NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1


# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 1 , 2013 *

Decided October 7, 2013



### Before

F RANK H. E ASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

A NN C LAIRE W ILLIAMS , Circuit Judge

J OHN D ANIEL T INDER , Circuit Judge

No. 13

- 2053

C LIFTON

- J EREL : J ONES , Plaintiff

- Appellant
,

v

.
S TATE OF I NDIANA , et al

. , Defendant s

- Appellee s

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12

- cv

- 1501

- WTL

- MJD William T. Lawrence
, Judge

.

Order

Clifton

- Jerel: Jones sued the State of Indiana, the Madison Circuit Court, the Mad ison County Sheriff’s Department, and Rodney J. Cummings, the Madison County Pro secutor

— all but one of them organizati ons rather than natural persons. The claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 have problems under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Se rvices , 436 U.S. 658 (1978) , and when dismissing the complaint the district judge noted

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).No. 13

- 2053 Page 2

others, including prosecutorial imm unity, the Eleventh A mendment , and the statute of limitations

.
The events leading to this suit began in 1999, when in a paternity action the court found Jones to be the child’s father and ordered him to pay child support. His failure to obey this order led to two prosecutions for contempt of court, one in 2008 and another in 2012; each time the court ordered Jones imprisoned. Another conviction in 2008 led to a term of imprisonment for the crime of driving with a suspended license . Jones co ntends that durin g that imprisonment offic ers of the Sheriff’s Department “violently” prevented him from praying.

In this suit Jones contends t hat the 1999 order violated his constitutional rights. His reasons are difficult to understand but need not be explored . To the extent that he co ntests the merits of that order, the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine establishes that federal district courts lack subject

- matter jurisdiction. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Fel dman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co ., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). To the extent that he attacks the prosecution and judgments imprisoning him for contempt, rather than the child

- support orders themselves, damages or collateral review could in princ iple be available

— though the fact that Jon es is not currently in custody would prevent resort to 28 U.S.C. §2254.

According to Jones, prosecutor Cummings obstructed justice and committed other misconduct when instituting and pursuing the contempt charges. Any request for da mages from the prosecuto r on account of the acts about which Jones complains is blocked by prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409 (1976) . And a request for damages from the organizational defendants, which do not enjoy personal immun ities, is blocked not onl y by Monell (which holds that organizations cannot be held vica riously liable for misconduct by their employees) but also by the principle that states and state agencies are not “persons” for the purpose of §1983 and equivalent statutes. See Will v. Michig an Department of State Police , 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

A local entity, such as the Sheriff’s Department, is a “person,” but the only relevant acts by employee s of the Sheriff’s Department occurred more than two years before suit and therefore would have been b arred by the statute of limitations, even if Jones had sued the persons who he asserts di srupted his prayer

— which he did not. The Sheriff’s
D epartment prevails under Monell independent of any limitations defense. But we also agree with the district court t hat the suit is untimely with respect to the Sheriff’s D epartment. Jones describes himself as too incompetent to have sued within the allowed
time , but this self

- serving declaration does not authorize equitable tolling. See Behavioral Institute of Indiana, LLC v. Hobart City , 406 F.3d 926, 932 (7th Cir. 2005); Hoosier Ban corp v.No. 13

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Rasmussen , 90 F.3d 180, 182

– 83 (7th Cir. 1996). He has not been adjudicated as incomp etent. He depicts himself as suffering travails, but personal difficulties differ from legal incompetence.

To the extent Jones seeks relief under Indiana law, he is in the wrong court. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution prevents federal courts from awarding relief, under state law, against states and their agencies. See Pennhurst State Sch ool & Hospital v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89 , 103

– 23 (1984)

.
Jones’s other arguments have been considered but do not require discussion.

A FFIRMED