The Legacy of american 

naval power

of American

naval Power

The Legacy

REINVIGORATING MARITIME 

STRATEGIC THOUGHT

An Anthology

Contributing Editor

Paul Westermeyer

Art Editor

Breanne Robertson, PhD

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Quantico, Virginia

2019
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Names: Westermeyer, Paul W., editor. | Robertson, Breanne, editor. | Marine 

 Corps University (U.S.). History Division, issuing body.

Title: The legacy of American naval power : reinvigorating maritime strategic 

 thought : an anthology / edited by Paul Westermeyer ; art editor, Breanne 

 Robertson.

Other titles: Reinvigorating maritime strategic thought

Description: Quantico, Virginia : History Division, United States Marine 

 Corps, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2019002676 | ISBN 9781732003019 (paperback)

Subjects: LCSH: Sea-power—United States. | Naval art and science—United 

 States—History. | United States—History, Naval. | United States. Marine 

 Corps—History. | United States. Navy—History.

Classification: LCC VA50 .L44 2019 | DDC 359.030973--dc23 | SUDOC D 

 214.511:ST 8

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019002676

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect 

the opinions of the organizations for which they work, Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine 

Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government. The information contained in this book 

was accurate at the time of printing. Every effort has been made to secure copyright permission on 

excerpts and artworks reproduced in this volume. Please contact the editors to rectify inadvertent 

errors or omissions.

Published by

Marine Corps History Division

2044 Broadway Drive

Quantico, VA 22134

www.mcu.usmcu.edu/HDPublishing

1st Printing, 2019
v

Marine Corps History Division

The Marine Corps is a part of the Naval Service, and its expeditionary duty with the Fleet 

in peace and in war is its chief mission. This fact was repeatedly brought to the attention of 

officers and men and was the controlling factor in deciding questions pertaining to military 

training, military education, and assignments to duty. It caused, too, every effort to be made 

to convince officers and men of the soundness of the doctrine that the future of the Corps 

would be determined by their ability to serve efficiently with the Fleet in the conduct of 

the shore operations which are essential to the successful prosecution of naval campaigns in 

war, and which are essential to the successful conduct of the foreign policy of our country 

in peace.

~ Major General John A Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Reminiscences of a Marine (1930)

vii

CONTENTS

EPIGRAPH v

FOREWORD xi

PREFACE xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii

A Brief Introduction to the History of Maritime Strategy 3

by Paul Westermeyer

CHAPTER ONE 17

The Ascendance of American Maritime Power:

A Historical Perspective Culminating at Guadalcanal

by Paul Westermeyer

Transformation a Century Ago 21

by Norman Friedman

The Color Plans, 1919–1938 34

by Louis Morton

Evolution of Modern Amphibious Warfare, 1920–1941 44

by Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough, Major Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw Jr.

The Legacy and Lessons of Operation Watchtower 62

by Jon T. Hoffman

Preliminary Report of JANEX-1 74

by Major General Holland M. Smith

Biographies

Lieutenant General John A. Lejeune 86

Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz 89
viii contents

CHAPTER TWO 93

The Expansion of Maritime Power:

The Role of Naval Aviation and Submarines

by Paul Westermeyer

The Future of the Submarine 

by Franklin D. Roosevelt 97

Use of Aircraft in Naval Warfare 101

by Commander D. E. Cummings

Letter from Geiger to Yarnell on Aviation 113

Major General Roy S. Geiger letter to Admiral H. E. Yarnell

How We Bridged a Wartime “Learning Gap” 118

by Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman

The Future Employment of Naval Forces 131

by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of American Naval Thought 140

by Dr. David R. Mets

Submarines: Key to the Offset Strategy 165

by Rear Admiral W. J. Holland Jr.

A New Naval Era 172

by Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert and General James F. Amos

Biographies

General Roy Stanley Geiger 179

Admiral Hyman G. Rickover 182

CHAPTER THREE 185

Maritime Power in Crisis Response: From the Nuclear Era to Hyperwar

by Paul Westermeyer

Letter from Geiger to Commandant Vandegrift on Bikini Atoll Atomic Tests 189

21 August 1946

Admiral Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy 192

by Dr. Donald Chipman 
contents ix

One Telephone Call Gets It All: Maritime Prepositioning 209

for Crisis Response Enhancement 

by General Paul X. Kelley

Restless Strategy: Alfred Gray’s Philosophy of Warfighting 216

by Thomas G. Mahnken and A. Bradley Potter

Why Cyberwar Will Not and Should Not Have Its Grand Strategist 256

by Martin C. Libicki

On Hyperwar 273

by General John Allen and Amir Husain

Keeping Our Amphibious Edge 283

by Admiral John C. Harvey and Colonel P. J. Ridderhof

Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy 291

by Captain Jeffrey E. Kline and Captain Wayne P. Hughes

Biographies

General Paul X. Kelley 298

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt 300

CHAPTER FOUR 303

The Future of Maritime Power

by Paul Westermeyer

The Marine Corps of Tomorrow 306

by Major Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.

Facing Westward to the Future 314

by General Charles C. Krulak

A New Twist to an Age-Old Naval Tradition 323

by Commander David B. Waidelich

A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 344

by Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations

The Navy and Nation Need a Maritime Strategy 357

by Paul S. Giarra
x contents

Seapower in Support of National Security 367

by General Joseph Dunford Jr., Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, 

and Admiral Paul F. Zukunft

Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment 374

by General Robert B. Neller and Admiral John M. Richardson

Biographies

General Peter Pace 397

Admiral James G. Stavridis 399

Chronology: Selected Significant Moments in the History 401

of Maritime Strategic Thought

An Introductory Bibliography of Maritime Strategic Thought 403

About the Editors 409
xi

foreword

I

n the conclusion of First to Fight, Lieutenant 

General Victor H. Krulak proffers timeless 

wisdom for future generations of Marines:

For the Marines, the maritime nature of the 

globe creates at once grave responsibility 

and an elegant opportunity. It makes a powerful statement of a truth the Corps must 

never, never forget—that their future, as has 

their past, lies with the Navy.

The sea is the lifeblood of our country and, 

accordingly, the U.S. Constitution empowers 

Congress in Article I, Section 8 “to provide and 

maintain a Navy.” The United States Marine 

Corps has always been a naval Service, bound 

indivisibly to the U.S. Navy through bonds of 

mission, comradeship, and federal statute. 

For most of the last two decades, the expeditionary Marine Corps’ main effort focused 

primarily on shore-based counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency campaigns, while maintaining a global presence at sea through our Marine Expeditionary Units and Amphibious Ready 

Groups. While ashore, our Marines served mainly alongside our counterparts in the U.S. Army, 

maritime special operations forces, and allies 

and partners. On every battlefield, our medical officers, corpsmen, and chaplains remained 

integral to our operations ashore. These shorebased campaigns have either subsided or are 

transforming, returning naval expeditionary operations to strategic prominence as our country 

enters an era of great power competition. The 

United States remains the world’s preeminent 

naval power, and we must be ready to face challenges to that primacy by earnestly preparing to 

fight at sea, from the sea, and ashore as an integrated naval expeditionary and joint combined 

arms team. 

The Marine Corps’ role in maritime strategic affairs is critical, and remains a cornerstone of the Corps. In a speech he gave to the 

Naval War College in 1923, Lieutenant General 

John A. Lejeune declared that “the maintenance, 

equipping and training of its expeditionary force 

so that it will be in instant readiness to support 

the Fleet in the event of war, I deem to be the 

most important Marine Corps duty in time of 

peace.” We must now recommit to fulfilling that 

critical function for the Fleet. 

Although produced by the Marine Corps’ 

History Division, this is not a work of historical 

scholarship; it is rather a historical primer on 

the development and fundamentals of maritime 

strategy, and the role of the Marine Corps in the 

maritime strategy of the United States. It in-
xii foreword

cludes a preface by retired Navy Captain Wayne 

P. Hughes Jr., wherein he articulates seven cornerstones for Marines in a new era of naval expeditionary operations. Marines are encouraged 

to use these cornerstones as lenses to view the 

articles and essays that follow. 

The Marine Corps has a long history of 

thinking, writing, and producing innovative 

work on maritime strategy, operations, and tactics. It is time for the Navy-Marine Corps team 

to reinvigorate maritime strategic thought. This 

anthology contributes to this worthy aim.

 

General Robert B. Neller

Commandant

United States Marine Corps
xiii

PREFACE

Chapter 1 of Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations describes six cornerstones that 

apply through most of naval history. 

The decisive Battle of the Nile in 1798 shows 

how Royal Navy Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson 

instinctively knew their significance. I cite them 

early because the cornerstones have been guideposts for successful combat at sea since the age 

of fighting sail. With some significant adjustments, they can serve today’s Marine Corps as 

well. I have added a seventh cornerstone that is 

particularly relevant to Navy-Marine teamwork 

in the twenty-first century.

The first cornerstone in the 1986 and 1999 

editions of Fleet Tactics is ”men matter most.” It 

emphasizes men because the combatants in perhaps 99 percent of all sea battles were men. To 

acknowledge the growing role of women in the 

U.S. Navy, the cornerstone in the third edition 

has been updated to “sailors matter most.” The 

purpose is to emphasize the abiding value of 

leadership, morale, training, physical and mental conditioning, willpower, and endurance as 

the most important elements of warfare. To be 

sure, one cannot win without the quantitative 

and qualitative sufficiency of good equipment 

and sound tactics. The equivalent cornerstone 

here is “Marines matter most.” The ways Marines, both men and women, have recognized 

and exploited human effectiveness is especially 

impressive. I have nothing to tell the Marine 

Corps about improving the first cornerstone but 

would add that the human element is especially 

vital because, as tradition says, the Navy mans its 

fighting ships, but when Marines go into combat 

the machines serve the fighters.

The second cornerstone illustrated by Nelson’s victory that remains true today is that 

doctrine is the glue of good tactics. In a navy, 

doctrine is the companion and instrument of 

good leadership. It is the basis of training and all 

that results from it: cohesion, reliability in battle, and mutual understanding for collaboration. 

Doctrine is the springboard and benchmark of 

all tactical improvement. Admiral Nelson knew 

that doctrine is standard battle methodology 

but it must not become dogma. A sturdy definition of the term combat doctrine is “the comprehensive and practical plans of action.” When 

I was a junior officer in the 1950s, the doctrine 

developed in World War II was still sound and 

served us well. An analogy of doctrine then is 

a football playbook with different plays to call 

for every “tactical” circumstance on the gridiron. Here, one of the most important corollaries to remember is how joint doctrine enhances 

SEVEN CORNERSTONES OF MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS
xiv preface

Navy-Marine collaboration. Beyond that, I have 

little to add. Warfighting, the 1989 doctrine first 

published by the 29th Commandant and founder 

of Marine Corps University, General Alfred M. 

Gray Jr., is my exemplar of tight, meaningful, 

specific, and executable doctrine.

The third cornerstone is to “know tactics 

you must know your weapons.” In the Marine 

Corps, everyone is taught to be a combatant and 

awareness of the capabilities of every weapon is 

second nature. Marines know that tactics and 

technology are two sides of a single coin. When 

new technologies emerge, such as unmanned 

and robotic systems or cyber operations, they 

cannot be fully exploited until new tactics are 

developed and forces are trained to employ 

them effectively. A recent insight is that robots 

also must be “trained” for different tasks, especially when they are expected to act in swarms. 

Indeed, information warfare that incorporates 

cyberwarfare, robots, and artificial intelligence 

has so risen in importance that the third edition 

of Fleet Tactics devotes a new chapter to it.

The fourth cornerstone, “the seat of purpose is on the land,” comes easily and naturally 

to Marines. “From the halls of Montezuma to 

the shores of Tripoli” is an illustration of decisions achieved on land that are engraved in the 

heart of every Marine. When I describe this 

cornerstone to my Navy compatriots, I like to 

point out that since Greek and Roman times 

most fleet battles were fought near land. When 

Nelson defeated French Admiral François-Paul 

Brueys d’Aigailliers in the Battle of the Nile, 

the effect was to doom Napoleon Bonaparte’s 

plan to take over Egypt and the Levant as French 

tributaries. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 

1588 and all the seventeenth century fleet actions fought in the Anglo-Dutch Wars took place 

near a coast. In the latter wars, invasion was never an aim of the fighting. The English general at 

sea, George Monck, expressed that “the Dutch 

have too much trade and I intend to take it from 

them” because he knew the many battle outcomes would have enduring consequences on 

land. In the Seven Years War (1756–63), when 

English Admiral Edward Hughes fought French 

Admiral Pierre André de Suffren in some of the 

most evenly matched battles in naval history off 

the coasts of India, all of India was an issue.

The fifth cornerstone, “a ship’s a fool to 

fight a fort,” was supposedly said by Nelson, 

who lost an arm and an eye fighting forts and 

whose decisive victory at Copenhagen in 1801 

was fought against forts and anchored Danish 

warships. The message is that forts—represented today by missile launch sights and land-based 

airfields—have the advantage because they can 

be reconstituted more quickly and cheaply than 

sunken ships. During World War II in the Pacific, Marines learned the hazards of attacking defended islands. They suffered severely in critical 

yet necessary assaults. In the twenty-first century, the Marine Corps is reassessing its roles in 

expeditionary warfare. Personally, I think large 

amphibious assaults are far less desirable today 

than the ability to move swiftly into positions 

threatened by a major enemy because it is easier to defend them than to assault them from 

the sea. If the Marines decide to employ small 

detachments of air-land capability to threaten 

an enemy in their home waters, this will be a 

decision determined in part by the hazards of 

expeditionary operations against modern landbased “forts.”

The sixth, and in some ways the most pervasive, cornerstone of fleet combat is to attack 

effectively first. I do not say attack decisively first, 

because sometimes a detachment of a navy must 

fight outnumbered, in which case its combat 
preface xv

goal is to have the greatest effect on the enemy 

while it goes down fighting. In modern sea battles, first attack rather than an exchange of fire 

demonstrably has had great value. In Fleet Tactics 

and Naval Operations the ways to attack effectively are described for the age of fighting sail, the 

battleship era, the carrier era, and—although 

the U.S. Navy has not had to fight one—battles 

in the missile era of warfare. The Marine Corps 

must ponder its equivalent cornerstone because 

defense in pure ground operations has usually 

been the superior posture in battle. Clues can 

be found in the challenging Guadalcanal campaign and still more in the cruel consequences 

suffered at Peleliu and Iwo Jima. These severe 

battles in World War II can be contrasted with 

the great Marine successes in Operations Desert 

Storm and Iraqi Freedom. I have in mind a Marine combat equivalent that is something more 

like “get there first and make the enemy attack.” 

I was only shot at twice, but that was enough 

to demonstrate the difference between Navy 

and Marine combat. At sea, you can run but you 

cannot hide. I urge the Marine Corps to devote 

its best minds to the cornerstone that best describes the essence of successful combat tactics 

at a beach and onto land.

For the Marine Corps and its expeditionary operations there is a seventh cornerstone 

related to getting there first. In littoral warfare, the home team has the advantage. This is 

not merely an issue of offense versus defense. 

It is a recognition that the littorals, where Marines traditionally operate, are dynamic, complex 

fighting environments where all operational and 

geographical domains intersect because each 

combat circumstance is unique. Therefore, local 

knowledge of topography, geography, hydrography, and oceanography will play a critical and 

variable role in tactical employment of forces. 

Where Marines have traditionally operated the 

invading force is at a disadvantage and must 

redouble its efforts to understand the local environment. The seventh cornerstone puts the 

burden on the Marine Corps to set conditions 

for success early by knowing the terrain, the 

people, and culture of the people. Building relationships with allies and partners can give the 

Marine Corps the home team advantage in the face 

of aggressive peer attempts to seize territory. 

The year-long Solomon Islands campaign during 

the Second World War was a brilliant example of 

Navy-Marine air-sea-ground collaboration. On 

the other hand, it is far better today to contain 

the war with naval forces that emphasize maritime actions to prevent the conflict from getting 

out of control and escalating into a world war. 

Today a maritime containment strategy is particularly applicable against China and/or Russia, 

and perhaps Iran.

~ Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr. (Ret)

xvii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I

n the summer of 2018, the president of Marine Corps University, Brigadier General 

William J. Bowers, ordered a lecture series, 

“Reinvigorating Maritime Strategic Thought: 

The Future of Naval Expeditionary Forces.” The 

series would include four lectures, and it was 

to be supported by this anthology, produced by 

History Division, providing readings to the students on the topics each lecture would cover. 

This volume presents a collection of 36 extracts, articles, letters, orders, interviews, and 

biographies. The work is intended to serve as a 

general overview and provisional reference to 

inform both Marines, sailors, and the general 

public of the broad outlines of maritime strategic thought. 

Additional support for this work came from 

the Journal of Military History, Naval History, MCU 

Journal, SEAPOWER, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Leatherneck magazine, and the Marine Corps 

Gazette, all of whom gave permission to reprint 

their articles. Their cooperation made this anthology possible.

We would like to thank Joan Thomas, art 

curator of the National Museum of the Marine 

Corps; Gail Munro, art curator, and Karin Haubold, collections manager, of the Naval History 

and Heritage Command; and Joe Rudinec of 

RequestAPrint for their assistance with illustrations.

The Legacy of American Naval Power could not 

have been published without the professional 

efforts of the History Division staff. The editors would like to thank the deputy director of 

Marine Corps History Division, Paul J. Weber. 

Colleagues Douglas E. Nash Sr., Dr. Fred H. Allison, Dr. Seth Givens, Ed Nevgloski, Michael 

Westermeier, Kara Newcomer, and Annette D. 

Amerman provided unflagging professional advice and support. Alisa Whitley and Dr. James 

Ginther of the Archives Branch and Gregory 

Cina of the Grey Research Center were instrumental in tracking down articles and documents 

for this collection. Interns Taylor Sorrells and 

Kolby Reinke provided research assistance and 

helped prepare images and the bibliography, 

respectively. Our Editing and Design Branch, 

led by Angela J. Anderson, was instrumental 

in transforming the manuscript into a finished 

product, editing the manuscript and overseeing 

the production process.

This anthology is organized into an introduction on the history of maritime strategic 

thought, four chapters covering the evolution of 
xviii acknowledgments

American naval power and strategic thought, a 

chronology of significant events, and a bibliography. This work is not meant to be an authoritative history, but rather it is intended to be used 

as a starting point for Marines, sailors, the general public, and academic researchers who are 

interested in further reading or applying these 

lessons for the betterment of their seagoing profession.
The Legacy of american 

naval power

3

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE 

HISTORY OF MARITIME STRATEGY

by Paul Westermeyer

War is the father of all and king of all, who manifested some as gods and some as men, who made some 

slaves and some freemen.

~ Heraclitus, pre-Socratic philosopher1

One of mankind’s oldest activities is 

certainly intraspecies conflict arising from competition over resources, mates, or ideas; such conflicts undoubtedly 

began long before civilization evolved with its 

complex social organizations. Once civilization 

developed, however, such conflicts became war, 

which may be defined as “organized, socially 

sanctioned armed violence employed by opposing groups against one another, normally 

for political, social or economic purposes.”2

 The 

methods used to guide the attainment of those 

purposes through violence is strategy, and it was 

born along with warfare at the dawn of civilization. 

As Carl von Clausewitz later said, “No one 

starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses 

ought to do so—without first being clear in his 

mind what he intends to achieve by that war and 

1

 Heraclitus fragment, DK22B53. Hermann Diels and Walther 

Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch, 6th ed. 

(Berlin: Weidmann, 1952).

2

 Working definition of war as provided to students over the years 

in John F. Guilmartin, “Basic Definitions” (course handout, Ohio 

State University, 1994).

how he intends to conduct it.”3 In other words, 

war is not merely about violence, it has a purpose. Guiding violence to achieve that end is 

one definition of strategy; but strategy goes beyond guided violence, it encompasses the threat 

as well as the means of violence—indeed some 

strategists have argued that avoiding violence 

entirely is the highest form of strategy.4

 Regardless of its scope, strategy is always (or should be) 

subordinate to policy—why one fights defines 

the strategic equation any set of belligerents are 

faced with.5

If warfare is one of civilizations oldest activities, maritime warfare is not far behind. Ancient 

societies soon developed seafaring technologies 

as the advantages of travel by sea were quickly 

apparent; goods could be transported in larger 

quantities with less labor by water then by land. 

This basic logistical advantage underpinned the 

3

 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976; first 

published 1832), 88–89.

4

 Suntzu and Wutzu, The Book of War: The Military Classic of the Far 

East, trans. Capt E. F. Calthrop (London: John Murray, 1908), 24. 5

 Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and Wars, ed. Williamson 

Murray et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1.
4 A brief Introduction

prime motivation for the influence of the sea 

on history, it spurred the development of cities 

along waterways and sheltered ocean anchorages along the coast as merchants and armies could 

more easily traverse those same routes. Ever 

since the first time that men went to sea in ships, 

strategy involved the intertwining of maritime 

and land affairs. 

Strategists in the early days of civilization 

also were usually rulers as well so that military 

strategy and statecraft were inextricably entwined. Successful generals had no time to write 

systemically and logically on strategy in the abstract; even when they did, historians today recognize that “strategic thinking does not occur in 

a vacuum, or deal in perfect solutions; politics, 

ideology, and geography shape peculiar national 

strategic cultures. Those cultures, in turn, may 

make it difficult for a state to evolve sensible and 

realistic approaches to the strategic problems 

that confront it.”6

Considering that the logic behind strategy 

began with the “father of history,” Herodotus, 

who opened his history of the Persian War thus: 

“I, Herodotus of Halicarnassus, am here setting 

forth my history, that time may not draw the 

color from what man has brought into being, 

nor those great and wonderful deeds, manifested by both Greeks and barbarians, fail of their 

report, and, together with all this, the reason 

why they fought one another.”7

In examining the causes of those conflicts, 

Herodotus inevitably examined what the participants hoped to accomplish with their various 

strategies, and he described what was possibly 

the first overtly maritime strategy. After the first 

Persian invasion of Greece, Herodotus recounts 

6

 Murray and Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” 3.

7

 Herodotus as quoted in David Grene, trans., The History of Herodotus (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

how the Greek strategos Themistocles first saw 

that the city’s path to greatness lay not in its 

fields but at sea; he thus convinced his fellow 

Athenians to take an unexpected windfall from 

a recently discovered silver mine and create a 

large fleet of triremes (oar-powered warships).8

And when the Persians marched on Greece, 

Themistocles recognized that the vast Persian 

army required its navy to keep it supplied. Following the Spartan defeat at Thermopylae, and 

when Athens seemed doomed, he convinced the 

Athenians to abandon their city and all of the 

8

A strategos was an elected general in ancient Athens; there were 

10 each year.

A marble Roman-era bust of Themistocles, based 

on a fifth-century BC Greek original, in the Museo 

Archeologico Ostiense, Ostia, Rome, Italy.

Museo Archeologico Ostiense, Rome
Westermeyer 5

allied Greek states to put their faith in fighting a 

naval battle off the coast of the island of Salamis; 

the resultant Greek victory crippled the Persian 

invasion. In Themistocles’ view, “the master of 

the sea must inevitably be master of the empire.”9

The Athenians, now convinced that their 

fleet was the primary factor in the Greek victory in the Persian Wars, built an empire based on 

that seapower, and when the expansion of their 

sphere of influence led them into conflict with 

9

 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Letters to Atticus, book 10 (Cambridge, 

Cambridge University Press, 1961), 8.4. On the Battle of Salamis 

as a maritime campaign and Themistocles’ vital role in the war, 

see Barry Strauss, The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that 

Saved Greece—and Western Civilization (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).

Sparta, their land power competitor, they continued to pursue the maritime strategies of Pericles. He had convinced the Athenians to pursue 

a defensive strategy at home, staying behind the 

walls they had built to protect the city and their 

access to the sea when the Spartans invaded Attica year after year, while their own fleets raided 

along the coasts and harried Sparta and its allies elsewhere. Even after Pericles perished, the 

Athenians continued to follow maritime strategies throughout the conflict, even surviving 

their own imperial overreach with the attempted conquest of Syracuse, and only succumbed 

after the Spartans had finally acquired a fleet of 

their own and pursued a countermaritime strategy in response.10

Perhaps the first of the abstract strategists 

was Thucydides, a former Athenian strategos 

ostracized following his defeat in the war. His 

carefully researched history of that war includes 

many speeches that do not record what was 

actually said at the time, but rather are Thucydides’ reconstructions of what should have been 

said. Thucydides presents his theory of statecraft 

and strategies in these speeches, much as his 

near-contemporary and fellow countryman Plato presented philosophy through dialogues. The 

result is that Thucydides’ work has been analyzed 

carefully over millennia, especially during the 

last century, not only by historians attempting to 

understand the Peloponnesian War specifically, 

but by military theorists looking for insights into 

war and strategy more broadly. During the Cold 

War, the struggle between the maritime power 

10 On Athens’ strategy, see Donald Kagan, “Pericles, Thucydides, 

and the Defense of Empire,” in Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the 

Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome, ed. Victor Davis Hanson (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). On the Peloponnesian War, 

see Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking Press, 

2003); Donald Kagan, “Athenian Strategy in the Peloponnesian 

War,” in Making of Strategy; and Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War

(New York: Random House, 1982).

Marble bust of the ancient Greek general and historian Thucydides from the second half of the second 

century. Asia Minor marble, small grained.

J. Paul Getty Museum, 73.AA.36
6 A brief Introduction

of Athens and the land power of Sparta was seen 

as a parallel to the struggle between the United 

States and the Soviet Union, and as a result, the 

study of Thucydides’ strategic insights spiked in 

popularity.11

More abstract military theorists arose during 

the years following Thucydides, although their 

work seldom differentiated between strategy 

and tactics. Virtually none addressed naval affairs. In the West, Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus left us the Epitoma Rei Militaris, a fourth 

century AD work describing Roman military 

organization, surviving into the medieval period 

it greatly influenced later European military reforms. Byzantine authors left several works that 

combined discussion on organization, tactics, 

and strategy. The most famous of these treatises 

11 For more on Thucydides as a strategic theorist, see Williamson 

Murray, “Thucydides: Theorist of War,” Naval War College Review 66, 

no. 4 (Autumn 2013): 30–46.

was the Emperor Maurice’s Strategikon, from the 

sixth century, which included the maxim, “The 

state benefits more from a lucky general than 

from a brave one. The first achieves his results 

with little effort, whereas the other does so at 

some risk.”12

Outside of the West, Chinese works on abstract military theory were produced beginning 

in the Warring States period.13 These were organized into what has been coined the “Seven Military Classics” in the eleventh century AD, and 

became required reading for promotion by military officers. Included in these was the military 

classic generally known today as Sun Tzu’s The 

12 Strategikon, book 7, 2.94, as seen in Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, trans. George T. Dennis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 91. On Vegetius 

and the Byzantine texts, see Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science, 

trans. N. P. Milner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011); 

and Three Byzantine Military Treatises, trans. George T. Dennis 

(Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1985).

13 Generally considered to run from fifth to third centuries BC.

Depicting a scene from the ancient Greek epic poem The Odyssey, this mosaic shows Odysseus and his men 

hearing the call of the sirens from aboard their galley. Always a maritime people, the ancient Greeks may be 

the first to pursue an expressly maritime strategy. Ulixes mosaic, second century.

Bardo National Museum, Tunisia
Westermeyer 7

Art of War. As with the European works, none of 

these books looked at naval affairs specifically, 

and they discussed tactical and organizational issues as often as they examined strategy.14

In India, the Arthashastra, a treatise of multiple 

books in Sanskrit composed in the third century 

BC that focused more directly on strategy and 

its relationship to the goals of sovereign rulers 

in books 7 and 10, while the rest of the work 

is focused on the broader art of ruling a state. 

Again, naval affairs are not given much if any attention.15

In a similar manner during the Renaissance, 

Niccolò Machiavelli’s Dell’arte della guerra (Art 

of War) focused on the relationship between 

civil and military matters and the formation of 

grand strategy; but as with the previous works, 

he avoided discussing naval affairs. The work 

was framed as a dialogue in which his narrator, 

a professional soldier, declared they will leave 

discussion of warfare at sea to the Venetians and 

Genoans, who were more practiced at fighting 

in that environment.16

Naval warfare in the Mediterranean remained essentially unchanged from the age of 

the Peloponnesian War until the Renaissance. 

The technological constraints of the wooden 

galley forced naval fleets to put ashore often, as 

they could not sit on station at sea for significant amounts of time. Geography in the form of 

sheltered landing beaches as well as winds and 

currents thus dominated naval affairs in ways 

14 Ralph D. Sawyer and Mei Mei-chün Sawyer, The Seven Military 

Classics of Ancient China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); 

Suntzu and Wutzu, The Book of War; and Michael I. Handel, Masters 

of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London & New York: Routledge, 

2001).

15 Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in 

Ancient India,” Journal of Military History 67, no. 1 (January 2003): 

9–38.

16 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War, trans. Ellis Farnsworth (New 

York: Da Capo Press, 2001); and Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The 

Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 11–31.

that precluded the sort of sea control that later 

naval thinkers would advocate. These unchanging technical and geographic factors allowed 

commanders to conduct maritime campaigns 

with virtually no naval assets, as Alexander the 

Great did when he eliminated the Persian navy 

as a threat by conquering all of its harbors and 

installations.17

But technological change was impacting 

all aspects of naval technology as the Age of 

Discovery emerged in the fifteenth century. 

European vessels from the various incipient 

maritime nations began to sail the world’s oceans 

with increasing confidence, eventually developing into the tall sailing ships that were capable 

of sustained operations at sea and that boasted 

the largest mobile concentrations of firepower 

then in existence.18 These technological changes 

altered the maritime strategic calculus as these 

states looked beyond the traditional factors representing a state’s latent military power.

Sir Walter Raleigh wrote in the early 1600s 

that, “for whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the 

trade of the world commands the riches of the 

17 Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); J. F. 

C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (London: Eyre & 

Spottiswoode, 1958); and N. G. L. Hammond, Alexander the Great: 

King, Commander, and Statesman, 3d ed. (London: Bristol Classical 

Press, 1994). On the unchanging strategic calculus of Mediterranean warfare at sea and the ways it differs from later periods and 

Mahanian naval theory, consult Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at 

Sea in the Sixteenth Century (London: Cambridge University Press, 

1974).

18 On these changes, see Roger C. Smith, Vanguard of Empire: Ships 

of Exploration in the Age of Columbus (New York & London: Oxford 

University Press, 1993); Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires: 

Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 

1400–1700 (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1965); 

and Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and 

the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, 2d ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
8 A brief Introduction

world, and consequently the world itself.”19

Heavily influenced by mercantilism, the nascent 

British Empire began to develop a maritime 

strategy based on its peculiar geographic circumstances and culture.20 Other maritime states 

at the time, such as Habsburg Spain, were forced 

to focus as much or more on continental land 

campaigns as they were on maritime affairs, but 

the British were able to avoid this s dispersion 

of military resources, adopting Raleigh’s maxim 

and focusing on the sea as both a means of defense and an avenue to national wealth.21

The zenith of the sailing age of maritime 

power came with the naval campaigns of the end 

of the eighteenth century, during the French 

Revolution and the wars of Napoleon, when 

19 Sir Walter Raleigh, “A Discourse of the Invention of Ships, Anchors, Compass, &c,” in The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh, vol. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1829), 325.

20 Mercantilism was the dominant school of economic thought 

through the eighteenth century and focused on nations maximizing their exports and minimizing their imports.

21 William S. Maltby, “The Origins of Global Strategy: England 

from 1558 to 1713,” in Making of Strategy.

the global maritime strategies of the British 

Empire were put to a stringent test. The revolution in military affairs that began during the 

Renaissance saw an increased rate of change as 

the professional armies of the ancien régimes 

transformed into the mass citizens armies of the 

Napoleonic wars.22 Coinciding with the Age of 

Enlightenment, this period celebrated the notion of genius, which was extended from scientists, mathematicians, artists, and composers to 

politicians and military commanders; Emperor 

Napoléon Bonaparte, who dominated all of Europe at the start of the nineteenth century, represented the military genius that others would 

attempt to emulate, and Vice Admiral Horatio 

Nelson, victor at Trafalgar, fulfilled the role of 

naval genius. 

Two military writers came to dominate the 

study of this sea change in strategic thought, 

22 The term ancien régime (French for old order) refers to political and social systems that dominated Europe prior to the French 

Revolution.

Cornelis Claesz van Wieringen, The Spanish Armada off the English Coast, 1620–25. Oil on canvas.

Rijksmuseum, Museum of the Netherlands, Amsterdam, SK-A-1629
Westermeyer 9

Prussian Major General Carl Philipp Gottlieb 

von Clausewitz and French Lieutenant General 

Antoine-Henri, baron de Jomini. Veterans of the 

Napoleonic Wars, both men were determined to 

distill the essence of Napoleon’s method for the 

use of later generations through the systemic, 

logical study of the theory of war. Neither spent 

much time considering naval conflicts, but they 

strongly influenced maritime strategic thought 

nonetheless. 

Jomini’s work was initially more popular, 

and it has had an enduring influence in how 

modern militaries approach conflict, focusing 

on prescriptive maxims or principles of war. 

Jomini was a great promoter of his own work, 

stating that “if a few prejudiced men, after reading this book and carefully studying the detailed 

and correct history of the campaigns of the great 

masters of the art of war, still contend that it 

has neither principles nor rules, I can only pity 

them and reply, in the famous words of Frederick that ‘a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince Eugene [of Savoy] would 

not be a better tactician than at the beginning’.” 

His principles were focused more on the tactical 

and operational levels of warfare than the strategic level.23

Unlike Jomini, Clausewitz passed away be23 Le Baron de Jomini, Précis de l’Art de la Guerre, ou Nouveau tableau 

analytique des Principales Combinaisons de la Stratégie, de la Grande Tactique et de la Politique Militaire (Paris: Anselin Libraire and G. Laguionie, 1838); Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. Capt G. H. 

Mendell (USA) and Lt W. P. Craighill (USA) (London: Greenhill 

Books, 1992); and John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 

143–85.

Charles Gleyre painted this portrait of Gen AntoineHenri Jomini, Swiss theorist and author of Treatise 

on Grand Military Operations (1807) and other historical works, in 1859. Oil on canvas.

Cantonal Museum of Fine Arts of Lausanne

Karl Wilhelm Wach, Carl von Clausewitz, nineteenth 

century. Oil on canvas.

Tiha von Ghyczy et al., eds., Clausewitz on Strategy: 

Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist

(New York: John Wiley, 2001)
10 A brief Introduction

Capt Alfred Thayer Mahan argued in The Influence of Sea Power upon History that any nation seeking to be great 

needed a navy and with it bases in the world to support its fleet. Oil on canvas, attributed to Alexander James, 

ca. 1945.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 65-350-FS
Westermeyer 11

fore finishing his magnum opus, Vom Kriege (On 

War), which was edited and published by his 

widow, Marie von Clausewitz. Initially less popular as a theorist than Jomini, Clausewitz’s work 

was dialectical rather than didactic, long, and 

often complicated. It also read as rather contradictory in many places, as he died before he 

could revise the whole so that portions written 

earlier would conform to his later, more mature views on the subject. Regardless of these 

flaws, his work has garnered immense attention 

and admiration as a touchstone in the study of 

military theory over the years, a fact he would 

have surely appreciated: “My ambition was to 

write a book that would not be forgotten in two 

or three years, and which anyone interested in 

the subject would certainly take up more than 

once.”24

Because Jomini and Clausewitz mostly agree 

in their discussions at the operational and tactical levels, there is not much difference in 

content, but Clausewitz’s most important contributions come from his embrace of the unity 

of policy and warfare, leading to his oft repeated 

phrase, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” which is often viewed by 

itself, but should instead be considered as part 

of “a fascinating trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to 

be regarded as a blind natural force; the play of 

chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of 

subordination, as an instrument of policy, which 

makes it subject to pure reason.”25

Where Jomini provided prescriptive principles on how to fight, Clausewitz explored an 

entire philosophy of warfare, defining it—its 

purposes and its nature—and putting those 

24 Clausewitz, On War, i. 25 Clausewitz, On War, 87, 605.

conclusions up for rigorous examination in his 

monumental work; the bulk of which remained 

an examination of practical methods of warfare. 

The resulting work was prone to misinterpretation, but has remained vitally important to 

understanding strategy even as technology has 

transformed in ways neither Jomini nor Clausewitz could have imagined.26

Maritime strategy’s most dedicated proponent arrived in the late nineteenth century, 

when Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce appointed 

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan as the professor of 

history at the Naval War College. Mahan’s father, 

Dennis Hart Mahan, was a professor at the U.S. 

Military Academy, or West Point, from 1824 to 

1871; he impressed Jomini’s theories on generations of cadets. His son firmly believed that, “the 

study of military history lies at the foundation of 

all sound military conclusions and practices.”27

He approached his new position from that perspective and developed a series of lectures on 

naval history that he later transformed into his 

landmark volume, The Influence of Sea Power upon 

History, 1660–1783 (1890).28

As committed to Jomini as his father had 

been, Mahan approached the study of naval history intent on pulling principles from it that 

26 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 186–216; 

and Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On 

War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).

27 A. T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, or The Place of Force in the 

International Relations of States (New York & London: Harper & 

Brothers, 1912), 206. It is interesting to note that three of the 

English-speaking world’s most successful strategists and heads of 

state—Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston 

S. Churchill—all served within the civilian leadership of their 

respective nation’s navy, where the Roosevelts were unusually 

influential assistant secretaries of the Navy and Churchill was a 

wartime First Sea Lord. Moreover, two of those leaders—Theodore Roosevelt and Winston Churchill—also wrote exceptional 

works of history: Churchill’s A History of the English-Speaking Peoples 

(1956–58) and Roosevelt’s The Naval War of 1812, or The History of 

the United States Navy during the Last War with Great Britain to which Is 

Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans (1882). 28 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783

(Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1890).
12 A brief Introduction

could be applied universally to naval affairs. 

For example, examining the Second Punic War 

(218–201 BC), he decided that Hannibal’s inability to destroy Rome despite victory after victory in Italy was because the Roman’s retained 

control of the sea.29 This led Mahan to the conclusion that all empires revolved around control 

of the sea, with the British Empire then being the 

greatest and most obvious example. Carefully 

examining the growth of British imperial power 

and its seapower foundations was the heart of 

his work, from which he extracted characteristics of a maritime state that were favorable to 

the building of a maritime empire. Mahan used 

two different definitions for seapower: command 

of the sea through naval armed force and a sort 

of neomercantilist view of maritime commerce, 

colonies, and access to markets. To achieve these 

forms of seapower, Mahan deduced that six 

factors influenced a nation’s ability to develop 

seapower: geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population, national character, and the character and policy 

of its government.30 A prolific author, Mahan’s 

later works repeatedly addressed the ways he 

believed the United States could increase its seapower through these different characteristics. 

Regarding fleets, Mahan recognized that 

the age of steam and ironclad vessels was bereft 

of historical examples; however, he also understood that technology altered time-distance factors involving the delivery of force, but did not 

alter the underlying, fundamental maritime strategic principles. He looked carefully at the naval 

battles fought throughout history and extracted 

29 This is a highly debatable conclusion; Rome’s ability to alter its 

constitution to overcome command difficulties and the inherent 

strength of its political and economic systems provided advantages that may have been insurmountable regardless of Carthaginian 

control of the sea. Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: Naval 

Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 450. 30 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 21–82.

those principles, the most important, from his 

point of view, being the concentration of naval 

power in the form of the battle fleet, which he 

perceived in writings prior to the maturity of 

the aircraft or submarine as the battleships of 

the fleet. He rejected the guerre de course (war 

on commerce) strategy that the French so often 

employed in part because it did not allow for 

the concentration of naval might he considered 

essential.31

Mahan’s influence upon maritime strategic thought was considerable in his lifetime; in 

the United States, his ideas shaped the thinking 

of Theodore Roosevelt, whom he befriended 

when the latter visited the Naval War College. 

Roosevelt was an accomplished naval historian 

himself, having written a naval history of the 

War of 1812 that is still considered a classic.32

It was more a case of kindred spirits supporting each other, but certainly Roosevelt’s naval 

policies, and especially the sailing of the Great 

White Fleet, can be described as Mahanian.33

Outside of the United States, Mahan influenced both the Japanese and the Germans, 

which were developing their own great battle 

fleets at the turn of the century. Mahan believed 

the Japanese had translated more of his work 

than any other nation, and despite the racism he 

often exhibited when discussing Japan, he singled out the Imperial Japanese Navy for successfully putting his theories into practice during the 

31 See Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 444–80; John T. Kuehn, 

“What Was Mahan Really Saying?: A Re-visitation of the Naval 

Theorist’s Classic Work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783,” U.S. Military History Review 1, no. 1 (December 

2014): 66–80; and Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and 

Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 32 Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812, or The History of the 

United States Navy during the Last War with Great Britain to Which Is 

Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans (New York: G. P. 

Putnam’s Sons, 1882).

33 Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 472.
Westermeyer 13

In Arrival of the American Fleet off Scapa Flow, December 1917, Bernard F. Gribble painted the battleships USS 

New York, Wyoming, Florida, and Delaware steaming into the British naval base at Queenstown, Ireland, amid 

cheers from the men assembled aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth, flagship of the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, 

during World War I. Oil on canvas, 1928.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 28-003-A

Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5. Kaiser Wilhelm 

II stated that Mahan’s works were widely read in 

the German fleet, and the German Navy’s building program prior to World War I was certainly 

Mahanian in concept. As with Roosevelt, these 

devotees tended to use Mahan to buttress beliefs 

they already held.34

Following World War I, new technologies 

and international conditions reduced the value 

of Mahan’s maritime supremacy theories, and 

34 Capt A. T. Mahan, USN (Ret), From Sail to Steam: Recollections of 

Naval Life (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1907), 302–3; Sadao 

Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the 

United States (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006); and Crowl, 

“Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 472–74.

his connections with American imperialism 

made his work increasingly unfashionable with 

modern strategists. But the U.S. Navy has periodically revisited his work, just as he searched 

the histories of the Age of Sail to understand the 

steam navy, modern theorist regularly find lessons for the nuclear age in the histories of the 

battleship age.35

Mahan’s works were widely read in Britain, 

where his broad approval of British naval policies over the centuries was appreciated, but the 

35 Dr. James R. Holmes and Cdr Kevin J. Delamer, USN (Ret), 

“Mahan Rules,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 143, no. 5 (May 

2017): 1371.
14 A brief Introduction

British produced their own maritime strategic 

theorist in Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. Like Mahan, Corbett was a historian tapped by the Royal 

Navy to produce works on maritime strategy; 

unlike Mahan, he was a civilian novelist when 

he began writing on naval history and strategy 

in 1902, which was given prominence when he 

was asked to give a series of lectures on the topic 

at the recently founded Naval War College. His 

civilian status prevented the Royal Navy from 

fully accepting his work, especially as Corbett 

rejected Mahan’s focus on concentration and 

downplayed the value of battle in favor of maintaining control of the sea through widely dispersed forces. Naval officers felt that Corbett’s 

views reduced its instinctive aggressiveness and 

encouraged the Royal Navy to preserve itself 

rather than seek battle.

Unlike Mahan, Corbett saw the land as the 

center of focus, and maritime power was merely a means to an end, not an end in itself. This 

connection with Clausewitzian concepts of policy and strategy, as well as general multi-Service 

approach to national strategy stood in sharp 

contrast to Mahan, who did not address power 

projection in any meaningful manner. Like Mahan, Corbett wrote before either submarines 

or aircraft had matured as technologies, and 

his work does not significantly take them into 

account.36 With Corbett, the stage is set for the 

development of maritime strategy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in the following 

chapters.

Taking into account the contributions of Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, and Corbett to the evo36 Michael I. Handel, “Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu,” Naval 

War College Review 53, no. 4 (Autumn 2000); and Andrew Lambert, 

ed., 21st Century Corbett: Maritime Strategy and Naval Policy for the 

Modern Era (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017).

lution of maritime strategic thinking throughout the nineteenth century, maritime strategist 

of the early twentieth century, as well as those 

today, were and are challenged to envision how 

continually evolving technology, particularly 

that involving kinetic and cyber weapons, as 

well as geopolitics, will impact the development 

of maritime strategy for the twenty-first century. If history is any guide, change in this realm 

of warfare is inevitable; but a firm grounding in 

the thinking that brought us here—these classics 

Levels of war.

Warfighting, adapted by History Division

Grand 

strategy/policy

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL
Westermeyer 15

of naval strategy—can only be gained by going 

back to the original source and dedicating time 

to their study and reflecting upon their timeless 

lessons.

POSTSCRIPT

When reading the following chapters, bear in 

mind the differences between the levels of war, 

as expressed in Warfighting.

37 In short, there are 

three levels of warfare. This work is primarily 

concerned with the strategic level, which es37 Warfighting, MCDP-1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 1997), 28–32.

tablishes military and naval goals, within the nation’s means in support of national policy. The 

operational level lies in the middle, establishing 

the how, when, and why for military and naval 

forces chosen to achieve the strategic goals. It 

links to the tactical level, the lowest level where 

military and naval forces meet in battle. All 

three levels are interrelated, each connecting to 

the others, and all influencing and influenced by 

the grand strategic or national policy goals that 

guide the conflict.
16 chapter number

Anton Otto Fischer’s painting depicts the first 

victory at sea by the USS Constitution over HMS 

Guerriere, 19 August 1812. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command
17

CHAPTER ONE

The Ascendance 

of American 

Maritime Power

A Historical Perspective 

Culminating at Guadalcanal

by Paul Westermeyer

The Marine Corps, from its infancy and 

throughout its early years, operated only 

at the tactical level. The Corps was born 

of a relatively thoughtless emulation of the Royal Navy—Royal Navy men-o-war had Marines 

and cannons—and so United States’ men-owar should have Marines and cannons as well. 

Throughout the early years of the republic, the 

Marine Corps continued to fulfill the same role 

that the Royal Marines had filled in the Royal Navy, guarding naval shore establishments, 

providing boarding and landing parties for the 

Navy’s men-o-war, and occasionally reinforcing 

the Army during operations ashore, such as at 

Bladensburg, Maryland, and New Orleans in the 

War of 1812. 

Although individual Marine officers increased the scope of their experience during the 

Mexican-American War and the American Civil 

War, the Corps as a whole during this period 

continued to perform its traditional tacticallevel duties. In the last quarter of the nineteenth 

century, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps began 
18 Chapter One

to evolve as the United States became entangled 

in world affairs, most especially in the Pacific 

and the Caribbean, where the United States inserted itself in a variety of colonial ventures. 

Along with rapid technological change and 

increasing American involvement overseas, the 

Navy Department responded to the rise in 

specialization brought about by the Industrial 

Revolution with its own professional training 

and education reforms. Rear Admiral Stephen 

B. Luce was at the forefront of many of these 

changes as the founder and first president of 

the Naval War College. In 1886, he appointed 

then-Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan as its professor of history. Following that appointment, Mahan developed his lectures into what became the 

groundbreaking book The Influence of Sea Power 

upon History, 1660–1783 (1890) and other later works on naval strategy. Mahan’s works were 

very popular and found special favor with the 

future U.S. president, Theodore Roosevelt, and 

other proponents of American imperialism. 

Mahan’s ideas were not limited to theories 

of sea power alone. He actively wrote about and 

advocated for national policies supporting his 

views, especially with regard to the acquisition 

of ports overseas that could be used as coaling 

stations for America’s burgeoning Navy. His focus was often on the Pacific—he was a strong 

proponent of a canal across the Central American isthmus and he advocated for a strong Pacific 

fleet. In the 1890s, he was in favor of annexing 

Hawaii, which he saw as the key to American interests in the Pacific; he worried about Japanese 

influence there and sought to deny them its advantages. Mahan saw himself as an expert on the 

Japanese; his writing on this topic was nearly as 

influential there as it was in the United States.1

Influenced by Mahan’s views on sea power, 

the pressure for technological change, and driven by the requirements of America’s overseas 

expansion, the U.S. Navy was forced to evolve 

at a rapid rate by the close of the nineteenth 

century. The dominance of steam-powered ironclads equipped with ever larger guns required 

overseas bases at strategic points to feed their 

insatiable need for coal. The Navy was loathe to 

call on the U.S. Army to garrison and defend 

such installations, as they did not trust the Army 

to make holding the ports as much of a priority 

as the Navy would. The Navy wanted garrisons 

that would answer directly to the Navy Department. The obvious solution to the problem was 

employing the Marine Corps to fulfill this mission, since it was already a part of the Navy and 

its traditional shipboard roles were increasingly 

superfluous as sailors became more professional and big gunned, ironclad battleships replaced 

wooden-hulled men-of-war. The relatively conservative Corps leadership initially resisted such 

a mission, even after the landings at Guantánamo 

Bay during the Spanish-American War had successfully demonstrated the concept. Another influential factor was that, increasingly from 1882 

on, newly commissioned Marine officers were 

graduating from the Naval Academy, where they 

drank in the theories of Mahan alongside their 

fellow midshipmen counterparts. This experience led to their acceptance of the Corps’ newfound role of seizing and defending advanced 

naval bases as part of an overall national maritime strategy, seeing this mission as the surest 

method for protecting the Corps’ continued 

existence. 

1

 See Sadao Asada, “Mahan’s Influence on Japanese Seapower,” From 

Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006).
Westermeyer 19

From 1907 to 1909, President Theodore 

Roosevelt incorporated Mahan’s theories of the 

importance of sea power into his own diplomatic policy: “speak softly and carry a big stick.” 

This was demonstrated when he ordered the 

Navy to send two squadrons of battleships on 

a worldwide goodwill cruise, with all the ships 

in the fleet painted in peacetime white livery. 

This Great White Fleet was intended to demonstrate the United States’ newly acquired military power as well as its peaceful intentions; the 

Japanese, however, saw it as a deliberate threat 

that demonstrated America’s ability to project 

its fleet into Far Eastern waters as evinced by its 

port visit to Yokohama, Japan.

In regard to naval strategy, the United States 

played little role in the First World War, leaving 

the formulation to the Royal Navy, which had 

been waging war on the high seas since August 

1914. The United States contributed a battleship 

squadron to the Royal Navy’s blockade of the 

German High Seas Fleet and shared in the protection of transatlantic shipping from the German 

submarine guerre de course.

2

 Nevertheless, the conflict left the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps more 

convinced than ever of the value of their theories 

of sea power, especially in the Pacific. There, the 

United States and Japan faced off against each 

other across a vast ocean as competitors for its 

natural resources and the access it offered to other areas of the globe. With the First World War 

having swept the board clear of those who had 

previously contended for the region, such as the 

Russians, the Germans, and the French, no other 

European power could be expected to challenge 

either the United States or Japan in the region, 

with the exception of Great Britain. The British 

were still considered to have the largest navy in 

2

 The term guerre de course refers to maritime warfare intended to 

disrupt seaborne commerce.

the world, but their interests were too widespread to focus solely on the Pacific.

The naval arms race between Great Britain and Imperial Germany, which had preceded World War I, was widely seen as one of the 

causes of that conflict and the nascent naval arms 

race that resumed after the war, spurring the 

Washington Naval Conference 1921–22, and resulting in the first of a series of treaties (renegotiated in London in 1930) that were designed to 

limit naval armaments; in practice, the various 

navies shifted resources to such nascent technologies as carrier aviation and submarines, which 

were not as restricted as battleships by the terms 

of the treaties. In addition to restricting new ship 

construction, the treaties restricted fortification 

of various American and Japanese colonial possessions in the Pacific.3

Despite the limitation imposed by the treaties, tensions between the United States and 

Japan increased, often driven by American suspicions of Japanese actions in China and American 

restrictions on Japanese immigration to the United States. American and Japanese naval planners 

each considered the other as future antagonists 

since the turn of the twentieth century, and both 

sides developed war plans heavily influenced by 

Mahanian concepts on control of the sea. 

Regardless of whether these plans became 

self-fulfilling prophecies, thoughtful American 

naval officers realized the United States might 

lose in the Far East during the early stages of 

any conflict with Japan, particularly since the 

Washington Naval Conference treaties in essence allowed Japan to build enough ships to 

achieve regional superiority. In the event of such 

a war, the United States would have to “march” 

across the Pacific, establishing naval bases until 

3

 “The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian.
20 Chapter One

a “decisive” fleet engagement could be fought 

that would give the U.S. Navy control of the 

Pacific and allowing it to establish a blockade 

that would starve Japan into submission. Designated War Plan Orange, the plan was Mahanian 

in concept, although it differed somewhat from 

Mahan’s proposed solution.4

For the Marine Corps, War Plan Orange’s 

most salient feature was the requirement for the 

defense of its colonial possessions, such as Guam 

and the Philippines, and the seizure and possible 

defense of additional advanced naval bases across 

the central Pacific. Marine officers had accepted 

their traditional role as part of a landing force, 

a role that gained the Corps a new lease on life 

due to their successful landing and assault at 

Guantánamo Bay, but the First World War had 

provided a spectacular example of amphibious 

failure in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915–16. 

Undaunted, the Corps’ leading thinkers demonstrated remarkable insight into the relationship 

between the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels of warfare as they approached the intellectually thorny problem of how to successfully 

conduct an amphibious assault against a defended beach, recognizing that War Plan Orange 

could only succeed if the tactical and operational problems of the amphibious assault could be 

overcome. 

In 1920, Major General John A. Lejeune became 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

at the same time that the Corps was becoming 

deeply involved in various countries throughout 

Central America and the Caribbean as colonial 

infantry. Despite this distraction, Lejeune maintained a focus on amphibious warfare, oversee4

 In 1911, when asked to comment on War Plan Orange, Mahan suggested a northern approach through the Aleutian Islands, 

Guam, and Japan’s Ryuku Islands. See William R. Braisted, The 

United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922 (Austin: University of 

Texas Press, 1971), 33–35.

ing the continuing transformation of the Corps’ 

training, organization, and equipment to prepare it for its newly intended role as an amphibious assault force. One of General Lejeune’s staff 

officers, Major Earl H. Ellis, wrote Operation 

Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, 

the Corps’ first systematic look at the problems 

posed by War Plan Orange.5

 At Marine Corps 

Schools in Quantico, Virginia, the various problems posed by amphibious warfare were studied by both faculty and students throughout 

the 1920s and 1930s, eventually producing the 

doctrines, techniques, and technologies that the 

Corps would utilize throughout World War II, 

when the United States was forced to put War 

Plan Orange into effect. 

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 came as a shock but 

after the smoke had cleared away and the dead 

were buried, the Navy and Marine Corps began 

to carry out the plans already in place to wage 

war against Japan. The early defeats, including 

the loss of the Philippines and the Mariana Islands, were expected though no less shocking; 

the speed of early Japanese advances though 

Malaysia and Indonesia surprised everyone, including the Japanese. After the 1942 Battle of 

the Coral Sea, followed shortly thereafter by the 

Battle of Midway, put the first brakes to Japan’s 

headlong advance, the Marine Corps was finally 

given the chance to demonstrate its amphibious 

capability, long assumed in War Plan Orange, 

with its conduct of Operation Watchtower. This 

would be the first Allied counteroffensive in the 

Pacific, which would see a Marine Division of 

19,000 men put ashore on the obscure island of 

Guadalcanal.

5

 Maj Earl H. Ellis, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia (Washington, DC: Intelligence Section, Division of Operations and Training, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1921).
21

TRANSFORMATION 

A CENTURY AGO

by Norman Friedman

Naval History, 20056

The torpedo was beginning to transform the 

world’s navies, and the U.S. Navy was buying its 

first modern submarine.

Yet, one kind of transformation seems to 

overshadow all the others. In 1900, the Navy 

was at the center of a deep shift in U.S. national 

strategy. The shift is obvious if, instead of focusing on 1900 itself, one looks at dates 15 years to 

either side. In 1885, U.S. national interest was 

concentrated on inward development, on the 

fate of the frontier. The U.S. Navy was beginning 

its revival, with construction of new steel cruisers and with measures taken to limit the further 

life of the obsolescent wooden fleet. This revival 

was clearly a limited effort; the Navy was anything but the focus of national policy.

By 1915, the U.S. Navy was the premier 

U.S. Service, and anyone interested in national 

defense took that preeminence for granted. As 

a measure of that attitude, we know Congress 

annually debated not whether to build further 

capital ships, but how many.7

 The [Woodrow] 

7

 The term capital ship refers to the Navy’s larger warships, such 

as battleships and aircraft carriers, and are generally a leading or 

primary ship within the fleet.

I

n 1900, the U.S. Navy was in an obvious state 

of flux.6

 The most visible change was the 

sudden, growth of the fleet; Jane’s Fighting 

Ships was listing it as the second most powerful 

navy in the world, a status inconceivable a decade earlier. A suddenly enlarged fleet required 

a vast growth in the officer corps and creation of 

the General Board, a permanent war-planning 

agency with the explicit role of devising policies based on what would be needed should war 

break out. [Navy Admiral] William Snowden 

Sims was on the verge of transforming U.S. naval gunnery; his work helped change a fleet with 

potential combat power into one with real combat potential. Within a few years, the naval personnel system also was transformed, again in the 

direction of greater capability. Much the same 

might be said of the drastic change in the way in 

which ship characteristics were determined, in 

accord with the needs revealed by war planning. 

6

 The original article came from Norman Friedman, “Transformation a Century Ago,” Naval History 19, no. 2 (April 2005): 32–37. 

Reprinted from Naval History with permission; copyright © 2005 

U.S. Naval Institute/www.usni.org. Minor revisions were made to 

the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
22 Chapter One

Wilson administration was about to propose the 

1916 [National Defense] Act, which would have 

made the U.S. Navy the most powerful in the 

world, at least in terms of modern capital ships. 

National policy was outward looking in the 

sense that the connection between the fleet and 

U.S. national independence was shared widely. 

Something enormous had happened in 30 years.

From a technological point of view, the creation of a steel navy was essentially inevitable; no 

one in the 1880s could deny that the collection 

of wooden steam sloops was obsolescent and 

perhaps even risible. A glance at any contemporary reference book will show that every navy 

in the world went through roughly the same 

process of modernization. That usually meant 

building a few modern warships. It absolutely 

did not usually mean aspiring to the first rank of 

sea powers. Indeed, the technological revolution 

of the late nineteenth century raised the cost of 

competing with the major sea powers, particularly with the Royal Navy. It took some special 

national impetus to cross that barrier. That is 

why, for example, the British were shocked into 

action when the Germans, until then almost exclusively a land power, chose to build a fleet to 

rival theirs. That the German effort was not seen 

as routine suggests that the U.S. effort, which 

was certainly comparable in its magnitude, was 

not routine either.

The key, it seems, was a new perception 

of what naval power could mean to the United 

In this lithograph, artist Thomas Birch illustrates the capture of HMS Cyane and Levant by the American frigate USS Constitution during the War of 1812.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 75-354-A
Friedman 23

States. The single most important fact of naval 

power is that the sea is the greatest of all highways: it is far easier to move anything, particularly anything massive, by sea than it is over 

land. The classic quoted example is that it is less 

expensive to move cars from Yokohama to New 

York than from Detroit to New York, but one 

might equally point out that it is remarkable that 

a fully equipped air base can be moved about the 

sea at more than 30 knots. One could hardly do 

the same over the best overland highway. Much 

the same might be said of a squadron of intercontinental ballistic missiles. This fact of seaborne mobility runs counter to most people’s 

experience; to them, the sea seems a rather dangerous place, more barrier than anything else.

If the sea is dangerous, it is a moat. If it is a 

highway, it is a potential invasion route. Another 

formulation might be that if the sea is a barrier, 

then the United States can and perhaps should 

isolate itself, because it is so conveniently far 

from most potential sources of trouble (except, 

of course, the land borders with Canada and 

with Mexico). On the other hand, if the sea is a 

highway, then in some special way distances over 

the sea count for far less than distances overland, 

and the United States is quite close to Europe 

and Asia and quite incapable of isolating itself 

from whatever problems arise there. For that 

matter, in this vision, the future of the United 

States is bound up with the futures of countries 

connected to us by that sea route.

Watercolor of USS New Ironsides depicted as it appeared in 1863 by Clary Ray.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 45-126-Q
24 Chapter One

Historically, Americans who lived far from 

the sea had little or no experience in foreign 

trade, so the highway aspect made little impression. The view from coastal ports was, of course, 

different. Inhabitants saw the fruits of overseas 

trade in their shops. Most of them could see 

the piers and the ships. For that matter, most of 

them came into daily contact with those arriving 

from overseas.

In 1885, the barrier view predominated. 

It might be conceded that an enemy could, if 

he wanted to make a supreme effort, approach 

the United States by sea, but most Americans in 

1885 would have doubted that such an assault 

would be anything but desperate and relatively 

easy to defeat. Moreover, the most appropriate 

means of defense against any such attack would 

be a combination of mobile and fixed fortifications. The former might include small capital 

ships.

When the revival of the U.S. Navy began 

in 1883, to the extent that any maritime threat 

was conceded, the agreed one was a descent 

by one or more European powers on the U.S. 

coast. Much of the wealth of the country was 

concentrated in a few coastal cities, such as 

Boston, New York, Baltimore, and New Orleans. The last great foreign war the country had 

fought, the War of 1812, had seen the British 

burn Washington and assault Baltimore and New 

Orleans. The strategic question was how such a 

threat could be met at minimum cost. The accepted answer, which was not particularly explicit, was that the enemy would be held off by 

coastal fortifications while a small U.S. cruiser 

force preyed on his commerce, raising the cost 

Leslie Arthur Wilcox, USS Iowa in Rio de Janiero, Brazil Harbor, 1907. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2009-152-02
Friedman 25

of the war. The hope was that after a time the 

foreign attacker would realize that the game was 

not worth its cost, and he would make peace. 

Americans of historical bent could remember a 

strategy of this type pursued during the War of 

1812. They tended to avoid remembering just 

how ineffective it had been. There was little or 

no hope or expectation of deterrence, merely 

a theory of war termination, should war come. 

It seems unlikely that many Americans took the 

threat of naval attack very seriously.

Naval reconstruction was predicated mainly on the feeling that unless the U.S. Navy was 

rebuilt, it would be ridiculed as far weaker than 

major South American navies, and hence inadequate to a self-respecting country. Periodically, 

writers produced books describing future wars 

in which European fleets threatened U.S. ports 

with destruction unless ransom was paid, but 

again such speculations had little or no effect.

The barrier view had a deeper consequence. 

It seemed far easier to move forces over land. 

If Britain was the most likely future enemy, 

then surely the long border with Canada was a 

much more likely invasion route. After all, the 

War of 1812 had seen attacks by both land and 

sea. Probably it was also very significant, in the 

1880s, that most Americans with military experience remembered the Civil War essentially as a 

land war. Naval officers remembered the blockade as the crippling blow against the South, but 

the land campaigns were far more prominent 

in the popular imagination. It seemed that in 

1861–65, as in 1812–15, naval power had been 

auxiliary to land combat. There was little or 

no interest in the sort of strategic analysis that 

would have demonstrated the key enabling role 

of sea power.

In about 1886, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan began to discuss his theory that sea power 

had been central, rather than peripheral, to the 

world history of the past two and a half centuries. In particular, he emphasized the highway 

aspect of the sea as the key to understanding that 

history. His largely tacit point was that, given 

very easy transportation by sea, seaborne commerce would soon become the dominant factor 

in the world economy. That would be true even 

for largely self-sufficient countries, such as the 

United States, because some vital commodities 

would always be far less expensive abroad than 

at home. Given very cheap transportation, they 

would dominate the U.S. market. All countries 

ultimately would specialize, hence ultimately 

would be dependent on sea transportation for at 

least some vital commodities. This was much the 

message we see now as globalization. Mahan’s 

argument was that any country dependent on 

the world economy must be able to secure access 

to the world. It could not do so if an enemy fleet 

dominated the seas. Mahan’s greatest historical 

example was the Netherlands, probably the first 

modern state largely dependent on overseas 

trade for its survival. When the Dutch fleet was 

defeated by the British, the Dutch economy collapsed; [or] in Mahan’s phrase, “grass grew in the 

streets of Amsterdam.”8

Mahan had served as a naval officer in the 

Civil War, and presumably his faith in the economic consequences of sea power can be traced 

to a belief that the blockade of the Confederacy had been decisive. Indeed, his first book, 

published in 1883, had been an account of naval operations in the Gulf and in inland waters 

during the Civil War.9

 The particular operations 

that Mahan recounted were involved main8

 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History. The original quote 

reads: “grass grew in the streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted.”

9

 Cdr A. T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters (New York: Charles 

Scribner’s Sons, 1883).
26 Chapter One

ly with exploiting seaborne (and river-borne) 

mobility rather than with blockade; but we 

would see such exploitation and blockade as two 

sides of the same coin. It does not, incidentally, 

seem that Mahan drew such conclusions at the 

time; he needed time to realize that the sea-ashighway was the key insight.

Mahan’s view was radical in that few before him seem to have made the sea-as-highway 

argument explicitly. Most military writing of 

Mahan’s time—indeed, most of the writing of 

any time—is devoted to particular battles. Sea 

power differs from land power in that much of 

its influence is indirect; ships in a blocking position can determine history, but armies tend to 

have to fight to make their presence count. One 

might imagine that the 1889 publication of Mahan’s first great book, The Influence of Sea Power 

upon History, led directly to the transformation 

of the U.S. Navy. That was hardly the case. Mahan’s insights did raise some consciousness of the 

significance of sea power, but he did not articulate any program, and he was not placed to have 

any direct influence on events.

What counted was a political decision, in 

the sense that the word political comes from the 

same root as policy. In the U.S. system, shifts in 

basic governmental policy must ultimately have 

public support. Mahan was well aware of the 

problem. In his first book, he contrasted two 

kinds of sea power. He understood British sea 

power to be organic, in the sense that the British political public (those responsible for electing Parliament, for example) were well aware 

that Britain’s fate as an island power rested on 

its navy. No special argument about the virtues 

of sea power was needed. With no theoretical 

underpinning, the British might use their sea 

power more or less wisely, but they would not 

consider it optional.

France represented an alternative. It was 

not at all obvious to Frenchmen in influential 

positions that sea power was vital. It was expensive, and it detracted from what could be 

spent on the army, which fought on most of the 

French frontiers. Periodically, a particularly insightful French minister managed to convince 

the king to spend much more on the fleet, generally to counter British sea power. Enormous 

dividends were gained. Because the policy argument for seapower was never well enough or 

widely enough articulated, however, it generally 

did not outlast the individual involved. Mahan 

concluded that only a natural sea power, the economic life of which rested on the sea, could support a major fleet. His problem was that this was 

not quite the case with the United States, with 

its anemic merchant marine. In fact, however, 

some of those who heard Mahan’s arguments 

realized that they did apply very much to the 

United States.

Benjamin F. Tracy served as secretary of the 

Navy in the [William H.] Harrison administration (6 March 1889–4 March 1893). Influenced 

by Mahan, he appreciated the potential of sea 

power, which made his position extremely important. Tracy formed a Policy Board, advised 

by but not dominated by Mahan. It submitted 

its report at the end of 1889, and the result was 

duly published the following year in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute. In typical nineteenth-century style, it laid out not only a broad 

policy but also details of the ships to be built, 

including drawings.10

The board argued for a new kind of strategy—a forward strategy rather than the earlier 

defensive concept. It proposed building an oceanic 

navy built around battleships rather than cruisers; 

10 Benjamin F. Tracy, Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, 

DC: Navy Department, 1889).
Friedman 27

one that could deal with an enemy by exploiting 

the same ocean highway an invader might use. 

This was deterrence. A few U.S. cruisers might 

create limited havoc; but as the Union Navy had 

shown decades earlier, they ultimately would 

be hunted down by a superior sea power. One 

consequence of the ongoing technological revolution was that it was becoming more expensive 

to produce cruisers capable of hunting down 

fast merchant ships. A commerce-raiding strategy would have to make do with fewer raiders, 

and they would be far more difficult to replace 

in wartime. On the other hand, a modern U.S. 

battle fleet could smash an enemy’s seapower 

and thus lay both his commerce and his coast 

open to attack.

The board called for creation of two fleets, 

one for long-range offensive action and a second to shield the U.S. coast. The concept of the 

coast defense fleet explains why the first three 

modern U.S. battleships were described as coast 

defense battleships; only the fourth, the USS 

Iowa [BB 4], was described as oceangoing. In the 

past, it had taken a massive ship to carry guns 

sufficiently powerful to deal with enemy capital ships. Now, however, a torpedo carried by a 

small boat could sink an ironclad. If the cost of 

close-in defense could be constrained, two oceanic fleets—one for distant operations and one 

for mid-ocean operations—might become more 

affordable.

Overall, however, the board’s prescription 

Matthew Walker, USS Terror Monitor (BM-4). Watercolor on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2009-152-12
28 Chapter One

called for a fleet nearly the size of that operated 

at the time by the dominant sea power, Great 

Britain. Newspaper editorials denounced such 

extravagance. But the board’s paper was intended as the beginning of a process, not the end. It 

does not seem to have provoked a national debate, but it did make Mahanian ideas respectable 

in the United States.

The Policy Board’s strategy clearly made 

sense, so it survived. Successive secretaries of 

the Navy took the new strategy seriously enough 

to shift the balance of U.S. naval construction, in 

the decade following the board’s report, toward 

battleships. Even so, on the eve of war with 

Spain, the United States was far from achieving 

the status of a major sea power. Moreover, given 

the slow pace of U.S. construction and the rapid pace of naval technology, it was unlikely the 

United States would or could even maintain its 

position.

Then, in 1898, the United States fought 

Spain. Suddenly, the oceans seemed far smaller. Histories of the war emphasize its offensive 

aspects: U.S. warships seized the Philippines, 

and the U.S. Navy destroyed the Spanish fleet 

off Cuba. Then, as now, China was seen as the 

great opportunity of the future, and the Philippines were, in effect, a U.S. foothold in the East. 

Those who favored global engagement clearly won. The unstated implication was that the 

world could easily engage the United States via 

the sea: the Policy Board’s argument.

The war had another side as well. When war 

broke out, the Spanish fleet was in home waters. 

It might steam to Cuba to protect against a U.S. 

assault. Then again, it might be employed more 

indirectly. Residents of the U.S. East Coast suddenly realized there was no good reason why 

the Spanish battleships and cruisers would not 

bombard them. That sort of operation certainly 

would have attracted attention. The Navy Department did commission the fastest U.S. liners 

to take up patrol stations in the mid-Atlantic, 

but it is not at all clear that, without radio, they 

could have got word back in time for any sort of 

effective reaction. The most visible Navy counter to the threat was to recommission surviving 

Civil War monitors as harbor-defense craft. Everything more modern was needed in the active 

theater of war—Cuba. The United States could 

Search for Cervera Squadron by Henry Reuterdahl. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 70-638-E
Friedman 29

afford a modern forward fleet or a modern coast 

defense force, but not both.

This story could, of course, be told in a very 

different way. The Spanish clearly valued Cuba 

and the Philippines. Offensive operations by the 

United States may well have focused their attention on both. They, too, did not know where the 

small but quite modern U.S. fleet would strike. 

They felt compelled, for example, to keep their 

one usable battleship in home waters (at the end 

of the war she was being sent East, to relieve the 

Philippines, but it was far too late for that). The 

Spanish cruisers went to Cuba, because without them the island would have been overrun 

instantly. In effect, Spanish action in response 

to a U.S. threat validated the strategy espoused 

by the Policy Board almost a decade earlier. The 

destruction of the Spanish cruisers in Cuban waters ended the threat to the U.S. mainland in a 

way familiar to students of decisive naval battle, 

though not to those citizens who wanted direct 

protection.

The quandary over defending U.S. cities 

highlighted the strategic problem the United 

States faced then (and, for that matter, now). 

Given finite resources, is it better to attempt 

to protect the country itself, or to deal with 

an enemy as far forward as possible? The Policy Board’s report can be read as a statement of 

what it would have cost to do both (omitting the 

obvious implication that such a strategy would 

be unaffordable). It also had to be admitted, 

however, that coast defense was not really practicable. The U.S. coast is just too long. The local 

defenses built up so expensively around U.S. 

cities—some of which survive as deserted fortifications—were insufficient, because an enemy 

could land farther up the coast and take the cities from the rear. Exactly such descents figured 

in the future-war fiction of the time. That sort of 

threat was a consequence of basic naval mobility.

In the aftermath of the war, Congress bought 

the battle fleet that had been proposed a decade 

earlier. That the United States would build and 

maintain a capital ship fleet, however, was hardly 

foreordained. As president, Theodore Roosevelt 

managed to buy numerous battleships; but at the 

time, he might have been seen as a lone visionary 

whose legacy would vanish after his departure. 

Moreover, just before he left office, a convulsion 

in battleship design—the dreadnought revolution—made his new ships obsolete.11 Every 

major navy built some dreadnoughts, but most 

could not afford to replace their earlier ships on 

anything like a one-for-one basis. Before about 

1906, battleship evolution had been slow enough 

that navies could take decades to build battle 

fleets. That situation did not last. Thus, for many 

navies, the advent of the new type of battleship 

ended any pretension to first class status. Not 

only did the U.S. Navy continue to build battleships, but it built larger and larger ones as the 

technology developed. This trend was so pronounced that skeptics in Congress began to ask 

the Navy to indicate the natural limits on such 

growth. Moreover, U.S. designers led the world 

in some important areas, such as protection (“all 

or nothing” armor and underwater protection) 

and machinery (turbo-electric drive, which was 

partly a matter of protection). It is true that the 

rate at which the U.S. Navy built dreadnoughts 

did not match that of the predreadnoughts, but 

these were much larger and more expensive 

ships.

The Navy did retain a coast-defense mission 

11 The dreadnought battleship revolution began with the arrival 

of the British Royal Navy’s HMS Dreadnought in 1906. The Dreadnought focused on an all “big gun” armament across its main gun installations and relied exclusively on turbine propulsion for speed. 

The revolution resulted in all-new designs of significantly more 

strength, power, and firepower.
30 Chapter One

after 1900, but it sought to accomplish that mission at minimum cost so the overseas offensive 

force could be built into an effective instrument 

of national power. That is why the post-1900 

U.S. Navy became so interested in submarines, 

which offered a mobile form of defense almost 

impossible to counter. Yet, even including their 

tenders, they were far less expensive than dedicated coast-defense ships, which the United 

States ceased to build.

The policy shift begun in 1890 extended far 

beyond the Navy. Before 1890, the U.S. vision of 

the world was largely dismissive. A foreign descent on U.S. shores might be conceivable, but it 

was far down the list of possibilities. The Policy 

Board report helped awaken Americans to the 

real possibility that foreign powers might use 

their fleets to cross the Atlantic, that the United 

States was far too underarmed to protect itself. 

It may be argued that this was actually a fairly 

new threat based on newly efficient steam engines, which by the mid-1880s finally made it 

Frank Muller’s Ships of the New Navy shows the white-hulled ships of the late nineteenth century that replaced 

the sailing ships of a bygone era and generally the types of ships that fought successfully in the SpanishAmerican War. From left to right: USS Marietta (PG 15), gunboat launched in 1897; USS Puritan (BM 1), 

monitor commissioned in 1896; USS Illinois (BB 7), battleship launched in 1898; USS Iowa (BB 4), battleship 

launched in 1896; and USS Stringham (TB 19), torpedo boat launched in 1899. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 44-006-H
Friedman 31

possible to build truly oceanic capital ships. For 

years, historians tended to dismiss fears of seaborne invasion as inventions devised to support 

expensive naval construction. To some extent, 

the 1898 scare on the Eastern seaboard suggests 

that the fear was not entirely fantasy.

This brief account of the U.S. strategic problems in the early part of the twentieth century 

shows that the United States faced a two-ocean 

problem. There was no question of building a 

two-ocean fleet to match, however; the resources simply were not there. A one-ocean fleet had 

to be able to swing between the two oceans to 

meet emergencies.

The problem had been highlighted in 1898 

by the heroic dash of the battleship [USS] Oregon

[BB 3] from the Pacific to the Atlantic, but examination of war plans showed just how serious 

it was. It was not accidental that President Roosevelt, long a student of naval history, successfully pressed the construction of the Panama Canal. 

The canal was clearly part of the same story that 

began with the Policy Board.

We are still living with the sort of national strategy the Policy Board first expressed. 

We still try to keep strategic problems at arms’ 

length; it is better to fight abroad than to fight at 

home. That view has never been unanimous, but 

it has been very important. The old contest between coast defense and a forward policy is visible right now in debates over the proper course 

of the ongoing war against terrorism.

The events of 1898, read in the light of 

the Policy Board paper, showed that the United States faced real threats. It was not enough 

merely to buy more ships. Something had to be 

done to make the Navy an effective weapon.

Before 1898, very little real war planning 

had been done, although there had been some 

exercises at the Naval War College. The secretary 

of the Navy convened a Strategy Board to recommend policy during the Spanish-American 

War. Advised by Mahan, it reflected the thinking 

first widely spread by the Policy Board. After the 

war, a permanent war-planning entity, the General Board, was convened on the theory that war 

plans should form the basis for naval policy. In 

1904, the General Board was called on to recommend that year’s building program, probably 

partly as a way of pushing the technical bureaus 

of the Navy to develop an all-big-gun battleship.

On a deeper level, the combination of the 

continuing influence of the Policy Board and 

1898 was to convince many younger officers 

that reform of the Navy was urgent; what would 

happen if instead of Spain the United States 

faced something more serious, like Germany? 

In effect, the reformers deepened the process 

of transformation, which had begun in 1890. 

Prominent among them was William S. Sims, 

who made his name as a gunnery expert, when 

guns were clearly the preeminent naval weapons. He and other young officers also managed 

to make the General Board, which represented 

the wartime operational thinking of the Navy, 

the main authority determining the overall 

characteristics of U.S. warships. Anyone reading the transcripts of General Board hearings 

conducted between the two World Wars will be 

struck by the repeated question: How does this 

ship contribute to the expected war with Japan? 

Nothing equivalent seems to have been asked 

before about 1900.

So, something very impressive happened 

between 1890 and, say, 1910. The Navy was 

transformed. In this particular case, one key 

transformation in U.S. overall policy inspired 

many to press forward the technical transformations that were far more visible. For example, 

the new battleships in some vital ways were far 
32 Chapter One

in advance of their foreign counterparts. There 

were, to be sure, some major gaps. A fleet was 

more than battleships. Each year the secretary 

of the Navy asked for cruisers and auxiliaries, 

but Congress only rarely provided them, and 

in insufficient numbers. The feeling on the key 

committee may have been that it was miraculous to convince an inward-looking Congress 

to buy the most expensive warships, and that 

anything smaller could be built relatively quickly as needed.

Why did transformation work? It had two 

key aspects. It was cooperative in that the basic transformational concept was widely understood within the Navy. Not all understood 

correctly, but enough did to carry through the 

transformation from the inside. It may be argued that ambition drove men such as Sims, but 

they could have pushed in any of a number of 

directions. The effect of a simple basic concept 

was to give Sims and many others a common 

direction, enormously strengthening what they 

did and also providing a measure against which 

to evaluate their efforts.

The other key aspect was that the transformation enlisted support from outside the 

Navy. The Policy Board study came not from a 

group of internal reformers, but from a politically appointed secretary. That meant he had, at 

least potentially, the president’s ear; he would 

Orlando S. Lagman, Great White Fleet in Magellan Strait. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 66-335-Y
Friedman 33

not have entered office unless the president had 

wanted him. He could transmit his thinking to 

Congress, and only Congress could agree to a 

major shift in priorities.

This sort of education is the role of major 

statements of naval strategy. There was really 

nothing like the product of the Policy Board until the statements of the maritime strategy in the 

1980s.
34

THE COLOR PLANS, 1919–1938

by Louis Morton

Command Decisions, 196012

isolationism, and congressional economy, military planning in the United States was largely 

theoretical. Germany had just been defeated 

and stripped of military power. Russia was preoccupied with internal problems and, though 

Communism was recognized as a menace, the 

Bolshevik regime was in no position to engage 

in military adventures. Neither France nor Italy 

had sufficient naval force to attempt any major 

operation the Western Hemisphere and had no 

reason to do so in any case.

Of all the powers in Europe, only Great 

Britain was theoretically in a position to engage the United States in war with any prospect 

of success. The British had extensive holdings 

in the Western Hemisphere from which to 

launch attacks on American territory and they 

had enough dreadnoughts and battle cruisers 

to obtain naval supremacy in the Atlantic. But 

the possibility of a contest with Britain was extremely remote, for there was no sentiment for 

war on either side of the Atlantic.

In the Pacific and Far East, the situation was 

different. Between Japan and the United States, 

there were a number of unresolved differences 

American strategical planning in the 

period immediately following World 

War I was largely conditioned by the 

postwar political system and by the wide popular reaction against war. The Versailles Treaty, 

the Washington [Naval Conference] treaties of 

1921–22, and the League of Nations (to which 

Germany was admitted in 1925) gave promise 

to the war-weary peoples of the world of an international order in which war would be forever 

banished. That promise seemed to many to have 

been fulfilled in 1928 when representatives from 

most of the nations in the world met at Paris to 

sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as 

an instrument of national policy.13 Though the 

United States was not a member of the league, 

American policy was closely and consciously designed to support the actions of the league in its 

efforts to further world peace.

During these years of disillusion with war, 

12 The original chapter came from Louis Morton, “Germany First: 

The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II,” in Command 

Decisions (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1960), 

12–20. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current 

standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

13 The Kellogg-Briand Pact was formally known as General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy.
Morton 35

and a reservoir of misunderstanding and ill will 

that made the possibility of conflict much more 

likely in that area than in Atlantic. Moreover, Japan’s position had been greatly strengthened as 

a result of the war and the treaties that followed. 

In the view of the planners, the most probable 

enemy in the foreseeable future was Japan. Thus, 

U.S. strategic thought in the years from 1919 to 

1938 was largely concentrated on the problems 

presented by a conflict arising out of Japanese 

aggression against American interests or territory in the Far East.

The preparation of strategic war plans involving joint (i.e., Army and Navy) forces—and 

for all practical purposes this mean the plans 

prepared by the American staff—was the responsibility of the Joint Board, predecessor of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reorganized in 1919 to 

correct defects that had become apparent since 

establishment in 1903, the board consisted of 

six members. The Army Chief of Staff and the 

Chief of Naval Operations, their deputies, and 

the chiefs of the War Plans Divisions of each of 

the Services. To it came all matters that required 

cooperation between the two Services, either 

by referral or on the initiative of the board itself. It had no executive functions or command 

authority and, until 1939, reported to the War 

and Navy secretaries. Its recommendations were 

purely advisory and became effective only upon 

approval by both secretaries, and, in some cases, 

by the president himself.

The most notable improvement of the 1919 

reorganization was the formation of a Joint PlanMap of War Plan Orange in the 1920s and 1930s.

Map courtesy of U.S. Naval Institute
36 Chapter One

ning Committee to assist the board. Consisting 

of eight officers, four each from the War Plans 

Division of the Army and of the Navy, this committee performed the detailed investigation and 

study required for policy decisions, preparation 

of war plans, and all other matters involving 

joint actions of the Army and Navy. It was, in 

effect, a working group for the Joint Board and 

made its reports and recommendations directly 

to that body.

The problems considered by the Joint 

Board after World War I varied widely, but the 

development of joint war plans constituted, as 

it had from 1903 to 1913, the major work of 

the board, with most attention being given to a 

possible war with Japan-called [War Plan] Orange in accordance with the system in effect between 1904 and 1939 of designating war plans 

by colors, each color corresponding to a specific 

situation or nation. The mandate to Japan of the 

German islands in the Central Pacific had given that nation numerous bases astride the U.S. 

Fleet’s line of communication and made American defense of the Philippines in the event of 

war with Japan virtually impossible. Moreover, 

in the Five-Power Naval Treaty of 1922, the 

United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy 

had promised not to fortify their Far Eastern 

Marines in ships’ detachments, such as this one on board the carrier USS Lexington (CV 2), served in major 

combatant ships of the prewar Navy. Many seagoing Marines were either commissioned or became senior 

staff noncommissioned officers during World War II.

Official U.S. Navy photo, Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 51363
Morton 37

possessions in return for a pledge by the Japanese to restrain themselves similarly. By this 

agreement, Japan was virtually assured that the 

Philippines, Guam, and Hong Kong would not 

become formidable fortresses threatening the 

home islands. And although Japan had to accept 

British and American superiority in capital ships 

at the Washington [Naval] Conference of 1922, 

its naval position in the Pacific improved greatly as a result. In the years that followed, while 

the United States scrapped ships and Japan built 

them, the strength of the U.S. Fleet relative to 

that of Japan so declined that it is doubtful if 

during the 1920s and 1930s it could have met 

the later on equal terms in the western Pacific.

The first postwar plan for war in the Pacific, developed between 1921 and 1924, reviewed 

America’s unfavorable strategic position and 

recognized Japan as the probable enemy. The 

strategic concept adopted by the planners in the 

event of hostilities was to fight “an offensive war, 

primarily naval” with the objective of establishing “at the earliest date American sea power in 

the western Pacific in strength superior to that 

of Japan.” To do this the United States would 

require a base in that area capable of serving 

the entire U.S. Fleet. Since the only base west 

of Pearl Harbor large enough for this purpose 

was in Manila Bay, [the Philippines,] it would be 

essential, said the planners, to hold the bay in 

case of war and be ready to rush reinforcements, 

under naval protection, to the Philippines in 

time to prevent their capture. To the Army fell 

the vital task of holding the base in Manila Bay 

until the arrival of the Fleet, but the major role 

in any war with Japan would be played by the 

Navy, for success in the final analysis depended 

on seapower.

War Plan Orange made no provision for a 

landing on the Japanese home islands. Japan was 

to be defeated by “isolation and harassment,” by 

the disruption of its vital sea communications, 

and by “offensive sea and air operations against 

her naval forces and economic life.” Presumably 

it would not be necessary to invade Japan. But 

the planners recognized that if they could not 

bring Japan to her knees by these means they 

would have to take “such further action as may 

be required to win the war.”14

For about 15 years, the strategic concepts 

embodied in the Orange Plan formed the basis 

for most American war planning. Variations of 

the plan were prepared and discussed at length. 

Every conceivable situation that might involve 

the United States in a war with Japan, including a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor, was 

carefully considered and appropriate measures 

of defense were adopted. At least half a dozen 

times between 1924 and 1938, the plan was revised, sometimes in response to military changes and sometimes as a result of congressional 

sentiment or because of the international situation. Each time, all the implementing plans had 

to be changed. The Army and Navy had their 

separate Orange Plans, based on the joint plans 

and complete with concentration tables, mobilization schedules, and the like. In addition, U.S. 

forces in the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and 

other overseas bases had their joint and Service 

plans, as did the defense sectors and continental commands within the United States. Rarely 

have plans for a war been so comprehensive and 

detailed, so complete on every echelon, and so 

long in preparation.

14 Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan Orange, 1924, Joint Board (JB) 

325, Ser. 228. After numerous drafts, the plan was completed and 

approved by the Joint Board and the secretary of the Navy in August 1924 and by the secretary of War the following month. The 

Preliminary Estimates of the Situation, Joint War Plan Orange, 

and other relevant studies are filed in War Plans Division (WPD) 

368; JB 325, Ser. 207; JB 305, Sers. 208–9; and General Board 

425, Ser. 1136.
38 Chapter One

But the United States never fought this war, 

for [War Plan] Orange was based on a situation 

that never came to pass. The Orange war envisaged by the planners was a war between the 

United States and Japan alone. Neither side, it 

was assumed, would have allies or attack the 

territory of a third power. It was a war that was 

to be fought entirely in the Pacific, with the decisive action to take place in the waters off the 

Asiatic coast.

These assumptions by the military strategists of the Army and Navy were entirely justified by the international situation and reflected a 

reasonable estimate of the most probable threat 

to American interests, an estimate that was 

shared by most responsible officials during these 

years. But the planners did not, indeed could 

not, ignore other possibilities no matter how 

remote. Thus, during the same years in which 

they labored on [War Plan] Orange, the joint 

planners considered a variety of other contingencies that might require the use of American 

military forces. Among the most serious, though 

one of the most unlikely, of these was a war with 

Great Britain alone ([War Plan] Red) which in 

the planners’ estimate could conceivably arise 

from commercial rivalry between the two nations, or with Great Britain and Japan ([War 

Plan] Red-Orange). The latter contingency was 

conceded by all to present the gravest threat to 

American security, one that would require a 

full-scale mobilization and the greatest military 

effort.

In their study of these two contingencies, 

the military planners came to grips with strategic problems quite different from those presented by [War Plan] Orange. A war with Japan 

would be primarily a naval war fought in the 

Pacific. So far as anyone could foresee, there 

would be no requirement for large ground 

armies. There was a possibility, of course, that 

Japan would attack the Panama Canal, Hawaii, 

and even the West Coast, but no real danger that 

Japan could seize and occupy any of these places. In the unlikely event of a conflict between 

Great Britain and the United States, there was 

Completed at the New York Naval Shipyard at the 

end of World War I, USS New Mexico (BB 40) escorted President Woodrow Wilson in USS George 

Washington (ID 3018) to France to sign the Treaty of Versailles. The New Mexico was the first U.S. 

Navy ship with a turbo-electric transmission, an 

innovation that increased engine performance while 

reducing its overall size requirements and weight. 

It proved so successful that the Navy immediately 

decided that all future ships would use this type of 

engine. Oil on canvas, Walter L. Greene, 1927.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

28-001-B
Morton 39

a real possibility of invasion of the United States 

as well as attacks against the [Panama] Canal and 

American interests in the Caribbean and Latin 

American. In such a war, the major threat clearly would lie in the Atlantic.

Plans developed to meet the remote danger of a Red war, in contrast to Orange, called 

for the immediate dispatch of the bulk of the 

U.S. Fleet to the Atlantic and large-scale ground 

operation to deprive the enemy of bases in the 

Western Hemisphere. As in Orange, it was assumed that neither side would have allies among 

the great powers of Europe and Asia, and no 

plans were made for an invasion of the enemy’s 

homeland by an American expeditionary force. 

This was to be a limited war in which the United 

States would adopt a strategic defensive with the 

object of frustrating the enemy’s assumed objective in opening hostilities.

The problems presented by a Red-Orange 

coalition, though highly theoretical, were more 

complicated. Here, the American strategists had 

to face all the possibilities of an Orange and a 

Red war-seizure of American possessions in the 

western Pacific, violation of the Monroe Doctrine, attacks on the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and 

other places, and, finally, the invasion of the 

United States itself. Basically, the problem was 

to prepare for a war in both oceans against the 

two great naval powers, Great Britain and Japan.

As the planners viewed this problem, the 

strategic choices open to the United States were 

limited. Certainly, the United State did not have 

the naval strength to conduct offensive operations simultaneously in both the Atlantic and 

Pacific Oceans; she must adopt a strategic defensive on both fronts or else assume the strategic 

offensive in one theater while standing on the 

defensive in the other. The recommended solution to this problem—and it was only a recommended solution, for no joint war plan was ever 

adopted—was “to concentrate on obtaining a 

favorable decision” in the Atlantic and to stand 

on the defensive in the Pacific with minimum 

forces. This was based on the assumption that, 

since the Atlantic enemy was the stronger and 

since the vital areas of the United States were 

located in the northeast, the main effort of the 

hostile coalition would be made there. For this 

reason, the initial effort of the United States, the 

planners argued, should be in the Atlantic.

A strategic offensive-defensive in a twofront war, American strategists recognized, entailed serious disadvantages. It gave the hostile 

coalition freedom of action to attack at points of 

its own choosing, compelled the United States 

to be prepared to meet attacks practically everywhere, exposed all U.S. overseas possessions to 

capture, and imposed on the American people 

a restraint inconsistent with their traditions and 

spirit. Also, it involved serious and humiliating 

defeats in the Pacific during the first phase of 

the war and the almost certain loss of outlying 

possessions in that region.

But the strategic offensive-defensive had 

definite advantages. It enabled the United States 

to conduct operations in close proximity to its 

home bases and to force the enemy to fight at 

great distance from his own home bases at the 

end of a long line of communications. Moreover, 

the forces raised in the process of producing a 

favorable decision in the Atlantic would give the 

United States such a superiority over Japan that 

the Japanese might well negotiate rather than 

fight the United States alone. “It is not unreasonable to hope,” the planners observed, “that the 

situation at the end of the struggle with RED 

may be such as to induce ORANGE to yield 
40 Chapter One

rather than face a war carried to the Western 

Pacific.”15

This plan for a Red-Orange war was admittedly unrealistic in terms of the international 

situation during the 1920s and 1930s. The military planners knew this as well and better than 

most and often noted this fact in the draft plans 

they wrote.16 But as a strategic exercise, it was 

15 Proposed Joint Estimate and Plan-Red-Orange, prepared in 

WPD (Army) and approved by Chief of Staff, 3 June 1930, as basis 

for joint plan, G-3 Obsolete Plans, Reg. Doc. 245-C. Additional 

material on Red-Orange may be found in same file 245-A through 

F and in WPD 3202. No joint plan was ever approved.

16 In 1923, the Army draft of Red-Orange started with the 

statement, “Under existing conditions a coalition of RED and 

ORANGE is unlikely,” and 12 years later the director of Naval 

Intelligence, commenting on another draft plan, stated that a 

Red-Orange combination was “highly improbable” in the next decade, if at all. Army Draft Red-Orange, 1923, Reg. Doc. 245-F; 

Director ONI to Director WPD, 27 June 1935, sub: Jt Estimate of 

Situation, RED-ORANGE, copy in WPD 3202. By 1935, planning 

for such a war had virtually ended.

of great value for it forced the military planners 

to consider seriously the problems presented by 

a war in which the United States would have to 

fight simultaneously in the Atlantic and Pacific 

Oceans. In an era when most war planning was 

focused on the Pacific and where Japan seemed 

the most likely enemy, this experience may have 

seemed irrelevant. But it was to prove immensely useful in the plans developed for World War II.

By late 1937, the assumptions that had given 

to Orange planning its prime importance during 

the past decade and a half had become of doubtful validity. International events had created a 

situation that made it increasingly unlikely that 

a war between the United States and Japan could 

be limited to these two nations. Germany, Italy, and 

Japan had joined hands in the Anti-Comintern 

Pact, and threats or direct acts of aggression 

U.S. Battleship Division Nine firing during target practice, 1928.

Official U.S. Navy photo, Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 124141
Morton 41

were the order of the day in Europe and Asia.17

Great Britain and France, still suffering from the 

prolonged economic crisis of the early 1930s 

and weakened by domestic conflicts, remained 

passive in the face of this threat, seeking to avert 

armed conflict by a policy of appeasement.

In the light of these developments, the Joint 

Board directed its planners to reexamine the 

Orange Plan. In its view, the existing plan was 

now “unsound in general” and “wholly inapplicable to present conditions.” The planners were 

to develop a new plan that should provide, the 

board specified, for an initial “position of readiness” 

along the West Coast and the strategic triangle 

formed by Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. In addition, the planners were to make “exploratory 

studies and estimates” of the various courses of 

action to be followed after the position of readiness had been assumed. Clearly implied in these 

instructions was the injunction to consider the 

possibility that the United States might become 

involved in a European conflict while engaged in 

offensive operations in the Pacific.18

In less than two weeks, the Joint Planning 

Committee reported its inability to reach an 

agreement. The Army members, viewing the 

uncertain situation in Europe, were reluctant 

to underwrite offensive operations in the Pacific beyond those essential to the security of the 

strategic triangle and the West Coast. With the 

European Axis in mind, they pointed out that 

political considerations might require limited 

action and purely defensive operations in the 

Pacific. To uncover vital areas in the Western 

Hemisphere for an offensive in the far Pacific 

17 The Anti-Comintern Pact was originally made in 1936 between 

Germany and Japan and then between Italy, Germany, and Japan in 

1937 to combat against Communist International but also specifically the Soviet Union.

18 JB to JPC, memo sub: Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, 10 November 1937, JB 325, Ser. 617; and Col S. D. Embick for WPD, 3 

November 1937, AG 225.

seemed to the Army planners foolhardy indeed. 

Thus, their plan provided for purely defensive 

operations after the assumption by U.S. forces 

of a portion of readiness.

To the Army planners, the primary problem 

was to determine the kind of war the United 

States should fight. Should the situation dictate 

operations designed only for the defense of the 

United States or of the Western Hemisphere, 

then the war in the Pacific might well take on 

a limited character. It was impossible to determine in advance just what the situation would 

be, whether the United States would be involved 

with one or more of the Axis Powers, or even 

what forces would be available. It might well be, 

declared the Army planners, that national policy 

and public opinion would neither require nor 

support a plan for offensive operations in the 

Pacific.

The Navy members of the Joint Planning 

Committee argued that American strategy could 

not be limited to a purely defensive position 

in readiness but must aim at the defeat of the 

enemy. Once war began, production must be 

quickly increased to provide the means required 

both for the security of the continental United 

States and for offensive operations in the Pacific. Should the European Axis give aid to the 

enemy, the naval planners assumed, with Great 

Britain clearly in mind, that the United States 

would have allies who would provide the assistance needed by the U.S. Fleet to maintain naval 

superiority over Japan. “The character, amount, 

and location of allied assistance,” they hastened 

to add, “cannot be predicted.”19

The separate reports submitted by the 

19 Army and Navy Members JPC to JB, 28 and 30 November 1937, 

sub: Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, Ser. 617. The Army 

plan is in appendix A, the Navy’s in appendix B. See also, Col W. J. 

Krueger, draft memo, sub: Some Thoughts on Joint War Plans, 22 

November 1937, AG 225.
42 Chapter One

Army and Navy members of the Joint Planning 

Committee put the choice between the opposing strategies squarely up to the Joint Board. The 

board avoided the choice by issuing new instructions to the planners on 7 December 1937. The 

new plan, it specified, should have as its basic 

objective the defeat of Japan and should provide 

for “an initial temporary position in readiness” 

for the Pacific coast and the strategic triangle. 

This last was to be the Army’s job; the Navy’s task 

would consist of “offensive operations against 

ORANGE armed forces and the interruption of 

ORANGE vital sea communications.”20

Even under these revised instructions, the 

20 JB to JPC, directive sub: Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, 7 December 1937, JB 325, Ser. 618.

planners were unable to agree on the best way 

to meet an Axis threat. Faced with another split 

report, the Joint Board turned over the task of 

working out a compromise to the deputy chief 

of staff and the assistant chief of Naval Operations. These two, after a month of discussion, 

finally came up with a new Orange Plan on 18 

February 1938. This plan maintained the traditional offensive strategy in the Pacific, but it also 

took into account the danger of a simultaneous 

conflict in the Atlantic—the first time this possibility was recognized in Orange planning. On 

the outbreak of a war with Japan, the United 

States would first assume a position in readiness and make preparations for the offensive 

against Japan. It would then be ready to meet 

USS Chicago (CA 29) is pictured here underway off of New York City during the 31 May 1934 fleet review. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 715
Morton 43

any unexpected development that might arise, 

including an attack in the Atlantic. If none did, 

the Navy would then proceed to take the offensive against Japan with operations directed initially against the mandated islands and extending 

progressively westward across the Pacific. These 

operations combined with economic pressure 

(blockade) would, it was believed, result in the 

defeat of Japan and a settlement that would assure the peace and safeguard American interests 

in the Far East.21

21 Joint Basic War Plan ORANGE, 21 February 1938, JB 325, Ser. 

618. The plan was approved by the secretary of the Navy on 26 

February and the secretary of War two days later.
44

EVOLUTION OF MODERN 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, 

1920–1941

by Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough, 

Major Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw Jr.

Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, 195822

maneuvers of the fleet. Expeditionary services 

in Cuba and Panama prevented an immediate 

follow-up to this early base defense instruction; 

but in 1910, a permanent advanced base school 

was organized at New London, Connecticut. A 

year later, it was moved to Philadelphia.23

By 1913, sufficient progress had been made 

in advanced base instruction to permit the formation of a permanent advanced base force. 

Made up of two regiments—one of coast artillery, mines, searchlights, engineers, communicators, and other specialists for fixed 

defense, and the other of infantry and field artillery for mobile defense—the advanced base 

force totaled about 1,750 officers and men. In 

January of 1914, it was reinforced by a small 

Marine Corps aviation detachment and joined 

the fleet for maneuvers at Culebra. But the 

analogy between advanced base training and the 

amphibious assault techniques that emerged in 

World War II is easily overdrawn. Prior to World 

War I, the primary interest was in defense of a 

23 J. A. Isely and P. A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its 

Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), 21–22.

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

The success of the Guantánamo Bay operation and the very real possibility 

that the United States’ new position 

in world affairs might lead to repetitions of essentially the same situation led high-level naval 

strategists to become interested in establishing 

a similar force on a permanent basis: a force capable of seizing and defending advanced bases 

that the fleet could utilize in the prosecution of 

naval war in distant waters—waters conceivably 

much more distant than the Caribbean. This in 

turn led to the setting up of a class in the fundamentals of advanced base work at Newport, 

Rhode Island, in 1901. During the winter of 

1902–3, a Marine battalion engaged in advanced 

base defense exercises on the island of Culebra 

in the Caribbean in conjunction with the annual 

22 The original chapter came from LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj 

Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw Jr., “Evolution of Modern 

Amphibious Warfare, 1920–1941,” in Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal: 

History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. I (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1958), 8–23. Minor revisions were made to the text 

based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and 

spelling.
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 45

base against enemy attack. There was no serious 

contemplation of large-scale landings against 

heavily defended areas.24

This all but exclusive concern for the defense of bases was clearly borne out by the 

writing of Major Earl H. Ellis. Ellis, one of the 

most brilliant young Marine staff officers, was 

among the farsighted military thinkers who saw 

the prospect of war between the United States 

and Japan prior to World War I. Around 1913, 

he directed attention to the problems of a future Pacific conflict. To bring military force to 

24 Annual Report of the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

Fiscal Year 1914 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

1914), hereafter CMC Annual Report (year).

bear against Japan, Ellis pointed out, the United 

States would have to project its fleet across the 

Pacific. To support these operations so far from 

home would require a system of outlying bases. Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, which 

were the most important of these, we already 

possessed. Their defense would be of utmost 

importance and would constitute the primary mission of the Marine advanced base force. 

Ellis discussed in considerable detail the troops 

which would be required and the tactics they 

should employ.

In addition to the bases already in the possession of the United States, Ellis foresaw the 

need of acquiring others held by Japan. To the 

Marine Corps would fall the job of assaulting the 

enemy-held territory. Although he did not discuss the problems involved or take up the tactics 

to be employed, Ellis foreshadowed the amphibious assault that was to be the primary mission 

of the Marine Corps in World War II.25

The infant Advanced Base Force was diverted to other missions almost as soon as it was 

created. Hardly were the Culebra maneuvers 

of 1914 completed when the Marines were sent 

to Mexico for the seizure of Veracruz. The next 

year, they went ashore in Haiti, and in 1916, unsettled conditions in Santo Domingo required 

the landing of Marines in that country. Expeditionary service in these two Caribbean republics 

was to constitute a heavy and continuing drain on 

Marine Corps resources, which might otherwise 

have been devoted to advanced base activities.

The expansion of the Marine Corps to 

about 73,000 officers and men during World 

25 Earl H. Ellis, “Naval Bases” (unpublished manuscript, n.d.). The 

date and origin of this work and to whom it was addressed are 

obscure, but it appears that the work is either a lecture or a series of lectures with the following divisions: 1. Naval Bases; Their 

Location, Resources and Security; 2. The Denial of Bases; 3. The 

Security of Advanced Bases and Advanced Base Operation; 4. The 

Advanced Base Force.

LtCol Earl H. Ellis, seen here in a 1952 portrait by 

Col H. Avery Chenoweth, USMCR, was the author 

of Operations Plan 712: Advanced Base Operations in 

Micronesia, which became the basis for the American 

campaign of amphibious assault that defeated the 

Japanese in World War II. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
46 Chapter one

War I served as a temporary stimulant to the Advanced Base Force. In spite of the demands for 

manpower resulting from the sending of an expeditionary force to France, the Advanced Base 

Force was maintained at full strength throughout the war. By the Armistice, it numbered 

6,297 officers and men.26

UPS AND DOWNS 

OF THE 1920S

Marines returning from overseas late in 1919 

picked up where they left off three years before. 

At Quantico, the Advanced Base Force, redesig26 LtCol Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine 

Corps (New York: Putnam’s, 1939), 456–60, 472.

nated the [Marine Corps] Expeditionary Force 

in 1921, stood ready to occupy and defend an 

advanced base or to restore law and order in a 

Caribbean republic. In that year, it included infantry, field artillery, signal, engineer, and chemical troops, and aircraft. A similar expeditionary 

force was planned for San Diego, [California,] 

but perennial personnel shortages prevented 

the stationing of more than one infantry regiment and one aircraft squadron there during the 

1920s.27

Nothing seemed changed, but delegates of 

the Great Powers, meeting at Versailles to write 

27 CMC Annual Reports, 1921–29.

The Marine battalion from USS Florida (BB 30) going ashore at Veracruz, Mexico, during the U.S. intervention on 21 April 1914. On the right is HMS Essex, flying from the foremast the flag of British RAdm Christopher G. Cradock, who died later in 1914 in the Battle of Coronel. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 42503, courtesy of LtCdr Richard Wainwright Jr., USN (Ret)
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 47

the peace treaty ending World War I, had already 

taken an action that was to have far-reaching 

consequences for a future generation of Marines. In the general distribution of spoils, the 

former German island possessions in the central Pacific had been mandated to the Japanese. 

[In] one stroke, the strategic balance in the Pacific was shifted radically in favor of Japan. That 

country now possessed a deep zone of island 

outposts. Fortified and supported by the Japanese fleet, they would constitute a serious obstacle to the advance of the United States Fleet 

across the Pacific.

Earl Ellis was one of the first to recognize 

the significance of this strategic shift. In 1921, he 

modified his earlier ideas and submitted them in 

the form of Operation Plan 712, Advanced Base 

Operations in Micronesia. In this plan, Ellis stressed 

the necessity for seizing by assault the bases 

needed to project the Fleet across the Pacific. 

He envisioned the seizure of specific islands in 

the Marshall, Caroline, and Palau groups, some 

of which were actually taken by Marines in 

World War II. He went so far as to designate the 

size and type of units that would be necessary, 

the kind of landing craft they should use, the 

best time of day to effect the landing, and other 

details needed to insure the success of the plan. 

Twenty years later, Marine Corps action was to 

bear the imprint of this thinking:

To effect [an amphibious landing] in the face 

of enemy resistance requires careful training 

and preparation, to say the least; and this 

along Marine lines. It is not enough that the 

Three landing craft leaving USS Michigan (BB 27) during the U.S. intervention at Veracruz, Mexico. 

Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-4987
48 Chapter one

troops be skilled infantry men or artillery 

men of high morale; they must be skilled 

water men and jungle men who know it can 

be done—Marines with Marine training.28

The Commandant, Major General John A. 

