The Honor able Na ncy G. Edmunds, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District * of Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0044n.06 F iled: Janu ary 17, 2007 No. 05-6349 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UN ITED STA TES , P laintif f-App ellee,

v. JESUS ANTONIO HERNANDEZ, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE E AST ERN D ISTRIC T OF KENT UCKY

Before: DA UG HTREY, GIBBONS, Circuit Jud ges; and EDMUNDS, Distr ict Judge * JULIA SMITH G IBBO NS, C ircuit Judge

. De fe nd ant Je su s A nto nio He rn and e z ap pe a ls his sentence of 327 months for money -launde ring conspirac y and eng ag ing in a continuing cr iminal enter prise. He rnande z asserts that the di s t ri ct court’s failure to state the rea sons for his particula r

se nte nc e in o pe n co ur

t wa s pla in er

ro r i n v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (c ) a nd tha t hi s c a se sh ou ld be re manded f

or re sentenc ing. F urther, H erna ndez argues that he e ntere d into an involuntary plea

a g re e me nt o n th e ba sis of pr omi se s ma de by the pr os e c uto r t

hat w e re ne ve r f

ulf ill e d, and a s a re su lt he sh ou ld b e a llo we d to wi thd ra w his g uil ty ple a . B e c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa ilure to c omp ly wi th § 3 55 3( c ) d id n ot a ff

e c t H e rn and e z’s su

bs tanti a l ri g hts and the re fo re is no t pl a in e rr or , a nd be c a us e his plea withdraw al ar g ument fails, we a ffirm the judg ment of the district cour t.3 I

. Her nandez was the leade r of a drug ring that transporte d substantial qua ntities of marijuana and money

betwee n Arizona and e astern K entucky . Acc ording to both Herna nd ez ’s p lea a

nd the Pr e se nte nc e Re po rt

(P SR) , me mbe rs of

the or g anizatio n h id stack s o f U .S. c ur re nc y , p a c ka g e d in shrink-wra

p, in the headliner s of their ve hicles. These vehicles w ere then driven to A rizona, where He rn and e z too k p os se ssi on of the mon e y

and loa de d th e veh ic le s w ithmari jua na fo r r e tur n to Kentucky . Var ious drivers tra nsported the dr

ug s over the y ear s, but all were paid by Her nandez for thei r s er v i ce s. Herna

ndez directe d more than te n trips betwee n Arizona and Ke ntucky over the

c ours e of se ve n y e ars , w ithe a c h tr ip i nv olv ingsu bs tan ti al qu antitie s o f m ari jua na . T he PSR estimated the total amount of mar ijuana attributab l e to Hernande z to be approxi mately 15,000 pounds, and ca lculated the total a mount of money transporte d betwee n Arizona and Ke ntucky to be roug hly $1,500,000. Her

nandez direc ted at lea st five people in the c onspiracy

. I n mid-2003, DEA ag ents bec ame awa re o f t h e d i s t ri b u t i o no rga n i z at i o ni n volving He rnande z and his co-c onspirators. F ollowing the a rre st and interrog ation of seve ral of his c o-conspirators, on Ap ri l 21 , 20 04 , He rn and e z wa s c ha rg e d a lon g wi th a

c o- de fe nd ant i n a

tw o- c ount i nd ic tme nt w ith drug conspirac y

in violation of 2 1 U.S.C. § 846. S uperse ding indictments include d additional char g es. The final Superseding I ndictment was filed on Aug ust 26, 2004, and cha rg ed He rnande z with involvemen t i n a co n t i n uing c riminal enterpr ise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 and with a money -launde ring conspirac y in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1 9 5 6 (h ). P u rsuant to a wr itten plea ag ree ment, Her

nand ez p l ed g uilty

to violations of 21 U.S.C . § 848 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) on Marc h 23, 2005.4

