M s. C o o d e ha s sin c e re m a rr ie d , an d he r sur n a m e is n o w C o lli n s. F o r cla rity’s sa k e , w e w ill re fer to he r in this 1 op i ni on as M s . Co od e.

T hei r ol des t daug ht er was born i n O ct ob er 198 7. T hei r t wo s ons wer e born i n O ct ob er 19 89 an d N ovemb er 2 1 9 9 2 re sp e c tive ly. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Jul y 7, 200 3 S es sio n BE TH A . C OL LI N S v. JA M ES B. C OO D E, III Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 2001-10-0064 M ichael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2002- 02557-COA-R 3-CV - F iled April 27, 2004
This appea l involves a dispute reg ardingthe post-divorce move by a primar y residential pa

rent fr om Clarks v i l l e to Knox ville. Upon rec eivingnotice of the planned move, the non-re sidential pare nt p e t i t i o n e d

th e C h an c e r

y C o urt f o r M o n t g o m e r

y C o un ty t o p r e v e n tth e m o v e o r t o c h an g e c u s t o dy. The trial court conducte d a bench trial and denied the petition. On this appe al, the non-r esidential pare nt asserts that the court applied the wrong reloc ation standards beca use i t mistakenly

conclude d th at th e p ar e n ts h a d n o t be e n s p e n d in g s u b s ta n ti a ll y e qu a l amo un ts o f ti me w it h th e ir c h il dr e n . We conclude that the re cord suppor ts the tri al co u rt ’s conc lusion that the parents ha d not spent substantially

equal time with the childre n, and ther efor e, we aff irm the judg ment. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancery Court Affi rm ed W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J ., del i v er ed t h e o pinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J J ., joined. R o g e r A

. M an e s s , C l ar

k s v i l l e , T e nn e s s e e , f

o r th e a p p e l l an t , J am e s B

. C o o d e , III

. Carrie W. G a sawa

y , Cl ark sv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lle e , B e th A . Co lli ns . OP IN ION I. J ames B . Coode, I I Iand B eth A. Coode wer e marrie d for approximately fiftee n year s. They 1 lived in Clarksville during the marria g e whe re the y had thre e children. On J anuar y 18, 2002, they 2 we re divo rced in the Cha nc e ry Court fo r M ontg ome ry

County on the g ro un d o f i rr e c on c ila ble differ ence s. Their pe rmane nt pare nt i n g plan provided that Ms. Coode would be the primar yT h e p a rtie s la te r a g re e d to c h a n g e the w e e k d a ys to T u e sd a y nig h t un til T h u rs d a y m o rn ing , b u t t h is c h a n g e d id 3 not al t er t he amo un t of r es i dent i al t i me al l ot t ed t o M r . Co od e.
T he p art i es es t i m at e t hat t he t i m e at C hri st m as amo unt s t o ab o ut one week. 4

Act of Apr i l 22, 1998, c h

. 910, 1998 T en n . Pub. Act s 637 be ca me ef f ec t i v e on M ay 7, 1998. 5 -2- residential pa

rent a nd that Mr. Coode would have residential t ime with the children e very other wee kend fr om Frida

y night until Sunday

night a nd ever y wee k from Monday night until Wednesday morning

. The plan also allowed Mr. Coode to ha ve the children for his birthday , for the f irst part 3 of Christmas brea

k, and for

four we eks of va cation time to be exerc ised at any time in the y ear . 4 OnJun e 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 , a

p p r o xi m at e l y f

i v e m o n th s a f

t e r th e e n tr

y o f th e d i v o r c e d e c re e , M s. Coode acc epted an unsolicited promotion that require d her to move f rom Clarksville to Knox ville. The promotion ca

rried w ith it a $15,000 increa se in her annual salary

. Acc ording ly , she notified Mr. Coode of her

intent to move to Knox ville with the parties’ thre e childre n. Mr. C oode re sponded on J une 13, 2002, by filing a

petition in the Chancery

Court for Montg omery

County seekingto preve nt Ms. Coode from movingthe childre n to Knox ville. Tenne ssee’ s pare ntal relocation statute [Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108 ( 2001)] contains differ ent dec ision-making sta ndards de pendingon the amount of time ea ch par ent spends with the children. Mr

