AL BERT SPAN, Plaintiff,

v. UNI TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF J USTI CE et al. , Def endants. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action No. 08-2183 ( HHK)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION Albert Span, proc eeding pro se , bring s this case pursua nt to the Fre edom of Information Act (“ FOIA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. B efor e the Court is the motion for summary

judgme nt filed by

the def endants, the F eder al B urea u of Investig ation (“F BI ”) a nd the Depa

rtment of Just ice ( “DOJ”). Upon c onsideration of the motion, the opposition t here to, and the re cord of the ca se, the Court conc ludes that the motion should be g rante d. I. BACKG ROUND Span, alleg edly

a member

of the “ Bla ck Disciples” g angoperating in the Chica g o are a,
was c onvicted of f

eder al nar cotics and f

irea rms violations and is now servinga life se ntence without possibi lity

of par ole. Compl. ¶ 19; Pl .’s Opp’n at 1-2. In October 2006, Span submitt ed a F OIA re quest to the FB I ’s Chicag o Field Of fice seekinginformation in the “F BI I -Drive files about my case , No. 03-c r-71 a

nd the af fidavit and c omplaint of the cha rg ing a g ents. Authorization for the wire tap in this case a nd court orde rs of the ta

ps.” De fs.’ Mot. for Summ. J

.(“D efs..’ Mot.”), De cl. of Da vid M. Hardy

(F eb. 27, 2009) ( “Ha

rdy Dec l.”) ¶ 6 & Ex . A (punctuation altered) . I n response to Span’s reque st, the Chicag o Field Of fice conducte d a sea

rch of the g ener al indices, whic h are automated, to its files in the ce ntral re cords sy stem (“CRS”) in order to identify

all potentially

responsive f

iles index ed to “Albe rt L ee Span.” Har dy Dec l. ¶¶ 25-32 (de scribingwhat is included in the CRS and how it is index ed and se arc hed). That searc h located just one suc h file, identified a s No. 245D-CG-107276. Id. ¶ 32. In FB IFOIA nomenclature, this was a “main” f ile, which is a file that is identified by the “name corr espondingwith a subject of a file.” Id. ¶ 27. In other wor ds, a “ma in” file for Albert Span is one that is identified by the name A lbert Span and ha s Albert Span as its subject matter

. In this case, the one main file wa s a “multi-subject file” and the F BI ’s sea rch a ddresse d “only

that portion which spec ifically perta ins to the plaintiff rather than information per

taining to other subjects.” Id. ¶ 39. While an individual may also be mentioned in a

file that is not about that individual, a so-ca lled “re fer ence ” or “ cross-r efe renc e” f ile, the cur

rent F BI policy is to searc h only “main” f iles — that is, files about the individual — when initially respondingto a FO I A reque st. Id. ¶¶ 27, 35. The FB I ’s letters to Span did not inform him of this policy or that the initial search in r esponse to his FO I A re quest was limited to “main” f iles. The F BI deter mined that the one main f ile it had identified as r esponsive, No. 245D- CG107276, “wa s located in a pendinginvestigative file” a nd there fore was e x empt from disclosure under F OIA Exempti on 7(A), 5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A ). Id. ¶ 32. Span appe aled the F BI ’s deter mination that all recor ds were exempt from disclosure. On a ppeal, DO J ’s Off

ice of Information and Priva cy

(“O I P”) dete rmined that “Exemption 7(A) no long er a pplied to [ a]

-2-portion of the re cords r esponsive to plaintiff’s r equest,” and re manded the r equest to the F BI for further proce ssing. Id. ¶ 11. When Span filed his appea l with the OI P, the FB Isear ched f urther in the Chica g o Field Offic e and loc ated a

responsive “ ref

ere nce” file for

Span. Id. ¶ 33. As a r esult of its review of the re fer ence file and its furthe r re view of the main file on re mand, the F BI identified 50 pag es that wer e re sponsive to Span’s reque st and not subject to Ex emption 7(A), a nd in May

2008 rele ased 32 of

the 50 pag es in full or in part. Id. ¶ 16. The F BI ’s produc tion to S pan included the following statement:

