S. Hrg. 115–573 

THREATS TO THE HOMELAND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 27, 2017 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
THREATS TO THE HOMELAND—2017 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

29–657 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

S. Hrg. 115–573 

THREATS TO THE HOMELAND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 27, 2017 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

JON TESTER, Montana 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

KAMALA D. HARRIS, California 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

DANIEL P. LIPS, Policy Director 

MICHAEL J. LUEPTOW, Senior Counsel 

ELIZABETH E. MCWHORTER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

M. SCOTT AUSTIN, U.S. Coast Guard Detailee 

MARGARET E. DAUM, Minority Staff Director 

JULIE G. KLEIN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

HANNAH M. BERNER, Minority Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BONNI E. DINERSTEIN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 2 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 12 

Senator Lankford .............................................................................................. 14 

Senator Heitkamp ............................................................................................ 16 

Senator Hassan ................................................................................................. 18 

Senator Peters .................................................................................................. 19 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 21 

Senator Harris .................................................................................................. 23 

Senator Hoeven ................................................................................................. 26 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 28 

Senator Daines ................................................................................................. 29 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 45 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 46 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2017 

Honorable Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

Honorable Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

U.S. Department of Justice ................................................................................. 6 

Honorable Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence ............................................ 7 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Duke, Hon. Elaine C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Rasmussen, Hon. Nicholas J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 67 

Wray, Hon. Christopher A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 59 

APPENDIX 

Countering Violent Extremism document ............................................................. 74 

IG report ................................................................................................................... 75

Letter from Alejandro Garcia Padilla .................................................................... 160 

DACA information ................................................................................................... 161 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record: 

Ms. Duke ........................................................................................................... 195 

Mr. Wray (non-response) .................................................................................. 316 

Mr. Rasmussen ................................................................................................. 324 

(1) 

THREATS TO THE HOMELAND 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford, Hoeven, Daines, 

McCaskill, Carper, Tester, Heitkamp, Peters, Hassan, and Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good morning. This hearing of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) is 

called to order. 

This is our annual ‘‘Threats to the Homeland’’ hearing. I want to 

welcome our witnesses. I would like to start, though, by acknowledging the victims of the hurricanes in Houston, Texas, in Florida, 

and throughout the Caribbean, but in particular Puerto Rico. I am 

sure we will be discussing that quite a bit. Maybe it was not contemplated when we first set this up and scheduled this hearing on 

the other enormous threats, but there are real threats to human 

life occurring now throughout our Nation, and we will certainly acknowledge that. All those individuals are in our thoughts and prayers. I am sure everybody on this Committee joins me in that. 

We are pleased to welcome the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Elaine Duke; the Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Christopher Wray; and the 

Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Nicholas 

Rasmussen. We want to thank all of you for your service. These are 

perilous times. The threats that face our homeland are growing, 

they are evolving, they are metastasizing. I do not envy any of you 

your task. These are serious responsibilities, and we are all grateful that you stepped up to the plate and we have quality individuals with real talent that are accepting that responsibility. 

The mission statement of this Committee is pretty simple: To enhance the economic and national security of America and to promote more efficient, effective, accountable government. Very similar, I would imagine, to some of the mission statements of your 

own Departments and Agencies. 

I do not want to spend a whole lot of time because we have a 

number of Members here, but, again, I just want to acknowledge 
2 

1The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 46. 

2The document referenced by Senator McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 74. 

your service to this Nation, the sacrifice you and your families are 

undertaking to serve this Nation. 

And, with that, I will turn it over to Senator McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL1

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Directors Wray and Rasmussen, thank you for being here today. 

Secretary Duke, I welcome you to the Committee for the first time 

as the Department’s Acting Secretary. I want to let you know that 

I appreciate the efforts that you and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are making to assist the victims of hurricanes in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico. I will have to say, 

though, we are very concerned about what we are seeing in Puerto 

Rico. I know there have been logistical challenges because of the 

devastation in Puerto Rico, but I am looking forward to the briefing 

that we are going to receive today from FEMA about what is actually occurring on the ground. And, those Americans are very deserving of whatever it takes for us to address the crisis, the humanitarian crisis that is impacting 3.5 million American citizens in 

Puerto Rico as we speak today. 

The hearing today is about threats to the homeland. 

Heartbreakingly, just last month, we suffered a terrorist attack 

here at home. The violence perpetrated by white supremacists and 

neo-Nazis at the Charlottesville rally was tragic, vile, and evil. It 

stunned many of us who thought the chants of ‘‘Blood and Soil’’ belonged in film footage from a Nuremberg rally, not a 21st Century 

American college. The boldness and the outspokenness of something that is so evil, proudly marching under a Nazi flag, is something that I think many of us did not think we would see in this 

country, but now we have seen it. 

I direct your attention to a document2 that is on the easel. I do 

not think many Americans understand the level of threat that we 

have in this county from white supremacists, anti-government, and 

other violent extremists. If you look at the comparison—and this 

data comes from the Government Accountability Office (GAO); this 

is not from a think tank, this is not from anybody who has bias, 

this is from the government auditors—we have had 62 incidents 

since September 11, 2001 (9/11) and 106 fatalities by the white supremacists, anti-government, and other violent extremists. Compare that to 23 acts of violence by Islamic violent extremists. The 

fatalities are almost equal. And so, one of my goals at this hearing 

today is to get specific responses as to whether or not the level of 

investigation and response matches the level of threat as it relates 

to these two types of terrorists that want to do harm to American 

citizens. 

I am worried that we have—and this Committee is a good example. We have had multiple hearings on the threat of Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as it relates to homeland security. We have 

had zero hearings about the threat of domestic terrorists and the 

threat they pose in our country and our response to it. 
3 

We also face the threats from foreign terrorist organizations like 

ISIS and those inspired by them. We only need to look overseas 

over the past 4 months to see what our allies have suffered. The 

suicide bomber in Manchester, England, in June; the pedestrians 

on the London Bridge in August; a van in Barcelona, Spain; and 

just this month a bucket bomb on a London subway. We know 

these organizations are not just targeting Europe. 

We know that, in addition to domestic terrorists, there are also 

foreign terrorists who want to kill Americans and who want to, importantly, radicalize Americans here at home to do so. 

That is why we depend on you, the men and women of the DHS, 

the FBI, and the NCTC. We rely on you to identify threats, prevent 

attacks, and keep America safe. 

That is why I am so concerned about some of the budget choices 

made by this Administration. For instance, mass transit locations 

and other ‘‘soft targets’’ where large groups of people gather have 

served as prime targets. In addition to aviation security, the 

Transporation Security Administration (TSA) helps secure mass 

transit, passenger rail, freight rail, highways, buses, pipelines, and 

seaports. According to the TSA, more than 10 billion passenger 

trips are taken on mass transit systems each year. 

Yet the President’s budget plans to cut critical TSA programs at 

a time that we cannot afford to let up when it comes to security 

measures. A large portion of this cut is taken from the Visible 

Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams. The VIPR 

teams deploy all across the country to provide critical assistance 

with securing airports, subways, and bus terminals. And, by the 

way, they also deployed to Houston to assist with recovery. But, 

the President’s budget would cut them by $43 million, reducing 

VIPR teams from 31 down to just 8 teams to cover the entire country. 

The President’s budget would also slash other DHS programs 

that provide critical security to our transportation systems. In July, 

DHS announced 29 awards through the Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (CCTA) Grant Program, including one that would 

help Kansas City preparedness plans and enhance communications 

systems, and another that would allow St. Louis to build an integrated response structure among first responders. This is the type 

of assistance we should be providing our cities in the face of threats 

like London, Barcelona, and Manchester. But, the President’s budget will eliminate all of these grant programs for next year. 

There unfortunately is not enough time to discuss in 7 minutes 

or even a single hearing all the threats our country faces. We face 

cyber ransomware attacks. We have Russia trying to hack our elections. This month, DHS ordered Agencies to remove cybersecurity 

software from Federal computer systems because of its manufacturer’s ties to Russian intelligence. We have border security issues. 

We even have potential threats to agriculture. Just last month I 

had a roundtable in Kansas City to learn what agro-terrorism 

could do to the Nation’s confidence in its food supply. 

So, I am glad you are all here today to talk about what the greatest threats are that America faces, what we are doing about them, 

and, most importantly, what we can do to help you in your most 

important work. 
4 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 45. 

2The prepared statement of Ms. Duke appears in the Appendix on page 48. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

I would ask consent that my written opening statement be entered in the record.1

It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if 

you will all stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the 

testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Ms. DUKE. I do. 

Mr. WRAY. I do. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is the Honorable Elaine Duke. Elaine Duke is 

the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She 

became the Acting Secretary on July 31st. She has served as Deputy Secretary since April. Her previous decades of Federal service 

include 2 years as the Department’s Under Secretary for Management. Acting Secretary Duke. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ELAINE C. DUKE,2 ACTING 

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. DUKE. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member 

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is 

my honor to testify this morning on behalf of the men and women 

of DHS who shield our Nation from threats of terror each and 

every single day. 

Last night, we learned of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) agent that was shot and is critically ill in Jacksonville, Florida, and each week I send out condolence letters for law enforcement officers, and it is on behalf of them that I testify today and 

came back to service. 

In recent weeks, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Jose, and Maria have 

placed a spotlight on natural disasters. With FEMA’s leadership, 

our Department and the whole Federal Government have come together to respond to these crises, and I am impressed with the professionalism I have witnessed. 

But the challenges in places like Puerto Rico are evidence that 

there is a long road ahead. To those that have been caught up in 

the disasters, let me say this: I promise to do everything in my 

power to bring relief, and we will stand with you side by side in 

the weeks, months, and years to come. 

But natural disasters are not the only threats we face as a Nation. Right now, the terror threat to our country equals and in 

many ways exceeds that in the period around 9/11. We are seeing 

a surge in terrorist activity because the fundamentals of terrorism 

have changed. Our enemies are crowdsourcing their violence online, promoting a do-it-yourself approach that involves using any 

weapons their followers can get their hands on easily. 

The primary international terror threat facing our country is 

from global jihadist groups. However, the Department is also focused on the threat of domestic terrorism. Ideologically motivated 
5 

extremists here in the United States are a threat to our Nation, 

our people, and our values. I condemn this hate and violence, and 

my Department is focused on countering it. DHS will not stand on 

the sidelines as these threats spread, and we will not allow pervasive terrorism to become the new normal. 

We are tackling the dangers ahead in two ways: 

First, we are rethinking homeland security for a new age. There 

is no longer a home game and an away game. The line is blurred, 

and the threats are connected across borders. That is why DHS is 

moving toward a more integrated approach, bringing together intelligence, operations, interagency engagement, and international action like never before. 

Second, we are raising the baseline of our security posture across 

the board. We are looking at everything from traveler screening to 

information sharing. Higher threat levels mean we need higher 

standards. 

For example, we are now requiring all foreign governments to 

share critical data with us on terrorists and criminals and to help 

us confidently identify their nationals. We must know who is coming into our country and make sure that they do not pose a threat. 

That is why I recommended and the President approved tough but 

tailored restrictions against countries who do not cooperate with us 

on immigration screening and vetting. This will protect America 

and hold foreign governments accountable. 

Similarly, we are elevating aviation security standards. Our ongoing Global Aviation Security Plan, which we began this summer, 

is making U.S.-bound flights more secure, and it is raising the 

baseline of aviation security worldwide. 

We are also making historic moves to keep dangerous individuals 

and goods from entering America illegally. That includes building 

a wall on the Southwest border and cracking down on 

transnational criminal organizations (TCO) that bring drugs, violence, and other threats across our borders. 

Within our borders, we are rededicating ourselves to terrorism 

prevention to keep extremists from radicalizing our people. As part 

of this effort, we are prioritizing education and community awareness. We are redoubling our efforts to stop terrorist recruitment, 

and we are emphasizing the importance of early warning to make 

sure communities report suspicious activity before it is too late. 

Americans are also alarmed by the spike in cyber attacks. Our 

adversaries continue to develop advanced capabilities online. They 

seek to undermine our critical infrastructure, target our livelihoods 

and our secrets, and threaten our democracy. 

On behalf of the entire Department, I appreciate the critical role 

this Committee plays in helping us execute our mission. I also respectfully ask the Committee to focus on reauthorizing our Department as quickly as possible. 

Thank you for letting me appear today, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Secretary Duke. 

Our next witness is Christopher Wray. Christopher Wray is the 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On August 2, 2017, 

Mr. Wray was sworn in as the eighth FBI Director. He previously 
6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Wray appears in the Appendix on page 59. 

served as Assistant Attorney General (AG) at the Department of 

Justice (DOJ) in charge of the Criminal Division. Director Wray. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY,1 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. WRAY. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member 

McCaskill, and Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to 

talk to you today about the threats here in the homeland and the 

tremendous work being done by the people at the FBI to confront 

those challenges. 

From my earlier years in law enforcement and national security, 

I already knew how outstanding the men and women of the Bureau 

are, but to see it, I must say, over the last few weeks from this position makes me feel even more honored, if that is possible, to be 

their Director. They are mission-focused; they are passionate; they 

are determined to be the very best at protecting the American people and upholding the rule of law. 

Having been away from government for a number of years, some 

of the changes that I have now seen in the first few weeks upon 

getting back have struck me in particular: the evolution of the 

threats, the expertise developed, and the capabilities that have 

been built. Changes in technology have dramatically transformed 

the nature of the threats we face and challenged our ability to confront those threats. 

In the terrorism arena, my prior experience was primarily with 

large structured terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, and to be 

clear, we still very much confront threats from large structured organizations like al-Qaeda planning large-scale, sophisticated attacks over long periods of time. But now added to that list, we also 

face groups like Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) who 

use social media to recruit and spread their propaganda and to inspire people to take to the streets with crude but effective weapons, 

like hatchets and car bombs. These are smaller in scale but greater 

in volume, and these organizations often move from plotting to action in a very short period of time, with very little planning and 

using low-tech and widely available attack methods. 

These terrorists’ use of social media and encryption technology 

has made it harder to find the messages of hate and destruction 

they are spreading and harder to pinpoint who these messages are 

gaining traction with here in the homeland. 

The same can be said of domestic extremist movements that collectively pose a steady threat of violence and economic harm to the 

United States, in that instance primarily through lone offenders. 

In the cyber arena, the threats are not only increasing in scope 

and scale; they are also becoming increasingly difficult to investigate. Cyber criminals have increased the sophistication of their 

schemes, which are now harder to detect and more resilient. What 

was once a comparatively minor threat, somebody hacking for fun 

and bragging rights and trying to prove a point just that he could 

do it, has now turned into full-blown nation-state manipulation and 

a multi-million-dollar business. 
7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen appears in the Appendix on page 67. 

And, in the counterintelligence arena, foreign governments pose 

a rising threat to the United States, and that threat also is more 

complex and more varied than it has been at any time in the FBI’s 

history. Historically, as the Committee may know, counterintelligence focused on protecting U.S. Government secrets from foreign 

intelligence services. But today, in addition, we face threats from 

nation-states targeting not just our national security secrets but 

our ideas and our innovation. And, we now see threats not just 

from traditional intelligence officers but from less traditional spies 

posing as business people or students or scientists. 

All those threats are amplified by the growing challenge that we 

in the law enforcement community refer to as ‘‘going dark.’’ It affects the spectrum of our work. The exploitation of encrypted platforms presents serious challenges to law enforcement’s ability to 

identify, investigate, and disrupt threats, whether it is—and I want 

to add to that that, obviously, we all understand that whether it 

is instance messages, texts, old-fashioned letters, citizens have the 

right to communicate with each other without unauthorized government surveillance, and the free flow of information is critical to 

democracy. 

But the benefits of our increasingly digital lives have been accompanied by new dangers, and we have been forced to wrestle 

with how criminals and terrorists might use advances in technology to their advantage. Even with unquestionably lawful authority, the reality is we are all too often flying blind, and we need 

to work together to find thoughtful but quick and effective solutions. 

The news is not all bad, not by a long shot. There are great 

strides being made. Intelligence is being far better integrated into 

our mission. The quality of our partnerships, both across Agencies, 

State and local, foreign, are at a whole new level. But while great 

progress has been made, we need to keep improving. I think the 

changes in technology are one of the primary concerns that we 

have, and I look forward to answering the Committee’s questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Director. 

Our final witness is Nicholas Rasmussen. Mr. Rasmussen is the 

Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. On December 

18, 2014, Mr. Rasmussen was sworn in as the fifth Director of the 

NCTC. He previously served as the NCTC’s Deputy Director since 

June 2012. Director Rasmussen. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN,1

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

McCaskill, and Members of the Committee, and I am pleased to be 

here with my colleagues and close partners Secretary Duke and Director Wray. 

As we passed the 16-year mark since 9/11 earlier this month, the 

array of terrorist actors we are confronting around the globe is 

broader, wider, and deeper than it has been at any time since that 

day. And, as we sit here today, the discipline of terrorism preven-
8 

tion I would argue is evolving and changing beneath our feet every 

day as well and requires that we respond with extraordinary agility. 

I will just briefly discuss two areas to complement what my colleagues have already said. 

First, I will quickly share what we have seen by way of changes 

or shift in priority in the terrorism landscape since I was sitting 

before the Committee a year ago. 

Second, I will say just a few words about areas where we can do 

a better job tackling the threat of those who are mobilized to extremist violence here at home. 

So let us begin with what has changed or is new since this time 

last year. We see those developments in three principal areas: the 

coalition’s success in shrinking the territory that ISIS controls in 

Iraq and Syria as compared to a year ago; the significant uptick in 

attacks inspired by ISIS that we have seen against Western interests across the globe in the last year as compared to the number 

of attacks directed by the ISIS group from its headquarters in Iraq 

and Syria; and, finally, the third new threat development I would 

point to for this year is the resurgence of aviation threats, reaching 

a level of concern that we in the intelligence community (IC) have 

not faced since al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s printer package plot in 2010. 

So, to start with, ISIS losses on the battlefield. Since I spoke 

with this Committee last year, ISIS has lost a number of senior 

leaders, been expelled from key cities in Iraq and Syria, and suffered other significant defeats in the heart of its so-called caliphate. 

As ISIS copes with this loss of territory, the group will look to preserve its capabilities by operating as a covert terrorist organization 

and insurgency. In some ways, ISIS is reverting to its roots with 

tactics we saw in the period 2004 to 2008, when it operated as an 

insurgency called al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

However, these territorial losses have unfortunately not translated into a corresponding reduction in the group’s ability to inspire 

attacks. While progress has been made in shrinking the size of the 

territory that ISIS controls, this has not diminished their ability to 

inspire attacks far beyond the conflict zone. Over the last year, 

those attacks have taken place in places like the United Kingdom 

(U.K.) and other countries in Europe. This highlights the diffuse 

nature of the global threat. And, the number of arrests and disruptions we have seen around the globe, while that is a testament to 

really effective and strong law enforcement and intelligence work, 

it also tells us that ISIS’ ability to reach globally is still largely intact. 

This uptick in inspired attacks is in contrast to the pattern of 

Western attacks directed and enabled by the group’s headquarters 

in Syria that we saw in 2015 and 2016. All of this underscores our 

belief that there is not, in fact, a direct link between ISIS’ battlefield position in Iraq and Syria and the group’s capacity to inspire 

external attacks. And, it makes clear that battlefield losses alone 

are insufficient to mitigate the threat that we face from ISIS. 

Winning on the battlefield in places like Mosul and Raqqa is a 

necessary but insufficient step in the process of eliminating the 

ISIS threat to our interests. As a result, we need to be patient in 
9 

terms of expecting return on the investment we are making with 

our campaign against ISIS. It is simply going to take longer than 

we would like to translate victory on the battlefield into genuine 

threat reduction. 

It is also worth me saying, as focused as we are in addressing 

ISIS, al-Qaeda has never stopped being a primary counterterrorism 

priority for the counter terrorism community here in the United 

States. The various al-Qaeda groups have also managed to sustain 

recruitment, maintain relationships, and derive sufficient resources 

to enable their operations. This is a strikingly resilient organization, and we are well aware of that. 

I will touch quickly now on the third development that has stood 

out over the last year: the threat to civil aviation. As you are well 

aware, terrorists see attacking aviation as a way to garner global 

media attention and inflict serious economic harm. Aviation has 

taken center stage over the last year as evidenced by the Australian authorities’ disruption of a plot by terrorists to bring explosives aboard an aircraft. Both ISIS-and al-Qaeda-aligned groups 

have demonstrated a continued capability to conduct aviation attacks. All of these attacks, both ones that succeeded and ones that 

failed, demonstrate several things. 

First, they show the persistent focus on terrorists on targets of 

Western aviation. 

Second, it shows that terrorists are aware of security procedures. 

They watch what we do, and they try to learn from it. 

And, third, it suggests that the bad guys have an ability to adapt 

their tactics in an attempt to defeat the airport security measures 

that we engage in. 

It is for these reasons that aviation-related threats have long 

been and will remain at or near the top of the list of things we 

worry about. 

Why don’t I stop there, Mr. Chairman? I have some words to say 

about terrorism prevention and our efforts to deal with homegrown 

extremism here in the United States, but I would rather reserve 

that for questions. I will stop there, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Thank you all for your testimony. 

I appreciate the attendance here by fellow members. It has been 

requested that we have two rounds, which I am happy to accommodate, but we will limit questioning to 5 minutes. And, I would ask 

the witnesses as well, there is a pretty tried and true technique of 

asking a question with, 2 seconds remaining. Respond, but respond 

quickly. We need to keep this thing going to respect everybody’s 

time. 

Oftentimes in these situations I will defer questioning, but in 

light of the events in Puerto Rico, I would like to just give Secretary Duke the opportunity to just kind of describe, first of all, the 

challenge, how FEMA and the Department have risen to the challenge in Houston, Florida, and what we face in Puerto Rico. 

Ms. DUKE. Puerto Rico has some unique challenges. The capacity 

of the Puerto Rican government is severely diminished, both because of Hurricane Irma, their prior existing financial situation, 

and the devastation wreaked by the direct hit of Maria. Maria was 

one mile shy of being a Category 5 hurricane, so the devastation 

is complete. 
10 

So, what we are doing is we are standing strong with the Governor. We are attacking the areas of the diminished capacity. So, 

there is food and water on the island. There is gasoline on the island. What we are focused on today, now that search and rescue 

is very much complete, is distribution channels. We have asked the 

Defense Logistics Agency to augment the local National Guard and 

distribution channels so we can get goods and gasoline out more 

quickly. That is what we are focused on today. 

The second thing we are focused on is communications. Right 

now, we are primarily dependent on satellite phones, which is ineffective, but it helps with emergencies, but it is not helping people 

find their loved ones. So, we are increasing the number of satellite 

phones. And, we have AT&T on the island now. We are supporting 

them with getting their people and equipment there. They have 

agreed that they will restore any tower, even if it is not their cell 

phone tower, and they are providing services to any person of Puerto Rico, regardless of their carrier. So, we are working on that cell 

phone coverage. 

The electrical grid is more of a challenge. We are doing the assessment. It is completely devastated in terms of point of delivery, 

and the distribution system and the whole power system from start 

to finish is virtually gone. So, that is going to be a long-term recovery. We are working with the Department of Energy, private industry, and working on that. So, that is where we are there. 

The Governor is still standing strong. We have Department of 

Defense (DOD) troops supporting the National Guard, the National 

Guard providing security, and we are in a full-court press. 

Additionally, we have Texas and Florida that were predominantly hit by the first two hurricanes. In Texas, last week we were 

able to sign a housing plan that really is going to bring people back 

into their communities quickly. It is a type of housing recovery program that has never been done before, and we are very proud that 

Texas is with us on that and wants to lead their housing recovery. 

In Florida, the electrical grid is restored predominantly. Key 

West still has challenges. The predominance of people on Key West 

had mobile homes destroyed, and that is going to be a challenge 

of how we recover that housing situation. Do we just restore with 

new mobile homes, or do we try to provide something more resilient for those Floridians as they recover? 

