SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4031-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

ISAKOVA O. SEALY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted November 6, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Accurso, Gilson and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 16-06-0917.

Arleo & Donohue, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Frank 

Paul Arleo and Gianna A. Bove, on the briefs).

Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (Alanna M. Jereb, Assistant Prosecutor, on 

the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 31, 2019
2

A-4031-17T1

Defendant Isokova O. Sealy – a former correction officer – was charged 

in eleven counts of a forty-count indictment for his participation in a scheme to 

smuggle tobacco into the Hudson County Correctional Facility.1 Following a 

jury trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree pattern of official 

misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7(a). The jury acquitted defendant on two counts 

and was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining eight charges. He was 

sentenced to a three-year prison term, with a two-year period of parole 

ineligibility.

Defendant appeals his conviction, raising the following points for our 

consideration:

I. . . . DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF 

CHOICE WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 

ARBITRARI[]LY REFUSED HIS REQUEST FOR AN 

ADJOURNMENT TO RETAIN NEW PRIVATE 

COUNSEL.

(Not raised below)

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO 

INDIVIDUALLY VOIR DIRE JUROR [NUMBER 

NINE] AND THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE 

JURY DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO A 

FAIR TRIAL.

(Partially raised below)

1

 Three inmates and their mothers were also charged in the indictment; their 

matters are not part of this appeal.
3

A-4031-17T1

III. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 

REQUEST INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONING OF THE

ENTIRE JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS IN 

ADDITION TO HER FAILURE TO RAISE THE 

VOIR DIRE ISSUE ON DIRECT APPEAL

VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO THE 

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

(Not raised below)

A. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 

REQUEST INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONING OF EACH MEMBER OF THE JURY 

DURING JURY DELIBERATIONS 

DEMONSTRATES HER SUBSTANDARD PERFORMANCE.

(Not raised below)

B. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 

RAISE THE VOIR DIRE ISSUE ON 

DIRECT APPEAL DEMONSTRATES 

HER SUBSTANDARD PERFORMANCE.

(Not raised below)

We are persuaded by some of the arguments defendant raises in points I 

and II, and – on the record before us – we are not convinced defendant received 

a fair trial because his request to adjourn the trial to retain new private counsel 

was summarily denied, and the trial judge thereafter failed to investigate 

allegations that a juror introduced extraneous information during jury 
4

A-4031-17T1

deliberations. We therefore reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. 

In view of our decision, the contentions raised in point III are moot.2

I.

We first consider defendant's argument that the judge referenced in point 

I (second motion judge) erred by summarily denying his request for an 

adjournment to substitute private counsel, without fully applying the governing 

law. In order to place the judge's findings in perspective, we summarize the 

procedural history from the brief proceedings before her and the first motion 

judge, who previously had denied defense counsel's request to be relieved of her 

representation of defendant.

A.

Defendant was arrested in January 2016; retained counsel in February; 

indicted in June; and arraigned in July. His opportunity to enter into a plea 

2

 Without reaching the merits of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument, we nonetheless recognize the issues raised in point III are not ripe for 

direct appeal. Resolution of those issues – which may have been grounded in 

trial strategy – "lie[s] outside the trial record." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,

460 (1992). We also note the point headings incorrectly state the issues were 

not raised on direct appeal, as this is defendant's direct appeal.
5

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agreement was "cutoff"

3

in December. Ten days before the initial March 7, 2017 

trial date, the PJ granted defense counsel's request for an adjournment because 

counsel was on trial in another matter. The PJ scheduled a peremptory trial date 

for May 2, although defense counsel apparently had informed the PJ she would 

be on trial in another county on "the oldest case in the State[,]" with a client 

who, unlike defendant, was charged with murder and had "been in jail since 

2012."

One month later, defense counsel moved to be relieved from her 

representation of defendant, citing his failure to communicate with her and pay 

for services she had rendered as of that date. Following oral argument on April 

12, the first motion judge denied counsel's request, finding that the application 

was belated in view of the upcoming May 2 trial date, and defendant had 

expressed his desire for defense counsel to continue as his attorney.4

3

 See R. 3:9-3(g) ("After the pretrial conference has been conducted and a trial 

date set, the court shall not accept negotiated pleas absent the approval of the 

Criminal Presiding Judge (PJ) based on a material change of circumstance, or 

the need to avoid a protracted trial or a manifest injustice.").