For y our information, additional material which mig ht possibly be responsive to your re quest is presently unavailable . This material include s FB I Chicag o field off

ice f ile number 245D- CG-107276 seria ls 319, 368, 471, 695, and 696. Id. Ex . K. No fur

ther e x planation was of

fer ed to Span at that time re g ardingthe re cords that
wer e “pr esently

unavailable .” It turns out that for some time the F BI could not locate the identified portions (ser ials 319, 368, 471, 695, and 696) of the main file indexed to Albert Span. After Span filed this lawsuit, the FB Isear ched a g ain and located the missing por tions. Id. ¶ 36. The pre viously

missing portions contained 21 r esponsive pag es, of whic h 14 wer e re lease d in full or in part. Id. Ex . O. In J uly 2008, Span made a

second F OIA re quest, this tim e to FB Iheadqua rters se eking any and all docume nts, recor ds, memoranda , statements, re ports, and other information (in whatever

form) ma intained by

y our ag ency

that relates to or makes ref ere nce to me dir ectly

or indirec tly . More spe cifica lly , Ireque st any information in the possession or control of your ag ency related to the investig ation and prosec ution of me by

fede ral a uthorities for illeg al g angactivity and nar cotics traff icking in and ar ound the Chicag o, I llinois are a fr om on or about January 2001 to the prese nt. Any

information would include, but not be limited to, ag ency repor ts, statements (302’s), f

iles, notes, case file summaries, or any other for ms of
-3-data maintaine d and/or g ener ated by y our ag ency

rela ted to the above ref

ere nced criminal investig ation. Ispecific ally

reque st that y our ag ency

sear ch the Centra l Records Sy stem, Automated Case Support Sy stem, Electronic case Files, Unive rsal I ndex Files, L eg al Attache s (L EGATS), investig ative Case Ma nag ement Sy stem, Confidential Source Sy stem, and the “ I -Drive ” sy stem files. Any “main” or

“re fer ence s” to me would be re sponsive to my reque st. Iwould expect advisement if a ny field off ice maintained any

rec ords re sponsive to this request. Har dy Dec l. Ex . P. I n response to Span’s second r equest, the F BI conducte d a sea

rch of the FB I headqua rters’ g ener al indices of its main files in the CRS and found no files whe re Span w as the subject of the f

ile. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35. Af

ter Span initiated this lawsuit, the FB Ialso sear ched its ref ere nce f iles and identified one that contained a ref ere nce to Span. That file was r efe rre d to the BO P for re view and dir ect r elea se to Span. Id. ¶ 35. Span does not ra ise any issues with respec t to the FB I ’s deter

mination to refer

that file to the B OP or to the BO P’s review and re lease decisions. In sum, the FB Iconducte d multipl e sea rche s of both main and re fer ence files by use of the Automated Case Support Sy stem (“ACS”) g ener al indices that make a sea rch of its CR S possible. See id. ¶ 27. These sear ches pr oduced a total of 71 responsive r ecor ds, of which 64
wer e re lease d to Span in full or in part. Span cha lleng es the sea rche s on the g round that they did not produce what he be lieves is a “va st respository of information in the possession/control of the Def endants that the F BI

is conce aling ,” Opp’ n at 11, and that the F BI did not searc h the exact files, and spe cifica lly

the I -drive, tha

t Span reque sted be sea

rche d, id. at 10. He a lso challeng es the FB I ’s asser

tion of Ex emptions 2 and 7(D) , to protect the ide ntity of and infor

mation provided by confide ntial sources, of

Ex emptions 6 and 7(C), to protec t third parties’ pr ivacy , and Ex emptions 2 and 7(E), to pr otect information relating to law enf orce ment investigative
-4-techniques a nd proce dures. Id. at 11-12. In addition, Span ge nera lly attacks the ag ency aff idavits by conclusorily

alleg ing ba d faith. Id. at 5-6. In fac t, except that the name of the decla rant ha s been ta ilored to the ca se, the a lleg ations are so g ener al and c onclusory that they are an identica l rec itation of alleg ations made by a plaintiff in anothe r, ure lated, F OIA suit. See King v. DOJ , No. 08-c v-1555 (HH K) Opp’ n at 5-6 (D .D.C. Sept. 23, 2009) (alleg ing ba d faith with respe ct to the dec laration made on beha lf of the Dr ug Enforc ement Administration). II. ANALYSIS A motion for summary

