September 2003

FEMA 386-7

Version 2.0

STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING

how-to guide

Version 2.0 September 2003

foreword

introduction

PHASE ONE organize resources

PHASE TWO assess risks

PHASE THREE develop a mitigation plan

PHASE FOUR implement the plan and monitor progress

afterword

appendix a acronyms

appendix b glossary

appendix c library

appendix d worksheets

i

v

1-1

2-1

3-1

4-1

a-1

b-1

c-1

d-1

Contents

4

3

2

1
STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

the

hazard

mitigation

planning

process

Hazard mitigation planning is the process of determining how to reduce or

eliminate the loss of life and property

damage resulting from natural and

manmade hazards. This diagram

shows the four basic phases of the

hazard mitigation process.

For illustration purposes, this diagram

portrays a process that appears to proceed sequentially. However, the mitigation planning process is rarely linear. It is not unusual that ideas

developed while assessing risks

should need revision and additional information while developing the mitigation plan, or that implementing the plan

may result in new goals or additional

risk assessment.

foreword
i Version 2.0 September 2003

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has

developed this series of mitigation planning “how-to” guides to

assist states, communities, and tribes in enhancing their hazard

mitigation planning capabilities.

These guides are designed to provide the type of information state

and local governments need to initiate and maintain a planning

process that will result in safer communities. These guides are

applicable to states and communities of various sizes and varying

ranges of financial and technical resources.

This how-to series is not intended to be the last word on any of the

subject matter covered; rather, it is meant to provide clear guidance for the field practitioner. In practice, these guides may be

supplemented with more extensive technical resources and the use

of experts when necessary.

The series consists of four guides covering the core aspects of the

planning process, and additional guides addressing special topics

in hazard mitigation. The “core four” guides cover:

 Getting started with the mitigation planning process,

including important considerations for how you can

organize your efforts to develop an effective mitigation

plan (FEMA 386-1);

 Identifying hazards and assessing losses to your community or state (FEMA 386-2);

 Setting mitigation priorities and goals for your community or state and writing the plan (FEMA 386-3); and

 Implementing the mitigation plan, including project

funding and maintaining a dynamic plan that changes

to meet new developments (FEMA 386-4).

Special topics covered include:

 Evaluating potential mitigation actions through the use

of benefit-cost analysis and other techniques (FEMA

386-5);

foreword

mit-i-gate\ 1: to cause to become less harsh or hostile;

2: to make less severe or

painful

plan-ning\ : the act or process of making or carrying out plans; specif: the establishment of goals, policies and procedures for a social or economic unit
ii STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

 Incorporating special considerations into hazard mitigation planning for historic properties and cultural

resources (FEMA 386-6);

 Incorporating mitigation considerations for manmade

hazards into hazard mitigation planning, the topic of

this how-to guide (FEMA 386-7);

 Using multi-jurisdictional approaches to mitigation

planning (FEMA 386-8); and

 Finding and securing technical and financial resources

for mitigation planning (FEMA 386-9).

Why should you take the time to read

these guides?

 It simply costs too much to address the effects of disasters only after they happen;

 State and federal aid is usually insufficient to cover the

full extent of physical and economic damages resulting

from disasters;

 You can prevent a surprising amount of disaster damage

if you understand where and how these phenomena

occur;

 You can lessen the impact of both natural and technological hazards and speed the response and recovery

process; and

 The most meaningful steps in avoiding the impacts of

hazards are taken at the state and local levels by officials

and community members who have a personal stake in

the outcome and/or the ability to follow through on a

sustained program of planning and implementation.

The guides focus on showing how mitigation planning:

 Can help your community become more sustainable and

disaster-resistant through selecting the most appropriate

mitigation actions, based on the knowledge you gain in

the hazard identification and risk assessment process;

 Allows you to focus your efforts on the hazard areas most

important to you by determining and setting priorities for

mitigation planning efforts; and
foreword

iii Version 2.0 September 2003

This special-topic

guide, Integrating

Manmade Hazards

Into Mitigation Planning, is not designed to

help you establish procedures to respond to disasters, write an emergency

operations plan, or create a counterterrorism program for your community;

rather, it assumes that your community

is engaged in the mitigation planning

process and serves as a resource to

help you expand the scope of your plan

to address terrorism and technological

hazards. It provides information to

supplement your community’s hazard

mitigation planning efforts. Because

each of the four mitigation planning

phases is covered comprehensively in

its own how-to guide, references to other

publications in the series are often used

in lieu of full explanations of a process

or activity. Furthermore, the guide is intended not as a highly technical manual

but rather as a source of general guidance for the broad audiences that are

likely to comprise state and local mitigation planning teams, including participants from government agencies, community interest groups, industrial

partners, and others.

 Can save you money by providing a forum for engaging in

partnerships that could provide technical, financial,

and/or staff resources in your effort to reduce the

effects, and hence the costs, of natural and manmade

hazards.

These guides provide a range of approaches to preparing a hazard

mitigation plan. There is no one right planning process. However,

there are several elements that are common to all successful

planning endeavors, such as engaging citizens, developing goals

and objectives, and monitoring progress. Select the approach that

works best in your state or community.
introduction
Version 2.0 September 2003 v

introduction

Manmade Hazards

For the purpose of this guide, “manmade hazards”

are technological hazards and terrorism. These

are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that

they originate from human activity. In contrast, while the risks

presented by natural hazards may be increased or decreased

as a result of human activity, they are not inherently humaninduced.

The term “technological hazards” refers to the origins of

incidents that can arise from human activities such as the

manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous

materials. For the sake of simplicity, this guide assumes that

technological emergencies are accidental and that their consequences are unintended.

The term “terrorism” refers to intentional, criminal, malicious

acts. There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism, and it can be interpreted in many ways. Officially, terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “...the

Disasters are events that can cause loss of life and property,

environmental damage, and disruption of governmental,

social, and economic activities. They occur when hazards impact

human settlements and the built environment. Throughout the

Cold War, the focus of emergency management planning was on

responding to and recovering from nuclear attack by foreign

enemies. During the 1990s, this emphasis shifted to address natural

disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods.

Yet again, the need to incorporate new threats into emergency

management planning—this time, manmade hazards such as

terrorism and technological disasters—has become all too apparent, as demonstrated by the September 11, 2001 attacks on New

York City and Washington, DC and the July 2001 hazardous material train derailment and fire in Baltimore, Maryland. Additionally,

the 2001 anthrax attacks, the 1996 bombing at the summer Olympics in Atlanta, the 1995 destruction of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and

scores of smaller-scale incidents and accidents reinforce the need

for communities to reduce their vulnerability to future terrorist

acts and technological disasters.

unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (28 CFR, Section 0.85). The Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) further characterizes terrorism as either

domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and

objectives of the terrorist organization; however, the origin of

the terrorist or person causing the hazard is far less relevant

to mitigation planning than the hazard itself and its consequences.

For the purposes of this guide, “terrorism” refers to the use of

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including biological,

chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons; arson, incendiary, explosive, and armed attacks; industrial sabotage and

intentional hazardous materials releases; and “cyberterrorism.” Within these general categories, however, there

are many variations. Particularly in the area of biological and

chemical weapons, there are a wide variety of agents and

ways for them to be disseminated.
vi STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Although this series of mitigation planning how-to guides—as well

as mitigation planning mandates such as the Disaster Mitigation

Act of 2000 (DMA 2000)—grew out of a focus on planning for

natural hazards, recent events suggest that an all-hazard mitigation

plan should also address hazards generated by human activities

such as terrorism and hazardous material accidents. While the

term “mitigation” refers generally to activities that reduce loss of

life and property by eliminating or reducing the effects of disasters,

in the terrorism context it is often interpreted to include a wide

variety of preparedness and response actions. For the purposes of

this how-to guide, the traditional meaning will be assumed; that is,

“mitigation” refers to specific actions that can be taken to reduce

loss of life and property from manmade hazards by modifying the

built environment to reduce the risk and potential consequences

of these hazards.

To better structure the way in which we manage disasters, the

concept of the “four phases of emergency management” was

introduced in the early 1980s after the similarities between natural

disaster preparedness and civil defense became clear. This approach can be applied to all disasters.

 Mitigation is defined as any sustained action taken to

reduce or eliminate long-term risk to life and property

from a hazard event. Mitigation, also known as prevention (when done before a disaster), encourages longterm reduction of hazard vulnerability. The goal of

mitigation is to decrease the need for response as

opposed to simply increasing the response capability.

Mitigation can save lives and reduce property damage,

and should be cost-effective and environmentally sound.

This, in turn, can reduce the enormous cost of disasters

to property owners and all levels of government. In

addition, mitigation can protect critical community

facilities, reduce exposure to liability, and minimize

community disruption.

 Preparedness includes plans and preparations made to

save lives and property and to facilitate response operations.

 Response includes actions taken to provide emergency

assistance, save lives, minimize property damage, and

speed recovery immediately following a disaster.

 Recovery includes actions taken to return to a normal or

improved operating condition following a disaster.
introduction

vii Version 2.0 September 2003

FEMA developed the Integrated Emergency Management System

(IEMS) using an all-hazards approach. While the IEMS was established as an “all-hazard” approach, responding to the threat of

terrorism (referred to as counterterrorism) came to be viewed as the

responsibility of law enforcement, defense, and intelligence

agencies. Furthermore, defensive efforts to protect people and

facilities from terrorism (referred to as antiterrorism) were generally limited to the government sector, the military, and some

industrial interests. However, both technological disasters and

incidents of domestic and international terrorism on United States

soil during the past decade have made it clear that emergency

managers, first responders, and planners must now work together

to build better and safer communities in the 21st century.

While you may not be able to prevent every accident or deliberate

attack, it is well within your ability to reduce the likelihood and/or

the potential effects of an incident through mitigation. The process of mitigating hazards before they become disasters is similar

for both natural and manmade hazards. Whether you are dealing

with natural disasters, threats of terrorism, or hazardous materials

accidents, you will use a process of 1) identifying and organizing

your resources; 2) conducting a risk or threat assessment and

estimating potential losses; 3) identifying mitigation actions that

will reduce the effects of the hazards and creating a strategy to

place them in priority order; and 4) implementing the actions,

evaluating the results, and keeping the plan up-to-date. This fourphase process is known as mitigation planning.

In one form or another, planning is an element of almost everything that individuals, institutions, corporations, and governments

do. Planning helps to coordinate actions, determine the order in

which goals are accomplished, leverage opportunities, and identify

priorities for allocating resources. Hazard mitigation planning is

the integration of these activities into a community’s emergency

management programs in order to reduce or eliminate losses of

life and property due to disasters.

The terms counterterrorism

and antiterrorism are often used

interchangeably. When using these

terms, you should be careful to distinguish their meaning. Counterterrorism

deals with offensively managing the threat of terrorism,

while antiterrorism refers to

defensive efforts to protect

people and property.

Hazard Mitigation Planning

The hazard mitigation planning process

consists of four basic phases as shown

below. The first phase, Organize Resources, addresses the creation of a

planning team with representatives from

the public and private sectors, citizen

groups, higher education institutions,

and non-profits. The second phase, Assess Risks, explains identifying hazards

and assessing losses. The third and

fourth phases, Develop a Mitigation Plan

and Implement the Plan and Monitor

Progress, discuss establishing goals

and priorities and selecting mitigation

projects, and writing, implementing, and

revisiting the mitigation plan, respectively.
viii STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

How do you use this and the other howto guides?

Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning, the seventh

guide in the how-to series, provides information that will help you

incorporate manmade hazards into the four phases of the mitigation planning process in your community or state, from organizing

your resources to updating your plan. This how-to guide follows

the four-phase mitigation process. Each section corresponds to one

of the phases.

The planning process is as individual as the jurisdiction that

engages in it. Each community or state approaches growth and

change in a unique way, and the process of planning for the future

should fit your particular community’s or state’s “personality.” As a

result, you should not consider the step-by-step sequence included

in this and other how-to guides to be the only way to pursue mitigation planning. However, the process illustrated here is based on

certain steps common to successful planning.

Types of Information Found in the How-to Series

The how-to series contains several types of information. Some

information is highlighted with icons. Additional information can

be found in Appendix C, Library.

Icons

The “States” icon identifies guidance focused solely on the role of

the state. Although much of the information will be the same for

local, tribal, and state governments, there are different requirements for state and local mitigation plans. Furthermore, states

have additional responsibilities to assist local entities in their

planning efforts. Guidance focusing on local governments applies

to tribes as well.

The “Caution” icon alerts you to important information and ways

to avoid sticky situations later in the planning process.

The “DMA” icon provides information relating to the mitigation

planning requirements outlined in the Disaster Mitigation Act of

2000 (DMA 2000) regulations.
introduction

Version 2.0 September 2003 ix

The “Glossary” icon identifies terms and concepts for which a

detailed explanation is provided in Appendix B, Glossary.

The “Tips” icon identifies helpful hints and useful information

that can be used in the planning process.

Library

A mitigation planning “Library” has been included in Appendix C.

The library has a wealth of information, including Web addresses,

reference sources, and other information. All of the Web sites and

references listed in the how-to guide are included in the library.

Worksheets

Finally, to help track your progress, worksheets have been developed to correspond with the activities in this guide. These are

included at the end of each section, where applicable, and in

Appendix D, Worksheets. You can duplicate these forms and use

them to organize your work as you implement the mitigation

planning process.
phase 1 phase 1
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organize

resources

Overview

Phase 1, Organize Resources, involves getting started in the

hazard mitigation planning process by identifying and pulling

together resources such as funding, staff, and political support.

These resources will be necessary both to get the process off the

ground and to achieve maximum effectiveness in the long term.

This section supplements the guidance provided in the Getting

Started: Building Support for Mitigation Planning how-to guide (FEMA

386-1). Step 1 involves establishing community support for integrating manmade hazards into the mitigation planning process.

Step 2 includes developing a list of stakeholders with expertise in

hazardous materials, security issues, and law enforcement, among

other disciplines, that you may want to add to your planning team.

Step 3 discusses special considerations relevant to public participation activities.

Step 1

Assess Community Support

To be successful, a mitigation planning initiative requires the

support of public officials, agency personnel, business owners and

operators, citizens, and other community members. Getting Started

discusses defining the planning area; gauging how much the

community knows about mitigation planning; educating public

officials on the hazards and risks in your community; using existing

plans as a base from which to start; and organizing funding, technical, and human resources.