4

 The record does not reflect that defendant was placed under oath before the 

inquiry was conducted.
6

A-4031-17T1

Apparently, the May 2 trial date was postponed to July 12 because defense 

counsel was on trial in the murder case. On July 12, the PJ again granted defense 

counsel's request to postpone the trial, this time because counsel "was starting 

another trial." Defendant's trial was rescheduled to September 12.

On that day, defense counsel sought an adjournment before the second 

motion judge, again seeking to be relieved of her representation of defendant. 

Citing correspondence entitled "termination letter," which she had received from 

defendant one week earlier, counsel told the judge, "there's been a breakdown 

in communication that clearly will affect my ability to adequately and properly 

defend Mr. Sealy at this time, given the fact that he even phrased his letter that 

way and sent it to me." Among other things,5 defendant's letter directed counsel 

"to send his file to his new attorney . . . ."

Defense counsel contacted defendant's potential new attorney, who 

indicated he and his partner "had spoken with the State, and that they did not 

. . . enter an appearance on this case or prepare a substitution of attorney . . . but 

5

 Defendant also requested discovery and complained that counsel "had not 

contacted him to prepare for [the upcoming] trial." Counsel informed the judge 

that the file was "very voluminous," but she had made available to defendant all 

discovery she received from the State.
7

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they would if [she] were to be relieved as counsel." Neither potential new 

attorney appeared at the hearing.

Defense counsel acknowledged her trial schedule in other matters caused 

defendant's trial to be delayed three times. Counsel also told the judge she had 

not spoken with defendant since May 2017, claiming she had previously "gone 

over this case numerous times" with him, and it was his obligation to contact 

her if he wished to discuss the case further. The prosecutor indicated he was 

prepared to proceed, but "underst[oo]d defense counsel's reservations [in] trying 

this matter." Accordingly, the prosecutor did not object to an adjournment, but 

rather "submit[ted] to the [c]ourt and [its] best judgment."

In a terse oral decision, the judge denied the application. Having noted 

during colloquy with defendant the failure of defendant's potential new counsel 

to appear in court that day, the judge directed her ruling to defendant:

This case is an old case. You have competent 

counsel. [Defense counsel] is . . . well known here in 

our criminal courts, and is well versed to defend this 

case. You wanted her on this case and begged this court 

before [the first motion judge], to keep her on there 

[sic]. That was long ago.

And now we cannot just keep on switching 

[attorneys], because . . . [t]hat's known as a delay tactic. 

Keep on changing attorneys. Get another adjournment, 

another adjournment, and another adjournment.
8

A-4031-17T1

I cannot delay this case any longer. We [are] 

going to be picking a jury this afternoon. I'm ordering 

all parties to report before [the trial judge] . . . .

[(Emphasis added).]

B.

We commence our analysis with well-established principles, recognizing 

we review the trial court's denial of an adjournment request under an abuse of 

discretion standard. State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 537 (2011). It is axiomatic

that criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel 

under the United States and New Jersey constitutions. State v. King, 210 N.J. 

2, 16 (2012). An essential element is "the right of a defendant to secure counsel 

of his own choice." State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 401 (App. Div. 

1985). That right, however, is not absolute. Ibid. "The trial court must strike a 

balance between its inherent and necessary right to control its own calendar and 

the public's interest in the orderly administration of justice, on the one hand, and 

the defendant's constitutional right to obtain counsel of his own choice, on the 

other." Hayes, 205 N.J. at 538.

"What constitutes a reasonable adjournment to permit a defendant to 

retain counsel of his own choice depends generally upon the surrounding facts 

and circumstances." Ibid. (quoting Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. at 402). The 
9

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factors included in this determination are set forth in United States v. Burton, 

584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978), adopted by New Jersey courts in 

Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. at 402, and reiterated in State v. Kates, 216 N.J. 393, 

396 (2014) (Furguson factors):

the length of the requested delay; whether other 

continuances have been requested and granted; the 

balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, 

witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the 

requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it 

is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the 

defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives 

rise to the request for a continuance; whether the 

defendant has other competent counsel prepared to try 

the case, including the consideration of whether the 

other counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel; 

whether denying the continuance will result in 

identifiable prejudice to defendant's case, and if so, 

whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial 

nature; the complexity of the case; and other relevant 

factors which may appear in the context of any 

particular case.

