Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Restoration of Civil Rights & Issuance of a

Firearm Owner’s Identification Card to Bailey,

2016 IL App (5th) 140586

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND ISSUANCE OF A 

FIREARM OWNER’S IDENTIFICATION CARD TO MARSHALL 

BAILEY (Marshall Bailey, Petitioner-Appellee, v. The Department of 

State Police, Intervenor-Appellant).

District & No. Fifth District

Docket No. 5-14-0586

Filed March 3, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Shelby County, No. 14-MR-31; the 

Hon. Allen F. Bennett, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded with directions.

Counsel on

Appeal

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, 

Solicitor General, and Valerie Quinn, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel), for appellant.

Sharee S. Langenstein, of Murphysboro, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Welch and Goldenhersh concurred in the judgment and 

opinion.
- 2 - 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 The Illinois Department of State Police (Department), intervenor-appellant, appeals the 

denial of its petition to intervene as of right pursuant to section 2-408(a)(2) of the Illinois Code 

of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(2) (West 2012)). For the following reasons, 

we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Shelby County and remand, with directions, for 

further proceedings. 

¶ 2 In April of 2012, Marshall Bailey (Bailey) applied to the Department requesting a firearm 

owners identification card (FOID card). His application was denied because of a prior 

misdemeanor conviction for a crime involving domestic violence. On July 1, 2014, Bailey 

petitioned the circuit court pursuant to section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card 

Act (FOID Act or Act) (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2012)) to remove his legal disability to possess 

a firearm, restore his civil rights to possess a firearm, and direct the Department to issue him a 

FOID card. The petition was served only on the Shelby County State’s Attorney (State’s 

Attorney), as required by section 10(b) of the FOID Act (430 ILCS 65/10(b) (West 2012)). 

¶ 3 On August 7, 2014, Bailey, his counsel, and the State’s Attorney appeared before Judge 

James L. Roberts for a hearing on Bailey’s petition. On that date, Bailey’s attorney was not 

prepared to go forward and moved for a continuance. The State’s Attorney did not object, and 

the continuance was granted. The circuit court directed Bailey’s counsel to coordinate a new 

hearing date with the State’s Attorney. 

¶ 4 The next day, August 8, 2014, the Honorable Allen F. Bennett entered an order granting 

Bailey’s petition. The introductory language in the order indicated that it was issued after the 

circuit court had considered the common law record, the comments and arguments of counsel, 

and all of the evidence. The record, however, does not support this preliminary language, as 

there is no indication that a hearing was actually held. There also is no transcript or docket 

entry that reflects the appearance of counsel or any type of bystander’s report. Therefore, we 

are left with little insight regarding the proceedings that occurred before the court. 

Nevertheless, the judgment issued on August 8 removed Bailey’s legal disability from owning 

and possessing a firearm, restored his civil rights to own and possess a firearm, and directed the 

Department to issue Bailey a FOID card. The circuit court found that the circumstances 

regarding Bailey’s criminal conviction and his criminal history, as well as his reputation, were 

such that he was not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, and that granting the 

relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest. 

¶ 5 On Monday, September 8, 2014, the Department, which had not been named as a party in 

the circuit court proceedings, filed a petition to intervene as of right pursuant to section 

2-408(a)(2) of the Code. The Department claimed that it should be allowed to intervene, 

having satisfied all the requirements set forth in the statute (735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(2) (West 

2012)). 1 More specifically, the Department first claimed that its interests had not been 

adequately represented, given that the State’s Attorney had not objected to Bailey’s petition. 

Second, because the Department was the entity bound by the judgment requiring it to issue a 

FOID card to Bailey, the Department argued that it had a direct interest in the proceedings. 

 

1The Department also based its petition to intervene as of right on section 2-1301(e) of the Code 

(735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2012)).
- 3 - 

¶ 6 In addition to the petition to intervene as of right, the Department concurrently filed a 

motion to vacate the circuit court’s judgment pursuant to section 2-1301(e) of the Code (735 

ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2012)). In both the petition to intervene as of right and the motion to 

vacate, the Department contended that federal law, namely the Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012)), prohibited Bailey from owning, possessing, or transporting a 

firearm because of his prior domestic violence conviction, even though it was a misdemeanor. 

