The Honor able Ave rn Cohn, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n Di s t ri ct of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0914n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 20, 2006 No. 05-5698 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee , v. J OSEPH HOWARD ORTKI ESE, Ap pe lla nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE MI DDL E DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

Be fore : SUTTON and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; and COHN, D istrict J udg e. * SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. Joseph Ortkiese appe als his 15-y ear sentenc e under

the Arme d Caree r Criminal Act. B eca use the district court did not commit a ny err or in se ntencing him under the Ac t, w e a ff

ir m.
I.
Whil e flying a

helicopter

over rura l a

rea s of Cannon County , Tenne ssee, state police off icer s sp ott e d s e ve ra l ma

ri jua na pla nts g ro wi ng ne xt t o a dir

t path a bo ut 50 y ard s f

ro m O rtkie se ’s mob ile home. The police proce eded to Or tkiese’s home, a dvised his wife that they had spotted marijuanaNo. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 2 - g rowing on the prope rty

and uproote d and seized 15 marijuana plants
. T h e police se cure d the premises a

nd soug ht a war

rant to sea

rch his home.
B y the tim e the of

fi c e rs re tur

ne d with a wa

rr ant, Or tki e se ha d co me ho me . T he y pla c e d h im under a rre st and asked him to sit in the living r oom while they sear ched othe r rooms of the home
. The off icer s found three long gun s i n the bedr oom and two handguns atop the re frig erator. Even though the office rs had not questioned him y et, Ortkiese said, “Well, Ihave ow ned those guns for 15 y e ars ,” a ft e r t

he of fi c e r r e tr ie ve d th e ha

nd g un s f ro m th e ir pe rc h. JA 71 . He a lso sa id, pr e su ma bly in refe renc e to the long g uns, that he “ha [d] owned those w eapons f or a wh ile.” Id. The off

icer s fo u n d s ev er al m o re gu n s i nt h e o u tb u i l d i n g. On May 26, 2004, a fe dera l gr and jury indicted Ortkiese under the felon-in- posses s ion statut e , 18 U.S. C. §§ 922 (g )( 1) , 924
. Af te r the dis tr ic t court de nie d O rtkie se ’s mot ion to s up pr e ss, a jury convicted O rtkiese on the c harg e. At sen t encing , the g overnme nt introduced e vidence that Ortkiese h ad been thr ice c onvicted of bur g lary in Florida—onc e in 1976 and twice in 1982—and urg ed the c ourt to sentence him under the Armed Car eer Criminal Act. Ortkiese r esponded that the th ir d c on vic tio n d id n ot c ount a s a “ vio le nt f

e lony ” un de r t

he Ac t be c a

us e he ha d p le a de d n olo contende re only

to a ttempted burg lary of a dwelling and third-de g ree burg lary of a stora g e cottag e. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re je c te d O rtkie se ’s argume nt, re a so nin g that bu rg lary of a sto ra g e c ott a g e wa s a “g ener ic” f

orm of burg l ar y fo r purpose s of the Ac t, see 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (e )( 1) , a nd se nte nc e d h im to t he mand a tor

y min imum un de r t

he Ac t—1 5 y e ars .No. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 3 - II.
Ortkiese r aises thre e cha lleng es to his c onviction a nd sentenc e: (1) the district c ourt err ed in denying his motion to suppress the evide nce f ound in his home; (2) third-deg ree burg lary of a sto ra g e c ott a g e is n ot a

“ vio le nt f

e lony ” un de r t

he Ar me d Ca reer Cr imi na l A c t; a nd (3 ) t he Sixth Am e ndme nt p re ve nts a

jud g e fr om e nh anc inga

de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e ba se d o n p ri or c on vic tio ns . A.
“W hen re vie wi ngthe de nia l of a mot ion to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e , th e a pp e llate c ourt

mus t consider the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the g overnme nt.” Un ite d S tat es v . E rwi n , 155 F.3d 818, 822 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (en ba nc). And when a

litigant fa ils to voi ce a

claim at trial but does
so on a pp e a l, we re vie w the argume nt f or pla in e rr or . F e d. R. C ri m. P . 5 2( b) ; se e als o Johnson v. United States , 5 20 U. S. 4 61 , 4 67 (1997) (h old ingthat a lit ig ant m

