 

common during the manned space program. On average, such an event occurs once every ten 

missions. 

4. Fire events caused by electrical short circuits 

 Short circuits have been responsible for the Apollo 204 and Apollo 13 fires. Also, does foreign 

object debris from a short circuit represent a fire hazard. 

5. Effect of work-arounds/mods 

 The effect of work-arounds or other modifications that can occur especially in long duration 

mission should be evaluated. Can these significantly alter the potential for fire? 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 8 

6. Aging electrical wire 

 Wear-induced failures in aging electrical systems can be a problem. There have been some 

occurrences of this recently in the Shuttle Obiter and SRB. 

7. Auto-ignition of waste storage 

 It is unknown whether waste might be susceptible to autoignition in low-gravity and, if so, under 

what conditions can this occur. 

The working group noted that other possibilities exist that have not been considered here including fire 

and ignition hazards associated with propulsion systems, pyrotechnics, fuels cells and electrolysis 

systems, etc. One must be careful to not limit consideration of all possibilities when designing fire 

detection and suppression systems and experiments. 

Of these potential fire scenarios, the highest research priority was to investigate ignition mechanisms 

and flammability for pressurized oxygen systems. 

The outcome of research in the area of fire scenarios should lead to improvements in understanding 

and aid in mitigation of potential fire scenarios. This would occur through additional crew training on 

awareness and considerations for fire safety. The group also recommended that researchers take 

advantage of lessons learned from AWIGG (Aircraft Wiring and Inert Gas Generator) working group. 

Issue 2: Testing/Screening Methods

The following is a list of recommendations for research that would improve and/or augment existing 

materials flammability screening methods: 

1. Augment existing go/no go criteria with a quantitative test method which provides ranking or 

indication of flammability margin, e.g. LOI or radiation panel. This would provide more 

information to the standard Test 1 acceptance criteria to aid in more informed materials selections. 

2. More understanding on relationship between 1-g test methods to microgravity performance. Due 

to the limited amount of microgravity data, this would allow for a better understanding of more 

appropriate material selection decisions. 

3. Need to understand the implications of non-flaming and smoldering combustion in microgravity 

with respect to ISS engineering materials. Current NASA standard flammability test techniques 

do not take smoldering combustion into account so this data would fill this apparent gap. 

4. There is a need for additional microgravity data on the effects of oxygen and flow on ignition, 

combustion and flame propagation for real engineering materials. This data is required to enable 

rational design analysis 

5. Very little data is available on combustion behavior in partial gravity yet this information is 

required for future exploratory missions. There is a need to obtain such data, or possibly 

appropriate theoretical predictions or scaling analysis, from microgravity data. 

6. A better understanding of the relationship between flame spread across thermally thick and thin 

materials must be established. Since the ability to obtain data using thermally thin samples is 

much better than for thermally-thick samples, a method or scaling relationship to accurately 

extrapolate thin data to more realistic thick spacecraft engineering materials would be very 

desirable. 

7. There is a definite need for long duration microgravity experimental data. A facility to carry out 

long duration partial and microgravity combustion experiment is essential. 

8. Currently NASAís materials selection criteria are based on flammability and not on the resulting 

toxicity of the combustion event. Research is needed to understand the toxicity and fire hazards 

associated with the pyrolysis of combustion products and production of aerosols. If necessary, 

this information should be factored into materials selection criteria, pre-fire events and post-fire 

response. (Need: Moderate) 

Of these research areas, all were considered to be high priority except for item number 8. 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 9 

Issue 3: New Materials Need to be Studied

The members of the working group recognized that future spacecraft were likely to be composed of 

different materials than those used in past and current spacecraft. Research topics within this area dealt 

with the need for additional or improved flammability investigations for these materials. 

1. Flammability of Inflatable Structures (Moderate) 

 Inflatable structures may be used for interplanetary transportation system structures, 

e.g. TransHab-type concepts, due to launch vehicle space constraints. Information on 

flammability of these materials is required. 

2. Non-Flammable Foam Packing Material (High) 

 Currently, flammable foam materials are widely used for ISS stowage and packaging. 

A nonflammable replacement would greatly benefit a short-term need. 

3. Flame-Retardant Clothing (Moderate) 

 More comfortable flame retardant fabric or fabric treatments for crew clothing is required, 

especially during long term missions. Current cotton clothing is, of course, highly flammable 

and not suitable for fire fighting. 

4. Alternative wire insulation (High) 

 An insulation material with the good properties (lightweight, flexible, high cut-through 

resistance) of polyimide and fluorocarbon constructions and none of the bad properties (poor tear 

resistance, cold flow, stiff) is needed. 

5. Advanced composites (Moderate) 

 Advanced composites are becoming more common and are extensively used in ISS for rack 

structures and are even being considered for oxygen tanks. In consideration of the potential for 

smoldering combustion, their inherent flammability in enriched oxygen, and because of the 

obvious advantages they offer in terms of weight and strength, these materials merit further 

flammability investigations for spacecraft applications. 

The working group emphasized that we may need to take advantage of FAA established data for 

advanced materials. 

Issue 4: New Research Considerations

1. Since future interplanetary missions will be weight limited, gaseous N2 may become a limited 

resource, hence microgravity experiments at oxygen concentrations greater than 30% should be 

considered. 

Issue 5: ISRU processes and storage

This discussion dealt with in-situ high temperature/high pressure production processes that are being 

investigated to utilize lunar and planetary resources for providing life support fuel resources (e.g. oxygen, 

methane, CO, etc.) 

1. Education and training of researchers 

 People doing this research may have not considered the possibilities of fire or explosion in the 

experimentation. Training and recognition of potential hazards is available in courses offered by 

ASTM, etc. (also see item #2 below) 

2. Understanding of hazards analysis techniques 

3. Improve understanding of flow friction as an ignition source 

 Flow friction involves a fluid leaking through a small orifice and has been thought to be the cause 

of several recent oxygen system fires. However, this ignition mechanism is not well understood. 

(Refer to Issue 1 research recommendations) 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 10

4. Supplement particle impact database 

 The data base for particle impact ignition information is very limited in terms of particulate sizes, 

types, velocities and temperatures. (Refer to Issue 1 research recommendations) 

Issue 6: Risk assessment

This discussion involved the aspect of analyses for preventing fires and quantifying fire risk. 

1. Probabilistic Risk Assessments 

Gain a better understanding of available probabilistic risk assessment and simulation tools. 

2. Aircraft, Submarine, and Ship Analogies 

Understand what is done in the submarine industry. 

3. Determine implications of limited microgravity data sets 

What are the confidence level considerations for repeatability of microgravity data/experiments? 

What are the implications when considering design of experiments (DOE) and the usefulness of 

limited sets of data? 

Fire and Post-Fire Response 

Moderators: Dr. Robert Friedman, NASA Glenn Research Center (retired) 

 Mr. J. Michael Bennett, Wright-Patterson AFB 

 This working group had 21 participants representing the government, various research organizations, 

and academia (see List of Attendees). The working sessions began with presentations on current research 

covering spacecraft fire response. Following these presentations, there was a general discussion about 

overall research needs in spacecraft fire safety and how many of these needs impacted topics in fire and 

post-fire response. The group then agreed to include topics that provided initial conditions for a fire 

response in their scope of research. 

Current Technology Issues

 First, the working group identified fundamental issues that can benefit greatly from new or increased 

information. This lack of knowledge hinders the ability of the fire-protection community to improve fireprotection capabilities. Examples of these basic needs include knowledge, measurements, predictions or 

correlations of the following: 

1. Rate of fire spread anticipated in space platforms under realistic fire scenarios 

2. Rate of extinguishing agent transport from the reservoirs to the site of the fire, and the 

phenomena that influence it 

3. Actual effectiveness and limits of performance of the existing on-board carbon dioxide fire 

extinguishing systems 

4. Performance and capabilities of the foam fire extinguishing systems currently employed by the 

Russians in space 

5. Current NASA policy that may permit or preclude consideration of alternative fire extinguishing 

agents to carbon dioxide 

6. Types of combustion by-products emitted by the fires and the extinguishing agents applied to 

them in spacecraft 

7. Fundamental understanding of the influence of low gravity (reduced gravity and microgravity) 

on the extinguishment process and 

8. Knowledge of the escape and evacuation mechanisms available to crew members 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 11

Research Areas

 Next, the team discussed the major research areas and enabling technologies that can address the 

identified key issues. These discussions defined the areas of study for improvement and advancement of 

spacecraft fire and post-fire response techniques. The research is presented in the following list. 

1. Experimental Determination of Flow in Compartments 

 The precise definition and characterization of the flow field in compartments where fires may 

occur, or where agent or by-products may flow, is of primary and fundamental concern for the 

fire-characterization process. For the ISS, the compartments are defined, in terms of increasing 

size, as the rack, module, and inter-module. Experimental data of the flow fields must be obtained 

in the appropriate low-gravity environment. Both scalar velocity and momentum data of the flows 

must be obtained. This activity should incorporate general flow fields in major zones and also 

local point sources of airflow variance due to the presence of inlet or outlet ducts, exhausts, etc. 

2. CFD Representation of Flow in Compartments 

 This activity is a corollary to activity #1, which constructs a computational fluid dynamics 

(CFD) model to correspond to the experimental model being developed. This numerical model 

will be a tool of great assistance in later characterizing the fire-establishment and -propagation 

process. These two activities should interact with and jointly refine each other. 

3. Digital Compartment Configuration Documentation 

 This effort entails the collection and development of engineering data on spacecraft 

compartment configurations, dimensions and components. These will be used as tools in defining 

fire-zone locations, conditions and geometries. The operating conditions, fuel sources and states 

(solid, liquid, gas), and other features pertinent to fire-protection analysis will be documented. 

Such data ideally are to be stored in digital formats for use in computer codes and models. 

4 Proposal of Fire Scenarios 

 The goal of this activity is to identify likely fire locations, size, and growth or spread 

phenomena on-board spacecraft of interest. Such fire designations should incorporate pertinent 

aspects of smoldering or flaming conditions, as applicable. The presence or lack of sooting should 

also be noted and represented. This activity should also support the initiation of an updated faulttree analysis (of issues related to fire safety) for platforms such as the International Space Station. 

5. Characterization of Fire Event 

 Modeling specifically for a fire event starts with the experimental and numerical verification 

of the fire conditions. This will establish the phenomena of fire growth and spread in low-gravity 

conditions on a realistic scale. (Note the distinction between fire growth, a safety issue, and flame 

growth, a research and possibly safety issue.) 

6. Development of Fire-Response Concepts 

 This activity starts with a review and assessment of the current fire-response systems to 

establish baseline protection. This leads to the proposal and development of new technologies to 

mitigate fire events. The innovative approaches will be based on the operating experience in 

space (as available) and the application of new data. The broad range of opportunities covers both 

passive and active fire mitigation. Passive responses are those of fire isolation, containment, 

power and flow shutdown, and the like. Active responses are those of conventional 

extinguishment-agent discharge and compartment venting. Partial evacuation followed by agent 

discharge is suggested as a very efficient method of combating a difficult fire, a technique worthy 

of further consideration. 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 12

7. Agent Transport in Low Gravity 

 An effective means of agent delivery in low gravity has never been determined. Experimental 

and numerical studies can characterize the transport phenomena from the discharge outlets to the 

fire site. The results can hold promise for improved specifications for extinguishing applications, 

covering gaseous and mixed phase agents. 