The Department alleged that the court had exceeded its lawful authority under sections 10(b) 

and 10(c)(4) of the FOID Act (430 ILCS 65/10(b), (c)(4) (West 2012)), which were in effect at 

the time Bailey filed his petition. Therefore, the Department argued that the circuit court was 

forbidden from entering the judgment overriding the federal disqualification that prohibited 

Bailey from receiving a FOID card. 

¶ 7 On October 28, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing regarding the Department’s petition 

to intervene as of right. During that hearing, the Department reiterated the arguments raised in 

its petition. Bailey argued that the Department’s petition should be denied because the 

Department lacked standing to intervene under Braglia v. McHenry County State’s Attorney’s 

Office, 371 Ill. App. 3d 790 (2007). Bailey also contended that the Department was not a 

necessary party to Bailey’s petition, as section 10 of the FOID Act (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 

2012)) did not require that the Department be notified of Bailey’s petition. In particular, Bailey 

asserted that under Williams v. Tazewell County State’s Attorney’s Office, 348 Ill. App. 3d 655 

(2004), it was the State’s Attorney, not the Department, that was the proper party to make an 

objection to Bailey’s petition. Finally, Bailey argued that the Department’s petition should be 

denied because it was filed 31 days after the circuit court’s judgment was entered and was, 

therefore, untimely. 

¶ 8 After considering the arguments of counsel, the court found that the Department’s petition 

was untimely, as it had been filed 31 days after the final judgment had been entered. The court 

also found, based upon its “personal position,” that it was the State’s Attorney, not the 

Department, that “should have the final say” as to whether or not the petition should be 

granted, and the State’s Attorney had not filed an objection to Bailey’s petition. Accordingly, 

the court denied the Department’s petition to intervene as of right. The Department has 

appealed the court’s order. 

¶ 9 ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 At the outset, we note that the Department filed a motion for leave to cite additional 

authority. Bailey filed no response. Therefore, the Department’s motion is granted. We next 

consider the arguments raised herein. 

¶ 11 The Department contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying its petition 

to intervene as of right under section 2-408(a)(2) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(2) (West 

2012)) when it ruled that the petition was untimely, and that the State’s Attorney was the only 

entity entitled to voice an objection to the issuance of a FOID card. Bailey argues that the 

Department lacks standing to appeal and urges us to support the trial court’s finding that the 

Department’s application for intervention was untimely and that the Department’s petition to 

intervene failed to meet the requirements of section 2-408(a)(2). We disagree. 

¶ 12 Our analysis begins with whether the Department has standing to appeal the denial of its 

petition to intervene as of right, as it was not a party to the original proceedings on July 1, 2014, 

when Bailey filed his petition for the issuance of a FOID card. A state agency has standing to 
- 4 - 

file an appeal in an action in which it has a direct, immediate, and substantial interest in the 

outcome, even if it was not originally named as a party. See In re O.H., 329 Ill. App. 3d 254, 

257-58 (2002); see also Odle v. Department of State Police, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶ 24.

Further, a party not named in an original action has nonparty standing to appeal if it believes 

that an order entered by the trial court exceeds its authority under the law. See In re Detention 

of Hayes, 321 Ill. App. 3d 178, 190 (2001). 

¶ 13 Bailey argues that the Department lacked standing to appeal because the State’s Attorney 

was the only necessary party pursuant to section 10 of the FOID Act. In support of his 

argument, Bailey relies on Braglia v. McHenry County State’s Attorney’s Office, 371 Ill. App. 