Inform the Public

One of the fundamental differences in planning for manmade

disasters versus natural disasters is that most people have had little

or no firsthand exposure to them. Even in light of the alarming

increase in terrorist activity directed against the United States, the

aging infrastructure, the persistence of security shortfalls in some

sectors, and the proximity of industrial hazards to population

centers, the public’s perception of risk varies widely. This percep-
1-2 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

tion is influenced by many factors, such as media portrayal of

events, the level of public education available, and an individual’s

experience with various hazards. Because the United States has a

relatively short history of dealing with manmade hazards, discussions on this subject may be characterized by elements of uncertainty and even fear. Therefore, to gain public support, it is important to educate public officials, citizens, and the private sector

about the manmade hazards that may affect the community and

about the prevention and mitigation actions that can help address

them. The planning team must present a realistic assessment of the

potential consequences of such disasters while taking care to avoid

overstating or inflating the risk.

Promote the Benefits of Mitigation Planning

You can further educate people and build support by emphasizing

the value added by mitigation planning and building on planning

opportunities that already exist. Although manmade hazards may

not be as easy to identify and predict as some natural hazards, the

benefits of planning for such events are the same: improved

disaster resistance, community involvement in the process, partnerships with sectors you may not have interacted with before, and

more sustainable communities. Building on existing opportunities

is a good way to create momentum for mitigation planning.

Many people are concerned about manmade hazards since the

attacks of 2001, and the media have focused intensely on these

disasters. You can use this high visibility to show why your community should plan for such contingencies. Getting Started examines

ways to implement natural hazard mitigation planning through

existing plans; now you can reexamine those plans with a focus on

how to integrate planning for manmade disasters into them.

You may want to point out the following benefits as you educate

others:

1. Mitigation helps local, tribal, and state governments

fulfill their responsibility to protect their citizens,

property, and environment by reducing the potential

impacts of manmade disasters.

2. Mitigation can enhance a community’s ability to recover

from the impacts of a manmade disaster.

3. Mitigation can reduce exposure to civil or criminal

liability in the event of a terrorist attack or technological

accident.

Summary of the

benefits of mitigation

planning

 Reduces future losses

from disasters

 Builds partnerships

 Facilitates funding priorities

 Contributes to sustainable communities

Planners should

recognizethat addressing manmade hazards may

require that more attention

be paid to dealing with a

range of potentially strong personal responses, and they should be prepared

to address potential concerns that may

not have arisen during natural hazards

planning such as security, unknown

risks, and civil liberties. Thus, it is critical that planners develop a realistic,

comprehensive picture of the hazards

present in their communities to better

educate the public and be prepared to

respond to their concerns.

Depending on the nature of

the incident, the impacts of a

manmade hazard can be localized—

even limited to a single building—or they

can be widespread, encompassing a

metropolitan area, a watershed, or a

transportation corridor. Additionally, the

extent of the physical damages generated by an incident can be surpassed

by its associated economic

impacts, as demonstrated

by the national-level economic effects of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Version 2.0 September 2003 1-3

organize resources 1

4. Mitigation actions may help reduce insurance premiums.

Capitalize on Planning Opportunities

As mentioned previously, manmade hazards can be integrated into

existing planning efforts. The following opportunities should be

considered:

1. Planning during post-disaster recovery. Following the

September 2001 attacks, the increased risk of manmade

hazards became a topic of conversation in the mainstream media and across the nation. This widespread

interest can serve as an impetus to enhance a mitigation

plan with actions that can reduce the effects of future

attacks.

At the time of this

writing, the long-term

consequences of the insurance industry’s response to

the events of September 11,

2001 are not clear. To date, the industry

is having difficulty estimating the frequency and magnitude of future terrorism risks and is concerned about ensuring adequate capital to absorb the

potential costs of another catastrophic

attack. As a result, many insurers are

establishing coverage limitations and

raising premiums and deductibles for

commercial customers. Risk is being

shifted from insurers to property owners and business operators, and future

attacks may lead to greater direct losses

to those impacted—further emphasizing the importance of taking actions to

reduce vulnerability and minimize

losses.

(Source: General Accounting Office,

Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured

Exposure to Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities)

The results of the Institute for Business & Home

Safety’s 2001 study Are We

Planning Safer Communities? Results of a National

Survey of Community Planners and

Natural Disasters show that the safest

communities are located in states where

hazards are a required consideration in

comprehensive planning. In many states,

however, this “best practice” is not followed. Ideally, hazard considerations are

an integral part of state and local comprehensive planning; if they are not, state

and local governments should consider

requiring that comprehensive planning

include all-hazard considerations.

Planners are encouraged to link together as many planning opportunities as possible to maximize coordination, thoroughness, information sharing, and cost-effectiveness. Relevant planning

actions may be ongoing or may already have been accomplished in

your jurisdiction as part of other emergency management planning

initiatives. For example, some jurisdictions completed a community vulnerability

assessment as part of the Department of Justice’s State Domestic Preparedness Support Program (equipment grant program – now within DHS); this information is directly transferable from first responder planning to mitigation planning.

The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 provides an impetus for state and local governments to undertake mitigation planning.

The Act does not mandate that terrorism or technological disasters

be addressed in hazard mitigation planning; however, it does encourage and reward state and local pre-disaster planning and promote

sustainability as a strategy for reducing the effects of disasters. Naturally, this

objective can only be fully achieved through incorporating not only natural hazards but also the full spectrum of manmade disasters. Interim final regulations on

hazard mitigation planning were published in the Federal Register on February

26, 2002 (see 44 CFR Parts 201 and 206).

2. Comprehensive and other community-oriented planning

activities. If your community has begun developing or

updating its comprehensive plan, capital improvement

plan, urban design guidelines, land development

regulations, growth management or sustainability plans,

or other community-oriented guidance, this is a prime

opportunity to incorporate planning for manmade

disasters. For example, if your community is planning to

build a new city hall or hospital, you can incorporate

defensive architecture, site planning, and design approaches into the facility planning process to reduce the

hazards to the facility from manmade events.
1-4 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

3. Update of existing mitigation plans or other emergency

management plans. In order to keep plans up-to-date,

state and local governments must perform periodic

reviews of existing plans. During these reviews, planners

should re-evaluate the hazards that can affect their

communities and update their plans as appropriate to

incorporate manmade hazards.

Step 2

Build the Planning Team

Assuming you have already set up your planning team, expanding

its scope to incorporate terrorism and technological disasters will

require enhancing the team’s capabilities by acquiring expertise in

a number of disciplines. To ensure that the composition of the

mitigation planning team contains the right mix of members, the

capabilities of the existing team should be assessed and any gaps

filled. To prevent the team from becoming so large as to be unwieldy, a committee/subcommittee approach may be implemented. You may wish to use the categories listed below to define

the various subgroup areas of the planning team.

A community’s hazard mitigation planners are its

primary resource for leading and coordinating efforts to reduce vulnerabilities in the built environment. In any given community,

however, there may be a variety of other entities operating to the same

end, either in concert with mitigation planning or independently. These

may comprise public, private, or partnered initiatives; they may cut across local,

state, and/or federal jurisdictions; and they may address planning, security, safety,

engineering, and other aspects of hazard reduction. While projects such as these

are often undertaken in a vacuum—that is, without relation to the community as

a whole—their key personnel may possess or have access to expertise and resources that will enhance the ability of the hazard mitigation planning team to

meet the state’s or community’s goals. The importance of thinking inclusively and

holistically when recruiting team members becomes especially clear when planners are confronted with new and generally unfamiliar challenges such as integrating manmade hazards into mitigation planning.

Getting Started: Building Support for Mitigation

Planning (FEMA 386-1) outlines methods for identifying stakeholders for a natural hazard mitigation planning process. Existing

groups, such as natural hazard mitigation planning teams or emergency planning committees, can serve as ideal bases for manmade hazard mitigation efforts. Such teams should have a broad-based membership that includes,

at a minimum, representatives of elected officials, emergency management, first

responder agencies, healthcare, local environmental and transportation groups,

the media, community groups, and representative owners and operators of private facilities.

The size and composition of the planning team will depend

on the community or state,

size of the planning area,

planning needs, and resources available. A team approach is optimal because:

a. It encourages participation and gets

more people invested in the process

b. It enhances the visibility and stature

of the planning process

c. It provides for a broad perspective on

the issues

d. It provides the widest possible range

of expertise and experience

e. It ensures the use of resources in a

coordinated fashion to maximize

benefits
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Expertise that will be helpful in addressing manmade hazards may

be lacking from a purely natural-hazards oriented team. Such

expertise includes the following:

Chemical emergency planning

Counter- and antiterrorism (law enforcement and

military)

Crime prevention planning, including situational crime

prevention and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Electrical engineering

Emergency management

Explosives/blast characteristics

Fire protection engineering

Force protection (protection of military personnel and

facilities)

Industrial security

Mechanical engineering, including heating, ventilation,

and air conditioning (HVAC)

Protective/defensive architecture

Site planning, urban design, and landscape design

Structural engineering, design, and construction

Specialized expertise in these fields can be found at a number of

sources, even in communities with modest resources. Additionally,

technical assistance from the federal government may be available

to communities. Among the many federal organizations offering

relevant support are the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the

Department of Justice (DOJ). See Appendix C for Web links to

these agencies’ programs.

See Worksheet #1: Build the Planning Team at the end of this

section (also included in Appendix D) to help you identify additional team members.

Although situational crime

prevention and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) are

closely related, the two are not synonymous. Situational crime prevention encompasses many CPTED principles but

focuses more on managerial and user behavior factors that affect opportunities

for criminal behavior in the

specific setting for the specific crime(s) being addressed. CPTED, on the other hand,

focuses more on changing the physical

design aspects of environments to deter criminal activity.

The planning team should

work with elected officials to

formalize the community’s commitment

to planning and to promote an atmosphere of cooperation by “authorizing”

the planning team to take the steps necessary to develop a mitigation plan for

terrorism and technological hazards. At

a minimum, this authority can be established through a resolution

or proclamation recognizing

the team as an authorized

agent of the community.
1-6 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Step 3

Engage the Public

Given the dramatic nature of terrorism and technological hazards,

the community will expect to be involved in and informed about

the mitigation planning process. Getting Started discusses developing a schedule or program for involving the public throughout the

mitigation planning process. Adding a manmade hazard element

to your public participation program will simply be another step.

Keep in mind, however, that care must be taken when presenting

certain types of information.

Because citizens may be fearful or upset about recent events and

apprehensive about publicized threats, they may want to engage

public officials in talking about such issues. The planning team

should encourage the public to focus on what they can realistically

do to protect their community and limit the time spent discussing

issues that are outside the scope of their influence. For example,

they may be concerned about travel safety and would like to see

changes in airport security, but federal government agencies

control these issues—not the local planning team. To alleviate

concerns about issues the community has no authority over, the

planning team should be informed enough to provide an overview

of who the various authorities are and what their responsibilities

are for addressing manmade hazards. Including as many stakeholders as possible in the planning process can help turn these concerns into productive considerations and enhance rather than

hinder the process.

There are several stages in the mitigation planning process at

which you can inform the public about your efforts to bring

manmade hazards into your program. These stages are:

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment. The planning team

should inform the community of the complete spectrum of natural

and manmade hazards it identifies and the risks they present,

emphasizing that terrorism and technological disasters can strike

not just in large cities, but in any community of any size. Although

in some cases it will be necessary to limit the kinds of information

shared, it is nevertheless important to provide the community with

a realistic picture of the hazards and risks and to understand what

the community considers to be an acceptable level of risk. It should

be emphasized that while no amount of planning and mitigation

can remove 100% of the risk from terrorism or technological

emergencies, a thorough hazard identification process will help in

Planners should

note that some issues involved with technological

hazards, such as industrial

siting, hazardous materials

transportation, or chemical storage and

processing techniques, may be contentious and can cause friction among citizens, industry leaders, emergency planners, and other decision makers. Local

Emergency Planning Committees

(LEPCs) will likely already be involved

with these issues and should be able to

provide insight into how they can be addressed.
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organize resources 1

prioritizing the community’s needs and allocating its resources

effectively.

Mitigation Strategy Development. When developing a strategy for

the hazard mitigation process, you should hold public meetings or

workshops to discuss mitigation actions. The planning team should

obtain public input into non-sensitive mitigation decisions, especially if the actions will have a long-term effect such as a change in

traffic patterns or an increase in the surveillance of public places.

The community should also have input into how to fund some

mitigation actions, such as through taxes, bonds, loans, or grant

programs. While citizens may be willing to pay for some actions,

they may not be willing to support others.

Implementation and Monitoring of the Mitigation Plan. The

planning team should keep the community informed of the implementation schedule and progress, although once again, it may be

necessary to limit the kinds of information released to the public.

The public should also be notified when the mitigation plan is

reviewed and updated.

Once you have established community support, expanded the

planning team to include manmade hazard experts, and engaged

the public in the planning process, you will be ready to perform a

hazard identification and risk assessment for your jurisdiction.

Phase 2 will guide you through this process.

When addressing

antiterrorism and

other manmade hazard mitigation actions, you should

recognize that many of

these are sensitive and that information

about them should be restricted to a

very limited number of people. You must

carefully consider whether each part of

the process will be open to the public or

whether for security reasons you will

have only the planning team and perhaps a limited number of outside stakeholders (such as key public officials not

on the planning team) discuss the best

actions for certain critical facilities. See

Phase 4 for sensitive information issues

to consider.
1-8 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Specialists for Manmade Hazards

Bomb and Arson Squads

Community Emergency Response Teams

Hazardous Materials Experts

Infrastructure Owners/Operators

National Guard Units

Representatives from facilities identified

in Worksheet #2: Asset Identification

Checklist

Local/Tribal

Administrator/Manager’s Office

Budget/Finance Office

Building Code Enforcement Office

City/County Attorney’s Office

Economic Development Office

Emergency Preparedness Office

Fire and Rescue Department

Hospital Management

Local Emergency Planning Committee

Planning and Zoning Office

Police/Sheriff’s Department

Public Works Department

Sanitation Department

School Board

Transportation Department

Tribal Leaders

Worksheet #1 Build the Planning Team phase 1, step 

Step 2 of Getting Started (FEMA 386-1) discusses establishing a planning team with a broad range of

backgrounds and experience represented. This worksheet suggests additional individuals, agencies, and

organizations that should be included on a team to plan for manmade hazards. State organizations can be

included on local teams when appropriate to serve as a source of information and to provide guidance and

coordination.

