U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

34–923 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

S. HRG. 114–810 

THE U.S. ROLE AND STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE 

EAST: THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.govinfo.gov 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LESTER MUNSON, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee .................................................. 1 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland .................................... 2 

The Right Honourable David Miliband, President and Chief Executive Officer, 

International Rescue Committee, New York, NY .............................................. 5 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 7 

Dr. Michel Gabaudan, President, Refugees International, Washington, DC ...... 13 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 16 

Nancy Lindborg, President, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 19

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 20 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Response of David Miliband to Question Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine ...... 45 

(III)

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

(1) 

THE U.S. ROLE AND STRATEGY IN THE 

MIDDLE EAST: THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Johnson, Gardner, Perdue, 

Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee 

will come to order. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here. Nancy, as I 

understand it, is tied up in traffic and will be coming in in a few 

moments. So we are going to go ahead and get started. I know we 

have a vote a little bit later on. We want to make sure that we get 

the full benefit of your testimony. 

But I want to thank the members for being here. 

Today’s hearing is the second in a series of hearings examining 

the role of the United States in the Middle East. This hearing will 

focus on the immense humanitarian crisis emanating from the region. The images of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and 

children fleeing for safety should challenge every moral fiber within 

us. These are people just like us that want only to be able to raise 

their families in dignity and cherish the same values and things 

that we all care about. And yet, we watch them on television in 

these desperate circumstances. 

We all know the scale of this tragedy, but it is worth again outlining the numbers. In Syria, in a country with a population of 22 

million in 2011, more than 4.1 million have fled the country and 

more than 7.6 million are displaced inside the country. So half of 

Syria’s population is not at home, not living in their hometowns 

but in some other place. 

Some estimates put the number of deaths in Syria at over 

300,000—people have different estimates—with the Assad regime 

being responsible for over 100,000 civilian deaths. Let me say that 

one more time: The Assad regime is responsible for over 100,000 

civilian deaths. 

In Iraq, 8.6 million are in need of humanitarian assistance and 

3.2 million are displaced. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

2 

Solutions must address why people are fleeing. I look forward to 

hearing the views of our witnesses today. 

Nancy, welcome. You did not miss anything actually. 

But I believe that after 4 years of war there is a perception that 

there is no light at the end of the tunnel. As Assad continues to 

barrel bomb his own people, the Russians and Iranians continue to 

ensure that he has the means to do it. 

More than 1 year after establishing a global coalition to counter 

ISIS, we learned that the main beneficiary, Iraq, has allowed Iran, 

Russia, and Syria to establish their own coalition within a coordination cell in Baghdad. It now appears that our administration is 

seriously debating some type of an accommodation with the Russians in order to fight ISIS. 

It is difficult to understand how working alongside the backers 

of Assad could in any way stem the flow of refugees who are fleeing 

the barrel bombs. It is important to remember that the war in 

Syria began with Assad, and he is still doing the same things today 

on a daily basis that he was doing at the time. 

I do want to digress and say I know that David Miliband took 

a very opposing view to most of the Labour Party when he at one 

time served in the Parliament and felt that interaction inside Syria 

should be taking place by Great Britain. Many of us felt the same 

way, and as crass as it may sound, I think all of us—all of us— 

today as we watch what is on television and see these refugees and 

the circumstances they are in—all of us are reaping what we 

sowed. We did not get involved at a time when we could have made 

a difference. 

I hope our witnesses can help us understand the scale and effect 

of the humanitarian crisis and what steps the United States and 

others should be taking to mitigate it. 

But I would like to again stress that we cannot simply rely on 

humanitarianism alone in this crisis and that it is incumbent upon 

us to work toward realistic policies that would bring back the hope 

of a normal life to those in need. 

Thank you again for appearing before our committee, and I look 

forward to your testimony. 

And with that, I would like to turn to our distinguished ranking 

member. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, first let me thank you for 

convening this hearing. This committee works in a bipartisan way 

in order to advance our foreign policy objectives, and I congratulate 

the chairman for his leadership in that regard. You and I talked 

a while back as to what we can do. We talked about what we can 

do in regards to the refugee crisis globally, but we recognize that 

Syria is an immediate concern, it is a humanitarian crisis, and 

there is a conflict there that needs a solution. It is complicated, of 

course, by ISIS’s presence in Syria. 

So I want to thank you for the manner in which we were able 

to convene this hearing to see how the United States Senate and 

Congress can advance the goals of the United States in dealing 

with this international crisis, how we can take a look at our tradiFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

3 

tional tools and perhaps refine them, and look at new ways that 

we can energize the United States involvement in the international 

community to deal with the humanitarian crisis. And I would agree 

with you. We also need to deal with the political underpinnings of 

why people have to flee their homes. 

For the first time since World War II, almost 60 million people 

have been forced from their homes and displaced in their own 

countries or forced to flee abroad. We are seeing more and more 

conflicts that do not end and result in exponential increases in humanitarian needs. The magnitude of the Syrian disaster is perhaps 

the most shocking. As the war enters its 5th year, the situation is 

increasingly desperate for both the refugees and host countries like 

Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and northern Iraq. 

Because Syrians are finding it increasingly difficult to find safety, they are being forced to move further afield. That is why so 

many are risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean. There are 

currently some 4 million Syrian refugees plus another 7.6 million 

internally displaced Syrians suffering and in need of humanitarian 

assistance. More and more families are forced to send their children to work or marry off their young daughters, just to survive. 

It is hard to comprehend the impact of millions of refugees on 

Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. The number of refugees in Lebanon 

would be equivalent—by percentage of their population—to the 

United States receiving 88 million new refugees. That is a shocking 

number for that country. Turkey has already spent $6 billion in direct assistance to refugees in its care. That is a huge part of the 

Turkish economy. At the same time, we in the West, until very recently, have been reluctant to admit even the most vulnerable Syrian refugees. While contributing generously to humanitarian funding, the United States has only accepted about 1,500 Syrian refugees, although the White House recently announced it would admit 

10,000 Syrians. 

We know that the Syrian humanitarian disaster, which has destabilized an entire region, is not the accidental byproduct of conflict. It is instead one result of the strategy pursued by the Assad 

regime. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria has 

documented that the Assad regime is using barrel bombs, intentionally engages in the indiscriminate bombardment of homes, hospitals, schools, and water and electrical facilities in order to terrorize the civilian population. As millions of families are displaced 

multiple times and, as the chairman pointed out, with the casualty 

numbers now approaching 300,000, the number of people fleeing 

the country will only rise. 

Mr. Chairman, I agree with you. The ultimate solution here is 

for Assad to leave. We know that we need to have Assad out and 

I believe he should leave for The Hague to be held accountable for 

his war crimes. So we need to work on a political solution. I know 

the President is in New York today meeting with world leaders to 

talk about a political path forward, but in the meantime, we do 

have the humanitarian crisis and there is no end in sight for the 

people trying to flee. As you said, what everyone wants is a safe 

environment for their families. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

4 

In Iraq, the number of people requiring humanitarian assistance 

has grown to 8.2 million people. Three million have been forced 

from their homes. Half of the displaced are children. 

To the south, Yemen is on the brink of humanitarian catastrophe. That country was particularly vulnerable even before this 

conflict. And now civilians throughout the country are facing an 

alarming level of suffering and violence. An estimated 21 million 

people are afflicted by the war and require humanitarian assistance; 1.5 million people have been forced from their homes and are 

now living in empty schools or other public buildings or along highways. 

The global refugee trends are indeed alarming. The international 

assistance being provided is not keeping up with the scale of the 

problem. The United Nations have been able to raise only 38 percent of the $7.4 billion it says it needs to care for the Syrians. We 

need to ask ourselves hard questions about how we can increase 

the effectiveness of the assistance. 

And now protracted crises seem to be a new normal, with many 

refugees displaced for 17 years on average. Let me just underscore 

that point. Our refugee program is aimed at looking at refugees as 

being temporary, and figuring out how we get them back safely to 

their homes. That is what a refugee was always thought to be. But 

if you are in some other place for 17 years, the chances of you going 

back to your native country is remote. In Syria, some of the communities no longer even exist. And many others have been transformed to such a point that it would not be safe anytime in the 

near future for the Syrians to be able to return to their homes. 

We need to rethink our refugee laws to recognize that a large 

number of refugees are not going to return to their native countries. And the United States needs to look at a refugee policy that 

is sensitive to the new norm and that deals with the realities that 

people need to find new homes for their families. 

I believe strongly we need to use humanitarian and development 

dollars more skillfully so that we are providing durable and development-like solutions to chronic vulnerability. 

In closing, we must recognize that as these conflicts proliferate, 

no corner of the world will be left unaffected. We must recommit 

ourselves to work smarter and harder to assist the world’s most 

vulnerable people. As we seek to win the hearts and minds in this 

region, our efforts to provide real, tangible humanitarian assistance 

to the people most affected by this conflict will be more effective 

than sending more military assistance or more weapons into a conflict where there is no pathway for success. Our humanitarian engagement is a moral and political necessity, and I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses as to how we can be more effective in 

dealing with the humanitarian crisis and hopefully addressing the 

causes of why people need to flee their homes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. And thanks for a lifetime 

of effort ensuring people have appropriate human rights. 

Senator CARDIN. Can I just add one thing, Mr. Chairman? Most 

people might notice that our chairman, who is always even-tempered and always in a good mood, is particularly proud today. He 

became a grandfather for the first time, and I know our committee 

offers him our congratulations. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

5 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. No doubt an incredible experience. 

And I only wish the people we are talking about today have similar 

experiences. 

So thank you again for your comments. 

Our first witness is The Right Honourable David Miliband, somebody we all respect, President and CEO of the International Rescue 

Committee. Mr. Miliband previously had a distinguished political 

career in the U.K. serving as Foreign Secretary. Thank you for 

being here. 

Our second witness today is Michel Gabaudan. Thank you for 

being here, sir. President of Refugees International. Michel spent 

more than 25 years at the UNHCR. Thank you for bringing that 

knowledge with you today. 

Finally, our third witness that we will hear from today is Ms. 

Nancy Lindborg, president of the United States Institute of Peace, 

someone who we also have seen many, many times, and we thank 

her. Nancy has served at USAID and as President of Mercy Corps. 

Thank you for that service. 

Thank you all for being here. I know you all have been here 

many times. If you could each spend about 5 minutes giving your 

positions—without objection, your written testimony will become a 

part of the record. And if you could just go down the line and give 

your testimony, we would appreciate it. We look forward to questions and certainly your comments. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE DAVID MILIBAND, 

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, NEW YORK, NY 

Mr. MILIBAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you probably 

heard, but I want to say thank you and that I am honored to be 

here. 

I want to congratulate you on not just holding a hearing on the 

humanitarian situation in the Middle East but recognizing the 

links between the humanitarian situation and the geopolitical situation. 

My organization, the International Rescue Committee, has, I 

think, a unique perspective on the crisis because we are working 

in the conflict zones of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. We are in the 

neighboring states that you referred to, both Senator Corker and 

Senator Cardin. We are in Greece on the Island of Lesvos where 

half of the refugees arriving in Europe are landing on European 

soil. And we are active in the United States resettling 10,000 refugees in 26 cities across this country every year. 

The roiling conflicts in the Middle East, as both of you have said, 

present the most challenging, dangerous, and complex humanitarian challenge in the world today. And I think they present a 

preeminent moral and geopolitical case for renewed American engagement. 

Conscious of your time constraints and the benefit of a genuine 

dialogue in the question and answer session, I want to confine my 

remarks to four areas that more or less follow my written testimony and focus less on our analysis of the situation but what 

might be done. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

6 

First, inside Syria, there is a war without law and there is misery without aid for the millions of people that you referred to, Senator. It is driving people to risk life and limb to get to Europe. And 

almost worse than the numbers you recited is that there is no 

structured political process at the moment to offer hope of an end 

to the war. 

The number one priority that we would present to the committee 

is to turn or help turn the words of U.N. resolutions, which are 

good words supported by all members of the Security Council, into 

actions that prevent death and destruction of civilians and their 

property by barrel bombs, car bombs, and mines. We advocate as 

a practical measure the appointment of humanitarian envoys by 

each of the permanent members of the Security Council, distinguished political or diplomatic figures who are able to work on the 

ground on the local access that is so essential to help the humanitarian aid that is being spoken of reach where it is needed. 

Second, the neighboring states, as you both said, are coping with 

unprecedented numbers of refugees. It is worth noting that a World 

Food Programme voucher is worth $13 a month for a family in Lebanon or Jordan, a middle-class family that has fled its home in 

Syria. 

For us, the priority must be for these neighboring states a 

multiyear strategic package that recognizes that these people are 

not going home soon. These refugees are not going home soon. In 

written testimony, we compare the package that is needed to the 

Marshall Plan, a multiyear plan which is not just an aid package 

but aligns private sector effort with public sector effort and addresses the economic conditions that people face not just the social 

conditions. 

Third, I am just back from Lesvos, the island in Greece where 

half of the refugees are arriving. I will not dwell on the responsibilities of European leaders and European citizens. Suffice it to say 

that they need to show both competence and compassion, both of 

which have been sorely lacking over the last few years. 

The three priorities in Europe are, first of all, to establish safe 

and legal roots to become a refugee in Europe. Without those safe 

and legal roots, you empower the smugglers who are currently 

charging 1,200 euros for the 6-kilometer boat trip across the Aegean. Secondly, to improve reception conditions, notably in Greece 

and on the routes into northern and western Europe. And thirdly, 

to implement a robust relocation plan within Europe to share the 

refugees between the different European states. 

Just finally, it is worth pointing out that European aid for the 

neighboring states does now exceed American humanitarian aid, 

and with the 1 billion euros that was announced last week at the 

European summit, that European lead, so to speak, which is currently $200 million will stretch to $1.2 billion. 

Finally, there is an important substantive and symbolic role for 

the United States in resettling refugees. IRC has been doing this 

for 80 years since Alba Einstein came to New York to found the 

organization in 1933. So far, just over 1,800 Syrians have been admitted, and with the greatest respect, the respect of someone who 

is a visitor to your country, even though I work here now but yet 

not a citizen, I would say that this 1,800 figure is not fitting for 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

7 

the global leadership role that the United States has played over 

a very long period in refugee resettlement. The administration’s 

commitment to take 10,000 citizens remains a limited contribution 

to the global effort. 

And we recommend three practical steps. 

One is to raise the ceiling, the number of Syrians who are allowed in. And in the course of the questions and answers, I hope 

we get to explain why the figure of 100,000 has been reached, 

100,000 refugees to be admitted over the next year, and how that 

speaks to the global need. 

Secondly, to fund that drive properly, including in the Department of Homeland Security where we strongly support effective security screening and can speak to that. 

And thirdly and something that has not had proper coverage I 

think is the scope for expanding access through family reunification 

schemes for Syrian American communities who are in this country 

across the country and have grandparents, cousins, relatives in 

Syria who want to come and join them. This is a DNA-based family 

reunification scheme that I think could offer a practical and shortterm way of circumventing some of the delays that have plagued 

the program. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful for this opportunity to 

speak with you. I deliberately curtailed my remarks and very much 

look forward to a real dialogue. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miliband follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE RT. HON. DAVID MILIBAND

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished Senators, I would 

like to thank you for your decision to hold this full committee hearing on the epic 

displacement crisis unfolding in Syria and the broader Middle East. For the purposes of my written and oral testimony, I will focus on Syria—the epicenter of the 

region’s humanitarian crisis—but am happy to take questions on other pressing 

emergencies in the region including Iraq and Yemen. 

There is urgent need for renewed international leadership in both resolving and 

responding to the Syrian crisis, and by necessity that means deep involvement by 

the United States (U.S.). The Syrian crisis has spilled onto the shores of Europe for 

two reasons: because of the magnitude of violence and threats to civilians in Syria, 

and because of the pressure in neighboring states. The mismatch between need and 

help for civilians, both in Syria and in the countries that surround it, is vast and 

growing. What was a civil conflict within one state has evolved into not just a 

regional human catastrophe of major proportions; it is also a defining geopolitical 

disaster for the Middle East. 

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has a unique vantage point from 

which to offer perspective on the crisis. IRC is working inside Syria; in the four 

major refugee receiving countries that surround it—Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey; on the island of Lesbos, which is the arrival point of over half of the hundreds 

of thousands of Syrians and people of other nationalities seeking asylum in Europe 

through Greece; and finally, IRC resettles refugees in 26 cities across the United 

States, including Syrians who have been given the opportunity to start their lives 

anew in this country. We witness the full arch of this crisis, from Aleppo to Beirut 

to Lesbos and Los Angeles. I hope to use the occasion of this testimony to pay tribute to the extraordinary efforts of IRC staff and our partner organizations, and 

highlight the vital contribution of aid workers from all the many organizations 

responding to the crisis in Syria, some of whom have paid with their lives. 

Attention to Syrian refugees has peaked in the last month, with stunning images 

in the news headlines of people floating at great risk to safety across the Mediterranean and literally walking across Europe in search of asylum. While not all of the 

asylum seekers are Syrian, they comprise the majority. Their sheer numbers and 

the perilous journey they take to escape suggest the Syria crisis is at a tipping 

point. IRC, amongst others, has long warned that the barbarism inside Syria, in 

which civilians are trapped in a war without law between government forces, the 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

8 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other parties to the conflict, would spill 

over. It has now done so in many ways, evident in the extreme pressure that 

hosting 4 million refugees has placed on neighboring states, in the connections 

between the conflict and displacement scenarios in Syria and Iraq, and finally in 

the onward journey out of the region to Europe. 