So, that is a summary. I am happy to answer your questions as 

we go forward. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I have two other questions to clarify. First 

of all, in my memory, I cannot remember three major disasters like 

that just back to back Houston, Florida, and now Puerto Rico. Can 

you give us some sense of the number of Federal employees, including FEMA, that are kind of on station at these three zones? And 

then, also just talk about the significance of what President Trump 

has done in terms of 100 percent funding in Puerto Rico and why 

that was necessary. 

Ms. DUKE. Right. We have over 10,000 Federal employees onsite 

right now. One of the things that President Trump has done for 

both Irma and Maria is—and Harvey, is declared declarations 

early. That has allowed our response to get ahead of the disaster. 

That has been hugely helpful. 
11 

Additionally, in Puerto Rico, he yesterday gave 100 percent cost 

share, which means the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico does not 

have to contribute in the first 180 days. That has been hugely important in us getting industry there. The electrical industry and 

others did not want to go there unless they knew they were going 

to get paid, and this has allowed us to mobilize industry to move 

forward, and that has been helpful. 

Additionally, I cannot stop answering that question without 

thanking the other Cabinet members. The Cabinet has really come 

together. We have the Small Business Administration (SBA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Department of 

Labor (DOL). Everybody has come together with their assets in 

support of DHS and FEMA and the Governors in their response. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Secretary. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, it is good to hear that brief. I will look 

forward to the detailed brief, and I know some of my colleagues are 

also very interested in the specifics on the ground in Puerto Rico. 

It seems to me we should have known 100-percent match before 

the hurricane even hit. Clearly, from the financial status of the island, they were going to be in no position to make the match. So, 

it is unfortunate that we had to wait this long to make that identification of the 100-percent match. 

I want to talk about what I mentioned in my opening statement. 

I do not think most Americans realize that the number of incidents 

by white supremacist, militant, anti-government organizations are 

almost triple the number of attacks of those who identify with a 

jihadist movement internationally in this country. 

Can you, Director Wray, talk about how many dedicated agents 

do you have full-time to investigating international terrorism 

versus the type of terrorism that has been responsible for almost 

as many deaths as the international terrorism, that is, the white 

supremacist, anti-government, militant right in this country? 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, first let me say I agree with you that the domestic terrorism threat is a very serious one indeed and something 

that we spend a lot of our time focused on. I do not have, sitting 

here right now, the allocation of agents, that number. What I can 

tell you on this particular subject is that we have about 1,000 open 

domestic terrorism investigations as we speak, and that over the 

past 11 to 12 months I think we have had 176 arrests of domestic 

terrorism subjects during that period of time. And, I have now been 

starting just in my first few weeks on the job getting out to some 

of the field offices, and there are significant numbers of agents who 

are working very hard on that subject. So, I can assure you that 

it is a top priority for us. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would really appreciate if you would provide to the Committee for the record some kind of breakdown of the 

resources that are being allocated in these various areas. I think 

that the threat is one that—if you asked most Americans, they 

would assume that the threat from ISIS influence is much greater, 

and in reality, the facts do not support that. And so, I would like 

to get a better sense of the balance of resources in this area, if you 

would. 
12 

Let us talk about counterterrorism budget cuts. The President’s 

budget calls for elimination of almost half a billion dollars in cuts 

for counterterrorism, while the same budget says that we need to 

build a wall that even Border Patrol agents say is not their top priority for border security. 

Can you talk about the substantial cuts and how that would impact the current counterterrorism efforts and security in a way that 

is possible for you to talk about, either Director Rasmussen or any 

of the three of you? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. It is kind of difficult for me to comment because 

the intelligence portion of the budget is, I do not think, exactly 

what you have got your fingers on with your question you are asking; and in terms of the resources I have available to me at the National Counterterrorism Center, I am comfortable that we have the 

resources necessary to carry out the various missions we have, particularly some of the extra additional work we are doing in the 

areas of screening and vetting to support Secretary Duke and her 

team at DHS. 

We are a very tiny slice, and so I do not want to—I am not—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN [continuing]. In any way evading your question. 

I am just saying that the resources I have available have not been 

significantly reduced, and I am in a position to carry out my missions effectively. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Duke, what about the—I mean, I 

think everybody would agree the VIPR teams have been very effective as they have worked around the country. Reducing the VIPR 

teams down to eight, are you going to try to advocate to reverse 

that as we move forward? I am hoping the appropriators will. 

Ms. DUKE. We have to do a risk-based approach, and we value 

the VIPR teams. They have had a significant mission, and we funded those that we could within the constraints of balancing the risks 

with the demonstrated and measurable value of the teams. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Look at that. I 

finished before 5 minutes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I hope everybody follows the Ranking Member’s—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is a bad example I set. 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. Excellent example. Senator 

Portman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, welcome to 

all three witnesses. Ms. Duke, you are here for the first time as 

Acting Secretary, and, Director Wray, you are here for the first 

time before the Committee. We are glad that you are still here, 

Nick. We need you. 

Look, this has been just a horrible hurricane season, and our 

hearts go out to the victims in the wake of the devastation. As you 

said, three storms, that probably makes this the worst hurricane 

season that we have experienced, and our thanks go out to the first 

responders and to the volunteers, some from my State, and all the 

States represented here who have lent a hand to their fellow citizens. But our citizens today in the Virgin Islands and in Puerto 
13 

Rico I think are in a particularly difficult situation, and I understand that in Texas and Florida, we have also got a tough situation. But we have the capability to be able to handle that better 

at the State level. 

You talked a little about what you are starting to do, Secretary 

Duke, and I guess my question really is about what more can be 

done, one, by DOD, because as I understand it—and you mentioned 

distribution. Yes, there is gas on the island. Yes, there is food and 

water. But it is not getting out to the locations that need it or to 

many of the locations that need it. And, it seems to me that infrastructure is going to have to be provided by the Federal Government. 

So, what can you tell us about DOD cooperation in that? Because 

it seems like you are not going to just need FEMA folks; you are 

going to actually need bodies and vehicles and other infrastructure, 

communications infrastructure. What is DOD doing? What could 

they do more of? And then, finally, what more can we do? I know 

you are going to come to us for additional appropriations later this 

fall, but what could this Congress be doing right now? 

Ms. DUKE. So, DOD is providing tremendous support. We have 

about 16 ships in the area between DOD and Coast Guard, with 

additional on the way, including Mercy Ship, a hospital ship. 

One of the things DOD is doing that is critically important is assessing the ports and the airports. If we can get the ports and the 

airports to full operation, that is going to be huge. We were able 

to reactivate the closed air force base, Roosevelt Roads, so now we 

are flying our supplies through that airport and have been able to 

open Puerto Rico to commercial flights to allow persons to come 

back to the United States that want to come back. 

So, I think what DOD is doing is helping us get the supplies 

there, but also helping us open the access roads. They also are 

leading the debris removal, which is huge. We still have areas that 

we cannot access by roads. 

We did send more troops down yesterday, including a general 

that will be in charge of coordinating on the ground. So, we do have 

a general onsite now that I think is going to help speed things 

around and put decisionmaking on the ground. I think that was a 

big step forward. 

In terms of Congress, there is funding. We did ask yesterday in 

a congressional call to hold off congressional visits because of the 

limited airspace, space in between flights, and we thank you all for 

doing that. I know many of you want to get there and see it, and 

we thank you for postponing until at least next week congressional 

visits so that we can use every minute of airspace and time for 

those that have survived this terrible event. 

Senator PORTMAN. Well, thank you. It is an urgent situation. I 

think a different response is needed, and I am glad to hear that 

our military resources are being used because I think it is required. 

I would ask you to change subjects for a second, and I want to 

talk about fentanyl, carfentanil, and really biochem issues. As you 

know, we have an opioid crisis in this country, and, in fact, more 

people are dying every day in my State of Ohio, your home State, 

and all of our States than last year. It is not getting better; it is 

getting worse. More deaths from overdoses from heroin, synthetic 
14 

heroins like fentanyl and carfentanil, than car accidents. It is the 

number one cause of death now in my State and in our country. 

By the way, 58 percent of the deaths in Ohio over the last year 

came from fentanyl, not from heroin. And, this fentanyl is coming 

into our country by the U.S. Mail system, primarily from China. 

So, this is a threat that is an external threat coming in, and I am 

frustrated because we cannot get our Postal Service to provide law 

enforcement, including your people at Customs and Border Protection, the information they need to be able to identify these packages and stop this poison from coming into our communities. 

I know you are aware of the issue. Can you tell us what progress 

you are making to be able to stop this? And, do you support our 

legislation, the STOP Act? There are a number of Members of this 

Committee who are cosponsors of that legislation. It is very simple. 

It just says that the post office has to provide advance information 

to law enforcement to be able to identify these packages and stop 

this threat. 

Ms. DUKE. Absolutely, and I think that the work of this Committee has helped. I am meeting with the Postmaster General next 

week. We have gotten visibility into a certain percentage of packages, but it absolutely has to increase. 

Additionally, we are seeing the routing change, so as we address 

China, the routing is changing to some stops. So, we are definitely 

focused on that, and I feel confident the Postmaster General is at 

the table now. 

Senator PORTMAN. Well, we would like your support on this legislation, because it needs a change in law to require the post office 

to do what all the other private carriers have to do. And, the traffickers know, as was said by Mr. Rasmussen earlier, they know 

how to take advantage of our weaknesses, and this is a weakness 

right now in our current system. 

And, by the way, this product is also being weaponized, so 

carfentanil in particular, Director Wray, I hope you all will focus 

on that as well. And, I have a concern about terrorist groups and 

State actors using this as a biological weapon, a chemical weapon 

as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Lankford. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you 

for being here and the testimony that you are bringing. 

Ms. Duke, thank you for stepping up. You came to be able to 

serve with General Kelly, and then he ran off to a different job, so 

you had to step up to be able to take this. Thank you for stepping 

up and being able to take that. I know we have a visit scheduled 

in my office, I believe, to be able to go through several of the details. I will skip through some of those until we get to it. 

Let me ask you some specific questions, first about Puerto Rico. 

A waiver was requested, a Jones Act waiver, for Puerto Rico. That 

was denied. That waiver was given to Houston, it was given to 

Florida. Obviously, the Virgin Islands, they are waived from the 

Jones Act entirely all the time, so they constantly have ships coming back and forth. Puerto Rico in good times thinks that the Jones 
15 

Act costs them about $1.5 billion in economic activity a year, but 

they especially need it now in just getting vessels in. 

Can you help me understand why and where the conversation is 

on the Jones Act for Puerto Rico? 

Ms. DUKE. First of all, we do not know of fuel shortages on the 

island of Puerto Rico. The challenge for us today is getting it distributed. 

In terms of the Jones Act waiver, we have researched this. I read 

it in the news clips this morning. We have no known Jones Act 

waiver request. We did receive a congressional letter today. We are 

double-checking to make sure that is not true. If there are fuel 

shortages we are looking at Jones Act. Like you said, we will use 

it appropriately. There are two issues with Puerto Rico. One is the 

potential shortage of carriers, U.S.-flagged carriers. The second is 

tariffs and other things that make the fuel cost high in Puerto 

Rico, and that is what we are hearing, too, is that people are suffering from the tariffs. 

Senator LANKFORD. I would say if we could proactively engage in 

that, it would help them. Obviously, it is a week to be able to get 

a vessel to them. So, the longer it takes to be able to get that waiver done, then vessels cannot even start getting there that are nonU.S.-flagged vessels to be able to get to it. So, that would be very 

helpful. 

Another interesting point that we can talk about later on is dealing with FEMA and the decision about nonprofits. Congress years 

ago said that nonprofits were included in disaster relief aid. Previous administrations have defined nonprofits as excluding churches. I am still trying to get a definition for that because often the 

churches are the ones that are the community location where food 

and everything is distributed from there, but then they cannot also 

get disaster relief, but the museum or the library or whatever else 

around them can. And so, that is one I think the administration 

already has the authority to make the decision. Congress has already spoken to that. Just previous administrations have defined 

nonprofits as everything but a church, but a church is also nonprofit. So, whether you are synagogue, a mosque, or a church, I 

think it should not apply on that. Again, we can talk about that 

later on some other things. 

I do want to talk to you a little bit about election security as well 

and some of the things that are going on as we deal with countering violent extremism (CVE) and what is happening and destabilizing us. We watched even this weekend the Russians and their 

troll farms and their Internet folks start hashtagging out ‘‘Take a 

knee’’ and also hashtagging out ‘‘Boycott National Football League 

(NFL).’’ They were taking both side of the argument this past 

weekend and pushing them out from their troll farms as much as 

they could to try to just raise the noise level in America and to 

make a big issue seem like an even bigger issue as they are trying 

to push divisiveness in the country. We have continued to be able 

to see that. We will see that again in our election time. 

My question for you is: You have the responsibility to oversee 

elections nationwide and to be able to work with our States that 

organize all their elections within the State. Does DHS have the 
16 

resources it needs to do onsite assessments for all the States that 

request it between now and the 2018 elections? 

Ms. DUKE. We do have the resources to do it. Not all States have 

requested it, and I think there is still an issue with some States 

on whether they want that Federal involvement. But we do have 

the resources. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. We will follow up on that in greater detail in another conversation. 

I have visited with DHS folks on the design of the border wall 

and trying to work through the border security for the Southern 

border. Several Members of this Committee were also involved in 

some of those conversations. We are still waiting on details, descriptions, design, cost. The cost per mile of the border wall done 

10 years ago was about $3.5 million. The initial request was about 

$20 million per mile. So, we are waiting for not only why that dramatic increase in cost, what the final design will look like, but also 

the long-term view of this, not to just look at the 77 miles that is 

requested currently, but where do we go, in what order, and how 

do we do it, and some simple things that can be cheaper. For instance, getting rid of the very actively growing cane that is on the 

river banks where individuals hide drugs and be able to move products into the United States illegally, that cane eradication would 

be exceptionally important as well. 

So, any comments you can make about the future of the wall and 

where we are going? 

Ms. DUKE. Sure. I am looking at the plan next week, and we will 

have it to Congress shortly after. And, as I committed in my confirmation hearing, it will not—the Southern border strategy does 

not include just the wall. It includes infrastructure, technology, and 

other co-securing mechanisms. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. We will follow up. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Heitkamp. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Just on follow up to that, you are working on 

both the Northern border and the Southern border strategy. What 

is the timeline on those, Secretary? 

Ms. DUKE. We will have the Northern border strategy by the end 

of the calendar year. We will have the Southern border strategy 

within the next month. 

Senator HEITKAMP. That is critically important as we go through 

decisionmaking, and as we look at cane eradication, another eradication, mesquite, clearly in Arizona and in—it is an invasive species there, easy to hide, needs to be eradicated so that we have a 

better chance of catching border crossers that first mile in. 

So, I want to talk about cybersecurity, and I do not have a lot 

of time, so I am going to do this quickly. Two questions. How do 

you grade our current vulnerability in this country, A being impenetrable, F being we are in big trouble? And, how do you grade— 

this is for all of you. How do you grade our current collaboration 

and coordination across Executive Branch agencies, including 

DOD? And, we will start with you, Secretary. 
17 

Ms. DUKE. Coordination across Federal Agencies has gotten very 

high. I would probably give it a B because I never think we are 

done. And, we know the threat is significant. 

In terms of grades, it would depend on the critical infrastructure 

sector. Right now we are focused on energy and critical infrastructure and the attacks on that. That is probably our highest threat 

right now. So because of its importance and the focus on that, I 

would give that the lowest grade. 

Senator HEITKAMP. OK. Director. 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, I would agree with Secretary Duke that on 

the cooperation side I think there has been dramatic advances and 

dramatic progress in the wake of Presidential Policy Directive 

(PPD–41) and a number of other things, much better coordination. 

So, like Secretary Duke I tend to be dissatisfied with our efforts, 

so, B, B-minus maybe on that front. 

On the threats, I am still trying to get my arms around a lot of 

them just a few weeks into the job. So, I guess I would call that 

incomplete. 

Senator HEITKAMP. OK. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Nothing really to add, Senator. 

Senator HEITKAMP. I think, we always hear there is coordination, 

and then an event happens, and it seems like no one really seems 

to know what—the right hand does not know what the left hand 

is doing, and so I would be very careful to give too high marks to 

coordination, because I am not sure that we in the Congress understand who is doing what and how it is being coordinated and what 

we need to do. I mean, we have these one-offs, whether it is election challenges, and then we look at what happened at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), what has happened at, obviously the Equifax penetration. And, these have all created incredible challenges. And, one of the things we know about cyber is that 

it is critical that we engage in a dialogue with the American public 

about cybersecurity and cyber hygiene. 

And so, which agency is taking that on to really begin that process? Like you have, ‘‘See something, say something.’’ Who is doing 

the actual education of the American public on how they can be 

part of a cybersecurity network? 

Ms. DUKE. That is our responsibility at Homeland Security. We 

have started it. We are working on trying to resensitize Americans 

to that need. There is much more to do. 

Senator HEITKAMP. And, I think we are woefully short. I think, 

you ask anyone who has been that person who has been trying to 

train their kids on how they can protect themselves. It is incredibly 

vulnerable, because it is as strong as the weakest link. And so, I 

am deeply concerned that we do not really have a handle on what 

we are doing in cybersecurity, and that at the end of the day we 

will spend all of our time and our resources looking at all these 

other threats and completely miss one of the most serious threats 

that could be pursuing this country. 

Director Wray, obviously very concerned about what is happening in Indian country. Pretty hard on your predecessor in terms 

of the role that the FBI plays in reservations in my State. Missing 

women across the board. I know you and I had a discussion in the 

back room. You are working on it. I just want to encourage you to 
18 

1The email submitted by Senator Hassan appears in the Appendix on page 160. 

personally, in spite of everything else that is going on, personally 

engage, because you are the only cop on the beat for many of my 

communities who are suffering from record amounts of drug addiction and drug abuse, people who are suffering violent crime at 

much higher rates, and now a continuation of maybe third-party or 

third-country involvement from law enforcement. So, please, pay 

attention to this. 

Mr. WRAY. Just a quick response? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sure. 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, I have not forgotten our conversation when 

we met a few weeks ago, and it is something that I have specifically raised with my leadership team. We do have the Safe Trails 

Task Forces that we are committed to, but I am well aware that 

in many ways we are the only game in town in that space, and so 

I am looking forward to learning more about how we can be more 

effective. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Hassan. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCaskill. I do have several questions today regarding terrorist 

threats to our Nation that I would like to discuss with the witnesses. But, I also would like to address the crisis in Puerto Rico 

and our fellow citizens’ pleas for Federal resources. 

As a former Governor, I know how important those resources are, 

and it is why I am very concerned to hear from my friend, former 

Governor of Puerto Rico, Alejandro Garcia Padilla, that relief efforts to this point have failed to make its way to those most in 

need. He and I served together as Governors until the end of 2016, 

and I know him to be a very steady hand amid the challenges that 

his island faces. So, that is why the email I got from him last night 

is so concerning, and I want to read an excerpt of it and would ask 

unanimous consent (UC) for the full email to be entered into the 

record.1

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection. 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you. 

Here is what he says: ‘‘The situation is critical. There is no electricity anywhere on the island, and only 40 percent of customers 

have running water. Hospitals are on the verge of collapse, and 

many have had to transfer all their patients to other overstrained 

facilities because they have run out of gas or diesel for their generators. Patients are dying in their homes because they cannot fill 

their prescriptions, do not have access to ice to keep their insulin 

cool, or cannot reach in time a dialysis center that has electricity. 

There are entire communities that the government has been unable 

to reach due to widespread landslides and debris. This is happening in America today. Unless we see a dramatic increase in assistance and personnel reaching the island soon, many thousands 

could die.’’ 

So, Secretary Duke, I would like to ask you to respond to Governor Garcia’s email and also in your response talk to us about 
19 

what kind of planning about assets being deployed to Puerto Rico 

was made before the storm hit. We knew the storm was coming. 

We knew they had been glanced by Hurricane Irma and not hit as 

badly as some others by Hurricane Irma. But, here we are with a 

really dire situation, and my friend, the former Governor, says, 

‘‘We need the Army and the National Guard deployed throughout 

the island now, today. This cannot wait another day. Despite Federal Agencies coordinating in San Juan, there is very limited presence of military personnel assisting people in the streets and 

throughout our communities.’’ 

So, Secretary? 

Ms. DUKE. The President, Vice President, and I talked with the 

Governor yesterday, and that was about 1 o’clock, and he had no 

unmet needs at that point. So I will followup with him again, but 

I have offered to him, you know, to reach out to me directly in addition to our FEMA Administrator. 

There are challenges in getting to the outer parts of the island 

because the debris removal, the landslides are so strong. What we 

have done that is significant in addressing those specific concerns, 

we are using the DOD to now help with distribution. That generally is something that the Commonwealth would do itself, but we 

have heard stories of shortages. We have also heard stories of extortion. And so, to avoid that and make sure that the critical resources get to where they need to, we are using DOD for that as 

of yesterday afternoon. 

Senator HASSAN. Well, thank you for that response, but I have 

to tell you that I know others have been in contact with the current 

Governor of Puerto Rico as well, and they are not hearing that all 

their needs have been met. And so, we have American lives at 

stake here, and I would urge you and the Department to do everything you can. And, I am concerned about why there were not more 

assets on their way to Puerto Rico as soon as the storm hit. We 

are almost a week out now. 

Ms. DUKE. Absolutely. And, we have been air-dropping. It is a 

challenge, and we will never stop and we will never be satisfied. 

So, I agree with you, Senator. 

Senator HASSAN. Well, thank you. I have a number of questions 

on homeland security, but given my time, I will yield back the remainder and wait for the second round. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator. Senator Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

our witnesses for being here today. 

I think that some actions by the administration, such as the 

travel ban as well as some very divisive rhetoric that we have 

heard coming out of the administration, have consequences, and 

sometimes very significant consequences. Beginning at the end of 

last year, we have seen a spike in anti-Muslim incidents in my 

home State of Michigan. We have seen a rash of bomb threats 

against Jewish community centers in Michigan as well, as well as 

across the country. That is why my colleague on this Committee 

Senator Portman and I wrote a letter together calling for the DHS 

and the DOJ to address these incidents and to provide the commu-
20 

nities with the resources that they need to deal with these incidents. 

The letter was signed by all 100 Senators. Every one of the colleagues of the Senate believed that this is something that we have 

to address. And, make no mistake, I think that some of the darkest 

elements in our society have become emboldened, and we need to 

look no further than the white supremacy protests in Charlottesville as well as other activities across the country to bring this to 

our attention. 

So, I want to follow up on a question by Ranking Member 

McCaskill to Mr. Wray. I know the question was how many agents 

do we have related to domestic terrorism versus international terrorism, but maybe I will ask a broader question. What are the resources, what are your budgets? I will start with you, Secretary 

Duke. What is the budget in your Department for domestic terrorism versus international terrorism? 

Ms. DUKE. We have no specific delineation in the budget for domestic terrorism versus international terrorism. We do believe that 

homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) who are persons in this 

country with an international nexus or motivation are our biggest 

threat, but we are looking at both the homegrown violent extremists and the domestic terrorists, but no specific delineation. 

Senator PETERS. Director Wray. 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, my answer is similar. We do not have in our 

budget allocations between specific types of terrorism. We do have 

allocations of agents and other resources to counterterrorism, and 

we tend to move agents and other analysts sort of seamlessly between squads depending on the particular time period, the particular field office, depending on the threat assessment in that community. 

Senator PETERS. In your response to Senator McCaskill’s question, you can provide that information to us so we can get a sense 

of how those allocations are occurring? 

Mr. WRAY. Let me see what information we can provide to be 

helpful, yes. 

Senator PETERS. I would appreciate it. Mr. Rasmussen. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I have no responsibility for domestic terrorism. 

The legislation that created NCTC specifically made clear that we 

were not to engage in tracking or analyzing threats related to domestic terrorism. 

Senator PETERS. All right. Thank you. 

It is also my understanding that, unlike international terrorism, 

we currently do not have any domestic terrorism legislation or statute. Do you think this legislation may be something we should consider, Director Wray? 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, I am aware of ongoing discussions about the 

possibility of a domestic terrorism statute. As you correctly note, 

there is not a domestic terrorism crime as such. We in the FBI 

refer to domestic terrorism as a category, but it is really more of 

a way in which we allocate, which agents, which squad is going to 

work on it. 

