J-S49016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.C., MOTHER No. 671 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order and Decree entered April 8, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 32 AD 2014, CP-22-DP-44-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, and OLSON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2015

C.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the order and decree which involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, A.B. (“Child”), born in 

December of 2012. The order and decree also changed Child’s permanency 

goal to adoption.1 We affirm.

On February 13, 2013, Mother brought Child to Penn State Hershey 

Children’s Hospital, seeking treatment for Child’s injured leg. Once there, it 

was discovered that Child had a fractured femur, thirteen fractured ribs, a 

fractured clavicle, a fractured metatarsal, and several possible metaphyseal 

fractures. Mother was unable to produce a satisfactory explanation for any 

of the injuries. 

On February 14, 2013, Mother was charged with aggravated assault 

and endangering the welfare of a child. Mother was “indicated” for child 

 

1 The parental rights of Child’s father, B.B. (“Father”), were terminated by a 

separate order and decree entered that same day. Father is not a party to 

the instant appeal.
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abuse in April of 2013, and a no-contact order between Mother and Child 

was entered. Child was adjudicated dependent by order dated May 15, 

2013, and aggravated circumstances were found as to Mother. Meanwhile, a 

safety plan was put into place, with Child residing in the home of Father’s 

grandmother. Child was subsequently placed in foster care after members 

of the grandmother’s household admitted to drug use.

On May 2, 2014, Dauphin County Social Services for Children and 

Youth (“the Agency”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

involuntarily, and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. A hearing 

was held on April 1, 2015, and April 6, 2015. On April 8, 2015, the orphans’ 

court entered its order and decree terminating Mother’s parental rights and 

changing Child’s permanency goal. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal on 

April 16, 2015, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Mother now raises the following issue for our review: “Whether the 

[orphans’] court abused its discr[e]tion when it determined to change the 

goal from reunification to adoption and involuntarily terminated Mother’s 

parental rights?” Mother’s Brief at 9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).2, 3

 

2 While Mother purports to challenge the change of Child’s permanency goal 

to adoption, her brief does not contain any citation to, or discussion of, the 

relevant provisions of the Juvenile Act. Accordingly, we conclude that 

Mother has failed to preserve any challenge to the orphans’ court’s change 

of goal order, and we focus our analysis on the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), 

appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 
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We consider Mother’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

 

897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“‘[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any 

discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the 

issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is 

waived.”’).

3 The Agency argues, inter alia, that Mother has waived “the issues 

presented in the statement of matters complained of on appeal,” because 

these issues were not included in Mother’s statement of questions involved, 

and because Mother failed to discuss those issues in her appellate brief. 

Agency’s Brief at 19-21. To the extent the Agency is attempting to argue 

that Mother has waived her challenge to the decree terminating her parental 

rights, we disagree. Mother challenged the termination of her parental 

rights both in her concise statement, and in her statement of questions 

involved. Mother also challenges the termination of her parental rights in 

the argument section of her appellate brief. We conclude that Mother has 

properly preserved this claim.
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the Agency filed its petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which 

provide: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. 

***

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 
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with an agency for a period of at least six months, 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the child. 

***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

We need only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection 

of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 
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A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) 

The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require an 

evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that 

led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

Instantly, the orphans’ court explained its decision to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights by emphasizing the abuse suffered by Child, and the 

fact that Mother did not take responsibility for Child’s injuries. Orphans’ 

Court Opinion, 5/14/15, at 11-12. Mother argues that she should not have 

been required to take responsibility for Child’s injuries, because such 

requirement violates her right against self-incrimination. Mother’s Brief at 

17-18. 

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the orphans’ 

court did not abuse its discretion. During the termination and goal change 

hearing, Dr. Kathryn Crowell, a pediatrician, testified that she examined 

Child at Penn State Hershey Children’s Hospital, and discovered Child’s 
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numerous injuries, listed supra. N.T., 4/1/15, at 7-9. A follow-up 

examination was conducted two weeks later to look for injuries that may not 

have been apparent during the initial examination. Id. at 11-12. This 

second examination revealed additional injuries, including a possible left 

clavicle fracture, and other possible metaphyseal fractures. Id. at 12-13. 

Dr. Crowell further testified that she spoke to Mother, who suggested 

that Child’s injuries may have been suffered when Child rolled off a couch. 

Id. at 14-15. However, Dr. Crowell opined, to a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty, that Child’s injuries were not caused by rolling off a couch. 

Id. at 15. Dr. Crowell explained that Child’s injuries were in various stages 

of healing, and could not all have occurred at the same time. Id. at 13-14. 

In addition, various different types of force would have been necessary to 

cause the injuries. Id. at 16-18. Ultimately, Dr. Crowell concluded that 

Child was the victim of physical abuse. Id. at 24. 

Pennsylvania State Trooper, Kyle Tobin, testified that he investigated 

the physical abuse suffered by Child. Id. at 30. As part of this 

investigation, Trooper Tobin interviewed both Mother and Father. Id. at 34. 