Lejeune, and other high-ranking Marines shared 

Ellis’ views. “The seizure and occupation or destruction of enemy bases is another important 

function of the expeditionary force,” [Lejeune] 

stated in a lecture before the Naval War College 

in 1923. “On both flanks of a fleet crossing the 

Pacific are numerous islands suitable for submarine and air bases. All should be mopped up as 

progress is made. . . . The maintenance, equipping and training of its expeditionary force so 

that it will be in instant readiness to support the 

Fleet in the event of war,” he concluded, “I deem 

to be the most important Marine Corps duty in 

time of peace.”29

The 1920s, however, were not the most favorable years for training in amphibious operations. Appropriations for the Armed Services 

were slim, and the Navy, whose cooperation and 

support was necessary to carry out landing exercises, was more intent on preparing for fleet 

surface actions of the traditional type. Still, a 

limited amount of amphibious training was carried out in the first half of the decade.

During the winter of 1922, a reinforced 

regiment of Marines participated in fleet maneuvers with the Atlantic Fleet. Their problems 

included the attack and defense of Guantánamo 

Bay, Cuba, and the island of Culebra. In March 

of the following year, a detachment of Marines 

took part in a landing exercises at Panama, and a 

battalion of Marines and sailors practiced a land28 Ellis, Advanced Based Operations in Micronesia. 29 MajGen John A. Lejeune, “The United States Marine Corps,”Marine Corps Gazette 8, no. 4 (December 1923): 252–53.

ing on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, that summer.

Panama and Culebra both witnessed landing 

exercises early in 1924, with a Marine regiment 

participating. This set of exercises was the high 

point of training reached in the 20s. It marked 

the advent of serious experimentation with adequate landing craft for troops and equipment. 

However, it was most notable for the great 

number of mistakes made in the course of the 

exercises, such as inadequate attacking forces, 

insufficient and unsuitable boats, lack of order 

among the landing party, superficial naval bombardment, and poor judgment in the stowage of 

supplies and equipment aboard the single transport used.30

The last landing exercise of the era was a 

30 Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 30–32.

Marines raise the U.S. flag over Veracruz, 27 April 

1914. American troops entered the city on 21 April 

and stayed through November.

Library of Congress, LC-DIG-GGBAIN-15834
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 49

joint Army-Navy affair held during the spring 

of 1925 in Hawaiian waters. It was actually an 

amphibious command post exercise, undertaken at the insistence of General Lejeune to prove 

to skeptical Army officers that the Marine Corps 

could plan and execute an amphibious operation 

of greater than brigade size. A force of 42,000 

Marines was simulated, although only 1,500 actually participated. It ran more smoothly than 

had the previous exercise, but still was handicapped by a lack of adequate landing craft.31

Even this meager amphibious training came 

to an end after 1925. New commitments in 

Nicaragua, in China, and in the United States 

guarding the mails served to disperse the expeditionary forces. By 1928, the Commandant 

31 BGen Dion Williams, “Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary 

Force,” Marine Corps Gazette 10, no. 2 (September 1925): 76–88; 

LtGen M. B. Twining to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, 25 January 1957, 

hereafter Twining letter; and BPlan JA&Nav Exercise, 1925, Problem No. 3, Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, 8 January 

1925.

announced in his annual report that barely 

enough personnel were on hand at Quantico and 

San Diego to keep those bases in operation.32

Whatever the shortcomings of the work in 

amphibious doctrine and technique during the 

1920s, the Marine Corps scored a major triumph when its special interest in the field became part of the official military policy of the 

United States. Joint Action of the Army and Navy, a 

directive issued by the Joint Board of the Army 

and Navy in 1927, stated that the Marine Corps 

would provide and maintain forces “for land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such 

limited auxiliary land operations as are essential 

to the prosecution of the naval campaign.”33

Further, in outlining the tasks to be performed by the Army and Navy in “Landing At32 CMC Annual Report, 1928. 33 Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and Navy (Washington, DC: 

GPO, 1927).

U.S. Marines land from “whaleboats” and ships’ boats during an early amphibious landing exercise at Quantico, VA, in the 1920s.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
50 Chapter One

tacks Against Shore Objectives,” this document 

firmly established the landing force role of the 

Marine Corps: “Marines organized as landing 

forces perform the same functions as above stated for the Army, and because of the constant association with naval units will be given special 

training in the conduct of landing operations.”34

ACTIVATION OF THE 

FLEET MARINE FORCE

The recognition of a mission did not create the 

doctrine or the trained forces to carry it out, and 

in 1927, neither was at hand. In January 1933, 

the last Marine had departed from Nicaragua, 

and withdrawal from Haiti was contemplated. 

Troops were now becoming available for training in landing operations; but before any real 

progress could be made, one preliminary step 

was essential. A substantial permanent force of 

Marines with its own command and staff would 

have to be organized for the purpose, otherwise 

training would be constantly interrupted by the 

dispersal of the troops to other commitments.

No one recognized this more clearly than 

the Assistant Commandant, Brigadier General 

John H. Russell. He assembled a staff at Quantico to plan the organization of a force that could 

be rapidly assembled for service with the Fleet. 

In August of 1933, he proposed to the Commandant that the old “Expeditionary Force” be 

replaced by a new body to be called either “Fleet 

Marine Force” or “Fleet Base Defense Force.” 

The new force, while an integral part of the 

United States Fleet, would be under the operational control of the Fleet commander when 

embarked on vessels of the Fleet or engaged in 

Fleet exercises afloat or ashore. When not so 

embarked or engaged it would remain under the 

Major General Commandant.

34 Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 3, 12.

Russell’s recommendations were promptly 

approved by the Commandant and by the Chief 

of Naval Operations. The designation Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was preferred by the senior 

naval staffs, and the Commandant was requested 

to submit proposed instructions for establishing 

“appropriate command and administrative relations between the commander in Chief and the 

Commander of the Fleet Marine Force.”35

This directive could well be called the Magna Carta of the Fleet Marine Force. It stated:

The force of Marines maintained by the Major General Commandant in a state of readiness for operations with the fleet is hereby 

designated as Fleet Marine Force (FMF), 

and as such shall constitute a part of the 

organization of the United States Fleet and 

be included in the operating force plan for 

each fiscal year.

The Fleet Marine Force shall consist 

of such units as may be designated by the 

Major General Commandant and shell be 

maintained at such strength as is warranted by the general personnel situation of the 

Marine Corps.

The Fleet Marine Force shall be available to the commander in chief for operations with the Fleet or for exercises either 

afloat or ashore in connection with Fleet 

problems. The commander in chief shall 

make timely recommendations to the Chief 

of Naval Operations regarding such service 

in order that the necessary arrangements 

may be made.

The commander in chief shall exercise command of the Fleet Marine Force 

when embarked on board vessels of the fleet 

or when engaged in Fleet exercises, either 

35 CNO letter to CMC, 12 September 33; and Isely and Crowl, The 

U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 33–34.
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 51

afloat or ashore. When otherwise engaged, 

command shall be directed by the Major 

General Commandant.

The Major General Commandant shall 

detail the commanding general of the Fleet 

Marine Force and maintain an appropriate 

staff for him.

The commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, shall report by letter to the commander in chief, United States Fleet, for 

duty in connection with the employment of 

the Fleet Marine Force. At least once each 

year, and at such times as may be considered desirable by the commander in chief, the 

commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, 

with appropriate members of his staff, shall 

be ordered to report to the commander in 

chief for conference.36

36 Navy Department General Order 241, 8 December 1933.

However significant the creation of the 

FMF may have been in terms of the future, its 

initial form was modest enough. The Commandant was obliged to report in August 1934 that 

the responsibility for maintaining ship’s detachments and garrisons abroad, and performing essential guard duty at naval shore stations, 

prevented the Marine Corps from assigning the 

component units necessary to fulfill the mission 

of the FMF. At this time, the total number of 

officers and men in the FMF was about 3,000.37

“THE BOOK” COMES OUT

With the creation of the FMF, the Marine Corps 

had finally acquired the tactical structure necessary to carry out the primary war mission assigned to it by the Joint Board in 1927. The next 

order of business was to train the FMF for the 

execution of its mission.

37 CMC Annual Report, 1934.

During an exercise in the Caribbean, Marines land a 75mm howitzer from an amphibious tank on the island 

of Culebra, Puerto Rico, in 1923. An early version of the landing craft used in World War II resulted from 

joint Navy-Marine Corps experiments in the 1920s and 1930s. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, 515227
52 Chapter One

But the training could not be very effective 

without a textbook embodying the theory and 

practice of landing operations, no such manual 

existed in 1933. There was a general doctrine 

by the Joint Board issued in 1933 and, though 

it offered many sound definitions and suggested 

general solutions to problems, it lacked necessary detail.

In November 1933, all classes at the Marine Corps Schools were suspended and, under 

the guidance of Colonel Ellis B. Miller, assistant 

commandant of the schools, both the faculty and 

students set to work to write a manual setting 

forth in detail the doctrines and techniques to be 

followed in both training and actual operations. 

Under the title, Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, it was issued in January 1934.

On 1 August 1934, the title was changed 

to Manual for Naval Overseas Operations and some 

changes were effected in the text. A few months 

later, this publication, now retitled Tentative 

Landing Operations Manual, was approved by the 

Chief of Naval Operations for “temporary use 

. . . as a guide for forces of the Navy and the 

Marine Corps conducting a landing against opposition.”38 In mimeographed form, it was given 

relatively limited distribution within the Navy, 

but wide distribution within the Marine Corps. 

Comments were invited.

The doctrine laid down in this remarkable 

document was destined to become the foundation of all amphibious thinking in the United 

States armed forces. The Navy accepted it as official doctrine in 1938 under the title of [Landing 

Operations Doctrine] (Fleet Training Publication 

167), and in 1941, the War Department put 

the Navy text between Army covers and issued 

it as [Landing Operations on Hostile Shores] (Field 

Manual 31-5).

Remarkable as it was, the Marine’s amphib38 Tentative Landing Operations Manual (Washington, DC: Navy Department, 1935).

John W. Christie’s amphibious tank lands on Culebra during the U.S. Marines’ 1924 winter maneuvers. The 

experimental amphibious tractor began a long line of test vehicles that culminated in the landing vehicle, 

tracked (LVT). 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 53

ious doctrine was largely theory when it was 

first promulgated at Quantico in 1934. To put 

the theory into practice, major landing exercises were resumed. They were held each winter 

from 1935 through 1941 on the islands of Culebra and Vieques, [Puerto Rico,] in conjunction 

with fleet exercises in the Caribbean, or on San 

Clemente off the California coast. A final exercise of the prewar period on a much larger 

scale than any previously attempted was held at 

the newly acquired Marine Corps base at New 

River, North Carolina, in the summer of 1941. 

These Fleet landing exercises provided the practical experience by which details of landing operations were hammered out.

In light of its importance, here might be as 

good a place as any to consider briefly the more 

basic aspects of this doctrine as conceived in the 

original manual and modified by experience in 

Fleet exercises up to the outbreak of the war. 

Amphibious operations and ordinary ground 

warfare share many of the same tactical principles. The basic difference between them lies 

in the fact the amphibious assault is launched 

from the sea and is supported by naval elements. 

While water-borne, the landing force is completely powerless and is dependent upon the naval elements for all its support: gunfire, aviation, 

transportation, and communication. In this initial stage only, the naval elements have the capability of reacting to enemy action. As the landing 

force, however, is projected onto the beach, its 

effectiveness, starting from zero at the water’s 

edge, increases rapidly until its strength is fully 

established ashore.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

This basic difference between land and amphibious operations created a problem in command 

relationships, which has plagued amphibious operations from earliest times. During the initial 

stage when only naval elements have the capability of reacting to enemy action, it has been 

generally and logically agreed that the overall 

command must be vested in the commander of 

the naval attack force. It has, however, not been 

so generally agreed in the past that once the 

landing force is established ashore and capable 

of exerting its combat power with primary reliance on its own weapons and tactics that the 

landing force commander should be freed to 

conduct the operations ashore as he sees fit.

The authors of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual, writing in 1934, evidently did not 

foresee that this particular aspect of command 

relations presented a problem that required 

resolution.39 They simply defined the “attack 

force” as all the forces necessary to conduct a 

landing operation and added that the attack 

force commander was to be the senior naval 

officer of the Fleet units making up the attack 

force. His command was to consist of the landing force and several naval components, organized as task groups for the support of the 

landing. These included, among others, the fire 

support, transport, air, screening, antisubmarine, and reconnaissance groups. The commanders of the landing force and of the several naval 

task groups operated on the same level under 

the overall command of the attack force commander throughout the operation.

This initial command concept was destined 

39 Unless otherwise noted, the material in the remainder of this 

chapter is derived from Tentative Landing Operations Manual and 

Landing Operations Doctrine (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief 

of Naval Operations, 1938); 1st Marine Brigade letter to CMC, 5 

June 1939 and enclosure (a); 1st Marine Brigade Flex 6 Report, 

“Notes from Critique for Makee Learn Problem at Culebra,” 

14–15 February 1940; and 2d Marine Brigade Minor Landing Exercises Report, San Clemente Island, CA, 17 April–6 May 1939.
54 Chapter One

to undergo a number of modifications and interpretations which will be discussed in this history 

as they occur. The first important change did not 

come about until toward the close of the Guadalcanal campaign.40

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

There is nothing new in the concept of using the 

fire of ships’ guns to cover an amphibious landing 

of troops during its most vulnerable phase: before, during, and after the ship-to-shore movement. Our own history contains many examples 

of this technique, notably: two landings of U.S. 

troops in Canada during the War of 1812 (York 

and Niagara Peninsula, summer 1813); General 

[Winfield] Scott’s landing at Vera Cruz in 1847 

during the Mexican War; several amphibious operations during the Civil War (e.g., Fort Fisher, 

[North Carolina,] in 1865); and Guantánamo 

Bay during the Spanish-American War in 1898.

However, the evolution of modern weapons 

posed difficult problems of a technical nature, 

and the much-belabored Gallipoli operation 

seemed to indicate that these were insoluble. 

High-powered naval guns, with their flat trajectory and specialized armor-piercing ammunition, proved no true substitute for land-based 

field artillery, and much study and practice 

would be required to develop techniques that 

would make them even an acceptable substitute.

Nevertheless, a rudimentary doctrine concerning naval gunfire support evolved during 

the years between 1935 and 1941. But it evolved 

slowly and none too clearly. Experimentation indicated that bombardment ammunition, with its 

surface burst, was better suited to fire missions 

against most land targets, while armor-piercing 

shells could be employed to good effect against 

40 See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, part 

VI.

concrete emplacements and masonry walls. The 

types of ships and guns best adapted to perform 

specific fire missions—close support, deep support, counterbattery, interdiction, etc.—were 

determined. And some progress was made in 

fire observation technique.

Three types of observers were provided for: 

aerial, shipboard, and once the first waves had 

landed, shore fire control parties. For the greater part of this period, the latter were made up 

of personnel of the firing ships, inexperienced 

in such work, untrained, and wholly unfamiliar 

with the tactical maneuvers of the troops they 

were supporting. Not until 1941 were trained 

Marine artillery officers with Marine radio 

crews substituted, the naval officers then serving in a liaison capacity.

Other considerations of a naval nature served 

as further limiting factors on the naval gunfire 

support concept. The necessity for the support ships to have a large proportion of armorpiercing projectiles readily available with which 

to fight a surface action on short notice restricted the accessibility of and limited the amount of 

bombardment shells carried. In turn, the probability of enemy air and submarine action once 

the target area became known caused much apprehension in naval minds and dictated the earliest possible departure of the firing ships from 

the objective. An example of this apprehension 

at work came to the fore early in the Guadalcanal campaign.41

Furthermore, tradition dies hard in any 

Service. The traditional belief that warships exist for the sole purpose of fighting other warships dates far back in history, with one of its 

leading exponents the great Lord [Vice Admiral 

Horatio] Nelson with his oft-quoted dictum: “A 

41 See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, part 

VI, chapter 2.
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 55

ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” This supposed vulnerability of surface vessels to shore-based artillery remained very much alive in the minds 

of naval planners. So, they dictated that support 

ships should deliver their fires at maximum 

range while traveling at high speed and maneuvering radically—not exactly conducive to pinpoint marksmanship.42

In sum, these considerations, the starting 

concept of naval gunfire support with which we 

entered World War II, added up to this: a bombardment of very short duration, delivered by 

ships firing relatively limited ammunition allowances of types often not well suited to the 

purpose, from long ranges while maneuvering 

at high speeds. Obviously, the best that could be 

expected would be area neutralization of enemy defenses during troop debarkation and the 

ship-to-shore movement, followed by a limited 

amount of support on a call basis, with this, too, 

to be withdrawn as soon as field artillery could 

be landed.43

42 Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 38. 43 Naval Gunfire in Amphibious Operations, SM-67 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Education Center, Marine Corps Schools, 1955), 2.

Area neutralization—that was the basic 

concept, with deliberate destruction fire ruled 

out. A blood bath would be required to expunge 

this from “The Book.”

AIR SUPPORT

As the Marine Corps developed the various 

techniques contributing to a smooth landing operation, it had to give more and more consideration to the fast growth of military aviation as a 

powerful arm.

Even the original Tentative Landing Operations 

Manual considered the vulnerable concentrations 

of troops in transports, landing boats, and on the 

beach and called for a three-to-one numerical 

superiority over the enemy in the air. Later, 

in FTP-167, the ratio was increased to fourto-one, primarily to wipe the enemy air threat 

out of the skies and secondarily to shatter the 

enemy’s beachhead defense and to cut off his reinforcements.

Considerable emphasis was placed, however, on direct assistance to the troops themselves. 

This included such supporting services as guiding the landing boats to the beach, laying smoke 

screens, and providing reconnaissance and spotting for naval gunfire and artillery. Most importantly, it included rendering direct fire support 

to the landing force until the artillery was ashore 

and ready to fire.

For this air war, employment of Marine 

squadrons on carriers was considered ideal but, 

due to a limited number of carriers, was not always a practical possibility. Planners even considered moving Marine planes ashore in crates 

and assembling them after the ground troops 

had seized an airfield.

Hence, the Tentative Landing Operations Manual called for the Navy to carry most of the 

initial air battle. Marine pilots, however, might 

Part of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, landing at 

Firewood Bay during amphibious exercises at Culebra, Puerto Rico, in February 1936.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photograph, 529463
56 Chapter One

be employed with Navy air units. Actually, in 

order to exercise Marine air, most of the early 

training landing had to be scheduled within 

round trip flying distance of friendly air fields. 

Although, by 1940, Marine carrier training operations were becoming routine, the heavy reliance upon Navy carrier air over Marine landing 

lasted throughout the war.

As noted before, close coordination of air 

with ground received great emphasis in the 

Marine Corps. Even in Santo Domingo, [Dominican Republic,] and Haiti and later in Nicaragua, Marine pilots reconnoitered, strafed, and 

bombed insurgent positions, dropped supplies 

to patrols, and evacuated wounded. The Tentative Landing Operations Manual incorporated this 

teamwork into its new amphibious doctrine, 

and the landing exercises of the late 1930s developed aviation fire power as an important 

close ground support weapon. By 1939, Colonel Roy S. Geiger advocated and other Marine 

Corps leaders conceded that one of the greatest 

potentials of Marine aviation lay in this “close air 

support.”

The challenge became that of applying the 

fire power of Marine air, when needed, to destroy a specific enemy frontline position without 

endangering nearby friendly troops.

Refinement of this skilled technique as we 

know it today was slow because of many factors. 

There was so much for pilots to learn about rapidly developing military aviation that close air 

support had to take its place in the busy training syllabus after such basic drill as aerial tactics, 

air-to-air gunnery, strafing, bombing, navigation, carrier landings, and communications, and 

constant study of the latest in engineering, aerodynamics, and flight safety.

Also, whenever newer, faster, and higherflying airplanes trickled into the Marine Corps 

in the lean 1930s, they were found to be less 

adaptable for close coordination with ground 

troops than the slower, open cockpit planes that 

supported the patrol actions of Nicaragua.

In Nicaragua, the aviator in his open cockpit 

could idle his throttle so as to locate an enemy 

machine gun by its sound, but in the maneuvers of 1940 pilots flashing by in their enclosed 

cockpits found it difficult to see what was going on below or even to differentiate between 

friendly and “enemy” hills.44 In Nicaragua, the 

Marine flier was most often an ex-infantryman, 

but 10 years later many of the new Navy-trained 

Marine aviators were fresh from college and 

knew little about ground tactics. The lack of a 

real enemy to look for, identify, and to shoot at 

hindered attempts at precision, especially since 

air-ground radio was not yet as reliable as the 

old slow-but-sure system where pilots read code 

messages from cloth panels laid on the ground 

or swooped down with weighted lines to snatch 

messages suspended between two poles.

The main key to development of close air 

support lay in reliable communications to permit quick liaison and complete understanding 

between the pilot and the frontline commander. Part of the solution lay in more exercises 

in air-ground coordination with emphasis on 

standardized and simplified air-ground communications and maps. By 1939, an aviator as an 

air liaison officer was assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade staff. While both artillery and naval 

gunfire, however, employed forward observers 

at frontline positions, air support control was 

still being channeled slowly through regimen44 From Culebra came the report, “1st MAG [Marine Aircraft 

Group] as a whole performed in a creditable manner, although at 

one stage they were impartial in their attack.” 1st Marine Brigade, 

FLEX-6 Report, “Notes from Critique for Makee Learn Problem 

at Culebra, 14–15Feb40.”
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 57

tal and brigade command posts.45 In the same 

year, one squadron sent up an air liaison officer 

in the rear seat of a scouting or bombing plane 

to keep abreast of the ground situation and to 

direct fighter or dive bomber pilots onto targets 

by means of radio.46This was better but not best.

Meanwhile, war flamed up in Europe. Navy 

and Marine planners took note as the Germans 

drove around the Maginot Line with their special air-ground “armored packets” in which aviation teamed up with the fast, mobile ground 

45 LtGen Julian C. Smith, interview with Historical Branch, G-3, 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 25 July 1956.

46 Col R. D. Moser, interview with Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps, 31 August 1956.

elements to break up resistance.47 By this time, 

the Marines were working on the idea of placing 

radio-equipped “observers” on the front lines 

to control air support for the troops. But the 

leathernecks were already in the war before the 

first standardized Navy-Marine Corps instructions on their employment appeared.48 Also at 

that time on Guadalcanal, certain infantry officers were given additional duty as regimental 

47 The Maginot Line, named for France’s Minister of War André 

Maginot, represented the French line of defense along the border 

with Germany during the 1930s. It extended from La Ferté to the 

Rhine River and stretched along the Rhine and the Italian frontier. 

WD G-2 to C/S, memo I. B. 130, Air-GrdOps, 23 September 

1941, tab C; and Commander in Chief, Atlantic, FLEX-6 Report, 

13 June 1940, 14–15.

48 USN, CSP-1536, 5 September 1942.

Marines go ashore in an early landing craft during amphibious exercises in 1939. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, 526331
58 Chapter One

“air forward observers.” They were coached on 

the spot by aviators of the 1st Marine Aircraft 

Wing.49

THE SHIP-TO-SHORE 

MOVEMENT

The ship-to-shore movement was visualized by 

the Tentative Landing Operations Manual in a 

manner that resembled closely a conventional 

attack in land warfare: artillery preparation, approach march, deployment, and assault by the 

infantry. It stressed that this movement was no 

simple ferrying operation but a vital and integral 

part of the attack itself and demanded a high order of tactical knowledge and skill.

The two major problems in the ship-toshore movement are the speedy debarkation of 

the assaulting troops and their equipment into 

the landing boats and the control and guiding of 

these craft to their assigned beaches. To facilitate 

the first, the Tentative Landing Operations Manual 

directed that each transport on which combat 

units were embarked should carry a minimum 

[number of] sufficient boats to land a reinforced 

infantry battalion.50 Thus, each transport and 

its accompanying troops would be tactically 

self-sufficient for the assault landing, and the 

loss of one ship would not be a crippling blow. 

To expedite their debarkation, the Marines generally went over the side via cargo nets rigged at 

several stations on the ship.

To solve the second major problem in the 

ship-to-shore movement, that of controlling and 

guiding the landing craft to their proper beaches, 

the Tentative Landing Operations Manual provided 

49 1st Marine Division, “Final Report on Guadalcanal Operation,” 

1 July 1943, Phase V, Annex D, OPlan 2-42, 5. The directive on 

appointing air forward observers was dated 2 October 1942.

50 This general concept that troops and their landing craft should be 

transported together to the objective area remained valid throughout the war, although at times it was necessary to deviate from it.

for: (1) marking the line of departure with buoys 

or picket boats; (2) a designated control vessel 

to lead each boat group from the rendezvous 

area to the line of departure, towing the boats 

in fog, smoke, or darkness, if necessary; (3) 

wave and alternate wave guide boats; (4) each 

boat to carry a signboard with its assigned letter 

and number indicating its proper position in the 

formation; and (5) for a guide plane to lead the 

boat waves in.

The system for the control of the shipto-shore movement was still substantially the 

same as prescribed in the Tentative Landing Operations Manual when the Marines made their 

first amphibious landing of World War II at 

Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942.

COMBAT UNIT LOADING

“Combat unit loading” of transports is the key to 

amphibious logistics as developed by the Marine 

Corps. This is a practical process designed to 

make supplies and equipment immediately available to the assault troops in the order needed, 

disregarding to a large extent the waste of cargo 

space which results. In contrast is commercial 

loading, which is equally practical in utilizing 

every cubic foot of cargo space available but prevents access to much of the cargo until the ship 

is unloaded.

Highest priority items for combat unit 

loading vary somewhat with the nature and 

problems of a particular operation. Relative priorities must be worked out with minute care. 

The responsibility for handling this was given 

to a Marine officer designated transport quartermaster (TQM) aboard each amphibious assault ship. He had to know not only the weight 

and dimensions of each item of Marine gear 

carried but had to familiarize himself with the 

characteristics of the particular ship to which 
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 59

he was assigned: exact location and dimensions of all holds and storage spaces in terms of 

both cubic feet and deck space. This familiarity required at times accurate remeasurement 

of holds and loading spaces as modifications, 

not shown in the ship’s plans, had often been 

made in the ship’s internal structure. Initially, 

the Tentative Landing Operations Manual directed 

that the TQM should be an officer of the unit 

embarked, but such were the variations in ships 

that it subsequently proved more feasible to 

assign a Marine officer, thoroughly familiar with 

Marine gear, permanently to a particular ship 

with which he would become equally familiar 

through experience.

Practical experience with combat loading 

between 1935 and 1941 generally confirmed the 

soundness of the doctrines set forth in the Tentative Landing Operations Manual. Application of 

these doctrines in the Fleet landing exercises 

was limited, however, by several factors, chiefly 

the lack of suitable transports. In addition, an 

uncertainty at times as to ports of embarkation 

and dates of availability of ships sometimes entangled planning procedures. As a result, there 

was no ideal approximation of wartime combat 

loading.

SHORE PARTY

One of the most serious problems encountered 

in early landing exercises was congestion on 

the beaches as men and supplies piled ashore. 

To keep such a situation reasonably in hand requires a high degree of control; control difficult to achieve under such circumstances, even 

when the enemy remains only simulated. Assault 

Troops of the 1st Marine Division conduct landing exercises from the Intracoastal Waterway along Onslow 

Beach at Marine Barracks New River, NC. Sketch by Vernon H. Bailey.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command
60 Chapter One

troops must push inland with all speed not only 

to expand the beachhead, but also to make room 

for following units and equipment to land and 

to provide space in which personnel assigned 

strictly beach functions can operate.

To solve this problem the Tentative Landing Operations Manual provided for a beach 

party, commanded by a naval officer called a 

beachmaster, and a shore party, a special task 

organization, commanded by an officer of the 

landing force. The beach party was assigned 

primarily naval functions,such asreconnaissance 

and marking of beaches, marking of hazards 

to navigation, control of boats, evacuation of 

casualties and, in addition, the unloading of 

material of the landing force from the boats. 

The shore party was assigned such functions as 

control of stragglers and prisoners, selecting and 

marking of routes inland, movement of supplies 

and equipment off the beaches, and assignment 

of storage and bivouac areas in the vicinity of 

the beach. The composition and strength of 

the shore party were not set forth except for 

a statement that it would contain detachments 

from some or all of the following landing 

force units: medical, supply, working details, 

engineers, military police, communications, and 

chemical. The beach party and the shore party 

were independent of each other, but the Tentative Landing Operations Manual enjoined that the 

fullest cooperation be observed between the 

beachmaster and the shore party commander, 

and the personnel of their respective parties.

It was not indicated from what source 

“working details” for the shore party would 

come, but in practice, since there was no other 

source, the policy of assigning units in reserve 

the responsibility for furnishing the labor details 

quickly developed. This in effect, however, temporarily deprived the commander of his reserve.

No realistic test of the shore and beach party doctrine took place during the early Fleet 

landing exercises. Although some material was 

landed on the beach, it generally consisted of 

rations and small quantities of ammunition and 

gasoline. Not until 1941 were adequate supplies 

available and the maneuvers on a large enough 

scale to provide a test of logistic procedures. 

The results were not encouraging. “In January 

of 1941 . . . the shore party for a brigade size 

landing . . . consisted of one elderly major and 

two small piles of ammunition boxes,” wrote 

a Marine officer who “suffered” through those 

years. “The ship-to-shore movement of fuel was 

a nightmare. We had no force level transportation, [no] engineers and no supporting maintenance capability worthy of the name. In short, 

the combination of the parsimonious years and 

our own apathy had left us next to helpless 

where logistics were concerned.”51

Major General H. M. Smith, the landing 

force commander at the New River, [North 

Carolina,] exercise in the summer of 1941, reported that “considerable delay in the debarkation of troops and supplies was caused by lack 

of personnel in the Shore and Beach Parties. 

. . . Roughly, the supplies except for subsistence 

it was possible to land . . . were insufficient to 

sustain the forces engaged for more than three 

days.”52

General Smith, who had a deep respect for 

logistics, was determined to correct these deficiencies. “It is evident,” he reported to Rear 

Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief, 

Atlantic Fleet, “that special service troops (la51 BGen Victor H. Krulak to assistant chief of staff, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps, 5 March 1957, hereafter Krulak letter.

52 Commanding general, Amphibious Force, Atlantic, Preliminary 

Report to commander in chief, Atlantic, New River Exercise, 

4–12 August 1941, 27 August 1941, hereafter Amphibious Force, 

Atlantic, Preliminary Report.
Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw 61

bor) must be provided for these duties in order 

to prevent reduction of the fighting strength of 

battalion combat teams. . . . The present doctrine results in divided authority between shore 

party commanders.” He recommended that “the 

beach and shore party commanders be consolidated into one unit, a Shore Party, under control 

of the landing force.”53

[A] solution to the problem of divided authority came from a joint board of Army, Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers appointed by Admiral King. Its recommendations 

closely followed those of General Smith and 

were accepted in toto and published on 1 August 

1942 and Change 2 to FTP-167. The principal 

changes were: (1) joining together of the beach 

and shore parties under the title shore party, as a 

component of the landing force; (2) designating 

the beach party commander as the assistant to 

the shore party commander and his advisor on 

naval matters; and (3) transferring the responsibility for unloading boats at the beach from the 

naval element to the landing force element of 

the shore party.54

Headquarters Marine Corps solved the labor 

force problem by adding a pioneer (shore party) 

53 Amphibious Force, Atlantic, Preliminary Report. 54 Amphibious Force, Atlantic, Preliminary Report.

battalion of 34 officers and 669 enlisted men 

to the Marine division.55 This change occurred 

on 10 January 1942, too late for the personnel 

concerned to gain practical experience in largescale exercises in the techniques of handling vast 

quantities of supplies or to test the adequacy 

of the strength and organization provided. At 

Guadalcanal, this lack came close to having serious consequences.56

General Smith was not content merely to 

submit his shore party recommendations to Admiral King. At his direction, the logistics staff of 

the Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet prepared 

a detailed standard operating procedure (SOP) 

covering all phases of logistics. Issued as Force 

General Order No. 7-42, SOP for Supply and Evacuation, it served as the basic guide to combat 

loading and shore party operations during the 

Guadalcanal operation.57

By 7 December 1941, the Marine Corps 

had made long strides toward amphibious preparedness. It had a doctrine that had been tested 

in maneuvers and found to be basically sound. 

Many of the errors in implementation had been 

recognized and corrected; still others were 

awaiting remedial action when war broke out. 

But the simulated conditions of the maneuver 

ground were now to be abandoned. The Marines 

and their doctrine were now to submit to the 

ultimate test of war.

55 Marine Corps table of organization D-94, 10 January 1942.

56 See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, part 

VI.

57 Krulak letter; andTwining letter.

An Army light tank is unloaded from its landing 

craft during joint Army-Marine amphibious exercises at New River, NC, in August 1941.

Official U.S. Army photo (SC 125129)
62

THE LEGACY AND LESSONS 

OF OPERATION WATCHTOWER

by Jon T. Hoffman

Marine Corps Gazette, 199258

fashioned the doctrine that guided a new generation 

of Allies through another world war.

The Marine Corps is presently in the process of 

creating the force structure and doctrine that will take 

it into the twenty-first century. At the same time, we 

will be honoring the 50th anniversaries of the greatest series of amphibious operations the world has ever 

known, the landings that formed the backbone of Allied victory in World War II in both the European and 

Pacific theaters. It would be ironic if modern Marines 

did not use that military history to help them see their 

way into the future, did not copy the proven techniques 

of their predecessors, who used similar information to 

create the doctrine that won those battles in the first 

place. The following article is the first in a series that 

will look at the legacy and lessons of World War II operations to see what we can learn that may be of use 

tomorrow. These essays, to be published to coincide with 

their respective anniversaries, will cover those operations that may hold some keys to the future of amphibious warfare.

***

In a recent piece in the Naval Institute’s Proceedings, analyst Norman Polmar lumped the GuaThe Marine Corps takes justifiably great 

pride in its reputation for combat prowess, 

but over the years it has also been noted for 

its intellectual achievements. One of the premier examples in the latter category was the development of 

the first amphibious doctrine in the 1930s. The idea 

of conducting such operations was not revolutionary; men had been landing against defended shores 

since the time of the ancient Greeks and the Peloponnesian War. What the Marine Corps did was figure 

out how to overcome the problem of making a successful assault in the face of modern weaponry and 

improved defensive mobility. When a group of Marine 

and Navy officers sat down in Quantico in 1933 to 

formulate the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations one of their major sources of ideas was the 

failed Allied invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula in 

World War I. They looked at that campaign to see what 

went wrong and how they could overcome similar 

difficulties. From this real-world laboratory, they 

58 The original article came from Jon T. Hoffman, “The Legacy 

and Lessons of Operation Watchtower,” Marine Corps Gazette 76, 

no. 8 (August 1992): 68–73. Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling.
Hoffman 63

dalcanal landing in with several other Pacific 

assaults that he said “were unprecedented for 

their success, valor, and cost in human lives.” 

In this issue of the Gazette, another author cites 

the same operation as giving rise to the need for 

an “elite element of Marines specializing in amphibious assault.” Although Guadalcanal certainly should be remembered for hard fighting and 

high casualties, it is often overlooked these days 

that those descriptions apply only to the land 

campaign that followed an unopposed amphibious landing. Just as important, one must also 

remember that the assault on Guadalcanal was 

only one of several landings that took place the 

same day, all of them part of OperationWatchtower. These first American landings of the war 

tell us much about the state of the amphibious 

art in the Marine Corps at the start of World 

War II and may yield some useful insights into 

the challenges modern Marines face as we enter 

the twenty-first century.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the directive 

for Operation Watchtower on 24 June 1942. 

The objective was to stop the southward extension of Japanese power in the Solomon Islands, 

a development that threatened the Allied lifeline 

to Australia. The initial target was Tulagi, a small 

island serving as a seaplane base, but evidence 

of construction of an airfield on nearby Guadalcanal added that larger land mass to the list. 

Courtesy of Marine Corps Gazette
64 Chapter One

The conjoined islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo 

would also be seized.

Several things complicated planning for Operation Watchtower. The item of biggest initial 

concern was a lack of time and intelligence. The 

1st Marine Division received the assignment 

to conduct the operation on 25 June, just five 

weeks before the scheduled 1 August D-day. Little information on the targets was available and 

extensive efforts turned up only some old hydrographic charts, a few former residents, and 

similar sources. This was later supplemented 

with a batch of poor aerial photos. The sketchy 

intelligence indicated there were a few hundred 

enemy on Tulagi and about as many on GavutuTanambogo. Planners believed there were several thousand troops on Guadalcanal. Although 

the estimates for the smaller islands were nearly correct, there were just 2,000 Japanese on 

Guadalcanal, and most of those were noncombatant labor troops, as were many of the men on 

Gavutu-Tanambogo.

The next set of problems centered on logistics. The ships bringing the division from the 

states to New Zealand were not combat loaded, nor was there enough shipping to take along 

all the division’s supplies and equipment. There 

were also too few of the most modern types of 

landing craft. The typical variety was the already 

outmoded Higgins boat [landing craft vehicle, 

personnel (LCVP)], a wooden craft that could 

beach an entire infantry platoon, but which 

had no capability for placing heavy equipment 

ashore. A modified version did have a bow 

ramp, but this could carry only relatively small 

vehicles. There were a handful of more recent 

vintage tank lighters and an armored tracked vehicle that could actually swim and crawl ashore. 

The latter was seen more as a logistic vehicle 

that would save the manhandling of supplies 

from boats onto the beach since it could drive 

inland directly to the quartermaster dumps.

To further complicate matters, the division 

was physically divided; one regiment had already 

landed in New Zealand, another was at sea, and 

most of the recently attached supporting forces 

were spread around the Pacific. All units would 

only come together at the rehearsal site just 

one week before D-day. Last, many of the units 

within the division were not well prepared for 

combat. Since its creation, the organization had 

periodically subdivided, almost like an amoeba, 

to provide cadres for new formations. Training 

and unit cohesion suffered in the process: too 

few experienced Marines were trying desperately to pass on their knowledge to the mass of 

fresh recruits.

Two men were largely responsible for creating a workable plan from this chaos: Lieutenant 

Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, the division operations officer, and Merrill L. Twining, his assistant. 

Although both saw Guadalcanal and its airfield as 

the primary target, they were concerned about 

the smaller islands. These were defended by elements of the Imperial Navy’s special landing 

forces, Japanese Marines. More important, the 

troops were well dug in on terrain overlooking 

the limited landing sites available on the small 

islands. Consequently, the bigger island would 

receive the bulk of the Marines (about 11,000 

men organized as the Guadalcanal Group). The 

best troops (in terms of training and leadership) 

would attack the smaller objectives. The 1st 

Raider Battalion, with 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 

in support, would take Tulagi while the 1st Parachute Battalion seized Gavutu-Tanambogo. A 

battalion of the 2d Marines bolstered this force, 

styled the Northern Group, to 4,000 men. The 

remainder of the 2d Marines, about 3,400 men, 

served as the operational reserve. 
Hoffman 65

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

One of the main things governing the choice of 

landing sites was the capability of the available 

landing craft. Given the reliance on Higgins 

boats, the Marines had to come ashore where 

hydrographic conditions would allow the boats 

to operate (i.e., at generally good beaches free 

of any obstructions like sandbars or coral reefs). 

Another consideration was logistics: What facilities might be available to offload boats? How 

far were the landing sites from proposed inland 

objectives? Finally, though not necessarily last in 

terms of priority, was the state of enemy defenses controlling possible landing areas (figure 2).

On Guadalcanal, the argument came down 

to two possible choices. The first option was 

designated Beach Red. It was hydrographically suitable and quite large, with ample room 

to land a large number of boats at once. It had 

two drawbacks. It was concave in shape, which 

meant that Japanese defenders arrayed along its 

length would have excellent fields of fire against 

incoming boat waves. Marines landing here 

might be attacking into the interlocking fires 

of machine guns and heavy weapons from the 

front and two flanks. Moreover, it was almost 

four miles from the airfield. It would take time 

for the landing force to make its way to the main 

objective, and equipment and supplies dumped 

ashore would be far from their eventual destination (an important consideration given that the 

division would leave most of its trucks behind 

due to a shortage of shipping space.)

The alternative was a smaller beach near 

U.S. Marines land on Red Beach during the invasion of Guadalcanal, August 1942.

Thayer Soule Collection, Archives Branch, History Division
66 Chapter One

Lunga Point. Its primary recommendation was 

the relatively short distance to the airfield, with 

obvious advantages in terms of tactics and logistics once ashore. The beach here was convex, 

which meant that Japanese gunners on one flank 

would quickly lose sight of boats landing on the 

opposite flank; in essence, there would be less 

firepower to worry about. Twining favored this 

site.

Thomas wanted Beach Red. The senior officer thought that “a landing at a point remote 

from the Lunga defenses would in all probability meet with little or no opposition.” Not 

only would distance from the valuable airfield 

reduce the likelihood of any enemy defenses, 

but reinforcements would take a longer time 

to arrive there. He also thought that a nearby 

river, located between the beach and the airfield, “constituted an obstacle for the protection 

of the more exposed right flank in the event of 

a counterattack early in the landing.” The river 

and the distance from the objective would work 

against the Marines once ashore, but Thomas 

considered subsequent operations on land less 

important than just getting ashore in the first 

place. Thomas’ arguments eventually carried the 

day; it would be Beach Red. Subsequent aerial reconnaissance revealed that there were no 

defenses at either landing site, but the plan remained unchanged.

Tulagi was much more complicated (figure 

3) It was a long, slender island, approximately 

4,000 by 1,000 yards in size. Three-quarters of 

it consisted of a heavily wooded ridge, about 

350-feet high, running from its northwest tip 

down the central spine of the island. The southeast tip was dominated by an even more rugged hill mass. In between was a patch of lower, 

generally open ground, much of it covered by 

coconut groves. Here were located the village, 

wharves, and government buildings that marked 

the island as the seal of British colonial administration in the Solomons. Here also were the 

harbor and the seaplane base that were the objective of this part of the operation. The only 

suitable beaches from a hydrographic standpoint 

were those on the northeastern side of this saddle, since the rest of the island was fringed by 

Courtesy of Marine Corps Gazette
Hoffman 67

coral reefs and outcrops. Inland of these rough 

waters, of course, were a few feet of beach and 

the sharply rising high ground of the northwest 

ridge and the southeast hill.

Aerial reconnaissance of Tulagi revealed 

that the Japanese thoroughly understood these 

amphibious considerations. The enemy garrison 

had concentrated its defenses, which included 

strong emplacements and heavy weapons, on the 

obvious approach to the saddle. Again, the enemy threat dominated considerations of logistics, 

objective, and, in this case, even hydrography. 

The division planners chose a landing site about 

halfway up the western coast and designated it 

Beach Blue, though the adjective in this official 

title was hardly descriptive of reality. Here, the 

Marines expected to run into coral formations 

that would keep the Higgins boats 30 to 100 

yards offshore. The infantry would have to wade 

in and there would be no capability to land artillery, vehicles, or bulky supplies.

The initial plan actually called for a night 

landing on Beach Blue to be made at the end 

of D-day, so the raiders could get ashore under the further protection of darkness. The 

Navy objected to that idea due to the treacherous hydrographic conditions off Beach Blue. 

The resulting compromise was to go ahead 

with a daylight operation early on D-day, but 

to reinforce the Raiders with 2d Battalion, 5th 

Marines, and increase the supporting fires of 

air and naval guns. Despite the selection of a 

landing zone away from the enemy’s defenses, 

the 1st Marine Division still expected a difficult 

fight to get ashore.

The last phase of the operation, the assault 

on Gavutu-Tanambogo, posed the most serious 

challenge. These two islets were almost entirely 

Courtesy of Marine Corps Gazette
68 Chapter One

surrounded with coral outcrops; the only good 

landing site was a clear area near the seaplane 

ramps on the eastern side of Gavutu. Terrain 

ashore was an even more important consideration. Each tiny island was dominated by a 

central hill that towered over the surrounding 

beaches. In addition, the enemy located on each 

target could provide supporting fires against any 

assault force hitting the other island, inasmuch 

as the two were just a few hundred yards apart. 

Unlike Guadalcanal and Tulagi, the planners 

foresaw that any landing in the area must be of 

necessity, made in the face of strong resistance.

Given that Gavutu’s Hill 148 was slightly 

taller than Tanambogo’s Hill 121, [the] division 

decided to take the higher terrain first. The 1st 

Parachute Battalion would land in a column of 

companies at the wharf area on the east side of 

Gavutu. The assault would take place at H+4 

hours in order to allow fire support ships to cover the Tulagi landing first and then concentrate 

in support of the Parachutists. Following the seizure of Gavutu, one company of the battalion 

would reembark and land on Tanambogo.

EXECUTING THE PLAN

Events on D-day confirmed some, but not all 

of Thomas’ expectations. The landing on Tulagi 

went exactly according to plan. The four line 

companies of the 1st Raiders made it ashore in 

two waves, received some desultory rifle and 

machine gun fire, but took no casualties. The 

units got organized and then moved down the 

length of the island with all four outfits abreast. 

The battalion held up briefly at a predesignated phase line (marked by the end of the ridge), 

U.S. Marine Corps LVT (1) amphibian tractors move toward the beach on Guadalcanal Island. This view was 

probably taken during the 7–9 August 1942 initial landings on Guadalcanal. The ship in the background is 

USS President Hayes (AP 39).

Official U.S. Navy photo, Naval History and Heritage Center, NH 97749
Hoffman 69

while planes and the antiaircraft cruiser [USS] 

San Juan [CL 54] prepped the saddle area. When 

they kicked off in the assault again, the Raiders 

met their first real opposition. It took the remainder of the day to compress the defenders 

into a pocket in the hill mass at the southeast 

end of the island.

That night, many Japanese sortied from the 

area, some in classic banzai assaults, many others 

in the infiltration mode. The next day, the Raiders and elements of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 

attacked the remaining enemy holed up in coral 

caves and strong bunkers. In action that would 

become commonplace later in the war, the 

Marines had to root out the fanatical Japanese 

with explosives. Only 3 of the 350 defenders 

surrendered; the Marines lost 126 men, about 

one-third killed in action. Since the enemy overlooked the wharves early in the battle and Beach 

Blue was totally unsuited, no significant quantities of supplies reached Tulagi until very late on 

the second day.

On Guadalcanal, the Marines also got ashore 

without enemy opposition. Here, however, rivers, jungle, and poor training slowed the advance of the 1st and 5th Marines. They did not 

reach the airfield until the second day, though in 

contrast to Tulagi, the Japanese never made any 

attempt to stand and fight. Logistics quickly became a tremendous problem, as the transports 

disgorged supplies onto the beach much faster than the underequipped and undermanned 

shore party could process them. Since the vast 

majority of the enemy garrison simply melted 

into the jungle during the bombardment on 

D-day, a landing at the Lunga beach would have 

worked out much better than the one at Beach 

Red.

Courtesy of Marine Corps Gazette
70 Chapter One

The assault on Gavutu-Tanambogo went 

poorly. The first wave of boats made it ashore 

before the defenders could recover from the relatively intense prelanding bombardment (280 

5-inch shells in four minutes), but the following two waves came under heavy small arms fire 

even before hitting the beach (actually a concrete pier standing four feet out of the water). 

These two companies took 10 percent casualties 

in the assault. One worked its way around to 

the southeast and under the protection of supporting naval guns, but the last to come ashore 

was pinned down by fire from Hill 148 and from 

flanking Tanambogo. The battalion commander 

was one of those killed in this early phase. A call 

for reinforcements brought a landing by Company B, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, on Tanambogo in the early evening, but this assault failed. 

Heavy fire drove off some of the boats, and most 

of the 30 men who made it ashore quickly withdrew. The parachutists maintained their toehold 

on Gavutu that night despite banzai and infiltration attacks.

Elements of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, went 

ashore on Gavutu the next day to assist in the 

final conquest of that island, while the remainder of the battalion executed another assault on 

Tanambogo. This landing, supported by naval 

gunfire, two tanks, and an infantry attack across 

the causeway, succeeded in securing a portion 

of the island. The Japanese conducted infiltration attacks that night on Tanambogo, and the 

LtCol John J. Capolino, Guadalcanal. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 92-2-82
Hoffman 71

Marines had to reduce several caves and bunkers the next day, but the island was secured on 

9 August. Of the more than 500 defenders—all 

but a platoon were airmen or laborers—only 

20 surrendered. The Marines suffered 157 

casualties, nearly one-half killed in action. A 

portion of these were inflicted by friendly air, 

which twice mistakenly attacked Marine positions on Gavutu.

ASSESSING THE LESSONS

These first American landings of the Pacific war 

make a useful study in contrasts. As noted at the 

beginning of this article, most Marines and analysts tend to think of Guadalcanal as just one of 

many hard-fought amphibious assaults. In reality, the planners and leaders of the 1st Marine 

Division went to great lengths to avoid the possibility of having to fight their way ashore. On 

Guadalcanal, they accepted the added logistics 

strain of landing far from the airfield, hoping 

that distance would enhance security during 

the initial hours of the operation. At Tulagi, they 

chose to make the assault against natural obstacles rather than enemy gunfire. Only on Gavutu 

and Tanambogo, where the minuscule size of the 

objectives left no room for options, did the Marines make an opposed assault. The results were 

in line with those decisions; easy landings on the 

first two islands, heavy casualties and early reverses on the tiny islets.

The 1st Marine Division went into Operation Watchtower with an amphibious doctrine 

developed after years of thought and trial by error in fleet exercises. But in 1942, the planners 

also realized that their capabilities did not necessarily match those called for in the manuals. 

Naval gunfire and aerial support had yet to be 

tested against a real enemy in strong defensive 

positions. The Higgins boat was a poor assault 

craft since it provided no armor protection for 

its crew or occupants and could land only on the 

easiest beachhead. Most of the landing force was 

only partially trained, and only a handful of senior officers and noncommissioned officers had 

combat experience. With these limitations in 

mind, the division wisely decided to ignore some 

tenets of the doctrine and land where the enemy 

would pose the least interference to an operation that was already complicated enough without combat. The Marines who developed the 

Tentative Landing Manual did an outstanding job, 

but the ones who put it into practice were just 

as important, as they made the hard decisions 

about what they could actually achieve and what 

was still just theory.

How do these events apply to modern Marines? There are some parallels between that 

earlier period and today. In the 1930s, the Marine Corps had to develop new doctrine and 

technology to deal with a threat that had overwhelmed the old way of doing things. It was no 

longer sufficient to get into longboats and row 

ashore now that the enemy had machine guns, 

updated artillery, and a host of other deadly engines of war. In a similar fashion, we are trying 

U.S. Marines come ashore on Tulagi Island, probably during the landings there on 7–8 August 1942. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives, 80-G-16485
72 Chapter One

to adapt to changing circumstances—antiship 

missiles, improved sea mines, and the proliferation of other advanced weapons throughout the 

world. Over-the-horizon doctrine promises to 

alleviate some of these problems, but much of 

the hardware needed to make it work is still just 

a gleam in the eye. The Department of Defense 

continues to oppose the [Bell Boeing] V-22 [Osprey] and it appears that the advanced amphibious assault vehicle has met an early budgetary 

death.

We need to think seriously now about the 

prospect of bridging the gap between old weapons and ideas that no longer work and new ideas 

that are still beyond practical implementation. 

As in 1942, the situation may not wait for everything to be in place before action is required. 

We have already seen that in the [Persian] Gulf, 

where sufficient capability reduced the amphibious assault to a mere feint. Given the current 

budget climate, any solution calling for more 

hardware is a long way from implementation. 

The only reasonable approach lies in doctrine 

and tactics.

On Guadalcanal and Tulagi, the 1st Marine 

Division found an answer in what we would now 

recognize as maneuver warfare; they simply 

avoided forcible entry and landed where there 

Looking from the air like a zig-zagging squadron of water bugs, troop-carrying barges land U.S. Marines on 

the beach of Florida Island during the initial stage of the Solomon Islands battle, 1942.

Thayer Soule Collection, Archives Branch, History Division
Hoffman 73

was no resistance on the beach. On Gavutu and 

Tanambogo, they could find no similar alternative and paid for their doctrinal, logistic, and 

technical shortcomings in blood. If the lessons 

of history mean anything, Marines somewhere 

should be hard at work trying to figure out how 

we would have retaken Kuwait in the absence 

of Saudi concurrence. Had we been forced to 

depend solely on the amphibious assault, the 

outcome of [Operation] Desert Storm may well 

have been much less positive. Hopefully, modern Marines are wise enough to repeat landings 

like those on Guadalcanal and Tulagi and avoid 

those like Gavutu-Tanambogo where possible. 

As the 1st Marine Division’s after action report 

counseled:

A comparison of the several landings leads 

to the inescapable conclusion that landings 

should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if, by any combination 

of march or maneuver, it is possible to land 

unopposed and undetected at a point within 

striking distance of the objective.59

Of course, the Japanese made that harder to 

do later in the war and the Marines eventually 

improved their capability for forcible entry. Future articles in this series will analyze that process and look at the opportunities for maneuver 

warfare when the enemy seemed to have all the 

avenues of approach covered.

59 As quoted in Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, U.S. Marines and 

Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), 9.
74

PRELIMINARY REPORT 

OF JANEX-1

by Major General Holland M. Smith, 194260

Marine, and Army), as well as ongoing debates about how best to conduct such operations. Note in particular Smith’s reference 

in paragraph 2(a)(2) to the “three-echelon 

principle previously recommended,” as well 

as his recommendation in paragraph 5 that 

the “transport group be made an organic 

unit of the Amphibious Force.61

From: Commanding General

To: Commander Train, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Subject: Preliminary Report of JANEX-1 

(Landing Exercises Lynnhaven Roads, 

12–19 January, 1942)

1. In compliance with reference 9a), a 

fragmentary report of JANEX-5 is 

herewith submitted. Reports from 

subordinate units and umpires pertaining to this exercise have not been 

received, and this Headquarters is, of 

course, unable to submit a full detailed 

report.

61 Jon T. Hoffman, chief historian, U.S. Army Center of Military 

History

The exercise after action report that 

follows was authored by Major 

General Holland M. Smith, the 

Marine commander of the Amphibious Force 

Atlantic Fleet. This joint corps-level command was composed of the 1st Marine Division and the Army’s 1st Infantry Division. 

Formed in June 1941 to enhance amphibious training, its focus turned increasingly to 

possible contingency operations in the Western Hemisphere as the threat of war loomed 

larger. This major exercise in January 1942, 

originally scheduled for New River, North 

Carolina (now Camp Lejeune), had been 

hastily switched after the war broke out to 

Fort Story, Virginia, to mitigate the threat 

of German submarines. Conducted less than 

seven months before the landings at Guadalcanal, it provides a glimpse into the state 

of amphibious readiness of U.S. forces (Navy, 

60 The original report came from MajGen Holland M. Smith, 

commanding general, to commander, Train, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 

“Preliminary Report of JANEX-1 (Landing Exercises Lynnhaven 

Roads, 12-19 January, 1942),” 19 January 1942. Minor revisions 

were made to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
Smith 75

2. The following are considered to be of 

primary interest at this time.

a. General Plan for Landing Exercises

i. Reference (b), as modified by 

Comtrain serial 011196, 17 

November 1941, directed that 

two-sided landing exercises be 

held in the New River, North 

Carolina, area during January 

1942. This reference directed 

that the exercises be based 

upon a designated tentative 

operation plan included in 

This diagram illustrates the anticipated and actual landing routes at Fort Story, VA, where the Marines conducted landing exercises on 12 January 1942 in preparation for amphibious operations during World War II.

Official U.S. Marine Corps illustration
76 Chapter One

Gray Plan 2, and that a forced 

withdrawal and reembarkation be effected. It indicated 

also that units of the 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by 

certain Marine Corps units, 

constitute the landing force 

and that elements of the 1st 

Marine Division be employed 

as the defense force. It was 

further directed that the Headquarters, Amphibious Force, 

Atlantic Fleet, participate as 

director control, as applied to 

troops. 

ii. In compliance with reference 

(b), control facilities were 

provided in the New River 

area, and umpire personnel 

for the defense force and 

fire marking teams were 

obtained through General 

Headquarters, U.S. Army. The 

Commandant, U.S. Marine 

Corps, assigned the staff and 

students of The Basic School 

for umpiring the landing 

force. The operations plan 

for the landing was prepared 

so as to closely simulate the 

designated, tentative landing 

operation plan, and partially 

test the three-echelon principle previously recommended—the air-tank-paratroop 

team designed to strike the 

initial blow and gain the initiative during the debarkation 

of the main landing force.

iii. Reference (c), which was received at this Headquarters 

on 5 January, 1942, canceled 

reference (b), and changed 

the locale of the landing exercises from New River, North 

Carolina, area to the Cape 

Henry [Virginia] area, and 

directed that the exercises be 

held during the period 12–20 

January 1942. This reference 

designated Major General H. 

M. Smith, USMC, as director 

of the maneuver as it applied 

to troops, and ordered General Smith to designate an 

appropriate shore defense 

force, establish control facilPhoto of Gen Holland M. Smith from a painting by 

Cdr Albert K. Murray, USNR.

Official U.S. Navy photo, Naval History and Heritage 

Command
Smith 77

ities for elements on shore, 

and arrange to provide the 

control personnel and umpires required. In compliance 

with this directive, arrangements were made with the 

Chesapeake Bay defense sector commander, General R. 

L. Tilton, USA, to assign mobile elements of his defense 

force as defense force in the 

Cape Henry area. These units 

were reinforced with Marine 

Corps artillery and tanks. See 

enclosure (A) for the composition of the landing force and 

the defense force.

b. Planning

i. Reference (c) did not direct 

that the exercises simulate a 

designated operation plan, 

apparently because the nature 

of the terrain and the hydrography of the area made available in the vicinity of Cape 

Henry, Virginia, would not 

permit a logical simulation of 

any of our tentative operation 

plans. The Naval Attack Force 

Operation Plan (1T-42) was 

prepared by the naval attack 

force commander and contemplated landing the landing 

force in two echelons. The 

first echelon, the 1st Separate 

Battalion (Marines) (Rein) by 

one light tank company was 

directed to land on Beach D at 

H-1.5 hours. It was planned 

that this landing be supported 

by all direct support aircraft 

available and the major portion of the naval gunfire. The 

main landing was ordered for 

H-hour on beaches B-1, B-2, 

and C. All of the naval gunfire 

and direct support aircraft 

were to be placed in support 

of the main landing. The Naval 

Attack Force Operation Plan 

included several constructive 

fire support groups, which, of 

course, could not be considered under umpire rules.

ii. The Landing Force Operation Plan, enclosure (B), was 

prepared in accordance with 

MajGen Holland M. Smith, commanding general 

of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, observes 

landing operations with his aide, Capt Victor H. 

Krulak, at Fort Story, VA, in the winter of 1941.

Official Marine Corps photo, 528648
78 Chapter One

missions assigned to the landing force by the Naval Attack 

Force Operation Plan (1T-42).

iii. The Defense Plan, enclosure 

(C), was prepared by the commanding officer, 116th Infantry. Enclosure (D) shows the 

disposition of the defense 

force in accordance with this 

plan. 

iv. Umpire rules, General Headquarters, U.S. Army, were 

used to umpire units of the 

landing force, aircraft in support of the landing force, and 

defense force units.

c. Execution of Plans

 The following comments are submitted in regard to the execution 

of the various operation plans:

i. The naval attack force, including transports, anchored 

about 3.5 miles off the designated landing beach. This location placed a large number 

of these ships within range 

of the 155mm howitzers 

and 75mm guns operating as 

shore batteries of the defense 

force. In this connection, it 

is realized that this artificiality was necessary in order to 

avoid the ship traffic through 

the Lynnhaven Roads channel 

and reduce hardship to troops 

in the small boats by cutting 

down the running time from 

ships to shore. 

ii. H-hour was set at 1100, 12 

January. The 1st Separate 

Battalion (Rein) landed on 

Beach D, its assigned beach, 

at approximately 0920—10 

minutes too early. Apparently, 

naval gunfire was simulated in 

support of this battalion in accordance with the prescribed 

plan. The mission of bombing 

and strafing attacks of enemy 

installations on Beach D (defense force) for five minutes 

prior to the landing of the 

initial boat wave of the 1st 

Separate Battalion (Rein) had 

been assigned to VF [Fighter] 

Squadron 71. This squadron 

failed in the execution of its 

mission by either arriving on 

station too late or misunderstanding the tactical situation. 

The squadron delivered its 

The design of this Higgins landing craft, loaded 

with a military truck, shown here in May 1941, 

served as the basis for the landing craft, vehicle and 

personnel (LCVP).

Official U.S. Navy photo, 73812
Smith 79

bombing and strafing attacks 

at approximately 0930, 10 

minutes after the initial boat 

wave reached the beach. This 

bombing and strafing attack 

was actually delivered against 

the 1st Separate Battalion 

(Rein) instead of against the 

defense force. 

iii. The defense force had taken 

up a cordon defense in the vicinity of Beach D and, by umpire rules, had thus provided 

superior firepower in that locality. The director, as indicated in enclosure (E), declared 

the landing of the 1st Separate 

Battalion (Rein) to be unsuccessful. The failure to effect a 

landing was due, in the first 

instance, to the lack of sufficient fire power to neutralize 

beach defenses. In the second instance, had sufficient 

fire power been provided in 

the form of naval gunfire and 

direct support aircraft, it is 

probable that the bombing 

and strafing attacks delivered 

by VF Squadron 71 against the 

“Wet” landing net training was conducted for 1st Division Marines off the Intracoastal Waterway at Marine 

Barracks New River. Note the different landing craft used in the exercise. Sketch by Vernon H. Bailey.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command
80 Chapter One

1st Separate Battalion (Rein) 

would have, in itself, defeated an otherwise successful 

landing. 

iv. The naval contingent of one 

of the shore parties, consisting of about 30 bluejackets 

from the USS McCawley [APA 

4], landed in the vicinity of 

Beach C, theoretically hostile 

Clambering down the side of their transport vessel, units of the 1st Marine Division and the Army’s 1st Infantry Division are preparing to board their landing craft during the 1941 joint amphibious exercises conducted 

at New River, NC.

James Lipinski Collection, courtesy of 16th Infantry Regiment Association
Smith 81

territory, at about 1000, one 

hour before H-hour, and were 

made prisoners of war by the 

shore defense force. Existing 

doctrine and all plans and orders contemplated that the 

advance units of the shore 

parties be sent ashore with 

the assault troops to which 

they are assigned. The landing of this contingent from 

the McCawley is indicative of 

either a misconception of the 

functional operation of shore 

parties or flagrant disregard 

of problem rules and orders.

v. The Naval Attack Force Operation Plan (1T-42) directed 

that the landing force land on 

the indicated beaches, presumed to be B-1, B-2, and 

C. The Landing Force Operation Order directed that 

the 26th Infantry land with 

two battalions abreast on 

Beaches B-1 and B-2, and the 

18th Infantry land on Beach 

C in column of battalions at 

H-hour (1100). Information 

now at hand indicates that 

not more than one of the 

three assault battalions landed on their assigned beaches. 

The major portion of the 2d 

Battalion, 26th Infantry, was 

landed about one mile to the 

northeast of Beach B-1 in an 

off-limits area, which had not 

been covered by either aircraft or gunfire support. The 

boat groups delivered the 

major portion of the assault 

battalions on beaches in such 

a manner that the whole force 

could have been immobilized 

and probably would have suffered a disastrous defeat by 

very small defense forces.

vi. Information now at hand indicates that some of the transports were out of position 

during the debarkation. This 

caused the crossing of boat 

lanes, in certain cases, during 

the approach of boat groups 

to the line of departure and 

beaches. 

vii. Naval gunfire was apparently 

simulated in support of the 

main landing at H-hour in 

accordance with the existing 

plan. The direct support aircraft bombed and strafed the 

beaches in accordance with 

the plan. Aircraft missions, 

in this instance, we executed 

in an excellent manner. Nevertheless, the effect of the 

gunfire and aircraft support 

was lost due to the confusion 

resulting from the assault 

battalions being landed on 

wrong beaches. 

viii. The defense force had occupied and strongly organized 

the beach on which the main 

landing was to have been effected. By umpire rules, the 

main landing failed, due to 

insufficient gunfire and air-
82 Chapter One

craft support to neutralize the 

beach defenses. The director 

declared the main landing to 

be unsuccessful. 

ix. Only one CA [heavy cruiser] 

and two DDs [destroyers] were 

available for gunfire support 

on Beaches B-1, B-2, and C, 

and their flanks, approximately 2,300 yards. It is interesting 

to note that the British Navy, 

during a Commando raid 

against Maloy Island, Norway, 

on 26 December 1941, assigned, and actually used, the 

full firepower of on CL [light 

cruiser] and two DDs against 

the German garrison, which 

consisted of about 85 men 

equipped with one light field 

battery and a few light antiaircraft guns. This British gunfire 

was delivered over a frontage probably not more than 

800 yards for eight minutes. 

The British raid was successful, and is an example of the 

amount and intensity of gunfire that is required in modern war to neutralize beach 

defenses just prior to the assault by the landing force. 

x. The landing on Beach D and 

the main landing on Beaches B-1, B-2, and C obviously failed in the first instance 

due to the lack of adequate 

aircraft and gunfire support 

The exercises at New River included many Higgins boats. Lacking the bow ramp, these vessels were more 

difficult to exit than the later LCVP. Here, troops struggle to hold the boat in the surf while others unload it.

James Lipinski Collection, courtesy of 16th Infantry Regiment Association
Smith 83

to neutralize the beach defenses actually present. In the 

second instance, if adequate 

naval gunfire and aircraft support had been provided, a 

successful landing would have 

been denied the landing force 

by the improper handling 

of landing boats, which destroyed the tactical integrity, 

and landed units in wrong 

places, some of which were 

approximately one mile from 

any of the designated beaches.

xi. During the initial phase of the 

landing, the combined shore 

party failed to fully execute 

its functions. Detailed data 

as to the cause of this failure 

are not available at this time. 

Nevertheless, this failure 

during the initial stage of the 

operation was in part due to 

the following:

a. Insufficient training of the 

engineer units assigned 

to the shore party. The 

36th Engineers, assigned 

as shore party engineers, 

had never before participated in a landing 

exercise. The commanding officer of this unit, 

Lieutenant Colonel F. 

B. Butler, USA, conferred with the staff at 

this Headquarters, and is 

believed to have been indoctrinated in shore party procedure. Lieutenant 

Colonel Butler was detached from the 36th 

Engineers and replaced 

by Colonel J. E. Wood, 

USA, only a few days 

before the unit was embarked. This officer did 

not have the opportunity 

to confer with his next 

subordinate commanders 

or conduct instruction 

until after arrival on the 

wrong beaches at Cape 

Henry. This unit, under 

Colonel Wood’s supervision, began functioning 

in a fairly satisfactory 

manner on the second 

day of the exercise. It is 

again emphasized that 

the shore and beach parties should be combined 

The landings at New River demonstrated that U.S. 

military amphibious operations were improving, 

but were not yet perfected. Here, the landing boats 

form in groups to wait for the movement in, but are 

not yet using the circling pattern seen in later operations.

James Lipinski Collection, courtesy of 16th Infantry Regiment Association
84 Chapter One

into a single unit under 

the command of the 

landing force. 

b. The shore party engineers, 

the naval contingent of 

the combined shore party, 

combat units with their 

command posts, supplies, 

and equipment were not 

delivered on assigned 

beaches.

3. Although the landings on Beach D and 

Beaches B-1, B-2, and C were obviously unsuccessful, operations were 

continued on orders of the director 

in order that some training might be 

given in the continued debarkation of 

troops, handling of supplies, and minor tactical actions ashore. Since the 

area was wholly unsuited for tactical 

training of a unit of the size and composition of the landing force, and since 

a forced withdrawal could not logically 

be caused due to lack of time to prepare the plans and move appropriate 

troops units and the unsuitability of 

the terrain, the director issued enclosure (G) to initiate reembarkation in 

accordance with enclosure (H). The 

reembarkation began at about 1500, 

13 January, and all troops with light 

equipment had completed reembarkation by early morning of 14 January.

4. All heavy equipment and stores that 

were not reembarked in the landing 

area were reembarked combat loaded, 

at the Naval Operating Base and Army 

Base at Hampton Roads, Virginia.

5. Recommendations

 It is recommended that:

a. The transport group be made an 

organic unit of the amphibious 

force in order that the teamwork, 

between transport personnel and 

troops, that is necessary for success in modern warfare may be 

developed. The tactical effectiveness of the landing force is directly 

dependent upon transport troops 

teamwork. Unless this team functions smoothly and efficiently, the 

full power of the landing force 

cannot be developed. 

b. A training area suitable for the 

conduct of training exercises of 

units up to and including at least 

a reinforced infantry regiment be 

procured in a sheltered area. It is 

thought that the area in Lynnhaven Roads, which was used in the 

JANEX-1 exercises is suitable for 

the training of a reinforced battalion. The Solomon’s Island area has 

some possibilities for training of 

units up to and including a reinforced regiment; further investigation of this area should be made.

c. The amphibious force conduct a 

progressive training program, and 

that no large-scale exercises be 

conducted until the various components of the Force have achieved 

a reasonable proficiency in basic, 

elementary unit, and advanced 

training in amphibious exercises. 

6. A further report will be made upon receipt of reports from subordinate units 

and umpires. 

~ H. M. Smith
Smith 85

Enclosure (A)

COMPOSITION OF OPPOSING FORCES

BLUE LANDING FORCE

1st Infantry Division Troops

Division Headquarters

Headquarters and Military Police Company

1st Signal Company

1st Quartermaster Battalion

1st Medical Battalion (less 1 company)

1st Engineer Battalion (less 1 company)

18th Infantry (less detachments)

26th Infantry (less detachments)

Division Artillery Headquarters

32d Field Artillery Battalion (75mm PH [pack howitzer])

33d Field Artillery Battalion (75mm PH)

Battery A, 7th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm howitzer)

70th Tank Battalion (less Company C)

29th Ordinance Company

1st Platoon, Company A, 57th Quartermaster Battalion (LM)

36th Engineer Regiment (less 2 companies)

1st Separate Battalion (Marine Corps)

RED DEFENSE FORCE

116th Infantry (less 1st and 3d Battalions)

Companies C and L, 116th Infantry

Batteries F and H, 74th CA [Coastal Artillery] (as infantry)

4th Battalion, 11th Marines (155mm howitzer)

Batteries B and C, 111th FA [Field Artillery] (75mm Gun)

Company A, 1st Tank Battalion (Marines)

1 Squadron 65th Observation Group

Battery G, 246th CA (3-inch antiaircraft)

1 Platoon Battery C, 246th CA (two 75mm guns)

Radio Intelligence Platoon, 71st Signal Company, [Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet] AFAF

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH Officers Enlisted

Blue Landing Force 516 9,836

Red Defense Force 100 230
86

LIEUTENANT GENERAL 

JOHN A. LEJEUNE BIOGRAPHY

1916 and became Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps.

Following America’s entry into World War 

I, he deployed overseas, where he commanded 

the 4th Marine Brigade and the U.S. Army’s 2d 

Infantry Division from July 1918 through August 

1919. His performance commanding an Army 

division established that Marine Corps officers 

were as professionally capable as their Army 

peers. He was awarded the Croix de Guerre and 

the Légion d’Honneur by the French government and both the U.S. Army and Navy’s Distinguished Service Medals for his service during 

the war.

In July 1920, he was appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps; during his two terms, 

he reinvigorated Marine development of doctrine and strategic planning and directed the 

Corps’ transformation from a colonial infantry 

into an amphibious assault corps. 

He retired from the Marine Corps in 1929 

and became superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute, a position he held until 1937.

[T]he major wartime mission of the Marine Corps is to support the Fleet by supplying it with a highly 

trained, fully equipped expeditionary force.

~ Major General John A. Lejeune, 

lecture to the Naval War College, December 1923

Lieutenant General John A. Lejeune was 

born 10 January 1867 on his family’s 

plantation in Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana. He secured an appointment to the U.S. 

Naval Academy from which he graduated in 

1888, then served two years as a midshipman 

at sea. He was serving aboard the sloop-of-war 

USS Vandalia (1876) in March 1889 when it 

was wrecked in a cyclone in Apia harbor during 

the Samoan crisis. He was commissioned into 

the Marine Corps as a second lieutenant in July 

1890. He commanded the Marine detachment 

aboard the USS Cincinnati (C 7) during the 

Spanish-American War. He later twice commanded a Marine battalion in Panama.

In 1907, he commanded Marine Barracks 

and Naval Prison, Navy Yard, Cavite, Philippines, 

and took command of the 1st Brigade of Marines in 1908. Following graduation from the 

U.S. Army War College in 1910, he again served 

in Cuba and Panama before becoming involved 

in the development of the advanced base regiment. He was promoted to brigadier general in 
Lejeune 87

MajGen John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps, by Samuel Burtis Baker. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
88 Chapter One

Throughout his career, General Lejeune remained determined to make the Marine Corps 

an elite fighting organization and a worthy expeditionary force for the U.S. Navy. When he 

passed away on 20 November 1942, Marines 

half a world away on Guadalcanal were proving 

just how successful he had been.
89

FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER 

WILLIAM NIMITZ BIOGRAPHY

Following World War I, he held a variety of 

command and staff positions, shifting between 

cruisers, battleships, and submarines. In 1926, 

he established one of the first Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units at the University of 

California, Berkeley. In the 1930s, he commanded the USS Augusta (CA 31), Cruiser Division 

2, Battle Force, and then Battleship Division 1, 

Battle Force. In 1939, he was appointed chief of 

the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Navigation.

Following the Japanese surprise attack on 

Pearl Harbor, he was made commander in chief, 

United States Pacific Fleet, the position he held 

for the duration of World War II. Beginning with 

submarine and aircraft carrier raids in 1942, he 

masterminded the strategy that led to the Japanese retreat at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the 

Japanese defeat at the Battle of Midway. Following the essential outline of War Plan Orange, he 

then led the Pacific Fleet during its methodical 

march across the Pacific, decimating the Japanese naval and air forces, blockading the Japanese islands, and finally, in 1945, culminating in 

the defeat of the Japanese Empire. 

The war with Japan had been enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people and in 

so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing 

except the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war. We had not visualized these.

~ Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, 

lecture at the Naval War College, 10 October 1960

F

leet Admiral Chester William Nimitz was 

born on 24 February 1885 in Fredericksburg, Texas. He graduated from the 

United States Naval Academy in 1905. His initial 

naval service was aboard the battleship USS Ohio

(BB 12) and a succession of cruisers, destroyers, 

and gunboats. In 1908, he was court-martialed 

for running the destroyer USS Decatur (DD 5) 

aground under his command in the Philippines. 

Returning to the United States in 1909, he was 

trained as a submariner and took command of 

the 1st Submarine Flotilla, and the USS Plunger

(SS 2). He continued to command a succession 

of submarines and submarine flotillas. In March 

1912, he rescued a drowning sailor and was 

awarded the Silver Lifesaving Medal. From May 

1912 to March 1913, he commanded the Atlantic Submarine Flotilla.

In 1916, he became the executive officer of 

the USS Maumee (AO 2), helping to pioneer operational underway refueling when the Maumee

refueled the first American destroyers sailing for 

Europe in 1917. In 1918, he was appointed chief 

of staff, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
90 Chapter One

Adrian Lamb’s portrait of Adm Chester W. Nimitz in 1960. He was promoted to the Navy’s newest and highest rank—fleet admiral—in December 1944. Official U.S. Navy photo of portrait rendered in oil on canvas.

Navy History and Heritage Command, KN-2578
Nimitz 91

Following the war, he was appointed Chief 

of Naval Operations, a position he held until 

1947. Notably, he supported then-Captain Hyman G. Rickover’s proposal to build the USS 

Nautilus (SSN 571), the world’s first operational 

nuclear-powered submarine. 

After retiring from the Navy at the close 

of 1947, he held several different academic and 

diplomatic positions. When he passed away in 

1965, the United States Navy was unquestionably the most powerful naval force in the world, 

and the submarines he had first thought of as, “a 

cross between a Jules Verne fantasy and a humpbacked whale” were now nuclear powered and, 

alongside aircraft carriers, had replaced the battleship as the prime weapon for control of the 

sea. 

Commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Adm Chester W. Nimitz points at Tokyo, the capital of Imperial Japan, during the American island-hopping 

campaign in the Pacific theater of World War II.

Official U.S. Navy photo, Library of Congress Prints and 

Photographs Division, 2016650581
92 chapter number

Capt Leonard H. Dermott, Harriers, A Pair. 

Watercolor on paper. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine 

Corps, 3-1-166
93

CHAPTER TWO

The Expansion 

of Maritime Power

The Role of Naval Aviation

and Submarines

by Paul Westermeyer

Not only had he placed himself beyond 

human laws, he had rendered himself independent, out of all reach, free in the strictest sense of the word! For who would dare 

chase him to the depths of the sea when he 

thwarted all attacks on the surface? What 

ship could withstand a collision with his 

underwater Monitor? What armor plate, no 

matter how heavy, could bear the thrusts of 

his spur? No man among men could call 

him to account for his actions.1

I

n 1870, French author Jules Verne produced Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, 

a prophetic work inspired in part by the Le 

Plongeur, a French submarine built in 1864 that 

was the first powered by mechanical means (the 

1863 Confederate submarine H. L. Hunley, the 

first submarine to sink an enemy vessel, was 

powered by the crew). The Swedish-built Nordenfelt I in 1885 was the first steam-powered 

1

 Jules Verne, Vingt Mille Lieues Sous les Mers [Twenty Thousand 

Leagues Under the Sea], trans. F. P. Walter (Paris: J. Hetzel, 1869–

71), chapter 10.
94 Chapter Two

submarine armed with torpedoes. By the turn 

of the century, submarines of similar design appeared throughout the navies of the world. 

Verne’s Captain Nemo is an undersea terrorist, using his wondrous submarine, the Nautilus, to attack the world’s shipping in a guerre 

de course against the “great nations” of the nineteenth century.2

 Even conducted by only one 

submarine, his war on shipping was somewhat 

effective. But early submarines had neither the 

incredible cruising range of Nemo’s Nautilus, 

nor could they match its underwater endurance. 

Prior to World War I, few naval thinkers gave 

much consideration to submarines, which were 

conceived as coastal defense vessels intended to 

prevent blockades or invasion. British Admiral 

John A. Fisher pushed British submarines in this 

direction, intending them as a defense for the 

British Isles and freeing Britain’s battle fleet to 

achieve strategic goals away from the homeland. 

The use of submarines as a commercial 

raider was considered impractical, since simply sinking a merchantman, especially without 

warning, was a violation of the laws of war codified in 1899. Submarines were too small to effectively fight merchant vessels on the surface, and 

they could not take aboard the ship’s crews after 

boarding. Instead, during the early days of World 

War I, submarines focused on enemy naval vessels. The German Navy showed how successful 

these actions could be with several spectacular attacks, including the sinking of the battleship HMS Formidable (1898) in January 1915. 

In 1915, frustrated with the progress of the 

war and its inability to come to grips with the 

Royal Navy, the German’s first turned to “unrestricted submarine warfare,” attempting to cut 

off all shipping to the British Isles initiating the 

2

 The term guerre de course refers to the practice of making war on 

the naval commerce of the enemy.

world’s first submarine guerre de course. The 

initial campaign against British merchant shipping was very effective; by the time the war ended, the Allies had discovered that the only solid 

operational counter to the submarine was the 

convoy system. 

During World War II, the Germans launched 

a second, even more effective submarine guerre 

de course masterminded by Admiral Karl 

Dönitz. This campaign nearly drove Britain to its 

knees; but in the end, the U.S. and British navies 

defeated the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic, 

securing the sea-lanes to Europe. But by far the 

most successful guerre de course was conducted by the U.S. Navy against Japan in the Pacific. 

The Imperial Japanese Navy focused submarine operations on long-range scouting for 

their fleet and imposing attrition on American 

capital ships in an attempt to turn the odds in 

Japan’s favor as a precondition for the Mahanian 

clash of battleships that the Japanese Navy expected as the culmination of the Pacific campaign. During the first year of the war, the 

Japanese Navy enjoyed some successes, sinking 

several American aircraft carriers as well as 

number of heavy cruisers and destroyers, but 

the climactic battle against the U.S. battleship 

fleet proved elusive. In contrast, American submarines first failed in the classic defense against 

the invasion mission when the submarines of 

the Far East Fleet failed to stop the Japanese 

landings in the Philippines. But with the bulk 

of U.S. battleships in the mud at Pearl Harbor, 

and aircraft carriers few in number, American 

submarines began a guerre de course against 

the Japanese that cut off nearly all shipping to 

Japan by 1945 thereby denying Japan most of 

the natural resources that their factories needed to produce ships, aircraft, and other arms. 

Following World War II, nuclear power be-
Westermeyer 95

came the norm for submarines, finally giving 

them the vast endurance and range of Verne’s vessel (indeed, the U.S. Navy named its first nuclear submarine USS Nautilus [SSN 571]). In 1959, 

the U.S. Navy launched USS George Washington

(SSBN 598), its first ballistic missile submarine. 

Launching nuclear missiles from submarines 

transformed them from a purely naval asset into 

a maritime strategic asset capable of projecting 

power ashore in a way that even Jules Verne had 

not imagined. The addition of cruise missiles 

with conventional warheads to attack other vessels and shore targets gave them greater flexibility in projecting power ashore. 

While some inventors had looked beneath 

the waves for advantage in warfare, others had 

looked to the clouds. Although the occasional balloon appeared for reconnaissance or artillery spotting purposes, aircraft were not a 

part of nineteenth-century military operations. 

Orville and Wilbur Wright’s 1903 flight in 

North Carolina kick-started the aviation revolution that, during the next 10 years, became 

a reality for military aircraft. World War I witnessed the introduction of strategic bombing, 

both by Zeppelin rigid airships and massive, 

four-engine bombers, such as the ZeppelinStaaken R VI, while the British converted a battlecruiser, the HMS Furious (47), into an aircraft 

carrier. 

Submarine enthusiasts limited themselves 

to finding uses for submarines within maritime strategy, but aviation enthusiasts believed 

that aerial forces would dominate warfare, In 

The Master of the World, Jules Verne imagined an 

aircraft of great power. Its designer, Robur the 

Conqueror, declared that “with it, I hold control of the entire world, and there lies no force 

within the reach of humanity which is able to 

resist me, under any circumstances whatsoever.”3

 Many aviation theorists thinkers of that era 

accepted enthusiastically embraced this apocalyptic vision.

The most well-known of these was General Giulio Douhet, an Italian who advocated for 

large fleets of bombers attacking population 

centers in an attempt to break their enemy’s 

morale. The idea was best illustrated in a speech 

to the British House of Commons by member 

Stanley Baldwin in 1932, “I think it is well also 

for the man in the street to realise that there is 

no power on earth that can protect him from 

being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, 

the bomber will always get through. The only 

defence is in offence, which means that you have 

to kill more women and children more quickly 

than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.”4

American airpower thinkers generally accepted Baldwin’s grim view of airpower’s ultimate purpose; however, budgetary realities 

pushed airpower thinkers such as Army Brigadier General William L. Mitchell to argue that 

aircraft could sink battleships, and that the Air 

Corps, not the Navy, could best defend the 

United States from invasion. Thus, the Air Force 

developed large, four-engine bombers for the 

naval strike mission that were better suited for 

strategic air campaigns.

In the Navy, air advocates pushed the fleet air 

arm’s utility as a scouting and strike force, while 

developing ship killing aircraft of its own—most 

notably torpedo and dive bombers. When the 

long anticipated Pacific war broke out, the Navy 

adhered to War Plan Orange, but the battle fleet 

did not included battleships, as anticipated, but 

rather a fleet of aircraft carriers. Aircraft car3

 Jules Verne, The Master of the World: A Tale of Mystery and Marvel 

(Paris: J. Hetzel, 1904), chapter 9.

4

 “Mr. Baldwin on Aerial Warfare—A Fear for the Future,” Times

(London), 11 November 1932.
96 Chapter Two

riers led most of the campaigns of the war in 

the Pacific, gaining control of the sea through 

a series of fleet engagements that resembled 

the long-sought after battleship engagements as 

much as the Battle of Jutland in 1916 resembled 

the clash at Trafalgar in 1805. Nonetheless, the 

essentials of the war plan that dictated the naval 

campaign remained unchanged. 

The two great theorists of maritime strategy—Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett—had not predicted the decisive 

impact that submarines or aviation would have 

on the future of naval warfare. Both passed away 

before the significance of these technologies to 

naval warfare was clear. New naval theorists did 

not arise to champion these new technologies; 

instead, practical naval officers capitalized on 

the advantages provided by these innovations 

and applied them to the underlying principles 

of naval strategy that Mahan and Corbett had 

promulgated. 
97

THE FUTURE OF THE SUBMARINE

by Franklin D. Roosevelt

North American Review, 19155

available, the mechanical problems of developing increased horsepower, have made progress 

seemingly slow; but within 10 years, the submarine’s surface engine has gradually grown from 

the size for a 250-ton craft to that for the 1,000-

ton so-called seagoing type, and the speed has 

been increased from 12 to 22 knots an hour. At 

the same time, a 3- or 4-inch gun has been added 

to the equipment. Thus, the result in the larger 

modern types is a vessel of about 1,000 tons, 

with fair speed, light armament and no armor, 

with seagoing qualities inferior to those of a destroyer, and with a cruising radius at reduced 

speed of 3,000–4,000 miles, though longer 

distances could possibly be covered by using the 

diving tanks for additional oil storage, thereby 

preventing diving operations. As a surface warship, there is little to commend in these qualities: speed, protection, and offensive power are 

all defective; and such a ship would be at the 

mercy of any other surface vessel stronger than 

a torpedo boat.

It is, however, as an underwater craft 

that the submarine gains in effective fighting 

strength, and incidentally in that appeal to the 

popular imagination that, sad to say, totally lacks 

Very long ago, man discovered that 

he could kill whales because he had 

learned by observation that these biggest of animals had to come to the surface of the 

ocean at frequent intervals to breathe. Knowledge of their habits has been followed by their 

partial extermination. Because there have been 

of late so many wild conceptions of the habits 

of the mechanical whale, the submarine, a brief 

description of submarines in general is perhaps 

necessary to a clearer understanding.

Primarily, in spite of its name, a submarine 

is a surface vessel, with an underwater body 

similar to that of other surface vessels, and propelled by twin screws. The power to drive it 

on the surface is developed by so-called diesel 

heavy oil engines or, as in some types, by steam 

turbines driven by oil-burning boilers. The requisite of these engines is that they may be shut 

off at a moment’s notice, and thereafter create 

no heat or gases when submergence takes place. 

Great difficulties have been experienced with 

these engines in the past. The amount of space 

5

 The original article came from Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The Future of the Submarine,” North American Review 202, no. 719 (October 1915): 505–8. Minor revisions were made to the text based 

on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
98 Chapter Two

war value. The moment the surface engines are 

shut off, and sufficient water admitted to submerge, the character alters; propelling power 

must of necessity become non-gas producing, 

[as] electric engines run by storage batteries. 

They are entirely separate from the oil engines 

and can give but slow speed—10 to 14 miles an 

hour—for a few hours only before it becomes 

necessary to rise and run on the surface in order to recharge the batteries by means of the 

surface engines. But the need of coming up like 

the whale for breath is not the only weakness: to 

deliver an attack sight is an essential [one], and 

thus far, man has discovered no means of seeing 

through the water. Invisibility is the source of a 

submarine’s strength, and yet the only way an 

enemy can be seen in order to discharge a torpedo is by raising the “eyes” or periscope above 

the surface. The enemy becomes visible; but in 

the same act, the submarine loses its invisibility, 

for a periscope can be seen if the proper means 

of observation are maintained. As an underwater craft, then, the submarine can hide when 

completely submerged, in which event it cannot 

see and has no offensive power; it can run submerged with periscope showing, in which case 

it can use the torpedo if not sooner discovered; 

[and] it can operate at slow speed and for a few 

hours only without rising.

During the past century, great changes have 

occurred in armed ships, but they have occurred 

gradually. People thought in 1815 that the steam 

frigate Demologos (1814), [later renamed] Fulton

the First, would “revolutionize” naval warfare, 

but nations were still building sailing frigates 

30 years later. The unseaworthy [Union-built, 

ironclad] Monitor was supposed to upset all traditions, yet she was not the first ship to carry armor, and development in naval architecture was 

eventually along the line of ships with seagoing 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, ca. 1920.

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, LCUSZ62-11190

Until World War I, use of submarines was limited. Germany made substantive improvements to its 

submarines, called U-boats, and began a campaign 

of unrestricted warfare against all merchant shipping. This policy was one of the events that drew the 

United States into the war in 1917. On 17 November 1917, USS Fanning (DD 37) was the first U.S. 

Navy ship to sink a German U-boat by firing a pattern of depth charges, a tactic that became standard 

in antisubmarine warfare. Edwin Simmons, Sinking 

of U-58 by USS Fanning, 1917, 1920. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

45-106-C.
Roosevelt 99

qualities. The torpedo boat of 20 years ago, with 

its great speed and self-propelling torpedo was 

going to put every battleship on the scrap heap, 

but very soon the destroyer was devised as an 

answer, and today has replaced the torpedo boat 

and taken its definite place as an integral part of 

the fleet. The more I study present-day naval development in the light of naval history, the more 

I am impressed with the slowness of evolution, 

with the fact that for every new weapon an antidote is found, and above all with the lesson 

that control of the seas means in its large sense 

precisely the same today as it did in the days of 

[Dutch Admiral Cornelis] Van Tromp or [British 

Admiral Horatio] Nelson. To prevent an invasion 

at one given point, to conduct a raid, to destroy 

isolated merchant vessels has never meant naval 

supremacy; but to be able to keep the seven seas 

open for the bulk of a nation’s vessels of commerce and of war, and to keep the seas closed 

for those of the adversary—that is what history 

means by the influence of seapower.

Today, I would say without hesitation that 

the submarine has not replaced the battleship 

as the principal factor in war at sea. Taking it in 

its existing stage of development, a submersible 

vessel is useful for certain purposes only. It cannot yet be called seagoing or seakeeping, [as] it is 

not fast; and it is extremely vulnerable. Already 

devices for its destruction are multiplying: the 

L-type submarines alongside USS Bushnell (Submarine Tender #2) at Bantry Bay, Ireland, in 1918. These 

submarines are, from left to right, unidentified submarine; USS L-1 (Submarine #40); USS L-10 (Submarine 

#50); USS L-4 (Submarine #43); and USS L-9 (Submarine #49).

Official U.S. Navy photo, Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 51171
100 Chapter Two

aeroplane or dirigible can see it well below the 

surface; the net, the minefield, the destroyer are 

all being used to oppose it; and a new type of 

armed patrol boat is being built for the purpose 

of watching the sea’s surface for signs of the mechanical whale that must come up. Submarine 

signals also, although now in the infancy of development, will doubtless soon be able to detect 

the presence of moving submarines and give accurately their direction and distance.

It would be, of course, not unreasonable 

to suppose that, while the weapons for the destruction of underwater craft are being perfected, the improvement of the submarine itself will 

continue. Without doubt, its size will increase, 

its engines, both surface and subsurface, gain 

in horsepower and resulting speed, [while] its 

radius of action grow and its seaworthiness improve. I have said nothing of the discomfort of 

the officers and men on the present-day vessels, 

or of the well-known fact that the propelling and 

operating mechanism is in such an experimental 

stage that frequent accidents occur; these are the 

evils of any new apparatus—witness the automobile of 15 years ago. But the time is not far 

distant when the “habitability” and safety from 

mishaps will make submarines as dependable as 

any other high-powered, complicated vessel of 

war. Two deterring factors will probably always 

be present in its development: the inability to 

see under water and the necessity of coming to 

the surface at short intervals.

The submarine has come to stay. It has 

taken its place, not as the sole weapon in naval 

offense and defense, but as an adjunct to other 

weapons. That it is useful for coast defense, for 

commerce destroying, for scouting purposes, 

and as a part of the protection to and attacking 

power of a battleship fleet is established. That 

it alone is capable of defending a coast against 

invasion is claimed only by the type of people 

in this country to whom national defense means 

preventing an enemy from landing an armed 

force on our Atlantic or Pacific seaboard; a Chinese wall kind of defense that requires necessarily the total abandonment of Alaska, of the 

[Panama] Canal, of Hawaii and our other dependencies overseas, the stopping of our exports 

and imports and the inability to protect against 

aggression our citizens abroad and our wellconsidered international policies. In other words, 

free communications across the seas are just as 

much an integral part of our national defense as 

is the protection of New York Harbor. Before I 

became associated with our naval affairs in an official way, I had a theory that I knew much about 

naval strategy and warfare. But I have come very 

quickly to recognize that I did not; that war on 

the sea is a greatly complicated science, developing step by step through the faithful work of 

men who are trained through years of study and 

experience. It is therefore of interest that the 

very great majority of naval officers both here 

and abroad do not believe that the submarine has 

supplanted the battleship, even though the characteristics of the latter may greatly change. They 

hold that, as it is improved step by step, the submarine will take its place as one, but only one, 

of the many instruments of offense and defense 

on the seas; that it will fit in to its well-appointed place, and that history, with the devising of 

another weapon, will repeat itself.
101

USE OF AIRCRAFT 

IN NAVAL WARFARE

by Commander D. E. Cummings

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 19216

tates on a vertical axis. This will differ from the 

airplane in that it can takeoff, alight, and maneuver without maintaining a high horizontal speed 

component.

Lighter-than-air machines include free balloons, kite (captive) balloons, and dirigibles. The 

free balloon is the old circus variety that, when 

released, is entirely at the mercy of the wind, 

and that can be controlled only by tethering it 

and by varying the weights carried, or gas pressure in envelope. The kite balloon is a captive 

balloon with devices to keep it headed into the 

wind. The dirigible is a free balloon with motive 

power and steering apparatus added.

The value of aircraft in war lies in a number of factors, such as their mobility, their vision, their speed, [and] the difficulty of attacking 

them. They can observe places otherwise inaccessible for observation. They can operate over 

either land or sea, they can reach and depart 

from a point of vantage for observation and 

bombardment with great speed, they can get 

a bird’s-eye view of the Earth’s surface within 

their radius of vision, which angle gives them a 

much truer and more complete picture than a 

view from near the surface. In many cases, they 

Aircraft appeared in the Great War as 

a new instrument of warfare. They 

are still a new instrument, whose development is incomplete, and imperfectly understood. In order, therefore, that their use in 

warfare may be developed and that officers may 

be enabled to employ them intelligently it is 

necessary to consider (a) the performances of 

which they may now be considered capable, (b) 

the limitations to which they are subject, and (c) 

the direction in which they may be expected to 

develop.

In general, aircraft are of two types: (1) 

heavier than air and (2) lighter than air. Heavierthan-air machines are designed to alight on land 

or on water; and some of each type are fitted 

to land, in emergency, on either element. The 

heavier-than-air machines in use at present are 

all planes.

Another type of heavier-than-air machine, 

known as a helicopter or gyrocopter, is in process of development, in which the propeller ro6

 The original article came from Cdr D. E. Cummings, USN, “Use 

of Aircraft in Naval Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 47, 

no. 11 (November 1921): 1677–688. Minor revisions were made 

to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. 
102 Chapter Two

can reach and depart from their vantage point 

without disclosing their presence. Their advantage of vision lies both in the angle from which 

they observe and in the speed with which they 

come and go and, sometimes, in the distance 

they can see.

Range of vision varies extremely according 

to conditions. At Philadelphia, on a hazy day, 

planes rose above the haze and saw Atlantic City 

[New Jersey], 60 miles away. On a clear day, 

planes at Hampton Roads [Virginia] saw ships at 

sea clearly, in detail, at 30 miles, and saw the 

smoke of Richmond, 90 miles away; while the 

day before, the same plane, spotting for firing 

ships, at a height of 1,500 feet over target could 

see the target but could not see even the flashes 

of the guns of the firing ships. No rule for visibility of or from aircraft can therefore be of great 

value. Haze at different altitudes may be indistinguishable from deck and yet reduce vision of 

aircraft materially.

The visibility of aircraft is very variable. A 

100-foot flying boat operating as part of a squadron in the clear daylight weather of Guantánamo [Bay, Cuba] was completely lost sight of by 

a similar boat at a distance inside of five miles; 

while the [Navy Curtiss] NC-4 [aircraft] approaching Lisbon, silhouetted against the western sky at sunset, was picked up at a distance of 

perhaps 20 miles.

Generally, planes are least visible when flying low, headed directly toward or away from 

the observer. They are most easily picked up on 

a clear day with high stratus cloud formations; 

Marine aviators flew from U.S. Navy carriers throughout the 1930s. Vought 02U-2 Corsairs of Marine Scouting Squadron 14 prepare to land on USS Saratoga (CV 3). Marine aircraft began operations from the Saratoga

and Lexington in 1931.

Official U.S. Navy photo, Naval History and Heritage, NH 94899, courtesy of PHC John L. Highfill, USN (Ret)
Cummings 103

and are difficult to pick up on the average clear 

day when there is a certain amount of haze. Usually, there is no smoke to give [it] away, though 

the smoke of the NC-4 was picked up at Lisbon 

before the plane. Protective coloration is not 

effective in the case of planes seen from below, 

as the visible part of them is always in shadow 

and looks black at a distance. Relative to ships, 

in most conditions, the small size of the plane 

makes its visibility less than its vision.

Lighter-than-air craft can be painted to 

be very inconspicuous under particular conditions, but under other conditions will be seen 

much further than they can see. Kite balloons 

frequently disclose the presence of the ships 

carrying them long before they themselves see 

anything.

The tactical qualities of aircraft are generally similar to those of ships. Every aircraft is 

a compromise, exactly as a ship is a compromise, between the various desirable factors, the 

preponderance of the one or the other being 

governed by the requirements of the service 

to which the aircraft is to be put. The tactical 

qualities may be said to consist of speed, radius, turning circle, acrobatics, carrying capacity, minimum flying speed, size, climb, ceiling, 

takeoff, landing, mooring requirements, seaJohn Charles Roach, PBY-1 during Fleet Exercises in 1930’s. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2012-12-02
104 Chapter Two

worthiness, airworthiness, [and] battery. Some 

of these depend to some extent on others. Thus, 

acrobatics depend on speed and available power, but also on properly proportioned structural 

strength and on rudder effect. Takeoff depends 

on minimum flying speed and climb, and is governed (in the case of waterborne craft) by hull 

shape, so that the craft cannot takeoff until it has 

speed enough to remain in the air, else it would 

hop from wave crest to crest and smash itself up. 

Power, weight per horsepower, and lifting area 

govern the capacity of a given plane.

The carrying capacity of aircraft is strictly 

limited by the design. This carrying capacity may 

be used for equipment, fuel, crew, armor, [and] 

armament. Thus, a bomber can greatly increase 

his radius by carrying extra fuel in place of his 

bombs, and a large machine can carry many passengers a short distance at the expense of fuel. 

Many extraordinary aircraft performances are 

therefore of limited value as indicating the practical possibilities of aircraft, inasmuch as they are 

accomplished by dispensing with other things 

that are necessary to practical work.

Aircraft have been armed with machine 

guns, Davis guns up to three inches, automatic 

cannon, up to 75mm, bombs, and torpedoes.7

Machine guns are mounted in small fighting machines either to fire between the blades of the 

moving propeller, being synchronized with it, 

or to fire through the hollow propeller shaft, 

or upon movable mounts, firing clear of propeller in any direction. Large craft usually have 

machine guns mounted to fire clear of the propeller in any direction. Synchronized guns must 

be fixed, and are aimed by aiming the aircraft. 

7

 Davis guns were experimental, recoilless weapons developed by 

Cdr Cleland Davis, USN, in 1910. They were intended to allow 

larger caliber weapons to be fired from the then flimsy aircraft of 

the day, but aircraft became sturdy enough to handle the recoil of 

larger calibers relatively quickly. 

Armor has not generally been employed in the 

past, but is increasing. Engines, gas tanks, and 

pilot’s seats are generally the essential points to 

be armored. Special means to accomplish some 

of the ends served by armor have been devised. 

Thus, nonflammable gas for balloons has been 

developed; gas tanks that will not leak when 

punctured, etc.

Aircraft are subject to certain limitations 

that govern the uses to which they may be put. 

Many of these limitations are subject to constant 

change as material and the knowledge of it develops. Thus, the weight which may be lifted by 

a plane of a given power and speed is a function 

of the area and efficiency of the lifting surface 

and of the wind resistance. In a given type of machine, as the linear dimensions increase, the ratio of useful load to gross load increases less and 

less rapidly, so that, beyond a certain point, increase of size can only be obtained by lightening 

the load, by increasing the ratio power to weight 

of engine, by sacrificing some tactical features, 

or by changing the type. All these matters are 

being studied constantly; engines have reduced 

their factors of safety to a minimum, but new 

types of greater power per unit of weight may 

be developed; new types are being studied 

constantly. New methods of obtaining strength 

with less weight and of streamlining are being 

developed. [Significant] increase in airplane size 

would seem to be dependent very largely on the 

development of an entirely new power plant, 

the present type having approached its maximum perfection. The resistance due to struts, 

wires, etc., known as “parasite” resistance, is a 

minimum on a monoplane.

One of the greatest limitations to which 

aircraft are now subject is life of the materials 

employed. The safe life of aircraft is limited by 

deterioration of wing fabric, struts, etc., which 
Cummings 105

cannot always be detected from the outside. Obviously that limitation will be gradually removed 

as materials develop. Engines can be renewed 

bodily at will. The average safe life of a Liberty 

[L-12 aircraft] engine, which in its field compares favorably with any other, between overhauls is 75 operating hours. After a total of 215 

hours, they are not considered safe. That limitation also is subject to change, but not so much 

as in the case of the structural parts, because (a) 

they have already been reduced to an approximately minimum factor of safety, and (b) engine 

failure in the air does not in itself mean certain 

disaster, as failure of important structural parts 

frequently does, because landing can be made 

without power if a suitable landing place is available within effective gliding distance. Probability of structural failure is negligible. At one air 

station, after a year’s experience, forced landing 

averaged 1 in 40 flights.

Aircraft are limited in their operations by 

the requirement that they must alight at suitable 

landing places. The requirements are (a) conditions that make a safe landing possible, and (b) 

conditions which will enable the aircraft to takeoff again. In order to land, a waterborne plane 

must have a clear water area, smooth enough for 

the type of machine, free from stakes or floating debris, and clear of interferences. To takeoff 

again, it must have these, and in addition, a sufficient area in which to gather speed and climb 

clear of interference. More space is required to 

takeoff than to land. A land machine’s requirements are similar, substituting for the water area 

a smooth field. In restricted areas, wind direction must be favorable, especially for taking off. 

Lighter-than-air machines must alight where suitable unencumbered areas with specially designed, 

permanent mooring equipment are available, although it will probably prove practicable to moor 

out a dirigible without special equipment under 

favorable conditions.

Radius of action is limited by fuel carrying 

capacity. Possibilities exist in this line for the development of motors making more efficient use 

of fuel or of a more concentrated fuel or both. 

Another restriction to the use of some types of 

aircraft is their limited habitability; but that can 

be met in large degree where necessary, [as] the 

larger craft correspond to submarines in that respect.

The uses of aircraft in war include (a) scouting, (b) bombing, (c) torpedo firing, (d) spotting, (e) lookout, (f) combat, (g) escort, (h) 

attack on surface craft by gunfire, (i) dispatch 

carrying, [and] (j) transportation.

[Item] (g) is of particular value in submarine danger zones, since underwater craft can, in 

many cases, be clearly seen from aircraft, which 

can guide surface craft to the attack, point out 

safe courses for nonmilitary vessels, or drive the 

submarine under by bombing attacks or gunfire. The essence of defense against submarines 

is vision, which aircraft possess in the highest 

degree. 

In the east coast of England submarine 

zone, large convoys passed constantly. Submarines always menaced them. Sinkings were daily 

occurrences. During five months of aerial patrol in this area, not a single sinking occurred 

in the presence of airplane patrols except one, 

and in that case the plane was on the surface of 

the water, in tow, and obviously unable to take 

[to] the air.

Aircraft are particularly suited for scouting 

work, on account of their speed and vision. They 

are handicapped, in this duty, by (a) their limited 

radius [since] they cannot expect to alight at sea 

and await fuel, as has been done by destroyers 

during the war, except under favorable condi-
106 Chapter Two

tions or as development progresses; (b) their 

limited radio range, which can be increased 

indefinitely if the circumstances justify the carrying of the extra weight; (c) defensibility [as] 

due regard must be [given] to the nature of the 

opposition that is to be met, whether it can be 

beaten off or avoided, or whether visibility conditions are such that the machines can see without being seen or heard, which would be their 

best defense; [and] (d) reliability of motors. In 

machines that are operated alone over the high 

seas, much must be sacrificed to reliability, else 

the ratio of results to cost would be too low to 

warrant the free use of this valuable instrument.

A letter dated at Hampton Roads, 27 April 

1920, speaking of the Atlantic Fleet Air Detachment, says:

We have just arrived here, yesterday, from 

Guantanamo, via Nuevitas, Turtle Harbor 

(near Miami) and Fernandina, Florida, and 

Southport, N.C. . . . we are anchored west 

of the operating base with the planes anchored just outside of the submarine basin. 

The people at the Air Station can’t quite get 

it through their heads that we don’t want 

anything from the Station, but we simply 

don’t. These planes will be turned in to the 

factory. They have been in service since we 

got them last October, and have had about 

150 hours in the air apiece. . . . From GuanLt Christian F. Schilt received the Medal of Honor for his daring rescue of 18 wounded Marines and Nicaraguan National Guardsmen from Quilali, Nicaragua, in 1928. He joined the Marine Corps during World War 

I and became an aviator in 1919. Schilt served in Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua through the 1920s.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Cummings 107

tanamo each flight has been without casualty, except that one plane landed once for 

a few minutes to change a distributor head. 

This detachment consists of six [Felixstowe] 

F-5-L flying boats with two Liberty engines 

each; and has visited Philadelphia, Hampton Roads, Pensacola, Guantanamo, Samana 

Bay [Dominican Republic], Virgin Islands, 

and other West India Islands and intervening points.

Dirigibles are especially adapted to long 

distance strategical scouting, where they are not 

liable to meet effective aerial resistance, on account of their great radius and ability to remain 

in the air without consuming fuel, while planes 

must keep going at high speed to remain in the 

air. . . . (e) A further and most important consideration is the question of navigation, which 

will be treated in some detail below. Within its 

radius, the conventional methods of search by 

surface vessels are all open to aircraft, remembering, however, that the aircraft course and 

speed made good is always the resultant of its 

own speed and course through the air and the 

speed and course of the wind. Thus, a change of 

course may involve a difference in speed over 

the water of twice the velocity of the wind. If 

the wind is force 5, that means a 50-knot change 

of speed. “Scouting and screening” also gives 

certain methods of utilizing ship planes to increase an area searched or to decrease fuel consumption in covering a given area.