I will say that in the domestic terrorism context, just like the 

international terrorism context, we take very much the approach 

that we are going to use all the tools at our disposal. So, a lot of 
21 

the domestic terrorism cases that we bring, we are able to charge 

under gun charges, explosive charges, all manner of other crimes. 

We also work a lot with State and local law enforcement who can 

sometimes bring very straightforward, easy-to-make cases, homicide cases, things like that. 

So, we have a lot of tools. We can always use more tools, and it 

is something that I am looking forward to learning more about. 

Senator PETERS. Secretary Duke. 

Ms. DUKE. Yes, we take both seriously, and oftentimes when we 

encounter an act of violence, we do not know if it is internationally 

motivated or domestically motivated. So, we take every threat and 

every act of terrorism, every act of violence with a motivation very 

seriously. They have a commonality in hate. It is just where their 

motivation comes from, an external international terrorist organization or internally. But, as was correctly said, the occurrences are 

stronger. We are trying to do it both from law enforcement through 

the FBI, but also through education programs to try to help communities be able to respond to it and be able to counter it. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Are you ready? Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. How is it going? We are glad you are here. 

Thank you. Thank you very much for your service and for joining 

us today. 

I do not know that this has been covered. My guess is it probably 

has not been, although we have covered what I am about to ask 

many times. But, Ms. Duke, I am going to ask maybe for you to 

start off. 

The President has indicated a willingness to find common ground 

on legislation involving legalizing the status of Deferred Action for 

Childhood Arrivals (DACA) students in this country. He is interested in our doing some more work on border security. And, he has 

had an ongoing interest in a wall. But, I have had the opportunity 

to travel to the border with some of my colleagues, a number of my 

colleagues, with your predecessor, the Secretary, now the President’s Chief of Staff, with former Secretary Johnson and others. 

And, I believe there are some places where a wall actually makes 

sense, but if you think about all the distance between the Pacific 

Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, it does not make sense in a whole 

lot of places, and I think you know that. 

There are places where fences make a lot of sense. There are 

places where roads make a lot of sense, roads especially along walls 

or fences. 

There are places where boats make sense. There are places 

where boat ramps make sense. 

There is a fair amount of use of helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, 

drones tethered to aerostats, dirigibles, stationary towers, mobile 

towers where they make sense. 

I used to be a naval flight officer (NFO) for many years, P–3 aircraft mission commander, and we did surface surveillance, subsurface surveillance, but we also on occasion would be tasked to do 

search and rescue. And, we put 13 guys in an airplane, fixed-wing 

aircraft, a couple thousand feet off the water, with binoculars to 
22 

look for a life raft, and we were not often very successful. So, the 

idea of putting whether it is fixed-wing or helicopters or drones out 

there without—or towers or tethered dirigibles out there without 

really sophisticated surveillance technology to enable us to see at 

night, during bad weather, and for long distances into Mexico, if we 

do not have the surveillance technology on board, that does not 

make much sense. 

I have seen places on the border where horses make sense and 

you have really high grass and you get the Border Patrol agents 

up on a horse, and they actually do their job better. There are 

places where intelligence, better intelligence, information sharing 

makes sense. 

The other thing that we have heard about here and in a number 

of hearings is that old story, needle in the haystack. It is hard to 

find those needles. You can make the needles bigger. If you have 

the right kind of surveillance equipment, you can actually make 

the needles bigger. But, it is also helpful if you make the haystack 

smaller, and that might be by making sure that fewer people come, 

feel the need to flee Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador to 

come to our country, and that would make the haystack smaller. 

The last administration has been a strong proponent—and it has 

gotten bipartisan support in Congress—to actually address root 

causes of folks in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador trying to 

get out of their countries, flee the murder and mayhem that threatens their lives and safety too often. And, the idea to find out what 

works, use something that has worked in the past, Plan Colombia, 

which we worked on for 20 years, has helped transform Colombia. 

They have had to do most of the work. We have helped. I like to 

say it is like at Home Depot: ‘‘You can do it. We can help.’’ 

That is a menu of options, if you will, to help secure our borders, 

and I just want you to direct at some of those—do any of those 

make sense to you as our Acting Secretary? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes, they all make sense, to be honest, Senator Carper. We are looking at not only in between the points of entry but 

at the points of entry, through information sharing and vetting and 

credentialing. Our goal is to keep bad people out and to keep the 

illicit movement of goods so that we are not funding transnational 

criminal organizations, and that is the goal. And, how that happens, we are open to doing that. I offered to talk about reform bills 

with any member and let you know how operationally we think it 

would play out, and I reaffirm that offer. 

In terms of the Northern Triangle and Mexico, I am in dialogue 

with all of them and working through some international banks to 

also look at that. How can we make it so people want to stay in 

their countries, which is the ultimate goal? And, those discussions 

are ongoing. In fact, we had a meeting on it this week and looking 

at setting up a forum. So all of them. 

Senator CARPER. Any quick comments, Mr. Wray? Nick, any 

quick comments before—my time has expired, but just very briefly. 

Mr. WRAY. Well, I would just share Secretary Duke’s view that 

we have to have a multidisciplinary approach which I think is built 

into, I think, your well-taken question. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Nick. 
23 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Again, the responsibility of the intelligence community is to provide the best possible service to those who actually 

carry out the screening and vetting of individuals trying to come 

into the country. We take that responsibility very seriously. We 

have made business process improvements in how we do that, but 

there is more work to be done for sure. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you all. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRIS 

Senator HARRIS. Secretary Duke, in response to Senator 

Lankford’s question about the Jones Act, you indicated you were 

not aware of any requests, that you were informed because you 

read it in the clips this morning. That troubles me. I am informed 

that there have been at least two requests: one from eight House 

Members led by Congressman Velazquez and another by Senator 

McCain. So, I am troubled because if you are unaware of those requests, it suggests that there is not a sufficient priority for Puerto 

Rico in your agency. 

Is there someone under you other than the FEMA Director who 

is responsible to reporting directly to you the status of your agency’s work in Puerto Rico? And if so, can you give me the name of 

that person? 

Ms. DUKE. We have the request from Congress, so if I misspoke, 

I apologize. We have the letters from Congress. Those go to Customs and Border Protection. We do not have any requests from industry, which is where they typically come from. 

Senator HARRIS. Is there a person under you who is responsible 

for reporting directly to you about the status of your agency’s work 

in Puerto Rico in addition to the FEMA Director? 

Ms. DUKE. No. 

Senator HARRIS. Can you please put somebody in place that can 

be responsible for responding to requests from Congress about your 

activities as it relates to the Jones Act or any other work in Puerto 

Rico? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. 

Senator HARRIS. And, you will follow up and give us a name? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. 

Senator HARRIS. And then, on the issue that Senator McCaskill 

raised, I was troubled to hear, Director Wray, but thankfully you 

are on top of it, that your agency has 1,000 open investigations on 

domestic terrorism, 176 arrests for domestic terrorism. The FBI 

and DHS issued a joint intelligence bulletin in May of this year 

where you indicated, ‘‘White supremacist extremists will likely continue to pose a threat of lethal violence over the next year.’’ 

So, Mr. Chairman, I am requesting that we open an investigation, a congressional investigation into this issue. According to the 

joint bulletin, the FBI and DHS define white supremacist extremists as ‘‘individuals who seek, wholly or in part, through unlawful 

acts of force or violence, to support their belief in the intellectual 

and moral superiority of the white race over other races.’’ I believe 

that this Committee has done a great job of conducting congressional investigations when we have found that there are Americans 
24 

1The information submitted by Senator Harris appears in the Appendix on page 161. 

who are at risk of harm and violence, and so on this matter, I 

would ask that we do a similar investigation. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Request noted. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

On the issue of DACA, Secretary Duke, on September 5th you 

issued a memo rescinding the original June 15, 2012, memo which 

established DACA. And. to rescind DACA, you indicated that recipients will have some period of time in order to apply. 

I am told by folks who are working with renewal on the ground 

that they have seen a slowdown in DACA recipients reapplying. 

Are you prepared to extend the amount of time that they will have? 

Ms. DUKE. We have had no requests. I did talk to one Senator 

about a potential need for an extension, but we have had no indication from DACA recipients that they are having trouble. We did 

check the system to make sure it is an easy system to reapply, and 

they do not have to reproduce their documents. 

Senator HARRIS. Have you convened or had a meeting at all and 

input from the community folks who are working on the ground to 

get information from them? And if not, I would request that you 

do that so you can get a complete picture of what is actually happening on the ground. But, I will tell you from the perspective of 

California, these young people are terrified. They are terrified. 

They were told by your agency that if they submitted this comprehensive information about their background and their status to 

apply for DACA, that that information would not be shared with 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). I have asked you, I 

asked the former Secretary: Are you willing to keep America’s 

promise to these young people and not share their information with 

ICE? 

Can you answer that question finally? It has not been answered 

the many times I have asked. 

Ms. DUKE. I cannot unequivocally promise that, no, but I do 

know that—— 

Senator HARRIS. So we will not keep our promise to these children and these young people? 

Ms. DUKE. I am not familiar with the promise that was made to 

these children, but I do know that having them on 2-year non-renewable suspensions is not the right answer, and I look forward to 

working with the Congress in coming up with a better solution. 

Senator HARRIS. OK. And, I will submit for the record1—and I 

will give you a copy of the document—where the U.S. Government 

told these young people when they applied for DACA status that 

we would not share their information with ICE. You have not seen 

this document? 

Ms. DUKE. No, I have not. 

Senator HARRIS. OK. I will give a copy to you. I have it here, and 

I will give you a copy. I think I presented it to you, and certainly 

the person that received it before. 

Ms. DUKE. OK, and I will get you an answer. 

Senator HARRIS. And I would like that answer before the end of 

the week, please. 
25 

You also indicated when you last testified before us that, in 

terms of the seven new enforcement priorities, they were in descending level of priority. Following your testimony before this 

Committee, the former Secretary said that there was no priority in 

terms of that list. So, which is the policy of your agency? And, how 

have you instructed the people on the ground about what are the 

enforcement priorities of your agency? 

Ms. DUKE. Those are enforcement priorities; however, an ICE 

agent is not restricted from apprehending anyone who is in violation of law. 

Senator HARRIS. There are seven enforcement priorities. Have 

you instructed the agents on the ground about which are the highest enforcement priorities versus the lowest, given that with all 

Agencies, and certainly yours, you have limited resources? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. 

Senator HARRIS. Can you give that information to me, please? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. 

Senator HARRIS. Now? 

Ms. DUKE. Oh, now? 

Senator HARRIS. Yes. 

Ms. DUKE. We have the DHS policy, and then we have the ICE 

policy. And, they all say that these are the priorities for enforcement. If there is any targeted enforcement, they are against the 

priorities. However, if an ICE agent encounters someone that is not 

a priority but is still an illegal immigrant, then they would be apprehended also using the discretion of the ICE agent. 

Senator HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. I will resume this in the second round. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Thank you. And, just real quick, following up on your request in terms of an investigation on white supremacists and domestic terrorists, I met with Director Wray prior 

to this meeting, prior to this hearing, and just confirm this. You 

said you had about 1,000 active investigations on basically white 

supremacist domestic terrorists, about 1,000 ISIS-related. Just 

kind of confirm that that was accurate. But, also, do you take the 

threat of white supremacist terrorists or violent extremists any less 

seriously than you do those perpetrated potentially by ISIS? 

Mr. WRAY. No, we do not. We take both of them very seriously. 

Our focus is on violence and threats of violence against the people 

of this country, and that is our concern. It is not ideology or anything else. It is the danger and the violence of the threats toward 

people in this country. 

On the number, the other part of your question, it is also true 

that we have about 1,000 open ISIS-related investigations at this 

time as well. So, we are very busy. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, except for the difference in the nexus 

to foreign fighters and the international connection there, is there 

any difference in your investigation techniques, your prosecution 

techniques, what you charge white supremacist violent extremists 

with ISIS-related violent extremists? Is there any difference in that 

approach? 

Mr. WRAY. I would say in most ways they are similar. Probably 

the biggest difference is the one that Senator Peters elicited, which 

is that there is not a domestic terrorism offense as such like there 
26 

is a material support to foreign terrorism provision. And then, of 

course, there are certain tools, investigative tools, like Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that is only available for foreign 

offenses. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Thank you. Senator Hoeven. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOEVEN 

Senator HOEVEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

thank all the witnesses for being here today and start with Secretary Duke. 

Secretary Duke, in your testimony you noted that DHS lacks authority to counter threats from unmanned aerial systems (UAS). In 

my State we are very involved with UAS, also with Customs and 

Border Protection using UAS on the border. We have one of the six 

test sites there for development of unmanned aircraft. So, talk to 

me about—can you describe in some greater detail the domestic 

threat of unmanned aircraft and what authorities you do not have, 

what authorities you should have, and what we can do? 

Ms. DUKE. We are seeing an increased use of drones. They could 

be for surveillance, they could be for bringing illicit materials, or 

they could be for acting violence. 

What we lack are some of the signals—the ability to interdict, if 

you will, the signals so that we can try to determine if this is a 

friendly or foe-type drone. And so, we are not the only ones lacking 

that ability. I think because it is a new threat, the specific authorities to monitor these drones does not exist generally. 

Senator HOEVEN. Would it be possible for you to get me something that would give me some, I guess, direction in terms of what 

would be helpful to you to understand how you could better try to 

monitor those drones, again, with reasonable protections for civil 

liberties and those kind of things, but maybe some information that 

you could provide us—— 

Ms. DUKE. OK. 

Senator HOEVEN [continuing]. In determining how we could craft 

authorities that might be helpful in that regard. And, are you talking primarily on the border, or are you talking other locations as 

well? 

Ms. DUKE. It could be other locations as well, but they would be 

primarily in the border for us. Other agencies have different types 

of problems, but we would be looking primarily from the border 

States, across the border States. 

Senator HOEVEN. OK. And, Director Wray, same kind of question 

to you. What are you doing in this area? Again, we have a test site 

where we are developing these capabilities, and this may be something that we can work on on the test site. So, from the FBI’s perspective, can you address drones and the threat they present? 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, I welcome the question. It is a topic that we 

have been discussing a lot lately. I think we do know that terrorist 

organizations have an interest in using drones. We have seen that 

overseas already with some growing frequency, and I think the expectation is it is coming here imminently. I think they are relatively easy to acquire, relatively easy to operate, and quite difficult to disrupt and monitor. So, that is something that I would 
27 

welcome working with the Congress as well as with the other 

Agencies to try to figure out a solution. 

Senator HOEVEN. Do you have a group of any kind that is working on this issue right now? Or what are you doing in regard to 

unmanned aircraft and the threat they present? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I can jump in there, Senator. 

Senator HOEVEN. Sure. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I know starting with the intelligence that Director Wray talked about where we saw ISIS and other groups using 

these capabilities overseas on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, we 

brought the community of intelligence professionals together in 

Washington to try to present a clear picture that we can then share 

with State and local partners around the country and begin to explain at least the tactics and techniques that individuals might use 

to try to bring harm to communities. That can be dropping small 

explosives the size of a grenade. It could be dispersal of toxins potentially. So, sharing that information is a first step. 

The next step is to begin to think about true defensive measures 

that either we employ as a Federal Government or recommend to 

State and local governments that they could employ at manageable 

cost, and that is a process, I think, that is underway. There is a 

community of experts that has emerged inside the Federal Government that is focused on this pretty full-time. Two years ago this 

was not a problem. A year ago this was an emerging problem. Now 

it is a real problem, and so we are quickly trying to up our game 

on this. 

Senator HOEVEN. I might ask then, Director, who is taking the 

lead? Are you taking the lead in that effort? Is there some coordinating mechanism across law enforcement agencies to develop a 

strategy and implement it? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I do not know yet that we have designated a 

single agency lead. We are trying to simply right now catalogue 

who all has capability to bring to bear against the problem, because 

it will not just be the law enforcement community. It will, of 

course, be the broader community involved with aviation that will 

have equities here as well. 

So, what I am talking about is trying to do a better job of convening everybody in the Federal Government who has a stake in 

this and a capability to bring to bear. That work is underway. 

Senator HOEVEN. Are you doing that? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I am participating in that. I am not leading 

the—— 

Senator HOEVEN. I am trying to understand who will be the lead. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I will get you an answer on that because I do 

not know who is the true belly button on this. 

Senator HOEVEN. Yes, and I am just trying to find out who you 

all think would be a good lead person for us to interface with to 

try to do this in the best way. It is just getting your recommendation, not trying to trip you up or indicate you have not done something. I am just trying to find out what you all think would be the 

best place to get a lead to work on it. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Well, I will certainly come back with a more 

thoughtful answer on where the best place to plug in with a lead 

is. 
28 

Senator HOEVEN. Thank you. 

Any other thoughts? 

Ms. DUKE. I was just going to say that we have started talking 

about this with the National and Homeland Security Council. This 

is an interagency process, and I think that would be the best process to come up with a Federal position. 

Senator HOEVEN. And, we will follow up with both of you, as well 

as Director Wray, and just try to find a good lead and make sure 

we are helping in the effort. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Tester. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

members of the panel for being here. I apologize. I have a committee, a committee, and a committee today. 

Guys, I appreciate your service, but I am not going to ask you 

any questions. They are all going to go to Ms. Duke. Do not hold 

that against me. 

Elaine, during the omnibus, 2017 omnibus, we put language in 

that to require a report to be sent back to Congress by August 4th 

talking about the most effective solutions for the Southern border. 

We have yet to receive that. 

First of all, do you know about that, number one? And, number 

two, can you give me a timeline when it is going to be here? Because, funding season, actually we are beyond it. We may be dealing with that funding bill next week, so it is really important that 

we know that. As Lamar Alexander said, we are not going to cut 

you a blank check, so we need to know what that plan is. 

Ms. DUKE. I do know about it. I am supposed to receive it next 

week, and earlier I said within the next month. If you have any 

specific needs as you deal with the funding bill, then we can work 

with you on that. 

Senator TESTER. I am glad you brought that up. I mean, it is 

supposed to be a comprehensive report. That means that you are 

going to look for the most cost-effective ways to make that Southern border secure. That means that the politics of a wall should not 

be in the picture. It should be about what you guys believe are the 

best options to make that border secure. And, we should not be 

backing into anything. We should be looking forward and giving us 

ideas on what you want and what the potential cost is. And so, that 

is what I need, and not on 80 miles of the border but on the border. 

And so, are we on the same page? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes, absolutely. What the Border Patrol needs to secure the border is what we are focused on. 

Senator TESTER. Yes, well, I think it is just really critically important. I do not think there is anybody in Congress that does not 

want secure borders. But, the last proposal that came in on an informal meeting was $24 million a mile for a wall, and I am one 

that does not—I do not think the wall is the most effective way. 

We have technology out there. It does not have stranded costs of 

land on the other side of a potential wall. And, by the way, you can 

tweak technology to make it work more and more effectively. 
29 

So, I just hope we get a good, comprehensive look on what is 

needed. You guys are the pros. You guys are the folks that are on 

the ground. We need an unbiased political opinion on what is best 

for this country, because it is a lot of dough. So, thank you for that. 

Earlier this year the President’s budget sought to eliminate the 

TSA law enforcement in our airports, over 300 nationwide. I do not 

understand what went into that thought process, and I am certainly not blaming you because it was drafted long before you were 

in this position. But, airports large and small would have fewer 

people on the ground, and it would burden airports with an unfunded mandate, which, by the way, I do not believe they have the 

resources to be able to fund. 

We have seen plenty of tragedies that have emanated from airports around the world and in this country. What is your position 

on this? You know what answer I want, but I want to know what 

is in your head. Do you believe that funding TSA in our airports 

is a critical component? And, what has been your conversation with 

the folks—and I know you are Acting—above you on this issue? 

Ms. DUKE. DHS’ position is that we try to look at what expenditure of funds brings the most value to aviation security. Some of 

the reductions that were put in the budget like having someone 

posted at the exit, those type of things, behavioral recognition as 

a stand-alone function, were ones where we either do not have evidence that they are successful or that we feel like they are lower 

risk than other types of protection. 

We believe in TSA. We have to be more efficient. We are looking 

at technologies to do that so it is not just human-intensive. But, it 

is an ongoing process, and we have to continue to refine it. 

Senator TESTER. I appreciate that. I will just tell you that the reimbursement program is really critical. And, by the way, I cannot 

thank you enough to look at where you get the most bang for the 

buck. But, security costs money. I think you would agree on that. 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. 

Senator TESTER. We have just got to figure out how to do it better, and I just think that this could be the epitome of shooting oneself in the foot. 

Thank you all very much. Thank you for your service. Christopher, next time around we will do some good stuff. Same thing 

with you, Mr. Rasmussen. So, thank you all very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Daines. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAINES 

Senator DAINES. Thank you, Chairman Johnson. 

Director Wray, cyber terrorism is an emerging threat that has 

become all too real in Montana. In fact, just 2 weeks ago, the Columbia Falls School District received cyber threats promising harm 

and demanding ransom. This forced the closure of more than 30 

schools across multiple school districts, affected over 15,000 Montana children. It is unprecedented. We have not seen that before 

in my home State of Montana. The culprit has been identified as 

the ‘‘Dark Overlord,’’ an overseas criminal organization. 

Mr. Wray, are you aware of these cyber threats? And, is the FBI 

investigating? 
30 

Mr. WRAY. Yes, Senator, we are actively involved in the matter 

that you are referring to in Montana. I want to be careful not to 

discuss an ongoing investigation, but I will tell you that I could not 

agree more that this concept of ransomware, cyber terrorism, the 

various variants of it that are hitting, and I think the example in 

your State illustrates that it is everywhere now. It is no longer just 

ransomware to, a big Fortune 500 company. It is hospitals; it is 

schools in your case. 

So, it is a threat that is growing. We have a lot of matters ongoing related to it. In some cases we have indicted ransomware authors. In other cases we have what is called ‘‘sinkholed’’ them, 

which is redirect them essentially into the hands of law enforcement. But, make no mistake, it is a very serious threat, and it is 

growing. 

Senator DAINES. So, I understand it is an active investigation, 

and you are limited in providing details. However, looking back at 

the big picture, what is the FBI doing to attribute these cyber 

crimes and help bring these criminals to justice? 

Mr. WRAY. There are a variety of technological things we can do. 

We are also working with partners to try to exchange information 

to help identify sort of telltale signs that may help us link back to 

particular organizations. 

I think one of the things we are seeing more and more in this 

area as much as any other is how the stuff transcends boundaries, 

and so some of the same organizations are targeting victims in 

other countries as well. And so, we are really working more and 

more with our partners to try to see if we can have their two plus 

our two to get more than four, to get five and six so that we can 

really deal with these otherwise very elusive foes. 

Senator DAINES. Ms. Duke, as you mentioned, General Kelly in 

his short time at the helm drove down illegal immigration and 

boosted Department morale. I think one of the underreported stories in this country is what you have seen in terms of the apprehensions and the decline of crossings coming across our Southwest 

border. General Kelly sat right where you all are sitting awhile 

back and shared some of these remarkable improvements, quantifiable reductions of 60 or 70 percent. And, I have confidence that you 

will continue on that trajectory. 

These recent cyber threats that I described here with the Director have Montanans shocked. They are nervous. It hits right at the 

core of who we are, our children. But, as you mentioned in your 

testimony, Americans will not be intimidated or coerced. 

You also briefly touched on identifying and punishing those who 

exploit cyberspace. What efforts has DHS taken to improve attribution capabilities? 

Ms. DUKE. If I could real quickly, we went up six points in the 

employee survey this year, also, so that was another good-news 

story, a tremendous amount of work—— 

Senator DAINES. I know they greatly respect and appreciate the 

emphasis on enforcing the law and law and order, so thank you. 

Ms. DUKE. Thank you. So, we are working a lot with the critical 

infrastructure. Cybersecurity has to start with those that own the 

systems, and so what we are working on is, through our monitoring 

and our diagnostics, protecting not only the Federal systems but 
31 

alerting and keeping the critical infrastructure, the private sector 

aware of threats that might come out. So, we do information bulletins. We do those types of things. 