INSIDE SYRIA

The figures of death, destruction, and displacement in Syria are shocking. The 

brutal, seemingly endless violence that has consumed the country since 2011, spread 

across its borders, and sucked in weapons and fighters from across and beyond the 

region, has claimed at a minimum 240,000 lives (the number is widely believed to 

be twice this many) and left every second Syrian displaced. Satellite imagery reveals 

that just a fifth of Syria’s prewar lights remain on—such is the devastation wrought 

by shells, rockets and barrel bombs. In places like Aleppo, that figure is over 95 percent. Half the country’s population have abandoned their homes. 

There is a chasm between the needs of Syria’s civilian population and the help 

they are receiving. It continues to grow. Global contributions are not keeping pace 

with needs, which have grown twelvefold since the beginning of the crisis and more 

than 30 percent in the last year alone. While food, water, shelter, health care and 

sanitation services are desperately required, last year’s U.N. appeal to meet basic 

needs inside Syria was only 50 percent supported—down from 68 percent in 2013. 

Only 34 percent of need inside Syria in 2015 has been committed so far. 

The unanimous adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2139 (UNSCR 2139) 

in February 2014—no small feat given the intractable nature of the Syria issue on 

the Security Council—brought with it much needed hope for people in Syria and 

across the Middle East. In the resolution, the Security Council called for an urgent 

increase in access to humanitarian aid in Syria and demanded that all parties immediately cease attacks against civilians—including through the use of barrel 

bombs—and lift sieges of populated areas. In July and December 2014, the Security 

Council adopted two additional resolutions—2165 and 2191—which, among other 

things, authorized U.N. aid operations into Syria from neighboring countries without the consent of the Syrian Government. And yet, whereas 1 million people inside 

Syria required humanitarian assistance in 2011, that number now stands at 12.2 

million; among them some 7.6 million people forced to flee, but still trapped inside 

Syria’s borders. 

By blocking civilian movement, attacking aid convoys, kidnapping humanitarian 

personnel, and rejecting or miring in redtape official requests for access, the parties 

to the conflict are disrupting the delivery of lifesaving aid to 40 percent of those in 

need. All told, some 4.6 million people are currently languishing in areas defined 

by the U.N. as ‘‘hard-to-reach’’—an increase of more than 1 million from this time 

last year. Over 422,000 people are completely besieged, cut off from food, water, and 

medicine, their lifelines choked, and escape routes blocked. A key component of 

UNSCR 2139—protecting civilians against indiscriminate attacks—is still sorely 

lacking, with government forces’ increased use of barrel bombs, and opposition 

groups’ use of explosive weapons. 

IRC’s eight decades of work in the world’s war zones and disaster settings have 

not lessened the shock of what has befallen the Syrian people and their neighbors. 

However, what is even more shocking is the lack of a plan—or effort to create a 

plan—to bring the suffering to an end. It is humanitarians’ job to staunch the dying, 

but it is only political action that will stop the killing. The political will and diplomatic energy aimed at securing an end to the war—and minimizing the impact of 

the fighting on civilians—have ebbed to low levels. Yet the longer the conflict goes 

on, the worse the options become. It is not the place of a humanitarian organization 

like IRC to advocate on military tactics. However, we have an intense stake in not 

only seeing humanitarian assistance make it to everyone who needs it, but also in 

the causes of humanitarian distress being addressed. A policy that truly puts civilian protection at its heart would leverage all diplomatic and political channels to 

curb the violence and bring hope of an end to the war. 

‘‘Friends of Syria’’ meetings once drew more than 100 nations. Today, the forum 

has been hollowed out to a core of less than a dozen countries. Early Arab League 

proposals, former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s six-point plan, and the 

Geneva II conference of January 2014, yielded minimal results, but there was at 

least a sense of commitment and grim determination. There are a few developing 

efforts toward national reconciliation through the establishment of an ‘‘international 

contact group’’ and the efforts of U.N. Syria Envoy Staffan de Mistura. However, 

if political and diplomatic vigor is not placed into these processes over a sustained 

period of time (and against all odds), the crisis will further metastasize. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

9 

IRC would put forward the following recommendations to the committee and U.S. 

policymakers regarding the crisis in Syria: 

• Protect civilians. There is an urgent need for the U.N. Security Council to establish a mechanism to track and publically expose indiscriminate attacks by any 

means against civilians, including barrel bombs, car bombs and mines, as well 

as the use of besiegement, and to lay down clear consequences for violators. 

Ending aerial bombardments of civilian areas was highlighted by the U.N. 

Security Council in its resolutions: civilian protection means turning words into 

action. • Access the hard-to-reach and besieged. Increasing humanitarian access to those 

in need—particularly the hard-to-reach and besieged—requires constant and 

unabated attention at the highest levels. The U.S. and other countries with 

leverage on parties to the conflict need strongly and consistently to press the 

belligerents to allow unimpeded cross-border aid, and to allow aid to pass into 

or through conflict zones. Humanitarian Envoys—senior diplomats with the 

backing of their head of state—should be appointed by permanent members of 

the Security Council and regional players to focus relentless attention to 

humanitarian access and protection obstacles in Syria, and actively seek ways 

to address them through bilateral and multilateral channels. They would advocate for the full implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and would 

work in tandem with all relevant parts of the U.N. 

• Provide enough aid to meet need. The United States has been a leader in the 

humanitarian response to the situation in Syria. However, the funding provided 

simply is not keeping up with the ever-growing need for life-saving assistance. 

As long as the crisis goes on and the international community collectively fails 

to find a solution to it, ensuring humanitarian assistance is available to those 

whose lives have been shattered by this conflict is the minimum that we must 

do. 

SYRIA’S NEIGHBORS

It is not only Syrians themselves who have borne the brunt of the country’s conflict, but the neighboring countries which now host over 4 million refugees. In exile 

for years now, with their economic and personal assets long depleted, Syrian refugees live on the margins and are in desperate need of food, water, shelter, and education. There is often reference to ‘‘refugee camps’’; but the vast majority of Syrians 

are not in camps. In Lebanon most live in decrepit dwellings or tented settlements 

that expose them to the elements and insecurity. In Jordan, tens of thousands of 

families live below the absolute poverty line. Rent accounts for more than half of 

refugees’ monthly expenses, forcing parents to send their children to work long 

hours for meager pay. A 2015 assessment found that 86 percent of Syrian refugees 

outside of camps in Jordan were living below the Jordanian absolute poverty line 

of $95 per person per month. 

The impact upon Syria’s neighbors of receiving such a massive influx of refugees 

cannot be overstated and they deserve great credit for their hospitality and sacrifice. 

Turkey has become the largest refugee-hosting country in the world, and last 

autumn put the cost of hosting Syrian refugees since April of 2011 at $4.5 billion— 

a figure that will have only grown in the last year. In Lebanon—a country with a 

host of preexisting tensions and no official government of its own—Syrians now constitute somewhere between a quarter and a third of the population, making it the 

highest per capita refugee hosting country in the world. The World Bank estimates 

that its basic infrastructure will need investment of up to $2.5 billion just to be 

restored to precrisis levels. Jordan, one of the most water-starved nations on the 

planet, hosts nearly 630,000 registered refugees; proportionally equivalent to the 

United States absorbing the entire population of the United Kingdom. The Jordanian Economic and Social Council has stated that the cost to Jordan per Syrian 

refugee is over $3,500 per year and the direct cost from the beginning of the conflict 

is expected to rise to $4.2 billion by 2016. 

The education of Syrian refugee children is probably one of the best illustrations 

of the strain that the influx has placed on surrounding countries and the failure of 

the humanitarian aid system to keep up. There are an estimated 400,000 children 

among the more than 1.1 million Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon. The ability 

of Lebanese schools to absorb these children has been limited by the scale of the 

task. Most have instituted second shifts to accommodate Syrian children. But in the 

2014–2015 school year, only 37 percent of Syrian refugee children ages 6–14 were 

enrolled in school. The Lebanese Education Minister recently announced a ‘‘Back to 

School’’ initiative—funded at $94 million by U.N. agencies and international 

donors—that will double the number of places for Syrian children to 200,000. This 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

10 

is welcome news, but leaves another 200,000 Syrian children out of school this year 

and on their way to becoming what is frequently referred to as a ‘‘lost generation.’’ 

International and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can continue to 

play an important role in providing educational opportunities to many of the Syrian 

refugee children who will not be reached by the ‘‘Back to School’’ program; they 

should not only be allowed, but vigorously encouraged and funded to do so. 

Refugee hosting countries’ public services, economies, and resources are creaking 

under this strain and their social fabrics are fraying. As a result, neighboring governments are now taking steps to restrict the flow of refugees into their territory 

with many of the formal and informal border crossings out of Syria often closed to 

civilians seeking safety. Hundreds of thousands of people are estimated to be living 

in camps on or near the borders of neighboring countries, unable to flee Syria. 

Increased and costly administrative regulations to renew residency permits have 

forced many families to live illegally and precariously. There are reports of refugees 

being forcibly repatriated to Syria, sometimes over missing papers and the space for 

refugees within the region—their ability to access essential services, or earn a living—is shrinking. Lebanon is cracking down on illegal work; Jordan has halted free 

health care. 

With the asylum space for millions on the line, it is stunning how poorly funded 

the U.N.’s humanitarian Regional Response Plan has been. It was just 64 percent 

funded in 2014, down from 73 percent in 2013. The current year seems to be shaping up for yet another decline, with only 45 percent funding as we head into the 

final quarter of 2015. As a result, some services are being scaled back, despite the 

growing need. For example, since the beginning of the year, the U.N.’s World Food 

Programme (WFP) has been forced to reduce the number of food voucher recipients 

in refugee-hosting countries from 2.1 million to around 1.4 million. Last month, 

229,000 of 440,000 Syrian refugees living outside camps in Jordan stopped receiving 

food vouchers from WFP. The value of food vouchers distributed to Syrian refugees 

in Lebanon has been slashed in half. The maximum voucher amount is now $13.50 

per person per month, down from $27 in 2014. 

With much less to feed their families, desperation among Syrian refugees is rising, forcing them into desperate measures—including begging, child labor, low-wage 

and unregulated labor, survival sex, early marriage and increased indebtedness. 

IRC would advocate that currently available resources be provided as much as possible through cash transfers, allowing refugee families to pay for rent, food, medical 

care and other urgent needs as access to public services is restricted and humanitarian aid programs continue to shrink. Another critical area of focus is vocational 

training for youth and creating livelihoods for Syrian families so they can support 

themselves. 

Finally, it is important to come to terms with the sobering fact that these refugees 

will not be returning home any time soon. Given international assistance has not 

been enough to meet the needs to date and is likely only to further diminish as this 

conflict drags on, it is of paramount importance that opportunities are made available for Syrian refugees to work in the countries to which they have been displaced. 

Employment laws in the region either leave Syrians to work illegally in the shadows—subject to exploitation and abuse—or best case in low levels of employment 

that are open to them. Not only is it a waste to let the human capital of these refugees go untapped, but allowing them to work is a key part of a strategy to make 

sure they thrive and contribute to the societies to which they have been displaced. 

IRC recommends the following in response to the influx of Syrian refugees into 

neighboring countries: 

• Aid: Increase international humanitarian assistance. There are challenges to 

getting aid to those who need it in certain parts of Syria, but there is no excuse 

for it not to reach those who manage to make it out. Providing this assistance 

ensures Syrian refugees who flee danger do not wind up in situations of abject 

poverty and exploitation. The U.S. has contributed $4.5 billion to the Syrian 

response over the course of the conflict—this assistance is vital and welcome, 

but it pales in comparison to the sheer scope of need generated by the crisis. 

The U.N. has called for $7.4 billion for 2015 alone. • Economics: Create a ‘‘Marshall Plan’’ for the region. After World War II, the 

Marshall Plan pulled Europe out of post-war devastation and laid the foundations for peace as well as prosperity. Public and private sector came together 

in an unprecedented drive. At that time the U.S. committed approximately $13 

billion, or 3 percent of GDP. The magnitude of the Syria Crisis necessitates a 

proportionate response. Whether by this name or another, the international 

community must coalesce around a large scale, multicountry economic plan to 

buttress the governments and communities hosting the lion’s share of Syrian 

refugees. Institutional and infrastructural support to ensure that these counFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

11 

tries can provide basic services like health care and education without buckling 

under the additional strain is a critical part of the mid-long term strategy to 

respond to the Syria crisis. This could be financed through public/private partnerships and serve as a framework to bring a wide array of actors along— 

including the Gulf State governments. The World Bank, U.N. Development Program, bilateral development donors and other international financial institutions should reorient their work to support the economies of conflict-affected 

states like Jordan and Lebanon to help them weather the shock. This type of 

large-scale support to governments is critical to maintaining the asylum space 

for refugees and ensuring that the events in Syria do not further destabilize the 

region. 

• Helping the Most Vulnerable: Take a ‘‘needs-based’’ regional approach to displacement. Iraqis internally displaced by chaos wrought by ISIS are living side 

by side with some 250,000 Syrian refugees. Effort must be made to provide support in these areas based on need—not displacement status—to ensure we do 

not end up in a situation with refugees receiving assistance while Iraqis in a 

similar or worse situation receive much less. This includes assisting the communities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region—one of the only safe places to flee—which 

are currently hosting a massive influx of people from their own country and 

their neighbor to the West. 

REFUGEE INFLUX INTO EUROPE

Given the dire scenario outlined above, it should not be surprising that refugees 

from Syria are risking life and limb to find asylum in Europe. The waves of people 

arriving on the shores of European member states have made a highly informed calculus on where their chances of survival are best and determined the perilous journey is their safest option. An estimated 477,000 people have arrived by sea in 2015, 

the vast majority of them in Greece. An estimated eight people a day die just among 

those traveling between Turkey and Greece, including children, which the world was 

so painfully reminded a few weeks ago when the photos of Aylan Kurdi surfaced 

in the world’s newspapers and social media. 

I just returned from visiting Lesbos, an island of 90,000 people where over half 

of all arrivals into Greece come ashore. In June, 200 refugees were arriving every 

day. When I visited the figure was 2–3,000 people a day. Last week the figure 

reached 6,000 on one day. IRC has established programs there to provide assistance 

in the form of clean water, sanitation, information services and transportation. Previously, families that had often arrived soaking wet and with few worldly possessions were walking the 40 kilometers north from their arrival points to register in 

the capital of Molyvos. Their ongoing journey, as we witness through dramatic 

images at train stations in Hungary and in the face of razor wire fences and tear 

gas on the borders of European Union (EU) member states, only becomes more 

fraught with obstacles. 

An estimated 84 percent of the people arriving in Europe are from the top ten 

refugee producing countries in the world, including Afghanistan where the IRC also 

has programs to address the ongoing humanitarian fallout from the conflict. However, Syrians represent 54 percent of the arrivals in Europe. Therefore, as the Syria 

crisis continues to uproot millions of people and asylum space in the broader Middle 

East closes, the arrivals to Europe will continue. It behooves European leaders to 

respond with both compassion and competence. This situation will continue to be 

a test of the strength of character of the EU as an institution and its ability to manage a complex crisis in the light vocal opposition on the part of a few member states. 

EU member states should: 

• Establish safe and legal options for refugees to come to Europe. Refugees will 

continue to fall prey to smugglers and face life-endangering options if more 

legitimate ones are not available to them. The tools are wide-ranging and 

should be maximized to increase opportunities for safe entry. These include: 

more proactively resettling refugees from the countries surrounding Syria; the 

flexible use of family reunification admission; increasing work and education 

visas; and private sponsorship schemes. 

• Improve reception conditions, particularly in Greece. Arriving refugees must be 

managed with dignity, especially in light of the circumstances they have already 

endured. The humanitarian response effort in arrival countries like Italy and 

Greece and countries of transit like Hungary and Croatia must be financially 

and technically supported by EU member states. The response, including rescuing people at sea, should be well-coordinated and information should be provided to arriving refugees on their options. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

12 

• Implement a robust and well-monitored relocation plan. The EU’s decision last 

week to relocate 120,000 refugees—on top of the 40,000 already agreed to— 

between member states should be done in an equitable fashion and every effort 

should be made to accommodate the wishes of refugees to be with family members. A proportional distribution plan should be followed to have an equitable 

split between member states. States should ensure refugees are integrated into 

their societies and that they live up to the commitments in the plan including 

those to housing and social services. When considering relocation of refugees to 

states that are reluctant to receive refugees or only receive a small population, 

liaison officers must be present to monitor adherence to asylum standards. 

Where refugee families are not housed together in the same country, they 

should be allowed to travel within the Schengen zone to visit their family members, relying on the fact that social support will only be available in the 

assigned country for the refugee (ensuring their return). The same standards 

of data protection that apply for all EU citizens should be carried out when biometric tracking is used with refugees to ensure human dignity and privacy. 

U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIANS

This brings us to the U.S. role in providing sanctuary to Syrian refugees. While 

the U.S. can and should encourage its European counterparts to respond to the refugee influx with fortitude and compassion, the best encouragement this country can 

offer is leading by example. To date, despite its relative leadership in providing 

humanitarian assistance to refugees from Syria, the U.S. has admitted just over 

1,800 refugees through its refugee resettlement program. This is a disappointingly 

low number for a country which has been the global leader in refugee protection 

since World War II and served as a beacon of hope to people around the world facing persecution and violence. 