. Coode testified at trial that the three children spe nt substantially the same a

mount of tim e wi th e a c h p ar e n t

. H o w e v e r , M s . C o o d e t e s t i f i e d th at M r . C o o d e h a d n o t e xe r c i s e d a l l of his residential oppor

tunities with t he childre n. S h e al s o as s erte d that Mr. Coode had a lrea dy missed betwee n twenty and thirty residential da

y s betwee n the date of

the divorce decr ee a

nd the date of

the he ari ng . T he tr ia l c ourt

de te rm ine d th at th e pa

rt ie s h a d n ot sp e nt su

bs tanti a lly e qu a l amou

nts of tim e with the children and denied Mr. Coode’s petition. On this a ppeal, Mr. Coode asser

ts that the trial c ourt ’s fa c tua l de te rm inatio n r e g ard ingthe amou nt o f t ime e a c h p aren t sp e nt w iththe c hil dr e n is flawe d. II. T HE P A R ENTA L R

E L OCAT I ON S TATU TE One of the most common post-divorce f lashpo in ts o c c u r s when the primary

residential pa

rent decide s to move with his or her child or c hildren to another city or state. The far

ther the move , the more intense the opposition because of the mo v e’ s ef

fect on visitation and the ability of the other pare nt to foster and ma intain an appr opriate r elationship with his or her child or childre n. In 1998, the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly enac ted Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108 to provide pare nts and the courts with a f

rame work for

deter mining whe ther the move should be permitted. 5 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108 embodies a legislatively mandated pr esumption in favor of a reloc atingcustodial pare nt who spends substantially more time w ith the child than the non-c ustodial pare nt. Elder v. Elder , No. M 1998-00935-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL1077961, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Se pt. 14 , 2 00 1) (N o T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a pp lic atio n f

ile d) ; Ca u dil l v
. Foley , 21 S.W .3d 203, 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ( the statute cre ates a pref ere nce for pa

rents ac tually

spendinga greater amountT h e p a re n t o p p o sin g the re lo c a tio n h a s the b u rd e n o f p ro v ing o n e o r m o r e o f t h e s e c irc u m sta n c e s, E l der v. 6 E l der , 20 0 1 W L 1 0 7 7 9 6 1 , at * 5 , and co nsi d erat i o ns o f t he chi l d ’ s b est i nt erest s d o no t co m e i nt o p l ay unt i l at l east one o f t h e se c irc u m sta n c e s is sh o w n to e x ist. He l t o n v. H el t on , N o . M 2 0 0 2 -0 2 7 9 2 -C O A -R 3 -C V , 2 0 0 4 W L 6 3 4 7 8 , at *7 (T enn. C t

. A p p . Jan. 13 , 20 0 4 ) ( N o T enn. R

. A p p . P

. 11 ap p l i cat i o n f i l ed ).
T h is c o u rt h a s d isa p p ro v e d p ro p o sa ls to c o u n t p o rtio n s o f d a ys a s full d a ys, H el t on v
. H el t on , 2004 W L 63478, 7 at * 8, or t o cons i der onl y the ch i l d’ s “ wak i ng hour s . ” C l a rk v

. C l a rk , N o. M 2002- 03071- CO A- R3- CV , 2003 W L 2 3 0 9 4 0 0 0 , at *5 (T e n n . C t. A p p . D e c . 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 ) (N o T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n fi le d ). -3- of tim e wi th the c hil d)

. I f the pa re nts are a c tua lly

sp e nd ingsu

bs tanti a lly

e qu a l amou

nts of tim e wi th the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108( c) r equire s the courts to dete rm ine whethe r per mitti ngthe reloc ation is in the child’s best interests. I f, howe ver, a pare nt’s actua l time with th e ch i ld is not substantially

equal to the primary residential parent’s, Tenn. C ode Ann. § 36-6-108( d) re quires the courts to permit the prim ary residential parent to move unl ess t he other pare nt can prove (1) that the move does not have a re asonable purpose, (2) t hat t he move poses a specific and serious harm that outweighs the harm r esulting f rom a c hang e of custody , or (3) that the primary residential pa

rent’s decision to move is vindictive. 6
Deter minations reg ardingthe amount of ti me t he parents are spending with a child are not controlled by

the custody

and visitation provisions in t he dec ree . Helton v. He lton , 2004 WL63478, at *7. Rather, they are based on the time eac h pare nt “ac tually” spends with the c hild. Tenn. Code A nn . § 3 6

- 6

- 1 0 8 ( c ) , ( d )