Recently, one of the more severe actions was a binding operation 

directive on specifically a significant threat in terms of the 

Kaspersky software. So, it depends on the situation. We work closely, we sit with the FBI, so there is a seamless—from just countering it as just a bug to it being a criminal activity. 

Senator DAINES. OK. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Daines. 

Director Rasmussen, last year, prior to your testimony, Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Brennan testified before the 

Senate Intelligence Committee, and his basic quote on ISIS was 

that, ‘‘All our efforts have not reduced the group’s terrorism capability and global reach. ISIS remains a formidable, resilient, and 

largely cohesive enemy.’’ 

A month or two later, in your testimony before this Committee, 

you said, ‘‘Despite this progress, ISIS’ ability to carry out terrorist 

attacks in Syria, Iraq, and abroad has not to date been significantly diminished, and the tempo of ISIL-linked terrorist activity 

is a reminder of the group’s continued global reach.’’ 

To paraphrase your oral testimony today, you basically said that 

the capacity or capability of ISIS has not been mitigated, they remain resilient. 

Is that pretty much your feeling, that even though we are making great gains—and we have been—I mean, we really are denying 

that territory, destroying that caliphate. Is their global reach 

undiminished? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Their global reach remains profound. I would 

make one distinction, though, and one thing that I think that I 

pointed to this year that was not on the table last year is we have 

seen a reduction in the ability of ISIS to be able to actually direct 

and command and control attacks from their safe haven in Iraq 

and Syria. That is the good news. 

The bad news is that they have shown an expanded ability to be 

able to inspire individuals to take the kinds of actions that we have 

seen in places across Europe and potentially even inside the homeland here. 

There is a good news/bad news element to that. Obviously, attacks that are driven by an organization under a command-andcontrol structure involving all the resources of that organization 

can be larger and more complex and more lethal. But, that is not 

to minimize the lethality that comes with a lone individual who 

may have acquired a firearm or developed an explosive device. So, 

I do not want to overstate the degree to which our threat condition 

is significantly mitigated by having these inspired plots as opposed 

to these directed plots. 

But, the underlying point in my testimony was it is going to take 

a longer period of time than we would like to mitigate the threat 

condition posed by ISIS. Battlefield success is necessary. It is coming. It is happening. It just is not going to produce the results we 

want from a threat perspective as quickly as we would like. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Also last year, Director Comey testified that 

ISIS, ‘‘They will not all die on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. 
32 

There will be a diaspora sometime in the next 2 to 3 years unlike 

we have ever seen before.’’ 

About a month or so ago, you had a different assessment on that. 

Can you talk a little bit about that? Are we not seeing that spreading? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I think we have come up with a more nuanced 

assessment just based on what we have seen with data over the 

past couple of years, and that is, more of these individuals who 

have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria are deciding to stay in the conflict zone to fight and ultimately in most cases die fighting to preserve their self-declared caliphate. 

What we expected when we saw that large inflow of foreign fighters was at some point to deal with a large outflow. That outflow 

is coming. It is, in fact, in some ways already happening, but it is 

not nearly as large in volume as perhaps we anticipated. That is 

a good thing that we are not going to have to deal with thousands 

and thousands of foreign fighters departing the conflict zone. 

I would say, though, quality matters here. Quality matters in 

some ways more than quantity. The wrong set of individuals who 

escape from the conflict zone in Iraq and Syria, if they have a particularly specialized set of skills or a particularly full Rolodex or 

deep connections into an extremist community in Europe or even 

potentially here inside the United States, they could pose a significant threat to us. But, volume is not what we expected it to be. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, if they have safe havens. I mean, are 

we seeing them move to Libya, to Afghanistan, where, again, they 

have safe havens? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. In some cases, yes, but, again, not in large volumes. But, there are other conflict zones where some of these fighters are looking to move. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Director Wray. 

Mr. WRAY. Mr. Chairman, I would just add one related point, 

which is I think we are starting to see some of the people who we 

previously thought would have traveled to fight over there being 

encouraged, because of the way things are going on the battlefield, 

to stay put in their respective countries. So, it is a variation on 

what I think Director Comey was referring to. 

Chairman JOHNSON. In my office earlier, Director Wray, we were 

talking about how our priority as a Committee is border security, 

cybersecurity, critical infrastructure. We talked about cybersecurity 

almost being above everything else. I mean, it is infiltrating and 

fueling all these other threats. 

The other thing we talked about—and this is a concern, too—is 

because that cyber capability, because of the Internet connecting 

everybody, for good and for ill—let us talk about the ill. The cooperation between potentially terrorist organizations, drug cartels, 

transnational criminal organizations, can you just describe how we 

are seeing that witch’s brew being developed because of the Internet? 

Mr. WRAY. I think what we are seeing, Mr. Chairman, is a blurring between different kinds of threats, so we are seeing in the 

counterintelligence arena nation-states enlisting the help of hackers for hire, for example. We are seeing transnational criminal organizations veering more into what would previously have been 
33 

1The report referenced by Senator McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 75. 

thought of as cyber crime. And, throughout all of the different 

types of threats we are facing, because more and more of it is online, encrypted platforms, etc, the modality of the threat is changing across all of them. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We used to have a joke about the FBI when 

I was the District Attorney (D.A.) in Kansas City, and that was, 

if you wanted to get information out of them, you better make sure 

you had something they needed, because sometimes it was very difficult to open up the lines of communication, even among everyone 

who is doing the same work. So, when I read the Inspectors General reports1 in March that reviewed the ability of the intelligence 

community, DHS, and Department of Justice in terms of how well 

they are sharing information and really indicted all three parts of 

our government that are responsible for going after counterterrorism, that you are not doing a very good job of sharing information. 

I understand the nature of this problem because you want to 

hold on to stuff that you do not want people to know that could 

misuse it or leak it, but I think it is really important. We have 

been talking about sharing information since the fires were still 

burning in those Twin Towers and how we are going to do it better 

and more effectively. And, this is not even the age-old problem of 

local versus Federal sharing of information. This is Federal to Federal. 

Can you address what the three of you are doing right now to 

look at the recommendation made by these Inspectors General from 

the three parts of the government that should be working together 

hand in hand? 

Mr. WRAY. I will go first. So, Senator, I would say first as to the 

Inspector General, he is somebody I have known and worked with 

for a long time. I had a one-on-one meeting with him early, I think 

within the first week of my arrival on the job, to try to learn what 

issues I needed to be focused on. And, I am continuing to try to 

evaluate that recommendation as well as a number of others. 

I will say on the information-sharing front that to me, as somebody who was in Government on 9/11, around for all the discussion 

of information sharing that you are referring to, that while we 

clearly have a long way to go, I have a little bit of the perspective, 

having gone and come back, and I will tell you it is so much better 

now than it was before. I mean, it is light years. Walking around 

going into field offices, seeing people from DHS collocated with people from the FBI, people from the CIA collocated with the FBI, 

every meeting all my folks want to talk about is the great relationships they now have with this agency, that agency. 

So, can we get better? Absolutely. But, I do want to reassure you 

that great progress has been made on this front. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is terrific. Do we have a specific plan 

on implementing the recommendations? Secretary Duke. 

Ms. DUKE. We are focused—there has artificially—I agree with 

Director Wray that it has improved. There was an artificial separa-
34 

tion between law enforcement and the intelligence communities 

that we have had to overcome. 

One of the major areas we are very close to overcoming is on vetting, and we have come up with a model that should be finalized 

very soon that will allow absolute clear sharing of information 

when it comes to vetting of persons, which is one of the most important areas to us, and that is what we have been focused on. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have been worried about how long it has 

taken us to notify the States about the potential efforts to scan 

voter registration files in their States. I am even more concerned, 

once I realized that one State was notified—I believe your State 

was notified—that this had occurred, and then the next day there 

was another callback to say, well, no, it did not occur. 

I assume that you all agree that we are still at risk—just speak 

up if you disagree that we are still at risk from Russia trying to 

interfere in our elections and election processes. And, if you all do 

agree with that, what is our strategy going forward? How are we 

going to do what needs to be done to notify the American public 

if this is going on and prevent it from actually happening in all of 

these various ways that Russia played around in our democracy? 

They do not even understand what a democracy is in Russia. And, 

it is pretty nervy for them to do this, try to break the backbone of 

democracy. And, they are doing it in a variety of ways. I just want 

to make sure that you all are preparing for this next year and have 

a plan. 

Ms. DUKE. Yes, in terms of the notification, we notified the 

States back when the intrusion occurred. What we learned from 

that and what we are correcting is that we notified the system’s 

owners, and that did not necessarily notify the right senior officials 

that need to take action. So, that is corrected. And, I know that our 

counterparts here are working on the identification and attribution 

pieces. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are you ready for next year? 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, we are spending an enormous amount of 

time talking about this very subject. We are surging more resources specifically focused on the upcoming elections. We are collecting more intelligence. 

One of the things we know is that the Russians and other State 

actors are trying to influence other elections in other countries as 

well. So, that is one of the places where those partnerships have 

become so important because we can exchange information about 

tradecraft, methods, capabilities. 

We are also in the FBI looking at this as a multidisciplinary effort not just across agencies but even within the FBI multidisciplinary. So our counterintelligence and our cyber people are working together on it. Those are a few examples. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know I am over time, but just—and if you 

need to take this for the record, just one more. Is somebody looking 

at the dark money that is going into these political campaigns? We 

have the ability of people to give money and never be identified 

publicly to influence campaigns, millions and millions of dollars. Is 

somebody at the FBI going through all of these so-called super Political Action Committee (PACs) that can take money without attribution to the public and seeing where their money is coming from? 
35 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, let me see if there is something I can provide 

you in writing after the hearing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes, because, the notion that nobody in public ever gets to know where this money is coming from, that is like 

tailor-made for Russia, and that is where the majority of the money 

is being spent in our elections right now, sadly, as a result of Citizens United. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Director Wray, let me ask a question and just read something 

that comes off the FBI website. It says, ‘‘Hate itself is not a crime, 

and the FBI is mindful of protecting freedom of speech and other 

civil liberties.’’ 

So, what I am trying to figure out is a trend and a direction. I 

hear a lot about hate groups now, and we have always talked about 

hate crimes. So, what I am trying to figure out is: Is the FBI maintaining a list of hate groups that are under greater scrutiny? And 

if so, how is that list developed? 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, we do a couple different things. Our focus is 

not on—we do not track movements or ideologies or groups that 

have specific beliefs. We focus on situations where—so from a terrorism angle, there are two different pieces of that. There is a domestic terrorism angle, for example, and a hate crime angle, and 

we do both. We focus on the threat of violence, and so there has 

to be proper predication for us to start an investigation. The FBI 

has a history that we try to be very sensitive to about not investigating people for their beliefs in this country. 

Senator LANKFORD. And, that is entirely appropriate and protected in the United States to have whatever belief you want to 

have, even if it is wrong. It is entirely appropriate. My question is: 

Are you tracking—does the FBI keep a list of hate groups, or do 

you outsource that to some other group? If I called the FBI and 

said, ‘‘Who is on your list of hate groups?’’ would there be a list? 

Mr. WRAY. We have, I would say, networks of people that are 

working together, and then we have—so that is groups in that 

sense. I do not know that we would call them ‘‘hate groups.’’ But 

then, we also have certain—I think we have nine designated movements that we use as sort of identifiers for particular types of—it 

is just a way of categorizing investigations. 

Senator LANKFORD. But, it is a list the FBI has created, no outside group is creating that for you and sending it to you? 

Mr. WRAY. Correct, absolutely. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Ms. Duke, let me ask you about entry-exit visas, and we have 

talked about it before as well on it. The report came out in May 

listing out people who have overstayed their visa from last year. 

We have 600,000 people in the country that have overstayed a visa, 

and we do not know where they are. So let me ask you a question 

from the 9/11 Commission, from something that is a decade and a 

half in the making here. 

There was a requirement to put in place entry-exit visa 

verification. If they come into the country, we know who they are. 

When they are leaving, we should be able to track and know when 

they leave and if they leave; and if they do not leave, to be able 
36 

to go find them and to figure out why they are still here. How is 

that going? There is a pilot program that is underway. I want to 

know how that is advancing, if everything is on schedule. 

Ms. DUKE. Yes, the pilot program that uses photos and biometrics is doing very well. Our next phase, which we are implementing now, is integrating it into TSA. It was only being used by 

CBP. And to date, that is the way we intend to progress. The pilot 

has proved itself successful so far in its limited application. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. Full rollout will be by when? 

Ms. DUKE. I would have to get back to you with a date on that, 

Senator. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. That would be very helpful just to be 

able to get a feeling of when we are rolling out and how long this 

is going to take. This has been a request for a very long time of 

Congress, and I know you are walking into this and trying to help 

finish a project that is ongoing. But, it is one that is exceptionally 

important and continues to grow in importance. 

Ms. DUKE. Agree. 

Senator LANKFORD. Let me ask a little bit about elections again. 

I had asked you before about any State request for onsite assessments, and you felt like any State that wants to get it, that you 

are prepared to be able to do it. I would tell you I have had this 

conversation before with DHS folks, and their statement to me 

was, ‘‘If we had more than just a few States ask us, we are not personnel ready to be able to actually go help them in time for the 

2018 elections.’’ 

So, what I would like to do is have a longer conversation with 

you where we can walk through and see what you are going to 

need to be able to be at that point, because it has been my understanding in the past that DHS is currently not prepared to be able 

to fulfill requests as they are coming in. And, maybe requests are 

not there yet, but if 10 States all made the request at the same 

time, we could not make it in time for the 2018 election, and we 

have a lot more than 10 States that may make that request and 

try to figure out how we can get you ready for that. 

The other one is trying to get States—and what I am interested 

in is your perception, where States are right now in understanding 

the risk, as the notifications have gone back out again to individuals, and thank you for correcting who gets notified in States. That 

does make a difference in getting the message out. But, as that is 

going out, do States understand the significance of the cyber 

threats they face on their network, from their voter data lists, from 

the equipment that is there? Are they prepared to do an audit? 

And, again, I am not asking for the Federal Government to take 

over the States’ elections. That is theirs. But, are they prepared to 

be able to do an audit where they can verify with paper and with 

electronic, if they use electronic, to be able to even audit after the 

election whether their machines have been hacked or affected at 

all? 

Ms. DUKE. We have seen some more interest. There still are people, I think, artificially delineating between voter databases and 

election. And so, I would like to see more sense of urgency, but the 

cyber threats are at the forefront of us every day. 
37 

Senator LANKFORD. All right. Well, if they get into a voter database and they delete people or they add people, you lose the integrity of the election at that point and people lose trust, because they 

show up and they are not registered to vote and they used to be, 

and now suddenly they are gone from a list because someone 

reached in and changed it. So, that does affect, again, just the 

sense of trust in the election, and we want to be able to maintain 

that and to be able to push back on the Russians or anyone that 

may try it next time, and to say not on our system, not ever. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Hassan. 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, just to echo 

Senator Lankford’s point, one observation I have is that DHS often 

has very good relationships with homeland security personnel and 

emergency preparedness folks in the States. The outreach to folks 

who run elections in the States is kind of a new thing for DHS, and 

I would urge you to marshal the resources that you have good relationships with in the States to try to foster that bridge to the election officials, because we all share this sense of urgency about 

2018. 

I wanted to follow up on Chairman Johnson’s very important 

question on the ISIS diaspora. Not all ISIS members are going to 

die on the battlefield, as you have all pointed out, and we are going 

to need a robust strategy for dealing with ISIS foreign fighters once 

the so-called caliphate truly fails. 

So that end, Secretary Duke, I want to ask you about ISIS teams 

of Homeland Security Investigation Officers that are now deployed 

to 30 U.S. embassies and consulates. These teams of law enforcement officers, which we call ‘‘visa security teams,’’ are trained 

counterterrorism professionals who aid the State Department’s consular offices as they make decisions about whether to grant U.S. 

visas to foreign nationals. 

Given the chance that many ISIS foreign fighters will return to 

their home countries, it is going to be even more important that we 

have these visa security teams at more than 30 U.S. diplomatic 

posts where they are currently deployed. Can you commit to expanding the number of posts at which visa security teams are located? I should note that my staff is working with the Chairman’s 

and Ranking Member’s staff to do that, but is that something the 

Department can commit to us on? 

Ms. DUKE. We are reviewing that right now, so I do not know 

if more—additionally, we are increasing vetting overall. But, that 

has been very useful to us. 

Senator HASSAN. Well, we would look forward to working with 

you on that because I think there are a number of us that think 

that 30 is not enough, and we want to do everything we can to 

partner with you on that. 

I also wanted to touch on the issue of white supremacist and neoNazi threats. I want to echo my colleague from California’s concerns. Mr. Chair, I think we need an absolutely thorough oversight 

effort in this regard focused specifically on the threats posed by 

white supremacists and neo-Nazis. 

I want to turn to you, Director Wray, because there are some 

complexities that go to domestic terrorism versus international ter-
38 

rorism. From an initial review, the FBI’s ability to prevent and address acts of international terrorism appears to be very different 

from their ability to prevent and address domestic terrorism. For 

one, while domestic terrorism and international terrorism are defined in statute, as you pointed out, there is no criminal offense or 

charge, as I understand it, of domestic terrorism, although there is 

an international terrorism offense and charge on the books. 

Neal Katyal, the former Acting Solicitor General, said in a media 

interview that if the Charlottesville attacker had emerged from his 

car and announced that he carried out the attack in the name of 

ISIS, then he could have been charged with international terrorism. 

Is that true? And, would that be the case even though the 

attacker was American? 

Mr. WRAY. We can charge ISIS supporters, whether they are 

American or foreign, under the various material support statutes 

and things like that. I will say, Senator, I just want to make sure 

that I am not confusing the Committee in some way about our effectiveness in the domestic terrorism space. Our approach in the 

terrorism arena in both international terrorism and domestic terrorism—and this is a product of the immediate post-9/11 era—is to 

look for every possible tool we have, and a lot of times the best 

charge may not—even in the international terrorism arena where 

we have a statute, may not be the terrorism charge. There may be 

reasons why it is simpler, easier, quicker, less resource intensive, 

and you can still get a long sentence with some of the other offenses. 

And so, that is really the approach we have been taking on the 

domestic terrorism front where a lot of times there are good, effective, very serious charges we can bring. And so, even though you 

may not see them from your end as a domestic terrorism charge, 

they are very much domestic terrorism cases that are just being 

brought under other criminal offenses. 

Senator HASSAN. No, I do understand that, but I also am concerned about making sure that we are doing everything we can to 

go after these domestic terrorism groups who promote violence. So, 

I have just been trying to think through—let us say we had a case 

of neo-Nazism terrorism. As I understand it, the defining factor for 

a charge of international terrorism can be whether the ideology 

that is being espoused comes from outside of the United States. So, 

there is nothing American or inherently domestic about Nazis. So, 

if a neo-Nazi carries out a mass murder while yelling, ‘‘Heil Hitler,’’ 

that would certainly appear to be an ideology that originated from 

outside of America’s borders. So, could they be considered international terrorists? 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, I would have to think about that one a little 

bit. I am not sure that we would call that international terrorism, 

but we have brought neo-Nazi cases. We are going to continue to 

bring them when we have the proper predication and the elements 

of the offense. And, I have not been hearing from my folks that 

they feel hamstrung in that space. But, as I said to Senator Peters, 

we can always use more tools in the toolbox to try to be as effective 

as possible. 
39 

Senator HASSAN. Well, I thank you for that, and I think it just 

goes to the point that there are some real complexities here, and 

we want to make sure that we are giving you appropriate tools, 

recognizing the complexity of the domestic situation but also the 

real danger of these terrorist groups. 

With that, I thank all of you for your service very much and for 

being here today. 

Mr. WRAY. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. I apologize for being in and out. We 

have a bunch of hearings going on, and we also are on different 

committees, as you know. I am pleased to be able to participate, 

at least intermittently. 

My first question is not really a question. I just want to say 

something, and so I will just go ahead and say it. I had a good conversation with Admiral Peter Neffenger, who was our leader at 

TSA until earlier this year. A great leader. A great leader in the 

Coast Guard for years, as you know. But, I think it was on 9/11 

this month, I think GAO released a report that found that TSA 

needs to take action to evaluate costs and effectiveness across its 

security countermeasures. The report from GAO found that TSA 

lacks some basic information to assess whether its programs are effective in deterring or detecting potential attacks on our aviation 

system. 

Under the previous administration, under Admiral Neffenger’s 

watch, he and others worked to institute reforms at TSA. I thought 

they made a lot of progress, but they tried to institute reforms at 

TSA in order to improve detection capabilities, to improve training 

and workforce morale, speed screening, and partner with airlines 

and other private sector companies to invest in the 21st Century 

screening technologies. 

I understand that as his successor, Admiral Pekoske, who is also, 

I think, a very able leader—how lucky we could be to have two 

guys that qualified and that good as leaders. But, I was pleased to 

vote to confirm him with my other colleagues earlier this year. 

So, here is what I want to ask. I am just sort of asking as a 

favor, Ms. Duke, and that would be to ask you to work with Admiral Pekoske to take a look at the GAO report. You may have seen 

it already. Take a look at it and try to make sure that the needed 

training in acquisition reforms continue in order to ensure the continued security of our aviation system. Thank you. 

Ms. DUKE. Absolutely. We are both committed to that. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. 

And, now just one question on the revised travel ban for each of 

our witnesses. I think it was just last Sunday President Trump 

issued yet another Executive Order (EO) limiting travel from, I 

think, eight countries. This new travel ban is indefinite in length. 

The nationals from these countries will not be able to travel to the 

United States until such a time as the President sees fit to remove 

them from the list. None of the countries listed in the original travel ban or the new one have been associated with deadly terrorist 

attacks in the United States Some of them are currently suffering 

from humanitarian crises. And, in addition to imposing a new travel ban, it has been reported that President Trump intends to cut 
40 

refugee admissions to some of the lowest levels in history. And, I 

have to think that some of these actions—the ban, the cut in refugee admissions—may have an adverse impact on our national security. 

So, I would just ask you, Ms. Duke, if I could, could you share 

with us any analyses that the Department has conducted to determine the cost and benefit of imposing a new ban? That would be 

my question of you. Can you share with us any analyses that the 

Department has conducted to determine the cost and benefit of imposing a new ban? And, to Mr. Wray, and to Nick, in terms of priority, would this travel ban be in your top, say, I do not know, five 

action items to take to prevent terror attacks on the homeland? 

First, Ms. Duke. Thank you. 

Ms. DUKE. What we need is we need better identity management, better vetting of persons, and that is what this review was. 

We did a very thorough review of all the countries. We have not 

done a cost analysis because I do not think you could put a cost 

on letting a terrorist into the country. However, we have structured 

it, as you saw in the proclamation, that as soon as a country gives 

us the information, starts doing the information sharing under the 

three criteria, we do not want people to be on a travel restriction. 

It is not in the best interest. And so, we are hoping that this will 

give incentives for them to work with us. 

Additionally, I want to point out that refugees are not subject to 

the ban of any country. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. Wray, Nick, the second question. In terms of priority, would 

this travel ban be, say, in your top five action items to take to prevent terror attacks on our homeland? 

Mr. WRAY. Senator, I do not know that I have my priorities in 

that space into the list, but I would say that getting sufficient information from foreign countries to allow us to prioritize targets of 

interest is a very high priority for us because, as you probably 

know, the name of the game in this space is trying to make very 

difficult judgment calls under sometimes very tight time constraints about which subject is the highest-priority investigation, 

and we cannot do that without sufficient information from the 

countries of origin. 

Senator CARPER. Nick. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. The only thing I would add is, again, I do not 

know that I have a prioritization schema in mind that would rank 

our particular activities. As I said in response to one of the other 

Senators’ questions earlier, our particular piece of this is to provide 

the best possible intelligence input into what is, as Director Wray 

said, a very complex decision and to make sure that we can do that 

in a repeatable, in a consistent, in a predictable way so that the 

State Department and Department of Homeland Security who end 

up owning these responsibilities can count on the best possible 

input from the intelligence community. 

