[Cite as Brown v. Ohio Dept of Rehab. & Corr., 2013-Ohio-4207.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Frank C. Brown, Jr., : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 12AP-891 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-03120)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 26, 2013 

 

Frank C. Brown, Jr., pro se. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and James P. Dinsmore, 

for appellee. 

 

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio. 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Frank C. Brown, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the 

Court of Claims of Ohio granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Ohio 

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("appellee" or "ODRC"), on all claims 

asserted by appellant. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} Appellant filed an amended complaint (hereinafter "complaint") on 

March 25, 2011, alleging that ODRC's employees wrongfully destroyed his property which 
No. 12AP-891 2 

he claimed consisted of legal materials pertaining to ongoing litigation.1 Appellant alleged 

that the conduct of destroying this property, three boxes of legal materials and a 

typewriter, was "willful, wanton, deliberate, intentional, malicious and in reckless 

disregard of [his] rights." (Amended Complaint, 6.) The complaint also alleged that, due 

to appellee's conduct, he has "suffered great mental and emotional distress, anxiety, 

humiliation, pain and suffering" and has been forced to spend unnecessary time and 

money. (Amended Complaint, 6.) Additionally, the complaint alleged that appellant's 

ability to pursue his legal proceedings was impaired. Appellant sought compensatory 

damages in the amount of $1 million against appellee jointly and/or severally. 

{¶ 3} According to appellant's complaint, after being instructed to condense 

property he had previously stored in Unit Manager Kelly Mason's office, he condensed his 

belongings from five boxes down to three and placed the boxes in a storage room in 

Mason's office. Approximately two weeks later, appellant was again told he was storing 

property in excess of that permitted by ODRC policy and that the excess property needed 

to be either mailed home or destroyed. The complaint specifically states appellant's 

response to the request was, "I am not going to mail it to anyone nor throw any of it 

away." (Amended Complaint, 4.) Appellant alleges he was denied the opportunity to 

speak to a supervisor and that his request that photos be taken of the property that was to 

be destroyed was also denied. After the excess materials remained, ODRC employee 

Sergeant Leonard Gilliam ordered three boxes of material and a typewriter to be 

destroyed by being thrown in an "institution trash compactor." (Amended Complaint, 5.) 

Appellant filed an informal complaint against the employees for this conduct. 

{¶ 4} The parties engaged in discovery, and on July 11, 2012, appellee filed a 

combined motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for summary judgment. 

Appellant moved for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading which the trial 

court granted and extended the time to respond to August 31, 2012. Appellant also 

requested additional time to conduct discovery. This request was denied. On August 29, 

 

1 The complaint lists the various cases, courts, and case numbers to which the legal documents allegedly 

pertained. 
No. 12AP-891 3 

2012, appellant sought a second extension of time to respond to the motion for summary 

judgment which was denied by the trial court. On September 11, 2012, approximately two 

weeks past the deadline of August 31, 2012 and prior to the trial court's ruling on the 

motion, appellant filed a responsive pleading to the motion for summary judgment. 

{¶ 5} During the pendency of the case, appellant filed, on October 27, 2011, an 

"IMMEDIATE REQUEST AND MOTION FOR IMMUNITY AND JURISDICTIONAL 

DETERMINATION PURSUANT TO RC 2743.02(F)." Upon order of the court, appellant 

provided an immunity determination list containing the names of individuals for which 

he sought an immunity determination. 

{¶ 6} On September 17, 2012, the trial court granted appellee's motion for 

summary judgment. In its judgment entry, the trial court concluded appellant's claim for 

retaliation was a claim requesting relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 over which it lacked 

jurisdiction. With respect to the remaining claims, the trial court concluded the property 

appellant alleged was improperly destroyed was not organized or kept in a manner so as 

to be in compliance with ODRC's policies pertaining to an inmate's personal property. 

Therefore, based on the affidavits submitted by the parties, the trial court concluded the 

destroyed property constituted contraband that appellant was not entitled to possess and 

of which ODRC cannot be held liable for the loss. 

{¶ 7} The court set forth the contents of Mason's and Gilliam's affidavits in its 

decision as follows: 

Mason avers: 

1. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this 

Affidavit and am familiar with the underlying facts of this 

lawsuit. Morevoer, I have personally reviewed [defendant's] 

records regarding [plaintiff]. 