The problem of bombing aircraft is purely 

an application of the principles of gunnery. In 

gunnery, the angle of discharge of the projectile 

is varied to suit the relative positions and speeds 

and courses of ship and target, while in bombing 

the angle of discharge is fixed and the position of 

the aircraft is varied to suit the speed and course 

conditions. The elements involved are (a) speed 

and course of aircraft relative to target, (b) altitude, [and] (c) bomb trajectory. The component 

of the bomb trajectory resulting from the speed 

of aircraft is much greater, obviously, than the 

corresponding element in the case of a firing 

ship. The bomb trajectory depends on coefficient of form and specific gravity of the bomb, 

and to some extent on lateral wind effect on 

bomb. Relative speed and course depend upon 

air speed and course of aircraft, direction and 

velocity of wind, course and speed of target. If 

these three, or their resultant, and the altitude 

can be accurately determined, the problem of 

bombing becomes largely one of mathematics. The tactics of bombing at sea under favorable conditions are as follows: (1) set sight for 

airspeed for aircraft; (2) set sight for altitude 

from altimeter; (3) by observation and estimate 

(quite accurate from air as regards course), set 

sight for target course and speed; (4) approach 

up or down wind to determine direction of 

wind (which may be entirely different in upper 

air than below). Set sight for direction of wind; 

(5) approach from right angles to wind to determine wind velocity. Set sight accordingly; [and] 

(6) approach on steady course, fire when on. 

This procedure, carefully followed through by a 

trained aircraft crew, in good air conditions, will 

give results whose accuracy depends entirely 

upon the accuracy of the instruments and sight 

employed and upon skill of the personnel.

Results of bombing practices under target 

practice conditions are of limited value as indicating actual results obtainable. In judging the 

figures, it should be borne in mind that:

a. Bombs used are subcaliber. At least 

10 percent greater accuracy may be 

expected from the full-size bomb. 

b. Present instruments are of limited 
108 Chapter Two

accuracy, and calibrating, or “bore 

sighting,” is not always adequately 

carried out.

c. All firing is done with open sights, 

mechanically very imperfect. Greatly improved telescope sights are in 

experimental use now.

d. Figures are misleading, in that the 

target area is a circle, while the 

pattern is usually an ellipse.

The recent exercises against ex-German ships 

are of more value and indicate great hitting ability under favorable conditions.

The effectiveness of a bomb depends on 

various factors. One is the penetration of the 

bomb before explosion. Another is the parts of 

the ship on which the explosion exerts its force. 

An aircraft carrier would make a very fine target 

in this respect, as well as in size. Another is the 

speed of the projectile, and herein lies a difficulty, for the speed of a bomb is due entirely 

to gravity. While in a vacuum the speed would 

increase rapidly with the height from which 

dropped, actually a point is soon reached where 

air resistance balances the force of gravity and 

the downward, speed becomes constant. This 

speed has been increased by streamlining the 

projectile. Recent experiments at Indian Head 

[Maryland] show better penetration results 

than had been anticipated. It is to be remembered that properly fused bombs will give depth 

charge effects even if an actual hit is not scored.

It has been authoritatively stated that: “Experimental development of the torpedo launching from aircraft is promising and there is no 

reason to doubt that ships may be successfully 

attacked in this manner. The tactics of this attack 

remain to be developed, but from a mechanical 

point of view no difficulty need apparently be 

anticipated.” The method of launching torpedoes from airplanes consists in flying within a 

few feet of the water, heading toward the target, 

and releasing the torpedo, after which the torpedo behaves precisely as does any other torpedo. The attack may be masked by a barrage of 

smoke bombs under conditions that will make 

the latter effective. In getting very near the water within torpedo range, the plane subjects itself to the possibility of zone shrapnel or fuzed 

H. E. [high explosive] fire from the entire battery of surface vessels, laying guns on the horizon and training on the plane. A very effective 

barrage might thus be laid. Even more effective 

would be a “splash” barrage ahead of the plane. 

This method was proposed for use in the British fleet. Wings, rudders, stabilizers, etc., are 

[made] of fabric and would be wrecked by a 

splash; and the substitution of metal surfaces, as 

has been done in some planes, would probably 

not enable a plane to pass through a splash barrage. Aside from all the questions of directing 

the torpedo itself so that it may make a hit, it 

is difficult to launch one effectively. Too great 

height or speed will result in deranging a torpedo. Thus, when a service torpedo was recently 

dropped from a Martin [MB-1] bomber at 35 

feet, and at high speed, the head broke off and 

spun in the air when the torpedo hit the water.

Comparing torpedoes with bombs as aircraft weapons, it may be considered that: (1) a 

large proportion of the torpedo weight is taken 

up by machinery, which has no destructive effect; (2) structural defense against torpedoes is 

highly developed; (3) zone fire and water barrage against craft within a few feet of the water 

and on a course giving small deflection promises 

many more hits than any high angle defense now 

in sight; [and] (4) torpedo directors are better 

developed than bomb sights.

The usefulness of aircraft for spotting has 
Cummings 109

been recognized by both the British and the 

United States navies. From the experience to 

date it may be stated that:

a. Aircraft, from their position, can 

observe the fall of shot immensely 

better than anyone on board ship.

b. Aircraft can sometimes spot successfully when ship’s spotters are 

prevented by (1) smoke screens, 

(2) thick weather, [and] (3) target 

hull-down beyond horizon.

c. Planes have thus far proved to be 

better spotting platforms than kite 

balloons.

d. Planes can seek best position for 

observation, while kite balloons 

can vary position only in height. 

This is most important in practice.

e. Planes, when up, do not hamper 

handling of ship. Kite balloons do.

f. Communications are an absolute 

essential.

g. Selective radio communication is 

to some extent possible to prevent 

Cutaway and interior structural drawings of USS Akron (ZRS 4), ca. 1931.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 80769, courtesy of Richard K. Smith
110 Chapter Two

interference of various spotting 

planes. Four planes have thus communicated without interference.

h. Spotting is best done by planes 

carrying two or more persons.

i. It is difficult, but by no means impracticable, to differentiate reasonably well between the salvos from 

various ships and between the targets that various ships are firing at.

Since kite balloons are much more vulnerable to attack from enemy aircraft than are 

planes, it may be considered that planes are the 

more desirable for spotting. When spotting, 

planes take position according to the visibility 

of the targets and to the effectiveness of the enemy’s antiaircraft measures. Their special value 

for the service lies in the fact that they can take 

position so as to accommodate themselves to 

existing conditions.

For simple lookout, as distinguished from 

scouting, an advantage of position over ship 

board observer is gained by the use of kite balloons. This advantage of position enables an 

observer, under favorable conditions, to see a 

submarine better than from deck. For surface 

craft, and for submarines not in favorable position, the advantage of vision is frequently offset by the added visibility. For observation of 

channels and along shore work, they are useful. 

They are very vulnerable to attack from mobile 

aircraft due to their immobility and consequent 

helplessness.

Combat machines are usually small land 

planes of great speed, climb, and aerobatic ability, armed with machine guns for use against 

other aircraft. The maneuvers executed by such 

craft vary with the whim of the pilot, but consist 

generally in maneuvering to get the opponent 

under a quick momentary burst of machine gun 

fire without getting in his arc of fire. Defense 

against such craft by aircraft may be by outmaneuvering them along the same line, or, in the 

case of large planes, by machine gun fire from a 

large number of machine guns capable of firing 

in any direction. To render this defense adequate 

the problem must be met of eliminating “blind 

spots” and in large machines placing guns to 

fire in absolutely all directions. Lighter-than-air 

craft are not defensible against combat planes, 

nor generally against planes of greater speed, 

climb, and ceiling, except that gun platforms 

have been rigged on top of Zeppelins, and it 

is probable that in future types guns will be so 

placed on rigid dirigibles as to be able to fire 

in all directions. The gunnery problem of combat planes involves such great speeds, variety of 

angles of approach, and quick turns that long 

ranges are not attempted, and sight setting is 

practically nonexistent, sights being designed 

with one fixed point and one movable, the movable one being controlled by the effective wind. 

Devices are usually added to assist the gunner in 

estimating the allowance for course and speed of 

the target relative to own plane. Training for this 

work is by means of camera guns, which photograph the target and show whether or not hits 

would have been scored.

Recent developments in airplane cannon 

seem to indicate that the use of cannon, of 

1-pounder, 3-pounder, and 3-inch is perfectly 

practicable. No exact data is available as to the 

use of these guns except that it is known that a 

high percentage of hits can be obtained on surface targets from altitudes up to 1,000 or 2,000 

feet. These are not Davis guns but automatic or 

semiautomatic guns of conventional type. Such 

guns suggest the feasibility of attacking light 

craft, such as submarines and destroyers. The 
Cummings 111

use of these guns or of machine guns to drive 

personnel from decks or from fire control top 

is also suggested as an occasionally and probably 

practicable method of attack.

The question of antiaircraft defense ashore 

and afloat differs materially for much the same 

reasons that gunnery differs. An essential part of 

any defense is a lookout sufficient to give ample 

warning of the presence of attacking aircraft. It 

would probably be impossible entirely to prevent observation of a naval base by enemy aircraft except by denying them a starting point 

within their radius. Operations to that end may 

be conducted by the use of longer radius observation aircraft with bombs or supported by surface craft. The use of artillery and splash barrage 

against planes would be effective in the case of 

planes flying very close to the water as to discharge torpedoes. Against lighter-than-air craft 

in daylight, it is less difficult within gunnery angle ranges. The use of artillery against aircraft 

by ships is difficult and of limited effectiveness. 

Machine guns with a proportion of tracer bullets are effective within an altitude of 4,000 feet 

when skillfully operated. Defense of fixed positions against dirigibles and low altitude planes at 

night is most effective by means of curtains of 

streamers hung from lines supported by captive 

balloons. Such lines have been strung at altitudes 

up to 10,000 feet. The most effective defense for 

John Charles Roach, Blimp USS Macon with Escort Plane. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2012-12-01
112 Chapter Two

fleet and most other purposes is combat planes 

of our own, outnumbering and out-speeding the 

enemy’s planes. 

The navigation of aircraft presents the same 

problem as the navigation of ships, but with 

some features very greatly emphasized. Thus, 

air currents are of unknown direction, and very 

speedy, so that dead reckoning frequently is entirely untrustworthy. Air currents vary in velocity and direction at various altitudes and at 

various places. An air indicating balloon released 

for observation purposes at Lisbon moved in a 

spiral covering 16 points of the compass before 

reaching 5,000 feet. With a wind of 20 knots, 

that means that two planes steering the same 

compass courses at the same air speeds from 

the same place but at different altitude would 

be 40 miles apart at the end of an hour. When 

landmarks are in sight, or ships, the course made 

good may sometimes be determined. It is sometimes possible to drop smoke bombs on the water and take observations of them. The taking 

of observations of the sun and stars is difficult 

due to inaccuracy of height of eye estimations. 

This has been overcome to some extent by development of a leveling sextant, which uses a 

self-contained bubble for horizon. The amount 

of apparatus that can be carried and used is 

limited by weight and space considerations. 

Observations are difficult due to the physical inconvenience of exposure to a wind of 60 knots 

or more while observing.

A very great aid to navigation may at times 

be found when light conditions are favorable, 

by the character of the bottom or the depth. 

Thus, in southern waters, where ships are frequently piloted by eye from the top, aircraft 

can frequently identify characteristic formations. Isolated reefs or deep spots or sharply defined depth curves can frequently be identified 

and furnish excellent land or water marks.

Aircraft can also obtain fixes from radio 

compass stations. In so doing, owing to speed of 

aircraft, observations by various stations should 

be taken on signal at the same instant. Results 

within three degrees have been obtained, and 

this can be bettered.
113

LETTER FROM GEIGER 

TO YARNELL ON AVIATION

Major General Roy S. Geiger letter to Admiral H. E. Yarnell

11 September 19438

in 1940, of the capture of Crete in 

1941, of the surrender of Pantelleria 

[Italian island] in 1943, and of softening up Italy to such an extent that that 

country surrendered upon threat of invasion by ground forces. The Air Arm 

can pass over the defenses of a country 

and destroy its communications, its industries, its material, its cities, and its 

will to fight, as proven in the case of 

Italy. There is nothing that floats, submarines, destroyers, cruisers, carriers, 

and even battleships that cannot and 

have not repeatedly been sunk by aircraft. Battles are won by fire and movement. From this criterion, aircraft is by 

far the most potent weapon today as it 

easily surpasses all other arms in firepower and speed. 

2. The Navy must retain control of its 

aircraft. With a few exceptions, aviation has played a major role and has 

been the deciding factor in the naval 

engagements of the present war. Pearl 

Harbor, Coral Sea, Midway, and Santa 

Cruz were all decided by air action. 

DIVISION OF AVIATION

My Dear Admiral,

In accordance with your letter of 6 August 1943, 

there is enclosed herewith my considered opinion of the status which should be given aviation 

in our military organizations, so as to maintain 

the greatest efficiency in all components of national defense.

Very truly yours,

Roy S. Geiger,

Major General, USMC

***

Admiral H. E. Yarnell, USN (Ret)

Naval Operations,

Navy Department,

Washington, DC

1. Operations conducted to date have 

proven beyond a doubt the tremendous power and importance of the Air 

Arm. It is credited by independent action of saving England from invasion 

8

 The original article came from MajGen Roy S. Geiger to Adm 

H. E. Yarnell, “Division of Aviation,” 11 September 1943, copy of 

original, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, 

grammar, punctuation, and spelling. 
114 Chapter Two

3. Whether we want to admit it or not, 

aircraft has revolutionized the Navy. 

Battleships are fast becoming obsolete. 

Aircraft carriers are taking their place 

as the backbone of the Fleet. In other 

categories, everything within reason 

must be sacrificed for speed and firepower, especially antiaircraft. The primary striking force in the Fleet will be, 

and is now, shipborne aircraft. Aircraft 

is [of] as much importance to the Fleet 

as the ships themselves. A Fleet without aircraft in a modern engagement 

will be sunk before firing a shot, except from its antiaircraft guns. 

4. As aircraft has become an integral part 

of the Fleet and is one of its essential 

components, it follows without argument that the same agency, viz. The 

Navy Department, which controls the 

design, construction, equipment, training, and operation of the ships of the 

Fleet must likewise control naval aircraft, which is a vital component. 

5. The Navy, in addition, has the responsibility of search and patrol with its 

surface forces. In order to coordinate 

all forces engaged in search and patrol, 

all aircraft engaged on these missions 

should be assigned to the Navy. Divided responsibility leads to confusion. 

So, there should be no restrictions as to 

the types of airplanes used, nor for bases used for operation, whether ashore 

or afloat. 

6. The conclusion is reached that the Navy 

should retain under its direct control all 

aircraft afloat and all aircraft required 

for search and patrol at sea. Now this 

includes carrier, ship, and tender-based 

aircraft, land-based aircraft for patrol 

duty when more efficient than tenderbased and the necessary utility aircraft. 

When new developments are made, 

nothing should interfere with the Navy 

adapting types most suitable for the execution of naval tasks. 

7. There should be a Department of Air 

A Marine fighter pilot stands by his plane after lending air support to men on the assault waves at Cape 

Gloucester, New Britain. He and many like him 

showed courage and grim determination in strafing 

the Japanese while their fellow Marines fought doggedly on the beach. Kerr Eby, Marine Airman, 1944. 

Drawing, charcoal on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

88-159-DX, gift of Abbott Laboratories
Geiger 115

on an equal footing with the War and 

Navy Departments. No one will dispute the necessity for a large Air Force 

capable of repelling any attempted invasion of the United States whether by 

air, land, or sea; nor of having an Air 

Force of sufficient size to bomb a hostile country into submission, as is now 

being attempted by the AAF [Auxiliary Air Force] and the RAF [Royal Air 

Force] in aerial operations against Germany. At times, it will be necessary for 

the Air Force to operate with the Army 

and the Navy, and at still other times, 

it may function entirely independently. There appears to be no good reason 

why such an Air Force should belong 

to the Army any more than it should 

belong to the Navy. Nor of why the Air 

Force should belong to the Navy any 

more than the Navy should belong to 

the Air Force. The development of the 

Air Force should not be retarded by 

prejudice of either of the older Services, as has been the case in the development of the Army and Navy Air 

Services in the past. It should be free to 

develop under the guidance of aviators. 

On 9 October, VMF-121 pilots were catapult launched off the USS Copahee (CVE 12) escort carrier and flew 

350 miles north to reach Guadalcanal, where the air group based at Henderson Field for the duration of Operation Watchtower. The watercolor commemorates the actions of Marine Corps pilot Capt Joseph J. Foss. In 

three months of sustained combat, Foss and his group shot down 72 Japanese aircraft, including 25 credited 

to him. He received the Medal of Honor in recognition of his role in air combat during the Guadalcanal campaign. 1stLt Hugh Laidman, Joe Foss’ Wildcat. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 21-1-2
116 Chapter Two

8. Naval Aviation should be independent 

of the Department of Air. There are 

two reasons for this. First, naval aviation is primarily interested in a floating Air Arm having many problems to 

solve requiring expert naval knowledge 

and training. Experience has proven 

that a Naval Air Arm under the RAF is 

neglected and is an impractical organization.

9. While this appears to be a duplication, as 

a matter of fact, it is not. It is a necessary 

augmentation which cannot be guaranteed under any other arrangements. 

10. The past and present sniping against 

naval aviation can be avoided by taking 

the following steps:

a. Stop building up a land-based naval air striking force. Restrict such 

forces to that assigned the Marine 

Corps, which should be no larger 

than sufficient aircraft to support 

Marine Corps troops. 

b. Naval officers conduct air operation afloat. There are too many 

high-ranking naval aviation officers ashore. 

c. Permit Air Corps and Marine officers to conduct shore-based air 

operations. They are trained, organized, and equipped for conducting these operations while the 

Navy is not. If they are, then there 

would appear to be a duplication 

of effort.

11. It is not believed that a Department of 

National Defense, including the three 

fighting branches (Army, Navy and 

Air) would prove to be an efficient organization; although at first sight, it appears to be a logical organization. Such 

an organization would be entirely too 

large to function efficiently. Each of 

the three components—Army, Navy, 

and Air—is of sufficient importance 

to have a cabinet member at its head. 

Each operates in a different sphere—

land, sea, air. Each has major problems 

unknown to the other. It is believed 

that the organization and control of any 

one of the Services is as much as one 

head can efficiently handle. 

12. It is appreciated that the Services have 

to be coordinated. In many operations, 

they fight as a team. This coordination 

can be brought about by a Joint General Staff. Provisions for the training 

of suitable command and staff officers 

should be made by the establishment of 

a Joint War College and by a free exchange of officers between the three 

Services. 

MARINE CORPS AVIATION

Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC,

Director of Aviation

The mission of Marine Corps Aviation is to furnish the necessary air support of the ground 

forces of the Marine Corp, and to provide a reserve from which the Navy may draw aviation 

units for service afloat on purely naval missions. 

Therefore, examination of the tasks assigned 

the ground forces will immediately disclose the 

tasks to be performed by Marine Corps Aviation. They are:

l. To provide the air support for the capture of advanced bases.

2. To provide the air support for the 

defense of advanced bases until their 
Geiger 117

occupation and defense is assumed by 

Army forces.

3. To furnish the air support necessary for 

the occupation and defense of areas for 

which the Navy is responsible.

It may appear at first sight that, in the present war, Marine Corps Aviation has been employed on missions other than those for which 

it is maintained. Close analysis, however, will 

disclose that this is not the case and that there 

actually has been no change of mission. 

At Wake and Midway Islands, Marine Corps 

Aviation most ably assisted the Marine Corps 

ground forces in the defense of those far flung 

outposts of the Navy.

The seizure and defense of Guadalcanal 

presented a true and even better example of the 

employment of Marine Corps Aviation in support of ground forces of the Marine Corps. In 

that operation, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing reported to the 1st Marine Division and worked 

closely as a team until that island was securely 

in our possession. When ground troops of the 

Marine Corps who had seized and organized the 

defense of Guadalcanal were relieved by Army 

troops, circumstances were such that Marine 

Corps Aviation was assigned to continue to perform the same missions for those troops as for 

Marine Corps troops. 

Marine Corps Aviation is an integral part 

of the Marine Corps, and its missions are therefore essentially the same. The fact that certain 

temporary circumstances have arisen in this war 

which have necessitated its employment on like 

missions in support of Army troops in no wise 

alters this fact. 

Corsairs of 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (2d MAW), Okinawa, 10 June 1945.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Louis R. Jones Collection, Archives Branch, History Division
118

HOW WE BRIDGED A 

WARTIME “LEARNING GAP”

by Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 20169

expected by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific were 

displaced for a time. Because they did not anticipate this role for the submarine, the Navy had 

to learn under fire, which it accomplished with 

great success.

The results were eventually impressive. 

Outdated tactics and timid commanders were 

replaced by night surface attacks and aggressive 

officers. New technologies, including search 

radars and sonar, were introduced. New torpedoes and their exotic magnetic exploders were 

found to be flawed, and were painfully fixed. 

Doctrine, intelligence on shipping, and strategy 

were integrated into a ruthless war of attrition 

in the Pacific. A small part of the overall force, 

just 2 percent of the Navy’s personnel, sank 

nearly 4,800,000 tons of merchant shipping (55 

percent of the war’s total) and asphyxiated Japan’s economy.12

Both the U.S. and Imperial Japanese navies 

12 Ian W. Toll, The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–

1944 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), 244–86. See Effects of 

Strategic Bombing on Japan’s War Economy: The United States Strategic 

Bombing Survey (Washington, DC: Overall Economic Effects Division, 1947), appendix table C-50, appendix table 1.

Looking back after World War II, many 

Navy officers believed that their prewar 

planning was superb. “War Plan Orange 

persevered for 40 years and eventually won the 

war,” claims one noted scholar. “What more can 

one ask of a great plan.” 10 There is no doubt that 

the U.S. Navy was effective eventually. But the 

ultimate victory was not just because of War 

Plan Orange or the fleet exercises that refined 

it.11 Instead, success must be credited to the innovation and learning done by the Fleet. War 

Plan Orange’s envisioned blockade of Japan 

began much earlier than originally designed. In 

ordering its small submarine force to conduct 

unrestricted warfare, the Mahanian clashes long 

9

 The original article came from LtCol Franklin G. Hoffman, 

“How We Bridged a Wartime ‘Learning Gap’,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 142, no. 5 (May 2016): 22–29. Minor revisions were 

made to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, 

punctuation, and spelling. 

10 Edward Miller cited by George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea 

Power, The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 128.

11 For details on these fleet exercises, see Craig C. Felker, Testing 

American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940 (College 

Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007); and Albert A. Nofi, To 

Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010).
Hoffman 119

recognized their respective strengths and weaknesses. But it was not the size of the fleets or 

their materiel differences that dominated. Overall, the competition in naval combat and organizational learning dominated the Pacific war. In 

fact, a significant “learning gap” was created in 

both surface and subsurface warfare.13 That [gap] 

got wider and wider as U.S. submarines adjusted to new demands, technologies, and roles.14

While the Japanese began to adapt as the war 

progressed, the U.S. Navy achieved what could 

13 Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold 

Story of the Battle of Midway (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2010), 

407.

14 For the conduct of that campaign, see Joel Ira Holwitt, “Execute Against Japan”: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009), 

162–82.

be called “organizational learning dominance.”15

Ultimately, it was the Navy’s learning capacity 

that allowed it to be so successful.

ORGANIZATIONAL 

LEARNING CAPACITY

Innovation literature identifies four principal 

attributes of highly successful learning organizations. Collectively, these facilitators constitute 

the most important contributors to what can be 

called organizational learning capacity.16

15 R. Evan Ellis, “Organizational Learning Dominance: The Emerging Key to Success in the New Era of Warfare,” Comparative Strategy 18, no. 2 (May 1999): 191–202, https://doi.org/10.1080

/01495939908403173.

16 Derived from the theory of adoption capacity posited by Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 16–84.

Artist Harrison Miller imaginatively renders the USS Cuttlefish (SS 171), commissioned in 1934, firing a torpedo while submerged, in company with a number of amberjacks, dolphins, and other fish. 

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command
120 Chapter Two

Leadership. Leadership involvement at 

lower and medium levels of the force is evident 

in innovations and adaptation all through World 

War II in both the Army and the Navy.17 The 

Americans placed no restrictions on where they 

got good ideas and were decentralized in terms 

of best practices, many of which were generated 

from the bottom up.18

17 Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned 

the Tide in the Second World War (New York: Random House, 2013), 

270; and Capt Michael D. Doubler, Busting the Bocage: American 

Combined Arms Operations in France (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

1988), 32–34.

18 Russell A. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 269, 271, 279.

A decentralized approach delegates authority for solutions to lower levels, where ideas can 

be rapidly discovered and implemented.19 Current research suggests that a personal attribute 

of leader openness is invaluable. This is manifested in intellectual curiosity, creativity, and 

a degree of comfort with novelty and variety. 

Leaders [believing] in openness search for relevant and conflicting perspectives on problems 

19 Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation: With Fear of Change (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 311; and Meir Finkel, 

On Flexibility, Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on 

the Battlefield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 

98–110.

Without a way to see the world above without surfacing, the greatest advantage of the submarine—stealth—

would be lost. The design of the modern periscope is credited to Sir Howard Grubb, who developed them for 

the first British submarines. In this painting, Orlando S. Lagman depicts the periscope view of Japanese ships 

from a U.S. Navy submarine during World War II. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 67-018-S
Hoffman 121

and seek and value inputs regardless of rank.20

Organizational Culture. A number of 

scholars emphasize the importance of culture 

to how organizations innovate or adapt.21 One 

went so far as to observe that “military culture 

may be the most important factor not only in 

military effectiveness, but also in the processes 

involved in military innovation.”22 Culture serves 

as a prism for how organizations view problems, 

and establishes limits to acceptable solutions. 

Thus, culture can be both a barrier and a facilitator of change and adaptation.23

The literature suggests that certain cultural factors explain the greater flexibility and 

adaptability of military organizations.24 Students 

of German military history, for example, credit German culture with supporting an ethos of 

critical thinking and analysis within its concept 

of ausbildung or professional development.25 Climates of critical thinking, intellectual curiosity, 

and objective analyses are key to supporting the 

20 Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong, Changing Minds in the Army: 

Why It Is So Difficult and What to Do About It (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013), 8. See also 

Steven H. Appelbaum and Walter Reichart, “How to Measure an 

Organization’s Learning Ability: The Facilitating Factors—Part II,” 

Journal of Workplace Learning 10, no. 1 (May 1998): 15–28, https://

doi.org/10.1108/13665629810370012; and John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup 

with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 22. 21 Theo Farrell, “Culture and Military Power,” Review of International 

Studies 24, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 410. 22 Williamson Murray, “The Future of American Military Culture: 

Does Military Culture Matter?,” Orbis 43, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 

90, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387(99)80055-6; Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ed., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, 

Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 7–8; and 

Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between 

the Wars,” International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 65–93. 23 Anthony J. DiBella, “Organization Theories: Perspectives on 

Changing National Security Institutions,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 

69 (April 2013): 15.

24 Murray, Military Adaptation, 305–28. 25 James S. Corum, “A Comprehensive Approach to Change: Reform in the German Army in the Interwar Period,” in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941, 

ed. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 2000), 54–56.

rigorous evaluation of new ideas.26 Cultures that 

value conformity and compliance with rules, 

routines, and operational praxis are rigid. Centralized and controlling cultures do not generate 

the conditions for creative problem solving.

Learning Mechanisms. An adaptive culture capable of inquiry must have processes to 

help commanders make sense of ongoing operations and to explore possible changes. One historian argues [that] “without a coherent system 

of analyzing what is actually happening, military 

organizations have no means of adapting to the 

conditions they face except [to] doggedly impose assumptions on reality or, even more dubiously, to adapt by guessing.”27 During World War 

II, most armies and navies began producing after 

action reports to collect best practices, a practice the Germans started in World War I.28

In both peacetime and during war, successful commanders or Services must also have a capacity to experiment to explore the unknown. 

Peacetime innovation has been correlated with 

cultures of critical inquiry augmented by these 

exercises and experiments.29

But in wartime, the laboratory moves to the 

battlefield; success is dependent on being able to 

sense, interpret, and respond faster than one’s 

opponent. Experimentation and thus learning 

become largely generated on the battlefield “in 

contact.” Sometimes this can be done by operational units, and often by special staff sections 

or operations research analysts. The British be26 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

1996), 314–28, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511601019.

27 Murray, Military Adaptation, 15. 28 See Robert T. Foley, “Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes?: Learning in the British and German Armies during the Great War,” International Affairs 90, no. 2 (March 2014): 287, https://doi.org

/10.1111/1468-2346.12109. 29 Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, “Military Innovation in 

Peacetime,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 410, https://

doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511601019.011.
122 Chapter Two

gan this practice in dealing with the Luftwaffe

and U-boat challenges.30 New staff structures 

or special task forces should also be considered 

a learning mechanism.31 Some historical examples, including the development of infiltration 

tactics in World War I by the German Army, 

were created by special units. Other examples, 

with the Israel Defense Force, point to using 

designated units as “incubators” to test new ideas 

30 See R. V. Jones, The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 

1939–1945 (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978); 

and Stephen Budiansky, Blackett’s War: The Men Who Defeated the Nazi 

U-Boats and Brought Science to the Art of Warfare (New York: Vintage 

Books, 2013).

31 Matthew Alan Tattar, “Innovation and Adaptation in War” (PhD 

diss., Brandeis University, MA, 2011), 24.

and create knowledge under operational conditions.32

Dissemination Mechanisms. Most military organizations have entities and processes 

dedicated to doctrine and distributing lessons; 

this can be done by bulletins or new doctrine 

by formal schools, or institutional-level training 

activities. In wartime, there is a need to rapidly acquire, process, and distribute new tactical 

lessons and techniques to units that have not yet 

32 Raphael D. Marcus, “Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel-Hizbollah Conflict: The Institutionalization of 

Lesson-Learning in the IDF,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 4 

(August 2015): 8–10.

The USS Dorado (SS 248) firing on a derelict cargo ship for target practice during its shakedown cruise, 

summer 1943. Following its commissioning in the fall of that year, Dorado sailed for the canal zone, but never arrived. Air searches discovered oil slicks and widely scattered debris, but no specific identification was 

made. A German submarine was known to be operating in the area, but the actual fate of Dorado is unknown. 

Thomas Hart Benton, Score Another for the Subs, 1943. Oil and acrylic on board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 88-159-BN. Gift of Abbott Laboratories
Hoffman 123

had their own combat experiences.33 Without 

such mechanisms, lessons learned by one ship 

or boat are not shared and have to be learned 

again, perhaps at grave cost.34

THE SUBMARINE FORCE’S 

LEARNING CAPACITY

Leadership. The key strategic leaders in the 

Pacific naval war possessed credible credentials 

with submarines and open minds willing to test 

existing doctrine. Fleet Admirals Ernest J. King 

and Chester W. Nimitz were intimately familiar 

with submarines, both having commanded boats 

as young officers.35 King commanded a division 

of boats, as well as the New London [Connecticut] submarine base.36 He claimed to be a proponent of decentralized leadership, recognizing 

that the coming war required “the initiative of 

the subordinate” with less detail in orders on 

how to do something.37

Nimitz, in turn, exuded calm and competence.38 He commanded four different boats as 

a junior officer, led a submarine division, and 

created the submarine base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. He was an acknowledged expert on diesel 

engines, and he too would write in his profession’s journal, Proceedings. And like King, he lec33 See Murray, Military Adaptation, 262–304; Finkel, On Flexibility, 

150–63; and Robert T. Foley, “A Case Study in Horizontal Military 

Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918,” Journal of Strategic 

Studies 35, no. 6 (December 2012): 799–827, https://doi.org/10

.1080/01402390.2012.669737.

34 Thomas Mahnken, “Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles of Guadalcanal, 1942–1943,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 

1 (Winter 2011): 95–121.

35 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral 

Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); and Walter R. Borneman, The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King—The Five-Star 

Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (New York: Little, Brown, 2012), 

26–40,119–26.

36 Buell, Master of Sea Power, 51–55. 37 Buell, Master of Sea Power, 25, 31; and Borneman, The Admirals, 

192.

38 E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

1976); and Borneman, The Admirals, 53–65, 79–84.

tured on the offensive opportunities presented 

by fleet submarines.39

The principal officers at the operational 

level were Admirals Charles A. Lockwood and 

Ralph W. Christie. Both spent the majority of 

their careers in submarines and were leaders in 

submarine development before the war. Known 

as “Mr. Submarine,” Lockwood was famous 

for his advocacy of the long-range fleet boat.40

Known for an informal style of leadership, he 

defended subordinates and reflected “loyalty 

down” rather than just demanding compliance.41

He was open to new ideas and actively strived 

to interview each returning boat captain to gain 

leaders like Commander Dudley W. Morton 

for personal interviews. Lockwood attempted 

to ensure he had the best information from the 

fighting units of his command.42 He would personally meet each boat as it returned to port, 

and would go over patrol reports with the commanders.43 Lockwood’s subordinates described 

him as “not [a] conformist and against rule book 

thinking.”44 He was willing to experiment and 

press to get necessary changes.45

Admiral Christie, on the other hand, effectively retarded learning in his command, and his 

example serves to highlight the positive impact 

that learning leadership from others had on the 

course of the war. He overcentralized his operations in Australia, and created a command climate in which he had stifled critical inquiry and 

39 Borneman, The Admirals, 120. 40 Adm I. J. Galantin, USN, Take Her Deep!: A Submarine against Japan 

in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 29. 41 Galantin, Take Her Deep!. 42 Anthony Newpower, Iron Men and Tin Fish: The Race to Build a Better Torpedo during World War II (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 101. 43 Charles A. Lockwood, Sink ’Em All: Submarine Warfare in the Pacific

(New York: Dutton, 1951), 33.

44 Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War 

II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1949), 225.

45 On his early career, see Brayton Harris, Admiral Nimitz: The Commander of the Pacific Ocean Theater (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 

2012), 7–65.
124 Chapter Two

adaptation. Known as “Mr. Torpedo” before the 

war, his insistence that commanders not criticize 

faulty weapons in their patrol reports closed out 

the possibility of learning about their faults, and 

he relieved commanders who persisted in complaining about the troubled magnetic exploder 

that Christie had championed. While Nimitz had 

ordered their deactivation in July 1943, [by] as 

late as March 1944, Christie had boats trying to 

use the flawed exploder.46 He failed to create or 

sustain a collaborative climate conducive to adaptation. Even after the war, Christie insisted torpedo performance was a function of operator 

and maintenance personnel, not the hardware 

itself.47 Lockwood sustained a more open and 

tolerant command style that allowed officers to 

challenge doctrine and make independent judgments.

Organizational Culture. At an organizational cultural level, the submarine community had to apply its specialty within the Navy’s 

sense of traditionalism and its Mahanian conception of sea control.48 War Plan Orange remained 

the embodied beliefs about the Navy’s principal 

operational challenge and how it would fight. 

Thus, the submarine had to fit and conform to 

this vision of a transoceanic drive across the Pacific to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy. The 

fleet submarine, with its impressive range and 

24 torpedoes, was originally designed to fit the 

bill, although it lacked speed.

Aside from its corporate identity and operating culture of independent command at 

sea, the operating culture of the submarine 

branch was technically focused and oriented 

46 Wilfred Jay Holmes, Undersea Victory: The Influence of Submarine 

Operations on the War in the Pacific (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 

1966), 311.

47 Toll, The Conquering Tide, 281. 48 RAdm Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis: 

Naval Institute Press, 1991).

on problem-solving. It was by necessity a rulesbased group and subjected to a common operating procedure. The older officers were the 

most indoctrinated by a rules-based system that 

focused on the reconnaissance mission of submarines but made them risk-averse in attack 

situations. This produced a generational tension 

between the more inflexible older officers and 

the younger officers who were less risk-averse. 

The former, indoctrinated by years of peacetime fleet exercises stressing conformity to an 

overarching “decisive fleet battle” concept, were 

comfortable in a control-based culture, whereas the latter were comfortable with informal 

command styles and stress on individual initiative that arose in the immediate aftermath of 

the war’s opening disasters. The new operating 

code for submarine warfare in the Pacific, unrestricted warfare, required a more creative/

risk-taking culture.

The culture of the submarine community 

was somewhat different from that of the larger 

Navy. The officers were younger and well trained 

and educated. Commanders were also younger 

and obtained command at an earlier stage of 

their careers. Boat crews were also volunteers 

and technically competent in their ratings. Leadership was more informal and discipline could 

be maintained, but living and working so closely 

generated less formal and less hierarchal modes 

of leading.49

Learning Mechanisms. The Navy’s submarine service had possibly the best after action/

lessons-learned gathering process. While each 

boat was returning from a combat patrol, the 

captain or their executive officer worked full 

time on making a formal record of it. These 

reports included tactical maps of each firing 

49 George Grider with Lydel Sims, War Fish (Boston: Little, Brown, 

1958), 10–11, 55.
Hoffman 125

solution on each target. On return to port, each 

captain would formally submit the patrol report 

to their immediate superior, and copies were 

disseminated horizontally to boats in the same 

squadron. This provided a means of feeding forward valuable information about the operating 

environment, new tactics and techniques, and 

on what needed to be enhanced (e.g., periscopes, radar, and, all too often, torpedoes).

In addition to the reports, each commander 

in the chain would review and append a formal 

written endorsement. These would assess each 

patrol as successful or not, and often publicly 

commend a commander for aggressiveness or 

rebuke one for recklessness with torpedoes. Endorsements to the war patrol reports became a 

tool for reinforcing best practices and produced 

a collective understanding.50 Lockwood and his 

50 VAdm James F. Calvert, USN (Ret), Silent Running: My Years on 

a World War II Attack Submarine (New York: John Wiley, 1995), 55.

staff examined every patrol report closely and 

strived to interview each returning boat captain 

to gain the latest intelligence directly from the 

source without filters.

Endorsements proved a way for the community at large to learn how officialdom viewed 

each new combat lesson and how others might 

view initiatives and overall boat performance. 

Naval historians and former commanders described them as the principal policy-making 

documents for the submarine fleet, by which 

the force’s doctrinally approved “way of war” 

was disseminated.51

In keeping with a general willingness to 

try nontraditional solutions to hard problems, 

the American fleet commander, Admiral King, 

turned to operational analysis to support the 

51 Clay Blair Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 77; and Calvert, Silent 

Running, 55.

During World War II, the United States deployed submarines in the Pacific to prevent Japanese shipping from 

transporting supplies and reinforcements to the islands. The USS Tang (SS 306) was one of the Navy’s most 

successful submarines until it sank due to one of its own torpedoes. Artist John Hamilton shows the submarine on its fifth and final war patrol, 24 October 1944. On that date, a malfunctioning torpedo circled back 

and sank it, killing most of the crew. John Hamilton, USS Tang at Formosa. Oil on wood.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 89-020-R
126 Chapter Two

antisubmarine warfare challenges in the North 

Atlantic. Ultimately, in April 1942, the U.S. Navy 

stood up the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG). It helped 

devise and refine submarine tactics, as well as 

best practices for sonar and convoy techniques. 

By August, ASWORG was making a real contribution.52 King credited this cell with recommendations that “increased the effectiveness of 

weapons by factors of three or five.” In fact, Admiral King found his learning/research support 

critical to success:

In the seesaw of techniques, the side that 

countered quickly, before the opponent had 

time to perfect the new tactics and weapons, 

had a decided advantage. Operations research, 

bringing scientists in to analyze the technical 

import of the fluctuations between measure and 

countermeasure, made it possible to speed up 

our reaction rate in several critical cases.53

Ultimately, Lockwood decided to set up his 

own operations research shop (called the Submarine Operations Research Group [SORG]) at 

Pearl Harbor.54 This team was slow to get started and adapt itself from antisubmarine work to 

submarine warfare. However, its insights were 

quickly cycled back through special reports or 

synthesized into tactical bulletins to the fleet.55

Not long after his staff was augmented with the 

SORG, Lockwood issued his first campaign plan 

52 Montgomery C. Meigs, Slide Rules and Submarines: American Scientists and Submarine Warfare in World War II (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 58–62.

53 Adm Ernest J. King, USN, “United States Navy at War: Final Official Report to the Secretary of the Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 71, no. 515 (1946): 174. Cited in Brian McCue, U-Boats 

in the Bay of Biscay: An Essay in Operations Analysis (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 1990), 1.

54 For details, see Lockwood, Sink ’Em All, 167–68; Peter Sasgen, 

Hellcats: The Epic Story of World War II’s Most Daring Submarine Raid

(New York: Caliber, 2010), 171–73; and Edwin P. Hoyt, Bowfin: 

The True Story of a Fabled Fleet Submarine (New York: J. Wiley, 1995), 

155–75.

55 Meigs, Slide Rules and Submarines, 202.

and raised the priority placed on targeting Japanese oil tankers.56 He used them well beyond 

their scientific disciplines as a red team as well, 

with appreciable influence.57

The initial absence of an experimental staff 

or operations research cell slowed the pace of 

adaptation. Lockwood ultimately had to develop his own experiments to find out that the 

Mark XV torpedoes were running too deep and 

that the contact exploders were flawed.58 Lockwood’s lack of his own SORG “learning team” 

may account for his slow investigation into the 

flawed torpedo.

Dissemination Mechanisms. During the 

course of the war, the submarine community shared its patrol reports beyond the fleet to 

schools, training commands, and the submarine/torpedo production facilities. Lockwood 

even took steps to provide his officers with copies of the war patrol reports while resting at the 

Royal Hawaiian Hotel [in Honolulu].59

Reading patrol reports became a form of 

self-improvement or pastime reading while at 

sea.60 This supports the idea that social and informal methods of distributed learning reinforce formal learning mechanisms. Not only 

were these war patrol reports used to feed better practices horizontally, but they were sent to 

the classrooms of the Submarine School as new 

crews were stood up.61

56 Holmes, Undersea Victory, 236. 57 VAdm Charles A. Lockwood, USN (Ret), and Col Hans Christian Adamson, USAF (Ret), Hellcats of the Sea: Operation Barney and 

the Mission to the Sea of Japan (New York: Bantam, 1988), 357. 58 Lockwood, Sink ’Em All, 112–13; Roscoe, United States Submarine 

Operations in World War II, 145–46; and Newpower, Iron Men and 

Tin Fish, 170–80. 59 Letter, Commander SubPac, 1 November 1943, Record Group 

313, Blue 443/2, A16 3 (3), National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.

60 RAdm Eugene B. Fluckey, USN (Ret), Thunder Below!: The USS 

Barb Revolutionizes Submarine Warfare in World War II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 201.

61 Galantin, Take Her Deep, 27.
Hoffman 127

Finally, the Navy fed lessons learned and 

new techniques to the fleet through short doctrine reports called Submarine Bulletins. The Submarine Force, [U.S.] Pacific [Fleet,] published 

numerous tactical submarine bulletins during 

the course of the war. The sub force based in 

Australia also issued bulletins that became an official means of recording and sharing best practices and semiofficial doctrine within the theater 

and the force after trial and error at sea. Patrol 

reports, distributed endorsements, and Submarine Bulletins were collectively a classic learning 

system based on an open feedback loop.62 Postwar memoirs note that these reports emphasized content to share among the community of 

practice.63

“VICTORY IN THE 

CRUCIBLE OF BATTLE”

Ultimately, the U.S. submarine force made a 

major contribution to the naval defeat of Ja62 Meigs, Slide Rules and Submarines, 175; and Calvert, Silent Running, 54, 55. 63 Grider and Sims, War Fish, 90; Calvert, Silent Running, 54–55; 

and Fluckey, Thunder Below, 201.

pan, although not the one the Navy originally 

planned. The postwar assessment from inside 

the submarine community was telling: “Neither by training nor indoctrination was the U.S. 

Submarine Force readied for unrestricted warfare.”64 Rather than a campaign of cataclysmic 

salvos by battleships or sorties of dive bombers 

between opposing battle lines, it proved to be a 

war of attrition, learning, and military change. 

Commanders from that period estimate that the 

submarine force was operating at a level only 

15 percent of its effectiveness in 1942.65 By late 

1943, the sub force was at full throttle.

The essence of this culture of learning existed throughout the Navy even before Pearl Harbor, but it strengthened as the Service quickly 

refocused itself to learn from actual experience 

at sea. As one historical account of the Pacific 

notes:

Combat was a hard and unforgiving school, 

but the U.S. Navy was taking its lesson to 

64 Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 18. 65 Capt Edward L. Beach, USN (Ret), Submarine!: The Classic Account 

of Undersea Combat in World War II (New York: Pocket Star, 2004), 

20.

Damage to USS Tang from its own torpedo, 1 January 1949. 

Submarine Report: Depth Charge, Bomb, Mine, Torpedo, and Gunfire Damage Including Losses in Action, 7 December 1941 

to 15 August 1945, vol. 1, War Damage Report No. 58 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Bureau of Ships, 1949)
128 Chapter Two

heart. If the Navy did one thing right after 

the debacle of December 7, it was to become 

collectively obsessed with learning, and improving. Each new encounter with the enemy 

was mined for all the wisdom and insights 

it had to offer. Every after-action report 

included a section of analysis and recommendations, and those nuggets of hard-won 

knowledge were absorbed into future command decisions, doctrine, planning, and 

training throughout the service.66

In the end, victory was forged in the Pacific campaign by the Navy’s learning capacity. 

Yes, the Navy outfought the Japanese, but this 

could only happen because its learning processes out-cycled those of the adversary so that 

each battle and each patrol laid a foundation for 

subsequent successes. Leaders and culture supported the process of learning. The obsession 

with learning that began in Sims Hall at Newport [Rhode Island] and continued with the fleet 

66 Ian W. Toll, Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942

(New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 375.

exercises was a central element in the operating 

ethos of the fleet. This learning capacity ultimately ensured victory in the crucible of battle. 

Technology was a part of this learning, as the 

Navy absorbed updated radars and sonar, wakeless “fish,” and an array of advanced defensive capabilities. They were incorporated into the fleet 

and ultimately refined by the operators. This 

learning had to be shared with the rest of the 

force. The Navy’s learning capacity proved to be 

the ultimate game changer.

To promote innovation, in war and during 

peacetime, the Navy must once again establish 

dominance in organizational learning and sharpen the education and mechanisms that promote 

learning across the fleet. It must stimulate a new 

generation of young Turks to bring forth fresh 

ideas.67 Our leadership must embrace and absorb disruptive thinking, experimentation, and 

technologies effectively to sustain its preeminence at sea.

67 Cdr Benjamin Armstrong, USN, “The New Young Turks,” Naval 

War College Review 68, no. 4 (Autumn 2015), 108–13.
Hoffman 129

Cdr Richard H. O’Kane sat for this photograph 

in March 1946, shortly after he had received the 

Medal of Honor.

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives, 80-G702334

“IT WAS OUR CHIEFS, TOO!”

“Some of them were crazy” were “hell-bent 

to get killed,” the veterans reflected on some 

of the legendary submarine commanding officers of World War II. I overheard these comments some years ago when I had the honor of 

listening to them tell sea stories at a few submarine veterans of World War II conventions. 

These surprising appraisals of their leaders 

varied greatly but always were fascinating.

At one such gathering, I had the pleasure of meeting Clayton Oliver Decker, who 

served as a machinist’s mate third class on 

board the USS Tang (SS 306) during the war. 

Decker was one of the nine who survived 

the ship’s final war patrol. Interested in what 

the crew thought about their legendary commander, Richard Hetherington O’Kane, I 

asked, “What made Tang so special?” Decker 

answered, “Well, we had the finest skipper of 

the war in Dick O’Kane, but it was our chiefs, 

too!”

Decker’s stories about the Tang’s chiefs’ mess were remarkable. He respectfully spoke of 

men such as Chief Quartermaster Sidney William Jones, who had been sent to a “top-secret 

telephone school” in Canada prior to reporting to the Tang. It turned out that the school taught 

the young quartermaster how to operate and maintain the ST and SJ radars, a fleet submarine’s 

second most unreliable pieces of equipment. Decker explained that Jones “had no match when 

it came to radar. Our radar worked!” he boasted. Embellishing a little, he said, “We could detect 

contacts at twice the range of any other boat.” Chief Jones trained the crew to a high level of 

expertise, even using the radar to navigate, a novel idea at the time. Excellence in radar operations surely gave the Tang and O’Kane, later a Medal of Honor recipient, a sizable advantage in 

detecting and closing their enemies for the kill.
130 Chapter Two

A SUBMARINE’S WARTIME SUCCESS

After driving to close an enemy target, our submariners often faced the biggest equipment problem on a fleet submarine, the legendary unreliability of their torpedoes. Fortunately, according to Decker, the Tang’s torpedoman chief and later chief of boat, William Ballinger, “would 

have none of it.” Decker lauded that “Ballinger knew his stuff, and he violated regs [regulations] 

and jury-rigged every torpedo.” Chief Ballinger trained “the fastest torpedo reload team in the 

fleet,” and “those torpedoes worked.” With chiefs like that and a brilliant commander in Richard 

O’Kane, it is no surprise that the Tang was credited with sinking 33 ships, the most of any submarine during the war. Decker did not talk much longer, as he teared up at the very mention 

of Ballinger. Later, I was told that Decker was the last to see Ballinger alive. After firing their 

last shot, the Tang crew’s joy at the thought of returning home quickly turned to despair as their 

final torpedo circled back. Unfortunately, the torpedo worked all too well, striking a devastating 

blow that instantly killed more than half of the crew, including Chief Jones. Decker followed 

Ballinger’s lead as they opened the ballast tanks, allowing the ship to rest somewhat level on the 

bottom of the Formosa Strait.

Chief Ballinger, his head bleeding profusely, then began to calmly prepare the remaining 

crew to escape. Japanese destroyers began depth charging their position. After carefully guiding 

Decker and others through the escape procedures, Ballinger later followed them up from the 

deep. Arriving on the surface just next to Decker, Ballinger endured extraordinary pain and 

struggled violently to survive. His lungs likely had exploded during the ascent. Watching Ballinger die haunted Decker. He always wondered why he survived and “not Billy.” Clayton Decker, 

Richard O’Kane, and seven others were picked up by the Japanese and brutally tortured in a 

prisoner-of-war camp before returning home to tell their story.

Perhaps that is the answer to Decker’s question: for we would not know all this had he not 

survived. We would not be reminded that a submarine’s wartime success belongs not only to 

the innovative, bold leadership of skippers like O’Kane but also to everyday heroes like Decker 

and to the terrific chiefs who trained them—leaders such as Chiefs Ballinger and Jones, who 

demanded that the Tang’s equipment perform reliably and that the crew always be ready to fight. 

Clayton Oliver Decker joined his shipmates on eternal patrol on 24 May 2003.

~ Captain David Adams, 

U.S. Navy
131

THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT 

OF NAVAL FORCES

by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

Marine Corps Gazette, 194868

co to Australia monthly would require for the 

same purpose 10,000 four-engine [Consolidated] 

C-87 [Liberator Express] airplanes manned by 

120,000 highly trained personnel, plus 89 seagoing tankers to provide gas along the route and 

at the far end of the run.69 Cargo carrying aircraft will no more replace vehicles of the same 

type on the seas than they will those on land. 

In fact, cargo-carrying ships will become increasingly important to the United States both 

in peace and in war. Our national resources in 

petroleum products alone are inadequate for the 

prosecution of a long war. A realistic appraisal 

of the requirements in materiel for this nation 

to engage in war shows that an uninterrupted 

stream of imports will be essential, and that the 

volume of these imports is such that they must 

come by sea.

69 The British ton, or the long ton, equals 2,240 pounds, and the 

U.S. ton, or the short ton, equals 2,000 pounds. Both measurements are defined in the same way: 1 ton is equal to 20 hundredweight. It is the definition of hundredweight that differs; in the 

United States, 100 pounds equals a hundredweight, while in Britain 112 pounds equals a hundredweight. To distinguish between 

the two tons, the smaller U.S. ton is called short, while the larger 

British ton is called long.

On the day of his departure from 

the Navy Department, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, 

forwarded to the secretary of the Navy the 

following paper, prepared in his office, expressing his views on the function of the naval forces in maintaining the future security 

of the United States.

Sir Walter Raleigh declared in the early seventeenth century that “whosoever commands the 

sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands 

the trade of the world, commands the riches of 

the world, and consequently the world itself.” 

This principle is as true today as when uttered, 

and its effect will continue as long as ships traverse the seas. That this period extends beyond 

the foreseeable future is apparent when it is 

realized that the 100,000 long tons of cargo 

that 44 ships can transport from San Francis68 The original article came from Chester W. Nimitz, “The Future Employment of Naval Forces” Marine Corps Gazette 32, no. 

3 (March 1948): 36–39. Minor revisions were made to the text 

based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and 

spelling.
132 Chapter Two

The United States possesses today control 

of the sea more absolute than was possessed by 

the British. Our interest in this control is not 

riches and power as such. It is first the assurance 

of our national security, and second, the creation 

and perpetuation of that balance and stability 

among nations that will ensure to each the right 

of self-determination under the framework of 

the United Nations organization.

Our present control of the sea is so absolute that it is sometimes taken for granted. As a 

result, there is a faulty tendency, under the assumption that any probable enemy in a future 

war possesses only negligible apparent fleet 

strength, to give no major offensive role to the 

Navy—only a supporting role and the prosecution of antisubmarine warfare. Opposing fleets 

have been eliminated, it is reasoned, hence ours 

should be reduced to a mere support force and 

its appropriations transferred to certain types of 

aircraft, which would be the answer to all our 

problems of offense and defense. The answer is 

not so simple. Technology in warfare, as in all 

else, has simplified some details but has greatly 

complicated the aggregate. The submarine and 

the torpedo, far from eliminating combatant 

surface ships, produced the depth charge, sonar 

and electronic sounding, and the antisubmarine 

aircraft that, in two wars, have successfully defeated them. Similarly, the airplane in its apCorsairs return to the fleet after strikes against targets in North Korea. Attacks on reinforcements and supply convoys behind enemy lines kept Chinese and North Korean armies perpetually short of men, food, and 

ammunition. The effort eventually ended the massive Communist offensives into South Korea. Herbert C. 

Hahn, Task Force, ca. 1951. Drawing, pencil on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 88-191-R
Nimitz 133

plication against naval forces has already given 

creation to the proximity fuse, homing missiles, 

electronic ranging and gun control, and carrier attack aircraft which, during World War II, 

repeatedly defeated concentrations of Japanese 

land-based aircraft wherever encountered.

Our present undisputed control of the sea 

was achieved primarily through the employment of naval air-sea forces in the destruction 

of Japanese and German seapower. It was consolidated by the subsequent reduction of these 

nations to their present impotence, in which the 

employment of naval air-sea forces against land 

objectives played a vital role. It can be perpetuated only through the maintenance of balanced 

naval forces of all categories adequate to our 

strategic needs (which include those of the nontotalitarian world), and which can flexibly adjust 

to new modes of air-sea warfare and which are 

alert to develop and employ new weapons and 

techniques as needed.

A report made in 1657 by one of [Oliver] 

Cromwell’s admirals that: “After we destroyed 

the ships we plied our guns against the forts” indicates that the purpose of achieving seapower 

and the recognized practice of applying pressure 

against an enemy wherever they can be reached 

by naval forces has not changed from that day 

to this. The basic objectives and principles of 

war do not change. The final objective in war is 

the destruction of the enemy’s capacity and will 

to fight, and thereby force them to accept the 

imposition of the victor’s will. This submission 

has been accomplished in the past by pressure in 

and from each of the elements of land and sea, 

and during World War I and II, in and from the 

air as well. The optimum of pressure is exerted 

through that absolute control obtained by actual 

physical occupation. This optimum is obtainable 

only on land where physical occupation can be 

consolidated and maintained. Experience proves 

that while invasion in some form of adjacent sea 

areas, covering air spaces, or enemy territory 

itself is essential to obtain decisions in war, it is 

sometimes unnecessary to prosecute invasion 

to the extent of occupying a nation’s capital or 

other vital centers. Sufficient of their land, sea 

or air territory must be invaded, however, to establish the destructive potential of the victor and 

to engender in the enemy that hopelessness that 

precedes submission. The reduction of Japan is a 

case in point.

Naval forces have always played a vital and 

often deciding role in warfare by invading adjacent sea areas to project their pressure on enemy 

territory. Before the invention of gun powder, 

in the days of Greece and Rome, there was no 

such thing as a “fleet in being.” Naval forces were 

built as they were needed, and the transport had 

Rough weather securing of aircraft and related support equipment aboard a carrier, 15 July 1956.

Official U.S. Navy photo, K-20637, National Archives
134 Chapter Two

equal standing with the man-of-war. The latter 

served to clear the narrow seas for the transport 

to discharge its force of troops and weapons 

upon enemy territory where the decision was 

obtained. In the long history of British domination of the seas, it is safe to say that the Royal 

Navy fought as many engagements against shore 

objectives as it did on the high seas. Singularly, it 

was the defeat by his shore batteries of a Royal 

Navy squadron off Toulon that gave Napoleon 

early in his career a disdain for British seapower. 

It was this same British seapower, in the form of a 

light blockade, which denied world intercourse 

to him but assured it to his enemies, and in the 

victories of Copenhagen, the Nile and Trafalgar, 

which was the controlling factor in his eventual 

defeat. Also, the great British strategic bastion 

of Gibraltar was captured in 1704 by a force of 

Royal Marines and seamen landed from a naval 

squadron that had first pounded the Spanish garrison into a state of confusion and despair.

The naval history of our own Civil War is a 

vivid portrayal of the employment of naval forces against an enemy without a fleet. Naval forces 

were a controlling factor in the Confederate defeat and in shortening the war. The Confederate 

States had no fleet. They were a consolidated 

land power with the advantage of interior lines 

and the possession of several large sea and river 

ports affording access to world commerce which 

they vitally needed. The Federal States outlined 

their naval missions as (a) the blockade of southern ports along a coastline of more than 3,000 

miles; (b) the reduction, in conjunction with the 

Army, of Atlantic and Gulf strongholds; and (c) 

the occupation and control of the Mississippi and 

its tributaries. The blockade was established and 

soon Confederate commerce, as such, ceased. 

Naval operations started on the western rivers 

in the first year of the war—November 1861. 

They were mainly in conjunction with the Army 

but frequently objectives were accomplished by 

naval gun and mortar fire alone. By April 1862, 

with the passage of [Admiral David G.] Farragut’s squadron past the Mississippi entrance 

forts and the capture of New Orleans, the Confederate States had been sealed on the western, 

Gulf, and Atlantic boundaries. It is safe to state 

that had they been unmolested by seapower, and 

had they received money, troops, and munitions 

from Europe, South America, and Mexico, they 

might well have consolidated their secession.

The development between World Wars I

and II of naval aviation provided naval forces with a striking weapon of vastly increased 

flexibility, range, and power. The development 

and use of this weapon in World War II against 

both sea and land objectives is one of the great 

achievements in modern warfare. It spearheaded our Pacific attack. First, it swept the sea of 

all naval opposition. Then it became the initial 

striking weapon in the capture of Guam, Saipan, 

and Iwo Jima—the advanced bases from which 

long-range bombers were able to strike the vital centers of the empire. Finally, like the British 

squadron in 1657, our Navy “after destroying 

the ships plied its guns against the Forts” and 

participated directly in the destruction of those 

vital centers on Okinawa and the home islands 

by gunfire and bombing; in spite of the concentration of Japanese air power, our Navy made 

possible the success of our gallant ground forces.

In all of these operations the employment 

of air-sea task forces demonstrated the ability of 

the Navy to concentrate aircraft strength at any 

desired point in such numbers as to overwhelm 

the defense at the point of contact. These operations demonstrate the capability of naval carrier-
Nimitz 135

based aviation to make use of the principles of 

mobility and concentration to a degree possessed by no other force.

In addition to the weapons of World War 

II the Navy of the future will be capable of 

launching missiles from surface vessels and submarines, and of delivering atomic bombs from 

carrier-based planes. Vigilant naval administration and research is constantly developing 

and adding to these means. In the event of war 

within the foreseeable future, it is probable that 

there will be little need to destroy combatant 

ships other than submarines. Consequently, in 

the fulfillment of long accepted naval functions 

and in conformity with the well-known principles of warfare, the Navy should be used in the 

initial stages of such a war to project its weapons 

against vital enemy targets on land, the reduction of which is the basic objective of warfare.

For any future war to be of sufficient magnitude to affect us seriously it must be compounded of two primary ingredients: vast manpower 

and tremendous industrial capacity. These conditions exist today in the great land mass of Central Asia, in East Asia, and in Western Europe. 

The two latter areas will not be in a position to 

endanger us for decades to come unless they 

pass under unified totalitarian control. In the 

event of war with any of the three, we would 

be relatively deficient in manpower. We should, 

On 3 August 1958, USS Nautilus (SSN 5710) completes Operation Sunshine, passing through the North Pole 

and becoming the first ship to reach the geographic North Pole submerged. Albert K. Murray, USS Nautilus

SSN-571, 1959. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 88-195-HL
136 Chapter Two

therefore, direct our thinking toward realistic 

and highly specialized operations. We should plan 

to inflict unacceptable damage through maximum use of our technological weapons and our 

ability to produce them in great quantities.

Initial devastating air attack in the future 

may come across our bordering oceans from 

points on the continents of Europe and Asia as 

well as from across the polar region. Consequently, our plans must include the development 

of specialized forces of fighter and interceptor 

planes for pure defense, as well as the continued development of long-range bombers. Offensively, our initial plans should provide for 

the coordinated employment of military and 

naval airpower launched from land and carrier 

bases, and of guided missiles against important 

enemy targets. For the present, until long-range 

bombers are developed capable of spanning our 

bordering oceans and returning to our North 

American bases, naval airpower launched from 

carriers may be the only practicable means of 

bombing vital enemy centers in the early stages 

of a war.

In summary, it is visualized that our early 

combat operations in the event of war within the 

next decade would consist of:

Defensively:

a. Protection of our vital centers from 

devastating attacks by air and from 

missile-launching submarines.

b. Protection of areas of vital strategic 

importance, such as sources of raw 

materials, our advanced bases, etc.

c. Protection of our essential lines of 

communication and those of our allies.

d. Protection of our occupation forces 

during reinforcement or evacuation.

Offensively:

a. Devastating bombing attacks from land 

and carrier bases on vital enemy installations.

b. Destruction of enemy lines of communication accessible to our naval and air 

forces.

c. Occupation of selected advanced bases on enemy territory and the denial 

of advance bases to the enemy through 

the coordinated employment of naval, 

air and amphibious forces.

Of the above activities or functions there 

are certain ones that can be performed best by 

the Air Forces and certain others that can be 

performed best by the Navy—it is these two 

Services that will play the major roles in the 

initial stages of a future war. The 80th Congress 

took cognizance of this fact when, in the National Security Act of 1947, it specifically prescribed 

certain functions to the Navy, its naval aviation 

and its Marine Corps. In so doing, the Congress 

gave emphasis to the fact that the organizational framework of the military Services should be 

built around the functions assigned to each Service. This is a principle that the Navy has consistently followed and is now organized and trained 

to implement.

Defensively, the Navy is still the first line 

the enemy must hurdle either in the air or on the 

sea in approaching our coasts across any ocean. 

The earliest warning of enemy air attack against 

our vital centers should be provided by naval air, 

surface, and submarine radar pickets deployed 

in the vast ocean spaces that surround the continent. This is part of the radar screen that should 

surround the continental United States and its 

possessions. The first attrition to enemy airpow-
Nimitz 137

er might be by short range naval fighter planes 

carried by carrier task forces. Protection of our 

cities against missile launching submarines can 

best be effected by naval hunter-killer groups 

composed of small aircraft carriers and modern 

destroyers operating as a team with naval landbased aircraft.

The safety of our essential trade routes and 

ocean lines of communication and those of our 

allies, the protection of areas of vital strategic 

importance such as the sources of raw material, 

advanced base locations, etc., are but matters of 

course if we control the seas. Only naval air-sea 

power can assure this.

Offensively, it is the function of the Navy 

to carry the war to the enemy so that it will 

not be fought on United States soil. The Navy 

can at present best fulfill the vital functions of 

devastating enemy vital areas by the projection 

of bombs and missiles. It is improbable that 

bomber fleets will be capable for several years 

to come of making two-way trips between 

continents, even over the polar routes, with 

heavy loads of bombs. It is apparent then that 

in the event of war within this period, if we are 

to project our power against the vital areas of 

any enemy across the ocean before beachheads 

on enemy territory are captured, it must be by 

Arthur Beaumont, USS Forrestal CVA-59 and USS Okanogan APA-220, 1968. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2009-128-01
138 Chapter Two

air-sea power, by aircraft launched from carriers, and by heavy surface ships and submarines 

projecting guided missiles and rockets. If present promise is developed by research, test, and 

production, these three types of air-sea power 

operating in concert will be able within the next 

10 years critically to damage enemy vital areas 

many hundreds of miles inland.

Naval task forces including these types are 

capable of remaining at sea for months. This 

capability has raised to a high point the art of 

concentrating airpower within effective range 

of enemy objectives. It is achieved by refueling 

and rearming task forces at sea. Not only may 

the necessary supplies, ammunition, and fuel be 

replenished in this way but the air groups themselves may be changed. The net result is that 

naval forces are able, without resorting to diplomatic channels, to establish offshore anywhere 

in the world, air fields completely equipped with 

machine shops, ammunition dumps, tank farms, 

warehouses, together with quarters and all types 

of accommodations for personnel. Such task 

forces are virtually as complete as any air base 

established. They constitute the only air bases 

that can be made available near enemy territory 

without assault and conquest; and furthermore, 

they are mobile offensive bases that can be employed with the unique attributes of secrecy and 

surprise, which attributes contributes equally to 

their defensive as well as offensive effectiveness. 

Regarding the pure defense of these mobile air 

USS Ranger (CV 61) was one of four Forrestal-class supercarriers built for the U.S. Navy in the 1950s. R. G. 

Smith, USS Ranger, 1969. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 88-160-FF
Nimitz 139

bases, the same power projected destructively 

from them against the enemy is being applied to 

their defense in the form of propulsion, armament, and new aircraft weapons whose development is well abreast the supersonic weapons 

reputed to threaten their existence.

It is clear, therefore, that the Navy and the 

Air Force will play the leading roles in the initial stages of a future war. Eventually, reduction 

and occupation of certain strategic areas will require the utmost from our Army, Navy, and Air 

Force. Each should be assigned broad functions 

compatible with its capabilities and limitations 

and should develop the weapons it needs to fulfill these functions, and no potentiality of any of 

the three Services of the military establishment 

should be neglected in our scheme of national 

defense. At the same time, each Service must 

vigorously develop, in that area where their 

functions meet, that flexibility and teamwork 

essential to operational success. It should also 

be clear that the Navy’s ability to exert from 

its floating bases its unique pressure against the 

enemy wherever they can be reached—in the 

air, on sea, or on land—is now, as it has been, 

compatible with the fundamental principles of 

warfare. That our naval forces can be equipped 

defensively as well as offensively to project pressure against enemy objectives in the future is as 

incontrovertible as the principle that every action has an equal and opposite reaction.

In measuring capabilities against a potential enemy, due appreciation must be taken of 

the factors of relative strength and weakness. 

We may find ourselves comparatively weak in 

manpower and in certain elements of aircraft 

strength. On the other hand, we are superior 

in our naval air-sea strength. It is an axiom that 

in preparing for any contest, it is wisest to exploit—not neglect—the element of strength. 

Hence, a policy that provides for balanced development and coordinated use of strong naval 

forces should be vigorously prosecuted in order 

to meet and successfully counter a sudden war 

in the foreseeable future.
140

THE INFLUENCE OF AVIATION 

ON THE EVOLUTION 

OF AMERICAN NAVAL THOUGHT

by Dr. David R. Mets

The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, 199770

In large part, naval air theory was formed in 

the decade after the great carriers USS Lexington [CV 2] and USS Saratoga [CV 3] came online 

at the end of 1927. That is precisely the decade 

in which the thinking at the Air Corps Tactical 

School was in its most formative phase, and that 

is the subject of another chapter.

The examination of each era starts with the 

general worldview and then considers the ways 

in which naval officers believed that international conflicts could be settled. It then discusses 

the general attitude on the proper objectives 

of a navy in the process, the standard methods 

employed in naval warfare, and changing views 

on the ideal organization of forces for war and 

their employment in international conflict. The 

study closes with an estimate of the state of naval thinking in all those categories as the nation 

approached the reorganization of its national 

security structure in the late 1940s. Hopefully, 

comparing that state with the initial one will 

yield some additional insight into the impact of 

aviation on naval thinking.

The [frame] of mind of the officer corps 

of the U.S. Navy is sometimes deemed 

Neanderthal, sometimes progressive 

and, less often, radical. This chapter revisits the 

history of recent naval theory and doctrine to 

evaluate this perception and the impact of the 

coming of aviation on the general attitudes of 

the naval profession in America from the beginning of flight to the end of World War II. Previous chapters have all dealt with the impact of 

World War I on the theory of airpower, usually 

in a continental war context. They went on to 

study its development in the interwar period. 

This chapter briefly looks at naval thought at 

the onset of aviation, which serves as a baseline. 

It continues with changes brought on by World 

War I and interwar evolution, and thence to the 

impact of World War II on the Navy’s outlook.71

70 The original article came from Dr. David R. Mets, “The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of American Naval Thought,” in 

The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. Col Phillip 

S. Meilinger (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: School of Advanced Air 

Power Studies, Air University Press, 1997), 115–50. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, 

grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
Mets 141

NAVAL ATTITUDES 

AT THE ONSET OF THE 

AGE OF FLIGHT

The collective attitude of the mainstream of the 

Navy at the dawn of aviation was fairly well developed. The Service was thoroughly convinced 

that the world was made up of nation-states and 

that conflict of one sort or another was natural 

among them. The premise of Clausewitz—that 

war was an instrument of state policy—was 

well understood and accepted. In the words of 

Commander Patrick N. L. Bellinger, who graduated from Annapolis in 1907 and the Naval War 

College in 1925, “War is a political action. . . . 

Even when armies and fleets are not employed, 

their existence and the possibility of their use 

constantly influence the action of governments. 

They are instruments of statecraft. The policy 

of countries must necessarily be controlled by 

their governments, and strategy from the naval 

and military point of view, must be subservient 

to policy.”72

However much one identified the thought 

of Alfred Thayer Mahan with that of AntoineHenri de Jomini (if that is supposed to mean that 

the adherents look upon war as a science that 

To control and coordinate antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic during World War II, Adm Ernest J. King 

established the Tenth Fleet. This included development of tactics and technology that ended the U-boat menace. In this dramatic presentation of a sea-sky battle, a Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bomber, bomb bay 

doors open, leaves death in its wake as it zooms away from a conclusive attack on a surfaced enemy submarine. 

Naval planes from escort aircraft carriers wreaked havoc on submarine wolf packs attacking Atlantic convoys, 

and they virtually blasted them from the ocean for many months. Bombers were fitted with depth charges, 

one of which is pictured exploding off the U-boat’s beam here. Robert Benney, The Kill, 1942. Oil on board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 88-159-AP, gift of Abbott Laboratories
142 Chapter Two

has natural laws that always apply and that there 

exists an eternal validity to principles of war), 

plenty of officers understood fog and friction. 

There were repeated assertions that both doctrine and any statement of principles were more 

than guides—certainly not invariable rules that 

one could not violate. The officer corps was 

thoroughly familiar with Mahan; for some, both 

the man and his works [had been well read as] 

Mahan had been Admiral William A. Moffett’s 

skipper when Moffett served aboard the USS 

Chicago (1885) in the 1890s.73 Furthermore, 

it was convinced that, for the United States at 

least, command of the sea remained the primary 

objective and that its exploitation could come 

later, through blockade or invasion. For Mahan and most of his followers, the fundamental 

method for achieving command was offensive—

seeking out the enemy main battle fleet and destroying it.74 Significantly, they gave a great deal 

more attention to achieving command of the sea 

than to exploiting it.

The officer corps was coming out of a period of very rapid technological advance. It had 

witnessed the coming of torpedoes, submarines, 

and destroyers—all of which had been touted 

as revolutionary and none of which, in the collective mind, had turned out that way.75 The 

necessity for decentralized command, initiative 

among junior and midlevel commanders, and 

doctrine that tended to create a common vocabulary and outlook was widely accepted.

METHODS 

OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Little questioned was the idea that command 

of the sea would be won in a single great clash 

between the main battle lines and that all other elements would necessarily play an auxiliary role. Notwithstanding Clausewitz’s assertion 

that, in land warfare at least, the defensive was 

the stronger form of war, the Navy (and Army 

and Marine Corps as well) probably voiced an 

overwhelming preference for the offensive in 

both strategy and tactics.76 Doubtless, the civilian attitude in isolationist America in the wake 

of the mayhem of World War I made it impolitic 

to dwell on this stance in public.

Practically all officers were graduates of the 

Naval Academy, the bulk of the senior-most officers had been through the Naval War College, 

and on the eve of World War I, some of the juA month after striking the Coral Sea, the Japanese 

launched an all-out assault against Midway Island in 

what was obviously intended as the first step of a 

grand attack on Hawaii and the continental United 

States. The Navy was ready, and the pilots from naval aircraft carriers inflicted a major sea defeat on 

two great converging forces northwest of Midway. 

On the last day of the battle, the two heavy cruisers 

Mogami and Mikuma were attacked by American forces. The Mogami was heavily damaged but escaped, 

while the Mikuma was not so lucky. In the end, the 

enemy lost four aircraft carriers, at least two heavy 

cruisers, and a number of light cruisers, destroyers, 

and transports—all by aerial attack. Griffith Baily 

Coale, Attack on Japanese Cruisers Mogami and Mikuma from Air, 1942. Charcoal on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

88-188-AG
Mets 143

niors were well indoctrinated through correspondence courses.77 There was a rather strong 

commitment to the idea that both study and 

practical experience were vital to understanding 

naval war. On the eve of the first air war, both 

the United States Naval Institute and its publishing organ, Proceedings, were more than a generation old. Senior and middling officers took a 

real interest in this journal as a forum for professional discourse—Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, 

the founder of the Naval War College, were both 

well published in its pages. The Naval Academy 

was one of America’s first and leading engineering schools; still, the historical approach to the 

study of war and seapower was common—even 

before Mahan.78 No one questioned the idea that 

the Navy constituted the first line of defense.

IDEAL ORGANIZATION 

FOR WAR

The effectiveness of the bureau organization 

was often debated, and the notion that the planning and operations functions should remain paramount and governed by a professional naval officer was very strong. Previously divided into line 

and engineering categories, a division that had 

caused much difficulty, the officers of the Navy 

found themselves reunified, first in the curriculum at the Naval Academy and then on the line 

of the Navy—both before 1900.79 Strong sentiment favored avoiding such divisions.80

At the beginning of the era of flight then, 

the U.S. Navy’s officer corps tended to consider the world as being made up of nation-states 

always in conflict, sometimes at war, and never 

recognizing any superior authority. Achieving 

command of the sea remained the first objective for naval forces; that done, a variety of naval measures could help in realizing the nation’s 

goals ashore. As yet, little thought existed about 

radical changes in the relationship of the Navy 

to the rest of the U.S. national security structure. Most thinking held that one should be a 

naval officer first and a deck or engineering 

officer second—that the officer corps should 

be a monolithic whole. Even Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Mustin argued before World 

War I that, to be competent as a naval aviator, an 

officer would need a comprehensive knowledge 

of the duties of the surface mariner. Because 

acquiring that knowledge took so long, he believed that trainees for aviation must come from 

the line of the Navy.81 Though, in time, Mustin 

would argue otherwise, the organizational implication of his belief was that one should refrain 

from further attempts at specialized corps (notwithstanding the continued existence of the Marine Corps), despite the fact that the fleet itself 

was organized along functional lines according 

to ship type. Some members of the officer corps 

felt that the bureau chiefs were too independent 

and that the creation of the office of Chief of 

Naval Operations (CNO) was a good thing. As 

William F. Draper’s Hangar Deck of Carrier shows 

sailors preparing for a strike on Palau in the Pacific 

Ocean during World War II. Oil on canvas, 1944.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

88-189-EB
144 Chapter Two

for the employment of navies, the consensus 

was that decision would come through a great 

sea battle between battleships and that all other 

vessels and organizations existed to support the 

main battle line.

EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN 

NAVAL AIR THINKING 

BEFORE PEARL HARBOR

Naval aviators had experimented with aviation 

in combat against Mexico even before World 

War I.82 Pilots had made landings and takeoffs 

from ships as well, and people harbored serious questions about whether the main air effort 

would lie with airships (lighter-than-air), flying 

boats, or shipborne airplanes.83 The Navy had 

substantial experience with aviation in World 

War I, both in overwater antisubmarine patrol 

and land combat on the western front. None 

of that was part of major fleet action in open 

ocean. Henry Mustin, one of the first wave of 

Navy flyers, was only one of many men who 

brought back perceptions of air war from Europe.84 As with the Army’s Air Service, however, 

one could draw no definitive inferences because 

technology was still in its infancy, and none of 

the exploits even approached being decisive.85

Only the Battle of Jutland resembled the Mahanian great battle; but because of its indecisiveness, its implications remained unclear.86

Aviation played little role in that battle, and its 

impact on the antisubmarine war was significant 

but not decisive. Aircraft forced submarines to 

remain submerged and, by closing the Strait of 

Dover, imposed the long trip around Scotland 

on them. The consequent reduction of the time 

on station lowered the number of U-boats in the 

German Navy.87 At the end of the war, Britain’s 

Royal Navy did possess three aircraft carriers, 

but the U.S. Navy had none. The brief American 

participation and the preoccupation of Europeans with the agony of the land war left little time 

to do much development work in naval aviation 

or to reach definitive conclusions.88

Largely because of the institutional culture, 

aviation affected the thinking of the Navy in an 

evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary, way. 

This statement does not suggest that the technology of naval warfare evolved on a steady, 

smooth curve. Only that thought about the use 

of the Navy as a whole to help achieve national 

objectives changed in a gradual way, with neither long periods of stagnation nor obvious discontinuities. On the other hand, as suggested 

by Dr. Gary Weir, scientific and technological 

innovation—dependent in part on sudden inspirations by inventors and scientists—probably 

can be characterized more as a sawtooth process 

with a generally progressive trend.89 Certainly, 

the general outlook was not radical; yet, it is 

also probably fair to say that insofar as strategic 

thinking was concerned, neither was it reactionary. The line officers of the Navy may have been 

reluctant to shed the ideas proven in the past, 

but they had adjusted to the coming of steam 

and armor and (with the British Navy) had led 

the world in the development of modern gunnery and fire control.

In part, external pressures forced the line 

officers of the Navy to accept change. One factor 

was the Five-Power [Naval Limitation] Treaty of 

1922, which drove the Navy to embrace aircraft 

carriers more rapidly than it might otherwise 

have done.90 A second was the implicit threat 

that if the Navy itself did not move smartly into 

the era of flight, then the upstart Air Service 

and, later, the Air Corps would gather maritime 

aviation unto itself.91 As yet, only a few officers, 

such as Admiral William S. Sims and Admiral 

William F. Fullam, questioned whether the car-
Mets 145

rier or the battleship would be the capital ship of 

the future—a question that remained open until 

after Pearl Harbor.

METHODS 

OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

One sees a sample of the [frame] of mind of the 

earliest crop of aviators in a lecture delivered by 

Commander Patrick Bellinger at the Naval War 

College in the summer of 1924. He allowed that 

naval aviation had other roles, such as cooperation with the Army in coast defense, but clearly 

his concentration remained on aviation as an adjunct to the fleet.92

Despite the presence of many skeptical 

mossbacks not disposed to change, some naval 

officers did not need external prods to revise 

their thinking—Sims and Moffett, for example.93 However, notions that one might bypass 

the great sea battle through a direct air attack on 

the enemy’s economic, cultural, and moral fabric appeared infrequently among their published 

and unpublished writings.

Such interpretations appeared only because 

the writer (e.g., Captain George C. Westervelt 

in 1917 and Admiral William Pratt in 1926) 

questioned the morality of such operations and 

the validity of [Italian General Giulio] Douhet’s 

notion that attacks on civilian morale would be 

humane because they would end the war quickly and thereby eliminate the danger of another misery in the trenches. Westervelt, even in 

1917, showed considerable insight in suggesting 

that in the short term, the German attacks may 

have had military value in that they diverted very 

considerable military potential from the fighting 

front for the largely futile defense of London. 

In the long term, however, he speculated that 

Germany might come to regret it. He thought 

the attacks might even toughen British civilian 

morale on the one hand and, on the other, act 

as a stimulus for greater and more destructive 

reprisals on the Germans by British and French 

air forces.94

At the end of World War I, the General Board 

of the Navy—made up of a group of the Service’s 

senior most officers, necessarily nonaviators at 

that time—advised the secretary on fundamental issues affecting the life of the organization. 

In 1919, before Mitchell’s bombing tests, the 

board held formal hearings and explicitly advised the secretary that the integration of aviation into the fleet was of the highest priority.95

Further, one should not infer that all the 

logic was on the side of the aviators and that 

the “gun club” was irrational in its arguments.96

Had the flying boat proven practical in timely 

reconnaissance and spotting support in midocean areas in the 1920s, it might have been a 

better solution to the air problem than either 

catapult-launched or carrier-launched aircraft. 

Indeed, flying boat technology was much more 

mature than that of the other craft, and aircraft 

operated from catapults or platforms atop turrets probably would have reduced the fields of 

fire as well as the volume and rate of fire of the 

main armament. (Although aerial observation 

would radically enhance the accuracy of fire, 

more might be lost than gained.) Moreover, it 

was hard to imagine ever developing the means 

of recovering such catapulted aircraft without 

stopping the ship—clearly suicidal in the presence of enemy surface ships or submarines.97

On the other hand, if one accepted the assumption that the decision in war would come 

through use of the battleship fleet’s guns, then 

the provision of aerial spotting through aircraft 

carriers, which could recover their “birds” while 

under way, would introduce another whole class 

of ships to the Navy line. This would come at a 
146 Chapter Two

time when funding and manning were insufficient to take care of the requirements that already existed. Flying boats, featuring long-range 

and a developed technology, could provide both 

scouting and spotting without that new line of 

ships (and one could greatly expand their areas 

of coverage by the use of tenders easily converted from ships already in the Navy). The flying 

boats, in fact, had just achieved enormous prestige by crossing the Atlantic in 1919. They did 

not inhibit the execution of the primary mission 

of the battleships and did not compete for funds 

and people nearly as much as carrier planes and 

their required ships.

Numerous aviators would support that reasoning. Bellinger, one of the most prominent, 

clearly was not skeptical of the value of shipboard aviation. He did not see much of a future 

for kite balloons or nonrigid airships, but he 

saw great value in shipboard aircraft supporting the battle line once air forces had achieved 

command of the air. Still, in 1924, he perceived 

enormous potential in the development of longrange flying boats.98 Moreover, notwithstanding 

the great promise and glamour of the initial 

operations of the Saratoga and Lexington, those 

operations involved many difficulties, and their 

security with the fleet posed constraints on the 

offensive preferences of the commanders.99

Many people made similar arguments in 

favor of airships. Thus, the thinking of the gun 

club was not nearly as Neanderthal as it might 

appear to observers looking back from the 

post-Pearl Harbor period. The common flaw to 

that thinking was that, if a force had no carrier aircraft, an enemy with carrier planes could 

deny the use of the air over the battle area to 

the farmer’s catapult airplanes, flying boats, and 

lighter-than-air craft and thus could produce an 

enormous advantage for his own battle fleet. 

Decisiveness would arise from the fact that the 

side with air superiority would be able to take 

its enemy under concentrated, accurate fire at 

long ranges and during impaired visibility while 

the other side could not.100

WORLDVIEW: 

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

From about 1906, we considered the Japanese 

a potential enemy, though continuing some war 

games with a Japanese-British enemy alliance 

until well after World War I.101 After the demise 

of German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s fleet at 

Scapa Flow, both the games and the thinking increasingly concentrated on a Pacific war against 

Japan, although we did not completely discount 

war against the British.102 Captain Yates Stirling 

Jr. provided us with a near-classical statement 

in Mahanian terms. In an article published in 

1925, he painted a worldview in which seafaring capitalist nations had to have overseas trade 

to survive; to do that, they had to protect that 

During World War II, battles were won by the side 

that was first to spot enemy airplanes, ships, or 

submarines. To give the Allies an edge, British and 

American scientists developed radar technology to 

“see” for hundreds of miles, even at night. Dwight 

Shepler, The Spider and the Fly–USS Hornet, 1945. 

Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

88-199-GN
Mets 147

trade with navies; those navies would have to 

have battleships to command the sea or part of 

it; and only Japan and Great Britain were in the 

game. Although Stirling more clearly identified 

Japan as a potential enemy, he plainly asserted 

that competition with Great Britain was inevitable and that only the statesmanlike work of 

the Washington treaties promised to contain that 

competition.103 In post-World War II terms, all 

of this constituted a “realist” worldview.

From the early 1920s, the war college games 

and fleet maneuvers came to feature surprise 

air attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Panama 

Canal, but the ultimate decision would always 

arise from a great clash between the main surface fleets. Even the aviators, whose first task 

was to kill the enemy carriers, gave at least lip 

service to the idea that the final decision would 

come from the great gun battle. The bombcarrying capability of carrier aircraft in the 

1920s and early 1930s was so limited that many 

aviators understood that the chances of decisive 

attacks on armored vessels were strictly limited; not until the late 1930s could dive-bombers 

employ 1,000-pound weapons at significant distances. Until late in the game, then, many aviators were persuaded that the gun battle might 

indeed be decisive.104

ORGANIZING FOR WAR

Creation of the office of the CNO in 1915 improved naval organization. Gradually, the traditional power of the bureau chiefs declined, 

relative to that of the CNO. Some flyers, such 

as Henry Mustin, called for the creation of a 

separate aviation corps; however, other flyers 

and most of the nonflyers were against it, notwithstanding the Marine Corps precedent.105

This attitude resulted in part from lingering 

bad memories about the nineteenth-century 

dichotomy between line officers and engineering officers, as well as a feeling that such a move 

would play into the hands of the Air Service’s 

William Mitchell and his followers. The aviators were satisfied, at least to some extent, with 

the foundation of the Bureau of Aeronautics in 

1921. Some of the senior officers of the Navy 

had opposed the congressional proposal for the 

bureau, but in large part the heat generated by 

Mitchell changed their minds.106 Its first chief, 

Rear Admiral William Moffett, was not a pilot, 

but he went immediately to Pensacola, Florida, and completed the observers’ course there. 

Popular among the flyers, he was also a successful battleship commander; had served once on a 

ship whose skipper was Mahan himself, as noted 

above; and had attended the Naval War College 

while Mahan was assigned there.107

From the outset, under Moffett’s guidance, 

the appearance of a new bureau—in fact, a superbureau—complicated the internal organization of airpower. Moffett did not confine his 

activities to technical and procurement functions, as did the other bureau chiefs. He cast a 

wider net, including personnel issues such as 

assignment policy and promotions for aviators. 

This brought him into conflict with the other 

bureaus, especially with the Bureau of Navigation, which had traditionally managed personnel 

policy for all naval officers. This tension continued, growing all the way up through and beyond 

the tenure of Rear Admiral John Towers at the 

helm of the Bureau of Aeronautics well into 

World War II.108

From the earliest days, military men in all 

the Services began groping for a way to properly integrate aviation into the national security force structure. As it turned out, the Army 

flyers would choose a more or less independent 

path that resulted in the creation of the U.S. Air 
148 Chapter Two

Force in 1947. The Navy’s flyers and almost all 

of its sailors favored integrating airpower with 

seapower. One such sailor, Rear Admiral Nathan 

C. Twining, wrote to Captain Henry Mustin in 

1919, stating tentatively that he felt airpower 

should be kept in the Army and Navy. He saw 

some possibilities in distant air raiding, but 

thought that should be part of the mission of the 

land army. He argued, however, that the most 

urgent task of all was developing aviation’s capabilities in spotting and scouting.109

Six years later, Captain George C. Westervelt, then manager of the Naval Aircraft Factory 

in Philadelphia (though not an aviator himself), 

expressed a similar idea with no sugar coating 

or hedging:

They [the aviators] are in the Navy, of the 

Navy, and wish to remain there. They firmly 

believe that the air arm is an inherent portion of the Navy; that, as a Naval air arm, 

it is helpless without the Navy, and that the 

Navy would be helpless without it. In imagination many of them, doubtless, project 

themselves into the future and see the time 

when the air arm of the Navy will be its 

paramount arm, and when the surface ships 

will get their orders from the Commanderin-Chief flying above them, but they still see 

these combined elements of their country’s 

power as the Navy, and themselves as officers 

of the Navy.110

Westervelt had visited Britain during World 

War I, and, undoubtedly, the Royal Navy was an 

influence on him and the entire U.S. Navy—as 

it always had been. The story about the influence 

of the Royal Air Force (RAF) on U.S. Army aviators is well known. Mitchell’s visits with [Marshal of the RAF] Hugh Trenchard during World 

War I are well documented.111 Perhaps less well 

known is the negative impact of the RAF on the 

U.S. Navy. The British integrated their naval and 

land-based airpower into a separate air force in 

1918 and kept it so organized up to 1937. From 

1918 forward, it was an article of faith in the 

U.S. Navy that that decision had been a mistake 

and proof that an independent air force would 

be bad for the United States. Without arguing 

the virtues of the [British Submarine] Spitfire, 

[RAF] Fighter Command, Taranto [Italy], and 

victory over the [German KMS] Bismarck and the 

U-boats, it is clear that the stout opposition to 

the idea in the U.S. Navy had its origins long before the RAF could possibly have had the deadly effects attributed to it. To cite one example, 

in testifying to the General Board of the Navy 

on 23 August 1918, Commander H. C. Dinger asserted, “Personally, I don’t see how there 

could be any argument. They [the British] must 

have both Naval and Army aviation. Of course, 

these are only my personal views. The amalgamation in England seems to have had a very bad 

effect.”112

In the wake of the commissioning of the 

USS Langley (CV 1) in the early 1920s, articles in 

Proceedings, as well as Naval War College papers 

and lectures, paid increasing attention to the implications of aviation.113 This increased sharply 

after the great ships Saratoga (CV 3) and Lexington (CV 2) came online late in 1927. No doubt, 

Navy people endlessly fought and refought the 

Battle of Jutland on the game boards at Newport and in the pages of Proceedings, but they also 

wrote many articles on aviation as well.114

PROPER NAVAL 

OBJECTIVES IN WAR

Even in the articles on aviation, usually the climax came in a big gun duel. Analogous to the 

Army experience on the western front, the most 
Mets 149

strident demand for a capability to command the 

air came from the most committed surface gunners. It became clear to battleship captains that 

aerial spotting so enhanced the power of the big 

gun that an admiral who lost that spotting capability found himself at a huge disadvantage.115

The corollary to that principle, as on the western front, was that one had to make every effort to protect free use of the air over the battle 

and to deny it to the enemy. Thus, hardly anyone 

in any of the Services needed much persuasion 

that command of the air remained a paramount 

consideration. In 1926, Admiral Pratt himself 

argued that it was a primary function of naval 

aviation.116

Although in the 1930s mainstream thought 

seldom wavered from the idea that the primary 

and final instrument of victory would be the battleship, it held that Japan would refuse battle until the combat power of the U.S. Navy had been 

diminished by projecting itself all the way across 

the Central Pacific. Most strategic thinkers felt 

that the Navy could minimize this weakening if 

the U.S. offensive went across the central (instead of the north or south) Pacific, invading and 

building up island bases as it went (as opposed 

to making one giant leap that would force the 

Japanese Navy to come out and fight for the 

sea when the Americans arrived in the vicinity of the Philippines). Carrier airpower would 

always be a scarce commodity. In those days, 

people deemed land-based airpower a formidable threat. Without air bases to protect the line 

of communications and naval bases to attenuate 

the erosion of sea power as it projected farther 

across the Pacific, the defeat of the Japanese fleet 

on the other side remained improbable.117

In all of this, aviation had two main functions. First, it would enhance the effectiveness 

of the cruisers and destroyers of the scouting 

fleet through reconnaissance. Second, it would 

enhance the effectiveness of the battle fleet 

through conducting reconnaissance, spotting 

the fall of shot, and defending against the enemy’s carrier airpower (usually through sinking 

or disabling enemy carriers.)118 Sometimes, aircraft might attack battleships, but usually they 

sought to slow them down so that the plodding 

American battleships could catch up with the 

speedier Japanese dreadnoughts to administer 

decisive blows with their guns.119 Not long before his death, Admiral Moffett spoke of using 

offensive carrier aircraft in exactly that way to 

facilitate the great sea battle.120 Even up to the 

eve of World War II, aviators who delivered lectures at the Naval War College on the uses of airpower were clearly reluctant to claim too much 

for airplanes versus battleships.121

To a large degree, students of the intellectual history of any military force must grapple 

with an eternal problem: Was the glass half 

full or half empty? Much of the final judgment 

necessarily resides in the eye of the beholder. 

Charles Melhorn and Curtis Utz have demonPlanes of Task Force 77 pass over the fleet in the 

bright waters of the Japan Sea. Herbert C. Hahn, 

Flight, c. 1951. Drawing, pencil on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

88-191-AA
150 Chapter Two

strated that declared policy and doctrine do not 

always match the undeclared worldview of the 

decision makers of any organization.122 To some 

extent, the articulation of official doctrine inevitably lags. Sometimes, acquisition policies indicate the difference between declared doctrine 

and the undeclared vision of the future. They 

both show that the Navy did make progress in 

aviation between the armistice and Pearl Harbor; in fact, there were almost as many carriers 

as battleships under construction on 7 December 1941. Those “flattops” under construction 

were close to double the size of the USS Ranger

[CV 4]—the first American carrier designed as 

such from the keel up.

The task force idea developed well before 

the onset of war, having its genesis even before 

the initial “fleet problems” of the late 1920s, in 

which the Saratoga and Lexington participated.123

In the late 1930s, the deck loads of carriers had 

changed substantially in an offensive direction 

before they were thrust into battle. Thus, naval 

aviators of the period and their earliest biographers and historians possibly exaggerated the 

weight of U.S. Navy conservatism for a number 

of reasons.124 One was physical: dive-bombers in 

1930 could not carry bombs big enough to penetrate battleship armor far enough to threaten 

the enemy battle line; by the end of the decade, 

they could.125 Clark Reynolds, long a leader in 

the history of naval aviation, provides a recent 

sample of the “half empty” part of the metaphor: “The rigid conservatism of the so-called 

Gun Club of battleship admirals stood in his 

Task Force 77 systematically destroyed hundreds of bridges in North Korea. Herbert C. Hahn, Scratch One!, 

ca. 1951. Drawing, colored pencil on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 88-191-BA
Mets 151

[Moffett’s] way at every turn.”126 Clearly, “rigid 

conservatism” can be in the eye of the beholder; 

Moffett himself had been a first-class battleship 

captain.

On the eve of war, then, the worldview of 

the naval officer corps had not changed much 

from the realist perception of the international environment held at the beginning of World 

War I.127 Few people in the Navy felt that the 

initial objective ought to be anything other than 

command of the sea, which would yield the 

capability for exploitation in a variety of ways, 

such as invasion or blockade. Nor did they lend 

much support to the idea of bypassing sea battles, blockades, or invasions in favor of a direct 

attack on the morale or industrial vital targets 

of an enemy.

Sentiment remained strongly opposed to 

a separate air force and strongly in favor of the 

Navy’s having its own air arm. Mitchell had not 

persuaded many people in the sea Services of 

the desirability of a unified department of defense. As regards internal organization, war at 

sea involving the use of aircraft required a task 

organization that put ships with varying functions under a single commander and that sought 

to achieve a specific goal. Everyone agreed that 

aircraft were a major asset in sea warfare but 

differed on the question of their employment—

whether in auxiliary or independent roles or 

both. Those favoring the offensive role for aircraft argued that the aircraft carrier would be 

the capital ship in the future and that all other 

elements of sea power should train and organize 

to support the air arm.

As to employment in battle, aircraft would 

first assure air superiority—ideally by sinking 

enemy carriers—and then provide reconnaissance, as well as spotting and damaging battleships to slow them down for the great sea battle, 

to be concluded by our own battleships. This vision of surface sailors received decreasing favor 

from aviators as the interwar period wore on. 

For the most “advanced” aviators, aircraft would 

win command of the sea by sinking enemy carriers, and then the air arm would tum to exploitation through mining or supporting an invasion.

THE TEST OF WAR: 

THE PACIFIC CAMPAIGNS

How did the experience of World War II modify this [frame] of mind? The war did nothing to 

change the worldview of the line officers of the 

Navy—as with the leaders of all the other Services, they were very much of the realist persuasion. It also did little to change the perception 

that command of the sea was the first goal, but 

the means of achieving it went through a transformation.

Pearl Harbor confirmed the Mitchell tests 

of 1921 that aircraft could sink unmoving, undefended dreadnoughts. The destruction by landbased airpower of the [HMS] Prince of Wales [53] 

and the [HMS] Repulse [1916]—both capital 

ships and both under way—had a far greater 

psychological impact on both the Navy and the 

American public. This, combined with the fact 

that precious few battleships remained with 

which to test the old notions in combat, led to 

the rapid acceptance of the carrier task force as 

the principal instrument of sea power.128

OBJECTIVES

Notwithstanding the fact that implementation in 

war differed from that envisioned, the preferred 

strategy of the Navy remained the same. Air battles instead of battleships won command of the 

sea, but the Central Pacific thrust with island 

hopping and base development remained the 

strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not have 
152 Chapter Two

the power or the inclination to force the Navy 

into another choice—or to persuade [General] Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific 

area to join the Navy’s strategy. It worked rather 

as planned, with the remnants of the Japanese 

fleet coming out to fight the final battles west 

of the Mariana Islands in the summer of 1944, 

and then again during the invasion of Leyte in 

October.129

The aviators had wound up pushing for a 

great sea battle at the time of the Marianas, and 

Admiral Raymond Spruance, the surface sailor, 

deemed his primary mission the protection of 

the amphibious operation and not the destruction of what remained of the Japanese fleet. 

Similarly, the main criticism of Admiral William Halsey came from the surface sailors who 

thought he should have been tied to the landing 

forces at Leyte rather than seeking the destruction of the Japanese carriers—in a decoy role, 

as it turned out.130 In a larger sense, though, one 

may infer that practically everyone involved remained persuaded that Mahan was right when 

he reasserted that he who commands the sea 

commands the world. In the words of Paul M. 

Kennedy,

The Second World War saw the full arrival 

and exploitation of this revolutionary (air) 

weapon and the fulfillment of the prophecies of Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard and the 

others that aircraft were vital to achieve 

dominance over land and sea theatres. As 

such, this did not invalidate Mahan’s doctrine that command of the sea meant control 

of those “broad highways,” the lines of communication between homeland and overseas 

ports; but it did spell the end of the navy’s 

claim to a monopoly role in preserving such 

sea masteries. And the Admiralty’s established 

belief that a fleet of battleships provided the 

ultimate force to control the ocean seaways 

was made to look more old-fashioned than 

ever—and very erroneous and dangerous.131

The naval officer corps remained committed to the idea of exploitation through blockade 

rather than invasion, but it was overruled, and 

amphibious planning was under way when nuclear weapons came along to precipitate Japanese surrender.132

Even earlier, on the eve of World War II, the 

aviators among the naval leaders were beginning 

to rattle the gates to high command. However, tension had existed throughout the conflict 

between them and the old guard. Some of the 

principal decision makers like Ernest King 

and William Halsey did have wings, even pilot 

wings, but most of them had gone through flying 

school as senior officers and had never served as 

crew members at the squadron level. They were 

deemed Johnny-come-latelies to the flying business and therefore unable to understand air war 

as well as the pioneers; the chief one of whom 

Planes of Attack Squadron VA-702, USS Boxer, in a 

bombing raid on Hamhung, April 1951. Herbert C. 

Hahn, Skyraiders, ca. 1951. Drawing, colored pencil 

on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

88-191-BI
Mets 153

had been at the head of the Bureau of Aeronautics when war came: John Towers. He aspired 

to high operational command throughout the 

war but was kept from it, mostly by Admiral 

King himself. Of the early aviators, only Marc 

Mitscher made it to such a level as a task force 

commander under the Fifth Fleet. Meanwhile, 

Halsey the Johnny-come-lately, Admiral Chester 

Nimitz the submariner, and Spruance the cruiser sailor, had been sent by King to implement 

the important decisions of the Pacific war, most 

of which were made by the CNO himself.

THE POSTWAR 

ATTITUDE ADJUSTMENT

It is probably fair to assert that the naval officer 

corps emerged from World War II with much 

the same worldview of international politics as 

it had held before 1914. Clearly, the “Wilsonian 

dream” had proven a mirage and many officers, 

if not most, were skeptical that the “one world” 

envisioned in the United Nations would fare any 

better. The substantial skepticism toward disarmament and arms control of the interwar period remained.133

METHODS OF CONFLICT 

RESOLUTION

The line officers of the Navy came out of the 

war with a strong notion that the carrier battles and the island invasions had been decisive 

and that the Navy remained the first line of 

defense, despite growing doubts on the latter 

point among Army airmen, Congress, and the 

public. As a corollary, the carrier admirals believed they would have to govern the Navy. They 

would never completely dominate the apex of 

the hierarchy, but they were well on the road 

to becoming the most equal among equals.134

Not until the fighting concluded did King and 

Nimitz send Towers to his seagoing command to 

take over the Fifth Fleet from Spruance, who replaced Nimitz in command at Pearl Harbor but 

soon moved on to the Naval War College. Towers then came to Pearl Harbor to take charge, 

as commander in chief of Pacific Command, the 

principal striking arm of the Navy.135

Naval aviators were coming of age in 1945, 

and at the Navy’s moment of glory, a substantial 

part of it agreed that carrier aviation was and 

would continue to be the core strength of the 

Service, notwithstanding the fact that no naval 

threat existed anywhere in the world. Further, 

the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 

concluded that the submarine in its unrestricted, independent campaign against Japanese maritime traffic, combined with strategic bombing 

of the home islands, had been decisive. This use 

of the submarine had not been formally articulated in interwar naval theory and in fact had 

been rejected by U.S. diplomats at the Washington [Naval] Conference of 1921–22 as a morally 

illegitimate use of the weapon. (As noted above, 

though, officers playing enemy commanders had 

explored the idea in war games and informally 

during the periodic Submarine Officers’ Conference.)

Too, naval leaders came away with the impression that the [Boeing] B-29s [Superfortress] 

had not been very cooperative in supporting 

either the Okinawa operations or the mining 

campaign.136 They viewed the bombing of the 

Japanese homeland as a waste of time, even 

though their carrier admirals also had targeted 

the airframe and engine industries in Japan at 

the end of the war. Increasingly in the last two 

years of the war, Navy flyers found their targets 

ashore. Traditionally, in the abstract at least, the 

very purpose of gaining command of the sea was 

to influence events ashore.137 Attention given 
154 Chapter Two

Joseph Binder’s compelling painting 3 Jets Flying over Destroyer highlights naval aviation in U.S. Navy recruitment posters of the 1950s. Acrylic on illustration board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 68-084-A-10
Mets 155

to the possible use of airpower directly against 

the sources of enemy power was minimal in the 

Navy prior to 1941. As the war neared its end, 

however, especially after command of Twentieth 

Air Force in the Pacific was kept out of the hands 

of the theater commanders, naval line officers 

gave a great deal more thought to the idea of 

strategic bombing.

ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

Increasingly, naval officers voiced their concerns about the morality of strategic bombing 

because of the harm to civilians, notwithstanding the harm done by blockade. In addition, 

the war made it clear that command of the air 

was a prerequisite in strategic as well as tactical operations, but it was difficult or impossible to achieve in the former because of the long 

ranges involved. Until escort aircraft could fly 

all the way to the target, the bomber could not 

get through, or so the argument went in naval 

circles.138 The implications of the coming of nuclear weapons were as yet little explored, and 

the result of all these factors left the naval officer 

corps in a state of flux, without a clear vision 

of its future and its purpose for one of the rare 

times in the twentieth century. This situation led 

to an institutional identity crisis that remained 

unresolved until a decade had passed.139

One problem for the Navy was that it had 

complete command of the sea, and nobody 

could challenge it. What could it use that command for? The new potential adversary was the 

Soviet Union, but it had no surface navy. Nor did 

it have any significant dependency on overseas 

raw materials or food vulnerable to blockade.140

The idea of an amphibious landing against the 

whole Eurasian world island was preposterous, 

and both Napoleon and Hitler had made the 

idea more so in any event. The United States 

was coming out of two decades of serious deficit 

spending, and William Mitchell’s idea of getting 

the job done with one air force instead of a twoocean navy—especially an air force equipped 

with nuclear weapons—was highly attractive to 

President Truman, the Congress, and the public 

in general. Doing this in a unified department of 

defense would eliminate much duplication and 

make available more ample funds for domestic 

purposes.141

Attempts to resolve the dilemma were 

made in the unification [National Security] Act 

of 1947 and the Key West and Newport conferences of the following year. However, they really 

did not achieve much. Back in the days of William Mitchell, most of the Navy’s officer corps 

had been dead set against a single military department containing all the services. But during 

World War II, some senior officers thought 

that unification might have some merit. Admiral Nimitz was one of them; but toward the 

end of the war, he and the rest of the mariners 

closed ranks against it.142 Led by [Secretary of 

the Navy] James V. Forrestal, the tactics entailed 

avoiding a head-on attack on the issues of unification and a separate air force because support 

for them was too strong; indeed, the president 

favored unification. Thus, the approach was to 

limit the function of a secretary of defense to 

powers of “coordination,” avoid opposing a separate air force directly, but try to constrain its 

functions as much as possible. Especially important as a goal was assuring the Marine Corps 

and the Navy of their own air arms, completely 

independent of any autonomous air force.

Minority opinions inside the Navy (e.g., 

that of Admiral Daniel V. Gallery) proposed 

that since all the old visions were obsolete, the 

Navy ought to take over the Air Force’s strategic bombing role because the Navy could do 
156 Chapter Two

it better.143 The legislation had emerged rather 

as envisioned by Forrestal, but neither that nor 

the subsequent Key West and Newport “agreements” calmed the waters. Perhaps the subsequent [Convair] B-36 [Peacemaker] debate was 

a manifestation of the insecurity of naval leaders, and the main outlines of a more stable Navy 

worldview and vision for its future started to 

take shape only later as a result of the Korean 

War and the reversal of the decline of defense 

spending. Also having an effect were the march 

of technology that resulted in the miniaturization of nuclear weapons; the Soviet acquisition 

of nuclear technology; the coming of the nuclear submarines; and the submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).144

The Navy’s internal organizational issues 

had largely been laid to rest. The powers of the 

CNO had been further consolidated under the 

wartime leader, Admiral King, when he was 

appointed to that office and at the same time 

retained the title of commander in chief of the 

U.S. fleet. The flyers had become firmly integrated into the upper ranks of the Navy, and 

little agitation remained for a separate naval air 

corps.145

VISIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 

IN WAR

The vision to emerge in the mid-1950s held that 

the United States could exploit its command of 

the seas with a revised naval role; one that had 

both a strategic and conventional dimension. 