Resettlement is a life-saving option to highly vulnerable families living on the 

margins of survival in places like Jordan or Lebanon. However, beyond its immediate value to individuals who have suffered so much, it is a signal of solidarity and 

shared responsibility to other countries that have absorbed the vast majority of Syrian refugees. While a number like 100,000—which is what the IRC recommends the 

U.S. take at a minimum in FY 2016 (see below)—is still only a small fraction of 

the total refugee population, its value is not lost on countries like Lebanon, a country of just 4 million which has absorbed over a million people in the last 4 years. 

The signal the resettlement number sends to these countries is a critical part of 

maintaining asylum space and provides the U.S. and European countries the credibility they need to encourage Syria’s neighbors to keep their borders open and 

improve conditions for those refugees who remain in the frontline states. 

During the last international Syrian resettlement pledging conference in December 2014, the U.N. Refugee Agency sounded the alarm bell when it said that roughly 

10 percent of the Syrian refugee population (400,000 people) were particularly vulnerable and needed to be resettled. This was set as a medium-term, multiyear 

benchmark. The U.S. has traditionally been the largest resettlement country in the 

world, possessing the geographic and population size as well as the know-how to 

absorb larger numbers than much smaller wealthy countries. As a result, it has traditionally taken at least 50 percent of all resettlement cases referred by the U.N. 

Refugee Agency. Given this tradition, the IRC is calling on the U.S. to provide resettlement for 100,000 Syrian refugees in the first year of a multiyear program, to 

ensure that the global community meets a goal believed necessary to save lives and 

stabilize the situation in the region. 

The IRC has long experience of resettling refugees across the U.S. Our annual figure is around 10,000. This is a country proudly built on the labor of refugees and 

immigrants. It is the same country that pulled together not too long ago in a massive effort to rescue over 1.2 million southeast Asian refugees through sheer force 

of political will when the circumstances demanded it. There is ample precedent for 

admitting and successfully integrating refugees on a much larger scale, when the 

political will and compassion is present. Large numbers of inquiries have flowed into 

IRC’s 26 field offices around the U.S. over the last several weeks from the American 

public ranging from ‘‘where do I send the collection we’ve taken at church?’’ to ‘‘how 

can I open my own home to a Syrian refugee family?’’ This is just one small reading 

that demonstrates the compassion and willingness to welcome that is present in 

American communities, and that people are hungry to live up to the principles that 

make this country great. 

The IRC strongly supports effective and efficient security screening for refugees 

entering the United States. Refugees are, in fact, the single most vetted population 

entering the country, and the U.S. Government has spared no efforts to continuFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

13 

ously improve security checks to safeguard the integrity of the program. There are 

ways that the administration can admit refugees in efficient and expeditious ways 

without compromising the integrity of security screenings. 

Finally, the U.S. has one untapped option to rapidly and safely increase Syrian 

resettlement: creating family reunification options for Syrian-Americans and other 

lawfully present Syrian immigrants. Many Syrians have a relative here in the U.S. 

who is desperate to take them in, just as Aylan Kurdi’s aunt in Canada was 

attempting to do. Currently, only Syrians who arrived to this country as refugees 

themselves are eligible to file for family reunification—a very small number considering just over 1,800 have been admitted to date. Syrian-Americans, many of whom 

immigrated to this country decades ago or were born here, are not eligible to apply 

for their families through the refugee program. We are not fully tapping into this 

option and are neglecting the opportunity to aid Syrian-Americans in bringing their 

family members to join them in safety in the U.S. These families would play a large 

role in helping Syrians integrate successfully here and moving them to self-sufficiency. 

The IRC recommends in regard to the resettlement of Syrian refugees in this 

country, the U.S. should: 

• Raise the U.S. refugee admissions ceiling to allow for at least 100,000 Syrian 

refugees to enter in FY 2016. The President should raise the overall U.S. resettlement ceiling to 200,000, allowing the space in the global program for 100,000 

Syrians without compromising the urgent protection needs of refugees from 

other troubled regions of the world. 

• Increase resources to make this happen. The agencies and offices that manage 

different components of the refugee resettlement process should be provided 

adequate resources to bring in additional Syrian refugees. This includes the 

Departments of State and Homeland Security, the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Health and Human Services Department, and other federal agencies that perform security checks. 

• Expand access to family reunification for Syrians with ties in the U.S. In order 

to make the 100,000 target feasible, the U.S. should expand opportunities for 

Syrian Americans and other Syrian immigrants lawfully residing in the U.S. to 

bring their family members to safety. It is time to think outside the box and 

use the tools that exist to expand the resettlement program to include family 

reunification. There is ample precedent for this approach, most recently for 

Iraqis, Haitians, and Central American minors. This is the single easiest, efficient and most cost-effective way to bring large numbers to safety. 

I thank you and the members of the U.S. Senate for the opportunity to provide 

IRC’s perspective on the complex humanitarian challenges facing people in the Middle East and indeed the rest of the world at this time. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHEL GABAUDAN, PRESIDENT, 

REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. GABAUDAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for 

holding this hearing. And we certainly subscribe entirely to the 

way you have both framed the question of the Syrian crisis. 

The chaos, distress, and drama we have seen on our screens over 

the past months are nothing but a reminder that we have collectively failed to respond appropriately to the needs of the victims of 

the conflict in Syria over the past year despite the tremendous 

amounts of funding that have been provided. And I want to thank 

the United States for being a leader in humanitarian funding to 

the Syrian crisis and certainly Congress for having made the right 

appropriations to grow humanitarian accounts of this country. 

RI has undertaken 12 missions over the past few years in all the 

countries holding Syrian refugees and ones inside Syria. We have 

looked at how displacement has evolved, how the situation of refuFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

14 

gees has changed over time, and unfortunately how the funding 

has been drying up. 

The drivers of displacements are multiple from the actions of the 

Shia militias at the beginning. We all remember the images of 

Homs and Hama, to the development of tremendous military operations by the Assad regime, to the rise of extremist groups, but also 

to the tremendous deteriorating socioeconomic situation in Syria 

which makes life unsustainable for many people who had to cross 

outside to find some ways to sustain themselves. 

However, today when you talk to refugees in southern Turkey, 

in Jordan on what is the primary reason why they move, they all 

had the same answer. It is the barrel bombings over markets, over 

schools, over medical facilities. Another NGO has reported that the 

month of August saw the largest number of medical personnel 

killed by these shellings and barrel bombs. 

The response to the crisis in neighboring countries has been, I 

must say, remarkable. We have seen very few crises in the world 

where borders have remained open for so long, where governments 

have accepted the refugees spread out among the population. There 

are very few refugees in camps. Most refugees are living in an 

urban setting mixing with the local population. Services have been 

accessible to refugees. National services of medical and schools 

have been accessible to refugees. And quite remarkably in all the 

interviews we had with refugees, there is a rather low reporting of 

abuses by authorities. This is not something we experience in many 

places where refugees seem to be targeted much more than we 

have seen. And I think we all have to recognize that Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraqi Kurdistan has done tremendous 

work in welcoming refugees. 

The international response has adjusted to the urban nature of 

the refugee situation. However, that urban nature creates some 

particular challenges because the impact of refugees on host communities is much stronger than when you have refugee camps 

which are easier to manage. And we are seeing now that there is 

some erosion of the tolerance of the local population when they see 

the schools overburdened, access to medical facilities being dependent on very long queues, the price of rents for apartments or whatever they find where they can live going up and up and up, and 

even the price of basic food commodities, et cetera going up. So 

there is an impact on the local population that after 4 years starts 

to generate reactions of rejections or at least tensions with the refugee community. 

The humanitarian needs remain because many refugees are poor. 

What we have seen over time is refugees being pushed from poverty to misery. More begging is happening from Istanbul to Amman 

and on the border cities. There are children working because as the 

parents are not allowed to work, they do send their children to 

work. It is easier for children to work legally than for adults. We 

have seen lowering of the age of early marriage for women, which 

is a way for families to try to get some funds, and we see an increase in what we call sex for food and basically the trading of 

young ladies to just be able to feed their family. All these are absolutely the trappings of the pauperization of the refugee population. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

15 

There were not many indications that people wanted to move 

until the end of 2013. When we talked to people in the first years, 

they said we go back to Syria as soon as we can. It is only at the 

end of 2013 that the mood started changing. In 2014, they mostly 

moved through Egypt and Libya trying to get the smuggler’s boat 

to Italy, with the sort of disasters we have seen and tremendous 

amount of risk for them. But the numbers remain sort of tolerable 

perhaps compared to what we have seen in 2015 where smugglers 

moved their route through Greece, probably making it much cheaper and therefore bringing a much higher number of people who 

wanted to leave. 

The poverty they have suffered, as their own resources were depleted over time, is certainly a main factor. For many people, the 

lack of education for children is also a motive for trying to move 

forward to Europe. But also, as I mentioned, the fact of their welcome is drying up. Governments now realize that they have a huge 

amount of people that are getting poorer and poorer and being like 

a lead ball on their own developments. And local populations, as 

I said, are starting to react, and we had riots in different countries 

against the refugees. That outflow will not stop because either the 

Europeans get their act together, which we hope they will, and 

then more people try to leave or it stays as it is now. And we have 

seen the difficulties they have faced to date have not really 

staunched the flow. So unless we go back to the root causes, which 

is how we address the situation of refugees in first asylum countries, I think the regional instability will keep on. 

We have to look at increasing support to humanitarian funds. It 

is true that funds have been available over the years in larger 

quantities, but they have not kept up with the needs. And actually 

what we have seen over the past year is a proportion of the U.N. 

appeals that have been funded has gone down and key services like 

education, et cetera, have been actually cut. In Jordan, food rations 

have been cut by half in the last few months. We have to maintain 

support to humanitarian needs, and we look certainly forward to 

U.S. leadership in this field. 

But we need to activate a much stronger response to the development needs of neighboring countries. Most of the challenge they 

face cannot be dealt by humanitarian agencies. They need development money. They need bilateral aid, but the key drivers of big development are the development banks. The High Commissioner has 

done due diligence in trying to approach the banks, but I think it 

is time to look at ways for the governing bodies of these banks to 

put this sort of situation as part of their regular mandate. It is not 

just a question of humanitarian response. It is a question of guaranteeing the stability of the neighboring countries to Syria. And I 

think this is why we see now these host countries becoming extremely nervous. 

Resettlement is important because it offers an orderly way of 

leaving the country. However, even with the highest number we 

can dream of, it is going to touch a small percentage of the refugees 

and it cannot leave us neglecting the needs on development that 

are humanitarian. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, we hear that there are some attempts to reinvigorate the peace process. We have always believed 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

16 

that there was no real military solution to the conflict and that 

some peace had to be negotiated. I think it is very important that 

the people who come to the negotiating table must make a much 

stronger commitment to protection of civilians. Then we must see 

a stop to the barrel bombings, et cetera, if we want to be able to 

talk to people that are going to be credible in the peace process by 

the refugees. If this does not happen, we will not see at any time 

any possibility of return. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gabaudan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHEL GABAUDAN

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Corker, Ranking Member 

Cardin, and the members of this committee for holding this important hearing 

today. Refugees International (RI) is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that 

advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people in some of the 

most difficult parts of the world. RI does not accept any government or United 

Nations funding, which allows our advocacy to be impartial and independent. 

Based here in Washington, we conduct 12 to 15 field missions per year to research 

displaced populations. Our ongoing reporting on the Syrian crisis includes my recent 

trip to Turkey to look at both cross-border assistance as well as birth registration. 

Since spring 2011 RI has conducted a dozen missions in the region, and has been 

able to witness the evolution of the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, 

Turkey, Egypt, and northern Iraq. I shall never forget the blank stares of children 

who fled the horrors inflicted upon civilians in Hama and Homs at the beginning 

of the conflict. Since then the causes of displacement have multiplied, with heavy 

military operations, the advent of various extremist groups, and the seriously deteriorating socioeconomic conditions all contributing to the largest movement of refugees and internally displaced people in the last three decades. But today, as many 

Syrians will tell you, it is the barrel bombs of the regime, dropped on civilian centers such as markets, schools, and health facilities, that represent the most compelling cause for the continued displacement of women, children, and men from their 

homes. The conflict has to date has killed over a quarter million people, displaced 

more than half of the preconflict population, and sent over 4 million refugees across 

the borders. 

As we have watched the causes of displacement evolve, we have also watched with 

frustration as assistance to the displaced has shrunk alarmingly over the years and 

is not keeping pace with the ever-growing needs, to the point where Syrians are now 

risking their lives to get out of the region—and even returning to Syria—in order 

to find better opportunities for a future. Funding shortages and aid agencies’ inability to keep up with the desperate emergency needs even 41⁄2 years on have led to 

secondary migration flows and the need to work on emergency aid and long-term 

stability at the same time, but with few resources at our disposal. 

Countries hosting the largest numbers of displaced Syrians (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 

Lebanon, and Turkey) have made enormous efforts in receiving and assisting the 

4 million Syrians who have collectively crossed their borders over the past 4 years. 

Support for Syrian refugees is estimated to amount to $7.5 billion from Turkey 

alone. But in spite of the scale of the needs, many other countries have not been 

able to maintain their support for the survivors of the crisis. The recent influx of 

refugees to the European Union has brought some much-needed attention back to 

the displacement caused by the conflict in Syria. But we need to recognize that the 

European crisis is merely a symptom of the world’s collective failure to respond to 

the problem both politically (a peace process is nonexistent) and socially (aid to refugees and IDPs is well below basic requirements). 

Over the course of 41⁄2 years, assistance by the United States to the Syrian crisis, 

which focused on the humanitarian needs of Syrians both inside and outside the 

country, has been absolutely critical. Most recently, the U.S. Government contributed more than $400 million in additional humanitarian assistance for the Syria crisis. I want to take this opportunity to thank Congress for supporting core humanitarian funding accounts, such as Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and 

International Disaster Assistance (IDA). Continued U.S. aid is essential, because 

although the world now considers Syria a long-term conflict and the Syrian refugee 

crisis a protracted one, Refugees International’s recent work in the region indicates 

that emergency humanitarian aid is still a desperate need. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

17 

LIFE IN HOST COUNTRIES FOR SYRIANS

Until about 18 months ago, most Syrians RI spoke with in the region were intent 

on returning home as soon as possible. Even knowing that their houses and property were destroyed and that it would hard to build a new life, they wanted to stay 

as close to home as they could in order to make returning faster and easier. But 

as their time in exile grew longer, people began to say that they saw no future for 

themselves in their host countries. This change of attitude happened at roughly the 

same time that large numbers of Syrians began leaving from the north coast of 

Egypt to make the journey across the Mediterranean to Europe; some even went 

over land to Libya in order to get on boats there. They knew these trips were dangerous, they knew that hundreds of people who had gone before them had drowned, 

and they knew that they could be detained in attempting to leave Egypt. But all 

of this appeared to be a better option than remaining in a place where they saw 

no future for themselves. During RI’s mission to Egypt in spring 2014, Syrian refugees were saying that taking their chances in dangerous waters seemed more promising than remaining in Egypt. Some were even trying for the second or third time 

to make the crossing by boat. 

Another 18 months on, the migration routes and the people on them have 

changed. Today, the Syrians leaving for Europe by sea are embarking mainly from 

Turkey, but they are coming from across the region, where it has become more and 

more difficult to survive. 

The neighboring countries hosting so many of the Syrians have long been feeling 

the pressure of the influx of huge numbers of people, of the strain on infrastructure, 

and of the ever-decreasing support the world has been able to provide. It is important to note that the huge majority of Syrian refugees—85 percent—are not living 

in the camps that we hear so much about, but rather are in urban and rural areas 

trying to get by in the local communities that are often not better off than the Syrians. Almost 2 years ago in Jordan, RI, visited a rural area where poor Jordanians 

and Syrian refugees were living in the same difficult conditions. Already at that 

time, the Jordanians we spoke with had the same needs as the refugees—food, medical care, employment, children’s education, but the majority of the assistance provided was going to their Syrian neighbors. How could such host communities reasonably be expected to absorb yet even more refugees? From the perspective of the 

Jordanians, at least the Syrians had the fallback of a refugee camp. 

Camps are, in fact, the option of last resort for handling refugee assistance, and 

it is commendable that there are so few formal camps for a population of this size. 

However, the fact that people are living side by side with the host communities 

makes it harder for humanitarian groups to find those in need, and practically 

impossible to separate the needs of the refugees from the needs of the hosts. The 

U.S. Government, the UNHCR, and their partners have all shifted focus to include 

greater attention to support for those outside of camps, but the scale of the task 

is enormous, and the numbers of people in need increase every day. Refugees and 

host communities are all sharing the same resources while facing the same struggles with health, education, and employment. The sheer numbers of Syrians make 

this even more of a challenge. 

Over a year ago in Lebanon, a Syrian mother told us about how she had pulled 

her teenage daughter from school to put her to work at a nearby local business. She 

had not been able to find work herself because the Lebanese host community where 

she lived was reluctant to hire Syrians in general, but children could often be put 

to work successfully because they were paid less and had fewer expectations than 

adults, either Syrian or Lebanese. Situations like this were leaving the Lebanese 

with the feeling that refugees were taking opportunities they wanted for themselves, 

even when those opportunities were far less than desirable. 

Inside Syria, despite three Security Council Resolutions supporting better access 

for humanitarian aid and the sustained efforts of Syrian civil society, INGOs, and 

donors, and as a result of the fluctuating nature of the conflict, with armed actors 

constraining free movement and the safety of aid workers, the efficient delivery of 

assistance remains a constant challenge 

SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The financial reality of assisting so many displaced Syrians is beyond grim. Each 

year, the United Nations and its partners require more and bigger contributions in 

order to help more refugees. But each year, additional crises around the world 

demand attention and money from the same donors who now must somehow provide 

more aid without a simultaneous increase in how much money they have available. 