8. Fire-Related Emissions 

 Emissions and their toxic effects are relevant to the assessment of fire response. By-products 

from the fire event can include not only pyrolysis and combustion products, but also those from 

suppressant decomposition. 

9. Extinguishing Agent Performance in Low Gravity 

 There is almost a complete lack of information on the performance of extinguishing agents in 

microgravity and other reduced gravity environments. Performance includes the efficiency 

(quantity required) of extinguishment, the sustaining power (time of application), and other 

criteria. Research must cover a range of current and potential future agents, including gases, 

liquids, powders, and mixed phases. 

10. Agent Distribution 

 In addition to the determination of extinguishing agent performance, necessary research must 

include the investigation and assessment of the spatial distribution of agents. These data will 

serve to optimize flow rates, predict the thermodynamic state of the agent, and establish the range 

of agent application. The scope of this research must include fixed and portable extinguishing 

systems, centralized and distributed systems, local and general applications, and streaming and 

flooding discharge. 

11. Agent/Fire Interaction 

 This necessary research covers the behavior of the suppressant entering and within the 

combustion zone, raising the issue of the determination of such transport issues as diffusion. It is 

almost certain that gravity will affect this interaction, and models and verifying experiments are 

necessary for low-gravity predictions. 

12. Post-Fire Sampling and Characterization 

 Existing rules include criteria for determining that a fire is ìoutî for discontinuing fire 

response and reentry into the affected zone. These regulations are based on ground experience 

exclusively. Low-gravity research is essential for the definition of the end of a fire, to assure safe 

entry, conserve extinguishing agent, and prevent re-ignition. Predictions from research should 

establish improved atmospheric sampling techniques and diagnostics for these criteria. 

13. Obscuration Mitigation 

 Both flaming and smoldering fire may generate smoke, quickly filling the confined volume 

of a spacecraft. Smoke may be both a hazard and a nuisance, but the major concern is the 

obscuration, impeding entry, control, or escape. Predictive data are important, covering the 

special environments of the low-gravity spacecraft. Research can lead to mitigating technology, 

including crew equipment to accommodate the obscured environment (smoke hoods, for 

example). 

 As evidenced by the above list, fire response requires input from the topics areas addressed by the 

other two working groups. For example, to properly respond to a fire, you have to first know what is 

burning (material flammability) and how long it has been burning (material flammability, time between 

initiation and detection). This implies knowing the specifics about material configuration, locations of 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 13

ignition sources, flow conditions, etc. The working group decided that this information is essential to 

determining a proper fire response and should be included in their analysis as part of determining the 

initial conditions to any fire response. Because of the short time allotted for this analysis, the working 

group did not further combine or prioritize their thirteen research topics. However, these topics are not 

unrelated and can be categorized into three general areas as follows: 

Specifications of the Conditions Prior to the Response

 To assess a fire response strategy, information about the expected type, size, and location of the fire is 

required. The research topics that address this general theme are: 

1. Digital Compartment Configuration Documentation 

2. Evaluation of Potential Fire Locations and Scenarios 

3. Experimental Determination of Flow in Compartments 

4. CFD Representation of Flow in Compartments 

5. Characterization of Fire Events 

 The computational and experimental determination of flow in a compartment is required to 

understand the initial conditions of the flow field where a fire may occur and the regions that would be 

affected by the discharge of a suppressant. Also, details of the flow field are required to determine the rate 

of flame spread and the path of smoke transport. From this, the time from fire initiation to detection can 

be estimated. Knowing the type of fire, the possible ignition source, flame spread rate, and time to 

detection, an estimate of the size of the fire what the automated and crew response procedures begin can 

be obtained. 

Evaluation of Fire Suppressants

 Once a fire has been detected and an alarm has sounded, the automated and/or crew fire response 

begins. There are different types of responses and the ability to determine their relative effectiveness for 

various fire scenarios is an important step in minimizing equipment damage and reducing the amount of 

clean-up required. The research areas that address this theme are listed below: 

1. Agent Transport in Low Gravity 

2. Extinguishing Agent Performance in Low Gravity 

 ñAgent/Fire Interaction 

3. Gaseous and Particulate Emissions from Fires and Suppressants 

Effectiveness of Fire Response Strategies

 Knowing the effectiveness and behavior of individual suppressant agents, various response strategies 

and be proposed and evaluated. The research areas required for this theme include: 

1. Development of Fire-Response Concepts 

 ñObscuration Mitigation 

2. Agent Distribution Requirements and Behavior 

3. Post-Fire Sampling and Characterization 

Summary and Conclusions

 Even though the working group did not specifically prioritize the research topics, the categories listed 

above imply a sequence of research areas required for the development of effective fire response 

strategies for manned spacecraft. An area that was repeatedly emphasized by the working group during its 

discussions was that an appropriate response could be defined only as well as the ìinitial conditionsî of 

the fire were known. This includes knowing the material being burned, the location and size of the fire, 

and the ambient conditions (O2 concentration and velocity, for example). Some of this is addressed by 
NASA/CPó2003-212103 14

research identified by the other two working groups. The areas that are not addressed, such as knowing 

the ambient conditions when a fire starts constitute high-priority research areas specific to fire response. 

Spacecraft Fire Safety Research Plan 

 Upon obtaining the above lists and prioritizations from experts in various aspects of fire safety, it is 

important to meld the recommendations into a coherent research plan. As a result of this input, a research 

roadmap for spacecraft fire safety was prepared and is shown in Table 2. The tasks are divided into the 

three general areas mirroring the focus of the working groups, i.e., fire prevention and material 

flammability, smoke and fire detection, and fire suppression. Work items and overall objectives were 

identified. While the roadmap shows research efforts over a ten-year period, the first tasks in each area 

are of the highest priority and work in these areas should be initiated immediately. Research in many of 

these areas has, in fact, begun since the workshop and the findings of these studies will be presented in 

future reports and workshops. Continuing research efforts will build on this initial work. 

 Many of the research areas identified in Table 2 are drawn directly from the recommendations and 

research priorities identified by the working groups during the workshop. Others have been refined from 

these recommendations based on results from on-going research. Of course, these research areas and 

topics will continue to evolve as plans are implemented and results are obtained to ensure that the most 

relevant and critical areas are continuously addressed. 

Table 2. Spacecraft Fire Safety Research Roadmap 

2001 - 2004 2004 - 2007 2007 - 2010

Flammability of

Practical Materials

Fire Signatures and

Detection

Fire Suppression

and Post-Fire

Response

Technical Area Time Frame

- Evaluate the potential for and behavior of deep seated fires in non-1g 

environments

- Determine potential for autoignition and explosion of high-P gaseous oxygen Flammability 

measurements and 

correlation from 

normal-g to μg; new 

validated test 

methods for 

material ranking

- Determine flammability and flame 

spread of plastic and composite 

materials in partial-g for variations in 

flow and imposed heat flux

- Improved test methods to rank 

materials

- Determine limiting O2 and flow for 

flame propagation on practical 

materials in μg and partial-g

- Determine the effects of sub-limit insitu propellant concentrations in 

standard and enriched O2 

atmospheres on practical material 

flammability

- Develop component-level sensors 

for fire detection

- Define and validate method to 

establish pre-fire and fire signatures of

practical materials in 1g

- Develop and demonstrate integrated 

sensor (chemical/smoke)

- Establish pre-fire and fire signatures 

of practical materials in low g

Data base for fire 

signatures and 

demonstration of 

new detection 

systems

- Evaluate in-situ fire extinguishants

- Develop model of flame growth and stability in practical configurations to 

extend applicability of data base and to guide design of new systems

- Integrate understanding of 

extinguishment strategy and flame 

behavior in non-1g environments 

through analysis and modeling

- Fundamental and system-level tradeoff studies of flame-suppression 

techniques

- Analyze and test physical dispersion 

of suppressant and techniques for 

extinguishment

- Test and validate flame suppression 

methods in enriched O2 and exotic 

atmospheres

Experimental 

validation of fire 

suppressant 

performance, 

analysis and models

of fire suppressant 

strategies in μg and 

partial-g
NASA/CPó2003-212103 15

References 

1. Margle, Janice M.: Spacecraft Fire Safety. NASA CP−2476, 1987. 

2. Friedman, Robert; and Sacksteder, Kurt R.: Science and Technology Issues in Spacecraft Fire Safety. 

NASA TM−88933 (AIAA Paper 87−0467), 1987. 

3. Apostolakis, G.E., Catton, I., Paulor, T., and Paxton, K.: Findings of a Review of Spacecraft Fire 

Safety Needs. NASA CR−189181, 1992. 

4. Singh, Bhim S.: Workshop on Research for Space Exploration: Physical Sciences and Process 

Technology. NASA/CP1998-207431, 1998. 

http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/GLTRS/browse.pl?1998/CP-1998-207431.html 

Accessed Jan. 7, 2003. 

5. Friedman, Robert; and Urban, David L.: Progress in Fire Detection and Suppression Technology for 

Future Space Missions. NASA/TM2000-210337 (AIAA Paper 2000−5251), 2000. 

http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/GLTRS/browse.pl?2000/TM-2000-210337.html 

Accessed Jan. 7, 2003. 

NASA/CPó2003-212103 17

AppendixóPlenary Presentations

Five presentations were delivered during the opening session of the workshop and are included in this 

appendix. The titles of the presentations and the speakers were as follows: 

 

1. Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space 

Speaker: Dr. Gary A. Ruff, Spacecraft Fire Safety Project Scientist, 

NASA Glenn Research Center 

2. Spacecraft Fire Safety: A Human Space Flight Program Perspective 

 Speaker: Dr. Michael D. Pedley, ISS Materials and Process Manager, 

 NASA Johnson Space Center 

3. Control of Materials Flammability Hazards 

 Speaker: Dr. Dennis E. Griffin, Chemistry Group Leader, Materials, Processes, and 

Manufacturing Department, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 

4. Overview of ISS U.S. Fire Detection and Suppression System

 Speaker: Alana Whitaker, ISS ECLS Subsystem Manager, Fire Detection and Suppression 

Systems, NASA Johnson Space Center 

5. An Introduction to Mars ISPP Technologies

 Speaker: Dr. Dale E. Lueck, Systems Engineering and Analysis Branch, Spaceport Engineering 

and Technology, NASA Kennedy Space Center 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Workshop on

Research Needs in Fire Safety

for the

Human Exploration and Utilization

of Space

Hosted by 

NASA John H. Glenn Research Center

and the

National Center for Microgravity Research in Fluids and Combustion

Sheraton Airport Hotel

Cleveland, Ohio

June 25 - 26, 2001

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Background

ï Last Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop was held August 20-21, 1986

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space 

Dr. Gary A. Ruff 

Spacecraft Fire Safety Project Scientist 

NASA Glenn Research Center 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 19
National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Background

ï Last Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop was held August 20-21, 1986