3d 790 (2007). In Braglia, the definitive issue was whether the Department was a necessary 

party to section 10 proceedings and, therefore, whether the state agency had standing to appeal 

an order directing it to issue a FOID card. Braglia acknowledged that our Illinois Supreme 

Court has held that “a state officer may appeal from an order in proceedings to which he or she 

was not a party when he or she has an interest that is direct, immediate, and substantial and that 

would be prejudiced by the judgment or would benefit from reversal.” Braglia, 371 Ill. App. 3d 

at 795. In its consideration of whether the Department had a substantial interest in the outcome 

of the section 10 proceedings that required the Department to issue a FOID card, the Braglia

court portrayed the Department’s acts and obligations in administering the FOID Act as 

“ministerial.” Braglia, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 795. As a result of this characterization, the Braglia

court held that the Department was not entitled to nonparty standing, as it had no direct, 

immediate, or substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Braglia, 371 Ill. App. 3d 

at 795. The Braglia court also noted that the Department had made no claim that the circuit 

court exceeded its statutory authority by requiring the Department to issue plaintiff a FOID 

card. Braglia, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 796. Therefore, the Braglia court denied the Department 

standing to appeal. Braglia, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 796. 

¶ 14 Recently, this court in Odle v. Department of State Police, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, 

allowed nonparty standing where the Department had a direct and substantial interest in the 

outcome of the proceedings, even though it had not been named a party. In Odle, the petitioner,

Joshua Odle, pled guilty to one count of battery. In exchange for this plea, additional charges 

involving crimes of domestic battery and aggravated battery of a child were dismissed. 

According to Odle, he was promised by the State’s Attorney that if he pled guilty to the battery 

offense, his FOID card would not be revoked. Subsequent to Odle’s plea, the Department 

revoked Odle’s FOID card based upon the battery conviction. Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 

140274, ¶ 1. The Department based its revocation on the fact that there was evidence, 

including statements from the victims and photographs of the bruising, that Odle had beaten 

his five-year-old son on the buttocks. Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶¶ 8, 10. Odle filed a 

petition pursuant to section 10 of the FOID Act. Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶ 11. The 

trial court overruled the Department’s revocation and ordered the Department to issue Odle a 

FOID card. Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶ 13. The Department then filed a motion to 

vacate the trial court’s order, which was denied. Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶ 15. The 

Department appealed and the issue then became whether the Department had standing to 

pursue its appeal of the denial of its motion to vacate. Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, 

¶¶ 16, 23. As in Braglia, the controlling principle of law was whether “[a] state agency ha[d] 

standing to file an appeal in a case in which it ha[d] a direct and substantial interest in the 

outcome even if it was not named as a party.” Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶ 24. We 
- 5 - 

concluded that where the trial court’s order had reversed the decision of the Department, and 

directed the Department to issue a FOID card, the Department had standing to pursue an 

appeal. Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶ 24. 

¶ 15 The Odle reasoning equally applies to Bailey. The Department has a direct and substantial 

interest in the outcome of the circumstances herein because it has been ordered to issue Bailey 

a FOID card, even though the court exceeded its statutory authority in requiring the issuance of 

a card. The Department, therefore, should be granted nonparty standing to pursue this appeal, 

as the Department has a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the appeal, namely 

whether Bailey will, or will not, be allowed to possess a firearm. 

¶ 16 Bailey’s reliance on Braglia to support his contention that the Department has no right to 

nonparty standing is simply injudicious in light of the 2013 amendments to the FOID Act and 

our reasoning in Odle. Braglia was decided prior to the 2013 amendments to the FOID Act. At 

the time of the Braglia decision, the circuit court had the authority to override the 

determination by the Department to deny the issuance of a FOID card. In other words, the 

circuit court could remove a federal firearm disqualification from an applicant. In 2013, the 

FOID Act was amended, and, as a result thereof, the circuit court no longer had the statutory 

right to require the issuance of a FOID card where the applicant would otherwise be prohibited 

under federal law from possessing a firearm. See 430 ILCS 65/10(b) (West 2012) (as amended 

by Pub. Act 97-1131, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013)); see also Coram v. State of Illinois, 2013 IL 

113867, ¶ 101 (Burke, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.) (in dicta, four justices of 

our Illinois Supreme Court found that the 2013 amendments to the FOID Act make clear that 

the circuit court no longer has authority to remove a federal firearm disability). In fact, the 

Odle court specifically held that, “[a]s amended, section 10 [of the FOID Act] requires courts 

to find that granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.” Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 

140274, ¶ 33.