The results of this are readily apparent in the aid available to Syrians. Food 

rations have been cut, health services have dwindled, and education programs have 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

18 

been closed down. RI has seen more and more Syrians each year living on the 

streets in their host communities or in inadequate and even dangerous housing. In 

Lebanon, additional protection concerns arose with the shortage of aid. In addition 

to not having enough food or being evicted for not paying the rent, Syrian refugees 

can be arrested or detained for begging in the streets or working illegally. 

Other agencies have reported on increases in child labor as families run out of 

savings, in early or coerced marriage intended to protect young girls whose families 

can no longer support them, and in people returning to Syria when the help they 

need is not available. As many Syrians have told RI and other groups over the 

years, ‘‘We can die here, or we can die at home.’’ For the poorer families, as a result 

of depleted financial resources and increasing poverty, lack of hope to settle in first 

asylum countries, and absence of other durable solution, more people now appear 

to be choosing to brave the dangers of returning home. 

Beyond international financial support, the host countries themselves are worried 

about their long-term futures as they are being affected by hosting so many Syrian 

refugees. While it is not at all clear that refugees are the economic burden that 

many have suggested, it is also not clear how to make the most of the economic benefits they can bring. This is a main challenge in host countries, where citizens and 

refugees are seen to be competing for jobs in tight markets. Work permission for 

refugees is a politically and socially fraught issue in the region, and without an 

effective plan for livelihoods, those tensions simply increase. And while an informal 

labor market does exist, Syrian refugees in all the host countries in the region have 

regularly told RI about the exploitative nature of this option. Most recently, a Syrian mother of three in Jordan described how she had taken on several catering 

projects from home, and her futile efforts to get the businessowner to pay her after 

the work was done. She had tried to get regular work, but people did not want to 

hire Syrians, so she resorted to unofficial labor and was taken advantage of. It is 

a story we have heard countless times. 

The creation of livelihoods is one of several points—but arguably the most crucial 

one—where humanitarian aid and development assistance intersect. While there 

has been wide recognition over the past few years of the desperate need of development support for livelihoods in the main host countries and for the general involvement of development actors in the refugee response, how to create and implement 

such programs remains largely untested. And while these projects are being developed, refugees are facing more and more difficult circumstances and taking their 

next steps, literally. 

NEXT STEPS

The inability to find a living situation that has a sustainable future appears to 

be driving Syrian refugees from the regional countries to more distant destinations 

like the EU. Tragically, many of them do not survive that journey across the sea, 

and those who do are not always welcome in Europe. This has been of tremendous 

concern over the past 2 months, and much has been made of the chaotic situation 

in Europe as it involves Syrians. 

However, as stated above, we need to recognize that the European crisis is merely 

a symptom of the world’s collective failure to respond to the problem. 

The most serious situation, and the one that needs the most attention, is the poorest refugees in the neighboring countries: those who cannot afford to move and are 

trapped in growing poverty and misery, with little hope for the future. Most of these 

Syrians will never have the means to move on to Europe or North America. And 

in spite of current discussions in the media, most will never be resettled, or even 

be eligible for resettlement. 

Thus, we need to recast the approach to the Syrian crisis by: 

(1) Fully funding humanitarian appeals. The $4.5 billion request for Syrian 

refugees is only 40 percent funded, and the appeal for inside Syria has received 

even less money—only 33 percent. As I mentioned previously, the humanitarian 

support the U.S. gives is essential, and the support it can prompt from other 

donors is equally important; 

(2) Developing a ‘‘Marshall Plan’’ type of development assistance to first asylum countries in order to ensure refugees’ impact on host communities is mitigated, a comprehensive plan for educating refugee children is implemented, and 

that livelihood programs are developed on a large scale. The U.S. can play an 

important role here by using its considerable governance weight with the development banks, in particular, to encourage their involvement in the regional 

response and reinforce the idea that host country development is now an essential element of addressing the Syrian displacement crisis; 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

19 

(3) Facilitating orderly departure from first asylum countries through resettlement that must include the Gulf States as receiving countries, in addition to 

the traditional resettlement countries; and 

(4) Urgently renewing attempts at a peace process led by the United Nations, 

including a dedicated attention to the protection of civilians by the parties wishing to participate in the process. 

New strategies to this ongoing emergency displacement crisis must begin now. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Lindborg. 

STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, UNITED 

STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee. 

I know a number of you have traveled to the region, and I greatly 

appreciate your focus and attention to this escalating humanitarian 

crisis. 

I testify before you today as president of the United States Institute of Peace, which was founded by Congress 30 years ago specifically to look at how to prevent, mitigate, and recover from violent 

conflict. And we do so by working in conflict zones around the 

world with practical solutions, research, and training. There is 

clearly a deep connection between what we are seeing right now in 

the humanitarian crisis and conflict that has spun out of control 

and become very, very violent throughout the region. 

I agree wholeheartedly with both of my colleagues, and both of 

you have, aptly described what is a starkly terrible crisis, numbing 

statistics, and heartbreaking stories through the region. So let me 

use my time to look at four recommendations that I would make 

as we look forward. Most importantly, even as we seek solutions 

for the crisis in Europe and the resettlement that both Michel and 

David have talked about, I would urge that we use this moment 

to expand our commitment to providing assistance in the region 

and look at solutions in the region because even if Europe and the 

United States take the most generous number of refugees possible, 

that will only scratch the surface of this crisis. 

So, first of all, we absolutely must sustain and increase our collective commitments to meeting the most immediate needs. As we 

have heard, the number of commitments have decreased against 

the needs. Thank you to all of you for having supported a very generous U.S. commitment, about $4.5 billion to date since the Syrian 

crisis. But this is against a global backdrop of 60 million people 

currently forcibly displaced from their homes. There is a global burden that is stretching the humanitarian system, straining it to its 

limits. We need to ensure that not only does the United States continue its commitment, but that we get a larger collection of countries to help shoulder that burden. It consistently falls on a small 

number of countries. We need to expand the number of countries 

that are providing assistance. 

Secondly, we also need to ensure that humanitarian assistance 

is as effective and efficient as possible. We have seen, as Senator 

Cardin noted, that we continue to treat the problem as if the refugees will go home when, in fact, there is a 17-year average duration of displacement. We are often constrained by our institutional 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

20 

mandates, our structures, and by stovepiping from doing the kind 

of assistance that enables refugees not only to survive but to look 

for some sort of sustainable future, as well as providing support for 

the host communities who are heavily burdened by the huge numbers of refugees. 

I have recently returned from Iraq where I met with a number 

of civil society organizations and Kurdish officials in Iraqi 

Kurdistan where one in five people are now displaced. They have 

some 3 million displaced Iraqis who fled ISIS over the last year. 

Despite a huge mobilization to provide assistance to these folks, 

their infrastructure simply cannot cope, including their water systems, electrical systems, schools, and clinics. You have people who 

are sitting in camps and containers, squatting in apartments, studies interrupted, no way to make a living. They do not see a future 

for themselves. A number of the displaced Iraqis with whom I 

spoke want to go to Europe because they do not see a future for 

themselves. As one civil society activist told me, we have seven 

camps in Erbil. That is seven time bombs as people are sitting here 

month after month, year after year, with no work and no education. 

This is something that we need to look at seriously. And it is far 

worse as you move into Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey in terms of 

the burden and the stretch on their infrastructure. 

So our assistance needs to focus more on education, on employment, on the kind of trauma counseling that can help people recover and on helping the communities bear the burden more effectively as we ask them to continue hosting. 

Thirdly, we can start now to help people return. In certain places 

in Iraq, there are opportunities to return, but we need to ensure 

we are helping communities deal with what could become cycles of 

conflict because of the mistrust that now exists between communities in the wake of ISIS. By working with communities to have 

the kind of facilitated dialogue that builds bridges, reduces tensions, and rebuilds social cohesion, we give people a better opportunity to return home without repeated cycles of conflict. 

Finally, in addition to pushing hard on the kind of diplomatic solutions that get at the roots of the conflict in Syria, I would also 

urge us to look more broadly at how to increase our efforts to provide the kind of development assistance that focuses on those 

places that are most fragile, whether they are weak, ineffective, or 

illegitimate in the eyes of their citizens, that are really the source 

of the flow of refugees, not just Syria and Iraq, but Afghanistan, 

Eritrea, Yemen, and Somalia, places where you have a web of 

hopelessness borne of conflict, oppression, and poverty. By focusing 

more on those areas, we have a better chance of managing conflict. 

At USIP, we say conflict is inevitable, but it must be managed it 

so that it does not become violent, it does not end up pushing people out of their homes and into the kind of crises that we see today. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG

Good morning and thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and 

other members of the committee, for this opportunity to discuss the U.S. role and 

strategy in the Middle East in the midst of an escalating humanitarian crisis. Your 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

21 

attention to this complex and protracted crisis is important and very much 

appreciated. 

I testify before you today as the President of the United States Institute of Peace, 

although the views expressed here are my own. USIP was established by Congress 

30 years ago with the mandate to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent global conflict, and we do so by focusing on practical solutions, research, and training in conflict zones around the world. 

I have spent most of my career working on issues of democracy, civil society, conflict, and humanitarian response. These experiences have led me to the strong conviction that we as a nation must invest more in approaches and tools that help us 

interrupt the spin cycles of conflict that engulf so many countries; it is more urgent 

than ever to get ahead of crises before humanitarian needs escalate, before conflict 

becomes violent and, as we are seeing now, before violence forces millions of people 

from their homes. 

The roots of the current refugee crisis in Europe are in Syria and Iraq, as well 

as in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen—all places where violent conflict, 

oppression, and poverty combine to create a web of hopelessness. The journey from 

there to Europe is long, arduous, and shockingly dangerous. And yet, according to 

the European Union’s border control agency, Frontex, more than 500,000 desperate 

people have made that journey this year, illuminating the distressing calculus that 

drives men, women, and children to risk their lives. 

The debate here and in Europe over how many refugees and migrants to accept 

hopefully will result in the greatest possible number of people restarting their lives 

in safety. We can certainly afford to absorb many more refugees here in the United 

States than is currently contemplated. More than 20 former senior U.S. Government 

officials from both parties recently issued a public statement calling upon the U.S. 

to accept 100,000 Syrian refugees. However, even if Europe and the United States 

collectively take the most generous number of people possible, it will only scratch 

the surface of the crisis now stretching across a swath of fragile and conflict-torn 

Middle Eastern and African countries. 

As the world focuses on the wave of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe, 

we must redouble our efforts in the frontline states. We must ensure critical assistance is reaching refugees and displaced people in the region, with an emphasis on 

building resilience for populations that may not go home anytime soon and helping 

those who can return. That also must include continued support for the countries 

and communities bearing the brunt of this crisis. Most importantly, we must not 

lose our focus on the roots of this crisis—the conflicts and oppression born of governments that are ineffective or illegitimate or both. 

I recently returned from Iraq, where I met with Iraqis who have been displaced 

since ISIS rampaged through their villages and cities more than a year ago. They 

are now living in camps, containers, or crowded apartments paid for with dwindling 

savings. Many of them are from minority communities—Christian, Yezidi, Shabak, 

and others—and are terrified of returning home in the absence of security guarantees. I met with two Yezidi sisters who escaped from their captors after having been 

sold to three different men. Now, sharing a container with another family and 

without access to trauma counseling or a way to support themselves, they are sliding into a new kind of hopelessness. I also met with a young Sunni mother who 

is alone with her two children, determined not to return to her ravaged community 

but rather make it to Europe, where she believes a better life awaits. There are 

countless stories of people with lives interrupted by terror and, now, uncertainty. 

In Iraqi Kurdistan, the strain of hosting so many displaced is clear. Churches, 

civil society organizations, and mosques have mobilized to provide life-saving assistance, but as the numbers of displaced continue to rise, resources are being rapidly 

depleted. Iraq’s Kurdish region already had taken in 275,000 Syrian refugees before 

the ISIS expansion into northern Iraq drove another 1.5 million Iraqis toward the 

safety of the Kurdish region. Now, one in five residents of Iraqi Kurdistan is displaced, placing an incredible strain on a region already reeling from plunging oil 

prices and the constant threat of ISIS. Many people are unable to find work or 

ensure their children attend school. As one civil society leader noted to me, ‘‘We 

have seven internally displaced camps here, which equals seven time bombs, as people sit without work or education for year after year.’’ 

Nationwide, Iraq has more than 3.2 million internally displaced people crowding 

into cities, camps, and makeshift shelter. Infrastructure—water systems, electrical 

supply, schools, and health clinics—is all strained to serve far more people than 

intended. And now, reports are emerging of cholera in Iraqi cities. Just over a week 

ago, the World Health Organization reported that it was supporting Iraq’s Ministry 

of Health, which on September 15 had declared a cholera outbreak in the provinces 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

22 

of Najaf, Diwaniya, and parts of west Baghdad. The agencies are working together 

to step up measures to stop transmission and prevent further spread of the disease. 

The story of displacement is even more stark in neighboring countries. The population of Lebanon, with its politically fragile demographic balance, is now fully onefourth Syrian. Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey have been taking in refugees for 5 

years now and together shelter 3.6 million Syrian refugees, according to the U.N. 

Much of the focus is now on Syrian refugees, but there are an additional 7.6 million Syrians displaced within what is left of their country, with an astounding 12.2 

million citizens inside Syria who need urgent humanitarian assistance. So as the 

conflict continues, the number of people choosing to leave the country is only likely 

to grow. 

Even as we seek solutions for refugees in Europe and the United States, we must 

also refocus on determined action in four areas: 

• Meeting the immediate humanitarian needs in the region to ease the suffering 

of millions forced from their homes and living on the edge of existence; • Recasting assistance to refugees, internally displaced and hosting communities, 

to emphasize longer term resilience and rebuilding of social cohesion for what 

are likely to be extended displacements stemming from protracted conflicts; • Enabling a return home for those able and willing to do so; • Redoubling efforts to address the root causes of violent conflicts that are driving 

these cascades of crisis. 

THE MOST IMMEDIATE NEEDS

The Syrian war, now in its 5th year, is contributing to a global humanitarian 

emergency of record displacement. According to the U.N., nearly 60 million people 

are displaced globally due to violence, conflict, and repression—roughly equivalent 

to the entire population of Italy. Thanks to your important support, Senators, the 

United States has been the global leader in dedicating significant resources to the 

humanitarian response. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the U.S. has committed $4.5 billion, saving countless lives. But the sustained level of crises worldwide is draining funding and attention. The U.N. has only raised 38 percent of the 

$7.4 billion it says it needs this year to care for Syrians fleeing the fighting, and 

only half of the $704 million requested for Iraqis displaced by ISIS. The World Food 

Programme has been forced to drop fully one-third of Syrian refugees in the region 

from its food voucher program this year due to funding shortfalls. The needs in 

Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, and the Central Africa Republic keep falling even further from public view. 

Now is not the time to shortchange critical aid programs. Even as the U.S. Government continues its generous support, it is important for a broader community of 

nations to join in the financing of these vital life-saving programs. Despite significant efforts over the last 5 years to broaden the donor pool, the primary funding 

continues to come from a small group of nations. 

There is also an urgent need to augment civilian protection for those still living 

inside Syria and facing daily deprivations and death. Despite a hard-fought effort 

that resulted in the unanimous passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2139 

in February 2014, to ease the delivery of aid to Syrians, there has not been a serious 

effort at implementation. This resolution calls for unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance across borders to those trapped inside Syria and, most importantly, 

a cessation of the targeting and killing of civilians, especially medical personnel. 

However, this resolution has never been fully respected, while the barrel-bombing 

campaigns, targeting of civilians, and blockage of life-saving assistance continues. 

RECASTING ASSISTANCE FOR LONGER TERM RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE

We also must ensure these assistance programs are as effective and efficient as 

possible. It is critical to focus on enabling refugees and displaced families to access 

employment, education, and trauma counseling, with the goal of helping them prepare for a future, not just survive the present. 

In the face of protracted conflicts, the global average for displacement is now 17 

years—it takes 17 years for families to return home, which is a lifetime for a young 

man or woman. And yet, all too often, aid programs, constrained by mandates, types 

of funding, and institutional strictures, continue to be administered as if displacement is a short-term problem. 

For those displaced by violent conflict, living in strange cities, and without 

resources, it is a daily struggle both for survival and dignity. Host-country policies 

often prohibit refugees from working legally, forcing many into underground economies and unsafe work. And despite generous efforts by Jordan and Lebanon, there 

simply is not enough space in their schools for the enormous number of Syrian chilFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

23 

dren. Across the Middle East, some 13 million children are not attending school 

because they are affected by conflict. And nearly 4 million of the displaced Syrians 

are children, many out of school for almost 5 years now. Investing in the future of 

these children must be a top priority. 

Also vulnerable are the many poor communities hosting the bulk of the refugees, 

especially in fragile Lebanon and Jordan. Our assistance must focus as well on 

building bridges between host and refugee communities and shoring up weak infrastructure and faltering economies that must now meet expanded demands. Again, 

thanks to your support, Senators, the U.S. Government has generously provided 

budget support and development assistance to the region, particularly to Jordan. 