The Navy could use its carriers as it had in the 

Korean War for power projection ashore. They 

would have nuclear weapons, not to take over 

the strategic bombing mission, but to facilitate 

the maritime campaign by targeting against Soviet submarine bases and the like.

The SLBM would give new life to the underwater arm of the Navy, even in the absence of 

a potential enemy with a significant surface naval or merchant marine dependency. It had the 

beauty of being perfectly suited to the secondstrike deterrent role the United States valued. 

That is, Polaris missile boats were invulnerable 

enough to ride out the first strike, yet their accuracy was not deemed sufficient to threaten a 

first strike themselves, thus they added to deterrent stability. Further, the great transfer of 

submarine technology, doctrine, and equipment 

from Germany to the Soviet Union at the end of 

World War II, combined with the contemporaneous change in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) 

technique, assured the future of the attack-boat 

portion of the submarine force.146 Thenceforward, one of the chief antisubmarine weapons 

would be submarines. The line officers’ preference for the offensive again received expression 

in the notion of attacking the Soviet underwater 

forces well forward in their home waters with 

ASW submarines and at their bases with naval 

air forces, soon to be armed with nuclear weapons.147

By the late 1950s, the reappearance of the 

naval nuclear camel’s nose under the Air Force’s 

strategic tent was not as threatening as it had 

been in Admiral Gallery’s version of the late 

1940s. The new conception called for a strategic triad, two legs of which would belong to the 

Air Force (ICBMs and heavy bombers) and all 

of which were vital to deterrence and nuclear 

stability. The Air Force, moreover, was no longer the new kid on the block and therefore had 

more confidence in its own role.148 The Navy’s 

new vision proved remarkably durable, and recent writings from The Maritime Strategy to From 

the Sea are really little more than a change in 

emphasis.149
Mets 157

IMPACT OF AVIATION 

ON NAVAL AIR THOUGHT

Aviation had not really changed the worldview 

of most of the Navy’s officer corps by 1947. In 

a generic way, the primary objective of navies 

remained command of the sea, although not 

much of a challenge to the hegemony of the 

U.S. Navy existed at that point. Exploitation 

through mining and blockade came out of the 

war with new prestige, at least to seamen. Even 

though the Navy had little enthusiasm for the 

invasion of Japan, the success of amphibious operations across the Pacific reaffirmed that mode 

as another way of exploiting command of the 

sea. On the eve of the unification debate, such 

support as had existed for either a separate air 

force or a unified defense department was much 

diminished among officers who had fought the 

war in the Pacific and in Washington. Internally, the task method of organization had the 

Artist’s conception of the aircraft carrier proposed by the administration in 1978 for inclusion in the fiscal 

year 1980 Navy shipbuilding program. This 62,500-ton ship would have a length of 912 feet and an extreme 

width of 256 feet. It would be capable of operating all present and planned types of carrier aircraft. S. L. 

Morison, watercolor, 1978.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 88035
158 Chapter Two

prestige of success in recent combat behind it.

The most significant change in naval thought 

had come in the employment of naval forces to 

achieve command of the sea. Battleships and 

other surface vessels found themselves largely relegated to supporting roles, as antiaircraft 

platforms in carrier task forces and as fire-support platforms for amphibious task forces. The 

aircraft carrier had become the capital ship in 

command of sea operations and that change was 

widely accepted by Navy people. They also gave 

more thought to the value and limitations of 

strategic bombing, mostly the latter. Notwithstanding the conclusions of the U.S. Strategic 

Bombing Survey, the idea that one could coerce 

nations without first defeating their armies and 

navies did not receive wide support within the 

Navy. The survey emphasized the great value of 

the submarine campaign in the Pacific war but, 

clearly, the prestige of the air arm overshadowed 

that of the submariners.

In the end, then, aviation apparently integrated itself into the Navy and its thinking, mostly in the realm of method rather than objective. 

The environment for military conflict remained 

similar in many ways, and nation-states still responded most clearly to coercion by military 

force. The naval vision still largely maintained 

that one first had to apply force to the armed 

forces of an adversary, and only later directly 

to the territory or other values after achieving 

command of the sea, the air, and the land approaches. At sea, the method of applying that 

force had changed, in that the carrier had become the capital ship, and the rest were to lend 

support. This implied that the postwar reorganization should not change our national security structure radically and that the Navy should 

certainly retain its own air arm. Even though naval aviators had risen to commanding heights of 

the sea service, the opposition of surface sailors 

was not as reactionary as sometimes pictured. 

Further, it seems fair to picture the intellectual 

style of the Navy as tending neither toward the 

reactionary nor the radical but an evolutionary 

or progressive [frame] of mind.

NOTES

71. I agree with Carl Builder that the personification of institutions entails serious limitations and that there can be 

no all-inclusive “Navy mind” any more than a “military 

mind.” Thus, any insight emerging from this chapter can 

be no more than a tendency or an approximation—if 

that much. Acknowledgment is particularly important 

in this case. Although I graduated from the U.S. Naval 

Academy and before that had an aviation rating in the 

enlisted Navy, all that was more than 40 years ago, and I 

have had little to do with naval history or naval aviation 

since then. I have received very important assistance for 

this chapter from distinguished experts in the field of naval history. Dr. Gary E. Weir set up a discussion seminar 

for an early draft of this work at the Washington Navy 

Yard in October 1994. Among the historians in that 

group were Dr. Jeffrey G. Barlow and Curtis A. Utz, and 

the session was a most productive one for me. Barlow’s 

book and Utz’s thesis were important aids. I also received 

significant insights from Dr. Clark G. Reynolds of the 

College of Charleston and Dr. William F. Trimble of Auburn University, the biographers of Adm John H. Towers 

and William A. Moffett, respectively. Their work went far 

beyond mere professional courtesy. Dr. Evelyn M. Cherpak, head of the Naval Historical Collection at the Naval 

War College, not only was expert and most cooperative 

in optimizing my research effort at Newport but also 

read an early draft of this work and rendered significant 

assistance. Ms. Alice S. Creighton and Ms. Mary Rose 

Catalfamo were also most impressive in maximizing the 

effect of the research time I had available at the Special 

Collections Division of the Nimitz Library at the U.S. 

Naval Academy. Other important readers who helped 

were my colleagues—Professor Dennis Drew, Dr. Hal 

Winton, and Col Rob Owen—Dr. Alexander Cochran 

and RAdm William T. Pendley, as well as Dr. Mark R. 

Shulman; Cdr Joe Tarlton, USN (Ret); Frank Uhlig; 

and Col Barry Watts, USAF (Ret). The original idea for 

the chapter was largely that of my boss, Col Phillip S. 

Meilinger, the former dean of the School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies and the general editor of this book. His 

support was generous and essential to the project.

72. Cdr P. N. L. Bellinger, USN, “Policy” (thesis, Naval War 

College, 1925), in Naval War College History Collection, Newport, RI, hereafter NWC History Collection.

73. William F. Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffett: Architect of 

Naval Aviation (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution 

Press, 1993), 29–30.
Mets 159

74. Charles M. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft 

Carrier, 1911–1929 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 

1974), 22–23; Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The 

Making of American Sea Power (New York: Free Press, 

1991), xi–xii; and Clark G. Reynolds, “The US Fleetin-Being Strategy of 1942,” Journal of Military History 58, 

no. 1 (January 1994): 107–18. Reynolds explains that, 

even in the fleet-in-being strategies, the British and U.S. 

approaches emphasized the preference for offensive applications.

75. Capt George C. Westervelt, USN, “Statement of Captain 

G. C. Westervelt (CC) U.S.N. before President’s Aviation Commission, (Morrow Board, 1925),” copy in E. 

E. Wilson Papers, Special Collections, box 22, Nimitz 

Library, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, hereafter 

USNA Special Collections.

76. One among many who held this opinion was John Towers, one of the Navy’s original aviators, who later explained that the carrier was weak defensively, which 

made it inherently an offensive weapon. See John H. 

Towers, “The Influence of Aircraft on Naval Strategy and 

Tactics” (thesis, Naval War College, 7 May 1934), Record 

Group 13, NWC History Collection. Six years later, he 

was still arguing in terms that Mahan would not have 

found objectionable. In “Naval Aviation Policy and the 

Bureau of Aeronautics,” Aero Digest 36 (February 1940): 

34–38, he states that United States’ well-being depends 

on free use of the seas, that a navy must command the 

essential part of the sea (achieved through offensive operations against the enemy naval fleet), and that aviation 

exists primarily to support those offensive operations. 

For an equally clear preference by another of the early 

flyers, see P. N. L. Bellinger, “Lecture Delivered by Commander P. N. L. Bellinger, Aviation, 1 Aug 1924,” NWC 

History Collection, 12, hereafter Bellinger lecture.

77. William S. Sims, “Cheer Up!: There Is No Naval War College,” 1916, Sims Papers, box 74, Library of Congress.

78. Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His 

Letters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 347. 

Mahan was only one of the most prominent officerhistorians; he reached the presidency of the American 

Historical Association in 1902, after his many historical 

writings on the history of seapower had achieved worldwide notice. See also Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer 

Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 444–54. The U.S. Naval Institute was established 

in the 1870s, as was its journal Proceedings, which from 

the earliest times contained many articles of a historical 

nature. See Philip A. Crowl, “Education versus Training 

at the Naval War College: 1884–1972,” Naval War College 

Review 26, no. 3 (November–December 1973): 2–10. 

Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles 

in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1989), 18, also argues that the Navy, 

above the other Services, values tradition; I suppose that 

has some affinity for a historical approach to things. See 

also Commo Stephen B. Luce, USN, “War Schools,” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings 9 (1883): 633–57; and RAdm 

W. V. Pratt, USN, “The Naval War College,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 53 (September 1927): 937–47.

79. See William E. Simons, Liberal Education in the Service 

Academies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 

52–53, for more about the line-engineer controversy at 

the Naval Academy.

80. Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffett, 4, 7, 67; and Capt 

Mark Bristol, USN, Office of Naval Aeronautics, Washington, DC, letter to secretary of the Navy, subject: Proposed Program, 16 August 1915, Henry Mustin Papers, 

box 7, Library of Congress.

81. LCdr Henry C. Mustin, USN, “Tile Naval Aeroplane,” ca. 

1915, Mustin Papers, box 6, Library of Congress.

82. Commanding officer [Henry Mustin], U.S. Navy Aeronautic Station Pensacola, FL, letter to Office of Aeronautics, 28 June 1914, Mustin Papers, box 7, Library 

of Congress. In this letter, Mustin makes technical recommendations based on naval air experience on the Vera 

Cruz expedition. See also director of naval aeronautics to 

Chief of Nava Operations, “Annual Report on Aeronautics,” 19 January 1916, Mustin Papers, box 7, Library of 

Congress.

83. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, 8–16, 27–35. For pre-World 

War I explorations of these issues, see Capt (later Adm) 

Mark L. Bristol, director of naval aeronautics, to Chief of 

Naval Operations, “Annual Report on Aeronautics,” 19 

January 1916, hereafter Bristol letter; and LCdr Kenneth 

Whiting, USN, aboard the USS Seattle (ACR 11), letter 

to commander, destroyer force, 16 March 1917, Whiting 

Papers, USNA Special Collections. 

84. Capt Henry C. Mustin, USN, to the secretary of the 

Navy, “Aviation Organization in Great Britain, France 

and Italy,” 25 August 1919, Mustin Papers, box 3, Library 

of Congress.

85. RAdm William S. Sims to Chief of Naval Operations, 

subject: United Air Service, 1 February 1921, Sims Papers, NWC History Collection; Capt T. T. Craven, “Naval Aviation,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 46 (January 

1920): 181–91; Craven, “Naval Aviation and a United 

Air Service,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 47 (March 

1921): 307–21; Craven, “Aviation,” lecture, 5 August 

1919, NWC History Collection; Cdr D. E. Cummings, 

“Use of Aircraft in Naval Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 47 (November 1921): 1678–688; Capt Nathan C. Twining, USN, to Capt Henry C. Mustin, USN, 

24 December 1919, Mustin Papers, box 9, Library of 

Congress; Mustin, “Aviation Organization”; and USN 

General Board to the secretary of the Navy, “Future Policy Governing Development of Air Service for the United 

States Navy,” 23 June 1919, Mustin Papers, box 7, Library of Congress.

86. In “Technology, Culture, and the Modem Battleship,” Naval War College Review 45 (Autumn 1992): 83, Jon Tetsuro 

Sumida argues persuasively that weapons systems can 

have important results without winning great battles, as 

with the British fleet in World War I.

87. As Adm Nimitz testified, Jutland was studied up one side 

and down the other in the aftermath of World War I. See 

Cdr Chester W. Nimitz, “Thesis on Tactics” (thesis, Naval 

War College, 28 April 1923), NWC History Collec-
160 Chapter Two

tion. For interesting contemporary views from outside 

the naval establishment on the implications of Jutland, 

especially the bombing tests of the 1920s, see Maj William C. Sherman’s chapter on the future of naval aviation 

in Air Warfare (New York: Ronald Press, 1926), in which 

he argues that the war provided even less of a historical 

database for speculations on the future of naval aviation 

than was true for Army airpower. For a contemporary 

notion that keeping submarines submerged rather than 

damaging them was the most important contribution of 

aviation, see Capt C. Gilbert More, Royal Navy, “Aviation Abroad,” in U.S. Navy General Board, Proceedings 

of the General Board, 23 May 1918, Record Group 80, 

reel 12, Ml493, 1918, National Archives, Washington, 

DC. See also Kenneth Hagan and Mark Shulman, “Putting Naval before History,” Naval History 9 (September/

October 1995): 24 –29.

88. Director of naval aeronautics to Chief of Naval Operations, “Annual Report on Aeronautics,” 19 January 1916, 

Mustin Papers, box 7, Library of Congress.

89. Gary E. Weir, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy 

Yard, Washington, DC, interview by author, 6 October 

1994.

90. Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, US Navy: 

A Sailor’s Life (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 

1974), 193–201; Ernest Andrade Jr., “United States Naval Policy in the Disarmament Era, 1921–1937” (PhD 

diss., Michigan State University, 1966), 1–12; Thomas 

H. Buckley, “The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922” (PhD diss., University of Indiana, 

1961), 19–21, 130; and Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy 

between the Wars, vol. 1, The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919–1929 (New York: Walker, 1968), 310. 

Writing at the time of the Vietnam War, RAdm Daniel 

V. Gallery was only one of many people who looked 

askance at arms control but who nonetheless thought 

that the Five-Power Treaty helped push carrier development along. See unpublished article, Gallery Papers, box 

31, USNA Special Collections.

91. Craven, “Aviation,” 20. In this lecture, Craven reported that he understood that the Royal Navy had lost its 

aviation to the RAF precisely because it had not moved 

vigorously to develop it itself. The same idea is one of 

the themes of Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell: Crusader for 

Air Power (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964, 

1975), viii, wherein he suggests that Mitchell was an important catalyst for progress in naval aviation. See also 

Gerald E. Wheeler, “Mitchell, Moffett, and Air Power,” 

Airpower Historian 8, no. 2 (April 1961): 79–87; Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, 56, 57; Capt N. E. Irwin, testimony, 

U.S. Navy General Board, “GB Proceedings 80,” 5 March 

1919, reel 13, M 1493, 1919, National Archives, 177; and 

William M. McBride, “Challenging a Strategic Paradigm: 

Aviation and the US Navy Special Policy Board of 1924,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies 14, no. 1 (February 1991): 74–

75, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399108437440. 

92. Bellinger lecture, 2.

93. For information on Sims, see, among many others, 

Wheeler, William Veazie Pratt, 149; Hagan, This People’s 

Navy, 255–58; David F. Trask, “William Snowden Sims: 

The Victory Ashore,” in Admirals of the New Steel Navy: 

Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930, ed. 

James C. Bradford (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 

1990); and Elting E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modem 

American Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942). For information on Moffett, see Trimble, Admiral William A. 

Moffett; Thomas C. Hone, “Navy Air Leadership: Rear 

Admiral William A. Moffett as Chief of the Bureau of 

Aeronautics,” in Air Leadership: Proceedings of a Conference 

at Bolling Air Force Base, April 13–14, 1984, ed. Wayne 

Thompson (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 83–113; and Clark G. Reynolds, “William 

A. Moffett: Steward of the Air Revolution,” in Admirals 

of the New Steel Navy, 374 –87. Lesser known was RAdm 

William F. Fullam, whose papers are in the Library of 

Congress, as are those of Adm Sims. Moffett’s papers are 

at the Naval Academy (microfilm copy at USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL). For 

a seminal piece on the subject, see Stephen Peter Rosen, 

“New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,” 

International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 135–67, 

https://doi.org/10.2307/2538898; and especially Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modem Military

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 58–70, 

76–80, 130–47, 234–50.

94. As Melhorn shows, the U.S. Navy observers in Britain 

during World War I were aware of the German zeppelin operations, both against the Royal Navy and against 

London, and Mitchell and others brought the idea for 

such operations before the Navy’s General Board and 

the rest of the Navy right after the war. See Melhorn, 

Two-Block Fox, 35, 40. One of the others was Maj B. L. 

Smith, USMC, and Cdr Kenneth Whiting. See testimony, U.S. Navy General Board, “GB Proceedings 80,” reel 

12, M 1493, 1918, National Archives, 99; and testimony, U.S. Navy General Board, “GB Proceedings 80,” 10 

March 1919, reel 13, M 1493, 1919, National Archives, 

1951, respectively. In a report on a trip to Europe that 

same year, Capt Henry Mustin discussed Italian ideas on 

strategic bombing and British experience with a separate 

air force. See “Aviation Organization in Great Britain, 

France, and Italy,” 25 August 1919; and Capt Henry 

Mustin, “Abstracts of Interviews Held with Authorities 

in Great Britain, France and Italy,” 1 October 1919, 

Mustin Papers, box 3, Library of Congress, which gives 

the views of Hugh Trenchard [Marshal of the Royal Air 

Force] and Sir David Beatty [admiral of the fleet]. Two 

years earlier, Capt George Westervelt, USN, kept a diary 

of his trip to England in which he speaks of the relative 

invulnerability of the Germans bombing London and 

their “barbarity” in doing so. See “Off to War,” diary, E. E. 

Wilson Papers, box 22, USNA Special Collections, 27; 

and Adm William V. Pratt, USN, “Some Aspects of Our 

Air Policy: An Argument from the Viewpoint of American Principles and of the Law,” February 1926, Record 

Group 4, NWC History Collection. The staff presentations at the Naval War College increasingly included 

allusions to the possibility of air attack against enemy 
Mets 161

industry or civilian morale—or the possibility of such 

attacks on the United States—as independent air missions, but the emphasis was on airpower as an integral 

element of naval power. See “The Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare,” staff presentation, Naval War College, September 1937, Record Group 4, NWC History 

Collection; and “The Employment of Aviation in Naval 

Warfare,” staff presentation, Naval War College, September 1940, Record Group 4, NWC History Collection. 

One suspects that the contemporary experience with 

airpower in the Spanish Civil War and Ethiopia provide 

the stimulus for those remarks.

95. Jeffrey G. Barlow, The Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for 

Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 (Washington, DC: Center 

for Naval History, 1994), 3; see also U.S. Navy General 

Board, “G Proceedings 80,” reel 13, M 1493, 1919, National Archives, wherein we clearly see the impossibility of determining how much of the enthusiasm of the 

General Board for aviation arises from progressive analysis and how much from Mitchell’s efforts, even at this 

early date. For the formal report of the board, see Adm 

Charles J. Badger, USN, senior member present, General 

Board of the Navy, to the secretary of the Navy, “Future 

Policy Governing Development of Air Service for the 

United States Navy,” 23 June 1919, General Board no. 

449, Mustin Papers, box 7, Library of Congress.

96. In 1909, Sims argued that hitting a moving ship from considerable height was an impractical proposition; in 1921, 

he reversed himself to argue that bombing from a considerable height could result in devastating hits on moving 

ships and that “this [the lethal area about a target vessel] 

could not easily be missed by a well-trained pilot.” William Sims to “Turner,” Norfolk, VA, 19 June 1909, Sims 

Papers, box 47, Library of Congress; and William Sims 

to VAdm Mark Kerr, Royal Navy London, 29 September 

1921, Sims Papers, box 47, Library of Congress. As it 

turned out, his first prediction in 1909 was the more accurate, for it was most difficult to hit a moving ship in the 

Pacific war from altitude, and most of the damage was 

done by torpedoes and dive-bombers (and kamikazes), 

all of which had to come too close to the vessels for comfort. See also Cdr Logan Cresap’s testimony, 23 September 1918, U.S. Navy General Board, “GB Proceedings 

80,” reel 13, M 1493, 1918, National Archives, 1074: 

and McBride, “Challenging a Strategic Paradigm: Aviation and the U.S. Navy Special Policy Board of 1924,” 

72–89; as well as an aviator’s description of these things 

in Cdr P. N. L Bellinger, USN, “Tactics” (thesis, Naval War 

College, 9 May 1925), NWC History Collection; or a 

submariner’s conception in Nimitz, “Thesis on Tactics.”

97. For a good source on some of this evolution, see Adm 

William H. Standley, “Naval Aviation, an Evolution of 

Naval Gunfire,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 78 (February 1952): 251–55.

98. Bellinger, “Aviation,” 4, 6–7, 13–15; see also Standley, 

“Naval Aviation, an Evolution of Naval Gunfire,” 251–55.

99. Francis L. Keith, “Steps toward Naval Readiness: An 

Examination of United States Fleet Problems” (unpublished ms, University of Maryland, 1976), 29–30. Copy 

provided to author by Curtis Utz, Defense Intelligence 

Agency.

100. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, 9, 21–54. For a discussion of the 

decisiveness of air superiority in connection with spotting for the battle line and the associated techniques, see 

[Henry Mustin?], “The Use of Airplanes for Observation 

of Fire of the Battle Line,” [1920?], Mustin Papers, box 

8, Library of Congress. RAdm J. K. Taussig, USN, “The 

Case for the Big Capital Ship,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 66, no. 7 (July 1940): 929–40, gives an articulate argument for the orthodox view on the eve of Pearl 

Harbor. For an excellent shorter summary, see Norman 

Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 8–9. For early 

views on the subject, see George C. Westervelt, “Aviation Situation Abroad,” testimony to U.S. Navy General 

Board, “GB Proceedings 80,” reel 11, M 1493, 1917, National Archives, 240.

101. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 90.

102. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, 24–25; and Baer, One Hundred 

Years of Sea Power, 93, 120.

103. Capt Yates Stirling Jr., USN, “Some Fundamentals of Sea 

Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 51, no. 6 (June 

1925): 889–918.

104. On war gaming against the Japanese, see Cdr James A 

Barber Jr., USN, “The School of Naval Warfare,” Naval 

War College Review 22, no. 4 (April 1969): 19–96; 

LtCdr Thomas B. Buell, USN, “Admiral Raymond A. 

Spruance and the Naval War College: Part 1—Preparing for World War II,” Naval War College Review 24, 

no. 3 (March 1971): 30–51; Crowl, “Education versus 

Training at the Naval War College,” 2–10; Edward S. 

Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 

1897–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991); and 

RAdm William S. Sims, USN, “The United States Naval 

War College,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 45, no. 9 

(September 1919): 1485–493. On maneuvers, see Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press. 1949), 270–81; Keith, “Steps toward Naval Readiness”; RAdm John D. Hayes, USN (Ret), “Admiral Joseph 

Mason Reeves, USN (1872–1948),” Naval War College Review 25, no. 1 (November 1970): 54 –55; and Eugene E. 

Wilson, “The Navy’s First Carrier Task Force,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings 76, no. 2 (February 1950): 159–69. 

For a view that submarines and aircraft would undermine the position of the battleship, although command of 

the sea remained a paramount consideration, see RAdm 

W. F. Fullam, USN (Ret), “Statement of Rear Admiral 

W. F. Fullam to the Aircraft Investigating Committee of 

Congress,” draft, 1924, Fullam Papers, box 7, Library of 

Congress. In a 1977 interview from USNA Special Collections, Adm John Thach recollects that he had participated in mock attacks on Panama on his first cruise on 

the Saratoga in about 1931. In “The Influence of Aircraft 

on Naval Strategy and Tactics” (thesis, Naval War College, 

7 May 1934), Record Group 13, NWC History Collection, 3, Capt John H. Towers, USN, remarked that “one 

should in the beginning of his study definitely eliminate 
162 Chapter Two

from his mind the idea that aircraft will revolutionize naval warfare.”

105. Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffett, 67; Westervelt, in 

“Statement of Captain G. C. Westervelt,” also argued in 

1925 for the creation of a separate aviation corps within 

the Navy, though he was resolutely opposed to any separate air force. 

106. Barlow, The Revolt of the Admirals, 4.

107. Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffett, 67–86; Clark G. 

Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval 

Air Supremacy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 

176; and Reynolds, “William A. Moffett,” 374. Theodore 

Taylor, The Magnificent Mitscher (New York: W. W. Norton, 

1954), 88–89, shows that Mitscher shared the harsh feelings on the parts of some aviators toward their seniors 

who went to flight training as senior officers, seemingly 

to preempt the top commands in naval aviation without 

having paid their dues.

108. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers, 319, 432; and Trimble, 

Admiral William A. Moffett, 7–8.

109. RAdm Nathan C. Twining, USN, USS New Mexico (BB 

40), at San Pedro, CA, to Capt Mustin, USS Aroostook 

(CM 3), 24 December 1919, Mustin Papers, box 7, Library of Congress.

110. Westervelt, “Statement of Captain G. C. Westervelt.”

111. Hurley, Billy Mitchell, 24 –25.

112. Cdr H. C. Dinger, USN, “Aviation Abroad,” testimony, 

U.S. Navy General Board, 23 August 1918, “GB Proceedings 80,” M 1493, 1918 National Archives. In “Aviation Organization in Great Britain, France, and Italy,” 

report to the secretary of the Navy, 25 August 1919, 

Mustin Papers, box 3, Library of Congress, Capt Mustin expressed a contrary view. He remarked on a general 

tendency toward centralization of the management of 

airpower, including naval airpower, in approving terms. 

He also cited that the main opposition to the Air Ministry and the RAF in Britain lay within the ranks of the 

Royal Navy. See also Cdr J. L. Callan, USNRF, to Capt 

Henry Mustin, USN, “Memo for Captain Mustin,” 3 July 

1919, Mustin Papers, box 3, Library of Congress, which 

reports of their visit to the HMS Furious and the captain’s 

advice urging that the United States not follow the British example.

113. VAdm F. W. Pennoyer Jr., USN (Ret), “Outline of US 

Carrier Development, 1911–1942,” draft, 17 December 

1968, E. E. Wilson Papers, binder 7, USNA Special Collections.

114. The following Proceedings articles courtesy of U.S. Naval 

Institute. LtCdr H. T. Bartlett, USN, “Mission of Aircraft 

with the Fleet,” Proceedings 45, no. 5 (January 1919): 

729–41; Craven, “Nava Aviation,” 181–91; Craven, “Naval Aviation and a United Air Service,” Proceedings 47, no. 

3 (January 1921): 307–21; Cdr D. E. Cummings, “The 

Air Detachment,” Proceedings 46, no. 6 (January 1920): 

891–94; Craven, “Use of Aircraft in Naval Warfare,” 

Proceedings 47 (November 1921): 1677–88; Lt Forrest 

P. Sherman, “Naval Aircraft in International Law,” Proceedings 51, no. 12 (October 1925): 258–64; Sherman, 

“Air Warfare,” Proceedings 52 (January 1926): 62–71; 

Sherman, “Some Aspects of Carrier and Cruiser Design,” 

Proceedings 56, no. 11 (November 1930): 997–1002; Lt 

DeWitt C. Ramsey, USN, “The Development of Aviation 

in the Fleet,” Proceedings 49, no. 9 (September 1923): 

1395–417; Lt Logan C. Ramsey, “Aircraft and the Naval Engagement,” Proceedings 56, no. 8 (August 1930): 

679–87; Lt Logan C. Ramsey, “Bombing versus Torpedo Planes,” Proceedings 57, no. 11 (November 1931): 

1509–15; Lt Logan C. Ramsey, “Air Power Is Sea Power,” Proceedings 67, no. 7 (July 1941): 921–26; Cdr H. 

M. Kieffer, USN, “Control of the Seas by an Air Department,” Proceedings 51, no. 12 (October 1925): 2265–70; 

RAdm Bradley A. Fiske, “The Warfare of the Future,” 

Proceedings 47, no. 2 (February 1921): 157–67; LtCdr H. 

B. Grow, USN, “Bombing Tests on the Virginia and New 

Jersey,” Proceedings 49, no. 12 (January 1923): 1087–98; 

Grow, “Tactical Employment of Naval Aircraft,” Proceedings 50, no. 3 (March 1924): 341–51; Cdr Jerome C. 

Hunsaker, USN, “The Navy’s First Airships,” Proceedings 

45, no. 8 (January 1919): 1347–68; David S. Ingalls, 

“Naval Aviation Today and in Prospect,” Proceedings 56, 

no. 10 (October 1930): 891–94; Capt A. W. Johnson, 

USN, “Aviation in Coast Defense,” Proceedings 51, no. 9 

(September 1925): 1652–66; “Admiral Moffett Claims 

All Sea Flying for Navy,” Professional Notes, Proceedings

50 (August 1924): 1364–74; Lt Franklin G. Percival, 

USN (Ret), “Elements Contributing to Aerial Superiority,” Proceedings 57, no. 4 (April 1931): 437–47; Capt 

Yates Stirling Jr., USN (a submariner), “The Place of 

Aviation in the Organization for War,” Proceedings 52, no. 

6 (June 1926): 1100–10; Stirling, “Some Fundamentals 

of Sea Power,” 899–918; Lt Frank W. Wead, USN, “Naval Aviation Today,” Proceedings 50, no. 4 (April 1924): 

561–74; Henry Woodhouse, “The Torpedoplane: The 

New Weapon which Promises to Revolutionize Naval 

Tactics,” Proceedings 45, no. 5 (January 1919): 743–52; 

and Eugene E. Wilson, “The Navy’s First Carrier Task 

Force,” Proceedings 76, no. 2 (February 1950): 59–69. 

Although this listing is not a complete survey, it is certainly massive enough to indicate that air-mindedness 

was more than a whim of the editorial staff or the mere 

output of a particularly prolific splinter group within 

the Navy.

115. See Cdr Kenneth Whiting, testimony on 8 March 1919, 

U.S. Navy General Board, “GB Proceedings 80,” reel 13, 

M 1493, 1919, National Archives, 195.

116. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, 37–38; and Bristol letter. Though 

then in charge of the Office of Naval Aeronautics, Bristol 

was not an aviator, and he made the above analogy explicit two years before the United States entered World War 

I. On the general acceptance of the notion of the primary need to command the air, see Pratt, “Some Aspects 

of Our Air Policy.” For an example as early as 27 March 

1919, see Cdr John Towers and Adm A. G. Winterhalter, 

remarks, U.S. Navy General Board, “GB Proceedings 

80,” reel 14, M 1493, 1919, vol. 2, National Archives, 

364.

117. Miller, War Plan Orange; Buell, “Admiral Raymond A. 

Spruance and the Naval War College,” 40–46; and Lou-
Mets 163

is Morton, “War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy,” World Politics 11, no. 2 (October 1958–July 1959): 

221–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009529. For an 

explanation by one of the primary actors, see briefing 

paper, William A. Moffett Collection, part 2, item J, 

USNA Special Collections, probably done in preparation 

of the U.S. delegation to the London Naval Conference 

of 1930. For a contemporary discussion of how it worked 

in practice, see Adm John H. Towers, “Strategic Employment of Naval Forces as the Essential Element of World 

War II in the Pacific,” draft speech, n.d., Towers Papers, 

box 4, Library of Congress. There was some dissent to 

the idea and to the generally held preference for the offensive, as in RAdm W. F. Fullam, USN (Ret), “The Passing of Sea Power: And the Dawn of a New Naval Era in 

which Battleships Are Obsolete,” McClure’s, June 1923, 

Fullam Papers, box 7, Library of Congress.

118. Bellinger, “Tactics,” 12.

119. Keith, “Steps toward Naval Readiness,” 20, 31; Barlow, 

The Revolt of the Admirals, 8; and Robert L. O’Connell, 

Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. 

Navy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 301.

120. See Bellinger, “Tactics.”

121. E. B. Potter, Bull Halsey (Annapolis: Naval Institute 

Press, 1985), 136. See “The Employment of Aviation in 

Naval Warfare” (staff presentation, Naval War College, 

September 1937), 44, Record Group 4, NWC History 

Collection, which proclaims it “unnecessary to open the 

controversial subject.” In his Naval War College thesis of 

1934, Capt John H. Towers, World War II spiritual head 

of the entire naval aviation community, remarked that 

“the generally accepted object of Naval Strategy is to gain 

and maintain control of the sea. There may be qualifying 

phrases, such as ‘in the vital area’ or ‘in the theatre of 

operations’ etc. The purposes of gaining and maintaining 

control are: to stop enemy trade while your own trade 

has freedom of movement, to deny overseas operations 

to the enemy, and be able to conduct them yourselves. 

. . . It [the carrier’s] missions can and should be varied, 

dependent upon the character of the operations, but in 

the final battle, its primary mission should be support 

of the battle line.” See Record Group 13, Naval History 

Collection, 13; additional copy in Towers Papers, box 4, 

Library of Congress.

122. See Melhorn, Two-Block Fox; and Curtis A. Utz, “Carrier Aviation Policy and Procurement in the U.S. Navy, 

1936–1940” (master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 

1989), 2.

123. Keith, “Steps toward Naval Readiness,” 2, 28, 39. For a 

first-person account of the development of the task force 

idea and carrier aviation in general, see Pennoyer, “Outline of US Carrier Development, 1911–1942.”

124. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox; Curtis A. Utz, “Carrier Aviation 

Policy and Procurement in the U.S. Navy, 1936–1940” 

(master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 1989); Potter, 

Bull Halsey, 137; and Rosen, Winning the Next War, 58.

125. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 143.

126. Reynolds, “William A. Moffett,” 379.

127. Adm Frederick J. Horne, USN, “Kiwanis Club, 27 Oct 

38,” draft speech, Horne Papers, box 2, Library of 

Congress. In this speech, Horne renders what I deem a 

near-classical expression of Navy officers’ general worldview; it appears to have been prepared for presentation 

by Adm Horne.

128. Clearly, the idea of independent carrier task forces antedated Pearl Harbor and the lost battleships, having its 

genesis in part in the annual fleet exercises dating from 

the late 1920s. See Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation; Hayes, “Admiral Joseph Mason 

Reeves,” 54 –55; Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers, 272, 

292; Reynolds, “The U.S. Fleet-in-Being Strategy of 

1942,” 109–11; and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of 

British Naval Mastery (New York: Scribner, 1976), 305.

129. “It is quite possible that ORANGE resistance will cease 

when isolation is complete and before steps to reduce 

military strength of ORANGE soil are necessary. In either case the operations imposed upon BLUE will require a series of bases westward from Oahu, and will 

require the BLUE Fleet to advance westward with an 

enormous train, in order to be prepared to seize and establish bases.” Nimitz, “Thesis on Tactics,” 35; and Baer, 

One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 127.

130. Buell, Master of Sea Power, 182–97, 468–73; E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1970), 271; 

LtCdr Thomas J. Cutler, USN (Ret), “Greatest of All 

Sea Battles,” Naval History 8, no. 5 (September/October 

1994): 10–18; Jack Sweetman, “Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings 120, no. 10 (October 1994): 56–58; 

and Milan N. Vego, “The Sho-1 Plan,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 120, no. 10 (October 1994): 61–63.

131. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 303.

132. Buell, “Preparing for World War II,” 45; Potter, Bull 

Halsey, 346; and Towers, “Strategic Employment of Naval 

Forces.”

133. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox, 21; Capt W. D. Puleston, USN 

(Ret), “The Probable Effect on American National Defense of the United Nations and the Atomic Bomb,” 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 72, no. 8 (August 1946): 

1017–29; see the paper expressing the views of Fleet 

Adm Nimitz on the function of naval forces in maintaining the future security of the United States in Chester 

W. Nimitz, “The Future Employment of Naval Forces,” 

1947, Whitehead Papers, box 648, Special Collections, 

National Museum of Naval Aviation, Pensacola, FL; Adm 

Arthur W. Radford, USN, “Statement of Arthur W. Radford, Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief 

Pacific Fleet before the Armed Services Committee of 

the House of Representatives Investigating the B-36,” 

[1949?], Halsey Papers, box 51, Library of Congress; 

Adm Raymond A. Spruance, “Statement by R. A. Spruance, Admiral, US Navy, Retired, Delivered before the 

House Armed Services Committee,” [1949?], Halsey 

Papers, box 51, Library of Congress; and Adm John H. 

Towers, USN, draft speech (1951–53), Towers Papers, 

box 4, Library of Congress.

134. Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, 3.

135. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers, 507–45; “Aircraft Carrier” (staff presentation, Naval War College, 4 February 
164 Chapter Two

1943), Record Group 4, NWC History Collection; Taylor, The Magnificent Mitscher, 321; and “Fast Carrier Task 

Force” (staff presentation, Naval War College, 26 July 

1945), Record Group 4, NWC History Collection, 1.

136. Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral 

Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 

1987), 385–86; “Statement by R. A. Spruance,” 10–11; 

Potter, Nimitz, 356; and W. D. Lanier Jr. “Victory and the 

B-29s,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 72 (December 

1946): 1563–567.

137. Barlow, The Revolt of the Admirals, 292.

138. RAdm Ralph A. Ofstie, USN, “Statement of Ralph A. Ofstie to the Armed Services Committee of the House of 

Representatives,” n.d., Halsey Papers, box 51, Library 

of Congress, hereafter Ofstie statement; Buell, The Quiet 

Warrior, 350, 353, 354, 367; Potter, Nimitz, 372, reports 

that Nimitz also had his reservations about city bombing; 

and Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, vol. 1, The Formative Years, 1947–1950 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), 

415. 

139. Capt Paul R. Schratz, USN (Ret), “The Admirals’ Revolt,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112, no. 2 (February 1986): 64–71; Builder, The Masks of War, 77–80; 

Lawrence J. Korb, “Service Unification: Arena of Fears, 

Hopes, and Ironies,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 104 

(May 1978): 170–83; and Rearden, History of the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, 385–422, are only drops in a sea 

of literature on a subject that contains a wide variety of 

interpretations. Dr. Jeffrey Barlow, for example, interprets the views of Adms Nimitz and Sherman as fairly 

well articulated and confident in the aftermath of the Bikini Atoll atomic bomb tests. See Barlow, The Revolt of the 

Admirals, 80.

140. Frank Uhlig Jr., How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 286–87. 

141. Donald Edward Wilson, “The History of President Truman’s Air Policy Commission and Its Influence on Air 

Policy, 1947–1949” (PhD diss., University of Denver, 

1978); George M. Watson Jr., The Office of the Secretary 

of the Air Force (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force 

History, 1993), 35–78; Ofstie statement; and Friedman, 

U.S. Aircraft Carriers, 19–21. 

142. Potter, Nimitz, 402.

143. RAdm Daniel V. Gallery, USN (Ret), Eight Bells, and 

All’s Well (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), 228–29. 

The roots of Air Force-Navy/Marine Corps rivalry far 

antedate Gallery and even the Mitchell bombing tests, 

as shown in the testimony of the pioneer Marine Corps 

aviator Alfred A. Cunningham to the General Board on 5 

February 1918 with his comment, “You [the USN] could 

have the field [an Army Air Service base in wartime Florida) for the training of these fighting pilots and you won’t 

have to depend on the charity of the Army, which is very 

unpleasant.” See U.S. Navy General Board, “GB Proceedings 80,” reel 12, M 1493, 1918, National Archives.

144. Gallery, Eight Bells, and All’s Well, 217–35; Watson, The 

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 35–78; Rearden, 

History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 385–422; 

George T. Hodermarsky, Postwar Naval Force Reduction, 

1945–50: Impact on the Next War (Newport, RI: Center 

for Naval Warfare Studies, Advanced Research Department, Naval War College, 1990), 1–69, copy in Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; and Uhlig, 

How Navies Fight, 286–87.

145. Buell, Master of Sea Power, 364–66, 374; and Reynolds, 

Admiral John H. Towers, 257, 370–71, chapter 17, 512–59.

146. See “Statement by R. A. Spruance,” 6, wherein he cites 

the growing Soviet submarine threat based on technology transferred from Germany as the single most serious 

problem facing the Navy at that time; and Friedman, U.S. 

Aircraft Carriers, 3.

147. Hodermarsky, Postwar Naval Force Reduction, 1–69; and 

Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, 17.

148. David A. Rosenberg, “American Postwar Air Doctrine 

and Organization: The Navy Experience,” in Air Power and 

Warfare: Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, 

United States Air Force Academy, 18–20 Oct, 1978, ed. Alfred 

F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 245–70; and Rosenberg, 

“Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in Making of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945–68,” Journal 

of Strategic Studies 9, no. 1 (March 1986): 35–52. 

149. Adm James D. Watkins, USN, The Maritime Strategy 

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986); John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy 

and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security 11, no. 

2 (Fall 1986): 3–57; Sean O’Keefe, “Interview: Be Careful What You Ask For,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 

119 (January 1993): 73–76; Gen Carl E. Mundy, USMC, 

“Coping with Change: The Department of the Navy and 

the Future,” Strategic Review 22 (Winter 1994): 20–24; 

and Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Power in the Twenty-First 

Century,” Journal of Strategic Studies 17 (March 1994): 

176–99.
165

SUBMARINES

Key to the Offset Strategy

by Rear Admiral W. J. Holland Jr.

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 201571

deploy and strike with relative freedom of 

movement and decision will continue to be a 

vital part of the mix.72

As an analyst with the Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments some 20 years ago, 

now-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. 

Work promoted submarines as the basis for a 

strategy that sought to exploit U.S. advantages in 

technologies for which there was no peer. Work 

viewed submarines as the prime example of investing in a weapon system in which the United 

States possessed a clear advantage with a lead 

that could grow faster than a potential adversary could match. Rather than trying to respond 

to an opponent’s strengths, an “offset” strategy 

seeks to impose on such a competitor burdens 

that will require more time and resources than it 

can muster. This cost-imposing strategy’s goal is 

not just victory in war but deterrence by making 

72 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Defense Innovation Days 

Opening Keynote” (speech, Southeastern New England Defense 

Industry Alliance, Newport, RI, 3 September 2014). Emphasis 

added.

On 3 September 2014, Secretary of 

Defense [Charles T.] “Chuck” Hagel, 

warning that China and Russia are 

“pursuing and funding long-term, comprehensive military modernization programs,” to include fielding an array of capabilities “designed 

to counter traditional U.S. military advantages,” 

promoted an “offset” strategy. Rather than wading into a symmetrical duel with the military 

modernization of potential opponents, he advocated employing technologies and associated 

operational skills that impose disproportionate 

costs on any competitor; specifically:

key investments in submarines, cyber, 

next-generation fighter and bomber aircraft, 

missile defense, and special operations forces—putting a premium on rapidly deployable, self-sustaining platforms that 

can defeat more technologically advanced 

adversaries. Undersea capabilities that can 

71 The original article came from Rear Admiral W. J. Holland Jr., 

USN (Ret), “Submarines: Key to the Offset Strategy,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings 141, no. 6 (June 2015): 22–29. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, 

grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
166 Chapter Two

evident the costs to compete and the prospect of 

a likely defeat in the event of war.

Any future conflict in the open ocean will 

start with submarines. For the immediate future no country will have the capacity and capability to deploy an armada to contest the sea 

in the face of the overwhelming superiority of 

the U.S. Navy. Even should such a navy appear, 

there will be no “fleet actions.” Any war at sea 

will be fought between submarines and such antisubmarine adversaries as can be assembled. In 

the words of historian and commentator John 

Keegan:

command of the sea in the future unquestionably lies beneath rather than on the 

surface. . . . Consider the record of the only 

naval campaign fought since 1945, that 

of the Falklands in 1982. From it two salient facts stand out: that the surface ship 

can barely defend itself against highperformance, jet propelled aircraft and that 

it cannot defend itself at all against a nuclear powered submarine.73

Recognition of the preeminence of American seapower is evident in the proliferation of 

submarine forces around the world. Even small 

countries investing in a navy elect submarines as 

their naval weapon system of choice. Many, if indeed not most, of those countries building navies 

and investing in submarine forces are friends or 

allies. Their submarines are not aimed at American carriers. Others, however, with nascent 

or resurrecting submarine forces, are devoted 

to efforts that threaten U.S. dominance at sea.

“ONLY THE FIRST STEP”

But a simple selection of hulls is only the first 

73 John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare 

(London: Hutchinson, 1988), 324.

step in creating an effective submarine force. 

Developing such a capability requires serious investment of money, intellect, people, and time. 

Development takes years or even decades to create the kind of capability that Germany, Japan, 

the United States, and Great Britain wielded 

in World War II. Attempts by smaller countries 

to produce an effective submarine force have 

foundered on lack of resources, failure to enlist and retain skilled people, and an inability to 

construct and sustain the logistics infrastructure necessary to create and then maintain these 

complex machines. Some Western countries 

have been successful in building and maintaining 

an effective submarine force, but only in small 

numbers and not without difficulty. Canada, 

Germany, and Australia, for example, all have 

admitted their inability to man all the submarines that they have in commission.

The United States, on the other hand, has 

a major force of submarines manned by experienced crews, practiced in the operations at sea 

and in the far corners of the world. These are 

supported by a construction and maintenance 

infrastructure that is the envy not just of other navies but of other parts of the U.S. Navy 

as well. The submarines this force operates are 

the world’s quietest and most technologically 

advanced. More important, behind this force is 

a training establishment that not only instructs 

a steady stream of new personnel but provides 

advanced training in maintenance and operations including realistic simulators in which submarine operational tactics are practiced daily. 

Finally, still smarting from the ineffective torpedoes of World War II, the Americans shoot real 

torpedoes regularly, including proof-testing war 

shots.

To properly employ submarine forces of 

whatever size requires leaders that grasp the 
Holland 167

unusual nature of their operations—the limitations as well as the capabilities of these ships 

and crews. Ships that “intentionally sink” do not 

follow the norms for other seagoing vessels. In 

World War II, the Japanese failed to employ to 

their full capability talented crews and wellbuilt submarines because the leadership of these 

forces rested with admirals experienced in battleship operations and conditioned to expect decisive battle between surface fleets. The lack of 

experience and understanding in the senior Imperial Japanese Navy leadership often resulted 

in deploying submarines as if they were surface 

ships, as scouts and supply vessels. Despite their 

misemployment, Japanese submarines scored a 

number of significant blows. On 15 September 

1942, the torpedo spread from the I-19 [Type 

B submarine] that sank the aircraft carrier USS 

Wasp (CV 7), fatally damaged the escort destroyer USS O’Brien (DD 415), and put the battleship USS North Carolina (BB 55) out of action 

for months has to be at least close to the most 

significant score from a single submarine salvo 

in history.

German and U.S. submarine operations 

in World War II benefited not just from leadUnderway supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. Sixth 

Fleet area of responsibility, USS Scranton (SSN 756) pulls into Augusta Bay, Sicily, to receive supplies and 

personnel. Monica Allen-Perin, USS Scranton, Augusta Bay, Sicily 2011, 2011. Watercolor.

Courtesy of the artist and RequestAPrint
168 Chapter Two

ers who knew and understood such actions 

but from command climates that for the most 

part encouraged honest reports and critical 

self-examination. Such climates are not erected 

overnight or come as a result of classroom instruction. They take lime, energy, and personal 

investment to create. Regular and sustained operations at sea are a vital ingredient not only to 

hone the ability of the individual ships’ crews to 

conduct their affairs but also to set the expectations of the command and staff personnel as they 

learn and exercise their functions. The limits of 

radio communication with submarines requires 

advanced planning, a climate of mutual understanding, and trust that comes about only with 

personal investment and routine practice. As difficult and time-consuming as they are to create, 

these climates can be fatally damaged by senior 

leadership that disabuses reporters of bad news, 

ignores symptoms of trouble or distress, or hogs 

credit for successes rightly achieved by subordinates. Societies that are based on rigid caste 

systems, have formal class hierarchies, or must 

conform to rigid political straitjackets have difficulty creating and maintaining such commandand-control characteristics. But any navy that 

expects to effectively employ its submarines requires these distinctive attributes.

The operational military effort involved in 

a strategy to dominate the sea is a return to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classic dictum that the first 

aim of the Navy is to destroy the enemy’s fleet.74

Before 1945, this meant major fleet actions but 

today any such action is exceedingly unlikely. As 

demonstrated in the Falkland Islands campaign, 

the ability of nuclear-powered submarines to 

dominate the ocean surface means that, in future conflict, warships will be widely dispersed 

74 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston: Little, 

Brown, 1918), 5.

and the most important parts of a fleet will be 

stealthy. Engagement will be defined by the ability to locate individual units and bring them to 

battle. The historical parallel is the cruiser warfare of the War of 1812 and World War I rather 

than the major fleet actions of Trafalgar or Jutland. But the goal remains the same: the first 

aim of a Navy in war is destruction of the enemy 

fleet.

Whatever the name, this effort is offensive 

submarine warfare. The operational aim at the 

heart of the strategy is to position submarines 

in the coastal and near-ocean areas of a potential 

enemy as a crisis builds and, should war break 

out, to quickly sink all opposing surface warships 

and submarines. War games have demonstrated 

the great advantage of “flooding the littorals 

with SSNs [attack submarines].” Properly operated, submarines become a national maritime 

resource, not simply a component of a battle 

group or the launcher of land-attack missiles.

THE PITFALLS

Here lie pitfalls within the Navy itself. Submarines have themselves become primary antisubmarine weapon systems. Their presence and 

performance as part of a task group have built an 

aura of security and a confidence that, when so 

assigned, threatening submarines will not appear 

undetected. This record is admirable but creates 

a situation that can dilute the primary task in 

the event of war. Commanders’ demands for 

submarines to be assigned to protect their task 

groups subvert the primary attribute of conducting unrestricted warfare against the enemy’s 

forces in waters that otherwise are not open or 

accessible to others. The proper employment of 

submarines is as a major force to be wielded as 

a unit—dispersed and widely distributed under 

an operational command whose task is to “sweep 
Holland 169

the seas.” Destruction of the enemy fleet is the 

goal; protecting our own fleet by eliminating the 

threat is a beneficial byproduct.

The second difficulty in properly using 

American submarines in times of war rises from 

their new role as arsenal ships. Recent wars and 

related actions against shore targets have seen 

employment of submarine-launched missiles in 

significant numbers, not because the submarine 

is the best-fitted launch platform or situated 

within an enemy surveillance and strike zone too 

dangerous for surface ships. Submarine-launched 

weapons are used because they are there. Surfaceship launchers outnumber the submarines’ in 

most situations, but such launchers are also 

homes for antimissile and antiair weapons. 

Where such threats may exist, the number of 

land-attack weapons in the surface fleet is substantially reduced, often leaving submarines 

as a significant source of land-attack missiles. 

Official Navy artist DM2 Robert Malin recorded the U.S. Navy’s role in RIMPAC, a biannual fleet exercise 

in the Pacific Ocean intended to enhance the tactical capabilities of participating units in major aspects of 

maritime operations at sea. In 1998, the exercise took place in the waters off Hawaii and included participants 

from six Pacific nations. The United States contributed more than 50 ships, 200 aircraft, and 250,000 military men and women from all Services. Robert Adam Malin, Up Periscope, 1998. Acrylic on illustration board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 98-110-F
170 Chapter Two

Combatant commanders with eyes focused on 

objectives and targets on the land are likely to 

want to add the land-attack weapons on board 

submarines to those available for attacking targets ashore at the expense of assigning their host 

submarines to efforts at sea.

For at least the duration of the period in 

which maritime dominance is being contested, submarines should be employed in pursuing elimination of the enemy navy—a task for 

which they are singularly fitted. In this early 

phase, submarines should be used as missile 

shooters only when they are the only launchers 

within range of high-priority targets or when 

the attack needs to launched from an otherwise 

impossible azimuth. Once maritime dominance 

is established, submarine missile shooters can 

then be positioned where most advantageous in 

regard to time of flight and direction of attack 

considerations.

Nuclear propulsion not only allows the submarine to operate under the cloak of invisibility, 

but it powers the ability to reposition quickly 

without a logistics train and for a long duration. These are all incalculable advantages in any 

time-constrained situation. This logistic-free tail 

allows dispatch of submarines singly or in numbers on short notice and with little buildup or 

fanfare. Among the advantages arising from this 

is an opportunity to learn the environment first 

and to find the most advantageous positions in 

relation to expected threats and geography.

GREAT FLEXIBILITY

Flexible submarine deployments can be accomplished without adding to the tensions surrounding a crisis, and with no notice or with subtle 

direct evidence if such is to our advantage. Early 

major deployments before the commencement 

of hostilities give the combatant commanders 

the assets to execute attacks and interdiction 

from the first moment of a war. This “freedom 

of movement and decision” that Secretary Hagel found so important is inherent in nuclearpowered submarines. This ability to enter the 

area of conflict without notice provides an additional benefit in that any opponent of the United 

States must assume that American submarines 

are always present on his littoral and across his 

maritime pathways.

Because nuclear power adds this dimension 

of logistic flexibility and rapid reaction, the capability to redeploy America’s total force of submarines on short notice places great stress on 

any potential opponent. Such an adversary must 

count on facing all active U.S. submarines within days. In any crisis the first forces to arrive at 

the scene are of great tactical importance and 

strategic significance. When those forces are not 

only powerful, but stealthy, the effect is multiplied by uncertainty concerning their location 

and strength. Regular operations by submarines 

in these waters are a necessary ingredient in this 

aspect of submarine warfare—not only to train 

crews but to establish the expectations that, 

should conflict occur, the American submarines 

will be on-scene early.

The potential peer maritime competitor appears to be developing an antiaccess/area-denial 

strategy based on a suspected land-based ballistic missile and an undefined ocean surveillance 

and targeting system aimed at large ships at sea. 

While the difficulties in creating and then operating such a system are enormous, its deployment might threaten major capital ships (read 

aircraft carriers). But a strategy based on such 

a system does not address the threat to the adversary’s navy and maritime assets from submarines. In the words of defense analyst and former 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Seth Cropsey:
Holland 171

As a hedge against China’s anti-access strategy, submarines are matchless. . . . So long as 

submarines remain stealthy, they bypass the 

age-old technological cat-and-mouse game 

of countering an adversary’s technology and 

in turn being countered.75

While this recognition is well understood 

by those with submarine experience, the annunciation by a nationally recognized figure who has 

no investment in the submarine force signals the 

wide awareness of the asymmetric advantages of 

submarines, now and in the future.

One necessary ingredient in the success of 

an offset strategy is the potential competitor’s 

75 Seth Cropsey, “A Naval Disaster in the Making,” Weekly Standard, 

6 October 2014.

recognition of these aspects of the contest. Establishing this perception is not accomplished by 

ships in harbor, much less ships on the building 

ways. Sustained operations at sea and regular 

visits to the neighborhoods populated by potential opponents create the impressions on which 

to lay the ground work to effect the strategic 

objective. By the end of the Cold War, most 

public utterances of officers of the Soviet Navy 

acknowledged the omnipresence of the Western 

powers’ submarines. That impression was one of 

the keys to their adaptation of defensive tactical 

operations—and to the success of the 1981 Maritime Strategy.
172

A NEW NAVAL ERA

by Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert and General James F. Amos 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 201376

in aviation technology drove development of 

the aircraft carrier, creating the ability to project power over the long distances of the Pacific 

theater. The same period sparked new ideas for 

maneuver at sea and led to the development of 

amphibious capabilities. In the Korean War, we 

demonstrated the asymmetric advantage that 

rests with a force that can use the sea as maneuver space to repeatedly outflank a land-bound 

opponent. Later, the Cold War produced maritime strategic concepts and sea-control capabilities focused on countering the blue-water 

maritime threat posed by the Soviet Navy. And 

in the aftermath of the Cold War, we shifted our 

operational focus to expeditionary capabilities 

that could influence events ashore as described 

in the maritime strategies . . . From the Sea and its 

encore, Forward . . . From the Sea. Our shared naval 

heritage is not to push back on the trends we 

encounter, but instead to leverage the opportunities they present.

We understand that this is a time of unsettling change for our military. Like our predecessors, however, we will use this situation as an 

We are faced today with an uncommon array of military challenges 

and opportunities. At home, we 

are experiencing financial constraints as our nation seeks to get its fiscal house in order. Overseas, instability continues in the Middle East and 

North Africa, Iran pursues nuclear weapons, 

and maritime territorial disputes persist in the 

East and South China Seas. At the end of more 

than 12 years at war, the continuing drawdown 

of our troops in Afghanistan provides an opportunity to reset our force and refocus our efforts 

on emerging challenges. We intend to leverage 

this combination of factors to revise how our 

Navy-Marine Corps team trains, operates, and 

fights.

We have been here before. In fact, we have 

been here repeatedly throughout our history. 

Between the two World Wars, treaty limits on 

the number of battleships and improvements 

76 The original article came from Adm Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, 

and Gen James F. Amos, USMC, “A New Naval Era,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings 139, no. 6 (June 2013): 16–20. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, 

grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
Greenert and Amos 173

opportunity to shape the future naval force to 

sustain its relevance and affordability. We are optimistic about our ability to do this because our 

visions as Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps are already closely aligned. We both see a future naval force that 

thinks together, plans together, trains together, 

and deploys together on a wide range of ships. 

Our forces will combine surface, undersea, aviation, expeditionary, cyber and space capabilities; 

we will deploy them in flexible packages that 

can be applied to many different contingencies.

Like today, our future naval force will be 

where it matters, when it matters, by maintaining a robust forward presence and appropriate 

readiness. Where our diplomatic interests are 

threatened or our citizens are at risk, this integrated naval force will provide the ability to 

intervene. It will create options for operational 

commanders and buy time for national decision makers. This naval force will be essential 

for preserving peace, building partner capacity, 

providing humanitarian relief, and preventing 

war through the deterrent effect of credible 

combat power. Where conflict escalates, naval 

forces will have the tools necessary to gain access from the sea, to fight, and to win.

The Department of Defense is embarking 

on a review of our strategy, investments, and 

objectives in the context of the emerging fiscal and security environment. We will similarly 

think anew about how we fight as a naval force. 

The nature of warfare as a competing clash of 

wills may not change, but the evolution of its 

character is relentless. We can expect our foes 

to be cunning and creative; they will take every 

action to exploit our weaknesses and limit our 

strengths. We must be just as wily, just as cunning, developing and employing the asymmetric 

capabilities of a naval force that can fight across 

traditional domain seams. In the coming era, it 

will be necessary to outthink our enemies as 

much as outfight them.

SECURITY CHALLENGES 

IN A MARITIME ERA

We are a maritime nation. Our prosperity and 

that of our partners and allies is underpinned by 

global systems of trade, finance, information, 

and security that depend on free access to the 

“commons”—ungoverned spaces on the sea, in 

the air, in space, and in cyberspace. Our Defense 

Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, stressed 

the importance of the commons and informs 

our effort to reevaluate how the Navy and Marine Corps will operate and fight in the future.77

The ability to efficiently move large quantities of goods and commodities makes sea 

lanes the most heavily used and most econom77 Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012).

From left, Army Chief of Staff Gen Raymond T. 

Odierno, Chief of Naval Operations Adm Jonathan 

W. Greenert, Marine Corps Commandant Gen 

James F. Amos, and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen 

Mark A. Welsh III testify on Capitol Hill in Washington on 7 November 2013 before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee.

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of Peter D. Lawlor
174 Chapter Two

ical routes of trade. Cyberspace, in the physical 

form of undersea fiber-optic cables, carries an 

even greater value for trade through financial 

transactions and information. These routes converge at strategic maritime crossroads such as 

the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca or the Suez 

Canal. In these waters, and the littoral regions 

that surround them, political instability or regional aggression can threaten our citizens, allies, or interests.

The maritime crossroads and littorals are 

areas of increased economic, political, and cultural activity where nations, communities, and 

ideas intersect, making them frequent locations 

for friction and conflict. Because of their importance to global economics and security, even 

small-scale disruptions at the crossroads can 

have effects that are felt globally. For example, 

the Arab Spring and ongoing Syrian violence 

arose in part from the intellectual and economic trends at maritime crossroads throughout 

the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, 

while the instability these events create ripples 

throughout the global political and economic 

system. Our diplomatic facilities in the littorals are highly visible targets in an environment 

where victory is sometimes measured in media 

ratings. Pirates, traffickers, and terrorists exploit the concentration of shipping and other 

traffic at the maritime crossroads and in the littorals to steal, hijack, or coerce their prey.

Maritime crossroads and our allies near 

them are vulnerable to military and economic disruption by regional actors seeking to 

shift balances of power. The development and 

proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, including long-range precision-strike and 

sea-denial capabilities, are designed to challenge 

the ability of the United States or its allies to 

project power in defense of our shared interests. 

We will not allow that to happen. Responding to 

these challenges must be reflected in our force 

design and strategy.

A TEAM SPORT

Historically, naval forces have existed for two 

purposes: to control the seas and to use that 

control to project power ashore. The mandate 

for both of these purposes continues. This effort 

is a team sport, and the Navy and Marine Corps 

are full of all-star players. The fiscal and security 

challenges in this new era demand we do a better job of operating and fighting as a team.

Achieving our shared vision of the future 

naval force requires analysis and new thinking 

about the ways and means of employing naval 

power. Now more than ever, the Navy-Marine 

team must better integrate its capabilities to be 

effective. The principle of single-battle describes 

the linkage of every action in a campaign to a 

common objective. Future naval leaders will 

not confront events in the littorals as carefully 

segregated specialists, but instead will combine 

all the tools of naval power projection into campaigns designed to present our enemies with a 

series of dilemmas.

The changing set of challenges in the emerging security environment requires a naval team 

that is smoothly integrated and easily adaptable 

to new situations. We must replace rigid command structures that are ad hoc, are not scalable, 

and do not support widely dispersed operations 

with more flexible structures. We will need to 

develop integrated operating concepts for our 

forces, field them with more compatible equipment, and then deploy them in innovative force 

packages. A one-size fits-all approach to navalforce packaging must be evaluated against our 

most-likely security challenges. Creativity and 

original thought must be encouraged.
Greenert and Amos 175

We need to remove seams that have an impact on our ability to fight as a naval team. We 

will complement more flexible command structures with habitual Navy-Marine Corps relationships that allow naval groups and task forces 

to more rapidly adapt and employ all the capabilities at their disposal. Marine planners must 

understand Fleet operations and the challenges of maintaining the readiness of capital ships, 

and how our preparation for and conduct of 

expeditionary missions are affected as a result. 

Navy staffs, especially those who employ our 

amphibious capabilities, will have to understand 

and practice employment of Marine capabilities 

across the range of military operations. From 

our perspective, the naval force of today is short 

of that standard.

EXPLOITING THE 

CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Fortunately, the most pressing challenges our 

Services face require intellectual effort and cultural change rather than large programmatic 

adjustments. Our initiatives will require some 

investments to support more effective NavyMarine Corps integration, but the cost will be 

well within our anticipated budgets. Our situation bears a striking parallel to the period between World Wars I and II. During that time, the 

Navy turned to the General Board to guide the 

Fleet’s effort to develop new capabilities and 

experiment with new concepts to employ air 

power and submarines. Today, the Naval Board 

of senior leaders from the Marine Corps and the 

Navy meets regularly for much the same purCommandant of the Marine Corps James Amos addresses members of the media at the short takeoff/vertical 

landing joint strike fighter demonstration at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, on 29 July 2011. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
176 Chapter Two

pose. It will oversee our intellectual effort to 

achieve shared warfighting development in the 

naval Services.

We do not have to go far to find imperatives 

for innovation and improvement of our naval 

warfighting capabilities. Here are some priority 

examples that the Naval Board, and our innovators across the force, will consider:

a. Assess our force-design and deployment models through the lenses of forward presence, deterrence, and crisis 

response in order to better align the 

core capabilities of the naval force to 

be immediately relevant to the geographic combatant commanders. We 

will evaluate and experiment with Marine detachments on ships other than 

amphibious vessels such as afloat forward staging bases (AFSB), destroyers, 

littoral combat ships (LCS), mobile 

landing platforms (MLP), and joint 

high-speed vessels (JHSV). We will also 

explore the integration of shore-based 

Marine detachments, small craft, and 

riverine operations into our delivery of 

naval forces.

b. Create better linkages between our 

Marine and Navy theater-component 

commander staffs to gain unity of effort within the naval force. As part of 

this effort we will also evaluate combined Navy-Marine Corps staffs at 

maritime operations centers to produce more responsive mechanisms 

for the deployment of naval forces. 

A combined effort will be necessary 

to craft maritime campaign plans as 

described in the new Maritime Security Cooperation Policy recently approved 

by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. 

Under this plan, maritime component 

commanders will articulate their needs 

for day-to-day theater shaping and crisis response in the form of integrated 

naval force packages as opposed to individual units.78

c. Improve the ability of our expeditionary forces to address the need for 

widely dispersed presence while still 

being able to aggregate for larger-scale 

operations. Split amphibious ready group 

(ARG) operations are routine today, but 

their logistics support and commandand-control systems and processes are 

ad hoc. Our amphibious ships are not 

equipped with the right communication 

and self-defense systems for independent operations, and many of the capabilities of the Marine expeditionary 

unit/ARG team are not severable to 

create smaller formations with equivalent capabilities. Our naval command 

and control organizations are not well 

designed or practiced at scaling up 

from independent operations to largescale contingencies, especially those 

that involve traditional “Navy” forces 

such as carriers along with traditional “Marine” forces such as amphibious 

ships, and Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTF). We will identify the right 

equipment and loading for our amphibious ships to support independent 

operations. We will experiment with 

both the carrier strike group’s compos78 Maritime Security Cooperation Policy: An Integrated Navy-Marine 

Corps-Coast Guard Approach (Washington, DC: Department of the 

Navy, 2013).
Greenert and Amos 177

ite warfare commander and MAGTF 

command-and-control constructs to 

find the most effective methods for a 

range of power projection options.

d. Develop new approaches for large-scale 

Marine expeditionary crisis response 

operations that address shortfalls in 

the size of our traditional amphibious 

ship fleet and provide more flexibility 

in how we organize, load, and offload 

people and materiel. The naval team 

must have concepts and training that 

support smooth and practiced scalability of the expeditionary elements 

of the Fleet. We will incorporate new 

platforms such as the LCS, AFSB, MLP, 

JHSV and large medium-speed rollon/roll-off ships into our concepts for 

these operations. This has implications 

for our command-and-control arrangements, our organization and for how 

we equip these new platforms.

e. Combine some elements of our 

concept-development and trainingand-education organizations to support more effective innovation and experimentation within the naval force. 

Building on our current effort with 

the Navy Warfare Group and the Marine Corps’ Ellis Group, we will forge 

persistent linkages between our operating forces, fleet training groups, 

concept developers, and warfare development centers. Continuous and highly 

visible interaction across both Services 

will replace episodic interaction. This 

linkage will be reinforced with organized campaigns for progressive war 

gaming, experimentation, and exercises. Increasing the frequency of our 

warfighting development interactions 

among professionals from a variety of 

communities will serve as an additional 

catalyst to innovation. 

f. Build our own Fleet experience and 

that of our partners through major exercise series including Rim of the Pacific, Bold Alligator, and Dawn Blitz. 

For example, the next Dawn Blitz 

exercise will include Japanese forces. 

We will guide these events with the 

concept development and experimentation work above. Each exercise will 

use Service-coordinated objectives that 

are clearly defined, progressive in deA Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II approaches 

the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) as 

the guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) 

transits alongside on 18 April 2018, following an expeditionary strike as part of Certification Exercise 

in the Philippine Sea. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of MC1 Daniel Barker
178 Chapter TWO

velopment, and focused on gaining 

improved integration of U.S. and international capabilities.

Defining and achieving our vision for future naval operations will be iterative, building 

on concept development, experimentation, and 

operational experience. Like pursuing a track at 

sea, we will be affected by set and drift, forces 

that will take us off our desired course. We must 

gain the institutional and personal resilience that 

enable us to embrace new opportunities and 

seek solutions despite the currents that might 

work against us.

History has many examples of how our 

naval forces innovated operationally and technologically to win. As the nation adjusts its military to new strategies and new levels of defense 

investment, the Navy-Marine Corps team will 

play an even greater role in forward presence, 

crisis response, regional deterrence, and building the foundations of collective security for 

the global maritime commons. Our ability to 

swiftly respond to the demands of a wide range 

of contingencies makes us an indispensable element of the joint force. As naval Service chiefs, 

we are fully committed to the changes necessary 

to adapt to the emerging fiscal and security environment. Together, the Navy and the Marine 

Corps will remain forward-deployed, ready for 

crisis, and engaged to preserve the peace.
179

GENERAL ROY STANLEY GEIGER 

BIOGRAPHY

which was attached to the U.S. Navy’s Day 

Wing, Northern Bombing Group. This force 

flew bombing missions against German submarine bases on the Belgian coast, and he later received the Navy Cross for “distinguished service 

in the line of his profession.”

Between the wars, Geiger commanded a 

Marine squadron in Haiti then went on to serve 

in multiple staff positions and attend the U.S. 

Army’s Command and General Staff School and 

later both the Army and Navy War Colleges. 

From 1931 to 1935, he served as the officer in 

Charge, Marine Corps Aviation. 

In 1941, he received an assignment to the 

Office of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, which 

sent him first to the London and then to the 

Mediterranean, where he observed British combat operations in Gibraltar, Malta, and Tobruk, 

Libya. On his return, he was made commanding 

general of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. 

In 1942, Major General Geiger took his 

wing to Guadalcanal, where he became the head 

of the “Cactus Air Force,” all of the Allied aircraft 

operating from Henderson Airfield. He conGeneral Roy S. Geiger was born on 25 

January 1885 in Middleburg, Florida.

He attended a state college in Florida 

and earned a law degree from Stetson University before enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1907. 

He served at the Marine Barracks in Washington, DC, and after passing a series of examinations was commissioned into the Marine Corps 

in 1909. During his first seven years as an officer, he served in a series of typical billets aboard 

various naval vessels and then in Marine forces 

occupying Nicaragua, where he first saw action, 

and China. In 1916, he was sent to Naval Air Station Pensacola for flight training, where he was 

designated Marine Aviator No. 5 in June 1917. 

Later explaining his shift to aviation, he said, 

“Oh, I just wanted to fly, that’s all.”80

During World War I, Geiger commanded 

a squadron of the 1st Marine Aviation Force, 

79 Navy Department, Office of Naval Operations, Washington, to 

Capt Geiger, letter, 15 December 1919, Subject: A Separate Air 

Force, Folder 15, Box 1, PC 312, Archives Branch, Marine Corps 

History Division, Quantico, VA.

80 Roger Willock, Unaccustomed to Fear: A Biography of the Late General 

Roy S. Geiger, USMC (Princeton, NJ: R. Willock, 1969).

I do not believe that anyone claims that Aviation acting alone is able successfully to combat and to defeat 

an Army or a Fleet. It is able to inflict heavy damage, or to offer invaluable assistance; but it cannot alone 

capture and hold ground or control the sea. Therefore, it is not an Independent Army; but is one of the 

components of an Army or of a Fleet.

~ Captain Roy S. Geiger79
180 Chapter Two

Gen Roy S. Geiger, seen here at the rank of colonel in 1937, was a four-star general who served in both world 

wars. During World War II, he became the first Marine Corps general to lead an army-size force.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Roy S. Geiger Collection, Archives Branch, History Division
Geiger 181

ducted the aerial defense of the island, and the 

subsequent elimination of Japanese from it. He 

received his second Navy Cross for his service 

commanding the Cactus Air Force. 

Returning to the Solomon Islands in November 1943, he commanded the I Amphibious 

Corps in the northern Solomons. His command 

was later redesignated the III Amphibious Corps, 

and he led it in the capture of Guam and then 

Palau in 1944. In 1945, he led his corps, as part 

of the Tenth Army, in the assault on Okinawa. 

On 18 June 1945, Lieutenant General Simon 

Bolivar Buckner, commander of the Tenth Army, 

was killed by Japanese artillery. Major General Geiger took command of Tenth Army for the 

next five days. After Okinawa, he was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of 

Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific. He was the only 

Marine Corps representative at the formal Japanese surrender. 

On 23 January 1947, he passed away from 

lung cancer. General Geiger was one of the 

few Marines in World War II to command both 

ground and aerial forces, one of the few to hold 

joint commands, and the only Marine to command a field army in combat. In his decades 

of service, he saw the Corps transform from a 

small force of naval infantry into today’s combined arms, air-ground team.
182

ADMIRAL HYMAN G. RICKOVER 

BIOGRAPHY

Admiral Hyman G. Rickover was born 

on 27 January 1900 in Przasnysz, in 

what was then Russian Poland. He immigrated to the United States in 1906. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 

1922 and served aboard various surface vessels 

for the first years of his career, primarily in engineering. He attended the Naval Postgraduate 

School and while there earned an MS in electrical engineering from Columbia University. He 

then transferred to submarines, serving on the 

USS S-9 (SS 114) and the USS S-48 (SS 159) before briefly taking command of the minesweeper USS Finch (AM 9) briefly in 1937. He was 

then designated an engineering officer, where he 

would serve in this capacity throughout World 

War II primarily in the Electrical Section of the 

Bureau of Ships, ensuring that ship repair and 

building operated efficiently. 

In 1946, he was involved in the design of 

nuclear propulsion for U.S. Navy ships, quickly 

81 Adm Hyman G. Rickover, “Address” (speech, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 16 March 1954).

becoming a proponent of the idea. He was assigned to command the Nuclear Power Division 

of the Bureau of Ships. In February 1949, he was 

assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission’s 

Division of Reactor Development and Technology and assigned as director of the Naval Reactors 

Branch, where he led the effort to develop USS 

Nautilus (SSN 571), the first operational nuclearpowered submarine. 

For more than 30 years, Rickover controlled 

the nuclear Navy, famously insisting that every 

officer considered for posting to a nuclearpowered vessel be interviewed by him personally, which amounted to more than 14,000 

interviews during his decades of service. 

On 31 January 1982, Rickover was finally 

forced to retire from the United States Navy 

after 63 years of service. He was the longest 

serving naval or military officer in United States 

history. Known as the “Father of the Nuclear 

Navy,” Rickover’s career highlighted the importance of planning and engineering in naval 

strategy. 

All men are by nature conservative but conservatism in the military profession is a source of danger to the 

country. One must be ready to change his line sharply and suddenly, with no concern for the prejudices 

and memories of what was yesterday. To rest upon formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death.

~ Admiral Hyman G. Rickover81
Rickover 183

In mid-1955, when this photograph was taken, RAdm Hyman G. Rickover was then, and for many years 

afterward, in charge of the Navy’s nuclear power program in the Bureau of Ships.

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives, 80-G-K-18497
184 chapter number

A Sikorsky MH-53 Pave Low helicopter from the 

USS New Orleans (LPH 11) begins the laborious 

task of clearing a channel through a minefield in 

the northern Persian Gulf off the shores of Kuwait. 

John Charles Roach, Minesweeping Gulf Style, 1991. 

Oil on canvas board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

92-007-Y
185

CHAPTER THREE

Maritime Power 

in Crisis Response

From the Nuclear Era 

to Hyperwar

by Paul Westermeyer

Someday, not too far distant, there can come 

streaking out of somewhere (we won’t be 

able to hear it, it will come so fast) some 

kind of a gadget with an explosive so powerful that one projectile will be able to wipe 

out completely this city of Washington. . . . I 

think we will meet the attack alright [sic] 

and, of course, in the air. But I’ll tell you 

one thing, there won’t be a goddam pilot in 

the sky! That attack will be met by machines 

guided not by human hands, but by devices 

conjured up by human brains. 

~ General Henry H. Arnold, 19431

The nuclear explosions at Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki, Japan, marked the opening of the nuclear age, but they did not 

represent the onset of nuclear strategy. Rather, they represented the ultimate expression 

of Italian General Giulio Douhet’s air bombardment strategy, as there were only a limited 

1

 Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United 

States Air Force, 1945–1960 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force 

History, U.S. Air Force, 1990), 35.
186 Chapter Three

number of bombs initially available that could 

only be delivered by manned bombers; and at 

first, only the United States possessed nuclear 

technology.2

Nuclear strategy was born on 29 August 

1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first 

nuclear device, so now two nations possessed 

the weapons. Other nations soon followed, as 

the British detonated their first nuclear device 

in 1952, the French in 1960, and the Chinese in 

1964. The development of the hydrogen bomb, 

first detonated in 1952, led to weapons an order 

of magnitude greater in destructive power then 

the bomb dropped on Hiroshima; the scope of 

nuclear warfare’s expanded beyond traditional strategic theory in response to the increasing range and lethality of nuclear weapons. It 

grew even more complicated with the launching of the USS George Washington (SSBN 598) in 

1959, the world’s first nuclear armed ballistic 

missile submarine. Nuclear strategy primarily 

revolved around deterrence, but some believed 

the weapons could be employed operationally or 

even tactically. Others argued that there was no 

essential difference between nuclear and nonnuclear military strategy, as the same underlying 

principles applied. Regardless, the shadow of 

nuclear war hovered over all international conflict, shaping the dynamics involved and limiting 

confrontations in unprecedented ways.3

Further separating nuclear strategy from 

2

 As described in the introduction to chapter 2, Gen Douhet advocated for large fleets of bombers attacking population centers in 

order to break the enemy’s morale.

3

 On nuclear strategy, see Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two 

Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy,725–78; Michael Carver, “Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear 

Age,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 779–814; and Colin S. Gray, 

“Strategy in the Nuclear Age,” in The Making of Strategy, 579–614. 

On nuclear strategy identical to military strategy, see Edward N. 

Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 68–174.

airpower theory was the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile, with the Soviet 

Union first successfully launching one in 1957, 

and the United States following with a successful 

missile test in 1958. The early days of the missile 

programs quickly became inextricably intertwined with the “space race,” as similar technology was used to launch spacecraft as well.

In maritime strategy, Mahan had argued, 

the function of technology is to alter timedistance factors rather than strategic principles. 

Thus, he strove to draw strategic principles for 

the Age of Steam from the history of the Age of 

Sail (and earlier, if one considers the “galley age” 

as distinct from the Age of Sail). The onset of 

the Nuclear Age a half-century later seemed set 

to disrupt that; not only did it introduce weapons of previously unimaginable power, it also 

expanded exponentially the cruising duration 

of naval forces through nuclear power. In addition to nuclear powered submarines, the first 

nuclear power aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise

(CVA[N] 65 now CVN 65) was commissioned 

in 1961. 

Nonetheless, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps 

strategists believed this posed no fundamental 

change to underlying maritime strategic principles, only operational and tactical challenges. 

Ships still needed bases, and fleets remained the 

best method for projecting power across the 

seas. For the Marine Corps, nuclear weapons 

posed a significant threat to the viability of amphibious assault. Following General Geiger’s advice, the Commandant formed a Special Board 

in 1946, under Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., to examine the difficulties involved 

and propose solutions. Following the board’s 

recommendations, the Corps focused on the 

concept of vertical envelopment via helicopter 
Westermeyer 187

assault, allowing for increased mobility and the 

dispersion of the landing force. Just as it had in 

the 1930s, the Corps found a way to keep the 

amphibious capability alive.4

The “nuclear triad” of strategic bombers, 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic 

missile submarines kept the U.S. Navy in the 

strategic calculus even as it found itself with no 

peer competitors following the Second World 

War. The greatest conventional naval threat 

came from the Soviet Union. In the event of a 

Soviet blitzkrieg into Western Europe, the U.S. 

Navy anticipated protecting convoys delivering 

troops, equipment, and supplies to Europe, and 

thus expected to refight World War II’s Battle of 

the Atlantic against Soviet submarines and longrange, four-engine bombers firing air-to-surface 

guided missiles. But the Soviets were also challenging America throughout the world in the 

Cold War, forcing the United States to use its 

vaunted sea power to project power assurance.5

In terms of naval technology, the latter half 

of the twentieth century resembled the latter 

half of the nineteenth century. Naval technology underwent a radical shift in the latter half of 

the twentieth century, as it had a century earlier; aging gunned battle ships were replaced by 

guided missile cruisers and destroyers as the 

primary surface combatant. The range of aircraft 

increased by orders of magnitude, and naval 

warfare moved beyond broadsides at any range. 

And, as in the nineteenth century, the changing technology was unaccompanied by many 

conflicts between major naval powers, making 

4

 See Gen Geiger’s letter following the Bikini Atoll tests later in 

this chapter. For more on the Shepherd board, see LtCol Kenneth 

J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900–1970 (Washington, DC: History and 

Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1973), 71–77.

5

 On Soviet Cold War strategy, see “Admiral Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy” later in this chapter. 

it difficult for naval strategists to judge which 

technological changes would have the most impact. Only a handful conflicts, all relatively short 

and involving relatively few forces, provided 

any guidance: the 1982 Falklands War between 

Great Britain and Argentina, and the 1987–88 

Tanker War between the United States and Iran. 

During the same decade, the Navy realized it 

needed a new strategic vision that would allow 

the United States to exploit its sea power. This 

led to the Maritime Strategy, first formally published in 1984.6

In recent decades, the rate of technological change has continued exponentially. The Gulf 

War of 1990–91 closed out the 1980s with the 

United States displaying operational and tactical naval virtuosity. Guided missiles fired from 

submarines and surface vessels accurately struck 

targets hundreds of miles inland as precisionguided ordinance struck Iraqi tanks and emplacements. Drones and satellites provided 

reconnaissance and precise geographic locations 

for American navigation as well as targeting 

weapon systems. 

Since the Gulf War, the internet has exploded in scale; it is now nigh ubiquitous across 

the planet, allowing cyberspace to join space, 

air, sea, and land as domains of human conflict. 

The technologies that first saw widespread use 

during the Gulf War are now widespread across 

the globe. But following the action/reaction 

strategic logic of Edward N. Luttwak, combatants lacking technological abilities have sought 

alternative methods for striking at their foes—

most commonly with basic explosive technolo6

 On maritime strategy, see John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. 

Swartz, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents

(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008); and Richard E. 

Hegmann, “In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the 

Maritime Strategy” (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 1990).
188 Chapter Three

gy employed in sophisticated ways following a 

strategy of terrorism.7

Consequently, the Navy and Marine Corps 

still face the traditional problems of maritime 

strategy—the need to maintain sea lanes and 

7

 See Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 

3–68.

bases while retaining the ability to project power ashore—but they also face asymmetrical 

technological threats in a rapidly changing technological and political environment. 
189

LETTER FROM GEIGER 

TO COMMANDANT VANDEGRIFT 

ON BIKINI ATOLL ATOMIC TESTS

at which bomb was released, height of 

explosion in test Alpha, depth of explosion in test Baker, and many other 

pertinent features. It is evident, therefore, that this report is based solely on 

knowledge gained by witnessing the 

explosion and making a hurried survey of damage done afterward, for the 

most part, from a distance. 

3. It was noted in test Able that, with few 

exceptions, target ships were not damaged structurally, except those very 

near the bomb. Superstructures, especially stacks, antennas, radio, radar, and 

life rafts, were seriously damaged at a 

considerable distance. Many fires were 

started, mostly from Army gear, such 

as tents, etc., placed on decks. Navy 

equipment, for the most part nonflammable, is not believed to have been the 

cause of starting many fires. Army field 

equipment, such as field guns, antiaircraft guns, tanks, tractors, and the like 

placed on deck, did not appear to have 

21 August 1946

From: Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, 

U.S. Marine Corps

To: The Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subject: Report on Able and Baker Atomic 

Bomb tests held at Bikini, July 19468

1. In compliance with orders, I witnessed 

the tests mentioned above and desire 

to render this report of impressions 

gained thereby.

2. There are many facts concerning the 

bomb and the tests that were not made 

known to me, such as quantity and 

availability of raw materials used in the 

construction of the bomb, feasibility of 

mass production, feasibility of mass attacks with the bombs, feasibility of use 

as a missile, weight [of bomb], height 

8

 The original document came from LtGen Roy S. Geiger to Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Report on Able and Baker Atomic 

Bomb Tests Held at Bikini, July 1946,” 21 August 1946, copy of 

original, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, 

grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
190 Chapter Three

been damaged. It is believed that such 

equipment placed in a fortified area 

would not be damaged by an atomic air 

burst. Personnel, however, would suffer prohibitive casualties and fire control, communications, radar, buildings, 

etc. would be demolished. Ammunition in target ships was not detonated 

or destroyed. Gasoline fires were started. 

4. Examination of the target ships after 

test Baker was not permitted, except 

at a distance because of the persistent 

presence of radioactivity. Judging from 

the number of ships sunk, its destructive effect was tremendous. The presence of gamma rays for days after the 

explosion would be fatal to personnel.

5. Under the assumption that atomic 

bombs can be produced in large quantities, that they can be used in mass attacks against an enemy objective, and 

that our probable future enemy will be 

in possession of this weapon, it is my 

opinion that a complete review and 

study of our concept of amphibious operations will have to be made. It is quite 

evident that a small number of atomic 

Painted from the perspective of Bikini Island, this study shows the clouds towering over the ships of the target 

fleet. Although the artist, Charles Bittinger, was at the test, he was not on the island as no one was allowed 

within five miles of the atoll during the blast. Charles Bittinger, Start of Able Bomb, 1946. Oil on canvas board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 95-129-D
Geiger 191

bombs could destroy an expeditionary 

force as now organized, embarked, and 

landed. Such a force might not fare so 

badly on the high seas, if properly dispersed.

6. Naturally, the first thought and immediate necessity is to develop countermeasures. The ones known today are 

air superiority, destruction of the bomb 

prior to reaching its objective, and destruction of enemy plants that make 

the bomb. Others may be developed.

7. It is my opinion that future amphibious operations will be undertaken 

by much smaller expeditionary forces, which will be highly trained and 

lightly equipped, and transported by 

air or submarine, and movement accomplished with a greater degree of 

surprise and speed then has heretofore 

been visualized. Or that large forces 

must be dispersed over a much wider front than used in past operations. 

With an enemy in possession of atomic 

bombs, I cannot visualize another landing such as we executed at Normandy 

or Okinawa. 

8. It is trusted that Marine Corps Headquarters will consider this a very serious and urgent matter and will use 

its most competent officers in finding 

a solution to develop the technique of 

conducting amphibious operations in 

the Atomic Age. 

~ Roy S. Geiger
192

ADMIRAL GORSHKOV 

AND THE SOVIET NAVY

by Dr. Donald Chipman

Air University Review, 19829

Of the various ways to describe the Soviet 

Navy, one approach is to consider the policies of 

the most remarkable admiral of our time, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei 

G. Gorshkov (b. 1910). Not since Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), United States 

Navy, has any individual so dominated naval policy as has Gorshkov. Gorshkov’s ingenuity was 

in his ability to promote the belief that Russia’s 

future lay at sea. He successfully challenged the 

conventional dogma that classified Russia as only 

a land power and supplemented this with his sea 

power doctrine. With Gorshkov’s help, the Soviet military has suddenly developed a keen desire 

to dominate the maritime frontier. 

For more than 25 years, Gorshkov has influenced Soviet naval doctrine. In the same 

length of time, the United States has had nine 

different Chiefs of Naval Operations. In 1956, 

just after assuming power, Nikita S. Khrushchev decided to scrap most of the Soviet Navy’s 

large surface combatants. Soviet Admiral of the 

Fleet Nikolai G. Kuznetsov disagreed so strongNever in peacetime history has a nation 

expanded its navy as rapidly as have 

the Soviets in recent years. Every 

month, new submarines, destroyers, and frigates join the Soviet Navy, while aircraft carriers, cruisers, and vessels of all types continue to 

roll out of the Russian shipyards.10 In contrast, 

30 years ago, the Soviet Navy was primarily a 

coastal defensive force with few major surface 

combatants. Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, the 

Soviets underwrote an aggressive ship construction program and began deploying their navy to 

the far corners of the world. Today, some experts believe the United States Navy’s “narrow 

margin of superiority is gone.”11 Others think that 

the Soviet Navy has the capacity to dominate 

any maritime environment they choose: surface, 

subsurface, or air.

9

 The original article came from Dr. Donald Chipman, “Admiral 

Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy,” Air University Review 33, no. 5 

(July–August 1982): 28–47. Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling.

10 The NATO designation for the Soviet aircraft carriers Leningrad

and Kiev is antisubmarine cruisers. 11 “U.S. Has Lost Sea Superiority, Navy Men Say,” Washington (DC) 

Star, 6 February 1981, 3.
Chipman 193

ly that he was fired and replaced by Gorshkov.12

Eventually, Gorshkov survived Khrushchev to 

become one of the world’s foremost strategists 

and architect of the new assertive Soviet Navy. 

Although Gorshkov is now more than 70 years 

old and destined to retire, his ideas will continue to dominate future Soviet naval doctrine and 

maritime strategy.

12 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, ed. 

and trans. Strobe Talbot (New York: Little, Brown, 1974), 28–34.

Recently, Gorshkov’s writings appeared in 

the Soviet Naval Digest, Morskoz Sbornzk.13 These 

articles were followed by one of the most comprehensive naval publications since Mahan’s The 

Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660–1783 

(1918), Gorshkov’s book The Sea Power of the 

13 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea, trans. Theodore A. 

Neely Jr. and ed. Herbert Preston (Annapolis: Naval Institute 

Press, 1974).

Soviet Fleet

Choke points

Tsushima Strait

La Perouse Strait

Map of Pacific theater.

Adapted by History Division
194 Chapter Three

State (1977).

14 The Morskoi Sbornik articles and 

this book emphasize one constant Gorshkov 

theme: Russia is a maritime nation, and its destiny will depend upon the seas. 

Today, after 25 years in which Gorshkov has 

controlled Soviet naval policies, there is ample 

evidence of his success. Russian ships are found 

in all parts of the globe, and their influence 

on United States military strategy is apparent. 

Thus, it is appropriate to view the Soviet naval 

threat in terms of Gorshkov’s doctrine. His use 

of Soviet Navy history, his assessment of the 

constraints challenging his navy, and his outline 

of the various Soviet naval missions provide a 

common theme by which to evaluate this new 

maritime threat.

SOVIET NAVAL HISTORY

Like Mahan, Gorshkov used history to demonstrate the necessity for a strong navy. Drawing 

on various history lessons, Gorshkov suggested 

that most Russian czars failed to use seapower 

properly. The exception was Peter the Great, 

whom Gorshkov credits with the founding the 

first Russian fleet. About 1700, Peter decided 

to build a navy. He hired Dutch and English engineers to construct these first Russian ships. 

Soon, the Russians were at war with Sweden. 

In a series of Baltic Sea battles, the Russians successfully drove Sweden from the region.15 Since 

Peter was one of the few czars who understood 

seapower, Gorshkov often quoted him: “Every 

potentate who has only ground forces has only 

one hand; yet whoever has a navy, too, has both 

hands.”16

14 S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Oxford: Pergamon 

Press, 1979).

15 RAdm E. M. Eller, “Russia’s Road to the Sea, Peter I to Napoleon,” in Red Star Rising at Sea, 11–21. 16 Michael W. Gramer, “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, 

an Operation Code and Thematic Analysis” (unpublished manuscript, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1975), 116.

After Peter, no czar contributed significantly to Russian naval development. In 1853, 

for instance, the Russians were defeated by the 

French and English navies and subsequently forbidden to have a fleet in the Black Sea.17 Misuse 

of the navy continued into the twentieth century. In 1904 and 1905, the Japanese overwhelmed 

the Russians in two major naval battles. Initially, 

the Japanese surprised and fatally crippled the 

Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur in the Yellow 

Sea. Gorshkov researched this surprise attack 

and included it in his doctrine, calling this a tactic of “The Battle of the First Salvo.”18 In a second 

battle, the Japanese sank the Russian Baltic Fleet 

in the Tsushima Strait.19 Thus, concluded Gorshkov, the czars did not understand how to develop or deploy their navy, and they suffered for 

this deficiency. With the advent of the Bolshevik 

Revolution, Gorshkov had to tread lightly, trying to indicate navy deficiencies yet not offend 

any of the Communist elite. He accomplished 

this by overlooking naval ineffectiveness and 

concentrating on the Marxist-Leninist concerns 

for a strong navy. Since the navy’s activities were 

inconsequential in World War I. Gorshkov had 

to search for something significant to praise. He 

decided to stress the loyal Communist theme, 

pointing out that Russian sailors were the first to 

join the Bolshevik Revolution “The cruiser Aurora and the minelayers Amu and Khoper,” stated 

Gorshkov, “took up station in the Neva [River] 

to bombard the Winter Palace,” proving that the 

navy was the first military service to join the 

revolution.20

Not until 1937 did the Communists begin 

rebuilding their navy. At the time, Germany was 

rearming, and [Joseph] Stalin decided to prepare 

17 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 81. 18 Gramer, “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union,” 94. 

19 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 91. 20 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 125.
Chipman 195

for war. By the beginning of World War II, the 

Soviets had one of the world’s largest submarine 

forces.21 Yet the navy’s help was seldom needed, 

for there were only a few naval battles in the 

Black Sea area. Often the Soviets would take 

sailors off the ships, hand them guns, and send 

them to the army. According to Gorshkov, more 

than 400,000 enlisted personnel and officers 

were sent to the ground forces, including sever21 VAdm J. F. Calvert, “The Soviet Navy Rebuilds, 1928–41,” in 

Red Star Rising at Sea, 65–75.

al naval detachments from the Baltic Sea Fleet, 

to help defend Leningrad.22 Gorshkov’s leadership was about the only bright light in Soviet naval operations during World War II. With a naval 

squadron in the Black Sea, he distinguished himself in landings on the Kerch Peninsula and later 

helped liberate the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.23 By this time, Gorshkov was 

22 See “The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War,” in Red Star 

Rising at Sea, 89–96. 23 “The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War,” 95.

Map of Atlantic theater.

Adapted by History Division
196 Chapter Three

31 years old and had attained the grade of rear 

admiral. According to Gorshkov, World War II 

proved the need for a balanced military, one that 

included a strong Soviet Navy.24

After World War II, there were modest efforts to rebuild the Soviet fleet. Yet, with more 

than 50 percent of the Russian industrial capacity 

destroyed, these efforts were delayed. Initially, 

with the help of captured German technology, 

the Soviets began building some new attack submarines.25 However, [it was] not until the arrival 

of Krushchev and the elevation of Gorshkov to 

admiral of the fleet [that] plans for a powerful 

Soviet Navy [were] proposed. Gorshkov’s first 

task was to convince the Communist Party that 

a powerful navy was not only a necessity, it was 

a part of the Russian heritage. The Russian land 

power doctrine, stated Gorshkov, was nothing 

more than imperialist propaganda designed to 

keep the Soviets from the seas. Russia has the 

world’s longest maritime frontiers, and the Russian people have always loved the sea. It is Soviet 

manifest destiny, argued Gorshkov, that the nation should go to sea.26

So, in using the lessons of history, Gorshkov established the fundamental rationale for 

the development of the current Soviet Navy. 

The doctrine’s seeds were planted, ship designs 

were drawn, and plans for a powerful Soviet 

Navy were established. Calling his navy “the 

Faithful Helper of the Army,” Gorshkov began 

the process of convincing the Communist Party 

of the necessity of building a large fleet. These 

ideas were soon reinforced when in 1962 the 

United States Navy blockaded Cuba, denying 

Russian access. After this, more and more So24 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 148. 25 Don East, “The Evolution of the Soviet Navy as an Instrument 

of Foreign Policy” (unpublished report, Air Command and Staff 

College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1980), 20.

26 Eller, “Russia’s Road to the Sea, Peter I to Napoleon,” 22.

viet military funds found their way into naval 

development.27 

SOVIET NAVAL CONSTRAINTS

In thinking through the various challenges for a 

strong Soviet Navy, Gorshkov faced three basic 

constraints: ice, chokepoints, and distance. To 

begin with, most of the Soviet naval fleets are 

located at high latitudes. The Northern Fleet 

is located along the Kola Peninsula coast, with 

a principal port at Murmansk [, northwestern 

Russia,] and in the White Sea at Archangel. Archangel, in particular, is closed with ice for about 

six months each year. The Baltic Sea Fleet, located at Kronstadt Naval Base [, Kotlin Island,] and 

Riga [, Latvia], is also constrained since ice closes 

these ports about three months a year; at times, 

the ice is so thick that the Russians can drive 

trucks across it. The Black Sea Fleet, of course, 

does not have ice problems. The Pacific Fleet, 

located at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, is also 

dogged with ice for several months each year.28

Historically, because of these ice problems, 

the Russians have sought warm-water ports.

To overcome the ice, Gorshkov has developed one of the world’s foremost icebreaker fleets.29 These ships are diesel powered and 

break channels into and out of the main ports. 

Yet, despite this capability, ice-clogged ports are 

a major problem, [and] one not easily corrected. 

A second major constraint for the Soviet 

fleets consists of the choke points through which 

Soviet ships must pass. In the Pacific Ocean, just 

north of the Japanese Islands, lies the La Perouse 

Strait, which hinders the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s 

ability to gain access to the ocean. Toward the 

27 Gramer, “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union,” 60.

28 David Fairhall, Russian Sea Power: An Account of Its Present Strength 

and Strategy (Boston, MA: Gambit, 1971), 18. 29 John Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1980–81 (New York: Grolier Publishing, 1980), 537.
Chipman 197

south of the Japanese Islands lies the Tsushima 

Strait through which the Soviets must pass to 

move down the China coast. Together, these two

Pacific choke points in time of war could prove 

to be extremely critical.

In the Atlantic, the Greenland, Iceland, 

United Kingdom (GIUK) gap is another major 

choke point. Although this area looks porous, 

in fact, it is well patrolled. Other choke points 

are more confined. The Skagerrak [and] Kattegat 

straits, the Turkish straits, Gibraltar, and Suez restrain the Soviets from easy access to the oceans. 

In time of war, these choke points could become 

critical.30 For instance, during World War I, the 

United States, working with the British, planted 

more than 100,000 mines in an area just west of 

the Skagerrak strait. This great North Sea minefield effectively contained the German U-boat 

threat.31 Today, this option is available.

The third major constraint is related to the 

30 Adm Harry D. Train, CSN, “Sea Link 80 Remarks” (paper presented at the Sea Link 1980 Conference, Annapolis, MD, 19 June 

1980). Adm Train is the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

31 F. P. Potter, The Naval Academy: Illustrated History of the United 

States Navy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), 142.

Edward L. Cooper, an artist working as a visual information specialist for the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

portrays a Soviet Delta III-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine firing SS-N-18 Stingray missiles. 

The Delta III submarine was 155 meters long, had 16 missile firing tubes, and carried SS-N-18 nuclear missiles. Edward L. Cooper, Soviet Delta Submarine Firing SS-N-19 Missile, 1987. Lithograph.

DIA Military Art Series: The Threat in the 1980s, Defense Intelligence Agency
198 Chapter Three

deployment of ships in the Pacific and Atlantic 

oceans. Once there, the Soviets have trouble replenishing their fleets. Their tendency to build 

small vessels limits the amount of supplies they 

can carry and thus the time they stay on station. 

Many of their larger ships do not have at-sea reload capabilities so they must return to port for 

supplies. Realizing this as problem, the Soviets 

have worked on their sea replenishment techniques.32 Recently, a new replenishment-type 

ship has come on line to help overcome this deficiency. This class of vessel is called the Berezina, 

a 40,000-ton multipurpose ship with six replenishment stations and helicopter capabilities.33

Another way in which the Soviets are overcoming this replenishment problem is by acquiring 

overseas ports. For instance, they can replenish 

their ships in Cuba, Angola, South Yemen, and 

in one of the finest harbors in all of the Pacific 

Ocean, Cam Ranh Bay [, Vietnam].34

Ice, choke points, and distance comprise the 

basic constraints that Admiral Gorshkov designed 

his new ships to overcome. Icebreakers help open 

the winter ports, and ships of the Berezina class 

offer ways to circumvent the effects of chokepoints and long-distance cruises.

SOVIET NAVAL MISSIONS

Within the last few years, the Soviet Navy has 

increasingly moved away from its coasts to the 

blue waters of the oceans. In so doing, the Soviets have changed their naval strategy from a basically defensive one to a more assertive forward 

32 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, 

1978), 22.

33 Keith A. Dunn, “Power Projection or Influence: Soviet Capabilities for the 1980s,” Naval War College Review 32 (September–October 1980): 31–47.

34 Michael T. Kaufman, “U.S. Naval Buildup Is Challenging Soviet 

Advances in Asia and Africa Supremacy at Sea,” New York Times, 19 

April 1981, 1.

deployment posture. During the 1960s, the first 

phase of this transformation took place. Initially, 

the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea fleets progressively extended their spheres of influence 

out of their traditional deployment areas. The 

Black Sea Fleet began deploying into the eastern 

Mediterranean while the Northern Fleet journeyed into the mid-Atlantic. By the early 1970s, 

the Soviets were deploying to the Cuban and 

South African areas and into the Indian Ocean. 

Thus, by the late 1970s, Soviet naval deployment patterns were clearly established.35

As the Soviets moved farther from their 

coasts, there was a subsequent shift in mission 

priorities. While there are many different ways 

to label these missions, most would agree that 

there are four basic types. The first Soviet naval 

mission is “sea presence,” which accounts for the 

peaceful use of naval ships in foreign areas. The 

second mission is “sea control,” and this involves 

antisubmarine warfare and interdiction. The 

third mission encompasses amphibious warfare 

and is labeled “power projection.” The last mission is “deterrence,” and it involves the use of 

ballistic missile submarines.

Sea Presence Mission

Sea presence is the newest of all the various Soviet naval missions. Gorshkov spent a great deal 

of effort convincing the Communist Party that, 

unlike the army, the navy is extremely influential during peacetime. In other words, the work 

of the navy exceeds traditional military roles. 

As a historian, Gorshkov was well aware of the 

ways in which the United States used its ships 

to influence foreign policies.36 “Speak softly and 

carry a big stick,” Theodore Roosevelt’s admo35 Michael McGwire, “The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 106, no. 5 (May 

1980): 155–83.

36 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 245–53.
Chipman 199

nition, became an accepted truism within the 

Soviet naval hierarchy.

Consequently, with the goal of increasing 

Soviet prestige abroad, the navy began deploying 

ships to the coastal waters of other nations. Warships sailed for such ports as Cienfuegos, Cuba; 

Conakry, Guinea; and Berbera, Somalia. Often, 

Soviet ships would dock in these countries and 

send their crews ashore to organized sports and 

other programs. Usually these visits were timed 

to coincide with some significant military event. 

For example, a recent Soviet visit to Mozambique just happened to occur about the same 

time the South Africans announced they were 

moving fighter aircraft to the common border 

area.37 Through these visits, Gorshkov noted, 

the navy serves as an important instrument of 

peacetime policy while protecting the USSR and 

supporting national wars of liberation.38

A significant part of the sea presence mission is fulfilled by Soviet merchant ships. With 

more than 1,700 merchant ships, most of which 

are relatively new, the Soviets have opened trade 

with many other countries. One of the unique 

features of these merchant ships is their ability 

to convert to a wartime mission quickly.39 Generally, these ships are small and were constructed to convert to military supply ships if needed. 

According to Admiral Gorshkov, the merchant 

fleet is now a major constituent of the Soviet naval force.40

Fishing trawlers comprise another element 

of the sea presence mission. The Soviets have one 

of the world’s largest fishing fleets, with approximately 4,000 ocean-going vessels.41 In terms 

37 “Soviets Send Warships to Mozambique,” Chicago Tribune, 24 February 1981, 12.

38 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 39. 39 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 51–53. 40 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 39. 41 Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 123–55.

of tons of fish caught, they rank second to Japan.42 The Soviets also have 50 or so intelligencegathering ships, called AGIs, that look very much 

like the fishing trawlers.43 These AGIs are often 

seen monitoring traffic near U.S. Navy bases in 

Scotland, Spain, and Guam. Frequently, other 

AGIs are sighted off the East and West coasts of 

the United States, where they play an active part 

in relaying intelligence data to the Soviet Union.

Thus, by placing their warships in strategic 

territorial waters and by using their merchant 

ships and trawlers, the Soviets influence the 

daily activities of foreign nations. The overall 

purpose of the sea presence mission is well summarized in Gorshkov’s statement:

Friendly visits by Soviet seamen offer the 

opportunity to the people of the countries 

visited to see for themselves the creativity of 

the socialist principles in our country, the 

genuine parity of the people of the Soviet 

Union and their high cultural level. In our 

ships they see the achievements of Soviet science, technology and industry. Soviet mariners, from rating to admiral bring to the 

people of other countries the truth about our 

socialist country, our Soviet ideology and 

culture and our Soviet way of life.44

Sea Control Mission

The sea control mission is based on broad Soviet military doctrine and foreign policy objectives. These involve, first of all, the avoidance of 

war, but if war comes, the Soviets plan to win.45

Thus, Gorshkov has promoted a more assertive 

navy, one that will move out from the coastlines 

and into the oceans to challenge the West. The 

42 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 55. 43 Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 521–22. 44 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 252. 45 McGwire, “The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” 155–83.
200 Chapter Three

mission of these forward-deploying Soviet ships 

is to counter the West’s sea-based strike force and 

interdict sea lanes of communication. Gorshkov is quite specific in this objective:

The imperialists are turning the world 

ocean into an extensive launching-pad, less 

dangerous in their view to their countries as 

compared with land, of ballistic missiles, of 

submarines and carrier aviation trained on 

the Soviet Union and the countries of the 

socialist community. And our navy must be 

capable of standing up to this real threat.46

In other words, the Soviets are sending 

their ships out to gain and maintain command 

of a large sea area and deny the enemy this extensive launching pad. In this type of mission, 

argued Gorshkov, the enemy must be countered 

in the air, on the surface, and below. Thus, arose 

the need to build multipurpose ships with antisubmarine warfare capabilities. In 1967, the 

first of these ships was completed, the Moskva, 

followed by a second ship in 1968, the Leningrad. The design resembles a cruiser bow with 

a carrier stern. The Moskva displaces approximately 17,000 tons and is propelled by steam. 