judgme nt under Rule 56 must be g rante d if the plea dings a nd evidenc e on file show that there is no g enuine issue of materia l fac t, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In consideringwhether there is a triable issue of

fac t, a cour

t must draw all rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the non-movingparty
. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. The pa rty opposing a

motion for summary

judgme nt, however , “may not rely mere ly on alleg ations or denials in its own pleading ; rather , its response must . . . set out specific f acts showing a g enuine issue f or trial,” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), that would permit a re asonable jury to find in his favor, Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 ( D.C. Cir. 1987). The non-moving party

must do more than simply “show that ther e is some metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). More over, “ any

fac tual asser

tions in t he movant’s a ffidavits will be ac cepte d as being true unless [the opposing pa rty] subm its his own affidavits or other documentar

y evidenc e contra dicting the asser

tion.” Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 ( D.C. Cir.1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 ( 7th Cir.1982)). In a F OI A suit, an ag ency is entitled to summ ary
-5-judgme nt once it demonstrate s that no material f acts a re in dispute and that it conducted a se arc h of re cords in its custody

or control, Kissi nger v. Re porters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150-51 (1980), that was re asonably calc ulated to uncove r all re levant informa tion, W eisberg v. D ep’t of Justice , 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 ( D.C. Cir. 1984), which either has bee n rele ased to the r equestor or is ex empt from disclosure , Students Against Genocide v . Dep’ t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 ( D.C. Cir. 2001). A. Allegations of Agency B ad Faith An ag ency

decla ration is entitled to a pre sumption of good f aith. SafeCard Servs., Inc . v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 ( D.C. Cir. 1991). Speculative c laims about the exist ence of additional documents ar e insuffic ient to rebut the pre sumption of good f aith acc orded a g ency

aff idavits. Flowers v. IRS, 307 F. Supp. 2d 60, 67 (D.D .C. 2004). To succe ssfully challeng e an a g ency ’s showing that it complied with the FOIA, the plaintiff must come f orwa rd with “spec ific fa cts” demonstratingthat there is a g enuine issue with re spect to whe ther the a g ency has improper ly withheld extant age ncy

rec ords. Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analy sts , 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989). Span’s boilerplate alleg ations of bad f aith do not constitute the “spec ific fa cts” re quired to threaten the g ood faith pre sumption. On thi s rec ord, the a g ency aff idavits are e ntitled to the presumption. B. The Searche

s To show that its searc hes for responsive r ecor ds “us[ed] m ethods which c an be
rea sonably

expected to produc e the infor mation reque sted,” Oglesby v . Dep’ t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 ( D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Campbell v. D ep’t of Justice , 164 F.3d 20, 27 ( D.C. Cir. 1998), the a g ency

may submit affidavits or dec larations that ex plain in rea sonable de tail and in a

-6-nonconclusory fashion the sc ope and me thod of the sea rch, Perry v . Block, 684 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In the abse nce of contra ry evidenc e, such a ffidavits or de clar ations are sufficie nt to demonstrate an a g ency ’s compliance with the FOIA. Perry, 684 F.2d at 127. A
sear ch nee d not be exhaustive, Miller v. De p’t of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1383 ( 8th Cir. 1985), and the ade quacy

of a se arc h is not determined by its results, but by

the method of the se arc h itself, W eisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485. An ag ency ’s fa ilure to find a pa rticular doc ument does not
nece ssarily

indicate that its sear ch wa s inadequate. W ilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 678 ( D.C. Cir. 2004); Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 892 n.7 ( D.C. Cir. 1995). Span contends that the se arc hes we re de ficient be cause they did not include a sea

rch of the exact file sy stems, and spec ifically the I -drive, a s he had r equeste d. Opp’n at 10. The F BI ’s I -drive is a

share d drive in its computer ne twork that is used by FB Ifield off

ices to hold “‘pr eliminary

work produc t investigative documents’” draf ted by an ag ent so that a super

visor
can r eview a

nd approve the document be fore placingit in the FB I ’s offic ial file. Amuso v. De p’t of Justice, 600 F. Supp. 2d 78, 88 (D.D .C. 2009) (quotinga dec lara tion by David M. Ha

rdy ); see also Jefferson v. Bure au of Prisons, No. 05-848 (G K) 2006 WL3208666 *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2006) (c iting letter