Over the last 5 years of the Syrian conflict, the U.N., the World Bank, host country governments, and local and international nongovernmental organizations have 

made significant strides in seeking new ways of working together to address the crisis more effectively. With U.S. support, the World Food Programme and nongovernmental partners have been able to launch an e-card platform to provide cash on 

debit cards for food and essential nonfood items, enabling women to have a choice 

and voice in their purchases instead of queueing up for bags of food, while also 

injecting critical funding into the local economy. In Jordan, U.N. agencies have 

teamed up to use biometric registration so refugees can use iris scans at ATM 

machines to access assistance, which reduces costs and increases accountability. The 

World Bank and the U.N. Development Program are supporting local governments 

to develop ‘‘resilience strategies’’ that chart a development course in light of the ongoing crisis. 

However, there is still much more that needs to be done, especially to increase 

education and employment opportunities. We must seize the opportunity of this crisis to push our assistance strategies to be more creative, look longer term, and support the resilience and dignity of those we seek to help. 

ENABLING RETURNS OF REFUGEES AFTER CONFLICT

Where there is hope for displaced people to return to their home communities in 

the foreseeable future, the international community can begin preparing the ground 

now. In Iraq, military forces will drive ISIS out of occupied areas eventually, but 

tensions and trauma will linger. The war has militarized large segments of the society, making caches of weapons ubiquitous and violence acceptable. We can help 

reduce the risk that cycles of conflict will continue by investing in rebuilding communities to make the way for sustainable returns. Key to this is support for those 

working to rebuild the social fabric and seeking reconciliation at all levels, from the 

local to the federal. 

In Iraq, thousands of families have already returned to Tikrit, a city in northern 

Iraq that was wrested from the control of ISIS in April by a combination of U.S.- 

led coalition air strikes and Iraqi regular and militia ground forces. Human rights 

organizations since then have documented accounts of retribution in the early days 

after that liberation because of outrage over a June 2014 massacre by ISIS of 1,700 

Iraqi cadets in training at a military base nearby known as Camp Speicher. The 

cadets killed were mostly Shia from the country’s south, and with ISIS touting 

itself, however disingenuously, as defender of the region’s Sunnis, blame for the 

massacre extended to entire Sunni tribes accused collectively of collaborating with 

the extremists and taking part in the killings. 

But in some parts of Tikrit, USIP partners on the ground were able to conduct 

careful negotiations and inclusive dialogue among tribal leaders connected to the 

survivors, families of victims, and those accused of involvement in the massacre. 

The dialogue served to increase understanding of the facts and reduce tensions. Shia 

tribes that included victims’ families, for instance, learned that Sunnis in the area 

had actually helped some of the survivors escape, even to the extent of allowing 

wives and sisters of Sunni tribal leaders to accompany the Shia cadets for cover as 

they passed through ISIS-controlled checkpoints. The channels of communication 

opened by those negotiations allowed 400 families to return, and thousands more 

have followed. 

In some cases, the process of rebuilding the social fabric can begin with people 

even while they are displaced. Facilitated dialogue involving displaced people and 

local citizens and officials of their host communities can enhance everyone’s sense 

of dignity and control over their lives, and achieve tangible improvements in living 

conditions not only for those displaced but also for their hosts. USIP has learned 

that effective dialogue—the kind that produces positive change—requires a great 

deal of planning and skill. The more complex and polarized the environment in 

which dialogue takes place, the more thought and skill are required. These structured forums can lead to measures that improve political inclusion on potential 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

24 

flash-point issues such as government budgeting. They can improve relations 

between citizens and police forces still hampered by the legacies of authoritarian 

culture and practices. They can prevent electoral violence, one of the most common 

triggers of broader violent conflict. The skills that are learned and practiced in the 

process—listening, communicating clearly and openly, negotiating respectfully—can 

later be transferred to home communities when displaced people return to newly liberated areas. 

ADDRESSING THE ROOTS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

Finally, there is the pressing need to prevent conflict from becoming violent in the 

first place. At USIP, we emphasize the point that conflict is inevitable, but violent 

conflict is not. The refugees we see streaming into Europe are coming from places 

that have experienced long-term unrest, repression, and weak or illegitimate governments. These are well-documented factors that spur violence, undermine development gains and prevent sustainable peace. 

Just a few days ago, we saw the passage of new Global Goals for development 

by all members of the United Nations. The successor to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Global Goals are remarkable for the historic inclusion of 

Goal 16, which calls for peaceful, inclusive societies as essential for sustainable 

development, with an emphasis on justice for all and accountable, inclusive institutions at all levels. This goal acknowledges the centrality of good governance and 

state-society relations to meet and sustain fundamental development goals, with the 

ability to manage conflict before it becomes violent. It may seem a quixotic effort, 

but 15 years ago, we never thought we would meet so many of the Millennium goals 

either. Now is the time to double down on helping those countries willing to tackle 

the challenges of Goal 16, and key will be the role of committed, courageous members of civil society. 

Members of the committee, as the international community rightly assists the refugees who are making their way to Europe, I urge the United States also to keep 

our attention fully focused on the regions that are at the epicenter of the crisis. 

Thank you for your continued support for these efforts. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all very much for not only what you 

do but for being here today. 

And with that, Senator Cardin has a conflict. So I am going to, 

as a courtesy, let him ask questions first. 

Senator CARDIN. See the conflicts are all over. [Laughter.] 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the courtesy. 

And let me thank all of our witnesses not only for being here but 

what you do to help in regards to this international humanitarian 

challenge. 

U.S. leadership is so desperately needed in multiple strategies. 

Yes, in the geopolitical landscape to deal with resolving these conflicts so people can live safely in their homes, that is obviously 

where the United States must put a great deal of attention. 

As has already been pointed out, a lot of these refugees are going 

to be in border countries for a long time, and the cost, is tremendous not only the dollar cost but as it affects the stability in those 

countries. And there are international responsibilities. The United 

States must be a leader. And as I pointed out in my opening statement, the United Nations has indicated that it does not have the 

money it needs to address the humanitarian needs. 

And then lastly the resettlements. And I just want to talk a moment about that because there are 20 million refugees. We know 

4 million are now from Syria. And most of these refugees are not 

returning home anytime soon. Some are not going to be able to return home. And regarding our refugee policy numbers, those caps 

were based upon the philosophy that refugees would be returning 

to their host countries. That is not the real world today. So for the 

United States to have a cap at 75,000 or 85,000 or 100,000, does 

not recognize that there are 20 million refugees worldwide, and 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

25 

that many of them are not going to be able to return safely to their 

homes, and many want to resettle in a place where they can have 

a future for their family. To live 17 years as a refugee on average 

does not give you a future for your family. 

So I guess my first question is: Should we be looking at the 20 

million differently? Should we be realistically determining how 

many of these individuals need permanent placements, particularly 

those who are recent and do not have roots in the border country, 

but really want to reestablish roots for their families? Should we 

be looking at these numbers more realistically today? 

Mr. MILIBAND. Thank you, Senator. Let me just say three things 

in response to what I think is a really apposite question because 

what we all face is at least 20 million refugees and 40 million internally displaced people, the 60 million that Nancy referred to. 

The central question is is this a trend or is it a blip. Those numbers were a world record last year, more than at any time since 

World War II. And my thesis to you is that this is a trend and not 

a blip. So your question is absolutely right. And I think three 

things are important. 

First of all, refugee resettlement is important for the substantive 

help that it offers, for the sake of argument, to the 100,000 people 

that you mentioned. But it is also a symbolic value of standing 

with the countries that are bearing the greatest burden. No one 

can pretend that refugee resettlement into Europe or into the 

United States is going to ‘‘solve the problem.’’ It is not going to involve the majority of the refugees, but it is a symbolic as well as 

a substantive show of solidarity. 

Second, a critical point. The vast majority of refugees live in poor 

countries neighboring those that are in conflict. And the Syria case 

is a prototype. And local integration is going to be the solution either because we acknowledge it and embrace it or because it happens de facto. And I think what Michel Gabaudan was saying is 

that we have to embrace this point that there are going to be the 

majority of refugees in neighboring states, and the question is do 

they become economic contributors or are they simply seen as an 

economic drain. 

And just to amplify his point, he was saying that at the moment, 

the World Bank by its mandate is not allowed to work in Lebanon 

and Jordan because they are considered to be middle-income countries. And in the new world that you are describing, it has got to 

be a central part of the World Bank’s modus operandi that fragile 

states, conflict states where 43 percent of the world’s extreme poor 

now live—I mean, that is the central challenge for the sustainable 

development goals that were embraced last week. It has got to be 

a central part of the philosophy of the World Bank that fragile 

states are its business. 

Frankly—and I hope my colleagues agree with me on this—it has 

also got to be a point of reflection for the NGO and humanitarian 

movement. We have to recognize that economic interventions need 

to sit alongside the traditional social interventions that we have 

done, not just health, education, protection of women and kids, but 

also economic livelihood programs. 

The third and final point is that already in the course of the 45 

minutes we have been together, it is evident that the words ‘‘huFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

26 

manitarian’’ and the words ‘‘development’’ do not do justice to the 

policy problems that are faced here. And I would submit to you 

that the budget headings, such and such is humanitarian, such and 

such is development, do not do justice to the problem. And the institutions that we have got, some of them working on humanitarian 

crises, others on development—that separation does not do justice. Just to give you a figure, in the 20 biggest crises last year, $5.5 

billion were spent on the so-called humanitarian intervention, and 

$28 billion was spent on development interventions. Now, the truth 

is they have to work together, and that is a major challenge to the 

international system, which I think it would be tremendously positive if the committee was able to engage with them. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me change gears just for one moment. The 

United Nations estimates that there are over 400,000 people inside 

Syria who are besieged and who we cannot be reached with humanitarian assistance. And they are saying there are another 4.8 

million that are hard to reach. Do we have a strategy for dealing 

with vulnerable populations within Syria that we cannot effectively 

reach through conventional means? 

Ms. LINDBORG. The U.S. Government was the leader in providing 

assistance that was going across borders, across the Turkish and 

Jordanian borders, to reach those who could not be reached 

through the U.N. Damascus-based effort. Many courageous NGOs 

were very much a part of that. That has been curtailed by the incursion of ISIS into some of those areas, although the work continues and there continues to be extraordinarily courageous efforts 

to reach those refugees. 

The barrel bombs are equally a problem, as my colleagues have 

noted, and despite the provision of a U.N. security resolution that 

David mentioned, there is not a serious effort to provide civilian 

protection. 

So as we look at resolving this conflict, civilian protection has got 

to be chief among the goals that we collectively put in front of the 

international community. In the absence of that, people are just 

being pummeled by both sides by Assad’s people and by ISIS, and 

that further curtails the ability to reach them with assistance, and 

even if you did, they are threatened with death. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Can I just add a short point on that? The short 

answer to your question is, ‘‘No,’’ there is not a good strategy for 

reaching these besieged areas. The truth is those people are in a 

worse position today than when the U.N. Security Council resolutions were passed. And so our proposal for the humanitarian envoys who will be on the ground trying to name, shame, negotiate, 

organize the delivery of aid is at least one idea to try and break 

this terrible deadlock because at the moment once a month, the 

U.N. Secretary General reports to the Security Council that medical aid is being taken off lories and dumped. And there is no accountability for that kind of abuse of basic morality, never mind 

international humanitarian law. And so I think that your focus on 

this and your demand or the implicit demand that this has to be 

at the absolute center of any basic approach to the humanitarian 

situation in Syria is absolutely right. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, there is no question that these individuals 

who are vulnerable, that we cannot reach, or hard to reach are 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

27 

going to add to the numbers. They are going to add to the number 

of casualties. They are going to add to the number of people who 

try to flee Syria for a better life. It is going to add to the number 

of refugees. It is going to add to all the numbers we are talking 

about. It is just a matter of how quickly they can find a safe place 

or leave or they will become casualties of the war. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Gabaudan, I think people in our Nation get confused. We 

allow about 70,000 refugees into our country right now each year. 

And I know the administration has talked about raising that to 

85,000 and then to 100,000 over the next couple of years. And then 

there have been statements about, on top of that, adding 100,000 

Syrians into our country immediately not by the administration but 

by others who are advocating for that. 

I know we have the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee here, but is there a way to actually screen and deal with 

that, or is that a number that really is one that is not realistic relative to our ability to screen those coming in? 

Dr. GABAUDAN. Senator, in terms of the capacity, the United 

States has shown in the past that it can admit large numbers. We 

saw that with Vietnam. We saw that with Cuba. We saw that with 

the Kurds, et cetera. So there is capacity in this country. There is 

a question of resources, of course. 

I think that the U.S. system has the most serious vetting system 

in the world. If you look at other countries who resettle refugees, 

they do not come half the way the United States does in vetting 

the people which it admits. 

The U.S. resettlement program has a tremendous quality, which 

is it chooses people on the basis of vulnerability, and that vulnerability is usually assessed at the beginning by the U.N. who makes 

the initial submission to the United States. When you start looking 

at people who suffered torture, women, female of household, et 

cetera, the sort of criteria the United States uses, I think you already have a filter deepened by the work of Homeland Security. So 

I think there is certainly the technique and the capacity. 

For Syrians, I do understand that it will take some time to reach 

the numbers because I was told that the intel that the Government 

has on the Syrians is not as good as the one it had on Iraqis, et 

cetera. 

So there are genuine difficulties that will have to be overcome. 

But our experience over the past 40 years in dealing with resettlement is that this country has the capacity, has the experience, and 

has shown the willingness to do it when the conditions require it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know there are some discussions right now 

about us working with Russia as it relates to Syria. And I just 

want to understand from your perspective—you are dealing with 

refugees—are they fleeing Assad’s barrel bombs or are they fleeing 

ISIS? I know they are fleeing both, but generally speaking, can you 

get at, for this discussion, the greater root or the roots, if you will, 

of why people are fleeing the country briefly? And then I want to 

follow on with additional questions. But go ahead. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Let me just speak to the experience I had last 

week in Greece. Over the course of 2 or 3 days, I must have spoken 

to 200 or 300 refugees, the majority of them Syrian. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

28 

The answer to your question is it depends where in Syria that 

they are coming from. The majority that I met, they were from 

Aleppo, from greater Damascus, or from Deir ez-Zor, which is out 

in the east of the country. And it is a different situation in different 

parts of the country. 

But the point that you made that they are facing a pincer movement, on the one hand, they have got the barrel bombs of Assad, 

and then on the other hand, they have got the terror of ISIS. And 

it is almost as they flee from the barrel bombs, they end up being 

driven into the hands of ISIS, and that is what is forcing them out. 

The particular circumstances in different parts of the country are 

obviously a matter detail, but there is a wider significant point; 95 

percent of the barrel bombing attacks and other attacks that the 

Assad air force are undertaking are not against ISIS targets. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could, so people understand, these are just 

against civilian populations. Right? 

Mr. MILIBAND. And other rebel groups, and some of them are 

against other rebel fortifications because obviously there is Jabhat 

al-Nusra and other groups. But it is certainly the case that a very 

small proportion of the bombing raids are targeted on ISIS. 

The CHAIRMAN. Does anybody differ or want to add to that? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I would just add, having been in Iraq last week, 

that it very much differs depending on the circumstances. For example, I met with a couple of Yezidi sisters who had recently escaped, having been sold to three different men. They are now living 

in a container with another family clearly dealing with enormous 

trauma. They do not really have a sense of what their future is, 

and they have no ability to imagine going home, which is true for 

a number of the minority populations that have been pushed out 

of their homes. In the absence of security guarantees, they are saying they want to be resettled. They cannot go back unless there is 

security. So that is one set of specific issues. 

I also met with a young Sunni woman who had been studying 

for her university exams when ISIS swept through Mosul. She fled 

with her family. She is now living in a very crowded apartment. 

She has not been able to resume her studies. It has been over a 

year. She is just wondering what is her life likely to be. She also 

wants to go to Europe. So there are lots of reasons that people are 

desperate to envision a better life. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask this question. It is hard for me 

to contemplate this even, but if an effort were put in place to 

strengthen Assad, which is what Russia and Iran are pursuing 

right now, what effect would that have if we were somehow a part 

of that or winked and a nod and said that was okay? What would 

that do from your perspective based on what you are seeing on the 

ground relative to the refugee crisis? I think I can answer for you, 

but if you would answer for the record. Mr. Miliband? 

Mr. MILIBAND. I congratulate you on the precision of your question, and leading a humanitarian organization, I am going to have 

to be extremely precise in my answer. 

I think that from our point of view the violations of international 

law and basic rights are coming from all sides, but the majority are 

coming from the Assad government. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

29 

Secondly, it is evident to anyone who reads the newspapers or 

follows the debate that significant actions by the Assad government 

have bolstered ISIS and have enabled the growth of ISIS. 

Thirdly, any diplomatic or political approach needs to address 

both sides of the coin if it is to have a chance of success. 

Ms. LINDBORG. I would just add that as we mentioned earlier, 

there is a tool, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2139, which was 

unanimously passed, that has not been upheld by key actors in the 

region who are now making different moves. There is an urgent opportunity to push key actors to take that seriously. That addresses 

the targeting of civilians, the barrel bombing, and the withholding 

of the humanitarian assistance. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gabaudan—and I know I am running out of 

time myself. I would say I do not remember many U.N. Security 

Council resolutions that have been adhered to, and it seems that 

when they are not adhered to, we just change them to something 

that can be adhered to. So I am sorry. I am a skeptic. But Dr. 

Gabaudan. 

Dr. GABAUDAN. No. I fully subscribe to what David was saying 

regarding the source of the main drivers of exodus. Of course, there 

are changes. Kobani was clearly driven by the ISIS offensive. But 

if you speak to refugees on the border, the majority will refer to 

the barrel bombing. This is the story we get on and on and on. And 

I am talking about Syrian doctors who work for NGOs that have 

a 501(c)(3). You know, these are people who understand where we 

come from, et cetera. I am not talking about wild groups, et cetera. 