ñ Challenger accident 8 months earlier

ñ Space Station designs underway

ï 107 people, 5 break-out forums

ñ Fire detection and ignition

ñ Fire extinguishment

ñ Human responses to combustion products and inert atmospheres

ñ Spacecraft materials and configurations

ñ Selection of spacecraft atmospheres

ï Objectives

ñ Review current knowledge in fire safety

ñ Assess the needs relevant to spacecraft

ï Microgravity combustion research conducted since 1986 has impacted 

fire safety practices on STS and ISS

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Office of Biological and Physical Research

Cross-disciplinary Science and Technology

Working Groups

NASA/CP—2003-212103 20
National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Bioastronautics Initiative Bioastronautics Initiative - History

ï In mid-1999, the Space and Life Sciences Directorate at Johnson Space 

Center was challenged to develop a new paradigm for NASA human life 

sciences

ñ Space Medicine

ñ Space Biomedical Research and Countermeasures

ñ Advanced Human Support Technology

ï A new thrust - Bioastronautics - was formulated with a budget augmentation request

ï Objective:

ñ Expanded extramural community participation through the National Space 

Biomedical Research Institute

ñ Initiated the detailed planning and implementation of Bioastronautics

ï An Integrated Approach to Ensure Healthy and Safe Human Space Travel

ï Assist in the Solution of Earth-based Problems

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Bioastronautics Initiative

ï Builds upon previous and ongoing work

ñ A significant amount of fundamental knowledge has been created through ground 

and flight research

ñ Apply this knowledge base to applications and solutions which will provide safer 

human operations in space 

ï Utilizes new research resources 

ñ ISS/STS research opportunities

ñ Ground analogs

ï Leverages new and unique capabilities

ñ Scientific community to focus on NASA issues

ñ Transfer knowledge to Earth based problems

ñ Cooperate with other Federal Agencies

ñ Develop new technologies

ï smart medical systems

ï biologically-inspired technologies

ï fire protection

NASA/CP—2003-212103 21
National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

NASA Bioastronautics Initiative NASA Bioastronautics Initiative ñ

Combustion Science

ï Substantially improve spacecraft fire safety within six years

ñ $1M per year for four years (initial funding level)

ñ Grant-based through NRAs and directed research

ï Fire safety practices and procedures

ñ ISS and Shuttle operations

ñ Prolonged human-crew missions in Earth orbit and beyond

ñ Lunar and/or Martian habitats

ï In-situ resource utilization

ï Propellant manufacture and storage

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Workshop Objectives

ï Identify research needed for fire safety of STS, ISS and their payloads

ï Identify fire safety concerns for prolonged human-crew missions in 

Earth orbit and beyond

ï Anticipate research for future Lunar/Martian habitats

Approach

ï Plenary session to overview current operations and issues in fire 

protection in space

ï Working groups to review current research and identify needs in the 

areas of

ñ Fire prevention and material flammability

ñ Smoke and fire detection

ñ Fire and post-fire response

NASA/CP—2003-212103 22
National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Plenary Speakers

ï Dennis Griffin

ñ Group Leader, Chemistry Group

Materials, Processes, and Manufacturing Department

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center

ï Alana A. Whitaker

ñ ISS Environmental Control and Life Support Systems

Fire Detection and Suppression Department

NASA Johnson Space Center

ï Dale E. Lueck

ñ Systems Engineering and Analysis Branch

Spaceport Engineering and Technology

NASA Kennedy Space Center

ï Michael D. Pedley

ñ ISS Materials and Processes Manager

NASA Johnson Space Center

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Working Groups

ï Fire Prevention and Material Flammability (OíHare Room)

ñ James Tíien, Case Western Reserve University

ñ Dennis Griffin, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center

ï Smoke and Fire Detection (Dulles Room)

ñ David L. Urban, NASA Glenn Research Center

ñ Thomas Cleary, National Institute of Standards and Technology

ï Fire and Post-Fire Response (Hartsfield Room)

ñ Robert Friedman, NASA Glenn Research Center

ñ J. Michael Bennett, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

ï Sessions will begin with introductions and short presentations of 

current research

ñ Begin discussions of mission-driven fire protection systems within these areas

ñ Recognize current knowledge and identify unknowns

ñ Define research needed to fill gaps

ñ Prioritize by short and long term, if applicable

NASA/CP—2003-212103 23
National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Schedule

Monday, June 25

Event 7:00 AM 8:00 AM 8:30 AM 9:00 AM 9:30 AM 10:00 AM 10:15 AM 10:45 AM

Welcome Materials Testing Spacecraft Fire ISS Fire In-Situ Charge to

Ruff, and Certification Safety: A Human Protection and Break Propellant Working

Registration/ Ostrach Griffin Space Flight the ECLSS (Grand Manufacture Groups

Plenary Continental NASA MSFC Program System Ballroom) and Storage Ruff

(Grand Ballroom) Breakfast Perspective W hitaker Lueck

 (Grand Ballroom) Pedley NASA JSC NASA KSC

NASA JSC

11:00 AM 12:00 PM 1:30 PM 3:30 PM 4:00 PM 6:00 PM 6:30 PM

Fire Prevention Moderators:

and T'ien, Griffin Working Working

Material Presentations: Session Session

Flammability Torero, 

(O'Hare Room) Fernandez-Pello

Olson

Moderators:

Smoke and Urban, Cleary Working Working

Fire Detection Presentations: Session Session

(Dulles Room) Urban, Hunter,

Young

Fire Moderators:

and Post-Fire Friedman, Bennett Working Working

Response Presentations: Session Session

(Hartsfield Room) Ross, Takahashi,

Abbud-Madrid

Lunch (Lambert Room)

Break (Grand Ballroom)

Cash Bar (Lambert Room)

Dinner (Lambert Room)

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Schedule

Tuesday, June 26

Event 7:00 AM 8:00 AM 9:00 AM 9:45 AM 10:30 AM 10:45 AM 11:30 AM 11:45 AM

Plenary Fire Prevention Smoke and Fire and Closing

(Grand Ballroom) and Materials Fire Detection Post-Fire Ruff

Summary Summary Summary

Fire Prevention Working

and Session

Material Wrap-up

Flammability

(O'Hare Room)

Smoke and Working

Fire Detection Session

(Dulles Room) Wrap-up

Fire Working

and Post-Fire Session

Response Wrap-up

(Hartsfield Room)

Continental Breakfast (Grand Ballroom)

Break ( Grand Ballroom)

Lunch/Completion of Written Summaries (Working Group Leaders)

(Lounge)

NASA/CP—2003-212103 24
National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Summary Presentations

General Topic

ï Current level of understanding

ï Desired improvement or level of knowledge required

ñ If possible, 

ñ Near-term

ñ Long-term

ï Recommendations for research within this topic

ï Other Considerations

ñ Enabling technologies

ñ Impact on current procedures or future designs

ñ Technology transfer/technology teaming opportunities

ñ Who is the User?

ï Desired format

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center

Written Report Written Report

ï Introduction

ñ Conduct of the group

ñ Decision/discussion process

ï Current Technology Issues

ñ Issue 1

ï Knowns and unknowns

ñ Issue 2

ï Research Areas

ñ Major Areas

ï Near-term

ï Mid-term

ñ Enabling technologies

ñ Technology teaming possibilities

ñ Format of information desired by user

NASA/CP—2003-212103 25

Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 1 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY 

A HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM 

PERSPECTIVE 

Michael D. Pedley 

ISS Materials and Processes Manager 

NASA Johnson Space Center

Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 2 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

TYPICAL MANNED SPACECRAFT MATERIALS

Spacecraft Fire Safety: A Human Space Flight Program Perspective 

Dr. Michael D. Pedley 

ISS Materials and Process Manager 

NASA Johnson Space Center 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 27
Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 3 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

TYPICAL MANNED SPACECRAFT MATERIALS

Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 4 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

TYPICAL MANNED SPACECRAFT MATERIALS

NASA/CP—2003-212103 28
Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 5 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

TYPICAL FLAMMABLE HARDWARE PROTECTION

Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 6 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

MATERIALS FLAMMABILITY 

• Current ground-based testing conservative but not intolerably restrictive for 

Shuttle/ISS environments ñ adequate supply of nonflammable materials for 

vehicle design to 30% oxygen environment 

• Long-term need to quantify ìconservativeî 

o Relax ISS flammability requirements for payloads, clothing, portable 

equipment accordingly 

o Future manned space exploration missions extremely weight limited ñ very 

desirable to minimize use of nitrogen as consumable by returning to 

Apollo/Skylab oxygen concentrations 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 29
Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 7 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

FIRE RETARDANTS

• Need a good and easy fire retardant treatment for fabrics (cotton, paper, 

synthetics) 

o No significant changes in weight/feel of material, 

o Impervious to washing, dry cleaning 

o Odorless 

• Have to compete with current practice of allowing 100% cotton outer clothing 

(flammable) 

o Commercially available fire retardants tried with little enthusiasm from crew 

ñ stiff, dry-clean only, slight odor 

Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 8 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

NONFLAMMABLE FOAM CUSHION MATERIAL

• No good nonflammable foam cushion material 

o Current choices are Pyrell fire-retardant polyurethane (flammable and life-limited) 

and Minicell polyethylene foam (more flammable but not life-limited) 

o Both weigh about 2 lb/cu. ft. and are very inexpensive 

• Desired cushion material would have following properties 

o Nonflammable to at least 30% oxygen 

o Lightweight ñ preferably appreciably less than 2 lb/cu. ft. 

o Not life-limited ñ life 30 years + 

o Minimal compression set 

o High resilience, tear resistance 

o Negligible particulate formation 

o Open cell for vacuum compatibility 

o Very inexpensive 

o Easy to cut into complex shapes 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 30
Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 9 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

NONFLAMMABLE FOAM CUSHION MATERIAL

-- EXISTING CANDIDATES

• Polyimide Foams (Solimide) 

o Very lightweight (0.5 lb/cu. ft.), nonflammable in 30% oxygen, not life-limited, 

open cell 

o Very poor compression set, significant particulate generation, poor ìfeelî 

o Difficult to cut without generating considerable particulate 

o Very expensive 

• Melamine Foams 

o Very lightweight (0.5 lb/cu. ft.), nonflammable in 30% oxygen, not life-limited, 

open cell, reasonable compression set 

o Minimal particulate generation but appreciable fine dust 

o Poor resilience, very poor tear resistance 

o Very difficult to cut complex shapes or thin slices 

o Very inexpensive 

• Silicone Foams 

o Expensive, very heavy (at least 6 lb/cu. ft. for adequate resilience) 

Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 10 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

ELECTRICAL WIRE AND CABLE

• Critical component from fire safety standpoint, because electrical power is only really 

credible ignition source (excepting solid-fuel oxygen generators) 

• Key features 

o Nonflammable to 40% oxygen, resists arc-tracking 

o High resistance to mechanical damage (abrasion, nicks, cuts) 

o High flexibility 

o Lightweight and capable of operating at high temperatures (at least 200 oC) 

• No perfect construction 

o Teflon is heavy and has poor damage resistance 

o Kapton is stiff, has very poor arc-tracking resistance, is easily damaged by 

nicks, and may degrade in humid environments 

o Tefzel is flammable in enriched oxygen, has limited life above 150 oC and modest 

damage resistance 

o Teflon-polyimide hybrids currently best compromise for most applications but 

some aspects inferior to Kapton and others inferior to Teflon 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 31
Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 11 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

