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TSA’s Challenges with 

Passenger Screening 

Canine Teams 

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

TSA’s Challenges with

Passenger Screening Canine Teams 

April 2, 2020 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

In fiscal year 2018, the 

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) spent 

nearly $77 million for 287 

Passenger Screening Canine 

(PSC) teams to screen passengers 

and baggage for explosive odors 

at airport security checkpoints. 

We conducted this review to 

determine whether TSA deployed 

PSC teams as necessary to fulfill 

its layered approach for 

passenger aircraft security and 

detect a variety of explosive items 

to safeguard the traveling public. 

What We 

Recommend 

We made two recommendations 

that, if implemented, should help 

TSA improve oversight of its PSC 

teams, formalize its canine 

allocation methodology, validate 

its canine management 

decisions, and improve internal 

controls. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 981-6000, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

What We Found 

TSA cannot show deployment and use of its PSC teams 

provide effective security at passenger screening 

checkpoints. Specifically, TSA: 

x	 has not determined the number of teams needed to 

provide security and mitigate risks because it does 

not identify and document mission needs, capability 

gaps, and operational goals for deploying the teams; 

x	 may not be allocating PSC teams to the highest risk 

airports because it does not properly justify and 

document allocation decisions; 

x	 has not determined whether the limited use of PSC 

teams provides sufficient security because it cannot 

justify the teams as the best, most cost-effective 

checkpoint security; and 

x	 cannot be assured airports are using PSC teams 

properly because it does not adequately oversee TSA 

management operations at airports. 

We also found canines on TSA’s PSC teams may not 

detect 

in an operational 

environment. This is due to canines having inherent 

limitations, restricting TSA’s ability to train PSCs to 

detect all significant explosive threats. As a result, our 

Nation’s aviation system and the traveling public could 

be at risk of a catastrophic event caused by an 

undetected explosive device. TSA could have redirected 

nearly $77 million spent on PSC teams in fiscal year 

2018 to other security programs and activities to better 

protect the aviation system. 

TSA Response 

TSA concurred with both recommendations. 

www.oig.dhs.gov	 OIG-20-28 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520. No part of 

this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know," as defined in 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520, except with the 

written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. 

Unauthorized release may result in civil penalties or other action. For U.S. Government agencies, public disclosure is governed 

by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520. 
 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

April 28, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: Darby LaJoye 

 Executive Assistant Administrator 

Security Operations 

 Transportation Security Administration 

FROM: Sondra F. McCauley 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

SUBJECT: TSA’s Challenges with Passenger Screening Canine 

Teams – Sensitive Security Information 

Attached for your action is our final report, TSA’s Challenges with Passenger 

Screening Canine Teams – Sensitive Security Information. We incorporated the 

formal comments provided by your office. 

The report contains two recommendations aimed at improving the overall 

effectiveness of TSA’s Passenger Screening Canine teams. Your office 

concurred with both recommendations. Based on information provided in your 

response to the draft report, we consider recommendations 1 and 2 open and 

resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please 

submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the 

recommendations. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of 

completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any 

monetary amounts. Please send your response or closure request to 

OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will 

provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We 

will post a redacted version of the report on our website. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Don Bumgardner, 

Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 

1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know," as defined in 49 C.F.R. 

Parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security 

Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalties or other 

action. For U.S. Government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 

and 1520. 
SENSITI\1E SECURITY INFORMATION 


OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 


Department of Homeland Security 


Table of Contents 

Background................................................................................................. 1 


Results ofAudit.......... .......... .............. .. ......... .............. .. ......... ................ ..... 4 


TSA Cannot Show It Is Deploying and Using Its PSC Teams to Provide 


Effective Security... ......... .............. .. ......... ................ ......... ................ ..... 5 


Canines on PSC Teams May Not Detect 

- ··································································································10 

Recommendations ...... .......... ......................... .............. .. ......... ................ ... 13 


Management Comments ............................................................................ 13 


OIG Analysis of Management Comments ........................................... ........ 14 


Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ..... ......................... ... 15 


Appendix B: TSA Comments to the Draft Report. ................................. 17 


Appendix C: List of Airports with Passenger Screening Canine Teams .. 22 


Appendix D: Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report. ....... ... 24 


Appendix E: Report Distribution.............. ......................... ........... ........ 25 


Abbreviations 

CETA Canine Explosives Training Aid 

DSARM Detection Standard Analysis and Revision Methodology 

FSD Federal Security Director 

MAP Measures of Accountability and Productivity 

NEDCTP National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PSC Passenger Screening Canine 

SNA Short Notice Assessment 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-20-28 

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Department of Homeland Security 


Background 

In 1972, the Federal Aviation Administration initiated the use of explosive 

detection canine teams in partnership with state and local law enforcement 

agencies with jurisdiction over airports. In March 2003, the Federal Aviation 

Administration transferred its canine program to the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) upon creation of the Department of Homeland Security.1 

TSA established its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program 

(NEDCTP) to detect and deter the introduction of explosives into the Nation's 

transportation system. 

TSA expanded the program in 2011 from primarily cargo screening using law 

enforcement handlers to include Transportation Security Inspector handlers at 

airports with Passenger Screening Canines (PSC) trained to detect explosives. 

As a primary function, PSC teams operate 

security checkpoints by screening passengers and carry-on baggage to detect 

explosive odors using a canine's 

sense of smell. Once a canine 

detects an odor, it exhibits a change 

of behavior, which is interpreted by 

a handler who then conducts a 

search to identify the source of the 

odor. Figure 1 shows a canine in 

training. According to DHS officials, 

TSA added PSC teams at 

checkpoints in response to the 

Christmas day 2009 bombing 

attempt by a male traveler who 

concealed an explosive in his 

clothing, but failed to detonate it 

during the flight. 