2. I am employed by [defendant] as a Unit Manager at [LoCI]. 

I have held that position for approximately eight years. I 

manage the daily operations of housing units assigned to me 

at LoCI, which includes managing all staff and inmates 

assigned to those housing units. 

3. [Plaintiff] is an inmate in the custody of [defendant] and is 

currently incarcerated at the Madison Correctional Institution 

(MaCI). However, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, 
No. 12AP-891 4 

[plaintiff] was incarcerated at LoCI in one of the housing units 

that I managed. 

4. I am familiar with and trained to implement [defendant's] 

policy regarding the storage and handling of inmate personal 

property, which includes legal materials. 

a. Attached to this Affidavit as Attachment 1 is a true and 

acute copy of [defendant's] Policy No. 61-PRP-01 that governs 

inmate personal property. The purpose of this policy is to 

establish policy and procedures regarding authorized personal 

property items for inmates. This policy defines inmate 

personal property as any item, not issued by [defendant], 

which the inmate has received permission to possess and 

provides that inmates are not permitted to possess state and 

personal property in excess of 2.4 cubic feet. 

b. Attached to this Affidavit as Attachment 2 is a true and 

accurate copy of [defendant's] Policy No. 59-LEG-01 that 

governs inmate access to court and counsel. The purpose of 

this policy is to establish guidelines that ensure that inmates 

have adequate access to courts, attorneys and legal research 

materials. Pursuant to this policy, inmates are permitted to 

possess a reasonable amount of general and personal legal 

materials, which shall be maintained within the inmate's 

overall 2.4 cubic feet property limitation described in 

[defendant's] Policy No. 61-PRP-01. This policy defines 

personal legal materials as those documents that pertain to 

active litigation to which the inmate is a party. In addition, 

this policy requires that all excess legal material, including 

inactive case files, must be either mailed out of the institution 

at the inmate's expense or otherwise disposed of by the 

inmate. Finally, this policy requires inmates to keep legal 

materials organized by title and case number and to provide a 

list of the active litigation upon request. 

c. Attached to this Affidavit as Attachment 3 is a true and 

accurate copy of [defendant's] Administrative Rule 5120-9-55 

that governs contraband. This rule defines minor contraband 

as items possessed by an inmate without permission where 

1) the location in which these items are discovered is 

improper; 2) the quantities in which an allowable item is 

possessed is prohibited; 3) the manner or method by which 

the item is obtained was improper; or 4) an allowable item is 

possessed by an inmate in an altered form or condition. 
No. 12AP-891 5 

d. Attached to this Affidavit as Attachment 4 is a true and 

accurate copy of [defendant's] Administrative Rule 5120-9-33 

that governs inmate packages and property restrictions. This 

rule states that contraband, as defined in [defendant's] 

Administrative Rule 5120-9-55, includes personal property 

that exceeds the inmate's overall 2.4 cubic feet property 

limitation described in [defendant's] Policy No. 61-PRP-01. 

5. On March 9, 2009, I gave [plaintiff] a direct order to 

remove five boxes of his personal property that he had stored 

in my office, but he refused to comply with my order. 

6. Although, in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, plaintiff alleges 

that I cursed at him during our March 9, 2009 interaction, I 

did not make the statements he alleges that I made. 

7. On March 10, 2009, [plaintiff] came to my office and 

removed the five boxes of his personal property with the 

assistance of another inmate and took them in his cell for 

storage. As a result, his personal property now exceeded his 

2.4 cubic feet property limitation that he is allowed under 

[defendant's] Policy 61-PRP-01 and the excess property was 

deemed contraband pursuant to [defendant's] Administrative 

Rules 5120-9-33 and 5120-9-55. 

8. Although, in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, [plaintiff] 

alleges that he made a list of his active cases during our 

March 9, 2009 interaction, I did not witness him make such a 

list and he did not provide me with such a list. 

9. On March 23, 2009, I called [plaintiff] to my office and 

ordered him to remove his excess personal property from his 

cell as it exceed[ed] the 2.4 cubic feet property limitation 

provided for by [defendant's] Policy No. 61-PRP-01. I gave 

[plaintiff] a direct order to either mail the excess property 

home or to label the active legal materials in accordance with 

[defendant's] Policy No. 59-LEG-01, but [plaintiff] refused to 

comply with my order. Consequently, I instructed Sergeant L. 