RUSSIAN SOLID-FUEL OXYGEN GENERATOR 

(SFOG)

Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 12 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

GOX IGNITION MECHANISMS

• Two important areas of limited understanding with respect to materials ignition 

and combustion in oxygen systems 

• In recent years, several oxygen system fires have been attributed to a 

phenomenon christened (possibly erroneously) as ìflow frictionî 

o Occurs only at high pressures (> 2500 psia) 

o Occurs in pressurized static systems (all other known ignition 

mechanisms are tied to motion ñ rapid pressurization, particle impact, 

friction 

o Appears to result from leakage through a seal 

o Ignition mechanism not understood, so cannot be controlled by 

design/materials selection 

• Limited studies of particle impact ignition have shown that high flow velocities 

are required and that metallic particles are probably worse than nonmetals ñ 

but we donít know in any detail: 

o Velocity effects for different particulate contaminants 

o Effects of particle size and quantity 

o Effectiveness of filters as protection (as functions of filter size and filter 

material) 

o True hazards from gas streams exiting valve seats/orifices at sonic velocity 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 32
Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 13 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

Michael D. Pedley/EM2

FIRE DETECTION

• Need capability to distinguish between pyrolysis event and true self-supporting 

combustion 

o Pyrolysis events relatively commonplace and inevitable (electrical shorts, 

component failures, arcing/arc tracking) 

o No true fires on orbit, excepting SFOG, combustion experiments 

• Needs to have high reliability, no false positives 

• Solve conundrum of 

o Air flow needed for to transport smoke, combustion products to traditional 

sensors for fire detection 

o Air flow worst thing for microgravity fires 

Michael D. Pedley/NASA JSC

Page 14 of 14 June 2001

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

FIRE SUPPRESSION

• Fire suppression capability always for backup only, but needs to be effective 

backup 

• Issues with Halon-type extinguishers include: 

o ECLSS compatibility 

o Extinguishant toxicity 

o Effectiveness at elevated oxygen concentrations 

o Environmental 

• Issues with carbon dioxide (ISS baseline) include: 

o Application (where is base of flame?) 

o Induced forced convection (will carbon dioxide application extinguish a 

microgravity fire or stir it up?) 

o Mixing (obtaining adequate concentrations in racks) 

• Issues with water-based suppressants (includes Russian segment ISS 

baseline) include: 

o Compatibility with electrical systems 

o Clean up 

o Use in racks (application to fire source, clean-up) 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 33

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 1

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Control of Materials Flammability 

Hazards

Dennis E. Griffin

Chemistry Group Leader

NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center

Materials, Processes, and Manufacturing Department

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 2

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Control of Materials 

Flammability Hazards

ï Fire is one of many potentially catastrophic hazards associated with 

materials used in the operation of manned spacecraft

ï Appropriate materials selection and control of flammable materials is an 

important element of NASAís approach to fire control

ï Major lesson learned from the Apollo 204 fire in 1966 was ignition 

sources can be minimized but never completely eliminated

ï Spacecraft fire control is based on minimizing potential ignition sources 

and ìeliminating materials that can propagate fireî

ñ This means controlling quantity and configuration of flammable materials to 

eliminate potential fire propagation paths and ensure any fire would be 

small, localized, isolated and would self-extinguish without harm to the crew

ï Fire extinguishers are always provided on manned spacecraft but are 

not considered as part of the fire control process

Control of Materials Flammability Hazards 

Dr. Dennis E. Griffin 

Chemistry Group Leader 

Materials, Processes, and Manufacturing Department 

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 35
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 3

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Control of Materials 

Flammability Hazards 

(continued)

ï Ground-based flammability testing is conservative but has not proven to

be unusually restrictive for materials in manned spacecraft environments

ñ Adequate sources of nonflammable materials for vehicle design

ï Many solutions have been developed for controlling the configuration of 

flammable materials and materials in commercial ìoff-the-shelfî (COTS) 

hardware so that they can be used safely in manned spacecraft 

ï NSTS 22648, ìFlammability Configuration Analysis for Spacecraft 

Applications,î describes these design solutions so customers can design 

safe and cost-effective flight hardware

ï Current processes for controlling materials flammability hazards have 

successfully assured space flight materials and systems do not constitute 

an uncontrolled fire hazard

ï Materials control processes include requirements, guidelines, testing, 

data bases, data requirement submittals, design analyses, deviation 

evaluation, hazard mitigation, verification, approval and certification

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 4

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Flammability 

Requirements

ï All flight hardware used in NASA manned space programs must comply with 

the flammability requirements of NASA-STD-6001, ìFlammability, Odor, 

Offgassing, and Compatibility Requirements and Test Procedures for 

Materials in Environments That Support Combustionî

ï Establishes NASA program requirements for evaluation, testing and 

selection of materials to preclude unsafe conditions related to flammability in 

the following environments:

ñ Habitable flight compartments (internal)

ñ Locations outside habitable areas (external)

ñ Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and specified test facilities

ñ Vented and sealed containers

ñ Liquid and gaseous oxygen (LOX/GOX)

ñ Breathing gases

ï NASA-STD-6001 describes required flammability tests and requires a 

system flammability evaluation for materials that fail these tests

NASA/CP—2003-212103 36
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 5

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Flammability 

Requirements 

(continued)

ï NASA-STD-6001 contains several materials flammability and ignition tests:

ñ Test 1 - Upward Flame Propagation (fundamental test for solid materials)

ñ Test 2 - Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates (cone calorimeter)

ñ Test 3 - Flash Point of Liquids (ASTM D 93 Pensky-Martens closed tester)

ñ Test 5 - Electrical Connector Potting & Conformal Coating Flammability (deleted)

ñ Test 4 - Electrical Wire Insulation Flammability (15o inclined @ 125o

C/ overload)

ñ Test 8 - Flammability Test for Materials in Vented or Sealed Containers

ñ Test 10 - Simulated Panel or Major Assembly Flammability (configuration Test 1)

ñ Test 11 - Simulated Crew Bay Configuration Flammability Verification (deleted)

ñ Test 13 - Mechanical Impact for Materials in Ambient/Pressurized LOX/GOX

ñ Test 14 - Pressurized Gaseous Oxygen (GOX) Pneumatic Impact for Nonmetals

ñ Test 17 - Upward Flammability of Materials in GOX (only for pressurized O2 sys.)

ñ Test 18 - Arc Tracking (for electrical wire insulation - not true flammability test)

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 6

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Flammability 

Requirements and System 

Evaluations

ï Nonflammable ñ a material that self-extinguishes within 6î when ignited and 

does not propagate a flame by transfer of burning debris (for at least 3 

standard sized samples) 

ï Standard chemical ignition source ñ energy 750 + 50 cal., temperature 2000 

+ 160o

F, burning duration 25 + 5 sec., flame height 2.5 + 0.25î

ï ìWorst-caseî anticipated use environment (most hazardous pressure, 

temperature, material thickness, and fluid exposure conditions) must be 

used in the testing and evaluation process

ï Materials shown to meet the acceptance criteria of the required test(s) are 

acceptable for further consideration in design

ï Systems containing materials that have not been tested or do not meet the 

criteria of the required test(s) must be verified acceptable in the use 

configuration by analysis or testing

ï Fundamental requirements is for overall system to be safe from a

flammability standpoint

ï Test methods exist to provide data needed to support systems evaluation

NASA/CP—2003-212103 37
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 7

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Flammability 

Requirements and System 

Evaluations (continued)

ï An acceptable alternative to flammability testing is to assume material is 

flammable and demonstrate by analysis that the material configuration 

cannot propagate fire (e.g. for COTS hardware and electronic equipment)

ï These requirements are implemented through various NASA program and 

Materials and Processes (M&P) requirements documents:

ñ JSC SE-R-0006/MSFC-STD-506, General M&P Standard (Shuttle)

ñ SSP 30233, Space Station Requirements for M&P (ISS)

ñ NSTS 1700.7, Safety Policy & Requirements for Payloads Using the Space 

Transportation System and (same requirements in the) ISS Addendum

ï NSTS 1700.7 tailors the NASA-STD-6001 requirements by exempting 

payload materials used in small quantities (less than 0.1 lb. or 10 square 

inches in manned crew environments and less than 1 lb. and/or 12 linear 

inches for external materials)

ï Hardware containing materials that do not meet flammability requirements 

require Board approval with acceptance rationale and system evaluation 

documented in Materials Usage Agreements (MUAs) or Hazard Reports

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 8

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

System Evaluations and 

Environments

ï Systems flammability evaluations or oxygen hazards analyses are required 

consistent with the hazards assessment guidelines and requirement of:

ñ NSTS 22648, Flammability Configuration Analysis for Spacecraft Applications

ñ NASA TM 104823, Guide for Oxygen Hazards Analyses on Comp. and Systems

ñ NSS 1740.15, Standard for Oxygen and Oxygen Systems, Guidelines for Design

ï Standard rationale codes (for Class III MUAs) are available for the most 

common acceptable configurations containing flammable materials

ï Approval of hazard assessments documented in M&P Certification 

ï Materials flammability depends strongly on the oxygen concentration in the 

environment to which the materials will be exposed (the effect of pressure is 

much smaller and can be ignored at crew cabin pressures < 1 Atm)

ï Past NASA programs used much higher oxygen concentrations than the 

current 30% maximum for ISS/Shuttle (100% for Apollo and 70% for Skylab) 

ï Configurations found to be acceptable under higher oxygen concentrations 

are considered acceptable for lower oxygen concentrations

NASA/CP—2003-212103 38
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 9

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

System Evaluations

ï When a flammability assessment results in an unacceptable configuration 

reduction of flammability hazards is necessary to correct the problems

ï Primary methods used by NASA to reduce flammability hazards are:

ñ Minimize or limit the use of flammable materials by replacement with 

nonflammable materials

ñ Eliminate or restrict propagation paths

ï Covering flammable material with a nonflammable material 

ï Separation of flammable materials

ñ Isolate flammable materials from ignition sources or eliminate ignition sources

ï When results of flammability configuration analysis are inconclusive the 

hardware configuration may be tested for flammability to determine 

acceptability

ï Alternatively the hardware organization may choose to assume the

configuration is flammable and implement appropriate measures to

eliminate the flammability hazard

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 10

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

System Evaluations 

(continued)

ï To conduct a flammability configuration assessment - Evaluate the overall 

hardware configuration:

ñ If the hardware is a closed box without vents or power, the materials inside will 

not contribute to the fire hazard unless the box is constructed from flammable 

materials ñ the box acts as a fire barrier

ñ If the only electrical power within the box is from batteries, the maximum shortcircuit power draw is nearly always too low to act as an ignition source 

ï NASA testing during the Apollo era showed that solid materials cannot be 

ignited by electrical powers below 25 watts 

ï Evaluate the way in which the hardware will be used:

ñ Hardware that is normally stowed in a fireproof container (stowage locker, many 

NASA provided stowage bags and ISS crew transfer bags) and exposed to the 

cabin environment for short periods during use may comply with stowage policy:

ï Max dimensions 10 in. and unstowed less than 1 day/week

ï Unstowed less than 1 hour/day

ï Contingency use only

NASA/CP—2003-212103 39
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 11

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

System Evaluations 

(continued)

ï Maximum dimension <6 in. and always stowed when not in actual use

ï Used only when covered by crew clothing

ï Exposed surface area < 1 sq. ft. and always worn by crew when unstowed

ñ A full flammability analysis is required for hardware that is permanently mounted 

in a rack or a locker space

ï Identify the major materials to be assessed

ñ Amounts greater than 0.1 pounds (or 6 linear inches maximum dimension and/or 

10 square inches maximum area) in crew-habitable compartments

ñ Amounts greater than 1.0 pounds (or 12 linear inches) in other compartments

ñ Metallic panels and structures are nonflammable in Shuttle/ISS environment 

(even magnesium and titanium) and need not be considered

ñ Metallic screens may be flammable and must be addressed

ñ Inorganic materials (ceramics) are also nonflammable in Shuttle/ISS 

environments and need not be considered

ñ Adhesives (sandwiched between two surfaces) and materials covered 

overcoated by nonflammable materials need not be considered

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 12

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

System Evaluations and 

Flammability Data

ï Flammability characteristics of materials can be determined by consulting 

the NASA/MSFC Materials and Processes Technical Information System 

(MAPTIS) at http://map1.msfc.nasa.gov/WWW_Root/html/page7.html

ï An A-rating in MAPTIS for test conditions that are the same as the use 

conditions means the material is acceptable in unlimited quantities

ï Any other rating means the material quantity/exposure must be controlled 

The following key factors in materials

ï Note the following key factors when using MAPTIS flammability data:

ñ Oxygen concentration - MAPTIS flammability data obtained at higher oxygen 

concentrations than the use concentration are always conservative (unpowered 

and painted metal boxes, or hardware stowed/transferred in a standard locker, 

Shuttle container or crew transfer bag for external use are acceptable) 

ñ Material thickness ñ generally, flammability deceases with increasing thickness, 

so the thickness associated with the MAPTIS rating should be the same as the 

use thickness of the material, or it is acceptable if a thinner version of the same 

material is rated A for flammability

NASA/CP—2003-212103 40
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 13

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

System Evaluations and 

Flammability Data 

(continued)

ñ Coatings on substrates ñ thin coatings bonded or sprayed on metallic substrates 

are generally not flammable because the substrate acts as a heat sink, coating 

flammability always decreases with increasing substrate thickness, so a coating 

is always acceptable if it is A-rated for flammability on a thinner substrate, if the 

coating is <2 mils thick and the metal substrate is >20 mils thick the coating is 

acceptable, nonmetallic substrates are not effective as heat sinks

ï Determine fire propagation paths

ñ Determine whether the externally exposed materials represent fire propagation 

paths exceeding 6î in crew compartments and 12î in other areas, propagation 

from one flammable material application to the next is not acceptable, and must 

be limited by fire breaks or positive action to control the hazard

ï Evaluate the ability of container to contain fire

ñ Sealed containers have no vents and are verified to a max. of 1X10-4 cm3/sec

ï Contains no oxygen or inert gas an internal fire will not be initiated

ï Contains air and nonflammable wall > 60 mils thick fire will be contained

ï Internal void space limited to less than 30% of total volume acceptable

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 14

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

System Evaluations 

(continued)

ñ Vented containers have active vents and associated cooling airflow

ï Vent area <1% of total surface area and vents covered with a fine metal 

(stainless steel or nickel, not Al, Ti or Mg) screen will contain fire

ï Carefully evaluate/test and reduce hazard by:

- Minimize number and size of vents (avoid chimney effect)

- Cover vents with fine CRES or Ni screen

- Minimize free volume by adding nonflammable packaging materials , e.g.

polyimide foam

- If forced air flow not required, cover all vents and evaluate as intermediate

- Relation between flow rate and flammability complex

- At low flow rates flammable materials burn more vigorously with increasing

flow rate (decreasing effectiveness of the container)

- At high flow rate airflow will prevent stable flames (blowing out fire)

- Intermediate flow rates are worse case and are configuration and

microgravity dependent 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 41
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 15

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

System Evaluations 

(continued)

ñ Intermediate containers have no active vents or cooling airflow

ï NASA-provided stowage lockers and bags are treated as containers that can 

act as barriers to external fires

ï Many commercial electronics items may be addressed by stowage policy or 

can be obtained with metallic or nonflammable polycarbonate case and with 

internal components packed closely such that void space is of no concern

ï Internal ignition of small commercial items powered by alkaline batteries is 

not considered credible

ï Potential for ignition from external sources can be eliminated with 

nonflammable case or by covering the case with a nonflammable material

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 16

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Processes to Control 

Materials Flammability 

Hazards

ï Elements of effective materials flammability control have successfully 

precluded uncontrolled fires on orbit:

ï Requirements - NASA-STD-6001 implemented by program requirements

ï Guidelines - NSTS 22648, MSFC-PROC-1301, NSS 1740.15, etc.ration

ï Testing ñ active program for new materials, applications & configurations

ï Data bases - MAPTIS provides 85,000 test reports on >32,000 materials

ñ Used to publish MSFC-HDBK-527/JSC 09604, Materials Selection Lists for 

Space Hardware Systems, all materials have unique NASA Material Code

ï Data requirement submittals ñ Type 1 Approval, MCPs, MIULs and MUAs

ñ Materials Control Plans ñ Describes how requirements will be implemented

ñ Materials Identification Usage Lists ñ Identifies where specific materials are used, 

quantities, environments, application, thicknesses, cure, applicable test data, etc.

ñ Materials Usage Agreements ñ used to approve materials that fail to meet 

requirements, describes application and hazard assessment with technical 

acceptance rationale for evaluation of deviation 

ñ Engineering Drawings

NASA/CP—2003-212103 42
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 17

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Processes to Control 

Materials Flammability 

Hazards (continued)

ï Design review/approval ñ M&P approval signature required on all 

engineering documentation

ï Design analysis ñ formal hazards analysis, inspections, walk-throughs

ï Hazard mitigation ñ numerous techniques developed and documented

ï Oversight/Insight ñ M&P approval signature and representation required for 

milestone design reviews (SRRs, PDRs, CDRs, DCRs), Safety Review

Boards/Panels, Certification of Flight Readiness Reviews (CoFRs)

ï Verification ñ data submittal, assessment and closure for generic 

flammability hazard, reconcile as-designed versus as-built configuration

ï Materials and Processes (M&P) organization responsible for preparing and 

approving certification that materials meet flammability requirements for 

CoFR and Safety Panel

ï Reciprocal Materials Agreements

ñ JSC, MSFC, JPL, GRC, GSFC maintain Intercenter Materials Agreements

ñ NASA, ESA, NASDA and RSA maintain Interagency Materials Agreements

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 18

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Flammability Reduction 

Methods

ï Commercial items with flammable outer surfaces (ABS, PVC, polyethylene, 

and/or polyamides) may be wrapped in nonflammable tape

ñ 3 mil aluminum tape (L-T-80) will protect most plastics, foams and cardboard

ñ Nonflammable fiberglass tape with silicone adhesive will provide same protection 

if each rotation or wrap overlaps the previous one by 50%

ï For long-term applications and aesthetics, flammable surfaces may be 

coated with nonflammable barrier such as Fluorel  (expensive, complex, 

fair durability)

ï Common case materials for commercial items are generally extremely 

flammable ABS or normally acceptable polycarbonate (up to 30%) or metal

ï Electrically powered items with internal flammable materials can usually be 

treated or filled with a suitable material (nonflammable glass-filled-epoxy 

potting compound) to provide protection from internal ignition sources

NASA/CP—2003-212103 43
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 19

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Wire and Cable

ï Most aerospace-grade electrical wire insulation is nonflammable in 

Shuttle/ISS environments

ï Limitations are usually driven by such factors as flexibility and cut-through 

resistance:

ñ Teflon (MIL-W-22759, MIL-C-27500, or equivalent) ñ good general-purpose wire 

with high flexibility but poor cut-through resistance

ñ Polyimide (MIL-W-81381) ñ no longer used except in flat circuits because of 

propensity to arc track

ñ Teflon-Polyimide Hybrids (MIL-W-22759, MIL-C-27500, or equivalent) ñ good 

general-purpose wire with lower flexibility than Teflon but higher cut-through 

resistance

ñ Tefzel (MIL-W-22759, MIL-C-27500, or equivalent) ñ suitable for external 

applications but flammable in enriched oxygen with performance similar to hybrid

ñ ISS also uses a custom silicone-insulated construction in power circuits (SSQ 

21652) that is nonflammable in ISS environments and exceptionally flexible

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 20

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Wire and Cable (continued)

ï COTS hardware typically has electrical wiring with PVC, polyethylene, or 

chloroprene insulations which are flammable in all Shuttle/ISS environments

ï Their use is generally discouraged and may be used only when 

demonstrated to be acceptable in configuration by flammability analysis

ï Commercial wiring inside electronics boxes and low-power signal wiring 

outside such boxes can usually be accepted by this method

ï External power cables nearly always need to be replaced or protected from 

ignition

ï Flammable insulation is acceptable on wires in external payloads that are 

not powered (including during ground testing) until in vacuum

NASA/CP—2003-212103 44
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 21

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Wire, Cable and Electrical 

Accessories

ï Methods for protecting flammable cables include:

ñ Covering with braided Teflon sleeve, such as Goretex  sleeving

ñ Wrapping with nonflammable fiberglass-backed-silicone adhesive tape

ñ Covering with sleeve of 7.2 oz/yd2 natural Nomex HT-9040 fabric, beta cloth, 

polybenzimidazole (PBl), or other nonflammable fabrics

ñ Covering by heat shrinking polyvinylidene fluoride or Teflon sleeve onto cable

ï Wire and cable accessories such as cable markers, spacers, and cable ties 

should not contribute to fire propagation paths

ï Polyvinylidene fluoride/fluoroelastomeric cable markers are generally used

ï Other types of cable marker material may be acceptable if used in small 

discrete amounts or covered with a clear Teflon TFE or FEP sleeve

ï Most types of spacers are usually acceptable because of heat sink effects

ï Acceptable lacing cords are Teflon TFE, Teflon TFE/fiberglass, or Nomex

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 22

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Electrical Accessories 

Hoses and Tubes

ï Acceptable cable ties can be made from ETFE or ECTFE fluoropolymers

ï If flammable cable tie wraps are used on nonflammable cables they should 

be spaced at least 2 inches apart to prevent fire propagation

ï In air and moderately-enriched oxygen environments (up to 40 percent 

oxygen) the shell of a metal shell electrical connector prevents fire 

propagation from the nonmetallic materials used inside the connector to 

other nonmetallic materials, regardless of the material inside the connector

ï Flammability configuration analysis is required for nonmetallic shell 

connectors

ï Acceptability of the nonmetallic materials used inside the connector depends 

on the flammability of the shell material and its ability to act as a fire barrier