My fear is that any attempt at peace that does not immediately 

have an impact over how, in this case, the barrel bombing are 

being used against civilians will go nowhere, will be completely discredited by the large majority of the Syrians we meet in neighboring countries. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, if I could, unless the barrel bombing stops, 

the refugee crisis will continue to get worse. 

And just in closing—I apologize to my colleagues here—are the 

Sunni—are any of the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, some of those 

that are working to unseat Assad in certain ways—are they taking 

any refugees at present? 

Mr. MILIBAND. They are not signatories to the 1951 Convention. 

So they do not recognize the status of refugees. If they were sitting 

here, they would say there are 500,000 Syrians living in Saudi Arabia and 120,000 Syrians living in the United Arab Emirates. Some 

of them have arrived recently; others have been there for a long 

time. But their status is not as refugees. Their status is as migrant 

workers. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Perdue. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you. 

I would like to thank our witnesses today not just for being here 

today but for what you are doing in the middle of a huge crisis. We 

all empathize. 

Mr. Miliband, I would like to start with you. In 2011, the United 

States created a vacuum in which ISIS began to grow. They needed 

land to legitimize the caliphate. They have done that. In the last 

few years, we have created a vacuum by not having a Syrian stratFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

30 

egy, and now we just see in the last few weeks the formalization 

of Russia’s presence there with military troops and so forth. In the 

last 5 years especially, we have seen Iran and Russia supporting 

the Assad regime, which we have been talking about today. 

My question is what complication does Russia, now showing up 

with military presence—and do you have any perspective being in 

the region? You talk about development and humanitarian help 

coming together. I would like to know how this development and 

the lack of a U.S. strategy in the region complicates your ability 

to deal with the ongoing crisis? I have a couple followup questions 

on that about prevention. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Thank you very much, Senator. I should say that 

every time the Senators applaud the work of our organizations, it 

is very reinforcing for our staff who are out there in the field in 

really the most dangerous places doing extraordinary work. And I 

want to thank you very much for what you said which I see as a 

tribute to their work. 

I think that in respect of the complication I think you said that 

is being inserted by the Russian moves over the last 2 or 3 weeks, 

I have to defer to those who are privy to the intelligence and to the 

military optionmaking that is going on. As the leader of a humanitarian organization, what I have to keep on stressing is that all decisions, both military and political and humanitarian, need to be 

made with the needs of the citizens at the heart. 

What I would point to over the last 5 years is the extraordinary 

fragmentation and complexity that has developed both within Syria 

and in Iraq as well, and that complication makes it doubly difficult 

for us to do our job. So the negotiation that is necessary to have 

local consent to deliver aid depends on engaging with a bewildering 

array of local actors whose power changes sometimes on a weekly 

basis. 

The wider point about the Russian role I think has to be split 

into two parts. Until the passage of the U.S. Security Council resolutions, there was no cover for the cross border work that we and 

others were trying to do. And so the issue then was trying to get 

that cover. Since the passage of the resolutions, however, we have 

not actually been able to do more work. We found our situation 

constrained in part by the position on the battlefield but also by 

the lack of official backing from those who supported the resolution. I think that is why the emphasis that Nancy has put on turning those words and that resolution into action, notwithstanding 

the history the chairman referred to, remains very, very important 

because a Security Council resolution is only as strong as the nation states who back it and their willingness to see it through. 

Senator PERDUE. You know, yesterday—and I want to move this 

question now to Assad and Putin’s relationship with Assad. Yesterday he made a comment—and I quote—‘‘refugees undoubtedly need 

our compassion and support, but the only way to solve the problem 

is to restore statehood where it has been destroyed, to strengthen 

the government institutions where they still exist.’’ 

My question—and I will start with Dr. Gabaudan. Can we solve 

this problem as long as Assad is barrel bombing his own people, 

targeting open markets, targeting children? The question then before us is, can we solve this? There are two levels of this. One is 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

31 

obviously the immediate crisis and then the long-term solution. As 

you said, Mr. Miliband, this is no longer a blip. It is a trend. If that 

trend is there, then going back to what Senator Cardin mentioned 

earlier, we have got to develop a different strategy. This is not just 

about feeding people for a few weeks. It is about education. It is 

about training. 

So my question is in trying to prevent this now, or at least getting at the immediate crisis, how should we look at Putin’s comments relative to Assad and also what Iran’s position has been over 

the last decade with regard to Bashar Assad. 

Dr. GABAUDAN. Well, I can only answer this from the perspective 

of what I heard from refugees and not from a politician or a strategist. So I hope you will take my answer in this context. 

I certainly think that if a negotiation takes place with Assad, it 

has to be credible with a large number of people who have fled the 

country. There should be an immediate stop to the deliberate attack against civilians. Any process that does not control that from 

day one will be doomed and will not lead anywhere in terms of satisfying the population who have left this very violence. Now, 

whether he is prepared to do that as a precondition for getting into 

peace negotiations, I do not know, to be honest, and I am not anywhere close to these discussions. But I think it is essential that 

people who are going to be associated to a peace settlement have 

to make a commitment to stop immediately the sort of deliberate 

attack on civilians. I know in a conflict there will always be civilian 

casualties by the very nature of the conflict, but the deliberate attacks on civilians is something that is far too grievous to sustain 

a peace process. 

Senator PERDUE. We have all traveled to the region. Senator 

Gardner and I were just there this spring in Jordan. They are overwhelmed. Basically the parallel would if the United States had accepted refugees, it would be the size of England, for example. They 

are overwhelmed. We see that. 

What I am really concerned about long-term are the children. We 

talk about it being half the problem basically today. Ms. Lindborg, 

would you just speak to that and elaborate just a little bit more 

about what we can do in the immediate future and then what the 

long-term implications of that are? Because this looks like a breeding ground for dissent, and I totally understand that. Would you 

just speak to that and what we need to be doing now in order to 

prevent further exaggeration of this crisis in the future? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes, you are absolutely right. There is an enormous population of children who are out of school both from the 

Syria crisis and Iraq and through the region who are the next generation growing up without a future, without a sense that they 

have something positive to connect to. As we look regionally at this 

whole issue of how to counter violent extremism while at the same 

time we are not, as a global community, enabling these displaced 

kids to connect to education and something more positive in their 

lives. This situation is creating, as the activists in Iraq told me, 

seven hot spots, seven time bombs. 

There was a very important effort launched 2 years ago called No 

Lost Generation, which was an effort to focus across the humanitarian and development community on education and on enabling 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

32 

fuller support for kids. One of the challenges that we have—and 

David spoke to this—is that we get trapped inside the differing 

mandates and stovepipes of the way in which we deliver humanitarian and development assistance. My hope is that this current 

crisis will really catalyze us to move further and faster on some of 

the more innovative ways that we know we can use to provide 

more appropriate assistance that gives people a chance to have a 

living, to get the kind of help they need to recover from trauma, 

to get their kids educated. That is one of the most important things 

that would enable people to not leave the region. Otherwise, they 

have a sense that only by going to Europe or the United States will 

they have an opportunity for those basic ways of having a more 

dignified life. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I might just point out the barrel bombs are being delivered by 

air. I think everybody understands that. I cannot imagine what 

these many refugees and people around the world are thinking 

about nations like the United States and others that know this is 

happening as we are sitting here in these nice circumstances and 

are continuing every day to allow that to happen, plus the torturing of people in its prisons. And yet, we are going to the U.N. 

Security Council and talking about hollow—hollow—resolutions. 

But anyway, Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony, and let me just briefly join the 

chorus of voices that have recognized the International Rescue 

Committee. I have done work with them. It is extraordinary work 

and you should be incredibly proud to lead them. 

As someone who comes from a community that were refugees to 

the United States, I have a very strong appreciation of the willingness of the country to accept those who are fleeing for whatever the 

reasons. So I am a strong supporter of broadening our response. 

But I also understand that at the core of the problem, as Ms. 

Lindborg says in her testimony, that the most generous contribution of the United States only scratches the surface. 

But at the end of the day, unless we get to the root causes, we 

are treating symptoms but not the causes of what makes people 

flee from their home. And in this case, in the case of Syria, the ongoing conflict. The barrel bombing, which unfortunately in and of 

itself, is a horrific act, is also exacerbated by the use of chlorine 

gas in violation of international standards, as well as my thought 

was that when this committee passed an authorization for the use 

of force to stop Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his people, 

that we would be looking at a permanent stoppage of chemical 

weapons against his people. And while I certainly rejoice in the fact 

that we did do a lot to relieve the risk to the people of Syria by 

a variety of chemical weapons, we have not relieved them from the 

total risk at the end of the day. And so at some point, it is hollow 

if you do not follow through. 

What I wanted to get a sense here, first of all, is on your statement, the most generous contribution of the United States scratches the surface, and maybe, Mr. Miliband, you can help me with this 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

33 

too. In other countries, the numbers of refugees that are flowing 

into them—what would be roughly the percent vis-a-vis the population of their countries that are taking place? Whoever can answer 

that. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Well, I can say it is one-fourth of the Lebanese 

population. In Iraqi Kurdistan, it is one-fifth of their population. 

These are unimaginable numbers to have occurring—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. 20 to 25 percent. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Twenty-five percent of the population in Lebanon 

is a Syrian refugee right now. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Just to follow that, 85 percent of the world’s refugees are in developing countries. So the European comparison 

would be Germany has agreed to take 500,000 refugees or accept 

500,000 asylum claims over the next year and for each of the next 

3 years. That is in a population of 90 million. Italy, a population 

of some 60 million, has taken in each of the last 2 years 120,000 

refugees. The U.K.—the Prime Minister has pledged that they will 

take 4,000 a year in a population of 60 million. So you can see the 

variation there and the big gap between the neighboring states in 

the Middle East and the European governments. It is worth saying 

that the United States at its peak was taking about 180,000 refugees a year in 1979, 1980, 1981 when so-called Vietnamese boat 

people were arriving here in very large numbers. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So with the administration’s announcement 

that they will move up to 85,000 total refugees—that is not necessarily Syrian refugees—that would be about 2 percent of the 

American population. So I say that in the context of understanding 

the challenges of other countries here compared to what the United 

States is looking at. And I say to myself in that regard, you know, 

we are either going to choose to help countries where, in fact, refugees are flooding to in the first instance and while we are, to be 

more robust about it, or we have to think about what is a number 

that is acceptable here in the United States as part of an international commitment. 

But I want to go to the core question, which is how do we stop— 

I would assume—and correct me if I am wrong for the record—that 

none of you advocate that in order to stop the refugee crisis, that 

we should accept the violators of human rights and core international principles as a way to solve that problem. Is that a fair 

statement? You are nodding. Can you just say yes or no for the 

record? 

Mr. MILIBAND. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So if that is the reality, that means in the 

case of Syria, moving away from Assad, even if it is in a transition, 

but at the end of the day moving away from Assad—and I only see 

the circumstances getting worse, not better. We are doing nothing 

to stop the barrel bombing, including that with chlorine gas. We 

have Russia that is now sending all types of military hardware and 

creating an airbase for itself in Syria. I see at the end of the day 

that they have been a patron of Assad and will continue to be a 

patron of Assad until they see a solution that protects their interests at the end of the day. So in the interim, I see them using that 

force. And whatever entity they are using that force, again let us 

say ISIL for argument’s sake, inevitably in a circumstance such as 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

34 

this, it will create more refugees. And I see Iran that has continued 

to support Assad. 

So I do not see a lessening of the refugee crisis. There are still, 

as I understand it, millions displaced who have not become refugees. At some point their displacement is going to lead them to be 

refugees, and when it leads them to be refugees, we are going to 

even have a more significant crisis. 

So at the end of the day, is not our goal, while in the interim, 

certainly doing everything we can for those who have sought refuge, to really dedicate ourselves to ending the violence, stopping 

the barrel bombing, and getting a transition in Syria? Because if 

we do not do that, there is not enough space, time, money to ultimately meet the crisis in the lives of these people. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Senator, I think you spoke very powerfully about 

symptoms and causes, and you have to treat the causes as well as 

the symptoms I think you are saying. And you are absolutely right. 

The way I would put it from my own organization’s work is that 

we can staunch the dying, but it takes politics to stop the killing. 

And that is the fundamental challenge that we face. 

Now, staunching the dying is very, very important. I do not have 

to tell you that. And we could be doing much, much better. We can 

also be doing more than staunching the dying. We can be 

staunching the radicalization. We can be staunching the misery by 

much more effective work both inside Syria and in the neighboring 

states. 

But if your question is, Are there true limits to the effectiveness 

or the impact of humanitarian work in the absence of peacemaking 

of a serious kind? then the answer has to be unequivocally yes. 

And until we stop the killing, we are not going to be able to be 

doing justice to the people on the ground or to the values that we 

all stand for. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Gardner. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Lindborg, I have a couple questions for you. You mentioned 

Security Council resolutions. And I think it was in 2014 a couple 

of security resolutions passed, Resolution 2139 in February 2014. 

I think you mentioned 2139, which demanded that parties promptly allow rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access, and then 

Resolution 2165, which has basically called upon notification not 

consent for delivery of humanitarian aid. 

You mentioned that not all countries are—violations are being 

reported on all sides. Could you go into that a little bit more in 

terms of 2139 particularly? 

Ms. LINDBORG. As David mentioned, there is a monthly report on 

progress, and there is a routine where lack of progress is reported 

and there are not any teeth in the resolution to do anything about 

it. And hence, Senator Corker, your skepticism. 

You know, there is not a Chapter 7 provision because there is not 

agreement among the Security Council members. For a number of 

years, there was a bit of a charade where there was not even full 

belief by all the Security Council members that we had a humanitarian crisis going on inside of Syria. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

35 

I think what is going on globally today makes that a very difficult case for people to still make, for countries to still make that 

we do not have a humanitarian crisis of truly epic proportions. The 

resolution does provide one tool for forcing the conversation and 

forcing the agreement that the killing is at the root of the crisis. 

Senator GARDNER. In terms of 2139, what ought we be pushing 

with the United Nations right now in terms of perhaps an amendment or enforcement? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I am sorry? 

Senator GARDNER. 2139 in terms of what we should be pursuing. 

Ms. LINDBORG. There is no enforcement built into the current 

resolution. It was a hard-fought effort to get passage of it the way 

it was, and it is without teeth. 

Senator GARDNER. You talked a little bit about—in response to 

the chairman’s question—a little bit about barrel bombing and the 

pincer movement that, Mr. Miliband, you described. What would 

change the refugee crisis if barrel bombing were to be stopped? 

How would that change the refugee situation? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Well, it would certainly decrease the deaths. As 

we have heard, the targeting is often of medical personnel, of clinics, of markets. I mean, we have seen the utter destruction of cities 

like Aleppo. People are fleeing often because their lives are just literally in shambles and their loved ones killed. There is still, obviously, the threat of ISIS and of other armed groups. It is a very 

chaotic situation. Yet, in pockets there are efforts to still maintain 

a life, and there are efforts to still have local administration in 

parts of Syria. I would add that we also need to continue and redouble our efforts to support those who are on the ground who are 

seeking to create some sort of ongoing stable lives for their communities. 

Senator GARDNER. Mr. Miliband, would you like to talk about 

that in terms of putting an end to the barrel bombing, what that 

would do as our efforts continue, obviously, with ISIS and others? 

Mr. MILIBAND. Yes. I think that there are two ways of looking 

at it. 

One is obviously on the more political side, and that is something 

that you will be thinking about as you contemplate your views 

about the ultimate resolution of the conflict. But there is no question that the position on the battlefield creates traction on the 

wider diplomatic and political front. And I leave that to you. 

On the humanitarian front, there is no question that the daily, 

hourly abuse of international humanitarian law has created what 

someone said to me, Aleppo is hell and I had to escape from hell. 

And it is as blunt as that. 

Frankly, we have had our own people, who were not actually our 

staff but were benefiting from our services, go home. We lost seven 

of them. They were barrel bombed. Now, this is a daily reality for 

people who are, to pick up something the chairman said at the beginning, giving up hope. And at the moment they see their chance 

as putting their fate in the hands of smugglers and criminals who 

say they will get them to Europe as offering them more than staying in their own homeland in their own country. And that is obviously an indictment of the global response over the 5 years of the 

conflict. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

36 

Senator GARDNER. I am intrigued by Ms. Lindborg. In your testimony, you stated even if Europe and the United States collectively 

take the most generous number of people possible, it will only 

scratch the surface of the crisis now stretching across a swath of 

fragile and conflict-torn Middle Eastern and African countries. And 

I just want to make sure that as we continue this conversation that 

we are providing the most effective support possible because humanitarian aid is not going to—excuse me—refugee aid—the 

United States, Europe is not going to solve the problem alone. We 

have got to get to the bottom of the barrel bombing and the continued drivers of this conflict because we can open up as much as we 

want, but the crisis will still exist. And we have got to have a better strategy than we have right now. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the witnesses for your work and your testimony. 

Just to explore, the U.N. Security Council resolution, what it 

called for but the absence of teeth to enforce it, has been incredibly 

disappointing. And I know everybody worked hard to get it passed 

in February of 2014 originally, and that was not easy. The fact that 

it was brought up during the middle of the Winter Olympics in 

Russia probably make it a little bit harder for them to throw the 

veto in as they have in the past with the eyes of the world on them 

during that Olympics. But it has been very discouraging that work 

has not happened. 