"If a trial court conducts a reasoned, thoughtful analysis of the appropriate 

factors, it can exercise its authority to deny a request for an adjournment to

obtain counsel of choice." Kates, 216 N.J. at 396-97. "[A] lengthy factual 

inquiry is [not] required." Id. at 397.

But, the absence of such an "analysis results in a one-sided and, 

consequently, arbitrary determination." State v. Martinez, 440 N.J. Super. 537, 
10 A-4031-17T1

545 (App. Div. 2015). "[I]f a trial court summarily denies an adjournment to 

retain private counsel without considering the relevant factors, or abuses its 

discretion in the way it analyzes those factors, . . . deprivation of the right to 

choice of counsel [can] be found." Kates, 216 N.J. at 397.

Against that legal backdrop, we conclude the second motion judge abused 

her discretion in her analysis of certain factors and failed to consider other 

relevant factors. Without citing Furguson, or any governing law, the judge 

summarily concluded the case was "old"; defendant "[kept] on changing 

attorneys"; defendant "begged" the first motion judge to deny his attorney's prior 

motion to be relieved; and defendant had "competent counsel." At least two of 

those conclusions find no support in the record.

Initially, we recognize the trial date had been postponed three times within 

the fifteen-month timeframe following indictment and plea cutoff had been 

entered nine months before the ultimate trial date. But, each of those 

adjournments was made at defense counsel's request and granted to 

accommodate her trial schedule. Unlike defendant, counsel's clients in those 

other matters were in custody or their cases were older. Absent from the record 

is any indication that defendant previously sought to adjourn any of the trial 

dates to retain new counsel. Rather, defense counsel represented defendant 
11 A-4031-17T1

continuously from February 2016 to sentencing in April 2018. The judge's 

determination that the trial was adjourned because defendant "[kept] on 

changing attorneys" therefore finds no support in the record. Any implication 

that the requested adjournment on September 12 was made for "dilatory, 

purposeful, or contrived" reasons is accordingly suspect. Ibid. We discern no 

basis to attribute the age of the case to any fault of defendant.

Nor does the record support the judge's finding that defendant implored 

the first motion judge to deny defense counsel's motion to be relieved:

[FIRST MOTION JUDGE]: Okay. So let me ask you 

this. Do you want her to continue as your attorney?

[]DEFENDANT: Yes and no.

[FIRST MOTION JUDGE]: Okay.

[]DEFENDANT: I mean, I don't really have a problem 

with her.

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: And I don't have a problem with 

him . . . .

[]DEFENDANT: I mean, the financial issue is the 

problem, and I understand that. But I said there was 

[sic] . . . certain events that . . . transpired.

. . . .

[FIRST MOTION JUDGE]: . . . before I proceed, I just 

need to know do you want her to be your lawyer for this 

trial or not?
12 A-4031-17T1

[]DEFENDANT: Well, I would like to be [sic].

That colloquy does not suggest defendant "begged" the first motion judge to 

deny defense counsel's application. Instead, defendant appears to have 

equivocated, without further explanation or inquiry from his attorney or the 

judge.

Also, although the second motion judge noted defense counsel's 

competence, our Supreme Court has recognized "the availability of other 

competent counsel, while relevant, 'is no substitute by itself for the 

constitutional right to choose counsel . . . .'" Kates, 216 N.J. at 396 (quoting 

State v. Kates, 426 N.J. Super. 32, 46 (App. Div. 2012)). "To argue otherwise 

is to confuse the right to counsel of choice – which is the right to a particular 

lawyer regardless of comparative effectiveness – with the right to effective 

counsel – which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever 

lawyer is chosen or appointed." Kates, 426 N.J. Super. at 46 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Turning to the remaining Furguson factors, we note at the conclusion of 

the hearing the second motion judge correctly observed defendant's potential 

new counsel had not contacted the court to seek an adjournment of trial or 

indicated "he ha[d] been newly assigned [sic] to this case[,]" but the judge 
13 A-4031-17T1

otherwise failed to determine "the length of the requested delay." Furguson, 198 

N.J. Super. at 402. We see no reason, under the circumstances presented here, 

why the judge could not have ordered potential new counsel to contact the court 

forthwith to address that factor and any other concerns she had about adjourning 

the trial.