ï External tubes or hoses (such as a vacuum cleaner hose) made from 

flammable materials may be replaced with a nonflammable material or 

covered with a fire barrier material

NASA/CP—2003-212103 45
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 23

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Hoses and Tubes

Hook and Loop Fasteners

ï Clear TFE or FEP Teflon tubes and hoses are readily available to replace 

flammable materials

ï If flammable tubes or hoses must be used, the exterior can be protected by 

a covering of 7.2 oz/yd2 natural Nomex HT-9040, PBI, Beta cloth, or other 

nonflammable fabric

ï In these cases potential for ignition of the tube walls from inside must be 

addressed

ï Although some hook-and-loop fastener materials are less flammable than 

others, all common types are flammable in spacecraft habitable areas

ï To prevent long flame propagation paths, the following usage limits are 

generally applied to hook and loop fasteners in habitable areas:

ñ Maximum size: 4 square inches, individually or in pieces

ñ Maximum length: 4 inches

ñ Minimum separation distance: 2 inches in any direction from another piece

ï NASA normally uses nylon fasteners in habitable areas for greater durability 

and Nomex in EVA operations for good low-temperature performance

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 24

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Stowage Bags and 

Lockers

ï Metal stowage lockers that do not contain ignition sources are acceptable

ï Material selection criteria for nonmetallic stowage lockers must be based on 

fire containment capability and should be supported by test data

ï Acceptable stowage bags may be constructed from the following fabrics:

ñ Beta cloth - acceptable for stowage of potentially flammable materials but has 

low durability and a tendency to shed glass fibers

ñ Natural Nomex HT-9040 fabric weighing at least 7.2 ounces/square yard

ñ Lighter weights of natural Nomex HT-9040 are acceptable in double layers

ñ Navy blue single-layer Nomex weighing 6.5 ounces/square yard treated with 

ammonia dihydrogen phosphate fire retardant

ï Used on the Shuttle but discouraged for ISS because the fabric cannot be 

wiped down without removing the fire retardant

ñ PBI and other flame-retardant fabrics (see MAPTIS)

ï These containers can have flammable items stowed inside them provided 

they do not contain ignition sources and are not susceptible to spontaneous 

ignition or chemical reaction

NASA/CP—2003-212103 46
Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 25

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Thermal Control Blankets

ï Thermal control blankets are the most widely used potentially flammable 

external materials

ï Blankets typically contain 12 to 40 layers of film (0.0005 to 0.002 inches in 

thickness) separated by some type of scrim cloth

ï Blanket materials are usually constructed of metal-coated polyethylene 

terephthalate or polyimide film with an organic separator scrim

ï The inner and outer layers are generally heavier than the internal layers for 

durability

ï Outer layer has controlled optical properties and is usually polyimide, silverTeflon, or Beta cloth

ï Acceptable thermal control blankets are typically constructed as follows:

ñ The outer layer is made of nonflammable material such as polyimide film (at least 

1.5 mil thick), metal foil, silver-Teflon, or Beta cloth

ñ Internal layers can be a combination of flammable films or scrims

ñ Edges are hemmed or suitably finished so that the inner flammable layers are 

protected and Atomic Oxygen is a consideration for long- term LEO exposure

Spacecraft Fire Safety Workshop Dennis Griffin 26

MSFC Materials, 

Processes, & 

Manufacturing 

Department

June 2001

Fiber Reinforced 

Laminates

ï Fiber-reinforced laminates are used as structural materials

ï Laminates may be flammable if used in thickness < 0.125 

inches

ï Flammability characteristics of thin laminates should be verified 

by test or the laminates should be protected

ï Flammable laminates may be used in external payloads 

provided that ignition sources (electrical wires, heaters, etc.)

are not located within 6 inches of the laminates

ï Otherwise firebreaks should be placed on the exposed surfaces 

of these laminates at 12 inch intervals, e.g. Aluminum tape 3 

mils thick X 3 inches wide (Federal Standard L-T-80)

NASA/CP—2003-212103 47

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 1

Overview of ISS US Fire Detection 

and Suppression System

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 2

Outline

ï Intro to Fire Detection and Suppression (FDS) 

ï Description of (FDS) Subsystems

ñ Portable Fire Extinguishers (PFE)

ï PFE Testing

ñ Smoke Detectors (SD)

ï Ventilation and Air Monitoring/Supply Systems

ñ Portable Breathing Apparatus (PBA)

ï FDS System Component Location and Status

ï FDS System Capabilities

Overview of ISS U.S. Fire Detection and Suppression System 

Alana Whitaker 

ISS ECLS Subsystem Manager 

Fire Detection and Suppression Systems 

NASA Johnson Space Center 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 49
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 3

Outline (cont.)

ï FDS Automatic and Manual Response

ï Post Fire Atmosphere Restoration and Air 

Quality Assessment

ï FDS Research Needs

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 4

Intro to FDS on ISS

• Fire Detection and Suppression (FDS) 

includes:

– Detection of smoke

– Isolation of fires

– The means to extinguish fires

– The means to recover from fires

NASA/CP—2003-212103 50
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 5

Portable Fire Extinguisher (PFE)

PFE w/Cover (config. on orbit) PFE w/o Cover

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 6

Portable Fire Extinguisher (PFE)

ï PFE Characteristics

ñ Contains 6 lbs CO2 at 850psi

ñ Discharges in 45 sec.

ñ Has two nozzles:

ï Conical Nozzle (open area nozzle) for 

open area suppression

ï Cylindrical Nozzle (closed volume 

nozzle) for suppression

in closeout fire ports

Open Area Nozzle

Closed Volume Nozzle

NASA/CP—2003-212103 51
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 7

PFE Cover

ï PFE Cover Characteristics

ñ Made of Nomex

ñ Fits snuggly to PFE

ñ Keeps PFE within allowable touch temp. limits during 

discharge (w/o Cover, PFE reaches 0 deg. F and nozzle -32 

deg. F)

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 8

Fire Suppression Ports

ï 1î or 0.5î diameter perforated access 

ports in racks and standoffs for the 

cylindrical nozzle (enclosed area 

nozzle) to suppress fires

ï O2 concentration in a rack is reduced to 

< 10.5% within 1 min of suppression.

Suppression port nozzle inserted Suppression port nozzle inserted 

into suppression port

NASA/CP—2003-212103 52
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 9

Fire Suppression Testing 

ï Enclosed Volume Tests (cylindrical nozzle)

ñ All CO2 sensors show > 50% concentration for 

volumes 60ft3 or less

ñ Good mix in enclosed volumes

ï Open Volume Tests (conical nozzle)

ñ Fire is suppressed by a combination of blowing 

the fire out (3 lb mass in first 10 sec) and 

supplying CO2.

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 10

Smoke Detector

NASA/CP—2003-212103 53
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 11

Smoke Detector

ï Photoelectric Smoke Detector

ñ Based on smoke particles scattering a light beam

ñ Light from a laser source is reflected by mirrors back to a 

photodiode (obscuration).

ñ Scattered light is measured by a second photodiode (scattering)

ñ Alarms are based on the voltage level generated by the 

scattering photodiode.

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 12

Smoke Detector Principle

Airflow

El ec tr onics

Photodiodes

Scatter Path

Obscur ati on Path

Laser Diode

NASA/CP—2003-212103 54
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 13

Smoke Detectors in Ventilation

ï Smoke Detectors are located on the ventilation filter intake ducts.

CROSSOVER DUCT

TRANSITION DUCT ASSEMBLY

PORT

STBD

OVERHEAD

SUPPLY

DIFFUSER

(6 POSITIONS)

BACTERIA FILTER

ASSEMBLY (6 POSITIONS)

CDRA

SUPPLY

IMV

OUT

ARS RETURN

IMV IN

PERFORATED MANUAL

DAMPER VALVE

PERFORATED MANUAL

DAMPER VALVE

MANUAL DAMPER VALVE

MANUAL DAMPER VALVE

MANUAL DAMPER VALVE

DECK

SMOKE DETECTOR

LABPD1

SMOKE DETECTOR

LABSD5 8

8

Lab Cabin Air Temperature and Humidity Control Assembly with Smoke Detectors

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 14

Smoke Detectors in Ventilation

Smoke Detector

NASA/CP—2003-212103 55
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 15

Air Monitoring/Supply System

ï Air components/concentrations are monitored 

by the Major Constituent Analyzer (MCA) in 

the LAB.

ñ Air samples are taken from each module and 

routed to the sensor (mass spec.) in the MCA.

ñ MCA gives percent compositions. (Typical O2

levels on ISS are slightly less than 24%.)

ï Metabolic O2 and N2 are supplied from 

Orbiter, Service Module, and Progress

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 16

Total and Oxygen Partial Pressure Control

Not In Campout Mode

ï Pressure control when Not in Campout Mode (nominal) 

is done with closed-loop control

ñ Total Pressure

ï The PCPs will be taking constant (1 Hz) total pressures

ï If the total pressure drops below 14.25 psia the Nitrogen Isolation Valve 

in the primary PCP will open

ï When the total pressure >= 14.3 psia the Nitrogen Isolation Valve in the 

primary PCP will close

ñ Oxygen Partial Pressure

ï The MCA will be making constant readings of the Station atmosphere

ï If the oxygen partial pressure drops below 3.00 psia the Oxygen 

Isolation Valve in the primary PCP will be opened

ï When the oxygen partial pressure >= 3.05 psia the Oxygen Isolation 

Valve in the primary PCP will close

NASA/CP—2003-212103 56
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 17

Total and Oxygen Partial Pressure Control

In Campout Mode

ï While in Campout Mode, the ppO2 in the Airlock will be controlled by the 

following:

ñ If ppO2 < 2.7 psia in the Airlock, the Airlock PCA will open the PCP OIV 

for 4 minutes +/- 10 seconds

ñ If the ppO2 > 2.85 psia in the Airlock, the Airlock PCA will open the PCP 

NIV for 2 minutes +/- 2 seconds

ñ If either the PCP NIV or OIV was opened, wait 11 minutes after the valve 

closes

ñ Repeat

ï Total pressure control is via manual operation of the Depress Pump

ï The rest of Station will continue to control total and oxygen partial pressures in 

the standard method

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 18

Portable Breathing Apparatus (PBA)

NASA/CP—2003-212103 57
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 19

Portable Breathing Apparatus (PBA)

ï PBA is composed of:

ñ Mask

ñ 15 minute O2 bottle

ñ 30í hose

ï Provides O2 to crew in emergency situations

ñ Post-fire clean-up

ñ Environmental contamination

ñ Depressurization

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 20

FDS System Component Location

ï Node 1 ñ 2 area Smoke Detectors (SD), 1 (PBA), 1 (PFE)

ñ Currently on orbit

ï PFE and PBA are nominal (have not been used)

ï SD#1 is powered, enabled, and nominal

ï SD#2 is powered and disabled

ï Lab ñ 2 area SD, 2 system rack SD (AR rack, CHeCS rack), 

up to 13 experiment rack SD (3 experiment rack SD at 7A), 

2 PBA, 2 PFE

ñ Currently on orbit

ï PFEs and PBAs are nominal (have not been used)

ï 4 SDs (2 area and 2 rack) are powered, enabled, and nominal

ï 1 payload SD is powered, enabled, and nominal

ï 2 payload SDs operate intermittently based on payload operations

NASA/CP—2003-212103 58
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 21

FDS System Component Location

ï A/L ñ 1 area SD, 1 duct SD, 2 Pre-breathe Hose 

Assemblies (PHA), 3 O2 bottles, 1 PHA spares 

kit, 1 PFE

ï MPLM ñ 1 duct SD, 1 PFE, 1 PBA (PBA & PFE 

stored in Node1 when MPLM is not attached)

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 22

FDS System Component Location

Suppression Port

Portable Fire Extinguisher

Smoke Detector

Portable Breathing Apparatus

Visual Indicator (LED)

ISPR FDS equipment required depends on

payload and payload rack integration. These

schematics show worst case scenario until

payload rack designs are finalized.