us t sh ow“ (1 ) e rr or , ( 2) that is plain, and (3) that aff

ect[s] substantial rig hts. I f all three conditions a re met, an appellate court may then exercise its discre tion to noti ce a forf eited er ror, but only

if (4) the err or ser iousl y aff ects the fairne ss, integr ity , or publ ic re putation of judicial proce eding s”) ( internal quotation marks omitted);

se e als o Un ite d S

tat es v . Ko e be rle in , 161 F.3d 946, 949 ( 6th Cir. 1998).
Ortkiese f

irst submit s that the offic ers violated his F ourth Amendment rig h t s wh en they enter ed his proper

ty to seize the marijuana pla nts. Supp. Br. at 8. The proble m with this contention is that the Fourth Ame ndment does not exten d to the open fie lds surrounding a per son’s home, Oliver v . United States , 46 6 U. S. 1 70 , 1 80 (1 98 4) ; Hester v . United States , 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924),No. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 4 - or to contra

band that an individual fr eely exposes to the public, Ho rto n v . Ca lif or nia , 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1 990). See Katz v. United States , 3 89 U. S. 3 47 , 3 51 (1 96 7) (“ What a pe rs on kn ow ing ly exposes to t h e p u b l i c, even in his own home or office , is not a subject of F ourth Amendment protec tion.”).
He re , th e po lic e sp ott e d s ever al mar iju a na pla nts g ro wi ngin O rtkie se ’s ba c ky ard wh ile conductinga routine he licopter fly over. The marijuana plants were not within t h e cu rt ilag e of Ortkiese’ s home, as the office rs spotted the contra band 50 y ards behind the home, out in the open
and wi tho ut a ny e nc los ur e . The Sup re me Court , nota bly , ha s re a ff

ir me d the op e n- fi e lds do c tr ine in the precise contex t of t he cultivation of m arijuana plants some distance f rom a pe rson’s re sidence
. See Oliver , 46 6 U. S . at 17 4, 17 9; c f. United States v. Dunn , 480 U.S. 301 (1987) (de fining the
c ur til a g e pr ote c te d b y

th e F ourt

h A me ndme nt b y

its “ pr oximi ty

. . . to the ho me ,” wh e the r i t is “within an enclosure surrounding the home,” how it is used by the owner and “the steps taken . . . to protect the a

rea from obser

vation by people pa ssing by”).
T o t h e e x t e n tO rt k i e s e m e an s t o c h a l l e n g e t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s s e ar c h o f

h i s p r o p e rt y b y a helicopter , he off

ers no e vidence to support his theory that the police we re ta

rg eting him for investigation, as opposed to per fo rm ing a g ener alized fly over, the latter of w hich the Court has approve d as constitutionally per m i s s i b le. See F

lorida v. Riley , 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (p lur a lity ); id. at 454–55 (O’Connor, J ., concur ring in the j udg ment). Be cause the offic ers’ sear ch fo r, and se izur e of

, th e mari jua na pla nts we re va lid

in e ve ry re sp e c t, t

he di str ic t c ourt

c or re c tly reje cted his F ourth Amendment c halleng e.No. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 5 - Equally unavailing is Ortkies e’ s claim t hat the district cour t should have suppre ssed the statements he made to police during the sea rch of his home. Under Miranda v. Arizona , 3 84 U. S. 436 (1966), we presume that statements g iven by a def endant in re sponse to a custodial interr og ation
are c oe rc e d (a

nd thu s ina dmi ssi ble a t tr ia l) un le ss the de fe nd ant w a ive d h is F if th A me ndme nt r ig hts , id. at 444–45. At the time Or t k i es e m ad e these statements, it is true, he wa s in custody , and the po lic e ha d n ot y e t g ive n h im Miranda w ar n i n g s . B u t O rt k i e s e d i d n o t m a k e t h e s t a te me nts in response to an interrog ation, and ac cording ly they need not be excluded. See O regon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985).
As Rh od e Is lan d v . I