During her initial interview, Mother again suggested that Child may have 

broken her leg by rolling off of a couch. Id. at 33. During a later interview, 

Mother stated that Child’s leg must have been broken by Father, while he 

was changing her diaper. Id. at 36. Mother also indicated that she had 
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been “squeezing the baby to help get air bubbles out of her,” and that this 

may have caused Child’s fractured ribs. Id. at 38. 

According to Trooper Tobin, Father claimed that Child’s ribs likely were 

broken when he “rolled over on her in bed the one time . . . .” Id. at 38. 

Father admitted to breaking Child’s leg, but stated that this occurred 

accidently. Id. at 39. Father “described that when he was changing the 

baby’s diaper, she was fussy and kind of rolling around, and he had grabbed 

her by the leg and pulled her across . . . . [w]hatever surface he had her on 

to change her diaper . . . .” Id. Father also described an incident during 

which Mother “toss[ed Child] on the bed.” Id. at 45. Father stated that 

Mother is “a very violent person.” Id.

Agency caseworker, Erica Dressler, testified that a service plan was 

created for Mother, which required, inter alia, that Mother “acknowledge 

responsibility for her role in [Child’s] injuries[.]” Id. at 56. However, 

Mother never discussed Child’s injuries with Ms. Dressler. Id. at 64, 70. 

Ms. Dressler explained that, “[a]t the very first permanency review, the 

judge had kind of advised that they don’t need to talk about these things so 

they wouldn’t incriminate themselves. And that was kind of the whole 

stance throughout my involvement, that we weren’t going to talk about it.” 

Id. at 60-61. Ms. Dressler further explained that the Agency filed a petition 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights because “[t]he issues which brought 

[Child] into care have not been resolved in any way, shape, or form. We 
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weren’t able to discern what had happened to [Child].” Id. at 64. Ms. 

Dressler stated that while Mother and Father “may have talked with the 

police officer, [] they had never sat down and talked with me about exactly 

what happened. So we couldn’t put anything into place to prevent it from 

happening again.” Id. 

Accordingly, the record confirms that Child suffered severe physical 

abuse at the hands of Mother and/or Father. Mother has never admitted to 

abusing Child, nor has she provided any reasonable explanation for Child’s 

injuries. Mother’s refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the harm 

suffered by Child has prevented the Agency from addressing the causes of 

this harm, and from ensuring Child’s safety while in Mother’s care. Thus, 

Mother has failed to remedy the conditions which led to Child’s removal. In 

addition, because Mother continues to pose a grave safety risk to Child, it is 

clear that terminating Mother’s parental rights would serve Child’s needs and 

welfare.4 

 

4 While Mother contends that the orphans’ court was not permitted to 

consider her refusal to admit to child abuse, she fails to cite any authority 

which supports this proposition. In her brief, Mother relies entirely on 

Commonwealth v. G.P., 765 A.2d 363 (Pa. Super. 2000). In that case, 

G.P. was charged with various crimes relating to the sexual abuse of his 

stepdaughter. Id. at 364. As part of a related child protective services 

case, G.P. made statements to a court-appointed psychologist “regarding 

what he perceived to be the victim’s sexual aggressiveness towards him.” 

Id. at 365. The psychologist then testified to these statements during G.P.’s 

criminal trial. Id. On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded, inter alia, 

that G.P.’s statements should not have been admitted, as G.P. did not 

engage in a “voluntary and knowing waiver of his rights against selfincrimination and benefit of counsel . . . .” Id. at 368. The Court observed, 
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We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond 

between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some 

citations omitted). 

Here, the orphans’ court found that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would serve Child’s needs and welfare. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

5/14/15, at 12-13. The court observed that Child is doing well in her preadoptive foster home. Id. at 12. 

Mother is not entitled to relief. Ms. Dressler testified that Child has 

been residing in a pre-adoptive foster home since June of 2013. N.T., 

4/1/15, at 71. Child is “very healthy,” and is developmentally on target. 

Id. at 76. Further, Child has a “very positive” relationship with her foster 

 

however, that G.P.’s statements were, “[u]nquestionably, . . . available to 

the court in the CYS proceeding . . . .” Id. at 368. G.P. is readily 

distinguishable from the case sub judice, and we do not find its reasoning to 

be relevant or persuasive.
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parents. Id. at 73. Ms. Dressler explained, “I know [Child] can’t verbalize 

it, but, . . . it’s clear that she cares for them and goes to them for comfort.” 

Id. at 73. Ms. Dressler noted that Child’s foster parents are willing to allow 

ongoing contact between Child and Mother. Id. at 74.

Thus, the record supports the finding of the orphans’ court that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights will serve Child’s needs and welfare. 

Child is thriving in her pre-adoptive foster home, and is bonded with her 

foster parents. In contrast, there is no evidence of any bond between Child 

and Mother, and Mother poses a serious safety risk to Child. 

Because we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its 

discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child involuntarily, and 

by changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption, we affirm the order and 

decree of the orphans’ court.

Order and decree affirmed.

P.J.E. Bender joins the Memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/2015