1 

1 

LAC6

DDCUs

LAC5

ISPR 

LAS6 Mod. Temp. TCS /

Cabin Air Assembly

LAC4

ISPR 

LAC3

ISPR 

LAC2

ISPR 

LAC1

ISPR 

1 

LAS5

MSS / Avionics 

LAS4

ISPR 

LAS3

ISPR 

LAS2

ISPR 

1 

LAS1

ISPR 

LAF1

Avionics #2

LAF2

Avionics #3

LAF3 ISPR (Window)

1 

LAF4 Fuel Cell Water Storage

LAF5 Avionics #1 / Cond.

Water Storage

LAF6

ARS

(CDRA, MCA, TCCS)

LAP6 Low Temp. TCS /

Cabin Air Assembly 

1 

LAP5 MSS / Avionics 

LAP4

ISPR 

LAP3 FSS / Stowage

LAP2

ISPR 

1 

LAP1

ISPR 

F 

Node 2

A 

1 

Node 1

X4

X1

X2

1 

X3

1 

1 

1 1 1 

Z P 

N S 

A 

F 

N1Z

Stowage 1 

PMA - 1 

N1N

Stowage 2 

N1S

Stowage 4 

N1P

Stowage 3 

Lab 

Zenith Truss Cupola

Node 3 Airlock 

P 

Node 1

Equipment Lock

Crew Lock 

AF1

Avionics

AA1 Cabin Air Assembly

Airlock

Node1 LAB

NASA/CP—2003-212103 59
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 23

FDS System Capabilities

ï Node 1, Lab, A/L, & MPLM FDS

ñ Fire emergency alarm received if any single SD 

FIRE status flag is set equal to ìFIREî 

ñ Scatter must exceed the fire threshold two 

consecutive times, the detector then initiates an 

active Built In Test (BIT), and the scatter must 

still be exceeding the threshold after the BIT to 

set the status flag equal to ìFIRE.î 

ñ Location may be determined by laptop.

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 24

FDS Automatic and Manual Response

(Overview)

ï In case of fire or smoke

ñ The crew can manually push the fire alarm or the 

Smoke Detectors can automatically initiate the fire 

alarm to perform the following functions:

1) Remove power to racks-to isolate ignition sources

2) Isolate module by shutting off ventilation (close 

IMVvalves, sample delivery systems, cabin fans)-to stop air flow 

within module and exchange between modules

3) Inhibit introduction of O2 and N2 into module (inhibit 

pressure control assembly in LAB)

*Crew can use PFE at their discretion*

NASA/CP—2003-212103 60
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 25

Post Fire Atmosphere Restoration

ï Gaseous Contaminants removed by the following:

ñ SM - Micropurification Unit(БМП)

ï Removes 19 different gaseous contaminants using a catalytic 

oxidizer (ambient) and expendable & regenerative charcoal 

beds. 

ñ FGB - Harmful Impurities Filter (ФВП)

ï Removes gaseous trace impurities (particles of 0.5 to 300μm 

to a level of 0.15 mg/m3).

ñ Lab - Trace Contaminant Control Subsystem 

(TCCS)

ï Removes gaseous contaminants using a catalytic oxidizer 

(400oC) and expendable sorbent and charcoal beds. Sorbent 

contains LiOH which can remove acid gases.

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 26

Post Fire Atmosphere Restoration

ñ Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) 

ï Removes CO2 from the atmosphere that was discharged from 

the PFE

ñ Extra charcoal air filters

ï Scrub the environment and contain 2% Pt for CO removal. 

ñ CO2 Removal Kit (CRK)

ï Consists of a portable fan assembly with a LiOH cartridge 

adapter.

ï Can be used with LiOH or ATCO catalyst canister for CO2 or 

CO removal

ñ Venting module to space

ï Only in worst case scenario

NASA/CP—2003-212103 61
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 27

Post Fire Air Quality Assessment

ï Air quality analysis done with the following 

equipment:

ñ Compound-Specific Analyzer for Combustion Products 

(CSA-CP) 

ñ Carbon Dioxide Monitoring Kit (CDMK)

ï Final analysis using Draeger detector tubes

ï Atmospheric sampling, using GSC and AK-1 air 

sampling assemblies, for delivery to ground.

6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 28

FDS Research Needs

ï Data to support suppressant selection

ñ Suppressant

ï Effective

ï Not harm ECLSS or other equipment

ï No/low toxicity

ï Not require extensive clean up

ï Microgravity research on suppression of fire

ñ Experiments needed on fabrics and items on orbit likely 

to burn

NASA/CP—2003-212103 62
6/25/01 Alana Whitaker 29

??Questions??

Contact Info.

Alana Whitaker - NASA/JSC 

ISS ECLS Subsystem Manager

Fire Detection and Suppression Systems

NASA/CP—2003-212103 63

An Introduction to Mars ISPP 

Technologies

Research Needs in Fire Safety 

for the 

Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

June 25-26, 2001 Cleveland, Ohio 

Dr. Dale E. Lueck NASA/John F. Kennedy Space Center

Background

ïISPP is an enabling technologies for HEDS missions to Mars.

ïCO2 + 4 H2 → CH4 + 2 H2O

2H2 + O2

(Sabatier Reaction with Water Electrolysis)

ïSupplemental oxygen production required

ï2 CO2 → 2 CO + O2

Electrolysis

An Introduction to Mars ISPP Technologies 

Dr. Dale E. Lueck 

Systems Engineering and Analysis Branch 

Spaceport Engineering and Technology 

NASA Kennedy Space Center 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 65
Sabatier Reactor / Water Electrolysis

2nd Generation SR/WE Test Bed

ïExothermic Reaction, must

be cooled

ïOperating Temp: 300°C

ïRequires Hydrogen 

Transport and Storage

ïCO2 Freezer

ïCryo-coolers and Storage 

for LCH4 & LOX

(common bulkhead storage 

tank?)

Sabatier Reactor Flow Chart

NASA/CP—2003-212103 66
Alternative Fuels?

! Methane requires 4 atoms of Hydrogen

! Lower hydrogen content improves ISPP 

weight savings ratio

H/C Tons H2

! Methane 4 5.1

! Ethane 3 4.7

! Ethylene 2 3.4

! Benzene 1 2.1

Fuels and Oxidizer

! ISPP saves weight by producing fuels 

on Mars (5 ñ 8 tons over H2 brought)

! Producing fuels other than methane is 

still in early development 

! Producing oxygen saves 70+ tons for 

MAV oxidizer.

! Life support and mobile power further 

increases savings.

NASA/CP—2003-212103 67
Oxygen Production

! All systems use electrolysis to produce 

oxygen

! Electrolysis of water from a reactor

! Direct electrolysis of CO2

! Electrolytes can be water, non-aqueous 

liquids or solids.

! 4 e- / O2 molecule establishes current

! Operating voltage and temperature establish 

efficiency and materials of construction.

PEM Cell Electrolyzer Schematic

ï Uses Proton Exchange 

Membrane (PEM) to 

separate H2 and O2 

ïNafion is preferred PEM

ïPlatinum group metals 

used for electrodes, 

deposited on PEM

From Hamilton-Sundstrand

Web site

NASA/CP—2003-212103 68
Electrolyzer Stack for Seawolf Submarine

ï100Cells/Stack (7 Cells / Inch)

ï50-kW (360 SCFH-H2)

ïHigh Current Density (1000 A/Ft2)

ïOver 100,000 hours operation

ïH2 & O2 at 3000 psi

Courtesy of J. Kosek, Giner, Inc.

Zirconia Solid Electrolyte Cell

Sridar, Gottmann, and Baird, AIAA Publication

NASA/CP—2003-212103 69
Zirconia Pros and Cons

ïDirect electrolysis of CO2 with pure O2 separated.

ïGood efficiency, about 1.5 V, similar to water 

electrolysis.

ïVery high operating temperatures, 800 - 1000°C.

ïAll ceramic construction in high temp zone.

ïFragile, easily cracked.

ïMembrane failure could threaten entire output.

ïHas been proposed for water vapor electrolysis

Possible Advantages for an Alternate System

ïLower temperatures

ï<700°CÖuse metals in construction

ï<270°C Öuse polymers and elastomers

ï< 31°C Öliquid CO2 as co-solvent

ïLower operating voltageÖbetter efficiency

ïMore rugged construction, a robust assembly

NASA/CP—2003-212103 70
Reverse Water Gas Shift (RWGS)

ïCO2 + H2 ↔ CO + H2O (RWGS Reaction) 

ïEquilibrium constant is only 0.1, must remove 

products to drive reaction to completion.

ïReactor requires pump, permeation filter and heat 

exchangers to run.

ïElectrolysis of water requires as much energy as 

zirconia.

ïRugged and low temperature, but complex and heavy. 

RWGS Reactor Assembly

NASA/CP—2003-212103 71
RWGS Test Bed

Molten Carbonate Electrolysis

Alumina Crucible 

and Cover

Alumina tubes

Ni wire lead

Pt wire Anode

Porous Cathode

Cover Detail

Clearance for 

5/8î tubes 

Molten Carbonate Test Cell Design

2 CO3

-2 ↔ 2 CO2 + O2 + 4eAnode Reaction

Cathode Reaction

2 CO2 ↔ CO + CO3

-2

NASA/CP—2003-212103 72
Molten Carbonate Test Fixture

Molten Salt Results

ïLi2O in Chloride melt Pure oxygen at anode

ïCurrent decreased to zero over a few hours

ïCarbonate formation at cathode is likely

ïCarbonate electrolysis at anode yields 2:1, CO2/O2

ïSustained reaction for 7 days

ïMinimal loss of O2 production

ïTemperature of operation: 550°C

ïCell voltage: ~ 0.8 Volts

ïPlatinum anode and cathode

NASA/CP—2003-212103 73
Non-Aqueous Solvents

ïPotential Advantages

ïWide electrochemical window

ïLow temperature operation

ïCO2 a potential co-solvent

ïSolvents Surveyed & Results

ïAcetonitrile, DMSO, Propylene Carbonate

ïC-V curves show CO2 reduction

ïNo evidence for oxide or carbonate solubility

ïNo oxygen generation at anode

Liquid CO2: Electrochemical Reaction Vessel

Electrodes Pressure Gauge

Product Vent

CO2 inlet

NASA/CP—2003-212103 74
Pro and Cons of Liquid CO2

ïAdvantages:

ïVery high electrode concentrations " High current density

ïNo porous gas cathode required " Simplified Cathode

ïIf carbon forms " Twice as much O2 out/ CO2 in

ïDisadvantages:

ïCO2 at high pressure mixed with electrode products

ïIf carbon forms " must remove carbon periodically

ïIf CO forms, separation technology is critical for life

support uses.