More importantly, the judge failed to inquire about defense counsel's 

declaration that her communication with defendant had "br[oken] down." 

Recognizing "defense counsel's reservations" in that regard, the prosecutor did 

not oppose the application for an adjournment – nor assert any attendant 

inconvenience – even though a new trial date had not been proposed. Notably, 

the second motion judge did not preside over the trial and did not indicate 

whether the trial judge's schedule would have been adversely impacted by an 

adjournment. Absent from the record, therefore, is any indication that the 

"litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court" would have been inconvenienced 

by an adjournment. Ibid.

Finally, we reject the State's fleeting argument that defendant suffered no 

prejudice by defense counsel's continued representation. As we have 

recognized, "[w]hen the right to counsel is wrongfully denied, it is not necessary 

to inquire as to effectiveness of counsel or whether defendant suffered actual 
14 A-4031-17T1

prejudice in the ensuing proceedings." Martinez, 440 N.J. Super. at 546; see 

also Kates, 426 N.J. Super. at 44 ("A non-indigent defendant who is erroneously 

or arbitrarily denied the constitutional right to counsel of his or her choice need 

not show prejudice to obtain reversal of a conviction.").

Because she failed to properly consider and balance the Furguson factors, 

we conclude the second motion judge abused her discretion by summarily 

denying defendant's request for an adjournment to substitute private counsel.

II.

We turn to the issues raised during jury deliberations concerning a juror's 

possible introduction of extraneous information.

A.

On the second day of jury deliberations, Juror Number Seven sent a note 

to the trial judge requesting to speak with him "in private." The judge 

summoned the juror into the courtroom in the presence of counsel to discuss her 

request. After addressing an unrelated scheduling issue, Juror Number Seven 

asked the judge: "Now, if there is an individual in the jury room that's more 

biased because of a certain background, is that something that we're supposed 

to bring up as a question, or how does that work?"
15 A-4031-17T1

The judge responded that he could not "restrict" discussions between the 

jurors, but he should be informed of a situation that was "potential[ly] harmful 

to others or [if] it [wa]s becoming problematic or somebody ha[d] some concerns

. . . ." Juror Number Seven then stated: "It's just a very strong situation that's a 

little scary . . . ." The judge told the juror, "if you think it's something, [you] 

[sh]ould discuss it with your foreperson. If you think it's something . . . that I 

need to address, then it should be presented out to me." After discussing the 

exchange with defense counsel and the prosecutor outside the presence of the 

juror, the judge instructed Juror Number Seven not to discuss their exchange 

with the other jurors, but to send him a more detailed note if she had further 

issues.

Toward the end of deliberations on the following day, Juror Number 

Seven sent the following note to the trial judge:

Judge, [Juror Number Nine] cannot be a part of the jury 

team. She has family that are cops, her husband was in 

jail, she talked about her son being a cop, [and] her 

husband used to get things when he was in jail. Please 

consider her removal.

In the presence of counsel, the judge again questioned Juror Number 

Seven, noting the jury had indicated it had already reached a unanimous verdict 
16 A-4031-17T1

on three of the eleven counts. When asked whether "anything beyond what [she] 

wrote in the [note]" concerned her, Juror Number Seven replied:

It's not only me. . . . [I]t's a group of us and, in 

the conversations, there's bringing up Facebook or, you 

know, son's a cop and this is going on, that's going on. 

[Juror Number Nine] talks about her husband being in 

jail, getting things that he wasn't supposed to while he 

was in jail, . . . it's not a[n] . . . unbiased opinion that's 

constantly being thrown out there and it's making a lot 

of people uncomfortable. . . . It's getting crazy in there, 

to be honest.