We are going to forever be limited by the amount of information 

we have available to us, and so we are going to be in a constant 

effort to try to increase the pile of information that we are relying 

on to provide that input. 
41 

Senator CARPER. All right. And, I would just say in conclusion, 

thank you for your responses, but it seems peculiar to me—interesting, at least—that countries that have never apparently posed 

a threat to us in terms of a threat on the homeland, we are going 

to say, ‘‘For whatever purpose you cannot come here. We are not 

going to allow you to travel to our Nation for school or for other 

reasons.’’ And yet, there are other countries that have posed a real 

danger, and still do, and they are free to come and go. It just seems 

peculiar. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Secretary Duke, actually I asked one of my 

team members to just go quickly to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website to make sure it was still there, and it is, 

on page 6 of 27 of the frequently asked question (FAQs)—‘‘Will the 

information I share’’—this is the DACA applicant. ‘‘Will the information I share in my request for consideration of DACA be used 

for immigration enforcement purposes?’’ And, they are told in the 

answer in this document, ‘‘Individuals whose cases are deferred 

pursuant to DACA will not be referred to ICE.’’ 

I also have a two-page letter signed by Jeh Johnson on December 

30, 2016, where he indicated, ‘‘Since DACA was announced in 2012, 

DHS has consistently made clear that the information provided by 

applicants would be safeguarded from other immigration-related 

purposes.’’ 

So, I would ask you to familiarize yourself with these documents, 

because we are talking about 700,000 young people in this country 

right now who are in utter fear about their future, about their lives 

right now, their families are, their employers are, their friends are. 

And, you have a responsibility to be clear about what your agency 

is doing as it relates to keeping a promise to these young people 

and thinking about their situation right now and their future. 

I would also point out to you that I asked you 6 months ago during your confirmation hearing about this document, which was a 

memo, Homeland Security, indicating there were seven new priority enforcement areas, and the seventh, which reads, ‘‘In the 

judgment of an immigration officer’’—‘‘They may have enforcement 

responsibilities if in their judgment that person poses a risk to public safety or national security.’’ I asked you then what are the factors for consideration and how are you training your agents on how 

they should exercise that judgment, knowing that you have limited 

resources, and there are potentially a lot of people that could fall 

in that category. You indicated to me you would get back to me on 

how those agents are being trained, and you have not done that. 

On a separate matter, you have indicated on September 5th that 

DACA would be rescinded and that these individuals would have 

until October 5th to reapply; otherwise, they would fall out of status. And, my question to you is: Did your agency directly notify the 

DACA recipients that they will be eligible to renew their applicants? Did you notify them directly, or was it just through the 

press? 

Ms. DUKE. No, we have not contacted each individual directly. 

Senator HARRIS. And, you have given them a month from the 

time that that word went out—one month only—to apply to renew 
42 

their status, which requires them to submit many forms and fill 

out the information in those forms. It requires them by October 5th 

to also provide a $495 application fee. Within 1 month it requires 

them to supply two passport photographs. Passport photographs 

cost between about $15 and $20. The last time I looked, Federal 

minimum wage is about $7.25 an hour. So, my question to you is: 

Given the responsibilities that they are required to meet to apply 

before October 5th, given also—and we have talked about it in this 

hearing—the impact of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, will 

you consider extending the deadline beyond October 5th for these 

kids to apply? 

Ms. DUKE. I am just as passionate as you are about doing the 

right thing by people in America, and I commit to working with 

Congress to do the right thing. An unconstitutional program that 

only keeps them in 2-year limbo status is not the right answer for 

these—— 

Senator HARRIS. So, are you willing to extend the deadline that 

you have already set given the circumstances of these natural disasters that have also occurred in the interim? 

Ms. DUKE. We have not been notified by anyone that natural disasters have affected—I have looked into the process. There is a 

money issue, I agree with you there. But, the process itself is very 

simple. So, we will do what is right. It is an unconstitutional program, so that is constraining, and I hope that we can come up with 

a better solution through Congress. 

Senator HARRIS. Are 700,000 young people supposed to suffer because you did not figure out how to implement this program properly? Are 700,000 young people supposed to be terrified because 

they cannot come up with a lot of money within 1 month? 

Ms. DUKE. It is not my position to come up with a statute. That 

would be Congress’ responsibility. 

Senator HARRIS. Who came up with the decision that they would 

be given 1 month from September 5th to October 5th? 

Ms. DUKE. That is something that we came up with to end the 

program in a compassionate manner. 

Senator HARRIS. I would ask you to consider extending that 

deadline. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Harris. I would just 

point out again that one of the reasons many of us asked President 

Obama not to use his Executive authority, what we believe is unconstitutional, is because it would create these types of issues. So, 

you know, certainly from my standpoint, I want to do everything 

I can to solve this problem in a very humane fashion. I am happy 

to work with you and any member on the other side of the aisle, 

together with my Republican colleagues, to fix this. We have 6 

months to do it. Let us really work together in a bipartisan fashion 

to humanely—— 

Senator HARRIS. I agree. 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. Resolve this issue. 

Senator HARRIS. Let us pass the DREAM Act. I agree. A clean 

DREAM Act. I agree with you. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. That is not exactly the best way of doing it 

bipartisan. So, again, hopefully there will be some give and take 

here and we can actually do things to secure our border as well. 
43 

With that, again, I want to thank all of our witnesses, not only 

for your testimony, written and oral, and the time you have taken, 

but literally just the commitment you have made to this Nation. It 

is a 24/7 job. Every last one of your positions here, it is an enormous responsibility. And, this Committee thanks you sincerely for 

doing that. 

With this, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days until 

October 12th at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(45) 

A P P E N D I X 
46 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Claire McCaskill 

Wednesday, September 27,2017 

"Threats to tbe Homeland" 

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Directors Wray and Rasmussen, thank you for 

being here today. Secretary Duke, I welcome you to the Committee for the first time as the 

Department's Aeting Secretary. I want to let you know that I appreciate the efforts that you and 

FEMA are making to assist the victims of hurricanes in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico. I will 

have to say, though, we are very concerned about what we arc seeing in Puerto Rico. 1 know 

there have been logistical challenges because of the devastation in Puerto Rico, but I am looking 

forward to the briefing that we are going to receive today from FEMA about what is actually 

occurring on the ground. Those Americans are very deserving of whatever it takes for us to 

address the humanitarian crisis that is impacting 3.5 million American citizens in Puerto Rico as 

we speak today. 

The hearing today is about threats to the homeland. Heartbreakingly, just last month, we 

suffered a terrorist attack here at home. The violence perpetrated by white supremacists and ncoNazis at the Charlottesville rally was tragic, vile, and evil. It stunned many of us who thought 

the chants of''Blood and Soil" belonged on the film footage of a Nuremberg rally, not a 21st 

century American college. The boldness and the outspokenness of something that is so evil, the 

proudly marching under a Nazi t1ag, is something that many of us did not think we would see in 

this country, but we have now seen it. I direct your attention to a document that is on the easel. I 

don't think many Americans understand the level of threat that we have in this county from 

white supremacists, anti-government, and other violent extremists. If you look at the 

comparison-and this data comes from the GAO, this isn't from a think tank or anybody who 

has bias-we've had 62 incidents since 9/11 and I 06 fatalities by the white supremacist, antigovemment, and other violent extremists. Compare that to 23 acts of violence by Islamic violent 

extremists. The fatalities are almost equal. So one of my goals at this hearing today is to get 

specific responses as to whether or not the level of investigation and response matches the level 

of threat as it relates to these two types of terrorists that want to do harm to American citizens. 

I'm worried that we have-this committee is a good example-we've had multiple hearings on 

the threat of!SIS as it relates to homeland security. We have had zero hearings about the threat 

of domestic terrorists and the threat they pose in our country and our response to it. 

We also face the threats from foreign terrorist organizations, like ISIS, and those inspired 

by them. We only need to look overseas over the past four months to sec what our allies have 

suffered. The suicide bomber in Manchester, England, in June; the pedestrians on London 

Bridge in August; a van in Barcelona, Spain; and just this month a bucket bomb on a London 

subway. We know these organizations aren'tjust targeting Europe. 
47 

We know that, in addition to domestic terrorists, there are foreign terrorists who want to 

kill Americans and who want to, importantly, radicalize Americans here at home to do so. 

That's why we depend on you, the men and women of the DHS, the FBI, and the NCTC. 

We rely on you to identify threats, prevent attacks, and keep America safe. 

That's why I am so concerned about some of the budget choices made by this 

administration. For instance, mass transit locations and other "soft targets" where large groups 

of people gather have served as prime targets. In addition to aviation security, the TSA helps 

secure mass transit, passenger rail, freight rail, highways, busses, pipelines, and sea ports. 

According to the TSA, more than 10 billion passenger trips are taken on mass transit systems 

each year. 

Yet, the President's budget plans to cut critical TSA programs at a time when we cannot 

afford to let up when it comes to security measures. A large portion of this cut is taken from the 

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response ("VIPR") teams. The VIPR teams deploy all across 

the country to provide critical assistance with securing airports, subways, and bus tenninals. By 

the way, they also deployed to Houston to assist with recovery. But the President's budget 

would cut them by $43 million, reducing VIPR teams from 31 down to just 8 teams to cover the 

entire country. 

The President's budget will also slash other DHS programs that provide critical security 

to our transportations systems. In July, DI-IS announced 29 awards through the Complex 

Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (CCTA) Grant Program, including one that would help Kansas 

City local preparedness plans and enhance communications systems, and another that would 

allow StLouis to build an integrated response structure among first responders. This is the type 

of assistance we should be providing our cities in the face of threats like London, Barcelona, and 

Manchester. But the President's budget will eliminate all of these grant programs for next year. 

There unfortunately is not enough time to discuss in seven minutes or a single hearing all 

the threats our country faces. We face cybcr ransom ware attacks. We have Russia trying to 

hack our elections. This month, DHS ordered agencies to remove cybersccurity software from 

federal computer systems because of its manufacturer's tics to Russian intelligence. We have 

border security issues. We even have potential threats to agriculture-just last month I had a 

roundtable in Kansas City to learn what agro-terrorism could do to the nation's confidence in its 

food supply. 

So l am glad you are all here today to talk about what the greatest threats are that 

America faces, what we are doing about them, and, most importantly, what we can do to help 

you in your most important work. Thank you very much. 

2 
48 

Testimony of Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine C. Duke 

"Threats to the Homeland"- Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 

September 27, 2017 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and distinguished members of the Committee, I 

would like to thank the Committee for inviting me to testifY on the threats facing our great 

Nat ion and what we are doing to confront them. First though, I would like to recognize the 

service of former Secretary John Kelly. While his tenure at the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) ended early, his impact was substantial. General Kelly visibly lifted the morale 

of the Department, set a new standard for leadership, and-most importantly--established the 

foundation for historic improvements in our Nation's security. The Department has not missed a 

beat since his departure, and it is my honor to continue to advance the work he set in motion. 

Make no mistake, the threats our country faces are serious. Our enemies and adversaries are 

persistent. They are working to undermine our people, our interests, and our way of life every 

day. But whether it is the violent menace posed by international and domestic terrorists or the 

silent intrusions of cyber adversaries, the American people will not be intimidated or coerced. 

am proud that the men and women ofDHS are driven to address these challenges, and they are 

more than equal to the task. 

I would like to stress two themes today. 

First, we are rethinking homeland security for a new age. We sometimes speak of the "home 

game" and "away game" in protecting our country, with DHS especially focused on the former. 

But the line is now blurred. The dangers we face are becoming more dispersed, and threat 

networks are proliferating across borders. The shifting landscape is challenging our security, so 

we need to move past traditional defense and non-defense thinking. This is why DHS is 

overhauling its approach to homeland security. We are bringing together intelligence, 

operations, interagency engagement, and international action in new ways and changing how we 

respond to threats to our country. 

Second, we are raising the baseline of our security posture--across the board. DHS is looking at 

everything from traveler screening to information sharing, and we are setting new standards to 

close security vulnerabilities. Since 9/11, we have spoken too often of the weaknesses in our 

systems without taking enough decisive action to fix them for the long haul. This Administration 

aims to change that. At the Department, we are building an action-oriented, results-centric 

culture. We are pushing our borders outward and pressing foreign partners to enhance their 

security so that terrorists, criminals, and other threat actors are stopped well before they reach 

our shores. 

Homeland Security in a New Age of Terrorism 

Today the magnitude of the threat we face from terrorism is equal to, and in many ways exceeds, 

the 9/11 period. While we have made it harder for terrorists to execute large-scale attacks, 

changes in technology have made it is easier for them to plot attacks in general, to radicalize new 

followers, and to recruit beyond borders. The rising tide of violence we have seen in the West is 

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49 

clear evidence of this reality. Indeed, acts of terror have become so frequent that we associate 

them with the names of cities that have been victimized-Paris, San Bernardino, Brussels, 

Orlando, Istanbul, Nice, Berlin, London, Barcelona, and others. As our government takes the 

fight to groups such as ISIS and al-Qa'ida in their safe havens, we expect operatives to disperse 

and focus more heavily on external operations against the United States, our interests, and our 

allies. 

We are seeing an uptick in terrorist activity because the fundamentals of terrorism have evolved. 

This includes changes in terrorist operations, the profile of individual operatives, and the tactics 

they use. With regard to operations, terrorist groups historically sought time and space to plot 

attacks. But now they have become highly networked online, allowing them to spread 

propaganda worldwide, recruit online, evade detection by plotting in virtual safe havens, and 

crowd-source attacks. The result is that our interagency partners and allies have tracked a record 

number of terrorism cases. 

Terrorist demographics have also created challenges for our frontline defenders and intelligence 

professionals. ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and other groups have managed to inspire a wide array of 

sympathizers across the spectrum. While a preponderance are military-age males, the profile of 

a terrorist includes young and old, male and female, wealthy and indigent, immigrant and U.S.-

bom, and living almost anywhere. 

The change in terrorist tactics has likewise put strain on our defenses. Globaljihadist groups are 

promoting simple methods, convincing supporters to use guns, knives, vehicles, and other 

common items to engage in acts of terror. They are also experimenting with other toolsincluding drones, chemical weapons, and artfully concealed improvised explosive devices-to 

further spread violence and fear. We have also seen a spider web of threats against the aviation 

sector, which remains a top target for global jihadist groups. In short, what was once a 

preference for large-scale attacks is now an "all-of-the-above" approach to terrorism. 

The Department is also concerned about violent extremists using the battlefield as a testbed from 

which they can export terror. We continue to see terrorist groups working to perfect new attack 

methods in conflict zones that can then be used in external operations. Operatives are packaging 

this expertise into blueprints that can be shared with followers online and in some cases are 

providing the material resources needed to conduct attacks. We recently saw this in Australia, 

when police foiled a major plot to bring down an airliner using a sophisticated explosive device 

reportedly shipped by an ISIS operative in Turkey. 

The primary international terror threat facing the United States is from violent global jihadist 

groups, who try to radicalize potential operatives within our homeland and seek to send 

operatives to our country. However, the Department is also focused on the threat of domestic 

terrorism and the danger posed by ideologically-motivated violent extremists here in the United 

States. Ideologies like violent racial supremacy and violent anarchist extremism are a danger to 

our communities, and they must be condemned and countered. 

The Department is not standing on the sidelines as these threats spread. And we will not allow 

pervasive terrorism to become the new normal. We are closely monitoring changes to our 

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50 

enemies' tactics, and we are working to stay a step ahead of them. This means ensuring that our 

security posture is dynamic, multi-layered, and difficult to predict. In every respect, DHS has 

been improving its response. We are doing more to identify terrorists in the first place, changing 

our programs and practices to adjust to their tactics, and working with our interagency and 

international partners to find innovative ways to detect and disrupt their plots. 

DHS is also working to help our state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners -and 

the public- to be better prepared. We actively share intelligence bulletins and analysis with 

homeland security stakeholders nationwide to make sure they understand trends related to 

terrorism and violent extremist activity, know how to guard against nascent attack methods, and 

are alerted to the potential for violent incidents. For example, in the days prior to the tragic 

events in Charlottesville, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis partnered with the 

Virginia Fusion Center to produce and distribute an assessment alerting state and local law 

enforcement to an increased chance for violence at the upcoming demonstration, which helped 

enable them to be in place and prepared. 

DHS is working closely with private industry and municipalities to help secure public venues 

and mass gatherings that might be targeted by violent extremists. We have also continued to 

refine our communications outreach to make sure members of the public report suspicious 

activity and don't hesitate to do so. Sadly, we have seen many attacks at home and around the 

world that could have been stopped if someone had spoken up. We want to break that pattern of 

reluctance. 

In many of these areas, we will continue to need Congressional assistance. The President's 

Fiscal Year 2018 budget calls for a number of counterterrorism improvements that need robust 

funding. But more must be done to keep up with our enemies. For instance, we lack the 

authorities needed to counter threats from unmanned aerial systems (UAS). We know that 

terrorists are using drones to conduct aerial attacks in conflict zones, and already we have seen 

aspiring terrorists attempt to use them in external operations. Yet DHS and many other 

departments and agencies do not have the appropriate legal authorities to engage and mitigate 

these threats in the way we should. Earlier this year, the Administration delivered a governmentwide legislative proposal to Congress that would provide additional counter-VAS authorities to 

DHS and other federal departments and agencies to legally engage and mitigate UAS threats in 

the National Airspace System. I am eager to share our concerns about UAS in a classified 

setting, and I urge the Committee to help champion efforts to resolve this and other challenges. 

Blocking Threats from Reaching the United States 

The Department is undertaking historic efforts to secure our territory. The goal is to prevent 

national security threat actors, especially terrorists and criminals, from traveling to the United 

States, while better facilitating lawful trade and travel. The Administration has made it a priority 

to secure our borders and to provide the American people the security they deserve. We are 

making it harder for dangerous goods to be flown into our country. And as part of our acrossthe-board approach to rethinking homeland security, DHS is focusing on uniform improvements 

to the screening of all categories of U.S.-bound travelers, including visitors, immigrants, and 

refugees. 

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Our forward-leaning counterterrorism approach is exemplified by the Department's recent 

aviation security enhancements. As noted earlier, terrorists continue to plot against multiple 

aspects ofthe aviation sector, in some cases using advanced attack methods. Based on carefully 

evaluated threat intelligence, DHS took action to protect passenger aircraft against serious terror 

threats. In July, the Department and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

announced new seen and unseen security measures, representing the most significant aviation 

security enhancements in many years. Indeed, our ongoing Global Aviation Security Plan is 

making U.S.-bound flights more secure and will raise the baseline of aviation security 

worldwide--including additional protections to prevent our enemies from placing threat items in 

mail or cargo. 

Today, terrorists and criminals are exploiting what they see as a borderless world, which is why 

stepping up our border security must be among the highest national priorities. DHS is actively 

focused on building out the wall on the Southwest Border and a multi-layered security 

architecture to keep threats from entering America undetected. We are making measureable 

progress, and we are cracking down hard on transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), which 

are bringing drugs, violence, and dangerous goods and individuals across our borders. These 

organizations have one goal-illicit profit, and they couldn't care less about the enormous 

human suffering they cause. 

TCOs pose a persistent national security threat to the United States. They provide a potential 

means for transferring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists or for facilitating 

terrorists' entry into the United States. We have already seen migrants with terror connections 

travel from conflict zones into our Hemisphere, and we are concerned that criminal organizations 

might assist them in crossing our borders. The shifting travel patterns of these foreign nationals 

has been cause for concern. TCOs also undermine the stability of countries near our borders, 

subvert their government institutions, undermine competition in world strategic markets, and 

threaten interconnected trading, transportation, and transactional systems essential to free 

markets. 

The Administration is fighting back against this threat by using the full force of the Department's 

authorities and in conjunction with other federal partners. DHS is leading the development of a 

stronger, fused, whole-of-government approach to border security. Stove-piped agencies cannot 

prevail against highly-networked adversaries, which is why we are bolstering Joint Task Forces 

to protect our territory and embedding border security professionals in other relevant 

departments and agencies. Our Components are coming together on initiatives such as the DI-IS 

MS-!3 Working Group and the DI-IS Human Smuggling Cell (HSC). The former, run by U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), is 

identifying gang members previously unknown to law enforcement. The latter is a multi-agency 

unit staffed by personnel from across the Department that is allowing us to bring together 

intelligence and operations to go after human smuggling organizations more effectively. 

We are also developing comprehensive plans to step up security in the Western Hemisphere and 

to push the U.S. border outward by shutting down TCOs and smuggling networks. For example, 

ICE's Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) is helping 

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train and equip foreign counterparts to collect biometric and biographic data on persons of 

interest and potential threat actors. The data allow us to map illicit pathways, discover emerging 

TCO trends, and catch known or suspected terrorists and criminals while they are still far from 

our border. 

Beyond border security, DHS is improving almost every stage of the vetting process for U.S.-

bound travelers. Front-end investigations of applicants are being modified to more quickly 

detect individuals with terror ties. Security checks are being brought into the digital age to 

incorporate social media and other appropriate information. We are gathering additional data 

from prospective travelers to more effectively validate their identities and determine whether 

they have connections to terrorists. And DHS is better leveraging unclassified and classified 

datasets to find previously undetected threats. We have already seen real successes. I cannot get 

into the details in this setting, but I can share that these enhancements have allowed us to detect 

and disrupt terror suspects we likely would not have identified otherwise. 

Our enhancements span the entire immigration process. For instance, DHS is committed to 

ICE's Visa Security Program (VSP), which currently assigns special agents to 32 diplomatic 

posts worldwide to conduct more intensive, up-front scrutiny of visa applications. But security 

shouldn't stop there. Once an application is approved, we believe there should be recurrent 

vetting throughout the immigration lifecycle. DHS has been developing Continuous 

Immigration Vetting (CIV), a real-time systematic process that constantly analyzes visa files 

against law enforcement and intelligence holdings to identify possible matches to derogatory 

information. And at our ports of entry, CBP's Tactical Terrorism Response Teams (TTRTs) are 

connecting dots and finding suspicious individuals we were unaware of previously. 

In the medium term, DHS is aiming to streamline how we organize our screening activities. We 

are examining specific ways to consolidate screening functions, better integrate intelligence data, 

leverage law enforcement information, and fuse our efforts to protect our country. Both of the 

witnesses here with me today have been critical partners as we do this and make sure our 

national vetting efforts are a top priority. 

The Department is also pursuing major initiatives to improve international information sharing. 

We are pressing foreign countries to provide us more data on terrorists and criminals, and we are 

urging them to use the intelligence our government already provides to catch global jihadists and 

other threat actors residing in or transiting their territory. DHS is exploring additional measures 

that could be taken to require foreign governments to take swifter action and how we can better 

assist them in doing so. 

For the first time ever, DHS established a clear baseline for what countries must do to help the 

United States confidently screen travelers and immigrants from their territory. As required under 

President Trump's Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 

United States (EO 13 780), all foreign governments have been notified of the new standards, 

which include the sharing of terrorist identities, criminal history information, and other data 

needed to ensure public safety and national security, as well as the condition that countries issue 

secure biometric passports, report lost and stolen travel documents to INTERPOL, and take other 

essential actions to prevent identity fraud. 

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Unfortunately, eight countries failed to meet the new baseline. So I recommended to the 

President, and he approved, travel restrictions and/or additional scrutiny for nationals of those 

countries to protect America and pressure those governments to comply with our minimum 

security standards. Fortunately, most foreign governments met these requirements, and in the 

process of working with them to understand the new baseline, we managed to negotiate new 

information sharing arrangements and got commitments to improve travel document security. 

Let me be clear: this has nothing to do with race or religion, and our goal is not to block people 

from visiting the United States. America is proud of its history as a beacon of hope to freedomloving people from around the world who want to visit our country or become a part of our 

enduring democratic republic. Rather, the goal is to protect Americans and ensure foreign 

governments are working with us-and not inhibiting us-from stopping terrorists, criminals, 

and other national security threat actors from traveling into our communities undetected. 

We are also focused on working with our foreign partners to close overseas security gaps that 

allow dangerous individuals to travel uninhibited. Many countries, for instance, lack the border 

security policies, traveler screening capabilities, intelligence information sharing practices, and 

legal tools to effectively stop terrorist travel. DHS is examining the full array oftools at our 

disposal to incentivize and assist foreign governments in making these improvements so these 

individuals are caught before they reach our borders. 