. T hu s , e v i d e n c e r e g ar d i n g th e am o un t o f t i m e th e p ar e n t s h av e o r are , in fac t, spendingwith a child takes pr ece dence over the custody and visitation arra

ng ements in a de cre e. Th i s co u rt h as consistently declined to a

pprove va rious “rounding -up” the ories propose d bynonresidential pa

rents to inflate the amount of time they have spe nt with their children. 7
III . T HE T I M E A CT UAL L Y S PE N T W I T H T HE C HILDR EN Mr . Co od e a sse rt s th at th e tr ia l c ourt a pp lie d t he wro ng st and ard wh e n it a uth or ize d M s. Coo de and

the ir c hil dr e n to mo ve to K

no xvill e . I

ns te a d o f u sin gthe mor e pe rm iss ive sta nd ard in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-108(d) , he insists that the trial court should ha ve employed the compar ative fi tne ss a na ly sis in T e nn . Co de Ann. § 3 6- 6- 10 8( c ). We h ave de te rm ine d th at th e tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y elec ted to invoke Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108( d)’s re location standar d. De te rm ini ngwhe th er pare nts are sp e nd ingsu bs tanti a lly

e qu a l amou

nts of tim e wi th t

he ir c hil dr e n is , in

the fi rs t in sta

nc e , th e tr ia l c ourt ’s pr e ro g ativ e . Wh ile the amou nt o f t ime the pa

re nts are actua lly

spending and the other relevant c ircumstance s are fac tual matters that will be re viewed us ingthe sta

nd ard of re vie w i n T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) , a de te rm inatio n re g ard ingwh e the r t he tim e a c tua lly be ingsp e nt i s “ su

bs tanti a l,” is a

n u lti mate fa c tua l c on c lus ion that is no t e nti tle d to the same defe renc e. Thus, the a

ppellate c ourts must review a trial court’s c onclusion reg ardingthe substantial e qu a lity of pa re nts ’ r e sid ent ial ti me wi tho ut a pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss. Me anin g fu l a

pp e llate re vie w r e qu ir e s u s to make an in de pe nd ent de c isi on re g ard ingwh e the r t

he re sid e nti a l ti me is su bs tanti a lly

e qu a l.In f ac t , t h e pr i or dec i s i on s con s t r u i n g T en n . Code Ann

. § 36- 6- 108( c) ’ s u s e of “ s u bs t an t i al l y eq ual ” are 8 d iff ic u lt to re c o n c ile. O n tw o o c c a sio n s, w e h a v e h e ld tha t a 6 0 % - 4 0 % sp lit o f c u sto d ia l ti m e w a s n o t s u b s ta n tially e q u a l. Br anham v
. Br anham , N o. E2003- 01253- CO A- R3- CV , 2004 W L 716729, a t * 3 (T en n . C t

. A pp. Apr

. 2, 2004) (T e n n . R

. A p p . P

. 3 9 p e tit io n fo r re h e a ri n g p e n d ing ); C o n n e ll v . C o n n e ll , N o. E1998- 00731- CO A- R3- CV , 2000 W L 1 2 2 2 0 4 , at *3 -4 (T e n n . C t. A p p . J a n . 2 5 , 2 0 0 0 ) (N o T e n n . R

. A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n fi le d ). H o w e v e r, w e ha v e a lso he ld tha t a 5 7 % - 4 3 % sp lit w a s su b sta n tially eq u a l, M onr oe v. Robi ns on , N o. M 2001- 02218- CO A- R3- CV , 2003 W L 132463, a t *4 (T e n n . C t. A p p . Ja n . 1 6 , 2 0 0 3 ) (N o T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n fi le d ). W e ha v e e v e n fo u n d a 6 5 % - 3 5 % sp lit to b e su b sta n tially eq u a l. W ool m an v. Wool m an , N o . M 2 0 0 0 -0 2 3 4 6 -C O A -R 3 -C V , 2 0 0 1 W L 1 6 6 0 7 1 4 , at *5 (T e n n . C t. A p p . D e c . 2 8 , 2 0 0 1 ) (N o T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 1 a p p lica tio n fi le d ).

W h ile th e ter m s o f a c u sto d y o r v isitatio n o rd e r a re no t co n tro lli n g , H el t on v
. H el t on , 2004 W L 63478, a t * 7, 9 the y a re re le v a n t.

