UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-1434

PAUL ANTHONY RANGOLAN, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals. 

Argued: October 28, 2008 Decided: December 3, 2008 

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: Linda Anna Dominguez, L.A. DOMINGUEZ LAW, L.L.C., 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Petitioner. M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: 

Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, 

Carol Federighi, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM: 

Paul Rangolan, a citizen of Jamaica, petitions for review 

of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying 

his motion to reopen the BIA’s order of removal. Because 

Rangolan has not raised a constitutional or legal question with 

respect to that order of denial, we dismiss the petition for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

I. 

In July 1987, the BIA granted Rangolan lawful permanent 

resident status in the United States; however, in December 1998, 

an immigration judge ordered his removal from this country as an 

aggravated felon. Three months later, Rangolan illegally 

reentered the United States. In June 2004, the Government 

arrested Rangolan and later convicted him of using, carrying, 

and possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking offense and 

of illegal reentry following removal for conviction of an 

aggravated felony. 

When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took 

Rangolan into custody after he served his criminal sentence, he 

expressed fear of persecution or torture in Jamaica on account 

of his (homosexual) sexual orientation. An asylum officer 

conducted a “reasonable fear” interview pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 

2 
§ 208.31 (2008), and transferred the matter to an immigration 

judge (IJ) for a hearing. 

 At his hearing, Rangolan conceded his ineligibility for 

asylum because of his aggravated felony conviction, but he 

argued that if removed to Jamaica, the government would 

persecute and torture him because of his sexual orientation. He 

testified that when deported to Jamaica in January 1999, he had 

to move out of his brother’s house because the neighbors, 

suspecting Rangolan was gay, threatened both him and his 

brother. Rangolan further explained that he returned to the 

United States shortly after an incident in which a crowd, 

yelling homosexual slurs, chased him and a friend, hit the 

friend on the head with a brick, and cut Rangolan with a broken 

bottle. Finally, Rangolan’s sister testified at the immigration 

hearing that neighbors killed Rangolan’s brother in July 1999 

because of his relationship to Rangolan. 

 The IJ found Rangolan ineligible for withholding of removal 

under the asylum statute and the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”) because he had been convicted of a particularly serious 

crime and because his prior crimes and his firearms collection 

make him a danger to the community. However, the IJ found 

Rangolan eligible for deferral of removal under CAT, reasoning 

that it was more likely than not that Rangolan would be subject 

to imprisonment and torture for homosexual acts if deported to 

3 
Jamaica. In reaching this conclusion, the IJ cited the State 

Department’s 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in 

Jamaica, which noted that public demonstrations of physical 

intimacy between men was a crime punishable by imprisonment in 

Jamaica, that there had been a number of incidents of civilian 

violence against homosexuals that year, and that reports of 

physical abuse of homosexual prisoners continued. 

 On August 16, 2007, the BIA granted DHS’s appeal, vacated 

the IJ’s grant of CAT deferral, and ordered Rangolan removed to 

Jamaica. The BIA found the IJ’s conclusion that Rangolan would 

be tortured in Jamaica to be “based on a series of unsupported 

suppositions” and concluded it not more likely than not that 

“any torture the applicant may suffer in Jamaica would be by or 

at the acquiescence of the government.” 

 Rangolan petitioned this court for review of the BIA’s 

decision and sought a stay of removal. The government opposed 

the stay and moved to dismiss the petition for lack of 

jurisdiction. On October 23, 2007, over a dissent, we granted 

the motion to dismiss and denied the motion to stay. Rangolan 

v. Mukasey, No. 07-1838 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 2007). We 

subsequently denied Rangolan’s petition for rehearing and 

rehearing en banc. Rangolan, No. 07-1838 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 

2007). The Supreme Court denied Rangolan’s application and reapplication for a stay of removal, Rangolan v. Mukasey, 128 

4 
S. Ct. 1331 (2008), and his petition for certiorari, Rangolan v. 

Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2934 (2008). 

 On March 7, 2008, Rangolan moved to reopen his case with 

the BIA and to stay his removal during the pendency of its 

consideration of that motion. He claimed that “there is a 

critical change in circumstances and/or a denial of due process 

in his case.” Rangolan based his argument primarily on an 

unpublished BIA decision issued December 18, 2007 in which the 

BIA reversed the decision of an IJ and determined that a 

homosexual Jamaican alien was eligible for statutory withholding 

of removal because of his sexual orientation. On March 31, 

2008, the BIA denied as untimely Rangolan’s motion to reopen 

explaining that an applicant must file a motion to reopen within 

90 days after a BIA decision, in this case on or before November 

14, 2007 -- 90 days following the BIA’s August 16, 2007 decision 

ordering Rangolan’s removal to Jamaica.