You should use the checklist as a starting point for expanding your team.

page 1 of 2

Special Districts and Authorities

Airport and Seaport Authorities

Business Improvement District(s)

Fire Control District

Flood Control District

Redevelopment Agencies

Regional/Metropolitan Planning

Organization(s)

School Districts

Transit/Transportation Agencies

Others

Architectural/Engineering/Planning Firms

Citizen Corps

Colleges/Universities

Land Developers

Major Employers/Businesses

Professional Associations

Retired Professionals

State

Adjutant General’s Office (National Guard)

Board of Education

Building Code Office

Climatologist

Earthquake Program Manager

Economic Development Office

ON

TEAM

ADD TO

TEAM

ON

TEAM

ADD TO

TEAM
Version 2.0 September 2003 1-9

page 2 of 2

Emergency Management Office/

State Hazard Mitigation Officer

Environmental Protection Office

Fire Marshal’s Office

Geologist

Homeland Security Coordinator’s Office

Housing Office

Hurricane Program Manager

Insurance Commissioner’s Office

National Flood Insurance

Program Coordinator

Natural Resources Office

Planning Agencies

Police

Public Health Office

Public Information Office

Tourism Department

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

American Red Cross

Chamber of Commerce

Community/Faith-Based Organizations

Environmental Organizations

Homeowners Associations

Neighborhood Organizations

Private Development Agencies

Utility Companies

Other Appropriate NGOs

ON

TEAM

ADD TO

TEAM

ON

TEAM

ADD TO

TEAM
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assess

risks

Overview

Phase 2 of the mitigation planning process, Assess Risks,

involves identifying hazards and estimating potential losses.

The results of these efforts will later be linked to estimates of the

effectiveness of the mitigation projects you may be considering.

There are some unique aspects to hazard characteristics, asset

identification, and vulnerability assessment that will affect the way

a risk assessment for terrorism and technological hazards is carried

out. This how-to guide addresses these special considerations;

please refer to Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and

Estimating Losses (FEMA 386-2) for information on the more general aspects of the risk assessment process.

Step 1

Identify Hazards

The first step in any risk assessment is to identify the hazards that

affect your community or state. Most manmade hazards fall into

two general categories: terrorism (intentional acts) and technological hazards (accidental events). These two categories include the

following hazards:

Terrorism

 Conventional bomb/improvised explosive device

 Biological agent

 Chemical agent

 Nuclear bomb

 Radiological agent

 Arson/incendiary attack

 Armed attack

 Cyberterrorism

 Agriterrorism

 Hazardous material release (intentional)
2-2 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Research Existing

Records, Plans,

and Reports

Terrorist attacks and technological disasters occur infrequently

enough in the United States that there

may be few relevant records that can

help determine what manmade hazards

may affect the area being studied. Both

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

and the U.S. Department of State (DOS)

issue annual reports on terrorist activities domestically and around the world,

and Local Emergency Planning Committees, State Emergency Response

Commissions, and the United States

Environmental Protection Agency are

sources for historical data on hazardous material incidents throughout the

U.S. Also, in many communities, plans

are in place to respond to numerous

types of technological hazards, and

these plans—and the people who develop them—may be valuable sources

of information about human-induced

risks. In researching existing documentation, remember to consider information available from other levels of

government whenever possible.

The following list identifies just a few of

the documents that may be of use to

the planning team:

Existing mitigation plans

Comprehensive plans

Emergency operations plans

Continuity of operations and

other contingency plans

Radiological emergency plans

(nuclear power plants)

Chemical stockpile emergency

plans

SARA Title III / hazardous material facility emergency plans

Toxic Release Inventory Reports

Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy

Technological Hazards

 Industrial accident (fixed facility)

 Industrial accident (transportation)

 Failure of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

(SCADA) system or other critical infrastructure component

Within these various types of incidents, there are many variations,

which illustrates one of the fundamental differences between

natural and manmade hazards. The types, frequencies, and locations of many natural hazards are identifiable and even, in some

cases, predictable. They are governed by the laws of physics and

nature. Malevolence, incompetence, carelessness, and other

behaviors, on the other hand, are functions of the human mind

and, while they can be assumed to exist, they cannot be forecast

with any accuracy. There is, therefore, the potential for most, if not

all, types of manmade hazards to occur anywhere.

Your community or state’s planning team should tap into available

expertise in the areas listed earlier to develop a comprehensive list

of the potential manmade hazards in your jurisdiction. You may

also want to review reports and obtain briefings on the various

plans government agencies and private companies have prepared

in the event of an emergency. These may include radiological

emergency plans, SARA Title III/hazardous material facility emergency plans, and chemical stockpile emergency plans, among

others.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Like terrorism itself, the term “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMD)

has various definitions. Common to all of them is the assumption that

WMDs comprise incendiary, explosive, chemical, biological, radioactive, and/or nuclear agents.

50 U.S.C., § 2302 defines WMD as follows:

“The term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ means any weapon or device that is

intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of

(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;

(B) a disease organism; or

(C) radiation or radioactivity.”

The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) considers a WMD to be “any device, material, or substance used in a manner, in a quantity or type, or under circumstances evidencing an intent to cause death or serious injury to persons or significant damage to

property.”
assess risks 2

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Step 2

Profile Hazard Events

In the area of hazard profiling, there are significant differences

between natural and manmade hazards, particularly those related

to terrorism. Foremost among these is that terrorists have the

ability to choose among targets and tactics, designing their attack

to maximize the chances of achieving their objective. Similarly,

accidents, system failures, and other mishaps are also largely

unforeseeable. This makes it very difficult to identify how and

where these hazards may occur. Notwithstanding the difficulty

involved with predicting the occurrence of manmade disasters, the

various consequences of these disasters are generally familiar to

the sectors of the emergency planning and response community

that already specialize in them: injuries and deaths, contamination

of and/or damage to buildings and systems, and the like. Numerous authoritative sources exist that can provide detailed information on the nature of all of these hazards; however, more important

for the purposes of hazard mitigation than details about the

various agents’ characteristics are the ways in which they can

impact the built environment and what actions can be taken to

reduce or eliminate the resulting damage.

Whether intentional or accidental, manmade disasters—as with

natural disasters—involve the application of one or more modes of

harmful force to the built environment. For the purposes of this

how-to guide, these modes are defined as contamination (as in the

case of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards),

energy (explosives, arson, and even electromagnetic waves), or

failure or denial of service (sabotage, infrastructure breakdown,

and transportation service disruption). The planning team should

include expertise in these areas in order to develop a comprehensive list of the manmade hazards in your jurisdiction and identify

the full spectrum of ways in which they might occur.

One-Stop Shopping Resources for General

Information on Manmade Hazards

http://www.fema.gov/hazards

(FEMA: links to authoritative sources of hazard information)

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/terrorisminfor/ctrt.asp

(FEMA: terrorism-related training and resources)

While these information sources are primarily oriented toward emergency response, they can provide valuable insight to mitigation planners on how manmade

hazards can impact communities.
2-4 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

The following table, Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards, is not intended to replace the expertise and knowledge of planning, security, or design professionals, but rather to

help guide the planning team in understanding some of the ways

in which these hazards can interact with the built environment. For

each type of hazard, the following factors are addressed:

 Application mode describes the human act(s) or unintended event(s) necessary to cause the hazard to occur.

 Duration is the length of time the hazard is present on

the target. For example, the duration of a tornado may

be just minutes, but a chemical warfare agent such as

mustard gas, if unremediated, can persist for days or

weeks under the right conditions.

 The dynamic/static characteristic of a hazard describes its

tendency, or that of its effects, to either expand, contract, or remain confined in time, magnitude, and

space. For example, the physical destruction caused by

an earthquake is generally confined to the place in

which it occurs, and it does not usually get worse unless

there are aftershocks or other cascading failures; in

contrast, a cloud of chlorine gas leaking from a storage

tank can change location by drifting with the wind and

can diminish in danger by dissipating over time.

 Mitigating conditions are characteristics of the target and

its physical environment that can reduce the effects of a

hazard. For example, earthen berms can provide protection from bombs; exposure to sunlight can render some

biological agents ineffective; and effective perimeter

lighting and surveillance can minimize the likelihood of

someone approaching a target unseen. In contrast,

exacerbating conditions are characteristics that can enhance or magnify the effects of a hazard. For example,

depressions or low areas in terrain can trap heavy

vapors, and a proliferation of street furniture (trash

receptacles, newspaper vending machines, mail boxes,

etc.) can provide concealment opportunities for explosive devices.

The FBI’s annual

report Terrorism in

the United States

contains profiles and chronologies of terrorism incidents in America. The 1999 edition includes a comprehensive review of

terrorist activities in the United States

over the past three decades. This information is helpful to planners as data for

hazard profiling; it also illustrates that

manmade hazards impact not only

large cities but commonly strike small

to mid-sized communities as well—an

important point when building public

support for mitigating terrorism and

technological hazards. The Terrorism in

the United States reports can be

downloaded from http://www.fbi.gov/

publications/terror/terroris.htm.
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Version 2.0 September 2003 2-5

Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards

Hazard Application Mode Hazard Duration

Extent of Effects;

Static/Dynamic

Mitigating and Exacerbating

Conditions

Conventional

Bomb/

Improvised

Explosive

Device

Detonation of

explosive device on

or near target;

delivery via person,

vehicle, or

projectile.

Instantaneous;

additional

"secondary

devices" may be

used, lengthening

the time duration of

the hazard until the

attack site is

determined to be

clear.

Extent of damage is

determined by type

and quantity of

explosive. Effects

generally static other

than cascading

consequences,

incremental

structural failure, etc.

Overpressure at a given standoff is

inversely proportional to the cube of

the distance from the blast; thus,

each additional increment of standoff

provides progressively more

protection. Terrain, forestation,

structures, etc. can provide shielding

by absorbing and/or deflecting energy

and debris. Exacerbating conditions

include ease of access to target; lack

of barriers/shielding; poor

construction; and ease of

concealment of device.

Chemical

Agent *

Liquid/aerosol

contaminants can

be dispersed using

sprayers or other

aerosol generators;

liquids vaporizing

from puddles/

containers; or

munitions.

Chemical agents

may pose viable

threats for hours to

weeks depending

on the agent and

the conditions in

which it exists.

Contamination can

be carried out of the

initial target area by

persons, vehicles,

water and wind.

Chemicals may be

corrosive or

otherwise damaging

over time if not

remediated.

Air temperature can affect

evaporation of aerosols. Ground

temperature affects evaporation of

l l iquids. Humidity can enlarge aeroso

particles, reducing inhalation hazard.

P e recipitation can dilute and dispers

agents but can spread contamination.

Wind can disperse vapors but also

cause target area to be dynamic.

The micro-meteorological effects of

b l uildings and terrain can alter trave

a n nd duration of agents. Shielding i

the form of sheltering in place can

protect people and property from

harmful effects.

Arson/

Incendiary

Attack

Initiation of fire or

explosion on or

near target via

direct contact or

remotely via

projectile.

Generally minutes

to hours.

Extent of damage is

determined by type

and quantity of

device/accelerant

and materials

present at or near

target. Effects

generally static other

than cascading

consequences,

incremental

structural failure, etc.

Mitigation factors include built-in fire

d d etection and protection systems an

fire-resistive construction techniques.

I y nadequate security can allow eas

access to target, easy concealment of

an incendiary device and undetected

initiation of a fire. Non-compliance

with fire and building codes as well as

failure to maintain existing fire

protection systems can substantially

increase the effectiveness of a fire

weapon.

Armed Attack

Tactical assault or

sniping from remote

location.

Generally minutes

to days.

Varies based upon

the perpetrators'

intent and

capabilities.

I y nadequate security can allow eas

access to target, easy concealment of

weapons and undetected initiation of

an attack.

Biological

Agent *

Liquid or solid

contaminants can

be dispersed using

sprayers/aerosol

generators or by

point or line

sources such as

munitions, covert

deposits and

moving sprayers.

Biological agents

may pose viable

threats for hours to

years depending on

the agent and the

conditions in which

it exists.

Depending on the

agent used and the

effectiveness with

which it is deployed,

contamination can

be spread via wind

and water. Infection

can be spread via

human or animal

vectors.

Altitude of release above ground can

a s ffect dispersion; sunlight i

destructive to many bacteria and

viruses; light to moderate wind will

disperse agents but higher winds can

break up aerosol clouds; the microm s eteorological effects of building

a e nd terrain can influenc

aerosolization and travel of agents.
2-6 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards (continued)

Hazard Application Mode Hazard Duration

Extent of Effects;

Static/Dynamic

Mitigating and Exacerbating

Conditions

Cyberterrorism

Electronic attack

using one computer

system against

another.

M t inutes to days. Generally no direc

effects on built

environment.

Inadequate security can facilitate

access to critical computer systems,

allowing them to be used to conduct

attacks.

Agriterrorism

Direct, generally

covert contamination

of food supplies or

introduction of pests

and/or disease

agents to crops and

livestock.

Days to months. Varies by type of

incident. Food

contamination events

may be limited to

discrete distribution

sites, whereas pests

and diseases may

spread widely.

Generally no effects

on built environment.

Inadequate security can facilitate

adulteration of food and introduction

of pests and disease agents to crops

and livestock.

Radiological

Agent **

Radioactive

contaminants can be

dispersed using

sprayers/aerosol

generators, or by

point or line sources

such as munitions,

covert deposits and

moving sprayers.

Contaminants may

remain hazardous

for seconds to

years depending on

material used.

Initial effects will be

localized to site of

attack; depending on

meteorological

conditions,

subsequent behavior

of radioactive

contaminants may

be dynamic.

Duration of exposure, distance from

source of radiation, and the amount

of shielding between source and

target determine exposure to

radiation.

Nuclear

Bomb **

Detonation of

nuclear device

underground, at the

surface, in the air or

at high altitude.