nn is , 4 46 U. S. 2 91 (1 98 0) , ma ke s c le ar, int e rr og a tio n “ e x tend [s] on ly to w or ds or

a c tio ns on

the pa rt of po lic e of fi c e rs that the y sh ou ld have kn ow n w e re re a so na bly lik e ly to elicit an incriminating response ,” id. at 302. The of fice rs in this inst ance arr ested Or tkiese and sat him on a couc h in his living room while t hey sear ched the rest of the hom e. At no point before administering the Miranda war nings did the office rs addre ss O rtkiese or ask him about the g uns they had found. A nd at no point did the office rs strike up a pr ovocative c onversation within earshot of Ortkiese. O rtkiese simply volunteere d the statements af ter the office rs discover ed the two ha ndg uns atop his ref

rig erator.
No r do e s the F ourt

h Am e ndme nt r e qu ir e the of fi c e rs to r e mov e the su sp e c t f ro m hi s h ome during the sea

rch; if a ny thing, just the opposite is true. Cf. United States v. Chadwick , 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (“[A] [searc h] wa rra nt a ssures the individual whose proper ty is searc hed or se ized of the lawful a uthority of the e x ecutingoffice r, his need to se arc h, and the limits of his power to sea rch.” ),No. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 6 - abrogated on other grounds , Calif ornia v. Ace vedo , 500 U.S. 565 (1991). And in f urther c laiming that th e police violated his Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel during the sea rch of his house, O r t k i e s e o v e r l o o k s t h e p o i n tt h a tt h e r i g h tt o c o u n s e l d o e s n o ta t t a c h u n t i l “ a d v e r s ar y judicial proce eding s” beg in. Kir by v . I lli no is , 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (e mphasis added)
.

B.
Ortkiese ne x t challeng es the district co u rt ’s classification of his third-deg ree burg lary of a storag e cottag e as a violent f elony under the Armed Caree r Criminal Ac t. A person who violate s the felon-in- possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ), and who “has three previous convictions
. . . for a violent felony

or a se rious drug offe nse, or both, committed on occ asions d i fferent fr om one another ,” the Act say s, “shall be fined
. . . and imprisoned not less than fiftee n y ear s,” id. § 924(e) (1). “[V ] i o l en t felony ,” the Ac t also say s, includes “bur g lary ,” id. § 924(e) (2)( B) , which cove rs “a n unlawful or unpr ivilege d entry into
. . . a buil ding or other structure, with intent to commit a crime,” Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
Ortkiese’ s conviction for third- deg ree burg lary of a storag e cottag e satisfies this definition. Th e F lor ida

burg lary statut e , it

is tru e , en c omp a sse s “ g e ne ri c ” burg lari e s ( i.e. , those traditional burg lari e s c o v e r e d

b y t h e A c t ) and

“ no n- g e ne ri c ” burg lari e s ( i.e. , burg laries involving an illeg al entry into a conveyance or cur

tilage not cover ed by

the Act)
. See Un ite d Sta te s v . P lu ta , 144 F.3d 968, 97 5– 76 (6 th C ir . 1 99 8) ; United States v. Adams , 9 1 F
. 3 d 1 1 4 , 1 1 5 ( 1 1 th Ci r . 1 9 9 6 ) . But the information for O rtkiese’ s burg lary char g es establishes that he committed a g ener ic burg lary —thatNo. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 7 - h e “ u n l aw fu l l y

an d wi t h o u ti n v i t at i o n o r l i ce n s e d i d en t er t h at ce rt ai ns t ru ct u re o t h er t h an a d we l l i n g, to- wi t: a stor a g e c ott a g e . . . w iththe int e nt t o c omm it a n o ff e ns e the re in, to- wi t: the ft ,” JA 20 4; see Taylor , 495 U.S. at 602 (“[I ]f the indictment or information . . . s h ow[s] that the def endant wa s char g ed only

with a burg lary

of a building , and that the [judge ] nec essar ily had to f ind a n entry of a building to c onvict, then the Gove rnment should be allowe d to use the convic tio n for
e nh anc e me nt. ” ); Shepard v. U nited States , 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (noting that the fa cts nec essar y to a prior c onviction could be identified f rom the “statutory