II. 

Rangolan moves for a stay of removal and seeks review of 

the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen as untimely. The 

government opposes this motion and moves for dismissal of 

Rangolan’s petition, arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) 

(2006) deprives us of jurisdiction to review Rangolan’s 

petition. 

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Section 1252(a)(2)(C) provides in relevant part: “[N]o 

court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of 

removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having 

committed a criminal offense covered in section . . . 

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).” This statute generally deprives us of 

jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued against 

an alien (like Rangolan) removable as an aggravated felon. But, 

as the Government concedes, pursuant to “the Real ID Act’s 

addition of new Section 242(a)(2)(D) to the INA . . . the 

federal courts” retain jurisdiction to review such an order if 

the case presents a constitutional claim or a question of law. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006); see also Saintha v. 

Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Admittedly, no statute explicitly permits us to review the 

BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen. See Sarmadi v. INS, 121 

F.3d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 1997); Patel v. Att’y Gen., 334 F.3d 

1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003). However, we believe that implicit 

in our power to review a final BIA order is the power, in the 

appropriate case, to review the denial of a motion to reopen 

removal proceedings. See Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587, 593 (4th 

Cir. 1999) (noting that the Fourth Circuit and our “sister 

circuits” “have traditionally interpreted ‘final order of 

deportation’ . . . to include a BIA order denying a motion to 

reopen”); see also Hanan v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 760, 763 (8th Cir. 

6 
2008) (holding that the authority to review an order denying a 

motion to reopen is implicit in the grant of authority to review 

a final BIA order); Patel, 334 F.3d at 1261 (same); Sarmadi, 121 

F.3d at 1321 (same); Chow v. INS, 113 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 

1997) (same), abrogated on other grounds by LaGuerre v. Reno, 

164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998).1

Tellingly, Rangolan does not suggest any other 

jurisdictional basis permitting us to review the BIA’s denial of 

a motion to reopen removal proceedings, and we can find none. 

Thus, the general power to review any “final order of removal” 

in § 1252(a)(1) provides a basis -- but our only basis -- to 

review a denial of a motion to reopen. 

For criminal aliens, Section 1252(a)(2) expressly limits 

our power to review final orders of removal in § 1252(a)(1) to 

constitutional and legal questions, and thus necessarily 

restricts our review of a denial of a criminal alien’s motion to 

reopen removal proceedings to constitutional and legal 

questions. Five courts of appeals that have considered this 

jurisdictional issue have reached the identical conclusion. 

 1

 Notably, not even the Government argues to the contrary. 

Moreover, in 1964, when the Ninth Circuit held that it did not 

have jurisdiction to review a BIA’s denial of a motion to 

reopen, the Supreme Court reversed that decision in a onesentence decision. See Giova v. Rosenburg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964). 

As a result, it seems clear that the courts of appeals retain 

jurisdiction to review motions to reopen removal proceedings 

despite the lack of an explicit statutory grant. 

7 
8 

See, e.g., Hanan, 519 F.3d at 763; Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 

240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006); Patel, 334 F.3d at 1261-62; Sarmadi, 

121 F.3d at 1321; Chow, 113 F.3d at 664; see also Pepaj v. 

Mukasey, 509 F.3d 725, 727-28 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 

court lacked jurisdiction to review a denial of a motion to 

reopen by a criminal alien where petitioner raised only an issue 

of fact); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 4 & n.5 (1st Cir. 

2006) (same); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115-16 (2d Cir. 

2004).2

In the case at hand, Rangolan presents no constitutional or 

legal question. Therefore, Rangolan’s petition for review is 

DISMISSED. 

 2

 We note that our decision in the case at hand does not in 

any way conflict with our recent holding in Obioha v. Gonzales, 

431 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2005). There, we addressed 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), which limits judicial review of “any 

judgment regarding the granting of relief under” certain 

immigration law provisions. That statute, unlike 

§ 1252(a)(2)(C), does not limit a court’s jurisdiction to review 

a final order of removal and therefore in that case, we had no 

need to consider the relationship between a final order of 

removal and a denial of a motion to reopen.