* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10487

Conference Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PAT ERVIN ARNOLD,

 Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:95-CR-001-A

- - - - - - - - - -

(October 19, 1995)

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pat Ervin Arnold argues that the district court erred in

applying the money-laundering guideline (U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1),

rather than the mail-fraud guideline (§ 2S1.1), in calculating

his 115-month sentence under the grouping rules of the Sentencing

Guidelines. "Review of sentences imposed under the guidelines is

limited to a determination whether the sentence was imposed in

violation of law, as a result of an incorrect application of the
No. 95-10487

-2-

sentencing guidelines, or was outside of the applicable guideline

range and was unreasonable." United States v. Matovsky, 935 F.2d

719, 721 (5th Cir. 1991). Legal conclusions by the district

court are reviewed de novo and findings of fact are reviewed for

clear error. United States v. Patterson, 962 F.2d 409, 416 (5th

Cir. 1992)(legal conclusions); United States v. Pope, 871 F.2d

506, 509 (5th Cir. 1989) (superseded in other part by statute)

(factual findings). Determinations of whether and how to group a

defendant's offenses are legal conclusions, "as they involve `a

purely legal interpretation of Guidelines terminology and the

application of that terminology to a particular set of facts.'" 

Patterson, 962 F.2d at 416.

Arnold argues that grouping under the money-laundering count

was improper because the telemarketing operation did not involve

"money laundering . . . in the strictest sense of the term." The

district court did not err in grouping Arnold's offenses and

determining that the money-laundering offense level was

applicable. See United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1183-86

& n.5 (5th Cir. 1995).

Arnold also argues that counsel's ineffective assistance in

a previous New York conviction deprived him of a concurrent

sentence and that the district court erred in not departing

downward because of this fact. Absent an error of law as to the

district court's authority to do so, the decision not to depart

downward is not reviewable on appeal. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1185 &

n.3.
No. 95-10487

-3-

In addition, only when the record is sufficiently developed

will this court resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel on direct appeal. United States v. Rosalez-Orozco, 8

F.3d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 1993). The record is not sufficiently

developed. As the record stands, we "can only speculate on the

basis" for defense counsel's decisions regarding Arnold's

sentence. See United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 314 (5th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1075 (1988). Thus, we AFFIRM

the decision of the district court, without prejudice to Arnold's

right to challenge the effectiveness of counsel in a 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 motion. See United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1573

n.4 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1113 (1995), and

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1825 (1995).

AFFIRMED.