Gilliam to go through [plaintiff] personal property with him 

and to reduce it to the 2.4 cubic feet limit set by [defendant's] 

Policy 61-PRP-01. 

10. Although, in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the Complaint, 

[plaintiff] alleges that I cursed at him during our March 23, 

2009 interaction, I did not make the statements he alleges 

that I made. 
No. 12AP-891 6 

11. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, I acted * * * in 

accordance with my official duties as a Unit Manager on 

behalf of [defendant], and I did not act with malicious 

purpose, [or] in bad faith * * *. 

Gilliam states: 

1. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this 

Affidavit and am familiar with the underlying facts of this 

lawsuit. Moreover, I have personally reviewed [defendant's] 

records regarding [plaintiff]. 

2. I am employed by [defendant] as a Correctional Counselor 

at [LoCI]. I have held that position for approximately 24 

years. 

* * * 

4. I am familiar with and trained in [defendant's] policy 

regarding the storage and handling of inmate personal 

property, which includes legal materials. 

5. On March 23, 2009, Unit Manager K. Mason instructed me 

to reduce [plaintiff's] personal property to 2.4 cubic feet per 

[defendant's] Policy No. 61-PRP-01. At that time, plaintiff 

selected what items he wanted [to] keep in his cell. In 

addition to providing him with one standard 2.4 cubic foot 

locker box per [defendant's] policy for the storage of his 

personal property, [defendant] also provided [plaintiff] with a 

second 2.4 cubic foot locker box to store his active legal 

materials. [Plaintiff's] remaining property that did not fit into 

the two locker boxes was deemed contraband pursuant to 

[defendant's] Administrative Rules 5120-9-33 and 5120-9-55. 

However, pursuant to [defendant's] Policy No. 59-LEG-01, 

[plaintiff] was given the opportunity to remove and label any 

active legal materials from his personal property that 

exceeded the two locker boxes of storage, but he refused to do 

so. In addition, [plaintiff] was also given the option of mailing 

his excess property outside of the institution. 

6. Although, in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Complaint, 

[plaintiff] alleges that I cursed at him during our March 23, 

2009 interaction, I did not make the statements he alleges 

that I made. 
No. 12AP-891 7 

7. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, I acted * * * in 

accordance with my official duties as a Correctional Counselor 

on behalf of [defendant], and I did not act with malicious 

purpose, [or] in bad faith ***. 

(Sept. 17, 2012 Entry, 2-6.) 

{¶ 8} The court determined that appellant failed to dispute Mason's and Gilliam's 

denial of acting maliciously in their dealings with him and determined that the employees 

acted pursuant to their duties and the policies of ODRC with regard to the storage and 

preservation of inmate property. Thus, the trial court held the property at issue 

constituted contraband that appellant had no right to possess, and appellee could not be 

held civilly liable for the loss of such property. The court also held that, to the extent 

appellant was asserting that Gilliam and Mason were not entitled to immunity, his 

assertion was meritless. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 9} Appellant timely appealed and asserts three assignments of error for our 

review: 

I. The trial court erred when it failed to properly and 

accurately review and construe the complaint and relief as 

requested as filed by plaintiff. 

II. The trial court erred when it failed to grant plaintiff 

additional discovery pursuant to and in accordance with Civil 

Rule 56(F) to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

III. The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment 

for defendant and failed to grant summary judgment for 

plaintiff pursuant to Civil Rule 56(C) and granted defendants 

qualified immunity. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 A. First Assignment of Error 

{¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court failed to 

properly and accurately review his complaint. Specifically, appellant challenges the 

portion of the trial court's decision framing appellant's complaint as containing an 

allegation that ODRC destroyed his property in retaliation for his filing of litigation and 

that he requested relief to deter and dissuade ODRC from retaliating against him in the 
No. 12AP-891 8 

future. According to appellant, this characterization is in error because "[a]t no time or 

anywhere in [his] complaint did he plead retaliation or requested relief for retaliation." 

(Appellant's Brief, 7.) 