The Department is not just concerned with threat actors but also threat agents, such as weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD). Our intelligence professionals have seen renewed terrorist interest 

in WMD and are aware of concerning developments on these issues, which can be discussed 

further in an appropriate setting. That is one reason why the Department is eager to establish a 

focal point for our work to protect Americans against chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) threats. 

The Department's current approach to addressing CBRN matters is inadequate. For nearly a 

decade, DHS has looked at reorganizing internally to better counter these dangers. We hope to 

engage with the Committee as we examine how to consolidate our counter-WMD efforts, with 

the goal of improving our defenses against CBRN threats, creating a focal point for such 

activities like most other national security departments and agencies, improving strategic 

direction, instituting business management best practices across the CB RN space, boosting 

morale, helping with leadership recruitment and retention, and over time reducing waste, 

overlap, and duplication. 

Preventing Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment in Our Communities 

In addition to counterterrorism, the Department is rededicating itself to terrorism prevention. 

Americans do not want us to simply stop violent plots, they want us to keep them from 

materializing in the first place. As part ofthis et1ort, we have launched an end-to-end review of 

all DHS "countering violent extremism," or CVE, programs, projects, and activities. In the 

coming months we will work to ensure our approach to terrorism prevention is risk-based and 

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intelligence-driven, focused on effectiveness, and provides appropriate support to those on the 

frontlines who we rely on to spot signs of terrorist activity. 

DHS efforts to combat terrorist recruitment and radicalization fall into four primary lanes. 

First, we are prioritizing education and community awareness. Before terrorists have a chance to 

reach into communities and inspire potential recruits, we are making sure those communities are 

aware of the threat. This includes extensive outreach to state and locals; awareness briefings; 

intelligence products regarding threats and trends; training for frontline defenders and civic 

leaders; and more. 

Second, we are focused on counter-recruitment. We know that terrorists will continue to seek 

new converts through persuasion and propaganda, which is why we must actively push back 

against solicitations. This includes enabling non-governmental organizations to counter-message 

terrorist propaganda, leveraging credible voices to dissuade potential recruits, working with 

social media companies and supporting their efforts to make online platforms more hostile to 

terrorists, and more. 

Last month, I traveled to Silicon Valley to engage with tech companies on this subject, and I am 

encouraged by the progress they are making, including through the recently announced Global 

Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. However, many companies still have a long way to go in 

shutting down the sprawling network of terrorist accounts and propaganda online. DHS will 

continue to press companies to quickly identify and remove terrorist content and find new ways 

to partner with industry. We will also strongly emphasize the importance of countermessaging-and using credible voices to fight back against the false narrative ofterrorist groups. 

Ultimately, as terrorists crowd-source their violence, the best way to fight back is to turn the 

crowd against them. 

Third, we are emphasizing the importance of early warning. Even with strong community 

awareness and counter-recruitment, terrorist groups will succeed in reaching at least some 

susceptible minds. That is why we are working to detect potentially radicalized individuals and 

terrorist activity earlier. This includes building trust between communities and law enforcement, 

expanding "See Something, Say Something"-style campaigns, ensuring there are appropriate and 

conftdential means for the public to provide tips regarding suspicious activity, and more. 

Finally, DHS is looking at what more can be done to counter terrorist recidivism. It is inevitable 

that some individuals will be recruited, radicalized, and attempt to engage in terrorist activity. 

So we want to make sure that once they are caught they do not return to violence. We currently 

have a number of inmates with terrorism affiliations scheduled for release from U.S. prisons in 

the next few years, and we need to work with interagency partners to make sure they do not 

return to violence once released. I look forward to engaging with the Committee further on this 

subject as we identify effective ways to prevent terrorist recidivism. 

This summer the Department announced the award of $10 million in grants to 26 organizations 

to advance terrorism prevention efforts. These grants will help inform our efforts and illuminate 

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what works--and what doesn't work-in combating terrorist recruitment and radicalization in 

our homeland. We look forward to sharing the results with Congress. 

I also want to note that although our terrorism prevention activities will be risk-based, they will 

also be flexible enough to address all forms of extremism. Any ideologically-motivated violence 

designed to coerce people or their governments should be condemned, prevented, and countered. 

That is why our approach must be agile so it can mitigate everything from the global jihadist 

threat to the scourge of violent racial supremacy. It must also engage and not alienate 

communities targeted by extremists. This means working with people of all races, religions, and 

creeds as partners in the fight against terror. 

Defending America's Digital Frontier 

The past year marked a turning point in the cyber domain, putting it in the forefront of public 

consciousness. We have long faced a relentless assault against our digital networks from a 

variety of threat actors. But this year, Americans saw advanced persistent threat actors such as 

hackers, cyber criminals, and nation states, take their attacks to another level. Our adversaries 

have and continue to develop advanced cyber capabilities. They have deployed them to 

undermine critical infrastructure, target our livelihoods and innovation, steal our secrets, and 

threaten our democracy. 

Cybersecurity has become a matter of homeland security, and one of the Department's core 

missions. Significantly, nation-state capabilities are falling into non-state hands. With access to 

tools that were previously beyond their reach, non-state actors now have the ability to cause 

widespread disruptions and possibly, destructive attacks. This is redefining homeland security as 

we know it. And it is affecting everyone, from businesses and governments to individuals who 

get swept up in data breaches affecting millions of Americans, like what we saw recently with 

the hack ofEquifax. 

Many of these threats are novel, as illustrated by the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 

and 2016, and the use oflnternet-connected consumer devices to conduct distributed denial of 

service attacks. Global cyber incidents, such as the WannaCry ransomware incident in May and 

the NotPetya malware incident in June, provide recent examples of actors leveraging cyberspace 

to create widespread disruptive effects and cause economic loss. These incidents exploited 

known vulnerabilities in software commonly used across the globe. 

Prior to these events, DHS was taking key cybersecurity actions through the National Protection 

Programs Directorate (NPPD), which is responsible for protecting civilian federal networks and 

collaborating with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and the private sector to defend 

against cyber threats. Through vulnerability scanning, NPPD limited the scope ofthe potential 

incident by helping stakeholders identify the vulnerability on their networks so it could be 

patched before the incident impacted their systems. Recognizing that not all users were able to 

install patches, DHS shared additional mitigation guidance to assist network defenders. As the 

incidents unfolded, DHS and our interagency partners led the Federal Government's incident 

response efforts in accordance with agencies' responsibilities set forth in Presidential Policy 

Directive 4 I, including providing situational awareness, information sharing, mal ware analysis, 

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56 

and technical assistance to affected entities. 

Historically, cyber actors have strategically targeted the energy sector with various goals ranging 

from cyber espionage to developing the ability to disrupt energy systems in the event of a hostile 

conflict. In one recent campaign, advanced persistent threat actors targeted the cyber 

infrastructure of entities within the energy, nuclear, critical manufacturing, and other critical 

infrastructure sectors. In response, DHS, the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, and the U.S. 

Department of Energy shared information to assists network defenders identity and reduce 

exposure to malicious activity. 

In the face ofthese digital threats, it is a DHS priority to work with Congress on legislation that 

would focus our cybersecurity and critical infrastructure mission at NPPD. We are pursuing 

changes that would streamline and elevate NPPD's mission. Through transition from a 

headquarters component to a DHS operating component, with better structure, the DHS Cyber 

and Infrastructure Security Agency would be better position to drive our cybersecurity mission. 

We are also endeavoring to enhance cyber-threat infonnation sharing across the globe to stop 

attacks before they start-and to help Americans quickly recover. We work closely with 

technology providers, information-sharing and analysis centers, sector coordinating councils, and 

critical infrastructure owners and operators to brief them on cyber threats and provide mitigation 

recommendations, and our hunt and incident response teams provide expert intrusions analysis 

and mitigation guidance to stakeholders who request assistance in advance of and in response to 

a cyber incident. 

In all its cybersecurity efforts, DHS draws upon its experience in emergency management and 

counterterrorism by taking a broad risk management approach. DHS considers cybersecurity 

risk within the landscape of overall threats to the Nation and an assessment of the likely 

consequences of cyber incidents which may or may not result in physical impacts. 

To increase the security and resilience ofnonfederal critical infrastructure, DHS leverages 

information and expertise gained from the federal protective mission. DHS makes technical 

capabilities and programs available to nonfederal entities and provides cybersecurity information 

and recommendations to, and partners closely with, a variety of private sector, State, local, tribal, 

and territorial, and international stakeholders. This information and technical assistance allows 

our stakeholders to make informed risk management decisions and to improve their 

cybersecurity. 

At the same time, the U.S. Secret Service and HSI work closely with other law enforcement 

partners to aggressively investigate, disrupt, and dismantle criminal actors and organizations 

using cyberspace to carry out their illicit activities. The efforts of the network protection and law 

enforcement experts must be increasingly coordinated within the Department and with other 

agencies and non-federal entities. Information about tactics and trends obtained through law 

enforcement investigations inform other network protection efforts, including those through the 

National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), to raise the defensive 

capabilities of the Nation. And the efforts of network protectors can identity trends, practices, 

and potentially new victims to shape law enforcement investigations. Together these etTorts are 

an important part of an overall national approach to deterrence by denying malicious actors 

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access to critical U.S. targets, increasing resilience of networks, and by identifYing and punishing 

those who try to use cyberspace for illicit purposes. 

Bringing together its network protection, law enforcement, risk mitigation, and emergency 

management expertise, DHS plays a lead role in the federal government's response to cyber 

incidents. Such incidents can result from malicious activity as well as natural or accidental 

causes. The NCCIC and DHS law enforcement components provide assistance to impacted 

entities. The Office oflntelligence and Analysis (I&A) and component intelligence offices play 

a supporting role by providing relevant intelligence support to DHS components from across the 

intelligence community. Sector specific agencies provide unique expertise and insights to 

response activities and help DHS ensure that lessons learned from incidents are incorporated into 

efforts to protect critical information systems. DHS works closely with sector specific agencies, 

the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice and the FBI before, during, and after 

incidents. 

In support of these operational efforts, DHS also works to strengthen the overall security and 

reliability ofthe cyber ecosystem. Because cyberspace is inherently global, DHS collaborates 

with the international community to exchange and advocate for best practices and promote the 

development and adoption of nonnative behavior to increase security and reliability. 

Additionally, in order to build up capacity for tackling emerging challenges and supporting the 

overall cybersecurity mission, DHS drives research, development, and technology transfer 

efforts and works with industry stakeholders to make the Internet and new technologies, like the 

Internet of Things, more secure. Finally, DHS prioritizes the expansion ofthe human resource 

programs to recruit, hire, develop, and retain personnel with strong cybersecurity skillsets. 

Conclusion 

l want to emphasize that we are overhauling homeland security to cope with changes in the threat 

landscape. Our leadership team is breaking down legacy bureaucratic barriers to make DHS 

operate more efficiently and effectively to counter threats to our nation. We are ramping up 

unity of effort within the department and tight collaboration with law enforcement, the 

intelligence community, and our allies. And we are looking at ways to further integrate 

intelligence and operations so that our actions are driven by timely information and that we 

respond quickly to new dangers. 

As we continue this overhaul, it is clear that the authorities, structures, and accountability 

measures developed for DHS over 15 years ago are no longer sufficient. We simply cannot keep 

the United States and its citizens secure with authorities drafted before smartphones and social 

media, as such technology has further blurred the line between the "home game" and "away 

game.'~ 

On July 20, 2017, the House passed comprehensive legislation reauthorizing the Department of 

Homeland Security. This legislation would be the Department's first ever reauthorization- and 

for certain parts of the Department, it would be their first actual authorization. H.R. 2825 

reflects the Department's importance in our national security efforts, and it solidifies our mission 

to protect our nation now and into the future. It empowers the men and women who protect our 

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58 

nation to better execute their mission. It authorizes replacement and modernization of outdated 

Coast Guard vessels, with an eye toward making the most of taxpayer dollars. It allows us to 

study disaster preparedness and response, so we can find ways to help communities recover more 

quickly and efficiently. It establishes standards for first responders to get the training and 

equipment they need to counter the terrorist threats of today. And it improves the Departments 

information sharing capabilities, so our state, local, tribal, and territorial partners can stay up-todate on the threats facing our communities, in both the cyber and the physical world. 

There is no more important mission- no duty more sacred- than protecting the people ofthe 

United States. Passing legislation to reauthorize DHS is an opportunity for Congress to show its 

commitment to that mission and to the men and women charged with executing that mission 

every day. I strongly encourage this Committee and the Senate to take up and pass legislation 

reauthorizing DHS as quickly as possible. DHS stands ready to assist in any way that we can. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued support of 

DHS. I am committed to working with this Committee to forge a strong and productive 

relationship as we work to achieve the shared objective of securing our homeland. 

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59 

STATEMENT OF 

CHRISTOPHER A. WRA Y 

DIRECTOR 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF lNVESTIGA TION 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

AT A HEARING ENTITLED 

"THREATS TO THE HOMELAND" 

PRESENTED 

SEPTEMBER 27,2017 

Good morning Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and members of the 

committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the current 

threats to the homeland. Our Nation continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving threats 

ranging from homegrown violent extremists to cyber criminals to hostile foreign intelligence 

services and operatives. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant challenge for the FBI. 

As an organization, we must also be able to stay current with constantly changing and new 

technologies that make our jobs both easier and harder. Our adversaries terrorists, foreign 

intelligence services, and criminals- take advantage of such modern technology to hide their 

communications, recruit followers, plan and encourage espionage, cyber attacks or terrorism, to 

disperse information on different methods to attack the U.S. homeland, and to facilitate other 

illegal activities. As these threats evolve, we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying 

heavily on the strength of our Federal, State, local, and international partnerships. 

Counterterrorism 

Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBI's top priority. The terrorist threat against the 

United States remains persistent and acute. From a threat perspective, we are concerned with 

three areas in particular: (I) those who are inspired by terrorist propaganda and act out in 

support; (2) those who are enabled to act after gaining inspiration from extremist propaganda and 

communicating with members of foreign terrorist organizations who provide guidance on 

operational planning or targets; and (3) those who are directed by members of foreign terrorist 

organizations to commit specific, directed acts in support of the group's ideology or cause. 

Prospective terrorists can fall into any one ofthese three categories or span across them, but in 

the end the result is the same- innocent men, women, and children killed and families, friends, 

and whole communities left to struggle in the aftermath. 

Currently, the FBI has designated the Islamic State oflraq and ash-Sham ("ISIS") and 

homegrown violent extremists as the main terrorism threats to the Homeland. ISIS is relentless 

and ruthless in its campaign of violence and has aggressively promoted its hateful message, 
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attracting like-minded extremists. The threats posed by foreign fighters, including those 

recruited from the United States, are extremely dynamic. These threats remain the highest 

priority and create the most serious challenges for the FBI, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and 

our foreign, State, and local partners. We continue to identity individuals who seek to join the 

ranks of foreign fighters traveling in support of! SIS, as well as homegrown violent extremists 

who may aspire to attack the United States from within. In addition, we are confronting a surge 

in terrorist propaganda and training available via the Internet and social networking media. Due 

to online recruitment and indoctrination, foreign terrorist organizations are no longer dependent 

on finding ways to get terrorist operatives into the United States to recruit and carry out acts. 

Terrorists in ungoverned spaces- both physical and cyber readily disseminate propaganda 

and training materials to attract easily influenced individuals around the world to their cause. 

They encourage these individuals to travel, or they motivate them to act at home. This is a 

significant transformation from the terrorist threat our nation faced a decade ago. 

Unlike other groups, ISIS has constructed a narrative that touches on all facets of life, 

from career opportunities to family life to a sense of community. The message isn't tailored 

solely to those who are overtly expressing signs of radicalization. It is seen by many who click 

through the Internet every day, receive social media push notifications, and participate in social 

networks. Ultimately, many of the individuals drawn to ISIS seek a sense of belonging. Echoing 

other terrorist groups, ISIS has advocated for lone offender attacks in Western countries. Recent 

ISIS videos and propaganda specifically advocate for attacks against soldiers, law enforcement, 

and intelligence community personnel. 

Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital communication platforms to 

reach individuals they believe may be susceptible and sympathetic to extremist messages, 

however, no group has been as successful at drawing people into its perverse ideology as ISIS. 

ISIS has proven dangerously competent at employing such tools for its nefarious strategy. ISIS 

uses high-quality, traditional media platforms, as well as widespread social media campaigns to 

propagate its extremist ideology. Social media also helps groups such as ISIS to spot and assess 

potential recruits. With the widespread distribution of social media, terrorists can spot, assess, 

recruit and radicalize vulnerable persons of all ages in the United States either to travel or to 

conduct a homeland attack. Through the Internet, terrorists overseas now have direct access into 

our local communities to target and recruit our citizens and spread the message of radicalization 

faster than we imagined just a few years ago. 

ISIS is not the only terrorist group of concern. Al-Qa'ida maintains its desire for largescale spectacular attacks, however continued CT pressure has degraded the group, and in the near 

term al-Qa' ida is more likely to focus on supporting small-scale, readily achievable attacks 

against U.S. and allied interests in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. Simultaneously, over the 

last year, propaganda from al-Qa'ida leaders seeks to inspire individuals to conduct their own 

attacks in the United States and the West. 

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In addition to foreign terrorist organizations, domestic extremist movements collectively 

pose a steady threat of violence and economic harm to the United States. Some trends within 

individual movements will shift as most drivers for domestic extremism, such as perceptions of 

government or law enforcement overreach, socio-political conditions, and reactions to legislative 

actions, remain constant. We are most concerned about the lone offender attacks, primarily 

shootings, as they have served as the dominant mode for lethal domestic extremist violence. We 

anticipate law enforcement, racial minorities, and the U.S. Government will continue to be 

significant targets for many domestic extremist movements. 

As the threat to harm the United States and U.S. interests evolves, we must adapt and 

confront these challenges, relying heavily on the strength of our Federal, State, local, and 

international partnerships. The FBI is using all lawful investigative techniques and methods to 

combat these terrorist threats to the United States. Along with our domestic and foreign partners, 

we are collecting and analyzing intelligence concerning the ongoing threat posed by foreign 

terrorist organizations and homegrown violent extremists. We continue to encourage 

information sharing, which is evidenced through our partnerships with many Federal, State, 

local, and tribal agencies assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country. Be 

assured, the FBI continues to strive to work and share information more efficiently, and to 

pursue a variety oflawful methods to help stay ahead of threats to the homeland. 

Intelligence 

Integrating intelligence in all we do remains a critical strategic pillar of the FBI strategy. 

The constant evolution ofthe FBI's intelligence program will help us address the ever-changing 

threat environment. We must constantly update our intelligence apparatus to improve the way 

we use, collect, and share intelligence to better understand and defeat our adversaries. We 

cannot be content to only work the matters directly in front of us. We must also look beyond the 

horizon to understand the threats we face at home and abroad and how those threats may be 

connected. 

To that end, we gather intelligence, consistent with our authorities, to help us understand 

and prioritize identified threats, to reveal the gaps in what we know about these threats, and to 

fill those gaps. We do this for national security and criminal threats, on both a national and local 

field office level. We then compare the national and local perspectives to organize threats into 

priorities for each of the FBI's 56 field offices. By categorizing threats in this way, we place the 

greatest focus on the gravest threats we face. This gives us a better assessment of what the 

dangers are, what's being done about them, and where we should prioritize our resources. 

Integrating intelligence and operations is part of the broader intelligence transformation 

the FBI has undertaken in the last decade to improve our understanding and mitigation of threats. 

Over the past few years, we have taken several steps to improve this integration. First, we 

established an Intelligence Branch within the FBI, headed by an Executive Assistant Director 

who drives integration across the enterprise. We also developed and implemented a series of 

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integration-focused forums that ensure all members of our workforce understand and internalize 

the importance of intelligence integration. We now train our Special Agents and Intelligence 

Analysts together at the FBI Academy where they engage in joint training exercises and take 

core courses together prior to their field deployments. As a result, they are better prepared to 

integrate their skillsets in the field. Additionally, our training forums for executives and frontline 

supervisors continue to ensure our leaders are informed about our latest intelligence capabilities 

and allow them to share best practices for achieving intelligence integration. 

I also urge the Congress to renew section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act ("FISA"), which is due to sunset at the end of this year. Section 702 is a critical tool that the 

Intelligence Community uses properly to target non-U.S. persons located outside the United 

States to acquire information vital to our national security. To protect privacy and civil liberties, 

this program has operated under strict rules and been carefully overseen by all three branches of 

the Government. Given the importance of section 702 to the safety and security of the American 

people, the Administration urges Congress to reauthorize title VII of FISA without a sunset 

provision._ 

Counterintelligence 

The Nation faces a rising threat, both traditional and asymmetric, from hostile foreign 

intelligence services and their proxies. Traditional espionage, often characterized by career 

foreign intelligence officers acting as diplomats or ordinary citizens, and asymmetric espionage, 

often carried out by students, researchers, or businesspeople operating front companies, is 

prevalent. Foreign intelligence services not only seek our Nation's state and military secrets, but 

they also target commercial trade secrets, research and development, and intellectual property, as 

well as insider information from the Federal Government, U.S. corporations, and American 

universities. Foreign intelligence services and other state-directed actors continue to employ 

more creative and more sophisticated methods to steal innovative technology, critical research 

and development data, and intellectual property, in an effort to erode America's economic 

leading edge. These illicit activities pose a significant threat to national security and continue to 

be a priority and focus of the FBI. 

Our counterintelligence efforts are also aimed at the growing scope of the insider threat 

-that is, when trusted employees and contractors use their legitimate access to steal secrets for 

personal benefit or to benefit a company or another country. This threat has been exacerbated in 

recent years as businesses have become more global and increasingly exposed to foreign 

intelligence organizations. We are also investigating media leaks, when insiders violate the law 

and betray the nation's trust by selectively leaking classified information, sometimes mixed with 

disinformation, to manipulate the public and advance their personal agendas. 

In addition to the insider threat, the FBI has focused on a coordinated approach across 

divisions that leverages both our classic counterespionage tradecraft and our technical expertise 

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to more effectively identifY, pursue, and defeat hostile state actors using cyber means to 

penetrate or disrupt U.S. Government entities or economic interests. 

Finally, we have initiated a media campaign to increase awareness of the threat of 

economic espionage. As part of this initiative, we have made a threat awareness video, titled 

"The Company Man," available on our public website, which has been shown thousands oftimes 

to raise awareness and generate referrals from the private sector. 

Cyber 

Virtually every national security and criminal threat the FBI faces is cyber-based or 

technologically facilitated. We face sophisticated cyber threats from foreign intelligence 

agencies, hackers for hire, organized crime syndicates, and terrorists. These threat actors 

constantly seek to access and steal our nation's classified information, trade secrets, technology, 

and ideas- all of which arc of great importance to our national and economic security. They 

seek to strike our critical infrastructure and to harm our economy. 

As the committee is well aware, the frequency and impact of cyber-attacks on our 

nation's private sector and government networks have increased dramatically in the past decade 

and are expected to continue to grow. We continue to see an increase in the scale and scope of 

reporting on malicious cyber activity that can be measured by the amount of corporate data 

stolen or deleted, personally identifiable information compromised, or remediation costs incurred 

by U.S. victims. Within the FBI, we are focused on the most dangerous malicious cyber activity: 

high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and global organized crime syndicates, as well 

as other technically sophisticated attacks. 

Botnets used by cyber criminals are one example ofthis trend and have been responsible 

for billions of dollars in damages over the past several years. The widespread availability of 

malicious software (malware) that can create botnets allows individuals to leverage the combined 

bandwidth ofthousands, if not millions, of compromised computers, servers, or network-ready 

devices to conduct attacks. Cyber threat actors have also increasingly conducted ransomware 

attacks against U.S. systems, encrypting data and rendering systems unusable- victimizing 

individuals, businesses, and even public health providers. 

Cyber threats are not only increasing in scope and scale, they are also becoming 

increasingly difficult to investigate. Cyber criminals often operate through online forums, selling 

illicit goods and services, including tools that can be used to facilitate cyber attacks. These 

criminals have also increased the sophistication oftheir schemes, which are more difficult to 

detect and more resilient. Additionally, many cyber actors are based abroad or obfuscate their 

identities by using foreign infrastructure, making coordination with international law 

enforcement partners essential. 

