If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re ESTATE OF JACK MCLAURIN SR.

GEORGE RIZIK II, Personal Representative of the 

ESTATE OF JACK MCLAURIN, SR,

Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 14, 2019

v No. 341596

Genesee Probate Court

FRED MCLAURIN, LC No. 17-206740-DE

Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, C.J., and STEPHENS and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Fred McLaurin (Fred), son of Jack McLaurin Sr. (the decedent), and a 

beneficiary of the decedent’s estate (estate), appeals as of right the probate court’s order granting 

appellee, George F. Rizik, II (Rizik), the personal representative of the estate, the authority to 

allow Fred to retain the decedent’s 1987 Chevrolet Monte Carlo (vehicle); to pay $2,000 to 

Continental Auto Sales, LLC (buyer); and to deduct that $2,000 from Fred’s distributive share of 

the estate’s residue, along with $1,000 in attorney fees and costs. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The decedent died intestate on February 10, 2017, leaving eight children as his 

descendants. The probate court appointed Rizik as the personal representative of the estate. 

Rizik had Fred and two of his siblings bid on the subject automobile after they had expressed an 

interest in it. Rizik testified that despite an array of competing bids, none of the family members 

ever provided any money to him. Consequently, Rizik sold the vehicle to the buyer. When the 

buyer attempted to claim possession of the vehicle, he was precluded from doing so by Fred. 

After a hearing, the probate court approved of Rizik’s sale of the vehicle, noting Fred’s failure to 

pay the purchase price in a reasonable time and Rizik’s discovery of a willing buyer. The 
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probate court ordered Fred to turn the vehicle over to Rizik, but when Fred refused to do so, he 

was found in contempt of court and sentenced to time in jail. 

Subsequently, Fred moved the probate court to remove Rizik as personal representative 

of the estate while Rizik moved the probate court to allow Fred to keep the vehicle but to deduct 

$2,000 from Fred’s share of the estate to pay the buyer along with $1,000 from his share to pay 

for attorney fees and costs arising out of Fred’s wrongful retention of the vehicle. Fred objected, 

citing that the vehicle was not worth that amount and that Rizik had breached an array of duties 

to the estate. The probate court found that such relief was warranted under the circumstances 

and entered an order adopting Rizik’s plan. This appeal followed.

II. DEDUCTION FROM FRED’S SHARE OF THE ESTATE

Fred argues that the probate court abused its discretion in granting Rizik’s petition to 

deduct the value of the vehicle, plus attorney fees and costs, from Fred’s distributive share of the 

estate’s residue. Fred has abandoned this issue, but even so, we disagree.

A. ABANDONMENT

“An appellant may not merely announce its position and leave it to this Court to discover 

and rationalize the basis for its claims, unravel or elaborate its argument, or search for authority 

for its position.” Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Builders & Constr

Managers, LLC, 282 Mich App 410, 413; 766 NW2d 874 (2009). “Insufficiently briefed issues 

are deemed abandoned on appeal.” Id. 

Fred’s brief on appeal cites two statutes as the sole authority for his position: MCL 

750.423 and MCL 700.1308. The former is the statute effectuating the penalty for perjury and is 

irrelevant to the issue on appeal. MCL 750.423. The latter is the remedy for removing a 

personal representative of an estate who breaches their fiduciary duty. MCL 700.1308. Fred 

offers no analysis as to how either statute warrants the relief he requests. Fred also fails to make 

a coherent argument as to why the probate court abused its discretion in granting Rizik’s petition 

to deduct Fred’s distributive share of the estate’s residue. Therefore, Fred has abandoned his 

argument on appeal. Greater Springs Ministry, 282 Mich App at 413.