The c ourt went ove r the plea ag reem en t wi t h Her

nandez in detail at his plea he aringand emphasized the implications of his guilty plea. Her nandez ag ree d with a ll the fac ts as they appea red in the ag ree ment and st ated that he understood the consequence s of hi s plea. The court found that Her nandez was f

ully capa ble and c ompetent of makingan informe d plea and that his plea wa s made knowing ly

and voluntarily

. The PSR calc ulated Her

nandez’s total offe nse level to be 37. This ref lected 38 points for a quantity of gre ater

than 3,000 kilogr ams but less than 10,000 kilogr ams of mar ijuana, an a dditional 2 points because defe ndant was c onvicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 , an d a 3 -point subtraction for

acc eptanc e of r esp o n s i b i l i ty under U .S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). He rnande z was previously convicted of

va ri ou s c ri me s, inc lud ing

mis c on du c t i nv o l v i n g

a w e a p o n , s o l i c i t a tio n to un lawf ull y po sse ss n a rc oti c drug s, car rying a loaded f irea rm, and misconduct involving a we ap o n . These pr ior convictions resulted in a c riminal history cate g ory of I I I

. This, when coupled with his total offense le vel, re sulted in a Gu ide lin e ra

ng e of 26 2 to 32 7 mo nth s. He rn an d ez wa s s en t en ce d o nAu gu s t1 1 , 2 0 0 5

. T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ad o p t edthe f ac tu al fi n d i n gs and Guideline a

pplications in the PS R and ag ree d that the cor rec t Guidelin e ra n ge was 262-327 months. Hernande z informed the co u rt that he had r eviewe d the PSRwith his lawy er a nd had no objections to it. P rior to sentenc ing, H erna ndez’s attorney offe red only that Her nandez knew he wa s fa c ing“ a ve ry , v e ry

lon g tim e ” in j a il, and

a sk e d f or “ the Court ’s me rc y and dis c re tio n to g ive him the sentenc e at the lowe st end, if at all possible.” When g iven the opportunity to speak, He rnande z

sa id o nly “ I ’m jus t sor

ry a bo ut it. I wa

nt to g e t it ov e r wit

h an d do my tim e .” Af

te r s ta tin g that it had “taken into acc ount all of the fa ctors ar ticulated in T i t l e 1 8 , United States Code, Section5

3553(a) ,” the district cour t sentence d Her

nandez to a ter

m of 327 months on Count One and a ter m of 240 months on Count Three, to be se rved c oncurr ently , producinga total term of 327 months. II. Be cause Her

nandez di d not object to his sentenc e, thi s court re views the de termination of the district court for

plain err or. United States v. Aparc o-Centeno , 280 F.3d 1084, 1087 ( 6th Cir. 2002); Fe d. R. Crim. P. 52( b). This c ourt cannot corr ect that err or unless it is “‘pla in’ or ‘cle ar’ under

curr ent law and . . . af

fec ts substantial rights.” United States v. Page , 232 F.3d 536, 543 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g J

o h n s o n v . U

n ite d States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)) . The de fenda nt bear s the burden of persua sion to demonstrate pre judice in the plain-e rror

inquiry

. United St ates v. Newsom , 452 F.3d 593, 604 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Whether the g overnme nt’s conduct violated its plea ag ree ment with a defenda

nt is reviewe d de novo

. United States v. Barnes , 278 F.3d 644, 646 ( 6th Cir. 2002). I I I

. Her nandez first ar g ues that this c ase must be rema nded for r esente ncing beca use the district court fa iled to give rea sons for sente ncing him at the highe st e nd of the a dvisory Guideline ra

ng e as require d by

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) . Section 3553(c) , which United States v. Book er , 43 U.S. 220 (2 00 5) , le ft

un imp a ir e d, state s: (c) Statement of re asons for imposing a s en tence . The c ourt, at the time of sentenc ing, sha ll state in open court the r easons f or its imposi tion of the particula r sentenc e, and, if

the sentenc e — (1) is of the kind, a

nd within the rang e, desc ribed in subsec tion (a)( 4) and that ra

ng e exceeds 24 months, the rea son for imposing a sentenc e at a pa rticular point within the ra ng e; or (2) is not of the kind, or is outside the rang e, descr ibed in subsection (a) ( 4 ) , th e s p e c if

ic r e a s o nf

o r th e im p o s it io no f

a s e n te n c e d if

fer ent fr om t hat de sc ri be d, wh ic h r e a so ns mus t a lso be st ated w ith specific ity

in the written orde r of judg ment and commitment . . . .6

18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( c ). Th e g ov e rnme nt a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t c omm it e rr or

be c a us e it eff ectively complied with the re quirements of § 3553(c) , and even i f t he court did err , any such er ror did not affe ct Her