The judge instructed Juror Number Seven to return to the jury room while 

he discussed with counsel her concerns and another note the jury had sent to him 

regarding the taking of a partial verdict. Although much of the record is 

indiscernible, defense counsel expressed concern that Juror Number Nine had 

brought her "outside experiences" into the jury room. The judge indicated Juror 

Number Nine "said she had family in law enforcement" during jury selection. 

Because of the lateness of the hour, the judge excused the jury for the weekend.

When the jury reconvened the following week, before responding to Juror 

Number Seven's note, the judge heard argument from counsel. The prosecutor 

asked whether the court explicitly had questioned Juror Number Nine about her 

family history during jury selection, adding, "[i]f she wasn't [asked about it], 

then I think it's an issue that the jury can't proceed." The judge replied, "Well, 
17 A-4031-17T1

I think she indicated her husband was convicted of . . . bookmaking in the early 

'80s." (Emphasis added).6

Defense counsel requested the judge voir dire Juror Number Nine to learn 

what she had disclosed to the jury about her husband's incarceration and how 

that might have influenced her. Counsel contended proceeding without 

conducting any further inquiry would constitute reversible error. The judge 

disagreed and elaborated:

The difficulty this note presents is it appears what is 

going on in the jury room is jury deliberations. Jurors 

are told, often by attorneys during summations; use 

your life experience and common sense. They're told 

in my instructions to use your common sense.

There is nothing in this note that triggers a 

concern in this [c]ourt's mind about a team player. We 

know that this jury has been able to . . . although not 

delivered, . . . reach[] verdicts on [seven] of [eleven] 

counts. . . .

[T]he fact that [Juror Number Nine] may be 

talking about her son in law enforcement . . . they're 

6

 During jury selection, Juror Number Nine revealed at sidebar that her father 

was an attorney, her brother-in-law was a municipal chief of police, and her son 

was a police officer for another municipality. The juror also disclosed that prior 

to her marriage, her husband had been arrested for bookmaking in the 1980s 

(emphasis added). She indicated that neither her family's law enforcement 

employment nor her husband's "difficulties bookmaking [sic]" would impact her 

ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Juror Number Nine did not, however, 

disclose that her husband had served time in jail in connection with his 

"arrest[]."
18 A-4031-17T1

going to have discussions as part of the deliberations. I 

don't see any way to make inquiry [about] what impact 

it may have had on her. It doesn't make a difference. 

There's nothing wrong if her decision[-]making is based 

on who she is and what makes her tick.

Her decision[-]making may be based on the fact 

that she has a son in law enforcement. It doesn't mean 

she's prejudiced or biased. That's who she is. That's 

who you all knew . . . she was. She had a husband that 

was convicted of bookmaking. She indicated it had no 

impact on her life. She can be fair and impartial.

There's nothing to indicate that she is in any way 

using outside sources, [or] that she's speaking to 

anybody about this case outside. There's not an 

indication there is a single instruction of this [c]ourt 

that has been violated by [J]uror [N]umber [Nine]. And 

I have to, in all candor, question somewhat the sincerity 

of [J]uror [N]umber [Seven] writing a note that 

someone's not a team player.

. . . . 

The note doesn't say [J]uror [N]umber [Nine] 

spoke to her husband last night and he told her that he 

used to get things in jail. It doesn't say that. So there's 

nothing to make inquiry of this juror. She may be 

speaking about their life experiences, as I imagine all 

of them do, as we tell them to use [their] common sense. 

What's your common sense based on? Life experience. 

I don't find that there's . . . any further inquiry needed 

to be raised.

Defense counsel disagreed, arguing: "The issue that I have is that a juror 

wrote on a note that her husband received things in jail. That goes directly to 
19 A-4031-17T1

this case."7 The judge denied counsel's request that the court conduct a further 

inquiry, and her ensuing application for a mistrial. The jury resumed 

deliberations, and shortly thereafter rendered a partial verdict, as stated above.

B.

We begin our review with well-settled principles. The Sixth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey 

Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury. 

See State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 557 (2001). A criminal defendant "is entitled 

to a jury that is free of outside influences and will decide the case according to 

the evidence and arguments presented in court in the course of the criminal trial 

itself." State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 60 (1983). "The securing and preservation 

of an impartial jury goes to the very essence of a fair trial." Ibid.

