RENDERED: JANUARY 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0467-MR

RHONDA M. WILSON APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JEFF L. DOTSON, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-CI-00276

SARAH S. HOLT AND TOMMY 

OWENS USED CARS, LLC APPELLEES 

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND GOODWINE, 

JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Rhonda M. Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals, for a second time,

from an order of the Boyle Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of 

Tommy Owens Used Cars, LLC (“Used Cars”). Based on our review, we reverse 

and remand.
-2-

The following is a summary of the background of this case from the 

first appeal: 

This case arose out of a car accident between 

Wilson and Sarah S. Holt (“Holt”). On October 14, 

2016, Trevor Tarter (“Tarter”) purchased a car from Used 

Cars via a conditional sales contract. Upon purchasing 

the car, Tarter signed a document titled “Agreement to 

Provide Physical Damage Insurance.” The agreement 

included spaces for the purchaser to list his contact 

information, information about the car, the insurance 

agent, and the insurance company. Although Tarter 

signed the agreement, acknowledging he “ha[d] arranged 

for the required insurance through the insurance company 

shown below,” Tarter did not provide the information of 

an insurance agent or insurance company.[1]

On July 27, 2017, Holt was operating the car 

Tarter purchased via the conditional sales contract on 

U.S. Highway 150 in Boyle County when the car collided 

with Wilson’s car. At the time of the accident, the dealer 

held the title to the car.

Following the accident, Wilson filed a complaint 

against Holt, Used Cars, and State Farm Mutual 

Automobile Insurance Company. Upon filing a motion 

for summary judgment, the circuit court dismissed State 

Farm from the suit pursuant to an order entered March 6, 

2020.

On September 14, 2020, Used Cars moved for 

summary judgment arguing Tarter was deemed the owner 

of the car under KRS[2] 186.010(7)(a) and (b), even 

though Used Cars still held title to the car. Wilson 

1 On remand, Used Cars presented evidence that Holt provided proof of insurance the same day 

Tarter drove the car off the lot. 

2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-

opposed the motion arguing Used Cars failed to consider 

KRS 186.010(7)(c), which requires dealers to comply 

with the requirements of KRS 186A.220, for Tarter to be 

deemed to be the owner of the car for statutory purposes. 

KRS 186A.220 requires dealers to obtain proof of 

insurance from the purchaser, and Used Cars failed to 

obtain proof that Tarter had an insurance policy covering 

the car. Wilson argued, because Used Cars failed to 

obtain proof of insurance, Used Cars was deemed to be 

the owner of the car and was liable for the collision.

After hearing argument from the parties, the circuit 

court granted summary judgment in favor of Used Cars. 

The circuit court found Used Cars substantially complied 

with the statute because Used Cars submitted the 

agreement under which Tarter averred he had an 

insurance policy covering the car. [The first] appeal 

followed.

Wilson v. Holt, 2020-CA-1623-MR, 2021 WL 5406358, at *1 (Ky. App. Nov. 19, 

2021).

In the first appeal, we held the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment. Used Cars’ reliance on Tarter’s signature averring that he had an 

insurance policy covering the car did not meet the KRS 186A.220(5)(b) 

requirement for Used Cars to obtain proof of insurance before Tarter drove the car 

off the lot. Wilson, 2021 WL 5406358, at *3.

On remand, Used Cars renewed its motion for summary judgment 

based on evidence in its possession, but that it failed to include with its first motion 

for summary judgment. Tre Owens (“Tre”) took over the business after his 

grandfather, Tommy Owens, passed away. Tre recalled Holt provided proof of 
-4-

insurance to Used Cars the same day Tarter purchased the vehicle. Used Cars 

attached to its motion a screenshot of an email from Holt dated the same day Tarter 

purchased the car with an insurance card attached to the email. Used Cars did not 

submit any evidence that the insurance card was provided before Tarter drove the 

car off the lot.

The circuit court heard oral argument from the parties and took the 

matter under submission. The video recording was not made part of the record. 

On April 13, 2022, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Used 

Cars, finding Used Cars strictly complied with the statute because it obtained 

“insurance cards bearing the same date the car was purchased by Trevor Tarter.” 

Record (“R.”) at 219. This second appeal followed.

On appeal, Wilson argues the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment because: (1) the motion was barred by the law of the case doctrine; (2) 

Used Cars failed to comply with KRS 186A.220; and (3) there were genuine issues 

of material fact.

First, Wilson argues Used Cars summary judgment motion was barred 

by the law of the case doctrine. 

The law of the case doctrine is “an iron rule, universally

recognized, that an opinion or decision of an appellate

court in the same cause is the law of the case for a

subsequent trial or appeal. . . .” Union Light, Heat & 

Power Co. v. Blackwel’s Adm’r, 291 S.W.2d 539, 542 

(Ky. 1956). That doctrine is the mechanism by which
-5-

matters once litigated and finally determined remain so.

TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc. v. Kentucky Labor Cabinet, 474 S.W.3d 153, 

158 (Ky. App. 2014). 

The law of a case is a strict rule, but there are exceptions and limits to 

its application. In Patmon v. Hobbs, 495 S.W.3d 722, 729 (Ky. App. 2016), this 

Court explained “the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to the extent that an 

issue was actually resolved. As stated in H.R. ex rel. Taylor v. Revlett, 998 S.W.2d 

778, 780 (Ky. App. 1999), ‘[t]he crucial requirement is that the appellate court 

enters a final decision on the question rather than merely commenting on the 

issue.’” This Court applied this principle to the facts of the case: 

“Although Patmon I placed the burden of proof on Patmon on remand to 

demonstrate American Leasing had the financial ability to perform the O’Reilly 

leases, Patmon I did not address the proof necessary to meet that burden.” Id.

Here, we simply held the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Used Cars because it failed to obtain proof of insurance for 

the car Tarter purchased. We did not hold that because of Used Cars’ failure to 

submit adequate proof of insurance in support of its motion for summary judgment, 

it was the statutory owner of the car and thus liable to Wilson for damages 

stemming from the accident. We did not dictate that the parties were prohibited 

from submitting additional evidence on the matter of Used Cars’ liability and did 
-6-

not direct the circuit court to enter an order denying Used Cars’ motion for 

summary judgment. We simply remanded the case for further proceedings leaving 

the circuit court with discretion to determine how to proceed. Thus, we do not 

believe the law of the case squarely applies in this instance. 

Second, Wilson argues Used Cars failed to comply with KRS 

186A.220. In the first appeal, we held the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment because Used Cars failed to obtain proof of insurance from Tarter under 

KRS 186A.220(5)(b), which provides:

The dealer may, with the consent of the purchaser, 

deliver the assigned certificate of title, and other 

appropriate documents of a new or used vehicle, directly 

to the county clerk, and on behalf of the purchaser, make 

application for registration and a certificate of title. In so 

doing, the dealer shall require from the purchaser proof 

of insurance as mandated by KRS 304.39-080 before 

delivering possession of the vehicle.

(Emphasis added.) 

Our decision in the first appeal was based on Gainsco Companies v. 

Gentry, 191 S.W.3d 633 (Ky. 2006). There, a dealer sold a car to a purchaser but 

failed to discuss insurance coverage. Id. at 635. The dealer sold the car on a 

Saturday and verified insurance coverage on Monday. Id. The purchaser was in 

an accident three days after the dealer verified the purchaser’s insurance coverage. 

Id. Our Supreme Court held: “By failing to strictly comply with the statutory 

procedures of KRS 186A.220(5),” the dealer “failed to validly transfer ownership 
-7-

of the truck to” the purchaser. Id. at 637. “Accordingly, Gainsco is the primary 

insurer of the car because” the dealer “continued to be the owner of the truck at the 

time of the accident. The fact that [the purchaser’s] insurance policy would have 

covered the vehicle if he had become the owner is, therefore, completely 

irrelevant.” Id.

In Travelers Indemnity Company v. Armstrong, 565 S.W.3d 550 (Ky. 

2018), our Supreme Court examined the distinction between transactions between 

a dealer and a purchaser for use and dealer-to-dealer transactions and left Gainsco 

intact. The Supreme Court analyzed KRS 186A.220 in the context of dealer-todealer transactions and held “substantial compliance, i.e., late compliance,” with

sections 1 to 4 “may still allow the dealer to take advantage of the exception in 

KRS 186.010(7)(c).” Id.

However, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Gainsco regarding KRS 

186A.220(5) in transactions between a dealer and a purchaser for use: 

the burden is on the dealer, when selling to a purchaser 

for use, to actively verify that the buyer has insurance 

before transferring possession of the vehicle. Failure to 

promptly comply with the requirements of KRS 

186A.220(5) in a transaction with a purchaser for use 

cannot be cured and the dealer may still be considered 

the “owner” of the vehicle in question.

565 S.W.3d at 567 (emphasis added). The Court opined that compliance “cannot 

be cured,” but use of the word “may” in its discussion of whether a dealer may be 
-8-

considered the owner of the vehicle left the section open to possible future 

exceptions. Id. However, Gainsco remains good law. No Kentucky case has held 

substantial compliance is sufficient for the proof of insurance requirement of KRS 

186A.220(5)(b). 