nandez’s substantial rig hts. This court’s plain e rror

analy sis consists of four distinct considerations. United States v. Thomas , 1 1 F .3 d 6 20 , 6 30 (6 th C ir . 1 99 3) . T o e sta bli shpla in e rr or , a

de fe nd ant m

us t sh ow : (1) that a n err or o cc u rr ed in the district court; (2) that the err or wa s plain, i.e., obvious or clea

r; (3) that the er

ror a ffe cted de fenda

nt’s substantial rig hts; and (4) that this adverse impact seriously aff ecte d the fa irn ess, integ rity or public re putation of the jud ic ia l pr oc e e din g s. Un ite d S tat es v . Ko e be rle in , 1 6 1 F. 3 d 9 4 6 , 9 4 9 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ). He rn an d ez ’s Gu i d el i n e r an ge spanned 65 months (262-327) , but the district court did not sta t e in open cour t why it chose the pa rt ic ula r s e nte nc e wi thi n th e Gu ide lin e s th a t He rn and e z re c e ive d. Ac c or din g ly , it di d n ot c omp ly with the dictates of § 3553(c) (1) a nd there fore committed error

. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . Le wis , 424 F.3d 23 9, 24 6 (2d Cir . 200 5) (f

ind ing that a sen te nc e imp os e d with ou t com ply ing wi th t he sti ll- a pp lic a ble po st- B ooker

require ments of § 3553(c ) constitutes err or, eve n assuming its leng th is reasona ble). I n light of the clar ity

of the statute and the rec ord, this e rror was “obvious or clea r.” Koe be rle in , 161 F .3 d at 949 ; s e e als o Un ite d S tat es v . G or e , 298 F.3d 322, 325 ( 5th Cir. 2002) (finding in 3553(c)( 2) context that “[ t] he text of the statute (‘in open c ourt’) le aves no doub t t h at althoug h it did is sue written re asons, the district cour t committed error

that is plain by

failing to expl ain the rea sons for the depa rture” ). This co u rt h as mentioned t he articulation require ment § 3553(c) on sever al occasions, but ha s n ot d ir e c tly

a dd re sse d w he the r t

he fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th t his sect io n n e c e ssa

ri ly a ff e c ts a defe ndant’s substantial rig hts and there fore constitutes plain error

. S e e, e . g. , Un i t ed S tates v.Her nandez points to Jack

son a s e vid e nc e that th is c ourt c on sid e rs fa ilure to c omp ly wi th 1 § 3553(c) to be plain er

ror. ( Final B r. of Appe llant at 7-8.) This is an ove rsimplification, ho we ve r, a s Jack

son has little in common with t his case. Jack son involved a downwa

rd depar ture fr om the Guidelines. Ye t, the district court in Jack son “ did no t in c lud e any

re fe re nc e to the applica

ble Guidelines provisions or fur ther e x plication of the re asons for the particula r sentenc e imposed” a

nd also failed to mention or c onsider § 3553(a ). Jack son , 408 F.3d at 305. 7 Jack son , 40 8 F .3 d 30 1, 30 5 (6 th Cir . 2 00 5) (m e nti on ingthe § 3 55 3( c ) r e qu ir e me nt, bu t ul tim a te ly

vacating a

nd rema nding f or re sentenc ing be cause the district court’s minimal discussion rende red

rea sonablene ss reviewimpossibl e). 1 Other circ uits that have addre ssed the issue provide some insight. I n United States v. Ve nces , the Ninth Circuit, in dictum , f ound the re wa s n o pla in e rr or wh e re a dis tr ic t c ourt fa ils to a rt ic ulate in open cour

t the rea sons for a depar

ture. 169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 1999). I n Venc es , the district

c ourt ma de no e ff

or t to e xpla in t

he de pa rt ur e in o pe n c ourt

a s r e qu ir e d b y

§ 3 55 3(c)(2 ) b ut d id eng ag e counse l in a discussion, and “the court’s reasons were impl icit in the colloquy the cour t had conducte d with counsel.” Id. The Ve nc es court conclude d that a rema nd for the sa

ke of c ompliance with the technica l dictates of § 3553( c) “ would be a me aning less formality .” Id. Th e Ei g hth Cir c uit has found that a

district court’s a doption of the PSR(which the district court did her e) is suff icient to avoid plain err or whe re that court has f ailed to fo l l o w t h e “open cour t” provision of § 3553(c ). United States v. Ev ans , 272 F.3d 1069, 1089 (8th Cir. 2001)