¶ 17 Although the 2013 amendments did not resolve the issue of whether the Department was a 

necessary party to section 10 proceedings, we do believe that the amendments have more 

clearly defined the Department’s role as the gatekeeper of the FOID Act. Since 2013, it is 

difficult to imagine how the Department’s enforcement of the Act could be characterized as 

“ministerial,” as the responsibility of the Department to protect the citizens in Illinois is 

substantial. Ensuring that FOID cards are not issued to individuals who “are not qualified to 

acquire or possess firearms, firearm ammunition, stun guns, and tasers within the State of 

Illinois” promotes the public safety. 430 ILCS 65/1 (West 2012). Therefore, in light of the 

foregoing, we hold that the Department has a direct and substantial interest in proceedings 

brought pursuant to section 10 of that Act and, further, has an interest in the outcome of any of 

the proceedings brought pursuant to that Act. 

¶ 18 Turning to the issue of timeliness, the Department filed its petition to intervene as of right 

pursuant to section 2-408(a)(2) of the Code. Section 2-408(a)(2) states, “(a) Upon timely 

application anyone shall be permitted as of right to intervene in an action: *** (2) when the 

representation of the applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the 

applicant will or may be bound by an order or judgment in the action ***.” (Emphasis added.) 

735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(2) (West 2012). The statute has no language that defines “timeliness” for 

purposes of filing a petition under this section. See 735 ILCS 5/2-408 (West 2012). Therefore, 

the determination of whether a petition to intervene has been timely filed is left to the 

discretion of the trial court. In re Estate of Mueller, 275 Ill. App. 3d 128, 140 (1995). 
- 6 - 

Generally, while a party may not seek to intervene after the rights of the original parties have 

been determined, and a final decree has been entered, a petition to intervene may be considered 

timely even after a final judgment has been entered, where it is necessary to protect the 

interests of the intervenor. See Winders v. People, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 15 (under the 

circumstances, the Department’s petition for intervention was timely even after a final 

judgment was entered); see also Redmond v. Devine, 152 Ill. App. 3d 68, 73-75 (1987) 

(intervention timely sought 20 months after entry of a final judgment); People ex rel. Baylor v. 

Bell Mutual Casualty Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 17, 21 (1971) (application for intervention allowed by 

the court almost two months after the entry of a final order). Other factors to be considered for 

determining timeliness include consideration of when the intervenor first became aware of the 

litigation, the amount of time that elapsed between initiation of the circuit court proceedings 

and the filing of the petition to intervene, and the reason for failing to seek intervention at an 

earlier date. Freesen, Inc. v. County of McLean, 277 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72 (1995). 

¶ 19 Here, the court decided that the Department’s petition to intervene had not been timely 

filed. The circuit court failed to consider the fact that the Department was not aware of Bailey’s 

petition until after the entry of the August 8, 2014, judgment. As noted previously, the 

legislature has not required that the Department be notified of such a petition under the FOID 

Act. See 430 ILCS 65/10(b) (West 2012). Therefore, the Department was not able to seek 

intervention at an earlier date because it did not have notice that Bailey’s petition had been 

filed. Once the Department became aware of the circuit court’s judgment, it acted diligently by 

filing its petition to intervene as of right within 31 days. Therefore, in construing the 

intervention statute liberally, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion when it found 

that the Department’s petition to intervene was not timely filed. 