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The FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat cyber threats, from improving threat 

identification and information sharing inside and outside of government, to developing and 

retaining new talent, to examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We 

take all potential threats to public and private sector systems seriously and will continue to 

investigate and hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace. 

Going Dark 

The rapid pace of advances in mobile and other communication technologies continues to 

present a significant challenge to conducting court-ordered electronic surveillance of criminals 

and terrorists. Unfortunately, there is a real and growing gap between law enforcement's legal 

authority to access digital information and its technical ability to do so. The FBI refers to this 

growing challenge as "Going Dark," and it affects the spectrum of our work. In the 

counterterrorism context, for instance, our agents and analysts are increasingly finding that 

communications and contacts between groups like ISIS and potential recruits occur in encrypted 

private messaging platforms. 

The exploitation of encrypted platforms presents serious challenges to law enforcement's 

ability to identity, investigate, and disrupt threats that range from counterterrorism to child 

exploitation, gangs, drug traffickers and white collar crimes. We respect the right of people to 

engage in private communications, regardless of the medium or technology. Whether it is instant 

messages, texts, or old-fashioned letters, citizens have the right to communicate with one another 

in private without unauthorized government surveillance, because the free flow of information is 

vital to a thriving democracy. Our aim is not to expand the Government's surveillance authority, 

but rather to ensure that we can obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the legal 

authority that Congress has provided to us to keep America safe. The benefits of our 

increasingly digital lives, however, have been accompanied by new dangers, and we have seen 

how criminals and terrorists use advances in technology to their advantage. 

The more we as a society rely on electronic devices to communicate and store 

information, the more likely it is that information that was once found in filing cabinets, letters, 

and photo albums will now be stored only in electronic form. When changes in technology 

hinder law enforcement's ability to exercise investigative tools and follow critical leads, those 

changes also hinder efforts to identity and stop terrorists who are using social media to recruit, 

plan, and execute an attack in our country. 

In the criminal context, we are seeing more and more cases where we believe significant 

evidence resides on a phone, a tablet, or a laptop- evidence that may be the difference between 

an offender being convicted or acquitted. If we cannot access this evidence, it will have 

ongoing, significant impacts on our ability to identity, stop, and prosecute these offenders. In the 

first 10 months of this fiscal year, the FBI was unable to access the content of more than 6,000 

mobile devices using appropriate and available technical tools, even though there was legal 

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authority to do so. This figure represents slightly over half of all the mobile devices the FBI 

attempted to access in that timeframe. 

Where at all possible, our agents develop investigative workarounds on a case-by-case 

basis, including by using physical world techniques and examining non-content sources of digital 

information (such as metadata). As an organization, the FBI also invests in alternative methods 

of lawful engineered access. Ultimately, these efforts, while significant, have severe constraints. 

Non-content information, such as metadata, is often simply not sufficient to meet the rigorous 

constitutional burden to prove crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Developing alternative 

technical methods is typically a time-consuming, expensive, and uncertain process. Even when 

possible, such methods are difficult to scale across investigations, and may be perishable due to a 

short technical lifecycle or as a consequence of disclosure through legal proceedings. 

Some observers have conceived of this challenge as a trade-off between privacy and 

security. In our view, the demanding requirements to obtain legal authority to access datasuch as by applying to a court for a warrant or a wiretap necessarily already account for both 

privacy and security. The FBI is actively engaged with relevant stakeholders, including 

companies providing technological services, to educate them on the corrosive effects of the 

Going Dark challenge on both public safety and the rule of law. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The FBI, along with its U.S. Government partners, is committed to countering the 

Weapons of Mass Destruction ("WMD") threat (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) 

and preventing terrorist groups and lone offenders from acquiring these materials either 

domestically or internationally. 

Domestically, the FBI's counter-WMD threat program, in collaboration with our U.S. 

Government partners, prepares for and responds to WMD threats (e.g., investigate, detect, 

search, locate, diagnostics, stabilization, and render safe WMD threats). Internationally, the FBI, 

in cooperation with our U.S. partners, provides investigative and technical assistance as well as 

capacity-building programs to enhance our foreign partners' ability to detect, investigate, and 

prosecute WMD threats. 

Conclusion 

Finally, the strength of any organization is its people. The threats we face as a nation 

have never been greater or more diverse and the expectations placed on the Bureau have never 

been higher. Our fellow citizens look to us to protect the United States from all of those threats, 

and the men and women of the Bureau continue to meet and exceed those expectations, every 

day. I want to thank them for their dedication and their service. 

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Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and committee members, 1 thank you 

for the opportunity to testifY concerning the threats to the Homeland. I am happy to answer any 

questions you might have. 

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Hearing before the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

"Threats to the Homeland" 

September 27, 2017 

Nicholas J. Rasmussen 

Director 

National Counterterrorism Center 

Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Members of the Committee, for 

the opportunity to be with you today. I am pleased to be joined by my colleagues and close 

partners, Acting Secretary Elaine Duke from the Department of Homeland Security {DHS), and 

Director Christopher Wray of the Federal Bureau of Investigation {FBI). 

Threat Overview 

Over the past 16 years, we have made tremendous progress in our ability to detect and prevent 

multi-actor, catastrophic attacks like September 11, 2001. We, along with many of our 

partners, have built a national security apparatus that has substantially expanded our ability to 

protect the safety and security of our communities. We share more information-with more 

frequency and with more partners-than we ever would have imagined possible a decade ago. 

And, we have reduced external threats emanating from core ai-Qa'ida and the self-proclaimed 

Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham, or ISIS, due to aggressive counterterrorism (CT) actions against 

these groups. 

However, both ISIS and ai-Qa'ida have proven to be extremely resilient organizations. ISIS's 

strategy to project its influence worldwide, despite geographic losses in Iraq and Syria, by using 

attacks and propaganda perpetuates fear and continues to attract violent extremists who wish 

to do us harm. Other terrorist groups around the world also continue to exploit safe havens 

created by ungoverned spaces and threaten the United States and our allies. Therefore, 

despite the progress we have made, it is our assessment that the current terrorism threat 

environment is increasingly complex, challenging, and geographically expansive, as we saw with 

the recent attacks in the UK, Spain, and Iran. It is also our assessment that NCTC, along with 

our federal partners, must expand our investment in terrorist prevention, specifically in the 

Homeland to prevent the recruitment of American youth and ensure we are equipped to 

respond to and prevent all forms of violence. 

First, allow me to provide an overview of the most immediate threat to the Homeland which is 

the threat of violence carried out by Homegrown Violent Extremists {HVEs). While there are 
68 

multiple factors that mobilize HVEs to violence, ISIS's large-scale media and propaganda efforts 

will likely continue to reach and influence HVEs in the United States. So far this year, there 

have been fewer attacks in the United States than the past two years, and we are working to 

determine the potential factors that may be responsible for this decrease in successful attacks. 

Arrests of HVEs remain at similar levels. 

What we have seen over time is that HVEs-either lone actors or small insular groups-tend to 

gravitate toward soft targets and simple tactics of opportunity that do not require advanced 

skills or outside training. We expect that most HVEs will continue to focus on soft targets, while 

still considering traditional targets, such as military personnel, law enforcement, and other 

symbols of the U.S. government. Some HVEs-such as the Orlando shooter in June 2016 and 

the San Bernardino shooters in December 2015-may have conducted attacks against 

personally significant targets. The convergence of violent extremist ideology and personal 

grievances or perceived affronts likely played a role in motivating these HVEs to attack. We are 

still working to learn more about what may have motivated suspects in other recent attacks. 

ISIS continues to pursue multiple avenues of attack with varying levels of support provided by 

the group. Over the course of the year we have seen a spectrum of attack plots. This spectrum 

ranges from those "inspired" by the group-in which ISIS claims responsibility for attacks where 

the attackers had no direct ties to the group-to attacks "enabled" by the group-when ISIS 

reaches out to individuals through secure communications to prompt an attack-to "directed" 

ones, in which the group provides direct support from Iraq and Syria to attempt attacks. 

ISIS's reach and narrative, rooted in unceasing warfare against all enemies, extends beyond the 

Syria-Iraq battlefield. Since 2014, ISIS has conducted or inspired attacks ranging in tactics and 

targets-the bombing of a Russian airliner in Egypt; the attacks in Paris at restaurants, a sports 

stadium, and a concert venue; the killing of hostages and law enforcement officials at a cafe in 

Bangladesh; and the growing number of vehicle attacks such as those carried out in Europe-all 

of which demonstrate how ISIS can capitalize on local networks on the ground for attacks. The 

threat landscape is less predictable and, while the scale of the capabilities currently 

demonstrated by most of these violent extremist actors does not rise to the level that core aiQa'ida had on 9/11, it is fair to say that we face more threats originating in more places and 

involving more individuals than we have at any time in the past 16 years. 

As we saw with the recent arrests in Australia, and with the attacks in Belgium and Istanbul last 

year, terrorists remain focused on aviation targets because they recognize the economic 

damage that may result from even unsuccessful attempts to either down aircraft or attack 

airports, as well as the potential high loss of life, and the attention the media devotes to these 

attacks. ISIS continues to innovate and test for security vulnerabilities in order to further its 

external operations and challenge our security apparatus. Since the 9/11 attacks, worldwide 

security improvements have hardened the aviation sector but have not entirely removed the 

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threat. Violent extremist publications continue to promote the desirability of aviation attacks 

and have provided information on how to target the air domain. 

ISIS's access to resources-both manpower and funds-and territorial control in areas of 

Syria and Iraq are the ingredients that we traditionally characterize as being critical to the group 

maintaining an external operations capability, to include ISIS's ability to threaten the 

Homeland. For that reason, shrinking the size of territory controlled by ISIS, and denying the 

group access to additional manpower and funds in the form of foreign terrorist fighters and 

operatives, as well as oil revenue and other financial resources, remains a top priority. Success 

in these areas will ultimately be an essential part of our efforts to continue reducing the group's 

ability to pursue external attacks and diminish its global reach and impact. We have made clear 

progress in these areas: ISIS has lost nearly three quarters of the territory it once controlled in 

Iraq and over half in Syria; the number of fighters it has in those countries is significantly down, 

and its illicit income streams are down. But despite this progress, ISIS's ability to carry out 

terrorist attacks in Syria, Iraq, and abroad has not yet been sufficiently diminished, and the 

consistent tempo of ISIS-linked terrorist activity is a reminder of the group's continued global 

reach. 

The group's external operations capability has been building and entrenching during the past 

two years, and we do not think battlefield losses alone will be sufficient to degrade its terrorism 

capabilities. As we have seen, the group has launched attacks in periods when it held large 

swaths of territory as well as when under significant pressure from the defeat-ISIS campaign. In 

addition to its efforts to conduct external attacks from its safe havens in Iraq and Syria, ISIS's 

capacity to reach sympathizers around the world through its robust social media capability is 

unprecedented and gives the group access to large numbers of HVEs. 

This year, ISIS has lost several key leaders whose deaths deprive the group of senior members 

with unique skillsets. However, the group's effective propaganda continues to inspire violence 

even after the removal of key spokesmen, as we have seen by the range of radicalized 

individuals who continue to look to statements by deceased terrorist figures for guidance and 

justifications to conduct attacks. ISIS's media enterprise will probably continue to redirect their 

narrative away from losses to emphasize new opportunities, as seen with ISIS's recent media 

attention to territories outside the areas it formerly held in Syria and Iraq. They may also try to 

paint losses as a rallying cry for revenge against local security forces and international CTactors, including the United States. Despite international efforts to counter violent extremism, 

or "CVE", online, the volume of media availability and its spread across a multitude of platforms 

and websites will continue to be a challenge but we are steadfast in our containment measures. 

Deceased ISIS spokesman and external operations leader Abu Muhammad ai-Adnani's final 

public statement encouraged ISIS supporters in the United States to conduct attacks at home 

instead of traveling to Iraq and Syria, suggesting that ISIS recognizes the difficulty in sending 

operatives to the Homeland for an attack. ISIS likely views the United States as a harder target 

than Europe because it is further away, U.S. ports of entry are under far less stress from mass 

3 
70 

migration, and U.S. law enforcement agencies are not overtaxed by persistent unrest, as are 

some of our counterparts overseas. 

The threat environment in Europe is increasingly being driven by Europe-based individuals and 

small cells who are inspired by ISIS's call to act or receive general guidance from ISIS members 

elsewhere in the world. The combination of Europe-based operatives and simpler tactics 

makes identifying, prioritizing, and disrupting these individuals' plots more difficult for our 

European partners to detect and, is a dynamic that the U.S. Government must consider in order 

to effectively aid our European counterparts in identifying and disrupting future attacks. 

Our review of ISIS attacks in Europe since 2015 reveals that most attackers have been 

radicalized males with EU citizenship, and many were of North African ethnicity with a criminal 

history. ISIS's leveraging of criminal, familial, and communal ties contributes to its ability to 

advance plotting in Europe. Many operatives involved in attacks since 2015 have had similar 

histories of criminal involvement, often petty crime, before becoming radicalized. 

ISIS's cadre of foreign terrorist fighters remains key in planning and executing external attacks. 

While only three of the nearly 40 attacks in Europe since 2015 involved foreign terrorist fighter 

returnees, those attacks caused over half of the fatalities, suggesting that combat experience 

plays a role in the success of a sophisticated attack. Two years ago, we confirmed that ISIS 

successfully sent several operatives-including at least two of the Paris attackers-from Syria 

to Western Europe by having them blend in with the flow of some 1 million migrants, asylum 

seekers, and refugees who traveled from Turkey to Greece in 2015. We have not seen ISIS 

successfully replicate this attack method in more than a year, probably because of increased 

border security and information sharing among our European partners. 

AI-Qa'ida 

We remain concerned about ai-Qa'ida's safe haven in Syria because of the presence of veteran 

ai-Qa'ida operatives there, some who have been part of the group since before the September 

11 attacks, and who are exploiting the conflict there to threaten the U.S. and our allies. 

The Nusrah Front, also known as Hayat Tahrir a I-Sham, is ai-Qa'ida's largest affiliate and one of 

the most capable armed groups operating in Syria. Its integration of ai-Qa'ida veterans 

provides the group with strategic guidance and enhances its standing within the ai-Qa'ida 

global movement. We believe the Nusrah Front's statement in July 2016 announcing the 

separation of the group from the broader ai-Qa'ida movement was in name only and that 

Nusrah Front remains part of ai-Qa'ida, supporting its ideology and intent to target the West. 

We will continue our efforts to counter this group and the threats it poses to the West. 

AI-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, the only known ai-Qa'ida affiliate to attempt a directed 

attack against the United States, continues to exploit the conflict in Yemen to gain new recruits 

and secure areas of safe-haven, contributing to its enduring threat. The group continues to 

threaten and call for attacks against the United States in its prolific media production, which 

4 
71 

includes its English-language Inspire magazine providing instruction and ideological 

encouragement for individual actors. 

We have constrained ai-Qa'ida's effectiveness and its ability to recruit, train, and deploy 

operatives from its safe haven in South Asia; however, this does not mean that the threat from 

core ai-Qa'ida in the tribal areas of Pakistan or in eastern Afghanistan has been eliminated. We 

believe that ai-Qa'ida and its adherents in the region still aspire to conduct attacks and will 

remain a threat as long as the group can potentially regenerate capability to threaten the 

Homeland with large-scale attacks. AI-Qa'ida's allies in South Asia-particularly the Taliban and 

the Haqqani Network-also continue to present a high threat to our regional interests. 

We are also cognizant of the level of risk the United States may face over time if ai-Qa'ida 

regenerates, finds renewed safe haven, or restores lost capability. We are on alert for signs 

that ai-Qa'ida's capability to attack the West from South Asia is being restored and would warn 

immediately if we find trends in that direction. I am confident that the U.S. government will 

maintain sufficient capability to continue to put pressure on that core ai-Qa'ida network and, 

therefore, reduce the risk of a resurgence by ai-Qa'ida in the region. 

We also see increasing competition between violent extremist actors within South Asia itself, 

between and among the Tali ban, ISIS's branch in South Asia, and ai-Qa'ida. This is an additional 

dynamic that we are working to understand. While conflict among terrorist groups may well 

distract them from their core mission of plotting attacks against Western targets, conflict also 

serves to introduce a degree of uncertainty into the terrorism landscape that raises questions 

that I don't think we have answers to yet. This is something we are watching very closely. 

Hizballah /Iran 

In keeping with the diverse set of threats we face, I would be remiss not to briefly call out the 

malign activities of Iran and its partner, Lebanese Hizballah. Iran remains the foremost state 

sponsor of terrorism, providing financial aid, advanced weapons and tactics, and direction to 

militant and terrorist groups across the Middle East, all while it cultivates its own network of 

operatives across the globe as part of its international attack infrastructure. 

Lebanese Hizballah during recent years has demonstrated its intent to foment regional 

instability, by deploying thousands of fighters to Syria to fight for the Assad regime; providing 

weapons, tactics and direction to militant and terrorist groups in Iraq and Yemen; and 

deploying operatives to Azerbaijan, Egypt, Thailand, Cyprus, and Peru to lay the groundwork for 

attacks. The group also has devoted significant resources to expanding its arsenal, including 

advanced rocket and missile capabilities that threaten interests along the eastern 

Mediterranean and across the Arabian Peninsula. 

In the Homeland, FBI's arrest two months ago of two operatives charged with working on 

behalf of Hizballah was a stark reminder of Hizballah's continued desire to maintain a global 

attack infrastructure that poses an enduring threat to our interests. 

5 
72 

Stepping back, the two trends in the contemporary threat environment that I highlighted 

before the Committee last year continue to concern us. The first is the ability of terrorist actors 

to communicate with each other outside our reach with the use of encrypted communications. 

Most recently, terrorists have begun widespread use of private groups in encrypted 

applications to supplement traditional social media for sharing propaganda in an effort to 

circumvent the intelligence collection and private sector disruption of their public accounts. As 

a result, collecting information on particular terrorist activities is increasingly difficult. 

The second is that we're seeing a proliferation of a rapidly evolving threat or plot vectors that 

emerge simply by an individual encouraged or inspired to take action who then quickly gathers 

the few resources needed and moves into an operational phase. ISIS is aware of this, and those 

connected to the group have understood that by motivating actors in their own locations to 

take action against Western countries and targets, these actors can be effective, especially if 

they cannot travel abroad to ISIS-controlled areas. In terms of propaganda and recruitment, 

ISIS supporters can generate further support for their movement, even without carrying out 

catastrophic, mass-casualty attacks. This is an innovation in the terrorist playbook that poses a 

great challenge. Further, martyrdom videos and official ISIS claims of responsibility for inspired 

individuals' attacks probably allow the group to convey a greater impression of control over 

attacks in the West and maximize international media exposure. 

Terrorism Prevention 

Given these groups' ability to be innovative, the whole-of-government must respond with 

innovative approaches to prevent the radicalization to violence and recruitment to terrorism of 

individuals, specifically here in the Homeland. I would like to talk a bit more about what NCTC 

is doing to prevent and counter violent extremism and the work that we assess still needs to be 

done. 

As a federal government, we have taken steps to organize and resource our efforts to prevent 

and counter violent extremism more effectively, under the leadership of DHS and the 

Department of Justice. We have been successful at helping provide communities with the 

information and tools they need to identify potential extremists and to engage with them 

before they reach the point of becoming an actual terrorist. 

NCTC accomplishes this mainly through a series of Community Awareness Briefings (CAB) and 

exercises that are produced and presented in cooperation with our interagency partners. As an 

example, the CAB, is an unclassified presentation on radicalization to violence and violent 

extremist recruitment designed to build awareness and catalyze community efforts to prevent 

individuals from mobilizing to criminal activity or violence. We also developed the CAB "Trainthe-Presenter" Program, which is designed to train local officials to present the CAB themselves 

to local audiences. Recently, these were expanded to include all forms of violent extremism in 

6 
73 

the United States to respond to a growing demand from federal, state, local and community 

partners for tools that reflect the full domestic threat picture. 

1 am proud of all of the good work our government- to include my colleagues at NCTC- is 

doing to prevent terrorism here in the homeland, but the reality is that we have to do more. 

The scale at which we undertake these efforts is too limited, and it is certainly not sized to 

tackle the kind of problem we are experiencing here in the Homeland today. But we do know 

this: prevention work has a positive impact in the places where we have tried it, we are poised 

to receive significant metrics through the good work of DHS that will help us better evaluate 

these efforts, and violent extremism is not a monolith. 

The bottom line is that our government's work to prevent all forms of violent extremism 

expands the counterterrorism toolkit beyond the hard power tools of disruption, it is resource 

efficient, and enables local partners-including law enforcement, social services providers, 

schools and communities-to create alternative pathways that can protect our youth from a 

variety of violent foreign and domestic ideologies. But, we need to reaffirm and expand our 

commitment to prevention, both resourcing it at the federal, state, and local level, and 

maintaining a whole-of-government effort to continue to keep Americans safe. 

Conclusion 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and members of the Committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify before you this morning. The role that NCTC, FBI, and DHS play in 

combating terrorism, along with the committee's support- is critically important. The men and 

women of our nation's counterterrorism community work tirelessly to defeat the efforts of 

terrorist groups around the globe. There is no doubt that the world today is more challenging 

and more dangerous. But I would also argue that we have more capacity to defend ourselvesmore capacity to keep ourselves safe-than we have ever had before. 

Thank you all very much, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

7 
74 

l!!D!~"-~~~~-Govr:I.Q.!:Q~'!.~-~c:.S:g~~.!~b_il.i.!X .. Q_ff!c!: ..... --.. -·-·---~ 

Report to Congressional Requesters 

Incidents 

White Supremacist/ Antigovernment/ 62 

Other Violent Extremists 

Radical Islamic Violent Extremists 23 

Fatalities 

106 

119 
75 

MARCH 2017 

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76 

REVIEW OF DOMESTIC SHARING OF 

COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... i 

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. ! 

BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................. 1 

FIELD-BASED COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING ...........•..•••.........••.•.••....•....•....•...••.•.•.............••.......•...•. 3 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................ 7 

INTEGRATION, COORDINATION, AND NATIONAL STRATEGY .......................................................................... 7 

EXAMPLES OF INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION ...................................................................................... 7 

SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES.. .. ...................................................................................................................... 8 

INTERCONNECTED MISSIONS OF FEDERAL PARTNERS ................................................................................................ 9 

STRATEGY AND COORDINATION IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING ........................................... 11 

DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE ...... ............................................................................................... ................. 14 

Limited Cohesiveness and Coordination of Effort across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise .. 

I&A Staffing Issues... .... ... ........................... .. .............. .. 

Insufficient Reporting of Counterterrorism Information......... . .................... .. 

Delays in I&A Intelligence Product Review and Approval.. .. ................. .. 

. ....... 14 

.. .... 16 

.. ... 17 

..18 

DHS Lacks Consistent Access to C-LAN and SCIFs in the Field .......................................... 20 

DOJ SUPPORT OF COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING ....... .. .............. 21 

DOJ Strategy for Internal Counterterrorism Information Sharing.. .. ... 22 

JTIF Executive Board Meeting Participation and Content. . ....................... 23 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC)......... .. .................... 27 

FBI Threat Review and Prioritization.. .. ................................................ 29 

ODNI FiELD BASED ELEMENTS SUPPORTTO COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING......... .. .................. 31 

The Domestic DNI Representative Program .... . 

The NCTC Domestic Representative Program ... . 

fUSION CENTERS. .. .................. .. 

Federal investment and Support to Fusion Centers .. 

National Network Maturity Model .. 

Need to Coordinate Granting of Security Clearances .... 

National Mission Cell Initiative .. 