T he l en gth o f

t he co m p ariso n p erio d ha s a d i rec t an d p ro no un ce d e ffe c t o n d eterm i ning w he t he r p are nts’ 10 cust o d i al t i m e i s subst ant i al l y eq ual

. U si ng a sho rt p eri o d m ay p rod uce a m i sl ead i ng co m p ari son b y exaggerat i ng t he di f f er enc e i n t he amo un t of t i me pare nt s ar e s pendi ng wi t h t hei r ch i l dren

. For exa mp l e, i f t he com pari s on per i od i s t wo we ek s , a pa r en t w h o s pen ds s ev en of f ou r t ee n day s wi t h t h e ch i l d h as s pen t 50% of t h e compa r i s on per i od wi t h t h e ch i l d. If t he p arent s p end s si x d ays wi t h t he chi l d , t he p o rt i o n of t he co m p ari son p eri o d i s reduc ed t o 42

. 9 % , and i f t he p arent sp e n d s five d a ys w ith the c h ild , t h e p e rc e n ta g e is re d u c e d to 3 5 .7 %

. -4- Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108 does not define the term “substantially equal.” Howeve r, no sp e c ia l de fi nit ion

is re qu ir e d be c a

us e the c omm on

me anin gof

the wo rd s a

nd the phra se are e a sil y un de rs too d. Th e wo rd

“ su bs tanti a lly” me ans “ e sse nti a lly ,” “ to a ll i nte nts and purp os e s, ” or “in reg ard to e very

thing materia l.” 17 O XF OR D E NGL I S H D I C TI ONAR Y 68 (2 d e d. 19 89 ). Thus , th e pla in me anin gof

the te rm “ su bs tanti a lly

e qu a l” c onno te s a re latio ns hip that is ve ry c los e to e qu a lity – s o c los e that it

may be c on sid e re d e qu a l. The c ourts have not pr ovided bright-line rules for deter mining whether

pare nts are spe nding “substantially

equal” custodial time with their children. As convenie nt as a bright-line rule might 8 be , w e se e no ne e d to a do pt o ne be c a us e c us tod

y de c isi on s, by the ir ve ry natur e , a re inh e re ntl y

fa c tde pe nd e nt. Court s mu st h ave fl e xibil ity to co ns ide r the pa

re nts a s th e y

fi nd the m. H ow e ve r, c ourt s c a lle d u po n to de te rm ine wh e the r pa re nts are sp e nd ing su

bs tanti a lly e qu a l amou

nts of tim e wi th t

he ir children should conside r, amongother thing s: (1) the terms of the applica ble custody

and visitation order s, (2) the numbe r of da y s eac h pare nt ha s actua lly spent with the child or children, (3) whe ther 9 the par ents are using the full amount of residential time provide d them, (4) the le ng th of the period duringwhich the c omparison of re sidential time is being made, and (5) the par ticular e x ige ncies 10 of the pa rent’s c ircumstance s. When the circ umstances pe rmit, courts should use a twelve-month period to determine the amount of t ime pare nts are actua lly spending with their childre n. Ex amining the twelve c onsecutive months im mediately

prec edingthe hea

ringmitigates the skewe d stati s t i cal r esults of shorter co mparison per iods and ena bles the cour

ts to factor in summer va cations, holiday s, and other extended visitation periods that are not e venly distributed throug hout the year . Howeve r, i n case s lik e thi s o ne in whi c h a

tw e lve -m onth c omp ari so n p e ri od is n ot p os sib le or

fe a sib le , th e c ourt s should use the long est possible period of time.O n a n a n n u al i ze d ba s i s , M r . Coode w ou l d h av e s pen t 48. 5% of t h e t i me wi t h t h e ch i l dr en , an d M s . Coode 11

w o u ld ha v e sp e n t 5 1 .5 %

.

T he dat e of

t he ent r y of

t he di vor ce decr ee. 12

T h e d a te o f t h e fi rs t h e a rin g o n M r. C o o d e ’s p e tit io n to p re v e n t M s. C o o d e fro m m o v ing to K n o x v ill e w ith 13 t he chi l d ren.