. The Fifth Circuit a rrived at a similar conclusion in Go re . 298 F.3d at 325 (finding in a Guidelines de parture case that the “ke y aim of the articulation r equire ment [i n § 3553(c) ] is satisfied if an appea ls c ourt can revie w the rea son for the depar ture.” ). The F irst Circ uit ha s also expli citly relied on a

district court’s re fer ence to the PSRas an indi cator of sufficient specific ity to allow appellate review. United States v. Cruz , 981 F.2d 613,Her nandez ar g ues that district court’ s “fa ilure to state its rea sons now prohibit this C ourt 2 from beingable to re view the se ntence for unr easona bleness” but doe s not ex plicitly seek a revie w for r easona

bleness. (F inal Br . of Appe llant at 6; 8.) 8 617-18 (1st Cir. 1992) (f inding r efe renc e to the PSR m et t h e § 3 5 5 3 (c) require ments “by the

narr owest marg in”). Her na n d e z e mp h a s izes the Second Circuit’s holding in Le wis , wher e the c ourt conc luded that the district c ourt’s failure to state specific rea sons f or its sente ncing decision satisfied the pla in error

ana ly sis be c a

us e on ly su c h a state me nt w ou ld a llo w the de fe nd ant “a platf or m up on wh ic h to bu ild an argument that her se ntence is unreasona ble.” 424 F .3d at 247. Her nandez’s re liance on Le wis is mispl ace d, howeve r, as t h at ca se is distinguishable. As a n initial matter, Le wis dealt with § 3553(c) (2), whic h conce rns a sentence that depar ts from the Guidelines r ang e, while He rnande z was g iven a se ntence within the Guidelines rang e. See id. at 243. The Le wis court also “slightly rela x ed” the plain er

ror r eview, a s acknow ledg ed by Her nandez. Id. at 248. Fina lly , the Le wis court conclude d the di strict court had “stat[ed] no reasons at all” f or its sentencingdecision. Id. at 245. As discussed below, the district court in this case did a rticulate its re asoning by

ref ere nce to the § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s. 2 Her e, the district cour

t expl icitly

stated that i t sentenc ed He rnande z only afte r “ha ving taken into account a ll of the fac tors articulated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a) .” The

c ourt a lso e xpre ssl y

a do pte d th e PSR, wh ic h d e ta ils ho w H e rn and e z co or din a ted and dir e c te d h is

e mpl oy e e s in a dr

ug tr a ff ic kin g c on sp ir a c y that sp ann e d s e ve n y e ars , invo lve d a uto ma tic we a

po ns , numerous people , thousands of pounds of drug s, and millions of doll ars . The c ourt informed Her nandez that it would “have to look to a number of fac tors to determine the appropr iate sente ncingBe cause we f ind that the district court’s e rror did not affe ct Her

nandez’s substantial 3 ri g hts , w e ne e d n ot a dd

re ss w he the r t

he e rr or “ se ri ou sly

a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss, int e g ri ty

or pu bli c reputation of the judicial proce eding s,” as is re quired unde r the four th prong of the plain e rror analy sis. See Thomas , 11 F.3d at 630. 9 g uideline ra

ng e in y our case. I have to look at t hings like y our role in the of fense and y our cr iminal his tor y , ju st t o n a me a c ou

ple .” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt inv ite d any argume nts He rn and e z mig ht h a ve wi th respe ct to § 3553(a) , but H erna ndez’s counsel stated only that Her nandez knew he was fa cing a long

se nte nc e and

that he ha d “le arn e d his le sso n. ” Whe n g ive n th e c ha nc e to s pe a k, He rn and e z sa id o nly “I ’m just sorry

about it. Iwant to g et it over with a nd do my time.” When asked if ther e wa s any le g a l r e a so n th e g ive n s e nte nc e sh ou ld not be imp os e d, He rn and e z’s c ouns e l sta te d the re wa s n ot. Al t h o u gh t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt d i d n o t s ay wh y i tch o s e as en t en ce at t h e h i gh en d o f t h e a d v i s o ry