¶ 20 We also note that even if the statute contained a 30-day requirement for filing, the 

Department’s petition to intervene as of right would have been timely. The thirtieth day after 

the circuit court entered its judgment fell on Sunday, September 7, 2014. The Statute on 

Statutes provides that when the last date for filing a motion falls on a Sunday, that date “shall 

*** be excluded” from the computation of time. 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2012). The court here 

did not exclude that Sunday date in its computation. Accordingly, even if there had been a 

30-day requirement for filing, the Department’s petition to intervene as of right would have 

been timely filed. 

¶ 21 Having concluded that the Department had standing to appeal, and that the Department’s 

petition to intervene as of right was filed timely, we address, finally, Bailey’s contention that 

only the State’s Attorney had the right to object to the issuance of the FOID card, and that the 

Department had no right to intervene. As discussed previously, intervention as of right requires 

a showing that the representation of the applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be 

inadequate, and the applicant will or may be bound by an order or judgment in the action. 735 

ILCS 5/2-408(a)(2) (West 2012). While the party petitioning for intervention as of right need 

not have a direct interest in the pending suit, it must have an interest beyond that of the general 

public. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 57-58 (2002). Therefore, when 

a party petitions for intervention as of right, section 2-408(a)(2) limits the court’s analysis to a 

determination of the timeliness of the application, whether there has been inadequacy of 

representation, and the sufficiency of the applicant’s position in the proceedings. Citicorp 

Savings of Illinois v. First Chicago Trust Co. of Illinois, 269 Ill. App. 3d 293, 298 (1995); 735 

ILCS 5/2-408(a)(2) (West 2012). If these threshold requirements are met, then, under the plain 
- 7 - 

meaning of the statute, the petition to intervene shall be granted. City of Chicago v. John 

Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 127 Ill. App. 3d 140, 144 (1984). 

¶ 22 The intervention statute is remedial in nature and, as such, should be construed liberally. 

Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Safway Steel Products, Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2004); see also 

Winders v. People, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 13. The decision to allow or deny intervention 

based upon the factors set forth in section 2-408(a)(2) will not be overturned on review absent 

an abuse of discretion. Ramsey Emergency Services, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 367 

Ill. App. 3d 351, 365 (2006). An application of impermissible legal criteria, however, justifies 

reversal. Rosen v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 372 Ill. App. 3d 440, 448 (2007). 

¶ 23 The precise issue raised by Bailey was recently decided in Winders v. People, 2015 IL App 

(3d) 140798. The facts in Winders are almost identical to those raised by this appeal. In 2013, 

Winders applied to the Department for a FOID card, which the Department denied. Winders, 

2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 4. In November 2013, Winders then petitioned the circuit court for 

reversal of the Department’s decision, alleging he met the requirements of section 10 of the 

FOID Act. Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 5. The State’s Attorney did not object to 

Winders’ petition. Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 6. The circuit court, after a hearing, 

granted Winders’ petition and issued a judgment on April 7, 2014, ordering the Department to 

issue Winders a FOID card. Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 6. On July 11, 2014, 

approximately three months after the trial court’s entry of the judgment, the Department filed a 

petition to intervene as of right pursuant to section 2-408(a)(2) of the Code (735 ILCS 

5/2-408(a)(2) (West 2012)), as well as a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code (735 

ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 7. The Department 

claimed that Winders had two criminal convictions which, under federal law, prohibited 

Winders from possessing a firearm. Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 9. On September 9, 

2014, the circuit court held a hearing on the Department’s petition. Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 

140798, ¶ 9. Counsel for the Department argued that the State’s Attorney had not adequately 

represented the Department’s interests. Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 9. The trial court 

denied the Department’s petition to intervene, finding that it had been filed untimely. Winders, 

2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 10. The remaining basis for denying the petition was unclear from 

the record. 

¶ 24 The case before us raises the same issues as Winders. We have already decided the issue of 

timeliness and held that the Department’s petition to intervene was timely filed. We then 

consider Bailey’s argument that the State’s Attorney was the only person who could voice an 

objection under proceedings brought pursuant to the FOID Act. The court, in the transcript of 

proceedings, agreed with Bailey. In doing so, the court erred on the mistaken belief that the 

State’s Attorney is the only officeholder who can object to a petition filed pursuant to section 

10 of the FOID Act. 