It is well armed carrying 18 [Kamov] Ka-25A 

Hormone helicopters, antisubmarine rockets, 

torpedoes, and antiaircraft guns. In 1976, a new 

class of Soviet aircraft carriers was launched. It 

was the Kiev, followed by a second carrier the 

Minsk. Unlike earlier carriers, these have angle 

decks that stretch the length of the ship. Both 

are steam propelled and displace approximately 

37,000 tons. The Minsk is extremely well armed, 

with weapons that reach out to [more than] 250 

miles. An enemy ship trying to attack the Minsk

would have to maneuver through five concentric 

circles of weapons beginning 250 miles out and 

46 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 280.

continuing to the bow, where 500-rounds-persecond Gatling guns would take effect. As with 

earlier carriers, the Minsk has a series of weapon systems designed to be effective against enemy ships, submarines, and aircraft. One of the 

unique aspects of the Minsk is the torpedo tubes 

on either side of the bow region. Yet, of all the 

weapons on board, the [Yakovlev] Yak-36 Forger 

vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft is 

the most versatile. Usually, there are about 18 

Forgers on each aircraft carrier, complementing 

about the same number of Hormone helicopters. The Forger uses two engines to take off and 

then a third to cruise out from the ship. Each 

Forger carries an assortment of rockets, machine guns, bombs, and air-to-surface missiles.47

Although building aircraft carriers is a relatively 

new Soviet program, they plan to launch two 

more within the next few years.

Complementing the aircraft carriers in the 

sea control mission are the various surface combatants. The newest and most sophisticated of 

these is the battlecruiser Kirov. This ship is approximately 860 feet long and displaces about 

23,000 tons. It is similar to a World War II pock47 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 21.

Gene Klebe, Soviet Guided Missile Frigate. Watercolor.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command
Chipman 201

et battleship, and it is nuclear powered, providing great staying power and long range. It has 

several weapon systems similar to the Minsk but 

with a much more advanced surface-to-air antiaircraft capability and surface-to-surface antiship capability. Recently, Rear Admiral Sumner 

Shapiro, director of United States Naval Intelligence, had this to say about the Kirov:

The Kirov is by far, the most heavily armed 

multipurpose combatant in the Soviet inventory. Its own long-range anti-ship cruise 

missiles will significantly enhance its ability 

to strike allied warships.48

Smaller than the Kirov are the various Soviet naval cruisers. Late in 1962, the Soviets 

sent to sea the first Kynda-class guided-missile 

cruiser. On board this ship, the most sophisticated weapons system is the SS-N-3 [Shaddock] 

antiship cruise missile (equivalent to the landbased SA-8) with a 200-mile range. A follow-on 

Soviet cruiser called the Kresta was launched in 

1967. This Kresta-class cruiser displayed new 

Soviet technology. The Kresta Is were primarily 

antisurface warfare-oriented while the second 

generation, the Kresta IIs assumed more of an 

antisubmarine role. The weapons on the Kresta

IIs include a sophisticated SS-N-14 [Silex] antisubmarine missile, torpedoes, twin antiaircraft 

missiles, and a helicopter. Aside from the Kresta, 

one of the newest Soviet cruisers is the Kara. 

This ship is propelled by a gas-turbine engine, 

which is capable of approximately 35 knots. In 

terms of weapons, it carries approximately the 

same systems as the Kresta IIs.49

The use of destroyers in the sea control 

mission centers around the Soviet’s Kashin

48 Stephen Webbe, “Soviet Navy a ‘Growing Challenge’ to West,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 3 March 1981, 6. 49 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 80–91.

and Krivak vessels. In the late 1960s, the gasturbine, guided-missile destroyers, the Kashins, 

were launched. With antiaircraft missiles, antisubmarine rockets, torpedoes, and mines, pound 

for pound these ships were considered some of 

the most heavily armed vessels afloat. With gasturbine engines, the Kashins were capable of 

moving through the seas at 35 knots. The Kashinclass was followed by the Krivak-class, which was 

launched in the early 1970s. Unlike the Kashins, 

this ship does not have the bow-mounted antiship missile launchers. Instead, it is configured 

for an antisubmarine mission carrying various 

antisubmarine missiles, rockets, mines, and torpedoes.50 Reports indicate that the Soviets have 

launched two very powerful new destroyers 

called the Sovremennyy-class and the Udaloyclass.51

While destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft 

carriers conduct their functions on the surface, 

attack submarines and cruise missile submarines 

complement these ships with their subsurface 

activities. The Soviets operate about 190 attack 

submarines, most of which are diesel-electric 

powered, providing quiet maneuverability. About 

one-third of these attack submarines are nuclear 

powered. The November, Echo, Victor, Foxtrot, and 

Tango-classes are their primary attack submarines. The principal weapons are the antisubmarine and antiship torpedoes. Some of the newer 

vessels have rocket-propelled antisubmarine 

weapons.52 Recently, the Soviets launched a new 

class of attack submarine, the Alfa. Although little is known about the Alfa, reports indicate that 

it is built of titanium alloy and has an underwater 

speed greater than that of any submarine in the 

world. One U.S. naval officer claimed that when 

50 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 85–90. 51 Drew Middleton, “Soviets at Sea: New Ships for Distant Bases,” 

New York Times, 25 January 1981, 3. 52 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 33.
202 Chapter Three

an Alfa submarine came down off the coast of 

Greenland, he tried to intercept it but was left 

standing behind. “She walked away from us,” he 

commented. “We estimate her speed at around 

50 knots submerged and she can dive to 2000 to 

3000 feet.”53

A second type of submarine used in the sea 

control mission is the cruise missile submarine. 

The Charlie-class is the newest of these, and it 

is nuclear powered. Its weapons systems consist 

of eight short-range, 60-nautical-mile antiship 

cruise missiles that are fired while submerged. 

Its underwater launch capability makes this craft 

one of the most potent antiship submarines in 

the Soviet Navy.54 Lately, the Soviets have built 

an extremely large guided missile submarine 

capable of launching 24 antiship missiles, with 

a range of approximately 250 miles.55 Like the 

Charlie-class, these missiles are fired while the 

ship is submerged. The classification of this new 

submarine is Oscar. With their Oscar, Charlie, and 

Alfa submarines, the Soviets have approximately 

260 vessels to provide submerged sea-control 

capability.56

Complementing both the surface and subsurface elements, the Soviets possess several 

classes of naval aviation capabilities. The [Tupolev] Tu-5 Bear-D, for instance, is used for 

long-range reconnaissance. It is a turboprop 

aircraft and quite often flies on trips to Cuba, 

Cam Ranh Bay, and West Africa. In addition, the 

Soviets use the [Ilushin] Il-38 May for maritime 

antisubmarine patrol. The prime strike force in 

the Soviet naval aviation consists of some 290 

[Tupolev] Tu-16 Badger aircraft that are fitted 

53 “Soviets Planning Advances in Maritime Capabilities,” Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, 16 March 1981, 18. 54 William J. Ruhe, “Soviet Navy Threatens Mideast,” Defense Electronics, February 1981, 75–80. 55 “Soviets Planning Advances in Maritime Capabilities,” 18.

56 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 33–34.

with antiship cruise missiles with an effective 

range of about 150 miles.57 As the Badgers are 

retired from the navy, the Soviets are replacing 

them with the new [Tupolev Tu-22M] Backfire 

bombers. The twinjet Backfire is a supersonic 

aircraft with variable swing-wing configuration. 

Recently, several Backfires joined the Pacific 

Fleet in Vladivostok. This aircraft carries a very 

sophisticated air-to-surface antiship cruise missile with an effective range of approximately 300 

nautical miles. With refueling capabilities this 

aircraft can fly up to 2,500 nautical miles out 

into the Atlantic or Pacific.58

Thus, with the surface combatants, submarines, and naval aircraft, the Soviets are quite 

capable of seeking out enemy forces and destroying them. In a conflict, the West’s aircraft 

carriers and ballistic submarines are the prime 

targets. Although the Soviets have spent a great 

deal of money on developing antisubmarine 

techniques, most naval experts believe they do 

not have the capability to pinpoint U.S. submarines. Yet each year, as the Soviets launch sophisticated weapon systems such as the Kirov, Oscar, 

and Alfa, the technological gap narrows.

Power Projection

The power projection mission is a function of 

the naval infantry’s capabilities. As a student 

of history, Admiral Gorshkov was impressed 

with the United States Marine Corps assaults 

at Saipan, Guadalcanal, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima. 

Yet, in comparison to the United States Marine 

Corps, which numbers approximately 180,000, 

the 12,000-man Soviet naval infantry is small. 

There is, however, at least one naval infantry 

57 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 99–100. 58 Clarence A. Robinson Jr., “Soviet Moves Spark Defense Support,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 January 1980, 74–91.
Chipman 203

regiment on each of the major Soviet fleets.59

In contrast to its United States counterpart, 

the Soviet naval infantry has very little staying 

power or organic firepower. If naval infantry 

were committed to combat, it would have to be 

reinforced within four or five days. Soviet doctrine indicates that the naval infantry is intended to be used as shock troops spearheading an 

assault, closely followed by the ground forces.60

Recent reports of Soviet naval infantry exercises in the Kuril Islands north of Japan confirm 

59 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 37. 60 Dunn, “Power Projection or Influence,” 31–47.

the speculation that the prime targets of these 

troops are shores bordering the various chokepoints.61

Complementing the Soviet naval infantry 

are the amphibious assault ships. The Alligator 

tank landing ship is a typical vessel used for this 

power projection mission. Propelled by diesel, 

this ship is relatively small, displacing about 

4,500 tons. In 1978, the Soviets launched a 

new amphibious ship, the Ivan Rogov[-class]. It is 

twice the size of the earlier ships and can launch 

amphibious vehicles from its open bow doors. 

61 Robinson, “Soviet Moves Spark Defense Support,” 81.

The lead ship of the USSR’s 65,000-metric ton Kuznetsov-class aircraft carriers, the Tbilisi, is being fitted out 

in the late 1980s in Nikolayev Shipyard. This carrier marked an evolutionary advance in naval capabilities 

over 37,100-metric ton Kiev-class carriers then operating with the Soviet fleet. Brian W. McMullin, Soviet 

Tbilisi-Class Carrier at Nikolayev, 1987. Lithograph.

DIA Military Art Series: The Threat in the 1980s, Defense Intelligence Agency
204 Chapter Three

In addition, it carries helicopters. Among the 

various small assault landing vehicles to launch 

from the bow are the hovercrafts, such as the 

Aist, which can carry the naval infantry ashore at 

speeds of 50 knots.62

The small naval infantry is one of the few 

elements of the Soviet military that are not powerful. In a conflict, these troops would most 

likely be sent ashore to capture the Dardanelles 

or the Kattegat straits and then wait for rapid 

reinforcement. Yet, with the arrival of the Ivan 

Rogov, there are indications that Gorshkov is planning to strengthen the power projection mission.

Deterrence

Of all the Soviet naval missions, deterrence is by 

far the most important, according to Gorshkov. 

In his book, he labels the deterrence mission as 

“fleets against shore” and has this to say:

The traditional operations of fleet against 

fleet which. Since ancient times, have been 

characteristic of the struggle against sea 

communications of the opposing sides, are 

now being used in a new, decisive sphere—

operations of a fleet against shore. This 

trend in the operational and strategic use of 

the fleet is becoming increasingly prominent 

and assuming the features of the main field 

of operations of a fleet, governing all others 

at all operational levels.63

This total reliance on the submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) began in earnest during the early 1960s, according to Michael 

McGwire, authority on the Soviet Navy. In a 

sense, the rapid buildup of the Soviet ballistic 

missile fleet began as a reaction to the deployment of Polaris submarines by the United States. 

62 Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 513–17. 63 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 221–22.

The Soviets and the West define deterrence 

somewhat differently. The Soviets hope their 

ballistic capabilities will be sufficient to dissuade 

an aggressor, which, of course, is deterrence in 

the traditional sense. But a crucial distinction 

lies in the Soviets’ belief that if war should come, 

their armed forces must recover from an initial 

strike and fight on for victory. In such a scenario, 

submarine forces would play a significant role.64

Basically, current Soviet ballistic missile submarines are categorized as either theater nuclear or intercontinental nuclear. The first category 

centers on the older ballistic missile submarines, while the latter includes the newest vessels. During the early 1960s, the Soviets began 

building the Hotel and Golf-class ballistic missile submarines. Initially, these submarines had 

to surface to launch their missiles. After some 

modification, these submarines became capable of submerged launchings. The Hotel-class 

submarine was first built in 1958. It is nuclearpowered and carries three SS-N-5 missiles. Following the Hotel, the Soviets built the Golf-class 

submarine. It is diesel-powered and also carries 

three SS-N-5 missiles. The effective range of 

these SLBMs is about 700 miles. With this short 

range, the Golf and Hotel would have to transit 

undetected through the GIUK gap. To avoid this, 

the Soviets use the Golf and Hotel-class submarines as theater nuclear weapons. That is, these 

submarines are assigned targets in the European 

area, thereby nullifying the need to transit any 

choke point. From their patrols in the Southern 

Baltic and Southern Norwegian Sea, the Hotel

and Golf [-class] submarines become an effective 

theater nuclear force.65

64 McGwire, “The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” 155–83.

65 Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., “Theater Nuclear Encirclement, Soviet 

SLBMs Targeted on Western Europe,” National Defense (February 

1980): 42–45.
Chipman 205

In the late 1960s, the Soviets began launching a series of larger ballistic missile submarines 

called the Yankees and Deltas. In the period between 1968 and 1977, the Soviets placed a priority on submarine construction. Each year, they 

constructed approximately 10 new submarines, 

of which 6 were ballistic missile submarines.66

The first of these vessels were the Yankee-class 

submarines. The Yankee is nuclear powered and 

carries 16 SS-N-6 missiles. Each missile is nuclear-tipped and has an approximate range of 

1,600 miles. The follow-on class of submarines 

constructed in the early 1970s was the Delta. 

The Delta is nuclear powered and carries 16 SSN-8 missiles, each with multiple independently 

targeted reentry vehicles and a range of approximately 4,200 miles. This means that the Delta

can sail undetected off the Rola Peninsula coast 

or in the Okhotsk Sea and target practically any 

part of North America.67 According to Jane’s 

66 McGwire, “The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” 155–83.

67 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 35–36.

Fighting Ships, 1980–81, the Soviets have about 

70 ballistic missile submarines of all classes.68

Even with 70 ballistic missile submarines, 

the Soviets have not slowed down their construction program. Reports indicate they are 

building the world’s largest ballistic missile submarine, the Typhoon. Estimates indicate that the 

Typhoon will displace about 25,000 tons, making 

it more than twice the size of the Delta-class submarines. In addition, this submarine will carry 

20 long-range missiles, each with a multiple 

independently targeted warhead. The effectiveness of this new submarine, comments Admiral 

Shapiro, is enhanced by the fact that it, like the 

Delta, can operate in the security of the Soviet 

home waters.69

When the Delta, Yankee, and Typhoon are 

evaluated in conjunction with the Soviets’ landbased missiles, the effectiveness of their strike 

capabilities is quite impressive. Their theater 

nuclear and intercontinental nuclear capabilities 

comprise the basic functions of the deterrence 

mission.

Soviet Naval Personnel

Weapons without manpower are useless, so it 

would be well to consider those who operate 

the Soviet weapon systems. Like their American counterpart, the Soviet naval officer is well 

trained and highly skilled. Typically, he is a volunteer, carefully selected, and professionally 

motivated. When he qualifies, the young officer 

is educated in either surface-warfare subjects 

or naval engineering courses. The engineering 

officer is rather specialized, while the surface 

warfare officer performs the line functions. Naval aviators are trained by the Soviet Air Force. 

After completing basic training, the surface 

68 Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 123–55. 69 Webbe, “Soviet Navy a ‘Growing Challenge’ to West,” 4.

A Marine Corps Hawker Siddeley AV-8A Harrier 

and two U.S. Navy McDonnell Douglas F-4N Phantom II fighters intercept a Soviet Tupolev Tu-95 in 

1977.

Official U.S. Navy photo
206 Chapter Three

warfare officer joins a ship, where he will earn 

his specialty rating by standing watch and learning his division duties. His responsibilities to 

his sailors consist of teaching them the technical specialties, their ship duties, and caring for 

their ideological well-being. Thus, working as a 

manager, technician, instructor, and loyal Communist Party member, the junior officer is quite 

busy during his first sea duty tour.

To gain command, the midlevel officer must 

broaden his career from a specialist to a generalist through a series of sea tours with the fleets, 

serving in different professional capacities. If he 

is selected for command, he will first serve as 

an executive officer and then succeed to command. Certification for command comes after 

a series of ship-handling tests. At one time or 

another, most senior officers attend the war college, A. A. Grechko Naval Academy, where undoubtedly they study about the American naval 

threat. Overall, the officer corps is technically 

competent, well-motivated, and a formidable 

adversary.70

Enlisted personnel are usually drafted from 

various Soviet Union regions. Typically, the Soviet sailor is a conscript with limited training 

and little career motivation. He begins his tour 

by attending a nine-week basic training course, 

after which he is sent to sea to learn shipboard 

skills. At sea, the Soviet sailor’s life is strictly 

regimented and closely supervised. While many 

of the new Soviet ships provide fair living conditions, they are not known for their comfort 

or habitability. On shipboard, time is specifically 

planned. For instance, idle chitchat, card playing, or other frivolous activities are curtailed in 

favor of political lectures by the ship’s propagandist. From early morning through the night, the 

Soviet sailor’s day is completely scheduled:

70 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 41–45.

Reveille is at 0600 followed by calisthenics at 0630: breakfast at 0700 and turnto or political classes from 0800 until 

1300 when lunch is served. Following the 

noon meal, the crew turns-to until dinner 

at 1800. Between 1800 and taps at 2300, 

either more political lessons, ship’s work or 

“constructive” recreational time is scheduled.71

The technical skills of the enlisted sailor are 

quite limited. Each sailor is usually responsible 

for only one shipboard task, such as maintaining a specific piece of equipment or painting the 

bow. Advancement comes after a specific time in 

service and is automatic. For the first year of the 

three-year hitch, the sailor is paid about $10 a 

month, while in his last year he may make about 

$30 a month. With low pay and few privileges, 

71 JO2 Don Wheeler, “Life in the Soviet Navy,” All Hands, May 

1977, 22–25.

A Vought A-7E Corsair II of Attack Squadron 27 intercepts a Soviet Ilyushin IL-38 patrol aircraft that 

was flying in the vicinity of the carrier USS Coral Sea 

(CV 43) steaming in the northern Arabian Sea, ca. 

1979. Such scenes were common during the Cold 

War as Soviet aircraft sought to keep track of U.S. 

carriers around the world.

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Museum of Naval Aviation, NNAM.1996.7075.030
Chipman 207

only about 10 percent of the enlisted force reenlist. For those who do, the rank of michman

(warrant officer) becomes a goal. With the constant rotation of sailors, senior enlisted personnel are in chronically short supply.72 This lack of 

technically qualified senior enlisted personnel 

is one of the few weaknesses of an otherwise 

strong Soviet naval force.

What, then, is the purpose of this rapid peacetime buildup of Soviet naval power? 

Sir John Moore, editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships, 

1980–81, had this to say:

It is hardly surprising that the USSR, a 

determined State, with increasingly imperialistic ambitions, has watched the process 

of American self-immolation with the same 

72 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 41– 45.

satisfaction that it has the industrial dismemberment that has followed in the wake 

of labour and management upheavals in 

Western countries. Although suffering from 

its own internal problems, economic, demographic and agricultural, the Soviet Union 

has maintained a basic aim of world domination which allows an impressive continuity in military planning.73

Indeed, Admiral Gorshkov is quite explicit in defining naval operational goals: “The sea 

power of our country is directed at ensuring favorable conditions for building communism.’’74

Sooner or later, he argued, the United States 

73 Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 123. 74 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 284.

An air-to-air left-side view of a Fighter Squadron 1 Grumman F-14A Tomcat aircraft escorting a Soviet Tupolev Tu-142 Bear-D maritime patrol aircraft, March 1987.

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives, DN-SC-87-04325
208 Chapter Three

will have to realize they no longer control the 

seas.

In terms of numbers, the Soviet Navy compares favorably with the U.S. Navy. Discounting the NATO allies, the United States has only 

about half the ships the Soviets possess. The 

Soviets outnumber the United States in surface combatants, attack submarines, and ballistic missile submarines. Yet, as Supreme Allied 

Commander, Atlantic Command, Admiral Harry D. Train II has pointed out, numbers alone are 

only part of the assessment. The Soviet Navy is 

deficient in several categories. In comparison 

to the United States, the Soviets’ naval aviation 

is vulnerable. They have fewer aircraft carriers 

providing little or no sea-based tactical air support, while their land-based planes have limited 

flexibility. Second, while the United States Navy 

can sustain combat operations at sea for long periods of time, the Soviets cannot. Third, without long-range staying power, the Soviet power 

projection mission is limited.75 In the Soviets’ 

antisubmarine programs, they are apparently 

75 Train, “Sea Link 80 Remarks,” 1–9.

lagging in acoustical detection capabilities but 

are attempting to make up the deficiency with 

space-based optical and radar systems. Reports 

indicate they have not made much progress 

here.76

Yet added all together, the Soviet Navy remains a sea power of great magnitude. If past 

Soviet naval developments continue into the future, their navy will be increasingly involved in 

maritime operations around the world. Into the 

1980s, there are signs of no letup in the Soviet 

shipbuilding program. Certainly, the Soviet acceptance of Gorshkov’s theoretical doctrine of 

sea power substantiates previous naval policies 

and will sustain these efforts for decades. Indeed, Admiral Gorshkov emerges as a twentiethcentury Mahan, “the articulate advocate of sea 

power as a vital, indispensable, attribute of real 

power status.”77 And just as the U.S. Air Force 

was called on to perform maritime operations 

in Vietnam, there is an increasing probability 

that our Air Force will be needed to counter 

this growing Soviet naval threat also.

76 McGwire, “The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” 155–83.

77 Adm Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., “Introduction,” in Red Star Rising at 

Sea, 1–2.
209

ONE TELEPHONE CALL 

GETS IT ALL

Maritime Prepositioning for Crisis Response Enhancement

by General Paul X. Kelley

Sea Power, 198478

munication to international markets and to the 

natural resources of the world, including the 

numerous strategic raw materials vital to our 

military posture and our nation’s economic 

wellbeing. Fortunately, our national leaders recognize the need for policies and programs assuring U.S. and allied control of the seas and have, 

largely for that reason, adopted a strategy that 

calls for maritime strength—a strategy designed 

to assure the United States and its allies a clear 

margin of maritime superiority at the points of 

decision.

Balanced naval forces are the key to implementing this maritime strategy. Those forces 

must be capable both of influencing events on 

the seas and of extending that influence ashore 

for offensive and defensive purposes. The best 

in powerful, fully modem, surface, subsurface, 

and aviation forces are required as are, if forcible entry is called for, strong and ready amphibious forces for projecting our ground and 

air power. Our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces 

(MAGTFs)—composed of command, ground 

combat, aviation combat, and combat service 

Maritime prepositioning operations 

have become a reality. We have added a new capability to the nation’s 

maritime arsenal, and we are expanding that capability almost daily as ships come on line and 

as combat ready Marine Amphibious Brigades, 

complete with weapons, equipment, and personnel, are earmarked for this employment in 

support of our country’s military strategy. Today 

and in the future, we can call on these forces, 

on a moment’s notice, to translate naval strength 

and readiness into meaningful, flexible response.

As I have stated many times—in congressional testimony and in speeches before the 

Navy League and other audiences—the nation’s 

security, economic prosperity, and political vitality are inextricably linked to our ability to 

control the seas. The seas both separate us from 

and link us to our allies and our potential enemies. And the seas provide us lines of com78 The original article came from Gen Paul X. Kelley, “One Telephone Call Gets It All: Maritime Prepositioning for Crisis Response Enhancement,” Sea Power 27, no. 12 (November 1984): 

23–34. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current 

standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
210 Chapter Three

support elements—are structured specifically 

for such employment, with the highly mobile, 

combined-arms Marine Amphibious Brigade 

(MAB) perhaps the most likely instrument available to act as the cutting edge.

The key to combat success is getting the 

MAB there soon enough to fight, and heavy 

enough to win. In this regard, recent initiatives 

aimed at revitalizing our forces have been right 

on target. The “600-ship Navy” calls for, among 

other things, an amphibious force capable of lifting the assault echelons of both a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)—the Division/Wing/

Force Service Support Group Team—and a 

MAB. Now, the advent of maritime prepositioning provides yet another, and complementary, 

capability either to project power abroad or to 

demonstrate national resolve with naval forces.

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING: 

THE CONCEPT

In preparing for maritime prepositioning operations, the supplies (30 days’ worth) and most 

of the equipment required for a powerful MAB 

are loaded aboard specially designed merchant 

vessels that are chartered and commanded by 

the Navy; these maritime prepositioning ships 

(MPS) are then deployed to what are considered 

potential areas of conflict in which U.S. forces 

might become involved. If and when required, 

the ships proceed to a beach or port in the expeditionary area, perhaps secured by a 2,000-

man forward-deployed Marine Amphibious Unit 

(MAU); some 16,500 Marines and sailors are 

airlifted to nearby airfields at the same time. 

Meanwhile, the tactical aircraft of the MAB’s 

aviation combat element flight-ferry to the area 

of employment.

Equipment and supplies are quickly offloaded from the MPS ships and married up with 

appropriate units. Now combat ready, the brigade moves on to its assigned objectives. It has 

arrived (anywhere in the world), soon enough 

(within five days after the ships are offshore), 

and heavy enough (in terms of both firepower 

and sustainability) to win.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 

EMPHASIS ON STRATEGIC 

MOBILITY

The trend of events in the late 1970s and early 

1980s reaffirmed the turbulent nature of international affairs in today’s world and highlighted 

the limited capacity of the United States to commit, on short notice, credible general purpose 

forces to contingencies abroad.

Recognizing these facts, the defense focus 

ONE PHONE CALL

GROUND COMBAT AVIATION COMBAT

Infantry Close air support

Armor Deep air support

Artillery Antiair warfare

Ground Air 

reconnaissance reconnaissance

Antiarmor Helicopter support

Mechanization Air electronic warfare

Ground electronic Inflight refueling

warfare 

• Fully integrated air-ground command and control system

• Integrated logistics support with 30-

day self-sustainability

• Engineer support

• Medical support
Kelley 211

turned to rapid deployment forces, and a search 

began to determine viable, and affordable, ways 

to improve national responsiveness by increasing 

our strategic mobility capabilities. Several different possibilities were considered and found 

wanting, at least in part:

• A dramatic increase in amphibious lift 

was rejected as plainly too expensive.

• Increased reliance on in-service commercial shipping also was considered 

not feasible; analyses showed that exclusive reliance on commercial shipping alone would be insufficient for 

rapid contingency response.

• The concept of land prepositioning 

was, and is, suitable for defense of a 

stable ally such as Norway; but land 

prepositioning ties our capabilities to 

specific locations and cannot provide a 

global capability.

• Total reliance on airlift, even if coupled 

with the development of new large 

cargo aircraft, was rejected because it 

would have been prohibitively expensive and would not have provided the 

required sustainability.

Even as those alternatives were being considered, Marine and Navy planners were developing a “Maritime Prepositioning” concept that 

would embrace the advantages of the readiness, 

firepower, and mobility of the MAB, the quick 

response of strategic airlift, and the sustainability and heavy lift provided by commercial shipping. That concept was found both viable and 

attainable; therefore, in August 1979, the secSailors and Marines offload humvees from the Military Sealift Command maritime prepositioning ship 

USNS 1st Lt Jack Lummus (T-AK 2011) onto a causeway ferry as they perform a maritime prepositioning force 

offload during Freedom Banner Exercise at Sattahip Naval Base, Thailand.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of PFC Nathaniel J. Henry
212 Chapter Three

retary of defense directed the procurement of 

specially designed maritime prepositioning ships 

that would be loaded with the weapons, equipment, and supplies needed by a Marine Amphibious Brigade. 

From the outset, it was apparent that a maritime prepositioning capability could meet both 

the long-term and immediate needs of the National Command Authority (NCA); plans were 

adopted to provide that capability the Indian 

Ocean, where it was most needed, as soon as 

possible. As a result, the Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) became a reality in the 

summer of 1980. In the force are seven vessels; 

unmodified, off-the-shelf commercial ships dedicated to Navy and Marine Corps operations 

and configured to support a MAB composed of 

11,200 personnel.

With the NTPF in place, the Navy and Marine Corps team went to work to provide the 

long-term capability the secretary of defense 

had called for. The result was the development 

of a coordinated set of “building blocks” that, 

when put together, make maritime prepositioning operations both possible and effective.

FROM CONCEPT TO ACTION:

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING 

BUILDING BLOCKS

The MPS MAB

Success in maritime prepositioning operations 

relies on the combat capability of the MAB—and 

each MPS MAB packs a punch: with 53 tanks, 

36 artillery pieces, 96 heavy antitank weapons, 

109 assault amphibian vehicles, [Ratheon MIM23] Hawk and [Ratheon FIM-92] Stinger antiaircraft missiles, and more than 140 aircraft. It 

is the most powerful brigade ever assembled by 

the Marine Corps. The current program provides for three such MABs in the MPS program.

The Ships

Thirteen merchant ships will support the three 

MABs in the MPS program. Chartered by the 

Navy for assignment to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and organized into three squadrons, 

they will be loaded with the weapons equipment, and supplies needed to sustain the MABs 

in combat for 30 days. Five new ships are being 

constructed to meet the special MPS needs, and 

existing vessels are being converted to provide 

the rest of the sealift required. Each of 13 MPS 

ships (T-AKX [roll-on/roll-off] by designation) 

will have, among other special features: container and “break bulk” storage spaces; liquid 

storage spaces for fuel, lubricants, and potable 

water; large capacity vehicle decks; stem and 

side ramps; and a helicopter landing platform 

capable of handling helicopters as large as the 

heavy-lift [Sikorsky] CH-53E Super Stallion. 

Most important of all, perhaps, the MPS ships 

will carry lighters on board that give them a 

self-offload capability—a capability that can be 

called on in stream and under adverse weather 

conditions.

In addition to the T-AKXs, four other ships 

being converted from their original merchant 

ship configurations two hospital ships (T-AHs) 

and two aviation logistics support ships (T-AVBs) 

could contribute significantly to the capabilities of the MPS force. Each T-AH will provide 

more than 1,000 beds and 12 operating rooms, 

and thus offer a full range of medical and surgical care. Each T-AVB will transport and house 

an aviation intermediate maintenance activity 

(IMA).

By transporting the large number of maintenance vans and spares that are too expensive 

to preposition but are required to support the 

aviation combat element of the MAB, the T-AVB 

will save up to 160 strategic airlift sorties.
Kelley 213

Another advantage is that the IMA can be 

made partially functional aboard ship while the 

T-AVB is still en route to the objective area. Like 

the T-AKXs, the T-AHs and T-AVBs will be assigned to the Military Sealift Command and will 

be civilian-crewed.

In connection with this aspect of the program, I am most pleased to point out that the 

dependence on and utilization of our country’s 

merchant shipping has enhanced our overall national sealift capability and already has contributed to the revitalization of the nation’s shipping 

industry and Merchant Marine.

The Navy Support Element

Vital pier-side and instream offload services will 

be provided by a Navy support element (NSE) 

composed of detachments from an amphibious 

construction battalion, a cargo handling and 

port group, an assault craft unit, and a beach 

master unit, as well as special warfare personnel 

for beach survey, obstacle clearance, and ship 

antiswimmer defense. Some 900 sailors will be 

a part of this important command—another 

confirmation of the naval character of the MPS 

force.

Airlift: Getting the Fly-in Echelon There

The Military Airlift Command (MAC) can get 

the fly-in echelon of both the MPS MAB and the 

Navy support element to the probable area of 

operations in time to influence the action. Indeed, when the T-AVB is used, only 249 MAC 

airlift sorties or fewer, as more [Lockheed] 

C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft and [McDonnell 

Douglas] KC-10 Extender refueling/cargo aircraft become available will be required to deploy the MAB and NSE to a contingency area. 

Were it not for the MPS ships, more than 4,500 

sorties over weeks, or even months depending 

upon the percentage of MAC lift made available, 

would be required to move this powerful force.

Organization and Employment

Maritime prepositioning forces are assigned to 

appropriate unified commanders. Their fleet 

commanders will have operational control, with 

the responsibility for administrative functions 

retained by the Fleet Marine Force commander 

(for the Marine forces) and by the MSC (for the 

ships themselves).

A Naval Task Force (NTF) will be established for a specific maritime prepositioning 

operation. Generally analogous to the Amphibious Task Force, the NTF will consist of an MPS 

MAB, an NSE, and an MPS squadron (e.g., escort vessels, a T-AVB, and a T-AH also could be 

assigned). In most cases, the NTF commander 

will be a Navy flag officer, and the MAB will remain under his operational control at least until 

the MAB becomes combat-capable; at that point, 

it could come under the operational control of 

another commander for operations ashore.

Assigned Forces

Two MABs already have been embarked for maritime prepositioning operations. The 6th MAB 

at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, is associated with the first maritime prepositioning ship 

squadron; the MAB and squadron will reach 

an operational capability before the end of this 

year and will be located in the Atlantic theater. 

The previously mentioned NTPF is now the responsibility of the 7th MAB at the Marine Corps 

Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, 

California. That MAB will come on line, along 

with the second ship squadron, for MPS operations in the Indian Ocean late next year as 

the NTPF is deactivated. I will assign the third 

MAB shortly; it will be associated with the third 
214 Chapter Three

squadron and become operational in the Pacific 

during 1986.

CRISIS RESPONSE NOW 

AND FOR THE FUTURE

The speed and flexibility of maritime prepositioning provide our National Command Authorities a variety of new crisis-response capabilities. 

One telephone call to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

gets the following:

• Superior combat power. With its powerful 

mix of ground and aviation assets, the 

MPS MAB can tackle any of a number 

of potential adversaries. For example, 

it would counter a mechanized force 

by employing its formidable combination of ground- and air-delivered 

weapons, including that most potent 

tank-killer of all, its own tanks. No reinforcement is needed to obtain these 

broad capabilities.

• Rapid global response. From their forward 

location, the MPS ships can quickly 

reach many potential expeditionary 

areas. Depending on where that forward location is, the MPS MAB will be 

combat-ready within 10 days or less for 

employment virtually anywhere in the 

world.

• Superior tactical mobility. Once operaA light amphibious recovery craft, or LARC, travels up the stern ramp of an underway Military Sealift Command maritime prepositioning ship. The LARC, working in conjunction with prepositioning ships, transported water from island to island in the Maldives following the devastation caused by a tsunami.

Official U.S. Navy photo, Military Sealift Command
Kelley 215

tionally ready, the MPS MAB will not 

be restricted to employment in the 

immediate vicinity of the reception 

beaches (or ports) and airfields. With 

109 assault amphibian vehicles and 32 

heavy and medium-lift helicopters, it 

can rapidly move the assault elements 

of its three infantry battalions to the 

area where they are most needed.

• Thirty-day sustainability. An immediate, massive strategic lift for resupply 

will not be required to ensure the battlefield success of the MPS MAB. The 

heavy-lift capability of the MPS ships, 

augmented by a T-AVB and a T-AH, will 

provide the brigade with all it needs for 

the entire first month, including ammunition, food, fuel, water, medical 

supplies, spare parts, and other combat 

consumables.

Such a force will be capable of myriad tasks 

that take advantage of the strength and readiness 

of our Navy and Marine Corps. Whether used 

independently or to provide reinforcement to 

other U.S. or allied forces; whether called on 

for political-military signaling, deception, or 

actual combat, maritime prepositioning operations could be employed to:

• Occupy and defend advanced naval 

bases, or areas bordering key choke 

points along sea lines of communications.

• Establish positions for use by landbased tactical aircraft to enhance fleet 

air operations.

• Effect an economy of force deployment during a developing crisis, thus 

forestalling the need for larger forces 

and assault operations.

• Put ashore a sizable mechanized 

combined-arms force to support a land 

campaign.

• Provide early support—both “tooth” 

and “tail”—to amphibious operations.

Insofar as this last capability is concerned, 

I would like to emphasize several points. MPS 

forces can of course never be expected to replace amphibious forces for power projection 

when forcible entry is required. They can, however, be used in amphibious situations. The two 

capabilities are complementary; I can envision 

crisis situations where one or two amphibious 

MABs and an MPS MAB, perhaps along with a 

forward-deployed MAU, could quickly come 

together to form a formidable MAF at the place 

of decision.

Another point needs to be made in regard 

to the way that maritime prepositioning enhances the security of our nation. As with amphibious forces afloat, forward-deployed MPS ships 

can allow us to show resolve without committing forces on foreign shores. Indeed, the mere 

movement of the ships in a time of crisis would 

send a subtle signal that neither our potential 

enemies nor our allies could ignore; and yet, 

just the presence of the ships, without troops, 

offshore in international waters cannot be considered provocative.

With maritime prepositioning operations, 

the Navy and Marine Corps team moves into a 

new era of cooperation and interaction for increased crisis response capability. The traditional strength and readiness of our naval Services, 

expressed in this innovative way, represent employable seapower that can, when called on, rapidly and positively influence the destiny of our 

nation and the entire free world. Of this, I am 

firmly convinced.
216

RESTLESS STRATEGY

Alfred Gray’s Philosophy of Warfighting

by Thomas G. Mahnken and A. Bradley Potter

Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, June 201879

especially potent when units are highly mobile, 

decentralized, and capable of independent sustained operations against threats ranging from 

numerically superior conventional opponents to 

insurgents. The second was the need to counter 

asymmetric threats and terrorism, a topic that 

rose to prominence following the 1983 Beirut 

[Marine] barracks bombing, while the third focused on the importance of sustaining a professional military education program for Marines 

of all ranks and the inculcation of a common 

warrior ethos among them. Gray was so dedicated to scholastic efforts that one commentator contends that the decorated general will 

be remembered foremost as the “Professional 

Education Commandant.”80 Finally, Gray heartily supported the development and deployment 

of new technologies to support his emphasis 

on maneuver warfare and asymmetric threats, 

yielding a mobile Marine Corps that was technologically capable of realizing his vision for maneuver warfare and special operations.

80 Col Gerald Turley, USMCR (Ret), Journey of a Warrior: The 

Twenty-ninth Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (1987–1991): General Alfred Mason Gray (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2012), 359.

INTRODUCTION

S

ome strategists are known less for original 

ideas than for refining long-standing concepts and bending them toward practical 

application. Marine Corps General Alfred M. 

Gray Jr. (Ret) is just such a strategist. Today, his 

influence is deeply embedded across the American military, not just the Corps he once led as 

Commandant, because he advanced and implemented a set of concepts that defined a generational debate over warfighting. This essay aims 

to tell Gray’s story as an American strategist, 

especially within the context of maneuver and 

asymmetric warfare.

Gray’s strategic vision has four central features. The first, and perhaps the most closely 

associated with him, was the concept of maneuver warfare, the notion that military force is 

79 The original report came from Thomas G. Mahnken and A. 

Bradley Potter, Restless Strategy: Alfred Gray’s Philosophy on Warfighting (Washington, DC: Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, 

2018). Minor revisions were made to the text based on current 

standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. The authors would like to thank George Flynn, Frank Hoffman, Tom 

O’Leary, and Terry Terriff for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We especially appreciate Gen Alfred M. 

Gray Jr. (Ret) for allowing us to interview him for this project.
Mahnken and Potter 217

Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr. departed from other Commandants by wearing camouflage in his official portrait by 

Peter Egeli. This wardrobe choice underscores his belief that the Commandant, despite their position, was a 

Marine among Marines.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
218 Chapter Three

The myths surrounding these four lines of 

effort, often propagated by a host of earnest admirers, sometimes shroud the true features of 

Gray’s strategic thinking.81 Further complicating 

matters, the general was part of a larger community of thinkers in and out of government 

during the 1970s and 1980s that was developing ideas about maneuver warfare and thinking 

about future threats to the United States. In the 

end, however, it was Gray who operationalized 

this style of warfare for the twenty-first century, 

integrating it with emerging technologies and 

educational approaches in an effort to meet nascent threats at the end of the Cold War. He was 

not the sole author of the strategic insights associated with these four lines of effort in the U.S. 

Marine Corps, but Gray was the man who took 

theoretical debates and acted on them to transform the forces under his command. We argue 

that this is an important strategic achievement 

all its own.

This essay focuses on the legacy of Alfred 

Gray as a practitioner of strategy. Wrapped up 

in this are aspects of his Marine leadership, record as a commander, and iconoclastic approach 

to implementing his vision, although we do not 

explore these in exhaustive detail. Nor do we 

cover the political battles in Washington over the 

mission and funding of the Marine Corps in the 

1970s and 1980s or attempt a more general military history of this period. We do touch on debates surrounding the intellectual development 

of maneuver warfare, especially since they are 

intertwined with Gray’s efforts to implement it 

in the Marine Corps, but we do not attempt to 

settle the history of these matters. Instead, the 

essay remains carefully centered on Gray him81 Earl J. Catagnus Jr., “The Intellectual Warrior,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 140, no. 11 (November 2014): 36 – 41.

self: his life, thinking, and lasting influence on 

American approaches to the practice of strategy.

Toward this end, we first sketch Gray’s career, focusing especially on his time as a general 

officer. We next turn to the important influences on his strategic outlook, especially those people and ideas that seemingly shaped his thinking. 

Gray’s views on the theory and practice of strategy make up the third section and in turn set up 

a discussion about his contributions to strategy. 

Finally, we consider the legacy of these contributions and evaluate their success relative to the 

challenges of his day. Linking this entire story is 

a sense of restlessness on the part of the general: on the battlefield, on the training ground, in 

the classroom, and among a community of what 

Gray would call his “warriors.” “Take what you 

get, make what you want,” Gray would often 

tell his subordinates.82 His restless pursuit of a 

particular strategic vision for the U.S. Marine 

Corps was true to this dictum.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH—

A MARINE’S MARINE

From an early age, Alfred M. Gray Jr. read newspapers his father brought home from the New 

York to Washington rail line on which he worked 

as a conductor. The news of the day spurred 

lively conversations among the New Jersey family—no small thing for an intellectually curious 

boy born in 1928 and peering over the precipice 

of coming global economic and military calamities.83 From a vantage point later in life, Gray 

would identify these newspapers and conversations as the earliest seeds of his thinking about 

82 Paul Otte, Grayisms: And Other Thoughts on Leadership from General 

Al Gray, USMC (Ret), 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute Press, 2015), 20.

83 Alfred M. Gray, interview with Thomas G. Mahnken and A. 

Bradley Potter, 30 October 2017, hereafter Gray October interview. 
Mahnken and Potter 219

the wider world and how countries interacted 

in it.84

Equally important to early reading, however, were his experiences on the sports field. 

Athletic, Gray attended Lafayette College [Pennsylvania,] on a football scholarship, playing a 

sport in which he not only excelled, but also 

from which he received his earliest education in 

leadership.85 But an injury in 1950 sapped the 

84 Gray October interview.

85 Gray October interview.

financial support of his athletics. He soon enlisted in the Marine Corps at the outbreak of the 

Korean War, following in the footsteps of many 

young men from home that he admired from the 

baseball diamond and the football field.86

Immediately following his basic training at 

Parris Island [South Carolina], the freshly minted Marine quickly deployed as part of an amphibious reconnaissance platoon to the Pacific. 

Gray’s time as an enlisted man, however, was 

86 Gray October interview.

Maj Alfred M. Gray Jr. stops in Hawaii en route to Vietnam to show Gen Victor H. Krulak, commanding 

general, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, the Travis Trophy awarded by the National Security Agency to the 1st 

Radio Battalion for their contribution during the assault on Khe Sanh. 

Photo courtesy Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr.
220 Chapter Three

short lived. In 1952, he received his commission as a second lieutenant and proceeded to 

serve two tours on the Korean Peninsula, first 

as a reconnaissance infantry officer and then as 

an artillery officer before moving on to new assignments. Following these initial deployments, 

he transitioned to a signals officer position and 

spent until 1961 in Asia and the Pacific engaged 

in signals intelligence activities, leading teams of 

radiomen who were intercepting communications throughout the region for exploitation by 

U.S. forces.

Once war in Vietnam erupted, Gray found 

himself serving multiple tours in South Vietnam 

between 1964 and 1969 in artillery and communications roles.87 He subsequently commanded 

the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, Battalion Landing 

Team, a unit with that he conducted many of his 

earliest air-ground exercises, before heading to 

back to Asia as the commander of Camp Hansen 

in Okinawa, Japan. Following this command, 

Gray famously played a central role in the final 

evacuation of U.S. embassy in Saigon in 1975, 

destroying sensitive communication equipment 

in the hours before the North Vietnamese overran Saigon. This action earned the now Colonel 

Gray his fourth bronze star.

By 1977, Alfred Gray was a brigadier general dual-hatted as the commander of 4th Marine 

Amphibious Brigade (MAB) and the Landing 

Forces Training Command (LFTC) at Camp Le87 For the best available account of Gray’s life up to this point see, 

Scott Laidig, Al Gray, Marine: The Early Years 1950–1967, vol. 1 (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute Press, 2013).

jeune, North Carolina.88 With direction to think 

about how Marines would be trained and an operational unit under his command, he embarked 

on a series of activities that would inform his 

later reforms of the Marine Corps. Perhaps 

most importantly, he brought the 4th MAB 

to Europe to play in NATO exercises, where 

he began experimenting with maneuver warfare and better integrating Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force (MAGTF) actions.89 These exercises 

helped Gray to begin socializing maneuver warfare concepts among junior officers who would 

subsequently help spread them throughout the 

Marine Corps.

Gray next took over as the director of De88 The 4th MAB was a middle-size MAGTF (~14,000 Marines) 

responsible for deploying in response to contingencies throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. MAGTFs are the Marine 

Corps’ combined arms configuration and feature four elements: 

command, ground combat, air combat, and combat support. Today, MAGTFs come in three sizes: the smallest called a Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a middle size Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade (MEB, formerly known as MABs), and the largest called 

a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Regardless of size, they are 

all capable of autonomous, combined-arms operations for limited 

periods of time.

89 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 17–20.

Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen Louis H. 

Wilson Jr., BGen Alfred M. Gray Jr., and LtGen 

Samuel Jaskilka on the occasion of Gray’s promotion 

to the rank of brigadier general.

Photo courtesy Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr.
Mahnken and Potter 221

velopment Command, one of the three components of the Marine Corps Development and 

Education Command (MCDEC) in Quantico, 

Virginia, during the fall of 1978.90 Gray helped 

MCDEC became the hub for designing how 

Marines would fight future wars while identifying the equipment they would need for these 

battles. It was an environment in which Gray 

could begin implementing the lessons he had 

learned from exercises in Europe and a series of 

academic studies from the mid-1970s in which 

he had been a part.91 There, the Assistant Com90 Today, this organization is known as the Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command (MCCDC).

91 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 121–32.

mandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert 

H. Barrow, who was soon to be tapped for the 

Corps’ top job, instructed Gray to improve several aspects of how Marines operated. Broadly, 

these efforts fell into four categories: enhancing 

mobility; strengthening the antimechanized and 

antitank capabilities of Marine infantry; improving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and developing special operations 

capabilities.92 During his time at MCDEC Gray 

helped procure the light armored vehicle (LAV). 

This new platform offered Marines the mobility 

essential to the growth of maneuver warfare in 

the Corps; in particular, the fast, rubber-tired 

vehicles enabled a highly mobile light infantry, 

the ability protect flanks, and later, following 

the Gulf War, would be used to project reconnaissance teams deep into enemy territory.93

These were all important advancements for an 

organization that had never before had its own 

indigenous mechanized capability.

After more than two years in Quantico, 

Gray was promoted to the rank of major general and assumed command of the 2d Marine 

Division at Camp Lejeune in June 1981. With 

an entire division now at his disposal, Gray vigorously incorporated maneuver warfare and 

special operations into the division’s training 

and exercise schedule. During this period, Gray 

faced one of the darkest moments in the history 

of the Marine Corps—the bombing of the Beirut [Marine] barracks in October 1983. True to 

his own maxim “look out for your fellow Marines,” Gray personally orchestrated much of the 

Marine Corps’ response to the bombing that had 

92 Terry Terriff, “Fields of Fire” (paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention: Exploring Peace,

Atlanta, GA, March 2016), 25; Gray interview; and Turley, Journey 

of a Warrior, 121–22. 93 Frank Hoffmann, correspondence with the authors, 26 March 

2018.

BGen Alfred M. Gray Jr., commanding general, 

4th Marine Amphibious Brigade, participates in a 

briefing aboard the amphibious command ship USS 

Mount Whitney (LCC 20), 8 September 1976. The 

Mount Whitney served as flagship during the allied 

Exercise Teamwork ’76.

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives, courtesy of 

Ph1 Joe Leo
222 Chapter Three

claimed the lives of more than 200 men under 

his command, taking special care to support and 

communicate with the families of fallen and injured Marines.94 The death of so many Marines 

under his command left such an impression on 

the general that he offered to resign. In 1984, 

not long after this trying experience, Gray was 

promoted to the rank of lieutenant general 

and named commanding general, Fleet Marine 

Forces, Atlantic (FMFLANT) where he quickly 

began to institutionalize his transformational 

goals for all Marines east of the Mississippi River, especially relating to maneuver warfare.

Gray’s ultimate appointment as Commandant of the Marine Corps was something of a 

surprise. The short list under consideration by 

94 For Gray’s own recollection of his efforts to respond to the 

bombing see, MajGen Alfred M. Gray Jr., USMC, interview by 

Benis Frank, Marine Corps Oral History Program, 26 May 1984, 

Box 2, Folder 6, Gerald R. Turely/Alfred M. Gray Research Collection (GRC), Archives Branch, History Division.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and 

incoming Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb 

during the winter of 1986–87 did not include his 

name, although Webb, a decorated Marine veteran of the Vietnam War, was concerned about 

the state of the Marine Corps and looking to 

shake things up. However, Gray impressed both 

Weinberger and Webb during meetings to discuss the leading candidates and ways of improving the Corps. As Webb later recalled, “I brought 

Al Gray back three times, not to interview him 

for commandant, but because he had such a 

grasp on the spiritual problems of the Corps.”95

The young and unconventional secretary of the 

Navy wanted a new direction, and the gruff 

man from New Jersey was his pick. Although 

outgoing Commandant General Paul X. Kelly 

had his own successor in mind, Webb secured 

95 Thomas E. Ricks, Making the Corps (New York: Scribner, 1997), 

142.

A U.S. Marine Corps Grumman EA-6A Intruder (BuNo 147865) from Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare 

Squadron 2 flying over Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, on 1 December 1978.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, National Archives, courtesy of SSgt Jomp
Mahnken and Potter 223

Weinberger’s support and Gray earned the nod. 

On 28 June 1987, the U.S. Senate unanimously 

approved Gray as the 29th Commandant of the 

Marine Corps. In a somewhat unceremonious 

turn, Gray was unable to move directly into the 

Commandant’s House at the Marine Barracks in 

southeast Washington, DC, because the building 

was undergoing major renovations. Instead, he 

started his tenure as Commandant living out of 

a small Washington area hotel.96

Regardless of his initial lodgings, Gray was 

an active Commandant and held the post at a no96 Gray October interview.

table moment of transition in American history. 

The Cold War ground on toward its unexpected 

end, the Goldwater-Nichols [Department of Defense Reorganization] Act transformed the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and new threats, especially from 

terrorist groups, loomed on the horizon. The 

Marine Corps had reconstructed its foundations 

after the dark years of the mid- to late-1970s; 

now, Gray saw “that his mission was to help the 

Marine Corps recover its self-confidence and 

sense of importance.”97 The general would travel across the world visiting “his” Marines and 

97 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 632.

Maj John T. Dyer Jr.’s Tragic Monument–Beirut, Lebanon, 1983 captures the twisted metal and rubble marking 

the spot where an explosives-laden truck demolished the battalion landing team headquarters building at the 

Beirut International Airport. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
224 Chapter Three

spreading his particular vision, especially about 

the importance of a “warrior philosophy” among 

all those in the Corps.98 Perhaps the most lasting aspect of his tenure as commandant was the 

publication of Fleet Marine Forces Manual 1,

Warfighting (FMFM-1), a codification in many 

ways of his warrior philosophy, but even more, 

the institutionalization of the maneuver warfare 

and special operations concepts he had refined 

in earlier commands.

On 30 June 1991, Gray’s term as Commandant came to a close. He retired from the Marine 

Corps, having served in uniform for more than 

41 years. In the years following his retirement, 

Gray remained active in a host of think tank, 

nonprofit, and corporate activities, continuing 

to advocate for the universality of decisionmaking concepts associated with maneuver warfare.

IMPORTANT INFLUENCES—

BENDING EXPERIENCE 

TOWARD PRACTICE

General Gray’s views on the theory and practice 

of strategy find their roots in his professional 

and personal experiences. In the broadest sense, 

Gray’s time in the Marine Corps was atypical 

compared to that of many other senior Marine 

officers, and it offers context for his interest 

in maneuver warfare, special operations, professional military education, and technology.99

Although most of the officers of his generation 

fought in Korea and Vietnam, Gray stood out 

from his peers in how he aimed to learn military 

lessons from these first-hand battlefield experiences, buttressing these lessons with an extensive reading of military history.100

98 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 287. 99 Catagnus, “The Intellectual Warrior,” 36–41.

100 Terriff, “Fields of Fire,” 23.

He also differed from most Marine general officers because he rose up from a private’s 

bunk to the Commandant’s House through a 

series of atypical assignments. His earliest days 

as an enlisted reconnaissance Marine gave way 

to intelligence work and artillery assignments 

as an officer, most of which were spent abroad 

in various parts of Asia in both peacetime and 

wartime. Gray later filled increasingly complex 

command positions, but unlike many senior 

Marines, he also filled assignments charged explicitly with improving how Marines fought. If 

“unique” could ever be applied to the career of a 

Marine Corps Commandant, it would apply to 

Alfred Gray.

The long arc of Gray’s career suggests 

something about the origins of his views on 

strategy. For example, it appears that his earliest 

Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen Alfred M. 

Gray Jr.’s official portrait in camouflage utility uniform.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Mahnken and Potter 225

years as a reconnaissance Marine in Korea may 

have informed his views on the importance of 

intelligence in supporting combat operations; 

after all, to reconnoiter a position, the young 

Gray needed to know what his commanders 

had in mind, consider the potential obstacles 

to operations of varying scales, and identify the 

type of information needed to make those operations successful.101 Following the Korean War 

Armistice, Gray spent time in northern Japan as 

the sole America officer working alongside local 

Japanese officials on local governance and security issues. Gray reflected on this period some 

years later, concluding that he learned an especially valuable lesson from this assignment: that 

treating people the way they should be treated 

offers huge advantage—plans are more readily carried out by loyal subordinates and partners.102 Gray credited these initial years working 

in small teams of Marines with teaching him 

another lesson: that many things can get done 

when one does not worry about who gets the 

credit.103 These two lessons informed his leadership for years to come, and insofar as leadership 

plays a central role in his thinking on maneuver 

warfare, offer a kind of bedrock to his views on 

strategy.

Gray’s subsequent time in Vietnam surely 

influenced his views on the use of military force, 

as it did many of his generation, and during his 

time in Southeast Asia he was already experimenting with field implementation of some maneuver warfare concepts. For example, while in 

command of an artillery battalion in Goi Linh, he 

would instruct his men to disperse after nightfall 

before North Vietnamese Army forces began to 

bombard their positions. At first light, Gray and 

101 Catagnus, “The Intellectual Warrior,” 36–41.

102 Gray October interview.

103 Gray October interview.

his men would return to their posts and open 

barrages of their own.104 From these kinds of direct combat experiences, Gray and a small cadre 

of officers deliberately sought concrete lessons 

for the future. Like B. H. Liddell Hart reflecting on the Somme [France] and other bloody 

battles of World War I, they were eager to get 

beyond attrition warfare, fight smarter, and 

explore how maneuver might offer an alternative.105 Gray and this cohort of junior and midgrade officers stressed the interactive nature of 

warfare. They wanted the Marine Corps of the 

future to pay closer attention to influencing 

the enemy’s mindset when devising operations 

rather than just focusing on strict adherence to 

standard operating procedures for massing firepower. Moreover, these officers believed that 

the Corps should move away from the linear 

formations embraced by then-current doctrine 

and toward emphasizing mobility as a means of 

putting an enemy at a disadvantage. The Corps 

needed to develop leaders who could lead from 

the front and adapt to changing tactical conditions, just as they had done in Vietnam.106 All 

of these insights would feature prominently in 

Gray’s future advocacy of maneuver warfare in 

the Marine Corps and inform his understand of 

special operations.

Although the roots of Gray’s maneuver 

warfare concepts lay in his experience during 

the Korean and Vietnam wars, they increasingly found shape in exercises featuring air-ground 

operations during his command of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, Battalion Landing Team. 

Taking place in Turkey and at the Marine training facility in Twentynine Palms, California, 

these efforts saw the innovative Marine leader 

104 We thank Tom O’Leary for relaying this insightful anecdote 

to us.

105 We appreciate Frank Hoffman stressing this point to us.

106 Terriff, “Fields of Fire,” 16–17.
226 Chapter Three

pushing the boundaries of acceptability in the 

post-Vietnam Corps, challenging his men to 

think in terms of rapid, deep penetrations of enemy territory rather than methodical set-piece 

battles.107 In addition to testing and refining his 

ideas about maneuver warfare, Gray began concurrently exploring what would later become 

the Marine Corps Special Operations Capable 

(SOC) program by conducting special operations exercises in a way that would become a 

hallmark of his later commands. These early efforts prompted Rear Admiral George Milligan, 

the commander of the flotilla to which Gray was 

attached at the time, to later remark, “It seems 

as if Al Gray saw such a future special training 

capability back as early as 1972.”108 The future 

Commandant would continue to talk about the 

formative influence of these exercises for years 

to come, drawing clear lines from these efforts 

to his later Marine Corps reforms.109

The mid-1970s also brought other important strategic influences into Gray’s life, namely 

congressional staffer William S. Lind, Marine 

lieutenant colonel and Vietnam veteran Michael 

D. Wyly, and retired Air Force Colonel John R. 

Boyd, among others. Gray first met Lind in 1976 

when the latter was helping the Marine Corps 

with a variety of field activities. The congressional staffer was highly critical of senior Marine 

leaders who he saw as stymied by old ways of 

doing business, a characterization that earned 

him the opprobrium of more than a few general 

officers. Specifically, Lind was a rabid proponent of maneuver warfare concepts and boasted 

a healthy following among young Marine officers eager to move on from Vietnam. He was 

also a leader in the so-called “military reform” 

107 Gray October interview; and Catagnus, “The Intellectual Warrior,” 36–41.

108 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 69–70. 109 Gray October interview.

movement that argued that the U.S. armed 

forces should invest in large numbers of less 

sophisticated (and less costly) weapon systems 

than those the Services traditionally favored.110

Michael Wyly, who by 1980 was leading 

tactics instruction at the Marine Corps’ Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia, 

was another important member of the maneuver warfare movement and well-known to Gray 

110 See, for example, Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War since 1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 

2008), 125–26.

A Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter from 

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMH362) picks up a Marine reconnaissance team during 

the 1977 NATO Exercise Display Determination in 

Turkey. Maj John T. Dyer, Recon Retrieval, “Display 

Discrimination.” Acrylic on linen.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 

1-4-417
Mahnken and Potter 227

who would later appoint him vice president of 

Marine Corps University.111 Wyly, in turn, was 

connected with John Boyd, the father of the 

observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop approach to decision making. The OODA loop 

was a means to execute decisions faster than 

an enemy and consequently open up battlefield 

advantages. Boyd would become a respected 

thinker among Marines, and his approach would 

ultimately become a staple of Marine Corps 

training across all levels of leadership. These 

four men formed the backbone of the maneuver 

warfare movement in the U.S. Marine Corps for 

years to come.

Boyd’s work was particularly influential. 

Writing in 1980 in the pages of the Marine Corps 

Gazette, Lind argued that Boyd’s work provided the “theory of maneuver warfare,” especially with its focus on psychologically dislocating 

an enemy though a more rapid decision-making 

process.112 Lind, who would later write the Maneuver Warfare Handbook in 1985, went on to argue that maneuver warfare was well suited to 

the U.S. Marine Corps provided its leadership 

could accept and adjust to this alternative style 

of thinking.113 Wyly, meanwhile, popularized 

many of the same ideas among mid-grade officers through his lectures at the U.S.

Army War College. However, as of the early 1980s, none of the people associated with 

this effort “had a clear conception of how or in 

what way these fit into an overarching, coherent concept for warfighting.”114 This task would 

fall to Gray, who used his extensive series of 

111 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War

(New York: Back Bay Books, Little, Brown, 2002), 395; and Gray 

October interview.

112 William S. Lind, “Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine 

Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette 64, no. 3 (March 1980): 55–58. 113 Lind, “Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps,” 55–

58; and Laidig, Al Gray, Marine. 114 Terriff, “Fields of Fire,” 26.

exercises to socialize many of the ideas all four 

men shared and who steadily worked to institutionalize features of them within portions of 

the Corps, especially those associated with 

training and equipping Marines for the future.

Some debate surrounds just who among 

these early proponents of maneuver warfare was 

most central to its development and adoption by 

the Marine Corps.115 This issue is likely impossible to settle.116 Each of these men advocated 

similar changes following the Vietnam War and 

worked to spread a new type of thinking among 

the senior military and political leaders shaping the future Marine Corps. What we can say 

with some certainty is that Alfred Gray was the 

central figure in operationalizing the maneuver 

warfare concepts that were circulating in intellectual circles and was essential to overcoming 

the bureaucratic challenges associated with institutionalizing the new style of warfare. Before meeting Boyd, Gray was already thinking 

in terms consistent with what would ultimately 

be called maneuver warfare, and according to 

one scholar, it may be best to think of Boyd’s 

work providing the “conceptual framework that 

fit Gray’s early ideas.”117 All of the men associated with the movement were learning from one 

another, recasting their ideas to take in the latest 

advances among them, and then striking back 

out into the defense community to challenge 

conventional wisdom.

115 Historian Grant T. Hammond and journalist Robert Coram 

both argue that it was Boyd’s constant briefings and popularization 

of the maneuver warfare concept that brought the U.S. military in 

line with this style of warfare, see Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of 

War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 

Books, 2012); and Coram, Boyd. 116 Robert Coram admits that so entangled were many of Boyd 

and Wyly’s thoughts that “it is difficult on occasion to separate the 

ideas” of the two. See Coram, Boyd, 389. This entanglement extends really into the entire circle of maneuverists and reformers, 

of which Gray, Lind, and others were a part.

117 Terry Terriff, email with author, 2 August 2017.
228 Chapter Three

As Terry Terriff observes, Boyd’s famous 

“Patterns of Warfare” lecture, a survey of military history designed to explore how maneuver 

warfare might work in a modern setting, was 5 

hours long in the late 1970s while by 1984, after years of communicating with Gray and other 

maneuver warfare advocates and thinkers, it was 

a full 14 hours long.118 Grant Hammond, one 

historian largely in the Boyd camp, nonetheless argues that Warfighting was “the essay Boyd 

should have written instead of only giving briefings” before contending that some of the ideas 

in the manual are taken directly from Boyd’s 

118 Terriff email.

presentations.119 Gray, for his part, later recalled 

benefiting from a “long working relationship” 

with Boyd, the men developing a close personal relationship over years talking about strategy 

and future threats to the United States.120 However, Gray held that Boyd was not involved in 

his field development of the maneuver warfare 

concept.121 Similar interactions were common 

between Gray and Lind. When the general first 

met the maverick staffer in 1976, he was proud 

to show off how American Marines already 

knew something about maneuver warfare, even 

119 Hammond, The Mind of War, 195. 120 Gray interview, 25 May 2018, hereafter Gray May interview; 

Gray October interview; and Coram, Boyd, 355. 121 Gray October interview.

On Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC, Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr., Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, speaks to his troops prior to their departure for the Middle East in support of Operation Desert 

Shield. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Mahnken and Potter 229

though the Corps had yet to formalize any of 

this understanding.122

In the full accounting, the association among 

these men really did matter in advancing a viable alternative to business as usual in the Marine 

Corps. Getting maneuver warfare to work required different types of talents—intellectual, 

bureaucratic, operational, and even evangelical—and each of them brought these to varying 

degrees. Their mutual influence on one another ultimately served as an intellectual proving 

ground to parallel Gray’s field exercises. But it 

was Gray’s combination of thoughtfulness, bureaucratic acumen, and operational focus that 

overcame many practical and political challenges facing the adoption of maneuver warfare by 

the U.S. Marine Corps.

Gray fixed himself on developing the concrete aspects of maneuver warfare and Marine 

special operations throughout his increasingly 

senior positions from the late 1970s through the 

1980s. His time commanding the 4th MAB, a unit 

upon which he bestowed the name “The Carolina Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)” to 

highlight his special vision for it, and the Landing Forces Training Command offered readymade opportunities to experiment with these 

ideas. Indeed, it was this time as commander of 

the 4th MAB when Gray’s ideas crystallized and 

began taking earnest shape in a series of exercises and training events that earned a reputation 

across the entire Corps.123 The general later argued that maneuver warfare’s development was 

crucially aided by force-on-force exercises with 

real post-operations critiques featuring the officers and enlisted men charged with carrying out 

operations. Experiential learning of this kind 

converted believers across the ranks and helped 

122 Gray May interview.

123 Terriff, “Fields of Fire,” 24.

Gray to better understand what was actually necessary to realize maneuver warfare with 

Marines.124 Central to his philosophy of socializing maneuver warfare and special operations 

capabilities in the Marine Corps were hands-on 

activities like exercises in which officers would 

come to appreciate these new approaches themselves rather than having them dictated from 

above. Gray later recalled hoping to have his vision for the Corps come from the ground up, 

take on a life of its own separate from him and 

rooted in junior officers doing the real operational work.125

The 4th MAB exercises served other functions as well, especially in identifying the technologies necessary to most effectively carry out 

maneuver warfare. During this period, Gray 

began implementing an approach to command 

and control that supported protracted Marine 

operations ashore that, combined with increased 

mechanization, would allow his Marines to attack far from littoral areas for extended periods 

of time.126 Using the amphibious tractors (amtracs) assigned to his brigade as makeshift armored personnel carriers, Gray also improvised 

the equipment needed to enhance the speed of 

his Marines in ways far outside the official Marine Corps standard operating procedures.127 In 

1978, during NATO’s Northern Wedding-Bold 

Guard exercises, he successfully merged technology with his maneuver warfare approach, 

impressing German allies with his unit’s newfound speed and maneuverability.128 Marines in 

amtracs operating ashore succeeded in breaking 

out of a German encirclement and achieved 

124 Gray October interview.

125 Gray May interview.

126 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 94. 127 Terriff, “Fields of Fire,” 24; and Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 

100–2.

128 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 98–119.
230 Chapter Three

their exercise objectives with such rapidity that 

they nearly ended up in East Germany.129 As had 

been true before and would prove increasingly so, many Marines skeptical about maneuver 

warfare came to believe after seeing this kind 

of success in hands-on, realistic, force-on-force 

exercises.130

Gray continued to innovate in similar ways 

during his time at Marine Corps Development 

and Education Command (MCDEC). He would 

eventually come to regard this posting as an especially important period in his intellectual development.131 Despite especially tight budgets, 

his time at the command led to some of his most 

pointed thinking on the strategic issues facing 

the Marine Corps, including requirements for 

a fast, armored vehicle to achieve the mobility 

necessary for maneuver warfare.132 This insight 

eventually led to the development of the light 

armored vehicle (LAV), but it started as a series 

of “off-the-shelf ” armored vehicles tests, some 

of which the general participated in personally. 

Gray’s experience at MCDEC led to an especially well-known aphorism: “It doesn’t cost any 

money to think.” In his view, years of austerity could also be periods of intense intellectual 

advancement, setting up especially productive 

periods once resources became available.133 So 

it was at MCDEC. When the budgetary spigots 

were opened once again beginning in the late 

1970s, the Marine Corps was well placed to 

field the LAV by 1983.

Gray’s penchant for realistic, force-onforce exercises extended to his command of the 

2d Marine Division, where he aimed to convert 

129 Gray October interview; and Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 98–

119.

130 Thanks to Tom O’Leary for stressing this point to us.

131 Gray October interview.

132 Gray October interview; Terriff, “Fields of Fire,” 25; and Turley, 

Journey of a Warrior, 128–29. 133 Otte, Grayisms, 22; and Gray October interview,

the entire division to a maneuver warfare philosophy.134 This period offered Gray a series of opportunities to get feedback on how his reforms 

were actually playing out. For example, he held 

“professional study groups” in which those who 

found his brand of reform appealing discussed a 

range of issues from combined-arms operations 

to maritime strategy. So-called “Al Gray men” 

would spread back out across the Corps, sharing a common set of ideas about how Marines 

might fight in the future.135 He also established 

the [2d Marine Division] Maneuver Warfare 

Board to “take the lead in collecting, receiving, 

and disseminating theoretical and practical information regarding maneuver warfare” with 

the goal of “improv[ing] upon the understanding 

of maneuver warfare concepts and encourage 

134 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 143–45. 135 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 148–49.

LtGen Alfred M. Gray Jr., commanding general, 

Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, enters the Marine 

field compound accompanied by unidentified officers during Exercise Cold Winter ’87.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl J. D. 

Gonzales, National Archives
Mahnken and Potter 231

their refinement and test in field exercises.”136 To 

bolster this effort, Gray hosted a series of commander’s conferences to discuss a wide range 

of tactical issues relevant to his larger strategic 

vision, including approaches to amphibious warfare, fire support, and combined-arms coordination, among others, and invited outside speakers 

such as Boyd to present on his OODA loop, 

“Patterns of Conflict” brief, and the intellectual 

underpinnings of maneuver warfare.137

The event that perhaps most influenced 

Gray’s thinking on special operations was the 

136 “Maneuver Warfare Board at Lejeune,” Marine Corps Gazette 65, 

no. 10 (October 1981): 6.

137 Terriff, “Fields of Fire,” 31–32; Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 136–

37; and “2d MarDiv Maneuver Warfare Study,” Marine Corps Gazette 

66, no. 3 (March 1982): 8.

Beirut barracks bombing on 23 October 1983, 

an attack that occurred while he was in command of the 2d Division.138 Following the incident, Gray was more convinced than ever that 

Special Operations Capable (SOC) training was 

essential for the Marine Corps; the world was 

changing, threats were changing, and the Marines needed to change with it.139 In this period 

of shock, the secretary of defense ordered the 

Services to consider how their special oper138 Gray dislikes calling this event the “Beirut barracks bombing” 

because in fact the building that was attacked was far more than a 

barracks, it was the hub of all Marine activity at the Beirut International Airport, serving important command, communications, 

and logistics functions. See Gray May interview. However, because 

the attack is generally referred to as the Beirut barracks bombing 

in the available histories, we use that term here.

139 Gray May interview.

Combat artist Capt Charles G. Grow’s LAV “Marietta” shows Sgt Tooke, Company C, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, beside his vehicle from Task Force Shepherd near the heel of northern Saudi Arabia, February 

1991. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 301-2-42
232 Chapter Three

ations forces might address low intensity conflicts in the future. Then-Commandant P. X. 

Kelly requested that Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, produce the Marine Corps report, an effort 

Gray oversaw as the unit’s commander.140 The 

resulting study identified the MAGTF as ideally 

positioned to address a wide range of nonconventional threats thanks to its worldwide presence and ability to quickly deploy forces against 

a target. Moreover, it stressed that the Marines 

enjoyed a long history of special operations-type 

activities, and it would only be natural to enhance their training to better execute these in 

the future. Gray would take up this cause as his 

own, aiming to certify some Marine Amphibious Units as SOC forces and advocate for Marine special operations roles throughout his time 

as Commandant

Finally, a passion for books represented one 

of the greatest influences on Gray’s strategic 

thinking, one that extended from his childhood 

into all of his assignments in the Marine Corps. 

Whereas his experiences playing sports as a boy 

informed his sense of leadership, his youthful 

reading opened his eyes to the world.141 For example, young Gray’s reading about [Josip Broz] 

Tito’s leadership of Communist partisans against 

the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia inspired his 

early interest in irregular warfare.142 Once in the 

Marine Corps, he selected books on the premise that one should “understand what you didn’t 

know;” a philosophy that led him to all kinds of 

reading in history, political science, economics, 

and even some physics, math, and chemistry.143

As Gray took increasingly senior command posi140 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, to Commandant of the Marine Corps, December 1984, Box 6, Folder 12, 

GRC, Archives Branch, History Division.

141 Gray October interview.

142 Gray October interview.

143 Gray October interview.

tions, the general became famous for deploying 

with a footlocker filled with books. “It’s important to look at people through their own eyes, not 

just our eyes,” Gray would tell his subordinates, 

and he sought through his reading to understand 

what he could about the history, culture, and religion of the places to which he was sent.144

Later in life, Gray argued that reading history helps inspire strategic and analytical thinking.145 In this spirit, writers including B. H. 

Liddell Hart, [British Major General] J. F. C. 

Fuller, S. L. A. Marshall, Reginald Hargreaves, 

[Brigadier General] Samuel B. Griffith, Lynn 

Montrose, and [Colonel] Robert D. Heinl all 

figured in Gray’s approach to strategic thought 

in one way or another.146 When asked about his 

strategic influences, Gray explained that he saw 

himself as a student of Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julian Corbett, Alfred 

Thayer Mahan, Isoroku Yamamoto, and especially Sun Tzu, though he admitted thinking through 

these great strategists took years and was a cumulative process.147 Interestingly, Gray distanced 

himself from Carl von Clausewitz, saying he was 

never a “Clausewitz disciple.”148 While acknowledging this central figure in Western strategy 

was important to some aspects of his thinking, 

especially about the nature of war, he contended that Eastern approaches to warfare focused 

on speed, intelligence, and deception always 

held greater appeal to him. Gray also pointed 

to several contemporary thinkers as “strategic 

figures” in his career, including General Ronald 

H. Griffith, Senator Sam A. Nunn, and Senator 

John G. Tower, although he remained disheartened about just how few think strategically—it 

144 Otte, Grayisms, 23. 145 Gray October interview.

146 Turley, The Journey of a Warrior, 33. 147 Gray October interview.

148 Gray October interview.
Mahnken and Potter 233

is easier, after all, to employ a “recipe mentality,” 

fitting the case at hand to some preconceived 

conception of the world and what ought to be 

done to affect it.149 Strategic wisdom—in theory and practice—is more elusive than not.

VIEWS ON THE THEORY AND 

PRACTICE OF STRATEGY—

ALFRED GRAY ON STRATEGY

In his own telling, General Gray took the Ugly 

American’s lesson to heart, arguing that a strategist must develop empathy if he is to find success.150 Thoughtless, ignorant, and ethnocentric 

views undermine sound defense policy, diplo149 Gray October interview.

150 Gray October interview.

matic efforts, and military strategy; cultivating 

their antidote, empathy, is thus essential to any 

person engaged in those efforts. Strategic thinkers are also good listeners, a natural trait of the 

empath. They take time to gather information 

from subordinates, intelligence sources, and 

outside experts before making definitive plans. 

Finally, sound strategists need to be careful with 

the assumptions they make about the world 

and their opponents. They must entertain contingency plans associated with each major assumption should one or many fail to hold up in 

reality.151 Only in this way might a commander 

hope to formulate strategies appropriate for the 

adversary at hand, rooted in facts, and capable 

of adapting to the ever-changing nature of the 

battlefield.

Gray views grand strategy as including all 

elements of national power and influence much 

the way B. H. Liddell Hart had some half a century before. Strategy at a high level is about “the 

art of getting things done so that you can keep a 

peaceful kind of a country” or more broadly to 

“survive as a nation and perchance thrive,” this 

second definition coming from a conversation 

the general once had with Max Lerner. Grand 

strategy also has long-range purpose: it requires 

looking over the horizon.152 It requires longrange planning.153 “What do we want it to look 

like when we are done?” is a famous Grayism 

that captures this line of thinking.154 Once an end 

is clearly established, one can work backward 

to match it with the most appropriate means. 

Looking at the grand strategic position of the 

United States, Gray cultivated a special interest 

in defending sea lanes, a la classic Mahanian na151 Gray October interview.

152 Gray October interview.

153 A. M. Gray Interview Transcript, Box 2, Folder 22, GRC, Archives Branch, History Division.

154 Gray October interview; and Otte, Grayisms, 10.

In Saudi Arabia, Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr. briefs 

members of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, during 

Operation Desert Shield. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
234 Chapter Three

val strategy; however, he argued that there may 

well be new domains of particular importance 

in the twenty-first century. And although the 

United States would need to maintain its power 

at sea, the traditional “commons” of the world, 

new arenas like the cyberspace are likely to face 

contestation in the future.155

Gray’s specific views on war, especially maneuver warfare and special operations, spring 

from a particular grand strategic context. In the 

late 1980s, Gray began to consider the implications of a post-Cold War world, one where the 

bipolar order fizzled to a close and new threats 

came to confront the United States.156 This 

world would present a host of new challenges, including asymmetric threats, low-intensity 

conflicts, terrorism, resurgent nationalism, and 

resource competition, among others. Warfighting captured Gray’s views on the future of warfare in clear terms. “By historical standards, the 

modern battlefield is particularly disorderly,” 

the manual argued, and “while past battlefields 

could be described by linear formations and 

uninterrupted linear fronts” future wars would 

feature “unoccupied areas, gaps, and exposed 

flanks which can and will be exploited, blurring the distinction between front and rear and 

friendly- and enemy-controlled areas.”157 Gone 

were the days of preparing mainly for large-scale 

conventional war; now, the United States would 

155 Gray May interview.

156 Alfred M. Gray, “Change, Uncertainty, and Challenge: The National Security Environment of the 21st Century” (presentation, 

MacNaughton Symposium, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, NY, 26 September 1989), Box 2, Folder 34, GRC, Archives 

Branch, History Division; Gen Alfred M. Gray, “Defense Policy for 

the 1990s,” Marine Corps Gazette 74 (May 1990): 18–19; “Statement 

of General A. M. Gray before the Subcommittee on Projection 

Forces and Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, 

United States Senate,” 10 March 1989, Box 2, Folder 19, GRC, 

Archives Branch, History Division, hereafter Gray Senate statement; and Millett, Semper Fidelis, 632–33. 157 Warfighting, FMFM-1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 1989), 9.

need to think much more about the many ways 

a weaker adversary might fight. Moving forward 

into the 1990s, Gray saw long-standing features 

of American strategy, including forward defense, 

deterrence, escalation control, and coalition 

warfare remaining central, though with fewer 

bases abroad, loss of some overflight rights, and 

potential conflicts along coastal areas, U.S. strategy would retain essential maritime features.158

Expeditionary combined-arms forces would be 

essential for meeting with the contingencies of a 

158 Gray, “Defense Policy for the 1990s,” 20.

During Operation CAX-1-2-82, the commanding 

officer of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, briefs MajGen Alfred M. Gray Jr., commanding general of 

the 2d Marine Division, on the present situation at 

Twentynine Palms, CA, 1 November 1981.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, National Archives, 

courtesy of SSgt D. D. Smith
Mahnken and Potter 235

future featuring progressively varied threats and 

an increasingly lethal battlefield.159

To this end, Gray imbued Warfighting with 

a special role for U.S. Marines. “The Marine 

Corps, as the nation’s force in readiness, must 

have the versatility and flexibility to deal with 

military and paramilitary situations across the 

entire spectrum of conflict,” the manual noted 

before arguing that “a modern military force 

capable of waging a war of high intensity may 

find itself ill-prepared for a ‘small’ war against 

a poorly equipped guerrilla force.”160 During his 

time as Commandant, Gray contended that the 

159 Gray, “Defense Policy for the 1990s,” 20–21.

160 Warfighting, 22.

Marine Corps enjoyed a unique opportunity to 

redesign itself to address future national security 

challenges from asymmetric threats. He argued 

that Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) 

should form the backbone of an American response to low- and mid-intensity conflict in the 

foreseeable future. From Gray’s perspective, this 

was a natural mission for the Corps since it was 

always forward deployed or could quickly deploy forward in response to a crisis.161 He built 

a first Marine Corps Campaign Plan (MCCP), a 

24- month guide to improving Marine warfight161 U.S. Department of the Navy, “Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

Master Plan 1990–2000,” Box 14, Folder 27, GRC, Archives 

Branch, History Division; and Warfighting, 42, for the language detailing the Marine relationship with the Fleet to achieve this goal.

Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, visits with members of Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, at their central training area. Gray is on hand to observe a training exercise during his visit 

to Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Okinawa.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, National Archives, courtesy of Cpl Michael T. Jordan
236 Chapter Three

ing capabilities, around the notion of strengthening MAGTFs to be an increasingly flexible, 

expeditionary force capable of projecting itself 

into a rapidly changing world.162 However, for 

MAGTFs, or any Marine unit, to play a role in 

the future, Gray would need to sell his grand 

strategic vision to the wider U.S. military and 

its political leadership.

This was often a challenge throughout the 

1980s. In fact, Gray’s vision for the Corps and 

more broadly the future of warfare frequently 

put him at odds with the other Services, most 

notably the Navy. Having fought the Cold War 

with an advanced “blue water” fleet, the Navy 

saw the future requiring many of the same tools 

of the past, namely power projection across 

vast ocean distances thanks to modern naval 

technology.163 Such a vision had little room 

for maintaining, let alone increasing, Marine 

transport ships for littoral combat missions, 

and Gray pushed Congress as early as his first 

report as Commandant in 1987 to expand amphibious ships in the Fleet.164 The inter-Service 

disagreements became so intense that Gray had 

to write to the secretary of the Navy, Henry L. 

Garrett III, in November 1989 as debates over 

the Fleet’s future makeup heated up in Washington.165 In his letter, Gray’s strategic vision of the 

future was clear, and he forcefully advocated not 

just for Marine transports but also for a broader 

understanding of littoral combat in the future. 

Marines would not only fight future battles on 

beaches, but also deep inside enemy territory, 

whether as part of a force fighting a conventional enemy, irregular opponent, or terrorist or162 MAGTF Warfighting Center, “Marine Corps Campaign Plan,” 

Box 14, Folder 18, GRC, Archives Branch, History Division.

163 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 340–44. 164 Gen Alfred M. Gray, “Annual Report of the Marine Corps, 

1987,” Box 2, Folder 8, GRC, Archives Branch, History Division.

165 Alfred M. Gray to Secretary of the Navy, 15 November 1989, as 

cited in Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 463.

ganization. The Navy would need to accept this 

future sooner or later.

Gray’s broad focus on low-intensity conflict 

of various sorts also put him at odds with the 

other branches of the armed forces, all of which 

were interested in retooling for new types of 

high-intensity wars.166 The U.S. Army had little 

interest in considering another irregular fight after Vietnam, and it had so “heavied up” for conventional combat against the Soviet Union that 

organizational inertia was against preparation 

for any alternatives. Meanwhile, increasing the 

mobility of the Marine Corps, and preparing it 

to fight inland, encroached on what the Army 

saw as its traditional mission. Gray was peddling 

dangerous ideas from the Army’s point of view; 

although Gray, paying careful attention to Army 

doctrine, was eager to show ways of differentiating the Corps from the U.S. military’s other 

land component.167 The Air Force, meanwhile, 

had expensive new weapons systems in mind, 

including new fighter aircraft, never designed 

for the types of conflicts Gray envisioned for the 

future. Thus, from the moment Gray joined the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, aiming to expand the ideas 

he had cultivated in his earlier commands across 

the entire Marine Corps, he faced skepticism if 

not outright hostility toward his views.

This did not deter him. From Gray’s perspective, low-intensity conflict of all sorts 

would require two things from Marines: familiarity with maneuver warfare and a special operations capability. Importantly, maneuver warfare 

was equally applicable to conventional and unconventional warfare. Although its central concepts were initially designed to offer Marines 

ways of fighting against numerically superior 

opponents, whether the USSR or some regional 

166 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 340–44. 167 The authors thank Frank Hoffman for this insight.
Mahnken and Potter 237

power with a hefty local force, the flexible way 

of thinking about war offered a viable path to 

success on the many various types of fluid future 

battlefields. And although the other branches of 

the U.S. military had developed their own special operations units, Gray saw an important gap 

in American capabilities that Marines could naturally fill. Because they were constantly at sea 

and stationed around the world, Marines would 

be well positioned to help augment special operations units from the other branches and often 

found themselves in positions requiring their 

own indigenous special operations capability. 

If Marines were to be given missions like that 

in Beirut between 1982 and 1984, they needed 

their own capability to counter terrorism and 

associated threats. Through these two vehicles, 

Gray saw a special place for his Marines in the 

future defense of the United States.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO 

THE THEORY AND 

PRACTICE OF STRATEGY—

MAKING THEORY WORK

According to one of his colleagues, Alfred 

Gray was “singularly responsible for the Marine Corps’ transformation from a conventional 

warfare mindset to one focused on the emerging 

threats.”168 Those describing Gray’s contributions to the theory and practice of strategy often 

rely on such glowing language. And to be sure, 

his contributions to maneuver warfare, special 

operations, professional military education, and 

the judicious application of new technology 

made Gray a central figure in American strategic 

debates at the end of the twentieth century. Like 

many thoughtful strategists, his efforts in these 

four areas interlocked, making each stronger 

thanks to the others. Together, they supported 

168 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 7.

military power but also undergirded American 

influence, the often forgotten but, for Gray, essential aspect of grand strategic planning.169 All 

four lines of effort remain relevant to contemporary strategic debates in the United States.

Maneuver Warfare

In an interview early in his tenure as Commandant, Gray made clear that one of his highest 

priorities for the Marine Corps would be to 

ensure “common operating procedures, common doctrine, and common war-fighting instructions” to ensure “one Marine Corps.”170

This came in the form of Fleet Marine Forces 

Manual 1, Warfighting.

171 “This book describes 

my philosophy on warfighting,” declared Gray’s 

introduction to the manual. The new publication was “Marine Corps’ doctrine and, as 

such, provides the authoritative basis for how 

we fight and how we prepare to fight.”172 Years 

later, Gray regretted muddying the understanding of Warfighting by calling it doctrine, admitting that it was a mistake to use the term. Once 

he became Commandant, there was a move to 

write something down by many who believed 

in maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps and 

wanted to differentiate it from similar efforts 

in the U.S. Army, and so FMFM-1 came about 

with Gray’s support; however, this decision 

obfuscated the philosophical features of the 

thought process, leading some to take it as a 

169 Gray October interview.

170 Gen Alfred M. Gray, “Much to Be Proud of, Much to Strive 

For,” Sea Power 30 (November 1987): 9. See also Gen A. M. Gray, 

“29th Commandant Speaks to the Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette 71 

(September 1987): 18.

171 For one thoughtful treatment on the origins, development, and 

debate surrounding maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps, see 

Terry Terriff, “ ‘Innovate or Die’: Organizational Culture and the 

Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 3 (2006): 475–503, https://doi

.org/10.1080/01402390600765892. 172 Warfighting, 1.
238 Chapter Three

more rigid, doctrinal approach.173 The notion 

of Warfighting as a philosophy of war and warfighting, or even more broadly as a philosophy 

on how to think about war and warfighting, was 

always much closer to his intent.174 Gray long 

argued that the ideas contained in the Marine 

Corps publication always went beyond policy, 

instead constituting a thought process appropriate for a wide range of endeavors, from 

warfighting to business.175 And although some 

critics would get bogged down in the notion 

of Warfighting as doctrine, those who read the 

book carefully often appreciated the nuanced 

thinking it advocated, pointing to excerpts like 

this:

Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in 

and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a 

bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless 

opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on 

shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by 

avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and 

by striking him in the way that will hurt 

him most. In short, maneuver warfare is a 

philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least 

173 Gray May interview; and Terriff, “ ‘Innovate or Die’,” 500. The 

problems associated with calling Warfighting doctrine were recognized by others in the Marine Corps, but from a different angle. 

Doctrine is often charged with more specific duties, things such 

as weapons acquisition and force structure, issues poorly covered 

in Warfighting. On this point, see Robert S. Trout, “Dysfunctional 

Doctrine: The Marine Corps and FMFM 1, Warfighting,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 77, no. 10 (October 1993): 33–35. 174 A great deal has been written outlining the theory, history, and 

application of maneuver warfare. For an especially widely read 

example, see Richard D. Hooker Jr., ed., Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993); Terry Terriff makes the 

point that Warfighting is a “philosophy of war and warfighting” or 

a “philosophy on how to think about war and warfighting,” email 

with author, 8 April 2018.

175 Gray October interview.

possible cost to ourselves a philosophy for 

“fighting smart.” 176

Gray later expanded on this central idea, 

arguing that the maneuver warfare concepts 

captured in Warfighting were all about helping 

Marines realize their potential. They were rooted in a simple idea that people can do more than 

they are often allowed, and so they should be 

empowered to do things rather than be risk adverse.177 If maneuver warfare was at its heart a 

way of thinking and “fighting smart” then, from 

Gray’s perspective, it was essential to offer leaders at all levels the opportunity to explore the 

“state of mind born of bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism.” This he did in 

his various commands.

But what exactly constitutes Gray’s philosophy of maneuver warfare? It is ultimately 

an approach to fighting aimed not at destroying an enemy’s armies but rather his will. Gray 

explained in congressional testimony that the 

Corps he envisioned would “fight a high tempo, 

fluid, combined arms, maneuver oriented conflict” with the goal of “collapse our opponent, 

destroying his ability to fight as a cohesive, organized force” and obtaining “quicker results with 

fewer casualties.”178 In the words of Warfighting, 

maneuver warfare aims “to shatter the enemy’s 

cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and 

unexpected actions which create a turbulent 

and rapidly deteriorating situation with which 

he cannot cope.”179 Speed is essential to shattering an enemy’s cohesion, allowing one to “seize 

the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and 

keep the enemy off balance” and thus intensify 

176 Warfighting, 77. 177 Gray May interview.

178 Gray, “Annual Report of the Marine Corps, 1987.”

179 Warfighting, 59.
Mahnken and Potter 239

the friction of war that an enemy faces and push 

the pace of combat beyond a point an enemy can 

cope.180 “Chaos and uncertainty create opportunities,” is one of the many aphorisms associated with the former Marine Commandant, and 

speed helps bring such chaos about.181 Violence 

remains essential to maneuver warfare, but “not 

so much as a source of physical attrition but as 

a source of moral dislocation.”182 Violent actions 

do more than kill an enemy, although this surely occurs in maneuver warfare; rather, violence 

aims to kill an opponent’s psychological capability to resist. Finally, surprise plays an important role. After carefully determining an enemy’s 

perceptions, a wise commander will employ 

deception to shape the opponent’s expectations 

before attacking him at an unforeseen time and 

place.183 Across all these maneuver warfare elements is a commitment to a combined arms 

doctrine, or “the full integration of arms in such 

a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy must make himself more vulnerable to another.”184 In so doing, the enemy faces dilemmas 

about how to counter its, speedy, violent, and 

surprising opponent.

Several other broad features underpin maneuver warfare, namely delegation of authority, establishment of commander’s intent, and 

constant intellectual engagement.185 To execute 

maneuver warfare requires a decentralized type 

of command in which subordinate leaders understand their commander’s intent and act on 

their own initiative to achieve that intent as 

the battlefield evolves.186 Warfighting explains 

180 Warfighting, 60. 181 Otte, Grayisms, 38. 182 Warfighting, 60. 183 Warfighting, 61. 184 Warfighting, 75. 185 Gray October interview.

186 Warfighting, 61–62.

that intent captures the reason for an operation, or the “desired result of the action,” and 

is the “glue” that holds all actions together at 

each level of command.187 A commander’s intent explains why a mission is being carried 

out rather than just how to conduct it.188 Gray 

argued that “intent must be clearly understood 

two echelons up and two echelons down” within a command structure since it will be those 

people in the field who will need to respond to 

changing circumstances, not some distant general; in fact, Gray forcefully held that, without 

a clear commander’s intent, people would wait 

for clear orders and that was a foolish thing to 

do in combat.189 Instead, a clearly conveyed 

commander’s intent helps subordinate leaders 

act on their own when unforeseen opportunities arise. When a commander’s intent is clear 

down the chain of command, Marines can “fight 

smart,” think on their feet, and exploit openings 

to meet the spirit of their mission rather than 

the letter of some particular order.190 This type 

of combat requires constant intellectual engagement at all levels of command, but, the side that 

better delegates authority and institutionalizes 

use of intent will ultimately make decisions faster than its opponent. “Whoever can make and 

implement decisions consistently faster gains 

a tremendous, often decisive advantage,” reads 

Warfighting.

191 This is where John Boyd’s OODA 

loop and stress on the importance of beating 

enemies to key decisions supports the broader 

maneuver warfare philosophy.

Scholars often contrast maneuver warfare 

with attrition warfare. Warfighting makes this 

187 Warfighting, 69. 188 Otte, Grayisms, 39–40. 189 Gray May interview.

190 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 34–35, 114–15. 191 Warfighting, 69.
240 Chapter Three

comparison when discussing the two basic 

forms of combat: fire and movement. Whereas 

maneuver warfare puts a premium on speedy 

and surprising movement to bring force against 

an enemy’s weak spots, finding ways to “circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of 

advantage rather than meet it straight on,” attrition warfare attempts to wear down an enemy 

physically, putting emphasis on larger forces and 

superior firepower.192 Maneuver warfare yields 

the possibility of success “disproportionate to 

the effort made” because the slog of attritional 

fighting is avoided but also carries with it greater risk of catastrophe due to the fickle nature 

of surprise and the increased faith it puts in the 

military judgment of commanders.193 Both styles 

of warfighting featured in American military 

history. In the opening pages of Warfighting, the 

author acknowledges that the approach outlined 

in the book is more akin to that employed by Andrew Jackson, George S. Patton Jr., and Douglas MacArthur rather than the more common 

American approach to war—attrition—that 

had only been possible thanks to the mobilization of the American population and technological base.194 Gray made his views on this debate 

known in a series of interviews and articles 

during his time as Commandant. He contended 

[that] the Marines needed to be “light enough to 

get there, heavy enough to win” and rely on a 

combination of fire and maneuver if they were 

to be successful across a spectrum of conflict, 

from high to low intensity.195 Commenting on 

another occasion, Gray explained that he believed militaries “win by putting together combinations of firepower and maneuver and want 

192 Warfighting, 32. 193 Warfighting, 32. 194 Warfighting, 37. 195 Gray, “Much to Be Proud of, Much to Strive For,” 7; and Gray, 

“Defense Policy for the 1990s,” 21.

to believe that everybody understands that.”196

Still, as Thomas Ricks writes, Gray “emphatically settled a long-running debate about whether [the Marine Corps] would pursue attrition 

warfare or maneuver warfare in favor of the 

latter.”197 Gray saw the purpose for firepower, 

indeed if one is engaged in a maneuver warfare 

way of thinking overwhelming firepower may 

sometimes be the best answer to a tactical or 

operational issue at hand, but only as subordinate to the broader maneuver warfare philosophy.

The inspirations for maneuver warfare underscore the approach’s eclectic features. Eastern strategists clearly inform the style’s use of 

movement, deception, intelligence, and surprise. Gray readily explained that the influence 

of Sun Tzu and his own time fighting and living 

in Asia permeate his strategic worldview.198 But 

there is plenty of Clausewitzian influence as 

well. Gray and his philosophy of warfighting 

place stock in the German’s views on the nature 

of war, most notably the prevalence of friction, 

the fog of war shrouding battlefield knowledge, 

and of course the use of force as an extension 

of politics.199 Similarly, in what is essentially language lifted from On War, the doctrine hails the 

strength of the defense but the necessity of offense to achieve the aims of war.200 Gray made no 

mistake that the concept of commander’s intent, 

so important to maneuver warfare, was inspired 

by Clausewitz’s emphasis on the importance of 

mission-type orders to bend military force in 

the service of political objectives.201 Thus, two 

classic thinkers of strategic studies, Sun Tzu and 

196 Gray, “29th Commandant Speaks to the Corps,” 18.

197 Ricks, Making the Corps, 146. 198 Gray October interview.

199 Warfighting, 15–20. 200 Warfighting, 25. 201 Gray October interview.
Mahnken and Potter 241

Clausewitz, both find their views embedded in 

maneuver warfare, albeit in different ways.

Throughout the late 1970s and all the way 

through the publication of Warfighting in 1989, 

many commentators inside and outside of the 

Corps thought of maneuver warfare as a kind 

of update to German World War II doctrine. 

William Lind and Michael Wyly, each of whom 

knew a great deal about European military 

strategies, pushed aspects of this idea at different times. This was a problem for the adoption 

of maneuver warfare since it led to opposition 

from Marines, who cited Germany’s ultimate 

loss in 1945. Gray came at spreading the logic of 

maneuver warfare from another direction since 

he had come up through the ranks in the Far East 

and was much more in tune with the Chinese 

and Japanese ways of approaching warfare. Gray 

was always less a disciple of Clausewitz than of 

Sun Tzu, but Warfighting clearly blended these 

two lines of thinking together.202 Consider the 

manual’s discussion of surprise, a la Sun Tzu, and 

boldness, an important feature of Clausewitz’s 

thinking. Surprise involves striking the enemy 

when he is unaware and depends on “speed, secrecy, and deception,” while boldness is a kind 

of “creative force” and involves taking the calculated initiative.203 Each relies on the other, 

as surprise may be achieved through boldness 

and the spoils of boldness are enriched thanks 

202 Gray October interview.

203 Warfighting, 33–34.

U.S. Marines with 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, utilize an M1A1 Abrams tank 

during Exercise Steel Knight 18 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, 10 December 2017. Steel Knight 18 is a division-level exercise designed to enhance the command and control and 

interoperability with the 1st Marine Division, its adjacent units, and naval support forces.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Joseph Prado
242 Chapter Three

to surprise. And so, Warfighting can summarize 

its view on how to fight in terms that both Sun 

Tzu and Clausewitz would applaud: “Reduced to 

its simplest terms, we should strike our enemy 

where and when we can hurt him most.”204

Of course, the intellectual foundation of 

maneuver warfare extends beyond Clausewitz 

and Sun Tzu. Historian Frank Hoffman argues 

that the original father of maneuver warfare 

was B. H. Liddell Hart. Yes, from Clausewitz 

came the emphasis on friction, fog, uncertainty, 

and some aspects of war’s human dimension, 

and yes, from Sun Tzu came the importance of 

deception and intelligence; but Liddell Hart, 

writing between 1916 and 1926 in a time much 

like Gray’s post-Vietnam period, focused on 

modern aspects of speed, mobility, and surprise.205 This led to his arguments for an “indirect approach” characterized by mechanized 

breakthrough operations, identification and 

exploitation of enemy gaps using multiple lines 

of attack, and stress not just on physical speed 

but also speedy command thinking to dislocate 

the enemy, break his will, and avoid costly attritional fighting.206 Hoffman contends that Gray 

ultimately took insights from Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart, blended them with the 

work of people like Boyd and Lind, and became 

“the father of modern maneuver warfare.”207

Thus, when Gray turned his attention to Warfighting, the doctrine produced under his watch 

became a clear example [of] maneuver warfare 

and the maneuver warfare thought process codified. Terry Terriff agrees, contending that, in 

the end, Warfighting “was all Gray,” though built 

204 Warfighting, 36. 205 Grant Hammond often makes this point. See Hammond’s presentations to Marine Corps leaders.

206 For Liddell Hart’s thinking on the “indirect approach,” see B. H. 

Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967). 207 Frank Hoffman, correspondence with authors, 28 March 2018.

on the work of his contemporaries and earlier 

strategists.208

Although the twenty-first century U.S. Marine Corps ultimately adopted Gray’s thinking, 

its tenets were the topic of considerable debate 

during his efforts in the 1980s. In particular, the 

debate exploded in the pages of the Marine Corps 

Gazette, the intellectual mess hall of the Corps.209

For example, some wondered if a Marine AirGround Task Force (MAGTF) was the appropriate vehicle for employing maneuver warfare. 

One writer argued that MAGTFs lacked the 

firepower for offensive operations and were too 

slow to move in the ways maneuver warfare required; instead, it was best structured to fight 

defensive attritional warfare, especially in the 

face of a Soviet threat.210 Others quickly countered this line of thinking, writing forcefully in 

the Gazette that the Marine Corps was uniquely 

positioned to employ maneuver warfare in the 

future thanks to its combined arms training and 

expeditionary nature.211

Further discussions focused on just how 

much was really “new” in Warfighting, with some 

of its readers suggesting it was just a rehash of 

common earlier ideas. Major John F. Schmitt, 

the man responsible for putting pen to paper 

for the manual and capturing Gray’s vision for 

the Corps, responded to these critics. “In purely 

conceptual terms, there is nothing new in Warfighting,” he wrote in the Gazette. “War is one of 

the oldest of the endeavors of man: I suspect we 

ran out of truly original ideas on the subject a 

208 Terry Terriff, email correspondence with authors, 2 August 

2017.

209 For an overview of the Marine Corps Gazette’s role in cultivating 

the maneuver warfare concept, see Coram, Boyd, 388–89. 210 J. D. Burke, “Maneuver Warfare and the MAGTF,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 66, no. 9 (September 1982): 66–71. 211 Capt G. I. Wilson et al., “The ‘Maneuver Warfare’ Concept,” 

Marine Corps Gazette 65, no. 4 (April 1981): 49–52; and Michael D. 

Wyly, “Thinking Beyond the Beachhead,” Marine Corps Gazette 67, 

no. 1 (January 1983): 34–38.
Mahnken and Potter 243

long time ago,” he continued before contending 

that “what is new is that, for perhaps the first 

time, Warfighting manages to weave these various [ancient and modern] ideas into a cohesive 

doctrine, and, also for the first time, we have 

made that doctrine official.”212 This defense of 

Warfighting highlights the biggest contribution 

Gray made with the manual’s publication. The 

small book brought together in an actionable 

form longstanding notions in strategy, such as 

surprise and boldness, with new frameworks 

like the OODA loop to produce a coherent approach to combat suitable for the threats Gray 

saw facing the United States at the close of the 

twentieth century. In short, Warfighting practically applied maneuver warfare to a changing 

world.

Asymmetric Warfare and Special Operations

The same lines of thinking driving the production of Warfighting were equally apparent in 

Gray’s contributions to the Marine Corps’ approaches to asymmetric warfare and special operations. By the time he became Commandant, 

Gray was convinced that the future of warfare 

would feature more than conventional combat 

and expand to include a host of nonconventional activities including counterinsurgency, 

counterterrorism, and a variety of humanitarian 

missions. This vision of the future spurred his 

interest in preparing the Marine Corps to operate in these capacities in the future. When Gray 

subsequently acted on the 1986 call from then 

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to 

develop Marine Corps Special Operations Forces (SOF) for small war contingencies, he was 

implementing long incubating ideas.213

212 John F. Schmitt, “The Great FMFM 1 Debate: Is There Anything 

New Here?,” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 1 (November 1989): 

25–26.

213 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 376–78.

Having served in Vietnam, Gray had long 

seen terrorism as a timeless tactic requiring 

special attention to counter.214 He brought this 

view with him into his subsequent commands. 

While director of Development Command 

at MCDEC in the late 1970s, Gray worked to 

prepare Marines for operations against terrorist 

organizations, and in the process began pursuing 

a variety of new equipment, including technology for mine clearing and reconnaissance.215 His 

nascent interest in Marine special operations capable (SOC) units was on clear display during 

these years as Gray hoped to make the Marine 

Corps relevant into the twenty-first century. 

Then Commandant P. X. Kelly requested Fleet 

Marine Forces, Atlantic, to conduct an internal 

review of SOF capabilities in 1983 following the 

Beirut Marine Corps bombing and Secretary 

of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s request for a 

review of American special operations capabilities, a review in which Gray took part. This effort eventually yielded in 1985 a list of 18 SOF 

missions that Marines could execute if properly 

trained and equipped, ultimately leading to the 

development of a SOC Marine Amphibious Unit 

(MAU) just a few years later.216 Among the 18 

special operations missions were hostage rescue, 

recovery operations, maritime interdiction, as 

well as gas and oil platform seizure, all of which 

represented the areas General Gray and his colleagues saw the most potential for Marines to 

make a special operations contribution.217

As commanding general of Fleet Marine 

Forces, Atlantic, Gray also helped usher the 

26th MAU toward SOC status thanks in part to 

214 Gray May interview.

215 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 121–30. 216 Catagnus, “The Intellectual Warrior,” 36–41.

217 For a thoughtful analysis of these missions, see Maj Lawrence D. 

Nicholson, “An Analysis of the Twenty-one Missions of the Marine 

Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)” (thesis, 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994).
244 Chapter Three

his insistence on employing experts from the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to help 

his men train in ways appropriate to their new 

missions.218 The FBI trainers brought with them 

a host of capabilities, most importantly tailored 

hostage rescue and negotiations techniques. In 

the years immediately before his time as Commandant, Gray socialized Marine special operations as an accompaniment to the capabilities 

of other Services; the Corps would not duplicate what other branches of the U.S. military 

already offered, but would instead have its own 

competencies expanding the options available to 

American leaders.219 The general did not want 

the U.S. Marines beholden to other special operations forces, and he sought a complementary, 

218 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 192–98. 219 See “Operational Concept for Marine Amphibious Units Being Special Operations Capable,” 2 April 1987, Box 15, Folder 5, 

GRC, Archives Branch, History Division.

self-sufficient capability suitable for addressing 

some aspects of terrorism and low-intensity 

conflicts.220 Forward deployed Marines, working in MEU-size MAGTFs and building off of 

their preexisting roles, would offer “the widest range of single source resources (air and 

ground), immediately available for use in special 

operations” should the need arise.221 In the end, 

historian Allan Millett describes Gray executing 

the MAU (SOC) program “with messianic conviction” while leading the 2d Division and later 

Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic.222 Frank Hoffman 

suggests that this messianic conviction was motivated by Gray’s personal sense of obligation fol220 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 177. 221 “Marine Corps Order 3120.XX, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable)” (unpublished draft, U.S. 

Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, 1993), 3, as quoted in 

Nicholson, “An Analysis of the Twenty-one Missions of the Marine 

Corps Expeditionary Unit,” 3.

222 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 630.

A four-man fireteam of Marines simulates infiltrating a beachhead to gain information about the enemy and 

its adjacent beaches to help forecast a ship-to-shore landing operation as seen in this 1985 photograph of the 

2d Force Reconnaissance Company, II MEF, Marine Corp Base Camp Lejeune, NC. From left to right: team 

leader LCpl James Scwartz, LCpl Lawrence Gentile, Cpl Michael Norton, and LCpl Samuel Marquet.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Mahnken and Potter 245

lowing the attack on U.S. Marines in Beirut.223

Gray’s thinking about special operations in 

the early 1980s placed him in a position to respond to the 1986 call from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for new special operations 

capabilities across the U.S. military. That same 

year, an amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act established U.S. Special Operations Command in an effort to integrate the special operations capabilities of the Armed Services. Navy 

SEALs, Army Green Berets, and Air Force Combat Controllers, would all be a part of this new 

combatant command, although MAGTFs with 

special operations mission capabilities would 

remain with the Corps.224 This arrangement 

presented new points of friction as the Services 

sought to establish clear lanes and mission responsibilities among them. In this context, Gray’s 

particular vision for SOC Marines was especially effective. After all, his Service was not aspiring to replace existing special operations units. 

His Marines would instead augment the capabilities of the other Services when called on and be 

prepared to serve as special operations first responders of a sort since they were often the first 

forces to respond to some contingency across 

the globe.

It is not surprising that the man so interested in transforming the Marine Corps into a 

maneuver warfare-oriented force also played an 

important role in bringing special operations capabilities to the Corps. Special operations seem 

ready-made for the type of thinking associated 

with maneuver warfare. Delegation of authority, a focus on speed and surprise, a premium 

on intelligence, and the aim of defeating an opponent’s will rather than its forces, among so 

223 Frank Hoffman, email with authors, 26 March 2018.

224 This has subsequently changed, with some Marine special operators serving under U.S. Special Operations Command starting 

in the mid-2000s.

many other concepts, are as readily applied to 

irregular warfare and special operations as they 

are conventional fights. Indeed, special operations may disproportionately benefit from many 

of these approaches to warfare. And so, Gray’s 

efforts to expand the special operations capabilities of the Corps went hand in hand with his 

efforts to move the force away from attritional 

warfare and toward maneuver warfare.

Training and Professional Military Education

Another one of Gray’s lasting contributions to 

the theory and practice of strategy is in the classroom. Much like Clausewitz before him, Gray 

emphasized the importance of a sound military 

education for leaders at every level of command. 

This education featured experiences, both lived 

and vicarious, in the service of developing what 

the general called a “warrior philosophy.” “Every 

Marine a rifleman” goes the saying, embodying the principle that all Marines, regardless of 

specialty, are trained to engage in combat. Gray 

called the men and women serving under him 

“warriors” to underscore this essential aspect of 

the Marine Corps.225 If Marines were to engage 

in maneuver warfare and special operations as 

“warriors,” however, they would need the training and education necessary to realize their potential. If Marines were to delegate authority 

and act on their own impetus to exploit battlefield opportunities, they would doubly need 

new approaches to learning.

Gray eschewed the “zero defect” mentality 

that he saw associated with the post-Vietnam 

Marine Corps, fearing that it would crush the 

calculated risk taking necessary to learn leadership and carry out a commander’s intent.226

Instead, he encouraged training and exercise 

225 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 13. 226 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 300.
246 Chapter Three

activities that offered Marines an opportunity 

to problem solve on their own and in a hands 

on way.227 To reinforce his view of Marines as 

warriors, the general developed Basic Warrior 

Training (BWT) as Commandant. It featured 

hand-to-hand combat instruction, introductions 

to diverse weapons, field activities, and live grenade throwing so that all Marines would have 

the combat training necessary to engage an enemy. BWT also focuses on the history of the Marine Corps, Gray later explaining that “history 

relates to the courage of the person who wears 

the title Marine. . . . History is the glue that 

holds this together . . . [because] a lot of people 

have worn the title Marine, and you don’t want 

to let them down.”228 The general also directed 

that all women in the Marine Corps undergo 

BWT since they too could find themselves in 

combat.229 As always, every Marine a rifleman.

Meanwhile, Gray founded the Marine AirGround Training and Education Center at Quantico as part of his curricular overhaul and 

engaged it to supervise training across the entire Corps, standardizing all aspects of Marine 

training.230 This training was put to practical use 

in exercises, realistic maneuvers that from even 

his earliest years were a trademark of Gray’s 

commands. He stressed the importance of free 

play, force-on-force exercises absent scripting 

and featuring earnest post-exercise “hot wash” 

evaluations with Marines from all levels of com227 Gray May interview.

228 Ricks, Making the Corps, 66. 229 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 325–29. 230 Gray explained the purpose and foundation of the Marine AirGround Training and Education Center to members of the U.S. 

Senate; see Gray Senate statement.

mand, including noncommissioned officers.231

These hot washes reflected Gray’s belief that 

continuous improvement was possible only 

through critique of the rationale for actions, not 

just their outcome; after all, mistakes offered 

real opportunities to learn and improve, and 

understanding why they occurred in an exercise 

was the only way to avoid them on the battlefield.232 This approach to exercises reflected the 

general’s belief that experience was the best 

teacher for would-be warriors.

Training thus took a special place in supporting Gray’s approach to strategy. But there 

was more to Gray’s educational vision than 

training on the ranges and proving ground of 

Twentynine Palms and Camp Lejeune. Gray saw 

himself as a “teacher or coach” throughout his 

years in the Corps, one who aimed to persuade 

instead of distantly barking at those he might 

mentor.233 “If Marines don’t have a lifelong idea 

of learning, then they will not rise to the top of 

their profession; nor will they maintain the . . . 

professional confidence that [they] . . . need,” remarked Gray during his time as Commandant.234

In this spirit, he encouraged all of those under 

his command, eventually every Marine in the 

United States, to engage with productive professional military education. For example, as a 

colonel in command on Okinawa, he established 

programs for young Marines to get high school 

or college credit even while on the faraway island. And so, his longstanding and simple advice 

stood even at this early point of his career: study 

231 Gray October interview. For Gray’s training vision as Commandant, see Gray, “Annual Report of the Marine Corps, 1987.” 

For his update on initial progress, especially the establishment of 

the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, see Alfred 

Gray, “Annual Report of the Marine Corps, 1988,” Box 2, Folder 

9, GRC, Archives Branch, History Division.

232 Otte, Grayisms, 46. 233 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 41. 234 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 29.
Mahnken and Potter 247

what you do not know, that is what you need to 

learn.235

Fellow Marine Colonel Gerald H. Turley 

recalls that Gray’s “goal all along was to make 

every possible effort to train and educate the 

Marine Corps’ future leaders. . . . He reminded us that the greater challenge and most lasting reward was to make every possible effort to 

train and educate the Marine Corps’ future leaders.”236 Central to Gray’s educational aims and 

broad conception of strategy was the cultivation 

of leadership at all levels. Only careful training 

and education could make broad mission-type 

orders work, prepare junior officers to take 

over for their seniors, and cultivate cohesion at 

all levels of command and unit. This entire notion was rooted in caring for those under one’s 

command and honestly presenting oneself as a 

leader worth following by taking actions consistent with words.237 Gray would often say “those 

who can’t teach—can’t lead,” explicitly linking 

education with leadership.238 And so, leaders are 

also educators, and educators make the kind of 

fighting man and women necessary to execute 

something like maneuver warfare.

By the time Gray became Commandant, he 

was ready to institutionalize many of his views 

on professional military education (PME) that 

had been percolating since his time first developing training in the late 1970s. His goal: teaching military judgment in lieu of rote learning.239

This took several forms. For example, reforms 

at the Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) that 

took place while Gray was Commandant began incorporating seminars and staff rides designed for the in-depth study of specific battles 

235 Gray October interview.

236 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 120. 237 Otte, Grayisms, 24–27. 238 Otte, Grayisms, 32. 239 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 304.

and campaigns; an experience that helped them 

think about war rather than just think about the 

nuts and bolts of serving as an office in the Fleet 

Marine Forces.240 During his time as part of the 

Joint Chiefs, Gray also revitalized the Marine 

Corps Base Library at Quantico in the image 

of the Air Force’s facility at Maxwell Air Force 

Base, taking it from a dusty and underused reading room to the national Marine Corps Research 

Center, and established the Marine Corps University to guide PME for Marines at all levels.241

He led the effort to expand the role of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC), renamed the Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 

having it work directly with Fleet Marine Forces 

to identify needs, develop doctrine, make assessments, share operational concepts, and generally improve the training needed to fight. General 

Gray would rely on the newly constituted MCCDC to help him transform the entire Marine 

Corps into a maneuver warfare organization.242

In his instructions to its inaugural commander, 

Gray stressed that his “intent in PME is to teach 

military judgment rather than knowledge. . . . I 

want marine NCOs and officers who know how 

to think about—and in war, who know how 

to conceptualize an engagement, a battle, and 

a campaign and then execute the concept.”243

Additionally, Gray established the Commandant’s Reading List in 1988. In the foreword, 

he explained to his Marines that “reading is an 

important way to enhance our understanding of war . . . therefore, my order to you is to 

240 Terry Terriff, email with authors, 8 April 2018.

241 Gray October interview; and Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 304–7. 242 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 311–12. 243 Commandant of the Marine Corps to Commanding General, 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1 July 1989, Box 

4, Folder 11, GRC, Archives Branch, History Division.
248 Chapter Three

read.” 244 Reading was not just about becoming 

better warriors, however, as Gray observed that 

it “will help keep us anchored in our democratic 

ideals and up-to-date in this changing world.”245

This list suggested readings for Marines of all 

ranks, from corporal to general, designed to expand not just their understanding of the Marine 

Corps, but also its place in the wider world and 

the ways by which to approach PME. It was the 

first time enlisted Marines had a reading list of 

their own.

All of these views on training and education found their way into Warfighting. “The Marine Corps’ style of warfare requires intelligent 

leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels,” reads the book 

244 Professional Reading Statement, Box 4, Folder 11, GRC, Archives Branch, History Division.

245 Professional Reading Statement.

in a clear manifestation of Gray’s thinking. Unsurprisingly, Warfighting warns against a “zerodefect mentality” and lauds taking calculated 

risks in learning.246 It also stresses the need for 

realistic exercises to test the products of training, highlighting the importance simulating the 

uncertainty, stress, and friction of combat while 

lauding post-exercise critiques designed to cultivate self-analysis for improvement.247 In its 

clearest explanation for the importance of continuous learning, Warfighting argues that “professional military education is designed to develop 

creative, thinking leaders.”248 And to facilitate 

the development of these leaders, the very kind 

of leaders needed for maneuver warfare to be 

successful, the book puts the responsibility for 

246 Warfighting, 45. 247 Warfighting, 47–49. 248 Warfighting, 49.

Through its resident and nonresident programs, Marine Corps University develops the professional competence of its Marines and other Service, international, and civilian students. Graduates are prepared to 

perform with increased effectiveness in Service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and across the range of military operations. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Marine Corps University
Mahnken and Potter 249

professional military education on three entities: the Marine Corps, commanders, and individual Marines.249 The Marine Corps would 

be an educated organization, to lead to was to 

teach, to train was to prepare to fight smart, and 

to be a fighting Marine was to constantly improve oneself. Many of the themes so central to 

Gray’s training and PME reforms found themselves most convincingly drawn in the pages of 

Warfighting. And in the end, the general’s goal 

was to do so much more than make some kind 

of doctrine, but rather to change the way Marine culture, to change the way Marines thought 

about fighting.250

Technology

The nature of war is timeless, but the means 

used to conduct it change. Gray understood this 

Clausewitzian insight well, and worked hard to 

consider how modern technologies might be 

integrated with his vision of maneuver warfare 

and special operations. Warfighting highlights how 

technology may gain advantage on the battlefield, 

especially for the side that first integrates new 

advancements into its way of war, and it was 

this advantage that Gray often sought with his 

own technology acquisitions.251 Still, technology does little for the force adopting it if it is 

hard to use or does not fit established doctrine 

and tactics. For Marines, an amphibious force, 

technology that enhanced lift at sea or mobility 

to an enemy, like helicopters and short takeoff 

aircraft, were of special value to Gray, especially in realizing maneuver warfare; however, 

equipment that enabled “overcontrol of units 

249 Warfighting, 50. 250 Terry Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and 

Organizational Culture in the U.S. Marine Corps,” Defence Studies 6, no. 2 (June 2006): 215–47, https://doi.org/10.1080

/14702430601056139. 251 Warfighting, 14.

in battle” was not conducive to maneuver warfare and consequently avoided.252 Warfighting also 

warns against an “overreliance on technology” 

and stresses that “technology cannot and should 

not attempt to eliminate man from the process 

of waging war” even as it may offer temporary 

advantages.253 War is between men, as Gray well 

understood, and his major technological pursuits were in the spirit of equipping men not 

manning equipment.

The risks associated with technological integration into warfare are tempered by their benefits and mitigated by thoughtful adoption. This 

recognition led Gray to play important roles in 

the adaption of several military platforms that 

would help the Marine Corps realize his maneuver warfare vision, especially the light armored 

vehicle (LAV) and the [Bell Boeing] V-22 Osprey vertical takeoff tiltrotor aircraft, among 

other technologies. As a brigadier general in 

1980, Gray worked hard to bring the LAV into 

the Corps after experimenting with motorized 

Marine infantry in NATO exercises. If maneuver 

warfare depended on speed, light mechanization 

could help realize this aim, giving the Marine 

Corps a “quick-strike capability that could both 

move rapidly across the battlefield.”254 Although 

movement is central to maneuver warfare, and 

often mechanized forces facilitate rapid movement, not all mechanized warfare is maneuver 

warfare and surely not all maneuver warfare is 

mechanized. Gray thus sought to find the right 

platform for the Marine Corps and worked to 

explain that the LAV offered movement in support of maneuver warfare; it was not just any 

new vehicle. In congressional testimony to secure the LAV, Gray argued that the platform 

252 Warfighting, 52. 253 Warfighting, 53. 254 Catagnus, “The Intellectual Warrior,” 36–41.
250 Chapter Three

would offer “a significant new dimension in terms 

of both firepower and mobility, particularly our 

ability to conduct maneuver warfare, which we 

are most interested in improving upon.”255 Here 

255 Michael N. Peznola, “Marine Light Armor 1980–1999 Operational Goals, Tactical Results: A Study in the Dynamics of Change” 

(paper, School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, November 1999), 3, as quoted in Catagnus, “The Intellectual 

Warrior,” 36–41.

was a piece of technology that supported the 

evolving doctrine of the Marine Corps and 

Gray’s particular maneuver warfare vision. It 

was technology with a purpose.

The V-22 [Osprey] also fit neatly into Gray’s 

vision of a Marine Corps capable of deploying 

from a ship to a target deep inland in support 

of maneuver warfare operations against a conA Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (VMM-263) taxis on the flight line 

at Marine Corps Air Station New River, NC, in this painting by combat artist SSgt Kristopher J. Battles.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
Mahnken and Potter 251

ventional adversary or in special operations missions. His role in acquiring and integrating this 

technology was more political, however, than 

his experience with the LAV. In the fall of 1987, 

as Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb debated the 

future of the V-22 program, Gray worked with 

his civilian superior to recognize the importance 

of a “from the sea and over the horizon” capability.256 After a series of conversations culminating 

an hours-long meeting with Webb, Gray secured 

the secretary’s support for the aircraft. Today, 

the V-22 is a mainstay of Marine Corps operations around the world. It offered a unique capability—vertical takeoff coupled with the range 

of a fixed wing aircraft—allowing Marines to 

move in force by the air from a sea-based loca256 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 321–23.

tion to a target on land hundreds of miles away. 

Not only did it help make the Marines a more 

maneuverable force, it also offered valuable 

medivac options to American forces in combat 

zones. Thus, by adopting a new technology Gray 

helped strengthen not just his maneuver warfare 

and special operations goals, but he also helped 

keep troops in harm’s way safer, another longtime goal of his leadership.

The LAV and V-22 were not pet projects 

of a general devoted to some new technological advancement. Rather, they were deliberate 

projects designed to enable the Marine Corps 

to fight as Gray envisioned they should. Gray’s 

catholic understanding of maneuver warfare, his 

philosophy of war, never necessarily required 

new technologies. Clever ruses, dogged intelliU.S. Marine light armored vehicles maneuver on W. P. T. Hill Field during the closing ceremony of Exercise 

Cooperative Osprey ’96. Conducted by Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, in August 1996 at Camp Lejeune, 

NC, the U.S. Atlantic Command-sponsored exercise provides interoperability training in peacekeeping and 

humanitarian operations along NATO/Implementation Force standards, with an emphasis on individual and 

collective skills. 

Official U.S. Army photo, courtesy of Sgt W. L. Davis
252 Chapter Three

gence work, careful planning, and high-quality 

training could all help facilitate the speed and 

surprise so essential to this more fluid way of 

war. However, these two projects were readymade opportunities for modern technological 

advances to enhance an approach to strategy, 

to complement it and make it just a bit more 

effective. Strategists like Gray do not focus on 

the whizbang features of the latest platforms. Instead, they help envision the types of technology 

that are congruent with their way of war and 

then field those tools like any other. Technology is not a substitute for strategic thinking; it 

often multiplies the positive effects of strategy 

when well matched and undercut them when 

poorly matched. The LAV and V-22 were well 

matched and consequently became mainstays of 

the twenty-first century Marine Corps.

CONCLUSION—

THE LEGACY OF ALFRED GRAY

General Alfred Gray is an American strategist 

who is often overlooked by those outside a close 

circle of Marines. He was not a strategist in any 

theoretical sense. Indeed, most of the ideas he espoused were in circulation for many years. What 

he did was make those ideas work, unifying doctrinal enhancements with improved training and 

Ahead of a U.S.-led Joint Task Force Exercise on the eastern seaboard of the United States, HMS Illustrious 

welcomed the very first embarkation of a U.S. Marine Corps Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey onto a United Kingdom ship.

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of Darby Allen
Mahnken and Potter 253

equipment procurement over the course of his 

career to successfully leave a lasting, and many 

argue positive, mark on the Marine Corps.257 He 

overcame the practical, political, and personnel obstacles in the way of the Corps adopting 

maneuver warfare and special operations capabilities. In the process, he refined the associated 

ideas, linking them to advancements in training, 

education, and technology that mutually supported one another. This is an important legacy, one few American strategists hold, and one 

that practitioners of strategy would benefit from 

studying.

Gray’s contributions appear durable. His 

time as Commandant came to a close as the 

Gulf War came to a successful conclusion, a war 

that featured the American Marines fighting just 

as he envisioned them—far from the beaches, 

moving quickly in dispersed units, executing 

broad mission-type orders, and avoiding cost257 The authors appreciate George Flynn stressing the importance 

of Gray achieving unity across many different lines of effort.

ly attrition warfare. Marine General Walter E. 

Boomer, the senior Marine commander in the 

Gulf War, would later recall that many of the 

technologies Gray had a role in integrating into 

the Marine Corps, including the LAV, played 

important roles U.S. Marines overwhelming 

Saddam Hussein’s forces.258 And as America’s 

battlefield moved to Afghanistan and back again 

to Iraq, Gray’s vision remained relevant. Marines found themselves fighting irregular wars 

using combined arms in units of varying sizes 

and in so doing employed maneuver warfare 

and special operations concepts well into the 

twenty-first century, just as Gray had predicted they would. That seemingly timeless insights 

into the nature of warfare, some drawing on 

thinkers as far back as Sun Tzu, remain relevant 

over this modern period of time might not be 

surprising, but it is noteworthy.

But relevance and success are not the same. 

The legacy of Gray’s strategic vision remains 

contested if only because the history surrounding the military endeavors in which his approach 

was apply is so fresh and open to interpretation. 

On one hand, the maneuver warfare and special operations concepts Gray advocated are so 

broad and apparently universal that critiquing 

them seems a dubious task. Who would argue 

with the notion of striking the enemy where one 

can hurt him most? But for all his efforts to build 

a coherent approach to strategy, one can imagine critiques of Gray’s approach and question 

its implications for the more distant future. For 

example, one might argue that the ideas Gray 

promulgated are so open-ended as to be meaningless. What does it mean to strike an enemy 

where you can most hurt him? Alternatively, 

one might question whether surprise is regu258 Turley, Journey of a Warrior, 453–54.

Col H. Avery Chenoweth’s Kuwait International Secured captures the intense tank battle between the 

United States and Iraq’s Ba’th Party that occurred 

on 27 February 1991, during the first Gulf War. Oil 

on masonite.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 

2012.1005.136
254 Chapter Three

larly achievable and thus wonder if a key tenet of maneuver warfare is lame out of the gate. 

Moreover, one might ask if it is even possible to 

understand an enemy’s worldview well enough 

to exploit it and achieve deception. Another dilemma comes up when considering Marine special operations. By training for such missions, 

the Marine Corps was necessarily preparing itself for low intensity conflict, but such a force 

may well be at a disadvantage in a conventional 

war having traded firepower and endurance for 

speed and movement.

These potential criticisms aside, serious 

strategists ultimately benefit from deeply considering Gray because his approach to warfare is 

a synthesis of and a response to many of the most 

important ideas in the field of strategic studies. 

His strategic vision reinterprets, builds on, refines, and reinterprets so many foundational approaches to warfare that to discount Gray out of 

hand is nearsighted. After all, similar criticism 

might be applied to Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart, 

and those men receive plenty of attention in 

classrooms and headquarters around the world. 

Gray would likely welcome future strategists to 

engage with, debate, and attempt to improve 

on his strategic vision, arguing such reflection 

is essential to crafting sound strategy just as “hot 

washes” are essential to learning from exercises.

Years after retiring from the Marine Corps, 

Gray argued that developing “street smarts” 

about how the world really works is essential 

to developing sound strategy, and he continued 

to hold that the precepts of maneuver warfare 

U.S. Marine LCpl Andrew Eisel, a rifleman with Company L, Battalion Landing Team 3/1, 13th Marine 

Expeditionary Unit, fast ropes out of an MV-22B Osprey from VMM-166 Reinforced, aboard the Wasp-class 

amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2), 20 November 2018.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl A. J. Van Fredenberg
Mahnken and Potter 255

were as relevant in a boardroom as they were 

on a battlefield.259 Gray maintained that good 

strategy comes from people thinking creatively 

and historically [those] who aim to understand 

the reasons for events and recognize that there 

is no textbook solution to strategic challenges. 

For all its potential flaws, the philosophy of warfighting, or perhaps even more accurately the 

philosophy of how to think about warfighting, 

put forth by Gray encourages critical probing 

of assumptions about how the world works and 

welcomes subversion of conventional wisdom, 

even if that conventional wisdom is maneuver 

warfare itself. The challenge today for Marines 

and others attempting to implement Gray’s vision for warfare is to avoid looking at his intellectual legacy as one of doctrine, but rather as a 

flexible, adaptable way of prosecuting not just 

war, but any competitive endeavor.260 Looking at 

potential threats to the United States in the near 

future, cross-domain rivalry in areas spanning 

cyberspace to outer space are all competitions 

that Gray holds would benefit from the application of a maneuver warfare mindset, of course 

in addition to more traditional land, sea, and air 

domains.261

259 Gray and a colleague from higher education actually set out to 

do just this in a small book project. See Alfred Gray and Paul Otte, 

The Conflicted Leader and Vantage Leadership (Columbus, OH: Franklin University Press, 2006). On “street smarts,” see Gray, “Much to 

Be Proud of, Much to Strive For,” 20.

260 Terry Terriff, email with authors, 8 April 2018.

261 Gray May interview.

Finally, although this is not a paper about 

Gray’s approach to leading the Marine Corps, 

his special reputation among Marines warrants 

mention, if only as an example of the type of 

leadership he hoped to inculcate in his subordinates. One author has gone so far to say that 

“no other Commandant before—or since—has 

garnered as much appreciation from both officers and enlisted Marines.”262 Another contends 

that he employed a “rustic populist” style and 

featured an “aversion to anything but operations.”263 These reputations likely sprang from 

his teacher persona, his insistence on looking 

out for “his Marines,” and his willingness to 

challenge conventional wisdom and succeed in 

implementing his vision. Author Thomas Ricks 

contends that Gray and Secretary of the Navy 

Jim Webb arguably “[made] the Corps what it 

is today.”264 Gray’s style of leadership, whatever 

one may think of his approach to warfare, won 

him the respect of those serving him and a lasting, positive legacy in the organization he led. 

Those are special achievements all their own and 

well worth emulating.

262 Catagnus, “The Intellectual Warrior,” 36–41.

263 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 632. 264 Ricks, Making the Corps, 133.
256

WHY CYBERWAR WILL NOT 

AND SHOULD NOT HAVE 

ITS GRAND STRATEGIST

by Martin C. Libicki

Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2014265

be sure, cyberwar has no shortage of advocates. 

But as Colin S. Gray recently observed, “When 

historians in the future seek to identify a classic book or two on cyber power written in the 

1990s and 2000s, they will be hard pressed to 

locate even the shortest of short-listable items. 

. . . Certainly they are nowhere near deserving 

(oxymoronic) instant classic status.”267

But has the failure of cyberwar to generate any such ideal necessarily been a bad thing? 

There is a case to be made that it is too early to 

expect such a classic. If the owl of Minerva flies 

at dusk in cyberspace, the sun is just above the 

are like Gen William (‘Billy’) Mitchell and the pioneer league of 

airmen. They see the potential. Mitchell’s vision of the potential 

for airpower drove, at great cost to himself but great benefit to 

the nation, the development of a new form of warfare,” in Stein, 

“Information Warfare,” Air Power Journal (Spring 1995); and Robert M. Lee writing in Air & Space Power Journal in 2013: “theorists 

and military officers, including Gen Giulio Douhet, Marshal of 

the Royal Air Force Hugh Trenchard, and Brig Gen William ‘Billy’ 

Mitchell, helped guide the direction of airpower. As cyberspace 

reaches its full potential as a do-main of warfare equal to the traditional domains, we—like those leaders—must vector it properly,” 

in Lee, “The Interim Years of Cyberspace,” Air & Space Power Journal

24, no. 3 (2012).

267 Colin S. Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky 

Is Not Falling (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2013), viii.

Cyberwar proponents often argue the domain needs its own [Brigadier General 

William] Mitchell or Giulio Douhet—

strategists with great vision who will declare to 

the world what great power lies therein.266 To 

265 The original article came from Martin C. Libicki, “Why Cyber 

War Will Not and Should Not Have Its Grand Strategist,” Strategic 

Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 23–39. Minor revisions 

were made to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

266 To those who think the argument in favor of finding a Billy 

Mitchell for cyberspace is a straw man, note the following requests 

from Frank J. Cilluffo, former special assistant to the president for 

homeland security: “We must find the cyber equivalents of Billy 

Mitchell, George Patton, Curtis LeMay and Bill Donovan—leaders who understand both the tactical and strategic uses of new 

technologies and weapons,” in Cilluffo and J. Richard Knopf, 

“Getting Serious about Cyberwarfare,” Journal of International Security Affairs, no. 23 (Fall/Winter 2012): 41–47; Stewart A. Baker, 

former general counsel of the National Security Agency: “As BrigGen Billy Mitchell predicted, airpower allowed a devastating and 

unprecedented strike on our ships in Pearl Harbor. We responded 

with an outpouring of new technologies, new weapons and new 

strategies. Today the threat of new cyber weapons is just as real, 

but we have responded with an outpouring—not of technology 

or strategy but of law review articles, legal opinions and legal restrictions,” in Baker and Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “What Is the Role 

of Lawyers in Cyberwarfare?,” ABA Journal (May 2012); Robert 

Cringely, an influential columnist in the IT trade press: “My fear 

is that when it comes to cyber war-fare there is no Billy Mitchell today in Washington,” in Cringely, “Remember Billy Mitchell,” 

I, Cringely . . . on Technology (blog), 1 June 2009; George J. Stein 

writing in Air Power Journal in 1995: “In some ways, ‘info-warriors’ 
Libicki 257

yardarm; the information revolution is hardly a 

done deal. But such a case is too easy. What if 

the fundamental features of cyberwar were to 

remain essentially as they are into the indefinite 

future? Although highly unlikely, this is not so 

absurd a proposition. The late Roger C. Molander of Rand would frequently remind me 

that the questions we wrestled with in the mid1990s are no less relevant and no better understood today than they were then. 

Even assuming that the cyber domain has 

yet to stop evolving, it is not clear that a classic 

strategic treatment of cyberwar is possible, or, 

even if it were, it would be particularly beneficial. In explaining why, this article makes three 

points. First, the salutary effects of such classics 

are limited. Second, the basic facts of cyberspace, and hence cyberwar, do not suggest that 

it would be nearly as revolutionary as airpower 

has been, or anything close. Third, more speculatively, if there were a classic on cyberwar, it 

would likely be pernicious.

THE LIMITED USEFULNESS 

OF CLASSICS

Clausewitz’s On War was, is, and will continue 

to be perhaps the classic book on warfare, but it 

would be an exaggeration to argue that it was an 

“instant classic.” It was published posthumously. 

Its influence spread slowly—within a generation 

in Germany and not until after 1945 in the United States. Furthermore, it really is not a book 

that gained its reputation by talking about land 

warfare as such. True, all of its chapters between 

the introduction and conclusion are about land 

warfare. But what made it a classic was its treatment of war itself—that is, the role and purpose 

of military force within the relations among 

states and the relationship between the goals of 

war and its reality in battle (fog and friction). 

In the naval domain, the name Mahan is 

clearly front and center. Mahan lauded naval power as essential to the maintenance of a 

seafaring state, especially one that wanted to 

maintain a global empire—not an irrelevant 

consideration circa 1890 when he published The 

Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 

(such historic dates suggest he was not overly 

impressed by technology fads). His book argued 

strenuously for large battle fleets, which by their 

very presence and concentration (fleet in being) 

After taking fire the night before from a position 

overlooking their perimeter at Kandahar International Airport, Marines in Afghanistan with the 

Combined Anti-Armor Team assigned to the 26th 

Marine Expeditionary Unit set trip flares in the 

doorway of a suspected Taliban position to warn 

them should the enemy return. CWO-2 Michael D. 

Fay, Setting Trip Flares, Kandahar.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
258 Chapter Three

could dissuade other states from trying to assert 

sea control on their own behalf. He eschewed 

the Jeune Ècole preference for commerce raiding.268

Mahan’s work was enormously influential 

inside the United States (an inspiration for Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet), and perhaps even more outside it. Kaiser Wilhelm was 

particularly enchanted by it, as were, to only a 

slightly lesser extent, [Admiral John A.] Jackie 

Fisher and the British Royal Navy. Although the 

expensive Anglo-German naval rivalry cannot 

be entirely laid at Mahan’s doorstep, his influence was not trivial, and the rivalry over battleship building hardly played a calming role in that 

bilateral relationship. 

As for naval strategy, Mahan’s work was not 

particularly helpful for those who believed in 

his doctrine. The Kaiser’s love for his fleet kept 

it in port for the two and a half years after the 

Battle of Jutland, even though Germany might 

have had a chance—admittedly, with a substantial amount of luck—to break the blockade on 

it and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This blockade ultimately accelerated the Central Powers 

breaking under the stress of war before the Allies did. Meanwhile, the naval action that nearly 

broke the war the other way was the success of 

German U-boat attacks on Britain’s supply lines 

to North America. In retrospect, the more decisive use for naval power in World War I was 

closer—albeit with submarines, not surface 

ships—to the commerce raiding that Mahan 

disdained 25 years earlier in favor of grand fleet 

actions. He had argued these fleet actions were 

the sine qua non of naval power. 

268 The term Jeune Ècole refers to a naval strategy adopted by France 

that changed the focus from a battleship-centric fleet to smaller 

ships armed with torpedoes intended to overwhelm larger warships.

All this suggests that the global enthusiasm 

over Mahan’s writing—which was an instant 

classic—was good neither for world peace nor 

a productive naval strategy. Perhaps these are 

tough tests for any analyst to pass, but if we are 

to laud the writing of great strategic formulations these are not unfair evaluations. 

Consider now airpower. Three individuals 

stand out in the development of post–World 

War I strategic thought: the writer Giulio Douhet 

and generals Billy Mitchell and [Marshal of the 

Royal Air Force] Hugh Trenchard. All three 

argued that air forces would become an increasingly important component of modern 

militaries and that military strategy should, correspondingly, reflect that fact. In that insight, 

they were correct. 

Douhet went further to emphasize the role 

of strategic bombardment in not only winning 

future wars, but also shortening them; in that 

respect—if World War II was any indication—

he was not correct. There is an important distinction to be made between the tactical or 

operational use of airpower to aid ground and 

naval forces and its strategic use: to break the 

enemy’s will to resist and destroy its ability 

to arm itself. In theory, air forces can do both 

operational and strategic missions; in practice, 

their resources are limited, and funds used for 

strategic purposes compete for resources used 

operationally. 

This leads to the question: Was World War 

II’s emphasis on the strategic campaign such a 

good idea? In the first major war in which this 

proposition could be truly tested, only three 

countries were capable of mounting a serious 

strategic bombing campaign—first Germany, 

then the United Kingdom [UK], and the United States. Germany’s efforts did not seem to 

have accomplished much; it did not force the 
Libicki 259

UK out of the war nor make much of a dent in 

its war production. The United States and UK 

bombing campaigns certainly had effects, but 

these effects were purchased at great cost—the 

8th Air Force alone suffered more than 50,000 

deaths (by comparison, the entire U.S. Pacific 

campaign cost twice as many lives). The succeeding decades saw considerable controversy 

over whether such bombing campaigns were 

worthwhile, with detractors saying they increased Germany’s will to resist and, only toward 

the very end, impaired its ability to produce war 

materiel. A recent prominent defense of strategic bombing by Richard J. Overy maintains they 

were worthwhile, not for what harm they did 

to the Germans, but for how much Germany 

spent (mostly wasted) to counter them.269 Even 

if true, that is a far cry from Douhet’s rationale: 

“air power will demoralize foes” to “air power 

will cause foes to overreact in self-defense.” Admittedly, a [Boeing] B-29 [Superfortress] loaded 

with nuclear weapons can have a considerably 

greater effect than a B-29 loaded with conventional weapons—a victory for airpower, but 

only for 15 years until missiles were invented to 

do the job more efficiently and reliably. Furthermore, it took until NATO’s campaign in Kosovo 

before there was a first, albeit even then arguable, validation of Douhet’s thesis. 

If the strategic implications of airpower 

were poorly understood by virtue of their being 

exaggerated, the operational implications of airpower à la Billy Mitchell (and many others at the 

time, if not so dramatically) were on point. Airpower would rise in importance relative to land 

and sea weapons. At sea, by 1942, the carrier 

was universally recognized as the replacement 

for the battleship, although the carrier was under firm naval control. Only a half-century after 

World War I, success in gaining air control—

the 1967 Six-Day War and Operations Desert 

Storm and Iraqi Freedom—predisposed and 

foretold success in ground combat at least over 

uncluttered terrain. 

The basis for Billy Mitchell’s optimism 

was, in retrospect, clear. Every year, aircraft 

became faster; flew higher, farther, and longer; 

and could carry more weight (weapons but also 

cargo). Antiaircraft weapons were improving 

but not so quickly, [where] targeting radar and 

analog computing helped but only somewhat. 

269 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton, 

1997). Incidentally, his most recent book, The Bombing War: Europe, 

1939–1945 (New York: Penguin, 2013), is far more critical of the 

entire air campaign.

A Lattice Modular Heli-Drone is displayed during 

a test run of the Lattice Platform Security System 

at the Red Beach training area, Marine Corps Base 

Camp Pendleton, CA, 8 November 2018. The 

Lattice Modular Heli-Drone was being tested to 

demonstrate its capabilities and potential for increasing security. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Dylan 

Chagnon
260 Chapter Three

Nor were ground or sea-based weaponry getting more impervious to bomb damage all that 

quickly. Technology was inexorably shifting the 

dominance of battle to the skies. That being 

so, every other decision about the conduct of 

battle would have to factor the shift-in-power 

relationships from ground and surface to air accordingly. 

As noted, nothing boosted airpower as 

much as the development of atomic weapons, 

which seemed to have validated Douhet’s thesis, 

at least ex post facto. The U.S. Air Force came to 

absorb almost half of the nation’s defense budget 

in the [Dwight D.] Eisenhower administration. 

Clearly, a single weapon capable of knocking out 

cities was going to have a strategic effect on both 

war and warfare. So, were there any classics in 

this new atomic field, and what good did they do?

The first place to look was a set of essays by 

Bernard Brodie for the book, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, wherein can be 

found his famous quote: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to 

win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be 

to avert them. It can have almost no other useful 

purpose.”270 His essays do mention deterrence, 

but the thrust of his writing was not about how 

to use atomic forces but to drive home the point 

that a country under serious atomic attack (i.e., 

thousands of atomic bombs) would be effectively destroyed regardless of how well defended it 

was. Indeed, his essay spends more time on how 

270 Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World 

Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946).

A Marine with Task Force Southwest catches the InstantEye small unmanned aerial system (UAS) following 

a flight at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC, 8 February 2017. The drone allows operators to record 

surveillance and execute reconnaissance in small, confined areas that are otherwise inoperable with larger 

aircraft. Approximately 300 Marines are assigned to Task Force Southwest, whose mission is to train, advise, 

and assist the Afghan National Army 215th Corps and 505th Zone National Police. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Sgt Lucas Hopkins
Libicki 261

to lay out cities to maximize their survivability in an atomic war than it does contemplating 

what a strategy of deterrence might mean for 

the construction and the use of forces. So, instant classic quote but no instant classic work. 

More works followed in the 1950s by Albert Wohlstetter on the importance of a secondstrike capability, Tom Schelling on strategies that 

“left something to chance,” and Herman Kahn 

on the need for escalation dominance.271 It was 

undoubtedly brilliant stuff, but was it necessarily a wise way to fight—or, better yet, avoid—a 

nuclear war? The classic model of a nuclear confrontation featured ultra-cool decision makers 

rationally facing the prospect of mega deaths 

and maneuvering deftly to avoid that and worse. 

The actual conduct of a nuclear crisis (e.g., 

Cuba, 1962) suggested something a little different: world leaders, having stared at the abyss, 

realized they had come far too close to a nuclear holocaust and never ever wanted to get that 

close again. Reactions to that near catastrophe 

included the hotline and the 1963 test ban treaty. Rather than each side making noises as if it 

would throw the steering wheel out the window 

(as Schelling’s strategy suggested), each instituted measures to ensure and assure others that 

it had a much better grip. Similarly, strategic 

thinking, deprived of direct evidence of Soviet 

thought, tended to assume that the Soviet Union 

would approach a confrontation much as Americans would—that is, by carefully delineating, if 

not necessarily observing, a firebreak between 

conventional and nuclear operations. The opening of the Soviet archives in 1989 indicated that 

such delineations were not particularly import271 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959): 211–34; Thomas C. Schelling, The 

Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 

1960); and Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios 

(New York: Praeger, 1965).

ant to them. Fortunately, no one ever had to go 

to war based on these strategic theories. 

Incidentally, none of this infers that such 

thinkers did not educate the mind by raising key 

questions. Even when wrong, one cannot help 

but profit by working through arguments and, 

in some cases, asking whether their logic applies 

to cyberspace. Unfortunately, when such thinkers are cited as authorities—which they inevitably are—their arguments are converted into 

answers, at least in the minds of their adherents. 

The next two domains of conflict—space and 

spectrum—have no comparably memorable 

strategic doctrines or assessments associated 

with them at all. This, alone, should raise the 

question of why cyberspace should. Once touted 

as the really high ground, outer space turns out 

to be merely a nifty place to stick information 

collection/processing devices—surveillance satellites, communications relays, and timing/navigation systems (e.g., GPS)—and it is not clear 

that space will always remain competitive vis-àvis networked unmanned air-breathing systems 

for the first two roles. Space is not a particularly good place from which to fight wars. It costs 

a great deal to get something into orbit, and 

the price per pound has not appreciably fallen 

since the 1970s. Space-based weapons are not 

only expensive but, in their current incarnation, take longer to reach their targets than do 

simple missiles—deorbiting something actually 

takes some time.272 Space systems are also quite 

fragile in the sense that they can be destroyed 

by a very small object hitting head-on at a relative speed of 36,000 miles an hour, assuming 

they are both in low Earth orbit. In a contest 

between a ground-based missile and a satellite, 

the odds these days are on the missile. So, much 

272 For a good general treatment, see Robert Preston et al., Space 

Weapons, Earth Wars (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002).
262 Chapter Three

to the anguish of the space community, here is a 

domain without a strategic concept and, at this 

point, not inappropriately. It is easy, incidentally, 

to get lost in arcane debates over which orbit in 

space is truly the high ground that dominates all 

the other orbits in space; true aficionados wax 

rhapsodic about controlling the L1 point, which 

is roughly four times as far from the earth as the 

moon and sits directly between the sun and the 

Earth.273

Finally, a word is needed in defense of the 

radio-frequency (RF) spectrum as a domain of 

warfare, mostly because this domain not only 

lacks a strategic theory but lacks a strong proponent for theory building. Yet, it is a physical 

domain in which dominance, in the sense that 

those who can get their signal through and keep 

others from getting their signal through, thereby 

gives its possessor a signal advantage in warfare. 

No serious military power ignores electronic 

warfare, largely because radio communications 

allow militaries to coordinate their operations 

and radar allows detection and tracking of all 

manner of enemy assets. But the wizards in the 

business know the purpose of manipulating the 

use of a spectrum is to enable physical warfare; 

by itself, electronic warfare is next to worthless. 

Similarly, no one seriously thinks that one country can wreak persuasive or dissuasive damage 

on another by unleashing its electronic warriors 

on it, although the latter may be the source of 

some interesting forms of annoyance, particularly if they can interfere with all GPS applications and mobile devices. 

273 Named for Joseph-Louis Lagrange, an eighteenth-century 

mathematician, a Lagrange point is a location in space where the 

combined gravitational forces of two large bodies equal the centrifugal force felt by a much smaller third body. The interaction of 

the forces creates a point of equilibrium where a spacecraft may be 

“parked” to make observations. 

THE SIGNIFICANCE 

OF WARFARE IN CYBERSPACE

It should be fairly clear by now that this article will not close with a ringing call for a strategic cyberspace doctrine. As oft noted, such 

doctrines—even, or especially, if they meet 

with universal approbation—are as likely to be 

wrong as they are right. 

To start with, cyberwarfare and cyberwar 

need to be distinguished from one another. Cyberwarfare, like warfare itself, is about the conduct of war, carried out inevitably to further the 

performance of combat in the physical domain; 

it can also be considered operational or instrumental cyberwar. Cyberwar is undertaken to affect the will of the adversary directly; it can also 

be considered tantamount to strategic cyberwar. 

A similar distinction can be made between electronic warfare and electronic war—the difference being that no one talks about electronic 

war as something interesting. 

First, we can ask whether cyberwarfare can 

so alter warfare that warfare—how it is conducted and what one can do with it—needs to 

be seriously rethought. Although the ultimate 

answer to that question is empirical and yet to 

be determined, it is easy to establish that such 

a question cannot be answered without an important intermediate step. Cyberwarfare attacks systems and digital networks. Prior to 

the 1960s, militaries had no digital networks to 

attack. A cyberattack carried out against a military today can, at worst, return it to its prenetworked condition (as long as it has something to 

revert to). To argue that cyberwarfare can have 

a revolutionary effect on the battlefield requires 

establishing that digital networking is itself revolutionary. This is a step many proponents of cyberwarfare neglect to take. 

So, how much does digital networking im-
Libicki 263

prove the workings of a military? First, one 

does not need digital communications to have 

RF communications; the latter can be carried 

out with analog equipment as it was prior to 

the 1970s and, to some extent, still is. Second, 

as helpful as network-centric warfare may have 

been for the United States, every other military in the world is less digitized and therefore 

less susceptible to cyberwar than the U.S. military—notwithstanding the possibility that the 

digital equipment they have is more vulnerable 

than the equivalent in the hands of U.S. forces. 

Thus, the revolutionary impact of cyberwarfare can be no greater than the revolutionary impact of digital networking, which 

is not, itself, a fully tested proposition. The 

question of how much less entails asking how 

effective cyber warfare can be at nullifying the 

advantages of digital networking. The most it 

can be is 100 percent, but there are many simple measures militaries can take to reduce it 

well below 100 percent. One is electronic isolation. If a network is disconnected from the rest 

of the world, it is very difficult for outsiders to 

penetrate it. In practice, as [Operation] Buckshot Yankee and Stuxnet [virus] proved, it is not 

enough that a network lacks an internet address 

or a phone number. There also has to be no way 

for errant bytes to get into these machines via 

RF links that depend on the strength of the attacker’s transmitter. These are challenging problems but hardly insurmountable. For the most 

part, systems can be immunized against much 

of cyberwarfare if their instructions are difficult 

LCpl Travis DeShazo, a rifleman assigned to Company E, 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, prepares a computer to control a Raven UAS to establish the location of notional enemy units aboard 

Twentynine Palms, CA, 10 December 2015. The Marines employed the Raven UAS as part of Exercise Steel 

Knight 18 to gain a better understanding of it and to develop a higher proficiency operating as an effective 

ground combat element of the I MEF.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl William Perkins
264 Chapter Three

to alter without hands-on contact. This could be 

because the logic is hardwired into the unit, or 

because the logic can only be replaced by new 

hardware modules, or the update has to be digitally signed by a known trustworthy source, 

using reliable cryptographic protocols implemented correctly. This prevents malware or malicious software with rogue instructions from 

being placed on the machines, which then limits 

a machine’s actions to those prespecified in its 

programming. Stuxnet, and its relatives such as 

Flame, as well as much of cybercrime and the advanced persistent threat all depend on the possibility of malware (arbitrarily altered instruction 

sets) to work.274 All this suggests that the effect 

of cyberwarfare, if properly recognized, will be 

far less revolutionary than the putatively revolutionary effect of digitized networking. 

In fairness, consider two objections to this 

argument. One is that militaries cannot revert 

to their predigitized network state. This may be 

empirically true, but if true, it says either that 

(1) such militaries have abjured that option because they correctly recognize that the impact of 

cyberwarfare is something they can manage, or 

(2) the revolutionary impact of cyberwarfare is 

incorrectly underappreciated by militaries who 

consequently digitize without giving sufficient 

thought to what would happen if cyberwarfare 

were revolutionary. If the former is true, the issue is settled. If the latter is true, then the only 

way cyberwarfare could be revolutionary is if 

those victimized by it fail to see it was going to 

be revolutionary. This is the sort of error that is 

unlikely to be made more than once, if it is even 

made at all. Consider, by way of example, Stux274 This does not eliminate all sources of cyberwarfare. A class 

of attacks known as SQL (structured query language) injection 

does not require malware to work, but it only works against systems that accept structured queries, which very few weapons 

systems do.

net. If Iranians had understood what Stuxnet 

could have done to them, they would have likely 

taken pains to ensure that no USB device was 

accessible. Because it came as a surprise, Stuxnet 

worked. But can one assign revolutionary strategic impact to a form of warfare that requires it 

be systematically underestimated before it can 

work? 

The second objection is that, while cyberwarfare is not much to look at now, it is only 

to get more important as militaries continue to 

digitize. This line echoes the argument that aircraft were going to get better every year; thus, 

what was false today may be true tomorrow. 

Can the same be said about cyberwarfare? 

The Marine Corps Tactical Service-Oriented Architecture (TSOA) will allow users to request 

and share mission-critical information on-demand. 

TSOA is a software platform that will be installed in 

combat operation centers, allowing for the sharing 

of data between combat operation centers across the 

Corps. This removes the need to depend on multiple independent tactical data systems, which are not 

always compatible.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl David 

Staten
Libicki 265

At this point in the article, one distinction 

between cyberwarfare and warfare in all other 

media must be made: cyberwarfare (as well as 

cyberwar) requires that the targets have made 

mistakes in their implementation and use of 

digital equipment. In theory, digital machines 

should only obey their given instructions in 

service of their owners/operators. In practice, 

there are variations between what a system actually does and what it is supposed to do that 

permits cyberwarfare to work. But neither the 

form nor even the existence of these variations is inevitable. They are artifacts of systems 

programming. Such artifacts can be reduced, 

perhaps even effectively eradicated. As noted 

above, even if systems still have errors, users—

especially military users—have a great number 

of steps they can take to reduce vulnerability 

to cyberwarfare. Indeed, many such steps are 

being taken—and, doubtlessly, more would be 

taken if the threat from cyberattacks and the 

like were greater (or at least perceived to be 

greater) than is currently the case. This is no 

proof that there will be a declining threat from 

cyberwarfare to advanced militaries—militaries that have failed to advance have little or 

nothing to attack in cyberspace—it may well 

grow. The fact that the threat from cyberwarfare has to be enabled by the target’s decisions 

weighs against the proposition that cyber warfare can be revolutionary. 

Indeed, there is every indication that electronic warfare will continue to generate more 

consequential effects on the battlefield than cyberwarfare because electronic warfare is not an 

artifact of the other side’s poor decisions. It is 

an unavoidable aspect of long-distance RF communications. And, as noted, there is no classic 

strategic treatment of electronic warfare; nor is 

there indication that such effort is missed. 

That leaves the question of whether strategic cyberwar can be significant enough to 

merit some twenty-first-century version of the 

Douhet proposition: a form of war that can induce countries to stop fighting (or better, avoid 

starting fights) without having been defeated or 

threatened on an actual battlefield. Arguments 

similar to those above can be generated to suggest that such a thesis is not terribly convincing today. Most cyberattacks, once discovered, 

are resolved and the effects (apart from leaked 

information) reversed within a period ranging 

from hours to days. In the long run, even in the 

highly unlikely event that hackers will always 

be able to control the systems they attack, the 

worst that can happen would be to convince 

people to abandon networking and thus set 

economies back to where they were in 1995, 

when the internet started to spread beyond 

universities and defense-related sites.275 For advanced countries, 1995 is not that much further 

behind than they are in 2013. Thus, an economy subject to continuous, vicious, and expectedly successful attacks would not retrogress as 

much as a society subject to World War II–level 

bombing. And cyberattacks have yet to kill anyone. Granted, if societies have evolved in ways 

that are difficult to reverse, the effects of cyberwar on such societies may be worse than if 

they had never adopted digitized networks in 

the first place. But such effects, almost by definition, can be used only once—and only if a society’s leadership systematically underestimates 

its vulnerability to cyberwar. Of course, if cy275 In the short run, it is possible that an errant set of codes can 

break equipment, as happened to Iran’s nuclear centrifuges following Stuxnet. There is considerable disagreement about whether 

Stuxnet can be replicated. Its revelation, incidentally, by illustrating what is theoretically possible may have made a repeat performance practically much more difficult because systems managers 

came to understand they expose their sensitive production and 

control equipment to the outside at their peril.
266 Chapter Three

berwar turns out to be weak, then perhaps they 

have not underestimated it at all. 

Over time, the distance between 1995 and 

the then-current year will increase, which will, 

in theory, lend cyberwar more leverage than it 

has today. Perhaps then, it will be possible to 

write how cyberwar has changed everything 

we know about warfare. Or maybe not. True, 

just as aircraft grew monotonically more capable from their invention forward, so societies 

are growing increasingly digitized, with little 

prospect that they will move backward unless, 

cyberattacks prove to be far more powerful and 

unavoidable than they are today. But the correlation ends there. Aircraft improvement was a 

contest against a fixed target (the laws of aeronautics, physics, and chemistry); cyberwar is a 

contest against a moving target wherein offense 

contends with defense. It is not obvious that 

offense will get continually better, particularly 

when defense—in the form of the target’s system and software—defines what the offense can 

do. Granted, hackers are getting better, thanks 

in part to markets and market-like mechanisms 

for sharing information about software vulnerabilities. Furthermore, new uses for digitization 

(e.g., networked cars) are constantly creating 

new vulnerabilities or new ways for vulnerabilities to do serious damage. But defense is not 

catatonic. If the problem with cyberattacks gets 

Theresa Rouse, training officer (left), and Ens Stephanie Wexler, combat information center officer, review 

and discuss contacts at the antiair warfare coordinator watch station in the combat information center aboard 

the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Shiloh (CG 67). Shiloh is assigned to the commander of Task 

Force 70, and is forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, to support security and stability of the Indo-Pacific 

Asia region. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of MC1 N. Ross Taylor
Libicki 267

bad enough, there are more radical steps that 

can be taken. One example is Apple’s iOS operating system, which has successfully resisted 

malware because it is a fairly closed system, although some countries have been rumored to 

have prepared and stashed away attacks on it. 

Another is the consensus reached by security 

professionals that Java software should be disabled on all browsers because it is becoming 

very difficult for its developer to stay ahead of 

all the vulnerabilities hackers keep discovering 

in it. On purely technical grounds, every successive version of Microsoft’s products is more 

malware resistant than its prior versions. These 

days operating systems are subverted by insecure applications rather than being attacked 

directly. So, the technology dynamic that Billy 

Mitchell employed—even if aircraft cannot do 

it today, tomorrow’s eventually will—does not 

necessarily translate into cyberspace, even if cyber security may get worse before it gets better. 

Then there is the possibility that the strategic effects of cyberwar may arise from the 

interaction of state actors that systematically 

overestimate its effects, as quasiapocalyptic statements from both U.S. and Chinese military officials suggest is quite possible. This could lead to 

unfortunate dynamics, but in the longer run, the 

problem with such analyses is similar to those 

analyses that posit leaders to underestimate the effects of cyberwar and are therefore unprepared 

in ways that make it more dangerous. Either 

way, this is an attitude capable of being corrected by events, and, by its very nature, of temporary import; unless one can successfully argue 

that the perception of what cyberattacks have done 

is systematically in error, but that is a hard case 

to make. 

Cyberspace, as it turns out, is ill-suited for 

grand strategic theories for other reasons. As 

mentioned earlier, cyberspace is changing very 

quickly in many important respects. Circa 1999, 

for instance, U.S. cyberwar capability, such as it 

was, housed itself within the U.S. Space Command (disestablished in 2002). In an era in which 

mischief in cyberspace was most likely perpetrated by individual hackers who were adroit at 

getting into systems, maneuvering deftly while 

discovering how they worked, doing their job, 

and leaving quietly, its working ethos would 

have made it a natural fit for something like the 

U.S. Special Operations Command. Fortunately, that never happened, because within a dozen 

years, it was clear that hacking was less about 

individual rough-and-ready hackers and more 

like a team-based enterprise building malware 

tools that took commands from afar and otherwise went about their business based on their 

programmed-in wits. Today, the original fit between cyberwar and the space business looks 

better—although the fit between U.S. Cyber 

Command and the National Security Agency is 

quite good itself. 

Another difficulty in proposing a grand theory of cyberwarfare is that deception lies at the 

essence of cyberwar. Systems, although meant 

to be under the control of their owners/operators, are tricked into obeying the commands of 

others. Once the precise nature of the trick is 

realized, it is relatively straightforward to figure 

out how to foil that particular attack, requiring 

hackers to come up with new tricks, which they 

often but cannot always do. Deception, by nature, introduces its own self-defeating dynamic, because its existence depends on two sides 

having different notions of what something can 

do. Success, in certain key respects, is often inherently unpredictable. Those who wrote strategic theory for, say, airpower had the advantage 

of understanding the interaction between the 
268 Chapter Three

machine and its aeronautical environment and 

between weapons and their targets. They could 

use that solid base to speculate on the relationship between the effects caused by aircraft 

and the goals for which countries went to war. 

Those who would write strategic theory for cyberspace have no such foundation. Everything 

appears contingent, in large part, because it is. 

THE POSSIBLY PERNICIOUS 

EFFECTS OF WRITING 

A CYBERWAR CLASSIC

To be fair, it is not easy to counter what some 

yet-to-be-written cyberwar classic would say. 

Setting forth here the brilliant insights of such 

a classic would create the tome this article says 

cannot exist. Yet, if cyberwar’s forthcoming 

classic looks like classics in past domains, they 

are likely to say (1) cyberwar is totally important, (2) those who wield its power should fight 

to win wars on their own rather than helping 

warriors in other domains, and (3) warfighters 

in those other domains should take their strategic cues from what takes place in cyberspace.

To say that war in the virtual world can 

match the horrors of war undergone or contemplated might seem a stretch, but anyone 

who ventured such an opinion would not stand 

alone. Joining them would be the U.S. Defense 

Science Board, which imagined a cyberattack 

so severe as to merit a nuclear response, some 

Chinese generals (one of whom casually opined 

that a cyberattack could be as damaging as a nuclear attack), and even Russian president VladMarines from II MEF fill up the expeditionary combat operations center during the field exercise aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, 31 March 2010. During the exercise, II MEF Headquarters Group demonstrated their ability to set up and maintain an expeditionary headquarters in the field.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Meg Murray
Libicki 269

imir Putin, who said that a cyberwar could be 

worse than conventional warfare—this from the 

head of a country that lost 25 million [people] 

in World War II.276 There is nothing quite like a 

good nuclear analogy to rally those in favor of 

an independent cyberwar force. Yet, the mere 

argument that cyberwar is going to be very im276 “The cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold War.” in Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat (Washington, 

DC: Defense Science Board, 2013), ES-1; “The United States and 

China held their highest-level military talks in nearly two years 

on Monday, with a senior Chinese general pledging to work with 

the United States on cybersecurity because the consequences of 

a major cyberattack ‘may be as serious as a nuclear bomb.’ ” in 

Jane Perlez, “U.S. and China Put Focus on Cybersecurity,” New

York Times, 23 April 2013; and “[Putin] warned that damage from 

cyberattacks could be higher than that of conventional weapons.” 

in “Putin Urges Readiness against Cyber and Outer Space Attacks,” 

RIA Novosti, 5 July 2013.

portant hardly says what to do with cyberwar 

capabilities, apart from keeping them well fed. 

Emphasizing the strategic aspects of cyberwar over its tactical (alternatively, operational or 

instrumental) aspects is not necessarily wrong. 

Because the operational uses of cyberwar are 

neither ethically nor particularly strategically 

problematic—in that it only substitutes nonlethal for lethal means—there is little reason not 

to use it against military targets.277 But military 

targets are generally harder targets than civilian 

ones. What may produce limited gains on the 

battlefield may produce huge payoffs off the bat277 “Particularly” inserted to the extent there are not fully explored 

stability impacts of using cyberwar as the opening shot of a kinetic 

engagement or using any form of warfare where attribution is less 

than obvious.

To counter the growing strength of the Soviet Union’s Navy in the face of fleet reductions at home, Adm 

Thomas H. Moorer wanted U.S. Navy ships equipped with the most advanced technology of utmost importance. This included nuclear propelled ships, improved aircraft, upgraded missile systems, and modern 

tracking systems. John Charles Roach, Watching the Sound, 1985. Oil on board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 88-163-CZ
270 Chapter Three

tlefield, thereby tempting the elevation of the 

strategic over the operational.278 But such elevation has consequences. It affects the allocation of 

resources and manpower. If talented cyberwarriors convince themselves that strategic warfare 

offers a better shot at top command slots, they 

will migrate accordingly. Perhaps if cyberwar is 

that important, there will be enough resources 

and manpower to go around—although the current difficulties in finding enough cyber security 

professionals suggest that their supply is not infinite and only time will tell how elastic. However, there are certain resources where serious 

choices must be made: that is knowledge of 

vulnerabilities in software that allows cyberwarriors into many of their targets. To the extent 

military and civilian systems rely on the same 

software and hardware—as they increasingly 

do, although there are still major differences—

then a vulnerability exploited for disruptive/

destructive purposes (rather than espionage) 

is likely to be a vulnerability that can be used 

only during a small time window. Its availability 

for strategic purposes limits its availability for 

military purposes. Hence, choices, notably between operational and strategic cyberwar, must 

be made. Because systems have to be penetrated 

well before they are attacked, such choices may 

have to be made well before the character of the 

upcoming conflict is clear.279

278 In March 2013, “The chief of the military’s newly created Cyber 

Command told Congress . . . that he is establishing 13 teams of 

programmers and computer experts who could carry out offensive cyberattacks on foreign nations if the United States were hit 

with a major attack on its own networks.” Mark Mazzetti and David E. Sanger, “Security Leader Says U.S. Would Retaliate against 

Cyberattacks,” New York Times, 12 March 2013. It would seem, 

from such comments, that these offensive teams would be oriented toward strategic rather than tactical missions.

279 That NATO actions against Moammar Gadhafi were unforeseen 

months before they took place was a key reason that cyberattacks 

were not used to take out Libyan air defenses. See Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Cyberweapons Had Been Considered to Disrupt Gaddafi’s Air Defenses,” Washington Post, 17 October 2011.

Consider, too, that both forms of cyberwar—the strategic and the operational—compete with cyber espionage when it comes to 

allocating vulnerabilities to exploit.280 Those 

who want to reserve the exploit for cyber espionage can make two strong points. First, since 

penetration, in and of itself, tends to be deliberately stealthy, the vulnerability can remain 

hidden longer than it can once a disruptive/destructive attack takes place.281 Second, the yield 

from cyber espionage can be immediate, while 

the yield from getting into a system that might 

be taken down is contingent on a war starting. 

Strategic cyberwar is far more problematic 

than its operational cousin. It raises laws-ofarmed-conflict issues that operational cyberwarfare does not. Similarly, it is more likely to result 

in escalation and in ways that make conflict resolution more difficult. By contrast, operational 

cyberwarfare ends when kinetic warfare ends, 

because there is no longer any advantage in making targets more susceptible to kinetic attack 

when kinetic attack terminates. 

If the galvanizing theory emphasizes doctrines such as preemption, further difficulties 

await. Although exactly how to preempt a cyberattack remains a mystery, there is very little 

that can be destroyed, and only a narrow class 

of attacks can be disrupted by actions taken outside one’s network. If the doctrine is attractive 

enough, people will think they have found a way 

280 Not every exploit, however, requires a software vulnerability. 

Some can be penetrated and exploited by poor systems administration, notably but not exclusively, poor password management.

281 A year is roughly the time that a typical (discovered) advanced 

persistent threat attack lasts prior to its discovery. Dan McWhorter, “Mandiant Exposes APT 1—One of China’s Cyber Espionage 

Units and Releases 3,000 Indicators,” FireEye (blog) 19 February 

2013. A year is also roughly the time that a discovered vulnerability sold on the vulnerability market remains undiscovered by 

anyone else. Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, “Nations Buying 

as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code,” New York Times, 13 July 

2013.
Libicki 271

CWO-2 Michael D. Fay, Practicing with the MARBOT. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 335-1-112
272 Chapter Three

to do so. Unfortunately, the many ambiguities of 

who is doing what to whom in cyberspace suggest that understanding who is preparing to do 

what to whom is even harder to discern. Grave 

mistakes are possible—particularly if the decision to preempt attacks is delegated from the 

president, as many have suggested it might be.282

Finally, what might be those cues that warriors in today’s domains should take from cyberspace according to some yet-to-be-written 

doctrine? Cyberwar is sneaky stuff. It relies on 

deceiving computers, which, in turn, requires 

deceiving humans who manage these computers. It usually works a great deal better when 

it comes without warning. Insofar as its success 

depends on the discovery of impermanent elements in the target system, laid-in attacks have 

to be used quickly if they are to be used at all. 

Furthermore, because many of its effects are 

temporary, they must be exploited in a very 

short time (as quickly as within hours and days). 

In that sense, powerful cyberattacks can pull 

follow-up strategic or operational actions behind them, whether or not the latter are, respectively, appropriate or ready. Cyberwar is also an 

elite activity in which numbers of hackers count 

for little but the skills of the best of the best 

count for a great deal. 

Cyber operations are covered in heavy 

layers of secrecy. In some ways, secrecy is deserved: vulnerabilities described quickly become vulnerabilities eradicated. But in other 

cases, it is questionable: no country admitted to 

282 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Broad Powers Seen for 

Obama in Cyberstrikes,” New York Times, 3 February 2013.

having cyberwar forces until 2012. And in other 

ways, particularly when disclosing information 

about vulnerabilities that the other side found 

in the systems of commercial organizations, it 

can get in the way. All this makes it difficult to 

have a serious public debate about the role of cyberwar in national security. To be fair, the common difficulty of understanding cyberspace also 

interferes with useful public debate. Hence the 

question: Would it be beneficial for the mores of 

physical war fighting to reflect the inherent mores of war fighting in cyberspace? Perhaps not. 

CONCLUSIONS

So, rather than bemoan the fact that there are 

no instant strategic classics on cyberwar, or even 

well-percolated ones, perhaps we should count 

ourselves lucky. Many of the strategic classics 

from earlier domains seem to have been misleading, even harmful. Warfighters that deal 

with the more recent media, such as outer space 

or the radio-frequency spectrum, seem to be 

doing just fine without them. And cyberwar appears to have even less basis for a strategic treatment than space warfare or electronic warfare. 

Its efficacy—much less significance—has been 

postulated well before it has been proven. By its 

very nature, cyberwar has to continually morph 

to retain its relevance. Furthermore, there are 

good reasons to believe that its contribution to 

warfare, while real, is likely to be modest, while 

its contribution to strategic war is a great deal 

easier to imagine than to substantiate.
273

ON HYPERWAR

by General John Allen and Amir Husain

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 2017283

gether with a purpose, reacting to each other 

and to the ship.

The speed of the attack quickly overwhelmed nearly all the ship’s combat systems, and while the information technology 

specialists were able to release some defensive systems from the clutches of the cyber 

intrusion, the sailors in the combat information center (CIC) simply were unable to 

generate the speed to react. Decision-action 

times were in seconds or less. Indeed, it appeared from the now very limited situational 

awareness in the CIC that some of the enemy autonomous weapons were providing 

support to other systems to set up attacks of 

other systems. The entire event was over in 

minutes.

The captain had survived, courageously remaining on the bridge, but he was badly 

wounded, as were many crew members. Fires 

were burning out of control, and the ship 

was listing badly from flooding. Because of 

the damage, the captain was unable to communicate to the damage control assistant 

2 JANUARY 2018

The battle damage was devastating 

and constituted the leading edge 

of what the United States soon 

would discover was a widespread, strategic 

attack. The guided-missile destroyer had not 

“seen” the incoming swarm because it had 

not recognized that its systems were under 

cyber attack before things turned kinetic. 

The undetected cyber activity not only compromised the destroyer’s sensors, but also 

“locked-out” its defensive systems, leaving 

the ship almost helpless. The kinetic strikes 

came in waves as a complex swarm. The attack appeared to be conducted by a cloud of 

autonomous systems that seemed to move to283 The original article came from Gen John Allen, USMC (Ret), 

and Amir Husain, “On Hyperwar,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 

143, no. 7 (July 2017): 23–39. Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling. As we build the conversation for hyperwar, we intend to recognize fellow travelers in this journey. To that end, we 

would like acknowledge the work of Peter W. Singer and August 

Cole in their excellent book, Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World 

War (Boston and New York: Eamon Dolan Book, Houghton Mifflin 

Harcourt, 2015) an important fictional treatment of future war.
274 Chapter Three

(DCA), who was, herself, badly wounded but 

valiantly seeking to control the fires and 

flooding. Damage control central had been 

hit. Evidently some of the autonomous platforms knew exactly where to strike the ship 

to both maximize damage and reduce the 

chances of survivability. With his capacity to 

command the ship now badly compromised 

and the flooding out of control, the captain 

did what no U.S. skipper had done for generations—he issued the order to abandon 

ship.

On only a few occasions has history witnessed fundamentally transformative changes in 

the way war is waged. The employment of cavalry, the advent of the rifled musket, and the 

combination of fast armor with air support and 

instantaneous radio communications in the execution of the blitzkrieg strategy are a few examples. Technological developments—sometimes 

originating in a variety of different fields—

come together to enable these seismic shifts. 

Another such shift is coming soon to the field 

of battle. Those who are not prepared for it will 

fare no better than the Iraqi Army did when confronted with the “second offset” technologies of 

smart, precision-guided weapons, stealth, and 

electronic warfare.

Broad contours of how this new shift in 

An artist rendering of the Zumwalt-class destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), a new class of multimission 

U.S. Navy surface combatant ship designed to operate as part of a joint maritime fleet, assisting Marine strike 

forces ashore as well as performing littoral, air, and subsurface warfare.

Official U.S. Navy illustration
Allen and Husain 275

the way war will be waged already are becoming clear. Technologies such as computer vision 

aided by machine-learning algorithms, artificial 

intelligence (AI)-powered autonomous decision 

making, advanced sensors, miniaturized highpowered computing capacity deployed at the 

“edge,” high-speed networks, offensive and 

defensive cyber capabilities, and a host of AIenabled techniques, such as autonomous swarming and cognitive analysis of sensor data, will be 

at the heart of this revolution. The major effect/

result of all these capabilities coming together 

will be an innovation warfare has never seen before: the minimization of human decision making in the vast majority of processes traditionally 

required to wage war. This minimization likely 

will alter where the human will be located in 

the decision-action loop and the human’s specific involvement in decision making itself. In this 

coming age of hyperwar, we will see humans 

providing broad, high-level inputs while machines do the planning, executing, and adapting 

to the reality of the mission and take on the burden of thousands of individual decisions with no 

additional input.

EXPLAINING HYPERWAR

First, why refer to AI-fueled, machine-waged 

conflict as hyperwar? This is not a new term. In 

World War II, its use implied the global nature 

and many concurrent theaters of war. In today’s 

context, however, hyperwar may very well be 

applied globally, but the element of “pan-war” is 

not its singular defining characteristic. Instead, 

what makes this new form of warfare unique is 

the unparalleled speed enabled by automating 

decision making and the concurrency of action 

that will become possible by leveraging artificial 

intelligence and machine cognition.

In describing the wars of the future, hyper is used in the original Greek sense of the 

word—over or above. This new type of combat 

will be beyond what has been seen before in important ways. In military terms, hyperwar may 

be redefined as a type of conflict where human 

decision making is almost entirely absent from 

the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. 

As a consequence, the time associated with an 

OODA cycle will be reduced to near-instantaneous responses. The implications of these developments are many and game changing.

Infinite, Distributed Command and 

Control Capacity: until the present time, a 

decision to act depended on human cognition. 

With autonomous decision making, this will not 

be the case. While human decision making is potent, it also has limitations in terms of speed, 

attention, and diligence. For example, there is 

a limit to how quickly humans can arrive at a 

decision, and there is no avoiding the “cognitive 

burden” of making each decision. There is a limit 

to how fast and how many decisions can be made 

before a human requires rest and replenishment 

to restore higher cognitive faculties.

This phenomenon has been studied in detail 

by psychologist Daniel Kahneman, who showed 

that a simple factor such as the lack of glucose 

could cause judges—expert decision makers—

to incorrectly adjudicate appeals. Tired brains 

cannot carefully deliberate; instead, they revert 

to instinctive “fast thinking,” creating the potential for error. Machines do not suffer from these 

limitations. And to the extent that machine intelligence is embodied as easily replicated software, often running on inexpensive hardware, it 

can be deployed at scales sufficient to essentially 

enable an infinite supply of tactical, operational, 

and strategic decision making.

Concurrency of Action/Perfect Coordination: “overpowering the enemy” is a 
276 Chapter Three

phrase used often in the literature of war. In 

military terms, this refers to the concentration 

of force in a finite space, during a finite period 

of time, such that the application of this force 

against the opposing elements able to respond 

delivers a numeric or firepower advantage impossible for the opposition to counter or resist. This may not necessarily be because the 

attacking force is larger or more powerful than 

the entire defending force, only that it is more 

powerful when and where it matters. This is an 

important distinction. If a smaller force can be 

quickly “perfectly coordinated” and applied to a 

precise point where the enemy is unable to reinforce during the period of hostility, then the 

smaller force usually will prevail. If such action 

can be replicated repeatedly, then much larger 

opposing forces can be effectively neutralized 

economically and often will be dislocated psychologically.

The two key variables of concern are time 

and space. The time is what it takes to form and 

execute kinetic action, and the space is where 

such action is to be executed. These variables 

are computed as a result of significant strategic, 

operational, and tactical decision making. Identifying a candidate space for the application of 

force is the first ingredient. When done properly, it involves computing a large set of contingencies, called branches and sequels in planning 

parlance, regarding the enemy’s capacity to 

replenish, resupply, and reinforce. The tactical 

matters of identifying targets, maneuvering to 

achieve advantage or to avoid counter fire, and 

directing one’s own fire add to this list of decisions and to the cognitive complexity. With 

machine-based decision making, a large group 

of sensors and shooters can be coordinated instantaneously, enabling the rapid forming or 

massing of forces and the execution of kinetic 

action and subsequent dispersal. The degree to 

which concurrency of action can be achieved 

with machine-based decision making fuels hyperwar and will far outpace what can be done 

under human control and direction.

Logistical Simplification: the old adage that, “amateurs talk tactics, and professionals discuss logistics” is good guidance. Since 

time immemorial, waging war has required the 

movement of human armies that must be fed, 

clothed, and protected. When the level of intelligence required to fulfill a specific mission can 

be created in synthetic form, however, machines 

can become soldiers. The needs and logistics 

demands of robotic soldiers will neither be as 

varied as those of a human soldier, nor will these 

machines be as indispensable as a human soldier. 

The loss of these assets no longer will trigger 

the expensive and dangerous standard operating 

procedures involving infiltration of a medical 

team, extraction, and transportation to a field 

facility.

Today’s drones or unmanned combat aerial 

vehicles (UCAVs) mostly are remotely piloted 

systems that simply separate the human pilot 

from the craft, placing human decision making 

at a distance. This is a useful configuration, but it 

has many downsides. First, the latencies involved 

mean that only certain types of missions can be 

fulfilled by today’s drones. High-speed air-to-air 

combat would be difficult, for example. Second, 

the system remains susceptible to jamming and 

loss of communications. Third, the human pilot 

succumbs to many of the pressures and stresses of real war. This drone pilot post-traumatic 

stress disorder phenomenon has been well documented and sheds light on the limitations of 

the current model.

Truly autonomous UCAVs of a variety of types 

and sizes with on-board synthetic intelligence 
Allen and Husain 277

will be the foot soldiers in a future hyperwar. 

Models the size of commercial quadcopters capable of weaving through forests and racing across 

open fields will assemble, act, and dissipate 

in no time. They will be armed with sophisticated sensors that feed vision and decisionmaking algorithms both on board, in the swarm, 

and when accessible, in centralized locations. In 

addition, they will come equipped with a variety 

of cyber and kinetic payloads. A large number 

of these systems can be coordinated by means 

of swarm algorithms, enabling “a collective” to 

ensure the fulfillment of a mission and individual drones to support and to adapt to the loss of 

another.

Despite their flexibility, these systems principally will require only two resources: energy 

and ammunition. In the future, energy may be 

converted to ammunition, such as with directedenergy weapons. Still, it will be some time before 

the requisite miniaturization can be achieved to 

deliver this capability. These assets will remain 

“resource neutral” until they are actively being 

employed, reducing the overall energy required 

to sustain them in a theater over time. With all 

these changes, the logistical effort will be simplified immensely, and as a result, the “teeth to 

tail” ratios for autonomous forces will be higher 

than for any manned force.

Instant Mission Adaptations: German 

World War II General Erwin Rommel once 

said, “The best form of welfare for the troops is 

first-rate training.” Without training, there is no 

chance of success, and advanced forms of miliMarines with I MEF and sailors with Cyber Protection Team 553 (CPT 553) monitor network activity during 

I MEF’s Large Scale Exercise 2016 at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, 22 August 2016. The overall 

purpose of the exercise was to practice the deployment of a fighting force of more than 50,000 military personnel to a partner nation and incorporate both live-fire and simulated combat scenarios against a near-peer 

enemy force. CPT 553 is a team of cyber defense specialists with Fleet Cyber Command. The team advised I 

MEF while setting up the command element’s networks. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Garrett White
278 Chapter Three

tary training help create specializations for roles 

that are essential in the conduct of war. In the 

face of artificially intelligent technologies and 

the hyperwar they will enable, there will be two 

groundbreaking changes in training.

First, AI technologies such as natural 

language-based dialog systems that can ingest 

hundreds of thousands of pages of manuals, 

guides, studies, and more will augment human 

operators in noncombat situations, such as with 

maintenance and remediation of equipment. 

Eventually these capabilities will be enriched 

with augmented reality information-delivery 

technologies in combat scenarios.

Second, when employed in an entirely autonomous fashion, the tactics and strategies of 

an AI system—its entire set of behaviors and 

corpus of acquired knowledge—can be copied 

easily from one system to another. This is the 

equivalent of having the most qualified veteran 

instantly transfer his or her experience and expertise to troops who have never been in battle. 

Further, an AI system’s skills and specializations 

can be swapped in and out immediately. The 

same autonomous aerial platform can be an expert “pilot” for a suppression of enemy air defenses mission and, with a quick swapping of the 

neural network controller, become the world’s 

deadliest air superiority specialist. In addition, if 

one such “expert” AI pilot needs to be sacrificed 

to achieve mission objectives, so be it. Other 

than the hardware, nothing is lost. The “brains” 

of the pilot simply can be replicated on a different piece of hardware.

Training for AI-based systems can happen 

in the real world, or in simulators. An approach 

known as “reinforcement learning” has made 

great strides in defeating human players at traditionally unconquerable games, such as the ancient game of Go. The same technology is being 

employed to build better autonomous cars. Each 

autonomous car does not have to go through the 

learning curve that every human driver must 

navigate. Instead, the car—or simulated car—

that evolves the best performing neural network 

can communicate that experience and learning 

instantly to all other vehicles. This instant “transfer learning” will be another unparalleled reality 

in future hyperwar, fueled by the employment 

of artificial intelligence.

28 MAY 2027

AN AUTONOMOUS 

DEFENSE RISES

The artificially intelligent cyber defense 

system in the guided-missile destroyer’s CIC 

was the first to detect what appeared to be 

an attempt at a major cyber intrusion, perhaps an attack. The intrusion was pervasive, 

seeking to lock-out the ship’s sensors and 

many of its defensive systems, and seemingly concentrating on the ship’s antiswarm 

batteries (ASBs) and supporting systems. 

The initial cyberattack and the successful 

defense occurred within microseconds. The 

defensive system had functioned exactly as 

it had been designed. As a result, the ship 

was able to “sense,” then detect, a massive incoming complex swarm attack—the kinetic 

follow-up to the invisible opening strike. In 

fact, the system had gone further, instantly 

forwarding threat information to the rest of 

the fleet, enabling other units to prepare for 

an impending attack.

The captain moved quickly from the 

bridge into the CIC and, along with the 

others in the center, donned the augmented reality headgear and attendant gauntlets to assimilate and react to the totality 

and complexity of the battle he was about 
Allen and Husain 279

to lead. His first thought was the status of 

his weapons. He had only seconds as some 

elements of the swarm were supersonic, maybe 

hypersonic. Because of the elevated threat 

level, the captain had been given a high 

level of authority and autonomy to engage 

any potential attackers. He quickly cycled 

to the “weapons status” views in his headset, and all were green, being continuously 

fed targeting information from the ship’s 

fire-control complex now locked onto and 

tracking and analyzing the incoming attacking swarm. He had to act and shifted 

to the “ASB status view.” With a sweep of his 

hand in virtual reality, he initiated the ASB.

In that instant, naval warfare changed 

forever. Now, “cleared hot,” the various components of the ASB sprinted skyward outside 

the skin of the ship, and the airspace was 

filled with several types of now-completely 

autonomous aerial vehicles. Some moved 

off at high speed on the azimuth of the incoming attack to engage the enemy swarm 

at long range; others dwelt in the vicinity 

of the ship, ready to engage as a last-ditch 

defense. No one on the ship, indeed no one 

in the U.S. Navy, had experienced the ASB 

going into action at full capacity. The ship 

shuddered as systems leapt into the air with 

a cacophony of noise.

Back in the CIC, the captain shifted 

to “target view” in his headset to see what 

was coming. He had been slightly skeptical 

this would all come together, beyond his 

simulator training, but now he was seeing 

the reality of something nearly beyond belief: completely autonomous aerial systems 

locked in mortal combat. Blue tracks representing ASB systems and red tracks identifying enemy threats filled the screens. 

Likely electronic countermeasures (ECM) 

decoys were highlighted in orange and automatically deprioritized by the ASB. As the 

battle unfolded—measured in seconds—

one after another red and blue systems 

winked out as they crashed into each other 

or detonated in close proximity. That battle 

was moving toward his ship at a high speed. 

Having donned his own headset, the weapons officer quickly unleashed the full might 

of the various close-in weapon systems, including the autonomous systems from the 

ASB, which continued to engage the closing 

enemy swarm.

The first impact was deafening. Some 

elements of the enemy’s swarm had detonated above the ship, taking out some of the 

ship’s antennas. They evidently were searching for certain antennas to reduce the ship’s 

connectivity. The second strike carried away 

a 20mm Phalanx Gatling gun, a principal 

means to defend the ship. The third blast 

struck the ship at the waterline, killing and 

wounding a number of crew members and 

starting fires and flooding. While outside the 

ship a maelstrom was unfolding as kinetic 

systems autonomously coordinated fires with 

the near continuous launching of the ASB, 

inside the ship, damage-control and medical 

recovery measures were under way.

The captain quickly switched to “damage control view” and was able to see the 

AI-enabled dashboard view of the damage 

and the damage-control measures the ship’s 

DCA was using to fight fires and control 

flooding. Because of the sophistication of 

the AI system, he could instantly “see” which 

of the ship’s systems were offline, which were 

being rebooted to recover, and which were 

being instantly cross-connected to restore 
280 Chapter Three

capacity and capability. The AI-powered 

damage-control system was quickly and autonomously shifting power loads and bringing emergency systems on line. Decisions for 

damage control were being made in seconds 

where before long minutes were needed.

The captain then shifted to the view he 

dreaded: “crew status.” Because every member 

of the ship’s company wore a “health status 

harness,” which measured body temperature, 

heart rate, blood pressure, and breathing, 

he instantly could see the overall status of 

his crew and each individual sailor’s status 

dashboard. Sobered and saddened by the 

number of casualties as he cycled through 

subviews in this domain, he saw who had 

been killed and who was wounded. He knew 

which of his leaders were down and began 

to consider how he would reconstitute the 

chain of command.

Hours later, with his wounded cared 

for, the fires out, and the flooding under 

control, the captain reflected on the engagement. He was shaken but not frightened by 

the reality. The attack had come seemingly 

from nowhere. The cyber defense system had 

detected the initial cyber intrusion, and not 

only had it protected the ship, but it also 

had reasoned the attack was a precursor to 

something larger and alerted the CIC of 

Navy PO3 Bryanna Artellano stands watch in the combat information center on the dock landing ship USS 

Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) in the South China Sea, 4 August 2016. The ship, with embarked 13th MEU, operates 

in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operation to support security in the Indo-Pacific Asia region. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of PO3 Zachary Eshleman
Allen and Husain 281

what might be coming. This hypothesis had 

been formed, researched, and validated in 

less than a second. Within 10 seconds, the 

ship initiated general quarters on its own 

and the captain had donned his augmentedreality ensemble. From that moment until 

the final fires were put out, using the automatic fire suppression system coordinated 

around crew status readings, the entire battle had unfolded and was over in minutes.

The autonomous nature of the ASB 

assets, coordinated with the CIC, and the 

ship’s defensive systems had foiled a coordinated, complex cyber and autonomous 

swarm attack. The captain was struck by the 

realization that at nearly every point where 

human actions and decisions were required 

they nearly risked the ship. Though he was 

a master of the combat systems of the USS 

Infinity (DDG 500), he had just experienced the near mind-numbing speeds of AI 

and deep-learning-driven warfare. He had 

become the first U.S. commander to fight in 

the environment of hyperwar.

IS THIS A REVOLUTION 

IN MILITARY AFFAIRS?

The scenarios here and the intervening discussion provide a window into only a few of the 

ways in which synthetic intelligence will fuel 

the next great shift in how warfare is conducted. 

The fusion of distributed machine intelligence 

with highly mobile platforms brings a speed and 

scale of concurrency never seen before. The hyperwar these technologies will enable is a new 

paradigm for which we need to plan. The rise of 

these capabilities has sparked a revolution. But 

it is more than a revolution in military affairs, 

it is a revolution in human affairs with major 

implications for the security and defense arenas. 

Advances in AI have the capability to fundamentally change the human condition, and with it, a 

profoundly human undertaking, war.

Near-peer opponents already are investing heavily in these technologies and have some 

operational AI-powered weapon systems, such 

as cruise missiles. The ability for autonomous 

algorithms to transform moderately dangerous 

weapon systems into significant threats means 

we must watch for and guard against synthetic 

intelligence being added to existing arsenals.

The speed of battle at the tactical end of the 

warfare spectrum will accelerate enormously, 

collapsing the decision-action cycle to fractions 

of a second, giving the decisive edge to the side 

with the more autonomous decision-action concurrency. At the operational level, commanders will be able to “sense,” “see,” and engage 

enemy formations far more quickly by applying machine-learning algorithms to collection 

and analysis of huge quantities of information 

and directing swarms of complex, autonomous 

systems to simultaneously attack the enemy 

throughout his operational depth.

At the strategic level, the commander supported by this capacity sees the strategic environment through sensors operating across the 

entire theater. The strategic commander’s capacity to ingest petabytes of information and conduct near-instantaneous analysis of information 

ranging from national technical means to tactical systems provides a qualitatively unsurpassed 

level of situational awareness and understanding 

heretofore unavailable to strategic commander.

AI-powered assistive technologies—such 

as intelligent assistants, advanced interactive 

visualizations, virtual reality technologies, and 

real-time displays projecting rapidly updated 

maps—will come together to enable this situational awareness. This level of strategic un-
282 Chapter Three

derstanding generates the capacity for a speed 

in command and control and concurrent and 

subsequent actions that will consistently dominate—at a time and place of our choosing—because our superior concurrency will consistently 

overmatch the enemy’s capacity to respond.

All of this reawakens the perennial conversation about the nature and the character of war. 

If, indeed, we are poised at the edge of hyperwar, we must explore the changes necessary to 

adapt to this new conflict environment. It will 

require understanding the moral dimensions of 

these advances, educating a new generation of 

leaders, and developing the AI-powered analytical systems and autonomous weapons platforms. 

The mental, moral, and physical challenges of 

hyperwar demand analysis and a searching conversation. Our adversaries and our enemies are 

moving forward aggressively in this area. The 

United States must make the strategic investments both to be ready to wage hyperwar and to 

prevent us from being surprised by it.
283

KEEPING OUR 

AMPHIBIOUS EDGE

by Admiral John C. Harvey and Colonel P. J. Ridderhof

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 2012284

THE REQUIREMENT

Amphibious capability has become associated 

primarily with assaulting defended beaches and 

seizing lodgments for land campaigns. However, such forces provide much broader capability 

to the nation than that narrow mission profile. 

Stripped to its essence, an amphibious capability 

places an intact, ready-to-operate landing force 

ashore and supports it from the sea to accomplish the mission.

A simple assessment of U.S. global interests 

and geographic position, set against a backdrop 

of continuing instability in the world, clearly 

points to the need for a U.S. amphibious capability so described. We have been fortunate to 

have ready access to friendly ports for our major operations over the past decades. This will 

not necessarily, nor even likely, be the case in 

the future. We may be denied these ports not 

only based on overt hostile action, but also by 

political decision, natural disaster, or lack of 

infrastructure. Amphibious capability brings a 

greater guarantee of access to a foreign shore at 

the time and place of our choosing.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 

MAINTAINING THE CRITICAL 

SEA-TO-SHORE-AND-BACK 

CAPABILITY? 

THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE 

CORPS, THAT IS WHO

I

n March, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and 

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command completed their Exercise Bold Alligator 2012 

(BA12), the largest amphibious exercise in the 

past decade. A mix of live and simulated forces, 

the exercise followed Bold Alligator 2011, executed in December 2010, which was conducted 

wholly with simulated forces. The commands’ 

staffs are now crafting an extended campaign 

plan to incorporate Bold Alligator exercises into 

annual operations and training of East Coast naval forces. So why are these exercises important, 

and what challenges lie ahead?

284 The original article came from Adm John C. Harvey, USN, and 

Col P. J. Ridderhof, USMC, “Keeping Our Amphibious Edge,” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings 138, no. 7 (July 2012): 36–40. Minor 

revisions were made to the text based on current standards for 

style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. 
284 Chapter Three

An amphibious operation becomes a 

forcible-entry capability when the environment 

is either hostile or potentially hostile. Since 

the end of the Cold War, the threat was ashore. 

However, today’s and tomorrow’s adversaries 

have capabilities that extend the threat out to 

sea. Whether it is against conventional or irregular forces, or a combination of both—what 

many describe as a hybrid threat—an amphibious forcible-entry capability must be able to 

succeed in a hostile air-land-sea environment.

Amphibious capability is not a one-way 

operation from sea to shore. Amphibious forces can adjust from sea to shore and back again, 

depending on logistical or political factors. They 

can also rapidly withdraw the landing force from 

one point and make use of the inherent mobility 

afforded naval forces to move and strike elsewhere. An amphibious attack is not only an axis 

of attack inland, but it can operate and dominate 

laterally along an extended littoral area.

This has been a key characteristic of U.S. 

military power, from its initial ad hoc forms 

in the Barbary Wars, the Civil War, and the 

Spanish-American War; through being the primary U.S. operational capability of World War 

II, all the way to the multitude of crisis response 

actions of today. The nation will continue to 

need amphibious capability in the future, and it 

is the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ responsibility to provide it.

THE CHALLENGE: 

BEYOND THE ARG-MEU

Belying recent chatter that the Marines and Navy 

are returning to their amphibious roots after a 

U.S. Marines from 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division, prepare to load an assault breacher 

vehicle (ABV) onto a landing craft utility (LCU) at Camp Pendleton, CA, in February 2018. All vehicles were 

loaded onto LCUs then transported to the USS Rushmore (LSD 47) to conduct the first amphibious landing 

in an ABV with a modified full-width mine plow prototype. Marine Corps Systems Command tested the 

prototype, which will make it easier to transport the ABV from ship to shore.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Harvey and Ridderhof 285

decade of war on land, we have never stopped 

preparing and deploying amphibious forces 

during the past 10 years. There is always an Amphibious Ready Group, Marine Expeditionary 

Unit (ARG-MEU), trained and ready, afloat 

somewhere on the oceans. The ARG-MEU has 

proved its worth in countless crises. The naval 

Services have nurtured this amphibious cutlass 

to a sharp and lethal edge. It has served us well 

in the past and will do so in the future.

However, the continued excellence of the 

ARG-MEU program does not by itself mean 

that the United States has an effective amphibious capability for the full range of operations. 

The ARG-MEU excels at forward presence, theater security cooperation, and crisis response, 

but it is not sufficient for all missions, or for taking on a competent adversary of significant size 

and strength. The Navy and Marine Corps must 

provide combatant commanders with workable 

doctrine and trained forces to execute amphibious operations, including forcible-entry operations, larger than the ARG-MEU.

To develop this effective amphibious capability, the naval Services must think and train 

beyond the ARG-MEU. As we have found in 

both 2011 and 2012, executing a large amphibious operation is not only quantitatively bigger, 

it is qualitatively different from an ARG-MEU 

operation. Lessons learned from the latter may 

not be relevant; some may actually be counterproductive. We must address a number of challenges in order to achieve expanded amphibious 

capability.

HOW TO EXPAND 

AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY

We must tactically integrate amphibious, seacontrol, and strike capabilities. A common 

belief is that the air and sea superiority battle 

must be completely fought and won before ever 

contemplating an amphibious assault. However, 

that has not been the historical pattern. While 

the amphibious attacker has usually set the local conditions for an assault, the defender has 

normally not made his strongest challenge to air 

and sea superiority until after the actual initiation of the operation. Think of the great air and 

sea battles—around Guadalcanal in 1942–43, 

the Philippine Sea in June 1944, Leyte Gulf in 

October 1944, the kamikaze assaults off Okinawa in April–May 1945, and the Battle of San 

Carlos Sound in the 1982 Falklands campaign. In 

each case, the great battle for air-sea superiority 

around the beaches did not begin until after the 

amphibious force was committed to the landing 

area.

Before the amphibious operation commences, the attacking naval force has the natural advantage of mobility and concealment afforded 

by open sea. Knowing this, the defender has 

little incentive to uncover his weapons and sensors to risk them in a long-range strike duel. 

Once the assault begins, however, the amphibious task force and supporting fleet elements are 

constrained to a relatively defined littoral area 

to support the landing force. This gives the defender a much easier detection problem to solve 

and a host of lucrative targets in the form of the 

amphibious ships.

The intertwined dynamic of the air/sea superiority fight and the amphibious assault makes 

it critical that these operations are tactically integrated. Operating ARG-MEUs and Carrier 

Strike Groups (CSGs) in the same vicinity has 

not provided us the experience or insight on 

how to closely align amphibious, sea-control, 

and strike operations. In fact, we have developed 

doctrines and operating practices that do not 

mesh with one another. If Bold Alligator 2012 is 
286 Chapter Three

any indicator, we have work to do to ensure that 

a CSG, Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), and 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) can effectively integrate their operations in a maritime 

environment.

SHIP-TO-SHORE

We must know how to embark and employ a 

larger Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 

across more ships. While there are variations in 

each deployment, ARG-MEUs all go out with 

a standardized embarkation of the Marine elements. More amphibious ships and a larger 

MAGTF mean more capability and more options, but these advantages will only be realized 

if we rediscover the art of combat embarkation 

and amphibious ship-to-shore tactical employment. This includes all elements of the MAGTF, 

from aviation coordinating across multiple 

decks to an infantry battalion launching from 

multiple well-decks to land in a single wave on 

a single beach. Parts of the MAGTF, especially 

aviation, may be based ashore within range of 

the amphibious operation, further enhancing 

capability, but complicating the situation. We 

must break out of the ARG-MEU mold to explore the possibilities and fully take advantage 

of the flexibility and combat power of a larger 

MAGTF.

We must be able to command and control 

a large Amphibious Task Force (ATF). A large 

ATF is not simply a collection of three-ship 

ARGs. There is no single template for how an 

ESG commander employs his subordinate ships, 

Amphibious Squadron Command elements, and 

other Navy assets. Amphibious doctrine calls for 

very centralized control under the commander 

ATF in the form of a primary control officer for 

surface movement and a tactical air officer for all 

air operations. We have very little recent practical experience in knowing whether or how this 

doctrine will work in large task forces in light of 

new capabilities as well as the pervasive influence of composite warfare doctrine in the force.

We must be able to embark and employ 

larger command elements. A large amphibious 

force requires more command elements. From 

where do they embark and operate? Do they all 

need to embark? The requirements levied by 

these command-and-control nodes can come at 

a cost to combat capability of the force, as well 

as stressing already limited bandwidth available 

at sea.

We must be able to simultaneously deploy 

aggregate, and operate the force. A large amphibious force will not be embarked and sail 

from a single port, or even a single coast. Deployed ARG-MEUs and CSGs will be the first 

naval forces on-scene and will be task-organized 

to begin operating immediately. Coordinating 

embarkation and deployment of Continental 

U.S.-based forces with aggregation and initial 

shaping operations in-theater will be a daunting challenge for fleets and tactical amphibious 

command elements. Our approach to largescale amphibious operations must account for 

how our amphibious forces will realistically 

concentrate from a dispersed strategic posture.

ROLE OF THE MILITARY 

SEALIFT COMMAND

We must leverage Military Sealift Command 

(MSC) capabilities. Current practice divides the 

landing force into an assault echelon on amphibious shipping and an assault follow-on 

echelon on MSC and other craft. We need to 

consider whether these categories and their 

impact on our thinking still make sense. BAI 2 

featured MSC ships closing rapidly to provide 

support and additional MAGTF elements, even 
Harvey and Ridderhof 287

while the assault echelon was still operating 

from the amphibious ships. MSC ships are by no 

means amphibious vessels, but further integrating MSC shipping into the amphibious operation, with proper shaping and risk assessment, 

may provide a more powerful assault-echelon 

punch than can be mustered by amphibious 

ships alone.

We must integrate Navy expeditionary capabilities. The classic rationale for an amphibious operation is to secure a port and/or airfield 

complex for the introduction of follow-on forces. Another look at the historical record indicates that physically securing a port has not been 

as much an issue as have the challenges in getting 

that port operating. We only need to think of Naples in 1943, Cherbourg in 1944, and Port-auPrince in 2010 to see the significant impact of 

damaged ports to sustaining operations ashore. 

The capabilities to execute port opening, operations, and security, or logistics over the shore 

may need to be prioritized for embarkation and 

offloading—even to the degree of having these 

capabilities as part of the assault echelon.

We must be able to understand and tie the 

amphibious operation into the broader joint 

campaign. On the far end of the amphibious 

operation, the landing always serves a further 

purpose. When that purpose is a lodgment 

ashore to allow the introduction of a larger joint 

force, then the plans and requirements of that 

joint force will drive the amphibious operation. Left to our own devices, the naval Services 

will tend toward courses of action that maxiMarines descend ladders to storm ashore during the landing at Inchon, Korea, on 15 September 1950.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Photograph Collection, Archives Branch, History Division
288 Chapter Three

Two Marine Corps McDonnell Douglas AV-8 Harrier “jump jets” return after a training flight to the USS 

Nassau (LHA 4) in the Gulf of Oman. The planes provided close air support to the many Marines loaded 

aboard this amphibious ship. John Charles Roach, USS Nassau (LHA-4) in the Gulf of Oman. Oil on canvas board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 92-007-BJ
Harvey and Ridderhof 289

mize the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses 

of the amphibious force. However, the needs of 

the campaign, and possibly the planned concept 

of operations for a land component, may drive 

the naval force to “suboptimize” the conditions 

for its amphibious phase to better support the 

overall campaign. The Inchon landing during the 

Korean War is the best example: General Douglas MacArthur’s need for the assault to occur 

in close proximity to Seoul overrode Navy and 

Marine Corps objections concerning the suitability of the area for amphibious operations.

We must be able to integrate Special Operations Forces. Amphibious operations rely 

heavily on good intelligence and shaping of the 

operating environment. Many of the required 

capabilities to accomplish these tasks now reside 

in U.S. Special Operations Command forces.

THE ANSWER: 

SINGLE NAVAL BATTLE 

AND AGGRESSIVE ACTION

As the list here demonstrates, large amphibious 

operations are not the domain of just the “Gator 

Navy” and the Marines. We will need to apply 

CSGs, submarines, patrol aircraft, mine warfare, Navy expeditionary forces, as well as the 

amphibious ships, landing craft, beachmasters, 

and the entire inventory of MAGTF capabilities 

to address land-air-sea threats and accomplish 

the amphibious mission. In order to integrate 

these units into coherent operating forces, we 

need a common approach across the naval Services. Single naval battle is a term that has recently emerged from the deliberations of the Marine 

Corps’ Amphibious Capabilities Working Group. 

Single naval battle is not an operating concept or 

a separate doctrine. It is a framework, or lens, 

for thinking, planning, and executing naval operations: everything that occurs in the maritime 

battlespace affects everything else in that battlespace, so every aspect of Navy and Marine 

Corps doctrine and operations must take into 

account the impact across the whole naval force. 

This framework will facilitate developing our 

ideas and capabilities with integration foremost 

in mind. However critical single naval battle is 

to bringing naval thinking into coherency, it is 

only a first step. To address the challenges itemized in this article requires active experimentation and training. U.S. Fleet Forces and Marine 

Forces Command are taking action to this end 

by crafting a multiyear campaign to develop and 

train to our capability of executing large-scale 

amphibious operations. This campaign will get 

after the “how” of large amphibious operations, 

and in the process ensure our forces are trained 

and ready.

The Combined [Force]/Joint [Force] Maritime Component Command with the Maritime 

Operations Center provides an actual naval 

command-and-control tool with which to apply 

single naval battle approaches in wargaming and 

exercises. In BA12, U.S. Fleet Forces and Marine Forces Command employed an inherently 

naval Combined Force Maritime Component 

Command (CFMCC), with equal Navy and Marine Corps staff representation, to pursue the 

single naval battle at the tactical and operational 

level of war. The CFMCC will be a centerpiece 

of the campaign plan.

PREMIER ANNUAL EVENT

The Bold Alligator exercise will be the premier 

annual event of this campaign. However, the 

campaign will not solely be an exercise series. 

It will feature experiments, professional military education, leadership seminars, and other 

events to truly develop and sustain this capability. This effort on the East Coast is part of a larger 
290 Chapter Three

Navy and Marine Corps effort to revitalize the 

full range of our naval capabilities.

The naval Services have a great deal of work 

to do to deliver the amphibious capability that 

our nation expects of us. There will always be 

capacity and resource limitations, and in an era 

of declining budgets, the naval Services will 

not be able to field and maintain all the forces 

we desire. However, the challenges laid out are 

primarily those of doctrine, training, and education. If we fail to understand how we should 

execute these operations, and fail to build a generation of sailors and Marines who have been 

trained to do so, we will also fail in execution, 

regardless of whether we have more resources 

or not.
291

BETWEEN PEACE AND THE 

AIR-SEA BATTLE

A War at Sea Strategy

by Captain Jeffrey E. Kline and Captain Wayne P. Hughes

Naval War College Review, 2012285

applaud the air-sea battle component as the most 

effective means of preparing for the most challenging conflict—full-scale conventional war. 

We propose, however, an intermediate strategy, 

one providing American leadership additional 

flexibility to avert the need to exercise the potentially escalatory strikes that the air-sea battle 

strategy may require. Predicated on American 

relative strengths, particularly in the undersea 

domain, it is a “war at sea” strategy.

A war-at-sea strategy’s purpose is to provide U.S. political leadership less intrusive ways 

to deter war and inspire allied engagement in 

peace. It is a maritime strategy confining conflict to the sea without land invasion or strike, 

thereby diminishing the threat of escalation. The 

strategy affords leadership the means to reinforce any relationship between the United States 

and China, whether cooperation, competition, 

confrontation, conflict short of war, or war. In 

this short article we describe the ends, ways, 

and means of the strategy, why its adoption provides more options for deterrence, and how it 

plays to American strengths.

“Land-sea wars” have significant maritime 

dimensions, with command of the sea posited by this study as mattering more than 

either [land combat] skill or strength. . . .

Command of the sea is a preeminent form of 

power that determines the outcome of landsea conflicts.

~ John Arquilla286

I

n a February 2012 article published in 

the American Interest, General Norton A. 

Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air 

Force, and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief 

of Naval Operations, provide solid justification 

for more closely integrating Air Force and Navy 

capabilities into an air-sea battle strategy.287 We 

285 The original article came from Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. 

Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea 

Strategy,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 35–

40. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. 

286 Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System 

(Washington, DC: Crane Russak, Taylor & Francis, 1992).

287 Adm Norton A. Schwartz, USN, and Gen Jonathan W. Greenert, USAF, “Air-Sea Battle,” American Interest, 20 February 2012. 
292 Chapter Three

THE STRATEGY’S ENDS, 

WAYS, AND MEANS

The war-at-sea strategy’s ends are to deter Chinese land or maritime aggression and, failing 

that, deny China the use of the sea inside the 

“first island chain” (a conceptual line from Japan 

to Taiwan and the Philippines) during hostilities. 

The ways are distant interception of Chinese shipping, widespread submarine attacks and mining 

inside the first island chain, offensive attacks 

by a flotilla composed of small missile-carrying 

combatants to fight in the China seas and patrol 

vessels for maritime interdiction at straits and 

choke points, and Marine expeditionary forces 

positioned to hold the South China Sea islands at 

risk, with no intention of putting ground forces on China’s mainland.288 The means are a force 

structure with a better combination of conventional air forces, battle-group ships, and submarines, and a forward-deployed flotilla of U.S. 

and allied small combatants.

Thus, by plying long-standing American 

maritime strengths against China’s dependence 

on the seas, the strategy is intended to retain our 

nation’s peaceable influence in the western Pacific for many years to come.

The war-at-sea strategy is also, however, a 

catalyst for peacetime engagement. It implies 

an adaptable force structure, a deployment plan, 

logistics capability, and allied collaboration. Accordingly, a critical peacetime component includes engaging Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, 

Brunei, Philippines, South Korea, and Japan. 

While engagement may take many forms, increased maritime security operations, especially 

288 The flotilla of small vessels as an entirely new component for 

inshore operations was popularized by Sir Julian Corbett in Some

Principles of Maritime Strategy in 1911. He foresaw the inability of 

battleships—the “capital ships” of their day—to operate inshore in 

the face of the evolving threat of torpedo boats and submarines. 

See Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 121–23.

with the flotilla, can aid these nations’ maritime 

governance operations to counter terrorism, 

piracy, smuggling, and illegal, unregulated, and 

underreported fishing. These vessels would also 

prevent seabed exploration contrary to international law, while at the same time providing 

valuable tactical experience for the crews.

MORE OPTIONS 

FOR DETERRENCE

The capacity for sea denial within the first island 

chain and executing a distant blockade would 

provide American leadership graduated options 

before undertaking the potentially escalatory 

step of strikes on mainland China. We believe 

that maritime options may be a more credible 

deterrent than air-sea battle’s deep-strike capability, if China perceives our leadership as being more willing to employ them in response to 

aggression within a maritime exclusion zone or 

in territorial disputes. A strategy of maritime 

interdiction or blockade has been criticized as 

too slow-acting. A war-at-sea strategy, however, 

affords time for passions to cool and opportunities for negotiation in which both sides can back 

away from escalation to a long-lasting, economically disastrous war involving full mobilization 

and commitment to some kind of decisive victory—in other words, World War III. In addition, 

if potential allies within the Pacific basin realize we intend to exercise “at-sea only” strategic 

options that lessen the likelihood of Chinese 

attacks on their homelands, they may be more 

willing to maintain and expand partnerships 

with the United States.

A tenet of the maritime strategy is that 

no U.S. Navy actions will be initiated except 

in response to claims by China contrary to international law. Our emphasis on influence and 

peacekeeping embraces the notion that we stand 
Kline and Hughes 293

USS Nathanael Greene (SSBN 636) was one of the “41 for Freedom,” nuclear-powered submarines designed 

to carry ballistic missiles. They served in the forefront of the Cold War, keeping the nation’s nuclear arsenal 

mobile and therefore able to respond to a surprise attack. Edward Terhune Wilbur, Nathanael Greene (SSBN636) Underway, March 29, 1965, for 21st Polaris Shot, 1969. Watercolor on illustration board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 88-185-K
294 Chapter Three

ready to respond should China assert hegemonic claims that interfere with the freedom of the 

seas so aggressively that both commercial enterprises and sovereign governments expect the 

U.S. Navy to act in their behalf.

A MARITIME STRENGTH: 

UNDERSEA CAPABILITIES

By exploiting our superior undersea forces within the first island chain, we neutralize China’s 

advantage of its extensive cruise and ballisticmissile antiaccess forces. U.S. and allied submarines, operating where large U.S. surface ships 

would be at risk, deny Chinese submarines, warships, logistic ships, and commercial traffic safe 

passage through the East and South China Seas. 

A combination of the following activities affords 

American policy makers an array of choices:

• The “shock” destruction of a prominent Chinese warship, like that of the 

Argentine cruiser General Belgrano by 

HMS Conqueror in 1982, making clear 

the Royal Navy’s intention to enforce 

a maritime exclusion zone around the 

Falkland Islands;

• Tracking and sinking all Chinese submarines at sea except ballistic-missile 

carrying boats;

• Sinking Chinese surface warships at sea;

• Mining some or all Chinese warship 

bases and commercial ports, with our 

submarines or unmanned underwater 

vehicles; and

• After establishing exclusion zones for 

all commercial shipping, sinking anything found inside them, while preserving routes for innocent, friendly 

traffic into East Asian states.

Flotilla Capabilities. Augmenting our 

undersea forces with small, missile-carrying 

surface combatants will challenge China’s targeting capabilities, even supposing it would expend its advanced ballistic and cruise missiles on 

such low-value targets. We draw from workshop 

discussions—with representation from the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College—to suggest three prominent employments:

• Hit-and-run raids on Chinese seabed 

exploitations that are contrary to international law;

• Escort of vital shipping into friendly 

ports, especially in the South China 

Sea; and

• Augmentation of Japanese patrol vessels to constrain illegal interference by 

China near the Senkaku Islands.