{¶ 11} As quoted previously in this decision, it is not precisely clear what specific 

causes of action are being asserted. However, the complaint does request an order for 

appellee to "immediately remove all the frivolous, retaliatory conduct reports levied 

against [him] in reprisal." (Amended Complaint, 7.) Thus, to the extent appellant's 

complaint could be construed as alleging a claim for retaliation, the trial court's 

conclusion that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims is a correct statement 

of law. Guillory v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-861, 2008-Ohio2299, ¶ 12 (retaliatory claims are not a category of claims actionable in the court of 

claims). Moreover, to the extent it can be said the trial court erred in construing 

appellant's complaint as containing a claim for retaliation, such error is of no consequence 

in this instance because the trial court's grant of summary judgment to appellee was not 

based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but, instead, was based upon the conclusion 

that ODRC could not be held liable under the circumstances presented herein. 

{¶ 12} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error. 

 B. Second Assignment of Error 

{¶ 13} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for leave to conduct additional discovery. Here, appellant sought 

leave to discover the following: 

1. All informal complaints filed against defendants in 5 years 

for destroying legal work. 

2. Copy of digital video from dates of 03-09, 03-10, 03-11, 03-

23, and 03-24 of 2009 which Brown requested be preserved. 

(See Ex. #1.) 

3. E-mails of Sgt. Roy Kelly, to Lo.C.I. to Sgt. Cappadonna, 

Man.C.I. in reference to sending Brown his legal material. 

4. All records from transportation which show/depict the 

transfer of said legal material from Man.C.I. to Lo.C.I. in 10-

08. 
No. 12AP-891 9 

(Motion for Leave to Conduct Additional Discovery, 1.) 

{¶ 14} Absent an abuse of discretion, the denial of a Civ.R. 56(F) motion will not be 

reversed. ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Roush, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-457, 2005-Ohio1763, ¶ 23. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment. It 

implies that the court's exercise of discretion was unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶ 15} Civ.R. 56(F) provides: 

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 

motion for summary judgment that the party cannot for 

sufficient reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 

justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 

application for judgment or may order a continuance to 

permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may 

make such other order as is just. 

{¶ 16} Thus, Civ.R. 56(F) requires the party seeking a continuance to submit an 

affidavit stating sufficient reasons why the party cannot present facts essential to justify 

the party's opposition to the summary judgment motion. Roush at ¶ 22; Bozeman v. 

Wendy's Internatl., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-112 (Aug. 21, 2001), quoting Gates Mills 

Invest. Co. v. Pepper Pike, 59 Ohio App.2d 155 (8th Dist.1978), paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Simply requesting a continuance in order to conduct discovery is not a sufficient 

explanation for why a party cannot present affidavits in opposition to the motion for 

summary judgment. Id.

{¶ 17} In the case before us, appellant failed to submit an affidavit in support of his 

Civ.R. 56(F) motion and failed to put forth any substantive reason why more time or 

discovery was needed before responding to appellee's motion for summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's Civ.R. 56(F) 

motion. 

{¶ 18} Consequently, we overrule appellant's second assignment of error. 

 C. Third Assignment of Error 

{¶ 19} In his third assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court's 

decision granting summary judgment in favor of appellee and contends summary 
No. 12AP-891 10 

judgment should have been granted in his favor. Additionally, appellant contends the 

trial court erred in finding that Gilliam and Mason were entitled to qualified immunity. 

{¶ 20} Our review of the granting of summary judgment is de novo. Stevens v. 

Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-1015, 2013-Ohio-3014, ¶ 10, citing 

Cashlink, LLC v. Mosin, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-395, 2012-Ohio-5906, ¶ 14. Pursuant to 

Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of 

evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate only under 

the following circumstances: (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, 

(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the 

evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to 

but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party. Stevens at 

¶ 11, citing Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1978). 

{¶ 21} In its motion for summary judgment, appellee asserted it could not be held 

liable for the loss of property at issue because such property constituted contraband that 

appellant had no right to possess in the institution. In support, appellee submitted the 

affidavits of Gilliam and Mason which established appellee's policies regarding inmate 

property.2 According to the evidence presented by appellee, inmates are not permitted to 

possess more than 2.4 cubic feet of combined state and personal property unless 

specifically authorized to do so pursuant to rule. Property in excess of these limitations is 

deemed contraband subject to disposal. Additionally, ODRC Policy 59-LEG-01 permits 

inmates to possess a reasonable amount of legal materials that must be maintained within 

the inmate's overall 2.4 cubic foot limitation. Said policy also requires that legal materials 

be organized by title and case number and that a list of active cases be produced upon 

request. The policy requires that all excess legal material be either mailed out of the 

institution or otherwise disposed of by the inmate. 