ra n ge

as o p p o s edt o a l o we r o n e, i tgav e agen er al i z edp i ct u re o f i t s re as o n i n g. Finally , Her

nandez w as t h e lea der of a substantial drugtraff

icking ring that transporte d

mari jua na (w ith the a id of nume ro us e mpl oy e e s and we a po ns ) ove r a six to se ve n y e ar pe ri od . H is previous convictions also sug g est a long- term lack of conce rn for compliance with the law. In light of the e ntire re cord, the court’s f ailure to c omply

with § 3553(c) d o es not affe ct Her nandez’s substantial rig hts. Cf. United States v. Kingsley , 2 41 F .3 d 828 , 836 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) (f ind ingthat a sentenc ing c ourt’s fa ilure to expressly explain it s rea sons for exacting a par ticular spec ial condition of super vised rele ase w ill be deemed ha rmless err or if the suppor t i n g rea sons are appar ent on the

overa ll recor d, and accor dingly did not amount to plain error unde r § 3553(c )). The err or her e does not rise to the level of

plain err or. 3 I V.10

He rn andez also asse rts that he ente red into an involuntary plea a g ree ment on the basis of pr omi se s ma de by the pr os e c uto r that we re ne ve r fu lf ill e d, and a s a re su lt he sh ou ld b e a llo we d to withdraw his g uilty

plea. As an ini tial matter, Hernande z’s claim t hat t he United States promised to h a ve his rel ate d st a te c ourt c ha rg e s d ism iss e d is moo t, a s th e ind ic tme nt p e nd inga g a ins t Her nandez in Ohio state cour

t was dismissed on Fe bruar y 22, 2006, as acknow ledg ed by Her nandez in his Final Reply

Br ief. Her nandez also asser

ts, howeve r, that “a s part of the plea a g ree ment, Mr. Her nandez ag ree d to provide substantial assistance to t h e go v er n m ent in exchang e for the filing of a dow nwar d de pa rt ur e mot ion

purs ua nt t o U .S. S.G . § 5K 1. 1 a

nd 18 U. S.C. § 35 53 (e ) b y

the g ov e rnme nt. ” Th is claim also fa ils. Hernande z knowingly pled guilty with the assis tance of counsel. The ag ree ment stated only

that “I f the De fenda

nt provides substantial assistance in the investigation or prosec ution of oth e r p e rs on s w ho have c omm itt e d a n o ff e ns e , th e Un ite d St a te s will consider filing a

motion for a downward departure from the sentencing g uidelines pursuant to 5K1.1 a nd 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) a

nd

a pp lic a ble statut or

y min imum man dator

y se nte nc e . The de c isi on

to f ile a mot ion is solely withi n the dis c re tio n o

f the Un ite d S

tat es. ” (e mphasis added) . The a g ree ment clea rly noted that it was “the complete a

nd only Plea Ag ree ment” betwe en the pa rties, and that the “United States has not made any other promises to the De fenda nt.” Fur ther, He rnande z expressly told the di strict court that he had ca ref ully revie wed the ple a ag ree ment with his lawy er, that h e u n d er s t o o d its terms and conditions, and that no one h ad m ad e any further promises to him that were not e mbodied in the ag ree ment. De sp ite thi s, He rn and e z co nte nd s th a t th e Un ite d St a te s p ro mis e d to fi le a 5K 1. 1 mo tio n if11

he per suaded his fa

mily members to plea d g uilty and t hat this ag ree ment was simply not memorialized in the plea a g ree ment. The ex istence of a sepa rate , unwritten plea

ag ree ment must be proven by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Un ite d S tat es v . H e rre ra , 928 F.2d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 19 91 ). Th e on ly “ e vid e nc e ” pr ov ide d by He rn and e z is his argume nt t hat th e g ov e rnme nt’ s o ff

e r t o he lp g e t th e state c ourt

c la ims dis mis se d w a s a lso no t e mbo die d in th e pl ea a g re e me nt. Th is

a tte nu a te d a

na log y a lon e do e s not ris e to the le ve l of c le ar a nd c on vin c inge vid e nc e , a

nd a c c or din g ly Her nandez’s attempt to withdrawhis plea on this basis fails as we ll. V. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t.