Ordinarily, we defer to the trial court's decisions concerning "matters 

pertaining to the jury." R.D., 169 N.J. at 560. Accordingly, "[t]he decision to 

grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge." State v. 

7

 Defendant did not testify nor present the testimony of any witnesses at trial. 

Notwithstanding the testimony of three inmates, who claimed their mothers paid 

defendant to smuggle tobacco into the jail for them, and a video apparently 

depicting defendant bringing tobacco into the jail, defense counsel argued the 

State failed to prove defendant was guilty as charged in the indictment. Among 

other things, counsel contended the State failed to prove the substance depicted 

in the video was tobacco.
20 A-4031-17T1

Gleaton, 446 N.J. Super. 478, 524 (App. Div. 2016). While we recognize 

"granting a mistrial in a criminal case 'is an extraordinary remedy[,]' the trial 

judge is bound to grant this relief when it is necessary to 'prevent an obvious 

failure of justice.'" Id. at 514 (quoting State v. Yough, 208 N.J. 385, 397 (2011)) 

(citation omitted).

Whether the court failed to properly exercise its discretion in handling 

juror issues depends upon whether the court's actions impaired defendant's right 

to a fair trial. "[A] defendant's right to be tried before an impartial jury is one 

of the most basic guarantees of a fair trial." State v. Brown, 442 N.J. Super. 

154, 179 (App. Div. 2015) (citation omitted).

We have observed the trial judge has a "duty to investigate any claims that 

may affect the integrity of the jury's deliberations." Gleaton, 446 N.J. Super. at 

518. For example, in Gleaton, we rejected the trial judge's reliance on one juror's 

description of an issue concerning another juror. We observed "the judge should 

have interviewed each juror individually." Id. at 519. "This approach . . . 

permit[s] the judge to gauge the extent of the problem in a private setting 

conducive to promote candor and honesty and less vulnerable to any 

intimidation or unintended pressures associated with group-thinking." Id. at 

518-19; see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R.
21 A-4031-17T1

1:16-1 (2020) (clarifying that although the Rule applies to post-verdict juror voir 

dire, the same method to determine juror taint also applies during trial and jury 

deliberations).

Of course, the trial judge must avoid eliciting information from the jurors 

about their deliberative process and their inclinations on the defendant's guilt. 

See State v. Jenkins, 182 N.J. 112, 134 (2004). We acknowledge that this is 

often easier said than done, particularly here, where the jury was obviously 

divided, the court had already given an Allen

8

charge, and had instructed the 

jury that it could render a partial verdict. We understand the judge's reluctance 

to interject himself into the jury's deliberations under these circumstances. We 

conclude, however, that Juror Number Seven's allegation that Juror Number 

Nine related matters extraneous to the evidence adduced at trial, i.e., her

husband's apparent disclosure about how he obtained "things" when he was 

incarcerated – the very issue the jury was charged with considering here –

required, at the very least, closer questioning of Juror Number Seven and likely 

voir dire of Juror Number Nine.

In reaching our decision, we note Juror Number Nine's reference to her 

husband's experience while incarcerated related directly to the charges before 

8

 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1986).
22 A-4031-17T1

the jury and was not the sort of common life experience or knowledge jurors 

might have acquired from the media. Compare State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 252 

(1966) (recognizing statements by jurors that "cops take bribes" constituted 

permissible deliberation based on life experience learned from the media) with

State v. Grant, 254 N.J. Super. 571, 588 (App. Div. 1992) (observing a juror's 

statements about conversations with her correction officer husband regarding 

his opinion on the defendant's guilt based on his law enforcement experience 

constituted impermissible extraneous information).

In sum, because we conclude the second motion judge summarily 

adjourned the trial without properly assessing the relevant Furguson factors, and 

the trial judge should have questioned Juror Number Seven as to precisely what 

Juror Number Nine related to the jury about her husband's receipt of "things that 

he wasn't supposed to" get in jail before declining to voir dire Juror Number 

Nine, we are constrained to reverse and remand for a new trial. See State v. 

Gibson, 219 N.J. 227, 241 (2014) ("A single error or a combination of errors in 

a pre-trial proceeding or a trial or both may require an appellate court to reverse 

the conviction and to remand for a new trial.").

Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.