* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-10802

Summary Calendar

EDWARD LEE MILLER, JR

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

THE WAYBACK HOUSE; AL RICHARD; PERCY WILSON; ANGIE WHITE

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas 

USDC No. 3:05-CV-1838

Before GARWOOD, GARZA, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Edward Lee Miller, Texas prisoner #646559, filed a civil rights complaint

against the halfway house where he resided while on parole, The Wayback

House (WBH), and WBH personnel, Al Richard, Percy Wilson, and Angie White.

Miller alleged that Richard, Wilson, and White acted with deliberate indifference

to his medical needs when they failed to provide the mental health treatment

that he requested for bipolar disorder and depression. When he took an

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 7, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-10802

2

authorized leave from the WBH Miller failed to return to the facility. As a

result, his Texas parole was revoked. Miller alleged that the revocation resulted

from the lack of treatment. Miller additionally alleged that the staff refused to

refer him to the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation in

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Miller sought punitive

and compensatory damages against WBH, Richard, and Wilson, as well as

punitive damages against White. Finding that a judgment in Miller’s favor

would undermine the validity of the parole revocation, the district court

dismissed Miller’s complaint with prejudice to being reasserted until Miller met

the requirements of Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). 

Itis unclear whether the district court dismissed Miller’s complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A dismissal as frivolous under

section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while a dismissal for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is

reviewed under the same de novo standard as a dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6). Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997); Black v. Warren, 134

F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998). This court will review the dismissal under the

more strict de novo standard. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir.

2005) (reviewing dismissal of complaint de novo where the district court referred

to three different statutes with different standards of review when making the

dismissal).

Miller failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against

cruel and unusual punishment. Prison officials violate this prohibition when they

demonstrate deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, which

constitutes an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S. Ct.

285, 291 (1976). Miller alleged that, around November 2003, he told Richards, the

Executive Director of WBH, that“his state of mind was challenging and had a problem

of rational thinking.” Although Miller suggested that Richards may not have believed

Miller, Richards referred Miller to Wilson, Miller’s counselor and case manager. Miller
No. 06-10802

3

then alleged that, some time in November, he asked Wilson for a referral to a state

mental health agency, which Wilson allegedly denied. Miller admitted that he already

had an appointment for a psychological examination for later in November 2003,

however, and that Wilson knew ofthe appointment. These allegations show that WBH

personnel, to the extent that Miller vaguely informed them of his alleged mental

health needs, provided treatment for him, although perhaps not the treatment Miller

would have liked. A prisoner’s disagreement with prison officials regarding medical

treatment does not give rise to a section 1983 cause of action. Varnado v. Lynaugh,

920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). A disagreement does not constitute an Eight

Amendment violation because it does not necessarily indicate that the prison officials

have been deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.

The district court dismissed Miller’s complaint because itfound that a judgment

for Miller would put into question the validity of Miller’s parole revocation. Heck v.

Humphrey requires that, when a favorable section 1983 judgment will call into

question the validity of the fact or duration of confinement, including parole, the

plaintiff must “prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus.” 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372; see Littles v. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles

Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Heck to proceedings calling into

question the fact or duration of parole). It is not entirely clear whether Miller’s parole

revocation would be invalidated if he were successful in pursuing his claims. In any

event, this is inconsequential because, as previously discussed, Miller’s complaint

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under the Eight Amendment. 

Furthermore, although Miller asserts “mistreatment under American with

Disability Act[,] 42 U.S.C. § 12132,” he has failed to brief the issue and has, therefore,

abandoned it. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

Miller additionally argues that the magistrate judge (MJ) who reviewed the

instant matter engaged in judicial misconduct because the MJ also presided over

Miller’s federal habeas action, giving him “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
No. 06-10802

4

facts, dates and occur[re]nces.” This argument is without merit because Miller has

failed to show that the MJ had any personal extrajudicial bias or knowledge that

harmed Miller’s case. See United States v. MMR Corp., 954 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (5th

Cir. 1992).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Miller’s

complaint.

AFFIRMED