¶ 25 While it is true that under the FOID Act, only the State’s Attorney is given notice of the 

proceedings brought to obtain a petitioner’s FOID card (430 ILCS 65/10(b) (West 2012)), this 

does not mean, however, that only the State’s Attorney can speak for all branches of 

government. Bailey’s argument suggests that the State’s Attorney represents the interests of 

the Department. Such is not the case. While the interests of the Department of State Police and 

the office of the State’s Attorney may overlap, each agency has distinct responsibilities to the 

public. This is why we are curious that the legislature has not seen fit to include the Department 

in the circuit court proceedings, even as a nominal party, or provide the Department with notice 
- 8 - 

of the proceedings. It would be disingenuous to argue that the Department does not have an 

interest greater than that of the general public. It is the Department that “is tasked with the 

administration of the FOID card program and must ensure compliance with federal and state 

law.” Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 16. Nevertheless, here, as in Winders, the circuit 

court erred by denying the Department’s petition to intervene as of right. Again, the record 

contains no indication that the State’s Attorney represented the interests of the Department, 

given that it did not file an objection to Bailey’s petition.

¶ 26 Finally, we have also concluded that the Department had a direct and substantial interest in 

the proceedings and was bound by the outcome thereof. More specifically, the court required 

the Department to issue Bailey a FOID card simply because it believed that the State’s 

Attorney was the sole voice that could object to a petition filed under the Act. The court’s order 

is devoid of any factual findings that justify the basis for its order. Section 2-408 requires that 

when its requirements are met, intervention shall be allowed. As described herein, the 

Department satisfied all of the requirements of section 2-408(a)(2), and the court erred when it 

denied the Department’s petition to intervene as of right. 

¶ 27 Before concluding, we take this opportunity to discuss the FOID Act and the ramifications 

this court has observed as a result of the 2013 amendments. Members of the criminal justice 

system have failed to recognize that a trial court can no longer require the issuance of a FOID 

card when faced with a conviction involving domestic violence. See 430 ILCS 65/10(b) (West 

2012) (the circuit court “shall not” issue an order directing the Department to provide an 

applicant with a FOID card where the applicant is “otherwise prohibited from obtaining, 

possessing, or using a firearm under federal law”). It does not matter if a plea is involved or if 

the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor. The severity of the crime is irrelevant; rather, it is the 

nature of the crime that is germane. Further, it is not important whether the criminal conviction 

is for a misdemeanor that contains the words “domestic violence.” A simple “battery”

conviction may suffice for the decision to revoke a FOID card based on the underlying 

circumstances. See Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274. The Department has the obligation to 

investigate the circumstances of the crime, as it did in Odle, and determine whether the 

criminal actions involved violence of a domestic nature. “The rationale behind this prohibition 

is that people convicted of crimes based on acts of domestic violence pose a danger to 

members of their families ***.” Odle, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶ 36. 

¶ 28 Perhaps our legislature should have considered requiring that the Department be named as 

a nominal party in a section 10 proceeding involving a request for the issuance of a FOID card. 

Alternatively, our lawmakers could have required that the Department be given notice of 

circuit court proceedings pursuant to section 10 of the FOID Act. Regardless of whether any 

action is taken to address the complexities brought about by the 2013 amendments to the FOID 

Act, it is now clear that the Act does not allow FOID cards to be issued to individuals who have 

been convicted of crimes that involve domestic violence. 

¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, the court’s order of August 8, 2014, is reversed in its entirety, 

and the Department’s petition to intervene as of right is granted. The Department is granted the 

same rights as if it was an original party to the proceeding. This matter is remanded to the 

circuit court with directions that the Department be granted leave to file its motion to vacate 

instanter. On remand, the circuit court shall consider the Department’s motion to vacate the 

August 8, 2014, judgment. 
- 9 - 

¶ 30 Reversed and remanded with directions.