What would the flotilla look like? In rough 

terms, we envision individual small combatants 

of about 600 tons carrying six or eight surfaceto-surface missiles and depending on soft kill 

and point defense for survival, aided by offboard 

manned or unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and tactical scouting.289 To paint a picture 

of possible structures, we contemplate as the 

smallest element a mutually supporting pair, a 

squadron to comprise eight vessels, and the entire force to be eight squadrons, of which half 

would be in East Asian waters. The units costing less than $100 million each, the entire force 

would require a very small part of the shipbuilding budget.290

289 For comparison, a PHM (or patrol combatant hydrofoil, discarded by the U.S. Navy in 1993) carrying four harpoons displaced 

250 tons; coastal patrol ships (PCs) now operating in the Persian 

Gulf are of either 300 or 400 tons; and the coastal minesweepers 

(MSCs) once stationed in Sasebo, on Kyushu, in Japan, displaced 

450 tons.

290 For example, supposing a unit cost of $80 in series production 

and assuming a mere 10-year service life, a force of 64 vessels 

would cost about $500 million per year to sustain, or a bit more 

than 4 percent of the probably diminished Ship Construction 

(Navy), or SCN, budget.
Kline and Hughes 295

Maritime Interdiction or Blockade. Interdiction would in most instances be our first 

action to indicate the seriousness of the U.S. government in response to interference with free 

trade or other belligerent actions by China contrary to international law or conventions. Maritime interdiction can be graduated from a small 

number of inspections through seizure of select 

cargoes, such as crude oil, up to a full blockade. 

We envision blockade as imposed at the Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok straits, as well as, to 

the extent feasible, the Luzon Strait. Carrier 

battle groups can safely cover these interdiction 

operations. To be most effective, cooperation of 

Japan and Singapore will be essential, and that of 

Indonesia and the Philippines desirable. If the interdiction moves away from choke points—for 

example, off the coast of Burma—aerial surveillance from littoral combat ships, land bases, or 

both seems desirable.

Holding the South China Sea Islands 

at Risk. The presence of Marine expeditionary 

forces and their amphibious ships station forward in the western Pacific provides a unique 

capability to keep Chinese-held South China 

Sea islands, particularly those in dispute, at risk. 

During peacetime, their presence, by balancing 

force in the region and signaling American commitment, may motivate peaceful resolutions 

to disputes over exclusive economic zones; increase engagement opportunities exercises with 

the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore; and provide an asymmetric threat in response to a Taiwan invasion. In the event of war, 

Patrol combatant missile hydrofoils USS Taurus (PHM 3) in the foreground, and USS Hercules (PHM 2) cruise 

alongside one another during a patrol on 1 November 1989.

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives, courtesy of PH2 Mark Kettenhofen
296 Chapter Three

these expeditionary forces would deny use of 

South China Sea islands and exploration of the 

seabed through quick-reaction raids, land-to-sea 

missile attacks from concealed sites, ground and 

air surveillance, and other collaborative island 

employment with allies.

Less Reliance on Communications. 

Our undersea forces will be less vulnerable 

to cyber and electromagnetic attack by operating in ways that exploit the “silent service’s” 

long-standing advantages. Flotilla ships would 

operate in stealthy, semisilent fashion as MGBs, 

MTBs, and PT boats have done in the past. Tactically offensive, yet operationally defensive, the 

war-at-sea strategy leverages the stronger form 

of warfare at sea, the offense, and allows for less 

concern on command-and-control interruption 

as it promotes individual and independent tactical actions for cumulative effect. Conventional 

air and sea forces that must employ active modes 

of search and communication will at first be assigned to support the distant blockade, thereby 

keeping them outside Chinese antiaccess and 

area denial targeting. If Chinese land attacks on 

U.S. or allied forces ashore require the United States to reply with the air-sea battle’s deep 

strike capabilities, then our ships and aircraft 

would move into position to execute their missions with well-rehearsed methods of deception 

and networking.

WISHING DOES NOT 

MAKE A STRATEGY

The assertions in favor of developing a war-atsea strategy are hypotheses. Further analysis, 

war gaming, and policy discussions must be 

united to answer the following questions:

1. Can the United States effectively deny 

China’s use of the South and East China 

Seas in the event of all-out war at sea 

without attacks on land-based forces 

by either side?

2. Before the war-at-sea strategy is adopted for the indefinite future, the United 

States must confirm the affordability 

of the Navy forces that would create 

a maritime no-man’s-land within the 

first island chain. What do the timephased, programmatic details look like?

3. Attacks on bases would be an expansion of the war to the land, so the more 

secure the bases the less temptation to 

attack them. Where are the best locations at which to base submarines and 

support flotilla operations?

4. Can China counter this war strategy by 

threatening attacks off U.S. West Coast 

ports and in the Pacific trade routes, 

essentially implementing a war-at-sea 

strategy of its own?

5. For what other combat and noncombat operations might the flotilla be 

more cost effective than traditional battle-group combatants? Patrolling and 

fighting in coastal waters will continue 

to be the most frequent tasks for the 

twenty-first-century U.S. Navy. Until 

we can carry part of the burden with 

our own flotilla, we must rely on our 

partners around the world or employ more expensive, multipurpose, 

blue-water combatants for maritime 

security operations.

6. Will a war-at-sea strategy have a better chance to deter, delay, or constrain 

conflict with China than land-attack 

strategies?

7. Last, how do we disseminate the change 

of structure of our strategy in a way 

that maintains influence in the western 
Kline and Hughes 297

Pacific? We suggest, for unity of effort 

among the U.S. armed forces and our 

partners in Asia, that the strategy be 

openly published. China will not like 

it, but it is a peacekeeping strategy, not 

at all a manifest for aggression.

CONSUMMATION

We have cited Professor John Arquilla on the 

significance of seapower, as Arquilla’s analysis 

looks at land-sea wars after 1815. He gives the 

classic nineteenth-century maritime strategists’ 

advocacy of seapower fresh credibility by validating the continuing efficacy of maritime superiority in contemporary times with current data 

and quantitative analysis.

Close integration between U.S. air and 

maritime forces with resilient communications 

and the ability to attack in-depth are desirable 

goals for both the air-sea battle and war-at-sea 

strategies. Our emphasis is on America’s maritime superiority, ways to exploit it, and by implication the hazards to the nation and the world 

should it be lost. Inserting a war-at-sea strategy as an intermediate step preceding the threat 

of full conventional war—and adjusting force 

structure to achieve it—will provide American 

leadership a more robust portfolio for engaging China and strengthening our alliances in the 

emerging age of the Pacific.
298

GENERAL PAUL X. KELLEY 

BIOGRAPHY

Following the Vietnam War, he served in 

a variety of joint staff billets, including chief, 

Southeast Asia Branch, Plans and Policy Directorate, and served as a liaison officer for the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Paris Peace Accords. 

He was promoted to brigadier general in 1974 

and commanded the 4th Marine Division and 

held several developmental and education commands. He served as the director of both the 

Development Center and the Education Center 

in turn at Marine Corps Development and Education Command. He then became deputy chief 

of staff for Requirements and Programs.

In 1979, he was appointed to lead the development of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task 

Force, he was then its first commander. He later 

described its value: 

As I envision the [Joint Rapid Deployment 

Task Force], we will present the National 

Command Authority with a full range of 

options for any given crisis. Rather than going through the last-minute agony of what 

forces are available and who will command 

them, we will have done all the proper planGeneral Paul X. Kelley was born on 11 

November 1928 in Boston, Massachusetts. He was commissioned a second 

lieutenant in the Marine Corps in 1950 through 

the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps program at Villaneuva University. An infantry officer, Kelley served in several billets in his first 

15 years in the Corps, attended jump school, 

and the U.S. Army’s Pathfinder course. He later 

commanded the 2d Force Reconnaissance Company. He then served as an exchange officer with 

the Royal Marine Commandos, where he earned the Royal Marine’s beret. After earning the 

beret, he commanded C Troop, 42 Commando, 

in the Far East in 1960–61. 

In 1966, Kelly deployed to Vietnam as the 

commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines; he was awarded the Silver Star for leading 

his battalion in combat. He returned to Vietnam 

in 1970–71, commanding the 1st Marines, the 

last Marine regiment in Vietnam. 

291 Attributed to Gen Paul X. Kelley in Richard C. Gross, “Marine 

Guards Scandal Could Hurt Soviets, Says Kelley,” UPI, 25 June 

1987.

Life is full of lousy options, the question is which of the lousy options is the best.

~ General Paul X. Kelley291
Kelley 299

the firepower of Marine infantry, while logistics 

were improved by the Logistics Vehicle System, 

or “Dragon Wagon.” In aviation, Kelley oversaw 

the introduction of the McDonnell Douglas AV8B Harrier II and McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 

Hornet to operational status. When he recommended the Joint Rapid Deployment Task force 

he created be transformed into U.S. Central 

Command, he advocated strongly for General 

George B. Crist as its second commander, the 

Corps’ first joint combatant commander. 

General Kelley retired from the Corps in 

1987, after a 37-year career in which he prepared the Corps for the challenges it would face in 

the Middle East as the twentieth century closed 

and the twenty-first century began.

Gen Paul X. Kelley served as the 28th Commandant 

of the U.S. Marine Corps from 1 July 1983 to 30 

June 1987. Here, he is seen during an official visit to 

Okinawa in October 1984.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Paul X. Kelley Collection, Archives Branch, History Division

ning and force sizing beforehand. The National Command Authority can then rapidly 

deploy the correct force package before the 

crisis gets out of hand. 

General Kelley was appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps on 1 July 1983. During 

his tenure as Commandant, he led the Corps 

through the 1983 Beirut bombing, the invasion 

of Grenada (1983), and the Iran-Iraq Tanker 

War (1984–88). He oversaw the most extensive modernization of the Corps since the early 

1940s. Light armored vehicles were introduced 

and M249 squad automatic weapons were assigned to each fireteam, dramatically increasing 
300

ADMIRAL ELMO R. ZUMWALT 

BIOGRAPHY

took command of Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 

Seven in 1965 upon promotion to rear admiral. In 1968, the same year he was promoted 

vice admiral, he became commander of Naval 

Forces Vietnam and chief of the Naval Advisory 

Group, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

In 1970, he was promoted to admiral and 

appointed as the Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO). During his tenure as CNO, he set about 

reforming the Navy’s culture and personnel policies, particularly targeting racism and sexism, 

but also removing regulations that were demeaning or abrasive to professional sailors. His 

preferred methods for communicating this goal 

to the fleet were Z-grams, Navy-wide communications that presented orders and explained 

his intent on broad Navy policies. Addressing 

the Navy’s need to replace aging World War II 

ships, he championed the Pegasus-class missile 

patrol boats and the Oliver Hazard Perry-class 

guided missile frigates.

Admiral Zumwalt retired in 1974 from the 

Navy and passed away in 2000. At his funeral, 

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt was born on 

29 November 1920 in San Francisco, 

California. He entered the United States 

Naval Academy in 1939 and was commissioned 

an ensign in June 1942. He served initially in destroyers, and was awarded a Bronze Star with V 

for his actions in the Combat Information Center aboard the USS Robinson (DD 562) during 

the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He later commanded 

a captured Japanese vessel, the river gunboat 

Ataka, which helped restore order in Shanghai, 

China, after the war.

Zumwalt continued to serve on destroyers 

until he took command of USS Tills (DE 748) in 

1950 and then was assigned as navigator aboard 

the USS Wisconsin (BB 64) during the Korean 

War in 1951. He was later the first commander 

of the original purpose-built guided-missile destroyer in the Navy, the USS Dewey (DDG-45), 

built in 1957. 

Following several desk assignments, he 

292 Adm Elmo Zumwalt’s Z-gram, quoted in John Desselle, “An 

Iconic Figure to Remember, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr.,” Sextant, 

6 October 2016.

After all, the best warships in the world are of no avail without the crews to sail and fight them.

~ Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt293
Zumwalt 301

President William J. “Bill” Clinton said, “When 

our historians look back on the century we 

have just left, they may well record that Arleigh 

Burke was the spirit of the United States Navy; 

they will certainly recall that Bud Zumwalt was 

its conscience.”293

293 William J. Clinton, “Remarks at Funeral Services for Elmo R. 

Zumwalt Jr.,” American Presidency Project, 10 January 2000. 

Adm Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. sat for this portrait photograph in August 1970, shortly after receiving his fourth 

star and assuming the post of Chief of Naval Operations. He was the youngest officer to hold that position. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of PHC W. Mason, Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 97202-KN
302 chapter number

In Helo Relief, Reserve artist Col Peter Michael 

Gish depicts Marine Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea 

Knights over a Kurdish refugee camp at the Turkish 

border in Northern Iraq during Operation Provide 

Comfort. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 

24-2-178
303

CHAPTER FOUR

The Future 

of Maritime Power

by Paul Westermeyer

S

tudying the lessons of World War II, Allan 

R. Millett and Williamson Murray noted 

that, “No amount of operational virtuosity . . . redeemed fundamental flaws in political 

judgment. Whether policy shaped strategy or 

strategic imperatives drove policy was irrelevant. Miscalculations in both led to defeat, and 

any combination of politico-strategic error had 

disastrous results. . . . This is because it is more 

important to make correct decisions at the political and strategic level than it is at the operational and tactical level. Mistakes in operations and 

tactics can be corrected, but political and strategic mistakes live forever.” Maritime conditions 

may change, but the imperative to make sound 

strategic decisions remains, and requires careful 

consideration of future maritime threats.1

Evaluating those threats requires that we 

follow Mahan’s dictum that “the study of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.”2

 The first step in 

1

 Quoted in Murray and Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” 3.

2

 Capt A. T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, or The Place of Force in 

the International Relations of States (New York & London: Harper & 

Brothers, 1912), 206.
304 Chapter Four

considering the United States’ future maritime 

strategy is considering what historical examples 

best fit current conditions, and then studying 

them closely, while keeping in mind that history can never truly repeat itself.3

 In other words, 

maritime strategists must study a wide variety 

of maritime conflicts looking for insights beyond the grand Mahanian struggles of the Pacific 

in World War II to ensure the future of American 

naval power. 

The maritime challenges facing the United 

States today are varied, ranging from asymmetrical piracy and terrorism through humanitarian disasters, unconventional responses to naval 

power from near-peer states, and traditional 

naval threats. The beginning of the twenty-first 

century resembles that of the beginning of the 

twentieth century. Naval technologies such as cyberwarfare and hypersonic antishipping missiles 

are at the height of development, altering naval 

time-distance factors. As with the big-gunned, 

steam-driven, armor-plated dreadnoughts of a 

century earlier, these elements carry immense 

potential to change the ways that naval battles 

will be fought; however, they have yet to be tested in major conflicts with enemies of comparable technological advancement to adequately 

measure their impact. 

The United States Navy remains the most 

powerful navy on the planet, dominating global 

maritime affairs as it has since the end of World 

War II; yet, it faces the threat of a submarine 

guerre de course from near-peer competitors in 

Russia and China possibly similar to the U-boat 

campaign of World War II. Similarly, hoping to 

control local sea spaces and choke points, a wide 

variety of aggressor forces may pose a threat 

3

 All human events are a unique combination of time, place, and 

participants; no event can ever completely mirror another in all 

of these respects.

similar to the hybrid littoral conflict of the Tanker War of the 1980s. In both scenarios, maritime 

technological change may require different strategic responses than those employed in the past. 

Along with traditional naval operations, 

the maritime Services must deal with law enforcement and border control issues, such as 

cross-sea migration, drug smuggling, and illegal 

fishing, challenges reminiscent of the Barbary 

pirates or the struggle against the slave trade 

prior to the Civil War. The modern era of operations includes bringing relief to civilian populations after natural or man-made disasters, which 

is of increasing political importance; historically, 

naval forces are very adept at such operations. 

All three of the naval Services of the United States—the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast 

Guard— must work together to face these 

threats. To meet this new requirement, military strategists have been working to conceive 

of a new collaborative, inter-Service model of 

naval power in the future. In 2015, the Chief 

of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard released A Cooperative Strategy for 

21st Century Seapower, addressing these threats. It 

has since been updated and additional strategic 

proposals published, most notably Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (2017) and A 

Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 

2.0 (2018).4

All of these strategic proposals attempt to 

balance the danger of the continually evolving 

threats posed by peer competitors with the 

need to stay abreast of the latest technological 

4 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, 

Ready (Washington, DC: Coast Guard, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, Department of the Navy, 2015); Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 

Department of the Navy, 2017); and A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, 2018).
Westermeyer 305

developments, while remaining mindful of the 

economic and political constraints common to 

democratic states limited by budgetary realities. 

Thus, the future challenges that maritime strategists will face require not only a solid grounding 

in the history of naval strategy but also a keen 

understanding of the technological realm as well 

as political realities. Failure to do so may result 

in unpleasant strategic surprises that can only be 

overcome through great sacrifice. By studying 

the following essays, students of naval strategic 

thought should come away with new perspectives that will guide them through the various 

and difficult challenges that the future holds in 

store.

The first three chapters of this anthology 

focused on the legacy of American naval power, 

examining how the nation’s maritime strategies have evolved since the start of the twentieth century. The subtitle for this anthology, 

however, is “Reinvigorating Maritime Strategic 

Thought” and, as such, this final chapter is forward-looking, focusing on “The Future of Maritime Power.”
306

THE MARINE CORPS 

OF TOMORROW

by Major Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 19935

Corps’ ability to redefine itself with respect to 

the demands of the age, and all of them share a 

common thread: they required the enlightened 

preparation of doctrine and forces in the present 

to meet an uncertain future. The challenge is no 

less today.

Successful anticipation of future requirements is key to maintaining a potent Marine 

Corps that will survive this interregnum and 

live into the next century. Wise choices must 

be made in today’s fiscally constrained environment to create, sustain, and refine doctrine and 

force structure poised against tomorrow’s potential foes. Anticipation of who tomorrow’s Marines will fight and what they will be required to 

do demands discriminating vision and the moral 

courage to change—or not to change, if more 

appropriate.

These choices will be expressed in the ways 

the Marine Corps fulfills its service responsibilities of equipping, training, organizing, and supporting forces for the warfighting commanders 

in chief. In the post-Goldwater-Nichols world, 

the warfighters enjoy enormous power. It is 

The periods after wars always have been 

difficult for the Marine Corps. Defense spending declines, the president 

and Congress grapple to shape the role of the 

United States in a new world order, and the 

Marine Corps’ struggles to avoid marginalization or absorption by hungry sister Services. To 

survive the recent victory of the grand strategy 

of containment, the Marine Corps must again 

revalidate its usefulness and, where necessary, 

reinvent itself. There is ample precedent for 

this. The amphibious mission evolved after the 

end of World War I. The idea of an expeditionary force-in-readiness followed World War II 

demobilization, and a general top-to-bottom revitalization and refocus was undertaken after the 

Vietnam War and the provocative Brookings Institution paper, “Where Does the Marine Corps 

Go From Here?”

These are clear examples of the Marine 

5

 The original article came from Maj Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., 

“The Marine Corps of Tomorrow,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

119, no. 11 (November 1993): 28–31. Minor revisions were made 

to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
McKenzie 307

these commanders, through their integrated 

priority lists, congressional testimony, and their 

access to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, who can control the missions of service 

components in their fiefdoms.

In balancing the commanders-in-chief’s requirements and internal imperatives, the Marine 

Corps operates within a triangular framework. 

Its three sides are doctrine, force structure, 

and training. Sound decision making is based 

on understanding and controlling the dynamic, 

causal relationship between current and future 

doctrine and force structure. Forces built and 

trained without workable, coherent doctrine 

are doomed to failure. Doctrine written without reference to the future is equally worthless.

DOCTRINE: 

NOW AND IN THE FUTURE

The 1992 Navy-Marine Corps white paper, “. . . 

From the Sea,” describes a changed role for naval forces in the national military strategy. Shifting from open-ocean, global war to a regional, 

green-water outlook, the white paper emphasized the effects of joint operations from rather 

than on the sea. Conceptually, this littoral focus 

granted the Marine Corps a central role in naval 

operations. Unfortunately, the fresh concepts of 

the white paper did not penetrate the collective 

thinking of defense planners.6

6

 Col Mackubin T. Owens Jr., USMCR, “The U.S. Marine Corps 

in Review,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 119, no. 5 (May 1993): 

131.

Marines assigned to the 31st MEU board a Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey assigned to VMM-265 (Reinforced), 

on the flight deck of the forward-deployed amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), 24 September 2013. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of MC3 Adam D. Wainwright
308 Chapter Four

The emphasis on jointness struck many as 

“operational correctness,” a craven attempt to 

slice a larger share of an ever-decreasing budgetary pie, like the Air Force’s hurried attempt 

to field and (most importantly) advertise their 

new composite 366th [Fighter] Wing as a global 

power-projection force.7

 Critics quickly labeled 

“. . . From the Sea” a political document, designed 

against an internal Department of Defense foe, 

that “deflected” rather than confronted the future.8

 Ironically, Marine doctrine has not been 

materially changed by “. . . From the Sea.” With 

this white paper, it is the Navy that has moved 

closer to a warfighting strategy that showcases 

the unique capabilities of the Corps, capabilities 

that have been available for more than 40 years, 

but that were overlooked by the Cold War planners of the Navy as they focused on the Soviets 

and a possible nuclear Midway.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea and the AirGround Task Force: the enduring style of the modern Marine Corps is defined by two concepts:

First, the Marine Corps is an expeditionary 

force with a naval character maneuvering 

from the sea to operate on the land.

Second, Marine operations are conducted within the framework of an integrated air-ground team.

Operational maneuver from the sea is the 

soul of the Marine Corps. It is the Marine expression of the white paper’s broader naval focus, with sea basing its fundamental tenet. It 

provides for the rapid deployment and subsequent employment of naval expeditionary forc7

 Julie Bird, “Anytime, Anywhere,” Air Force Times, 29 March 1993, 

12–17.

8

 Michael Vlahos, “. . . From the Sea and the Politics of Change,” 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 119, no. 2 (February 1993): 47.

es with all the advantages—both tactical and 

strategic—granted by control of the seas. This 

doctrine recognizes the relative unlikeliness of a 

traditional amphibious assault, and much attention is devoted to the myriad of other activities 

that can be conducted in littoral areas, including 

war and circumstances short of war. Humanitarian operations, such as those in Somalia and 

Bangladesh, represent the low end of this continuum, while [Operation] Desert Storm and 

Korean contingencies stand at the high end.

Both amphibious and sustained operations 

ashore are united by the Marine Corps’ airground team. This doctrine calls for the synchronized application of aviation and ground combat 

power, which gives the Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force (MAGTF) commander the flexibility to 

strike both deep and close areas with a powerful aviation component. The aviation combat element as a coequal component of the MAGTF 

is critical, because the ground combat element 

is traditionally lighter, hence “poorer” in towed 

and self-propelled artillery than comparable 

army formations.

Institutionally, the Marine Corps is recovering from a decades-long doctrinal trough in 

which it reduced its combined-arms doctrine, 

born in Korea, from potent elegance to empty dogma. While chanting the air-ground team 

mantra, Marine leaders let the ground combat element of the MAGTF assume primacy in 

planning, while the other two elements (the air 

combat element and the combat service support 

element) supported the ground concept of operations. This planning syllogism now has changed 

as part of the maneuver warfare revolution of 

the 1980s. A painful renaissance of the MAGTF 

command element is virtually complete. The 

swiftness and virtuosity of the MAGTF, com-
McKenzie 309

posed of equal air, ground, and service support 

elements, is the glue of Marine Corps doctrine. 

It permeates every aspect of Marine Corps tactical thinking.

FORCE STRUCTURE

Doctrine drives force structure. Since Korea, 

this has produced three functionally different 

types of MAGTFs: amphibious forces, prepositioned forces, and special purpose forces.9

 In 

9

 As opposed to the traditional MAGTFs: MEF, MEB, MEU. They, 

of course, are all functionally similar, hence the differentiation.

looking at the future, it seems likely that variations of these three models will remain the basis 

for the Marine Corps’ forward-deployed structure. 

Amphibious Forces: the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest amphibious 

force, and would be employed only in a major 

regional contingency.10 Other forces that might 

be deployed include amphibious ready forces 

and airlift alert forces. All of these forces are 

10 Under new Marine Corps doctrine, MEFs are defined by their 

command element rather than by assigned forces.

EN2 David Watson (front) assigned to USS Freedom (LCS 1), shows Marines from the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 

19) Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team, Pacific, how to secure a Jacob’s ladder and pelican hook during a joint 

visit, board, search, and seizure exercise. Freedom is in Singapore on an overseas deployment. Fast, agile, and 

mission-focused, littoral combat ships are designed to operate in near-shore environments and employ modular mission packages that can be configured for surface warfare, mine countermeasures, or antisubmarine 

warfare. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of MC Cassandra Thompson
310 Chapter Four

constrained by time. They either are not immediately available, or they are employable rapidly 

only outside a traditional MAGTF task organization. Until the recent rise of the Special Purpose 

MAGTF (SPMAGTF), the only force that has 

been readily available is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The MEU—composed of an 

infantry battalion, a helicopter squadron, logistics support, and a command element—epitomizes Marine Corps amphibious forces. MEUs 

in some form have been employed for more than 

30 years in forward-presence missions. Based 

on board three to five amphibious platforms, 

a MEU is task organized with the amphibious 

squadron with which it has trained. Together, 

they form a Marine Amphibious Ready Group. 

This force possesses great operational depth 

and flexibility, manifested principally in its ability to conduct operations simultaneously and 

on extremely short notice. In response to the 

commanders-in-chief requirements, the Marine 

Corps maintains a MEU in the Mediterranean, 

the Pacific, and in the Persian Gulf.

MEUs operate in the realm of deterrence, diplomatic resolve, and missions short 

of sustained combat. The MEU is diplomatically 

“cheap.” It requires no basing rights or overflight 

agreements. It can be postured rapidly and with 

veiled intent. These forward-presence forces 

can enter forcefully, alone or in concert with 

airborne or other joint elements. Once through 

the front door, they enable either heavier combat or humanitarian assistance forces to follow 

rapidly. Innate flexibility, joint interoperability, rapid response, and the escalation control 

unique to sea-based organizations are the hallmarks of Marine forward deployed forces.

Today and tomorrow, the greatest threat to 

forward presence lies in well-meaning attempts 

to retain capabilities while reducing the strain on 

ships, personnel, and equipment. The U.S. Central Command’s deployment of a scaled-down 

MEU in 1992–93 as an amphibious task unit is a 

classic example. The 15th MEU was not whole; 

it did not possess all of its equipment or personnel on board its amphibious ships. Instead, in a 

curious Rube Goldberg artifice, a single prepositioned ship was tagged to join up with the 

MEU, meeting a fly-in-echelon of troops from 

the United States.11 While saving personnel tempo days, this scheme gutted the MEU of all its 

traditional advantages, significantly reducing its 

flexibility and combat power.

Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPFs):

MPFs were born in the mid-1980s, when the 

Marine Corps played in global war scenarios 

against the Soviet Union. Three squadrons of 

ships, each preloaded with combat equipment 

and sustainment for a Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade, were positioned in selected forward 

ports. The plan was to marry up this equipment 

with Marines flown in to an adjacent airfield.

In the 1980s, there were powerful advantages to such a scheme. It provided a fairly rapid 

buildup of combat power in excess of a comparable light Army division of the same period, 

and it reduced the commitment of strategic lift 

at the start of a general war.

The prepositioning decision looks even better now than it did at conception. In a global war 

against the Soviets, the slow-steaming maritime 

prepositioning squadrons would have had little 

chance of survival against the Soviet gauntlet 

of submarines and long-range naval aviation. 

Today, with the steady weakening of the seadenial threat, these squadrons can reach almost 

11 Reuben Garrett Lucius Goldberg, a.k.a. Rube Goldberg, was an 

American cartoonist, sculptor, author, engineer, and inventor best 

known for his cartoons depicting complicated gadgets performing 

simple tasks in indirect, convoluted ways.
McKenzie 311

any region without fear of strategic interdiction. 

The successful employment of maritime prepositioning ships in [Operations] Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm stands as a strong lesson in the 

powerful utility of these ships.

Maritime prepositioning forces are the critical link between tripwire and sustained conflict. But unlike amphibious forces, they have 

significant political limitations. They are not 

diplomatically “free,” because they require a host 

nation that will allow the entry of the squadron 

and the arrival of the flown-in Marines. The introduction of additional combat forces into an 

area of potential conflict can be escalatory. The 

prepositioning forces thus become a strong signal of resolve on both our part and, ineluctably, 

on the part of the host nation. Many nations will 

shrink from such a stand.

Maritime prepositioning forces and amphibious forces are fundamentally different and 

irreconcilable, unless they are employed in accordance with their capabilities. Amphibious 

forces enter and secure, forcibly or otherwise. 

Prepositioning forces add combat power, depth, 

and sustainment, but in sequence, not simultaneously.

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground 

Task Forces: as part of the search for ways to 

create forward-deployed forces “on the cheap,” 

in 1992, the U.S. Atlantic Command proposed 

Marines of the 24th MEU file out on the flight deck of USS Bataan (LHD 5) to await their aircraft the MV22 Ospreys, during a training evolution in preparation for their upcoming deployment. SSgt Kristopher J. 

Battles, Shuffling Out to the Birds, 2017. Acrylic on canvas board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2017-004-05
312 Chapter Four

the establishment of a company-size Marine 

force on board a carrier. Austere aviation and 

combat service support elements were colocated with the company, along with a small command element.

The carrier-based SPMAGTF, the current 

adaptive joint force paradigm, possesses none of 

the operational depth of a MEU. Once ashore, 

the company has no mobility, little firepower, 

and only the carrier aircraft wing for support. 

It can be inserted only by helicopter, which requires the carrier battle group to move dangerously close to a potentially hostile shore. This 

mismatch of operating envelopes either forces 

the carrier battle group to operate outside its 

element, or, most likely, forces the SPMAGTF 

to conduct operations at extreme helicopter 

range, with no backup. Every operation thus has 

the potential for disaster that attends extremely 

long-range helicopter operations. Additionally, 

the carrier’s antiair capability is weakened by 

making room for the Marine helicopters.

There are advantages to adaptive force 

packaging, and there is certainly a role for its 

current naval manifestation, the SPMAGTF. The 

advantages are in the fiscal and personnel arenas, however, not in operational capabilities. To 

survive, the SPMAGTF must be linked directly 

to precise circumstances, circumscribed in time 

and space, carefully calibrated to the nuances 

and specifics of a particular situation. To attempt 

to employ these forces as MEU surrogates—as 

general purpose forces—in a fixed deployment 

routine invites disaster.

CONCLUSIONS 

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Crafting doctrine and force structure requires 

foresight, to balance conflicting visions of the future. It requires courage, to defend the product 

of foresight. Finally, it requires persistence and 

integrity, to articulate and hold to a vision over 

the long run. This means rejecting the lure of 

short-term compromises that promise transient 

advantages but deviate from the basic values of 

the institution. War is waged most effectively 

from first principles, and the first principle of 

the Marine Corps is the continued organization 

and training of expeditionary amphibious forces, deployed intact and employed in depth as 

integrated air-ground task forces. These forces, 

using our doctrine, possess the flexibility, combat power, and simultaneity that will be critical 

in future regional wars, across the spectrum 

from low to mid to high intensity. They must 

remain whole, self-contained, and capable of 

action without escalatory reinforcement, yet capable of joint interoperability.

Both the Central Command and the Atlantic Command have sponsored initiatives that may 

alter fundamentally the organization and doctrine of forward deployed MAGTFs. These ideas 

are just the bow wave driven by many others, 

all of which will seek to impose regional, fiscal, 

or other constraints on Marine Corps generalpurpose forces. The Marine Corps must not 

stand by idly while these changes are implemented. We must be full partners in the dialogue. Where the changes are good, we should 

support them. Where they clash with our first 

principle, they must be opposed.

The Marine Corps must retain its singular 

vision of how to fight; once abrogated, it can 

never be recovered. The Marine Corps brings 

unique and compelling options to a commander’s strategic menu. There is no need to rush to 

change, to modify, or to recast an organization 

because of operational fads. As General Vande-
McKenzie 313

grift said in his May 1946 testimony before Congress, “the bended knee is not a tradition of our 

Corps.”12 If we must pass from the stage, let it 

be because our capabilities are judged no longer 

12 Gordon W. Keiser, The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 

1944–47: The Politics of Survival (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: 

NDU Press, 1982), 56.

needed after hard-headed analysis, not because 

we changed sound practices capriciously and 

ill-advisedly in pursuit of the chimera of “operational correctness.”
314

FACING WESTWARD 

TO THE FUTURE

by General Charles C. Krulak

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 199713

there, Americans began to look farther west, 

across the Pacific Ocean, to find economic 

opportunity. This westward focus enabled the 

United States to become a world power by the 

close of the nineteenth century, largely because 

of burgeoning maritime trade with countries 

that rim the Pacific. During the twentieth century, we as a Pacific power were destined to fight 

three wars in the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean region, at a cost of more than 200,000 American 

lives.

Poised at the threshold of the twenty-first 

century, we still look westward for future economic growth. The key to our national security lies in the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean region, 

whose markets are essential to the continued 

health of our economy. Access to and free trade 

within these markets can be possible only in a 

regional environment of political, economic, 

and military stability; such tranquility, however, 

is far from a natural state of affairs. Many have 

hoped for a period of global stability after the 

demise of the Soviet Union, but it has not materialized. Many challenges are surfacing to threatF

or two centuries, our nation maintained 

foreign-policy focus on the European 

continent. There were several reasons 

for this: the majority of the first settlers came 

from Europe; threats from that area posed the 

first challenges to our national security; and we 

fought two world wars primarily against European powers. But in many ways, our nation has 

found the key to the future not by looking east, 

but by looking west.

The people of the United States traditionally have looked to the West for growth and opportunity. Thomas Jefferson’s quest for a nation 

that stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific 

Ocean was shared by many, because the West 

meant opportunity. Jefferson’s efforts opened 

the vast North American interior for development, turning the continent’s potential wealth 

into economic growth, and accelerated the flow 

of immigration to the West Coast. Once settled 

13 The original article came from Gen Charles C. Krulak, “Facing 

Westward to the Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 123, no. 

3 (March 1997): 12–18. Minor revisions were made to the text 

based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and 

spelling. 
Krulak 315

en the security of the United States and its allies 

in the twenty-first century:

Rapid advances in science and technology are bringing vastly increased lethality 

to conventional weapons, and are making 

weapons of mass destruction more available.

The post-Cold War diffusion of power 

and resultant political fragmentation are 

creating power vacuums from which spring 

new conflicts fueled by ancient ethnic, religious, and cultural animosities. These conflicts are aggravated by explosive population 

growth, regional food shortages, and mass 

migrations, which bring a new dynamic to 

local conflicts and increasingly threaten to 

escalate into large-scale regional conflict.

The world is becoming more economically interdependent.

The global economic center of gravity 

is shifting westward toward the Asia PacificIndian Ocean littoral.

The Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean littoral is as 

diverse as it is wealthy. It is home to one of the 

planet’s most influential economies (Japan), the 

last significant Communist state (China), the 

two most populous nations (China and India), 

and the most populous Islamic nation (Indonesia). Six of the world’s great religions (Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, 

and Taoism) intersect there. In addition, this region creates more than 33 percent of the world’s 

wealth, contains 41 percent of the world’s bank 

reserves, and consumes 28 percent of the oil. It 

is responsible for one out of every six jobs in the 

United States. In terms of geography, resources, 

and economic and industrial capacity, the nations that comprise this region have all the tools 

and the momentum to become the world’s economic heartland. Unfortunately, these elements 

of strength also provide tinder for conflict, and 

regional tensions could in time become the 

seeds of global instability.

Geography: the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean 

littoral features great land masses, peninsulas, 

islands, straits, rain forests, mountains, and river basins—all separated by water. This diverse 

and fragmented geography has nurtured civilizations that in the course of many centuries have 

learned to excel at, and depend upon, sea-based 

trade. As a result, the region’s economies have 

become extremely interdependent with one 

nation’s success fueling expansion for its neighbors. This focus on trade and regional interdependence has enabled the Asia Pacific-Indian 

Ocean nations to bring the productivity of their 

national infrastructures to unprecedented levels 

during the final decade of the twentieth centuMarines with Weapons Company, Battalion Landing Team, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (BLT 2/5), sit 

on a LAV atop the flight deck aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) during a defense 

of the amphibious task force drill underway in the 

South China Sea, 27 September 2018. During the 

training, Marines with BLT 2/5 and crewmen with 

the Wasp rehearsed ship security using a variety of 

mounted and dismounted small arms and heavy 

weapons. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of GSgt E. V. 

Hagewood
316 Chapter Four

ry with incredible economic growth continuing 

through the foreseeable future.

This fragmented geography is a source of 

strength, but it also is a potential weakness. The 

nations in the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean littoral 

rely on a steady flow of strategic raw materials 

and resources, such as oil, to fuel their burgeoning economies. These resources must move 

along the sea lines of communication, through 

the straits, and near the islands and peninsulas 

of their economic, cultural, and military competitors. If these resources become scarce, or 

the demand for them cannot be met, these geographic features can become choke points, taking on new strategic significance. The region’s 

unique geography can help a desperate or aggressor nation interdict, divert, or deny the flow 

of resources to its competitors. Considering oil, 

for example: More than 80 percent of Japan’s 

oil imports must transit not only through the 

Strait of Hormuz but also past Pakistan, India, 

Myanmar, through the Strait of Malacca, and 

past Vietnam, the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, China, and Taiwan. With regional demand 

for oil projected to outstrip supply early in the 

twenty-first century, the potential for regional 

tension is likely to rise.

Economic Growth: by the year 2020,

the global economy’s center of gravity will have 

shifted from North America to Asia, with 80 

percent of the world’s largest economies located along the Pacific and Indian Ocean Rim. 

Today, in China and India, we are watching the 

emergence of two economic superpowers that 

together will have a major impact on the global 

economy. Both have burgeoning high-tech industries, an expanding middle class, and a limitless pool of inexpensive labor that will compete 

strongly with other manufacturing and servicebased economies in the world. Current projections show that China’s economy will be 40 

percent larger than that of the United States by 

the year 2020.

At present, Japan has the region’s strongest economy, with a growth rate of more than 

4 percent per year. But Japan’s economic preeminence is being challenged by such other 

economic and industrial powers as China, India, 

South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, 

Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which have 

annual rates of growth of more than 6 percent. 

These competitors are beginning to erode the 

Japanese market share of high-technology exports.

The wealthier states in the Asia PacificIndian Ocean littoral are generating economic 

growth throughout the rest of the region by underwriting industrial initiatives in less wealthy 

nations and by improving the regional transportation infrastructure (e.g., the new superhighway in between China and Hong Kong). The 

effects of these initiatives are most noticeable in 

China’s Guangdong and Fujan provinces, where 

cross-border investment from Hong Kong has 

generated economic growth rates exceeding 15 

percent per year. This spreading development 

will continue to gain strength, owing largely to 

the region’s economic interdependence, which 

is growing at more than 2.8 percent per year.

Energy Requirements: fueling this economic growth is oil, and the demand for it, by 

the region’s existing economic powers and the 

newly industrialized economies, is increasing 

rapidly. At present, the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean 

nations use 23 percent of the world’s energy, up 

from 18 percent 10 years ago. Moreover, the region’s rate of oil consumption is forecast to continue growing at 4 percent per year. One of the 

by-products of the region’s economic growth is 

the creation of a middle class, which now has 
Krulak 317

the means and the desire to purchase consumer 

goods.

This year, Chinese workers will buy 

300,000 new automobiles; that number will increase to 3,000,000 by the year 2000. In order 

to fuel these vehicles and support its growing 

industrial sector in the next century, China must 

increase its regional oil imports from 10.9 percent to 19.4 percent. With a finite supply of oil, 

an increase of this magnitude could provide the 

tinder for a flare up of regional instability.

Most of these regional powers lack adequate oil reserves, and even today’s oil producers, such as Indonesia, will be net importers 

by the year 2000. Today’s relative peace in this 

region could be shattered by any constriction 

in the supply of oil in the near term. Over the 

long term, there will not be enough oil to meet 

the region’s demand unless alternative energy 

sources are developed. This future shortfall is 

cause for concern, because it could lead to a regional arms race. The national security of these 

nations hinges upon the health of their respective economies, and their economies have a voracious and growing demand for oil.

Security: the current security environment in the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean littoral 

is laced with contradictions. On one hand, the 

region seems to be fairly stable, bolstered by 

surging economies, and unprecedented multilateral political cooperation. But on the other 

hand, long standing political, economic, military, and cultural disagreements are fomenting 

uncertainty and anxiety in the region. India and 

Table 1. Asia-Pacific oil import dependence

1993 2000 2010

Oil demand (million barrels/day) 14.9 19.8 26.6

Oil supply (million barrels/day) 6.9 6.9 6.7

Imports 8.0 12.9 19.9

Share imports from Middle East 70 percent 87 percent 95 percent

Volume imports from Middle East 5.6 11.2 18.0

(Million barrels/day)

Table 2. Changing global defense budgets

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 % change

 1990–95

United States 291.4 300.0 270.9 259.9 251.4 252.6 -13.3

USSR 116.7 -- -- -- -- -- --

Russia -- -- 85.9 75.1 78.5 62.8 -26.9

Japan 28.7 32.7 35.9 39.7 42.1 53.8 +87.5

People’s Republic of China 6.1 6.1 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.5 +23.0

Taiwan 8.7 9.3 10.3 10.5 11.3 NA +29.9

South Korea 10.6 10.8 11.2 12.1 14.0 14.4 +35.8

Indonesia 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.6 +73.3

Australia 7.0 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.4 +5.7

Note: Figures stated in billions of dollars. Data do not reflect exchange rate fluctuations.
318 Chapter Four

Pakistan have gone to war several times in the 

past half-century, and still are fighting, albeit 

on a limited scale, on the Siachen Glacier. China, which already possesses the world’s largest 

standing army, is increasing the size and quality 

of its forces, and has made threatening overtures 

in the past year toward Taiwan. North Korea’s 

military forces still pose a threat to Asian stability, and its precarious economic and agricultural situation could generate massive migrations 

toward South Korea and China. North Korea’s 

military posturing is a source of anxiety today, 

but many in the region also are concerned about 

the future military potential of a reunified Korea. The region is wracked with such territorial disputes as those over the Indian Kashmir 

and the Spratly Islands. In addition, overlapping 

maritime claims in the East China Sea, the South 

China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Gulf of Thailand all contribute to a heightened level of anxiety and sow the seeds of distrust and conflict. 

These insecurities and anxieties have caused 

many of the regional powers to upgrade their 

military arsenals.

Trends in Regional Military Procurement: the end of the Cold War and the demise 

of the Soviet Union have not led to a reduction 

in military spending in this region. In fact, the 

nations of the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean littoral 

are increasing the size and capabilities of their 

military arsenals. It is clear that the traditional Cold War powers have reduced their defense 

spending drastically, while the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean regional powers are increasing theirs 

at a rapid rate.

One current trend in these weapon procurement programs is the change from arsenals 

designed primarily to combat insurgents to ones 

focused on guaranteeing national sovereignty, 

backing territorial claims, and protecting sea 

lines of communication. India, already a regional naval power, is improving the capabilities 

of its fleet. Japan, the nation with the biggest 

oil appetite in the region, already has a strong 

navy, and is in the process of building an even 

stronger one. China is developing amphibious 

power projection forces, has fortified the 

Spratly Islands, and has built forward air bases on Woody Island in the Paracels, allowing 

its [Sukhoi] Su-27s to cover these islands with 

fighter aircraft support. Most telling though, 

are the newly industrialized economies’ weapon-procurement programs. Such countries as 

Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 

Indonesia, and Malaysia are investing heavily in 

naval assets. Amphibious shipping, attack submarines, mine-countermeasures ships, ski-jump 

equipped small-deck aircraft carriers, and aircraft armed with antiship missiles are flowing 

into the region’s expanding arsenals. In addition, these countries can afford top-of-the-line 

equipment in large numbers, because of excess 

capacities of their economies. Although these 

weapon-procurement programs are designed to 

protect national sovereignty and livelihood, they 

also could lead to a regional arms race, which 

would be destabilizing.

The nations in this region have a valid requirement to protect their sea lines of communication from interdiction. But they must be 

aware of additional threats that lurk in the Asia 

Pacific-Indian Ocean littoral. These are internal 

threats, which reside within the growing economies, feeding the flames of domestic and regional chaos: cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict; 

environmental pollution; rapidly increasing urbanization; drug cartels and organized crime; 

food and clean water shortages; population 

explosions; and large-scale unemployment for 

unskilled labor are creating friction and chal-
Krulak 319

lenges that can undermine regional stability. 

The geography of the region lends itself to ethnic and religious splintering, similar to what we 

have seen in the former Yugoslavia. Armed with 

high-technology weapons, including weapons of 

mass destruction, these ethnic enclaves, positioned along the world’s busiest sea-lanes, could 

not only interdict their ethnic or religious opponent’s flow of trade, but in the process they also 

could interdict the trade of the entire region. 

Small-scale ethnic battles over resources could 

trigger larger regional conflagrations, much 

more devastating than any scenario envisioned 

for the Balkans. Chaos in these littorals would 

affect much more than just the Asia PacificIndian Ocean region. The effect would be global.

IMPORTANCE 

OF REGIONAL STABILITY

Leaving aside the possibility that a twentyfirst-century regional conflict could escalate 

into a large-scale conventional or even a nuclear 

confrontation, we still should recognize that 

both the stability and security of the Asia PacificIndian Ocean littoral are of great importance 

to the national security interests of the United 

States. Our National Security Strategy defines our 

most basic vital interests as the defense of our 

territory and citizens, our allies, and our economic well-being, which in turn is tied inextricably to the economies of the Asia Pacific-Indian 

Ocean region.14 Today, 40 percent of U.S. overseas trade is with Asia, and U.S.-Pacific trade 

outstrips U.S.-European trade. By the year 2000, 

our Asian trade will double our European trade. 

Instability in the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean littoral, whether fed by resource shortages, territorial or cultural disputes, or chaos, will affect our 

14 National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017

(Washington, DC: White House, 2017).

economy, our citizens, and our national interests. We also should remember that the nations 

in this region include some of our best and most 

respected allies, and it is vital to our national interest that we work together with our allies to 

maintain regional security and stability.

The Center for Strategic and International 

Studies has identified four vital national interests 

in this region. We must:

Ensure that a regional hegemon does not 

emerge and upset the balance of power.

Ensure the security of the Korean Peninsula.

Ensure commercial, political, and military access throughout the region.

Contain the growth and proliferation 

of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 

throughout the region.

The best way for the United States to protect 

these vital interests in the Asia Pacific-Indian 

Ocean littoral is by remaining politically, economically, and militarily engaged in the region. 

The key to this engagement is presence.

PRESENCE

The United States is, and will continue to be, 

the critical guarantor of regional political stability. At the same time, we cannot assume 

that we can continue to conduct business as we 

have in the past. The Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean 

nations have matured both politically and economically during the past 50 years. The methods and strategies through which we established 

presence earlier in this century may no longer 

work in this region. The political leaders of our 

regional allies still rely on the United States to 

provide military forces to maintain stability and 

security, but they are coming under increasing 

pressure to reduce the numbers of U.S. land-
320 Chapter Four

based personnel and their support infrastructure. Whether this is a short-term phenomenon 

or a long-term trend remains to be seen, but in 

the past 10 years we have lost our bases in the 

Philippines, and we recently have consolidated 

certain U.S. bases on the island of Okinawa—a 

result of local pressures, among other things.

The region’s security and stability require 

that the United States maintain a credible military presence, but regional political dynamics 

may deny us access to or the use of the traditional land bases and facilities we have used for 

years. Nonetheless, we still must ensure that we

have the flexibility and the means to project decisive military force, appropriate for use across 

the full range of conflict, and a force whose basing posture is acceptable to our allies. Without 

question, the forces best suited to provide this 

flexibility and acceptability are provided by the 

Navy and Marine Corps.

WHY THE NAVAL SERVICES?

In large measure, the cultures associated with 

the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean region look to 

the sea for their livelihood, their defense, and 

their international relations. The sea provides 

the common ground for the military interaction 

vital to regional collective security. This factors 

very heavily in what the regional powers find 

acceptable in terms of U.S. military presence. 

Traditionally, naval forces have been looked on 

as politically and culturally acceptable because 

they are viewed as transitory. At the same time, 

it is the presence of the U. S. Navy and Marine 

Corps in this region that provides our allies with 

a tangible symbol of both our commitment and 

capability to remain engaged for the long term 

in the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean littoral.

Naval forces are unique in the range of options they provide for the National Command 

Authorities (NCA) to respond to national security challenges. In many ways, these air, land, 

and sea forces can be used as a rheostat for the 

NCA, providing an on-scene combined-arms 

team with a wide range of force application 

capabilities, which can be tailored to meet 

any contingency. Whether that means simply 

deterring a threat to stability by maintaining 

presence, ensuring the integrity of sea lines of 

communication, conducting humanitarian assistance operations or participating in a major 

regional contingency, naval forces allow the 

NCA to operate across the full range of conflict. Forward deployed, on-the-scene Navy and 

Marine Corps forces offer the NCA the ability 

to respond quickly and decisively respond to a 

conflict in its incipient phase. The wide range of 

force application capabilities resident in these 

naval forces allows the NCA to employ precisely 

the right amount of power required to deter an 

aggressor, resolve the conflict, or secure access 

for follow-on forces. Because these naval forces can respond so expeditiously, operate freely 

from land or sea bases, and employ such a diverse set of tools, they allow the NCA the luxury of choosing from a wide range of options, 

turning up or down the power setting as needed to achieve their objectives. If the NCA were 

forced to wait for the deployment of U.S.-based 

combat forces, their range of options could be 

diminished greatly.

Forward-deployed naval forces are expeditionary by design. They are organized specifically for forward deployment as a part of their 

normal mission, and as a result there is little or 

no additional cost associated with their commitment to a contingency. As a crisis unfolds, these 

naval forces can reposition, to be immediately 

responsive to the orders of the NCA. Since their 

forward deployment already has been funded, 
Krulak 321

the Department of Defense will not have to 

ask for heavy supplemental funding to cover 

the costs associated with pop-up contingencies. 

With the defense budget already pared to the 

minimum, we cannot afford to ignore the economies resident in naval expeditionary forces.

IMPLICATIONS 

FOR THE NAVAL SERVICES

Look at a map of the region. What are the potential challenges? Where are the choke points? 

Look closely at the distances involved in projecting military power to the region. What bases 

might we be able to use today? Will they still be 

available into the twenty-first century? Geography will not change the tyranny of distance in 

Asia will remain a factor. Distance equates to 

time; time equates to political leverage.

We know that the future political landscape 

of this region will be quite different from today’s. Maintaining presence there will require 

agile, competent, and capable naval power projection forces, able to conduct operations ranging from submarine warfare and mine-clearing 

operations to high-intensity land and air combat, 

simultaneously with humanitarian operations. 

In addition, these naval forces must be able to 

operate in surroundings that range from open 

seas to urban slums. Most important, they must 

be able to accomplish their missions from their 

secure sea bases.

We cannot avoid the geostrategic reality 

of the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean region, whose 

geography places a premium on naval presence, 

access, and flexibility. Since presence in this 

littoral is best provided by forward-deployed, 

on-scene, Navy and Marine Corps forces, this 

translates to an increased emphasis on naval 

The aircraft carrier Liaoning takes part in a military drill of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy 

in the western Pacific Ocean, 18 April 2018.

Official PLA photo
322 Chapter Four

amphibious shipping, maritime prepositioned 

forces, and land and air combat systems that 

can operate from austere land bases and naval 

platforms. Contingencies in this region could 

range from small-scale humanitarian operations 

to large-scale conflict; but irrespective of the 

scope of the conflict, our ability to respond will 

depend directly upon our access to the region’s 

port and air facilities. Forward-deployed naval 

forces will be responsible for guaranteeing such 

access, enabling the introduction of conventional follow-on forces, humanitarian organizations, 

and additional logistics support. Naval forces offer a flexible operating posture that is uniquely 

suited to the region’s geography, political, and 

social dynamics. This becomes increasingly important in situations where a host nation decides 

that it will not (or for political reasons cannot) 

allow U.S. forces to operate within its borders 

or airspace. In such cases, the land and aviation 

forces that were operating ashore simply redeploy back to their sea bases and continue operations.

We must ensure that our naval expeditionary forces are properly organized and equipped 

to provide the National Command Authorities 

with a relevant force application rheostat. To 

maintain security in this region in the twentyfirst century, naval power-projection forces must 

be visible and on the scene, working together 

with our allies, providing presence, deterring 

potential aggressors, dampening the forces of 

chaos, and promoting stability and peace.

As the Asia Pacific-Indian Ocean littoral 

economies grow and become more interdependent, instability anywhere becomes less and less 

tolerable. This is why a continued credible forward presence is so vital. By underwriting stability, by providing the security foundation upon 

which economies can grow, free from pressures 

to invest in massive military establishments, we 

help reduce the potential for conflict by reducing the need for states to arm against one another. This is not just their gain; it is ours as well. We 

ultimately profit economically while enhancing 

regional security. Markets replace threats, and 

trading partners replace former enemies.

Since regional stability is so critical to our 

economic health and national security it is imperative that we invest adequately in our presence providers—the naval Services. In the 

words of then-National Security Advisor W. Anthony Lake: “We must be a Pacific power, or no 

power at all.”

To be a Pacific power, we must be a naval 

power.

Laurel Stern Boeck, Gen Charles C. Krulak, 31st 

Commandant of the Marine Corps (1995–99).

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
323

A NEW TWIST TO AN 

AGE-OLD NAVAL TRADITION

by Commander David B. Waidelich

Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 200915

two new expanded capabilities: maritime security, as well as proactive humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief. The strategy’s ability to balance the enduring hard power capabilities with a 

new emphasis on the expanded soft power made 

it a unique document.

While the Army and Marine Corps find 

themselves stretched fighting two ground wars 

in two theaters, the Navy’s reduced role in these 

conflicts has afforded them the opportunity to 

deploy units focused on building partnerships 

and administering aid. The Navy has begun executing this new strategy and its subsequent 

expanded capabilities as a number of ships are 

underway as part of the Global Maritime Partnership initiatives and proactive humanitarian 

deployments. The Maritime Strategy stated, “preventing wars is as important as winning wars” 

and by executing these two new aspects of the 

strategy, the U.S. Navy has met the complex and 

irregular challenges that face the maritime environment of today.16

16 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 2.

INTRODUCTION

I

n October 2007, the U.S. Navy released its 

new Maritime Strategy, The Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower. When the 

strategy was released, the United States faced 

complex and challenging situations around the 

globe. There was no longer a definitive enemy, 

such as the Soviet Union, but rather unconventional warfare against nonstate actors. The Navy, 

drawing on the shift in the U.S. National Security Strategy, 2006, drafted a document that called 

for it to develop six core competencies. The first 

four were enduring capabilities: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection; and [they] focused on the traditional, 

hard power aspects of the Navy. In an effort to 

enhance international cooperation and demonstrate America’s goodwill, the Navy introduced 

15 The original work came from Cdr David B. Waidelich, USN, “A 

New Twist to an Age-Old Naval Tradition: The Maritime Strategy 

and Its Impact on Humanitarian Assistance and Maritime Security 

Operations” (master’s thesis, Command and Staff College, Marine 

Corps University, 2009). Minor revisions were made to the text 

based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and 

spelling.
324 Chapter Four

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/

DISASTER RELIEF AND

THE UNITED STATES NAVY: 

A HISTORY

It was . . . an act by our sailors not of combat 

but of charity and compassion, a model for 

many such efforts by the United States to 

come.

~ Honorable Richard Greco Jr.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy17

On 28 December 1908, at 0520 in the morning, 

a massive earthquake struck the straits of Sicily. The carnage and devastation from the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that followed was 

catastrophic. Almost 80,000 lives were lost, 90 

percent of the buildings were destroyed, and 

three cities lay in ruin. The Italian people and 

its government needed help in recovering from 

the worst natural disaster they had experienced 

in recent memory. The aid and assistance they 

would receive came from Italy’s conventional 

allies around the world. The most significant 

foreign contributor in this immense relief effort 

that would help Italy rebuild and recover would 

be from a most unlikely entity—the United 

States Navy.18

In 1907, in an effort to increase America’s 

influence around the world, President Theodore Roosevelt, sent 16 battleships on a mission 

to circumnavigate the world. His Great White 

Fleet was sent as a demonstration of America’s 

military strength and was extremely successful in this endeavor. The devastation that took 

place in Italy in December 1908 gave the United 

17 Salvatore J. LaGumina, The Great Earthquake: America Comes to 

Messina’s Rescue (Youngstown, NY: Teneo Press, 2008), xviii. 18 “America’s Greatest Humanitarian Deed: Responding to the 

Messina Earthquake of 1908,” New York Council for Humanities, 

accessed 5 January 2009.

States an opportunity to show the world a more 

diplomatic and compassionate side of the Navy.19

When the Messina earthquake hit Sicily, 

a squadron of four battleships was exiting the 

Suez Canal. As news of the disaster reached the 

squadron, it diverted to the coast of Italy to offer assistance and supplies. In the effort that followed, the Navy delivered much needed food, 

medical relief, and supplies, as sailors were used 

on shore to extract bodies and rebuild homes, 

shelters, and hospitals. The overall effort lasted 

a few months and is considered one of America’s 

greatest humanitarian achievements.20

The unexpected response of the Great 

White Fleet to the Messina tragedy marked the 

genesis of a long tradition of response to natural 

disasters in the form of humanitarian assistance 

for the United States Navy. Since its inception, 

the Navy had offered aid while on the high seas. 

Rescues at sea, aiding vessels in distress, and 

transport of supplies had been a tenet of naval 

operations since the days of John Paul Jones. 

However, the response in Messina marked the 

first time the Navy had been used on foreign soil 

in such a role.21

During the next century, as the Navy grew 

into a preeminent world naval force, it continued to respond in varying degrees to natural disasters around the world. Yet, almost a century 

after this first humanitarian endeavor, a similar 

catastrophic event took place that would mark 

the beginning of another new chapter in the Navy’s role in humanitarian assistance—the Indonesian tsunami of 2004.

19 Donald C. Winter, “100th Anniversary of the Great White Fleet 

Sailing” (keynote address, USS Theodore Roosevelt [CVN 71], Norfolk, VA, 15 December 2007). 

20 LaGumina, The Great Earthquake, 140–64. 21 James Hoeft and Jennifer Craig, “[USS] Kearsarge Upholds Vision 

of Great White Fleet,” Navy.mil, 1 November 2008. 
Waidelich 325

The Indonesian Tsunami of 2004

On 26 December 2004, a massive earthquake 

and subsequent tsunami struck the Pacific in 

the region of Southeast Asia. The earthquake’s 

magnitude measured 9.0, one of the 10 greatest 

earthquakes ever recorded. More than 150,000 

people were dead, 1 million displaced, and 

more than 26,000 missing. In terms of human 

suffering, it was the most destructive tsunami in 

history.22 The impact of its destruction reached 

countries from Thailand to India to Somalia; the 

22 Bruce A. Elleman, Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the 

Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, Newport Paper no. 28 (Newport, 

RI: Naval War College Press, 2007), vii.

greatest suffering took place in Indonesia. The 

devastation and suffering there was unimaginable as more than 100,000 people perished in 

the country alone. In addition to the human toll, 

the tsunami caused inconceivable damage to the 

infrastructure and the environment. Much of 

the coast of Indonesia lay in ruins and the fear 

of disease and epidemic necessitated an immediate and drastic response. The response came in a 

relief effort that would become one of the most 

challenging ever faced.

The relief effort, Operation Unified Assistance, was a multinational, inter-Service, interagency venture led by U.S. Pacific Command 

In Wheat Unloaded Kisamayu, Somalia, Col Peter Michael Gish depicts the Norwegian ship Slevik unloading a 

precious cargo of grain to relieve starving Somalian refugees in the port of Kismayo. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 24-1-168
326 Chapter Four

Col Peter Michael Gish, Grain Queue, Somalia. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 24-2-189
Waidelich 327

(USPACOM) whose mission was to “prevent 

further loss of life and human suffering by expeditiously applying resources to the overall 

relief effort.”23 The task force created for the 

mission included the countries of Australia, Japan, Russia, Singapore, France, and Malaysia; 

the interagency and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) included United States Agency 

for International Development (USAID), Save 

the Children, and Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Societies.24 Yet, when the initial stages of the relief effort began, there was a unique challenge. 

More than 110 miles of coastal infrastructure 

were destroyed, creating an inability for aid to 

be transported to the disaster area via roads. 

With the dearth of access by land, the Navy 

became a key contributor as they were able to 

leverage their capabilities and resources from 

the sea.25

When the Indonesian tsunami occurred, 

the U.S. Navy had forces in East Asia but did 

not have ally ships in the immediate area. Within 

10 days, there were 25 Navy ships and approximately 13,500 military personnel off the coast.26

Operating from a “sea base,” the Navy became a 

key player in organizing and executing the relief 

effort. Through coordination with the government and military of Indonesia, the U.S. Navy 

and its partners were able to deliver much needed materials, food, water, and medical treatment to the ravaged coastal population. Unified 

Assistance lasted almost two months and, by the 

end of the operation, the Navy had delivered 10 

million pounds of food and 400,000 gallons of 

water. Thousands of patients were treated on the 

23 Elleman, Waves of Hope, vii. 24 Elleman, Waves of Hope, 8, 29. 25 Elleman, Waves of Hope, vii. 26 Elleman, Waves of Hope, 10.

hospital ship, USNS Mercy [T-AH 19].27 In the 

end, the Navy’s goodwill had helped transform 

Indonesia’s attitude toward America.28

The success of Unified Assistance not only 

had profound effects on the people of Indonesia, 

but also was a stimulant for a new way of thinking about how to deploy naval assets throughout the world. Navy leadership began to realize 

that the lessons learned from Unified Assistance 

would help shape thinking and strategy for the 

twenty-first century.29 A first area of focus dealt 

with the cooperative aspect of the operation. In 

January 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, published an article 

in which he discussed the concept of “The 1,000 

Ship Navy.”30 The 1,000 Ship Navy is defined 

as “a global maritime partnership that unites 

maritime forces, port operators, commercial 

shippers, and international, governmental and 

nongovernmental agencies to address mutual 

concerns.” It does not purport 1,000 ships at 

sea, but rather promotes global capabilities and 

partnerships.31

A second transformative aspect of the tsunami relief effort was the overwhelming impact 

that the humanitarian effort had on the hearts 

and minds of those affected. Admiral Gary 

Roughead, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander during 

the operation, realized the effect his forces had 

27 Samantha L. Quigley, “Wolfowitz: U.S. Should Safeguard Tsunami Relief Successes,” DefenseLink News, 10 February 2005; and 

Elleman, Waves of Hope, 31. 28 Elleman, Waves of Hope, 101. 29 John G. Morgan Jr. and Charles W. Martoglio, “The 1,000-Ship 

Navy: Global Maritime Network,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

132, no. 11 (November 2005): 14–17. 30 Adm Mike Mullen, “What I Believe: Eight Tenets that Guide My 

Vision for the 21st Century Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 

132, no. 1 (January 2006). 31 Christopher P. Cavas, “The Thousand-Ship Navy,” Armed Forces 

Journal, December 2006.
328 Chapter Four

on the region.32 The supplies and medical aid 

they provided were tangible actions that directly 

influenced the opinions of the population. Following the tsunami, favorable opinions of the 

United States increased from 15 percent to 34 

32 Adm Gary Roughead, “Remarks as Delivered: Assumption of 

Office” (speech, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, 11 October 2007).

percent.33 Realizing the significance of this information along with positive feedback from leaders in the area, Navy leadership began to think 

that instead of reacting to such disasters, what 

if the Navy proactively deployed ships whose 

primary mission was goodwill and humanitarian 

aid? How much good could be done and what 

33 “2006 Poll: Humanitarian Relief Sustains Change in Muslim Public Opinion,” Terror Free Tomorrow, accessed 14 January 2009.

Col Peter Michael Gish, 15th MEU Marine in Mogadishu, Somalia. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 24-1-193
Waidelich 329

impact would this have on the attitudes of the 

people who came in contact with these goodwill ambassadors from the United States Navy?34

With these two visions in mind, the origins of 

the new Maritime Strategy had begun.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY

This strategy builds upon changes that have 

already been underway for some time, and 

formally endorses operations that we are 

already carrying out. 

~ Honorable Donald C. Winter

Secretary of the Navy35

Through much of its history, the United States 

has been a maritime nation and the Navy has 

played a prominent role in making it the preeminent world power it is today. Despite the focus 

on the ground conflicts being fought in Iraq and 

34 Roughead, “Remarks as Delivered.” 

35 Donald C. Winter, “Remarks” (speech, 18th Biennial International Seapower Symposium, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 18 

October 2007). 

Afghanistan, the security of the maritime environment remains vital to global prosperity. The 

Earth is approximately 70 percent water. Eighty 

percent of its population lives near a coast, and 

upward of 90 percent of global commerce is 

transported via the sea. Due to the globalization 

of world economies, any disturbances in this 

flow of goods could have significant ramifications 

to a number of countries including the United 

States.36 It is evident that in order to serve its 

national interests, the United States must maintain a strong maritime presence throughout the 

world. Thus, the three maritime Services—the 

Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps—developed a strategy designed to enhance their ability 

to protect the nation’s vital interests.

There was not a relevant maritime strategy 

in place when the development of the current 

maritime strategy began in early 2005. The last 

maritime strategy was released in 1986 and was 

a Cold-War centric strategy designed to defeat 

the Soviet Union. While effective at the time, 

it provided no guidance for the complexities 

and multidimensional challenges of operating 

in today’s maritime environment.37 In October 

2005, naval leaders from around the world met 

in Newport, Rhode Island, at the International 

Seapower Symposium. It was at this conference 

that the discussions took place that led to the 

beginnings of the strategy.38 Many of the leaders at the conference had been the ones directly 

involved and impacted by the tsunami relief effort. The discussions they had demonstrated an 

increased international interest in the maritime 

environment and a call for cooperative efforts 

from international forces. From these talks, 

36 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 2–5. 37 Su Hao, “The U.S. Maritime Strategy’s New Thinking Reviewing 

the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” Naval War College 

Review 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 68–72. 38 Roughead, “Remarks as Delivered.”

Newly arrived to the Persian Gulf for Operation 

Desert Shield/Storm, hospital ship USS Comfort 

provides complete medical services for combat casualties. The morale boost the ship represents is inestimable. John Charles Roach, Hospital Ship USNS 

Comfort at Sitrah, 1991. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

91-049-T
330 Chapter Four

Navy leadership pressed forward with hopes to 

codify a strategy that would shape future operations. In addition to the input from the global 

community, the Navy realized the importance 

of collaborating with the mainstream leaders 

of America. Through a series of “Conversations 

with the Country,” they met with business, academic, and civic leaders and the shared ideas 

were instrumental in the strategy. From these 

conversations, it was apparent that the “American people [desired] their maritime services to 

remain strong, to defend the homeland, and to 

protect American citizens” as well as to cooperate internationally to secure national interests 

abroad.39 With these ideas in mind, the next two 

years were spent debating and discussing the 

strategy. Finally, at the 2007 International Seapower Symposium, before a record attendance 

of 98 nations, including 94 chiefs of navy and 

coast guards, The Cooperative Strategy for the 21st 

Century Seapower was released.40

The strategy marks the first time in history, 

that the three U.S. maritime forces—the Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—collaborated on the formulation and implementation of 

a maritime strategy. This collaboration served 

as an assurance that an integrated approach 

would be taken to protecting the nation’s vital 

interests. It builds on the core capabilities that 

have been a recent part of the Service’s maritime approach to operations. Forward presence, 

deterrence, sea control, and power projection 

were tenets of the maritime Services outlined 

in numerous strategic whitepapers to include 

“. . . From the Sea” (1992), “Forward . . . From 

39 House Armed Services Committee on The Cooperative Strategy 

for 21st Century Seapower (statement of Adm Gary Roughead, 13 

December 2007), hereafter Roughead House Armed Services 

Committee statement. 

40 Adm Gary Roughead, “Maritime Strategy Testimony” (remarks, 

Washington, DC, 13 December 2007). 

the Sea” (1994), and “Sea Power 21” (2001).41

The strategy confirms that the Navy will be 

forward deployed and will act as a deterrent 

force capable of controlling the seas. Further, it 

mandates that when access is denied or mission 

dictates, they are able project power both on 

the seas and on the shores. These warfare roles 

have been customarily accepted as what is traditionally expected from the Navy and have been 

“enduring capabilities . . . for centuries.”42 While 

the explicit delineation of these core capabili41 Roughead House Armed Services Committee statement.

42 Roughead, “Remarks as Delivered.”

This makeshift sign was created by USNS Comfort 

mariners to direct patients to the ship for medical 

care while the ship was docked in Pascagoula, MS, 

during the relief operations for hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita in 2005. The storms devastated the Gulf 

Coast region, bringing mass flooding and damaging 

winds. Nearly 1,500 people received medical care 

from the ship. 

Headquarters Artifact Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2012-57-1
Waidelich 331

ties is an essential part of the strategy, it is not 

what makes this strategy a unique and distinctive 

document. Rather, it is the strategy’s ability to 

balance these core hard power capabilities with 

a new emphasis on cooperative soft power that 

makes it so innovative.

In addition to these enduring capabilities 

addressed, the strategy calls for the expanded capabilities of proactive maritime security as well as proactive humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief. These expanded capabilities 

support a key precept of the strategy that “preventing wars is as important as winning wars.”43

Maritime security addresses the global economic systems dependence on the sea and the free 

43 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 1.

flow of goods on and above the oceans. Without 

the freedom of shipping, whether from piracy, 

smuggling, terrorism, or other illicit activities, 

the global system is disrupted.44 The strategy 

clearly stresses the importance of “[joining] navies and coast guards around the world to police the global commons and suppress common 

threats.”45 Through this cooperation and collaboration, a maritime awareness can be developed 

and programs and initiatives can be developed to 

protect and preserve both national and international interests abroad.46

In his testimony before Congress on the 

Maritime Strategy, current Chief of Naval Op44 Roughead, “Remarks as Delivered.”

45 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 12. 46 Roughead, “Remarks as Delivered.”

A port beam view of the hospital ship USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) at anchor at a harbor in the Philippine Islands, 

May 1987. The ship visited various ports in the Philippines during the first phase of its five-month humanitarian medical service and training mission.

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives, courtesy of PHC Chet King
332 Chapter Four

erations, Admiral Gary Roughead stated [that] 

“we also intend to pursue proactive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”47 This second 

expanded capability, proactive humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), is perhaps the 

most distinctive and innovative concept within 

the strategy. As stated, the maritime Services 

have traditionally responded to international crises and disasters, however, deploying ships with 

the sole mission of rendering goodwill and aid 

had never been done. In delineating this as a core 

capability, the strategy states “we will continue 

to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of 

interagency and multinational efforts, both in a 

deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to 

crises.”48 The expeditionary nature of all three 

maritime Services allows them to render assistance and aid in such a quick and unique manner 

in response to crises. In making this a proactive 

endeavor, the Services will not only bring direct 

support and care to the international community, but perhaps more importantly, the global 

maritime Services will develop relationships, 

procedures, and methods that will benefit future 

response operations.49 As the strategy states, 

“trust and cooperation cannot be surged,” and 

through these expanded capabilities, the maritime Services are building relationships so that 

“strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.”50

These capabilities offer a new approach 

consistent with the National Security Strategy of 

the United States of America, March 2006 and National Defense Strategy, June 2008. These strategies 

clearly call on the military to use diplomacy and 

soft power in coordination with traditional hard 

47 Roughead, “Maritime Strategy Testimony.”

48 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 12. 49 Roughead, “Remarks as Delivered.”

50 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 9.

power capabilities in order to help shape the 

behavior and actions of the global community.51

They are also in accord with the new presidential administration’s focus on diplomacy and 

multilateralism. The top leaders of President 

[Barack H.] Obama’s national security team—

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—share the same 

vision of how America will ensure peace both 

here and abroad. According to Secretary Clinton, “we know our security, our values and our 

interests cannot be protected and advanced by 

force alone nor indeed by Americans [alone].”52

Secretary Gates, in a November 2007 speech, 

argued for more funding for the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in an effort to “strengthen our 

51 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 

2006 (Washington, DC: White House, 2006); and National Defense Strategy, June 2008 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 6.

52 Jim Lobe, “Obama’s Team Stresses Diplomacy, Multilateralism,” 

Global Information Network, 2 December 2008.

A sailor with refugee and child during Operation 

Passage to Freedom in 1966. American officials and 

sailors helped refugees as they were moved from 

North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

Naval History and Heritage Command, UA 478.06
Waidelich 333

capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power.”53 Perhaps most telling are the words of President Barack Obama 

when he said, “In order to [assure prosperity] we 

have to combine military power with strengthened diplomacy and we have to build and force 

stronger alliances around the world so that we’re 

not carrying the burdens and these challenges by 

ourselves.”54 It is apparent that a renewed focus 

on balanced, multilateral approaches will be a 

prevailing part of the new administration’s ap53 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture” (speech, 

Landon Lecture Series on Public Issues, Kansas State University, 

Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007). 

54 Lobe, “Obama’s Team Stresses Diplomacy, Multilateralism.”

proach to global affairs. With the Maritime Strategy’s focus on cooperative security and proactive 

HA/DR, the Navy is poised to contribute to the 

overall National Security Strategy for the coming 

years.

STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

My guidance to the fleet is to execute our 

strategy. 

~ Admiral Gary Roughead55

A strategy is of no use unless it is put into action 

55 Roughead, “Maritime Strategy Testimony.”

SSgt Kristopher J. Battles, Marine Providing Security at Distribution Point 16 Carrefour, Haiti. Watercolor on 

paper. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, 2016-80-2
334 Chapter Four

and thus the ability of the naval Service to implement the Maritime Strategy is the unique challenge faced by each Service. When the Navy is 

deployed, it is implementing the strategy. Today’s 

fleet, whether combating piracy off the coast of 

Africa, flying combat missions over Afghanistan, 

or patrolling the ocean floors, is consistently engaged in the traditional core capabilities. 

Yet, during the past several years, deploying assets in support of the expanded capabilities of 

maritime security and HA/DR have been much 

more prevalent. It comes as no surprise that the 

Navy has been able to focus on this aspect of the 

strategy. While the Army and Marine Corps find 

themselves stretched fighting two ground wars 

in two theaters, the Navy’s reduced role in these 

conflicts has afforded them the opportunity to 

deploy units focused on building partnerships 

and administering aid.

While the Navy has been able to focus on 

the soft power missions, they have also elected 

to deploy to regions whose conditions allow 

for such missions to take place. Since proactive 

HA/DR deployments began in 2006, the Navy 

has deployed ships to three primary areas of operations: South America, the west coast of Africa, and the Pacific.56 Because these regions are 

absent of intense combat operations, the combatant commanders have been able to focus on 

these type missions to improve social conditions 

and cooperative engagements.

In both U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) 

and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), 

the value the interagency plays in their missions 

have garnered so much attention that their commands now incorporate representatives from 

various interagency and NGOs. In fact, both 

commands have placed a senior State Depart56 Cdr Rob Bennett, Global Maritime Partnership lead, OPNAV 

N52, discussion with author, 12 January 2009.

ment official to act as the deputy to the commander.57 With this type of thinking and focus 

from the combatant commands, the Navy has 

received significant support in execution of its 

Maritime Strategy.

Though the Maritime Strategy was released 

in 2007, the Navy did not wait for its release 

to start implementing the expanded core capabilities. As noted, the genesis of the ideas 

surrounding cooperative engagement and proactive HA/DR, took place soon after the Indonesian tsunami of 2004–5 (table 1). As early as 

2006, the Navy deployed one of its two hospital 

ships, USNS Mercy, on a proactive HA/DR mission as part of Pacific Partnership 2006. On its 

five month deployment, it revisited Indonesia, 

where it had deployed in response to the Tsunami in a continuing effort to “restore hope and 

spread goodwill to the region.”58 In spring of 

2007, just prior to the release of the strategy, 

the catamaran HSV-2 Swift deployed to the Caribbean and South American in the first deployment in support of cooperative engagement.59

These two deployments marked the beginning 

of the efforts of the Navy to execute the two 

soft aspects of the Maritime Strategy: HA/DR and 

maritime security operations.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

The U.S. Navy’s unique capability in rendering 

HA/DR is made possible by its two dedicated 

hospital ships—USNS Comfort [T-AH 20] and 

USNS Mercy—as well as its fleet of large deck 

amphibious ships. The hospital ship has been an 

intermittent part of the Navy’s inventory since 

57 LtCdr Pat Paterson, USN, “SOUTHCOM Turns to Soft Power,” 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 134, no. 7 (July 2008): 56–61. 58 Donald Smith, “Hospital Ship Mercy Deployed on Humanitarian 

Mission,” Defenselink News, 11 May 2006. 59 Commander Task Group 40.9, “Global Fleet Station HSV-2 

SWIFT” (brief, Chief of Naval Operations International Engagement Branch [OPNAV N52], 2007).
Waidelich 335

1918 and has predominantly been activated 

during times of war. The current ships, Comfort and Mercy, were commissioned in 1986 and 

1987, respectively. The ships are equipped with 

operating rooms, intensive care units, dental 

services, optometry, and laboratory facilities. 

Through 2004, their deployments mainly consisted of supporting military operations, and disaster and refugee relief.60

While the hospital ships are designed for 

HA/DR-type missions, the Navy has begun to 

use their large deck amphibious ships in diverse 

ways to support its overall strategy. Large deck 

amphibious ships, typically used to carry elements of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 

in preparation for combat operations, have 

60 “Comfort Deployments,” ComfortNavy.mil; and “Mercy History,” MercyNavy.mil. 

played an integral part in executing the Maritime 

Strategy. As Marine units have been deployed to 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the frequency of their deployments aboard naval vessels has diminished. 

With the reduced deployment on board amphibious ships, the Navy has elected to deploy 

the ships without the Marines and their usual 

complement of weapons and equipment and 

instead have deployed with medical equipment, 

construction vehicles, and medicine. Instead of 

Marines, the ships are deploying with doctors, 

nurses, and a “medical assault force.” While it is 

undetermined if these types of deployments will 

be part of the long-term future of naval HA/DR 

missions aboard amphibious ships, they currently are filling the role quite effectively.61

61 David Axe, “Medical Diplomats,” Sea Power 51, no. 10 (October 

2008): 52–53.

Table 1. HA/DR and theater security cooperation missions since 2004

Operation Type assistance

Unified Assistance 2004–5 Tsunami relief

Pacific Partnership 2006 USNS Mercy (T-AH 19)

Partnership of America 2006 USS George Washington (CVN 73)

Pacific Partnership 2007 USS Peleliu (LHA 5)

Continuing Promise 2007 USNS Comfort (T-AH 20)

Southern Partnership Station 2007 HSV-2 Swift

Partnership of America 2007 USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52)

Bangladesh Engagement Opportunity 2007 USS Kearsarge (LHD 3)

Africa Partnership Station 2007–8 HSV-2 Swift/USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43)

Continuing Promise 2008 USS Kearsarge/Boxer (LHD 4)

Pacific Partnership 2008 USNS Mercy

Black Sea Partnership Cruise 2008 USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20)

Africa Partnership Station 2008 USS Elrod (FFG 55)

Partnership of America 2008 USS George Washington/Farragut (DDG 99)/

 Kaufman (FFG 59)/Sherman (DDG 98)

Southern Partnership Station 2008–9 HSV-2 Swift

Africa Partnership Station 2008–9 USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55)/

 Robert G. Bradley (FFG 49)

Continuing Promise 2009 USNS Comfort

Africa Partnership 2009 USS Nashville (LPD 13)

Pacific Partnership 2009 USS Dubuque (LPD 8)
336 Chapter Four

Since the first deployment of Mercy in 2006 

and the release of the Maritime Strategy in 2007, 

the Navy has significantly increased the frequency of proactive HA/DR deployments (see table 1). In 2007 and 2008, there were a total of 

four deployments conducted to South America 

and the Pacific, and the Navy has committed to 

annual deployments to each region. Under the 

initiative Continuing Promise 2007, the Comfort

deployed to South America while Continuing 

Promise 2008 saw USS Kearsage [LHD 3] and 

USS Boxer [LHD 4] continue the mission. Currently, Comfort is scheduled to redeploy to the 

region in 2009. The Pacific Partnership initiative 

has seen two Mercy deployments and one deployment by USS Peleliu [LHA 5]. In 2009, the 

USS Dubuque [LDP 8] is scheduled to deploy to 

the region.62

While the deployments have become a part 

of the naval rotation, it is important to understand exactly what these missions accomplish. 

The Continuing Promise 2008 mission is to “conduct civil-military operations including humanitarian and civic assistance as well as veterinary, 

medical, dental and civil engineering support to 

six partner nations and to send a strong message 

of U.S. compassion, support and commitment 

to Central and South America and the Caribbean.”63 In its five-month deployment, Keasarge 

conducted missions in five nations: Nicaragua, 

Colombia, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and 

Tobago, and Guyana. The crew included 150 

military and Public Health Service medical professionals as well as host nation medical teams 

and NGOs. Overall, the team treated 47,000 

patients; conducted 221 surgeries; treated 5,600 

animals with veterinary care; dispensed 81,300 

62 “Global Maritime Partnerships: Table of Contents” (unpublished 

report, OPNAV N52, 2008).

63 MC1Amy Kirk, “Continuing Promise 2008 Mission Complete; 

Kearsarge Heads Home,” Navy.mil, 28 November 2008.

prescriptions; and conducted 198,600 medical, 

dental, and optometric services. In addition to 

these services, a team of military engineers built 

three schools and conducted 25 renovation and 

infrastructure projects.64 These numbers were 

just a continuation of the goodwill Comfort delivered in summer of 2007, where 400,000 

patients were treated and more than 1,100 surgeries were performed.65 It is evident that the 

operations were particularly successful in helping to improve impoverished countries where 

leadership is often hesitant and distrustful of 

American intervention.66

Maritime Security: 

Theater Security Cooperation 

and Global Maritime Partnerships

When Admiral Mullen called on an increase in 

64 “Continuing Promise May–Dec 2008,” SOUTHCOM.mil, accessed 3 January 2009.

65 Axe, “Medical Diplomats,” 52–53.

66 Paterson, “SOUTHCOM Turns to Soft Power,” 56–61.

Beachmasters assist U.S. sailors and Marines embarked aboard the multipurpose amphibious assault 

ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) on 25 July 2010 after 

they performed humanitarian assistance in Port-dePaix, Haiti.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of PO1 Christopher B. Stolz
Waidelich 337

existing alliances and cooperative engagements 

with his 1,000 Ship Navy concept, it marked 

a renewed emphasis on collaborative maritime 

partnerships.67 This concept was soon codified 

in the Maritime Strategy. Later referred to as Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), it called for an 

increased emphasis in maritime security and was 

the impetus behind the major initiative that became known as the Global Maritime Partnership 

(GMP) concept.

In February 2008, the Navy released a GMP 

concept paper. This paper not only defined the 

concept, but also defined why it is needed and 

helped identify how the concepts would be conducted. Its definition is as follows:

Global Maritime Partnerships is new approach to cooperation among maritime nations with a shared stake in international 

commerce, safety, security, and freedom of 

the seas. GMP serves as a basis for building a 

global consensus on policy principles and for 

undertaking common activities to address 

maritime challenges by improving collective capabilities. Global Maritime Partners 

will seek opportunities to assist one another in using the sea for lawful purposes and 

legitimate commerce, while limiting use by 

those who threaten national, regional, or 

global security.68

The GMP is not an official organization led 

by any particular country but rather a voluntary 

organization amongst nations committed to supporting maritime security. In essence, it is an informal partnership focused on collaboration and 

exchanging best practices to foster maritime security.69 The Navy began to “operationalize” the 

67 Mullen, “What I Believe.”

68 “Global Maritime Partnership Concept Paper” (draft report, 

OPNAV N52, 2008).

69 “Global Maritime Partnership Concept Paper.”

concept when it began deploying units as part of 

Global Fleet Stations (GFS).

GFS came about in the Navy’s effort to support the GMP concept. A GFS is a small, adaptive force package that is deployed to facilitate 

partnerships in a region. Its size can range from 

one ship to a small flotilla consisting of four to 

five ships primarily focusing on shaping operations. By using the Navy’s sea-basing capability, a 

GFS deploys to specific regions for an extended 

period of time and works to meet the needs of 

partner nations. Through training and working 

with these partners, the GFS aims to bolster the 

effectiveness of maritime operations through 

the exchange of ideas and skills. However, perhaps the greatest benefit of the GFS is that it is 

able to do all of this while imposing a negligible 

presence ashore.70

The GFS is still in its infancy stages. There 

was one GFS deployment to the west coast of 

Africa in 2008, while another one is slated for 

early 2009 (see table 1). In South America, 

there have been a total of four deployments 

since 2007.71 With the newness of such deployments, the Navy is still developing procedures 

on how to execute such missions. However, thus 

far, there has been very positive feedback in the 

effectiveness of these deployments.

SOUTHCOM has two initiatives which support the GFS concept, Partnership of Americas 

(POA) and Southern Partnership Stations (SPS). 

An annual operation, there have been three 

POA deployments since its initial deployment in 

2006. These deployments focus on exercises and 

other training evolutions in an effort to improve 

coordination and interoperability amongst participating countries. The exercises, which focus 

70 “Global Fleet Stations: Supporting Global Maritime Partnerships” (draft report, OPNAV N52, 2008).

71 “Global Maritime Partnerships Concept Paper.”
338 Chapter Four

on combating unconventional threats such as 

narco-terrorism and illicit trafficking, are carried out by traditional combatant ships to include destroyers and aircraft carriers.72

Where POA has emphasized exercises and 

other at sea events to work and train with other navies, SPS has taken a slightly different approach. SPS is a much smaller scaled operation 

whose primary mission is information sharing. It 

has used the HSV Swift (high speed vessel), a 300 

foot, wave-penetrating catamaran as its prima72 “Southern Partnership Station,” SOUTHCOM.mil, accessed 3 

January 2009.

ry vessel. A leased vessel with a crew of 45, the 

Swift deploys with embarked engagement teams 

from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard 

as well as Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

and Information System technicians. Focusing 

on classroom training and hands-on instructions, these teams train and mentor partner 

nation’s defense forces, police departments and 

Coast Guards. Engagement teams instruct on 

a wide spectrum of topics including small boat 

operations, boarding techniques, search and 

rescue, marksmanship, martial arts, and port 

security. HSV Swift is currently conducting its 

Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265 (Reinforced), 31st MEU, assists the government of 

Japan in supporting those affected by recent earthquakes in Kumamoto on 18 April 2016. VMM-265 picked 

up supplies from Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Takayubaru and delivered them to Hakusui Sports 

Park in the Kumamoto Prefecture. The long-standing relationship between Japan and the United States allows U.S. military forces in Japan to provide rapid, integrated support to the Japan Self-Defense Forces and 

civil relief efforts. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Nathan Wicks
Waidelich 339

second SPS mission as it is in the midst of a fivemonth, seven-country deployment throughout 

the Caribbean and Central and South America.73

Perhaps more significant and potentially 

under more scrutiny, is the Africa Partnership 

Station (APS) conducted off the west coast of 

Africa. APS is the Navy’s GFS initiative that, according to its mission statement, is designed to 

“build maritime safety and security capabilities 

in the Gulf of Guinea with partner nations using 

an at-sea training platform that provides persistent regional presence with a minimal footprint.”74 Similar to its counterpart initiatives in 

South America, the Navy is using a combination 

of large deck amphibious ships, destroyers, submarines, and HSV Swift to accomplish its mission.75

The first APS deployment took place in 

November 2007 through April 2008 where the 

goals, objectives, and outcomes were the similar 

to SPS and POA. The African maritime environment is extremely unstable. One-quarter of the 

cocaine sold in Europe goes through West Africa and approximately 60 percent of the world’s 

human trafficking takes place in sub-Sahara Africa. The maritime capabilities of West African 

nations are extremely limited, making it very 

difficult for local navies to combat the illicit activities that take place on their waters.76

Africa’s dangerous waters and insufficient 

protection provide a model environment for 

the Navy to make a difference with APS and, 

by Navy standards, the most recent deployment 

was extremely successful. Seven countries were 

73 “Continuing Promise May–Dec 2008”; and Commander Task 

Group 40.9, “Global Fleet Station HSV-2 Swift.” 74 “Africa Partnership Station WOT-FED Forum APS Current Status Brief 15 May 2008” (brief, OPNAV N52, 2008), hereafter Africa Partnership brief.

75 Africa Partnership brief.

76 “Navy Aims to Curb Wariness towards AFRICOM,” Oxford Analytica, August 2008, 1. 

visited and 1,770 courses were given to more 

than 1,500 students from 15 nations ranging 

from small boat operations to port security to 

maritime law. Eleven nations were represented 

on the APS staff to include six European and five 

African nations. Training took place aboard ships 

as well as host nation facilities. Finally, NGOs, 

including USAID, Project HOPE, and the Wildlife Conservation Society assisted in community 

outreach programs delivering aid, training, and 

hospital equipment.77 On an operational level, 

APS was able to improve maritime security and 

promote goodwill while establishing partnerships in an unstable region of the world.

However, there are still some reservations 

about a growing military presence in Africa. 

Currently, African governments are apprehensive about the establishment of AFRICOM. 

There is a fear of an increased U.S. military 

presence, particularly land forces, on the continent. Likewise, most of the littoral African nations are years away from developing a credible 

and competent naval force. Some may think this 

would discourage future APS endeavors. However, the Navy’s unique characteristics make 

it an ideal platform for the region. Due to its 

small footprint, APS is able to work with host 

countries without burdening them with a sizable 

ground force. It also is able to assuage concerns 

of AFRICOM’s presence with the assistance and 

training it is offering.78 Finally, while many countries may be decades off from developing strong 

maritime forces, the APS costs are low and as 

long as the Navy is committed to this concept, 

in the long run it should prove to be an effective 

investment.79

77 Africa Partnership brief.

78 “Navy Aims to Curb Wariness towards AFRICOM.”

79 Africa Partnership brief.
340 Chapter Four

THE WAY AHEAD

For far too long and in far too many ways, it 

has been about big-ship battles and hightech weapons. Life is just not that simple 

anymore.

~ Admiral Michael Mullen 80

The Maritime Strategy has laid the foundation of 

how the Navy will operate in the coming years. 

As seen, the Navy has and will continue to maintain a balanced approach between the hard power it is customarily known for and the soft power 

that is called for and required in today’s irreg80 Mullen, “What I Believe.”

ular and complex global environment. As this 

new strategy is implemented, it is important 

to evaluate its effectiveness. It is important not 

only to evaluate the strategy from a strategic and 

operational level, but it is equally as important 

to assess if HA/DR and TSC are effective means 

of reaching the nation’s objectives.

Strategic Analysis

Much of the press and discussion surrounding 

the Maritime Strategy has tended to focus on the 

expanded core capabilities of HA/DR and maritime security. The new focus on these capabilities, in conjunction with the aforementioned 

proactive deployments, is an innovative and new 

Indonesians rush to a U.S. Navy Sikorsky HH-60H Seahawk helicopter assigned to the Golden Falcons of 

Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 2 to receive food and water, as the helicopter lands in Jalan, Sumatra, 

Indonesia, in support of Operation Unified Assistance, 8 January 2005.

Official U.S. Navy photo, National Archives, courtesy of PH2 Phlip A. McDaniel
Waidelich 341

undertaking for the Navy. Highlighting these 

missions is an important development as they 

will be more essential over the coming years 

while the United States continues to battle terrorism, instability on the high seas, and political 

volatility. From a strategic perspective, it is important to realize the necessity to balance the 

soft power with hard power. With this strategy, 

the Navy has done so.81

It is essential the Navy not reduce the hard 

power capabilities that are so clearly outlined in 

the strategy. These capabilities are the backbone 

of the U.S. Navy and the emphasis on soft power elements does not preclude the necessity for 

hard power.82 As secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Donald C. Winter, stated at the release of 

the Maritime Strategy, “Let there be no mistake: 

we are not walking away from, diminishing, or 

retreating in any way from those elements of 

hard power that win wars. . . . Our increased 

emphasis on maritime partnerships and the 

‘1000 ship Navy concept’ is not a repudiation of 

the Mahanian insistence on U.S. Navy maritime 

dominance.”83 The balance of these capabilities 

have ensured the Navy is postured to prevent, as 

well as combat conflicts it may face in the future.

The Navy must also determine if its HA/

DR and TSC deployments are focused in the 

appropriate regions. Annual deployments are 

already taking place in South America, West Africa, and the Pacific. The Maritime Strategy has 

stated that its areas of focus will be the Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific. 

However, it also recognizes the importance of 

increased peacetime operations in Africa and the 

81 William Housey and James Stark, “Crisis of Confidence,” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings 135 (January 2009): 26–30. 82 J. Michael McGrath, “Wielding ‘Soft Power’,” Sea Power 51, no. 

10 (October 2008): 3. 83 Winter, “Remarks.”

Western Hemisphere.84 This can be interpreted 

to mean that the hard power focus will remain 

in the Middle East and Pacific in response to 

threats, such as Iran and China, where soft power concentration will remain the more unstable 

areas where deployments are currently underway. While this current force distribution makes 

sense, the Navy must assess if there are other 

regions, such as East Africa and the Arabian 

Gulf, where proactive HA/DR and TSC could 

be effective.

Finally, it is important to address the strategic shortfalls that are inherent in the implementation of any new plan. Initial responses 

to the GFS and HA/DR deployments have for 

the most part been extremely positive yet there 

have still been some negative, unintended consequences. In some cases, the good works done 

by Navy and NGOs have revealed the incompetency of the host government or military.85 It is 

imperative that the Navy continue to work in 

conjunction with host nations in order to build 

confidence in the governments and militaries. 

In doing so, they must remain sensitive to the 

perceptions, both good and bad, that may come 

about from their works.

Next, the Navy must be mindful that their 

stops in each country are only temporary. They 

cannot train every sailor, treat every village, or 

build enough schools to immediately change 

many of the conditions that inflict these nations. 

Therefore, it is essential to develop a comprehensive and logical deployment plan that best 

meets the strategic objectives for each region. 

Is it better to revisit a select group of countries 

or villages at the cost of working with other 

nations? While consistent revisits are the core 

of creating partnerships, is there a benefit to 

84 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 7. 85 Bennett discussion. 
342 Chapter Four

“spreading the wealth” and deploying to more 

countries at a less frequent interval?

These questions are so challenging because 

currently there are no means of evaluating the 

measures of effectiveness of these deployments. 

It could be years if not decades before one 

knows if the overall strategic objective has been 

achieved. According to a November 2008 study 

on HA/DR missions conducted by the Center 

for Naval Analysis, “accepted measures of effectiveness have not been established but are being 

developed along with operational doctrine. In 

particular, there is not yet any framework that 

relates the achievement of operational objectives 

to the achievement of strategic objectives.”86 The 

86 Alison Lawlor et al., Navy-NGO Coordination for Health-Related 

HCA Missions: A Suggested Planning Framework (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 

2008).

Navy must develop a framework quickly because 

until hard numbers can be evaluated, it will be 

difficult to determine the strategic effectiveness 

of such missions.

Operational Analysis

The biggest operational challenge for the Navy 

concerns resources and force structure. First, 

the Navy does not have the resources or capacity 

to execute the strategy. Second, it is still debating future structure of the force in determining 

if it should be built for small-scale and maritime 

security operations or large-scale, conventional 

war.87

The Navy currently has 280 ships in its inventory, which is too small of a number to exe87 Houley and Stark, “Crisis of Confidence,” 26–30.

Displaced residents from Super Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda prepare for takeoff inside a Boeing C-17 Globemaster III from Tacloban Airport to Manila, 15 November 2013. The supply drop-off and personnel loading was 

the first use of the C-17 during Operation Damayan, which is able to carry significantly more supplies and 

displaced persons than the Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft currently being utilized. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Sgt Jonathan Wright
Waidelich 343

cute the strategy. It has a goal of building the size 

of the fleet to 313 ships; yet, this number, according to Admiral Roughead, is the minimum 

number of ships that is acceptable to execute the 

strategy.88 Given the current financial crisis the 

country finds itself in, along with the necessity 

to fund the Army and Marine Corps, the pressure on DOD budgets will likely lead to a loss of 

Navy budget supplementations.89 With this reality, the Navy must find a creative way to attain 

necessary funding or must figure out a creative 

way to purchase the number of ships it needs for 

the strategy. The latter option is more likely and 

will require the Navy to sacrifice some technologies and capability in order to attain capacity.

When evaluating the decision of what type 

of force to build, the Navy will have to make 

the difficult decision of either building a force 

to combat an unconventional or conventional 

opponent. The fiscal realities of today will make 

it difficult to achieve the ideal, a well-balanced 

force able to combat both high- and low-end 

opponents. The Navy has already cut the DDG1000 program designed for high-end warfare 

and likewise has halted the littoral combat ship 

production designed for low-end warfare. If a 

high-end force designed for conventional war88 “Senate Armed Service Committee Oral Statement” (statement, 

Adm Gary Roughead, 28 February 2008). 

89 Houley and Stark, “Crisis of Confidence,” 26–30.

fare is desired, there will likely not be the numbers to support the Maritime Strategy.

90 Likewise, 

if a low-end force focused on unconventional 

and TSC operations is built, the capability will 

likely be absent to meet the strategy’s demands 

in the conventional realm. The Navy is at a crossroad. It must make difficult decisions in sacrificing its ideal force if the future fleet is going to be 

capable of executing all aspects of the strategy.

CONCLUSION

The Maritime Strategy has set a course for the 

Navy in the twenty-first century. While challenges and uncertainty still exist in some of the 

specifics of its implementation, the men and 

women of the Navy have deployed and conducted all facets of the strategy. In doing so, they 

have laid the foundation for future deployments 

and execution. The world is more complex and 

more dynamic than ever. By maintaining a focus 

on the core capabilities that have been tenets of 

naval strategy for years, while codifying the new 

areas of proactive HA/DR and TSC, the strategy 

has not only found itself relevant for the coming 

years, but as the world has shifted to a more cooperative environment, the Navy has positioned 

itself to lead and influence future world affairs.

90 Houley and Stark, “Crisis of Confidence.”
344

A DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING 

MARITIME SUPERIORITY

by Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations

Version 2.0, 201891

necessary, revised to stay relevant. This update 

reflects the first reevaluation. There were three 

reasons we undertook this assessment.

The first reason was to ensure our plans 

were aligned with updated strategic guidance. 

President [Donald J.] Trump issued a new National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2017, 

and Secretary of Defense [James N.] Mattis 

issued a supporting National Defense Strategy

(NDS) in January 2018. A new National Military 

Strategy (NMS) will follow. These documents 

orient national security objectives more firmly 

toward great power competition. While Design 

1.0 highlighted that competition, these new 

strategies demand that we reevaluate our current heading to ensure it maximizes the Navy’s 

contribution to the objectives they set forth.

The second factor driving our assessment 

was to account for progress that has been made 

since Design 1.0 was issued. We have accomplished many of the tasks it articulated, and have 

advanced many more—it is now time to define 

what comes next. The third motivation was to 

validate Design 1.0’s characterization of the 

MISSION

The United States Navy will be ready to 

conduct prompt and sustained combat 

incident to operations at sea. Our Navy 

will protect America from attack, promote 

American prosperity, and preserve America’s 

strategic influence. U.S. naval operations—from 

the seafloor to space, from the blue water to the 

littorals, and in the information domain—will 

deter aggression and enable resolution of crises 

on terms acceptable to the United States and 

our allies and partners. If deterrence fails, the 

Navy will conduct decisive combat operations 

to defeat any enemy.

WHY DESIGN 2.0? 

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 1.0, released in January 2016 (Design 1.0), 

was explicitly intended to be assessed and, if 

91 The original work came from Adm John M. Richardson, A Design 

for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: 

Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, 2018). Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for 

style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
Richardson 345

strategic environment, to check our assumptions.

Design 2.0 reflects the results of this assessment. Overall, the structure of Design 1.0 

proved sound: the characterization of the security environment, the core attributes, and the 

lines of effort (LOEs) remain valid and relevant. 

Readers should recognize the new version as 

a continuation of Design 1.0; a major course 

change was not required.

There are, however, some adjustments. Design 2.0 provides updated operational guidance 

to link strategy with execution. The “Achieve 

High Velocity Learning” Green LOE has been 

tightened, focusing on outcomes rather than 

processes. The tasks supporting all of the LOEs 

have been updated to establish new and ambitious goals that will spur us to accelerate our 

progress. This is an all-hands effort.

Like Design 1.0, Design 2.0 establishes the 

framework to guide our behaviors and investments this year and in the years to come. More 

specific details about programs and funding adjustments will be reflected in our annual budget 

documents.

A Grumman F-14 Tomcat, preceded by two Grumman A-6 Intruders, launch from USS Ranger (CV 4) as 

part of the opening strikes against Iraqi targets in Kuwait and Iraq as Operation Desert Storm, the liberation 

of Kuwait, is ordered by President G. W. Bush at 0200 hours on 17 January 1991. Chip Beck, Commencing 

Hostilities, 1991. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 91-159-H
346 Chapter Four

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The United States Navy will aggressively compete, harnessing three forces that continue to 

shape our modern security environment:

The increasing use of the maritime domain

—the oceans, seas, waterways, and seafloor.

The rise of global information systems, 

especially the role of data in decision making.

The increasing rate of technological 

creation and adoption.

It has been decades since we last competed for 

sea control, sea lines of communication, access 

to world markets, and diplomatic partnerships. 

Much has changed since we last competed. 

We will adapt to this reality and respond with urgency. The future of the United States depends on the Navy’s ability to rise 

to this challenge. As discussed in the 2018 NDS, 

China and Russia are deploying all elements of 

their national power to achieve their global ambitions. In addition, our competitors have been 

studying our methods during the past 20 years. 

In many cases, they are gaining a competitive advantage and exploiting our vulnerabilities. Their 

activity suggests that Eurasia could once again 

be dominated by rivals of the United States, our 

allies, and partners. China and Russia seek to accumulate power at America’s expense and may 

imperil the diplomatic, economic, and military 

bonds that link the United States to its allies and 

partners. While rarely rising to the level of conflict, Chinese and Russian actions are frequently 

confrontational. And these actions are not only 

directed at the United States: China and Russia 

seek to redefine the norms of the entire international system on terms more favorable to themselves.

This global competition extends to the 

maritime domain, including the seabed, and importantly, to newer domains: space and cyber. 

The new security environment is shaped by the 

following facts:

Our competitive advantage has shrunk and, 

in some areas, is gone altogether. We do not 

have the margins we once enjoyed.

Twenty-first century competition takes 

place over a wide range of conceptual approaches—from peaceful competition to violent conflict. This competition involves all 

elements of national power.

The competitive space has expanded to 

new domains, fueled by technological advances as well as the amount and availability of information.

The pace of competition has accelerated in many areas, achieving exponential 

and disruptive rates of change. As this pace 

drives yet more unpredictability, the future 

is becoming increasingly uncertain. Identifying mid- and near-term outcomes will 

become more challenging.

We cannot become overwhelmed by the 

blistering pace. This is a long-term ion. We 

must think in terms of infinite, instead of 

finite, time frames. Only sustainable approaches will prevail.

OUR RESPONSE

To recapture strategic momentum and grow 

our advantages in the maritime domain, the 

U.S. Navy will act with a sense of urgency and 

creativity. Three central themes will guide our 

response:

1. The Navy will become more agile.

The Navy will develop concepts and technology 

to “expand the competitive space” as the 2018 

NDS directs. With the Joint Force, we will restore agility—conceptual, geographic, and 
Richardson 347

technological—to impose cost on our adversaries across the competition-conflict spectrum. 

Our efforts will be prioritized to exploit our 

strengths against our competitors’ weaknesses.

We will leverage the creativity and expertise of the Fleet. It is essential to develop options 

for the full spectrum of competition. Naval concepts and capability development will appreciate that this spectrum is fluid from peaceful 

presence to total war. Our competitors see the 

landscape as continuous; we will do so as well. 

Restoring agility means realizing that operating 

in the spectrum can be non-linear and simultaneous—our adversaries can operate at different levels of intensity in different domains at 

the same time. We will not let rigid thinking or 

self-imposed structures prevent us from operating in creative ways.

2. The Navy will compete in ways that are 

sustainable. Overextension in the short- and 

long-term—the pursuit of ends that are beyond 

the ways and means of the force—is self-defeating. Over the long timelines that characterize 

the current competition, the Navy will be ready 

to fire effectively first, but also be able to defend and return fire. We will aim to act as early 

as possible to deescalate any crisis on our terms 

and be ready for the next move. This will require 

that we sustain the fight with the logistics capabilities needed to refuel, rearm, resupply, and 

repair our operational forces.

3. The Navy, fighting with the Joint Force 

and with our allies and partners, will 

control the high end of maritime conflict. The Navy is a key enabler of the Joint 

Force’s ability to prevent China and Russia from 

controlling the Eurasian rimland and its adjacent 

seas. We will protect the sea lines of communication between the United States and its allies 

and partners.

FOUR CORE ATTRIBUTES

The current security environment demands that 

the Navy be prepared at all levels for decenPeaceful

presence

Show

of intent

Use

of force

Offensive

cyber

Violence Nonstate violent conflictState violent conflictTotal

war

Day to day Escalation Lethal combat

Information warfare (cyber, EMW, space, C4ISR-T)

Conceptual challenge Capability challenge

The competition-conflict spectrum for the military dimension of power. Navy concepts and capabilities 

should improve our ability to day-to-day operations, to escalation, to lethal combat.

Adapted by History Division
348 Chapter Four

tralized operations, guided by commander’s 

intent. This operating style is reliant on clear 

understanding up, down, and across the chain 

of command. It is also underpinned by trust and 

confidence created by demonstrating character and competence. Our actions must always 

reflect our core values of honor, courage, and 

commitment. Four core attributes define our 

professional identity and serve as guiding criteria for our decisions and actions. Leaders at all 

levels must continue to educate and focus our 

sailors through example, education, and dialogue.

Integrity: our conduct must always be upright and honorable. Our behaviors as individuals, as teams, and as an organization must align 

with our values as a profession. We will actively 

strengthen our resolve to act consistently with 

our values.

Accountability: we are a mission-focused 

force. We achieve and maintain high standards. 

Our actions support our strategy. We clearly define the problem we are trying to solve and the 

outcomes to which we will hold ourselves accountable. In execution, we honestly assess our 

progress and adjust as required. We are our own 

toughest critic. Our leaders in command recognize the unique trust and confidence placed 

in them to operate independently. This is a profound responsibility.

