Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1711-CR-2562 | November 14, 2018 Page 1 of 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Evan K. Hammond

Marion, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Waylon L. Sadler,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 14, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

27A02-1711-CR-2562

Appeal from the Grant Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Mark E. Spitzer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

27C01-1601-MR-1

Darden, Senior Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Waylon L. Sadler appeals his convictions of murder, a felony;1battery resulting 

in serious bodily injury,2a Level 5 felony; criminal confinement resulting in 

serious bodily injury, a Level 3 felony;3and intimidation with a deadly weapon, 

a Level 5 felony.

4

 We affirm.

Issues

[2] Sadler raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Sadler’s request to replace a seated juror with an alternate 

juror.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Sadler’s motion for mistrial.

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in instructing 

the jury on sudden heat.

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2014).

2

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2014).

3

Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3 (2014).

4

Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1 (2014).
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Facts and Procedural History

[3] In late 2015, James Zook, Jr., was in ill health. He had diabetes and was prone 

to seizures if his blood sugar was too high or too low. One of his toes had been 

amputated due to complications from diabetes. In addition, Zook had 

circulation problems in his legs caused by bone deterioration, and he had 

further suffered a stroke that limited his mobility on one side of his body and 

limited the use of one of his arms. He used a motorized wheelchair when he 

left his house, and he walked with a cane inside his house. Zook’s daughter, 

Shannon Collins, moved into his house in September 2015 to help take care of 

him. Collins’ boyfriend, Sadler, joined her. At the time, Sadler was on parole 

and was not allowed to possess weapons, including knives; however, he owned 

a black pocketknife.

[4] Collins and Sadler argued from time to time, which irritated Zook. In addition, 

Zook’s relationships with Collins and Sadler were contentious. He and Collins 

argued, and he occasionally grabbed her and shook her. In addition, Zook was 

irritated that Sadler did not pay rent or help around the house. In December 

2015, Zook stated he wanted Sadler to move out.

[5] On the evening of Monday, January 11, 2016, Collins’ mother, Sheila 

Schrameck, dropped off Collins’ four-year-old son, K.C., at Zook’s house. At 

some point during the evening, Collins called K.C.’s father and arranged for 

him to pick up K.C. in the morning.
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[6] Two days prior to January 11, 2016, Collins had experienced what she believed 

was a miscarriage. On the evening of January 11, she argued with Zook, 

claiming he may have caused the miscarriage by shoving her. Although Sadler 

was not in the room during the argument, he may have heard it because Zook’s 

house was small. Collins then watched a movie with K.C. in the living room 

before going to the bedroom she shared with Sadler, where she fell asleep.

[7] At around 2 a.m., Collins was awakened by a loud thud, and she thought Zook 

might have fallen in his bedroom. Sadler was not in their bedroom. She 

immediately went to Zook’s bedroom and found him on the floor, “with blood 

all around his neck.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 6. Zook was making gurgling noises and 

blood was coming from his neck. Collins tried to stop the bleeding, but was 

unsuccessful, and Zook died. She closed his eyes and left the room.

[8] Next, Collins went into her bedroom to find a telephone to call for help. Sadler 

was sitting on the futon bed, with Zook’s mobile phone in his hands. She asked 

Sadler, “why did you kill my dad,” and tried to grab the telephone from him. 

Id. at 9. At that point, Sadler punched her in the nose, causing profuse 

bleeding. He then said, “you guys won’t be arguing or something to that affect 

[sic] anymore.” Id.

[9] Sadler then went to the bathroom, and Collins locked the bedroom door before 

continuing to search for her mobile phone. Sadler kicked open the door and 

reentered the room. He took Collins’ telephone from her. Collins went to 

K.C., who remained asleep during these events, but Sadler told her to return to 
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the bedroom. She was afraid and begged him not to hurt K.C. Sadler and 

Collins laid down on the futon, and Collins tried to keep him calm. She 

noticed that Sadler had a deep cut on his thumb. They eventually fell asleep.

[10] When Collins awoke, the sun had risen. Sadler was awake and told her they 

should create a story about a break in or another explanation for Zook’s death 

that did not involve him. He further told her to go down to the basement and 

turn on the hot water so that they could clean up the blood. Due to Sadler’s 

agitated state, and fearful for K.C.’s safety, Collins told Sadler that K.C.’s father 

would soon arrive to pick up K.C., and she suggested that it would be better if 

she called Schrameck, her mother, to pick up K.C. instead. Sadler agreed that 

K.C. could leave with Collins’ mother, but Collins would have to stay and help 

clean up the house.

[11] Meanwhile, Schrameck had finished her overnight shift at work and was 

driving home when Collins called to ask her to pick up K.C. Sadler was sitting 

near Collins as she made the call, monitoring what she said. Schrameck heard 

Sadler yelling in the background, and Collins sounded nervous. Collins told 

her mother to park in the alley behind the house instead of the driveway. It was 

snowing outside, and Collins explained that the driveway would pose a 

problem because it had not been plowed; but, in reality she wanted Schrameck 

to park in the alley so that she could drive away without having to back up. 

Collins then changed her clothes, which were bloody, attempted to rinse blood 

out of her hair, and woke up K.C. The two went and stood outside in the alley 
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with K.C.’s car seat. She looked back at the house and saw Sadler watching her 

from the back door.

[12] Schrameck arrived in the alley, where Collins and K.C. were waiting for her. 

Collins opened Schrameck’s passenger side door and put K.C. in his child seat. 

Collins said loudly that she was strapping K.C. in his car seat. Collins then 

jumped into the car and, in a panicked state, told Schrameck to drive away. 

Schrameck was confused but told Collins to close the passenger door. Collins

then screamed, “[H]e killed dad. Go, go, go!” Id. at 27.

[13] At that point, Sadler ran up to the car from around the corner of a garage, 

wielding a baseball bat. He struck the windshield, fracturing it, as Schrameck 

began to drive away. Sadler smashed the driver’s side window as Schrameck 

continued to drive away, causing glass shards to fall inside the car. Sadler ran 

after the car shouting, “I’ll kill you b*****s!” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 140. A neighbor’s 

security camera recorded Sadler’s attack on Schrameck’s car and further 

showed that he ran back to Zook’s house, clutching the bat.

[14] Collins called the police using Schrameck’s cell phone. An officer met them at 

a nearby store. Collins ran up to the officer and said, “her boyfriend had killed 

her dad.” Id. at 173. Officers took Schrameck, Collins, and K.C. to the police 

station for questioning while other officers went to Zook’s house. Upon 

arriving at Zook’s house, officers discovered that the back door was open even 

though it was cold and snowing. They entered the house and found Zook’s 

body in his bedroom. One of the officers saw a slashing wound on Zook’s 
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neck, and blood was pooled on the floor around his head. The officers also 

found a baseball bat in the house with shards of glass embedded in it. Sadler 

was not present.

[15] Meanwhile, John Rush, who lived in Zook’s neighborhood, was awakened by 

someone “pounding” on his front door. Id. at 161. He slightly opened the door 

and saw a man, later identified as Sadler, standing there. Sadler was “agitated, 

irritated and talking so fast that you couldn’t make out what he was saying.” 

Id. at 162. Rush determined that Sadler wanted to enter his house and use his 

phone. Rush rejected Sadler’s request and told him to leave, but Sadler stuck 

his foot in the doorway. Rush, who was armed, again told Sadler to leave, and 

Sadler left. Ten minutes later, police officers arrived at Rush’s home. They had 

followed footprints in the snow from Zook’s house and learned that Sadler had 

been there.

[16] Next, Roger Pence, who also lived in Zook’s neighborhood, was alerted by his 

dogs that someone was walking through his yard and approaching his back 

door. Pence saw a man he did not recognize. The man, later identified as 

Sadler, left the back door and approached Pence’s truck. Pence had left the 

truck unlocked, and Sadler got in. Pence went outside and yelled at Sadler to 

get out of his truck. Sadler got out and approached Pence, saying he needed a 

lift to Wabash. Pence told him to leave before he called the police. Sadler 

apologized and walked away.
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[17] An officer later took Sadler into custody after he spotted Sadler walking along 

the roadway that led to Wabash, Indiana. Sadler initially ran from the officer 

and attempted to enter a nearby house, but eventually surrendered at gunpoint. 

He had bloodstains on his pants, and the officers found two cell phones in his 

clothes. The officers noticed Sadler had a deep cut on one of his thumbs and 

took him to the hospital for treatment before incarcerating him.

[18] A few days later, Sadler told officers he would show them where he had 

discarded his knife. They drove him to Zook’s neighborhood, and he pointed 

out a trash can in an alley. The officers looked in the can and found a black 

pocketknife. They submitted the knife for DNA testing, and testing revealed

there was a mixture of Zook’s and Sadler’s blood on the knife. Additionally, 

DNA testing revealed Zook’s blood on Sadler’s jeans.

[19] An autopsy of Zook’s body revealed he died from “stabbing and blunt force 

trauma with punctured jugular and laryngo [sic] tracheal fracture.” Tr. Vol. 2, 

p. 156. The blunt force trauma and the stab wound were inflicted by separate 

attacks on Zook.

[20] The State charged Sadler with murder, battery resulting in serious bodily injury 

(for punching Collins in the face), criminal confinement resulting in serious 

bodily injury (for preventing Collins from leaving the house), and intimidation 

with a deadly weapon (for attacking Schrameck’s car with a baseball bat). 

Sadler was tried by a jury. He initially presented a self-defense claim and

argued alternatively that, at most, he may have been guilty of manslaughter 
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rather than murder. The jury found Sadler guilty of murder as charged. The 

court imposed sentencing, and this appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Replacement of Seated Juror with Alternate

[21] Sadler first argues that the trial court erred in not replacing a seated juror who 

had been seen briefly interacting with one of Zook’s relatives after the trial 

began. If a seated juror is determined to be unable or disqualified to perform 

their duties, the court shall replace the juror with an alternate juror. Ind. Trial 

Rule 47(B). Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether to 

replace a seated juror with an alternate juror, and we will reverse such 

determinations only where we find them to be arbitrary, capricious or an abuse

of discretion. Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ind. 1995). In this context, 

an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision placed the defendant in 

substantial peril. Id.

[22] Because of the fundamental role of the jury in our system of justice, a rebuttable 

presumption of prejudice arises where a juror has participated in out-of-court 

communications. Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (Ind. 1994). Such 

juror misconduct must be based on proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that an extra-judicial contact or communication occurred, and that it pertained 

to a matter pending before the jury. Currin v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1045, 1046 (Ind. 

1986). In these circumstances, a trial court must often “weigh the nature and 

extent of a juror relationship with a party or witness established pre-trial and 
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arising in the normal, and often inevitable, course of interaction in an 

employment or community environment.” May v. State, 716 N.E.2d 419, 421 

(Ind. 1999) (emphasis omitted). Our review of the trial court’s decision in these 

matters is highly deferential. Id.

[23] In the current case, jury selection took place on August 28, 2017. The trial 

court read to the potential jurors a list of names of potential witnesses who may 

be involved in the pending case and asked if they recognized any of them. 

Juror Number One stated that he recognized the name of Zook, believing he 

might be the son of a classmate from high school. A jury panel was selected,

including Juror Number One and an alternate, and the court adjourned for the 

day.

[24] On the morning of August 29, 2017, it was brought to the trial court’s attention 

that a juror may have interacted with one of the victim’s family members in the 

courthouse that morning. The trial court conducted a hearing, and Deputy 

Warren Sample of the Grant County Sheriff’s Department testified that he 

witnessed the following encounter:

[Deputy Sample]: I had two gentlemen come in early, 

approximately ten minutes til eight and told [sic] me that they 

were family members. They did not state whether it was the 

victim or the Defendant. I did not ask, but I told them that they 

couldn’t go up yet cause there was . . . nothing was opened and I 

told them they could wait on the bench just down the hall. As 

some of the jurors started filing in, juror number one [. . .] came 

in and started to come upstairs and as he passed the two family 

members, they recognized each other and I couldn’t hear the 

exact words, but they shook hands and it sounded like [Juror 
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Number One] said I recognized the name and I also heard him 

say that he was a juror, a jurist and it was a very cordial meeting.

They were jovial, smiling and as he walked off, it sounded like 

the family member said well that’s good, something to that affect 

and that was it.

[The Court]: That’s good with regards to the fact that he was a 

juror?

[Deputy Sample]: That he was a juror. That’s the way it sounded 

to me.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 109. After the family member made that statement, Juror Number 

One “smiled and continued on to the elevator.” Id. at 111. To the deputy, it 

appeared to be a “cordial chance meeting.” Id. at 110.

[25] Next, Juror Number One testified. He explained that one of the men, Joe Zook

(Joe), was his classmate and that he had not seen him since they graduated 

from high school in 1980. In fact, he did not even recognize Joe at first sight. 

Juror Number One further stated Joe asked Juror Number One if he was on 

jury duty, and he said he was. Next, Joe told Juror Number One, “you’re a 

good man.” Id. at 113. The juror did not discuss the encounter with his fellow 

jurors. Subsequently, the following exchange occurred:

BY THE COURT Okay. Did that . . . would that interaction in 

any way affect your service as a juror or your ability to look at 

the case objectively or anything like that in your mind?

JUROR #1 No certainly not.
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Id. at 114. Juror Number One further stated, under questioning by the parties, 

that he believed he could still be fair and impartial and would not be 

uncomfortable sitting in the courtroom with the decedent’s relatives.

[26] After receiving the testimony of the witnesses, the trial court concluded, “I 

think for the record, my determination in judging the demeanor of [Juror 

Number One] and the remoteness of the connection that he had with the family 

member, um, I don’t believe that there was anything there that gave me, um, 

any, um, indication that he would not, um, be objective.” Id. at 115-16. He 

noted Zook “is an individual who [Juror Number One] hasn’t seen in thirtyseven years . . . .” Id. at 116.

[27] We find that there was an out-of-court communication, and a rebuttable 

presumption of prejudice applies. However, we conclude there is ample 

evidence in the record to rebut the presumption of prejudice. The evidence 

reveals that Joe was not a close friend or even a close acquaintance of Juror 

Number One, as they had not seen one another for thirty-seven years. Their 

discussion was brief and limited in scope. The juror stated he would be fair and 

impartial, and he would be a fair and objective juror despite the brief 

interaction. The juror further stated Joe’s presence in the courtroom would not 

make him uncomfortable. The trial judge was in the best position to weigh the 

evidence and observed the juror’s demeanor while making the determination 

that the juror could remain impartial.
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[28] Under the facts and circumstances in this case, the trial court’s decision to allow 

Juror Number One to remain on the panel did not place Sadler in substantial 

peril, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Spears v. State, 811 

N.E.2d 485, 489-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (no abuse of discretion in declining to 

replace juror; juror had a brief encounter with a witness during a break in the 

trial, but the two persons had not met before and the juror stated he would 

remain impartial).

II. Motion for Mistrial

[29] Sadler argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after 

Shannon Collins inadvertently violated the trial court’s order in limine while 

testifying. A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified when other 

remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation. Hale v. State, 875 

N.E.2d 438, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. On 

appeal, the trial judge’s discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial is 

afforded great deference because the judge is in the best position to gauge the 

surrounding circumstances of an event and its impact on the jury. McManus v. 

State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2004). We therefore review the trial court’s 

decision solely for abuse of discretion. Id. The appellant must demonstrate that 

the conduct complained of was both erroneous and had a probable persuasive 

effect on the jury’s decision. Hale, 875 N.E.2d at 443.
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[30] Prior to trial, the court granted Sadler’s motion in limine and prohibited any 

reference at trial to his criminal history. During trial, Collins testified as 

follows:

[State]: Shannon, did Waylon have any knives?

[Collins] Yes. 

[State] What kind of knives did he have? 

[Collins] It was like pocket knives with a clip on them. One of 

them had a clip on it. I’m not sure if the other one did or not. 

[State] Okay and was it a clip . . . what kind of clip . . . what was 

the clip for?

[Collins] To like put on your pants or something, your pocket. 

[State] Is that where he would keep it?

[Collins] Usually, yeah.

[State] What color was that? 

[Collins] Black.

[State] Do you recall when he had got that? 

[Collins] I don’t know exactly when he bought it, but he bought 

it when he wasn’t with me because he wasn’t suppose [sic] to 

have knives anyways. Or . . . I’m sorry.
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Tr. Vol. II, pp. 30-31. According to Sadler’s trial attorney, when Collins said 

“I’m sorry” she simultaneously pulled her shirt up to briefly cover her face. Id.

at 34.

[31] The State quickly changed its line of questioning regarding the knife, never 

mentioned or alluded to it again, and continued to question Collins for several 

more minutes about other matters. After the State ended its direct examination, 

out of the presence of the jury Sadler moved for a mistrial, arguing Collins 

violated the order in limine. The court ruled as follows:

Okay. So I think that it was clearly inadvertent. Um, you know, 

did it violate the Court’s order in limine, yes, arguably it did. 

Um, but it was inadvertent. I did look at the jury after she made 

the comment, I didn’t see it register with anybody or they did not 

appear to have, um, I did not see any juror take note of it in any 

overt fashion. Um, I think that to admonish the jury at this time 

would simply call to . . . would additionally call attention to it so, 

um, it’s the Court [sic] decision to let it pass at this time. I’m 

gonna deny the motion for mistrial, um, and will . . . I’m not 

going to admonish . . . .”

Id. at 42.

[32] On the morning of the next day of trial, the court held a hearing outside the 

presence of the jury. The trial court explained for the record that it had received 

information that when one of the jurors had left the courthouse the prior 

evening, he or she had asked the bailiff why Sadler was not supposed to have a 

knife. The bailiff instructed the juror to address the question to the judge, in 

writing. After the trial court explained the situation to the parties, Sadler 
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renewed his motion for mistrial. The trial court denied the renewed motion, 

reiterating that the violation of the order in limine was inadvertent and 

concluding that Sadler had not been placed “in great peril.” Id. at 54. The trial 

court further stated that if the juror submitted the question in writing, then the 

court planned to admonish the jury to disregard the issue.

[33] The jury was brought into the courtroom, and Collins returned to the witness 

stand. At that point, a juror submitted a written question asking why Collins 

apologized for stating Sadler was not supposed to have a knife and further 

requesting additional information. During a subsequent bench conference

outside the hearing of the jury, the trial court reaffirmed that it was denying the 

request for a mistrial and would give an admonishment. Next, the trial court 

gave the following admonishment to the jury:

Okay. Juror question, uh, number one, um, was tendered and, 

um, it is not my . . . uh, it’s not an appropriate question to ask the 

witness. Relates to matters that really aren’t relevant to your 

determination and you shouldn’t speculate about, um, uh, about 

what, uh, those matters are, um, and so I am not going to answer 

that question as it was . . . it’s not one that would be permitted to 

be asked . . . .

Id. at 57.

[34] Sadler argues that Collins violated the order in limine by stating he was not 

supposed to have knives. He further argues Collins’ violation placed him in 

grave peril because it had a persuasive effect on the jury, noting that one juror 

followed up on Collins’ testimony by submitting a written question. In support 
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of his motion for mistrial, Sadler argued that a possible theory of his defense of 

the case was that he may have committed manslaughter rather than murder, 

and if the jury knew that he was barred from having a knife but chose to carry 

one anyway, that information may have had a persuasive effect by undercutting

his claim that he acted under the influence of sudden heat.

[35] We do not agree that Collins’ inadvertent and isolated remark placed Sadler in 

grave peril. Sadler did not immediately object to the remark, nor did he 

immediately ask to have the remark struck from the record or request an 

admonishment. Instead, he waited until Collins’ testimony on direct 

examination was finished before moving for a mistrial. At that time, the trial 

court explained that it had looked at the jurors’ demeanor after Collins made 

the remark, and determined that the jurors did not appear to show any response 

or to have focused on Collins’ remark. The trial court’s ruling was reasonable 

under the facts and circumstances at the time, particularly because Collins’ 

remark was ambiguous and did not directly implicate Sadler’s past involvement 

in any criminal activities, and in addition the prosecutor quickly moved on to 

another topic. Cf. Lehman v. State, 777 N.E.2d 69, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (trial 

court erred in denying motion for mistrial; witness testified that Lehman had 

committed acts against “nine other victims.”).

[36] Herein, the next day, after a juror had asked the bailiff why Sadler was not 

supposed to have a knife, and had submitted to the trial court a written question 

on the same topic, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the question

as an inappropriate question to ask the witness and the question was not 
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relevant to this case. The court further directed the jury not to speculate about 

that irrelevant issue in making their determination in the present case. A timely 

and accurate admonition is presumed to cure any error in the admission of 

evidence. James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 22 (Ind. 1993). Further, there is no 

evidence that the juror had discussed the question with other jurors before 

submitting the question to the trial court. Finally, the trial court admonished 

the jury; and, after reviewing the totality of the evidence presented at trial 

establishing Sadler’s guilt for murder, we conclude it is unlikely Collins’

inadvertent and isolated remark, which did not implicate Sadler’s criminal 

record or parole status, had a persuasive impact on the jury. “We presume 

juries follow the admonitions of the court.” Tharpe v. State, 955 N.E.2d 836, 

842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Sadler’s motion for a mistrial. See Banks v. State, 761 

N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ind. 2002) (no error in denying motion for mistrial after 

witness referred to Banks’ criminal history; admonishment was sufficient to 

correct any error).

III. Jury Instruction – Sudden Heat

[37] Sadler argues the trial court erred in accepting the State’s proposed Final 

Instruction 15, and reading it to the jury. He claims it duplicated other 

instructions and unfairly shifted the burden of proof to him.

[38] The purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the 

facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case 
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clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. Overstreet v. State, 783 

N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind. 2003). Our standard for deciding whether the trial 

court erred in instructing the jury is well settled and affords great deference to 

the trial court. Reed v. State, 720 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. 

denied. Instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we 

review its decision only for an abuse of discretion. Washington v. State, 997 

N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. 2013).

[39] In reviewing a trial court’s decision to give or refuse tendered jury instructions, 

this Court considers: (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) 

whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; 

and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other 

instructions that are given. Chambers v. State, 734 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind. 2000). 

An abuse of discretion arises when the instruction is erroneous and the 

instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. 

Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484-5 (Ind. 2015).

[40] In Sadler’s case, both parties submitted proposed jury instructions on voluntary 

manslaughter. The trial court’s Final Instruction 4 followed the Indiana Pattern

Jury Instruction definition for murder and voluntary manslaughter, explaining

that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sadler was 

not acting under sudden heat. In addition, Final Instruction 14 defined 

“sudden heat” using the Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction, as follows:

The term “sudden heat” means a mental state which results from 

provocation sufficient to excite in the mind of the defendant such 
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emotions as anger, rage, sudden resentment, jealousy, or terror 

sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, and as 

such prevents deliberation and premeditation, excludes malice, 

and renders the defendant incapable of cool reflection prior to 

acting.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 53. The State submitted an additional proposed

instruction providing that anger, standing alone, does not establish sudden heat. 

After discussing all of the instructions with the parties, the trial court also in 

addition accepted the State’s proposed instruction and read it to the jury as 

Final Instruction 15: “Anger, standing alone, is not sufficient for sudden heat.” 

Id. at 53-54.

[41] Final Instruction 15 was a correct statement of law, because it is well 

established that anger without provocation is insufficient to establish sudden 

heat. Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (Ind. 1992). Further, there was 

evidence in the record to support giving the instruction. The jury learned that 

there was past animosity between Zook and Sadler, and the trial court was 

justified in explaining that mere anger, standing alone, was insufficient to prove 

sudden heat. In addition, Final Instruction 15 did not duplicate Final 

Instruction 14 because it addressed a distinct, albeit related, principle of sudden 

heat. Finally, we cannot agree that Final Instruction 15 improperly shifted the 

burden of proof to Sadler. Reading all of the instructions as a whole, Final 

Instruction 4 unequivocally instructed the jury that the State bore the burden of 

disproving the existence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1711-CR-2562 | November 14, 2018 Page 21 of 21

Conclusion

[42] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[43] Affirmed.

[44] Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.