ïNo known cell compartment separators that would 

transport carbonate, and simplify product separation.

Ionic Liquids

ïWhat are they?

ïLow melting point ionic salts. By using large anions 

and cations, a low temperature melt with conductivity 

similar to molten salts can be obtained.

ïExamples include pyridinium and imidizolium cations 

with anions such as PF6

-

, BF4

-

, and many others. 

ïDesirable Properties

ïLow temperature (-100 - 300°C).

ïHigh conductivity (low I*R losses).

ïWide electrochemical window.

ïNon-volatile.

ïMiscible with or high solubility for CO2.

NASA/CP—2003-212103 75
Hurdles for Ionic Liquids

. Find one that carbonate is soluble in, or carbonate is the anion.

(Working with Prof. R. Rogers @Univ. of Alabama)

ïConfirm CO2 reduction, preferably to CO.

ïConfirm O2 production at anode (2:1, CO2/O2).

ïConfirm long term stability and balanced cell reactions.

ïMinimize cell voltage.

ïElectrode materials

ïMinimize I*R drop " thin electrolyte film, highly conductive.

ïConstruct porous support for electrolyte (similar to carbonate).

ïConstruct cell manifolds and multi-cell assemblies.

Mobile Oxide Ceramic Membranes

ïSimilar to Zirconia, but lower temperature.

ïDemonstrated on NOx electrolysis.

ïOxide ion from CO2 reduction stabilized by 

Ceramic Lattice structure.

ïOperating temperatures 500 - 700°C allows 

use of metal manifolds and seals.

Working with Prof. E. Wachsman at 

Univ. of Florida to prove feasibility.

NASA/CP—2003-212103 76
Oxygen Production Conclusions

ïOxide ions as an electrochemical intermediate are only 

viable in mobile oxide ceramics.

ïCarbonate is formed from CO2 reduction in molten salts, 

and produces a 2:1 CO2/O2 mixture at the anode. 

ïOther products of CO2 reduction do not produce O2 at

the anode.

ïCarbonate melts and mobile oxide ceramics are probably 

useable below 700oC for CO2 electrolysis.

ïIonic liquids may be able to operate below 200oC if 

one compatible with carbonate can be found. 

Acknowledgements

! KSC researchers involved in ISPP work presented here

! Mike OíNeal Bill Larson Clyde Parrish

! Bill Buttner Jan Surma Curtis Ihlefeld

! Approximately 50 workers have participated in ISRU 

related technologies at KSC, including biological 

research on plant growth chambers, Mars atmospheric 

test chamber, static charge experiments, ISPP and 

other technologies. 

NASA/CP—2003-212103 77

NASA/CPó2003-212103 79

List of Attendees 

Name Organization Working Group E-Mail

1 Gorecki, Chris National Center for Microgravity Research Admin Christine.R.Gorecki@grc.nasa.gov

2 Jones, Sandi National Center for Microgravity Research Admin Sandra.L.Jones@grc.nasa.gov

3 Baker, Diane Hill AFB Prevention diane.baker@hill.af.mil

4 Beeson, Harold NASA JSC-White Sands Test Facility Prevention harold.d.beeson1@wstf.nasa.gov

5 Erickson, Kenneth L. Sandia National Labs - Albuquerque Prevention klerick@sandia.gov

6 Feikema, Douglas NASA Glenn Research Center Prevention douglas.feikema@grc.nasa.gov

7 Fernandez-Pello, Carlos Univ. of California, Berkeley Prevention ferpello@euler.me.berkeley.edu

8 Ferkul, Paul National Center for Microgravity Research Prevention Paul.V.Ferkul@grc.nasa.gov

9 Frazier, Wayne NASA Headquarters Prevention wfrazier@mail.hq.nasa.gov

10 Griffin, Dennis NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Prevention dennis.e.griffin@msfc.nasa.gov

11 Hirsch, David Honeywell, NASA White Sands Test Facility Prevention david.b.hirsch1@wstf.nasa.gov

12 Jackson, Brian (James) NASA Glenn Research Center Prevention james.b.jackson@grc.nasa.gov

13 Linteris, Greg Nat Inst of Standards and Technology Prevention linteris@nist.gov

14 Miller, Fletcher National Center for Microgravity Research Prevention fletcher.j.miller@grc.nasa.gov

15 Nayagam, Vedha National Center for Microgravity Research Prevention Vedha.Nayagam@grc.nasa.gov

16 Olson, Sandra NASA Glenn Research Center Prevention sandra.l.olson@grc.nasa.gov

17 Orvis, Leigh Southwest Research Institute Prevention lorvis@swri.org

18 Pearlman, Howard NASA Glenn Research Center Prevention howard.pearlman@grc.nasa.gov

19 Pedley, Michael NASA Johnson Space Center Prevention michael.d.pedley@jsc.nasa.gov

20 Sacksteder, Kurt NASA Glenn Research Center Prevention kurt.sacksteder@grc.nasa.gov

21 Stemphoski, Thomas TRW - Tyndall AFB Prevention Tom.Stemphoski@tyndall.af.mil

22 Tewarson, Archie Factory Mutual Corporation Prevention archibald.tewarson@fmglobal.com

23 T'ien, James National Center for Microgravity Research Prevention jst2@po.cwru.edu

24 Torero, Jose Dept. of Fire Protection Eng, Univ. of Maryland Prevention jltorero@eng.umd.edu

25 Tucker, James Applied Research Assoc, Wright-Patterson AFB Prevention james.tucker@wpafb.af.mil

26 Wu, Ming-Shin National Center for Microgravity Research Prevention Ming-Shin.Wu@lerc.nasa.gov

27 Cleary, Thomas Nat Inst of Standards and Technology Detection thomas.cleary@nist.gov

28 Disimile, Peter Wright-Patterson AFB/Univ of Cinncinnati Detection peter.disimile@wpafb.af.mil

29 Hegde, Uday National Center for Microgravity Research Detection Uday.G.Hegde@grc.nasa.gov

30 Hunter, Gary NASA Glenn Research Center Detection gary.w.hunter@grc.nasa.gov

31 Lueck, Dale NASA Kennedy Space Center Detection Dale.Lueck-1@ksc.nasa.gov

32 Piltch, Nancy NASA Glenn Research Center Detection nancy.d.piltch@grc.nasa.gov

33 Quintiere, James Dept. of Fire Protection Eng, Univ. of Maryland Detection jimq@eng.umd.edu

34 Roby, Richard Combustion Science & Engineering Detection rroby@csefire.com

35 Silver, Joel Southwest Sciences, Inc. Detection jsilver@swsciences.com

36 Sunderland, Peter NASA Glenn Research Center Detection Peter.B.Sunderland@grc.nasa.gov

37 Suo-Anttila, Jill M. Sandia National Labs - Albuquerque Detection jmsuoan@mailgate.sandia.gov

38 Urban, David L. NASA Glenn Research Center Detection david.l.urban@grc.nasa.gov

39 Vanderwal, Randy NASA Glenn Research Center Detection Randy.VanderWal@lerc.nasa.gov

40 VonJouanne, Roger Boeing - Houston Detection Roger.VonJouanne@HSV.Boeing.com

41 Weiland, Karen NASA Glenn Research Center Detection Karen.J.Weiland@grc.nasa.gov

42 Young, Rebecca NASA Kennedy Space Center Detection Rebecca.Young-1@ksc.nasa.gov

43 Yuan, Zeng-Guang National Center for Microgravity Research Detection zgyuan@grc.nasa.gov

44 Abbud-Madrid, Angel CCACS, Colorado School of Mines Response aabbudma@mines.edu

45 Baum, Howard Nat Inst of Standards and Technology Response howard.baum@nist.gov

46 Bennett, Joseph (Michael) Wright-Patterson AFB Response Joseph.Bennett@wpafb.af.mil

47 Dierdorf, Doug Air Force Fire Research Laboratory Response Doug.Dierdorf@tyndall.af.mil

48 Faeth, Gerard Dept. of Aerospace Eng, Univ. of Michigan Response gmfaeth@umich.edu

49 Friedman, Robert NASA Glenn Research Center Response macfried@xcelnet.net

50 Gritzo, Louis A. Sandia National Labs - Albuquerque Response lagritz@sandia.gov

51 Kailasanath, K. Naval Research Lab Response kailas@lcp.nrl.navy.mil

52 King, Merrill NASA Headquarters Response mking1@mail.hq.nasa.gov

53 Labus, Thomas National Center for Microgravity Research Response Thomas.L.Labus@grc.nasa.gov

54 Mather, Douglas Univ. of NM - Ctr for Glbl Envr Tech Response mather@nmeri.unm.edu

55 Nam, Soonil Factory Mutual Corporation Response soonil.nam@fmglobal.com

56 Olson, John Eglin AFB Response john.olson@eglin.af.mil

57 Ross, Howard NASA Glenn Research Center Response howard.d.ross@grc.nasa.gov

58 Ruff, Gary A. NASA Glenn Research Center Response gary.a.ruff@grc.nasa.gov

59 Struk, Peter National Center for Microgravity Research Response Peter.M.Struk@grc.nasa.gov

60 Sung, C.J. (Jackie) National Center for Microgravity Research Response cjs15@po.cwru.edu

61 Takahashi, Fumiaki NASA Glenn Research Center Response Fumiaki.Takahashi@grc.nasa.gov

62 Tapscott, Robert GlobeTech, Inc. Response GlobeTech@rmi.net

63 Whitaker, Alana A. NASA Johnson Space Center Response alana.a.whitaker1@jsc.nasa.gov

64 Yang, Jiann C. Nat Inst of Standards and Technology Response jiann.yang@nist.gov

Legend: Prevention - Fire Prevention and Material Flammability

Detection - Smoke and Fire Detection

Response - Fire and Post-Fire Response
This publication is available from the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information, 301–621–0390.

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

14. SUBJECT TERMS

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

 OF REPORT

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Unclassified Unclassified

Conference Publication

Unclassified

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field

Cleveland, Ohio 44135–3191

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

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National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546–0001

Available electronically at http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov

April 2003

NASA CP—2003-212103

E–13759

WBS–22–101–52–02

81

Research Needs in Fire Safety for the Human Exploration and Utilization of Space

Proceedings and Research Plan

Gary A. Ruff

Spacecraft fire safety; Flammability; Fire detection; Fire suppression; Fire prevention

Unclassified -Unlimited

Subject Category: 18 Distribution: Nonstandard

Contents were reproduced from author-provided presentation materials. Proceedings of a conference held at and

sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio,

June 25–26, 2001. Responsible person, Gary A. Ruff, organization code 6711, 216–433–5697.

The purpose of the workshop documented in this publication was to bring together personnel responsible for the design

and operations of the International Space Station (ISS) and the fire protection research community to review the current

knowledge in fire safety relative to spacecraft. From this review, research needs were identified that were then used to

formulate a research plan with specific objectives. In this document, I have attempted to capture the very informative and

lively discussions that occurred in the plenary sessions and the working groups. I hope that it will be useful to readers and

serve as a significant step in assuring fire protection for the crews of current and future spacecraft.