definition” and the “cha

rg in g d o c u ment,” among o t h er t h i n gs ). Beca use a stora g e cottag e amounts to a “ building or othe r structure ,” Ortkiese’ s prior convic tion for t hird-deg ree burg lary of a stora g e cottag e wa s a violent felony under § 924(e)
. Ortkiese r aises four

objections to this analy sis, not one of wh i ch is convincing . First, he
c on te nd s th a t w e c ann ot r e ly on the “ inf or ma tio n” to d e fi ne the of

fe ns e be c a

us e it l e d to a

no lo
c on te nd e re ple a . Su

pp . B r. a t 7. Or

tki e se c ite s no pr e c e de nt in s up po rt of thi s p ro po sit ion , n or

c ou ld he as our case law allows the review of a cha rg ing doc ument reg ardle ss of the mea ns of conviction. Un ite d S tat es v . A rn old , 5 8 F .3 d 1 11 7, 11 24 n. 5 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 5) (“ [T]he d is tr ict c ourt may , if
ne c e ssa ry , ref er to the c on du c t c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt e nte re d a g a ins t de fe nd ant b e c a us e defe ndant’s plea

of nolo contende re ha s a similar leg al eff ect a s pleading g uilty .”) ( internal quotation
mark s o mit te d) ; see United States v. Armstead , 467 F.3d 943, 949 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2006).
S e c on d, Or

tki e se argue s th a t Sh e

pa rd r e qu i r e s a j u d g e t o m a k e e xp l i c i t f a c tu a l f i n d i ng s in the abse nce of

a jury trial and that a defe ndant must assent to those findings be fore they can be usedNo. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 8 - to e nhance his se ntence
. Br . at 13–14. Sh e pa rd , how e ve r, did no t con str ic t the e vid e nc e a va ila ble to a f ed er al co u rt in determining the nature of a pr ior conviction under Taylor . I nstead, Sh e pa rd
rea ffirme d that a fede ral court fac ed with a non-g ener ic state statute may turn t o “charg ing documents filed in the c ourt of convic tion, or to recor ded judicial ac ts of that court limiting
c o n v ic ti o n s to th e g e n e r ic c a te g o r y . ” Sh e pa rd , 5 44 U. S. at 20 ; id. at 19 (“ [T] he ACCA nowher e provides that convic tions in t ried a nd pleade d case s are to be reg arde d differ ently .”). Tha t is all that happene d here
. See id. a t 2 4 ( n o t i n g t h a tt h e qu e s t i o ni s w h e t h e r a “ p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n‘ n e c e s s a r i l y’ involved (and a

prior plea

nece ssarily

admitted) facts equating to g ener ic burglar y ”). Bec ause the information clea

rly outlines that the burg lary char g e was for unlaw ful entry into a storag e cottag e, the district court co rr ec t l y fo u nd that this fact wa s nece ssary for c onviction. See United States v. Mahon , 444 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that beca use the indictments clea

rly classified the cr imes as g ener ic burg laries, “ the district court did not nee d to en gage i n further fac tfinding
conce rning the two convictions”)
. Third, Ortkiese contends that be cause second- degreeburg lary under Florida law require s the
e ntr y int o a dw e lli ngor

the pr e se nc e of a “ huma

n be ing in the str

uc tur e or c on ve y anc e a t th e tim e the offe nder e ntere d or re mained,” F la. Stat. § 810
. 0 2(3) ( 1994), his conviction for third-degree burg lary “does not mee t the standard” for being a vi olent felony
. Supp. Br
. at 6. B ut in sugg esting that a per son must be present in the building , or that a w eapo n o r v i o l en ce must be use d, for a burg lary to be a violent fe lony , he adds a gloss to the s tatute that simply is not there. Id. ; Br. at 12. Th e ph ra se “ vio le nt f

e lony ” e nc omp a sse s bo th “burg lar[ies]” and crimes that have “ as an e lementNo. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 9 - the use, attempted use, or thre atene d use of phy sical for ce a g ai n s t the per son of another ” or that prese nt “serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” Taylor , 495 U.S. at 578, 597. The Court has held that a g ener ic burglar y prese nts such a ser ious potential risk. The g overnme nt thus
ne e d o nly pr ov e that O rtkie se wa s c on vic te d of a g e ne ri c burg lary (a nd tw o othe r v iol e nt f