 

2 The policies at issue were attached to the affidavits. 
No. 12AP-891 11 

{¶ 22} According to the affidavit of Mason, she ordered appellant to remove the 

five boxes of property from her office. Though initially refusing to do so, appellant 

ultimately did remove the property and take it to his cell for storage. Mason's affidavit 

states she instructed Gilliam to assist in the removal of the excess property, deemed 

contraband, from appellant's cell. Additionally, Mason ordered appellant to remove and 

label any active legal material from his personal property and gave him the option to mail 

the excess property out of the institution. Appellant refused to do both. In their 

affidavits, both Gilliam and Mason denied acting in bad faith or with a malicious purpose. 

{¶ 23} In opposition, appellant submitted his affidavit, as well as affidavits from 

several other inmates. The affidavits from the inmates indicated, inter alia, that they 

witnessed appellant reduce his property from five to three boxes, the destruction of the 

three boxes, and verbal "tirades" instructing appellant not to discuss the matter with 

anyone other than "the inspector." Appellant averred in his affidavit that he presented 

case lists to staff, that the documents destroyed had the appropriate notations on them, 

and that "[a]ll documents in [his] possession now comports to DRC Policy 59-LEG-01." 

(Appellant's Affidavit, 1.) 

{¶ 24} Appellant did not dispute, and essentially admitted, many of the assertions 

made in the affidavits of Mason and Gilliam. For example, in his complaint, appellant 

admitted that he was given the opportunity to condense his property, as well as the 

opportunity to preserve it by mailing it out of the institution. Additionally, as the trial 

court noted, though appellant averred he labeled the documents and provided case lists as 

requested, his affidavit provides no indication of when such acts occurred. Further, 

whether or not appellant "now comports" with appellee's policies is irrelevant with respect 

to the documents in question. 

{¶ 25} Based on the above, the trial court determined the evidence in the record 

established the property at issue was contraband that appellant was not entitled to 

possess, and, as such, appellee could not be held liable for the loss of such property and 

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Triplett v. S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 10th Dist. 

No. 06AP-1296, 2007-Ohio-2526, ¶ 7 (a facility must exercise ordinary care in handling 

and storing an inmate's property; however, a correctional institution cannot be held liable 

for the loss of contraband property that an inmate has no right to possess). Hence, the 
No. 12AP-891 12 

trial court concluded appellee met its burden under Civ.R. 56, but appellant failed to meet 

his reciprocal burden and establish a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the issue 

of liability. 

{¶ 26} After a de novo review, we conclude appellant failed to present sufficient 

evidence to create an issue of fact regarding whether the destroyed property was 

contraband and whether appellee could be liable for the loss thereof. Accordingly, we 

conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. 

{¶ 27} Appellant also challenges the trial court's rejection of appellant's position 

that Gilliam and Mason were not entitled to civil immunity. As stated by the trial court, 

R.C. 9.86 provides, in part: 

[N]o officer or employee [of the state] shall be liable in any 

civil action that arises under the law of this state for damage 

or injury caused in the performance of his duties, unless the 

officer's or employee's actions were manifestly outside the 

scope of his employment or official responsibilities, or unless 

the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad 

faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. 

{¶ 28} Accordingly, the trial court determined Gilliam and Mason were entitled to 

immunity, pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F), because their action in destroying the 

contraband was consistent with their duties and because "[appellant] failed to dispute 

Mason and Gilliam's averments that they did not act maliciously in dealing with 

[appellant]." (Entry, 7.) 

{¶ 29} Appellant takes issue with the fact that the trial court determined Gilliam 

and Mason were entitled to civil immunity because the motion for summary judgment 

filed by appellee did not raise the issue of immunity. However, it was appellant who 

requested the court to make such determination in his pleading of October 27, 2011 and 

his subsequent immunity determination list filed February 15, 2012. Furthermore, the 

trial court did not grant summary judgment on immunity grounds, but on its 

determination that the character of the property at issue was contraband and disposed of 

pursuant to policy. 
No. 12AP-891 13 

{¶ 30} For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in 

granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, and we overrule appellant's third 

assignment of error. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 31} Having overruled all of appellant's asserted assignments of error, we hereby 

affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio. 

Judgment affirmed.

TYACK and O'GRADY, JJ., concur. 

_____________________________