of David M. Hardy

explaining the I -drive) ; Antonelli v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &Explosives, No. 04-c v-1180 (CKK) , 2006 WL 367893, at *7 (D.D .C. Feb. 16, 2006) (same). In other wor ds, the I -drive is intende d to hold, temporarily , draf t documents that when f

inalized become pa

rt of the CRS. Given that Span was tried in late 2004, see U .S. v. Span, 188 Fe d. Appx. 487, 489 (7th C ir. J uly 14, 2006), there is good r eason to c onclude that no documents re sponsive to his information request would be found on an I -drive in 2006 or later. Fur thermore , it is not even c lear that the Chicag o Field Of fice maintains an I -drive, a s some field
-7-office s now have a shar ed drive that is identified by some other letter

. Amuso, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (citingHar dy ’s dec laration). These f acts illustrate why

the law doe s not require an ag ency to conform its sear ch to the dictates of a

reque ster, but rather to conduc t a sea rch that is reasona

bly expected to produc e the information re quested. Where, for example, the information re quested may be re asonably 1 expected to be f

ound on the I -drive, the ag ency could ig nore suc h a spec ific re quest only at its peril. Where, how ever , there is no reasona ble expectation that the information requested c ould be located by

sear chingthe I -drive, the law does not oblig ate the a g ency to conform its sear ch to the dictates of

the re quester. T he Ha

rdy Dec laration filed in this case spec ifically states that “the FB Iconducte d a sea

rch of the [Chi cag o Field Of

fice ] i ndices to the CRS to i dentify all potentially

responsive f

iles index ed to Alber

t L ee Span,” and that “the FB Iconducte d a sea rch of the FB Iheadqua

rters indice s to the CRS to identify all potentially

responsive f

iles index ed to Albert Span.” Har dy

Dec l. ¶¶ 32, 34. Span has not off ere d any specific fac ts to support a conclusion that the F BI ’s dec ision not t o sear ch its I -drive w as unre asonable or fe ll short of the require ments of the law to c onduct a se arc h that is “rea sonably expected to produc e the information re quested.” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. Furthe rmore, a car eful e x amination of the ag ency ’s desc ription of the CRS i ndicates that it would have bee n redunda nt to searc h the var ious file sy stems mentioned in Span’s 2008 FOIA re quest to FB Iheadqua rters, a s they

are all part of Span’s cites Public Citiz en v. D ep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634 ( D.C. Cir. 2002) and 1 Antonelli, 2006 WL367893, in support of the proposition that an ag ency is obligate d by

law to sear ch spec ific files if so re quested by the re quester. H is reliance is mispl ace d. Public Citiz en did not even obliquely

addre ss this i ssue, and Antonelli mere ly stated that “[a]bsent plaintiff’s specific reque st for a se arc h of the ha rd drives, de fenda

nt had no obliga

tion under the F OIA to sear ch them.” Antonelli, 2006 WL367893, at *7. The c ourt in Antonelli did not indicate that a specific reque st alone wa s sufficient to oblig ate the a g ency to searc h wher e re quested. -8-the CRS. Compare Har dy Dec l. ¶¶ 26-31 ( descr ibing CRS and its related sy stems) with Span’s 2008 FOIA Request, id. Ex . P. Span also maintains that it is “incredulous” that the sear ch wa s adequate in light of the relatively small number of re cords located in response to his request. Opp’n, A ttachment 1, Pl.’s Dec l. of Disputed Mater ial Fa cts (Mar . 23, 2009) (“ Pl.’s Decl.”) ¶ 1. He argues that “c ommon sense would sug g est that the F BI ’s Chicag o Field Of fice should have more than 50 pag es of documents re lated to someone the DOJ claims to have controlled a section of the Chica g o metropolitan are a, and w as a le ader of a notorious Chicag o street g ang known as the B lack Disciples.” Opp’ n at 8-9 (punc tuation and ca pitaliz ation altere d). Given that Span is not entit led to rec ords about other

persons, a s those are protec ted under various provisions of the Privac y Act and/or the F OIA, and that the F BI is but one of multiple DOJ components that mig ht have
cre ated a nd maintained re cords in the investig ation leadingto Span’s prosec ution, his i nvocation of common sense is not persuasive a s a basis on which to c onclude that the a g ency ’s sea rch w as inadequate. In any