Light/heat flash and

blast/shock wave

last for seconds;

nuclear radiation

and fallout hazards

can persist for

years.

Electromagnetic

pulse from a highaltitude detonation

lasts for seconds

and affects only

unprotected

electronic systems.

Initial light, heat and

blast effects of a

subsurface, ground

or air burst are static

and are determined

by the device's

characteristics and

employment; fallout

of radioactive

contaminants may

be dynamic,

depending on

meteorological

conditions.

Harmful effects of radiation can be

r f educed by minimizing the time o

exposure. Light, heat and blast

energy decrease logarithmically as a

function of distance from seat of

blast. Terrain, forestation, structures,

etc. can provide shielding by

absorbing and/or deflecting radiation

and radioactive contaminants.

Hazardous

Material

Release

(fixed facility

or transportation)

Solid, liquid and/or

gaseous

contaminants may

be released from

fixed or mobile

containers.

Hours to days. Chemicals may be

corrosive or

otherwise damaging

over time. Explosion

and/or fire may be

subsequent.

Contamination may

be carried out of the

incident area by

persons, vehicles,

water and wind.

A r s with chemical weapons, weathe

conditions will directly affect how the

hazard develops. The microm s eteorological effects of building

a d nd terrain can alter travel an

duration of agents. Shielding in the

form of sheltering in place can

protect people and property from

harmful effects. Non-compliance with

fire and building codes as well as

failure to maintain existing fire

protection and containment features

can substantially increase the

damage from a hazardous materials

release.

* Source: Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook

** Source: FEMA, Radiological Emergency Management Independent Study Course
assess risks 2

Version 2.0 September 2003 2-7

Step 3

Inventory Assets

As discussed in Step 1, the probability of manmade hazards occurring cannot be quantified with as great a level of accuracy as that of

many natural hazards. Furthermore, these incidents generally

occur at a specific location such as a building rather than encompassing a wide area such as a floodplain, and potential locations for

terrorist attacks and technological disasters are likely to be distributed widely throughout your community. Thus, translating most

manmade hazard profiles into meaningful geospatial information

is difficult at best.

Instead, the planning team should use an asset-specific approach,

identifying potentially at-risk critical facilities and systems in the

community. Once a comprehensive list of assets has been developed, it should be prioritized so that the community’s efforts can

be directed to protect the most important assets first. Then, beginning with the highest priority assets, the vulnerabilities of each

facility or system to each type of hazard should be assessed. A

discussion of each of these steps follows.

As part of the hazard mitigation planning process, you

should develop a base map

showing the assets in your

jurisdiction. You can overlay this map

with information representing manmade

hazards and their potential consequences. Maps may not be able to actually predict where manmade hazards

are most likely to strike, but they can

help planners understand the interrelationships between assets and hazards.

Through functions like buffering and dispersion modeling, planners can identify

how proximity and clustering of assets

may exacerbate the impacts of a particular type of attack, and even evaluate the implications of multiple vulnerabilities.

The initial inventory can be done very

quickly and easily using the baseline

data contained in HAZUS (“Hazards

US”), FEMA’s hazard loss estimation

software that uses building stock, economic, geologic, and other data to provide loss estimates for earthquakes. You

can identify medical care facilities; emergency response facilities; schools;

dams; hazardous material sites; roads,

airports, and other transportation facilities; electric power, oil, and gas lines;

and other infrastructure. Refer to page

2-3 of Understanding your Risks: Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses

(FEMA 386-2) for help in creating a base

map.

The term “mitigation” in the context of this howto guide refers to the physical aspects of vulnerability reduction.

Thus, in identifying the areas of interest for the purposes of terrorism

and technological hazards, planners should focus on specific places

in their community where opportunities exist to reduce exposure to,

and the potential consequences of, the various types of malevolent acts and

accidental incidents that could occur. While this does require a highly facilityspecific approach (e.g., the protection of a utility system, communications infrastructure, or government building), planners must be sure to consider the

interconnectivity of all of the elements in the built environment such as buildings,

infrastructures, and aggregations of human activity when determining the physical or geographic constraints of their planning activities.

Expand the Asset List

In expanding an existing asset list, the planning team should start

by referring to the community’s Emergency Operations Plan

(EOP) to identify specific critical facilities, sites, systems, or other

locations that could potentially be targeted for attack or that are at

risk of being the site of an accident that could produce significant

consequences. This process should take into account the dynamic

nature of manmade events: while the physical consequences of

some types of incidents generally remain localized (as with the

bombing of a building), the impacts of others may spread well

beyond the location of origin (as with a chlorine gas leak).
2-8 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Critical infrastructures are systems whose incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating effect

on the defense or economic security of the nation.

The critical infrastructure categories include:

Agriculture & food

Water

Public health

Emergency services

Defense industrial base

Telecommunications

Energy

Transportation

Banking & finance

Chemicals & hazardous materials

Postal & shipping

The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) was established in July 1996 by Presidential

Executive Order 13010 to formulate a comprehensive national strategy for protecting the infrastructures we all depend

on from physical and "cyber" threats. The PCCIP included

senior representatives from private industry, government, and

academia, and was divided into five teams representing the

critical infrastructures. Each team evaluated the growing risks,

threats, and vulnerabilities within its sector. The sector teams

and their industries included:

Information & Communications – telecommunications,

computers & software, Internet, satellites, fiber optics

Physical Distribution – railroads, air traffic, maritime,

intermodal, pipelines

Energy – electrical power, natural gas, petroleum, production, distribution & storage

Banking & Finance – financial transactions, stock &

bond markets, federal reserve

Vital Human Services – water, emergency services,

government services

Threats to critical infrastructures can be posed by anyone

with the capability, technology, opportunity, and intent to do

harm. Potential threats can be foreign or domestic, internal

or external, state-sponsored or a single rogue element. Terrorists, insiders, disgruntled employees, and hackers are included in this profile. The fact that most of the nation's vital

services are delivered by private companies creates a significant challenge in determining where the responsibility for

protecting our critical infrastructures falls; the PCCIP addressed this challenge by bringing the private and public sectors together to assess infrastructure vulnerabilities and develop assurance strategies for the future, consulting with

industry executives, security experts, government agencies,

and private citizens. State and local mitigation planning teams

are encouraged to draw on this model as a basis for their

own efforts to incorporate terrorism and technological hazard mitigation into their planning processes.

Source: Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office at www.ciao.gov.

References and background information on critical infrastructure

protection can be found on the Critical Infrastructure Assurance

Office’s web site at http://www.ciao.gov/resource/pccip/

pccip_documents.htm.

In addition to your EOP, Worksheet #2: Asset Identification Checklist at the end of this section (also included in Appendix D) is

intended as an aid for identifying critical facilities, sites, systems,

and other assets in your community or state. Step 3 provides some

approaches for determining the importance of each asset to the

community.

Assess Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities of a given facility, site, system, or other asset can be

identified based on two distinct but complementary approaches. First,

any given place in the built environment has a certain level of inherent

vulnerability that exists independent of any protective or mitigation

actions that are applied to it. For example, a football stadium is a

setting where thousands of people gather, and a terrorist may find
assess risks 2

Version 2.0 September 2003 2-9

such a target very attractive in that many people would be hurt in an

attack. An assessment of such inherent vulnerabilities must be conducted for each asset to determine its weaknesses. Second, the security, design, and other mitigation tools used to protect a place determine its tactical vulnerability. For example, if an HVAC system is designed so that its components are not visible to the public and has

security cameras aimed at it, a terrorist may be less likely to attempt to

use the system as a weapon to release poisonous gas. A tactical vulnerability assessment should be completed for each asset to determine

how well it is protected from an attack.

Inherent Vulnerability. Using the asset inventory you assembled in

Step 3, the planning team can assess the inherent vulnerability of

each asset based on:

 Visibility: How aware is the public of the existence of the

facility, site, system, or location?

 Utility: How valuable might the place be in meeting the

objective(s) of a potential terrorist or saboteur?

 Accessibility: How accessible is the place to the public?

 Asset mobility: Is the asset's location fixed or mobile? If

mobile, how often is it moved, relocated, or repositioned?

 Presence of hazardous materials: Are flammable, explosive,

biological, chemical, and/or radiological materials

present on site?

 Potential for collateral damage: What are the potential

consequences for the surrounding area if the asset is

attacked or damaged?

 Occupancy: What is the potential for mass casualties

based on the maximum number of individuals on site at

a given time?

Completing Worksheet #3: Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix at the end of this section (also included in Appendix

D) will help you determine how vulnerable each asset is and how

vulnerable the assets are relative to each other.

In conducting the

vulnerability assessment, it is important to ensure that the focus

is not only on hazard reduction but also includes preparedness, response, and recovery considerations.

For example, allowing unrestricted vehicle access to a building may create

some risk of a vehicle bomb attack, but

it also helps ensure easy fire apparatus

access for emergency response purposes. Thus, just as it is important to

balance security and openness in planning and design, it is critical to consider

the secondary hazards that could arise

from well-intended efforts to reduce vulnerabilities.
2-10 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Tactical Vulnerability. The following list will help the planning

team assess the tactical vulnerability of the assets in the community.

The tactical vulnerability of each asset is based on:

Site Perimeter

 Site Planning and Landscape Design: Is the facility designed with security in mind—both site-specific and with

regard to adjacent land uses?

 Parking Security: Are vehicle access and parking managed

in a way that separates vehicles and structures?

Building Envelope

 Structural Engineering: Is the building’s envelope designed to be blast-resistant? Does it provide collective

protection against chemical, biological, and radiological

contaminants?

Facility Interior

 Architectural and Interior Space Planning: Does security

screening cover all public and private areas? Are public

and private activities separated? Are critical building

systems and activities separated?

 Mechanical Engineering: Are utilities and HVAC systems

protected and/or backed up with redundant systems?

Tactical Vulnerability Considerations
assess risks 2

Version 2.0 September 2003 2-11

 Electrical Engineering: Are emergency power and telecommunications available? Are alarm systems operational? Is

lighting sufficient?

 Fire Protection Engineering: Are the building’s water supply

and fire suppression systems adequate, code-compliant,

and protected? Are on-site personnel trained appropriately? Are local first responders aware of the nature of

the operations at the facility?

 Electronic and Organized Security: Are systems and personnel in place to monitor and protect the facility?

A list of mitigation actions that correspond to the factors described

above can be found in Phase 3, Develop a Mitigation Plan, in this

guide.

Establish Mitigation Priorities

For the purpose of developing a realistic prioritization of

manmade hazard mitigation projects, three elements should be

considered in concert: the relative importance of the various

facilities and systems in the asset inventory, the vulnerabilities of

those facilities, and the threats that are known to exist.

Asset criticality. The first element, asset criticality, is a measure of

the importance of the facility or system to the community. Considerations in determining asset criticality include:

 Is it an element of one of the community’s critical

infrastructures?

 Does it play a key role in your community’s government,

economy, or culture?

 What are the consequences of destruction, failure, or

loss of function of the asset in terms of fatalities and/or

injuries, property losses, and economic impacts?

 What is the likelihood of cascading or subsequent

consequences should the asset be destroyed or its

function lost?

Vulnerability. The second factor was addressed in the previous

section, Assess Vulnerabilities. By identifying the most exploitable

weaknesses of each asset, the planning team can identify vulnerabilities in greatest need of attention. This, in effect, gives the

planning team a criterion to use in establishing mitigation priorities so that the community can focus its efforts on addressing the

most critical issues.
2-12 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Threat. The last element, threat, is fundamental to the

prioritization process but very difficult to quantify. It

answers the question “what must we mitigate against?”

The frequency of a hazard’s occurrence is an important

factor in establishing mitigation priorities, but unfortunately it is impossible to determine with any precision in

the case of terrorism (for technological hazards, “threat”

can be interpreted to mean the likelihood of some type

of human-induced unintentional event). Instead of

being influenced by predictable, quantifiable natural

forces, terrorism—and to some degree, other technological hazards—is the result of human behavior that

often lies outside conventional ideals of appropriateness

and rationality and is thus difficult to predict.

In understanding the threat of terrorism, historical data

can be of some value in that it illustrates the types of

tactics that have been used previously (and thus may be

used again); however, the historical approach is far from

definitive because, in addition to the fact that threat

information lacks the predictive accuracy needed for

making decisions of this type, the origin and nature of

the threats constantly change with technology, political

issues, and other factors that compel and enable terrorist activity. Further complicating the use of threat information in determining relative risk, once a protective

action is applied to an asset and its vulnerability reduced

relative to that of a comparable target, the balance of

target attractiveness—and thus the likelihood of attack—

may be altered, displacing some risk onto another asset

that has become relatively more vulnerable.

The most useful application of threat information for

mitigation planning purposes, then, will be as a guide to

the types of incidents that are relatively most likely to

occur. Clearly, the level of detail that can be provided to

the planning team will be determined by the sensitivity

of the threat information. The broadest threat estimates

may be so vague as to be of little use, while the most

current and specific information may be part of ongoing

criminal and/or intelligence investigations and thus not

available for mitigation planning purposes. However, it

should be possible to obtain a useful level of understanding through consultation with local, state, and federal

law enforcement agencies that can provide the planning

Prioritizing Mitigation

Requirements: The General

Services Administration

Approach to Security

Standards

The General Services Administration (GSA) is the

United States government’s landlord. As such, it is

responsible for security at more than 1,000 federal

facilities, both owned and leased. To meet this need,

GSA uses a standards-based approach that involves

assessing and categorizing facilities and assigning

minimum security standards to each category.

Facility Security Levels

In order to determine the appropriate package of security measures for each facility, a five-level classification system is used to rate facilities based on occupancy, size, level of public contact, type of

operations, and the nature of the agencies present

in the facility.

You can adapt this model to help prioritize mitigation

projects by establishing criteria based on the assets

present in your community. In a small town, for example, a three-level system may be adequate: the

City Hall complex, containing the offices of elected

and administrative officials as well as Police Headquarters and an Emergency Operations Center,

would qualify as a Level III facility; the city’s maintenance yard might fall within Level II; and a remote

sewage lift station would be assigned Level I status.

Recommended Minimum Security Standards

The GSA list of security standards can serve simply

as a list of recommended measures; however, to better allocate resources, measures can be linked to

facility security levels. For example, the most basic

measures may be mandated for all facilities, while

the most stringent or sophisticated measures may

be required only for the highest level facilities, recommended for middle-level facilities, and unnecessary for the lowest-level facilities. The following criteria are among those considered for each category of

security measures:

Perimeter security – parking, closed-circuit

television, lighting, physical barriers

Entry security – receiving & shipping, access

control, entrances & exits

Interior security – employee & visitor identification, utilities, occupant emergency plan, day

care centers

Security planning – tenant assignment, construction & renovation (this category also includes intelligence-sharing, training, and

administrative procedures, which are outside

the scope of this guidance)

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities
Version 2.0 September 2003 2-13

assess risks 2

team with a general characterization of terrorist and other such

groups known to be active in your community, the tactics they may

employ or have employed in the past, and projections of potential

and emerging threats.

In addition to asset criticality, vulnerability, and threat, the planning team may also take the following considerations into account

when prioritizing projects:

 What assets were of concern during your community’s

Y2K planning?

 What assets support the continuity of your jurisdiction’s

governmental operations and essential functions?

 What assets support the implementation of your

jurisdiction’s EOP, Emergency Support Functions

(ESFs), and Incident Command/Unified Command

systems?

 What political priorities may be relevant?

 To what extent will funding constraints limit mitigation

options?

The following diagram illustrates the prioritizing process.

The list you develop of the assets most important to protect will

help you focus your loss estimation analysis in Step 4.
2-14 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Step 4

Estimate Losses

As with natural hazard risk assessment processes, the potential

losses from manmade hazards are generally grouped into three

categories: people (death and injury), assets (structures and their

contents), and functions (provision of services and generation of

revenue). However, terrorism and technological disasters present

some unique implications for loss estimation. As previously discussed, for example, the key issue of frequency of occurrence (also

called “recurrence interval”) is elusive in the case of manmade

hazards because of the difficulties associated with predicting

human behavior and with acquiring and applying appropriate

threat data.

For some hazards, worst-case scenarios can be generated and losses

estimated if the hazard can be characterized with some precision.

CAMEO (Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations) software is one application that has been used extensively for

preparedness and response activities relating to hazardous materials. For example, using the location of rail lines and the kinds and

quantities of hazardous materials transported over them, models

can be used to estimate the consequences of various chemical

release scenarios. Particular attention can be paid to considerations such as evacuation of residential areas and critical facilities

as well as mechanisms such as streams and winds that can disperse

contaminants beyond the primary incident scene. Similarly, flood

damage curves provide information about the extent of damage

expected in a given flood event, and HAZUS provides loss estimates for earthquakes.

For other manmade hazards such as bombs, however, damage

analysis capabilities are still evolving and are not yet widely available within state and local governments. Software can be used to

model blast effects on structures, but tools that can easily translate

this information into loss estimates for mitigation purposes are not

yet available. When dealing with these difficult-to-quantify risks, the

planning team may wish to assume worst-case scenarios and estimate losses based on those scenarios using the techniques discussed in Step 3 of Understanding Your Risks (FEMA 386-2).

Using the results of your vulnerability analysis and your best estimates of potential losses, you can now formulate mitigation goals

to drive the development of a mitigation strategy.
Version 2.0 September 2003 2-15

page 1 of 2

Worksheet #2 Asset Identification Checklist phase 2, step 

This worksheet is intended as an aid for identifying critical facilities, sites, systems, and other assets in your community

or state. Check all the boxes that apply to your jurisdiction.

Local, state, and federal government offices

(list all in your jurisdiction)

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Military installations, including Reserve and National

Guard component facilities (list all in your jurisdiction)

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Emergency services

Backup facilities

Communication centers

Emergency operations centers

Fire/Emergency Medical Service (EMS) facilities

Law enforcement facilities

Politically or symbolically significant sites

Embassies, consulates

Landmarks, monuments

Political party and special interest group offices

Religious sites

Transportation infrastructure components

Airports

Bus stations

Ferry terminals

Interstate highways

Oil/gas pipelines

Railheads/rail yards

Seaports/river ports

Subways

Truck terminals

Tunnels/bridges

Energy, water, and related utility systems

Electricity production, transmission, and distribution system

components

Oil and gas storage/shipment facilities

Power plant fuel distribution, delivery, and storage

Telecommunications facilities

Wastewater treatment plants

Water supply/purification/distribution systems

Telecommunications and information systems

Cable TV facilities

Cellular network facilities

Critical cable routes

Major rights of way

Newspaper offices and production/distribution facilities

Radio stations

Satellite base stations

Telephone trunking and switching stations

Television broadcast stations

Health care system components

Emergency medical centers

Family planning clinics

Health department offices

Hospitals

Radiological material and medical waste transportation,

storage, and disposal

Research facilities, laboratories

Walk-in clinics
2-16 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Financial services infrastructures and institutions

Armored car services

Banks and credit unions

Agricultural facilities

Chemical distribution, storage, and application sites

Crop spraying services

Farms and ranches

Food processing, storage, and distribution facilities

Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities

Apartment buildings

Business/corporate centers

Chemical plants (include facilities having Section 302

Extremely Hazardous Substances on-site)

Factories

Fuel production, distribution, and storage facilities

Hotels and convention centers

Industrial plants

Malls and shopping centers

Raw material production, distribution, and storage facilities

Research facilities, laboratories

Shipping, warehousing, transfer, and logistical centers

Mobile assets

Aviation and marine units

Mobile emergency operations centers/command centers

Portable telecommunications equipment

Red Cross Emergency Response Vehicles, Salvation Army

mobile canteens, etc.

Other (Bloodmobiles, mobile health clinics, etc.)

page 2 of 2

Recreational facilities

Auditoriums

Casinos

Concert halls and pavilions

Parks

Restaurants and clubs frequented by potential target

populations

Sports arenas and stadiums

Theaters

Public/private institutions

Academic institutions

Cultural centers

Libraries

Museums

Research facilities, laboratories

Events and attractions

Festivals and celebrations

Open-air markets

Parades

Rallies, demonstrations, and marches

Religious services

Scenic tours

Theme parks
Version 2.0 September 2003 2-17

Increments may be adjusted to better reflect your response capabilities or to be consistent with other guidance such as Mass Casualty Incident

plans. Note that different risks may exist at a facility depending on whether it is occupied or vacant.

Adapted from: FEMA Emergency Management Institute, Terrorism Planning Course

Worksheet #3 phase 2, step 

Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix

The Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix provides a way to record how vulnerable each asset is and

enables the planning team to compare how vulnerable the assets are relative to each other. Make a copy for each asset

and fill in the facility name or other identifier in the space provided. Select the appropriate point value for each criterion

based on the description in each row. Then add the point values to get the total for each asset. When you have done this

for each asset you identified, compare the total scores to see how the assets rank in relation to one another.

Vulnerability Point Values

Criteria 0 1 2 3 4 5 Score

Asset

Visibility _

Existence

not well

known

_ Existence

locally known _ Existencewidely known

Target Utility None Very Low Low Medium High Very High

Asset

Accessibility

Remote location,

secure perimeter,

armed guards,

tightly controlled

access

Fenced,

guarded,

controlled

access

Controlled

access,

protected

entry

Controlled

access,

unprotected

entry

Open

access,

restricted

parking

Open

access,

unrestricted

parking

Asset

Mobility _

Moves or is

relocated

frequently

_

Moves or is

relocated

occasionally

_ Permanent /

fixed in place

Presence of

Hazardous

Materials

No hazardous

materials present

Limited

quantities,

materials in

secure

location

Moderate

quantities,

strict control

features

Large

quantities,

some control

features

Large

quantities,

minimal

control

features

Large

quantities,

accessible to

non-staff

persons

Collateral

Damage

Potential

No risk

Low risk /

limited to

immediate

area

Moderate

risk / limited

to immediate

area

Moderate

risk within

1-mile radius

High risk

within 1-mile

radius

High risk

beyond

1-mile radius

Site

Population/

Capacity

0 0 1 0 -25 2 0 51-50 5 0 01-100 1 0 001-500 > 500

TOTAL

Facility _____________________________________________________________________________________________
phase 3 phase 3
Version 2.0 September 2003 3-1

3

develop a

mitigation

plan

Goals are general guidelines that identify what you want to achieve.

They are usually long-term in nature.

Objectives define measurable strategies or implementation steps to

attain a goal. They are shorter in range and more specific than goals.

Overview

The hazard identification and risk assessment described in

Phase 2 will determine what facilities and systems in your

jurisdiction are at highest risk. In Step 1 of Phase 3, you will develop goals and objectives for the protection of these assets to

prevent or avoid an attack and to reduce losses in the event an

attack occurs. Step 2 discusses the issues unique to identifying and

prioritizing mitigation actions for terrorism and technological

hazards. These actions primarily focus on creating a resilient,

protective built environment. Step 3 highlights special considerations in developing an implementation strategy. Step 4 summarizes the important components to include in your terrorism and

technological hazard mitigation plan. Cross-references are made to

Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions and

Implementation Strategies (FEMA 386-3).
3-2 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Sample Mitigation Goals and Objectives for

Terrorism and Technological Hazard Mitigation

Goal 1: Reduce the community's risk of exposure to hazardous

materials.

Objective 1: Install security measures at the anhydrous ammonia transfer and

storage facility.

Objective 2: Increase the level of security of the facility using landscape design,

lighting, and vehicle barriers.

Objective 3: Assess feasibility of hardening product storage and handling

infrastructures.

Goal 2: Protect the community's water supply.

Objective 1: Install security measures at the city water treatment plant.

Objective 2: Secure all remote pump facilities.

Objective 3: Monitor for radiological, biological, and chemical contaminants.

Goal 3: Ensure that the city government has reliable communications

systems.

Objective 1: Update the telecommunications capabilities of city government

offices.

Objective 2: Create redundant/backup capability for landline telephone system.

Objective 3: Develop off-site backup of information technology systems.

Goal 4: Reduce risk to critical government facilities.

Objective 1: Increase vehicle standoff distance from the Emergency Operations

Center.

Objective 2: Restrict parking and vehicle access to the underground parking

garage at City Hall.

Goals and objectives help determine

where efforts and resources

should be focused to maximize the effectiveness of

mitigation-related activities. Whenever

possible, mitigation goals and objectives

should be multi-hazard in nature in order to provide the most comprehensive

protection to your community or state.

In addition to brainstorming, the planning team can identify additional goals

and objectives in the following ways:

 Review existing plans. Review

existing mitigation, comprehensive,

and emergency plans, building

upon and/or modifying existing

initiatives to maximize coordination

between plans and minimize

conflicts and duplication of effort. To

the extent possible, existing plans

should be used to address the

special problems posed by

technological and other manmade

hazards rather than generating

new, stand-alone documents.

 Solicit public opinions. Including

the community in identifying goals

and objectives will help ensure buyin when mitigation actions are

selected, and both the media and

the Internet can be valuable

communication tools. There are a

number of methods for gauging

public opinion:

 Establish working groups or advisory committees

 Hold town hall meetings

 Administer surveys

 Hold facilitated meetings with

community representatives

While all of these methods can be effective on their own, it may be advantageous to combine multiple strategies,

such as surveys and town hall meetings, in order to obtain the advantages

of both a structured questionnaire as

well as a free-flowing discussion.

Step 1

Develop Mitigation Goals and

Objectives

The process for developing the mitigation goals and objectives that

will shape your implementation strategy is the same whether you

are addressing natural or manmade hazards. As discussed in

Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions and

Implementation Strategies (FEMA 386-3), you will review the risk

assessment and loss estimation findings to identify assets at greatest

risk. Manmade risk information should be combined with the

findings for natural hazards to create a comprehensive picture of

your community or state's vulnerabilities to both natural and

manmade hazards. Your terrorism and technological disaster

mitigation goals, as with those for natural disasters, should strive to

protect lives and property, reduce the costs of disaster response,

and minimize disruption to the community or state following a

disaster. See Developing the Mitigation Plan for more details on

formulating and prioritizing your goals.
develop a mitigation plan 3

Version 2.0 September 2003 3-3

Step 2

Identify and Prioritize Mitigation Actions

Once you have developed goals and objectives for mitigation, you

should identify specific actions to help you achieve them. As you

consider mitigation options, keep in mind that attacks and

accidents are functions of human activity, and the risk of such

events is a characteristic of the target itself rather than of its

geographic location. Clearly, there are areas in most communities where the chances of an attack or accident are considerably

different from other parts of the jurisdiction—higher at industrial parks and critical facilities than in suburban residential

neighborhoods, for example—but there is no such thing as a

definable "terrorism zone" or "accident district" in the same

sense as there are identifiable floodplains and seismic fault lines.

Thus, it is not effective to protect people, buildings, and systems

from manmade hazards by simply relocating them as one could

for some natural disasters.

Rather than removing potential victims from the hazard, then,

mitigation strategies for manmade hazards focus primarily on

creating a built environment that is difficult to attack, resilient to

the consequences of an attack or accident, and protective of its

occupants should an incident occur. This can be accomplished

through target hardening and other actions. Additional actions

such as public awareness and education initiatives are not discussed in this guide but should be considered when formulating

your mitigation strategy.

Target hardening actions range from small-scale projects, such as

installing security fencing around an HVAC system's air intake, to

community-wide initiatives, such as altering land use patterns to

require buffer zones around campuses of high-risk buildings.

Also, while some actions are highly specific in nature and function, others can meet multiple goals. For example, designing a

building to resist the force of a bomb blast will also offer protection from windstorms, and requiring buffer zones around critical

facilities can help meet open space requirements and protect

wetlands. The planning team is encouraged to take advantage of

these complementary approaches whenever possible.

Target hardening actions draw from a wide variety of disciplines,

all of which, as discussed in Phase 1, should be represented on

(or at least accessible to) the mitigation planning team. Potential

hardening techniques and strategies are numerous, and a listing

Taking Advantage of Existing

Processes, Strategies, and

Tools

Some actions and techniques used for mitigating natural hazards may also provide

protection against manmade hazards,

such as:

Earthquake mitigation techniques that

provide structural strengthening of buildings

may help resist impact/explosion effects of

bombs. Examples of such techniques include

adding steel moment frames, shear walls,

cross bracing, stronger floor systems, walls

reinforced with shotcrete/fiber materials, columns reinforced with fiber wraps/steel jackets, tension/shear anchors, vibration

dampers, and strengthening or providing additional detailing of the building's connections.

Fire mitigation techniques may help protect facilities against the effects of bombs and

incendiary attacks. Examples of such techniques include improved sprinkler systems,

increased use of fireproofing and/or fire-resistant materials, redundant water supplies

for fire protection (day-to-day

and alternative), and site setbacks.

High wind mitigation techniques that provide building envelope protection and structural

strengthening may also help mitigate against

impact/explosion effects of bombs. Examples

of such techniques include openings using

windows with impact-resistant laminated

glazing, improving connections and the load

path of the building, and adding/reinforcing

shear walls.

Terrorism mitigation is becoming an integral part of multi-hazard mitigation, in process and often in practice. Additionally, an

action that addresses the fullest possible

spectrum of natural and manmade hazards

will likely show the most cost-effectiveness.

The planning team should draw on

all available sources of expertise when selecting specific

actions, keeping in mind the

overall objectives of maximizing opportunities for multi-hazard mitigation; promoting

sustainability through choosing socially,

economically, and environmentally beneficial solutions; supporting preparedness,

response, and recovery; and ensuring

cost-effectiveness.
3-4 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

of every possible action lies beyond the scope of this guidance. The

list of potential actions provided below gives an overview of the

techniques and strategies available. The Library in Appendix C

contains references to many sources of information on these

topics. The following section will discuss special considerations

when evaluating actions to meet your goals and objectives.

Terrorism and Technological Hazard Mitigation Actions

The list of actions below is by no means exhaustive or definitive; rather, it is intended as a point of departure for

identifying potential mitigation techniques and strategies in your community or state.

Site Planning and Landscape Design

 Implement Crime Prevention Through Environmental

Design (CPTED)

 Minimize concealment opportunities in landscaping

and street furniture, such as hedges, bus shelters,

benches, and trash receptacles

 Design grounds and parking facilities for natural

surveillance by concentrating pedestrian activity,

limiting entrances/exits, and eliminating concealment

opportunities

 Separate vehicle and pedestrian traffic

 Implement vehicle and pedestrian access control

and inspection at perimeter (ensure ability to

regulate flow of people and vehicles one at a time)

 Design site circulation to minimize vehicle speeds

and eliminate direct approaches to structures

 Incorporate vehicle barriers such as walls, fences,

trenches, ponds/basins, plantings, trees, sculptures,

and fountains into site planning and design

 Ensure adequate site lighting

 Design signage for simplicity and clarity

 Locate critical offices away from uncontrolled public

areas

 Separate delivery processing facilities from

remaining buildings

 Maintain access for emergency responders,

including large fire apparatus

 Identify and provide alternate water supplies for fire

suppression

 Eliminate potential site access through utility tunnels,

corridors, manholes, etc.

Architectural and Interior Space Planning

 Collocate/combine staff and visitor entrances;

minimize queuing in unprotected areas

 Incorporate employee and visitor screening areas

into planning and design

 Minimize device concealment opportunities such as

mailboxes and trash receptacles outside screened

areas

 Prohibit retail activities in non-secured areas

 Do not locate toilets and service spaces in nonsecured areas

 Locate critical assets (people, activities, systems)

away from entrances, vehicle circulation and parking,

and loading and maintenance areas

 Separate high-risk and low-risk activities

 Separate high-risk activities from areas accessible to

the public

 Separate visitor activities from daily activities

 Separate building utilities from service docks, and

harden utilities

 Locate delivery and mail processing facilities

remotely or at exterior of building; prevent vehicles

from driving into or under building

 Establish areas of refuge; ensure that egress

pathways are hardened and discharge into safe

areas

 Locate emergency stairwells and systems away from

high-risk areas

 Restrict roof access

 Ensure that walls, doors, windows, ceilings, and

floors can resist forced entry

 Provide fire- and blast-resistant separation for

sprinkler/standpipe interior controls (risers) and key

fire alarm system components

 Use visually open (impact-resistant, laminated glass)

stair towers and elevators in parking facilities

 Design finishes and signage for visual simplicity

Structural Engineering

 Create blast-resistant exterior envelope

 Ensure that structural elements can resist blast loads

and progressive collapse

 Install blast-resistant exterior window systems

(frames, security films, and blast curtains)

 Ensure that other openings (vents, etc.) are secure

and blast-resistant

 Ensure that mailrooms are secure and blastresistant

 Enclose critical building components within

hardened walls, floors, and ceilings

(continued)
Version 2.0 September 2003 3-5

develop a mitigation plan 3

Mechanical Engineering

 Locate utility and ventilation systems away from

entrances, vehicle circulation and parking, and loading

and maintenance areas

 Protect utility lifelines (water, power, communications,

etc.) by concealing, burying, or encasing

 Locate air intakes on roof or as high as possible; if not

elevated, secure within CPTED-compliant fencing or

enclosure

 Use motorized dampers to close air intakes when not

operational

 Locate roof-mounted equipment away from building

perimeter

 Ensure that stairways maintain positive pressure

 Provide redundant utility and ventilation systems

 Provide filtration of intake air

 Provide secure alternate drinking water supply

Electrical Engineering

 Locate utility systems and lifelines away from

entrances, vehicle circulation and parking, and loading

and maintenance areas

 Implement separate emergency and normal power

systems; ensure that backup power systems are

periodically tested under load

 Locate primary and backup fuel supplies away from

entrances, vehicle circulation and parking, and loading

and maintenance areas

 Secure primary and backup fuel supply areas

 Install exterior connection for emergency power

 Install adequate site lighting

 Maintain stairway and exit sign lighting

 Provide redundant telephone service

 Ensure that critical systems are not collocated in

conduits, panels, or risers

 Use closed-circuit television (CCTV) security system

Fire Protection Engineering

 Ensure compliance with codes and standards,

including installation of up-to-date fire alarm and

suppression systems

 Locate fire protection water supply system critical

components away from entrances, vehicle circulation

and parking, and loading and maintenance areas

 Identify/establish secondary fire protection water

supply

 Install redundant fire water pumps (e.g., one electric,

one diesel); locate apart from each other

 Ensure adequate, redundant sprinkler and standpipe

connections

 Install fire hydrant and water supply connections near

sprinkler/standpipe connections

 Supervise or secure standpipes, water supply control

valves, and other system components

 Implement fire detection and communication systems

 Implement redundant off-premises fire alarm reporting

 Locate critical documents and control systems in a

secure yet accessible place

 Provide keybox near critical entrances for secure fire

access

 Provide fire- and blast-resistant fire command center

 Locate hazardous materials storage, use, and

handling away from other activities

 Implement smoke control systems

 Install fire dampers at fire barriers

 Maintain access to fire hydrants

 Maintain fire wall and fire door integrity

 Develop and maintain comprehensive pre-incident and

recovery plans

 Implement guard and employee training

 Conduct regular evacuation and security drills

 Regularly evaluate fire protection equipment

readiness/adequacy

Security

 Develop backup control center capabilities

 Secure electrical utility closets, mechanical rooms, and

telephone closets

 Do not collocate security system wiring with electrical

and other service systems

 Implement elevator recall capability and elevator

emergency message capability

 Implement intrusion detection systems; provide

24-hour off-site monitoring

 Implement and monitor interior boundary penetration

sensors

 Implement color closed-circuit television (CCTV)

security system with recording capability

 Install call boxes and duress alarms

 Install public and employee screening systems (metal

detectors, x-ray machines, or search stations)

Parking

 Minimize off-site parking on adjacent streets/lots and

along perimeter

 Control all on-site parking with ID checks, security

personnel, and access systems

 Separate employee and visitor parking

 Eliminate internal building parking

 Ensure natural surveillance by concentrating

pedestrian activity, limiting entrances/exits, and

eliminating concealment opportunities

 Use transparent/non-opaque walls whenever possible

 Prevent pedestrian access to parking areas other than

via established entrances
3-6 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Prioritize Mitigation Actions

When prioritizing natural hazard mitigation actions, a benefit-cost

analysis is generally conducted for each proposed action. Several

factors are considered, including:

Cost(s) of the mitigation action;

Dollar value of risk reduction (i.e., loss of life, structure,

content, and function) each time the hazard occurs

(discussed in detail in Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses [FEMA 386-2]);

Frequency with which the benefits of the action will be

realized (i.e., frequency of hazard occurrence); and

Time value of money (i.e., the fact that benefits and

costs in the future are worth less than benefits and costs

today).

These factors are then combined by calculating the net present

value of aggregate future benefits and costs over the life span of

the action. For more details, see Using Benefit-Cost Analysis in Mitigation Planning (FEMA 386-5).

Three challenges arise when applying this benefit-cost framework

to terrorism and technological disaster mitigation actions: (1) the

probability of an attack or frequency of the hazard occurrence is

not known; (2) the deterrence rate may not be known; and (3) the

lifespan of the action may be difficult to quantify.

First, the frequency factor is much more complex in the case of

manmade hazards than for natural hazards. While it is possible to

estimate how often many natural disasters will occur (for example,

a structure located in the 100-year floodplain is considered to have

a 1 percent chance of being flooded in any given year), it is very

difficult to quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack or technological disaster. Quantitative methods to estimate these probabilities are being developed but have not yet been refined to the point

where they can be used to determine incident probability on a

facility-by-facility basis. Therefore, the planning team must use a

qualitative approach based on threat and vulnerability considerations to estimate the relative likelihood of an attack or accident

rather than the precise frequency. Such an approach is necessarily

subjective but can be combined with quantitative estimates of costeffectiveness (the cost of an action compared to the value of the

lives and property it saves in a worst-case scenario) to help illustrate

the overall risk reduction achieved by a particular mitigation

action.

While many

benefits can be

achieved through implementing mitigation actions,

planners should be sensitive

to potential negative impacts as well. For

example, altering traffic patterns may increase commute times and distances,

and reducing on-street parking may impact retail activity. Such considerations

can be pivotal in determining the feasibility, viability, and potential for success

of mitigation planning initiatives.
develop a mitigation plan 3

Version 2.0 September 2003 3-7

It is possible to determine fairly accurately how effective

mitigation efforts will be in preventing damages from a given type of

attack. The performance of many security and mitigation actions can

be modeled using established engineering techniques. For example,

structural engineers can determine how a hardening action will protect a building's envelope. Naturally, the effectiveness of actions that rely on personnel or complex hardware can be more difficult to ascertain. For example, what

is the probability that a security guard will fall asleep or that lightning will disable

a perimeter sensor system?

Second, the deterrence or preventative value of an action cannot

be calculated if the number of incidents it averts is not known.

Deterrence in the case of terrorism may also have a secondary

impact in that once a potential target is hardened, a terrorist may

turn to a less protected facility—changing the likelihood of an

attack for both targets.

Third, the lifespan of a mitigation action presents another problem when carrying out a benefit-cost analysis for terrorism and

technological hazards. Future benefits are generally calculated for

a natural hazard mitigation action in part by estimating the number of times the action will perform successfully over the course of

its useful life. However, some protective actions may be damaged

or destroyed in a single manmade attack or accident. For example,

blast-resistant window film may have performed to 100% effectiveness by preventing injuries from flying glass, but it may still need

replacement after one "use." Other actions, such as a building

setback, cannot be "destroyed" or "used up" per se. This is in

contrast to many natural hazard mitigation actions, where the

effectiveness and life span of a structural retrofit or land use policy

are easily understood and their value over time quantifiable.
3-8 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Step 3

Prepare an Implementation Strategy

As stated in the Foreword, this how-to guide assumes that your

community or state is engaged in a natural hazards mitigation

planning process and is intended to serve as a supplemental

resource to help you address the unique risks associated with

terrorism and technological hazards. If you have incorporated

terrorism and technological hazards into a well-managed process,

the implementation strategies and tools you use should enable you

to effectively reduce your community or state's vulnerability to

manmade disasters as well. Developing the Mitigation Plan (FEMA

386-3) provides more details on preparing an implementation

strategy.

Step 4

Document the Mitigation Planning

Process

The mitigation plan for manmade hazards will be based on the risk

assessment conducted in Phase 2 and will include a comprehensive

strategy to address the mitigation priorities developed in Phase 3,

Step 2. This information, which should be integrated into the

natural hazard mitigation plan, should include:

A summary of the planning process, including the

sequence of actions taken and a list of the team members and stakeholders who participated;

The results of the risk assessment and loss estimation;

Mitigation goals and objectives aimed at reducing or

avoiding the effects of manmade hazards;

Mitigation actions that will help the community or state

accomplish the established goals and objectives; and

Implementation strategies that detail how the mitigation actions will be implemented and administered.

The hazard mitigation plan should serve as the focal point and

basis for mitigation decisions for all hazards—natural and

manmade. As such, it should be written so that anyone who reads it

can gain an understanding of current and future hazards and risks

as well as the community's or state's intended solutions to those

problems.
develop a mitigation plan 3

Version 2.0 September 2003 3-9

Ideally, terrorism and technological hazards will

be incorporated into your existing mitigation plan;

a single comprehensive plan is generally easier to manage and implement than a collection of stand-alone documents. However, some information may be of such high sensitivity that it should not be included

in publicly available mitigation planning documents. Examples of such information include vulnerability studies of critical infrastructure and data on security

plans and systems. This material should be treated as an addendum to the mitigation plan so that it is still part of the plan, but access to it can be controlled. For

guidance on protecting sensitive information, see Phase 4, Consideration 1, Community Interest and Information Sensitivity.
phase 4 phase 4
Version 2.0 September 2003 4-1

4

implement

the plan

and

monitor

progress

Overview

The fourth phase of the mitigation planning process, Implement

the Plan and Monitor Progress, describes how to bring the mitigation plan to life. The implementation and monitoring phase is

largely the same across the entire spectrum of hazards and is

discussed in detail in Bringing the Plan to Life: Implementing the

Hazard Mitigation Plan (FEMA 386-4). This section will address

special considerations for implementing mitigation actions unique

to manmade hazards and should serve as a supplement to the

process described in Bringing the Plan to Life.

Consideration 1

Community Interest and Information

Sensitivity

As a result of the heightened level of interest in the vulnerability of

American communities to terrorism following the events of September 11, 2001, the public is likely to be keenly interested in

efforts to protect people, buildings, and systems from terrorism

and technological disasters. The planning team should understand

that this presents both benefits and challenges, because much of

the same information that can be used to rally public support for

mitigation planning can also be of use to potential terrorists,

saboteurs, or others with malevolent intent. For that reason, the

planning team must carefully maintain the security of any information that pertains to vulnerabilities, security measures, and response plans. Jurisdictions' legal counsels should be able to provide

guidance on how best to protect such sensitive information within

the provisions of applicable freedom of information laws.

This constitutes a significant departure from the open and inclusive way in which mitigation planning has historically been conducted. However, new security realities demand that we re-evaluate

the way we think about information sensitivity, in particular how,

where, when, and with whom we discuss risks, vulnerabilities, and

protective (mitigation) actions. In addition to the overarching
4-2 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

public safety rationale for protecting this information from those

who would use it against us, the planning team should be sensitive

to the fact that the owners and operators of many community

assets may be reluctant to reveal their own security shortcomings

due to concerns about liability, perception of vulnerability or

weakness, and general security-consciousness. For communities

and states to work effectively with the people, facilities, and systems

they are tasked with protecting, working relationships must be

based on trust. All project partners should be committed to maintaining the integrity of the planning process as well as the principles and ultimate goal of the process: a more secure built environment.

Thus, managing sensitive information will be a new challenge for

many communities and states. The federal government has the

option to classify information when appropriate to protect the

interest of national security, but most state and local governments

currently lack adequate authorities and tools for preventing the

inappropriate disclosure of every kind of sensitive data with any

certainty. Communities and states should address this problem in

two ways: first, they will need to ensure that sensitive information is

handled in such a way as to maintain its security, and second, they

will need to have adequate protections in place to ensure that

sensitive information is not released when it is requested by members of the public who have no justifiable reason (or "need to

know") for seeing the information. The following sections elaborate on these two ways to protect sensitive information while

maintaining an appropriate level of public involvement in the

planning process.

 Internal handling procedures. State and local governments may have the ability to assign "For Official Use

Only" (FOUO) status or a similar designation to information that is privileged, sensitive, or otherwise should

be protected from circulation or disclosure to the

public. However, such actions often lack formal information handling procedures and enforceability. Communities are encouraged to review their handling

procedures to ensure that sensitive information in their

possession can be authoritatively designated as such and

protected appropriately, and once proper procedures

are in place they should be applied and adhered to

rigorously.

 Withholding sensitive information. In keeping with the

democratic tradition, federal and state laws generally
Version 2.0 September 2003 4-3

implement the plan and monitor progress 4

require that government proceedings and documents

be accessible to the public. These laws, often called

"sunshine laws" or "freedom of information" laws,

usually require public access to meetings whenever a

commission, committee, board, task force or other

official group meets to discuss public business. They also

require that most government documents and records

be made available to the public upon request.

While these laws seek to keep governmental processes in

the open, many of them establish disclosure exemptions

for various types of sensitive information. Planners

should work with their jurisdiction's legal staff to carefully review the applicable laws and to determine how

these laws may impact their ability to protect sensitive

planning information. Furthermore, they should also

understand the specific procedures required to withhold documents and hold closed meetings as necessary

to protect sensitive information from disclosure to

anyone without a "need to know."

Suggested Elements and Sample Language for a “For Official Use Only”

(FOUO) Policy

Document marking requirements

Information that has been designated FOUO should be

plainly marked as such for ease of recognition. To

promote proper protection of information, markings

should be applied at the time documents are drafted or

as soon as FOUO information is added. Materials

containing FOUO information should be marked

'PROPERTY OF (JURISDICTION NAME)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'

at the bottom of the front cover, title page, first page and

outside of the back cover. Additionally, each page

containing FOUO information should be similarly marked

at the bottom. Material other than paper documents such

as slides, computer media, films, etc., should also bear

these markings. Electronically transmitted messages

(e.g., e-mails) containing FOUO information should have

the abbreviation 'FOUO' before the beginning of the text.

Handling instructions

FOUO material should never be left unattended, and

reasonable steps should be taken to minimize the risk of

access by anyone without a "need to know." After

working hours, FOUO information should be stored in a

locked desk, file cabinet, bookcase, or similar location.

Restrictions may also be placed on the duplication and

transmission of FOUO information.

Definition of FOUO

The term 'For Official Use Only' should apply

to information which is sensitive and requires protection

from disclosure to the general public, and for which a

significant reason, statutory requirement, or regulatory

instruction exists to preclude general circulation. FOUO

status is not a security classification level.

Guidelines for determining sensitivity

Information that may qualify for FOUO status includes

the design, construction, security, and protection of

government facilities and critical infrastructures; assessments of the vulnerabilities of facilities and systems;

plans, procedures, and protocols for responding to

terrorist attacks or other criminal events; or any other

information that could be used for the purposes of

damaging or destroying any facility or disrupting any

operations.

Designation of authority

Authority to assign and remove FOUO status should be

granted to designated personnel based on position and/

or responsibilities.
4-4 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Federal Funding for

Manmade Hazard

Mitigation Projects

At the time of this writing,

there is little federal funding

specifically earmarked for

state and local use in mitigating against manmade

hazards. When dealing with multiple

sources of funding, ensure that you seek

funding from the most directly appropriate and relevant program before

seeking assistance from other sources.

That said, mitigation against terrorism

and technological hazards will require

creative funding strategies that incorporate a variety of non-traditional sources.

Three reasons for this are:

1. Terrorism can potentially occur

almost anywhere and can affect a

wide range of facilities and

systems;

2. As with natural hazard mitigation,

the development and implementation of antiterrorism strategies can

be complex and expensive; and

3. Comprehensive antiterrorism and

technological hazard mitigation

includes security measures and

other techniques that may not be

eligible for FEMA funding under

current regulations.

Consideration 2

Project Funding

Increasingly, communities are challenged by budget constraints

that require "doing more with less." While many pre- and postdisaster funding sources exist that can help communities

strengthen themselves against natural disasters, creativity will be

the key to identifying how mitigation plans and actions for terrorism and technological hazards can be funded.

 Local governments have a good opportunity for incorporating mitigation funding into long-range planning,

especially in the capital improvement budget process.

For example, planning for a new municipal building is

an ideal opportunity to site a critical facility in a low

hazard area, to ensure that it is built with seismic, high

wind, or other appropriate hazard resistance as applicable, and to incorporate security systems and securityoriented design principles into the facility's planning

and design.

 State governments can implement incentive programs

using tax rebates and budget surpluses to promote

mitigation actions and strengthen building codes. They

can also incorporate all-hazard mitigation considerations into the processes, guidance, and requirements

that they develop for comprehensive planning, capital

improvement planning, urban design, land development regulation, growth management, and

sustainability.

 Federal government funding for terrorism-related

activities is rapidly expanding following the events of

September 11, 2001. Many funding streams that may be

of use to states and communities working to reduce

their vulnerability to manmade hazards are not yet in

place, but other established funding mechanisms not

previously used for this purpose can be leveraged to

provide assistance. Detailed information on available

federal funding can be found in the Catalog of Federal

Domestic Assistance at www.cfda.gov.

 Private sector organizations, businesses, and individual

homeowners have much to gain from reducing their

own risk by implementing cost-effective actions to

increase security and survivability. Industrial partners

and other private interests may be willing to contribute

time, labor, materials, or other support if they are

Security considerations should be a priority in all capital improvement

projects including both

renovation and new development.
implement the plan and monitor progress 4

Version 2.0 September 2003 4-5

convinced that the mitigation effort will benefit their

organization as part of an overall community improvement.

Consideration 3

Monitoring and Evaluation

There are significant challenges to monitoring and evaluating the

implementation of mitigation strategies for terrorism and technological hazards. Given the relatively low likelihood of manmade

disasters occurring in most communities (particularly in contrast to

many naturally occurring events), the value and effectiveness of

mitigation actions such as structural blast-resistance retrofits and

land use regulations may never be realized. Other actions such as

the application of Crime Prevention Through Environmental

Design techniques may indeed function to their full level of performance but their deterrent or preventative value may go unrecognized if they averted an incident that was, as a result, undetected.

Still others such as guards and intrusion sensors may be put to the

test regularly, either as part of a routine testing, training, and

maintenance program or in "real world" events. Should an incident or accident occur, however, there will likely be significant

interest on the part of the government, engineering, design, and

standards communities in the performance of various actions, and

the resulting inquiries and studies can provide valuable input into

subsequent mitigation planning initiatives.

The monitoring and evaluation of the manmade hazards portion

of the mitigation plan should correspond with the schedule established for the natural hazards portion of the plan. The plan should

be revisited, and if necessary updated, on a regular basis to ensure

that it is still relevant and accurate. If a disaster occurs, the plan

should be revisited, and perhaps revised, then as well.
afterword
Version 2.0 September 2003 afterword

afterword

The basics of mitigating hazards before they become disasters

are similar for both natural and manmade hazards. Whether

you are confronting wind, water, seismicity, terrorism, hazardous

materials, or sabotage, you can use the same four-phase mitigation

planning process to reduce the consequences should these hazards

impact the built environment. While communities of all sizes are

increasingly aware of their vulnerability to manmade hazards, this

awareness is of no value unless it is translated into action.

You may not be able to prevent every accident or deliberate attack,

but a well planned and effectively implemented mitigation program will help to reduce the consequences of such incidents. Of

course, the reality is that natural hazards may indeed present a

much greater risk than terrorism and technological disasters due

to their higher frequency of occurrence. By using this guide and

the other how-to guides in the series, you will be able to identify,

prioritize, and implement mitigation actions across the full spectrum of hazards and maximize the efficient allocation of public

resources.
appendices
Version 2.0 September 2003 a-1

Benefit-Cost Analysis

Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations

Closed-Circuit Television

Community Emergency Response Team

Code of Federal Regulations

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000

Department of State

Emergency Operating Plan

Emergency Support Function

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Emergency Management Agency

For Official Use Only

General Services Administration

Hazards US

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

Integrated Emergency Management System

Local Emergency Planning Committee

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition

Weapons of Mass Destruction

appendix a

acronyms

BCA

CAMEO

CCTV

CERT

CFR

CIP

CPTED

DMA

DOS

EOP

ESF

FBI

FEMA

FOUO

GSA

HAZUS

HIRA

HVAC

IEMS

LEPC

NBC

PCCIP

SCADA

WMD
Version 2.0 September 2003 b-1

appendix b

glossary

Antiterrorism

Counterterrorism

Crime Prevention Through

Environmental Design (CPTED)

Critical Infrastructure

Domestic Terrorism

Goals

International Terrorism

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals, forces,

and property to terrorist acts. (Source: US Department of Defense, Report

of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, 2000.)

Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

(Source: US Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the

President and the Congress, 2000.)

A crime prevention strategy based on evidence that the design and form

of the built environment can influence human behavior. Specifically,

CPTED seeks to create a physical environment that discourages criminal

activity. CPTED’s basic principles are territoriality, access control,

surveillance, activity support, and property maintenance.

System whose incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact

on the defense or economic security of the nation.

(Source: U.S. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office at

http://www.ciao.gov/resource/index.html.)

The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or

individual based and operating entirely within the United States or

Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or

property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population,

or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.

(Source: FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1998.)

General guidelines that identify what you want to achieve. They are

usually long-term in nature.

Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the

criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a

criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United

States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or

coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by

intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by

assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the

United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by

which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to

coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or

seek asylum. (Source: FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1998.)
b-2 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

To cause to become less harsh or hostile; to make less severe or painful.

Measurable strategies or implementation steps to attain a goal. They are

shorter in range and more specific than goals.

The act or process of making or carrying out plans; the establishment of

goals, policies, and procedures for a social or economic unit.

A crime prevention strategy based on reducing the opportunities for

crime by increasing the effort required to commit a crime, increasing the

risks associated with committing the crime, and reducing the target

appeal or vulnerability (whether property or person). This opportunity

reduction is achieved by management and use policies such as

procedures and training, as well as physical approaches such as alteration

of the built environment.

The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to

intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any

segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (Source:

28 CFR Section 0.85.)

Explosive, incendiary, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. As

defined in 18 U.S.C., Section 2332a,

"the term 'weapon of mass destruction' means –

(A) any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title;

(B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or

serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or

impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;

(C) any weapon involving a disease organism; or

(D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity

at a level dangerous to human life."

Furthermore, a 'destructive device' is defined in 18 U.S.C., Section 921 as:

"any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas –

(i) bomb,

(ii) grenade,

(iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,

(iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than

one-quarter ounce,

(v) mine, or

(vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding

clauses."

Mitigate

Objectives

Planning

Situational Crime Prevention

Terrorism

Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD)
Version 2.0 September 2003 c-1

appendix c

library

Research and Publications

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Winter 1994-95: 3-4.

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Archibald, Rae W., et al. 2002. Security and Safety in Los Angeles High-Rise

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at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB381.

Britton, Neil R. and John Lindsay. 1995. Demonstrating the Need to

Integrate City Planning and Emergency Preparedness: Two Case Studies.

International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 13,2: 161-178.

Clarke, Ronald V., ed. 1997. Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case

Studies (2nd ed.). Guilderland, N.Y.: Harrow and Heston.

Coleman, Michael A. 1997. The Influence of Traffic Calming Devices upon Fire

Vehicle Travel Times. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Transportation Engineers.

Crowe, Timothy D. 2000. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design:

Applications Of Architectural Design And Space Management Concepts (2nd ed.).

Stoneham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2002. World Trade Center

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Recommendations (FEMA 403). Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency

Management Agency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2001. Mitigation Resources for

Success (CD-ROM) (FEMA 372). Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency

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Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2000. Planning for a Sustainable

Future: The Link Between Hazard Mitigation and Livability (FEMA 364).

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Available at http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning_toc.shtm.
c-2 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1997. Radiological Emergency

Management Independent Study Course (IS-301). Washington, D.C.: Federal

Emergency Management Agency. (Online) Available at

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Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1996. The Oklahoma City

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Fehr, Stephen C. 1996. Parking Under Siege in D.C.: U.S. Anti-Terrorism

Plan Threatens 360 Spaces. The Washington Post, July 13, 1996.

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Gordon, Corey L. and William Brill. 1996. The Expanding Role of Crime

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cptedlia.pdf.

Hart, Sara. 2002. In the aftermath of September 11, the urban landscape

appears vulnerable and random: Architects and consultants focus on risk

assessment and security through design. Architectural Record, March 2002.

Hinman, Eve E. and David J. Hammond. 1997. Lessons from the Oklahoma

City Bombing: Defensive Design Techniques. Reston, VA: American Society of

Civil Engineers (ASCE Press).

Lasley, James. 1998. “Designing Out” Gang Homicides and Street Assaults.

Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. (Online) Available at

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La Vigne, Nancy G. 1997. Visibility and Vigilance: Metro’s Situational Approach to Preventing Subway Crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of

Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. (Online)

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Mulder, Kathy. 1998. Split Speed Bump. Washington, D.C.: Institute of

Transportation Engineers.

National Capital Planning Commission. 2002. The National Capital Urban

Design and Security Plan. (Online) Available at

http://www.ncpc.gov/publications/UDSP/final%20UDSP.pdf.

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Nation’s Capital. (Online) Available at http://www.ncpc.gov/

planning_init/security/designingsec.pdf.
appendix c – library

Version 2.0 September 2003 c-3

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 2002. Guidance for

Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks (DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2002-139). Cincinnati,

Ohio: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (Online)

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National League of Cities. 2000. Domestic Terrorism: Resources for Local

Governments. Washington, DC.: National League of Cities.

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Newman, Oscar. 1996. Creating Defensible Space. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

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http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/def.pdf.

Schneider, Richard H., and Ted Kitchen. 2002. Planning for Crime Prevention: A Transatlantic Perspective. New York, New York: Routledge.

Schwab, Jim, et al. 1998. Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction (Planning Advisory Service Report Number 483/484). Chicago,

Illinois: American Planning Association.

Sidell, Frederick R., et al. 1998. Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook. Alexandria,

Virginia: Jane’s Information Group.

Smith, Keith. 1992. Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing

Disaster. New York, New York: Routledge.

Smith, Mary S. 1996. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in

Parking Facilities. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. (Online) Available at

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedpkg.pdf.

Steinberg, Michele and Burby, Raymond J. 2002. Growing Safe. Planning

68,4: 22-23.

Taylor, Ralph B. and Adele V. Harrell. 1996. Physical Environment and

Crime. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice

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Headquarters, Department of the Army. (Online) Available at

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c-4 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms. 1999. Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard And Evacuation Distance

Tables. This publication is no longer available online. To request a copy,

write to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Exposives, Arson and

Explosives Programs Division, 800 K Street, NW, Tech World Suite 710,

Washington, DC 20001.

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Releases: Addressing Terrorist Activities in the Local Emergency Plan. (Online)

Available at http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/factsheets/lepcct.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2002. Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities (GAO02-472T). (Online) Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

d02472t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2001. Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts (GAO-02-208T). (Online)

Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02208t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2001. Homeland Security: Key Elements of a

Risk Management Approach (GAO-02-150T). (Online) Available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02150t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2000. Combating Terrorism: Linking

Threats to Strategies and Resources (T-NSIAD-00-218). (Online) Available at

http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00218t.pdf.

U.S. General Services Administration. 2002. GSA Occupant Emergency

Program (OEP) Guide. (Online) Available at http://www.gsa.gov/attachments/GSA_PUBLICATIONS/extpub/GSA_OEP_Guide_6.doc.

U.S. House of Representatives. 1996. Impacts of the closure of Pennsylvania

Avenue on the District of Columbia. Hearing before the Subcommittee on

the District of Columbia of the Committee on Government Reform and

Oversight, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress,

second session, June 7, 1996. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office.
appendix c – library

Version 2.0 September 2003 c-5

Web Sites

American Institute of Architects:

Building Security Through Design

American Lifelines Alliance

American Society for Industrial Security

Building Owners and Managers Association:

BOMA International Emergency Resource Center

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance:

terrorism-related funding

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office:

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Emergency

Management Institute, Terrorism Training and Resources

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Mitigation Planning

Federal Emergency Management Agency:

Information on manmade hazards

General Services Administration: Facilities Standards for the

Public Buildings Service (note: certain information is excluded

from public access for security reasons, but a vast amount of

helpful guidance is available)

General Services Administration: Office of the Chief Architect

General Services Administration, Public Buildings Service:

First Impressions – Streamlining Security

International Facility Management Association

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Advice for

Safeguarding Buildings Against Chemical or Biological Attack

National Capital Planning Commission:

Security and Urban Design

National Infrastructure Protection Center

National Institute of Building Sciences

http://www.aia.org/security

http://www.americanlifelinesalliance.org

http://www.asisonline.org

http://www.boma.org/emergency

http://www.cfda.gov

http://www.cfda.gov/911.htm

http://www.ciao.gov

http://www.ciao.gov/resource/pccip/

pccip_documents.htm

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/

terrorisminfor/ctrt.asp

http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning.shtm

http://www.fema.gov/hazards

http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/

facilitiesstandards

http://www.oca.gsa.gov

http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/firstimpressions/

takingaction/streamline_security.html

http://www.ifma.org

http://securebuildings.lbl.gov

http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/

security/security.html

http://www.nipc.gov

http://www.nibs.org
c-6 STATE AND LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING how-to guide: Integrating Manmade Hazards

Penn State University, Protective Technology Center:

Modern Protective Structures course

Public Entity Risk Institute

The Infrastructure Security Partnership

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Center of Expertise for

Protective Design: Blast Mitigation Action Group

U.S. Army Soldiers' and Biological Chemical Command:

Basic Information on Building Protection

U.S. Department of Defense:

Force Protection Equipment Demonstration IV

U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State:

Technical Support Working Group

U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories:

Architectural Surety Program

U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories:

Critical Infrastructure Protection initiative

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation:

Terrorism in the United States reports

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:

Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office

U.S. Fire Administration

U.S. General Accounting Office:

Special Collections – Terrorism

U.S. Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center,

Security Engineering Division: Systematic Approach for

Reviewing Projects for Protection Against Terrorism

3-day workshop

Whole Building Design Guide: Provide Security to Assets

http://www.cde.psu.edu/C&I/

ProtectiveStructures/default.html

http://www.riskinstitute.org

http://www.tisp.org

http://bmag.nwo.usace.army.mil

http://buildingprotection.sbccom.army.mil/

basic

http://www.fped4.org

http://www.tswg.gov

http://www.sandia.gov/archsur

http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN02-11-00/

steam_story.html

http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/

terroris.htm

http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/

content/index.html

http://www.usfa.fema.gov

http://www.gao.gov/terrorism.html

http://atfp.nfesc.navy.mil/training.htm

http://www.wbdg.org

(click “Design Guidance” then “Design Objectives” then “Secure/Safe”)
Version 2.0 September 2003 d-1

appendix d

worksheets

Worksheet #1 Build the Planning Team

Worksheet #2 Asset Identification Checklist

Worksheet #3 Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix
Worksheet #1 Build the Planning Team phase 1, step 

page 1 of 2

Specialists for Manmade Hazards

Bomb and Arson Squads

Community Emergency Response Teams

Hazardous Materials Experts

Infrastructure Owners/Operators

National Guard Units

Representatives from facilities identified

in Worksheet #2: Asset Identification

Checklist

Local/Tribal

Administrator/Manager’s Office

Budget/Finance Office

Building Code Enforcement Office

City/County Attorney’s Office

Economic Development Office

Emergency Preparedness Office

Fire and Rescue Department

Hospital Management

Local Emergency Planning Committee

Planning and Zoning Office

Police/Sheriff’s Department

Public Works Department

Sanitation Department

School Board

Transportation Department

Tribal Leaders

Step 2 of Getting Started (FEMA 386-1) discusses establishing a planning team with a broad range of

backgrounds and experience represented. This worksheet suggests additional individuals, agencies, and

organizations that should be included on a team to plan for manmade hazards. State organizations can be

included on local teams when appropriate to serve as a source of information and to provide guidance and

coordination.

You should use the checklist as a starting point for expanding your team.

ON

TEAM

ADD TO

TEAM

ON

TEAM

ADD TO

TEAM

Special Districts and Authorities

Airport and Seaport Authorities

Business Improvement District(s)

Fire Control District

Flood Control District

Redevelopment Agencies

Regional/Metropolitan Planning

Organization(s)

School Districts

Transit/Transportation Agencies

Others

Architectural/Engineering/Planning Firms

Citizen Corps

Colleges/Universities

Land Developers

Major Employers/Businesses

Professional Associations

Retired Professionals

State

Adjutant General’s Office (National Guard)

Board of Education

Building Code Office

Climatologist

Earthquake Program Manager

Economic Development Office
page 2 of 2

Emergency Management Office/

State Hazard Mitigation Officer

Environmental Protection Office

Fire Marshal’s Office

Geologist

Homeland Security Coordinator’s Office

Housing Office

Hurricane Program Manager

Insurance Commissioner’s Office

National Flood Insurance

Program Coordinator

Natural Resources Office

Planning Agencies

Police

Public Health Office

Public Information Office

Tourism Department

ON

TEAM

ADD TO

TEAM

ON

TEAM

ADD TO

TEAM

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

American Red Cross

Chamber of Commerce

Community/Faith-Based Organizations

Environmental Organizations

Homeowners Associations

Neighborhood Organizations

Private Development Agencies

Utility Companies

Other Appropriate NGOs
page 1 of 2

Worksheet #2 Asset Identification Checklist phase 2, step 

This worksheet is intended as an aid for identifying critical facilities, sites, systems, and other assets in your

community or state. Check all the boxes that apply to your jurisdiction.

Local, state, and federal government offices

(list all in your jurisdiction)

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Military installations, including Reserve and National

Guard component facilities (list all in your jurisdiction)

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

Emergency services

Backup facilities

Communication centers

Emergency operations centers

Fire/Emergency Medical Service (EMS) facilities

Law enforcement facilities

Politically or symbolically significant sites

Embassies, consulates

Landmarks, monuments

Political party and special interest group offices

Religious sites

Transportation infrastructure components

Airports

Bus stations

Ferry terminals

Interstate highways

Oil/gas pipelines

Railheads/rail yards

Seaports/river ports

Subways

Truck terminals

Tunnels/bridges

Energy, water, and related utility systems

Electricity production, transmission, and distribution system

components

Oil and gas storage/shipment facilities

Power plant fuel distribution, delivery, and storage

Telecommunications facilities

Wastewater treatment plants

Water supply/purification/distribution systems

Telecommunications and information systems

Cable TV facilities

Cellular network facilities

Critical cable routes

Major rights of way

Newspaper offices and production/distribution facilities

Radio stations

Satellite base stations

Telephone trunking and switching stations

Television broadcast stations

Health care system components

Emergency medical centers

Family planning clinics

Health department offices

Hospitals

Radiological material and medical waste transportation,

storage, and disposal

Research facilities, laboratories

Walk-in clinics
Financial services infrastructures and institutions

Armored car services

Banks and credit unions

Agricultural facilities

Chemical distribution, storage, and application sites

Crop spraying services

Farms and ranches

Food processing, storage, and distribution facilities

Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities

Apartment buildings

Business/corporate centers

Chemical plants (include facilities having Section 302

Extremely Hazardous Substances on-site)

Factories

Fuel production, distribution, and storage facilities

Hotels and convention centers

Industrial plants

Malls and shopping centers

Raw material production, distribution, and storage facilities

Research facilities, laboratories

Shipping, warehousing, transfer, and logistical centers

Mobile assets

Aviation and marine units

Mobile emergency operations centers/command centers

Portable telecommunications equipment

Red Cross Emergency Response Vehicles, Salvation Army

mobile canteens, etc.

Other (Bloodmobiles, mobile health clinics, etc.)

page 2 of 2

Recreational facilities

Auditoriums

Casinos

Concert halls and pavilions

Parks

Restaurants and clubs frequented by potential target

populations

Sports arenas and stadiums

Theaters

Public/private institutions

Academic institutions

Cultural centers

Libraries

Museums

Research facilities, laboratories

Events and attractions

Festivals and celebrations

Open-air markets

Parades

Rallies, demonstrations, and marches

Religious services

Scenic tours

Theme parks
Increments may be adjusted to better reflect your response capabilities or to be consistent with other guidance such as Mass Casualty Incident plans.

Note that different risks may exist at a facility depending on whether it is occupied or vacant.

Adapted from: FEMA Emergency Management Institute, Terrorism Planning Course

Worksheet #3 phase 2, step 

Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix

The Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix provides a way to record how vulnerable each asset is

and enables the planning team to compare how vulnerable the assets are relative to each other. Make a copy for

each asset and fill in the facility name or other identifier in the space provided. Select the appropriate point value

for each criterion based on the description in each row. Then add the point values to get the total for each asset.

When you have done this for each asset you identified, compare the total scores to see how the assets rank in

relation to one another.

Vulnerability Point Values

Criteria 0 1 2 3 4 5 Score

Asset

Visibility _

Existence

not well

known

_ Existence

locally known _ Existencewidely known

Target Utility None Very Low Low Medium High Very High

Asset

Accessibility

Remote location,

secure perimeter,

armed guards,

tightly controlled

access

Fenced,

guarded,

controlled

access

Controlled

access,

protected

entry

Controlled

access,

unprotected

entry

Open

access,

restricted

parking

Open

access,

unrestricted

parking

Asset

Mobility _

Moves or is

relocated

frequently

_

Moves or is

relocated

occasionally

_ Permanent /

fixed in place

Presence of

Hazardous

Materials

No hazardous

materials present

Limited

quantities,

materials in

secure

location

Moderate

quantities,

strict control

features

Large

quantities,

some control

features

Large

quantities,

minimal

control

features

Large

quantities,

accessible to

non-staff

persons

Collateral

Damage

Potential

No risk

Low risk /

limited to

immediate

area

Moderate

risk / limited

to immediate

area

Moderate

risk within

1-mile radius

High risk

within 1-mile

radius

High risk

beyond

1-mile radius

Site

Population/

Capacity

0 0 1 0 -25 2 0 51-50 5 0 01-100 1 0 001-500 > 500

TOTAL

Facility _____________________________________________________________________________________________
September 2003

FEMA 386-7

Version 2.0