Senator McCain was probably the first in this body, beginning 

really in the fall of 2013, to start to talk about the notion of a nofly zone, a humanitarian safe zone, some use of military force to 

create safe space most likely in the north of Syria near the Turkish 

border where people could go if they were fleeing Bashar al-Assad, 

ISIL, cholera, hunger. They could go with the thought that the creation of that zone and the protection of it with military force would 

allow the cross border delivery of aid under circumstances where 

the aid workers and others would not be jeopardized. 

I was originally not a fan of that proposal, but by probably February of 2014, I came to his way of thinking, seeing the numbers 

dramatically increase. My first visit to Turkey was at a time when 

there was about 750,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey in the summer 

of 2013 and now it is 2 million. Other countries are seeing the 

same thing, and now we are seeing it spread not only through 

neighboring nations but throughout Europe. 

It is not easy. I assume that there is a whole lot of challenges 

in doing that. But to me it just seems if we do not go upstream 

and try to create some safe area with an additional nearly 8 million 

displaced people within Syria, that the crisis is going to continue. 

And even if we wave a magic wand and we say the United States 

will take 10 times the number of refugees that we have said we 

would take, it is still a drop in the bucket compared to the challenge that is likely to come. 

So am I wrong? Is that a strategy that is the wrong way to go 

about it? I am not sure you would get a majority of votes in this 

body for it. I think the vote that we had about using military force 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

37 

against the use of chemical weapons against civilians barely got a 

majority on this committee, and it was likely not going to get a majority in the Senate. It certainly would not get a majority in the 

House. Still, if the administration were to advocate strongly for it, 

there is some bipartisan support for the notion. But as folks who 

do this work, am I looking at this wrong? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Senator Kaine, I have long wrestled with this 

question through this crisis. You know, the history of safe zones 

and no-fly zones for humanitarian purposes is fraught with cases 

where it did not work well and it is filled with moral hazard. 

At the same time, I think that as the crisis progresses and the 

level of killing continues that is prompting this level of crisis, for 

us to continue to not take some action that is forthrightly about civilian protection creates enormous tragedy for the people of Syria 

and is not at all consistent with who we are as a country. It seems 

to me that as we did in places like Kosovo, that it warrants a very, 

very hard look with our allies or maybe through concerted diplomacy with other actors who now claim to be interested in putting 

solutions on the table, that we look very closely at how to provide 

civilian protection. We should ask what is the best way of doing it 

and have that be the joint concerted goal of our actions and look 

at what military means might be required for a no-fly zone or a security area. 

Senator KAINE. Other thoughts? 

Mr. MILIBAND. I would say two things, Senator, about this. 

First of all, I think it would be very welcome if the debate about 

no-fly zones moved from slogans to details because the details really matter. 

Secondly, I think NGOs like ours can offer the benefit of experience of different ways in which governments around the world have 

tried to deliver so-called safe areas or no-fly zones because we have 

suffered from the details being got wrong. And I think that immediately you see that a safe area, which is designed to protect some 

people in some part of the country, immediately creates the moral 

hazard that Nancy referred to because for us barrel bombing any 

part of the country of Syria is an affront not just in parts of it. But 

that only is to make the point that obviously the debate about safe 

areas engages other questions and merely civilian protection, a proposal for safe zones most recently in the Armed Services Committee last week, was for reasons beyond the humanitarian. And 

that is why I think our best contribution is to advise on the humanitarian impact of different models of military and other action 

to protect civilians. And on that basis, I think we have got something to say without taking away from you the ultimate judgment 

that you have to make about who to put at risk and in what ways. 

Senator KAINE. But clearly, we are all in a position here where 

the existence of a U.N. resolution that calls for cross-border delivery of aid without the consent of the Syrian Government and the 

stopping of barrel bombing, that that resolution now, you know, a 

year and a half old with zero enforcement of it—I mean, the impotence of that and the message that sends about the impotence of 

the international institutions and the unwillingness of the nations 

that are members of those institutions to do anything to back up 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

38 

their words—that is incredibly destructive not only in this circumstance but more generally. Would you not agree with that? 

I do not know the legal precedent on this, and maybe this is the 

wrong panel to ask this. But is there a legal precedent for a group 

of nations taking action to enforce a U.N. Security Council resolution that the U.N. is unwilling to enforce? 

Mr. MILIBAND. The closest precedent would be the Kosovo experience where, obviously, there was not a U.N. Security Council resolution and the U.S. administration at the time decided not to put 

a vote at the U.N. because it did not want a Russian veto. But the 

action took place. I cannot think of an immediate precedent of the 

kind that you describe. 

Senator KAINE. And looking back on that action, what is the humanitarian sort of NGO’s conclusion about that in retrospect. Was 

that a good thing to do or not? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Well, having been with an NGO at the time, I 

think there was widespread concern that Kosovo was undergoing 

the beginnings of mass atrocities and that without the campaign, 

there would have been terrible, terrible loss of life in Kosovo. With 

some mixed feelings, there was gratitude that action was taken 

that saved so many lives. 

Senator KAINE. So action that was taken to save lives in an ethnic cleansing situation, a huge atrocity, even without a predicate 

of a U.N. Security Council resolution calling precisely for delivery 

of aid into this area—you know, I know you can make mistakes 

and there is risk, there are mixed feelings about it. But the general 

sense was gratitude that the actions were taken. 

What projections have your organizations done—I am about 

done. But what projections have your organizations done about the 

likely pace of continued migration out of Syria over the next year 

or two if sort of status quo continues? 

Mr. MILIBAND. Just to finish off on your previous question. of 

course, the other relevant example would be the Rwandan genocide 

earlier in the 1990s, then Kosovo, about which people have very 

strong opinions. 

Our projections—— 

Senator KAINE. And on that, was there a Security Council resolution but no international action was taken or it was taken horribly 

late so that the slaughter was just at dramatic levels before anybody did anything? 

Dr. GABAUDAN. I wanted to go back to your first question, Senator, which is projections. I do not think we have numbers in mind, 

but certainly the people who are leaving now are people with a certain level of education and who have the resource to pay the smugglers and all—— 

Senator KAINE. Many do not. 

Dr. GABAUDAN. That is going to dry off. The people who are staying in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, et cetera, are those who are getting to the levels of absolute misery. I mean, I think these are 

those we have to retain in our mind. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Sorry. I did not answer you. None of our projections included a scenario where the German Government would say 

3 weeks ago anyone from Syria can claim asylum in Germany. And 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

39 

so the truth is what projections we have done, they need to be revised in a very substantial way. 

Now, I think it is only fair to the committee to say both from 

within Syria and from within the neighboring countries, there has 

been a significant up-tick in the last month or 2 months of people 

leaving, including people who are staff members and others. Undoubtedly, there is not just a pincer movement inside Syria, there 

is also a pincer movement on the people from Syria and from the 

neighbors. 

The second piece of evidence I think is very significant is that 

the number of people who we anticipate crossing the Aegean during winter we anticipate to be quite high. I was told when I was 

in Lesvos that the U.N. are actually projecting 20,000 people to 

cross the Aegean in December, which would be unheard of. And obviously the dangers of hypothermia and other health hazards are 

very large. 

I think if where you are going with your question is do we have 

to prepare for very, very, very significant numbers leaving Syria 

and leaving the neighbors in the next year, the answer would be 

yes. And obviously what is happening in Europe at the moment 

shows the difficulty of playing catchup on this because Europe has 

had its eye on the euro crisis. It has had its eye on the Ukraine 

crisis. It has not had its eye on the refugee crisis. And now desperately trying to play catchup means that it is in a very, very 

much weaker position. So there is a warning there about what 

might happen in the next year. 

Senator KAINE. I have gone over my time. So thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could, before turning to Senator Risch, just 

to clear something up. You mentioned—Senator Kaine mentioned 

the ethnic cleansing that was taking place in Kosovo. For what 

purpose is Assad barrel bombing civilian populations and clinics 

and others? There is not a military strategy there. So for what purpose would he be barrel bombing his own citizens? 

Mr. MILIBAND. I would be interested in my two colleagues. 

I think there are only two ways of seeing this. One is obviously 

as an assertion of strength and a display of strength, and secondly 

is that he is engaged in using air power, the only Syrian belligerent 

with air power, to attack some of the rebel groups. And he is not 

taking any care as to where the mortars land. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, when you look at this, this is a pretty depressing situation because the solutions that are on the table—as I understand 

the U.S. policy, is that number one, the policy is to return people 

back to where they came from. That is the first objective. If that 

does not work, number two, that they be kept safely in the years 

where they are housed. And only thirdly do you look at resettlement. Well, if you look at those policies, you wonder if that really 

works under the present situation. I think the description of this 

is epic, certainly is an understatement probably. 

But these people that now have—the number is about 20 million, 

as I understand it, worldwide. Is that a fair number that you work 

with? If you talk about 20 million people who have left their homeFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

40 

land and essentially people who maybe would not have left under 

normal circumstances but now have been forced out, and once they 

have been forced out and they see what the rest of the world is 

like, they are not inclined to go back as is the number one policy 

supposedly that we have of seeing that they return to their homeland. 

So when you are talking about 20 million people, I mean, that 

number just is staggering. What troubles me is after this has happened and people have watched this with the Internet that we have 

now and the communications we have now, what is going to continue to happen in the future to people who look at this migration 

that has taken place and have said, well, you know, I am tired of 

living where I am? This is not good here. I am going to move on. 

And even though they are not forced out, they are going to make 

that move and, Ms. Lindborg, as you noted, the woman that you 

talked to said, look, there are only two places to go, the United 

States and Europe. I mean, this is a challenge of staggering proportions. 

What we have now, which most people do not realize, but what 

I think what is coming in the future when people see that this migration takes place—and you can do it, and you can become a citizen of another country by simply packing up and moving. 

How do you see this playing out? I mean, this is a problem that 

looks to me like it is just going to overwhelm the planet. Anybody 

want to take a run at that? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Actually, and just to make you more depressed, 

I think the relevant number is 60 million, which is the number of 

people who are forcibly displaced right now, 20 million as refugees, 

the rest as displaced within their own countries. 

Senator RISCH. But probably subject to the same thought process 

I just went through. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Exactly, absolutely. 

Senator RISCH. We have left our home. Why stop here when we 

can move on? 

Ms. LINDBORG. So I think we have talked a lot about some of the 

urgent shorter term solutions that one might employ in dealing 

with the roots of the Syria conflict, which is this raw, bleeding conflict that is driving a lot of people through the region. 

I would put a couple of other considerations on the table. One is 

that in Iraq where there is movement right now to clear ISIS, we 

have the urgent opportunity to help people return where they are 

able to and where they would like to. And USIP has been working 

with communities on the ground in places like Tikrit that are 

cleared of ISIS, but in order for people to go home, you really need 

to work on a concerted dialogue process that gets rid of the mistrust and rebuilds the social cohesion so they can go home and live 

side by side with neighbors who might be different from themselves. As we look at investing in our military action in Iraq, we 

need to ensure that we are commensurately investing in all of 

those solutions that do enable people to go home so they do not join 

that migration that you have talked about. 

Even longer term, I would note that among the Syrians who are 

going to Europe these days, among the 20 million or 60 million, almost everybody is from a country that one would term as fragile, 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

41 

you know, weak, ineffective, and/or illegitimate in the eyes of its 

citizens. And these are the countries that have the billion people 

who are living in poverty. They are the ones that have that mixture of oppression, of violent conflict and poverty that are driving 

people to seek better lives. 

Longer term, we collectively need to refocus how we think about 

development programs, moving development, humanitarian assistance to work hand in hand with security and diplomacy. We have 

just had new sustainable development goals passed in New York 

this week where there was the historic inclusion of something 

called Goal 16, which basically calls for inclusive democratic societies with accountable justice for all, which sounds very 

Pollyannaish, but every nation has signed off on this. And it gives 

us a platform for insisting that we not continue to have these kinds 

of bleeding sores around the world that create these kind of humanitarian crises and keep so many people in misery and poverty. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Can I just briefly address I think a very important point that Senator Risch has made, which is to understand the 

distinction between someone who is fleeing for economic reasons 

and someone who is fleeing for reasons of political persecution, 

which is what defines a refugee? It is a world on the move, and 

there are 200 million people moving around the world for economic 

reasons. And I think one of the lessons of this crisis is that it is 

very, very important, indeed, to maintain the integrity of the status 

of a refugee, someone who has a well-founded fear of persecution, 

and the erosion of that status has damaging implications for the 

politics of this issue and it has damaging implications for the policy 

of this issue. 

The truth is it is harder to reach America as a refugee than any 

other way short of swimming across the Atlantic. The checks, the 

vetting, et cetera are far, far tougher to arrive in the United States 

as a refugee than under any other visa or other regime. And in a 

way you can understand that because there are rights associated 

with refugee status that are earned, that if you have a well-founded fear of persecution, that you have rights and the state has obligations to you. And I think it is important that we do not allow 

that status to be undermined because when it becomes part of a 

simple migration debate—in honest truth, that is what has happened in Europe. A lot of the problems in Europe are for the confusion of the migration debate with the refugee debate—then it is 

very, very hard to hold the public, never mind to run the policy. 

Senator RISCH. Interesting. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I turn to Senator Markey, just to put 

things in context, our staff looked up the numbers relative to the 

Yugoslav war of a decade, and there were 140,000 people that were 

killed and 4 million people displaced. So if you look at the scale, 

this one causes that to pale, and yet, again there is no real action 

relative to the barrel bombing. 

So, Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Miliband, I have been and remain a skeptic of policy 

recommendations that increase the risk of Americanization or 

Westernization of the armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria. And I 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

42 

would much rather see us work to influence parties toward internal 

compromises necessary to end violence and work together to establish governments that fully represent and fairly treat all people. 

Most recently, we have heard that U.S. policy may be moving toward the creation of so-called safe zones, long advocated by Turkey. 

Just last week, retired General Petraeus called for us to create, 

quote, enclaves in Syria protected by coalition air power where a 

moderate Sunni force could be supported and where additional 

forces could be trained. Internally displaced persons could find refuge, and the Syrian opposition could organize. 

But on September 16, here in the Foreign Relations Committee, 

we heard testimony from Michael Bowers of Mercy Corps who told 

us that such zones cannot be considered safe. 

I have been advised that there are three requirements for true, 

effective humanitarian safe zones. One, parties to the armed conflict must agree to the creation of the zone and to respect it. Two, 

the zone must be secured by an impartial force with sufficient capability and size, and it is critical that this force not be a party to 

the conflict or a supporter of any party to the conflict. Three, the 

zone must be deemed militarized, meaning that it must not be a 

base for any military activity or operations by parties to the conflict, and this must be rigorously enforced by the impartial security 

force. 

In August, the U.N. Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, 

completed a round of consultations that the U.N. Security Council 

has endorsed. 

Secretary Miliband, could you provide your perspective on how 

the P5 and the entire international community can focus diplomatic support for his efforts? More specifically, how might such a 

process create true humanitarian safe zones in Syria that meet the 

criteria I just mentioned? 

Mr. MILIBAND. Thank you, Senator. I would say two things. 

First of all, your skepticism about military engagement is widely 

shared. And I know that you have not been a skeptic about engagement internationally generally. And I think the greater the skepticism about the military side, the greater the responsibility to act 

on the humanitarian and the political. 

Secondly, I said earlier that I thought that in the debate about 

safe zones, no-fly zones, it was important to move from slogans to 

details, which is what you have done, and also learn the lessons 

of history because all of us—actually my colleagues here with far 

more personal experience than me can speak to the different ways 

in which different tactics for the establishment of safe zones have 

worked or have not worked. 

Where I can comment—and the well known example of the 

Kurds in 1991 who were protected versus the Srebrenica example—in a way one of my frustrations is that we have got to go beyond just using those two examples as clubs with which to beat the 

argument. We need to get right underneath the details because the 

truth to my mind is that the situation in Syria and Iraq at the moment is unlike anything else that we have seen before, and we 

need to learn from history but not be imprisoned by it. 

You asked about the diplomatic and political engagement. I said 

in my opening statement that it is extraordinary to look not just 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

43 

at the numbers of people affected by this crisis but the absence of 

political engagement either from the great powers or from the regional powers on the political front. The Staffan de Mistura mission does not have the active ongoing engaged backing on a dayto-day basis of the nations who voted for the establishment of his 

office. And that contrasts with the situation in the Balkans where 

there were successive contact groups and other formations of the 

P5, the permanent members of the Security Council, and others to 

try to put political and diplomatic muscle behind the attempts. 

Now, many times those attempts failed to resolve the Balkans 

crisis, but nonetheless there was the effort. And I think I would 

argue for as inclusive a process as possible because that reflects the 

realities on the ground and for a process as structured and urgent 

as possible, secondly; and thirdly, for a process that does not leave 

the humanitarian situation last because often in these diplomatic— 

I do not like to say ‘‘games,’’ but diplomatic enterprises, the humanitarian situation seems an add-on, whereas to my mind it may 

well be that the humanitarian situation provides the way in for a 

contact group rather than the conclusion of a contact group. And 

it is in that light that I suggested that this notion of humanitarian 

envoys appointed by the P5 heads of state but also by the regional 

powers to start with what should be unbreakable rules. And that 

seems to me to be at least a plausible hypothesis about a way an 

international effort could begin. 

Ms. LINDBORG. If I could just underscore two points. 

I would, first of all, emphasize that now that this crisis has 

reached the shores of Europe, it does catalyze a renewed focus, and 

the humanitarian crisis is an important way in. It is now the leading edge of this crisis as it presents globally. 