case , the law holds that “[t] he re sults of a sear ch do not deter mine whether the sea rch is ade quate.” Amuso, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 89. Rather , the ade quacy of a se arc h is deter mined by its methods. W

eisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485. On this recor d, the FB Ihas established that it conducted se arc hes that we re r easona bly expected to produc e the infor mation reque sted. B. The Exe mptions Asserted The F BI has asse rted F OIA Exempti ons 2, 6, 7(C), 7(D) , and 7(E) as justification for specific withholdings. Ha rdy Dec l. ¶¶ 41, 43; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(2), ( b)(6) , (b)( 7)(C), (b)( 7)(D) , and (b) (7)( E). Span interpose s g ener al, not specific , challeng es to the use of these

-9-exemptions . He a lso argues that the c ircumstance s require an index of exempti ons, see Opp’n

at 7, 11, and a

n in camera revie w of the doc uments, see Compl. at 8. An ag ency ’s explanation for withholding inf ormation under F OIA exemptions m ust meet two require ments. First, it must “specifica lly identify [] the re asons why a par ticular e x emption is rele vant,” a

nd second, it must “cor

relat[ e] those claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they

apply .” Mead D ata Cent., Inc. v. D ep’t of the Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Vaughn v . Rosen , 484 F.2d 820, 827 ( D.C. Cir. 1973). Any ag ency may , but is not required to, mee t these re quirements by developingan index. “[I ]tis the function, not the form, of the index t hat is important.” Keys v. D ep’t of Justice , 830 F.2d 337 ( D.C. Cir. 1987). Whatever

form the e x planation takes, it must be clea r enough to allow a de novo revie w of its application of the e x emptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)( B) . Although a court may

conduct a

n in camera revie w, bec ause it re quires ef fort and r esourc es . . . a c ourt should not resort to it routinely on the theory

that ‘it can’ t hurt.’” Ray v . Turner , 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 ( D.C. Cir. 1978). “I f a district c ourt believe s that an in camera inspection is unnece ssary to make a r esponsible de

novo deter

mination on the claims of exemption, it acts within its broad discre tion by decliningto conduct suc h a re view.” Juarez v . Dep’ t of Justice, 518 F.3d 54, 60 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (interna l quotation marks and c itations omi tted). To protec t the identity

of conf idential source s (“CS”), includingthe ag ency ’s numeric al code ide ntifying a

particula r CS, and the information g leane d from that CS, the FB Iconjointly
asser ts Ex emptions 2 and 7(D) . Ex emption 2 protects informa tion “related solely

to the internal . . . prac tices of a

n ag ency .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) . Ex emption 7(D) a pplies to “information compiled for la

w enf orce ment purposes,” that “could r easona bly be expected to disclose the
-10-identity

of a c onfidential sourc e . . . [or] i nformation fur nished by a conf idential source .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)( D). On the ir fac e, these exemptions justify withholding the a g ency

’s assig ned identification code number for a CS, and the information that was g leane d from the CS. The F BI asser ts Ex emptions 6 and 7(C) tog ether to withhold information about persons other than the plaintiff if disclosure would constitute a “c lear ly unwar rante d invasion of per sonal privac y ,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) , or — for rec ords compiled for

law enf orce ment — if disclosure would constitute an unwa rra nted invasion of per sonal privac y , 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)( C). Ag ain, the application of these exemptions appear s justified on their fac e. Span asser

ts the public domain exception to these exemptions and ar gues that “[a]ll of the information that the F BI

is trying to ke ep fr om plaintiff has pre viously been r elea sed into the public domain via judicial proc eeding s, or the F BI and the U.S. Attorne y ’s Off ice lea king information to the media to pre judice plaintiff’ s criminal trial proc eeding s.” Opp’n 12 ( applying this same argument to the use of Exemptions 6 and 7(C)); see also id. at 13 (a pplying this argument to the use of Exemption 7(D)); Pl.’s Dec l. ¶ 3 (stating that the information conta ined in the “he avily

reda cted” form 302’s “ has alre ady been r elea sed to the public domain via c ivil, criminal, judicial proc eeding s, newspape rs, websites a nd other media