In fiscal year 2018, TSA obligated about $152 million for NEDCTP, which 

comprised 1,047 explosive detection canine teams across the Nation. The 

teams included 675 canines handled by state and local law enforcement 

officers. The remaining 372 canines were designated as PSC teams. TSA 

oversees the teams to ensure they comply with current TSA explosive detection 

1 Homeland Security Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002). 

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Figure 1: Passenger Screening Canine 

Source: DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
SENSITI\1E SECURITY INFORMATION 


OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 


Department of Homeland Security 

standards. A canine team is composed of a handler and a canine. A handler is 

trained to detect changes in a canine's behavior or action signifying a potential 

explosive during Canine Enhanced Screenings. This screening process involves 

the deployment of a PSC team to screen passengers and their baggage at 

checkpoints for explosive odors in accordance with TSA's Proprietary Canine 

ManuaP. and Screening Checkpoint Standard Operating Procedures. 

In FY 2018, TSA reported spending nearly $77 million in costs associated with 

its PSC teams. The expenses included personnel compensation and benefits as 

well as travel and lodging for the PSC teams. As of October 20 18, TSA had 287 

PSC teams deployed and operating at airports. Deployed and operational PSC 

teams are assigned to an airport and are currently certified to conduct 

screening activities at security checkpoints. The teams were located at 47 of 

449 (10 percent) primarily Category X and I domestic airports, which TSA 

considers to be the highest risk. 3 See appendix C for a breakout of PSC teams 

by airport. In FY 2019, Congress funded an additional 50 PSC teams, bringing 

TSA's total authorized PSC teams to 422.4 

In FY 2018, initial start-up and maintenance costs for each PSC team were 

approximately $227,000 and $145,900, respectively. The costs are included in 

the $77 million TSA reported spending in FY 2018. See table 1. 

2 TSA's Proprietary Canine Manual, Revision 9.2, July 18, 2017. 

3 TSA classifies commercial airports in the United States into one offive security-risk categories 

(X, I, II, III, and IV), based on factors such as the total number of annual enplanements and 

other security program requirements. In general, Category X airports have the greatest 

number of passenger boardings while Category IV airports have the least. 4 TSA is budgeted for a specific number of PSC teams. However, it hires additional teams 

because of canine and handler attrition. 

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Table 1: FY 2018 Total Costs for a PSC Team 

Item 

Canine (procurement, supplies, food, kennels, 

veterinarian) 

Handler (Personnel Compensation and Benefits) 

Training (Canine Training Center, certifications, 

role players, Canine Explosives Training Aids, 

baas) 

Administrative (laptops, vehicles, uniforms, cell 

, 

TOTAL 

FY 2018 

Initial Maintenance 

Cost Cost 

$ 16,000 $ 3,000 

125,000 127,500 

71,000 7,400 

15 000 8 000 

$227,000 $145,900 

Source: 0 I G analysis of TSA data 

Once it receives a canine, TSA trains the dog and handler at its Canine 

Training Center at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. At the time 

of our review, TSA provided 20 weeks of initial PSC training, which included 

odor recognition training and development of search patterns, responses, and 

endurance in multiple aviation environments. The training center provided 

PSC handlers with 12 weeks of training. The classroom training included 

search techniques before TSA paired the handler with the canine. Once paired, 

the PSC team completes the training. 

After graduation, the PSC team is sent to a designated airport and is given 30 

days to acclimate to the new operational environment. A regional canine 

training instructor administers an initial Operational Transition Assessment to 

evaluate the PSC team's performance at the assigned airport. The team is 

certified to conduct screening activities once it successfully completes the 

evaluation.s To measure a canine's ability to detect an explosive odor and its 

handler's ability to recognize and respond to the canine's change of behavior 

within an operational environment, TSA periodically conducts a covert exercise 

called a Short Notice Assessment (SNA). 

s A certified PSC team has met or exceeded the established explosives detection certification 

standards and has no restrictions when conducting screening activities. 

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TSA uses two information systems to record daily utilization, training, and 

assessment data for PSC teams: 

• 	 Asset Management Database tracks certification and training status 

information for canine teams and results of assessments, such as SNAs, 

conducted by field personnel. 

• 	 Canine Website System tracks operational data such as utilization and 

training records, as well as Canine Training Center assessment data for 

canine teams. Daily utilization records may include searches by canines, 

public visibility activities, and passenger and cargo screening 

information. 

TSA relies on multiple layers of security to detect and prevent catastrophic 

aviation events. However, work performed by DHS OIG and other oversight 

entities disclosed shortfalls within many of the security layers. 6 For example, 

our prior covert testing efforts identified vulnerabilities in TSA's checkpoint 

screening effectiveness and access controls to airport secure areas. TSA has 

yet to show significant progress in preventing security risks exposed through 

our covert testing. We conducted this audit to determine whether TSA 

deployed PSC teams as necessary to fulfill its layered approach for passenger 

aircraft security and detect a variety of explosive items to safeguard the 

traveling public. 

Results of Audit 

TSA cannot show deployment and use of its PSC teams provide effective 

security at passenger screening checkpoints. Specifically, TSA has not 

determined the number of teams needed to provide security and mitigate risks 

because it does not identify and document mission needs, capability gaps, and 

operational goals to appropriately deploy the teams. TSA may not be allocating 

PSC teams to the highest risk airports because it does not properly justify and 

document allocation decisions. TSA has not determined whether the limited 

use of PSC teams provides sufficient security because it does not justify the 

6 See e.g., Covert Testing ofTSA 's Passenger Screening Technologies and Processes at Airport 

Security Checkpoints (Unclassified Summary}, OIG-15-150, September 22, 2015; Covert Testing 

of TSA 's Screening Checkpoint Effectiveness (Unclassified Summary}, OIG-17-112, September 

27, 2017; Covert Testing ofAccess Controls to Airport Secure Areas (Unclassified Summary}, 

OIG-19-21, February 13, 2019; AVIATION SECURITY: Airport Perimeter and Access Control 

Security Would Benefit From Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates, GA0-16-632, May 31, 

2016. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 


Department of Homeland Security 


teams as the best, most cost-effective checkpoint security. Finally, TSA cannot 

be assured airports are using PSC teams properly because it does not 

adequately oversee TSA management operations at airports. We also found 

canines on TSA's PSC teams may not detect 

This is due to canines having inherent limitations, restricting 

TSA's ability to train PSCs to detect all significant explosive threats. 

As a result, our Nation's aviation system and the traveling public could be at 

risk of a catastrophic event caused by an undetected explosive device. Further, 

TSA could have redirected nearly $77 million spent on PSC teams in fiscal year 

2018 to other security programs and activities to better protect the aviation 

system. 

TSA Cannot Show It Is Deploying and Using Its PSC Teams to 

Provide Effective Security 

TSA cannot show deployment and use of its PSC teams provide effective 

security at passenger screening checkpoints. Specifically, TSA has not 

determined the number of teams needed to provide security and mitigate risks 

because it does not identify and document mission needs, capability gaps, and 

operational goals to appropriately deploy the teams. TSA may not be allocating 

PSC teams to the highest risk airports because it does not properly justify and 

document allocation decisions. TSA has not determined whether the limited 

use of PSC teams provides sufficient security because it does not justify the 

teams as the best, most cost-effective checkpoint security. Finally, TSA cannot 

be assured airports are using PSC teams properly because it does not 

adequately oversee airport management in this regard. 

TSA Has Not Determined the Number of PSC Teams Needed to Provide 

Security and Mitigate Risks 

According to TSA's Transportation Security Capability Analysis Process 

Implementation Guide, documenting mission needs begins with recognizing key 

TSA functions to successfully carry out its mission. The functions include 

mitigating the introduction of explosive materials at airport screening 

checkpoints and optimizing the number, capability, and use of canine teams. 

According to the guide, once mission needs are known, TSA should identify 

potential capability gaps, which may change as technology evolves and new 

threats emerge. 

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In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 

2010 requires agencies to establish objective, quantifiable, and m easurable 

performance goals contributing to the general goals and objectives in an 

agency's strategic plan. For TSA's PSC teams, this would include goals such as 

the number of airports covered and travelers screened. 

Contrary to these guidance documents, TSA could not provide a formal 

assessment documenting the need for canine teams as a layer of security or the 

gaps the teams would fill. According to officials, TSA has not been required to 

determine the number of PSC teams needed to provide security and mitigate 

risks and has reactively allocated PSC teams based on congressional funding. 

This is occurring becau se TSA does not have a documented formal assessment 

of mission needs, capability gaps, and performance goals for its PSC teams. 

Although TSA has documents related to the teams, it could not provide a final 

document or policy identifying the methodology u sed to determine the metrics 

for its PSC teams. TSA provided a draft working paper from 2015, which 

included a rough estimate of th e optimal number of PSC teams needed to 

secure airport scr eening checkpoints, but the draft did n ot include a 

methodology for how TSA determined these numbers. The document also did 

not indicate the numbers represented TSA's operational goals for its PSCs. 

TSA May Not be Allocating PSC Teams to the Highest Risk Airports 

According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, management should 

implement internal control activities through policies to achieve its objectives 

and respond to risks.7 In addition, Federal agencies are responsible for 

implementing risk management practices that identify, assess, and respond to 

risks. These practices must be forward-looking and designed to help leaders 

make better decisions and alleviate threats.a Although TSA had a risk-based 

model for deploying PSC teams to airports, it deviated from the model in FY 

2019 and allocated canine teams based on informal and undocumented 

executive discretion. 

We compared TSA's FY 2019 risk model with the allocation of PSC teams based 

on executive discretion. TSA did not deploy PSC teams to 10 Category I 

7 Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GA0-14-704G, September 10, 2014 

a Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for 

Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control (Rev. July 15, 2016). 

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airports, which TSA classifies as the second highest of five risk levels, as 

indicated by the risk model. Instead, TSA focused on efficiency and allocation 

of additional teams to the largest airports. Several canine officials said some 

local TSA managers use PSC teams to expedite passenger-screening 

throughput rather than to detect explosive odors as intended. TSA officials 

said they use the risk model to begin informal conversations with Federal 

Security Directors (FSD) and as a guide for allocating PSC teams, rather than a 

policy. TSA officials could not provide evidence of discussions about 

allocations or the methodology used to determine how allocations were revised. 

This is occurring because TSA does not have a formal process to fully 

document and expeditiously approve allocation decisions about PSC teams. 

TSA also did not document officially allocation justifications deviating from its 

FY 2019 risk model. TSA did not formally document the justifications for its 

executive discretion or provide steps taken to mitigate the risks for airports 

that were not allocated PSC teams. 

Although the TSA Administrator signed an allocation memo in FY 2016, TSA 

has not consistently formalized allocation memos before the start of the fiscal 

year to ensure accountability and allocation of PSC resources are based on 

risk. In FY 201 7, allocation of new PSC teams was approved verbally without a 

memo. In FY 2019, TSA did not finalize the allocation memo until May, and 

the memo did not discuss analysis or justification for the allocation decisions. 

Limited Use of PSC Teams 

In its TSA's Measures ofAccountability and Productivity (MAP) Guidelines9, TSA 

established targets for how long PSC teams should operate on a daily basis. 

According to the MAP Guidelines, the national "on-leash" standard is between 

20 and 40 percent of a workday or approximately 1.5 to 3 hours of an 8-hour 

workday. A canine's total "on-leash" time should consist of three primary 

tasks: 

• 	 screening passengers and baggage for explosive odors at checkpoints; 

• 	 training exercises; and 

• 	 performing other utilization tasks, such as screening unattended bags or 

providing visible deterrence. 

9 TSA's MAP Guidelines establish PSC team training and operational activity targets. 

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Figure 2 shows an example of an ideal workday for a PSC team based on TSA's 

MAP Guidelines. We found checkpoint screening by PSC teams is limited by 

several factors. Our analysis of FY 2018 MAP data showed PSC teams spent 

less than 1 hour per work day screening for explosive odors at checkpoints, 

which is within the standard. Subsequent Figure 2: Example of an Ideal 

to the completion of our audit work, TSA 8-Hou.r Workday for a PSC Team 

acknowledged the original MAP 

requirements no longer aligned with the 

PSC primary focus at checkpoints. 

Consequently, in May 2019, TSA revised 

these guidelines by increasing "on-leash" 

time to four hours per day. For airports 

using canine teams as a layer of security, 

TSA reported PSC teams screened about 9 

percent (51.5 million of 605 million) of 

passengers. The remaining 91 percent of 

passengers were not screened by PSC 

teams. Finally, TSA is unable to use all of 

its authorized PSC teams to conduct 

screening at the checkpoints for reasons Source: DHS OIG analysis and TSA's MAP such as when canines are in training or a Guidelines 

canine or handler is on medical leave. 

In addition to the checkpoint screening limitations, as of April 2019, only 273 

(63 percent) full-time teams ofTSA's 436 authorized PSC teams were 

operational. TSA deployed teams to 4 7 of 449 (10 percent) domestic airports. 

However, only 9 of 47 airports (19 percent) were operating at full capacity with 

all assigned PSC teams conducting screening. About 13 of the 47 (28 percent) 

airports had 50 percent or fewer of their canine teams actively screening. 

Although it must follow on-leash standards, TSA has not verified the amount of 

time PSC teams spend screening passengers and baggage for explosives, as 

well as the number of operational teams, is effective as an additional layer of 

security at checkpoints. 

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No Assurance Airport Staff are Using PSC Teams Properly 

According to the Proprietary Canine Manual, TSA FSDs and staff at airports are 

responsible for ensuring appropriate and effective use of PSC teams, providing 

support, and ensuring administrative oversight for implementation of the 

teams. We found that, although TSA provided the Proprietary Canine Manual 

and additional directives, it did not provide enough oversight to ensure all 

FSDs followed the policies and procedures and used PSC teams effectively or as 

intended. For example, we interviewed several NEDCTP officials who stated 

local TSA management at some airports used canines to expedite passenger 

screening at checkpoints rather than to detect explosive odors as intended. To 

expedite checkpoint screening, airports rely on canines to screen passengers in 

the checkpoint queue before they are screened by metal detectors rather than 

Advanced Imaging Technology machines. This method of screening takes less 

time than the current and standard screening of passengers using Advanced 

Imaging Technology equipment. More importantly, this process introduces 

greater risk because the metal detector only identifies metallic objects whereas 

the other equipment identifies all anomalies on a person's body. 

In FY 2018, TSA's Special Operations Division administered a survey to PSC 

handlers and concluded airports used canine teams for efficiency and reducing 

passenger wait times at checkpoints rather than for security. As previously 

mentioned, if the airport provided PSC teams at the checkpoint, TSA relied on 

walk through metal detectors - less reliable screening methods for passengers. 

Additionally, in response to an April 2019 internal NEDCTP survey question, 

an airport canine official stated FSDs "insist" PSC teams continue screening at 

checkpoints even when there are no passenger lines. According to the official, 

the idle PSC teams could be used better in training activities, conducting 

proactive sweeps, and providing public visibility. The official also stated the 

FSDs emphasized passenger-screening throughput over the proper use of the 

PSC teams. The individual indicated if the FSD is not required to report to 

upper management about how PSC teams are used, it could be a detriment to 

the program. 

We attribute TSA's inability to ensure proper use of PSC teams at airports to its 

inadequate oversight of TSA management operations at the airports, including 

not enforcing canine program guidelines. This was conf"rrmed by a senior TSA 

official who also said the component did not ensure TSA management at all 

airports use the teams to detect explosive odors as trained. TSA also does not 

hold FSDs accountable for proper use of PSC teams. In particular, we 

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determined FSD performance plans do not include standards to hold FSDs 

accountable for how they use canine teams. 

Canines on PSC Teams May Not Detect 

Federal law requires TSA to periodically review threats to aviation, with 

particular focus on explosive materials presenting the most significant threats 

to passenger aircraft.10 To achieve its mission, TSA must train canines to 

detect the most significant threats to aviation security. However, we confirmed 

through our analysis that TSA's PSC teams may not detect 

. Specifically, TSA was training its canine 

teams to detect 13 explosives and 2 components of explosive devices, but not 

To determine canine teams' effectiveness for 

checkpoint screening activities, TSA conducts According to a canine 

SNAs at the airports. SNAs measure canines' program official, with 

ability to identify and properly respond to regard to TSA's 

explosive odors they are trained to detect in management of its 

an operational environment. TSA's FY 2018 PSCs, "We are laying 

SNA results showed canines tracks as the train is 

initial SNAs. Although TSA moving...We are 

trains its canines to detect explosives on 

moving people and objects, the component's 

own covert tests revealed canines did not 

constantly in 

catch-up." 

always detect explosive training aids during 

actual screening at airports. 

TSA's Office of Inspection's Special Operations Division also assessed PSC 

teams' effectiveness through its covert testing and identified deficiencies. 

Between January and April 2017, the division conducted the first round of 

testing on canine teams at 24 airports and conducted the second round of 

testing in FY 2018. The results of this testing identified significant 

improvements were needed. TSA has been working to reduce the 

vulnerabilities identified in the testing. For example, it developed and is 

implementing the open queue configuration at checkpoints. This new 

configuration is designed to increase canine detection capabilities by ensuring 

10 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 44912 (b)(l)(B) 

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more open spaces for canines to process and assess explosive odors. However, 

the results ofTSA's efforts will not be known until the Special Operations 

Division conducts further testing. 

We compared TSA's current Canine Explosives Training Aid (CETA) list with the 

current Detection Standard Analysis and Revision Methodology (DSARM) list of 

explosives. The CETA list contains all explosives TSA canines are trained and 

certified to detect. The DSARM list is classified and contains over 300 current 

explosives identified by subject matter experts in aviation security. Of the 13 

explosive odors TSA was training the canines to detect, the top 

• threats on the DSARM list.11 odors were among the top 

100. 

TSA acknowledged it had not updated its training aids for canines "in many 

years" to ensure they include emerging explosive threats. According to TSA 

officials, some of the training aids are based on outdated information, such as 

known and perceived threats and intelligence data, which is no longer relevant. 

This occurred because TSA did not have a formal process to evaluate and 

update its explosive training aids inventory to include emerging explosive 

threats based on intelligence. TSA acknowledged it did not have a formal 

process and in FY 2017, TSA's Explosives Operations Branch and NEDCTP 

began validating the then-current odor list to align with current explosive 

threats. TSA documented this initiative as a long-term project. However, 

almost 3 years later, TSA has not completed this initiative. According to TSA 

officials, its Requirements and Capabilities Analysis Office is working to create 

a formalized process to update its odor list based on current threats and new 

insights from scientific research. According to TSA, in March 2019, this office 

conducted a two-day interagency canine workshop, which included 

representatives from the United States Secret Service, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, and Johns Hopkins 

University. The workshop focused on the current status of TSA's canine 

program, current and planned research and development efforts, and proposed 

changes to the CETA list. 

Even ifTSA creates a formal process to evaluate and update its CETA list, 

canines have two inherent limitations that could prevent detection of all highrisk explosive threats. First, TSA's recent internal testing showed canines are 

. The second limitation is.. 

11 We removed the two component odors from our analysis because they are components of an 

explosive device, not an actual explosive, and, therefore, are not included in the DSARM list. 

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To train and maintain the canines' odor detection capabilities, each airport has 

a CETA kit comprised of real explosives that emit odor. Understandably, a PSC 

team's detection capability is limited to non-hazardous, non-toxic training aids. 

Some other explosives are highly dangerous and exposure would be harmful to 

the handlers or canines' health and safety. TSA has not formally documented 

which current explosives threats canines can or cannot detect. 

Conclusion 

In FY 2018, TSA reported spending nearly $77 million in costs associated with 

its PSC teams, including personnel compensation and benefits as well as travel 

and lodging. As of October 2018, TSA had 287 PSC teams deployed and 

operating at airports to conduct screening activities at security checkpoints. 

However, TSA cannot show deployment and use of these PSC teams are 

effectively ensuring air transportation security. 

Specifically, without defined mission needs, capability gaps, and operational 

goals, TSA cannot be certain it is properly allocating PSC teams to screen for 

explosives at airport screening checkpoints. Unless TSA assesses risk and 

formally justifies its allocation decisions, it cannot ensure it is deploying PSC 

teams in the most efficient and effective manner. TSA's PSC teams have 

limited presence at security checkpoints, as well as limited detection 

capabilities that may affect the teams' ability to provide an additional layer of 

security. Moreover, without adequate oversight to enforce canine program 

guidelines, airports may not be using PSC teams as intended or effectively. 

Additionally, TSA is not training canines to detect the most significant 

explosive threats, and has not updated its explosive training aids to ensure 

they include emerging threats. TSA is aware of known inherent limitations 

restricting its ability to train PSC teams to detect all significant explosives 

threats. However, TSA has not developed an approach to address the 

challenges and optimize the PSC teams' capabilities to detect explosive odors. 

In FY 2018, TSA could have redirected the nearly $77 million it spent on PSC 

teams to other security programs and activities to better protect the aviation 

system. 

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Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Transportation Security 

Administration Executive Assistant Administrator, Security Operations, 

develop a detailed Passenger Screening Canine plan and implement policies to: 

a. 	identify and document the canine program's current operational 

capability needs and number of Passenger Screening Canine teams 

necessary for effective checkpoint screening; 

b. 	formalize a documented methodology to justify Passenger Screening 

Canine team allocation decisions; 

c. 	create a formal process to analyze and document capabilities of 

Passenger Screening Canine teams and justify whether the teams or 

other options provide the best, cost-effective security at checkpoints; 

and 

d. 	hold Federal Security Directors accountable for using the teams as 

intended by the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program 

to maintain effectiveness. Additionally, TSA should establish a 

process to ensure local compliance with this guidance. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend the Transportation Security 

Administration Executive Assistant Administrator, Security Operations, after 

demonstrating the need and cost-effectiveness of Passenger Screening Canine 

teams: 

a. 	establish a formal process to conduct an annual assessment of the 

Canine Explosives Odor List with current explosives threats based on 

intelligence information. From this assessment, TSA must determine 

and document whether its Passenger Screening Canine teams are 

capable of detecting the explosive threats; and 

b. 	update the Canine Explosives Odor List, based on the assessment 

conducted, to include current explosive threat odors canines may be 

able to detect that are not hazardous to the safety of the Passenger 

Screening Canine teams. 

Management Comments 

TSA's comments noted that the agency appreciated the OIG's audit work to 

identify areas to optimize the use of canines as a layer of security. TSA 

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concurred with the report's two recommendations, but indicated the agency 

disagreed with the conclusions. Specifically, TSA responded that the OIG did 

not complete analyses with the level of methodological rigor necessary to 

support the report's conclusions. We disagree with TSA's assessment, as the 

report provides specific details of the team's extensive analyses based on TSA's 

available data and products. The following is a summary of TSA's response to 

each recommendation and the OIG's analysis of those responses. TSA 

submitted technical comments separately, which we incorporated in the report 

as appropriate. 

OIG Analysis of Management Comments 

Recommendation 1 

TSA's Response: TSA concurred and described plans to develop a formal, 

risk-based PSC Capability Strategic Road Map to address all components of 

this recommendation. The Road Map will identify capability needs, validate 

and enhance a risk-based allocation methodology, formalize Federal Security 

Director accountability, and implement measures to provide Federal Security 

Directors with the knowledge and resources needed to manage PSC teams. The 

estimated completion date is September 30, 2020. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. TSA provided a 

corrective action plan and completion date that should satisfy the intent of the 

recommendation. 

Re commendation 2 

TSA Response: TSA concurred and explained that the agency has developed a 

Requirements Engineering Integrated Process Manual to guide implementation 

of TSA's engineering methodology. TSA has prioritized research and 

development to determine canine capabilities in eight key areas and gain 

insight into canine behavior in working environments. Future updates to the 

Canine Odor List will include both hazardous and non-hazardous materials. 

The estimated completion date is March 31, 2021. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. TSA provided a 

corrective action plan and completion date that should satisfy the intent of the 

recommendation. 

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Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Pub. L. No. 107- 296) by 

amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

We conducted this review to determine whether TSA deployed PSC teams as 

necessary to fulfill its layered approach for passenger aircraft security and 

detect a variety of explosive items to safeguard the traveling public. To achieve 

our objective, we assessed the number of canines deployed, canine testing, and 

accompanying procedures. Specifically, we reviewed TSA's NEDCTP 

management operations from FY 2017 through April 2019. We reviewed 

Federal, departmental, and component guidance on explosive canine detection 

team management, including the TSA Proprietary Canine Manual, Revision 9.2. 

We interviewed headquarters officials from DHS Office of the Chief Readiness 

Support Officer, DHS Science and Technology Directorate, and officials from 

various TSA offices. We reviewed prior OIG and Government Accountability 

Office reports for findings and recommendations related to our audit. 

To understand TSA's PSC operations, we conducted site visits and interviewed 

officials at TSA Headquarters and three airports: Logan International Airport in 

Boston, MA; Dulles International Airport in Dulles, VA; and George Bush 

Intercontinental Airport in Houston, TX. We interviewed an FSD, Assistant 

FSDs, Field Canine Coordinators, and Canine Supervisors. We also met with 

officials at TSA's Canine Training Center at Lackland Air Force Base in San 

Antonio, TX to understand current training requirements as well as future 

plans and procedures for PSC teams. 

TSA provided multiple data spreadsheets for FY 2018, which included the total 

amount spent on PSC teams; initial start-up and maintenance costs for a PSC 

team; total number of passengers screened by PSC teams; total number of PSC 

teams certified and working at passenger screening checkpoints as of April 19, 

2019; all SNAs conducted in FY 2018; as well as TSA's PSC team allocations for 

FY 2018 and FY 2019, using its risk model and final FY 2019 allocation. We 

reviewed the spreadsheets for background information related to the cost of the 

program. This information is manually entered so we could not conduct data 

reliability tests. Therefore, we used this data to support our program cost 

figures for background purposes only. 

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To determine the average time PSC teams spent screening passengers for 

explosives at checkpoints in FY 2018, we relied on data from TSA's Canine 

Website System, which included PSC teams and total time the canines were 

"on-leash". This data contained all PSC teams' duty days and total time the 

teams spent conducting screening activities at checkpoints in FY 2018. For 

this analysis, we removed any PSC teams that did not spend any duty days 

conducting screening activities at the checkpoints because we presumed the 

teams were never fully certified to conduct screening activities. We compared 

the data in the spreadsheet with reports within the Canine Website System to 

ensure the information provided matched. We determined the data was 

sufficiently reliable to support our findings. 

To determine whether TSA's internal testing found its PSC teams to be a 

successful layer of security, we reviewed its testing results for Operations Cairo 

and Bretagne. Additionally, we interviewed TSA officials involved in those 

operations and analyzed documents regarding the scope of testing and 

methodologies used. We did not validate this data and, therefore, did not use it 

as the sole basis to support our findings. 

To determine whether TSA's CETA list was updated to train canine teams on 

the highest-risk threats, we compared TSA's CETA list from TSA's NEDCTP as 

of October 2018, with the DSARM list provided by TSA's Office of Inspection. 

The DSARM list is also used by TSA's Office of Inspection's Special Operations 

Division to assess aviation security vulnerabilities through covert testing. The 

DSARM data is ranked from highest to lowest threat based on incident history, 

availability, and amount of damage the explosive can cause. We identified the 

top 20 highest-risk explosive threats. 

We conducted this performance audit between July 2018 and September 2019 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. 

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Appendix B 

TSA's Comments to the Draft Report 

IT.S. 0<-p3rtnM'nl ofllohM'l!lndS~urfty 

60t Somh U°' Strc~t 

A..-llnglon, \ "A 20598-6028 

Transportation 

Security 

Administration 

March 26, 2020 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, PhD . 

Inspector General 

U.S. Department ofllomeland Security 

FROM: Davi? '.· Pekoske 

AdmimsLralor 

~ · -...., /<flu."" /} /JI. l 

tt.. "-{ 

Transportation Security Administration 

SUl3JECT: Management's Response lo OIG Drafl Report: "TSA's 

Challenges with Passenger Screening Canine Teams," 

(Proj ecL No. 010 18-094-AUD-TSA) 

Thank yoll for the opportunity to comment 011 this draft report. 'The U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security's (DT-lS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) appreciates 

the work ofthe Office ofInspector General (OIG) in planning a11d conducting its review 

and issuing this report 

While TSA concurs with the recommendations in the report, TSA strongly disagrees with 

the report's conclusions lhal because TSA has not met lhe i<lenli l'ied program 

management best practices for the Passenger Screening Canines (PSC) program ( I) the 

program is not effectively helping ensure air transportation security and consequently 

" our Nation's aviation system un<l the LJ'avelling public could be al risk ofa catastrophic 

event caused by an undetected explosive device," and (2) that "TSA could have 

redirected Lhe nearly $77 mill.ion it spent on PSC lea ms lo other security programs and 

acLivities lo heller prolecl the aviation system." The Office nr U1e Inspector General audit 

team has not completed any analysis with the level ofmethodological rigor necessary to 

support these conclusions. 

TSA PSCs provide a valuable detection and deterrence capability in TSA· s layered 

approach for transportation secw·ity that cannot be duplicated by technology. They have 

been trained lo detect explosive odor emitted from persons or their accessible property. 

This capability allows PSC teams to screen a large number of people and large spaces for 

explosive t.b.reats in a short period of lime. PSC teams rnay also be deployed outside the 

checkpoint Lo assist with other operational or rfak-based screening initiati\'es. In 20 19, 

TSA PSC tearns screened more lhan 30 million passengers at security checkpoints. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-20-28 

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Puts Hi aad 1S20, eaeept with tile writtea permiHiea eftlle AdmiaiBtnter eftlle Traaepel'tatiea Seeurity 

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2 

The program has experienced significant growth since 20 11, with 422 funded TSA PSC 

teams. The program has also shown its willingness and dedication lo continued 

improvement in how canines are used to ensure effectiveness. TSA appreciates the 

010·s work to identify areas to optimize use ofcanines as a layer ofsecurity. Although 

this report is informative, TSA believes it minimizes the accomplishments ofTSA's 

Canine Program, specifically relating lo operational proficiency improvements by PSC 

teams. 

TSA implemented several risk-based initiatives that d.irectly support canine 

modernization goals. TSA notes thal we are the only U.S. government entity lhat 

conducts extensive covert testing on its canine teams' effectiveness. As the report 

correctly states, TSA identified perfonnance im provements as a direct result of this 

testing. These in.itiatives aim lo improve effectiveness and accountability. as well as 

maximiz e canine use and productivity in support of the Adminislration 's broader efforts 

to strengthen canine capabilities. TSA also established an executive oversight working 

group to ensure continued momentum and executive-level tracking of progress. Given 

this track record, TSA believes continued investment in tl1is program is clearly warranted. 

The draft report contained two recommendations with wl1ich TSA concurs. Attached. 

find our detailed response to each recommendation. TSA previously submitted technical 

com meats under separate cover for OIG's consideration. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity lo review and comment on this draJ)' report. Please 

feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to working with you 

again in the future. 

Attachment 

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Puts Hi aad 1S20, eaeept with tile writtea permieeiea eftlle Admiaietnter eftlle Tnaepel'tatiea Seeurity 

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Attachment: Management Response to Recommendations 


Contained in OIG Draft Repo1·t, "TSA ' s Challenges with Passenge1· Scn ning 

Canfoc T eams," (Project No. OIG 18-094-A UD-TSA) 


Recommendation 1: We recommend the Transportation Security Administration 

Executive Assistant Administrator, Security Operations. develop a detailed Passenger 

Screening Canine plan and implement policies to: 

a. 	 identify and docu ment the canine program' s current operational capability needs 

and number of Passenger Screening Canine teams necessary for effective 

checkpoint screening: 

b. 	formalize a documented methodology to justify Passenger Screening Canine team 

allocation decisions; 

c. 	 create a fonnal process to analyze and document capabilities of Passenger 

Screening Canine teams and justify whether the teams or other options provide the 

best, cost-effective security at checkpoints; and 

d. 	 hold Federal Security Directors accountable for using tbe teams as intended by the 

National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program to maintain effectiveness. 

Additionally, TSA should establish a process to ensure local compliance with this 

guidance. 

Response: Concur. TSA will develop a fonnal, risk-based Passenger Screening Canine 

(PSC) Capability Strategic Road Map. Tb is document wi ll addl'ess all components ofthis 

recommendation, lo include identifying capability needs, validating and enhancing a riskbased allocation methodology, and formalizing Federal Security Director accountability. 

TSA implemented several risk-based initiatives that directly support canine 

modernization goals. These initiatives aim to improve effectiveness and accountability, 

as well as maxi mize canine use and productivity. 

With Congressional and Administration support, TSA invested significantly to increase 

the number of PSC teams since 20 1 I, with 422 funded teams in fiscal year 2020. TSA 

deployed these additional teams to various airport locations based on several factors, such 

as risk, airport cmtfiguration, and passenger throughput. TSA will continue to document, 

within the PSC Capabil ity Strategic Road Map. the link between canine operational 

capability needs and enterprise-level capability needs and gaps. Tbis effort will help to 

ensure optimal coverage by PSC teams, including additional law enforcement officer 

PSCs. 

TSA · s risk-based PSC allocation methodology is designed to appropriately account for 

new or mitigating factors affecting allocation decisions. A validation and enhancement 

of the model and corresponding methodology a.re uuder development and will be 

documen ted in Lhe PSC Capability Slrategic Road Map. A formal comparison ofthe 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 


Department of Homeland Security 

2 

capabilities of PSC teams in the checkpoint environ ment to otl1er mitigation options will 

also be addressed in the PSC Capability Strategic Road Map. 

TSA is implementing measures to provide Federal Security Directors with rhe knowledge 

and resources so that they can be held accountable for using PSC team in accordance 

with the direction and requirements of the National Explosives Detection Canine Team 

Program. To that end, effective October I, 2019, the following changes were made: 

• 	 field Canine Coordinators (FCCs) and Regional Canine Training lnstnictors 

(RCTls) now report to the Federal Security Directors. 

• 	 FCC and RCTI positions will be converted into a single Canine Training Instmctor 

position in calendar year 2020. 

• 	 Supervisory personnel for FCC/RCTls have formally lnmsitioned to a Canine 

Quality Assessor. 

• 	 CQAs will conduct quality assurance processes to improve accountability at all 47 

PSC airports through Canine Program Compliance Assessments. 

• 	 FSDs have all completed a specialiwd training event at the TSA Canine Training 

Center, so that they understand the program requirements and their 

responsibiJities. 

Estimated Completion Date (ECD): September 30, 2020. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend the Transportation Security Administration 

Executive Assistant Administrator, Security Operations, after demonstrating the need and 

cost-eJJectiveness of Passenger Screening Caniae teams: 

a. 	 establish a formal process to conduct an annual assessment of the Canine 

Explosives Training Aids with current explosives threats based on intelligence 

infomrntion. From tbis assessment, TSJ\ must determine and document whether 

its Passenger Screening Canine teams can detect the explosive threats: and 

b. 	 npdatc the Canine Explosives Training Aids, based on the assessment conducted, 

to include current explosive threat odors canines may be able to detect that arc not 

hazardous to the safety of the Passenger Screening Canine teams. 

Response: Concur. TSA bas developed a Requirements Engineering Integrated Process 

Manual (REIPM) to guide implementation ofTSA's requirements engineering 

methodology. The REIPM supports efficient and consistent requirements engineering, 

bujJds upon legacy best practices, creates a process/product improvement forum_ defines 

roles ru1d responsibilities, ru1d focuses on instilling engineering rigor while allov1ing for 

adaptive implementation . 

While the REIPM has historically focused on transportation security equipment processes 

and procedures, it will be updated to include a documented, fomia li zed process for fumre 

www.oig.dhs.gov 20 	 OIG-20-28 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

3 

updates to the TSA Canine Odor List. The proposed process wil l be based on several 

faclors including Delection Standard Analysis Revision Methodology. curreul 

intelligence. and findings from focused research and development (R&D). 

To determine canine capabilities to detect explosive threats in an operational 

environment. TSA lias priori tized R&D into eight key areas to obta.in scientific data to 

infonn decisions. Initial sludies will aim lo optimize the working environment to infonn 

concept of operations and s1andard operatiJ1g procedures. Follow-on studies will focus 

on passenger screen ing canine capabilities. 

Additionally, TSA has planned R&D to gain insight into canine behavior in working 

environments. Coordination with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science 

and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) to conduct these R&D studies is undern1ay. 

TSA ·s Chemistry and Explosives Branch maintains the Canine Odor List and the Cunine 

Explosives Training Aids (CETAs). Training and Development (T&D) is responsible for 

imprinting the canines according to the odor list and training aids. T&D"s Canine 

Training Center coordinates with Domestic Aviation Operations and the Chemistry and 

Explosive Branch to periodically review the odor list to ensure it incorporates current 

threats to the transportation domain. Future updates lo Lhe Canine Odor List will include 

both hazardous and 11 011-haz.ardous materials. Hazardous materials will require the 

assessment and use of non-detonable training aids. Several variations arc under 

development for materials that arc hazardous to the PSC teams. 

TSA is coordinating further R&D with OTIS S&T to dctennine whether TSA can obtain 

non-detonable aids that could serve as a suitable substitute for hazardous, live explosives. 

Results from R&D acli vi lies -will dri ve future development of non-detonable training aids 

for applicable explosives in the CETA kit. 

ECD: March 31, 202 l. 

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Appendix C 

List of Airports with Passenger Screening Canine Teams 

25 

25 

25 

25 

20 

15 

15 

14 

14 

13 

13 

12 

11 

10 

9 

9 

8 

7 

6 

6 

6 

6 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

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Department of Homeland Security 

25 6 

26 5 

27 5 

28 5 

29 5 

30 5 

31 5 

32 5 

33 4 

34 4 

35 4 

36 4 

37 4 

38 4 

39 4 

40 4 

41 4 

42 4 

43 4 

44 3 

45 3 

46 3 

47 3 

TOTAL AUTHORIZED PSC TEAMS 422 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 


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Appendix D 

Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report 

Patrick O'Malley, Director 

Sharon Johnson, Audit Manager 

Amber Carlson-Jones, Program Analyst 

Thomas Bobrowski, Program Analyst 

Jeffrey Threet, Program Analyst 

Saajan Paul, Auditor 

Kelly Herberger, Communications Analyst 

Deborah Mouton-Miller, Communications Analyst 

David Kinard, Independent Referencer 

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Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

TSA Executive Assistant Administrator for Office of Security Operations 

TSA GAO/OIG Audit Liaison Office 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

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To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

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