We now turn to application of Gainsco to the facts of this case. Tarter 

purchased a vehicle from Used Cars on October 14, 2016, under a conditional sales 

agreement. Tarter signed a form agreeing to provide physical damage insurance, 

but the form does not include his insurance agent and company information. On 

remand, Used Cars submitted a screenshot of an email dated October 14, 2016, at 

11:19 a.m. from Sarah Holt with an insurance card for the purchased vehicle. R. at 

204. Used Cars did not submit evidence that the insurance card was submitted 

before Tarter drove the car off the lot. Approximately nine months later, on July 

27, 2017, Holt was driving the purchased car and was in an accident with Wilson. 

Because Tarter purchased the car under a conditional sales contract, the dealer still 

held the title on the date of the accident. The circuit court found Used Cars 

“strictly complied with KRS 186A.220 and [was] not liable for damages resulting 

from the automobile collision that is the subject of this case” because Used Cars 

submitted “a copy of an email and automobile insurance cards bearing the same 

date as the car was purchased by Trevor Tarter.” R. at 219. 
-9-

This finding does not comport with the plain language of Gainsco and 

Armstrong. Used Cars admits in its brief that Holt produced the insurance card 

“the same day as the sale of the vehicle.” Appellee Brief at 4. There is no 

evidence Used Cars strictly complied with the statute by obtaining proof of 

insurance before Tarter drove the car off the lot as required by our Supreme Court. 

Though the accident occurred months after Tarter drove the car off the 

lot, Used Cars still held the title to the car under the conditional sales contract. 

Had Used Cars not retained the title to the car, it likely would not be liable for this 

accident. Used Cars had two opportunities to prove it strictly complied with the

proof of insurance requirement and has failed to do so both times. It submitted no 

evidence to prove the insurance card was submitted before Tarter drove off the lot. 

The screenshot of Holt’s message is insufficient. Used Cars did not accompany 

the screenshot with an affidavit from either Holt or Tre. And, if Used Cars had 

received the message before Tarter drove the car off the lot, the insurance 

information would have been listed on Tarter’s paperwork. It was not. Instead, 

Used Cars relied on Tarter’s promise to provide proof of insurance. 

Though the Supreme Court of Kentucky hinted in Gainsco that it 

might consider exceptions to the strict compliance proof of insurance requirement, 

it has not done so. We are “bound by and shall follow applicable precedents 

established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor court.” 
-10-

Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 1.030. Thus, even if we were sympathetic to Used 

Cars, we lack the authority to deviate from our Supreme Court’s holding that car 

dealers must strictly comply with the proof of insurance requirement in KRS 

186A.220(5)(b) by obtaining before a car leaves the lot.

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the Boyle Circuit 

Court and remand with instructions to deny Used Cars’ motion for summary 

judgment finding it the owner of the car for failing to strictly comply with KRS 

186A.220(5)(b) and, thus, liable for the collision.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.

DIXON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.

DIXON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: While I acknowledge this Court is 

constrained by our Supreme Court’s decision in Gainsco, I nevertheless agree with 

the dissent in that decision that this ensuing result is absurd and unreasonable. 

Justice Graves, writing the dissent in this four-to-three decision aptly stated:

“A statute should not be interpreted so as to bring about 

an absurd or unreasonable result. The policy and purpose 

of the statute must be considered in determining the 

meaning of the words used.” Kentucky Industrial Utility

Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d 

493, 500 (Ky. 1998). It elevates form over substance to 

an unreasonable degree to hold an automobile dealer, 

who takes the necessarily remedial steps, indefinitely 

responsible for the insurance coverage on a vehicle that 

was transferred to an insured owner simply because 

verification did not occur in the proper sequential order.
-11-

Gainsco Companies v. Gentry, 191 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Ky. 2006) (Graves, J., 

dissenting). Justice Graves further noted:

If there was a deficiency in [the dealership’s] verification 

of insurance at the time of the sale, the transfer of 

ownership of the vehicle was completed when [the 

dealership] directly contacted [the insurance company] 

on the following Monday. Although this verification 

occurred after possession of the vehicle was transferred 

where KRS 186A.220 requires verification before the 

transfer of possession, it nevertheless cured any 

deficiency.

Id. Herein, the automobile accident occurred more than nine months after Tarter 

purchased the vehicle from Used Cars. There appears to be no dispute that Tarter 

actually had obtained insurance the same day he purchased it. Nevertheless, 

apparently, under Gainsco, the failure to ensure insurance coverage prior to 

transfer of possession renders a car dealership liable for any automobile accident 

for at least as long as the buyer keeps the car. Such is the poster image of an 

absurd interpretation of KRS 186A.220. I would affirm.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Larry F. Sword

Somerset, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE TOMMY 

OWENS USED CARS, LLC:

Jamie Wilhite Dittert

Katie Bouvier

Lexington, Kentucky