e lon ie s) to trigg er a

sentenc ing e nhance ment under the Armed Car eer Criminal Act. See id. at 588 (re jecting t h e i d e a th a tt h e A c to n l y

t ar g e t e d “ s o m e s p e c i a l s u

b c l a s s o f b u r g l ar i e s t h a tm i g h tb e e s p e c i a lly da ng e ro us , s uc h a s tho se wh e re the of fe nd e r is arm e d, or the bu ild ing is o c c up ie d” ); United States v. Sparks , 2 65 F .3 d 8 25 , 8 35 n. 3 ( 9th Cir . 2 00 1) ; United States v. Sac ko , 178 F.3d 1 , 3 (1st Cir. 1999) (“ [A] sentenc ing c ourt should look only to whether

the st at u t e o f conviction containe d the elements of a ‘g ener ic’ burg lary and should not inquire whether the specific crime c ommitt ed wa s
e sp e c ia lly da ng e ro us to o the rs .” ); United St a t es v. Strahl , 958 F.2d 980, 985 ( 10th Cir. 1992) (“Cong ress include d most burgla ry convictions as predic ate of fense s even thoug h use of phy sical forc e or thre at of violenc e did not play a par t in every burg lary .”).
Fo u rt h , i n v o k i n g United States v. Day , 465 F.3d 1262 ( 11th Cir. 2006), Ortkiese c ontends that the information re lied on by the district court doe s n ot refle ct the conduc t for which he was convicted. Day

is inapt, however . I n that case , the information alleg ed that the de fenda nt had “unlawf ully enter [ed] . . . a dwe lling” ( i.e. second- deg ree burg lary under F lorida law)
. Id. at 1266. The Eleventh Circuit r ecog nized that the defe ndant could not have ag ree d to the fac ts alleg ed in the i n f o r m a t i o n b e c a u s e h e w a s c o n v i c t e d o n l y o f t h i r d

- d e g r e e b u r g l ar

y ( i.e. unlawfully

enter ing a

n unoccupie d structure other than a dwelling or an unoc cupied c onvey ance with intent to commit anNo. 05-5698

Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se

- 10 - o f f e n s e th e r e in)
. Id. ; Fla. Stat. § 810.02(4) . I n contra st to Day , th e inf or ma tio n a g a ins t O rtkie se alleg ed that he ha d unlawfully enter ed a “structure other than a dwelling , to-wit: a storag e cottag e,” J A 204, a fac t that c omports w ith his conviction for third-de g ree burg lary . And bec ause O rtkiese’ s entry of a stora g e cottage was a nece ssary fac tual predic ate of his state-c ourt conviction, the district court prope rly

relied upon the information to deter mine whether

the conviction amounted to a g ener ic burg lary
. Cf. Ar

no ld , 58 F .3 d at 11 24 (“ [A c ou rt ] sho uld lim it i ts e xami natio n to on ly tho se char g es in the indictment that are essential to the off ense to whic h defe ndant enter ed his plea.” ).
C. Ortkiese, f

inally , argues that the c ourt’s use of his prior offe nses to enha n ce his sente nce violates his S i x t h Am en d m ent right to a jury trial. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booke r , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we have f ace d this question many

times. See, e .g. , United Sta te s v . W atf or d , 468 F .3 d 891 , 915 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) ; United States v. Mahon , 444 F.3d 530, 535–36 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Un ite d S

tat es v . H ill , 4 40 F .3 d 2 92 , 2 98 –9 9 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) ; Un ite d Sta te

s v . B ar ne tt , 39 8 F .3 d 5 16 , 524 –2 5 (6t h Ci r. 20 05 ). Ea c h ti me , w e have po int e d o ut t hat Almendarez- Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466 (2 000), and Booke r continue to pe rmit c ourts to do this ve ry thing. Se e id ; se e als o Apprendi , 5 30 U. S. at 49 0; Booke r , 543 U.S. at 244. Any

chang e on this score is for the Supreme Court, not for us, to make.
III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.