M ovi ng i s t he s ort of

“s peci f i c har m” cont emp l at ed by T enn . C od e A nn . § 3 6- 6- 10 8(d) ( 2). M ovi ng i s a f act 14 of l i f e f or ma n y c h i l dr en , t h os e wi t h mar r i ed par en t s a s w el l a s t h os e wh os e par en t s a r e di v or ce d. Al l owi n g M s . Coode t o m ove wi t h t he chi l dren wi l l r equi r e t hem t o a dapt t o a new s chool an d new f r i ends

. H owever , t he r ecor d s hows t hat t h e s e c h i l dr e n a r e br i g h t a n d w e l l

- a dj u s t e d, a n d t h i s a da pt a t i on do e s n ot c on s t i t u t e a t h r e a t of s pe c i f i c a n d s e r i ou s h a r m. -5- The pe rmane nt pare nting plan inc orporated in the final divorc e dec ree envisioned t hat Mr. Coo de c ou ld s pe nd

17 7 d ay s p e r year wi th his c hil dr e n. Ho we ve r, the dis pute re g ard ingMs. 11 Coode’s dec ision to m ove to Knox ville arose less than s ix months following the e ntry of the divorc e decr ee. A ccor dingly , the comparison period in this case must nece ssarily be less than one year . The trial court de cided to ana ly ze that period fr om J anuar y 18, 2002 through J uly

30, 2002. We have 12 13 deter mined that this period is appropriate. Had Mr. Coode exercised a ll the r esidential time he was entitled to be tween J anuar y 18 and J uly 30, 2002, he would have sp en t 4 3

. 5 % o f t he time with the childre n. Howeve r, he did not exercise at least twenty

day s of re sidential time during this period, and thus he ac tually spent no more than 33.2% of the co mp ar i s o n p er iod with the children. The re is no evide nce that Ms. Coode interfe red w ith Mr. Coode’s visitation, and Mr. Coode pr esente d no other e x ige nt circumstanc es that preve nted him from exercisinghis visit ation. Acc ording ly , the onl y conclusion that ca

n be dra wn fr om the e vid e nc e is that Mr. Coo de and Ms. Coo de we re no t sp e nd ingsu bs tanti a lly

e qu a l amou

nts of time with their childre n betwee n J anuar y 18 and J uly 30, 2002. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de cision to a

naly ze Ms. Coode’s contemplated move to K nox ville using Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108( d). Mr . Co od e c ha

ra c te ri zes thi s mo de of a na ly sis a s “ be an c ounti ng ” and a sse rt s th at it

is inconsistent with the policies of coope ration an d fl exibi lity that underg ird the re cently enac ted pa re nti ngpla

n p ro c e dure s. We do not

c on sid e r T e nn . Co de Ann. § 3 6- 6- 10 8 to be inc omp atib le wi th Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 6-401, -414 ( 2001 & Supp. 2003) as long as the courts consider the rea sons for a pare nt’s failure to exercise the r esidential time they have be en provide d. IV. T HE A PPLI C A TIO N O F T E NN . C OD E A NN . § 3 6- 6- 10 8( d) As a final matter, we have determined that the t rial court properly applied Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108( d)’s standa

rds to the evidence in this case . Ms. Coode has a r easona ble purpose f

or mov ingbe c a

us e the job in K

no xvill e of

fe rs an o pp or

tun ity fo r c are e r a dv anc e me nt a s w e ll a s a substantial incre ase in compensation. Whil e two of the children de sire to re main in Clarksville, the rec ord conta ins no eviden ce t h at m o ving to Knoxville will “pose a threat of specif ic har m.” 14-6-

Finally , the record does not demonstrate or sug g est that Ms. Coode was being vindictive when she decide d to move to Knox ville. Whil e our decision to a ffirm the trial court favor s Ms. Coode , it should not be construed a s re fl e c tin gin a

ny wa y on the pa re nti ng sk il ls of eit her

Ms. Coo de or

Mr . Co od e . N oth ingin t his rec ord sug g ests that the childre n are safe r, happier, or healthier with one parent than with the other

. Both Mr. Coode a

nd Ms. Coode are g ood pare nts. Howeve r, bec ause Ms. Coode is the pa rent who sp e nd s su bs tanti a lly

mor e tim e wi th t

he c hil dr e n, Te nn . Cod e Ann. § 36 -6 -1 08 (d) r e qu ir e s th e c ourt s to permit her to move with the c hildren whe n her e mploy ment opportunities require it. V. We affirm the judgme nt and re mand the ca se to the trial cour t for whatever

further proce edings m ay b e re qu i red. We tax the costs of this appea l to J ames B . Coode, I I Ifor whic h execution, if nece ssary , may issue.

_____________________________

W I L L IA M C

. K O C H , JR

. , J.