outlets . . . .”). Of

course , Span has no wa

y of knowingwhether

all the re dacte d information is in the public domain, as he does not know what is in t he undisclosed r ecor ds. I n any case , Span has not “‘point[ed] to specific information in the public domain that appe ars to duplicate that beingwithheld,’” a s the law re quires him to do before a cour t can f ind that the exemption has been wa ived by the public domain doctrine. Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d at 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Afshar v. Dep’ t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 ( D.C. Cir. 1983)). I t is the burden of a FOIA plaintiff, not a F OIA
-11-defe ndant, to identify the “spe cific infor

mation in the public domain that might duplicate that beingwithheld.” Public Citiz en v. D ep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634, 645 ( D.C. Cir. 2002) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Be cause Span has not identified any specific information or the“ the

exac t portions” of a

specific document that is in fac t “pre serve d in a per manent public domain,” his public domain challeng e fa ils. Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). To protec t its i nterna l assessment ratings of publicly known law e nforc ement tec hniques and proc edure s, the FB Iasser ts Ex emption 2 in conjunction with Ex emption 7(E). Exemption 2, as noted a bove, exempts from disclosure infor mation that is “relate d solely to the internal . . . prac tices of a

n ag ency .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) . Ex emption 7(E) a pplies to “information compiled for law enfor ceme nt purposes,” that “would disclose tec hnics and proc edure s for law enfor ceme nt investiga

tions or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for la w enf orce ment investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure would rea sonably be expected to r isk circ umvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)( E). Span ar g ues that the e x emption applies only to law enf

orce ment techniques or

proce dures that a

re not g ener ally

known to the public, and there fore do not apply

in his case. See Opp’n at 11, 14. His challeng e misses the point. The F BI did not withhold i nformation about the te chniques or pr ocedur es, but only the FB I ’s own interna l assessment of the usefulness of various we ll-known technique s and proc edure s in a particula r
case . See Har dy

Dec l. ¶ 50. As the Ha

rdy Dec lara tion ex plains, the investigative techniques “ are rate d numerica lly

to memorialize their eff

ectivene ss” and that “ [i ]f the form contains a numerica l ratingadjac ent to one or more of the listed investig ative tec hniques, all columns of ratings a re excised in order to pre clude disclosure of both the par ticular investig ative tec hniques used in the investigation and the ef

fec tiveness of the individual tec hniques.” Id. An examination of the

-12-rele ased r ecor ds show that these re dactions ar e fa irly descr ibed. See, e .g., Har dy Dec l. Ex . O at “SPAN-52.” The defe ndants have justified their use of Exemptions 2 and 7(E) to withhold their internal ratings of the techniques a nd proce dures use d. Span’s re quest for a

n index of the asserted e x emptions is frivolous under the circ umstances a

nd will be reje cted. The FB Iproduce d to Span copies of r ecor ds that show the prec ise location and e x tent of the re daction in context, and that corr elate the claimed e x emptions with eac h reda ction. A sepa rate index of redac tions would not onl y be re dundant of the information he a lrea dy

has, but would provide less, not more , information to him, because the index would remove the conte x t. Span’s reque st for an in camera revie w will also be re jected. In light of the rec ords produc ed and the ag ency decla ration attac hing c opies of all re sponsive
rec ords not rele ased in full, a r esponsible de novo revie w of the a sserted e x emptions does not require an in camera revie w, and Span ha s not presente d specific fac ts to show good c ause f or an in camera revie w. See J

uarez, 518 F.3d a

t 60. Aside from these objections, Span does not separ ately dispute that the defe ndants produce d all seg reg able infor mation. On this recor d, there is no reason to doubt the a g ency ’s sworn state ment that all rea sonably seg reg able infor

mation has been se g reg ated a

nd rele ased. H ardy

Dec l. ¶ 72. III. CONCLUSION A ca ref ul reviewof the e ntire re cord a nd the par ties’ ar g uments in this case shows that there is no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct, and that the de fenda nts are e ntitled to judgment as a matter of la

w bec ause the y

have de monstrated that they conducte d sear ches r easona bly expected to produce all rele vant information and ha ve either rele ased a ll non-exempt i nformation or

-13-justified withholding the information. Accor dingly , the def endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt will be gr anted. A se parate orde r ac companies this memora ndum opinion.
HENRY H. KENNEDY , J R. Date: Ma rch 22, 2010 United States District J udg e

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