Nonetheless, even in addressing the merits of Fred’s arguments, we disagree with him

that the probate court abused its discretion in granting Rizik’s petition to deduct the value of the 

vehicle, plus attorney fees and costs, from Fred’s distributive share of the estate’s residue.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

“This Court reviews the probate court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

dispositional rulings for an abuse of discretion.” In re Lundy Estate, 291 Mich App 347, 352; 

804 NW2d 773 (2011). “A finding is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is evidence to support 

the finding.” In re Duke Estate, 312 Mich App 574, 580-581; 887 NW2d 1 (2015) (quotation 

marks omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when the probate court “chooses an outcome 

outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich 

App 122, 128; 748 NW2d 265 (2008). “[A]ppeals from a probate court decision are on the 
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record, not de novo.” Id. However, issues involving the application and interpretation of a 

statute or court rule are reviewed de novo as questions of law. Id.

“The probate court is ruled by equitable principles.” In re Cox Estate, 284 Mich 628,

633; 279 NW2d 913 (1938); see also Matter of Estate of Williams, 164 Mich App 601, 608-609; 

417 NW2d 556 (1987) (“Over matters of which it has jurisdiction, the probate court has the same 

powers as the circuit court to make any proper order, including the power to provide equitable 

relief.”), citing MCL 600.847. MCL 700.1302(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) confer “exclusive legal and 

equitable jurisdiction” on probate courts in matters related to the “internal affairs of the estate”; 

administering, distributing, and settling a decedent’s estate; and “[d]eclaration of rights that 

involve an estate, devisee, heir, or fiduciary.” (Emphasis added.) Additionally, MCL 

700.1303(1)(a) grants probate courts with “concurrent legal and equitable jurisdiction” to 

“[d]etermine a property right or interest.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, “[t]he residuary estate 

may be distributed in any equitable manner.” MCL 700.3906(1)(c). 

A personal representative is required to “proceed expeditiously with the settlement and 

distribution of a decedent’s estate . . . .” MCL 700.3704. Generally, the personal representative 

shall settle a decedent’s estate without adjudication, order, or direction of the court; “[h]owever, 

the personal representative may invoke the court’s jurisdiction in a proceeding authorized by this 

act to resolve a question concerning the estate or its administration.” Id. 

C. ANALYSIS

The probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rizik’s petition because a 

probate court may issue equitable relief in the distribution of a decedent’s estate, in determining 

heirs’ property interests, and in determining heirs’ rights to a decedent’s property. MCL 

700.1302(a)(ii) and (iii); MCL 700.1303(1)(a). Despite the probate court’s order requiring Fred 

to return the vehicle to Rizik, Fred refused to do so. Fred’s willful noncompliance resulted in 

him being held in contempt of court and a sentence of four days in jail. Yet, even so, he still 

refused to turn the vehicle over to the personal representative. Rizik’s petition to deduct the 

value of the vehicle, plus attorney fees and costs, from Fred’s distributive share of the estate’s 

residue stated that “[b]ut for Fred McLaurin’s actions with respect to the vehicle, the estate could 

be closed,” and that “[t]his proposal will allow the personal representative to pay claims and 

close this estate, which should have been closed three months ago [August 2017] but for Fred 

McLaurin’s actions.” The probate court’s order authorizing Rizik to deduct $3,000 from Fred’s 

distributive share of the estate’s residue allowed for the expedient administration of the estate 

and its closure. MCL 700.3704. Thus, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in 

authorizing this partial distribution, as it properly invoked its equitable jurisdiction and authority. 

MCL 700.1302(a)(i), (ii), (iii); MCL 700.3704; see also Cox, 284 Mich at 633; Williams, 164 

Mich App at 608-609. 

The probate court determined $2,000 was the “deemed value” of the vehicle. This

calculation included the buyer’s “expected profit after refurbishing expenses and his towing 

expenses.” The court’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous as the lower court record 

indicates that Fred’s brother bid in excess of $1,500 for the vehicle and that the buyer’s towing 

expenses were estimated to be between $100 and $150. Furthermore, Rizik submitted an invoice 

with an itemized list of his attorney fees and costs, including in excess of $1,000 from the period 
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of July 11, 2017, through November 30, 2017, relating to the preparation of a motion and order 

to show cause relating to Fred’s conduct with respect to the vehicle. Thus, the probate court’s 

determination that $3,000 would be deducted from Fred’s distributive share of the estate’s 

residue, in light of Fred’s actions, was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. 

Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich App at 128; see also MCL 700.1302(a)(i), (ii), and (iii); MCL 

700.1303(1)(a); MCL 700.3906(1)(c); Cox, 284 Mich at 633; Williams, 164 Mich App at 608-

609. 

III. REMOVAL OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

Fred argues that the probate court abused its discretion in denying his petition to remove 

Rizik as personal representative of the estate. Because Fred has abandoned this argument on 

appeal and because it lacks merit, we disagree. 

A. ABANDONMENT

Fred provides no legal analysis as to why or how the probate court abused its discretion 

in failing to remove Rizik as personal representative. Fred’s brief on appeal merely accuses 

Rizik of various forms of misconduct and breaches of his fiduciary duties. While Fred cites 

MCL 700.1308—the statute providing remedies for a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to an heir, 

beneficiary, or protected individual of an estate—as authority for his position, Fred’s brief on 

appeal fails to explain, even minimally, how Rizik’s alleged breach of his fiduciary duties 

entitles Fred to relief under MCL 700.1308. Thus, this argument has been abandoned. Greater 

Springs Ministry, 282 Mich App at 413. 

Nonetheless, we disagree with Fred that the probate court abused its discretion in denying 

Fred’s petition to remove Rizik as personal representative of the estate. 

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a probate court’s decision regarding the 

removal of a personal representative. In re Kramek Estate, 268 Mich App 565, 575-576; 710 

NW2d 753 (2005). An abuse of discretion occurs when the probate court “chooses an outcome 

outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Temple, 278 Mich App at 128. 

“An interested person may petition for removal of a personal representative for cause at

any time.” MCL 700.3611(1). Pursuant to MCL 700.3611(2), the probate court may grant the 

petition under the following circumstances: 

(a) Removal is in the best interests of the estate. 

(b) It is shown that the personal representative or the person who sought the 

personal representative’s appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts 

in a proceeding leading to the appointment. 

(c) The personal representative did any of the following: 

(i) Disregarded a court order. 
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(ii) Became incapable of discharging the duties of office. 

(iii) Mismanaged the estate. 

(iv) Failed to perform a duty pertaining to the office.

C. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Fred argues that the probate court should have removed Rizik as the personal 

representative for selling the vehicle to the buyer, whom Fred argued Rizik knew personally, 

despite all of the descendants’ wishes to keep the vehicle in the family. However, testimony

shows that Rizik sold the vehicle because the bids of Fred and his brother for the vehicle never 

materialized, as neither could pay the amount bid. At no point during Rizik’s appointment as

personal representative does it appear he was doing anything but acting in the best interests of 

the estate. See MCL 700.3611(1). Nor is there evidence that he disregarded any of the probate 

court’s orders, that he mismanaged the estate, or failed to perform a duty required of him as 

personal representative of the estate. See id. As previously discussed, Rizik sold the vehicle in 

order to expeditiously administer the estate and begin closing it out, which could have been 

closed in August 2017 if Fred had not taken the car. Rizik was acting under the authority of 

MCL 700.3704 when he sold the vehicle to the buyer, and the probate court had the equitable 

jurisdiction to authorize the sale. MCL 700.1302(a)(i), (ii), and (iii); MCL 700.1303(1)(a); MCL 

700.3906(1)(c). Therefore, the probate court’s denial of Fred’s petition to remove Rizik as 

personal representative for selling the vehicle was not an abuse of discretion. Lundy, 291 Mich 

App at 352. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Despite defendant abandoning all of his claims on appeal, we have considered them on 

the merits and found them lacking. Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan