RINGED BY FIRE

U.S. MARINES AND THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 

21 JANUARY TO 9 JULY 1968

MARINES IN THE VIETNAM WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

COLONEL RICHARD D. CAMP, USMC (RET)

WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEONARD A. BLASIOL, USMC
This pamphlet history, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the Vietnam War, is published for the education and training 

of Marines by the History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, as part of the U.S. Department of Defense 

observance of the fiftieth anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of 

the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Commemorative Series Historian

Paul Westermeyer

Senior Editor

Angela J. Anderson

Commemorative Series Editor

Jason Gosnell

Visual Information Specialist

Robert A. Kocher

2019

PCN 2019931805

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n the last analysis, Khe Sanh was defended because it 

was the only logical thing to do. We were there, in a prepared position and in considerable strength. A well-fought 

battle would do the enemy a lot more damage than he could 

hope to inflict on us.

~ General William C. Westmoreland

U.S. Army, Commander, 

United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

(USMACV)

Khe Sanh Background

For many of the Marine Corps replacements in 1968, the first 

sight of Khe Sanh Combat Base during the siege came from 

the porthole of a transport helicopter flying several thousand 

feet above the plateau.* The base was clearly visible, set against 

a backdrop of red clay soil, the distinctive earth color of the 

plateau, and the deep green jungle surrounding the perimeter wire. Flights into Khe Sanh took on an added dimension during the siege. Similar to a thrill ride at a theme park, 

the aircraft were forced to execute violent maneuvers to avoid 

North Vietnamese antiaircraft fire, particularly the 12.7mm 

*Some of the content in the following work was originally published in 1997 

by Jack Shulimson, LtCol Leonard A. Blasiol (USMC), Charles R. Smith, 

and Capt David A. Dawson (USMC) in U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968.

machine guns emplaced near the runways. Typically, the helicopter approached the base at an altitude above 3,000 feet 

before executing a quick dive to the runway—leaving passengers with their stomachs in their mouths and that “controlled 

crash” look on their faces.

As soon as the wheels touched down, the replacements 

scrambled out of the helicopter and sprinted to the trenches and bunkers that lined the perimeter of the runway. The 

North Vietnamese regularly shelled the incoming aircraft with 

artillery and mortar fire from positions located in the Co Roc 

Mountains of Laos and from hidden positions surrounding 

the base. Captain Steve Dickey, a pilot with Marine Medium 

Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262) recalled, “We had just 

landed . . . when enemy rockets and mortar rounds started 

falling all around us. We all managed to squeeze into a drainage pipe just along the strip. We stayed there for the next 45 

minutes while the enemy fired rounds into the zone.” Sergeant T. M. Kane described his arrival, “We got off the plane 

and [some] guy says ‘Run!’ ‘Run!’ Well, I ran! And they [the 

shells] were hitting all around us.” A hand-painted sign on the 

control tower proclaimed, “Welcome to Khe Sanh.” 

Khe Sanh Area of Operations

Khe Sanh Combat Base is located on a relatively flat plateau in the extreme northwestern corner of South Vietnam’s 

Ringed By Fire | 1
2 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Quang Tri Province, part of the I Corps Tactical Zone 

(ICTZ). Bordered on the north by the demilitarized zone 

(DMZ) and west by the Laotian border, the area of operations generally encompassed all of the 1,554 square kilometers of the Huong Hoa District. The base functioned 

primarily as a support facility for surveillance units watching the DMZ and probing the outer reaches of the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail in nearby Laos. It was shaped somewhat like an 

irregular rectangle and covered an area approximately one 

mile long and one-half mile wide.

The remote base takes its name from the nearby village 

of Khe Sanh, a collection of nine hamlets astride National 

Route 9, the only east-west road in the northern province 

to join Laos and the coastal regions. Captain John W. Ripley’s Company L, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, was assigned to 

provide security for Rough Rider supply convoys. “The condition of Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh was incredibly 

bad,” he said. “It was pitted, holes washed out, completely 

overgrown in places, and rock slides had covered part of it. 

It was an impossible route. The road was cut into a cliff side 

on the north side and there were no guard rails anywhere 

along the road.” Sharp turns and 36 narrow bridges, some 

dating from the French colonial era, had to be shored up or 

bypassed. During the monsoon season—June into November—the road often became impassible. 

This crumbling one-lane macadam road ran for 63 torturous kilometers from Dong Ha to the combat base, through 

terrain studded with thick foliage right to the edge of the 

roadway that greatly restricted visibility. It was the only overland supply route to Khe Sanh. Its entire length from Ca Lu 

Defense Department photo 

Oblique aerial photograph of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. 
Ringed By Fire | 3

to Khe Sanh was a grim task for a convoy commander. “It 

was a tactical nightmare,” Ripley said. “There was no way 

you could secure your position unless you had a company of 

infantry moving ahead of you at every step.” In early August, 

Route 9 was shut down because of the North Vietnamese 

Army (NVA) ambushes. The 3d Marine Division was under 

severe pressure along the DMZ north of Dong Ha and 

simply did not have the men available to keep Route 9 open.

The terrain around the combat base is characterized by 

steep hills and valleys and multicanopied dense undergrowth 

forests. Streams flow through many of the valleys, emptying into one of two rivers. The Xe Pone River, also known 

as the Tchepone, located west of Khe Sanh, forms the international border between South Vietnam and Laos. The Rao 

Quan River north of the base flows northwest to southeast, 

forming a natural barrier. In addition to the two large rivers, 

there were many streams that were fordable in the dry season 

but impassible after heavy rains. 

The Khe Sanh area has numerous access points. Many 

avenues or access points follow existing trails, along ridgelines and streambeds. However, military movement along 

streambeds is unsuitable during the rainy season because 

of swift stream currents and difficulty in crossing. Two avenues of approach enter from the northwest. One crosses the 

Laos/Vietnam border and moves southeast along streams 

and valleys that join the Rao Quan and continues southeast until it joins National Route 9, the major east-west 

avenue of approach across the area of operations. The second 

approach from the northwest crosses the Laos/Vietnam 

border and continues southeast along the ridgeline to Hill 

Adapted by History Division 
4 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A181584 

A Marine convoy moves along Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A191580 

Convoy going to Khe Sanh. 
881 South and Hill 861. The approach from the southeast 

travels through the Da Krong Valley, which enters the area of 

operations and moves northwest until it reaches Route 9. An 

approach from the northwest enters the area of operations 

just south of Hill 1123 and runs southwest along the Khe Xa 

Bai River to a point just north of Hill 558.

From a military point of view, the thick vegetation 

throughout the area of operations provided excellent cover 

and concealment for both friendly and enemy forces. Doubleand triple-canopied forests with tree heights of between 

60 to 90 feet are common. Dense undergrowth, consisting 

of bushes, vines, and bamboo stands limited cross-country 

movement and greatly reduced long-range observation. “Tall 

‘elephant grass’ about 7-feet tall, was razor sharp and full of 

bacteria,” Navy Lieutenant Ray W. Stubbe recalled. “Cuts on 

arms and hands resulted in large sores that remained infected 

for weeks.” In general, patrols were restricted to existing trails 

and streams, however, periods of steady, heavy rainfall also 

made many of the streams difficult to impossible to cross.

The soil on the Khe Sanh plateau consisted of deeply 

weathered red-brown clay mixed with basalt. Staff Sergeant 

James E. Haskins recalled, “The earth at Khe Sanh was red; 

redder than any dirt I had ever seen . . . and when it rained it 

made walking a new experience, with the red clay as slick as 

ice in a hockey rink. And when the weather was dry, the dust 

was [like] talc and fouled the air. Everything became red, 

clothes, tents, equipment, tanks, trucks, jeeps, you name it, 

and it was covered with red dirt. Our body hair stayed red.” 

The soil was excellent for construction of underground 

fortifications and tunnels because of its cohesive properties, 

particularly around the airfield. The soil’s composition gave 

it a cohesion that does not require shoring or supports. The 

soils covering the hills were categorized as sandy, stony soils 

that are shallow, particularly on the steeper slopes. On the 

hills, however, underground construction was limited because 

of the hill’s sandy, stony soils. In areas of multicanopied forests, the enemy was capable of digging in artillery with maximum concealment. 

Weather played a significant role in operations, particularly during the northeast monsoon season. The weather was 

characterized by low clouds, overcast skies, and dense fog 

that occurred during the hours of darkness and early morning. The monsoon rains dropped as much as 80 inches of 

rain. It was accompanied by the crachin, a weather phenomenon in which dense 3,000–5,000 feet thick cloud formations reached as low as 500 feet, reducing visibility below to 

one-half a mile. Staff Sergeant Haskins said, “The drizzle 

and fog would roll in from the mountains and seemed never 

to go away until late the next morning.” These periods lasted 

from three to five days. Tactical air operations were limited 

during the periods of heavy rains and fog conditions restricted observation. 

Key terrain at Khe Sanh consisted of the commanding 

heights (or hills), which afford observation and control over 

the airfield and avenues of approach to the airfield. The heights 

played a significant tactical role in the defense of the base. Four 

and a half kilometers north across the Rao Quan loomed the 

1,015-meter Dong Tri Mountain, the highest peak in the area 

and one that dominated the entire Khe Sanh plateau. A kilometer to the west of Dong Tri lay Hill 950, which became a 

platoon-size observation post and radio relay station. Hill 558, 

located four kilometers north-northwest of the base, was occupied by the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, on 17 January to block 

enemy movement through the Rao Quan Valley. Company K, 

3d Battalion, 26th Marines, occupied Hill 861 four kilometers 

to the west, while Company E, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, 

On 21 July 1967, Company M, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

sweeping ahead of an 85-vehicle Rough Rider convoy to 

bring M107 175mm self-propelled guns to reinforce Khe 

Sanh, prematurely triggered an NVA battalion-size ambush 

halfway between the base and Ca Lu. The company was supported by a self-propelled 40mm antiaircraft gun, called 

a “Duste,” M55 quad mounted .50-caliber machine guns 

(Quad-50), and two tanks. The engagement quickly turned 

deadly. Several Marines were killed and wounded before 

additional reinforcements from 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, 

arrived. The convoy was held up at Ca Lu and eventually 

returned to Camp Carroll. 

Rough Rider Ambush

Ringed By Fire | 5
6 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

garrisoned on Hill 861A. The hills gave Marines control of the 

approaches from the north and northwest. Company I (reinforced by Company M’s headquarters and two platoons), 3d 

Battalion, 26th Marines, occupied Hill 881S, seven kilometers 

west-northwest and dominated the approaches from the west.

Approximately 10,000 to 12,000 of the Bru, a Montagnard tribe, lived in a dozen small villages and resettlement 

areas in the immediate vicinity of the combat base. Army 

Specialist Fourth Class Robert E. Lee Shippen Jr., Special 

Forces medic, said, “They were still a fairly primitive tribe, 

still doing hunting and gathering. They didn’t have a written language and they had a very simple, very primal way of 

being . . . they were straight forward, honest and sincere.”

Many of the Bru served alongside the U.S. and South Vietnamese Special Forces as members of the Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group (CIDG) and the Studies and Observation 

Group (SOG, later the Special Operations Group) and in 

the District Popular Forces. “These guys [Bru] had been soldiers pretty much all their lives,” Specialist Shippen remembered. “They lived in the area and were familiar with that part 

of Vietnam and Laos because the tribal unit didn’t recognize 

international boundaries. They looked at the world according 

to river valleys and watersheds.”

The Viet Cong also were organizing an administrative 

network among the Montagnard villages. A chairman, two 

secret agents, and 15 guerrillas were assigned to each hamlet. 

Adapted by History Division 

Schematic depicting the major topographical features, road network, and bases in the Khe Sanh area.
“We knew the district police chief was a North Vietnamese spy,” Army Sergeant James Turner, 149th Military Intelligence Group, recalled. “We’d give him misinformation . . . 

I’m sure that there was VC [Viet Cong] that came right into 

the village. They probably had family there.” There were also 

1,200 ethnic Vietnamese in the surrounding area, as well as 

three French families who owned coffee plantations, two 

French Catholic priests, two nuns, and one American missionary family.*

American Involvement in Khe Sanh 

Khe Sanh sat on an extinct volcano. The place was born 

in violence and heat, and that’s the legacy that remained.

~ Lieutenant Ray Stubbe

Chaplain, U.S. Navy

*Felix Poilane, one of the French plantation owners, was killed in the crash 

of a Lockheed C-130 Hercules that was hit by rocket fire as it came in for 

a landing.

American involvement on the plateau began in 1962 when a 

Special Forces team, A-131, established a camp at an abandoned French fort along Route 9 about two kilometers east 

of the village of Khe Sanh. The “Old French Fort,” as it was 

known, served as a base of operations for the locally recruited 

Bru Montagnard CIDG. The CIDG camp was one of a network of border camps that served primarily to gather intelligence in the remote areas of South Vietnam. Two years later, 

the Special Forces camp was moved to a light-duty airstrip 

that had been built by the French in 1949 on the Xom Cham 

Plateau, which eventually became the Khe Sanh Combat 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A190186 

A Bru village from Hill 90, south of the Khe Sanh airstrip.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Bru civilian refugees, including many children, walk toward 

Ca Lu along Route 9 after the fall of Lang Vei. Not having 

the resources to care for them and fearing the possibility of 

enemy infiltrators, the Marines decided against allowing the 

refugees into the Khe Sanh base.

Ringed By Fire | 7
8 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Base. In the spring of 1964, Marine Detachment, Advisory 

Team 1, under Major Alfred M. Gray Jr., later the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, established a radio monitoring site atop Dong Voi Mep (Tiger Tooth Mountain) north 

of the CIDG camp. The site was where the first Marine unit 

conducted independent operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). 

In 1966, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) carried out two battalion-size operations—Operation Virginia and Operation Prairie—near Khe Sanh to search for 

North Vietnamese units that Special Forces had reported in 

the area. The first unit, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, arrived in 

April and, after spending a week of fruitless patrols though 

the jungle, marched back to the coast on Route 9. The second 

unit, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, spent four months combing 

the hills and valleys with very little enemy contact, claiming only 15 dead North Vietnamese. During this latter operation, Special Forces personnel relocated their CIDG camp 

to the village of Lang Vei on Route 9 approximately 8 kilometers from Khe Sanh and 3.3 kilometers from the Laotian 

border. A small detachment known as Forward Operating 

Base 3 (FOB 3) was deployed in late 1967 to the southeast 

corner of the combat base, while a small U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (USMACV) advisory team was 

located at the district headquarters in Khe Sanh village.

In February 1967, a detachment from Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalion 10 began extending and improving 

the runway. The detachment resurfaced the old 457-meter 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

The hill battles in the spring of 1967 culminated in assaults on significant terrain outside the combat base. Here, on 30 April 

1967, Marines of Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, catch their breath during the assault on Hill 861. That day, the company overran an NVA bunker complex.
runway and added a new 732-meter extension and an airfield parking apron. Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 

protected the project. A second company was added in late 

March because of increased enemy activity. During the 

month, Combined Action Platoon O (CAP Oscar) established its headquarters in the Khe Sanh village and began 

patrolling the surrounding Bru hamlets. 

Sergeant Turner, of the Joint Technical Advisory Detachment ( JTAD), recalled that Khe Sanh village “was a very 

primitive place.” The main street stretched about three 

city blocks along Route 9 and consisted of mostly singlestory stucco or cinder block buildings, many with wooden 

awnings. The Huong Hoa District headquarters was located at the west end of the village. Corporal Michael Archer 

noted that “across the street from the district headquarters 

sat a long wooden shack. This was the local brothel, amusingly referred to by everyone as ‘Howard Johnson’s’.”

On 24 April, a platoon from Company B became heavily 

engaged with a large North Vietnamese force near Hill 861. 

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 3d Marines, joined the fight. The 

ensuing battles to eject the North Vietnamese from the commanding terrain overlooking the combat base became known 

as the “Hill Battles” and lasted until 11 May before the NVA 

slipped over the border to rest and refit. 

The fighting in the First Battle of Khe Sanh—24 April to 

11 May 1967—was savage and costly for both sides. Marine 

casualties numbered 155 killed and 425 wounded, while the 

North Vietnamese left nearly 1,000 dead on the battlefield. 

Decision to Hold

U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland visited Khe 

Sanh in his earliest months in Vietnam and noted that “the 

critical importance of the little plateau was immediately 

apparent. . . . Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration into Laos; a base for (secret border 

crossing) operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail; a western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and 

an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail.” Later, Westmoreland defended the 

decision to hold Khe Sanh, stating, “had we not taken a stand 

in that remote area,” he wrote, “our forces would have inevitably been required to fight in the more populous coastal areas where the application of firepower would have been 

hampered in order to protect civilians.”

The III MAF commander, Lieutenant General Robert 

E. Cushman Jr., agreed with Westmoreland that Khe Sanh 

should be held because it was “a complete block to invasion 

and motorized supply,” as well as allowing him to conduct 

mobile operations in the enemy’s base area at a time when III 

MAF did not have enough troops to effectively cover all the 

territory near the DMZ. The next senior Marine in the chain 

of command, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, commanding general of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPac), 

disagreed with the decision to keep Marines at Khe Sanh, 

because “to withdraw would save lives that would otherwise 

be lost . . . [and] nobody ever won anything by backing away.”

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Army Gen William C. Westmoreland (center), commander, 

USMACV, and LtGen Cushman (left) visit a Marine battalion 

command post south of Da Nang. Westmoreland is the senior 

U.S. military commander in South Vietnam.

Ringed By Fire | 9
10 |

In Tourison and Stubbe’s 2006 book, B5-T8 in 48 QXD: 

The Secret Official History of the North Vietnamese Army of the 

Siege at Khe Sanh, Vietnam, Spring, 1968, the North Vietnamese appeared to agree with both General Westmoreland and General Krulak. The authors stated that the mission 

of the overall general offensive, including Khe Sanh, “was 

to draw the enemy out [into remote areas], pin him down, 

and destroy much of his men and means of conducting war.” 

Specifically, the Khe Sanh Route 9 campaign portion of the 

overall offensive had several aims, including the destruction 

of “an important portion of the enemy’s strength, primarily 

the American.” The North Vietnamese wanted to draw the 

U.S. forces “out route 9, the further the better,” and then “tie 

them down.”

The campaign called for close coordination with other 

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong commands throughout 

South Vietnam, especially with Military Region Tri-ThienHue. According to the North Vietnamese documentation, 

the destruction of “enemy strength and coordination with 

other battlefields [military regions] are the most fundamental [and] important.” The plan directed that North Vietnamese commanders “focus mainly on striking the enemy outside 

his fortifications,” but “to strike the enemy in his fortifications when necessary and assured of probable victory.” In 

effect, the North Vietnamese would take Khe Sanh if they 

could, but there were limits to the price they were willing 

to pay. Their main objectives were to kill American troops 

and to isolate them in the remote mountain border region of 

Quang Tri Province. 

Comparing Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu

I don’t want any damn Dinbinphoo.

~ President Lyndon B. Johnson

The Johnson administration focused almost obsessively on 

the Khe Sanh situation. The president actually pored over a 

detailed terrain model of the area that had been constructed 

in the White House situation room. A newsman noted that 

“the White House took on the atmosphere and trappings of 

a military command post just before a siege.” The president 

repeatedly phoned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Army General Earle B. Wheeler, seeking reassurances about 

Khe Sanh. John Prados and Stubbe wrote that “President 

Johnson was apt to call downstairs [to the White House situation room] for the latest information at any hour of the 

day or night; sometimes he even came down himself.” The 

situation inevitably raised parallels to the disastrous 1954 

Battle of Dien Bien Phu. 

On a superficial level, the situation at Khe Sanh began 

to resemble Dien Bien Phu from 14 years earlier. Bernard B. 

Fall’s Hell in a Very Small Place, the detailed account of the 

battle, was a popular read. The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines’ 

Lieutenant Colonel James B. Wilkinson made the book 

required reading for all his officers. The author remembers 

reading a copy of the book during the siege.

Both Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu were remote outposts 

organized around small airstrips in the highlands. They were 

each served by a single light-duty road, which, in both cases, 

was cut by the enemy, and were forced to rely on air delivered supplies. Both posts were affected by the weather, which 

restricted air support.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A192347

Marine LtGen Robert E. Cushman, commanding general, 

III MAF, returns a salute during a ceremony at Da Nang. By 

January 1968, III MAF, the senior U.S. command in I Corps, 

which encompassed the five northern provinces of South Vietnam, equaled a field army in size.

10 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
General Westmoreland ordered a study prepared on the 

siege of Dien Bien Phu and other classic sieges to determine 

how Khe Sanh fit into the historical precedent. The study 

concluded that “the pattern of previous sieges” lay with the 

besieging forces rather than the defense. Westmoreland was 

not deterred by the gloomy results. He held that the Marines 

at Khe Sanh had advantages the French lacked, which were 

spelled out in a memorandum for the president: 

Our situation at Khe Sanh as compared with the 

French at Dien Bien Phu is different in three significant respects. We have supporting air (tactical air and 

[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress] B-52s) for all-weather 

attack of enemy forces by orders of magnitude over 

that at Dien Bien Phu. We have reinforcing heavy 

artillery within range of the Khe Sanh area from 

USMC positions east of the mountains. We have multiple and vastly improved techniques for aerial supply 

and we are within helicopter support range for troop 

reinforcement, logistic support, medical evacuation 

and other requirements. 

We have a significant capability to reinforce Khe 

Sanh by fire in all weather conditions by artillery, tactical air, and B-52s. There are 18 105mm howitzers[,] 

6 [M109] 55mm howitzers [, and six 4.2-inch mortars] within the Khe Sanh defensive system. Additionally, 16 175mm guns are with the 3d Marine Division 

forces east of Khe Sanh positioned at the Rock Pile 

and Camp Carroll. These guns are within range of 

Khe Sanh and their fires can be massed as required 

through the use of the centralized fire direction facility 

at Dong Ha. In addition to this heavy artillery support, and in contrast to the French situation at Dien 

Bien Phu, we have a highly effective tactical air and 

B-2 capability. Radar or “Sky Spot” technique allows 

us to direct tactical air strikes either at night or in zero 

visibility conditions throughout the Khe Sanh area. In 

addition to tactical air, our B-52 strikes are also weather independent. During adverse weather in the Khe 

Sanh area there are frequent breaks of three or four 

hours, in which we could intensify the air strikes, and 

insert helicopter gunships into the area for additional 

fires as required. If the enemy masses to attack, he will 

be extremely vulnerable to the massed B-52s against 

his supporting forces and destructive power of tactical air, gunships and artillery against his infantry. This 

capability of reinforcement by fire alone could have 

changed the course of the battle at Dien Bien Phu. 

Although logistical support will present a major 

problem, I am satisfied we can resolve it by our multiple means of resupply. Enemy interdiction of the airfield at Khe Sanh will not deny our reinforcement and 

support capability by helicopters. As pointed out in a 

note to the President, we could also re-open Route 9 

for a land line of communications.

Although not ideal, the tactical situation at Khe 

Sanh as well as our improved combat techniques and 

capabilities are considerably different from those at 

Dien Bien Phu. 

Once the decision was made to hold Khe Sanh, all that was 

needed were the forces to defend the base.

Buildup of U.S. and South Vietnamese 

Forces at Khe Sanh 

Things are picking up. 

~ Colonel David E. Lownds 

Following the Hill Battles, operational control of the Khe 

Sanh area of operations passed to the 26th Marines, which 

they maintained for the duration of the siege. The regiment 

In November 1953, the French occupied and fortified the village of Dien Bien Phu in northwest Tonkin. The Viet Minh 

besieged the outpost, capturing it in May 1954 after a dramatic battle involving great loss of life on both sides. The fall 

of Dien Bien Phu was the final straw that broke the back of 

French colonialism in Indochina, leading to the 1954 Geneva 

Accords and the partitioning of the Associated States of 

French Indochina into autonomous countries, which included Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Dien Bien Phu

Ringed By Fire | 11
Adapted by History Division 

was organized at Camp Pendleton, California, in January 1944, one of three infantry regiments in the 5th Marine 

Division. The regiment’s baptism of fire occurred at Iwo Jima 

in February 1945. In 30 days of hard fighting, the regiment 

suffered 650 killed and 2,025 wounded in action. The regiment was disbanded on 5 March 1946. Twenty years later 

on 1 March 1966, it was reactivated and deployed to Vietnam in August. 

Initially, the 1st Battalion was the only unit of the regiment at Khe Sanh. “We were pretty spread out,” Lieutenant 

Colonel Wilkinson explained. “I had a company on [Hill] 

881 [South], a company on 861, and another company protecting a bridge on Route 9 because most of our resupply 

came by truck convoy and one company at the combat base. I 

also had a platoon on Hill 950 because it was the best observation post in and around Khe Sanh.” At the same time, the 

Special Forces and Bru tribesmen from FOB 3 began running deep reconnaissance missions into Laos and North 

Vietnam. In June, enemy activity increased. On 6 June, the 

radio retransmission site on Hill 950 was overrun before the 

12 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
defenders rallied and restored the position. The next day, a 

platoon-size patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, was 

ambushed. As a result of this increased enemy activity, the 

3d Battalion, 26th Marines, was sent to Khe Sanh until midAugust when the battalion was redeployed, leaving just one 

battalion in the area. 

On 14 August, Colonel David E. Lownds assumed command of the regiment. “It wasn’t all that I had expected since 

there was only one battalion there,” Lownds said. “There was 

little enemy activity at the time. . . . We kept sweeping the 

area looking for signs of enemy buildup.” 

Throughout the summer and early fall, there was only 

light contact with the enemy, which allowed a 75-man 

Seabee detachment to begin rebuilding the airstrip. On 17 

August, the runway was closed and for the next three months 

the battalion’s Seabees removed the old matting, replaced 

the undersurface with crushed rock quarried just outside the 

base, and installed solid aluminum planking, making the airstrip capable of handling the heavily loaded 60-ton Lockheed C-130 Hercules cargo planes. In early November, a 

small detachment from the 1st Radio Battalion established 

an electronic listening post in a bunker near the landing 

zone (LZ) on Hill 881 South. The detachment was tasked 

to intercept NVA high-frequency Morse code and low-level 

voice intercept in conjunction with South Vietnamese interpreters. The detachment also had a short-range direction 

finding capability. 

Beginning in late October and into November 1967, 

signal intelligence units (SIGINT) detected elements of two 

North Vietnamese regiments, the 304th and the 320th, and 

three independent regiments departing their home bases in 

North Vietnam and moving onto the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 

Adapted by History Division 

Ringed By Fire | 13
southern Laos. This was the first time that National Security Agency analysts had seen two North Vietnamese divisions 

moving onto the trail at the same time. Staff Sergeant James 

E. Haskins, 3d Interrogation Translation Team, reported that 

a wounded NVA transportation group officer from the 66th 

Regiment, 304th Division, stated that his unit had moved into 

a base area west of the Co Roc Mountains in Laos. General 

Westmoreland believed the massive troop movement pointed to Khe Sanh as the major battleground for the upcoming 

winter offensive. Colonel Lownds recalled that “we received 

intelligence reports telling us that there was an enemy buildup in the area, so we became more cautious.” While visiting 

the Marines on Hill 881 South, Lownds said, “Men, we here 

at Khe Sanh are going to be remembered in our American 

history books.”

By mid-December, SIGINT had tracked the two NVA 

divisions to staging areas around the southern Laos city of 

Tchepone, just across the border from Khe Sanh. Enemy activity along the border region increased dramatically. Vehicular 

traffic on the Laotian roads and trails nearby increased from a 

monthly average of 480 trucks in the first nine months of 1967 

to more than 6,000 by the end of December. Marine reconnaissance patrols found evidence of heavy trail usage north of 

the base, extensive night activity (lights), as well as increased 

infiltration activity in the west. The patrols also reported many 

new bunkers on Hill 881 North and new sightings and indications of heavy activity around Hill 950, which was attacked 

on Christmas Eve. The defending platoon from Company C 

had five Marines wounded but repulsed the North Vietnamese. “These were not just scouting parties,” Lieutenant Colonel 

Wilkinson explained. “These were hard core line troops.” The 

Marines occupying Hill 861 experienced a probing attack and 

Hill 881 South was subjected to increased sniper fire. 

On 13 December, as a result of the increased North 

Vietnamese sightings and contacts around the base, the 3d 

Marine Division directed the return of the 3d Battalion, 

26th Marines. First Lieutenant John T. Esslinger recalled, 

“They [the regiment] didn’t have any room for us. So they 

sent us outside the wire to the west area a little bit. . . . We 

built sort of an add on, an annex to the base. We extended the wire and dug our holes and that’s where we lived.” 

The 26th Marines after action report shows that the mission 

of the regiment was to conduct reconnaissance and combat 

patrols in the assigned area to detect and destroy enemy personnel infiltrating into and through the Khe Sanh tactical 

area of responsibility. They also were to provide security for 

the Khe Sanh airfield and ancillary facilities and other vital 

installations in the area. Their tasks also included maintaining 

open and secure lines and active ground surveillance within 

the tactical area of responsibility, though they could also provide artillery support for the CAP company at Khe Sanh village and conduct relief or reinforcement operations for the 

CIDG Camp at Lang Vei.

26th Marines Mission

Photo courtesy of LtCol James B. Wilkinson

LtCol James B. Wilkinson, ca. March 1968, outside the command bunker of 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, 3d Marine Division.

14 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Navy Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure 

in presenting the Navy Cross to Colonel David E. Lownds, 

United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while 

serving as Commanding Officer of the Khe Sanh Combat 

Base in connection with operations against the enemy in the 

Republic of Vietnam from August 1967 through 

March 1968. Upon assuming command of the 

vital combat base located in western Quang Tri 

Province and tasked with the responsibility of 

interdicting major North Vietnamese resupply 

routes and blocking any enemy invasion attempt 

from the west into the northern provinces of 

South Vietnam, Colonel Lownds immediately 

established combat outposts on Hills 881 South, 

861, and 950, and launched extensive and highly 

effective patrol activities throughout his area of 

responsibility. Despite the hazardous, mountainous terrain, thick jungle foliage, and adverse 

weather conditions, Colonel Lownds’ valiant 

combat leadership and indomitable command ability were the 

central instrument in achieving and maintaining the superb 

combat posture of the base. On 28 January 1968, when North 

Vietnamese divisions launched a coordinated attack on the 

Khe Sanh Combat Base with rockets, artillery, mortar, and 

machine-gun and small-arms fire, and with their main attack 

directed at Hill 861-A, Colonel Lownds’ superb knowledge 

of and appreciation for the terrain and his aggressive utilization of all supporting arms minimized the effectiveness of the 

enemy attack and resulted in a large number of enemy casualties. During daily enemy rocket and artillery attacks, and on 

23 February when the firing reached its peak with more than 

1300 rounds impacting on the combat base, his 

superior tactical judgment, calm leadership, brave 

demeanor, and resolute endurance were an inspiration to all around him and were a prime factor 

in maintaining a high level of morale among his 

men. Giving no thought to his own safety, while 

exhibiting a compassionate concern for the welfare of his Marines, he gallantly and repeatedly exposed himself to hostile fire making daily 

visits to outlying units to observe tactical operations and to study conditions confronting his 

unit commanders. During the period 1 November 1967 to 31 March 1968, Colonel Lownds 

organized and directed Operation SCOTLAND, 

a highly effective search and destroy operation throughout 

the Khe Sanh tactical area of responsibility, which resulted in 

numerous enemy casualties, the capture of several enemy, and a 

large number of weapons confiscated. By his gallant leadership, 

distinguished personal bravery, and selfless devotion to duty 

throughout, Colonel Lownds upheld the highest traditions 

of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Colonel David E. Lownds was 46 from Holyoke, Massachusetts, and had been commissioned into the Marine Corps at the height of World War II. He led a platoon in the invasions of Kwajalein, Saipan, and Iwo Jima, suffering wounds in the latter two campaigns 

for which he would be awarded a Purple Heart. A reserve captain, Lownds was recalled 

to active duty for the Korean War and became a regular major in 1951. He served in various staff positions until the early 1960s, when he returned to the troops as commander 

of the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Later, he served as 

plans officer for the 2d Marine Division. He was promoted to colonel in July 1965. He 

received the Bronze Star while serving as operations officer of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade during the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. For his actions 

in Vietnam, Lownds was awarded the Navy Cross.

Colonel David E. Lownds

Ringed By Fire | 15

Marine Corps History Division

Col Lownds at Khe Sanh. 
Shortly before Christmas, the battalion conducted a four-day 

sweep of a ridgeline and adjacent valley west of combat base. 

The sweep found ominous signs of freshly built bunkers and 

small caches of supplies. At the end of the sweep, Company I 

plus two platoons of Company M occupied Hill 881 South. 

Company K and two platoons of Company A, 1st Battalion, 

26th Marines, held 861. 

Company L remained at the base, assuming a portion of 

what would become the perimeter’s “Red Sector.” On the 

night of 2 January 1968, the Marines from one of the company’s listening posts (LP) made contact with an enemy 

reconnaissance patrol. The LP was located approximately 

400 meters from the western end of the airstrip and north 

of where Company L’s lines tied in with 1st Battalion, 26th 

Marines. The company commander, Captain Richard D. 

Camp Jr., dispatched a reaction force under Second Lieutenant Nile B. Buffington to reinforce the listening post. The 

combined force formed a line and, under 60mm mortar illumination, started sweeping the area. A Marine in the middle 

of the formation spotted a dark shadow on the ground and 

voiced a challenge but did not receive a reply. He challenged 

a second time and was fired upon. The Marines opened fire 

and, after receiving friendly fire, withdrew to the company’s 

lines. 

At first light, a detail was sent out to check the area and 

discovered five enemy dead. Using a scout dog, Gunnery 

Sergeant Max H. Friedlander, 17th Interrogation Translation Team, followed the trail of a sixth man, believed to be 

wounded:

I started walking in the direction I thought the escaped 

NVA had taken. It led me toward a wooded area . . . 

and I lost the trail, so I walked a little bit further [sic]. 

By then, I was about sixty yards from the bodies. I saw 

a large log on the right, where the tree line was, and 

for some reason I stopped, looked around, and walked 

back to where everybody was standing around. I later 

learned that an NVA company was in the tree line, 

ready to open fire on me and the Marines around the 

bodies if I took even one more step. 

The 26th Marines intelligence officer, Captain Harper 

L. Bohr Jr., examined the bodies of the five enemy soldiers 

and came to the conclusion that one of them was Chinese, 

because the man “was just too big and too non-Vietnamese 

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence gathering by 

interception of signals, whether between people (communications intelligence—COMINT) or from electronic signals 

not directly used in communication (electronic intelligence—

ELINT), or a combination of the two. As sensitive information is often encrypted, signals intelligence often involves the 

use of cryptanalysis. Also, traffic analysis—the study of who 

is signaling to whom and in what quantity—can often produce valuable information, even when the messages themselves cannot be decrypted.

SIGINT

Photo courtesy of author

Digging a position in the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, at Khe 

Sanh. Note Hill 1015 ridgeline in the background.

16 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
looking.” He sent photographs and a medical description to 

the 3d Marine Division in hopes of receiving confirmation of 

his supposition. Captain Bohr determined that at least some 

of the dead were officers. It appeared to the Marines that the 

enemy had indeed been reconnoitering the perimeter, further 

fueling speculation that a major North Vietnamese attack 

was in the making.

A CIA report dated 10 January 1968 stated: “Enemy 

reconnaissance and probing activity near Khe Sanh has 

increased markedly in the last few weeks. The Communists 

could be using the time between now and the Tet holidays to 

complete their concentration around Khe Sanh in preparation for an offensive after Tet.” 

Operation Niagara

During the first week of January, USMACV initiated Operation Niagara, a two-part plan to find the enemy units around 

Khe Sanh and to eliminate them with superior firepower. The code name Niagara was chosen because the amount 

of bombs and artillery shells would mimic the amount of 

water over Niagara Falls. Operation Niagara was designated 

a SLAM operation—seek, locate, annihilate, and monitor—

using all available Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force strike, 

reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft in a massive 

bombing effort. 

The first part of the operation, Niagara I, called for 

intelligence officers to mount a “comprehensive intelligence collection effort” to locate and identify enemy units 

and to develop target boxes for B-52 strikes. On 6 January, 

USMACV advised III MAF that 

the anticipated build-up of enemy forces in the western DMZ area provides an opportunity to plan a comprehensive intelligence collection effort and to make 

preparations for coordinated B-52 and tactical airstrikes. We should be prepared to surprise and disrupt 

enemy plans for an offensive against Khe Sanh with 

heavy bombing attacks on a sustained effort.

The collection efforts resulted in the detection of two 

regiments of the North Vietnamese 325th Division operating north and west of Khe Sanh. At the same time, analysts 

monitored the 304th and the 320th Divisions surging across 

the border into South Vietnam. By mid-January, SIGINT 

showed there were three NVA division headquarters deployed 

around the base. USMACV tasked the U.S. Seventh Air 

Force to coordinate all fixed-wing assets in support of the 

defense of Khe Sanh. 

The G-2 (intelligence) for Seventh U.S. Air Force moved 

quickly to establish an integrated intelligence collection and 

analysis effort that would compile and record information 

from all sources. Eight French generals, some of whom were 

survivors of Dien Bien Phu, were interviewed about North 

Vietnamese siege tactics. Using sand-table models, they 

spelled out in detail what was wrong with our initial plans. 

Within days, the planners knew that airlift would be crucial, as would the suppression and interdiction of antiaircraft 

guns.

Sensors

On 20 January, Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King helicopters of the 

21st Helicopter Squadron dropped the first acoustic sensors, 

followed by another drop the next day. A total of 104 sensors were emplaced north and west of the base in the first 

two days. This operation was code named Muscle Shoals. 

The network of acoustic and seismic sensors consisted of 

three functional components: (1) sensing devices that were 

emplaced across, along, or within suspected routes of infiltration to detect enemy foot or vehicle movement, together with munitions to inhibit such movement; (2) orbiting 

At 2030H, the listening post Lima One spotted approximately 6 individuals . . . the reaction force was alerted and 

maneuvered into position to sweep the area. Under 60mm 

illumination the 6 were seen lying on the ground and were 

challenged, failing to answer, they were saturated with small 

arms fire. A sweep of the area netted one NVA LtCol KIA. 

Results were 5 NVA KIA.

3d Battalion 

Command Chronology

Ringed By Fire | 17
aircraft that received signals from these sensors, amplified 

them, and retransmitted them; and (3) an Infiltration Surveillance Center, which received the transmitted signals from 

the aircraft and analyzed them to produce reliable intelligence data for planning interdiction operations.

Muscle Shoals was expected to produce information on 

enemy vehicular and personnel movements reliably enough 

and quickly enough to be used for directing immediate 

strikes by attack aircraft against these targets as they were 

identified and located. It was conceived as a real-time intelligence source that would result in rapid target acquisition 

and attack by airstrikes. A central and crucial portion of the 

system was to be the Infiltration Surveillance Center, a complex of highly technical electronic equipment and highly 

trained personnel to operate it, located in Nakhon Phanom 

Air Base in northeastern Thailand.

The two main types of sensors were acoustic (Acoubuoy) and 

seismic (air-delivered seismic intrusion detector or ADSID). 

Acoubuoy was a converted Navy antisubmarine device with 

the hydrophone removed and replaced with a sensitive microphone that passed on actual sounds. Navy Lieutenant Bernard Walsh said, 

Our particular job was to use our old Navy antisubmarine warfare patrol planes, flying at 180 knots, to lay 

a string of sonobuoys [Acoubuoys] along the trails to 

listen to troop and truck noises. Once the enemy was 

identified, air strikes would be called in on the trail 

adjacent to the listening devices. Around Khe Sanh, 

there weren’t any trails that I could see, so I figured 

they just wanted a wall of buoys to give warning of 

infiltration.

The ADSID was a miniature seismometer that recorded minute vibrations. The sensors broadcast their readings 

to an orbiting Lockheed EC-121 Warning Star, which forwarded them to Task Force Alpha, code named Dutch Mills, 

located at Nakhon Phanom. In Thailand, analysts interpreted the readings and passed the information back to the 26th 

Marines, where it was used for targeting supporting arms. 

By the end of January, the Navy’s Observation Squadron 67 

(VO-67) and the U.S. Air Force 553d Reconnaissance Wing 

had flown 72 sorties to drop 44 strings totaling 316 sensors 

in 9 arrays or modules. 

The sensors were credited with being the predictors of 

major enemy attacks. In each case, the 26th Marines Fire 

Support Coordination Center was able to divert air strikes 

and other supporting arms to sensor-located targets, and the 

end result was that no significant attack ever reached the 

Marine perimeter. Colonel Lownds later told a congressional committee that the sensors played a significant role in the 

defense of the combat base by allowing for the early warning and active target acquisition of targets, and without them 

he might well have had twice as many Marines killed at Khe 

Sanh. 

Reinforcements

To counter the growing threat, USMACV ordered the U.S. 

Army’s 1st Air Cavalry Division to displace to Thua Thien 

Province. On 17 January, Major General Rathvon M. Tompkins, 3d Marine Division, decided that Colonel Lownds 

“didn’t have enough people” and ordered the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, to reinforce Khe Sanh, marking the first 

time in the war that all three battalions of the regiment 

were together. The 2d Battalion occupied Hill 558, a small 

Defense Department (Marine Corps)

A Marine infantryman does not have the most comfortable 

sleeping position but does have safety from any enemy barrages at Khe Sanh.

18 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
knob three kilometers north of the combat base, overlooking the Rao Quan River, and squarely in the middle of the 

northwestern approach. Its mission was to block the North 

Vietnamese from using the river valley avenue of approach. 

Company E was attached to the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, 

and occupied Hill 861 Alpha west of Hill 558.

On 22 January, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, unexpectedly received orders to deploy to Khe Sanh. Lieutenant Colonel John F. Mitchell recalled, “Some of our units were out in 

the field and needed to be brought to Camp Evans by chopper to get ready that day to saddle up for the chopper flight 

to Khe Sanh.” Mitchell’s command group and two companies 

arrived in late afternoon. He was directed to “hunker down 

for the night and be prepared for immediate deployment due 

west.” The next morning, Colonel Mitchell selected a small 

hill that fronted a rock quarry approximately 1,500 meters 

to the west by southwest of the perimeter’s Red Sector. The 

battalion’s lines curved near but did not tie in with Company 

L, 3d Battalion; however, the gap could easily be covered by 

fire. The 1st Platoon, Company A, established a combat outpost on an even smaller hill a quarter of a mile due west of 

the battalion perimeter. “I thought occupying that hill would 

give the battalion an early warning when the attack came,” 

Mitchell said.

The platoon was reinforced with “some machine gun 

teams and two 60mm mortar teams . . . in total 64 Marines 

and Navy Corpsmen,” Mitchell explained. “That is how we 

came up with the name ‘Hill 64.’ I also called it ‘Alpha Outpost’.” The outpost was supported by preregistered mortar, 

artillery, and direct fire from tanks, M50 Ontos antitank 

vehicles, and air support. “We were only 500 yards from Hill 

64, so we also prepared an escape route in the event the 1st 

Platoon needed to abandon the hill,” Mitchell said. 

The last reinforcement, the 300-man 37th ARVN (Army 

of the Republic of Vietnam) Ranger Battalion (Biệt Động 

Quân) arrived on 27 January. The rangers were assigned a 

position at the east end of the runway just forward of Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. In essence, they formed 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Ringed By Fire | 19
a “bubble” outside of the original base defensive perimeter 

and had to quickly dig in. According to one source, Colonel 

Lownds wanted “to gain more elbow room . . . to push out 

the perimeter” since he had received implied criticism from 

superiors about the limited extent of his defenses in this 

sector. The ranger battalion assignment was for “psychological reasons as well as military.” The North Vietnamese Liberation Radio specifically targeted the rangers, urging them 

to desert and mutiny: “Desert the enemy ranks, escape from 

your present dangerous situation, and return to our fatherland and compatriots. . . . Join the revolutionary armed forces 

and carry your weapons with you.”

In addition to the infantry units, Khe Sanh had additional firepower, including 5 tanks with 90mm guns, 10 Ontos 

antitank vehicles with 6–106mm recoilless rifles each, 16 

individual M40 106mm recoilless rifles, 3 self-propelled 

twin Bofors 40mm antiaircraft automatic cannons, and 2 

truck-mounted quad .60-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, 

with the antiaircraft weapons capable of firing ground support as well as antiaircraft missions.

Buildup of NVA Forces at Khe Sanh

In early December 1967, the North Vietnamese Military 

Central Commission established the Route 9 Front, which 

was divided into two battlefields: east and west. The western battlefield, the primary battlefield, was controlled by 

one of the NVA headquarters known as B5-T8 Headquarters, located approximately 14 kilometers west of the Laotian 

border at Sap Lit. Its commander, Brigadier General Tran 

Quy Hai, had previously served as deputy chief of the NVA 

General Staff. John Prados, in Khe Sanh: The Other Side of the 

Hill, noted that Hai’s assignment was an indication that 

Hanoi wanted to exercise an extra degree of control over 

the operation. Two of Route 9 Front’s three divisions, the 

304th and 325C Divisions, were committed to Khe Sanh. 

Their mission was twofold: create conditions that would be 

favorable for an uprising in Tri-Thien and Hue and to draw 

out and tie down American and South Vietnamese forces. 

A Military History Institute of Vietnam monograph noted, 

“Route 9 Front—Khe Sanh was the area into which forces 

were to be drawn and tied down, eliminating the American 

mobile units . . . so that the General Offensive and Popular 

Uprising could take place in the other areas.”

Preparation of the Battlefield

A study of the battle by the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff and the CIA provided insight into the NVA construction and logistics activities. The CIA estimated that it 

would take 32–37 tons of supplies each day to sustain NVA 

forces in the Khe Sanh area. To support this supply effort, 

the NVA constructed two new roads paralleling Route 9 

through Laos to the South Vietnamese border. The two roads 

were known to the Marines as the “Santa Fe Trail.” Numerous supply depots, distribution points, and waypoints were 

constructed close to the border. The movement of supplies, 

equipment, and personnel was the responsibility of Transportation Group 559. The South Vietnamese identified at least 

13 transportation companies, two battalions of civilian laborers, and more than 700 trucks to support the effort. Based on 

trailwatchers’ observations, the CIA estimated that the NVA 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A801114

ARVN Rangers occupy a defensive trench east of the runway 

and just outside the main base. 

20 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
had stockpiled enough supplies, equipment, and ammunition 

to support the 22,000 troops in the Khe Sanh area for 60 –90 

days of combat. 

Military Units

The formidable B5-T8 forces included the 304th and the 

325C Infantry Divisions, one battalion and one company of 

local force, two artillery regiments (675th and 45th), one antiaircraft artillery regiment (241st), one (PT-76) light amphibious tank battalion minus one company, one platoon and 

one company of engineers, one reconnaissance battalion, one 

signal battalion, one light flame thrower company, and six 

transportation battalions. 

The 304th (Glory) Division was formed in 1951 and was 

one of the oldest in the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA). It 

was known as one of the first “Steel and Iron” divisions of the 

army. It had participated in the French defeat at Dien Bien 

Phu and was considered an elite “home-guard” unit. The 

9,800-man division consisted of three infantry regiments 

(the 9th, 24th, 66th), the 68B Artillery Regiment, and the 14th 

Antiaircraft Battalion. 

The division’s artillery group also included the 2d Battalion, 675th Artillery Regiment, with 24 122mm guns. The 

artillery units were equipped with 122mm and 85mm guns. 

Elements of the division had fought the Americans before. 

In November 1965, the 66th Regiment was involved in the 

Battle of Ia Drang Valley, the first battle between regular North Vietnamese soldiers and the U.S. Army. South 

Vietnamese analysts established that the three regiments 

deployed from North Vietnam in November, traveled down 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and arrived in the Khe Sanh area 

in late December. The division was commanded by General Hoang Dan, who had established his command post near 

Lang Troai Road on the border south of Lang Vei.

The mission of the 304th Division was to concentrate its 

forces to attack and seize the Huong Hoa District, eliminate the Laotian garrison at Huoi San, seize the Special 

Forces camp at Lang Vei, and invest Khe Sanh to draw in 

reinforcements. 

The 8,000-man 325th “Gold Star” Division was formed in 

1953 and was one of the Steel and Iron units that fought 

at Dien Bien Phu and the Street Without Joy. It consisted 

of the 101st, 95C, and 18th Regiments. The 95th Regiment

entered South Vietnam in December 1964, the 101st and the 

18th soon followed, making the 325th the first combat division to enter the war. In addition to its own artillery regiment, the 45th Regiment (36 rocket tubes), one battalion of 

the 675th Regiment (12 122mm DKZ-B surface-to-surface 

rockets) was attached. U.S. analysts believed the division was 

also augmented by the 4th Battalion, 84th Rocket Artillery 

Regiment, and two antiaircraft battalions, the 74th and 75th, 

with their 14.7mm machine guns and 74mm, 80mm, and 

100mm antiaircraft guns. By 1967, the division had fought 

several battles against U.S. forces and knew that superior 

firepower rested with the Americans. The lead elements of 

the division arrived in the Khe Sanh area in late December.

The mission of the 325th Division was to eliminate the 

enemy on Hill 861, envelope Hill 881 South and Hill 950, 

and to attack enemy forces landing by air to the north and 

northwest of Khe Sanh.

John Prados, in Khe Sanh: The Other Side of the Hill, wrote 

that 

during the last week of 1967, the 325C Division under 

Col. Chu Phuong Doi moved to the vicinity of Ca 

Tran Quy Hai was born in Tinh Chau in Quang Ngai Province,  French Indochina (now Vietnam), and he followed 

the Viet Minh (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, English 

League for the Independence of Vietnam) in the early stages 

of the movement. During the French war, he fought them in 

Laos and central Vietnam, became commander of the 101st 

Regiment, and finished the war as the 325th Division commander. In the early 1960s, he served as chief of the People’s 

Army of Vietnam (PAVN) advisory team in Laos. In 1972, 

Major General Tran Quy Hai became the commander of 

the Quang Tri Front during the Easter offensive. After Khe 

Sanh, he switched to politics, becoming a Politburo member 

(executive committee for the Communist Party), and ended 

his public life as vice minister of defense during the 1980s. 

He retired as a lieutenant general and died in 1985.

General Tran Quy Hai

Ringed By Fire | 21
Lu, about halfway along the mountainous segment of 

Route 9 that stretched to Khe Sanh. . . . On January 12, 

he set up a new command post at a point close to the 

Laotian border. Col. Hoang Dan’s NVA 304th Division, recently reequipped in North Vietnam, moved 

down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Khe Sanh front. 

The units were augmented with artillery and engineer units 

and some local guerrillas. Their present-for-duty strength 

numbered approximately 27,000 men, which included 9,000 

riflemen, more than 500 light and 100 heavy machine guns, 

about 40 recoilless rifles, and some 180 mortars—Type 31 

light mortars (60mm) and RGP2 rocket launchers (82mm)—

were scattered around the proximity of the combat base in 

a roughly 2,000–3,000 meter radius. Assorted antiaircraft 

guns—42 37mm AA guns and an additional dozen 57mm 

caliber guns, along with their 130 antiaircraft machine guns 

and rockets—also ringed the base.

The North Vietnamese employed the Soviet-built 122mm 

rocket to advantage by positioning them on the long axis of 

the base in line with the runway so that longs or shorts would 

be “in the ball park.” Most of the rocket positions were located on the slopes of Hill 881 North. During the siege, approximately 5,000 122mm rockets hit the base from this location. 

Heavy artillery support included a total of 212 weapons, 

among them 8 152mm guns, 16 130mm guns, 36 122mm 

guns, 8 105mm howitzers, and 12 100mm guns. Most of the 

heavy artillery was emplaced in tunnels and caves in the Co 

Roc Mountain and Area 305, so-called because it was on a 

bearing of 305 degrees (west-northwest) from Hill 881 South 

at a range of about 10,000 meters. Sixty to 70 percent of the 

rounds that struck the base were from Area 305. 

Both sites were beyond the range of Marine counterbattery fire from Khe Sanh. The NVA 152mm gun had a range 

of 17,260 meters, about 16.9 kilometers. The 130mm gun 

fired a 74-pound shell out to 31,000 meters, almost 30.6 

kilometers. The heaviest Marine artillery piece at Khe Sanh, 

the 155mm howitzer, ranged to 14,955 meters, about 14.5 

kilometers. The NVA took advantage of the range disparity by emplacing their guns in positions that were impervious to Marine counterbattery fire but were vulnerable to 

air attack. As a result, the North Vietnamese concealed the 

positions from aerial observation through the masterful use 

of camouflage and cautious employment. The NVA gunners 

fired only a few rounds every hour so that continuous muzzle 

flashes did not betray their positions and, after each round, 

quickly covered the guns with mats and screens. The weapons 

in the Co Roc Mountains were mounted on railroad tracks 

and wheeled in and out of caves to conceal their location. 

First Lieutenant Tomas F. O’Toole, the VMO-6 aerial 

observer, found a North Vietnamese artillery piece inside 

Laos firing its big gun at the base and ran several air strikes 

to knock it out. O’Toole explained that 

a big hole square opened. It was a big bamboo mat 

that had fallen off to the side from this string of bombs 

when the overpressure blew stuff around. And sticking 

out of this hole was a 130mm gun. Apparently what 

they were doing was rolling the gun out, firing a round 

or two and then rolling it back in, putting this cover 

back on top and being relatively impervious to aerial 

observation . . . out in Laos . . . probably seven or eight 

kilometers beyond the Vietnamese border.

Lieutenant O’Toole described the North Vietnamese 

artillery tactics: “The North Vietnamese emplaced their guns 

in single gun positions on the gun-target line, so that in order 

to hit Khe Sanh all they had to do was adjust for range, not 

for deflection. And once they cranked in that range adjustment for each gun, which remained constant, since Khe Sanh 

wasn’t going to move, they could fire in battery fire . . . they 

emplaced their guns at about 500-meter intervals, with the 

rear guns probably close to maximum range, which is 27,000 

meters for the 130mm field gun—then forward from there.”

“Arty,” “Arty,” “Arty.”

From the heights of Hill 881 South, Captain William H. 

Dabney’s Marines could see all three of the NVA’s firing positions—Hill 881 North, Area 305, and the Co Roc Mountain. When the NVA fired, alert observers on the hill could 

often see the muzzle flash or hear the rounds come overhead. 

Dabney said, “Virtually all rocket sites the NVA used during 

the siege were within two kilometers of our hill, several close 

enough for us to hit with machine gun fire, and all within 

easy range of our mortars. We ‘hosed them down’ regularly.”

Rocket sites were high on the list of targets for the aerial 

observers that circled overhead. Air Force Captain Charles 

22 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Rushforth spotted a site. “I really got excited about those 

rocket positions,” he said. “I saw the smoke in the trees, and 

then the whoosh, and the dust.” He called in several flights of 

fixed-wing aircraft to attack the site:

The [North American F-100 Super Sabre] F-100s 

really did the job. They bombed and strafed for twentyfive minutes: really zapped them. It was like an endless 

chain of fighters, rolling in high, glinting in the sun, 

down through the clouds and blue, disappearing as the 

trees blended the camouflage, and the target erupted; 

then zoom, up through the clouds again. The last plane 

pulled off to the right, buzzed Hill 881 South, then 

pulled straight up in an arching right turn. What a 

bunch of hot shots! 

We could also hear the guns out west across the 

border. . . . We were on the gun-target line. The rounds 

going over sounded like squirrels running through dry 

leaves. The radio operator would then broadcast a short 

radio message over the 3d Battalion tactical radio net: 

“Arty, Arty, Arty, Co Roc” or “Arty, Arty, Arty, 305.” 

The battalion would then pass the warning to the 26th 

Marines COC [Combat Operations Center] and 

immediately horns and sirens would sound throughout 

the base. A resourceful motor transport mechanic took 

a horn from one of the trucks and tied it in the top of 

a tree. He jury-rigged the lead wires to two beer can 

lids. When the message was received, a Marine, who 

monitored the radio, pressed the two lids together and 

the blaring horn gave advanced warning of the incoming rounds. The noisy alert gave the men on the base 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A190292

Marines of Battery W, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, load a 155mm howitzer before blasting the North Vietnamese around Khe 

Sanh.

Ringed By Fire | 23
anywhere from five to eighteen seconds to find cover. 

One base radio operator responded after the rounds 

landed with a cryptic, “Roger India, Splash.” 

North Vietnamese Opening Moves

As the North Vietnamese tightened their noose around Khe 

Sanh, one of the first skirmishes occurred near Hill 881 South.

Hill 881 South

Captain Phillip F. Reynolds’s Company B, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, was billeted in several Southeast Asia huts 

along the main road in the center of the base, adjacent to the 

runway. It was a good location because it was close to the 

regimental intelligence officer, whose office was located just 

a short distance away in the underground concrete bunker 

that served as Colonel Lownds’s command post. The location made it easy for the teams to be briefed before and after 

missions. The site was also just a short walk from the logistics 

support area (LSA) where the teams linked up with the helicopters that flew them back and forth on missions. In midDecember and early January, the reconnaissance teams were 

sighting more and more large groups of NVA troops moving 

into the area around the base. Contact was becoming more 

frequent. In the last two weeks of December, three reconnaissance Marines were killed. 

On the afternoon of 18 January, reconnaissance team 

Dockleaf was ambushed on Hill 881 North. The team 

leader, Second Lieutenant Randall D. Yeary, and his radioman, Corporal Richard J. Healy, were killed and the remaining five men were wounded. Captain Dabney recalled, “The 

recon team needed help with emergency extraction because 

they didn’t have enough able-bodied men left to carry their 

wounded.” Second Lieutenant Thomas D. Brindley’s 3d Platoon, Company I, was sent to help them. “Do whatever you 

have to do to get there as quickly as you can and get back to 

the hill by dark,” Dabney ordered. “They shucked their helmets and flak jackets . . . booked to the ambush loaded for 

bear.” The platoon reached the trapped reconnaissance team 

only to discover that whatever NVA had been there were 

gone. They evacuated the wounded before making their way 

back to Hill 881 South. Later, Dabney was notified that a 

radio and shackle sheets (classified radio code sheets) had 

been left behind by the reconnaissance team. 

At dawn on 19 January, Second Lieutenant Harry F. 

Fromme’s 1st Platoon set out to retrieve the missing communication gear. The platoon was heavily reinforced with 

machine guns, a 60mm mortar squad, and an 81mm mortar 

forward observer. About noon, the platoon reached a finger 

of land that led to the crest of Hill 881 North, when it 

was taken under fire from several bunkers by an unknown 

number of the enemy. While maneuvering against the complex, the platoon suffered three casualties and was forced to 

pull back. Private First Class Leonard L. Newton covered 

the withdrawal until he was killed.* The platoon did not find 

the missing radio or the code sheet.

Something Was About to Happen

After two days of enemy contact, Captain Dabney, Company I’s commander, requested to conduct a reconnaissance-inforce to Hill 881 North with his entire company. Dabney had 

a premonition that “something was about to happen.” The 

3d Battalion staff, two platoons, and a company command 

group from Company M, 3d Battalion, was helo-lifted to 

the hill to guard the perimeter during Company I’s absence. 

At 0500 on 20 January, Company I, along with a seven-man 

*For his courageous act, PFC Newton was posthumously awarded the Silver 

Star.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A189356

Shell-scarred Hill 881 South, shown here in an aerial view, 

became a combat base for Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th 

Marines.

24 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Defense Department

The ambush of a Marine reconnaissance team near Hill 881 North on 18 January 1968 was the prelude to the opening battle 

three days later.

reconnaissance team, left the perimeter and marched into 

the fog-shrouded valley that separated Hill 881 South from 

its neighbor to the north. Dabney split the company into 

two columns, which moved along parallel fingers about 500 

meters apart—Lieutenant Fromme’s 1st Platoon on the left, 

Lieutenant Brindley’s 3d Platoon and the seven reconnaissance team members on the right. The company command 

group and Second Lieutenant Michael H. Thomas’s 2d Platoon followed behind the 1st Platoon. 

At 0900, the fog lifted as the company crossed the narrow 

valley and began climbing up the jungle-covered slopes of 

Hill 881 North. “We moved silently away from the hill, 

keeping our intervals as we slipped through the waist-tohead-high elephant grass,” Hospital Corpsman Third Class 

Michael Ray recalled. He described the atmosphere in great 

detail:

We followed the trail down from our vantage point 

into the valleys and sloughs and then edged along the 

ridges of the lower hills. We came down through the 

fog cover. As we went deeper, the bright sun durned 

into a faint glow. Then in time, we were in a gray, overcast world . . . moving as slowly and cautiously as we 

did, it took quite some time to get completely through 

the fog.

Four small knolls formed a line perpendicular to their 

advance. As the 3d Platoon approached one of the knolls, it 

received heavy fire and was pinned down. Captain Dabney 

explained that “we got about half-way to 881 North, maybe 

about 1,000 [meters] from 881 South when the s——t 

hit the fan in every sense of the word.” Fromme’s 1st Platoon attempted to flank the enemy, but it too was stopped 

Ringed By Fire | 25
by NVA fire. With the forward momentum halted, Dabney 

called for fire support and medical evacuation for his casualties. A Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight medevac helicopter from HMM-262 responded. “As the medevac aircraft 

approached the zone, it was hit by a burst from an antiaircraft weapon and immediately caught fire,” Dabney recalled. 

“The pilot, apparently realizing the consequences of crashlanding a burning aircraft in a landing zone where several wounded men were staged, sheared off into a gully and 

made a controlled crash about 200 meters west of the zone. 

Two crewmen leaped from the burning aircraft. The pilot and 

copilot managed to escape seconds before it became totally engulfed in flames and were rescued by a helicopter from 

another squadron.”

Dabney’s fire support—artillery, helicopter gunships, and 

fixed-wing aircraft—enabled Brindley’s platoon to continue the assault. Hospital Corpsman Third Class Ray recalled 

that “jets started coming in. They were so close, they almost 

gave me the impression I could reach out and touch them.” 

As Brindley reached the crest of the hill, he was mortally 

wounded by a sniper and his platoon went to ground, low on 

ammunition, with many casualties and under heavy machine 

gun fire. Dabney committed Thomas’s 2d Platoon as reinforcement. The platoon reached the beleaguered Marines 

and immediately organized a rescue effort to evacuate the 

wounded and locate several men who were missing. Thomas 

worked his way down the hill to where the casualties were. 

Lieutenant Esslinger was watching him through his binoculars from Hill 881 South and said, “He [Thomas] picked 

up one of the casualties and carried him up to the top of the 

hill. He started down after another one of the wounded and 

dropped like a rock. . . . He took a .50 caliber machine gun 

bullet right between the eyes.”*

The battalion commander requested reinforcements to 

support Company I’s attack. Colonel Lownds denied the 

request and instead ordered Company I to break contact 

immediately and return to Hill 881 South. Captain Dabney 

recalled, “A message suddenly came through from battalion directing us to break contact and return to Hill 881 

South immediately.” Lieutenant Esslinger remembered that 

Dabney did not like the idea of being called back: “It took 

*Lts Brindley and Thomas were both awarded posthumous Navy Crosses for 

their actions. 

about a half hour to cajole and order him to come back.” The 

company backed down the face of Hill 881 North under 

fire. Air strikes and artillery support covered its withdrawal. “[They] finally came trudging up the hill,” Lieutenant 

Esslinger said. “We were utterly exhausted,” Dabney recalled. 

The daylong engagement cost Company I 4 men killed in 

action and another 39 wounded. It was estimated that at 

least 100 North Vietnamese were killed. 

Chieu Hoi (Open Arms)

While Company I battled the enemy on Hill 881 North, 

a fortuitous event occurred on the northeastern side of the 

perimeter. At 1400 on 20 January, the 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, spotted an NVA soldier waving a white 

flag in front of their position. Captain Kenneth W. Pipes was 

walking the lines when he was notified of the sighting. Pipes 

recalled, “With an Ontos covering us, a fire team from the 

2d Platoon, the Ontos officer, and I moved some 500 meters 

outside the wire. The NVA soldier initially disappeared, so 

I shouted ‘Marine dai-uy [captain]’ several times as we proceeded. He reappeared and surrendered.” Pipes took the soldier into custody and turned him over to Gunnery Sergeant 

Friedlander, 17th Interrogation Translation Team, who interrogated him. “When we got to my bunker, the first thing 

I did was to offer him a cigarette and ask him if he was 

hungry,” Friedlander explained. “I got him something to eat 

and he devoured it quickly.” The chieu hoi turned out to be 

Lieutenant La Thanh Tonc, the commanding officer of the 

14th Antiaircraft Company, 95C Regiment, 325C Division.

He freely provided Friedlander with detailed information on 

the enemy’s dispositions and plan of attack for Khe Sanh. 

One of the most startling revelations that Tonc made 

was that the North Vietnamese were going to attack Hill 

861 that very night. Friedlander briefed Colonel Lownds, 

who sent him to Lang Vei with the information. An officer courier was dispatched to inform Major General Tompkins, commanding general, 3d Marine Division at Dong Ha, 

of Tonc’s information. Tompkins accepted the information 

at face value because “we had nothing to lose and much to 

gain.” Colonel Lownds ordered Company I to break contact and return to Hill 881 South. “This is not very frankly, easy to do with a Marine unit . . . have a guy break contact 

and give up a battle that he thinks he’s winning,” Lownds 

26 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
explained. “So my judgment was that I should get my troops 

in a defensive position.” He also ordered the base to be 

placed on high alert—flak jackets and helmets to be worn 

at all times, 50 percent alert on the lines, and everyone was 

to sleep in their fighting positions. When Tonc’s revelation 

reached the 3d Battalion, it made Company I’s withdrawal 

order understandable. 

Hill 861

We’re being overrun!

~ Radio message flashed to 

3d Battalion COC from Hill 861 

Hill 861 was a bomb-cratered bare knob approximately 50–60 meters wide at the top. The grass-covered slope 

angled gently to the jungle floor. Bunkers and sleeping shelters had been dug along the trench line even though the “soil 

on the hill did not lend itself to digging,” according to Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson. “In fact,” he said, “the trench line 

had been washed away so often during the monsoon that we 

finally were able to get some 55 gallon drums and we placed 

them all around the hill to form a sort of gutter to drain the 

trenches.” The Marines turned to with a will and dug a chesthigh trench that ran around the crest of the hill. The digging 

occasionally unearthed the bones of dead NVA killed during 

the previous year’s hill battles. The Marines tried to cut logs 

to build bunkers, but there was so much shrapnel in the trees 

that it made the chain saws worthless.

First Lieutenant Jerry N. Saulsberry bid farewell to Company L on the morning of 20 January and walked down the 

dirt road in the center of camp to the flight line for transportation to his new assignment as the executive officer 

of Company K on Hill 861. Saulsberry had been Company L’s weapons platoon commander when the orders came 

through. It would be his second assignment since arriving incountry after washing out of flight school. He arrived on the 

hill by midmorning and took up his responsibilities, never 

realizing that a few hours later he would command a company in extremis.

Corporal Dennis M. Mannion recalled that “at about 

2030, after it got really dark, word came up from one of the 

platoons that they could hear the North Vietnamese outside 

the wire, down in the ravine off the northwest corner of the 

hilltop.” Mannion investigated, saying, “I could hear the 

NVA outside the wire. They were talking and giving commands. I could hear the wire being cut, could hear the tinny 

sound when the wire sprang back in both directions.” Private 

First Class Elwin Bacon said, “We started hearing noises 

on a ridge to the west of us . . . the g—ks were not being 

all that quiet.” Sergeant Mykle E. Stahl said that one of the 

new men asked if he thought the NVA would attack. “There 

isn’t a North Vietnamese within a hundred miles of here,” he 

Hill 881N is presently surrounded. There is a company of sappers deployed in the general area of 881N. This sapper company will be the company used against Hill 861. Once Hill 861 

has fallen, the general attack against the Khe Sanh Combat 

Base will begin. This will consist of a reinforced regimentalsized force from the direction of Hoan Tap by way of Hill 

861, where they will link up with the occupying force there. 

Once linked up, Khe Sanh Combat Base will begin receiving 

heavy artillery fire and rockets from unknown positions, but 

from [a] northwesterly direction. When this occurs, the first 

regiment will move to assault positions under cover of fire. 

One mortar platoon on northeast side of Hill 1915 will cover 

the Marine heavy weapons on Hill 950. One mortar platoon 

will begin 82mm mortar barrage on parked helicopters and 

airstrip. Each of the mortar platoons has one 12.7mm antiaircraft gun platoon in their adjacent areas to cover them from 

counter air attack. If the first and second regiments are forced 

to withdraw, they will link up with the third regiment (position unknown) and commence another attack on Khe Sanh 

Combat Base. This will occur before Tet.

Source: Gunnery Sergeant Max Friedlander’s notes for Lieutenant La Thank Tonc interrogation

Friedlander’s 

Interrogation Notes

Ringed By Fire | 27
replied. “Just as I said that, the first RPG [rocket-propelled 

grenade] slammed into the hill.” 

Shortly after midnight on 21 January, the hill was blanketed by NVA mortar rounds. Second Lieutenant Linn Oehling’s 2d Platoon manned the southwestern perimeter. “We 

took incoming,” he said, “[but] kept our heads low and wherever we heard movement . . . we threw grenades.” Two red star 

signaling flares soared into the black sky. Immediately, North 

Vietnamese infantrymen from the 6th Battalion, 95C Regiment, 325th Division, launched an attack against Hill 861. 

Striking from attack positions within 100 meters of the crest, 

the enemy blasted holes in the protective wire with Bangalore torpedoes and quickly advanced, supported by mortars 

targeting Company K’s bunkers and trenches. Private First 

Class John Lewis said, “The enemy had put satchel charges 

in our wire . . . and set them off. They got through our lines, 

just like that.”

Lieutenant Saulsberry explained that “they crept as close 

to our lines as possible under the cover of supporting arms, 

then began to throw sticks of dynamite over the wire to simulate mortars . . . then the enemy mortar fire lifted. However, 

a good many of our men still believed we were under mortar 

fire and were seeking cover . . . this enabled the enemy to get 

much closer to our lines than they would normally have been 

able to.” The action was close and fierce, with North Vietnamese penetrating the perimeter and overrunning the company’s landing zone. “Once the wire had been breached,” 

Saulsberry explained, “the bunkers that had been knocked 

out served as a very good bridge for the NVA to jump the 

trench lines. Their flat roofs furnished a flat runway for them 

to leap across.” The NVA moved through sections of the 

Marine position, heaving satchel charges into bunkers and 

forcing the defenders back. Sergeant Stahl recalled, “We lost 

three bunkers right off the bat.”

Lieutenant Saulsberry took command when Captain 

Norman J. Jasper Jr., the company commander, was seriously 

wounded and forced out of the fight. The company gunnery 

sergeant was killed and First Sergeant Stephen L. Goddard 

was severely wounded when the command bunker was hit by 

an 82mm RPG. Goddard recalled, “They hit us with RPGs 

. . . and then they let us have it with 82mm mortars. They 

walked those 82 mortars right up the line, up and down the 

hill, and they were goddam effective, very accurate.” First 

Sergeant Goddard made his way out of the damaged bunker 

and collapsed against an outer wall. A passing corpsman 

stopped the blood flow with medical scissors and told the 

badly wounded senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) to 

hold it tight if he wanted to live. Goddard survived and was 

evacuated the next morning.

The North Vietnamese penetrated the southwest side of 

the company’s perimeter and forced the defending platoon 

from its positions. Sergeant Stahl singlehandedly counterattacked, distracting the enemy while other Marines recovered 

casualties. As he advanced up the trench line, three North 

Vietnamese attempted to capture him. Stahl killed two but 

suffered a bayonet wound. When his rifle malfunctioned, 

another Marine killed the third man. Stahl then picked up an 

enemy AK47 assault rifle and attacked a third bunker, killing three of the enemy and capturing three others. When the 

Marines reoccupied the positions, Stahl, although wounded 

three times, manned a .50-caliber machine gun and continued the fight.*

*For his actions, Sgt (later captain) Stahl was awarded the Navy Cross.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Hill 861 clearly showing the outline of the Marine outpost in 

July 1967. 

28 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
During the deadly fight, Company I’s two 81mm mortars on Hill 881 South fired an astonishing 680 rounds in 

support. “We could get at the NVA because our fires weren’t 

masked,” Dabney said. Hill 861 was at the mortar’s maximum range. “The guns got so hot that they glowed,” he 

recalled. “Over time when the gunner dropped the round 

down the tube the increments would cook off before it got to 

the bottom of the tube.” The mortars became so hot that the 

men cooled them with water, then fruit juice, and finally, by 

urinating on them. Dabney said that “[it] smelled a bit rank 

in the gun pits!”

At first light on 21 January, Company K’s Marines 

launched a counterattack, supported by three Douglas A-26 

Invader aircraft and three North American T-28 Trojans, and 

by 0530, the enemy onslaught had spent itself. SIGINT personnel reported hearing the NVA commander beg for reinforcements. But it was too late. Company K hit the enemy 

with a final blast of fire, driving them off the hill but leaving 

bodies scattered on the slopes and in the perimeter wire. Private Duong Van Ha, 1st Company, 4th Battalion, 95C Regiment, was captured. Ha confirmed the intelligence Tonc 

provided to Gunnery Sergeant Friedlander. 

Corporal Lofton’s helicopter responded to Company K’s 

request to evacuate the wounded: “I remember looking at 

[Hill] 861, seeing bodies in the wire, large numbers of NVA 

dead, Marine[s] dead as well. . . . We circled for what seemed 

like an eternity until finally the shelling died down and we 

went in, picked up the wounded and whatever dead they 

could throw on, and we pulled out of there.”

Khe Sanh Combat Base

No sooner had the NVA assault on Hill 861 been stopped 

than a massive bombardment struck the combat base. At 

0530 on 21 January, enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket fire 

smothered the airstrip and its surrounding bunkers and 

trenches. Sergeant Glenn E. Prentice was walking to the 

mess hall when “I noticed some streaks of light coming in. 

They [rockets] started impacting on the road. One hit the 

mess hall. Another rocket hit the ammunition dump.” 

Within minutes of the opening salvo, enemy shells hit the 

ammunition supply point (ASP-1), located between the airstrip and the artillery battalion positions. A large quantity of 

ammunition had been stored outside the revetments because 

it was filled to capacity. The enemy shells set off more than 

1,500 tons of ammunition, about 98 percent of what was 

stored there, which began exploding, throwing fragments 

and unexploded rounds, some of them on fire, through the 

air to land in and around the Marines’ fighting positions. 

Corporal Kreig Loftin, a helicopter crew chief with 

HMM-226 on overnight duty to provide emergency support, 

recalled, “We started receiving incoming rounds . . . and the 

ammo dump was hit. There was a massive explosion and the 

concussion almost knocked the air out of you.” The barrage 

also cratered the runway and destroyed two HMM-262 aircraft in the revetments. Loftin recalled that “we assembled the 

air crew and made a mad dash completely across the combat 

base, which was probably three football fields wide, running 

from hole to hole, trying to dodge the incoming. All the hills 

were calling for medevacs as we launched.” The shelling hit 

several 55-gallon drums of o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile 

(CS or tear gas) riot control agent, sending choking clouds of 

CS gas rolling through the trenches and bunkers, forcing the 

men to don gas masks. 

Lance Corporal Ernie Husted, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, wrote, “The shelling started, and they were rockets because we you could hear them scream all the way in 

and then hit. Shortly afterwards they hit the ammo dump 

and from then on, we couldn’t tell what was incoming or our 

own stuff blowing off. There was CS tear gas going off, large 

At 0030, Company K received heavy mortar, RPG, and small 

arms fire. Thirty minutes later, approximately 300 NVA assaulted the hill. The [perimeter] wire was initially breached by sappers armed with Bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges. 

Assault troops made a small penetration of the lines before 

the attack was repelled. Results were 4 USMC KIA, 11 WIA, 

45 NVA KIA and 1 NVA POW.

Source: “3d Battalion, 26th Marines Command Chronology,” 

1968, National Archives and Records Administration

3d Battalion, 26th Marines 

Command Chronology

Ringed By Fire | 29
amounts of artillery shells, plastic explosives, and so we were 

getting hit by our own ammo cooking off and producing 

shrapnel, plus everything that they were firing at us. It was 

just unbelievable.” 

Captain Kenneth Pipes explained, “A steady stream of 

105mm rounds were hurled through our command post 

bunker’s entrance by the continuous explosions in the adjacent dump. Many of them were smoking when they landed. 

One of my Marines cradled each one in his arms and ran 

outside with them. Many of those rounds exploded after he 

left them in the open.” Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson said 

that “Company B had to displace its CP [command post] at 

least twice because burning shells were landing in or near it.”

The artillerymen of 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, had to 

contend not only with the bombardment but also the exploding ammunition dump. Battery C, only 50 to 70 meters from 

the conflagration, had dozens of unexploded shells land in and 

around its position and received considerable damage. First 

Lieutenant William L. Eberhardt, executive officer of Battery 

C, said, “All we could think of was trying to get those rockets and mortars silenced. Until we could get them stopped, we 

didn’t have time to worry about the duds or the ammo blowing right there.” The cannoneers continued to man the guns 

despite the danger, delivering counter-rocket and countermortar fire that neutralized several enemy positions.

One howitzer was out of action for several minutes while 

a dud mortar round was cleared from the emplacement and 

another gun took a direct hit from a white phosphorous shell 

that ignited the gun’s ready ammunition. One man was killed 

and another wounded. The battery command post received 

five direct hits. Miraculously, no one was hurt. Battery C 

fired 3,000 rounds in trying to counter the North Vietnamese fire.

Incoming rounds smashed into the airstrip, ripping apart 

the steel plates, destroying two HMM-262 CH-46 helicopters, and damaging five others. In addition, incoming rounds 

damaged all of the weather monitoring equipment, most 

of the airstrip’s night lighting system, many field telephone 

lines, bunkers, engineer equipment, generators, the post 

exchange, a mess hall, and other facilities. Only 549 meters 

of the 1,189-meter runway remained open after the bombardment. The fighting and shelling of 21 January resulted 

in 14 Marines dead and 43 wounded. III MAF immediately 

Defense Department photo 

Top: This aerial view of the Khe Sanh Combat Base looking west was taken during the siege. The runway of the airstrip can be seen below. In the top right of the picture is what 

appears to be a rocket pod hanging below the aircraft taking 

the picture.

Bottom: An Air Force Fairchild C-123 Provider transport is 

about to land just beyond the leveled ammunition dump at 

Khe Sanh, bringing in much-needed supplies.

Defense Department photo 

30 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
declared a “tactical emergency” and rushed to replenish the 

ammunition. Six Fairchild C-123 Provider light cargo aircraft of the 315th Air Commando Wing brought in 26 tons 

of ammunition after dark on 21 January. A 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter brought in much needed whole blood on the same night.

Khe Sanh Village

Corporal Michael Archer described the Khe Sanh village 

headquarters complex as 

roughly triangular shaped with one side along Route 9 

and one side parallel to a Buddhist shrine and school 

just to the west. The base of the triangle, about 200 

meters in length, ran southwest from a rice storehouse 

on Route 9 to the end of the Special Forces compound. 

The district headquarters was a large stone and stucco 

building in the French colonial style, with high ceilings and a large verandah. 

A 3.7-meter-high sandbag tower stood in front of the headquarters building. A .50-caliber machine gun was mounted on the tower. The administrative building and barracks 

for the Provincial Forces building stood next to the tower. 

The Marine Combined Action Platoon barracks, mess hall, 

mortar pit, and showers were located behind the headquarters building. A small helicopter landing zone had been 

cleared nearby. 

The Special Forces compound was located adjacent to 

the Marine compound. “This compound, self-contained and 

more heavily barbed-wire than the Marine’s, was surrounded 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A190594

Large clouds of dust and smoke obscure part of the Khe Sanh Combat Base after two NVA artillery shells exploded. On 23 February, another Marine ammunition supply point took a direct hit, which resulted in several secondary explosions.

Ringed By Fire | 31
by a shallow trench filled with punji stakes (sharpened 

bamboo spikes),” Archer noted. A narrow passageway next to 

the communications bunker was the only entrance through 

the barbed wire. The communications bunker was located 

behind the district headquarters building about 20 meters 

from the barbed wire fence that formed the west side of the 

compound. Archer described the bunker: “Only half of the 

bunker was below ground, and it was topped by a corrugated 

metal roof. The interior was divided into two rooms separated by about ten feet of empty space. The room to the left was 

for the Special Forces radio operators, the one on the right 

for the Marines.” 

At 0530 on 21 January, almost simultaneously with the 

indirect fire attack on the main base, the North Vietnamese 

bo dois (people’s soldiers) of the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 

304th Division, under the command of Nguyen Van Thieng, 

launched an attack on the Huong Hoa District headquarters 

in Khe Sanh village. The village was defended by 175 soldiers 

and Marines, including two platoons of the South Vietnamese 915th Regional Force Company, a four-man U.S. Army 

advisory group, headed by U.S. Army Captain Bruce B. G. 

Clarke, and two platoons from CAP Oscar, commanded by 

Marine First Lieutenant Thomas B. Stamper. CAP Oscar1 (CAP O-1), consisting of 10 Marines and 1 Navy corpsman, headed by Sergeant John J. Balanco, and about an equal 

number of Bru tribesmen, was in the headquarters hamlet.*

The second platoon, CAP O-2, led by Sergeant Roy Harper, 

at about the same strength, was in a nearby hamlet about 200 

yards to the west. 

Lieutenant Stamper recalled, 

The base started taking real heavy incoming and right 

away we ordered everyone into the trenches; grab your 

rifles, flak jackets and everything. Fifteen minutes later, 

I started to go out of the bunker, walked out the door, 

and saw a red pen flare. That’s when all hell broke loose 

around the entire compound—360 degrees around the 

thing. 

*Sgt Balanco would later be awarded a Silver Star for his actions on 21

 January.

Defense Department (Marine Corps)

A Marine 105mm howitzer lashes out at enemy troops surrounding Khe Sanh.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A190802 

Marines stack empty 105mm casings at Khe Sanh, indicative of the artillery support provided for the base. In the background, partially obscured by clouds, is Hill 950.

32 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Under cover of a heavy fog, the NVA assault elements 

crept to within 15 meters of the compound’s punji stake–

filled moat before launching their attack. “I had seven guys 

wounded in the first thirty to forty seconds,” Hospital 

Corpsman Second Class John R. Roberts with CAP O-2 

exclaimed. The main enemy fire came from the front and 

right flank of the compound, dominated by the Buddhist 

shrine. “We took a lot of fire from [the direction of ] the 

shrine,” Lieutenant Stamper said. “We knocked that out with 

artillery, on the third round.” 

Captain Clarke and Lieutenant Stamper called in artillery and air support, stopping the initial assault. The 1st 

Battalion, 13th Marines, fired more than 1,000 rounds of 

variable-time proximity fuses to form a ring of steel around 

the embattled village. “The officers called in air strikes and 

artillery, because the NVA were in the wire,” Sergeant Balanco recalled. “It was scary as hell when those jets are dropping 

their bombs that close to you.” Hospital Corpsman Second 

Class Roberts said, “The jets came in dropping napalm so 

close we could feel the intense heat as though we were in an 

oven.” However, the defenders were eventually forced to give 

up most of the village and establish a final defensive perimeter around the headquarters compound. 

CAP O-2 was able to hold its position against the enemy 

assault. As the fog lifted about midday on 21 January, the 

enemy attack slackened. The NVA continued to place pressure on the defenders with mortar fire and RPGs, but they 

limited their infantry action to small arms fire and probes. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

A crash crew works to extinguish a Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea 

Knight on fire at Khe Sanh.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A190245) 

The Khe Sanh shuffle in action on 25 January 1968 as Marines 

run for cover. Forty-five mortar rounds and eight rockets hit 

Khe Sanh that day. Note that a camouflage parachute covers 

a bunker and that one of the Marines is completely airborne. 

Time magazine reported, “The dash for cover is part of every 

man’s routine.”

Ringed By Fire | 33
Helicopters attempted to resupply the embattled headquarters compound but could not land. Sergeant Balanco managed to retrieve some ammunition that was kicked out of the 

aircraft and distributed it to his men.

The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, sent a platoon from 

Company D to reinforce the village. “The platoon fought its 

way down the road until it reached the top of a hill overlooking the compound,” First Lieutenant John M. Kaheny said. 

“They spotted a mass of enemy soldiers deploying against 

them and turned back to the base.” A second relief expedition was organized. The South Vietnamese 256th Regional Force Company was flown into a landing zone near the 

old French fort, 2,000 meters east of Khe Sanh by the U.S. 

Army’s 282d Assault Helicopter Company (Black Cats). As 

the Black Cats set down in the zone, the 11th Company of 

the 66th Regiment opened fire from camouflaged trenches. 

It was a slaughter. The North Vietnamese killed more than 

25 of the American pilots and crew and 70 or more of the 

Regional Force troops. Among the dead was the expedition 

leader, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Seymoe, the 

deputy advisor for Quang Tri Province.

During the night of 21–22 January, the situation remained 

tense but relatively quiet, except for some enemy sniper fire. 

The surviving Marines—most of whom were wounded—and 

Bru of CAP O-2 took advantage of the lull and made their 

way to the headquarters compound. In the late morning of 

22 January, a helicopter took Lieutenant Thomas Stampler to 

brief Colonel Lownds about the feasibility of continuing the 

defense of the village. The regimental commander decided 

to evacuate the village after “long consideration and proper 

evaluation of the facts.” 

General Westmoreland sent a message to Admiral U. S. 

Grant Sharp Jr., commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, and 

to General Wheeler. An extract of the message stated:

The anticipated enemy attack on Khe Sanh was initiated last evening. Khe Sanh military installation had 

been under constant rocket and mortar fire since early 

morning, and Hill 861 had been under ground attack. 

Ammunition and POL [petroleum, oil, lubricants] 

dumps have been hit, with fire and explosions reported 

by Air Force FAC [forward air control]. Seventh Air 

Force is maintaining an airborne command post and 

FAC’s [sic] in the area. 

Fire Support Coordination

The 26th Marines Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 

was located adjacent to the operations section in the regimental Combat Operations Center (COC). The FSCC was 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A190683

Incoming artillery shell explosion at Khe Sanh.

34 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
tasked with the responsibility for coordinating, planning, and 

supervising all supporting arms at Khe Sanh. It was headed 

by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hennelly, 1st Battalion, 13th 

Marines’ commander, and comprised of representatives from 

intelligence, infantry, artillery, air, and three different military 

branches—Navy, Marines, and Army. Lieutenant Colonel 

Hennelly was given the nickname of “Band of Steel Hennelly” 

because of the overwhelming fire support that he brought to 

bear on the North Vietnamese. 

The FSCC had three principal subordinate sections: Fire 

Direction Control, which served as the brain of the artillery 

battalion; the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) for control of aircraft; and Target Intelligence that identified possible enemy locations. Captain Kent O. W. Steen, the 26th 

Marines’ assistant fire support coordinator, said that the 

Marine “culture of fire support planning and coordination 

integrated with the infantry they support” played a large role 

in the defense of the base. 

Targeting

The targeting effort at Khe Sanh was run by Captain Mirza 

M. Baig, the 26th Marines Target Intelligence officer. He 

was on special assignment from the 3d Marine Division, 

where he served as the clandestine intelligence coordinator. 

Baig believed that a thorough knowledge of enemy doctrine 

and tactics was essential in developing a fire support strategy. 

His assistant claimed Baig had a mind like a computer and 

stored bits of information on note cards, one card for each 

1,000-meter map grid. Lieutenant Colonel Shawn P. Callahan in Close Air Support and the Battle for Khe Sanh wrote that 

Baig’s job “was to mix art and science to find the enemy.”

Airspace Coordination

The ground and airspace around Khe Sanh was divided into 

several different regions, as noted in the diagram of the airspace divisions. The two zones closest to the combat base, 

A and B, include the immediate battle space. These zones 

were under the control of the 26th Marines FSCC. Located in the regimental command bunker, the FSCC exercised 

unrestricted control of all maneuver units, as well as all air 

strikes and indirect fire missions in support of ground units. 

The FSCC controlled the air strikes through the DASC, 

which was located in the Air Force bunker about 75 meters 

from the COC. Normally, the DASC would be colocated 

with the FSCC, but the COC was too crowded. Lieutenant 

Colonel Johnny O. Gregerson, Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3), complained that “problems occurred on 

coordination of the air effort in the overall fire-support plan 

because of a lack of instantaneous communications and joint 

understanding of the problems involved. Its location caused 

problems.” 

The airspace represented by the letter “C” of the diagram 

on p. 36 was under the control of the 3d Marine Division 

because it was decided that the NVA in the area posed no 

threat to Khe Sanh. The 3d Marine Division exercised fire 

support and air control through its own FSCC and DASCBravo from the division COC bunker in Dong Ha. The final 

divisions of airspace, D and E, were designated “free strike 

zones” and controlled by the Air Force through its Airborne 

Battlefield Command and Control Center set in a C-130 configured with a command and communications suite that orbited over Laos.

Single Manager Controversy

The escalating situation at Khe Sanh brought to the surface the old dispute about the role of Marine air in the overall air campaign.*

 Air Force General William W. Momyer, 

USMACV deputy for air and commanding general of the 

Seventh Air Force, was charged with the responsibility of 

overseeing all USMACV air operations in Vietnam, and he 

was not happy that III MAF was essentially operating its 

own air force in the I Corps Tactical Zone. He considered 

this “separate” system to be in contradiction to the principal that, as the air commander, he should have the ability to 

mass his forces at the decisive time and place on the battlefield, just like the ground commander. He recommended that 

the 1st MAW turn over control and scheduling of its fixedwing assets to the Air Force. The Marine Corps was strongly 

opposed, considering its fixed-wing aircraft an integral part 

of its air-ground team. 

General Momyer was able to convince General Westmoreland to support his proposal. “If the battle of Khe Sanh 

develops,” Momyer said, “it [single manager] may be the 

event to get air responsibilities straightened out.” General 

*A detailed discussion of the single manager controversy is presented in 

chapter 24 in U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968.

Ringed By Fire | 35
Westmoreland submitted a letter of intent to adopt the new 

system to the next higher command, Admiral Sharp, just 

a week before Operation Niagara was to begin. But Sharp, 

influenced by senior Marine generals, immediately put a halt 

to Momyer’s proposal. However, despite the Marine objections, the plan was resurrected two months later and implemented on 31 March. Colonel Lownds complained that “the 

time of request for an on-call mission just about doubled . . . 

if you wanted a pre-planned strike you could have it the next 

night following the night you put it in—in other words, 48 

hours afterwards. Air should be more responsive. . . . At Khe 

Sanh the enemy didn’t stand still and wait for you to hit him.”

Lieutenant Colonel Callahan wrote, 

In summary, the single management controversy and 

its effect on the battle of Khe Sanh is often overstated. Although the single management of aviation 

assets within Vietnam was the subject of heated debate 

which resulted in a fundamental change of air command and control during the battle . . . the adoption 

of [it] had limited effect on the Marines at Khe Sanh. 

This was largely true due to Marine efforts to preserve 

the air-ground team by countering the imposition of 

the system and mitigating its effects.

Retribution

General Westmoreland decided to unleash a massive air assault 

on the North Vietnamese, code named Operation Niagara. 

Niagara II

Operation Niagara II began at 0930 on 22 January, with 595 

tactical strike sorties (including Air Force, Marine Corps, 

and Navy) and 49 B-52 sorties on a round-the-clock basis 

against located targets. From that date through 31 March 

1968, when Operation Niagara was officially terminated, 

more than 24,000 tactical strike sorties and 2,500 B-52 sorties had dropped more than 95,000 tons of ordnance. Prados 

and Stubbe noted that the cascade of bombs “amounted to 

almost 1,300 tons of bombs around Khe Sanh, the equivalent 

Adapted by History Division

36 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
of a 1.3-kiloton tactical nuclear weapon, every day of the 

siege. Allied aircraft were delivering approximately five tons 

of bombs for every one of the 20,000 NVA soldiers initially estimated in the Khe Sanh area, or more than fifteen tons 

per man measured against roughly 6,450 Marines and ARVN 

troops in the garrison.”

Arc Light Strikes

The B-52 missions were a key element in Niagara II’s air 

offensive. During the period from 22 January to 31 March, 

the B-52s dropped nearly 60,000 tons of high explosives on 

North Vietnamese targets. On the weekend before the Tet 

Offensive began, U.S. Army and Air Force Douglas EC-47 

Skytrain’s airborne direction finding pinpointed the location 

of the NVA “Front” headquarters just inside Laos that was 

directing operations in the Khe Sanh area. On 29 January, 

the day before the Tet Offensive began, 45 B-52 bombers 

dumped 1,350 tons of bombs on the site of the North Vietnamese headquarters, and the radio transmissions that had 

been originating from the site disappeared for almost two 

weeks, indicating that the bombers had destroyed the enemy 

headquarters.

The big bombers could each carry 27 tons of ordnance 

in mixed bomb loads of 250-, 500-, and 750-pound loads. 

Initially, the safety zone for an Arc Light strike was three 

kilometers. The North Vietnamese were aware of this restriction and moved some troops and ammunition storage areas 

within the safety zone. At the end of February, the Air Force 

Defense Department photo

An Air Force Boeing B-52 Stratofortress drops its bombs during an Arc Light mission over Vietnam.

Ringed By Fire | 37
started employing a van-mounted MSQ-77 Combat Skyspot 

radar to direct the strikes. At the same time, the 3,000-meter 

bombing restriction was rescinded. The tactical commander could request a strike as close as 1,000 meters from the 

perimeter. The first “close in” strike was conducted on 26 

February at a distance of 1.2 kilometers from the perimeter. A captured North Vietnamese soldier reported that his 

company suffered 10 men killed, including his commander, political officer, and assistant political officer. Many of the 

company’s trenches were collapsed and several machine guns 

and mortars destroyed.

The 26th Marines FSCC at Khe Sanh provided 90 percent of the targeting data for the strikes, but General Westmoreland personally approved each mission. The FSCC sent 

their mission requests to the 3d Marine Division air officer 

about 15 hours prior to the scheduled drop time. Up to three 

hours prior to the strike, the regiment could request an alternate target; but after that time, no changes were permitted. 

USMACV scheduled eight strikes every 24 hours. Later, the 

response time was pared down. A three-plane cell was scheduled every three hours. Every 90 minutes, the Skyspot radar 

would pick up the bombers and direct them to a particular 

target. The schedule was juggled to keep the enemy off balance. The cells would vary their intervals over their targets 

from 60 to 90 minutes, or even two hours. In the last week 

of February, the Air Force changed the number and intervals 

to six B-52s every three hours instead of three aircraft every 

90 minutes. 

To rapidly develop target boxes for the incoming B-52 

strikes, the Khe Sanh area was overlaid with a grid system in 

which each “box” represented a one by two kilometer target 

area. It was the same size as could be effectively hit by a cell 

of three B-52s. The coordinates of the box to be hit were forwarded to the Skyspot radar site, which in turn directed the 

incoming B-52 sorties.

The Arc Light strike put fear into the hearts of the North 

Vietnamese soldiers. In March 1968, a diary from an NVA 

NCO near Khe Sanh was captured. In it, he wrote, “Here 

the war is fiercer than in all other places. . . . It is even fiercer than Dien Bien Phu. All of us stay in underground trenches. . . . We are in the sixtieth day and B-52s continue to pour 

bombs . . . this is an area where it rains bombs and cartridges. Vegetation and animals, even those who live in deep caves 

or underground, have been destroyed.” A Marine private first 

class described the effects of a bombing:

A B-52 strike is truly awesome. There would be no 

hint of a strike arriving until the bombs exploded. The 

bombs fell in a staggered pattern. First one bomb, then 

another to the right and front of the first explosion, 

then another to the left and front of the second explosion, and so forth. The bombs created a long pattern of 

craters, churned up earth, and blasted trees. After the 

bombs exploded, I would be able to hear the planes. 

They produced a weird, low moaning that lasted until 

they were out of range. I never saw the planes, since 

they bombed from a great height.

Mini Arc Light

In their bombing campaign around Khe Sanh, the Marines 

experimented with several techniques. Two of the most 

unique were the “Mini” and “Micro” Arc Lights, which were 

used for area bombing and required close coordination with 

ground supporting fires. The concept behind the Mini Arc 

Light was to act upon fast-breaking intelligence when the 

B-52 strikes were not available. When the regiment received 

indications that North Vietnamese units were moving into 

a specific area, the Khe Sanh FSCC would plot a 500 by 

1,000-meter run in the center of the suspected enemy sector. 

The regiment then asked for Marine fixed-wing aircraft on 

station to conduct a radar-controlled AN/TPQ-10 mission 

and at the same time alerted artillery batteries at Camp Carroll and the Rockpile (175mm guns) for fire missions. With 

the bombing runs, usually flown by two Grumman A-6 

Intruders, carrying 28 500-pound bombs and artillery batteries firing mixed caliber ranging from 4.2-inch mortars 

to 175mm guns, the FSCC and Air Support Radar Team 

(ASRT) computed the data so that the initial shells and 

bombs hit the target at the same time. The Micro Arc Light 

was a smaller version of the Mini Arc Light using smaller 

targets and lighter ordnance.

Close Air Support

Despite the dramatic aspects of the Arc Light campaign, the 

26th Marines relied heavily on the close air support missions 

flown by the tactical fighter-bomber aircraft, especially those 

controlled by ASRT-Bravo from MASS-3. Captain Moyers 

38 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
S. Shore II, in The Battle for Khe Sanh, noted, “The accuracy 

of ASRT-3 was phenomenal.” The ASRT and its sensitive 

equipment arrived at Khe Sanh on the evening of 16 January and by 20 January commenced operations. Three days 

later, it set a new squadron record by controlling the delivery of 210.7 tons of bombs. The team was located in heavily 

sandbagged underground bunkers behind the Gray Sector of 

the perimeter. On 24 January, ASRT-Bravo received minor 

damage to an antenna as a result of an enemy shell fire. 

Operations were not interrupted. 

An Air Force liaison officer believed that the Marine 

radar operators could safely bring a bombing mission in as 

close as 50 meters. A Marine from the Khe Sanh FSCC 

stated in an emergency that “he would have no qualms about 

calling in an ASRT-B . . . TPQ [10] within thirty-five meters 

of his position. During Niagara II, ASRT-B controlled 

nearly 5,000 missions.” According to the airborne controllers 

who observed strikes by ASRT-Bravo, it was highly accurate in directing strikes. Captain Richard E. Donaghy, 26th 

Marines’ air officer, said, “I cannot imagine what would have 

happened at Khe Sanh had we not had ASRT-B. They were 

always ‘up,’ always on target and always innovative.”

In addition to its accuracy, the TPQ-10 system was 

extremely flexible. A strike could be programmed and executed within 10 or 12 minutes utilizing any available aircraft. 

Most of the missions were at night when it was inefficient 

and dangerous to conduct dive-bombing strikes. As a matter 

of routine, two Marine and three Air Force flights were 

scheduled every hour unless an emergency developed. On 

18 February, ASRT-Bravo set a new squadron record for a 

single 24-hour period by controlling aircraft that delivered 

486 tons of ordnance on 105 separate targets.

The basic ingredient of Marine air at Khe Sanh remained 

the visual close air support missions.* Air Force Captain R. 

G. Lathrop, a Douglas A-4 Skyhawk pilot, flew several close 

air support missions at Khe Sanh: 

The first thing that caught my eye was how small the 

*Marine close air support usually refers to missions where the pilots under 

the direction of an airborne or ground controller visually obtain and attack 

the target.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A421997

Two Grumman A-6 Intruders (only the wing tip can be seen of the second aircraft) from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (AllWeather) 533 return to Chu Lai after a mission. Note that the bomb racks of the first aircraft are empty.

Ringed By Fire | 39
Khe Sanh base was. It looked like a piece of tape, red 

and torn laid across a small ridge surrounded by taller 

mountains. I could see . . . the mottled layout of the 

base which was covered with bunkers, debris of types 

I could not recognize from my altitude. There were 

wrecked aircraft on the mat and there were rounds 

impacting inside the perimeter. From the perimeter 

outward, there were concentric rings of trenches, 

blown apart and separated from each other by almost 

interlocking bomb craters. The trenches went for as far 

as I could see to the north and west. A bombed out 

road ran past Khe Sanh to the west, and there was a 

bombed out French style building along the road just 

past Khe Sanh on the way to the Laotian border. There 

were air strikes being conducted by more than one air 

controller and the impact of bombs could be seen west 

toward Laos from where I was orbiting.

Along with radar-controlled bombing, close air support 

missions were launched against pinpoint targets in proximity to friendly troops. This type of air strike was the most 

responsive to the needs of the ground commanders and the 

most accurate. There were usually fighter/bombers overhead at Khe Sanh around the clock. During the day, the air 

around the base was filled with the high-pitched shriek of jet 

engines: Marine, Navy, and Air Force McDonnell Douglas 

F-4 Phantom IIs; Marine and Navy A-6 Intruders, A-4 Skyhawks, and Vought F-8 Crusaders; Air Force Republic F-105 

Thunderchiefs, North American F-100 Super Sabres, and 

propeller-driven South Vietnamese Douglas A-1 Skyraiders. 

 Upon arrival in the sector, the fixed-wing aircraft would 

report into the Khe Sanh DASC, who in turn would assign 

the pilots to a Marine or Air Force airborne controller. These 

controllers came from the Air Force’s 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron or from Marine Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36 and VMO-6. At least five pilots flying 

either Cessna O-1E “Birddogs” or Bell UH-1 Iroquois (or 

Hueys) remained overhead during the day in radio communication with both the ground and air. Once in visual and 

radio contact with the attack aircraft, the controller would 

make a “marking run,” where they fired either a smoke rocket 

or dropped a colored smoke grenade upon the target. Given 

the correct headings by the airborne controller and possibly 

The Air Support Radar TeamBravo (ASRT-B) used the 

AN TPQ-10 radar to guide 

aircraft to their target. The 

radar emitted a pencil-shaped 

beam that detected and locked 

on to the aircraft. Using target 

coordinates provided by the 

Fire Support Coordination 

Center (FSCC), the controller 

programmed the enemy position, ballistic characteristics of 

the bombs, current wind, and 

other pertinent data into a 

computer, which was connected to the radar. The computer 

also received inputs from the 

radar and, in turn, provided 

correction in airspeed, altitude, and heading, which the operator passed on to the pilot. The controller closely monitored 

the set and, at a predetermined release point, called a “Mark” 

to the pilot who “pickled” (or dropped) his bombs.

AN TPQ-10 Radar

40 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
after a few “dummy” passes, the jets would then strike the 

enemy positions. In the meantime, the controller would be in 

contact with the ground and make any necessary adjustments 

in their instructions to the attack pilots. Once the attack aircraft released the ordnance, the air controller made an assessment of the strike and radioed the results to the fixed-wing 

pilots. 

Aerial Lifeline 

The North Vietnamese recognized the importance and vulnerability of the Route 9 supply route. They commenced 

ambushing convoys, and by the end of August 1967, nothing ventured beyond Ca Lu. Khe Sanh had to be supplied 

by air. The first problem faced by an inbound aircrew was to 

find the base. Just off the east end of the runway, the ground 

dropped off sharply into a gorge more than 1,000 feet deep. 

The wind channeled warm, moist air from the coast into the 

gorge, producing the right conditions for thick, heavy banks 

of fog, which spilled onto the plateau to obscure the combat 

base and the surrounding area. Before the siege began, the 

structures at Khe Sanh showed up vividly on aircraft radar, 

allowing pilots to “see” through the fog. However, once the 

North Vietnamese started shelling the base, the Marines 

went underground and leveled the above-ground structures, 

resulting in a poor radar return.

A detachment from Marine Air Traffic Control Unit 

62, Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36), operated ground 

control approach (GCA) radar from the airstrip to guide 

aircraft, but enemy fire knocked it out on 19 February. An 

ASRT TPQ radar, which normally controlled bombing, was 

pressed into service. Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Carey, 

1st MAW staff, said the radar “proved to be invaluable in 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

A fully loaded Douglas A-4A Skyhawk from VMA-211 is located at the Chu Lai airstrip. The small, maneuverable Skyhawk could 

carry a variety of ordnance and a payload of nearly 8,000 pounds.

Ringed By Fire | 41
multiple roles. We utilized it in conjunction with aerial delivery . . . for supplementary positioning of A-6 [aircraft] . . . 

strikes which we conducted when the Arc Lights were not 

available, and we used it for Special Close Air Support on 

the hill positions.”

The aircrews also faced a formidable array of North Vietnamese antiaircraft weapons. The enemy cleverly concealed 

heavy machine guns and some 37mm antiaircraft guns along 

the approaches to the runway and invariably engaged aircraft on landing and takeoffs. Even when the supply planes 

approached the field in dense fog under radar control, the 

NVA gunners fired away “in the dark,” so to speak, presumably firing at the sound of the engines. Fifty-three airlift aircraft were hit by ground fire, 18 extensively damaged, and 

3 Fairchild C-123 Providers were destroyed. Several aircraft 

were hit on GCA final and completely in the “soup.”* For 

*In other words, in trouble or in a bad situation.

an aircraft loaded with several tons of fuel or ammunition, a 

single hit could be disastrous. 

A standard landing approach toward a runway consisted of a constant, controlled descent at a shallow angle, but 

the surrounding hills and risk of enemy fire forced the crews 

to keep their large, comparatively unwieldy craft—C-130s, 

C-123s, and De Havilland C-7 Caribous—at a much higher 

level for longer to stay out of range of small-arms weapons 

and present a smaller target to the larger-caliber weapons. 

Then, as the aircraft approached the end of the runway, the 

pilot would drop the nose and put the aircraft into a steep 

dive, levelling out only at the very last moment. From here, 

the pilot could either land or make a very low-level pass 

along the runway at an altitude of about five feet, dropping 

the supplies out of the open rear cargo doors along the way. 

The pilot would then pull up sharply at the far end of the 

runway and execute a steep climb out of the valley, helped by 

the fact that the plane was now much lighter, having deposited its load.

National Naval Aviation Museum, NNAM.1996.253.2810

A Douglas A-1 Skyraider aircraft, nicknamed “Spad,” after the French World War I fighter.

42 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
On 10 February, a 1st MAW Lockheed Martin KC-130 

Hercules, with a crew of six and five passengers, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Henry Wildfang and Major 

Robert E. White, was hit by heavy machine-gun fire on the 

approach to the combat base. The plane was carrying flamethrowers and bulk fuel in bladders. According to Wildfang, 

the enemy fire “set the number three engine ablaze, punctured the fuel cells in the cargo compartment, and ignited 

the fuel.” He recalled that “two explosions rocked the . . . [aircraft] in-flight, with a third occurring at touchdown. Oily 

black smoke and flames entered the cockpit area and “limited 

our visibility to near zero.” Wildfang was able to land the aircraft and maneuver it clear of the runway so that the airstrip 

could remain in use. He and White escaped through their 

respective cockpit swing windows, although White had difficulty when his foot got caught in the window. Wildfang tried 

to open the crew door but “a wall of fire and dense smoke” 

drove him back. Crash crews arrived and rescued three men, 

two of whom later died of their injuries. 

When an aircraft safely touched down, the North Vietnamese immediately fired on the runway with everything 

they had, often damaging the plane or causing casualties 

among the exposed personnel gathered to service or board 

it. Every moment on the ground was fraught with danger. 

Pilots soon developed the technique of “speed offloading” for 

cargo, in which the plane continued to taxi after landing and 

the cargo simply rolled out the back. This reduced offloading 

time from the 10 minutes required with a forklift to less than 

30 seconds. The Fairchild C-123K Providers, equipped with 

auxiliary jet engines, could land, offload, take on passengers, 

turn around, and lift off again in as little as three minutes. 

One unknown pilot in the Air Force’s 834th Air Division 

described it as “the longest three minutes on earth.”

Defense Department (Air Force)

Then-Captain Richard Camp recalls, “I watched a Skyraider on one of the first days of the siege. The pilot lined up on 

the target and started his bombing run. I could hear the NVA 

12.7mm anti-aircraft guns chattering away. The plane continued to dive and instead of pulling out after releasing its 

bombs, it plowed into the ground and exploded in a huge 

fireball. Needless to say I was flabbergasted. Either the pilot 

was hit by ground fire or got target fixated. In any event, he 

did not survive the crash.” 

Skyraider

Defense Department (Marine Corps)

Top: Fairchild C-123 Provider transport at the National Museum of the United States Air Force.

Bottom: An Air Force Fairchild C-123K Provider transport 

brings in supplies for the Marines at Khe Sanh. This version 

of the Provider was equipped with auxiliary jet engines and 

could land, unload, and take off in as little as three minutes.

Ringed By Fire | 43
The workhorses of the fixed-wing air delivery effort were 

the Lockheed C-130 (or KC-130) Hercules, the C-123K 

Provider, and the C-7 Caribou, with cargo capacities of 15 

tons, 5 tons, and 3 tons, respectively. Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152) provided the 

KC-130s while the Air Force flew all three types of transports. While the C-130 had the obvious advantage of greater carrying capacity, the smaller aircraft could land on shorter 

spaces of open runway, spend less time on the ground, and 

present a smaller target on the ground as well as in the air.

The day following the Marine KC-130 loss, a North Vietnamese 122mm rocket exploded 15 feet from an Air Force 

C-130 that was offloading troops, killing one and wounding 

four. Fragments damaged the tail section and the aircraft 

could not fly until repaired. On 12 February, enemy gunners 

hit it again. The aircraft was finally repaired that night and 

the next morning took off, sporting 242 new holes in the airframe. At this point, General Momyer, Seventh Air Force, 

ordered the field closed to Air Force C-130 flights. Ten days 

later, III MAF followed suit.

The C-130 prohibition meant that the resupply needs of 

the garrison could not be met by the C-123 and C-7 aircraft. 

Logisticians estimated that Khe Sanh consumed, on average, 125.6 tons of supplies per day. The destruction of ASP-1 

on 21 January drove the daily requirement to 235 tons. To 

maintain this amount, other methods of resupply were used. 

Photo courtesy of David Douglas Duncan

Marines on the ground stand back and watch as the Lockheed Martin KC-130, piloted by CWO-3 Henry Wildfang and Maj 

Robert E. White, burns on the Khe Sanh runway after enemy fire set ablaze the cargo of flamethrowers and bulk fuel.

44 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Container Drop System

The container delivery system, or parachute drop method, 

delivered the most cargo at Khe Sanh. A drop zone 500 by 

300 meters was established outside the combat base perimeter, near the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and in front of the 

Red Sector defense perimeter. Lieutenant Colonel John F. 

Mitchell, from 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, recalled that the 

drop zone was a “no-man’s land from the valley floor west 

of Khe Sanh and north/northwest of . . . [the combat base].” 

Company C, supported by Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th 

Marines, was assigned the dangerous recovery mission. The 

men were subjected to sniper fire and an occasional ambush. 

Typically, five or six planes made drops during the morning, 

releasing their loads at intervals of about 25 minutes each 

to allow the cargo to be picked up. The airdrops resumed in 

the afternoon until halted before darkness. Colonel Mitchell 

believed his men recovered 95 percent of the supplies.

North Vietnamese antiaircraft fire was a constant threat 

throughout the run-in and during the drop itself. Marines on 

the perimeter could hear the enemy machine guns fire at the 

aircraft, many of which were hit by the fire, but none were 

shot down. Low clouds and low visibility in an area of high 

terrain made the drop mission even more hazardous. 

The parachute drop technique called for close air-ground 

coordination. The Marine Air Traffic Control Unit at Khe 

Sanh guided the C-130 pilots to the drop zone by lining 

them up with the long axis of the runway. When the aircraft passed a certain point over the eastern threshold of the 

field, the controller called, “Ready, ready, mark.” At “mark,” 

the pilot pushed a stopwatch, activated his Doppler navigation system, turned to the predetermined run in heading, and maintained an altitude of between 500 and 600 

feet. The Doppler device indicated any deviation from the 

desired track to the drop zone. The release point was calculated by using the stopwatch—20 to 26 seconds from “mark,” 

depending on the winds. At the computed release point, the 

pilot pulled the C-130 into an eight-degree up altitude and 

applied full power. The 16 pallets, containing 15 tons of supplies, moved backward on floor rollers and slid from the rear 

of the plane. A large cargo parachute carried the one-ton 

bundle to the ground. 

Photo courtesy of David Douglas Duncan

A rescue team chief stands in exhaustion, looking at the foamcovered wreckage of the aircraft. Eight of the 11 persons on 

board the aircraft died in the crash and resulting fire.

Defense Department photo

The air remained Khe Sanh’s lifeline to the outside. Here, a 

Lockheed C-130 Hercules parachutes supplies to the defenders. Approximately 8,120 tons of supplies arrived by parachute or extraction methods during the period of the siege, 

compared with about half as much landed and unloaded.

Ringed By Fire | 45
Under visual flight rules, the average computed error 

for the drops was only 95 meters. Even when these missions were executed completely under instrument flight rules 

(IFR), the average distance that the bundles landed from 

the intended impact point was only 133 meters—well inside 

the drop zone. On a few occasions, however, the parachute 

bundles missed the zone and drifted far enough away from 

the base to preclude a safe recovery. In those rare instances, 

friendly artillery and air strikes were brought to bear on the 

wayward containers to keep them from falling into enemy 

hands. One load fell within the combat base, and five men 

were killed by the heavily laden pallets. During the siege, Air 

Force C-130 crews conducted a total of 496 parachute drops, 

totaling more than 8,000 tons of supplies at Khe Sanh.

Ground Proximity Extraction System 

With the ground proximity extraction system (GPES), loadmasters positioned palletized cargo on rollers inside the aircraft with a hook attached to the pallet in such a manner that 

it would hang down like the tailhook of a carrier plane. To 

drop the cargo, the pilot made a low pass over the drop zone 

trailing the hook and engaged an arresting cable, much like a 

plane making a carrier landing. When the hook engaged the 

cable, the pallets were jerked out of the rear hatch and came 

to a dead stop on the runway. GPES only had limited use, 

not because of any fault of the system but rather because of 

faulty installation of the arresting gear. The Marine installers 

were repeatedly forced to seek cover from enemy mortar fire, 

and as a result, they failed to anchor the arresting apparatus 

Defense Department photo

An Air Force C-130 cargo hold just after parachuting supplies to the combat base.

46 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
properly. In the first attempt, the Air Force C-130 ripped 

the arresting cable out of the ground. After the cable was 

repaired, other efforts were more successful. In one instance, 

a pallet of 30 dozen eggs was extracted “without a single eggshell being cracked.” Another source allowed that only two 

of the eggs were broken. In all, 15 GPES deliveries were 

made during the siege.

Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System 

For a low altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) 

delivery, the loadmasters prepared the cargo in much the 

same manner as the GPES, except that, instead of attaching 

a hook to the pallet, they attached a parachute. The pilot flew 

over the runway at an altitude of five feet and fired a small 

explosive charge that cut a retraining cable and allowed the 

parachute to deploy out of the rear cargo hatch. The parachute pulled the palletized cargo out of the aircraft to drop 

the few feet to the ground. LAPES was extremely accurate, 

with some crews able to place their cargo within a 25-meter 

square. There was one problem with the system—the platforms would slide for some distance until the extraction 

parachute brought them to a halt. On 21 February, a C-130 

inadvertently struck the ground, tearing off the airplane’s rear 

ramp and causing the load to extract early and break apart. 

The careening cargo killed one Marine and injured another. In mid-March, an extraction parachute separated from 

the load, allowing the platform to go wild, smashing into a 

bunker and killing the Marine inside. LAPES also caused 

some damage to the runway, the result of repeated pounding 

by nine-ton loads moving at more than 100 knots, slamming 

down from five feet and skidding along the strip. Altogether, 

there were 52 LAPES missions. 

Near the end of February, the Air Force resumed C-130 

landings. A few days later, on 1 March, North Vietnamese 

fire hit and destroyed a C-123 attempting to take off, causing General Momyer to end the experiment and forbid 

Defense Department photo

Supplies for the embattled Marines at the base. Marines on the ground at Khe Sanh watch as the supplies come floating down. 

Several collapsed parachutes can be seen in the background.

Ringed By Fire | 47
C-130 landings once again. Enemy gunners continued to 

take a toll, however. On 5 March, they hit a C-123 caught 

on the ground while changing a flat tire, wrecking the transport completely. Only a day later, 49 men died when another C-123 fell to antiaircraft fire while approaching Khe Sanh 

to land. In addition to the three destroyed C-123 aircraft, 

26 Air Force transports (18 C-130s and 8 C-123s) received 

battle damage during the siege. 

Despite the many problems and risks encountered, both 

the Air Force and Marine transport aircraft kept the base 

supplied when they were the only means available to do so. 

The Air Force aircraft delivered more than 12,000 tons of 

supplies to the garrison, with two-thirds of the amount by 

parachute, delivered by either LAPES or GPES. From the 

period 5 January through 10 April 1968, Marine fixed-wing 

transports, mostly Lockheed Martin KC-130 Hercules from 

VMGR-152, hauled 1,904 tons into Khe Sanh and carried 

832 passengers.

Super Gaggle

While fixed-wing aircraft largely provided for the needs of 

the units located within the Khe Sanh base itself, the Marines 

on the isolated hill posts depended on Marine helicopters for 

everything from ammunition to water and casualty evacuation. The 1st MAW mounted a monumental helicopter effort 

using aircraft from both helicopter groups, MAG-16 and 

MAG-36. This massive helicopter lift also resulted in new 

techniques involving close coordination between Marine 

fixed-wing and rotary aircraft as well as with supporting 

artillery fire.

Helicopter flights to the hills were at least as dangerous 

as the C-130 runs to the combat base. The helicopters were 

exposed to small-arms fire from hundreds of North Vietnamese positions in proximity to the Marines’ lines as well as 

to mortar fire while in the landing zone or hovering above it. 

The enemy quickly learned that the Marines ignited smoke 

grenades to mark their landing zones when helicopters were 

Defense Department photo

An Air Force C-130 after being hit by North Vietnamese shell fire. The three men shown are fleeing the damaged aircraft. One is 

wounded.

48 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
inbound. As a result, mortar fire almost always greeted the 

resupply aircraft and harassed the Marines detailed to recover the supplies from the landing zone. “The weather was a 

primary consideration during this period,” HMM-262 command chronology noted. “Early in the evening the fog would 

roll in and the visibility and ceiling would remain zero until 

late the following morning.” The fog and low-lying clouds 

sometimes dipped down to enshroud the peaks of the higher 

hills, even when the combat base remained clear.

The Marines on the outposts attempted to alleviate 

the problems for the aviators. On Hill 881 South, Captain Dabney always tried to obtain needed fire support from 

external sources, rather than from his own mortars and howitzers. In this manner, he conserved his own ammunition. He 

tried to confuse the enemy by setting off numerous differentcolored smoke grenades and then told the pilots which color 

smoke marked the correct landing zone.

The Marine helicopters brought supplies to the hill positions directly from Dong Ha, rather than from the combat 

base itself. This reduced the number of times cargo handlers 

had to package and stage the supplies, as well as the amount 

of time the aircraft had to remain airborne in the hazardous 

environment around Khe Sanh. This system was not without 

problems, however. One battalion commander complained 

that priority requests required up to 5 days for delivery, while 

routine resupply took 10 days. Further, carefully assembled 

loads, packaged to fulfill specific requests, sometimes arrived 

at the wrong position.

By mid-February, with the enemy shooting down three 

helicopters attempting to reach the hill outposts on a single 

day, Marine commanders realized that they had to take steps 

to remedy the situation. Lieutenant General Richard Carey 

noted that “it became apparent that we had to do something 

fast . . . Bill [Lieutenant Colonel William J. White] and I 

suggested that we could come up with an answer. I was the 

considered authority on the fixed-wing participation and 

Bill provided the helicopter expertise. When all the details 

were sorted out I suggested the name super gaggle as that is 

a favorite fighter pilot term meaning, ‘perceived confusion of 

the first order’.” 

The plan was to establish a small air task consisting of 

8 to 16 resupply CH-46 helicopters, about a dozen A-4 

Skyhawks and four Huey gunships to fly cover, a Marine 

KC-130 to refuel the aircraft, and a TA-4F Skyhawk with a 

TAC(A) in the backseat to orchestrate the entire affair. The 

Khe Sanh DASC and FSCC ensured the coordination of air 

and ground fires. In the first Super Gaggle mission flown on 

24 February, under cover of suppressive fixed-wing and artillery support, each of eight CH-46s successfully dropped off 

a 3,000-pound external load in less than five minutes when 

they could have been taken under fire. One helicopter took a 

hit but landed safely at the Khe Sanh airstrip.

In a typical Super Gaggle mission, a TA-4 would fly 

to Khe Sanh on weather reconnaissance. When the TA-4 

reported favorable conditions, the A-4s launched from Chu 

Lai, en route to Khe Sanh, and the CH-46 helicopters took 

off from Quang Tri, en route to Dong Ha where prestaged 

supplies waited. After picking up the supplies and carrying them externally underneath in specially designed cargo 

slings, the helicopters began the short trip to Khe Sanh, 

flying on instruments and then letting down through a 

hole in the cloud cover. Major John A. Chancey, pilot with 

HMM-364, noted in his diary, “worst weather in the drop 

zone yet encountered . . . was [instrument flight rules] IFR 

all the way and had to come through a hole south west of the 

hill, go below the ridge line and scoot up in to the zone just 

over the ground and in the clouds the last 200–300 yards.”*

Just before the helicopters arrived, four A-4s struck 

enemy positions with napalm and two others saturated antiaircraft positions with CS gas carried in spray tanks. About 

30 seconds prior to the helicopters’ final approach to the designated hills, two A-4s laid a smoke screen on both sides of 

the planned flight path. As the helicopters flew in behind the 

smoke, four more A-4s carrying bombs, rockets, and 20mm 

cannons suppressed known and suspected North Vietnamese 

gun positions. It often appeared that planes were everywhere. 

Corporal Thomas J. Miller, a crew chief for HMM-364 

remembered, “[We] had just pickled [dropping the external 

load] and I looked out the side door to see an A-4 about 

50 feet outside our rotor tips. The fixed wing has his gear 

down, flaps down, and speed brakes deployed. I yelled at the 

pilot, ‘do not turn right’.” Another crewman recalled, “We 

broke out on the bottom of the clouds just as an F-4 roared 

*Maj Chancey was awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross for his actions 

during these resupply missions.

Ringed By Fire | 49
beneath our Huey. . . . I swear I could see the F-4 driver writing on his knee board!”

The Hueys followed closely to pick up any downed crews 

and a KC-130 Hercules orbited high overhead to refuel any 

A-4s in need. At times, the entire gaggle operated in the 

hills where some peaks reached 3,000 feet with less than 

1,500 feet ceilings, and occasionally the helicopters took 

off and landed at Dong Ha with less than 400-foot clearances. “What a gaggle!” Major Chancey exclaimed, “But no 

mid-air—don’t tell me how we missed . . . I had a badly 

swinging load—sheer terror . . . what a way to make a living!!” 

Captain Dabney recalled:

On the days when a Super Gaggle was due, we’d register all of our mortars (we had eight-two 8mm and 

six 60mm) on known or suspected AA [antiaircraft] 

sites and stand by. At about 10 minutes prior to Super 

Gaggle, we’d get the word and fire all mortars with 

white phosphorus (WP) rounds. Four A-4s would 

then appear—two on either side of the hill—and attack 

mortar marked sites with Zuni rockets. Two more 

would then drop delay cluster bomb units and highdrag 250-pound bombs in valleys north and south of 

the hill. Two or more would then drop napalm along 

both sides of the hill—about 75 to 100 meters out to 

discourage NVAs who would lie on their backs and fire 

up into bellies of birds with their AK-47s. It got hot 

when napalm hit, and we prayed a lot, but they never 

missed. We’d also have each Marine in the trench line 

(about 200) heave a grenade as far as he could down 

the hill in front of him to clear or discourage the same 

Defense Department A192747

A CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter delivers a sling load of supplies to a Marine fire support base in Vietnam.

50 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
NVA. Finally, our mortars would fire four to five more 

rounds of WP at AA sites they were registered on (to 

blind them in case Zunis hadn’t gotten them), and 

then all Marines on the hill would take cover. As we 

did so, two more A-4s would lay smoke on either side 

of the hill. Super Gaggle prep was an exciting show, 

and we’d sometimes have trouble keeping troops, especially replacements new to the hill, under cover. It was 

dramatic entertainment, but given the inevitability of 

incoming mortars, it was mortally dangerous to forsake cover to watch.

Captain Dabney explained that CH-46 helicopters carrying 

supplies in slings dangling below the aircraft were the key to 

the resupply effort:

As soon as smoke was laid, flight crews from HMM364 would appear with external loads brought from 

Dong Ha, 10 birds in two strings of 5 just above the 

smoke. They’d fly parallel to the hill, usually to the 

south because wind was usually from the north. They 

appeared to us to do a “right flank, march,” come in to 

the five zones on the hill, release their loads of supplies 

(such as ammunition, food, and water) and beat feet. 

A second echelon of five would do likewise, but it was 

dicier, because by then smoke from the north would be 

blowing over the hill and visibility would be severely 

restricted. Because all zones were on a line only 200 

meters long, the birds were damn close together. How 

they avoided colliding, I don’t know, but they did. One 

bird in the second echelon would be designated to land 

in a zone we’d have ready, drop off mail and replacement Marines, and pick up any casualties. The NVA 

would always fire mortars, but their forward observers 

were blinded by smoke, so their fire was generally ineffective except when an occasional round would land in 

some trooper’s hole. Nothing we could do about that, 

except pray. AA fire was constant and sometimes heavy, 

but, like mortars, gunners were firing blind through 

Defense Department (Marine Corps)

Smoke screen being deployed by an A-4 aircraft during a Super Gaggle mission on Hill 881 South.

Ringed By Fire | 51
smoke. They’d occasionally get lucky and wing a bird, 

but they never brought one down on the hill during 

Super Gaggle.

Using the Super Gaggle technique, groups of helicopters could resupply the hills four times per day with little 

danger of losses. Indeed, only two CH-46s fell to enemy fire 

during the Super Gaggle missions, and in both cases, the 

Hueys picked up the crews immediately. During the month 

of March, the helicopters delivered about 80,000 pounds of 

cargo per day to the hill outposts. Marine helicopters flew 

more than 9,000 sorties, including the Super Gaggle flights, 

and carried 3,300 tons of supplies and more than 10,600 passengers to the Khe Sanh defenders.

Tightening the Ring: Hill 861 Alpha

With Echo Company, Khe Sanh will be held.

~ Captain Earle G. Breeding

Captain Earle G. Breeding’s Company E, 2d Battalion, 26th 

Marines, was assigned to occupy Hill 861 Alpha, located approximately four kilometers northwest of the combat 

base and 500 meters northeast of Hill 861 South. The hilltop 

was important because it blocked direct observation between 

Company K, 3d Battalion, on Hill 861 and the 2d Battalion’s 

position on Hill 558. This stretch of ridgeline prevented the 

two units from supporting each other by fire and created a 

corridor through which the North Vietnamese could maneuver to flank either Marine outpost. Company E was attached 

to the 3d Battalion for the duration of the siege. 

The hill was only a mile southwest of Hill 558, but the 

company had to get there the hard way—shank’s mare (i.e., 

to walk) through thick undergrowth. “I remember saying to 

myself that I couldn’t believe that any type of grass could 

grow this high,” Lance Corporal Larry E. Jackson recalled. 

“It was about six to seven feet high. Each blade would cut 

you as you walked across it. . . . I would have to take my 

M-16 rifle and put it in front of me and lean forward with 

all my weight to open a trail.” Company E set out shortly 

after first light on 22 January and were quickly bogged down. 

The men were weighed down with weapons, equipment, and 

a 10-pound protective flak jacket that trapped body heat. 

The temperature was in the high 70s, although the tropical 

humidity made it seem much hotter. Water soon became a 

problem as the hot, sweaty, parched Marines emptied their 

canteens. Several men became heat casualties, which further 

slowed the column down. Night was falling as the exhausted 

Marines reached the summit of the hill. 

The next morning, the men started to dig foxholes and 

string the barbed wire that had been brought in by helicopter. 

The defenses were gradually expanded until a trench system 

completely encircled the hill. Claymore mines were added 

and artillery targets were preregistered. Captain Breeding 

instituted an alert system that put one-half the company on 

alert throughout the night. 

On the evening of 3 – 4 February, sensors northwest of 

Hill 881 South detected the movement of 1,500 –2,000 

people. Captain Mirza Baig, 26th Marines Target Intelligence officer, initially believed the movement to be a North 

Vietnamese resupply effort and passed the information to 

fire support units for their attack. On the following night, 

however, the massed movement continued and further study 

Defense Department A422352 

A CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter provides a net of supplies to 

Marine ground units atop a rugged combat support base in 

the northernmost sector of South Vietnam.

52 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
caused Baig to change his opinion. He now thought the sensors had detected a North Vietnamese regiment in an attack 

formation. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, joined by four 

batteries of 175mm guns at Camp Carrol, pounded the suspected NVA formation. Sensors in the area transmitted the 

explosion of impacting shells, as well as the voices of hundreds of panic-stricken men running to escape the deadly 

barrage.

Company E watched the scene from Hill 861 Alpha. 

Unbeknownst to them, one or possibly two North Vietnamese battalions from the 325th Division split off from the 

larger unit being punished by the artillery barrage and readied 

an assault on Hill 861 Alpha. At 0305 on 4 February, Company E was struck by a tremendous 82mm mortar barrage. 

This was followed up by volleys of RPG fire, which knocked 

out several Marine crew-served weapons and shielded the 

advance of the NVA sappers and assault troops. The perimeter wire was quickly breached. “They came up the northern 

slope,” Captain Breeding explained. “The only approach they 

had. They had all the cover in the world between the dark of 

night—it was absolutely pitch black—and all that high elephant grass.” 

Second Lieutenant Donald E. Shanley’s 1st Platoon bore 

the brunt of the attack. Private First Class Michael DeLaney 

said, “They hit the 1st Platoon because it was stretched across 

a finger that was lower than the rest of the hilltop, easier to 

get to.” The crew-served weapons bunkers were knocked out 

with the first rounds. “The NVA knew where they all were 

before they started the attack,” DeLaney added. Captain 

Breeding thought the enemy had “zeroed their mortars in 

on us the night before, but I hadn’t realized what they had 

done.”

Photo courtesy of David Douglas Duncan 

Capt Earle G. Breeding, commander of Company E, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, with cigar in his right hand and radio in his left, 

reports the successful counterattack of his company against the enemy on Hill 861A.

Ringed By Fire | 53
The North Vietnamese penetrated the 1st Platoon’s position, forcing the Marines back to the company command 

post. “They didn’t break through Shanley as much as they 

absorbed through him,” and Breeding explained that “there 

were 1st Platoon Marines down there manning their positions through the fight.” Just the same, Shanley’s platoon lost 

more than one-half its men in the first moments of the fight.

The company command post was located halfway back 

along the hill from the 1st Platoon area and a little to the 

east of the military crest, near a big tree. The tree also sheltered the company aid station that had been set up in a huge 

bomb crater. Breeding called for fire support. Friendly artillery rolled back and forth over the slope upon which the 

NVA were attacking. Captain Baig later speculated that the 

heavy and accurate artillery fire (almost 2,000 rounds from 

the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, alone) on and behind the 

assaulting NVA had prevented their reserves from joining 

the attack. Companies I and K also supported Company E 

with 81mm and 60mm mortar fire, which helped to disperse 

the massing enemy. Under the control of ASRT-Bravo, flight 

after flight of fixed-wing aircraft pummeled the attacking 

North Vietnamese. 

The fighting was close and personal, sometimes handto-hand. “It was just like a World War II movie,” Breeding said. “Knife-fighting, bayonet fighting, hitting people on 

the nose with your fist and all the rest of that.” Shortly after 

0500, Lieutenant Shanley led his men in a bold counterattack that restored the lines after hand-to-hand fighting. The 

North Vietnamese who survived the counterattack fled the 

hilltop, then regrouped and attacked again, but the second 

effort was stopped cold. By 0630, Company E had beaten 

back the attack. 

Defense Department A801357 

U.S. Army artillery from 3d Section, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 94th Regiment, at Camp J. J. Carroll, firing 175mm guns as support 

missions for Marines at Khe Sanh.

54 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Private First Class DeLaney said, “There were bodies 

everywhere. . . . I had never seen young dead people . . . their 

skin was gray and rubbery; they didn’t look human anymore.” 

An early morning fog blanketed the hilltop and there were a 

number of seriously wounded men that needed to be evacuated. Lance Corporal William Maves stood in the middle of 

the tiny landing zone with a red star cluster in his hand. As a 

medevac helicopter eased down through the fog, Maves fired 

the signal flare that the pilot used to vector in on the landing zone. The casualties were loaded and he took off. Another 

helicopter followed and evacuated the remaining men. 

The fight for Hill 861 Alpha cost Company E 7 dead and 

35 wounded Marines. A sweep of the area at dawn revealed 

more than 100 enemy dead on the slopes of the hill and 

within the perimeter.

Lang Vei Special Forces Camp

Lang Vei was a heavily fortified position on Route 9 about 

two kilometers from the Laotian border. Its primary mission was border surveillance and area pacification. The camp 

was defended by fewer than 500, including 24 soldiers of 

Detachment A-101, Company C, 5th Special Forces Group; 

14 Vietnamese Special Forces; four CIDG companies of 

Bru Montagnards, including an attached mobile strike 

(MIKE) force company; and six interpreters. The camp was 

well armed with one 4.2-inch mortar, seven 81mm mortars, 

and 16 60mm mortars; two 10mm and four 57mm recoilless 

rifles; two .50-caliber and 39 .30-caliber machine guns; plus 

100 4.2-inch light antiarmor weapons (LAAWs). On 6–11 

January, a forward observer from 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, 

registered defensive artillery fires for the camp

In late January, a Special Forces reconnaissance patrol 

reported that it had discovered the telltale tracks of armored 

vehicles and locations where the NVA had marked off fording sites just across the Laotian border from Lang Vei. The 

patrol’s findings were forwarded but disregarded with the 

comment, “You’re wrong, the tracks are from bulldozers.” 

Army Colonel Jonathan F. Ladd, 5th Special Forces Group, 

tried to get antitank mines—“We could hear the tanks 

moving around”—but USMACV refused to believe there 

was a tank threat and no mines were supplied. On 23 January, the Laotian outpost at Huoi San, which was held by the 

Photo courtesy of David Douglas Duncan 

Two Marines of Company E repair the unit’s barbed wire after its successful defense of Hill 861A. The body of one of the attackers is in the foreground.

Ringed By Fire | 55
Royal Laotian Army’s 33d Infantry Battalion (BV-33 or Elephant Battalion) was overrun by the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, 304th Division, supported by seven PT-76 tanks from 

the 198th Tank Battalion.

* An Air Force FAC who was trying 

to provide support radioed, “Just before dawn, Elephant (BV33) reported that they were being overrun. I could hear the 

machine guns and mortars in the background as he talked 

rather sadly over the radio.”

The panicked Laotian survivors and their wives and children retreated to Lang Vei. The Laotian commander reported that the North Vietnamese attackers had been supported 

by tanks, but his report was met with skepticism by higher 

headquarters primarily because there was no visual sighting 

of tanks—“Tracks had been sighted they could have been 

made by vehicles other than tanks.” At the same time, sensors detected considerable personnel and vehicle movement 

toward Lang Vei, while patrols and outposts continued to 

report heavy enemy activity in the area. On 30 January, Private Luong Dinh Du of the 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 

304th Division, surrendered and reported that the base was 

going to be attacked. 

On the day that Du surrendered, a Special Forces patrol 

found an underwater road in the Sepone River. The road was 

built so that it was covered with just enough water to conceal 

it from air observation. Army Specialist Fourth Class John 

A. Young, accompanying a Laotian patrol, was ambushed 

near Khe Sanh village and captured. On 31 January, a MIKE 

force patrol near Khe Sanh surprised an NVA battalion and, 

together with air strikes, killed an estimated 154 enemy soldiers. Sergeant Turner, who served at Lang Vei from September 1966 to June 1967 said, “We were just hanging out 

there. There was no support, especially in rainy weather. You 

couldn’t even get a helicopter in. I was surprised that the 

North Vietnamese didn’t try to take us out long before they 

did. We always had an escape and evasion plan to get out of 

there if we were attacked.”

North Vietnamese Plan of Attack 

North Vietnamese forces for the attack on Lang Vei consisted of the 24th Regiment (minus one battalion) reinforced 

by the 3d Battalion, 325th Division; the 198th Tank Battalion, 

*The 15-ton PT-76 tank is a Russian amphibious light tank mounting a 

76mm D-56T rifled tank gun and a turret-mounted 7.62mm machine gun. 

consisting of 16 PT-76 tanks; 4th and 40th Sapper Companies; one 14.5mm antiaircraft company; and one flamethrower platoon.

The plan of attack was for the 3d Battalion with five tanks 

to attack from the south and eliminate the command headquarters and the positions of the 104 and 101 CIDG Companies. The 5th Battalion, 24th Regiment, with two sapper 

squads and six tanks was to attack from the west and eliminate the 102 and 103 CIDG Companies and to assist with 

the elimination of the command headquarters. The 7th Company, 24th Regiment, and two tanks were to attack the outer 

outpost, while the 4th Battalion, 24th Regiment, using the 2d

and 3d Companies, was to attack from the northeast into the 

positions of the 101st CIDG Company. 

“I’ve got a tank sitting on top of my bunker!”

At 0030 on 7 February, North Vietnamese infantrymen, led 

by 12 PT-76 amphibious tanks, crashed through the perimeter’s barbed wire and rolled into the camp. The defenders 

fought back fiercely, destroying a number of the tanks with 

106mm recoilless rifle fire, but it was not enough to stop the 

assault. The enemy overwhelmed Detachment 101-A and 

the Bru CIDG companies.

Eight Special Forces survivors, six of them wounded, managed to barricade themselves in the command post 

bunker, an underground concrete reinforced structure. They 

held out despite the efforts of the North Vietnamese. An 

Air Force forward controller described the situation: “Our 

advisors were trapped in the command post bunker in the 

middle of the camp, and the NVA were swarming all over it, 

throwing satchel charges and smoke bombs down the [air] 

vents.” The trapped Special Forces called in fire support and 

airstrikes. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, responded with 

19 missions, expending 567 rounds, including 68 selected 

ammunition (firecracker) projectiles, while overhead Marine 

and Air Force attack aircraft tried to drop their ordnance on 

enemy concentrations in and around the camp. The Special 

Forces requested that the 26th Marines execute the previously arranged contingency plan. Colonel Lownds refused, 

reporting that the combat base itself was even then being 

heavily shelled and that he expected an enemy assault against 

the airstrip at any time. Further, the difficulty of moving 

through the rough terrain at night with enemy tanks along 

56 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Route 9 made reinforcement, in the words of one Marine 

staff officer, “suicidal.”

First Lieutenant Fred McGrath, from Bravo Battery, 1st 

Battalion, 13th Marines, noted, “The last transmission was 

to the effect, ‘Oh hell, they have tanks. They’re right on top 

of us’.” There was a rushing sound and the Lang Vei radio 

went silent. The defenders were largely dependent upon their 

own efforts. Individually and sometimes in groups, the Special Forces and Bru CIDG troops broke out of the camp and 

made their way to Lang Vei village where the Laotian BV-33 

Battalion still remained. Special Forces personnel with the 

battalion in the old camp attempted to encourage and plead 

with the Laotians to assist their comrades in the new camp, 

but the results were only a few feeble and begrudging counterattacks. After much discussion and some recriminations, 

General Westmoreland ordered the Marines to conduct a 

helicopter evacuation of the camp. 

Shortly after 1700 on 7 February, under strong air cover 

from fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter gunships, Marine 

CH-46s helilifted the relief force from FOB-3 into old 

Lang Vei. “The 46s went in and received ground fire,” Captain Edward Kufledt, from VMO-6, explained, “which we 

tried to suppress. There was a lot of fire, everybody got hit.” 

A CH-46 copilot, First Lieutenant Charles Crookall said, “It 

was like a flying circus. I had an A-4 roll in below me and 

drop napalm—scared the crap out of me—and left a big wall 

of fire.” Kufledt watched the CH-46s go in: “They landed 

quite a distance from each and were immediately inundated by hundreds and hundreds of Laotians and Vietnamese.” 

The aircraft were so overloaded that they could not get 

off the ground. “There were people hanging on the ramp, 

the wheels, even the VHF antenna,” Army Special Forces 

Staff Sergeant Dennis L. Thompson recalled, continuing 

that “they were grabbing anything they could get a hold of.”*

Kufledt was astonished, “I heard one of the pilots exclaim, 

‘this is not working, we’re taking off.’ I saw people falling off the tramp, off the wheels as the aircraft pulled out 

of the zone. They took some light hits from the right side. 

. . . I could see the tracers, so we went in to suppress with our 

machine guns.” Crookall’s aircraft was struck. “We took a hit 

in a hydraulic line, a pinhole leak in the forward rotor area 

*Sgt Thompson was awarded a Silver Star for actions during the defense of 

Lang Vei.

over the cockpit,” he said. “It was not enough to bleed the 

system but we lost some power and the gates fell off. We got 

down low, in case we had to set it down.” Crookall’s helicopter made it back to Khe Sanh. “Our crew chief inspected the 

troop compartment after we landed and found an incendiary 

grenade with the pin pulled lodged between the troops seat 

and the bulkhead, which he carefully deactivated with a piece 

of wire,” Crookall added. 

Captain Kufledt’s gunship was about half a mile from 

Khe Sanh when he received a radio call from the Air Force 

FAC saying there was an American still in the landing zone. 

Kufledt polled his crew to see if they were up for a rescue 

attempt. “Let’s do it,” they replied. “I circled around to the 

south and asked Covey [FAC’s call sign] to use the fixed wing 

on station to . . . suppress NVA fire,” Kufledt said. The bombers pulled off the target. “As we rolled out on final approach,” 

First Lieutenant George E. Rosental, Kufledt’s copilot 

explained, “I saw a file of NVA—10 or 20—in a gully . . . at 

least a quarter mile away, far enough I thought that we could 

get in and out before they were a threat.” Kufledt started the 

The battle for Lang Vei was the first time North Vietnamese tanks were used in South Vietnam. The tanks came down 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail to a point on the Xe Pone River, 11 

kilometers south of the Special 

Forces camp. The tanks entered 

the river and swam for a kilometer or two before mounting the west bank and driving 

overland for another six kilometers. At the Laotian border, 

they entered the river again and 

swam the last four kilometers 

to the Vietnamese village of 

Lang Troai, a kilometer from 

Lang Vei, where they staged for 

the early morning assault.

PT-76 Tanks at Lang Vei

Ringed By Fire | 57

Defense Department (Air Force) 

Two PT-76 tanks disabled 

on the road leading into 

Lang Vei.
approach and explained, “I pulled back on the stick and started to flare. Suddenly the whole world lit up!”

Lieutenant Rosental recalled, “I looked through the chin 

bubble and saw an NVA directly below me on one knee. He 

opened fire and stitched us with his AK-47! I was hit with 

three rounds, one in each leg and one in the arm, which cut 

an artery. The bullets in the legs felt like someone had hit me 

with a sledge hammer.” Rosental slumped in his seat, semiconscious. The aircraft took hits. “The instrument panel lit 

up like a Christmas tree,” Kufledt said. “Almost all the caution lights were solid yellow. The engine red fire light came 

on and the engine coughed. I struggled to gain control and 

abort the landing. I caught a glimpse of my copilot. He was 

slumped in the seat and I thought he was dead.”

Captain Kufledt managed to keep the helicopter airborne. “The helicopter vibrated badly, but stayed in the air,” 

he said. The crew chief, Corporal Robert Crutcher, tried to 

administer first aid. “Rosental was bleeding heavily and in 

pain but the armored seats kept me from getting to him,” 

Crutcher said. Kufledt was able to fly the badly damaged 

helicopter to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion, or “Charlie 

Med,” where Rosental was treated, stabilized, and evacuated. 

The shot-up helicopter—with more than 80 bullet holes—

was also evacuated but had to be jettisoned into the jungle 

when something went wrong during the lift. Captain Kufledt 

was awarded the Silver Star and Corporal Crutcher received 

a single mission Air Medal. 

The loss of Lang Vei cost 10 Special Forces soldiers 

killed or missing, along with 5 Vietnamese Special Forces 

and 5 interpreters. Initially, only 50 –70 Montagnards were 

accounted for, although eventually 9 Vietnamese Special 

Forces, 117 CIDG strikers, 127 MIKE force troops, and 

Department of Defense

58 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
1 interpreter managed to reach safety. Many of the survivors were wounded, including all but one of the Americans. 

North Vietnamese losses included seven tanks destroyed and 

an estimated 250 killed in action. Detachment A-101 was 

awarded the Presidential Unit Citation (Navy) for its heroic 

defense.

Humanitarian Crisis

Early in the morning of 8 February, Company L, manning 

positions on the Red Sector adjacent to FOB-3, were surprised to find several thousand Laotian civilians, local Bru 

tribesmen, and CIDG soldiers lining the road outside the 

gate begging for admittance and help. The refugees said 

they were survivors of the battle and had walked all night to 

reach the base. An aerial observer spotted the long column 

of refugees: “They were mainly women and children carrying belongings. That sure tore at me. Those poor people 

just didn’t know where to go. They were caught right in the 

middle—so sad.” Many of them were wounded, without 

food, and exhausted from the trek. They were refused entry 

to the base and were forced to spend several days on the road 

without proper medical treatment, food, and water.

The refugee problem was exacerbated by the refusal of 

the South Vietnamese to evacuate the Montagnards. Many 

felt that the decision was a reflection of Vietnamese attitudes 

toward the tribesmen. After a great deal of back and forth, 

some of the Montagnards were flown out, but most simply 

walked away, down Route 9 to the east. It soon became 

obvious that many of them had not reached safety but had 

been pressed into service by NVA troops. The refugees were 

observed moving back and forth on the road with NVA soldiers intermingled with them.

Hill 64, Alpha Outpost

Second Lieutenant Terence R. Roach’s reinforced 1st Platoon, Company A, 9th Marines, occupied a small, ovalshaped (40 meters by 20 meters) combat outpost on Hill 

64, approximately 500 meters west of the battalion perimeter. The hilltop outpost, designated Alpha Outpost, had 

steep sides, except for the northwest slope. It was a wellprepared position with multiple layers of barbed wire around 

the perimeter and a network of trenches that linked the platoon’s sandbagged bunkers together. The platoon’s mission 

was to serve as an extra measure of security for the battalion 

through its ability to detect and report enemy activity well 

ahead of the lines. 

Lieutenant Colonel John Mitchell said, “We knew the 

hill was going to be attacked . . . it was only a matter of time. 

We could hear the buildup of the NVA via the new acoustic sensors that were strewn around Hill 64, and out in front 

of our perimeter. . . . I passed the word to Lieutenant Roach 

to put the Marines on full alert.” At 0415 on 8 February, 

in a heavy fog and near-total darkness, a reinforced battalion from the 101D Regiment, 325C Division, struck the outpost after laying down a heavy and accurate mortar barrage 

that covered the hilltop for three to four minutes. The North 

In November, Captain John Raymond’s Company A, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, was directed to find an overland route to Lang Vei, 

should it be necessary to reinforce the camp. The company avoided well-used trails to reduce the risk of ambush. The straight-line distance was only nine kilometers, but it took the company 19 hours to reach the camp. Major James Stanton, 26th Marines staff officer 

said, “It is true that we had an agreement to go to the aid of Lang Vei in the event it was threatened with being overrun, but the situation at the combat base deteriorated so quickly and so completely that it should have been obvious to anyone that we could no longer 

guarantee their security.” Major Gary E. Todd reported that Bru refugees “had seen what amounted to an NVA regiment lying in 

ambush between Khe Sanh Combat Base and Lang Vei that night during the attack.” Lieutenant General Cushman said, “There was 

nothing one could do really, to salvage the situation.” 

Reinforcement Controversy

Ringed By Fire | 59
Vietnamese also shelled the combat base and 1st Battalion’s 

position to disrupt Marine artillery support and to prevent 

friendly reinforcements from reaching the outpost. During 

the attack, more than 350 mortar and artillery shells fell on 

the battalion’s position.

The North Vietnamese assault troops launched a twopronged attack against the northwestern and southwestern sectors of the perimeter. They blew the barbed wire with 

Bangalore torpedoes, satchel charges, and even threw canvas 

on the obstacles to roll over them. They swarmed into the 

inner perimeter almost immediately. Lieutenant Roach tried 

to stem the breakthrough almost single-handedly, killing 

several of the enemy with his rifle and attempting to rally 

the troops on the perimeter. He died in a hail of automatic 

weapons fire while trying to rescue a badly wounded Marine. 

Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell said, “For the most part, it was 

a fight without any senior platoon leaders (the platoon sergeant and two of three squad leaders were killed) . . . leadership of the platoon was taken over by a corporal, while 

Marine privates and lance corporals independently engaged 

in numerous acts of courage to keep the top of the hill in 

control of the Marines.”

The battalion’s 81mm mortar platoon and 1st Battalion, 

13th Marines, laid down heavy defensive fires to prevent 

NVA reinforcements from entering the fight. An Air Force 

FAC directed several strikes in support: “They [Canasta 403] 

did a fantastic job of placing their bombs and strafing passes 

right up the hill toward the outpost.” Additional airstrikes 

were conducted, resulting in 50 enemy killed by air. 

About 30 Marine survivors gathered in the southern portion of the trench network and used sandbags to wall off 

their part of the trench from the enemy. Some of their weapons were damaged or destroyed, ammunition was scarce, 

and many of the men were wounded. They fought desperate 

hand-to-hand encounters, sometimes swinging entrenching 

tools or five-gallon water cans. 

One Marine had an extremely close call during the fight 

but lived to tell about it. On the northern side of the perimeter, Private First Class Michael A. Berry of the 1st Squad was 

engaged in a furious hand grenade duel with the NVA soldiers, when a ChiCom grenade hit him on top of his helmet 

and landed at his feet.* Private First Class Barry quickly 

picked it up and drew back his arm to throw, but the grenade 

went off in his hand. Had it been an American M26 grenade, 

the private would undoubtedly have been blown to bits, but 

the ChiCom grenades frequently produced an uneven frag 

pattern. In this case, the bulk of the blast went down and 

away from the Marine’s body. The back of Berry’s right arm, 

his back, and right leg peppered with metal fragments, but 

he did not lose any fingers and continued to function for the 

rest of the battle. 

In another section of the trench line, Lance Corporal Robert L. Wiley had an equally hair-raising experience. 

Wiley, a shell-shocked victim, lay flat on his back in one 

of the bunkers, which had been overrun by the enemy. His 

eardrums had burst, and he was temporarily paralyzed. His 

glazed eyes were fixed in a corpse-like stare, but the Marine 

was alive and fully aware of what was going on around him. 

Thinking that Wiley was dead, the North Vietnamese were 

only interested in rummaging through his personal effects 

for souvenirs. One NVA soldier found the Marine’s wallet 

and took out several pictures, including a snapshot of his 

family gathered around a Christmas tree. After pocketing 

their booty, the NVA moved on. The relief column rescued 

Lance Corporal Wiley. 

*The term ChiCom refers to grenades made in Communist China.

A short time after the refugees arrived, a Special Forces officer ordered the Company L Marines, without the knowledge of the company commander, to disarm the strikers. The 

Marines collected four M60 machine guns, several M79 grenade launchers, and dozens of .30-caliber carbines, which 

they quickly appropriated for Lima Company’s use. The Special Forces officer was outraged to learn of the theft and confronted the Marine company commander, demanding return 

of the weapons to his custody and accusing the Marines of 

being thieves. A heated exchange followed, after which the 

Special Forces officer stalked off without the weapons. Company L gained the use of the weapons, except for the carbines, 

which were collected and surveyed.

Disarming the Refugees

60 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Shortly after daylight, the commanding officer of Company A, Captain Henry J. M. Radcliffe, led the 2d Platoon 

in fighting their way to the base of the hill. Radcliffe directed 

an air strike on the North Vietnamese, then led his Marines 

in a frontal assault that cleared the enemy off the hill, directly into the 1st Battalion’s fire. Companies B and D joined 

with the 106mm recoilless rifles and a tank in cutting down 

the retreating enemy troops. By 1100, the battle was over and 

the charred and blasted outpost was again in Marine hands.

The 1st Platoon’s Marines had paid a high price; casualties numbered 24 dead and 27 wounded. More than 150 

North Vietnamese littered the hill and many more may have 

died from wounds. Additionally, the Marines captured much 

enemy equipment, including 13 machine guns, an indication that the North Vietnamese fled the battlefield in disorder. Although the hill had been recaptured, Colonel Lownds 

ordered the outpost abandoned. 

The Siege

As the North Vietnamese shelling intensified, the Marine 

defenders were forced to dig an elaborate system of trenches, 

bunkers, and shelters to defend themselves.

Digging In

Home is where you dig it.

~Unknown Marine, Khe Sanh

Until the North Vietnamese artillery, rocket, and mortar 

attack on 21 February, most of the base facilities—billeting 

areas, bunkers, ammunition storage areas, mess facilities—

were built above ground. Very few installations had been 

dug in. After the shelling, things changed dramatically—

the Marines went underground. Khe Sanh was given a high 

priority for engineering supplies, particularly sandbags, razor 

barbed wire, barbed wire, and antipersonnel mines. Colonel 

Lownds ordered that the troops would have overhead cover 

to protect against at least an 82mm mortar round. It was 

determined that one strip of runway matting and two or 

three layers of sandbags would meet the requirement. The 

difficulty, of course, was to procure enough runway matting. 

Lance Corporal Ernie Husted remembered, “The Seabees 

had this funny idea that [runway] matting should be used 

on the airstrip, so we would trade with them and when that 

didn’t work, we’d wait till there was shelling and then we 

would go and steal the matting and use it for our bunkers.”

The average bunker usually started as a 2.4-by-2.4-meter 

dugout with one 15 by 15 centimeter timber inserted in each 

corner, a strip of runway matting, sandbags, loose dirt, and 

more sandbags. Some enterprising Marines piled on more 

loose dirt, then took discarded 105mm casings and drove 

them into the top of the bunker like nails. Sergeant Glenn 

Prentice asked, “How do you build something to withstand 

a rocket round or an artillery round or a mortar round? . . . 

Photos courtesy of author 

Top: Above ground bunker in the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, 

area before the start of the siege.

Bottom: Bunker in the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, area after 

the siege started.

Ringed By Fire | 61
dug in, our sleeping quarters, out fighting holes, everything 

was underground and camouflaged. We dug constantly, even 

tunnels between fighting holes . . . there was nothing above 

ground on our hill.” Master Sergeant James A. Haskins 

described the 17th Interrogation Translation Team’s method 

of filling sandbags: 

Gunnery Sergeant Max Friedlander constructed a 

table of artillery ammo boxes with six legs and a sand 

chute. We would pile red, Khe Sanh dirt onto the table 

and hand a sandbag at the end of the chute; then using 

a shovel we would push the dirt down the chute into 

the bag. The whole thing resembled something seen 

in a mining camp of the late 1800s, but we were soon 

filling hundreds of sandbags a day.

Within days, a network of trenches extended completely around the combat base. Their zigzag pattern was designed 

to limit casualties if a round exploded in the trench. Lieutenant Stubbe recalled, “[We] would make what they called 

‘roll-outs,’ which were little cavities in the bottom edge side 

of the trench that [we] could roll into and still be safe in 

case a round did land in the trench.” The red clay soil made 

digging easy, but “when it became saturated, it became pea 

soup, and anything below ground collapsed,” Stubbe noted. 

The men learned to live and work underground. One Marine 

placed a sign next to his trench: “Home is where you dig it.” 

Despite their efforts, it was virtually impossible to construct 

a shelter that was thick enough or deep enough to survive a 

direct hit by a North Vietnamese heavy caliber shell.

Trenches at the base varied, but generally they were four 

to six feet deep, one to two feet wide at the bottom, and 

two to three feet wide at the top. The spoil from the trench 

was heaped to either side and lined with sandbags. The sun 

quickly bleached the color out of the bags, making it easy 

to spot the trench line and the bunkers that were piled with 

sandbags. Every 9–15 meters the trench would have overhead protection, usually runway matting with three or four 

layers of sandbags. 

1st Battalion, 26th Marines

The 1st Battalion had three companies—B, C, and D—

manning the Blue and Grey sectors, nearly three-quarters 

of the perimeter. It tied in on the left flank with Company 

It was like building a fort when you were a kid. We used 

wooden ammunition boxes for building blocks and fill them 

with dirt. We had a whole series of supports and sandbags 

and hollow areas to basically protect against the artillery and 

rocket and mortar rounds.”

First Lieutenant William K. Gay, Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion, was the detachment commander charged 

with the development of the defenses. When he first arrived 

in mid-November, the perimeter consisted of a single barrier of triple concertina barbed wire. It was in bad repair and 

overgrown by elephant grass in some places. Gay’s engineers 

cut the brush away and cleared a trace 150 –200 meters wide. 

More layers of concertina were added, as well as a 10-meter 

wide swath of tanglefoot wire. Hundreds of claymore mines 

were emplaced around the perimeter and, finally, crew-served 

weapons were sighted in to create overlapping bands of steel. 

Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson’s battalion prepared a devil’s brew of gasoline and explosives. They put the mixture in 

55-gallon drums and placed them along avenues of approach 

into the battalion’s lines. When detonated, it would spray 

flaming gasoline on anyone in its path.

During the day, hundreds of Marines dug trenches, bunkers, and individual shelters. Private First Class Bill Hancock 

described digging in on Hill 558, “Everything on our hill was 

The battalion executive officer, Major Joseph M. Loughran Jr., 

told the author to look at a shell crater on the main road that 

ran through the center of the camp. It was an all-weather road 

the Seabees had constructed from crushed rock. “I remember 

staring at this huge crater, possibly six feet deep and seven 

or eight feet wide, thinking how are we going to build anything that will stop one of these. I reported my sighting to 

Loughran and kiddingly remarked, ‘I think we better surrender.’ We both laughed. A week later the COC bunker took a 

direct hit. Fortunately it did not penetrate the roof. No one 

laughed.”

Shell Crater

62 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Defense Department (U.S. Air Force) 

Portion of the perimeter at Khe Sanh after the siege commenced. Note the ammunition and supply berms at the top 

of the photo. 

Defense Department (U.S. Air Force) 

Eastern end of the combat base perimeter showing the 37th 

ARVN Ranger position on the left foreground. 

Defense Department (U.S. Air Force) 

Interior of the combat base south of the runway, close to the 

regimental command post. 

Defense Department (U.S. Air Force) 

Interior of the combat base south of the runway. Note the 

smashed buildings. 

Ringed By Fire | 63
L, 3d Battalion, and on the right with FOB-3. Company D, 

even though it held a position on the perimeter, it was designated the reserve in case the North Vietnamese penetrated the lines. The battalion command post was located in the 

remnants of an old French bunker. “It had been filled with 

trash and debris,” Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson said, “but 

we cleaned it out and strengthened it with logs.” The battalion hardened its aid station. “I really had nothing under 

cover when we first got here,” Wilkinson explained, but “with 

the help of the engineer platoon we secured huge logs and 

used them to cover the top.” 

The battalion’s lines were strengthened “by a tremendous amount of barbed wire, double apron, particularly on 

the eastern side of the base which was probably the primary avenue of approach because it happened to come up from 

the village,” Wilkinson explained. “We had double apron, 

Canadian tangle foot, single apron, double concertina and we 

got the Seabees to dig trenches with their backhoe . . . and 

clear fields of fire.” The battalion also reinforced the defenses with improvised mines called fougasse. “There was a garbage dump on the south side of the perimeter that I felt was 

probably the most opportune avenue of approach the enemy 

could have. So we placed a few out there,” Wilkinson added.

Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson complained about a lack 

of fortification material. He explained, “I felt frustrated 

because we really never had the material with which to build 

a real bunker. We had fighting holes and a trench line, with 

maybe one layer of sand bags on top, but one layer of sandbags won’t stop a very big round.” He improvised by ordering his men to dismantle the battalion’s mess hall. “It was not 

a large structure,” Wilkinson said, “but it did have a lot of 

lumber in it. We cannibalized it as well [as] some of the other 

wooden huts to . . . put a little overhead on the positions so it 

would protect the men from at least a 60mm mortar.”

Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson said that “one of the most 

tragic things that happened is when Company B had a patrol 

go out in daylight hours.” 

The Jacques Patrol

On the morning of 25 February, Second Lieutenant Donald 

Jacques led the 3d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th 

Marines, through the perimeter wire of the combat base 

and headed south on a short-range patrol as part of the 

Defense Department (U.S. Air Force) 

Western end of the combat base showing the turnaround 

area. Note the destroyed aircraft on the left. 

Defense Department (U.S. Air Force) 

Center of the combat base showing a portion of the runway 

and exterior trench line in the foreground 

64 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
regiment’s effort to gather information on enemy activity 

close to the base. The patrol consisted of two heavily reinforced squads with two machine gun teams, an 81mm mortar 

forward observer, a rocket team, a Kit Carson scout, and a 

scout from the battalion intelligence section, for a total of 

47 Marines.* Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson explained that

“the patrol was to follow a diamond-shaped rough [three 

check points]—from Point A to Point B to Point C and 

then back in.” Captain Kenneth Pipes, from Company B, 

briefed Second Lieutenant Jacques before the patrol. “There 

were three checkpoints,” he explained, “and beyond the third 

checkpoint they were to re-enter our lines in the vicinity of 

the 1st Platoon, which was standing by as a reaction force in 

case the 3d Platoon ran into some problems. The patrol was 

to depart 0800 and return 1000.” 

Corporal Gilbert Wall, an 81mm mortar forward observer, explained, “We went out the south gate by the trash dump 

and moved down along the NVA trenches.” Hospital Corpsman Third Class Frank V. Calzia, the platoon corpsman, 

recalled, “The trench half-encircled the trash dump and went 

*A Kit Carson scout refers to former Viet Cong guerrillas used as intelligence scouts for American infantry units.

down the face of a small hill, across a river, and up the face 

of another small hill, and then around it and out of sight.” 

The trench was two to three feet deep and a foot wide. Corporal Wall said, “We followed the trench until it came to an 

end, then headed south away from the base. It was open—

no cover at all—but the NVA never fired or shot at us. We 

moved hundreds of meters away from the base.” 

About a kilometer south of the base, the patrol spotted three North Vietnamese near the road leading to Khe 

Sanh village. Jacques radioed Captain Pipes for permission 

to capture them. Pipes gave permission, not realizing that the 

patrol was not where it was supposed to be. He warned the 

officer to be extremely careful “and don’t get sucked into an 

ambush.” Corporal Wall said Jacques shouted, “Let’s go get 

them! His pistol was in the air and his hand fell forward to 

signal, ‘charge’.” Private First Class Calvin E. Bright said that

“the Kit Carson scout that was with us begged and pleaded 

not to go; he said, ‘Don’t go any further!’” “Within a matter 

of minutes,” Pipes recalled, “they reported heavy enemy fire 

and that they were penned down.”

Just south of the road, the patrol ran into an ambush. 

A company-size enemy unit occupying a bunker complex 

Defense Department A190852

Marine forward observers trying to spot North Vietnamese Army mortar positions from the front lines at Khe Sanh.

Ringed By Fire | 65
allowed the platoon to advance to within point-blank range 

before opening fire. “I couldn’t believe how many NVA were 

there,” Corporal Wall said. “I was terrified. I could see clearly the deep trouble we were in.” Private First Class Bright’s 

fireteam was on the left of the formation. “Our point man 

was hit almost immediately. . . . At first we succeeded in 

having fire superiority . . . then all of a sudden they had reinforcements that came up, and they gained superiority over 

us,” Bright explained.

The platoon attempted to maneuver, but under intense 

enemy fire casualties mounted rapidly. “I noticed that the 

3d Squad had been wiped out,” Hospital Corpsman Third 

Class Calzia said.“There was no one left.” Lieutenant Jacques 

ordered a withdrawal. “The lieutenant came by,” Calzia 

remembered, “We gotta get out of here,” he said. “Get out the 

best way you can. We’re getting wiped out,” Captain Pipes 

said. 

Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson was faced with a dilemma. “Do I send a squad or are we going to send a company?” 

Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, was ready to go. 

Wilkinson said, 

It was the most difficult decision a commander has to 

make and the decision I made was: we would not send 

out the force or go to the aid of those Marines. Now 

that violates all the Marine principles that I was taught 

from the first day at Parris Island [South Carolina] in 

1948. When a Marine gets in trouble, you go out and 

help him and bring him back. My decision was based 

on the fact that casualties had been inflicted rapidly. 

The Marines went into a killing zone and were either 

killed or seriously wounded. Then, the history of the 

Vietnamese War was filled with instances in which 

you get a squad in trouble, you send out a platoon; the 

platoon gets into trouble you send out a company; you 

Defense Department A190685

An overview of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines’ bunker defenses along the western perimeter of the base. The Marines had come 

under criticism for not “digging in.”

66 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Defense Department A190833

LCpl T. Steinhardt, Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Regiment, with an M-14 shooting at an enemy forward observer at Khe Sanh. 

send out another company. Before long night falls and 

you’ve got half a battalion out in a very tenuous position. My mission was to defend Khe Sanh Combat 

Base. I was thin. That’s why I did not send aid to the 

Bravo Company patrol.

Captain Pipes sent another platoon to assist. Second 

Lieutenant Peter W. Weiss led the 1st Platoon through the 

gaps in the perimeter wire and headed for the scene of the 

ambush. About 300 meters from the beleaguered 3d Platoon, 

Weiss and his men received enemy machine gun fire from 

20 meters to their front, forcing them to the ground. Captain Pipes said, “As the 1st Platoon moved into position to 

offer supporting fire, they in turn were pinned down. I called 

for close air support, 81mm and 60mm mortars, 90mm tank 

guns, firing .50 calibers but fog and the proximity of friendly and enemy forces hampered their efforts.” To add to the 

confusion, the North Vietnamese entered Company B’s 

radio net, possibly using a radio captured from one of the 

3d Platoon’s destroyed squads, compounding communication problems in the critical situation. Hospital Corpsman 

Third Class Calzia “looked over and the lieutenant stood up 

for some ungodly reason, and that’s when he got it. I crawled 

over to him. He’d caught it right across both femoral arteries, 

and he was dead within minutes.”

Corporal Wall tried to rescue his platoon commander. Wall described the gruesome scene: “I moved Lieutenant Jacques behind a small mound of dirt and tried to stop 

the bleeding. I soon noticed a change in the color of his 

face. It was turning white. His head fell back, his eyes rolled 

back, and he died.” Several survivors filtered back to the 1st 

Platoon. Lieutenant Weiss ordered his men to gather the 

wounded and withdrawal. The 3d Platoon was in shambles, 

with most of the men were either wounded, dead, or missing. 

Ringed By Fire | 67
First Lieutenant Thomas O’Toole from VMO-6 was 

flying overhead when he spotted the patrol. He reported: 

There were 15 Marines in the trench trying to make 

it back. I thought they were taking fire, because the 

rear man was shooting to the rear. We went back to 

the area of the bunker complex, and in the middle 

of a field surrounded on all sides by trenches, there 

appeared to be fifteen to twenty Marine bodies. We 

turned around, and I did identify them because of the 

flak jackets and helmets. Three men lay together as if 

they had been a machine gun crew. One man was bandaged on the chest, while another lay beside him as if 

he was a corpsman. 

The 3d Battalion COC monitored the air nets and heard 

Lieutenant O’Toole ask if anyone at the base had Marines 

outside the wire and then said, 

They’re being slaughtered! We came around again. 

This time, a figure among the bodies stood up and fired 

at us and with that the entire trench line opened up, 

and we received three hits on the aircraft. We figured 

that the point had walked into this open area, and was 

annihilated, and the rest were trying to make their way 

back to the perimeter. 

For what had started out as a platoon patrol, the casualties were staggering: 6 killed in action, 17 wounded, and 

25 missing. One of the men declared missing, Private First 

Class Ronald L. Ridgeway, was captured and finally released 

in 1973. No enemy casualties could be confirmed. On 27 

February, Colonel Lownds issued further restrictions on 

patrolling, limiting it to that which was “necessary to insure 

[sic] the security of . . . defensive obstacles and local security elements.”

On 30 March, Company B attempted to recover the 

bodies of the missing men. In a four-hour firefight, the company fought its way 500 –600 meters from the perimeter 

but ran into a buzz saw of enemy fire from the entrenched 

8th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th Division. Captain Pipes 

recalled, “We immediately came under extremely heavy 

RPG, 82mm and 60mm mortar fire, as well as heavy automatic weapons and small arms.” Unable to proceed, Captain 

Pipes ordered a withdrawal. Nine of his men were killed in 

action and another 40 wounded, including Captain Pipes, 

but 115 of the enemy lay dead on the battlefield. None of 

the Jacques patrol was recovered until a week later by Company D.

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

Company L, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, manned approximately 3,000 meters of the Red Sector of the perimeter. The 

other three companies in the battalion were deployed to the 

hill positions—881 South and 861. Company L tied in with 

1st Battalion, 26th Marines, on the right and the Special 

Forces FOB-3 on the left. The battalion command post was 

located in a grove of trees 75–100 meters behind the company’s lines.

Initially the battalion established a base camp, complete 

with tents and a mess hall. The perimeter consisted of hastily 

dug foxholes, but after the January shelling, the area changed 

dramatically. Within a matter of days, deep trenches and 

underground bunkers miraculously appeared. It was possible 

68 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Adapted by History Division
to walk Company L’s lines without leaving the trenches. 

Thick barriers of concertina and barbed wire were erected. 

Engineers laid dozens of M14 antipersonnel mines, known 

as “toe poppers,” in front of the wire. 

37th ARVN Ranger Battalion

The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines’ perimeter extended some 

200 meters behind the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. “The 

Rangers were set up in front of my 2d Platoon, on the east 

flank of the perimeter, covering one of the main routes of 

advance into the base,” Captain Pipes said. Wilkinson 

explained that “we were in the inner line of defense and they 

[37th Ranger Battalion] were the outer line. They had a pretty 

good position out there. We were able to get them sandbags 

and the backhoe had dug them a pretty good position.” The 

only gap in the Ranger lines was where the runway extended through it, and this was covered by two Ontos. At night, 

the gap was sealed off with strands of German tape—a new 

type of razor-sharp barbed wire that was extremely difficult 

to breach.

Captain Pipes thought the Rangers were “a good outfit—

a good, scrappy bunch. We quickly built up a mutual trust 

with the ARVNs.” Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson said, after 

meeting with the battalion commander, Captain Hoang Pho, 

“He appeared to be about 23 years old, a real nice guy, but 

not a very strong commander. I kept a very close eye on them, 

although they did have a very dedicated and very heroic U.S. 

Army captain as their advisor, Captain Walter [A.] Gunn Jr.” 

The officer had been with the Rangers for two months. “The 

ARVN Rangers are supposed to be the most elite troops 

Defense Department

Ringed By Fire | 69
there are besides the airborne,” Wilkinson said, “and what 

little I’ve been around them, I’d say they’re the best.”

During the night of 28–29 February, sappers prepared 

the ground to the front of the Ranger perimeter by cutting holes in the perimeter wire and removing mines and 

trip flares. Their activity was not discovered until morning. 

The following night at 2130, a battalion of the 66th Regiment, 304th Division, struck the ARVN position. Unknown 

to the enemy, electronic sensors had silently heralded their 

impending attack, and by the time the first waves of assault 

troops rushed the wire, two B-52 strikes, diverted from other 

targets, were on the way. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, 

accompanied by the Army’s 175mm guns and radar-directed 

attack aircraft, pounded the North Vietnamese infantry with 

telling results. The B-52s saturated the area to the rear of the 

assault waves with tons of high-explosive bombs, devastating 

what the sensors indicated was a second battalion moving 

forward to attack.

The Rangers reported that the North Vietnamese left 7 

dead in the perimeter wire, but a search the following morning revealed 71 more with many Bangalore torpedoes and 

satchel charges. The dead were still huddled in trenches, 

many in the kneeling position, in three successive platoon 

lines, as if they had been caught in the assault position. The 

devastating effect of the firecracker round was apparent. The 

Rangers had one man wounded.

For the remainder of the Khe Sanh battle, the enemy concentrated most of their efforts against the Rangers, attacking 

its position seven times in March, including another battalionsize assault on 18 March. Although North Vietnamese sappers breached the wire during one of these attacks, the Rangers repulsed every attempt, with assistance of supporting 

fires from 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, and attack aircraft. 

In addition, the North Vietnamese employed psychological warfare against the ARVN using loudspeaker broadcasts 

enticing them to defect. 

The Water Point Miracle 

The water point was located on a small hill obscured by high 

grass about 150 meters outside the northern sector of the 

base perimeter. Seabees constructed a dirt dam in the Rao 

Quan River 25 meters wide, creating a 6-foot deep reservoir. 

Engineers from the 1st Platoon, Company A, 3d Engineer 

Photos courtesy of author 

Top: A portion of Company L, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines’ perimeter. 

Bottom: Company L, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines’ trench line.

70 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Battalion A, maintained a 350-gallon-per-minute pump that 

lifted the water 27 meters from the river over an 244-meter 

span and into a large black rubber storage container. The 

pump had to be hauled down to the stream every few days to 

fill the containers. Engineer Bill Gay said that 

we drew a lot of mortar fire doing that and the NVA 

could have ambushed us and destroyed the pump but, 

to our amazement, they never interfered. The pipe 

from the pump up to the bladders was often punctured and we had to figure out how to create a whole 

new pipeline from damaged pieces. The bladders and 

purification equipment were also damaged by shrapnel 

and we were soon patching the patches. 

The extensive rains of September and October 1967 ruptured the dam, but it was quickly repaired by a detail led by 

U.S. Navy Equipment Operator First Class Rulon V. Rees. 

The detail lined the face of the dam with old scrapped Marston matting from the airstrip and blasted a crater in the riverbed about nine meters in front to act as a reservoir in case 

the river level fell. On 24 February, the base was down to just 

1,893 liters in its water supply.

Life on the Hills

For the men defending the hill positions, the monotony of 

everyday living was interspersed with moments of fear. 

Hill 881 South

Hill 881 South was small, only 50 meters wide and 100 

meters long, manned by less than 300 men. “The hill had two 

knobs connected by a saddle. India Company took the bigger 

knob,” Lieutenant John Esslinger said. “Mike Company took 

the smaller knob and that’s where we stayed for the rest of the 

siege.” Initially, the trenches on the hill were merely shallow 

furrows. “Maybe eighteen inches deep,” Esslinger recalled, 

“because the soil was really hard clay, almost like rock. Digging was really difficult. You’d bend your E-tool [entrenching tool] trying to dig the stuff up.” Most of the men lived 

in aboveground bunkers, but when the hill started receiving 

incoming fire, “the dirt got a lot softer,” Esslinger humorously remembered. Esslinger also recounted some problems with 

the depth of the trenches: “It wasn’t long before some portions of the trenches were too deep. In some places eight feet 

deep so I had the men dig firing steps so they could step up 

and see over the trench line.” The aboveground bunkers were 

abandoned and the sandbags used as overhead protection for 

shelters the men dug into the sides of the trench. Esslinger 

said that “within a week we were living in the trenches.”

Captain Dabney recalled, “We had no bunker-building 

capability and it meant there was nothing we could do to 

stop the big rounds. The smallest thing they [NVA] threw at 

us was a 120mm mortar round. You just don’t stop that with 

overhead cover made of barbed wire stakes and sandbags.” 

The 120mm mortar round caused more damage and casualties than all the other enemy weapons combined. Lieutenant Esslinger recalled, “The round had a super quick fuse that 

detonated upon contact with the ground, leaving an impact 

crater not much deeper than a coffee saucer. The explosion 

sent the shrapnel flying horizontally . . . any exposed Marine 

within 30 meters was a casualty, more often than not a KIA 

[killed in action].” Lieutenant Esslinger recalled that “you 

could hear the thump of the mortar round leaving the tube.” 

The firing position that gave Company I the most trouble was located to the southwest of the hill in a U-shaped 

draw known as “the Horseshoe.” There were at least two 

NVA 120mm mortars in the area which, in spite of an avalanche of bombs and artillery shells, continued to plague the 

defenders. Because of the shape of the hill, the summit was 

the only defendable terrain, which provided the enemy with 

a compact target. Captain Dabney figured that it took one 

layer of runway matting, eight layers of sandbags, and one of 

either rocks or 105mm shell casings to stop a 120mm mortar 

shell with a quick fuse from penetrating. Nothing could be 

done if the round had a delayed action fuse. During the siege, 

Company I lost 40 men killed in action and more than 150 

wounded. 

Captain Dabney requested bunker-building material, but 

heavy timbers were simply too heavy to transport by helicopter. Dabney explained that “what little bunker-building 

material we got, every last bit of it was dedicated to the ammo 

bunkers because if they got hit, the explosion would blow 

us all off the hill.” Dabney estimated that at one point, the 

bunkers were stuffed with 3,000 rounds of 105mm ammunition, 5,000 rounds of 81mm and 60mm mortar ammunition, 500 rounds of 106mm ammunition, and 300 rounds for 

the 3.5-inch rocket launchers, as well as explosives, grenades, 

Ringed By Fire | 71
said. “The anti-aircraft rounds were always whipping by and 

the mortar rounds were often ‘on the way’ and they knew it, 

yet they did their duty ’til the bird was gone then ran like hell 

and dove into the nearest hole.”

The hill was under constant observation by snipers who 

shot at anyone venturing above ground. Company M’s commander, Captain John J. Gilece, fell victim to a sniper in the 

middle of the day as he moved from one side of the hill to the 

other. Instead of going through the trench line, he jumped up 

and ran across the top of the hill and a sniper shot him in the 

leg. Lieutenant Esslinger took command of the company and 

held it during the entire siege. 

Company I had been cursed with the presence of a particularly accurate sniper who was located in the brush to 

the south of their perimeter. The sniper wounded 10 men in 

the course of a week, all of whom had to be evacuated. The 

Marines on the perimeter watched patiently for the culprit 

to expose himself. Their vigilance paid off when they spotted the glint off the sniper’s telescopic sight. They marked his 

position and lugged a nearly 450-pound 106mm recoilless 

rifle from the northern side of the hill through the trenches. 

Once in position, the gunner sighted in and fired an antipersonnel round containing 6,000 13-grain flechettes (a pointed steel dart stabilized with fins). The sniper was eliminated. 

Hill 861

Hill 861 was located approximately three kilometers northwest of Khe Sanh. The entire topographical crest of the hill 

was pocked with craters and buried in loose soil. During the 

1967 Hill Battles, it was estimated that bombs had blown 

more than 20 feet off the summit. One Marine said that 

some of the craters were deep enough to hold a small building. Author Gregg Jones, in Last Stand at Khe Sanh: The 

U.S. Marines’ Finest Hour in Vietnam, wrote, “The American 

stronghold on Hill 861 measured approximately four hundred meters north to south and about 150 meters east to west. 

The hill sloped upward toward the north and crested a little 

over fifty yards above the trench line as it snaked around the 

northern perimeter . . . the helicopter landing zone was down 

the hill to the south.”

A Marine said, “We were really fortifying the place . . . 

more digging, more wire and more claymores.” A chest-high 

trench ran completely around the hill with protective sandbags 

and tens of thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition. 

“Given the size of the hill, it was absolutely critical that we 

fortify the bunkers,” he explained. 

The hill was barely large enough for three small landing zones; one in the saddle and two on a gradual nose east 

of Company I’s position. The NVA had mortars zeroed 

in on each one of them. “As soon as they saw a helicopter 

approach one of the zones, the enemy would start pumping 

out rounds,” Esslinger explained. “So we would have helicopters feint into one zone and then land in another. They had 

to be out of the zone within thirty to forty seconds. Casualty evacuation was dangerous.” Essingler added: “We had a 

trench line out to the landing zone. We’d have the casualty 

in the trench with a couple of guys. As soon as the helicopter got close to the ground, the stretcher-bearers would run 

out and throw the casualty into the helicopter, jump back in 

the trench and the bird would get out of there. It all had to 

be done before the mortar rounds exploded.”

Captain Dabney recalled a disastrous resupply/emergency 

medevac. He explained, 

We off-loaded the ammunition and immediately 

began loading wounded aboard. The bird had been in 

the zone two or three minutes when a 120mm mortar 

round impacted within a few feet of it. Our senior 

Doc [corpsman] and two of our previously wounded 

Marines were killed in action. About a dozen others 

including the helicopter crew were wounded. We’d no 

sooner gotten that mess unscrambled when the second 

bird, a CH-46 came in—same damn thing—down in 

the zone and full of holes. We had lost 2 birds shot 

down and 1 crash-landed at Khe Sanh after getting 

hit leaving the hill. All told we sustained 7 KIAs and 

maybe 25 WIAs [wounded in action].

The hill’s lifeline depended on a small team of men 

from the Helicopter Support Team (HST) and the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Together they formed the 

backbone for directing and controlling aviation assets, both 

fixed and rotor wing. Captain Dabney praised their bravery: 

“Daily when the weather allowed and often several times a 

day, those [HST] Marines stood in the open in those zones 

under the helicopters and performed tasks without which we 

grunts and the helo crewmen could not have survived,” he 

72 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
on the outside. Bradbury dug a sleeping hole in the side of the 

trench that he could stretch out in. “It was about five or six feet 

long,” he explained. “I dug mine about two or three feet in and 

then I went to the left. I figured if a mortar happened to land 

in the trench the shrapnel would not reach me.”

Following the NVA attack on 21 January, the Marines 

on the hill maintained a heightened state of alertness as 

they repaired the damage to the perimeter. Private First 

Class Elwin Bacon said, “Kilo Company was on 100 percent alert [at night]. That’s a very long time to be without 

sleep.” The situation on the hill was made even worse by the 

dozens of North Vietnamese bodies that littered a ravine. 

“The smell from in front of my position was enough to make 

a hog vomit,” Bacon explained. There was no way to bury 

the remains because NVA snipers were actively shooting at 

anyone moving along the perimeter. Corporal Dennis M. 

Mannion recalled, “Using heavy ship’s binoculars I was able 

to see clearly that the bodies turned to skeletons within three 

weeks. . . . There was no flesh on them, just skeletons wearing 

North Vietnamese uniforms, packs and helmets.” 

During the remainder of the siege, Hill 861 was not 

attacked again by North Vietnamese infantry, but it was 

raked by mortar and sniper fire. “We would get mortared 

twice or three times a week,” Lance Corporal Bradbury said. 

“It would be sporadic.”

Hill 950 

The 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, provided one platoon to the 

defense of the radio relay station on Hill 950. Private First 

Class Robert A. Harrison said the day-to-day routine on the 

hill consisted of “digging deeper trenches, laying concertina wire and playing cards.” This all changed when a resupply 

helicopter came in. “The NVA would open up with heavycaliber machine gun and mortar fire. We would usually be 

able to call in some close air support to suppress the enemy 

fire,” Harrison explained. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson 

stated, “We did a little risk taking up there. The enemy had 

people with a .50 caliber machine gun on Hill 1015, which 

they used to shoot at us with impunity.” On 23 January, the 

HMM-262 command chronology stated, “Attempting to 

resupply Hill 950, Major [Anton E.] Therriault crashed near 

the landing zone and the aircraft was destroyed. No casualties occurred.” 

Resupply was a continuing problem because of the 

weather. “Even a heavy wind could keep the helicopters from 

landing in the small landing zone,” Wilkinson explained. The 

hill sometimes went for a week or more before supplies could 

be flown in. At one point, the hill was dangerously close to 

running out of water. There were only two gallons for the 

75-man garrison. Wilkinson gave the platoon commander 

permission to take a patrol out to get water: “I had some concerns about the patrol and having casualties that we would 

be unable to evacuate. They not only were able to bring back 

some water but they surprised a rather lethargic NVA unit 

and kicked the hell out of them. It raised the Marines spirit 

immeasurably.” 

Hill 558

The three companies of 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, completely encompassed Hill 558 and blocked enemy movement 

through the Rao Quan Valley. The battalion quickly dug in.

Lance Corporal William Hancock, a rifleman in Company H, said, “Everything on our hill was dug in, our sleeping quarters, fighting holes . . . everything was underground 

and camouflaged . . . we set up barbed wire, minefields, booby 

traps. . . all kinds of defensive things.” Lieutenant Colonel 

Francis J. Heath Jr. sent out reinforced platoon-size patrols to 

determine the enemy’s location and disposition. On 24 and 

25 January, patrols from Company F made contact with an 

NVA company. The patrols pulled back to hit the enemy with 

artillery, mortar, and air strikes. The patrols suffered one KIA 

and 20 WIA (12 medevac and 8 minor), while killing 39 of 

the enemy. 

The 26th Marines curtailed all security patrols in February, allowing the battalion to place its efforts on improving 

its defensive position. Triple concertina and a combination 

double apron and German standing fence was installed around 

the battalion’s position. Punji pits and tangled barbed wire 

were placed within the triangular cells of the barbed wire 

obstacles. Barbed wire explosive devices, consisting of a roll 

of straight wire with C4 in the center, were employed along 

the perimeter. Fougasses, gasoline, and fuel in barrels were 

buried in the sides of the hill. C4 placed at the bottom of the 

barrels was triggered electronically, igniting the mixture and 

sending a sheet of flame out of the barrel like a flamethrower. 

Claymore mines were extensively utilized, and finally, a total 

Ringed By Fire | 73
of 11 antipersonnel and antitank minefields containing more 

than 1,500 M14 antipersonnel mines and 141 M15 antitank 

mines were installed.

During January, February, and March, 2d Battalion, 

26th Marines, received sporadic 82mm and 60mm mortar 

fire, as well as rockets, but casualties were light. There was 

no enemy ground contact. However, small enemy reconnaissance teams—three to six men—worked against the battalion’s western perimeter. 

NVA Trenches and Bunkers 

The North Vietnamese also dug in. They used the bad weather to conceal a system of siege trenches, interlaced with 

supply bunkers they were digging in the Khe Sanh area. The 

trenches extended from the Laotian border to the perimeter of the combat base, with the heaviest concentration in 

the south and southeast. The trench system was of great concern because the same tactics were used by the Viet Minh 

at Dien Bien Phu to get close to the French defenses. The 

press played up the similarities between the two. Lieutenant 

Colonel Wilkinson had studied Bernard Fall’s book Hell in 

a Very Small Place, which described the battle of Dien Bien 

Phu, and made it required reading for all his officers. As they 

read Fall’s book, they could look outside and see the very 

same tactics developing on the North Vietnamese side of noman’s-land. One Marine kiddingly remarked, “Jesus Christ, 

skip the middle part; what happens at the end of the book?” 

The 3d Battalion COC had a sign that was blank on one side 

and on the other side it read, “Tonight’s the Night.” Every 

night, it was turned so the words could be read.

The trenches were immediately targeted for artillery and 

air strikes. The pilots described the trenches they were finding. “I saw more high-speed trenches right up to the southern perimeter of the base,” Captain Charles Rushforth, an 

Air Force forward air controller said. “I saw guys in the 

trenches—two hundred plus. Who’s friendly? I buzzed them, 

and the guy in the field waved: the others in the trenches, 

just 500 meters away, sat. I zipped over them and started to 

pull the turn. Then the whole world opened up. The ground 

troops yelled on their radios, ‘Hey, Covey, get out of there! 

They’re really hosing you down!’ ” 

Flight after flight of fixed-wing aircraft attempted to 

bomb the NVA out of the trenches with rockets, 2,000-pound 

bombs, and “napalm baths,” a scheme in which they dropped 

a number of unfused napalm tanks on the target that were 

then ignited by rocket or cannon fire from the following 

planes. Yet, despite the heavy bombardment, the North Vietnamese continued to extend the trench system. Working at 

night or under cover of fog, the NVA often moved their lines 

forward as much as 200 – 300 meters in a single night. One 

Marine recorded that “we watched with some fascination 

and no small apprehension, day by day, as the trenches crept 

closer and closer to our perimeter.” Some of the enemy trench 

lines stretched 2,000 meters from assembly area to within 35 

meters of the perimeter. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson said, 

“Marines of 1/26 [1st Battalion, 26th Marines] used periods of good visibility to register M-79 rounds on the close-in 

NVA trenches. At night, during periods of invisibility, M-79s 

would fire a version of H&I [harassment and interdiction] 

fires into the trenches.” 

On 25 February, a Marine aerial observer spotted a section that ran north from Hill 471, one kilometer north of 

Khe Sanh village to within 25 meters of the base perimeter. A 50-meter section ran parallel to the perimeter, which 

seemed to indicate that the North Vietnamese planned to 

use it as a line of departure (LOD) for an assault. Surprisingly, this new trench had been dug in one night despite 

the heavy artillery and air assault. Another trench paralleled 

the 1st Battalion’s sector of the perimeter. At night, Douglas AC-47 Spooky gunships, nicknamed “Puff the Magic 

Dragon,” worked over the NVA trenches with their three 

7.62mm General Electric miniguns. The machine guns fired 

2,000 rounds a minute. “The miniguns looked like flaming 

water hoses,” Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson said, “as they 

hosed down the trenches for us.” 

In the following days, aerial photographs disclosed more 

and more of the trench system. The photographs showed that 

the North Vietnamese trenches followed the contours of the 

ground and used existing vegetation to make airborne detection difficult. Spoil was concealed with reeds and elephant 

grass, rather than used for parapets as the Marines did at 

the base. The trenches were narrow, only 46 –61 centimeters 

wide and normally about 1.22 meters deep. Communications 

trenches connected crew-served weapons. Antiaircraft guns 

were heavily camouflaged in small gun pits that only gave 

them a small sector of fire but made them more difficult to 

74 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
locate. U.S. pilots quickly learned that the trench lines were 

heavily protected by 12.7mm antiaircraft machine gun. 

Medical Support

With an ever-growing number of casualties, the medical battalion assumed an increasingly important role. 

Charlie Med

Company C, 3d Medical Battalion (“Charlie Med”), was 

a collecting and clearing company attached to the 26th 

Marines. It was located adjacent to the midpoint of the 

runway about 30 meters from the loading ramp/helicopter 

landing zone and close to the regimental headquarters. Its 

mission was to prepare the casualties for evacuation so that 

they could safely make the flight in a stabilized condition. 

Before the siege, the doctors and corpsmen worked in four 

4.6 by 9 meter tents: one for sick call, one for supplies, and 

two as living quarters for the corpsman. After the bombardment on 21 January, they were “hardened” by ringing them 

with a double row of waist-high sandbags, which gave the 

medical personnel some protection from flying shrapnel as 

they worked on the wounded men. 

A “bomb proof ” aid station was finally constructed by 

Navy Seabees. It consisted of heavy timbers covered with 

runway matting and sandbags. One Marine remembered 

that it had seven layers of sandbags, 105mm shell casings, 

David Douglas Duncan Collection

Navy doctors and corpsmen from Company Charlie Med, wearing helmets and flak jackets, conduct an emergency operation on 

a wounded helicopter pilot at Khe Sanh dispensary. Most wounded were evacuated out of Khe Sanh as soon as possible. 

Ringed By Fire | 75
and runway matting, forming a huge mound nearly impervious to mortar and rocket fire. Hospitalman Michael Hill 

said, “Charlie Med was a huge bunker, a massive structure 

that could take a hit. You’d hear rounds going off and sometimes you’d see dirt falling . . . but you couldn’t stop working. If we had casualties, we had to take care of them, and we 

had to make sure they didn’t get hurt worse from the shelling.” “Charlie Med” was staffed by 4 doctors and 26 Corpsmen and was under the leadership of Navy doctor James 

Finnegan. 

Casualties were brought to the triage area by Marines 

who had been assigned as litter-bearers. The stretcher was 

placed on a pair of waist-high sawhorses where corpsmen 

quickly removed the casualty’s uniform and began checking for wounds. A doctor would examine the casualty and 

make a determination as to the treatment they would receive. 

After the casualty was stabilized, they would be prepared for 

evacuation. One observer noted, “I went down into the med 

bunker and was overwhelmed with the amount of Marine 

wounded. They were everywhere with the doctors and corpsmen working feverishly to staunch the flow of blood and save 

as many lives as they could. The floor was sticky with their 

blood. The smell was unforgettable.”

When word was received that medevac helicopter was 

inbound, stretcher-bearers carried the casualties to a fivefoot high sandbag blast wall adjacent to the helicopter pad 

Defense Department

Air Force stretcher-bearers carrying a casualty to the runway for evacuation by air. Photo was taken before the siege as noted by 

the undamaged building and vehicle.

76 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
and wait. “When it came in,” Hill explained, “you’d load 

them aboard and just hope we wouldn’t get blown away by 

incoming artillery. They had been shooting at that place for 

some time . . . and they had it exact.” Lance Corporal Charles 

Thornton recalled, “It was truly a helpless feeling as two 

Marines picked up the stretcher and began running toward 

the helicopter. . . . I could see the impact of rounds ‘walking’ 

down the runway.” Thornton was loaded on the helicopter. 

It seemed like an eternity before we left the ground. 

. . . There were so many wounded on board that it 

had to get a running start to get off the ground. I can 

remember vividly looking out the helicopter door as 

we circled Khe Sanh and seeing the trench lines and 

bomb-scarred terrain become smaller as the helicopter flew higher. I thanked God for allowing me to be 

wounded in order to escape that hellhole. 

Navy doctor Lieutenant Edward M. Feldman noted that 

from 15 January to 23 April 1968, Company C treated 2,541 

patients, of which 2,000 were serious enough to require hospitalization. Less than 5 percent were for gunshot wounds. 

The great majority of the wounds were from shrapnel, mostly 

to the abdomen and extremities.

Operation Pegasus

“On 25 January,” Army Major General John J. Tolson III, 

commanding general of 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 

stated, “I was directed to prepare a contingency plan for the 

relief or reinforcement, or both, of the Khe Sanh base. This 

was the first in a chain of events that was later to emerge 

as Operation Pegasus.” The concept of operations for Pegasus was for the 1st Marine Regiment with two battalions to 

launch a ground attack west toward Khe Sanh while the 3d 

Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, would lead the air assault. 

D-day was set for 1 April 1968. On 2 and 3 April, all elements 

would continue to attack west toward Khe Sanh; and, on the 

following day, the 2d Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division 

would land three battalions southeast of Khe Sanh and attack 

northwest. The 26th Marine Regiment, which was holding 

Khe Sanh, would attack south to secure Hill 471. On 5 April, 

the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, would air assault 

just south of Khe Sanh and attack north. The following day 

the ARVN Airborne Task Force would air assault southwest 

of Khe Sanh and attack toward the Lang Vei Special Forces 

camp. Linkup was planned at the end of seven days.

The construction of a new airstrip in the vicinity of Ca 

Lu, 16 kilometers east of Khe Sanh, was a key factor for the 

entire operation. The 3d Marine Division scheduled a deception operation designed to divert the enemy’s attention 

from Khe Sanh to Dong Ha. Capitalizing on its air mobility, the Army division would advance along the axis of Route 

9. Engineers would follow, repairing culverts and bridges to 

make the road passable to vehicles. The South Vietnamese 

promised an ARVN airborne task force of three battalions to 

participate in the operation.

Preparations began immediately. The 11th Engineer Battalion and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 joined the 

1st Air Cavalry Division engineers in building the base at 

Ca Lu, to be called “LZ Stud.” The project included bunkers, supply storage facilities, and an airstrip capable of handling C-123 cargo aircraft. The 1st Air Cavalry Division 

began preparing the battlefield on 26 March when Army 

Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Diller’s 1st Squadron, 9th 

Cavalry, began helicopter-borne reconnaissance patrols in everwidening arcs from LZ Stud. During the initial surveillance 

efforts, it became evident that the enemy had established 

positions designed to delay or stop any attempt to reinforce 

or relieve Khe Sanh. Diller’s squadron located and targeted NVA positions and prepared landing zones by directing 

air strikes using delay-fused or “daisy cutter” bombs to blast 

gaping holes in the dense vegetation. 

Operation Pegasus started not with a bold and powerful thrust but with a decidedly more ponderous motion. At 

H-hour—0700 on 1 April—foul weather grounded the 

helicopters of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, but the men of 

the 1st Marines, on foot, crossed the LOD on time, initiating 

the offensive. The regiment attacked along Route 9, removing mines and obstacles from the road and repairing bridges, culverts, and bypasses. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, was 

assigned to secure the high ground north and west of Route 

9 and LZ Stud and provide security for the engineers.

By 1300, the weather cleared, allowing the 1st Air Cavalry’s 3d Brigade to conduct the planned air assaults into landing zones along Route 9 west of the 1st Marines. Despite the 

delay, the brigade secured its landing zones and flew in its 

artillery before nightfall. Throughout the area of operations, 

Ringed By Fire | 77
allied forces made only light contact with the North Vietnamese. In the following days, the operation continued in 

the pattern set on D-day, including the seemingly obligatory bad weather in the mornings, which forced delays in airmobile operations. The North Vietnamese remained elusive.

The Khe Sanh garrison joined the offensive on 4 April 

when the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, sortied against Hill 

471, which was 2,500 meters due south of the airstrip. The 

hill was a key terrain feature because it overlooked the road 

junction and that segment of Route 9 that snaked to the 

southwest. The battalion, minus Company B, moved to the 

LOD at 0230, finally leaving the positions it had defended 

for 73 days. Hospital Corpsman Third Class William Gressner recalled, “I felt naked when we left the holes and trenches behind and moved to the battalion’s first objective.” At 

0600, the battalion attacked along the fog-shrouded Che 

Rien Ridge toward Hill 471, which lay two kilometers to 

the southeast. Following a lengthy artillery and air preparation, Company A assaulted the hill at 1500. The defenders, a 

reinforced platoon of the 8th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment, 

put up a spirited fight, but Company A soon overwhelmed 

them, securing the hill at 1600. The attack cost the battalion 10 dead and 56 wounded. The enemy left 16 dead on the 

objective.

The North Vietnamese were not content to give up Hill 

471 that easily. Shortly after the Marines overran the hill, 

enemy rocket fire began and by midnight, 192 rounds had 

fallen. At 0430 the next morning, the 7th Battalion of the 

66th NVA Regiment assaulted Captain Ralph H. Flagler’s 

Company C on the eastern half of the hill. Company A, 

Department of Defense

78 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
located on the western side, was masked by the crest of the 

hill and could not fire in support. North Vietnamese infantry swarmed up the slope firing rifles, submachine guns, and 

RPGs, while heavy machine guns pounded Company C’s 

positions. The enemy advanced to within 20 meters of the 

Marine fighting holes, but Flaglers’s men stood fast, with the 

help of almost 1,000 rounds of artillery fire from the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. By 0630, the enemy attack was spent 

and the North Vietnamese withdrew. At a cost of 1 Marine 

killed and 28 wounded, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, killed 

more than 140 North Vietnamese and captured 5 prisoners.

Other units of the garrison went on the offensive as well. 

On 6 April, Captain Lee R. Overstreet’s Company G, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, attacked the ridge that extended from 

Hill 861 toward the base. Just as the company reached the 

crest of the ridge, North Vietnamese opened fire from camouflaged, mutually supporting bunkers cutting down several Marines at point-blank range. Unable to advance into the 

heavy and accurate enemy fire, Company G suffered additional casualties as Marines tried to recover the fallen men 

nearest to the enemy positions. Captain Overstreet called 

for artillery and air support, but the number of aircraft available was limited and the artillery frequently entered a “check 

fire” status to allow for the safe passage of planes supporting 

other units. Because of these fire-support coordination problems, the Marines could not overcome the stiff resistance atop 

the ridge. With six Marines missing in action (later found 

dead) but presumed dead within the enemy perimeter, Captain Overstreet ordered Company G to withdraw to Hill 558 

at nightfall “as a result of regimental policy to recall units to 

Defense Department A801090 

1st Battalion, 9th Marines, west of Khe Sanh.

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the defensive positions for the night.” In addition to the 6 

MIAs, Company G had 4 Marines killed and 47 wounded 

and claimed 48 NVA died in the fight.

Elsewhere in the area, many major events took place on 

6 April. The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, attacked out of the 

combat base to the south, sending Company D against the 

NVA bunker complex where 25 missing members of Company B had last been seen. Company D recovered the remains 

of 21 Americans. As the 1st Air Cavalry Division’s 3d Brigade 

worked to clear Route 9 in the area west of the 1st Marines, 

they encountered a strong NVA blocking position and fought 

a daylong battle that ended when the enemy fled, leaving 83 

dead. At noon, the men of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 

became the first defenders of Khe Sanh relieved in Operation 

Pegasus when the Army’s 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, landed 

at Hill 471 and assumed responsibility for its defense. The 

1st Battalion, 9th Marines, immediately attacked westward 

toward Hill 689. As a climax to the many events of the day, 

the ARVN 84th Company, 8th Airborne Battalion, landed by 

helicopter at Khe Sanh Combat Base and linked up with the 

37th Ranger Battalion. 

The momentum of the offensive continued unabated on 7 

April. The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, returned to the scene 

of the previous day’s ambush, this time with two companies, and cleared the ridge of the enemy, killing more than 

30. The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, continued the westward 

advance it had begun the previous afternoon, capturing Hill 

552 with no enemy resistance. Near Khe Sanh village, the 

2d Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division captured the old 

French fort after a three-day battle against an NVA battalion. Along Route 9, the 1st Marines conducted a few airmobile operations of its own, as the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, 

and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, searched the vicinity of the 

highway for signs of enemy activity that might threaten the 

Defense Department

80 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
11th Engineer Battalion’s road repair project. The 3d Brigade 

of the cavalry division pressed on along Route 9, still west of 

the 1st Marines.

Enemy resistance began crumbling even further as the 

allied force maintained pressure. Units reported finding many 

abandoned weapons and large numbers of North Vietnamese 

bodies and mass graves as enemy units withdrew toward Laos. 

Major General Tolson reported, “It became increasingly evident, through lack of contact and the large quantities of new 

equipment being found abandoned on the battlefield, that the 

enemy had fled the area rather than face certain defeat.” Some 

organized resistance remained, however, as the Communist 

forces continued to conduct limited objective ground attacks 

and probes in the areas.

The much-awaited linkup of U.S. forces at the Khe Sanh 

Combat Base proper occurred at 0800 on 8 April, when the 

Army’s 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, entered the base along the 

coffee plantation road. First Lieutenant Joseph Abodeely, 

Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, said, “We all knew 

this was a big deal. . . . My platoon was the first platoon to 

walk into Khe Sanh, and I blew a cavalry charge on a bugle 

[captured from the NVA].” As the 3d Brigade began moving 

in, the 26th Marines prepared to depart the base. But the 

offensive did not slow down, even for this event. West of 

the base, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, advanced on Hill 

689, which had for 11 weeks dominated its position at the 

quarry. The enemy, although unseen, made their presence felt 

through steady and accurate mortar fire that killed 9 Marines 

and wounded 27 during the battalion’s advance.

On 11 April, the engineers declared Route 9 open to 

vehicular traffic. The engineers had replaced nine bridges, constructed 17 bypasses, and repaired 14 kilometers of road. It 

was the first time the road was passable from Ca Lu to Khe 

Sanh since September 1967. The same day, the 1st Air Cavalry’s 1st Brigade left for operations in the A Shau Valley. The 

37th Ranger Battalion left soon afterward.

Colonel Bruce F. Meyers was aboard the USS Iwo Jima

(LPH 2) when he received a call from Major General Tompkins over the scrambler radio. “The general asked did I ‘want 

a regiment’,” Meyers said. “I replied, ‘Hell yes, General!’ We 

arranged for me to turn over command of my landing force 

[Special Landing Force Alpha] in the morning, and by 1100, 

I was dodging the 12.7mm anti-aircraft in the early-morning 

Khe Sanh fog aboard the first chopper I could get.” The 

change of command was held the next morning, 12 April. 

“Dave [Lownds] took off by chopper for what later proved to 

be a trip to the White House to receive the Navy Cross and 

the 26th Marines’ Presidential Unit Citation.”

On 14 April, Colonel Meyers, the new commanding officer of the 26th Marines, ordered the 3d Battalion, 

26th Marines, to attack Hill 881 North. With the order to 

take the hill, Lieutenant Colonel John C. Studt, who had 

assumed command of the battalion the previous month, laid 

on a full menu of fire support. In addition to the howitzers 

and guns emplaced at the main base and Ca Lu, the battalion 

also had the support of the three 105mm howitzers on Hill 

881 South and its own 106mm recoilless rifles.

Shortly after midnight, all four companies of the battalion, accompanied by two scout dog teams, moved along 

routes previously secured by patrols into assault positions in 

the saddle between Hills 881 South and North. One platoon 

of Company I with Headquarters and Service Company was 

left on Hill 881 South. Captain William Dabney, who had 

been selected for major, was placed in command of the Provisional Weapons Company and rear security. 

Throughout the night, Marine artillery and mortar shells 

crashed into Hill 881 North, destroying the enemy’s bunkers 

and trenches, as the 3d Battalion waited for daybreak and the 

order to mount the final attack. Finally, shortly after dawn 

at about 0530, the artillery began final preparation fires as 

the battalion attacked with three companies abreast and the 

command group and one company in reserve close behind. 

Surging forward through an eerie and barren landscape of 

charred limbless trees and huge bomb craters, the battalion 

rolled up the enemy’s defenses on the southern slope of the 

hill. As the Marine lead elements approached a tree line in 

their “uphill assault . . . the 106’s [on Hill 881 South] literally blew the tree line away,” Colonel Meyers recalled. Finally, with the crest of Hill 881 North before it, the battalion 

called for a massive 2,000-round artillery barrage. When it 

was over, Company K attacked along the right flank. Captain Paul L. Snead’s men rushed through the smoking debris, 

rooting out the defenders from the ruins of bunkers and 

trenches. 

At 1428, Company K raised a U.S. flag, which a squad 

leader had brought along, marking Hill 881 North as friendly 

Ringed By Fire | 81
CITATION: 

For extraordinary heroism in action against North Vietnamese Army forces during the battle for Khe Sanh in the Republic of Vietnam from 20 January to 1 April 1968. Throughout 

this period, the 26th Marines (Reinforced) was assigned the 

mission of holding the vital Khe Sanh Combat Base and positions on Hills 881, 861-A, 558 and 950, which dominated 

strategic enemy approach routes into Northern I Corps. The 

26th Marines was opposed by numerically superior forces—

two North Vietnamese Army divisions, strongly reinforced 

with artillery, tank, anti-aircraft artillery and rocket units. The 

enemy, deployed to take advantage of short lines of communications, rugged mountainous terrain, jungle, and adverse 

weather conditions, was determined to destroy the Khe Sanh 

Combat Base in conjunction with large scale offensive operations in the two northern provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. The 26th Marines, occupying a small but critical area, 

was daily subjected to hundreds of rounds of intensive artillery, 

mortar and rocket fire. In addition, fierce ground attacks were 

conducted by the enemy in an effort to penetrate the friendly positions. Despite overwhelming odds, the 26th Marines 

remained resolute and determined, maintaining the integrity of its positions and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. 

When monsoon weather greatly reduced air support and compounded the problems of aerial resupply, the men of the 26th 

Marines stood defiantly firm, sustained by their own professional esprit and high sense of duty. Through their indomitable will, staunch endurance, and resolute courage, the 26th 

Marines and supporting units held the Khe Sanh Combat 

Base. The actions of the 26th Marines contributed substantially to the failure of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army 

winter/spring offensive. The enemy forces were denied the 

military and psychological victory they so desperately sought. 

By their gallant fighting spirit and their countless individual acts of heroism, the men of the 26th Marines (Reinforced) 

established a record of illustrious courage and determination 

in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps 

and the United States Naval Service.

Presidential Unit Citation

Defense Department 

President Lyndon B. Johnson attaches the Presidential 

Unit Citation Streamer to the colors of the 26th Marine 

Regiment in ceremonies, 23 May 1968, at the White 

House. Holding the unit’s colors is Sergeant Major 

Agrippa W. Smith, sergeant major of the 1st Battalion, 

9th Marines, who remained as top enlisted man the longest period of time at Khe Sanh, while Colonel David E. 

Lownds, commanding officer of the 26th Marine Regiment during the defense of Khe Sanh, looks on. The unit 

was cited for its outstanding performance during the 

seven week siege by North Vietnamese Forces.

82 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

The President of the United States takes great pride in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

TWENTY-SIXTH MARINES (REINFORCED),

THIRD MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

For service set forth in the following:
territory. The 3d Battalion lost 6 dead and 21 wounded. The 

Marines took two prisoners from the 8th Battalion, 29th Regiment, 325th Division, and killed more than 100 of the North 

Vietnamese troops. With the enemy driven from the hill, the 

battalion began withdrawing to Hill 881 South, their mission accomplished. The attack was the last battle of Operation Pegasus.

At 0800 on 15 April, the 3d Marine Division once again 

assumed responsibility for the Khe Sanh Combat Base and 

Operation Pegasus gave way to Operation Scotland II. The 

1st Air Cavalry Division transferred its command post to 

Camp Evans but left its 2d Brigade under the control of the 

3d Division.* The 1st Marines, to this point still operating 

along Route 9 just west of Ca Lu, moved to Khe Sanh to 

assume responsibility for defense of the combat base. Even 

*Camp Evans was named for LCpl Paul O. Evans, a member of Company L, 

3d Battalion, who was killed during actions in Quang Tri Province in 1967.

Defense Department 

A Marine from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, takes a long look at Khe Sanh airstrip before departing the base.

Ringed By Fire | 83
as the Marines boarded their helicopters, Company K came 

under mortar fire.

As the helicopters landed at the Quang Tri airstrip, the 

3d Marine Division band, playing the Marine Corps Hymn, 

was there to greet the troops. According to the band master, 

“it was the most inspiring performance of his career: chopper 

after chopper disgorging filth covered Marines in tattered 

and torn utilities, some with bandages, many carrying NVA 

souvenirs, but the expressions on their faces as soon as they 

perceived the strains of the Hymn was what moved him.” 

In Operation Pegasus, allied forces accomplished their 

mission of reopening Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh 

at a cost of 92 Americans dead and 667 wounded and 51 

ARVN killed. The North Vietnamese lost more than 1,100 

killed and 13 captured. III MAF units found enemy supply 

caches estimated as “exceeding the basic load for an NVA 

division,” including 3,000 tons of rice, more than 200 crewserved weapons, 12,000 rounds of large caliber ammunition, 

5 wheeled vehicles, and a tank. 

Epilogue

The base continued to receive light, sporadic incoming rocket 

fire for the next two months. In mid-June, a plan was drawn 

up for the closure of the base.

Operation Charlie

On 19 June, Task Force Hotel, the successor to the 26th 

Marines began executing Operation Charlie, the 3d Marine 

Division’s plan for the evacuation and destruction of Khe 

Sanh Combat Base. The plan called for the Marines to withdraw all salvageable supplies and equipment and to destroy 

all fortifications and anything of possible use that they could 

not move. Colonel Marion C. Dalby noted, 

Clearing Khe Sanh was tedious but thorough. Elements of 1st Marines moved methodically across the 

combat base filling trenches, destroying fortified positions, evacuating anything that might be of use to the 

enemy and removing the wreckage of many months 

[of ] heavy fighting. As they moved they leveled the 

entire area with bulldozers, so that on 6 July as the 

1st Marines command group departed the area, it was 

level and smooth . . . only the old runway and taxiways 

remained.

Convoys rolled from Khe Sanh to Ca Lu daily, heavily 

laden with stockpiled supplies, salvaged fortification materials, and previously stranded damaged equipment. Detachments from the 3d and 11th Engineer Battalions and the 3d 

Shore Party Battalion arrived with bulldozers and mechanics to help with the work. Even burned-out vehicle hulks 

and damaged equipment were cut apart into smaller pieces, 

moved to secure areas, and buried to prevent their use in 

enemy propaganda. The same Seabee unit that had toiled to 

repair and upgrade the airstrip months before returned to rip 

up the steel matting runway.

Working parties destroyed more than 800 bunkers and 

4.8 kilometers of concertina wire, throwing the wire into the 

trenches and filling them with soil. They slit open the countless sandbags and emptied them, wrecked standing structures, and burned what remained to the ground. As a final 

step to discourage the North Vietnamese from attempting to 

dig through the ruins for useful material, the Marines sprinkled the area with CS powder, an irritant chemical agent. At 

2000 on 5 July, the Khe Sanh Combat Base, now just a smoldering scar on the land, officially closed.

Twenty years after the battle, when asked to name the 

decision of which he was the most proud, General Westmoreland replied, “The decision to hold Khe Sanh.”

84 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Sources

This commemorative was based on the official U.S. Marine 

Corps publication originally written by Jack Shulimson, 

LtCol Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and Capt David 

A. Dawson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968

(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1997). Additional information came 

from Gregg Jones, Last Stand at Khe Sanh: The U.S. Marines’ 

Finest Hour in Vietnam (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2014); Col 

R. D. Camp with Eric Hammel, Lima-6: A Marine Company 

Commander in Vietnam (New York: Atheneum, 1989); LtCol 

Shawn P. Callahan, Close Air Support and the Battle for Khe 

Sanh (Quantico, VA: History Division, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 2009); Capt Moyers S. Shore II, The Battle for Khe Sanh

(Washington, DC: G-3 Division, Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1969); Sedgwick D. Tourison and Ray 

W. Stubbe, B5-T8 in 48 QXD: The Secret Official History of 

the North Vietnamese Army of the Siege of Khe Sanh, Vietnam, 

Spring, 1968 (Wauwatosa, WI: Ray W. Stubbe, 2006); John 

Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam 

War (New York: Wiley, 1999); and Ronald J. Drez and Douglas Brinkley, Voices of Courage: The Battle for Khe Sanh, Vietnam

(New York: Bulfinch Press, 2005).

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86 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARVN....................................................................................................................................Army of the Republic of Vietnam

ASRT...................................................................................................................................................Air Support Radar Team 

CAP ...............................................................................................................................Combined Action Platoon or Program

CIDG..................................................................................................................................... Civilian Irregular Defense Group

COC ................................................................................................................................................Combat Operations Center 

DASC ...............................................................................................................................................Direct Air Support Center 

DMZ..............................................................................................................................................................demilitarized zone

FAC............................................................................................................................................................... forward air control

FMFPac ............................................................................................................................................Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

FSCC ................................................................................................................................... Fire Support Coordination Center 

GCA..................................................................................................................................................... ground control approach 

GPES.................................................................................................................................. ground proximity extraction system 

H&I ................................................................................................................................................harassment and interdiction

HMM ................................................................................................................................Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron

HST ....................................................................................................................................................Helicopter Support Team

ICTZ........................................................................................................................................................ I Corps Tactical Zone

IFR...........................................................................................................................................................instrument flight rules 

JTAD............................................................................................................................... Joint Technical Advisory Detachment

KIA ......................................................................................................................................................................killed in action

LAAW ..................................................................................................................................................light antiarmor weapons

LAPES.........................................................................................................................low altitude parachute extraction system 

LOD.................................................................................................................................................................. line of departure

LSA............................................................................................................................................................ logistics support area

LZ ...........................................................................................................................................................................landing zone
MAF .................................................................................................................................................Marine Amphibious Force

MAW.......................................................................................................................................................Marine Aircraft Wing

MIKE.............................................................................................................................................................mobile strike force

NCO ....................................................................................................................................................noncommissioned officer

NVA .....................................................................................................................................................North Vietnamese Army

RVN...........................................................................................................................................................Republic of Vietnam

SIGINT .................................................................................................................................................signal intelligence units 

SOG......................................................................................... Special Operations Group or Studies and Observations Group

TACP.................................................................................................................................................Tactical Air Control Party 

USMACV ............................................................................................................U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

VPA........................................................................................................................................................Vietnam People’s Army

WIA...............................................................................................................................................................wounded in action 

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88 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Acknowledgments

I would like to recognize the Marine Corps History Division 

for its assistance with this monograph, particularly Chuck 

Melson and Paul Westermeyer for their advice and constructive comments; Dr. Fred Allison for providing the oral history interviews from History Division’s extensive collection; 

interns Patrick Saint, Igor Neves, and Robert P. Hanger for 

their work with the illustrations and maps; and the Marine 

Corps Heritage Foundation for the research grant it provided 

to support the project. Special recognition, of course, goes to 

the veterans of the battle for their sacrifice and valor at Khe 

Sanh. Semper Fi, particularly the Marines and corpsmen of 

Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines. Special recognition, of course, goes to the veterans of the battle for their 

valor and sacrifice at Khe Sanh, particularly the Marines and 

Corpsman of Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines.

Richard D. Camp Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Dick Camp entered the Marine Corps through the Officer Candidates 

School after attending the State University of New York and graduating with a degree in elementary education. Commissioned as a second 

lieutenant in 1962, he served in a variety of command and staff assignments during a 26-year career, including 13 months as a rifle company 

commander with Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, and aide 

de camp to Major General Raymond G. Davis. Camp retired in 1988 

with the rank of colonel and became a business manager for two school 

districts in Ohio. Retired again in 2005, he became the acting director of Marine Corps History Division. In 2006, Camp became the vice 

president for museum operations at the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. He retired in 2012 to write full time.

He is the author of 15 books, including Assault from the Sky: U.S. 

Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in Vietnam (2013); two novels on 

Vietnam titled Echo Among Warriors: A Novel of Marines in the Vietnam War (2011) and The Killing Ground: A Novel of Marines in the Vietnam War (2013); cowriting Lima-6: A Marine Company 

Commander in Vietnam (1989); and more than 100 articles in various military history magazines. In addition, Camp has been a 

guest lecturer at numerous seminars and professional meetings.

Richard D. Camp Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Photo courtesy of the author

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