Initiative: we strive to accomplish what 

needs to be done, even in the absence of direct 

orders. Leaders at all levels take ownership and 

act to the limit of their authorities. We foster a 

questioning attitude, and we encourage everyone to look at new ideas with an open mind. 

Our most junior teammate may have the best 

idea; we must be open to capturing and implementing that idea.

Toughness: we can take a hit and keep 

going, tapping all sources of strength and resilience. Through rigorous training for operations 

and combat, the fighting spirit of our people, 

and the steadfast support of our families, we 

maintain a culture of warfighting excellence and 

hone our warfighting ethos. We do not give up 

the ship, we never give up on we never give up 

on ourselves. We are never out of the fight.

FOUR LINES OF EFFORT

As in Design 1.0, Design 2.0 is structured along 

four LOEs that are interrelated and mutually 

supporting. Together, the LOEs and their supporting tasks define our priority efforts.

LOE Blue: Strengthen Naval Power 

at and from the Sea

1. Strengthen the undersea leg of our nation’s strategic deterrent. Be ready to 

deploy USS Columbia (SSBN 826) as 

quickly as possible—beating the current schedule—in order to preserve 

our ability to defeat the threat. Refresh 

and fortify the nuclear command and 

control system. Develop the nuclear 

capabilities directed in the Nuclear Posture Review.

92

2. Build 2d Fleet to full operational capability by 2019. Commander, 2d Fleet 

(C2F) and Commander, 3d Fleet (C3F) 

will be expeditionary: they will have 

the capability to command and control their forces while deployed forward. In order to retain the capability 

for force generation while C2F and/

or C3F are deployed, Carrier Strike 

Group (CSG)-4 and CSG-15 will develop the capability and capacity to 

92 Nuclear Posture Review, 2018 (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, 2018).
Richardson 349

generate forces, reporting directly to 

Commander, Fleet Forces Command 

(CFFC) and Commander, Pacific Fleet 

(CPF), respectively.

3. Continue to reinvigorate and strengthen the warfighting culture of the Navy 

through execution of the comprehensive review and strategic readiness 

review programs. In support of this, 

make any necessary adjustments to the 

command and control structure for 

the talent and capacity resident in the 

Afloat Training Groups. Aim to assign 

the capacity for training and certification to the accountable commander.

4. Establish data-driven decisions as a 

foundation for achieving readiness in 

our warfighting enterprises. Lead Type 

Commands (TYCOMs), supported 

by Systems Commands (SYSCOMs), 

Budget Submitting Offices, and higher echelons will develop and maintain 

authoritative and accessible data for 

decision-quality information. We will 

strive to reduce cycle time in all aspects of the organization.

5. Refine, through execution and iteration, and in concert with the Joint 

Force, the dynamic force employment 

(DFE) concept. Use DFE creatively to 

impose costs on competitors and make 

our Navy stronger, more ready, and 

sustainable. Ensure Navy’s development of DFE concepts is aligned with 

the Joint Force to achieve maximum 

effects.

6. Continue to mature the distributed 

maritime operations (DMO) concept 

and key supporting concepts. Design 

the Large Scale Exercise (LSE) 2020 

to test the effectiveness of DMO. LSE 

2020 must include a plan to incorporate feedback and advance concepts 

in follow-on wargames, experiments, 

and exercises, and demonstrate significant advances in subsequent LSE 

events.

7. Posture logistics capability ashore and 

at sea in ways that allow the fleet to 

operate globally, at a pace that can be 

sustained over time. Assess and develop options for improved ability and resilience to refuel, rearm, resupply, and 

repair. 

8. Invigorate and continually reinforce our 

culture of mission command, which 

is an enduring advantage against any 

adversary. As stated in the charge of 

command, the ability of commanding 

officers to execute commander’s inOfficial Navy artist DM2 Robert Adam Malin’s 

Dawn shows flight deck preparations on board USS 

Carl Vinson (CV 70) during RIMPAC ’98, a biannual 

fleet exercise in the Pacific Ocean with the goal of 

enhancing the tactical capabilities of participating 

units in major aspects of maritime operations at sea. 

Acrylic on illustration board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

98-110-C
350 Chapter Four

tent, using their initiative and creativity to fight, will enable victory.

9. As stated in “One Navy Team,” we will 

leverage inclusion and diversity within our teams to make better decisions. 

This will make us more creative, more 

competitive, and more operationally 

effective.

LOE Green: Achieve High Velocity Outcomes

1. Rapidly acquire key platforms and payloads:

• Award the future frigate contract 

in 2020 to deliver as soon as possible (ASAP).

• Award the large surface combatant contract in 2023 to deliver 

ASAP.

• Award the large unmanned surface vehicle contract in 2023 to 

deliver ASAP.

• Award the future small auxiliary 

contract in 2023 to deliver ASAP. 

• Award the future large auxiliary 

(CHAMP) contract in 2023 to deliver ASAP.

• Contract for and field the family 

of underwater unmanned vehicles 

([Lockheed Martin] Orca, Snakehead, Razorback, [General Dynamics] Knifefish) ASAP, and no 

later than (NLT) 2025.

• Unmanned aerial vehicles:

• Reach [Boeing] MQ-25 [Stingray] first flight in 2021 and 

initial operating capability 

ASAP.

• Reach [Northrup Grumman] 

MQ-4C Triton initial operating capability in 2021.

• By the end of 2019, identify 

requirements across the family of systems to replace the 

[Boeing] F/A-18E/F [Super 

Hornet] and EA-18G [Growler] by 2030.

• Develop and field an offensive 

hypersonic weapon by 2025.

• Develop and field the family 

of laser weapons (low power 

lasers, high power lasers, surface Navy laser weapons system) beginning in 2019 and 

NLT 2025.

a Improve the performance of 

our current enterprise networks in 2019. Modernize 

these networks under the 

[Next Generation Enterprise 

Networks Recompete NGEN-R 

contract.

2. Strengthen the synergy between development and dissemination of naval 

doctrine and naval capability:

• Establish a concept development 

hub (DEVGRUEAST) at C2F. 

Principally supported by the Naval 

War College (NWC), the Naval 

Warfare Development Command 

(NWDC), and the TYCOM Warfare Development Commands, 

it will form the Navy’s Center of 

Excellence for concept development.

• Establish a capability development hub (DEVGRUWEST) at 

C3F. Principally supported by 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Command (SPAWAR), the Naval 

Postgraduate School (NPS), the 
Richardson 351

NWDC, and the TYCOM Warfare 

Development Commands, it will 

form the Navy’s Center of Excellence for capability development.

• DEVGRUEAST and DEVGRUWEST will collaborate to exploit 

the constructive, iterative dynamic between capability and concept 

development.

3. Design and implement a comprehensive operational architecture to support 

DMO. This architecture will provide 

accurate, timely, and analyzed information to units, warfighting groups, and 

fleets. The architecture will include:

• A tactical grid to connect distributed nodes.

• Data storage, processing power, and technology stacks at 

the nodes.

• An overarching data strategy.

• Analytic tools such as artificial 

intelligence/machine learning 

(AI/ML), and services that 

support fast, sound decisions.

The operational architecture will be designed to be extensible to Joint and coalition 

forces. It will include a development environment to rapidly generate enhancements and 

support its continued evolution.

4. Upgrade the plan-brief-execute-debrief 

(PBED) cycle to a plan-practiceperform-progress-promulgate (P5) 

cycle:

• Red team the plan early to expose weaknesses and vulnerabilities as soon as possible.

• Practice the plan under expected 

and casualty conditions.

• Perform the event according to 

the plan, recording information 

for further analysis. Depart from 

the plan during execution if required, but do so deliberately, 

with an understanding of what assumptions have been abandoned.

• Progress to a higher level of performance by analyzing planned 

outcomes versus actual performance. Review the original plan, 

practice, and performance data. 

Make adjustments to improve performance the next time.

• Promulgate what has been 

learned.

5. Focus Navy efforts for fielding AI/ML 

algorithms on areas that most enhance 

warfighting, training, and corporate 

decisions. By the end of 2018:

• CFFC and CPF identify five priority warfighting problems for AI/

ML to address.

• Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) 

and N7 identify five priority training problems.

• VCNO identify five priority corporate problems.

a Demonstrate initial capability for 

each AI/ML application by the 

end of 2019.

6. Maximize use of additive manufacturing (AM) to fabricate hard to source or 

obsolete parts, reduce cost, field more 

effective systems, and reduce reliance 

on vulnerable supply chains, through 

production at the point of need.

• OPNAV N4, with the SYSCOMs 

in support, develop and issue 

means to certify each stage of the 
352 Chapter Four

process, to include design, data 

transmission, printing, article 

test, and installation.

• Field AM-produced metal parts in 

at least five current programs by 

the end of 2019.

• If relief from current policies is required, recommend adjustments 

to better align policy with future 

technological trends.

7. Expand the use of live, virtual, and 

constructive (LVC) training to support the growing demands of the scale, 

complexity, and security of training 

and operations. LVC training capabilities must provide a realistic, accurate 

experience in a secure environment at 

all levels of classification.

• TYCOMs ensure unit-level training fully leverages LVC tools and 

systems.

• Deliver an initial cross-domain 

solution by LSE 2020.

LOE Gold: Strengthen Our Navy Team 

for the Future

1. Continue to improve and modernize 

military personnel management and 

training systems through the Sailor 

2025 program. Deliver mobile access, 

increased career choice and flexibility, 

easier movement back and forth between active and reserve components, 

expanded family support, and tailored 

learning.

• Provide commanding officers with 

Ronald Wong, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Black Stallion 41 (MH-53E). Oil on canvas. 

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2007-095-01
Richardson 353

a dashboard for talent management and risk monitoring by the 

end of 2020.

• Build a one-stop detailing marketplace for reenlistment and billet 

negotiation by the end of 2019. 

Implement rating modernization 

so sailors can explore opportunities and understand the training 

required to take a job in a different rate. Enable every sailor 

to negotiate for more than one 

tour to include opportunities like 

geographic stability, education, 

colocation with spouses, advancements for hard-to-fill locations, 

and special pays.

• Deliver a new performance evaluation system by the end of 2021 

that emphasizes meaningful, frequent, and timely feedback. Use 

a standards-based assessment that 

evaluates character and that values merit over tenure. Focus on 

enhancing coaching and individual 

development.

• Modernize and integrate the personnel and pay systems to provide 

accurate auditable pay to all active and reserve personnel by the 

end of 2021. Create a single authoritative data environment for 

Navy personnel systems to permit 

the use of cutting-edge machine 

learning and data analytics by the 

end of 2024. Use commercial offthe-shelf, cloud-hosted modern 

technology.

• Complete the transition to block 

learning and choose the training 

technology portfolio to deliver 

ready, relevant learning.

2. Stand up a three-star director for Warfighting Development on the OPNAV 

staff (OPNAV N7). This office will be 

responsible for coordinating and aligning the Navy’s education, experimentation, exercise, and analytic efforts. 

It will align leader development across 

accession sources. Synergy between 

how we fight and how we learn will 

accelerate our combat effectiveness.

3. Release a mobile version of MyNavy 

Portal that can be accessed without a 

common access card and allows leave 

submission and record access from a 

smartphone by the end of FY2020.

4. Shift from multiple Personnel Support 

Detachments to two MyNavy Career 

Centers with 24 hours/7 days a week 

sailor and family customer service support by the end of 2019.

5. Better align our Navy Reserves to fleet 

and warfighting, instead of administrative, roles.

6. Establish the goals in “Laying the Keel” 

to advance leadership development for 

our enlisted force by the end of 2020. 

Create courses that focus on character, ethics, leadership, and decision 

making, and are facilitated by certified senior enlisted leaders. Continue 

to evolve chief petty officer (CPO) 

initiation to build senior line leaders 

with expertise and innovative thinking—consistent with the CPO creed.

7. Use quantitative techniques, datadriven analysis, and other research to 

catalyze Navy leadership development 

by the end of 2020. Use science-based 
354 Chapter Four

practices and training to support leader development and better decision 

making.

8. Continue the work started with the 

Navy Civilian Workforce Framework.

• Develop Navy-wide guidance for 

Navy civilian acculturation that 

provides a consistent approach to 

acclimating civilians to our Navy 

mission and culture.

• Create a structure for effectively 

developing civilian leaders through 

experience, education, training, 

and personal development.

• Educate uniformed military members and civilians on effective personnel management.

9. As outlined in the Navy Family Framework:

• Provide for authoritative Navy information online.

• Provide for spouse and family 

training and education to strengthen a sense of mission in families.

a Evaluate the effectiveness of support provided to families.

a Include assessment of command 

family support in our command 

inspections.

LOE Purple: Expand and Strengthen 

Our Network of Partners

1. Further strengthen Navy and naval integration into the Joint Force.

• Ensure the development of the 

naval operational architecture, 

to include the naval tactical grid, 

progresses in alignment with and 

in support of the development and 

fielding of the Joint tactical grid.

• Deepen naval integration with 

other services to realize the NDS 

and the NMS in multidomain, distributed operations. Integration 

with our natural partner, the U.S. 

Marine Corps, will continue to 

get top priority.

• Work with the COCOMs and 

Joint Staff to support the development of joint operational concepts.

2. Maintain close alignment across the 

U.S. government.

• Strengthen our relationships with 

other Executive Branch agencies 

and the Congress. Work to achieve 

a relationship of transparency in 

order to build mutual understanding and trust. Develop a cohesive 

approach to building and supporting a balanced and ready Navy.

3. Strengthen the Navy’s unique role in 

diplomacy. Our nation’s history is replete with examples where the Navy 

has advanced the diplomatic element 

of national power.

• Increase Navy International Programs Office contributions to 

strategic U.S. relationships.

• Strengthen support for the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), especially for high-end 

operations at sea.

• Mature Joint Forces CommandNorfolk as the NATO headquarters for high-end naval operations 

and warfare in the Atlantic theater.

• Execute the work plans as set out 

in our maritime trilateral agreements between:
Richardson 355

• The United States, United 

Kingdom, and France.

• The United States, United 

Kingdom, and Japan.

• Continue to progress agreements 

and technology for information 

and intelligence sharing.

• Build on existing maritime intelligence and logistics partnerships 

with allied nations, and expand 

relationships with partner nations 

to broaden and strengthen global 

maritime awareness and access.

4. Advance the Navy’s partnership with 

industry.

• Encourage collaboration between 

industry and the new requirements 

officer community. Continue to 

refine and optimize requirements, 

informed by the availability of mature technology.

• Move the acquisition process to 

progress via faster, more frequent 

iterative steps for acquisition and 

capability development.

• Expand dialogue at all levels with 

industry partners to increase 

shared understanding and reduce 

obstacles to more effective and efficient ways of doing business.

5. Enhance cooperation with academic 

and research institutions.

• Securely connect Navy labs in the 

cloud.

• Create a commercial cloud environment to accelerate collaboration with academia.

• Use this environment to allow our 

workforce to be more agile and 

innovative, as we reimagine traditional workflows to maximize 

efficiency.

• Leverage NPS to facilitate deeper exchanges between technology 

developers and warfighters, to inform rapid capability and concepts 

development.

• Expand cooperation with academia beyond technical matters, 

to include social and decision sciAW1 Kelly R. Evinger, Helicopter Anti-Submarine 

Squadron 8, kneels in the doorway of his SH-60F 

Seahawk, a turbine powered Navy helicopter. 

Evinger is an air crewman who operates the aircraft 

sensors and fires weapons as needed. AWs also may 

act as rescue swimmers. This perspective shows 

him flying astern of the aircraft carrier while engaged in combat operations as part of Operation 

Enduring Freedom. Morgan Ian Wilbur, Crossing the 

Wake, 2002. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

2002-093-01
356 Chapter Four

ence to improve decision making 

in the Navy.

6. Reinforce relations with our neighbors.

 Forge closer relationships between our 

Navy installations and host communities, both within the United States and 

abroad. Create new access opportunities, promote mutual security through 

drills and exercises, and build pride in 

and loyalty with the communities we 

serve.

END STATE

A dominant naval force that produces outstanding leaders and teams, armed with the best 

equipment, that learn and adapt faster than our 

rivals. Every person and every unit in the Navy 

will maximize their potential and be ready for 

decisive combat operations.

CONCLUSION

The margins of victory are razor thin but decisive. We will remain the world’s finest Navy by 

fighting each and every minute to achieve excellence in everything we do. Our rivals are intent 

on taking the lead from us—we must pick up 

the pace and deny them. We cannot be satisfied 

with achieving minimum standards—we are a 

Navy focused on being the best we can be, every 

day. I am counting on you. I am honored and 

proud to lead the Navy team.

~ John M. Richardson

Admiral, U.S. Navy

Chief of Naval Operations
357

THE NAVY AND NATION NEED 

A MARITIME STRATEGY

by Paul S. Giarra

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 201793

ing contemporary perceptions of threat and opportunity in an iterative value proposition that 

is essential to maintaining an effective Navy. As 

strategic circumstances have changed, the strategies they have shaped and in which they are 

reflected have changed in general syncopation. 

This has ensured that the Navy’s strategic rationale for what a navy is for has been aligned with 

what it has to do, and that it has been expressed 

in a logical and broadly understandable way. This 

is the essence of the Navy narrative.

The Navy’s strategy enterprise has been 

fundamental to operations and tactics as well as 

to the guiding vision that expresses what a U.S. 

Navy is for. It has depended on the Navy’s intellectual bent, tempered by a seaman’s experience 

and practicality. As an expression of commander’s intent, previous maritime strategies have 

reflected central guidance that at the same time 

distributed authority. Not everyone can be a 

strategist, but when the strategic mechanism is 

working—when the strategy is well articulated, 

widely circulated, and popularly debated—all 

in the sea Services are able to understand and 

S

ince the closing of the American frontier, 

U.S. Navy strategy has been both instrument and guide for U.S. national power, 

international engagement, opposition to hegemony and totalitarian regimes, and the global 

assertion of U.S. interests and values. When 

presidents have recognized the strategic salience 

of the Navy and lent their authority to maritime 

strategies, the Navy’s strategy has become the 

national strategy. The combination of presidential backing and Navy strategic planning has 

produced maritime strategies of outsized geostrategic influence, with historic consequences. 

Today presents one of those junctures when the 

Navy should step up again to lead the thinking, 

strategies, plans, and capability development 

necessary in a challenging and competitive 

world. But first, there must be a viable Navy 

narrative.

Maritime strategies are contextual, reflect93 The original article came from Paul S. Giarra, “The Navy and 

Nation Need a Maritime Strategy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

143, no. 12 (December 2017). Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling.
358 Chapter Four

American artist John Singer Sargent painted Theodore Roosevelt’s official presidential portrait in February 

1903. Standing with his arm akimbo, the 26th president of the United States exudes physical vitality and 

confidence. Oil on canvas.

White House Collection/White House Historical Association, 1903.1328.1
Giarra 359

internalize strategy. This necessary popular relationship between the fleet and the strategic 

enterprise and the maritime strategy extends 

to landsmen as well, for maintaining a navy depends on the tangible and intangible appreciation and support of others. 

THE LONG CYCLE

Navy strategic leadership has waxed and waned 

in three long cycles since the Civil War. The first 

cycle of Navy strategic leadership began with 

Alfred Thayer Mahan. It is no coincidence that 

he began to write at the same time the U.S. 

Naval Institute was founded. Each was a representation of the same compelling naval strategic impulse. At a time of dramatic international 

competition and shifting balances of power, 

Mahan’s representation of the influence of sea 

power on history had precisely that effect of historical influence. He was seconded by the likes 

of Stephen B. Luce and William S. Sims, who 

drove the Navy to think about itself not just as a 

gunnery platform or engineering problem, but 

as a shaping force that affected its circumstances 

as well as reflected them.

President Theodore Roosevelt embraced 

Mahan’s concept of naval-based national greatness as a strategic rationale and point in fact. His 

leadership in an ambitious national competition 

culminated in the Great White Fleet’s “grand 

pageant of American sea power.” He combined 

a great naval buildup with the hefty sinews of 

the United States’ economy, industry, natural resources, and abundant and ambitious populace. 

In doing so, Roosevelt demonstrated how seapower could shape, drive, and affect those other elements in a persuasive calculus of national 

power. 

This was a symmetric maritime strategy. 

The measure of effectiveness at the time was 

battleships in direct competition with other 

fleets. But the new U.S. fleet represented more 

than the industrial capacity necessary to build 

and maintain it. The Great White Fleet was an 

expression of the American desire to compete 

on a geostrategic basis with the other powers 

of the time and a symbol of the United States’ 

emergence as a great power in its own right. 

This was a new direction for U.S. grand strategy, and the Navy was both the symbol and the 

means of the strategy.

The second cycle of Navy strategic leadership began in the interwar years. By the 1920s, 

war and depression had intervened. The surge 

of World War I naval building peaked in 1920, 

with 243 surface warships, before plummeting to 102 surface warships in 1921.94 A postwar, isolationist United States was in no mood 

to underwrite naval power and endorsed naval 

disarmament. At the outset of the second cycle, 

the Navy was left to itself to quietly consider 

the long-brewing threat from Japan and how to 

defend the colonial Philippines. Nevertheless, 

this was a period of great clear-mindedness for 

the Navy, which set about the most difficult of 

tasks: talking itself out of deeply held doctrinal 

preferences for a Trafalgar-like, definitive Mahanian victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy in 

a short, sharp campaign.

Likewise inspired by Mahan, and encouraged by their own great naval victories over 

China and Russia around the turn of the century, Japan’s admirals planned for the same battle, albeit without modernizing their approach. 

The difference was that the U.S. Navy was able 

to work through the exercise of changing its 

mind at the strategic and doctrinal level, and 

Japan never managed to divest itself of its pre94 See “U.S. Ship Force Levels, 1886–present,” Naval History and 

Heritage Command, 17 November 2017. 
360 Chapter Four

vailing strategic concept of a great fleet engagement.

The Navy received a great deal of political 

support in the interwar period, sotto voce, from 

President Franklin Roosevelt, who was not entirely constrained by the prevailing national 

isolationism, and more explicitly from Congressman Carl Vinson, who became the political father of the “Two-Ocean Navy.” 95 It is an 

indication of how far the Navy and he had to go 

that Vinson began laying the ground for the naval 

buildup to come by having to argue in the mid1930s that the first task was to build to interwar 

treaty limits with modern ships.

In the meantime, the Navy was challenging 

every strategic, operational, and tactical preconception on the books, investing in enough transformative capabilities that it would be ready 

when the time came not just for expansion, but 

also for revolutionary technical and operational 

change. This brewing intellectual and strategic 

transformation preceded both political and budget authority. The Navy did not wait to be told 

to get ready, and not just because thinking did 

not cost much. Although isolation was the national policy, naval aviators could design aircraft 

carriers based on airplanes that did not exist, 

which in turn had to wait for engines to be designed that were powerful enough to lift a useful 

bomb load. And thinking was not against the law 

either. In the run-up to Pearl Harbor, submariners could consider the efficacy of unrestricted 

submarine warfare against Japan even while its 

conduct was literally illegal.

This was difficult and consuming work, 

and essentially the entire Navy was involved. 

Two decades of fleet problems, hundreds of war 

95 The Two-Ocean Navy Act (a.k.a. the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act) 

increased the size of the U.S. Navy by 70 percent—1.325 million 

tons—for combat tonnage at a cost of $4 billion.

games at the Naval War College, defining tactical 

innovation emerging from the Fleet, and thinking forward ensured that the Navy was ready 

with a fleet design when Carl Vinson passed his 

landmark Two-Ocean Navy Act in the summer 

of 1940. The interwar process of transformation 

was not perfect, and it was not complete by the 

time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, but virtually 

every World War II flag officer had attended the 

Naval War College before the war started. Interwar thinking and planning, when the Navy had 

time but no money, succeeded in articulating 

the need for and requirements of a great maritime strategy that would exemplify the nation’s 

naval ambitions and drive the rest of the national 

strategy through World War II. This institutional 

effort set up the cascade of naval building and 

authorizing legislation that was to follow, when 

the Navy had money but no time.

At its most fundamental, the interwar Navy 

was able to conceptualize and articulate its strategic purpose and goals to itself, the Congress, 

the president, and the American people. Unlike 

its turn-of-the-century antecedent, it was an 

Douglas Mitchie, USS Olympia (C-6) in Hong Kong, 

22 February 1898. Oil on canvas. 

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 

2013-002-001
Giarra 361

asymmetric maritime strategy of power, sustainment, and sea control that disadvantaged 

competing concepts of short wars and internal 

lines, with its denouement the decisive use of 

naval power against the shore. Numbers, materiel, logistics, jointness, and maneuver all played 

prominent roles. Time was a critical factor; 

this would not be a short war, and sustainment 

would be a key consideration. Destroying Japan’s national economy and ability to wage war 

was a key strategic objective for the Navy. Like 

its strategic antecedent at the turn of the century, it was persuasive and broadly accepted. Its 

direct result was a U.S. Navy unprecedented in 

size and power, enabled by institutional clarity 

of vision and purpose. Even more so than its antecedents, this second-cycle maritime strategy 

informed a national strategy of external lines, 

forward deployment, sea-lane defense, and sea 

control that essentially pertained for the next 50 

years.

Postwar reduction repeated several times 

during the Cold War. By the outbreak of the Korean War, the World War II[-era] U.S. Navy had 

shrunk from 833 surface warships and 28 fleet 

carriers to 161 surface warships and 11 fleet 

carriers. Despite the dramatic buildup of the 

Soviet Navy after the Cuban missile crisis, the 

post–Vietnam War low came in 1977: 182 surface warships and 13 fleet carriers.96 The Navy 

was following, not leading.

The third cycle of Navy strategic leadership 

commenced in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam. As commander of the Pacific Fleet from 

1976 to 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward defied conventional wisdom. The strategic transformation he led began in his own thinking, as 

he read the war plans as 7th Fleet commander. 

War with the Soviet Union was going to escalate 

96 “U.S. Ship Force Levels, 1886–present.”

rapidly to a nuclear exchange. There was to be 

little use, and no place, for the U.S. Navy.

Hayward recognized that the strategy of 

the time, which would send all the Pacific Fleet 

to the Atlantic to support a European war with 

the Soviet Union, was not only insufficient but 

also counterproductive. He saw that this reflexive shift was poor use of his fleet and also 

of the Navy; swinging the Pacific Fleet would 

not pressure the Soviets in a general war. The 

Trans-Siberian Railroad had been modernized 

and expanded, was handling 100 trains a day in 

peacetime, and could transport scores of Soviet 

divisions to the western fronts long before any 

transatlantic reinforcement could make a difference. Holding these divisions in the Soviet Far 

East would be essential to any war in Europe. 

Furthermore, Hayward concluded that the Navy

was not taking advantage of its inherent mobility, flexibility, conventional striking power, and 

survivability. Doing so would require expanding 

fleet operational plans globally, escalating horizontally, and fighting in the Pacific as well as in 

the Atlantic.

Perhaps most important, his plan was developed as an alternative to an early and automatic resort to nuclear warfare. This was the 

deterrent irony at the core of the strategy: plan 

to fight to win to avoid having to fight. What began as the Pacific Fleet “Sea Strike” plan had obvious force structure and posture implications 

for all the Services. More important, it was a 

maritime strategy that was both practical and expansive. It leveraged the combat power and strategic influence of maritime forces in a national 

realignment of military posture that was able to 

address the nuclear conundrum of the Cold War 

on conventional warfighting terms.

Like Mahan and then the interwar naval 

leadership, Hayward had not waited to be asked. 
362 Chapter Four

The complex strategic formulation on which 

he had embarked as commander of the Pacific 

Fleet was not in his remit. Nevertheless, when 

Senator Sam Nunn stopped by Makalapa on his 

way through Hawaii on a fact-finding tour of 

U.S. defenses in the Pacific, Hayward was ready 

with his strategic conclusions and prescriptions. 

Nunn was the first of many to recognize the deceptively simple audacity of what became the 

maritime strategy of President Ronald W. Reagan’s defense buildup in which Navy Secretary 

John F. Lehman Jr. played a pivotal role. As it 

had for Mahan and the pre-World War II Navy, 

this presidential imprimatur made all the difference in elevating Navy strategic thinking to national prominence and geostrategic effect.

THE CONTEXT 

OF MARITIME STRATEGIES

What, then, is the strategic context for the 

fourth cycle of Navy strategic leadership, a Navy 

narrative to garner that essential presidential 

imprimatur?

The Fleet and its platforms will continue 

to change, with new warfighting technologies 

emerging more rapidly than ever. Budgets are 

a perennial challenge, as is the ebb and flow of 

presidential and popular political support. Obviously, the United States is not now an emerging 

power rationalizing its naval power in Mahanian 

terms. The U.S. Navy is not trying to fight its 

way to the top; rather, it is striving to stay on top.

The context of the Navy, however, has not 

changed nearly as much. Addressing the British 

Parliament just before the outbreak of World 

War I on the largest estimates for British naval 

expense ever presented, Winston Churchill described what could be our own conjunction of 

naval and national strategies:

Two things have to be considered—first, 

that our diplomacy depends in great part 

for its effectiveness upon our naval position, 

and that our naval strength is the one great 

balancing force which we can contribute to 

our safety and to the peace of the world; 

secondly, we are not a young people with a 

blank record and a scanty inheritance.97

In his remarks, Churchill was addressing 

constant purpose, not transitory method. In 

fact, in the same address, he highlighted the 

transformative effects of oil and submarines on 

naval warfare and alluded to the eventual obsolescence of battleships: “two eggshells striking 

each other with hammers.”98

Just as for Great Britain then, the effectiveness of the U.S. naval position, its great balancing force, its essential contribution to the 

nation’s safety and to the wider security of the 

world, and the great U.S. naval heritage remain 

constants in the equation of naval strategy.

Nevertheless, there are four holdbacks to 

working through the U.S. Navy’s narrative:

The first is the irony of success. The Cold War 

ended in such a way that the Navy walked 

away from the successes of Reagan, Lehman, 

and Hayward. This was to be the end of history, which some took literally, forecasting 

that the Navy would face no competition 

going forward.

Second, without ostensible competition, it was decreed the Navy would not 

need a strategy. In his June 1990 confirmation hearings, when asked what he thought 

of the Maritime Strategy, Chief of Naval 

Operations (CNO) Admiral Frank B. Kelso II responded, “We don’t need one.” Soon 

97 Quoted in “Battleships, Submarines, and Oil,” Army and Navy 

Register 55, no. 1761 (18 April 1914): 486. 98 “Battleships, Submarines, and Oil.”
Giarra 363

thereafter, the Navy strategic planning 

subspecialty was disestablished, the small 

community of Navy strategists was left to 

fend for itself, and the bones of the strategic planning enterprise were fought over by 

OpNav’s [Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] three-stars.

Third, Goldwater-Nichols disestablished 

the CNO’s responsibility as the Navy’s 

strategic planner and distributed strategic 

planning authority in small portions without critical mass to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the 

theater commanders.

Fourth, OpNav strategic planning influence passed to budget programmers, and 

platform preference as a strategy was not 

compelling. This has had a pernicious effect 

on Navy strategic leadership. The figurative 

result was that no one spoke for the Navy 

strategy, let alone for the Navy as a shaper 

of national strategy.

Still, there is room for optimism. The 

On 27 March 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Vinson-Trammel Act to increase the Navy’s 

treaty limits. Also present at the White House signing were Representative Carl Vinson, Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy Henry L. Roosevelt, and Representative Fred Britton.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 973
364 Chapter Four

bones of Navy geostrategy are still solid.99 Like 

Churchill’s Royal Navy, “we are not a young 

people with a blank record and a scanty inheritance.”100 In fact, we have a lot to remember, 

to our credit and our benefit. Thinking through 

the maritime strategy is terra obliti (forgotten 

territory), not terra incognito (unknown or unexplored territory).

In a fourth cycle of Navy strategic leadership, two ingredients are indispensable. The 

first is strategic leadership in the person of the 

CNO, who can speak both to the Navy and for 

the Navy. The CNO must express what a navy 

99 The Navy has many resources to call on: numerous self-selected 

Navy strategists, the Naval War College strategy curriculum, and 

Center for Naval Analysis [CNA]; the Naval Postgraduate School 

strategic planning curriculum and many other civilian academic 

resources; [federally funded research and development centers] 

FFRDCs like CNA; the national laboratories; and university affiliated research centers all are traditionally invaluable resources.

100 Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Young Statesman, 

1901–1914 (Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press, 2007).

is for and thereby shape both the maritime and 

national strategies and the fleet operations that 

flow from that guidance. The CNO must express 

this Navy narrative without waiting to be asked, 

remit or no remit. This requires making the fundamental case that the strategy is the independent variable—not the budget, not particular 

ships or capabilities, and certainly not proposals 

for withdrawal and reduction.101

Second, as a forcing function, the fleet is 

going to have to train, equip, and operate on 

the world ocean like a great navy of great inheritance. As in each of the first three cycles, the 

fourth-cycle Navy will have to be a fighting navy, 

with all the at-sea and shore-based sustainability 

and industrial base necessary to support it.

The justification for a muscular deterrent 

101 See Sam LaGrone, “Randy Forbes to CNO Greenert: ‘The Navy 

Desperately Needs a Strategy’,” USNI News, 1 October 2014. 

DM2 Robert Adam Malin’s painting, Defenders of Freedom, Past and Present, captures the moment when USS 

Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) pulls in to relieve USS Independence (CVA 62) in Pearl Harbor, where the World War IIera battleship USS Missouri (BB 63) is anchored in the background. Acrylic on illustration board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 98-110-A
Giarra 365

rests in the enduring Cold War insights of Admiral Hayward: war has become too terrible 

to lose and too terrible to fight. Neither doing 

nothing nor not doing enough are options. Remembering Churchill’s description of “eggshells 

and hammers,” and the temptation of preemption, we must ensure that our competitors are 

never tempted to move beyond phase zero.102

This requires taking competitor navies into 

account, as did Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, 

102 Lt C. C. Gill, USN, “Professional Notes,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 40, no. 4 (July–August 1914): 1811.

but also accounting for the Navy’s influence 

against the shore, as did Franklin Roosevelt and 

Hayward. This requires an iterative emphasis on 

the fleet’s sustainment and transformation. This 

will be no short deterrent campaign, and any 

failure would not bring a short war. Furthermore, advanced technology will be important 

but not necessarily determinative.

Great naval strength will require fleet expansion in parallel with transformation and 

worldwide deployments. Numbers of ships and 

squadrons count; although there is much more 

A Tomahawk cruise missile is launched from the battleship USS Missouri against Iraqi targets as Operation 

Desert Storm commences. More than 100 such cruise missiles were fired in the opening hours of the war. 

Chip Beck, Cruisin’ for a Bruisin’, 1991. Watercolor on paper.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 91-159-O
366 Chapter Four

to a strategy than numbers, and it is fallacious 

to make those numbers the bottom line of any 

strategic argument. That said, it would be good 

to remember that the surge of the Navy into the 

Pacific in 1943 and 1944, in what amounted to a 

strategy of power, “changed everything” for our 

commanders and our strategy:

At the operational level, nothing prepared 

the Navy to employ the explosion of naval 

production that took place in 1943 and 

1944. Fifteen fast aircraft carriers were put 

into commission in 1943. Thus was born 

the idea of a single carrier task force composed of three- and four-carrier task groups. 

The ability to concentrate or disperse gave 

[Admiral Raymond A.] Spruance and his 

carrier boss, [Admiral] Marc A. Mitscher, 

tremendous flexibility.

They realized during the February 

1944 strike on Truk Atoll that it was no 

longer necessary to hit and run. There had 

been no precedent for this. Instead of hitting and running, relying on mobility and 

surprise, they could hit and stay, relying on 

sheer combat power, both offensive and defensive. That changed everything.103

103 See Christopher Nelson, “ ‘The Fleet at Flood Tide’: A Conversation with Author James D. Hornfischer,” Center for International 

Maritime Security, 7 December 2016; and James D. Hornfischer, 

The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, 1944–1945

(New York: Bantam Books, 2016).

This means the Navy has to both guide and 

reflect the national impulses for power, the good 

offices of international engagement, insistent 

opposition to hegemony and totalitarian regimes, and the global assertion of U.S. interests 

and values.

CONCLUSION

Maritime geography has not changed, nor have 

the basics of maritime strategy. Yale Professor 

Nicholas J. Spykman’s prescient observations 

in 1942 and 1944 regarding the postwar United States’ power position apply directly to today’s world: “Who controls the rimland, rules 

Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies 

of the world.”104 He foresaw a postwar alliance 

with Japan to control China: “a threat not only 

to Japan, but also to the position of the Western 

Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean.”105

Perhaps most tellingly, he saw this Asiatic 

Mediterranean in the marginal seas of the western Pacific as controlling China’s access to the 

Pacific Ocean and the sea lanes of communication connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans. 

For the Navy’s strategic planning enterprise, 

that observation is a good point of departure.

104 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The 

United States and the Balance of Power (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction 

Publishers, 2007); and Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of 

the Peace, ed. Helen R. Nicholl (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944). 

See the discussion by Francis P. Sempa, “Nicholas Spykman and the 

Struggle for the Asiatic Mediterranean,” Diplomat, 9 January 2015. 105 Sempa, “Nicholas Spykman and the Struggle for the Asiatic 

Mediterranean.”
367

SEAPOWER IN SUPPORT 

OF NATIONAL SECURITY

by General Joseph Dunford Jr., Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, 

and Admiral Paul F. Zukunft 

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 2015106

essential functions: all domain access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. We employ these functions in a 

combined-arms approach as the summation of 

U.S. seapower, providing a unique comparative 

advantage for the Joint Force and the nation.

ALL DOMAIN ACCESS

All domain access is the ability to project military force in contested areas with sufficient freedom of action to operate effectively. In today’s 

security environment, that access is increasingly 

contested by state and nonstate actors that can 

hold even our most advanced forces and weapons systems at risk with their own sophisticated 

antiaccess/area denial strategies.

We must be able to achieve access in any 

domain. That means altering how we plan 

and coordinate actions in the air, sea, land, 

space, and cyberspace domains, identifying 

and leveraging the right capability mix to 

assure access and freedom of action.

~ Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert

The sea Services operate in the world’s 

oceans to protect the homeland, build 

security globally, project power, and 

win decisively. This ability to maneuver globally on the seas and to prevent others from using 

the sea against our interests constitutes a strategic advantage for the United States. Carrier 

strike groups with embarked airwings, as the 

naval forces’ preeminent strike capability, and 

amphibious task forces with embarked Marines, 

along with surface combatants, submarines, and 

Coast Guard cutters, provide flexible and sustainable options from the sea to the littoral in 

support of the following naval missions: defend 

the homeland, deter conflict, respond to crises, 

defeat aggression, protect the maritime commons, strengthen partnerships, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

We organize, train, and equip naval forces 

to accomplish these missions through the five 

106 The original work came from A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps, Coast Guard, 2015). Minor revisions 

were made to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
368 Chapter Four

Employed in coordination with the Navy–

Marine Corps team’s sea control and power 

projection capabilities, all domain access allows 

Joint Force maritime component commanders 

to provide cross-domain capability to the Joint 

Force through the following elements:

• Battlespace awareness, which provides: 

persistent surveillance of the maritime 

domain, including the landward portion of the littoral, and the information 

environment; penetrating knowledge 

of the capabilities and intent of our adversaries; an understanding of when, 

where, and how our adversaries operate; and a comprehensive grasp of the 

environment in which our forces will 

operate.

• Assured command and control, which 

provides commanders the ability to 

maintain robust, resilient, and agile 

networks for the command and control 

of forces in contested environments.

While providing gunfire support to harass the Iraqi troops in Kuwait in preparation for a possible amphibious 

landing, USS Missouri (BB 63) was fired upon by an Iraqi silkworm antiship missile. By the use of infrared 

flares and chaff, the missile’s guidance was confused. It crossed close astern of the Missouri and was engaged 

and shot down by HMS Gloucester (D 96). John Charles Roach, USS Missouri under Attack by Iraqi Silkworm, 

1991. Oil on canvas board.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 92-007-U
Dunford, Greenert, and Zukunft 369

• Cyberspace operations, including both 

defensive and offensive measures, which 

preserve the ability to utilize friendly 

cyberspace capabilities; protect data, 

networks, net-centric capabilities, and 

other designated systems; and project 

power by the application of force in or 

through cyberspace.

• Electromagnetic maneuver warfare 

(EMW), a relatively new concept, which 

blends fleet operations in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic 

spectrum with advanced nonkinetic 

capabilities to create warfighting advantages.

• Integrated fires, which provide an expanded range of kinetic and nonkinetic options for the commander to fully 

exploit and, when necessary, attack adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Cross-domain synergy is achieved when 

these elements are synchronized, providing 

Joint Force commanders a range of options in 

all domains to defeat antiaccess/area denial 

strategies. These options include greater emphasis on force-wide, coordinated nonkinetic 

capability and countertargeting techniques as 

opposed to engaging each threat with increasingly expensive kinetic weapons. In short, we 

must become more comprehensive in our offensive capability to defeat the system rather than 

countering individual weapons. As an example, 

we may more effectively defeat antiship ballistic and cruise missile threats by making use of 

superior battlespace awareness to employ cyber 

and EMW capabilities in an integrated fires approach that defeats the threat before it has even 

been launched.

Assuring access in all domains begins in 

peacetime through routine regional operations 

with the naval and maritime forces of our allies 

and partners. These efforts enhance relationships, build capability and capacity, and lead to 

access in the maritime environment. When naval 

forces set the conditions for access in peacetime, 

we enhance our interoperability with allies and 

partners to more readily achieve all domain access during conflict.

Naval forces achieve all domain access as 

part of joint operations, improving relationships 

and deterrence in peacetime and enabling success against our enemies in wartime. This function supports all naval missions.

DETERRENCE

We achieve deterrence by convincing potential 

enemies that they cannot win or that the cost of 

aggression would be unacceptable.

Strategic nuclear deterrence is guaranteed 

by Navy ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) 

that provide the United States with an assured, 

precise, nuclear second-strike capability. Always 

at sea, SSBNs patrol undetected, remaining in 

continuous communication and capable of immediate response. As the most secure and survivable element of our nation’s nuclear triad, it 

is imperative that our sea-based nuclear forces 

be maintained at peak readiness and fully resourced.

Conventional deterrence is provided by 

naval forces through the overwhelming combat 

power of our carrier strike groups with embarked airwings; surface and subsurface combatants with precision attack weapons; and the 

scalable, deployable, expeditionary combat 

power of Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), 

Marine Expeditionary Brigades [MEB], and Marine Expeditionary Units [MEU] employed from 

various combinations of amphibious ships, mar-
370 Chapter Four

itime prepositioning, and forward bases. The 

Coast Guard maintains a continuous presence in 

our ports, internal waterways, along our coasts, 

and offshore, providing an additional layer of 

defense against maritime threats. Together with 

multimission ballistic missile defense–capable 

ships, these naval forces offer a wide range of 

credible deterrent options that are agile, flexible, and scalable. They are also positioned to 

rapidly respond to defend the homeland and our 

allies should deterrence fail.

This function supports the naval missions of 

defending the homeland, deterring conflict, and 

strengthening partnerships.

SEA CONTROL

Sea control allows naval forces to establish local 

maritime superiority while denying an adversary that same ability. Forward naval forces employ a full spectrum of layered capabilities for 

the destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, and protection of 

vital sea-lanes, including ports of embarkation 

and debarkation, which enables strategic sealift 

Promoting global security through international cooperation, Adm Michael G. Mullen supported the “1,000 

Ship Navy,” which would be a “free-form, self-organizing coalition of partners.” More than a number, the 

effort would make effective use of the best resources of Coalition members in the places they were needed. In 

this image, USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) provides air support to Coalition partners in Afghanistan. Morgan 

Ian Wilbur, Naval Nocturne, USS John C. Stennis, 2009. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2009-020-05
Dunford, Greenert, and Zukunft 371

and facilitates the arrival of follow-on forces. 

The essential elements of sea control are surface 

warfare, undersea warfare, strike warfare, mine 

warfare, air and missile defense, maritime domain awareness, and intelligence, surveillance 

and reconnaissance.

The centerpieces of naval capability remain 

the Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious 

Ready Group. . . . These ships, aircraft, Sailors, and Marines have deterred and defeated 

aggression since World War II and will continue to do so well into the future.

~ Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert

Years of supplying resources to the global war on terrorism resulted in the reduction of the Navy’s presence in 

the Pacific Ocean. Adm Jonathan Greenert sought to “rebalance” the Navy’s assets by increasing its presence 

and replacing or renovating older ships. Here, USS George Washington (CVN 73) departs Yokosuka, Japan, returning to the United States for a period of refueling and complex overhaul, as seen from the deck of USS Blue 

Ridge (LCC 19). Morgan Ian Wilbur, USS George Washington Departs Yokosuka, Japan, 2015. Oil on canvas.

Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command, 2015-012-08
372 Chapter Four

Establishing sea control may require projecting power ashore to neutralize threats or 

control terrain in the landward portion of the 

littorals. Similarly, projecting and sustaining 

power ashore requires establishing sea control 

in the adjoining seas and airspace. Because of 

this, sea control and power projection are mutually reinforcing. This function supports the naval 

missions of defending the homeland, defeating 

aggression, and strengthening partnerships.

POWER PROJECTION

In a broad sense, power projection is the ability 

of a nation to apply all or some of its elements 

of national power—diplomatic, informational, 

military, or economic—to respond to crises, 

contribute to deterrence, and enhance regional 

stability.

Naval power projection includes conventional strikes against targets ashore, integrated 

kinetic strikes and nonkinetic fires against enemy forces, advance force operations, raids, 

and all forms of amphibious operations, from 

ship-to-objective maneuver and sea-based fire 

support to forces ashore to missions conducted 

by Naval Special Warfare and Special Operations 

Forces. Navy strike forces led by aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and other ships, as well 

as submarines provide long-range, sea-based 

strike capabilities. Naval expeditionary forces 

can project power deep inland to disrupt the enemy, destroy enemy forces, and seize terrain in 

support of a joint campaign.

Power projection also depends upon our 

ability to sea-base capabilities and leverage Military Sealift Command’s strategic sealift and 

logistics support, as well as Joint Force aerial refueling, and the global strategic laydown of our 

bases and facilities that safeguard, deliver, and 

sustain our forces. Naval logistics integration is 

a key enabler of our ability to sustain forces operating from the sea. Historically, the capability 

to sustain distant operations has served as a cornerstone of naval power projection.

Naval power projection capabilities also 

facilitate other elements of “smart power” missions in the form of humanitarian assistance and 

disaster response, as demonstrated in the 2010 

earthquake in Haiti, the 2011 tsunami in Japan, 

and the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines. Positioned to respond rapidly to disasters in key 

regions, forward naval forces working with 

allies and partners are ready to save lives, provide immediate relief, and set the conditions 

for effective civilian response without relying 

on damaged or inaccessible ports or airfields 

ashore. This function supports the naval missions 

of defending the homeland, responding to crises, deterring conflict, defeating aggression, and 

providing humanitarian assistance and disaster 

response.

The Coast Guard’s vast array of authorities 

is unique—we are a regulatory agency, a 

federal law enforcement organization, and 

one of the Nation’s five armed services. We 

sustain mission excellence by combining our 

authorities and competencies with the significant capacity of our sister services.

~ Admiral Paul F. Zukunft

MARITIME SECURITY

Maritime security protects U.S. sovereignty and 

maritime resources, supports free and open seaborne commerce, and counters weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, 

illegal exploitation of the maritime environment, and unlawful seaborne immigration.

Naval forces provide maritime security in 

the maritime commons and the seaborne ap-
Dunford, Greenert, and Zukunft 373

proaches to our nation. The United States manages critical mineral and marine resources in 

our 4.5 million square mile exclusive economic 

zone (EEZ) and maintains internationally recognized search and rescue responsibility in the 

larger Western Hemisphere transit zone. Operating in and beyond our EEZ, Coast Guard and 

Navy ships and aircraft are the forward edge of 

the nation’s layered defense, developing maritime domain awareness, establishing effective 

maritime governance, and protecting the homeland.

Maritime security supports U.S. efforts to 

uphold the laws, rules, and norms that govern 

standards of behavior in the maritime commons 

for transit, trade, and the pursuit of natural resources. Particularly important is cooperation 

with other coast guards to address both military 

and nonmilitary state-sponsored challenges to 

sovereign rights.

We conduct maritime security operations 

by locating and monitoring vessels suspected of 

carrying illicit cargo or persons. If required, we 

intercept and board these vessels in support of 

U.S. law or international sanctions. Operating 

with the Coast Guard’s unique legal authorities, 

naval forces combat the illegal drug trade, human trafficking, and the unlawful exploitation 

of natural resources, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Maritime security operations 

further support the broad maritime governance 

activities of the United States. These include assuring access to ice-covered and ice-obstructed 

waters in the Arctic and Antarctic.

Because all nations share in the collective 

benefits of maritime security, it is a promising 

area for expanded cooperation with our allies 

and partners. Through multinational exercises 

and training, we will conduct maritime security 

force assistance to combat transnational organized crime and protect fisheries and maritime 

commerce. This function supports the naval 

missions of defending the homeland, protecting 

maritime commons, and strengthening partnerships.

The guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam (CG 54) 

pulls alongside the Navy’s forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) during a 

refueling in the Philippine Sea, 21 June 2018. The 

Ronald Reagan, flagship of Carrier Strike Group 5, 

provides a combat-ready force that protects and defends the collective maritime interests of its allies 

and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of PO2 Kaila Peters
374

LITTORAL OPERATIONS 

IN A CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT

by General Robert B. Neller and Admiral John M. Richardson

2017107

contested littoral environments.108

Included among those ideas are: 

additional, versatile force options; 

a wider application of existing 

doctrine; and the more flexible 

employment of current, emerging, and some potential capabilities. To confirm their integral 

merit, the ideas put forth in this 

concept require further testing 

and refinement through detailed 

wargaming, experimentation, and 

exercises. It is expected that these 

activities will invigorate and advance naval operational art and 

stimulate creativity on how to 

exploit the inherent synergy of integrated Navy and Marine Corps 

108 The term contested is used to encompass both the uncertain and 

hostile environments as defined in joint doctrine. An uncertain 

environment is one in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, 

do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. A hostile environment is one 

in which hostile forces have control, intent, and capacity to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.

1. Purpose

a. The purpose of this concept is 

to describe “naval operations in 

the littoral environment in light 

of emerging threats” in order to 

provide a unified framework for 

Navy-Marine Corps innovation. 

It places a renewed emphasis on 

fighting for and gaining sea control, to include employing seabased and land-based Marine 

Corps capabilities to support the 

sea control fight.

b. This concept introduces ideas on 

how naval forces could be organized, trained and equipped to 

enhance their ability to operate in 

107 The original work came from Littoral Operations in a Contested 

Environment, 2017 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 

Department of the Navy, 2017). Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling.
Neller and Richardson 375

capabilities. Of particular importance, practical application of the 

concept during live exercises will 

allow naval forces to identify the 

inevitable seams and capability 

limitations that must be resolved.

c. Following this rigorous testing 

and refinement process, the ideas 

determined to have merit will generate changes to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership 

and education, personnel, facilities, 

and policy (DOTMLPF-P) and influence operational planning and 

execution of integrated Navy and 

Marine Corps operations on and 

from the sea.

2. Scope

a. As described in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and 

the Marine Corps Operating Concept, 

all domain access is the ability to 

project military force in contested areas with sufficient freedom 

of action to operate effectively.109

This concept addresses the littoral 

109 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 19.

A landing craft utility (LCU) attached to Naval Beach Unit 7 prepares to depart the well deck of forward-deployed amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) to retrieve Marines after completing a simulated amphibious assault in support of exercise Talisman Saber 2013. Talisman Saber is a biennial exercise 

that enhances multilateral collaboration between U.S. and Australian forces for future combined operations, 

humanitarian assistance, and natural disaster response.

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of MC SA Edward Guttierrez III
376 Chapter Four

component of all domain access 

by examining options for integrated Navy-Marine Corps operations 

to overcome sea denial forces in 

contested littoral environments.

b. This concept is derived from an 

assessment and comparison of 

friendly and adversary capabilities 

in the near future. It spans a range 

of naval operations that extends 

from forward postured formations 

conducting crisis response in uncertain environments on one end 

to larger formations established to 

conduct significant contingencies 

in openly hostile environments on 

the other.

i. Crisis Response Operations 

in Uncertain Environments. 

As recent history has wardpostured naval forces frequently conduct noncombatant 

evacuations, embassy reinforcements, humanitarian 

assistance/disaster response, 

and other crisis response operations in situations where 

state or nonstate actors possess some measure of sea 

denial capabilities. Because 

friendly naval forces are often responding to crises for 

humanitarian purposes, they 

normally operate under rules 

of engagement that restrict 

preemptive offensive action 

to eliminate potential threats.

ii. Contingency Operations 

in Hostile Environments. 

A number of state actors 

possess significant sea denial capabilities and capacities. 

Some nations are demonstrating an increasing pattern 

of aggressiveness by employing proxy forces against their 

regional neighbors as a means 

of asserting control over disputed geography. As a result, 

the potential for confrontation has been growing, particularly in the Western Pacific, 

the Baltics, and the Eastern 

Mediterranean. In such cases, friendly naval forces that 

are forward-postured, or 

surged from other regions, 

may be called upon to conduct contingency operations 

in support of allies and partners. In such contingencies, 

friendly naval forces play a 

critical role in deterring escalation by demonstrating 

that they represent credible 

force. This concept espouses 

ideas that may be useful both 

in deterring and winning such 

conflicts; however, major 

combat operations (MCO) 

and campaigns versus peer 

competitors are beyond the 

scope of this concept.

c. While naval forces normally operate under a Joint Force commander (JFC) and often utilize enablers 

provided by other members of the 

joint team, this concept is focused 

on the Navy-Marine Corps forces 

assigned to a fleet commander or 
Neller and Richardson 377

a Joint Force maritime component 

commander (JFMCC). It therefore does not address joint integration beyond the fleet/JFMCC 

context. This concept is, however, 

consistent with and fully supportive of the emerging family of joint 

concepts.

3. Background

a. The Littoral Battlespace. Joint 

doctrine defines the maritime domain as consisting of the “oceans, 

seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal 

areas, and the airspace above these, 

including the littorals.” Joint doctrine also says the littoral is comprised of two segments. The seaward 

portion is that area from the open 

ocean to the shore that must be 

controlled to support operations 

ashore.110 The landward portion is 

the area inland from the shore that 

can be supported and defended 

directly from the sea. Today, the 

range of modern sensors and weapons extends hundreds of miles both 

seaward and landward, blurring 

the distinction between operations 

at sea and on land and necessitating 

an operational approach that treats 

the littorals as a singular, integrated 

battlespace. Depending on a given 

situation, the cognizant naval commander’s assigned operating area 

should include a sufficient portion 

of the landward battlespace to enable rapid engagement of threats 

therein.

110 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, JP 

2-01.3 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009).

b. The Need for a Paradigm 

Shift. During the immediate postCold War era, the maritime environment was largely uncontested. 

As a result, the Navy and Marine 

Corps were able to focus on the 

capabilities that support maritime 

power projection unfettered by 

a corresponding need to fully invest in those capabilities required 

to establish sea control. The luxury of this presumptive maritime 

superiority meant that the capabilities, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP) associated with 

fighting at sea, along with the 

idea that maritime power projection might need to be conducted 

in support of sea control, were 

allowed to wane. In fact, the increasingly contested operating 

environment marks a return to 

the historic norm, with the added 

challenge posed by twenty-first 

century sensors and weapons. 

Friendly naval forces now routinely face land-based and sea-based 

threats employed by state and 

nonstate actors who are implementing sea denial strategies.111

Armed with increasingly formidable sea denial capabilities, fu111 While the defense community has adopted the term antiaccess/

area denial (A2/AD) as shorthand to describe this situation, that 

term is highly problematic in two fundamental ways. The first is 

that it has created the impression outside the naval Service that 

we face an impenetrable “wall at sea” that cannot be overcome. 

The second is the misperception that this is a new problem when, 

in fact, such strategies have been employed since at least the fifth 

century BC, when the Greeks employed what is more properly 

called a sea denial strategy against the Persians. See Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis: Naval 

Institute Press, 2013).
378 Chapter Four

ture adversaries may be capable of 

controlling choke points, holding 

key maritime terrain, or denying 

freedom of action and maneuver 

within the littorals by imposing 

unacceptable risk to forces at ever 

increasing ranges. Additionally, 

some potential adversaries are 

attempting to expand their sea 

denial capabilities into the ability 

to achieve sea control. These conditions call for a paradigm shift 

and the reinvigoration of a unified 

naval approach that effectively integrates sea control and maritime 

power projection capabilities. To 

do that effectively, it is important 

to recognize the major factors that 

impact naval operations:

i. We face potential adversaries 

that operate from a position 

of relative advantage in close 

proximity to their territory 

and basing networks, while 

we operate globally, in remote locations, with extended lines of communication. 

Some adversaries have significant capacity advantages, especially in precision weapons, 

shore-based sensors, and air 

and surface platforms within 

the region, which can negate 

our capability advantages.

ii. The new long range, precision 

missile era has added a landward dimension to naval combat, even for missions where 

the primary focus is at sea.

iii. Some adversaries have fielded advanced undersea capabilities that may challenge 

friendly naval operations.

iv. Even in peacetime, state and 

nonstate actors employ space, 

cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) capabilities, as well as information 

operations, against friendly naval forces. Adversaries may use 

these capabilities in attempts 

to deny, degrade, and exploit 

our use of our historic command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) strengths.

v. Crisis response operations 

may be conducted with constrained rules of engagement 

to mitigate escalation, thereby limiting opportunities to 

shape the battlespace.

vi. Large overseas bases offer 

economy of scale but are also 

vulnerable.

vii. Large ships offer superior 

endurance and flexibility for 

forward presence but are lucrative targets.

viii. Geography matters—especially key maritime terrain 

and hydrography.

c. Naval Integration. Recognizing 

the growing threat, beginning in 

2006 successive Chiefs of Naval 

Operations (CNO) and Commandants of the Marine Corps (CMC) 

published a series of strategy, concept, and guidance documents, as 
Neller and Richardson 379

well as professional journal articles, which increasingly called for 

more flexibility in task organizing 

and employing Navy and Marine 

Corps forces and capabilities.112

Two of the Service chiefs summarized the issue succinctly in 

a professional journal by stating 

that the Navy and Marine Corps 

cannot “confront events in the 

littorals as carefully segregated 

specialists” because the “changing 

set of challenges in the emerging 

112 Most prominent among them are the 2007 and 2015 versions 

of the maritime strategy, the 2006 and 2010 editions of the Naval 

Operations Concept: Implementing the Maritime Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps, 

Coast Guard, 2010); the Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an 

Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 2017); the 36th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 2015: Innovate, Adapt, Win (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2015); the 37th Commandant’s FRAGO 

01/2016: Advance to Contact (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 19 January 2016); and the CNO’s A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.

security environment requires a 

naval team that is smoothly integrated and easily adaptable to new 

situations.”113 A Cooperative Strategy 

for 21st Century Seapower outlines 

the need for the naval Service to 

develop new warfighting concepts 

which identify the capabilities and 

solutions required to gain and 

maintain access and freedom of 

action in the global commons.

d. Concept Development Guidance. Given the foregoing, at the 

Navy-Marine Corps Warfighter 

Talks conducted on 10 June 2015, 

senior U.S. naval leadership, using a framework spanning crisis 

response in uncertain environments and contingencies in hostile 

environments, issued guidance to 

develop the Littoral Operations in 

113 Amos and Greenert, “A New Naval Era.” 

A humvee launches from an LCU assigned to amphibious dock landing ship USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). 

Whidbey Island is deployed as part of the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group, supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. 

Photo courtesy of MC3 James Turner
380 Chapter Four

a Contested Environment concept. 

The word littoral was specifically 

chosen to frame the content in a 

manner that is much broader than 

just amphibious operations. The 

CNO and CMC endorsed the consensus position to explore a more 

integrated application of Navy and 

Marine Corps capabilities in operations on and from the sea. This 

included considering new, scalable 

models of command and control 

unconstrained by current force 

constructs and terminology.

e. Concept Development Events. 

In August 2015, the deputy chief of 

Naval Operations for Operations, 

Plans and Strategy, and the deputy 

commandant for Combat Development and Integration issued a 

planning order that formalized the 

tasks and guidance to the concept 

development team. Accordingly, 

in September 2015, the writing 

team presented a plan of actions 

and milestones to the Naval Board, 

which had oversight authority for 

the project. The concept development plan, conducted as a collaborative effort between the Navy and 

Marine Corps, included a series of 

workshops, a “capabilities” game 

run by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in December 2015, and 

the annual Naval Service Game in 

February 2016. The two wargames 

provided critical venues wherein 

sailors and Marines from the operating forces were able to examine key ideas and provide insights 

to the concept development team.

f. Literature Review. In addition 

to the prescribed activities and 

events, the concept development 

team conducted an extensive literature review. This included research on littoral operations in 

general as well as specific related 

topics. These topics included adversary sea denial/sea control 

strategies, sensor and weapon 

capabilities, naval command and 

control, and naval operational art. 

These writings allowed the team 

to leverage the insights of historians, naval theorists, allies, intelligence analysts, and experienced 

naval leaders over time in order 

to identify the considerations and 

enduring truths that informed the 

concept. Naval personnel who 

will be engaged in testing and refining this concept would be well 

served by leveraging the bibliography provided in appendix C. At a 

minimum, for a thorough understanding of the nature and theory 

of littoral operations, they should 

start with Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat by retired U.S. Navy 

Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., professor emeritus of the Naval Postgraduate School, and “On Littoral 

Warfare” by Milan Vego, professor 

of Joint military operations at the 

Naval War College.114

114 Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat; and Milan Vego, “On 

Littoral Warfare,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 2 (2015). Dr. 

Vego’s article offers a number of thought-provoking force structure recommendations that helped inform, but are not mirrored 

in, this concept.
Neller and Richardson 381

4. Military Problem

Certain aspects of naval operational art 

have not been adequately developed 

for twenty-first century warfare. The 

Navy and Marine Corps already possess some very effective capabilities.

 However, adversaries demonstrate 

the ability to rapidly adapt and implement sophisticated counters to U.S. 

capabilities. The Navy and Marine 

Corps need to renew integrated naval 

approaches for applying those capabilities, adapt them to meet emerging 

challenges, and identify capability gaps 

that must be overcome. At a time when 

adversary capabilities have extended 

the seaward reach of land-based weapons, thereby blurring the dividing line 

between land and sea, Navy and Marine Corps forces are often employed 

as separate entities in an artificially 

divided maritime battlespace. These 

practices inhibit the effective application of our complementary capabilities. Friendly naval forces lack recent 

experience employing unified and integrated task forces able to conduct operations in a contested littoral against 

advanced threats. Task-organized naval 

forces must be able to flexibly apply 

the capabilities resident in each Service both at sea and ashore. However, 

given advances in adversary sensor and 

weapon capability and capacity, as well 

as geographic considerations and global commitments, fleet commanders/

JFMCC may be challenged to assemble the required capabilities, capacities, 

A Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II short takeoff/vertical landing aircraft conducts test operations on the 

flight deck of amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6), 8 November 2016. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Darin Russell
382 Chapter Four

span of control, or optimal formations 

to effectively respond to crises, address 

larger contingencies, and deter aggression in contested littorals. Subordinate 

elements of the problem include:

a. Dissimilar Command and Control Constructs. Naval forces require a common tactical command 

and control doctrine for integrated Navy and Marine Corps 

operations in a unified maritime 

battlespace.

b. Insufficient Marine Corps 

Representation within the 

Fleet/JFMCC Staffs. The strategic environment and Service chief 

guidance call for the more integrated application of Navy and Marine 

Corps capabilities, but there is insufficient Marine representation 

within the fleet/JFMCC staffs to 

do this effectively. While the maritime operations centers (MOC) 

within each fleet provide the venue for operational level planning 

and execution, the existing fleet/

JFMCC staffs that man those facilities require resident expertise 

regarding landward operations in 

general and Marine Corps capabilities, limitations, and support 

requirements in particular.

c. Augmentation of Amphibious 

Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs). 

The ARG/MEUs are optimized for 

forward-postured crisis response 

and may require augmentation to 

operate in some environments, 

depending on the nature of the 

threat.

d. Capacity Challenges. Navy and 

Marine Corps forces may be at a 

capacity disadvantage within key 

regions. In some instances, naval 

formations may need to composite additional assets to provide 

sufficient organic air and missile 

defense capacity or capability to 

conduct operations in the face of 

land-based precision weapons. 

Capacity challenges, and how they 

might be mitigated, can be viewed 

through three lenses:

i. MAGTF Capabilities Not Fully 

Leveraged. Marine air-ground 

task forces (MAGTFs) are 

designed for seaborne power projection in which 

their primary mission lies 

ashore. These include forward-postured MEUs that 

routinely conduct sea-based 

engagement and crisis response, as well as the episodic 

projection of Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) as 

part of an amphibious or 

maritime preposition force 

operation. When required, 

these MEBs can be expanded 

into a full Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) capable of 

conducting sustained operations ashore. In addition to 

these existing roles, MAGTFs 

have the as yet untapped potential to make significant 
Neller and Richardson 383

contributions—from either 

a sea-based or land-based 

posture—to the sea control 

fight.

ii. Composition of the Surface Force.

Following the Cold War, 

some surface force capabilities and capacities for sea 

control were deemphasized, 

and select foundational warfare skills eroded over time. 

The emergence of sophisticated sea denial strategies has 

driven a need to shift to an offensive imperative to control 

the seas. The surface warfare 

community has identified 

the need to counter rapidly 

evolving missile, air, submarine, and surface threats. This 

includes the need to develop 

missiles that represent a significant improvement in capability and to employ them 

more broadly across the force. 

The surface warfare community has also called for a more 

fully integrated Marine Corps 

surface force combat team to 

provide persistent presence 

that can influence and control 

events at sea and in the littorals.115

iii. Risk to High Value Units. Each 

ship within the current carrier strike groups (CSGs) and 

ARG/MEUs provides capa115 VAdm Thomas Rowden et al., “Distributed Lethality,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141, no. 1 (January 2015).

bilities critical to the force 

as a whole, meaning that the 

loss of a single ship would 

degrade the force’s ability to 

accomplish the mission. It is 

therefore imprudent to task 

those ships with inshore operations in complex archipelagoes or confined and shallow 

waters, where geography and 

battlespace geometry allow 

an adversary to concentrate 

diverse weapons systems to 

maximum advantage. “The 

coastal defender’s wide range 

of options and his freedom to 

initiate a strike practically any 

time he chooses to do so create a threat that is both continuous and immediate.”116 In 

the face of this unremitting 

threat, a surface platform’s 

self-defense systems—along 

with its crew’s vigilance and 

the captain’s decision making—must perform flawlessly 100 percent of the time. 

As stated by one of the participants in the Naval Services 

Game, “A fleet commander 

needs some chess pieces he 

can wager without risking 

the whole game.” Lacking 

such assets, commanders can 

be expected—rightly—to 

approach littoral operations 

with a tactically defensive 

116 RAdm Yedidia Ya’ari, Israel Navy, “The Littoral Arena: A Word 

of Caution,” Naval War College Review 48, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 8.
384 Chapter Four

orientation. To promote a 

more offensive orientation, 

fleet commanders/JFMCC 

must have strong screening 

and scouting capabilities to 

develop and maintain a tactical 

picture. By complementing 

current capabilities with a sufficient number of lower-end 

units, commanders will have 

more options available to accept calculated risk in confined and shallow waters.

5. Desired End State

Naval forces capable of operating in contested littorals with sufficient freedom 

of action to accomplish likely objectives. 

Broadly stated, these objectives are:

a. Gain and maintain battlespace 

awareness.

b. Establish persistent sea denial capabilities forward to deter aggression in the littorals.

c. In a hostile environment, establish 

sea control.

d. In an uncertain environment, 

employ sufficient defensive and 

nonlethal capabilities to conduct 

operations in the face of sea denial 

threats.

e. Conduct maritime power projection operations.

The commanding officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA-122), LtCol John P. Price, enters 

his aircraft in preparation for VMFA-122’s first flight operations in an F-25B Lightning II on Marine Corps 

Air Station Yuma, AZ, 20 March 2018.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Sgt Allison Lotz
Neller and Richardson 385

The main prerequisites for success in littoral 

warfare are suitable and diverse platforms, 

weapons, and sensors; robust command organization; close cooperation among friendly 

forces; air superiority; well-developed theory; and sound doctrine.

~ Dr. Milan Vego117

6. Central Idea

 The Navy and Marine Corps will refine 

how we organize, train, and equip forces in order to provide the fleet commanders/JFMCC the ability to operate 

in all five dimensions of the littorals for 

the duration required. These five dimensions include: (1) seaward (both 

surface and subsurface); (2) landward 

(both surface and subterranean); (3) 

the airspace above; (4) cyberspace; and 

(5) the electromagnetic spectrum.118

These refinements will give the fleet 

commanders/JFMCC a wider range 

of integrated, Navy-Marine Corps 

force options and additional sensor and 

weapons capacity. These task organizations will fight with unity of command, 

employing networked, sea-based and 

land-based capabilities as well as common doctrine and operating principles, 

to counter adversary sea denial forces, 

disrupt their C4ISR-strike complex, 

and overcome disadvantages in capacity and/or weapons range. In sum, the 

goal is to create a modular, scalable, 

117 Vego, “On Littoral Warfare.”

118 As we refine force organization, training, and equipment for 

operations in all dimensions of the littorals, there is a temporal 

aspect to force employment that must be considered. How long 

it takes to conduct key tasks, how long we can maintain certain 

conditions, as well as the anticipated duration of a given operation, 

are important factors.

and integrated naval network of seabased and land-based sensors, shooters, and sustainers that provides the 

capabilities, capacities, and persistent 

yet mobile forward presence necessary 

to effectively respond to crises, address 

larger contingencies, and deter aggression in contested littorals.

7. Supporting Ideas

a. Composite Warfare Commander (CWC). The Navy and 

Marine Corps will conduct wargaming, experimentation, and 

exercises to determine the most 

effective way to integrate Marine 

Corps capabilities into the CWC 

construct for operations on the 

sea and from the sea, and from 

the land to the sea. Near-term 

wargames will be used to develop 

predoctrinal solutions that will be 

tested and refined in subsequent 

games, experiments and exercises. Marine participation in CWC 

has been debated for many years. 

Consensus feedback provided by 

participants during recent wargames and exercises has recommended that the Navy and Marine 

Corps explore CWC as a common 

command and control construct. 

The composite warfare organization facilitates simultaneous, integrated offensive and defensive 

combat operations against multiple targets and threats. Flexibility 

of implementation, reinforced by 

clear guidance to subordinates, 

and use of command by negation 

are keys to decentralized control 
386 Chapter Four

of the tactical force. The officer in 

tactical command (OTC) may implement a composite warfare organization whenever and to whatever 

extent required, depending upon 

the composition and mission of 

the force and the capabilities of the 

adversary. The composite warfare 

construct allows the OTC to assign 

some or all of the command functions associated with mission areas 

to warfare commanders, functional group commanders, and 

coordinators, thus supporting decentralized execution.119 The philosophy of decentralized execution 

that is inherent in CWC is entirely 

consistent with “mission tactics” 

as espoused in the Marine Corps’ 

maneuver warfare doctrine. Potential revisions to [Navy Warfare 

Publication] NWP 3-56, Composite 

Warfare: Maritime Operations at the 

Tactical Level of War, include options for employing MAGTF commanders as a warfare commander. 

For example, landing force operations, maritime prepositioning 

offload operations, and expeditionary advanced base operations 

(EABO) (described in paragraph 

7.d. [1] below) are not currently 

included under any of the warfare 

commander options within CWC. 

These missions could be conducted 

by a MAGTF commander designated as an expeditionary warfare 

commander (EXWC). The po119 See Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of 

War, NWP 3-56, for additional details.

tential solution may also include, 

depending on the formations involved, the option of employing 

the MAGTF commander as a strike 

warfare commander (STWC), given the capabilities of Marine aviation and ground-based fires. Each 

warfare commander, whether a 

Navy officer or Marine officer, will 

support or receive support from 

the other warfare commanders 

as the tactical situation demands 

and CWC directs. For example, 

current, emerging and envisioned 

Marine Corps capabilities (e.g., 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] assets, air defense 

batteries, [Lockheed Martin] 

F-35B/C [Lightning II], the High 

Mobility Artillery Rocket System 

[HIMARS], coastal defense cruise 

missiles [CDCM], etc.) can be integrated into the CWC construct as 

additional sensor and firing nodes 

for the various warfare commanders, including the STWC, surface 

warfare commander (SUWC), and 

air and missile defense commander 

(AMDC). For those cases in which 

expeditionary operations primarily encompass forces from Navy expeditionary forces (NEF), a Navy 

officer from these forces may be 

designated the EXWC. Alternate 

command and control options for 

Navy mine warfare capabilities 

should also be considered during 

follow-on wargaming and experimentation.

b. Integrated Fleet/JFMCC Staff. 
Neller and Richardson 387

The Navy and Marine Corps will 

explore assigning Marine subject 

matter experts (SMEs) to fleet/

JFMCC staffs to provide the requisite expertise regarding Marine 

Corps capabilities, limitations, 

and support requirements. These 

Marine assignments should be to 

actual billets within each staff, 

rather than liaison positions, to 

create an integrated “blue/green” 

staff. Such a staff will support the 

commander’s ability to plan and 

execute operations involving the 

gamut of Navy and Marine Corps 

capabilities. Additionally, future 

crises and contingencies could 

benefit from deliberately planned 

force options that give the fleet 

commander/JFMCC flexibility. 

For example, while CSGs are the 

principle formations that fleet/

JFMCC commanders employ to 

establish sea control, a blue/green 

staff can advise the commander 

regarding the complementary application of Marine Corps capabilities within the CWC construct to 

support the sea control fight.

c. Littoral Combat Groups (LCG). 

The Navy and Marine Corps will 

explore the viability of a force 

package designed to establish sea 

control in order to conduct crisis response in an uncertain environment. Due to the focus on sea 

control, the LCG would be Navy 

flag led as an integrated naval 

task group that includes an ARG, 

a MEU, one or more a surface 

combatants, and select capabilities 

from the NEF. In the event of an 

expanding crisis or larger contingency, when more combat power 

is required to gain sea control, the 

fleet/JFMCC commander may 

elect to reinforce the LCG with 

additional capabilities or combine 

the LCG with other formations 

such as a CSG, an afloat MEB, or 

a special purpose MAGTF. Major 

areas for innovation include:

i. Command Element. Commanded by a Navy flag officer who 

is supported by an integrated 

Navy-Marine staff, the LCG 

command element is envisioned as a means of providing continuity of command in 

the event that crisis response 

operations expand into larger 

contingencies. It also provides 

the seniority, expertise, and 

unity of command necessary 

to conduct integrated operations by a larger formation 

in the seaward and landward 

portion of the contested littoral. While in an earlier era 

both Navy admirals and Marine generals were eligible 

to command the original incarnation of the expeditionary strike groups (ESG), that 

construct was feasible only 

because U.S. naval forces enjoyed presumptive maritime 

superiority. The nature of the 

threats across the domain into 

and within the seaward por-
388 Chapter Four

tion of the littoral is such that 

an LCG is appropriately commanded by a Navy flag officer. 

Determining the composition 

and location afloat of the LCG 

command element, along 

with the command structures of the subordinate ARG, 

MEU, surface combatants, 

and NEF detachments, will 

rely on a detailed functional 

analysis conducted with due 

consideration for embarkation, allocation of spaces, 

C4ISR requirements, and be 

informed by rigorous live experimentation. This functional analysis should consider 

how the emerging family of 

expeditionary ships might be 

added to the LCG as a means 

of redistributing embarked 

assets in order to accommodate a flag command element 

and NEF detachments, as well 

as to expand distributed maneuver options.120

ii. Littoral Sea Combat. Assign or 

attach SUW, ASW, and expeditionary MCM capabilities 

to the LCG, as required to 

gain sea control in the littorals. The fleet commander/

JFMCC determines the capabilities and capacities required to counter the threats 

an LCG will likely encounter 

within the region, and assigns 

or attaches forces accordingly.

iii. Air and Missile Defense. Ensure 

120 The family of expeditionary ships includes the following types: 

expeditionary fast transport (EPF) (formally called the joint highspeed vessel or JHSV); expeditionary transfer dock (ESD) (formerly called the mobile landing platform [MLP]); and the expeditionary base, mobile (ESB).

Officer in tactical command

Composite warfare commander

Warfare commanders

Air and missile defense commander (AMDC)

Information operations warfare

commander (IWC)

Antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC)Surface warfare

commander

(SUWC)

Strike warfare

commander

(STWC)

Expeditionary warfare commander (EXWC)

Sea combat commander (SSC)

Functional group

commanders

Ballistic missile defense commander (BMDC)Maritime interception

operations commander (MIOC)

Screen commander (SC)

Underway replenishment group commander 

(URG CDR)

Mine warfare

commander

(MIWC)

Coordinators

Common tactical

picture manager (CTPM)

Cryptologic resource coordinator (CRC)

Air resource element coordinator (AREC)Airspace control authority

(ACA)

Force track

coordinator (FTC)

Helicopter element coordinator (HEC)Launch area

coordinator (LAC)

Submarine operations coordinating authority (SOCA)

Notional options within a revised composite warfare construct.

Adapted by History Division
Neller and Richardson 389

the defensive capabilities of 

the LCG are sufficient to operate in the contested littorals 

without unacceptable risk.

iv. Littoral Raid Forces. Provide the 

LCG a high-speed, long-range, 

low-signature combatant craft 

capable of projecting and recovering Marines for a variety of missions. As an interim 

measure/proof of concept, 

Mk VI patrol boats or riverine command boats from the 

NEF Coastal Riverine Force 

(CRF) may be useful surrogates for experimentation 

that informs development of 

some future craft specifically 

designed for this purpose.

d. Increasing Capacity. Recognizing that capability and capacity 

will always be subject to resource 

constraints, the Navy and Marine 

Corps team needs to examine 

ways to leverage existing capabilities while also seeking relatively 

low-cost means to further negate 

adversary capacity. Major areas for 

innovation include:

i. Expeditionary Advanced Bases. Further mitigate the adversary’s sensor and shooter 

capacity advantages by implementing the Expeditionary 

Advanced Base Operations

(EABO) concept being developed by the Marine Corps. 

While EABO was initiated 

separately from the Navy’s 

distributed lethality [DL] effort (described below), the 

two concepts are complementary and there has been 

beneficial interaction among 

the two development teams. 

The EABO concept further 

distributes lethality by providing land-based options 

for increasing the number of 

sensors and shooters beyond 

the upper limit imposed by 

the quantity of seagoing platforms available. The EABO 

concept espouses employing 

mobile, relatively low-cost 

capabilities in austere, temporary locations forward as 

integral elements of fleet/

JFMCC operations. As such, 

these land-based capabilities would be employed by 

the EXWC within the CWC 

construct in support of the 

other warfare commanders. 

Expeditionary advanced bases 

may be used to position naval 

ISR assets, future CDCMs, 

antiair missiles (to counter 

cruise and ballistic missiles as 

well as aircraft), and forward 

arming and refueling points 

(FARPs) and other expedient 

expeditionary operating sites 

for aircraft, critical munitions 

reloading teams for ships and 

submarines, or to provide 

expeditionary basing for surface screening/scouting platforms, all of which serve to 

increase friendly sensor and 
390 Chapter Four

shooter capacity while complicating adversary targeting. 

They may also control, or at 

least outpost, key maritime 

terrain to improve the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and choke 

points or deny their use to 

the enemy, and exploit and 

enhance the natural barriers formed by island chains. 

The EABO concept provides 

the opportunity to “turn the 

sea denial table” on potential 

adversaries and deter fait accompli actions. This can be 

done in a pre-crisis manner 

through security cooperation 

activities with our partners 

and allies. This could include 

prestaging equipment and 

supplies in key regions, conducting EABO exercises, 

and perhaps even creating 

more persistently forward 

postured—but continuously 

mobile—forces task organized for EABO. This would 

give the fleet commander/

JFMCC sea denial assets persistently postured in potentially disputed areas in order 

to deter aggression. In the 

event of crises, EABO can be 

employed in support of task 

forces maneuvering into the 

area to seize the initiative. 

To fully leverage the DL and 

EABO initiatives, the Navy 

and Marine Corps must pursue the ability to network seabased and land-based sensors 

and shooters. Additionally, 

the Navy should determine 

what current or planned 

sensors and weapons can be 

fielded in an expeditionary 

variant while the Marine 

Corps should determine what 

changes to existing Marine 

systems can enhance their 

utility in a sea denial or sea 

control fight. Furthermore, 

new initiatives, such as fielding a common antiship missile that can be launched from 

existing surface combatants, 

submarines, manned (and 

perhaps unmanned) aircraft, 

and mobile ground launchers, 

should be explored.

ii. Distributed Lethality. Mitigate 

the adversary’s sensor and 

missile capacity advantages by 

leveraging the ideas presented in the “Distributed Lethality” (DL) white paper. The DL 

white paper is a surface force 

initiative in which the offensive capacity of the entire surface fleet would be increased 

and the surface force would 

be employed in “dispersed” 

offensive formations known 

as “hunter-killer” surface action groups (SAGs). Both of 

the DL and EABO concepts 

seek to impose increased battlespace complexity on the 

adversary and confound his 
Neller and Richardson 391

decision calculus by forcing 

him to allocate sensors and 

shooters against a wider—

and more dispersed—set of 

threats. The forward posturing of sensors and weapons, 

such as the Ground/Air Task 

Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), 

Navy tactical and electronic 

warfare collection capabilities, 

and repurposed HIMARS, integrated into fleet operations 

via CWC, would further complement the DL initiatives designed to expand sea control 

capability and capacity.

iii. Screening/Scouting Surface Forces. Explore complementing 

current fleet composition, incorporating the ideas of DL, 

and reducing the risk of inshore operations in complex 

archipelagoes or confined and 

shallow waters through the 

establishment of screening/

scouting surface forces in 

proximity to key operating 

areas. The idea of fielding 

screening/scouting surface 

forces, employed in conjunction with manned and 

unmanned aircraft, supports 

the ideas within the DL and 

EABO concepts, as “hard to 

find, hard to hit” platforms, 

operating from mobile expeditionary locations or an 

afloat forward staging base 

would further complicate 

adversary targeting and help 

provide friendly forces a favorable missile ratio.

e. Force on Force Littoral Exercises. Our current certification 

exercises serve valid and useful 

purposes. However, they need 

to be complemented by realistic 

and stressful littoral exercises that 

challenge leaders’ cognitive skills 

and accelerate learning. Revitalizing littoral operational art requires a realistic and challenging 

training environment that places 

humans and machines in conditions as close to actual combat as 

possible. The most effective way 

of achieving this is by conducting 

realistic, evaluated force-on-force 

exercises—using a combination 

of physical and virtual means—

that produce winners and losers. 

To enable this approach, friendly forces must be pitted against 

a red team that replicates the capabilities and tactics likely to be 

employed by adversaries in the 

littorals. By putting our concepts, 

doctrine, organizations, tactics, 

and capabilities to the test under 

stressful conditions, we will learn 

what works and what does not. We 

will determine how to integrate 

new technology and how to coordinate actions in all dimensions 

and warfare specialties. Most importantly, leaders will be forced 

to make time-sensitive decisions 

in the face of uncertainty and 

then—in a rigorous post exercise 

critique—explain their actions to 
392 Chapter Four

their seniors, peers, and subordinates. This is not a novel idea; it is 

the method used by the fleet and 

fleet Marine force commanders 

during the interwar period that 

generated victory in World War 

II. Leaders need to prepare themselves for these demanding events 

through unremitting professional 

study, conducting rigorous analysis of friendly and enemy capabilities, developing an aggressive 

spirit tempered by realism, and 

fostering the ability to think like 

the enemy.121

8. Command and Control for a 

Continuum of Operations

 The ability to conduct a continuum of 

operations is predicated on the idea 

that the fleet commanders/JFMCC can 

adjust command arrangements—to 

include task organization, subordinate 

unit command relationships, and the 

assignment of battlespace—as needed 

to meet changing circumstances. This 

flexibility can be understood by considering the evolution from initial deployment and steady-state activities to 

crisis response to larger contingencies.

a. Currently, ARG/MEU assets are 

often employed over wide areas 

within a region or tasked to conduct distributed operations across 

regional boundaries. Similarly, it 

is anticipated that LCG assets will 

normally be distributed within or 

across regions to conduct a wide 

121 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 17.

array of missions, with maritime 

security operations and security 

cooperation activities being the 

most common. When episodic 

crises occur, the fleet commander/JFMCC may task organize 

available naval forces and assign 

them to an LCG commander. The 

most likely missions will be noncombatant evacuation, embassy 

reinforcement, foreign humanitarian assistance, and strikes or 

raids against violent extremist organizations.

b. In the event of larger contingencies, in which a significantly more 

capable force is required to deter 

or contain conflict, the fleet commander/JFMCC will review and 

prioritize requirements and aggregate additional Navy and Marine Corps forces as needed.

c. A key aspect of effective force aggregation is the need to develop 

common tactics, techniques, and 

procedures that promote effective 

integration of all fleet and select 

fleet Marine force units. An historical example of the benefit of 

a fleet-wide SOP can be found in 

Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, 

U.S. Pacific Fleet, more commonly 

known as “PAC 10,” of 1943.122

This manual made it “possible for 

forces composed of diverse types, 

and indoctrinated under different 

task force commanders, to join at 

122 Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet (Washington, 

DC: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1943).
Neller and Richardson 393

sea on short notice for concerted 

action against the enemy without 

interchanging a mass of special 

instructions.”123 As noted in the 

manual’s introduction. “The ultimate aim is to obtain essential 

uniformity without unacceptable 

sacrifice of flexibility.”124

9. Proposed Capabilities

 The following is a list of notable capabilities required to implement this 

concept. This list should not be considered exhaustive. Additional capabilities 

will likely be identified through wargaming, experimentation, and exercises.

a. Command and Control

i. Ability to form and command 

and control scalable, integrated Navy and Marine Corps 

task organizations (i.e., task 

force, task group, task unit) 

from globally distributed 

forces based on mission requirements.

ii. Ability to command and control naval task organizations 

in denied, degraded, and exploited environments (D2E2).

iii. Ability to employ a combination of integrated and interoperable Navy and Marine 

Corps C4ISR systems and 

networks to enable operations in all dimensions of the 

littoral battlespace.

123 As quoted in Thomas C. Hone, “Replacing Battleships with 

Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War II,” Naval War College 

Review 66, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 63. 124 Trent Hone, “U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in 

the Pacific,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 75.

iv. Ability to conduct expeditionary airborne early warning in support of littoral 

operations.

v. Ability to integrate sea-based 

and land-based Marine Corps 

capabilities into the Navy’s 

CWC construct.

vi. Ability to employ common, 

collaborative, and adaptable 

Navy-Marine Corps processes to support rapid planning 

and execution.

b. Intelligence

i. Ability to rapidly develop battlespace awareness 

in uncertain environments, 

particularly with regards to 

threat antiship missiles, naval 

mines, air defenses, improvised explosive devices (IED), 

cyberspace capabilities, and 

unmanned systems.

ii. Ability to perform rapid and 

accurate mission assessment 

of fires.

iii. Ability to understand the 

entire littoral operating environment. This includes not 

only military features, but 

also natural and man-made 

terrain, hydrography, the “human terrain” in the area (e.g., 

culture, society, economy, 

technology, and population 

concentration/dispersion), 

civilian traffic (e.g., air, sea, 

and land), the climate, and 

regional weather patterns.
394 Chapter Four

c. Fires

i. Ability to integrate Navy and 

Marine Corps lethal and nonlethal effects from afloat and 

ashore (e.g., EAB) for sea 

control and power projection.

ii. Ability to disrupt adversary 

command and control, movement, and maneuver, and 

intelligence capabilities and 

to protect our own, by employing synchronized Navy 

and Marine Corps lethal and 

nonlethal effects.

iii. Ability to strike adversary 

naval forces at longer ranges 

using ground, surface, subsurface, or aviation platforms. 

This includes development of 

long range SUW missiles.

iv. Ability to provide land-based 

support to sea denial and 

sea control operations (e.g., 

coastal defense cruise missiles, rockets, artillery). This 

includes developing Marine 

Corps shore based antiship 

capabilities that can be integrated with Navy surface 

combatant sensors and weapons systems. This may be accomplished by modifying the 

munitions for existing systems, such as the HIMARS, 

or by modifying off-the-shelf 

CDCMs to meet our needs. 

Ideally, to simplify systems 

integration and logistics support, the Navy and Marine 

Corps will field a common 

missile or family of missiles 

that can be launched from air, 

surface, subsurface, or landbased means.

v. Ability to support over-thehorizon amphibious raids and 

assaults.

vi. Ability to conduct over-thehorizon fire support for amphibious operations.

vii. Ability to rapidly employ and 

closely integrate SOF in support of naval objectives.

d. Movement and Maneuver

i. Ability to establish expeditionary advanced bases to 

support sea denial, sea control, power projection, and 

sustainment operations in 

contested environments.

ii. Ability to maneuver in cyberspace and the electromagnetic 

spectrum to assure command 

and control and ISR and deny 

the same to the adversary.

iii. Ability to employ scalable 

landing forces using a variety 

of platforms, including amphibious ships, as well as alternative capabilities, including 

expeditionary fast transport 

(EPF) (a.k.a. JHSV), expeditionary transfer dock (ESD) 

(a.k.a. MLP), expeditionary 

base mobile (ESB) (a.k.a. 

AFSB), dry cargo ammunition ships (T-AKE), and littoral combat ship (LCS). The 

use of alternate platforms in 

contested environments will 
Neller and Richardson 395

have to be weighed carefully, 

balancing the additional lift 

capacity and flexibility against 

force protection requirements and the legal status of 

merchant mariners. Depending on the assigned tasks, 

under international law, platforms designations may need 

to be changed from “USNS” 

to “USS” and have Navy personnel assigned.

iv. Ability to conduct sea-based 

inshore maritime raids and 

amphibious advanced force 

operations.

e. Protection

i. Ability to defend expeditionary advanced bases through 

active and passive means (the 

latter including the use of 

low-signature, mobile assets).

ii. Ability to defend forward logistics capabilities afloat and 

ashore.

iii. Ability to conduct littoral 

Marines and sailors of the 26th MEU step off a landing craft utility vehicle onto the shore of Breezy Point, 

a small coastal community in New York City, 9 November 2012. The Marines and sailors of the 26th MEU 

are partnering with the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 2d Marine Logistics Group, II MEF, as well as the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Guard to clear 

debris from walkways and public spaces to help the residents of New York City return to normalcy as soon as 

possible after Hurricane Sandy. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Bryan Nygaard
396 Chapter Four

mine detection, avoidance, 

and clearance.

f. Sustainment

i. Ability to protect logistics capabilities, and provide selective redundancy for critical 

requirements. 

ii. Ability to sustain distributed 

naval forces with precision 

munitions and sufficient fuel 

in high-intensity combat.

iii. Ability to rapidly establish mobile, clandestine expeditionary logistics bases to provide 

sustainment to afloat and expeditionary operating forces.

iv. Ability to provide logistics 

forces the mobility, protection, and agility to support 

widely dispersed forces with 

diverse support requirements.

v. Ability for logistics at-sea 

forces to sustain forces in the 

contested littorals.

vi. Ability to utilize auxiliary platforms to augment logistics 

sustainment capacity, spread 

sustainment risk, and enhance operational tempo.

vii. Ability to fully integrate naval 

force logistics staffs to realize 

efficiencies and maintain operational tempo throughout 

the naval campaign.

viii. Ability to operate in a communications contested/degraded environment.

ix. Ability to synchronize distributed logistics forces.

x. Ability to achieve battlespace 

awareness, manage signal 

control, and conduct dynamic 

maneuvering.

xi. Ability to safeguard and improve the integrity of logistics 

data.

xii. Ability to conduct expeditionary maintenance and battle damage repair.

xiii. Ability to conduct casualty 

and medical treatment and 

evacuation.
397

GENERAL PETER PACE 

BIOGRAPHY

Corps Combat Development Command. Pace 

also served in Somalia as deputy commander, 

Marine Forces, and deputy commander Joint 

Task Force-Somalia from 1992 to 1994. 

In 2000, Pace was promoted to general and 

took command of U.S. Southern Command before serving as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. In 2005, President George W. Bush 

appointed Pace chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, making him the first Marine to hold that 

position. He retired from the Service in October 2007. 

General Pace’s career represents the final 

acceptance of the Marine Corps as an equal 

Service with the Army, Navy, and Air Force at 

the highest levels, as he held multiple joint commands, including a combatant command, and 

served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

helping to formulate the nation’s strategies and 

acting as the senior most U.S. military officer 

and principal military advisor to the president. 

Today’s tactical victory does not guarantee tomorrow’s strategic success.

~ General Peter Pace125

General Peter Pace was born on 5 November 1945 in New York. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy and 

was commissioned in the Marine Corps in June 

1967. The following year, he was assigned to 2d 

Battalion, 5th Marines, as a platoon commander 

in Vietnam. After his tour, he was attached to the 

Marine Barracks at 8th & I in Washington, DC, 

where he served as a ceremonial platoon commander and White House social aide, among 

other duties. He held several command and staff 

billets, served on recruiting duty, and attended 

Command and Staff College during the next decade. 

In 1985, he led the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, before advancing to service on the combined/joint staff in Korea. He returned to the 

Marine Barracks at 8th & I as the commanding 

officer in 1988. He went on to hold high positions including the chief of staff for the 2d 

Marine Division, president of Marine Corps 

University, and commanding general of Marine 

125 Gen Peter Pace, “Pace Says War on Terror Will Last Years,” Associated Press, 24 March 2006
398 Chapter Four

The official portrait of Gen Peter Pace, 16th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unveiled in the Pentagon auditorium on 16 January 2009. Pace retired from the Marine Corps on 1 October 2007, after more 

than 40 years of service. Photo of original oil painting by Peter Egeli.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl Jacquelyn M. White
399

ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS 

BIOGRAPHY

tank, which was formed in the Pentagon to provide the Chief of Naval Operations with ideas for 

fighting the War on Terror at the strategic level. 

From 2002 to 2004, he commanded the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group in the Indian Ocean 

and Persian Gulf region in support of operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2006, he took command of U.S. Southern Command, and in 2009, 

he became Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 

He retired from that position in 2013.

In addition to his naval and joint commands, Admiral Stavridis has been a prolific author, publishing both division and watch officer 

guides through Naval Institute Press, as well as 

several books on command and maritime strategy. Throughout his career, Stavridis has helped to 

shape the Navy’s modern approach to maritime 

strategy and its commitment to a joint approach 

to maritime and naval affairs. 

Whenever a new international crisis faced the nation, the president then in office would continue to ask, 

“Where are the carriers? Where are the Marines?” Why? Because they form the ready strike forces that 

are sustainable from the sea.

~ Admiral James G. Stavridis126

Admiral James G. Stavridis was born on 

15 February 1955 in West Palm Beach, 

Florida.126 He graduated from the U.S. 

Naval Academy in 1976 and was commissioned 

as a surface warfare officer. He served in a variety of surface warfare billets on cruisers and 

destroyers before attaining a master’s in law and 

diplomacy, and a doctorate in international affairs from Tufts University in 1983 and 1984, respectively. He commanded the USS Barry (DDG 

52) from 1993 to 1995, and Destroyer Squadron 

21, then deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1998. 

He held a variety of staff billets for the 

Chief of Naval Operations and the chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a strategic planner and 

senior military assistant to the secretary of the 

Navy and the secretary of defense. Following the 

9/11 attacks, Stavridis was the first commander 

of the U.S. Navy’s “Deep Blue” strategic think 

126 Adm James Stavridis, USN (Ret), Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 327.
400 Chapter Four

From 2009 to 2013, Adm James G. Stavridis served as combatant commander of the U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe. He was the first Navy officer to hold these positions. 

Official Department of Defense photo
401

CHRONOLOGY

Selected Significant Moments

in the History of Maritime Strategic Thought

1210 BCE In the first dateable sea battle, 

the Hittites, under Suppiluliuma 

II, defeat a Cypriot fleet.

ca. 500–430 BCE Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is completed. 

483 BCE Themistocles convinces the Athenians to use the unexpected 

wealth from silver mines to build 

a fleet of 200 triremes. 

480 BCE Employing the first overtly maritime strategic plan, the Greeks 

defeat the Persians in a naval 

campaign that includes the battles of Artemisium and Salamis. 

ca. 410 BCE Thucydides produces his History 

of the Peloponnesian War, a classic of both history and strategic 

thought.

ca. 383–450 Flavius Vegetius Renatus writes 

the Epitoma Rei Militaris. 

ca. 575 Maurice’s Strategikon is written. 

ca. 1050 The “Seven Military Classics” of 

China are compiled. 

1571 Spain and Venice lead an alliance 

of Christian states and defeat the 

Ottoman Turks at the Battle of 

Lepanto. 

1588 The British defeat the Spanish 

Armada. 

1805 British VAdm Horatio Nelson 

defeats the French in the Trafalgar campaign.

1832 Carl von Clausewitz’s wife publishes Vom Kriege (On War) posthumously, Clausewitz’s classic 

work on strategic thought. 

1838 Antoine-Henri, baron de Jomini, publishes Précis de l’Art de la 

Guerre, ou Nouveau tableau analytique des Principales Combinaisons 

de la Stratégie, de la Grande Tactique 

et de la Politique Militaire.

1890 Alfred Thayer Mahan publishes 

his seminal work on history and 

maritime strategic thought, The 

Influence of Sea Power upon History, 

1660–1783.

1907–9 The U.S. Navy, at the orders of 

President Theodore Roosevelt, 

sends the Great White Fleet on 
402 Chronology

an around-the-world cruise, 

demonstrating the global reach 

of American naval power. 

1911 Julian S. Corbett publishes Some 

Principles of Maritime Strategy.

1916 The British Home Fleet and the 

German High Seas Fleet clash in 

the Battle of Jutland.

1919 War Plan Orange is produced by 

the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army, 

planning for war with Japan. 

1920 LtCol Earl H. Ellis produces Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, Operation Plan 712.

1921 Italian Gen Giulio Douhet publishes Il dominio dell’aria (The 

Command of the Air).

May 1942 The Imperial Japanese Navy and 

the U.S. Navy clash in the Battle 

of the Coral Sea, the first naval 

battle fought by carriers on both 

sides. 

June 1942 The U.S. Navy fleet defeats the 

Imperial Japanese Navy in the 

Battle of Midway.

August 1945 The United States drops atomic 

bombs on the Japanese cities of 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

1954 The U.S. Navy launches the USS 

Nautilus (SSN 571), the world’s 

first nuclear powered submarine. 

1959 The U.S. Navy launches the USS 

George Washington (SSBN 598), the 

first ballistic missile submarine. 

1961 The U.S. Navy launches the 

USS Enterprise (CVA[N] 65), the 

world’s first nuclear powered 

aircraft carrier. 

1984 Chief of Naval Operations Adm 

James D. Watkins issues the Maritime Strategy.

1985 The Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, Gen Paul X. Kelley, and 

the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Adm James D. Watkins, issue The 

Amphibious Warfare Strategy.

1989 The Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr. 

issues Warfighting, FMFM-1.

1992 The U.S. Navy publishes “. . . 

From the Sea.”

2015 Commandant of the Marine 

Corps Gen Joseph F. Dunford 

Jr., Chief of Naval Operations 

Adm Jonathan W. Greenert, 

and Commandant of the Coast 

Guard Adm Paul F. Zukunft issue A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 

Century Seapower.

January 2016 Chief of Naval Operations Adm 

John M. Richardson issues A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 1.0.

February 2017 Commandant of the Marine 

Corps Gen Robert B. Neller and 

Chief of Naval Operations Adm 

John M. Richardson issue Littoral 

Operations in a Contested Environment. 

December 2018 Chief of Naval Operations Adm 

John M. Richardson issues A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0.
403

AN INTRODUCTORY 

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MARITIME 

STRATEGIC THOUGHT

The following bibliography provides an introductory list of relevant works on strategic theory, broadly, 

and maritime strategic thought, specifically. There is 

an emphasis on foundational works and those relating 

more directly to the current U.S. strategic challenges. This list is a starting point, reading works beyond 

it is required for a thorough understanding of these 

subjects. Entries in bold appear within this anthology. 

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Washington, DC: Department 

of the Navy, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, 2015.

A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 

Version 2.0. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2018.

Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, 

2017. Washington, DC: Department 

of the Navy, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 2017.

Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary 

Force Operates in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 

2016.

Warfighting, MCDP-1. Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1997.

BOOKS

Asada, Sadao. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial 

Japanese Navy and the United States. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1976; first published 1832.

Clifford, LtCol Kenneth J., USMCR. Progress and 

Purpose: A Developmental History of the United 

States Marine Corps, 1900–1970. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 1973.

Cohen, Eliot A. The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power 

and the Necessity of Military Force. New York: 

Basic Books, 2017. 

Coker, Christopher. Rebooting Clausewitz: On War in 

the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 

Corbett, Julian S. 21st Century Corbett: Maritime Strategy and Naval Policy for the Modern Era. Edited by Andrew Lambert. Annapolis: Naval 

Institute Press, 2017.

———. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London: 

Longman, Green, 1911.

Corbett, Julian S., and H. J. Edwards, eds. Naval and 

Military Essays: Being Papers Read in the Naval 
404 Bibliography

and Military Section at the International Congress of Historical Studies, 1913. Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1914.

Cottrell, Alvin J., and associates. Sea Power and Strategy in the Indian Ocean. Beverly Hills and 

London: Sage Publications, 1981.

Crowl, Philip A. “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval 

Historian.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: 

From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited 

by Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1986.

Cutler, Thomas J., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval 

Strategy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 

2015.

Dennis, Peter, ed. Armies and Maritime Strategy. 2013 

Chief of Army History Conference. Canberra, New South Wales: Big Sky Publishing, 2014.

Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 2d ed. New York: Palgrave MacMillan 

Press, 1989.

———. Strategy: A History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Friedman, B. A., ed. 21st Century Ellis: Operational Art 

and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015.

Friedman, Norman. Seapower as Strategy: Navies and 

National Interests. Annapolis: Naval Institute 

Press, 2001.

Goldrick, James, and John B. Hattendorf, eds. Mahan 

Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference 

on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral 

Sir Herbert Richmond. Newport, RI: Naval 

War College Press, 1993.

Gorshkov, S. G. The Sea Power of the State. New York: 

Pergamon Press, 1979.

Guilmartin, John Francis, Jr. Gunpowder and Galleys: 

Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century. New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Hagan, Kenneth J. This People’s Navy: The Making of 

American Sea Power. New York: Free Press, 

1991.

Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic 

Thought. London & New York: Routledge, 

2001.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Strategy. 2d rev. ed. New York: 

Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Hattendorf, John B., ed. U.S. Naval Strategy in the 

1990s: Selected Documents. Naval War College Newport Papers no. 27. Newport, RI: 

Naval War College Press, 2006.

Hattendorf, John B., and Peter M. Swartz, eds. U.S. 

Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents. 

Naval War College Newport Papers no. 33. 

Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008.

Hughes, Capt Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret). Fleet Tactics 

and Coastal Combat. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Hughes, Capt Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret), and RAdm 

Robert P. Girreir, USN (Ret). Fleet Tactics 

and Naval Operations. 3d ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018.

Keegan, John. The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of 

Naval Warfare from Trafalgar to Midway. New 

York: Viking, 1983.

Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of British Naval 

Mastery. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Ashfield, 

1976.

———. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 

2000. New York: Random House, 1987.

Livezey, William E. Mahan on Sea Power. Norman: 

Oklahoma University Press, 1947.

Luce, Stephen B. The Writings of Stephen B. Luce. Edited by John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf. Newport, RI: Naval War College 

Press, 1975.

Luttwak, Edward N. Strategy: The Logic of War and 

Peace. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 

Harvard University Press, 1987.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Art of War. Translated by Ellis Farnsworth. New York: Da Capo Press, 

2001.

Mahan, Alfred T. 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military 

Conclusions for the Modern Era. Edited by 

Benjamin F. Armstrong. Annapolis: Naval 

Institute Press, 2013.

———. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–

1783. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1890.

———. The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and 

Future. Boston: Little, Brown, 1897.
Bibliography 405

———. Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selections from the 

Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan.

Edited by Allan Westcott. Boston: Little, 

Brown, 1943.

———. Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with 

the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land. London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1911. 

Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and 

the Coming of the Great War. New York: Random House, 1991.

McNeill, William H. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, 

Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Meilinger, Col Phillip S., ed. The Paths of Heaven: The 

Evolution of Airpower Theory. Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL: School of Advanced Air 

Power Studies, Air University Press, 1997.

Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to 

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Institute Press, 1991.

Millett, Allan R., and Williamson Murray, eds. Military Effectiveness. 3 vols. Boston, London: 

Unwin Hyman, 1988; new editions by 

Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Millis, Walter, ed. American Military Thought. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966.

Murray, Williamson, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin 

Bernstein. The Making of Strategy: Rulers, 

States, and Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge 

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Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Modern Age. Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1986.

Potter, E. B., ed. Seapower: A Naval History. Annapolis: 

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Stavridis, Adm James G. Sea Power: The History and 

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409

ABOUT THE EDITORS

PAUL WESTERMEYER is a historian who 

joined the History Division of the U.S. Marine 

Corps in 2005. He earned bachelor of arts in 

history and master of arts in military history 

degrees from The Ohio State University. He is 

the recipient of Marine Corps Heritage Foundation’s Brigadier General Edwin SimmonsHenry I. Shaw Award in 2015 for his book U.S. 

Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991: Liberating Kuwait. He is the author of U.S. Marines in Battle: AlKhafji, 28 January-1 February 1991 and the editor 

of Desert Voices: Oral Histories of Marines in the Gulf 

War and U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2010–2014: 

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. He is the 

series historian for the Marines in the Vietnam 

War Commemorative Series.

BREANNE ROBERTSON joined the History Division of the U.S. Marine Corps in 2015. 

She earned a bachelor of arts in art history from 

the University of Missouri, a master of arts in 

art history from the University of Texas, and a 

PhD in art history from the University of Maryland. Essays drawn from her research appear in 

Marine Corps History, American Art, Annals of Iowa, 

and Hemisphere: Visual Cultures of the Americas. She 

recently authored Camp Pendleton: The Historic 

Rancho Santa Margarita y Las Flores and the Marine Corps in Southern California, A Shared History

(2017) in commemoration of the 75th anniversary of that military base. Her current projects 

include a monograph on Marine Corps activities 

in the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 

1924 and an edited volume examining the history and cultural meaning of the Iwo Jima flag 

raisings, entitled Investigating Iwo: The Flag Raisings in Myth, Memory and Esprit de Corps (2019). 

This volume, The Legacy of American Naval Power: Reinvigorating Maritime Strategic Thought, is the second 

in a series edited by Paul Westermeyer and Dr. Breanne Robertson. The first anthology in the series 

was The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles, published in 2018.