Secondly, it is very dangerous to conflate military approaches 

with civilian protection. Any approach that conflates those goals I 

think is a perilous way forward. 

Senator MARKEY. So you agree more with the three-point program that I laid out. Do you each agree with that? That is a better 

approach? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes, although I would fully subscribe to David’s 

advice that we have a detailed conversation based on particulars. 

But, yes. 

Senator MARKEY. No, no. I appreciate that. But in principle, the 

sanctuary for the refugees can also be the military base. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Correct. 

Senator MARKEY. You all agree with that. So I think that is a 

contract with General Petraeus, and I think it is important for us 

to put that out here on the table because that is, I think, central 

to this issue. 

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask an additional question about 

Yemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. 

Senator MARKEY. But I can wait. Is that all right? 

The CHAIRMAN. Just out of curiosity, since I understand your 

point of view and I think David Miliband does too, are you saying 

on the other hand that you would support U.S. intervention to stop 

the barrel bombing if it was not about military activity taking place 

within that safe zone but protection of civilians? 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

44 

Senator MARKEY. Are you asking—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No. I am asking you that, just out of curiosity. 

I just heard you all. Because that would be a breakthrough. 

Senator MARKEY. I think the breakthrough honestly has to be 

Obama and Putin sitting down and reaching an agreement on this. 

Okay? And I think that is the only way it is going to happen. I 

think any other intervention is not going to be effective in the long 

run. I think we need a political resolution of this, and we need everything on the table. And we need the major powers to get this 

back out of the cold war framework, which it is back into. So that 

is my view. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Just for the record, Mr. Chairman, before I get or 

my organization gets signed up to—— 

Senator MARKEY. No, no. Can I say this? You did not answer. 

Mr. MILIBAND. I just wanted to say that Nancy’s point about details really matters. So let us just take the example of a demilitarized zone. A demilitarized in an area in a country which is flooded with arms of all kinds is a nice aspiration but does not speak 

to the detail of the situation on the ground. I would suggest that 

the imperative is to look at what a detailed proposal actually is and 

then measure it against the situation on the ground and the objectives that are set for it because in the end, it is the application of 

the principles that is going to matter. And frankly, the devil is in 

the detail, and my goodness, we have seen that in the last few 

years in Syria. 

Senator MARKEY. Just quickly, Ms. Lindborg, looking back to last 

winter and spring, it seems that we were on autopilot to reflexively 

support a Saudi decision to intervene in Yemen without a full examination of alternatives. What are your thoughts on this? What 

do we need to do to assess what we might have done differently 

last winter and spring, particularly diplomatically in the run-up to 

outside military intervention in Yemen? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I would answer it this way. We are seeing where 

the military intervention is preventing humanitarian assistance 

from reaching populations that were very, very vulnerable to begin 

with, and we are already seeing the beginning of pockets of famine 

in Yemen. And if there is not an ability to provide assistance on 

a more regular basis, including the ability of ships to dock because 

Yemen is deeply dependent upon imports of fuel and critical food 

supplies—it is also running critically short of water, as we know— 

there will be massive widespread famine. And I think there is an 

important conversation to be had with both Saudi Arabia and Iran 

as to whether their military objectives are worth that kind of 

broad-spread humanitarian crisis. 

Senator MARKEY. What can we do to help to deescalate the violence so we can get the humanitarian aid into those who need it? 

What would you recommend that we do? What is the policy? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I would increase the pressure to, at a minimum, 

create a regular cycle of humanitarian pauses so that there can be 

a regularized ability to get assistance in, including ships that can 

get in and regularly offload and onload. There is clearly a need for 

the bigger diplomatic resolution of the conflict, but in the absence 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

45 

of that, there needs to be a way to keep the country from tipping 

into famine. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Miliband was the leading voice in 

Great Britain on climate change, and I know how he knows how 

it interacts with food and water crises that then further exacerbates all these problems. But I know my time has run out, but I 

just wanted to thank you publicly for all the work you have done 

in your career, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. MILIBAND. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Any additional comments? 

I want to thank you and thank all three of you for your testimony, for the service that you provide to so many people around 

the world. Certainly the world would be a very different place if 

you and the organizations you represent were not doing the things 

that you are doing. So we thank you very much for your testimony. 

We appreciate the honest assessment you have given us on topics 

maybe outside of what you actually came here to necessarily talk 

about. It is much appreciated. 

And if you would, there will be additional questions, I know, and 

comments from others. I would say to the committee if we could 

have those in by close of business by Thursday, and if you could 

respond fairly quickly, we would appreciate that. But again, thank 

you for your service. Thank you for helping us understand the magnitude and some of the details relative to the problem. 

And with that, this meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF DAVID MILIBAND TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

Question. During the hearing, you spoke of the need to ‘‘move from slogans to a 

discussion of the details’’ of humanitarian safe zones. You also noted that international NGOs should have an important voice in that discussion given their particular experience and knowledge of the current situation on the ground and what 

has worked in the past and what has not. At the same time, you acknowledged that 

prior examples of safe zones in Kosovo and Kurdish Iraq are not perfect precedents 

for a situation as unique and complex as the current situation in Syria. 

♦ Given that, from your perspective at the International Rescue Committee, what 

are the specific recommendations and what lessons learned would you offer policymakers on the details of a feasible and effective safe zone to address the 

humanitarian needs of Syrian civilians? 

♦ What coordination, operational and diplomatic modalities would be essential for 

such a zone to be successful? 

Answer. Thank you Senator Kaine for your question at the hearing and your deep 

interest in responding to the crisis in Syria. 

There is a healthy debate around the topic of civilian protection mechanisms and 

no definitive guidelines for the best course of action, reflecting the great variance 

in context between conflicts. There are, however, key considerations that the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and other humanitarian actors would put forward 

to policymakers to address in their calculus on civilian protection options. It is by 

exploring these questions (and others) that we can begin the process of ‘‘moving 

from slogans to details’’ as I noted at the hearing. 

Consent of all parties: The ideal, in order for a zone to be deemed ‘‘safe,’’ is that 

parties to the conflict agree to the terms. Without this consent—civilians can and 

will continue to be targeted. In fact the creation of the safe zone can concentrate 

civilians and make them easier targets. This occurred in the case of the six safe 

zones that were declared through United Nations Security Council Resolution 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

46 

(UNSCR) 819 in Bosnia in 1993. Bosnian Serbs did not consent to the creation of 

the safe havens or recognize the areas as neutral spaces. As a result, they moved 

in and proceeded to slaughter Bosnian Muslim men and boys, including 8,000 in 

Srebrenica alone. Hence, there is some skepticism about ‘‘safe zones.’’ That consent, 

which may lure civilians into a false sense of security, may also change over time. 

Such was the case in Sri Lanka, where civilians were encouraged to move into ‘‘no 

fire zones’’ in 2009 for their own protection as the government pursued the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in the final months of that country’s decades-long 

civil war. The zones ultimately were bombed and an estimated 40,000 civilians were 

killed. 

Given the sheer numbers of parties to the conflict in Syria—many of which have 

shown blatant disregard to international humanitarian law and the lives of innocent 

civilians—and their fractious, ever-evolving nature, ensuring this consent and maintaining adherence to it would be extremely challenging. 

Defense of safe zone: Without such agreement, safe zones can still be established. 

However, they will require some form of defense—including the deployment of 

ground forces under a proactive mandate and clear rules of engagement—to ensure 

the protection of the civilians within them. The U.N. Security Council is authorized 

to act to restore international peace and security when it determines the existence 

of a threat, including through establishing safe zones, even when all parties do not 

consent. Such was the case in the situation of UNSCR 891 on Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, as we so painfully learned, the peacekeeping presence protecting 

the six cities deemed safe zones was not enough (only 7,500 strong). Furthermore, 

the U.N. Protection Force (UNPFOR) in Bosnia only had a standard peacekeeping 

mandate that allowed for the use of force only in the case of self-defense (not to 

proactively protect civilians). 

While we are not likely to see a U.N. peacekeeping force in Syria, the point 

remains that safe zones without the consent (and sometimes with) the agreement 

of all relevant parties to the conflict must be actively protected and attacks 

deterred. Introducing another military force (whether backed by the U.N. Security 

Council or otherwise) into the equation amounts to creating a new party to the conflict. That can (and is intended to) alter the conflict dynamics. 

The defense of a safe zone may be required not over a period of months, but years. 

As the no-fly zone (NFZ) instituted in northern Iraq in 1991 shows, protection may 

be needed for a decade or more. This NFZ is widely viewed as a successful effort 

to protect civilians, but evolved over the course of 12 years from Operation Comfort 

to Operation Comfort II to Operation Northern Watch. Without a definitive change 

in the dynamics threatening the population, it is not possible to define what the 

time dimensions and the commitment involved to provide continual protection to 

them in a safe zone will be. 

Demilitarization: In order for a ‘‘safe zone’’ to truly be a space where people are 

protected and which is off limits to armed actors, it would have to be demilitarized. 

To the extent that parties to a conflict agree with the concept, their continued support may largely hinge on the fact that establishing a safe zone is not to the benefit 

of any actor. This means ensuring that it is not a space for fighters to organize or 

launch attacks. Certainly, the recent introduction of Russian forces into the theater 

of conflict complicates demilitarization, and must be considered very carefully. 

It is also critical for humanitarian organizations providing assistance in such a 

safe zone to not be involved in a situation where their actions benefit a party to 

the conflict by assisting them as they continue to perpetrate violence—which is in 

contravention of the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality. 

The establishment of safe zones in 1994 through UNSCR 929 in southwest 

Rwanda demonstrates this dynamic well. An estimated 1.2 million people ended up 

living in safe zones protected by a temporary multinational force through Operation 

Turquoise. However, it was widely understood that Hutu genocidaires were not all 

disarmed and continued to perpetrate the genocide from within the safe zone. The 

protection and humanitarian assistance that was afforded to Rwandans fleeing violence was partly undercut by the ability of armed actors to continue killing people 

from the safe zones. In an environment like Syria where arms are circulating freely 

among a panoply of fighting forces, serious efforts would need to be made to ensure 

the civilian and demilitarized nature of a safe zone. 

Incentive to close asylum space: Some people argue that the creation of safe zones 

may provide an incentive for the countries of asylum surrounding Syria—Jordan, 

Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq—to close their doors to refugees fleeing to safety. As I 

detailed in my testimony, the social and economic impact of hosting 4 million Syrian 

refugees is profound in these countries. Despite the generosity that has been extended to refugees, this impact has begun to translate into tightening asylum space, 

the closing of border crossings and an increased desire to see displaced Syrians 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

47 

remain inside Syria. These troubling developments are documented in a report the 

IRC and Norwegian Refugee Council published last year called ‘‘No Escape: Civilians in Syria Struggle to Find Safety across Borders.’’ 

The recent debate (and seeming confusion) between the U.S. and Turkey about 

the purpose of the buffer zone being established north of Aleppo along the border 

with Turkey highlights this concern. While it has now been made clear that this 

zone is not considered a protected zone by the U.S. Government, there were initial 

indications that the Turkish Government hoped such a zone—one from which 

attacks to defeat ISIL would be launched—could also serve as a haven for the millions of Syrians who have fled into Turkey. Beyond the further tightening of the border for Syrians fleeing, there is concern that establishing a safe zone may actually 

result in Syrians being sent back into Syria from the countries where they have 

sought safety, under the guise that they no longer need international protection. 

Pull Factors: Establishing safe zones could create pull factors for people to move 

from the areas where they are currently located and, as a result, possibly put themselves at extensive risk to reach them. Without a mechanism to protect civilians on 

their way to safe zones, this may increase the danger they face. In the case of Syria, 

civilians face a gauntlet of security challenges across the country and, if they are 

able to actually escape the areas where they face threats (as many as 422,000 people are estimated to be besieged), they face a mosaic of armed actors, check points 

and indiscriminate attacks of all varieties as they move through the country on to 

safety. 

Protection outside of the safe zone: Finally, creating safe zones somehow indicates 

that the rest of the country is not safe and that efforts are not being extended 

beyond these particular geographies to protect civilians. While safe zones established with the correct contextual planning could offer protection to some civilians, 

it may detract from the urgency of protecting all civilians in Syria. In a conflict 

where there has already been shockingly little progress toward any semblance of a 

political solution—let alone agreements to stop targeting civilians directly or ensure 

that humanitarian assistance reaches those who need it—the establishment of a 

safe zone may provide a false sense of resolution. Establishing safe zones in a conflict characterized by massive and widespread violations of international humanitarian law must be looked to as one step to provide protection for some people in 

need, but not a silver bullet. The creation of any zone must not become an excuse 

to further political inertia on an urgent and unparalleled challenge of our time. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

48 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER


hrf1.eps

(J- human rights first 

HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 

Written Statement for 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

The U.S. Role and Strategy in the Middle East: The Humanitarian 

Crisis 

September 29, 2015 

We are pleased to submit this statement on behalf of Human Rights First. Human Rights First works in the 

United Slates and abroad to promote a secure and humane world by advancing justice, human dignity, and 

respect for the rule of law. Human Rights First is an independent advocacy organization that challenges 

America to live up to its ideals. We are a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organization with 

offices in New Yorf<, Washington D.C., and Houston, Texas. 

For over 30 years, we've built bipartisan coalitions and teamed up with frontline activists and lawyers to 

tackle issues that demand American leadership, including protecting the rights of refugees who flee 

persecution. Protecting the persecuted is a core American value. Reflecting this country's deep-seated 

commitment to liberty and human dignity, as well as its pledge under the 1951 Refugee Convention's 

Protocol, the United States has long led efforts to protect those who flee from political, religious, and other 

persecutions. 

The world is facing the largest refugee crisis since World War II. Globally, about60 million people have 

been forced to flee their homes. Over 4 million Syrians have fled their country, and many have been 

stranded for years in neighboring countries where they can't work, cannot support their families, have little 

aocess to education, and face shortages in food and other assistance due to massive underfunding of UN 

humanitarian aid appeals. Syria's neighbors, faced with overwhelming refugee numbers and inadequate 

international support, have made it more difficult for refugees to enter to seek protection or extend their 

stays. Meanwhile, the fighting and violence within Syria has intensified, leaving refugees with little hope that 

they will be able to safely return. 

Many are turning to danger,ous routes to reach places of safety where they can rebuild their 

lives. Thousands have embarked on risky journeys in an attempt to reach Europe. 
49 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER


hrf2.eps

This is a defining moment for the world, and the United States. Faced with the largest refugee crisis since 

World War II, how will the United States respond? Will it exercise leadership by truly sharing in the 

responsibility of hosting more of Syria's refugees or will it provide refuge to only a token or minimal number? 

How the United States addresses this refugee crisis will be a critical test for U.S. leadership. The United 

States has played a leading role in providing humanitarian assistance, giving over $4 billion to relief efforts 

both within Syria and in neighboring countries. This is consistent both with U.S. leadership on humanitarian 

relief and its strategic interest in preventing further destabilization of the region. But the U.S. government 

can and should do more, including by using its unique position as a global leader to champion the protection 

of refugees trying to flee from Syria and to launch a meaningful resettlement initiative. The United States 

has not launched a significant resettlement initiative that would demonstrate to Syria's neighbors a real 

commitment to share in hosting at least some of Syria's refugees and would encourage other resettlement 

states to follow suit. A meaningful resettlement initiative, in addition to providing a future to the individual 

refugees and families it would directly assist, should be seen as part of a broader effort to increase the 

protection space available to Syrian refugees in the region and globally. 

The United States has long been a leader in protecting refugees and has typically resettled about half of the 

refugees identified as in need of resettlement each year. The United States has only resettled about 1,300 

Syrian refugees in fiscal year 2015 through August 31 , and has only committed so far to resettle at least 

10,000 Syrian refugees in fiscal year 2016. Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon are hosting about 4 million Syrian 

refugees. Meanwhile Germany has announced it can host 800,000. This level of U.S. response falls far 

short of global leadership, and our resettlement process is much too slow, often taking two years or longer. 

The United States must lead, and lead by example. Not only is it the right thing to do, but it is strategically 

smart. In addition to supporting Europe, a stronger refugee response will promote the stability of states 

bordering Syria including key U.S. allies in the region, such as Jordan. 

In light of this global emergency situation, we urge the United States to lead a comprehensive global 

initiative in partnership with European and other states to improve aocess to protection for refugees. We 

urge the United States government led by the President and the Secretary of State to: 

1. Increase Resettlement and other Routes to Protection. The United States should lead a global 

initiative that includes many countries to resettle or provide other admission to 1 to 1.5 million Syrian 

refugees. The United States should increase its own resettlement commitment to 100,000 Syrian 

refugees for fiscal year 2016 and implement more expeditious routes to protection for Syrian refugees 

with family in the United States and other at-risk refugees. In the next month, the administration should 

appoint a high-level coordinator in the White House to oversee the refugee response. This official 

should be tasked with securing significant improvements in the pace of the U.S. resettlement program. 

The U.S. should press other countries to sharply increase resettlement or other admission routes, and 

call on the European Union to create safe and legal ways for refugees to reach Europe. Over the next 

six months, the United States should review and reform its delay-plagued resettlement process to be 

more timely and effective without compromising security. 

2. Meet humanitarian assistance goal. The United States should lead a global push to secure 100% 

funding of the UN's humanitarian appeal for the Syria crisis, set a strong example by further stepping up 

its contribution to cover a higher percentage of the appeal, significantly increase development funding 

for refugee-hosting countries, press wealthy states to increase contributions and develop longer term 

strategies for meeting the front-line needs of refugees and hosting communities. 
50 

Æ 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER


hrf3.eps