. ........... 31 

.. ...... 38 

.. .......... 42 

.. .............. 42 

. ................. .47 

.. ... 49 

..50 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ ., ..................................... 51 

APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE & METHODOLOGY .................................................................................. 52 

APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................. 54 

APPENDIX C: THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT 

REPORT ........................................................................................................................................................ 63 

APPENDIX D: THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT ............... 67 

APPENDIX E: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT ...................................... 77 

APPENDIX F: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT .................... 80 
77 

REVIEW OF DOMESTIC SHARING OF 

COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Fifteen years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the 

United States, the terrorist threat remains in the United States and abroad, as 

evidenced by recent attacks in Paris, France; San Bernardino, California; 

Brussels, Belgium; Orlando, Florida; and Nice, France. The U.S.'s national 

security depends on the ability to share the right information with the right 

people at the right time. This requires sustained and responsible collaboration 

among federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector and 

international partners. 

In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Offices of Inspector 

General (OIG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DO,J) conducted a review of the 

domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. 

The O!Gs concluded that the partners in the terrorism-related 

Information Sharing Environment- components of the Offlce of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DO,J, and their state and local partnersare committed to sharing counterterrorism information. The partners' 

commitment to protecting the nation is illustrated by the actions taken before, 

during, and following terrorism-related incidents, as well as by programs and 

initiatives designed to improve sharing of counterterrorism information. 

However, the O!Gs also identified several areas in which improvements could 

enhance information sharing. 

To share information effectively, the federal, state, and local entities 

actively involved in counterterrorism efforts must understand each other's 

roles, responsibilities, and contributions, especially with the involvement of 

multiple agencies, such as the DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 

DHS' U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in complex 

investigations. Updating or establishing new information sharing agreements 

among such entities should enhance coordination and collaboration, and 

reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the current 

information sharing environment. Similarly, although there is a national 

information sharing strategy, its implementation has been viewed to be uneven. 

The OlGs believe that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ should review the interagency 

information sharing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and take necessary 

actions to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes 

among the departments, which we believe would result in better 

implementation of the strategy. 
78 

The OIGs also identified improvements in various practices and 

processes of the partners involved in counterterrorism. At DHS, a lack of unity 

in its Intelligence Enterprise, issues in the field related to staffing and access to 

classified systems and facilities, as well as problems with intelligence reporting 

processes, have made the DHS Intelligence Enterprise less effective and 

valuable to the IC than it could be. DOJ can improve its counterterrorism 

information sharing efforts by developing and implementing a consolidated 

internal DOJ strategy, and evaluating the continued need and most effective 

utilization for the United States Attorney's Offices' Anti-Terrorism Advisory 

Council (ATAC) meetings. Further, the FBI should spur participation 

associated with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTIF) and improve its efforts to 

obtain partners' input in the process of identifying and prioritizing 

counterterrorism threats. Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative 

program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear 

strategic vision and guidance. In addition, the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC) Domestic Representative program, although well received in the 

field, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions. At the state and local 

level, due to unpredictable federal support, fusion centers are focused on 

sustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities. Further, varying 

requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal 

agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities. 

Our review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharing 

of counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation's ability to 

prevent terrorist attacks. We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings and 

Recommendations section of the report. 

ii 
79 

INTRODUCTION 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary 

Committee requested that the Inspectors General (!G) of the Intelligence 

Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of 

Justice (DOJ) conduct a performance audit of federally supported entities 

engaged in field-based domestic counterterrorism, homeland security, 

intelligence, and information-sharing activities in conjunction with state and 

local law enforcement agencies. The oversight committees requested that the 

joint audit examine these entities' overall missions, specific functions, 

capabilities, funding, personnel costs to include full-time employees and 

contractors, and facility costs. 

In response to this request, the Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) of 

the IC, DHS, and DOJ conducted a coordinated, joint review focusing on 

domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The objectives of this review 

were to: (1) identify and examine the federally supported field-based 

intelligence entities engaged in counterterrorism information sharing to 

determine the overall missions, specific functions, capabilities, funding, and 

personnel and facility costs; (2) determine if counterterrorism information is 

being adequately and appropriately shared with all participating agencies; and 

(3) identify any gaps or duplication of effort among these entities. 

The review was conducted by three teams from the OIGs of the IC, DHS, 

and DOJ. The OIGs interviewed more than 450 individuals, including senior 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNl), DHS, DOJ, and state and 

local officials. In addition, the O!Gs reviewed policies, procedures, and other 

relevant documentation, as well as prior studies. While the OIG teams shared 

relevant documents, attended briefings, and participated jointly in interviews of 

officials and subject matter experts, each OIG team was responsible for 

evaluating the actions of, and information available to, its respective agencies. 

Background 

Post 9 I 11 investigations proposed sweeping change in the IC, resulting 

in congressional passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 (IRTPA). 1 As a result of the IRTPA, the ODNI was officially 

established to lead and integrate the 16 members of the Intelligence 

Community, and the IRTPA codified the establishment of the National 

l Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, PL 108-458, December 17, 2004, 118 Stat 

3638. 
80 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as part of the ODNJ.2 The IRTPA also directed 

the establishment of an Information .Sharing Environment (ISE) for the sharing 

of terrorism information. 3 In addition, the IRTPA required the President to 

"designate an individual as the Program Manager (PM) for information sharing 

across the Federal Government," as well as an interagency Information Sharing 

Council (ISC) to advise the President and PM.4 

EO 13388, Further Strengthening Terrorism-related Information Sharing, 

established the policy framework for the terrorism-related ISE. In particular, 

ISE Presidential Guideline 2 - Sharing Among and Between Federal, State, 

Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities and its Report expanded the scope of 

the terrorism-related ISE to crimes of national security concern and involved a 

step forward from initial interagency information sharing established earlier. 

Under the statute, both the PM-ISE and ISC would expire after 2 years. 

In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act permanently established the PM-ISE and ISC. The PM-ISE is responsible 

for facilitating the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate 

federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector, through 

the use of policy guidelines and technologies. The office of the PM-ISE 

facilitates the development of responsible information sharing by bringing 

together mission partners and aligning business processes, standards and 

architecture, security and access controls, privacy protections, and best 

practices. The IRTPA mandated the PM-ISE to annually report to Congress on 

the lSE's progress, status of efforts, and targeted next steps. 

In October 2007, the White House issued a national strategy for 

terrorism-related information sharing (2007 NSIS), which provided the 

Administration's vision for the information sharing environment.5 In 2009, the 

White House established the Information Sharing and Access Interagency 

2 IRTPA supra note 2 at§ 1021. codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3056(a). President Bush initially established the 

NCTC by Executive Order 13354, on August 27, 2004. In July 2008, Executive Order 13354 was 

rescinded by Executive Order 13470 because the IRTPA codified the establishment of the NCTC. 

3 ISE broadly refers to the people, projects, systems, and agencies that enable responsible information 

sharing for national security. This includes many different communities: law enforcement, public safety, 

homeland security, intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs. The people in these communities may work 

for federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial governments. 

4 lRTPA § 1016 (0(1), codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485(0; established the responsibilities for the ISE PM. IRTPA § 

1016(g)(1); codified at 6 U.S. C.§ 485(g)(l) established the responsibilities for the ISC. 

5 National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related 

Information Sharing (October 2007). 

2 
81 

Policy Committee (!SA IPC). 6 The !SA !PC is co-chaired by the National Security 

Staffs Senior Director for Information Sharing Policy and the PM-ISE.7 The ISA 

IPC's mission is to implement the national information sharing strategy and to 

lead information sharing policy on national security issues across the federal 

government.s The President issued an updated national strategy in December 

2012 (2012 Strategy).9 The 2012 Strategy outlined 5 goals and 16 priority 

objectives for the national security information sharing environment. 

Field-Based Counterterrorism Information Sharing 

Various components of the ODNI, DHS, DOJ, and state and local law 

enforcement are among the ISE partners that contribute to the nation's 

field-based homeland security and counterterrorism missions and information 

sharing. Within the ODNI, the NCTC serves as the federal government's 

primary organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or 

acquired pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism (except intelligence 

pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism). 

In addition, the NCTC ensures that agencies have access to and receive 

intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans to perform 

independent, alternative analysis and serves as the "central and shared 

knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror 

groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts 

and support."lO The NCTC is staffed by personnel from multiple departments 

and agencies from across the IC, including the CIA, FBI, DHS, Department of 

State, Department of Defense, and other federal entities. In addition to the 

NCTC, the following ODNI programs and entities are involved in domestic fieldbased sharing of counterterrorism information. 

6 The Executive Office of the President, establishes Interagency Policy Committees {IPC) on a variety of 

issues. These IPCs are the primary day-to-day forums for interagency coordination on particular issues. 

They provide policy analysis for consideration by senior committees and staff and ensure timely responses 

to decisions made by the President. The lSA IPC subsumed the role of a predecessor body, the 

Information Sharing Council, which was established by Executive Order 13356: Strengthening the 

Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans in 2004. 

7 The ISA IPC consists of representatives from the ODNI; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of Management and 

Budget; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); National Security Agency; 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and 

Human Services, Homeland Security, Interior, Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury. 

8 In a July 2009 memorandum, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism made clear that the Administration regarded information sharing as extending beyond 

terrorism-related issues to encompass the sharing of information more broadly to enhance the national 

security of the United States and the safety of the American people. 

9 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (December 2012). 

10 IRTPA of2004, § 102l(d); codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3056(d). 

3 
82 

Table 1: ODNI Programs and Entities 

»m~rnnriAt.e federal, st(\tte, local, and 

tribal entities, as well as private sector through the use of 

(. .. ...... ...... .. ..... ....... .. • p?li::~: ~':l~~~!if!.~~~.l:ci.t<0£1::11:?!?~i_es,. ~ ............. . Source: NCTC, ODNI Partner Engagement, and PM-ISE documentation 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, created DHS and 

established its primary mission to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States 

and enhance security. While not all DHS components have specific programs 

or groups dedicated to domestic field-based counterterrorism information 

sharing, they contribute to this mission through their areas of expertise and 

authorities. 

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (!&A) is one of DHS' two IC 

elements and is obligated and authorized to access, receive, and analyze law 

enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from 

federal, state, and local government agencies and private sector entities, and to 

disseminate such information to those partners. 11 !&A's Field Operations 

consists of intelligence officers, reports officers, and regional directors deployed 

nationwide to manage DHS' role in information sharing with state and local 

entities. The U.S. Coast Guard is the other DHS element of the IC and has the 

authority to "collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, 

and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence including defense 

and defense-related information and intelligence to support national and 

departmental missions" and to "conduct counterintelligence activities." 12 Other 

DHS components, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), also have intelligence 

programs though they are not IC elements. These programs, in addition to I&A 

and the U.S. Coast Guard, compose the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

DHS components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Federal Protective 

Service (FPS), deploy representatives nationwide to leverage their law 

ll 6U.S.C.§l21. 

12 Executive Order No. 12333 at§ 1. 7(h). 

4 
83 

enforcement authorities in counterterrorism investigations with federal, state, 

and local partners. For example, CBP personnel at land, air, and sea ports of 

entry have the authority to search people and their belongings entering the 

United States and collect personal information for all travelers entering or 

leaving the United States. ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agents 

across the country enforce more than 400 federal statutes focused on the 

illegal movement of people, goods, and currency. Table 2 lists the DHS 

components engaged in this review and their respective missions. 

Table 2: 

I &A 

an a\vareness and 

. itltegritx.of.the.u.:~: .. i!ll~igratioi}:';YSt:.O'!'· 

Source: DHS OIG compilation of DHS information 

Within DOJ, there are two components that are primarily involved in the 

field-based sharing of counterterrorism information- the FBI and the U.S. 

Attorney's Offices (USAO). By law, the FBI is the lead agency within the federal 

government responsible for investigating crimes involving terrorist activity 

within the statutory jurisdiction of the United States. 13 Each U.S. Attorney is 

13 18 usc 2332b(!). 

5 
84 

the chief federal law enforcement officer within his or her particular 

jurisdiction. The following table shows the missions of specific entities within 

the FBI and USAOs that are predominantly involved in the field-based sharing 

of counterterrorism information. 

Offices-

:Anti-Terrorism 

:Advisory 

'Councils 

Source: FBI and Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys documentation 

As acknowledged in the 2007 NSIS, state, local, and tribal governments 

serve as the nation's first "preventers and responders," and are critical to the 

nation's efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks and to respond if an attack 

occurs. Often, these state, local, and tribal entities are best able to identify 

potential threats that exist within their jurisdictions. In our review, we 

identified the National Network of Fusion Centers and the Regional Information 

Sharing Systems (RISS) as the two primary state and local counterterrorism 

information sharing entities. The following table provides the missions of these 

non-federal entities. 

Regional 

Information 

Sharing 

Systems 

Table 4: Non-Federal Entities Engaged in Field-Based 

as to promote officer 

crin1inal justice agencies 

additlon 1 users with information sharing resources, analytic 

and support, and training. 

Source: 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report and R!SS website 

6 
85 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

INTEGRATION, COORDINATION, AND NATIONAL STRATEGY 

In general, the OIGs found that federal, state, and local entities are 

committed to sharing counterterrorism information. The participating entities 

have shown their commitment to this effort by undertaking programs and 

initiatives that have improved information sharing, yet the participating entities 

were unable to quantify the significant personnel and funding resources 

dedicated to this effort. The OIGs also identified areas that require 

improvement to further strengthen the sharing of counterterrorism 

information. 

Examples of Information Sharing and Coordination 

During our review, several terrorism-related incidents occurred. We 

believe that many actions taken by federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies prior to, during, and following these incidents reflect their 

commitment to sharing counterterrorism information. For example: 

• In June 2015, Ali Saleh, a resident of New York, was arrested after he 

systematically made multiple attempts to travel to the Middle East to join 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Saleh, who allegedly was 

inspired by ISIL propaganda, expressed his support for ISIL online, and 

took steps to carry out acts encouraged in the ISIL call to arms. This 

arrest resulted from the efforts of the New York Joint Terrorism Task 

Force (JTTF) working collaboratively with its federal, state, and local task 

force officers. 

• In June 2015, the Boston JTTF stopped and ultimately used deadly force 

against Usaamah Rahim, who had been under investigation and 

surveillance. According to an FBI affidavit, Rahim, along with coconspirators, was initially plotting to kill a prominent blogger but had 

abandoned that plot and instead targeted police officers. During the 

course of the review, we learned that the successful disruption of this 

plot was based, in large part, on information shared between federal and 

local law enforcement authorities in Boston. 

• During and following recent terrorism-related events, such as those in 

Chattanooga, Tennessee; Paris, France; and San Bernardino, California, 

fusion centers along with their federal, state, and local partners used the 

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to share real-time 

updates, submit and respond to information requests, and support one 

another nationwide. The majority of fusion center personnel interviewed 

considered the use of HSIN as a best practice in information sharing 

across the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

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• Following the Paris, France; San Bernardino, California; and Brussels, 

Belgium, terrorist attacks, the FBI linked partner agencies using 

technology, including Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC), to quickly 

provide up-to-date threat information. For example, on the day of the 

Paris attacks, November 13, 2015, the FBI conducted a 3-hour 

conference call with representatives from all 78 Fusion Centers, DHS, 

executives from national law enforcement associations, the Criminal 

Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC), Governor's Homeland Security 

Advisors, and state and local law enforcement. 

In addition to these specific events, federal, state, and local partners 

exhibited a continued commitment to certain programs or initiatives, which 

further enhanced the sharing of counterterrorism information. For instance: 

• The National Fusion Center Association, with federal support from DHS, 

DOJ, FBI, and the PM-ISE, is leading an initiative to share Real-time 

Open Source Analysis of Social Media (ROSM). The goal of the ROSM 

initiative focuses on how law enforcement agencies can and should 

analyze and share social media information and related criminal 

intelligence to help identify common indicators that can support 

intervention with potentially violent extremists and thereby prevent 

and/ or disrupt attacks. 

• In FY 2015, state and local partners initiated 623 terrorist watchlist 

nominations through !&A's Watchlisting Enterprise, 79 percent of which 

were accepted. 

• As of FY 2014, about half of the almost 18,000 state and local law 

enforcement agencies in the United States had staff members who 

participated in their respective fusion center's Fusion Liaison Officer 

(FLO) Program. In FY 2014, there were a reported 40,187 FLOs, 

representing a 104-percent increase from about 19,700 in FY 2011. 

• The FBI and DHS-led Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative 

is a collaborative effort for federal, state, and local law enforcement 

entities to share information on suspicious activities. Suspicious activity 

reporting increased by 96 percent between FY 2012 and FY 2015, with a 

majority of reports coming from the FBI's partners, including fusion 

centers. 

Summary of Challenges 

Although the above examples evidence positive and proactive information 

sharing between federal and non-federal partners, the OIGs identified several 

areas in which improvements could strengthen the sharing of counterterrorism 

information, as summarized below. 

• Because both the FBI and DHS have counterterrorism-related missions 

and a role in gathering and disseminating counterterrorism information, 

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some DHS and FBI officials expressed concerns about potential overlaps 

in their counterterrorism missions and activities. 

• Although there is a national-level information sharing strategy, the PMISE determined that its implementation across the information sharing 

environment has been uneven. 

• The DHS Intelligence Enterprise is not as effective and valuable to the IC 

as it could be. For example, there is a lack of unity across the DHS 

Intelligence Enterprise, problems with !&A staffing levels in the field, 

issues with the internal intelligence product review and approval 

processes, and difficulty accessing classified systems and facilities in the 

field. 

• DOJ can improve its counterterrorism information sharing efforts by 

implementing a consolidated internal DOJ strategy and evaluating the 

continued need and most effective utilization for the USAOs' AntiTerrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meetings. In addition, the FBI should 

spur participation associated with JTTFs and improve its efforts to obtain 

partners' input to the process for identifying and prioritizing 

counterterrorism threats. 

• Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative (DDNIR) program is 

hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear 

strategic vision and guidance. In addition, the NCTC Domestic 

Representative program has also struggled to sufficiently cover its 

regions. 

• At the state and local level, fusion centers are focused on sustaining 

operations rather than enhancing capabilities due to unpredictable 

federal support, including potential reductions in grant funding. 

Further, varying requirements for state and local security clearances 

sponsored by federal agencies can impede access to classified systems 

and facilities. 

Based on the results of this review, the OIGs concluded that sharing of 

counterterrorism information among federal, state, and local partners could be 

strengthened. Details of the above issues are contained in the following 

sections, including recommended actions to further improve the sharing of 

counterterrorism information. We believe that implementing these 

recommendations will help enhance and coordinate information sharing, 

which, in turn, can lead to a more comprehensive picture of the terrorist threat 

and greater national security. 

Interconnected Missions of Federal Partners 

Both the FBI and DHS have counterterrorism-related 

missions and both have a role in gathering and 

disseminating counterterrorism information. The working 

relationships between DHS components and the FBI relating 

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to counterterrorism investigations reflect the challenges of 

these interconnected missions. During our review, some 

DHS and FBI officials expressed concerns about potential 

overlaps in law enforcement and counterterrorism missions 

and activities. 

The FBI is the primary federal government agency responsible for 

handling counterterrorism investigations. However, these complex 

investigations often involve multiple possible violations of law, some of which 

may fall under another agency's primary jurisdiction, and thus, require 

information and expertise from different source agencies, such as travel 

information, nuclear regulatory information, or watchlist information. An 

executive within the FBI's Counterterrorism Division told the DOJ OIG that the 

FBI relies upon the JTTF concept to provide the coordination, information 

sharing, and deconfliction of investigative efforts. For example, multiple 

entities contributed to the investigation of the April 2013 bombing at the 

Boston Marathon, including the Boston JTTF, CBP, TSA, and USCIS. 14 

Although officials said that they generally understood the missions of the 

other partners, the involvement of multiple agencies in counterterrorism 

investigations increases the risk that field personnel may interpret sharing 

requirements and guidance differently than what is articulated in the 

interagency information sharing MOU.IS The actions resulting from those 

differences in interpretations may contribute to a lack of trust among law 

enforcement agents, perpetuate negative perceptions about the other agency's 

ability and willingness to share information, and foster an atmosphere in which 

individuals rely on their personal relationships with other law enforcement 

partners rather than establishing standardized coordination mechanisms that 

remain in place despite any personnel changes. 

The OIGs found that the quality of the working relationships between 

DHS components and the FBI varies widely in the field. For example, ICE HSI 

and FBI officials reported a challenging working relationship. According to the 

FBI, its field division leadership has consistently expressed to headquarters its 

concerns with ICE HSI performing work within the FBI's mission. ICE HSI has 

learned of these reports, which has perpetuated its negative perceptions about 

the FBI's willingness to work cooperatively with other law enforcement 

agencies. In general, ICE HSI said it believes the FBI does not sufficiently 

14 Inspectors General for the Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of 

Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security, Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 

15, 2013, Boston Marathon Bombings, April10, 2014. 

15 The interagency information sharing MOU is discussed in the following section of this report. 

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understand or recognize ICE HSI's functions, capabilities, and abilities to 

contribute to counterterrorism investigations and information sharing. ICE 

HSI officials reported similar issues when discussing their involvement in the 

JTIFs. 

However, CBP reported that it generally has good working relationships 

with FBI field offices and personnel. Some CBP officials suggested that this is 

most likely because CBP has distinct authorities and unique access to 

information about travelers, which is often used in counterterrorism 

investigations. CBP officials said their relationship with the FBI has come a 

long way in recent years so that it feels more like a partnership than previously 

when it was one-sided with CBP sharing information with the FBI but not vice 

versa. CBP officials added that their involvement in the JTIFs has led to better 

awareness by the FBI of CBP functions and capabilities. 

Because agency missions are connected, it is critical that all partners 

understand and value the roles and contributions of its partners. The OIGs 

concluded that the issues cited above largely reflect struggles for this type of 

respect and cooperation in the counterterrorism arena. To achieve a shared 

vision and foster greater and more consistent cooperation, entities involved in 

counterterrorism should standardize practices and processes, as well as 

update and implement information sharing agreements. Throughout this 

report, the OIGs make recommendations to encourage and institutionalize 

such coordination through improvements to various practices and processes of 

the parties involved. 

Strategy and Coordination in Domestic Intelligence and Information 

Sharing 

To move away from personality-based coordination and codify 

interagency information sharing, the federal partners involved in 

counterterrorism efforts need formal agreements at the national level. The 

formal agreement governing information sharing, which includes priorities, 

requirements, and responsibilities, is outdated. The OIGs believe reviewing the 

interagency information sharing MOU and taking necessary actions to update 

intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the 

departments would reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of 

partners in the current information sharing environment. The agencies 

involved in counterterrorism should also establish processes to implement the 

overall strategy in the field. Clearly designating a capstone coordination and 

engagement body for the terrorism-related ISE would further assist in 

implementing the overall strategy and establishing field-level processes. 

As previously noted, in October 2007, the White House issued the 

National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in 

Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing, which outlined the 

Administration's vision for the information sharing environment. The White 

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House issued an updated national strategy, the National Strategy for 

Information Sharing and Safeguarding in December 2012 (2012 Strategy). The 

2012 Strategy outlined goals and priority objectives for the information sharing 

environment. In December 2013, the PM-ISE issued its Strategic 

Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Information Sharing and 

Safeguarding, which established a construct for executing the 2012 Strategy. 16 

However, in its annual report to Congress for 2014, the PM-ISE reported that 

federal department and agency implementation of the 2012 Strategy had been 

uneven. The PM-ISE attributed some of the challenges in implementing the 

2012 Strategy to the broad-based nature of the 2012 Strategy's priority 

objectives, as well as differences in department and agency prioritization, 

maturity, and operating environments. 

In addition, although the White House updated the national strategy and 

the PM-ISE issued a strategic implementation plan, the Memorandum of 

Understanding between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement 

Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information 

Sharing dates back to 2003. This MOU outlines information sharing priorities, 

reciprocity and transparency, sharing requirements, coordination and 

deconfliction, and officials responsible for information sharing. However, the 

MOU predates the establishment of the ODNI and NCTC. 

The ODNI, DHS, and DOJ need to review the interagency MOU and 

determine what actions are necessary to update intelligence information 

sharing standards and processes among the departments. Such standards 

and processes should reflect the current structure, roles, and responsibilities of 

the ISE and the current threat environment and priorities. Based on these 

determinations, the NCTC, I&A, and FBI should continue to develop guidance 

for future intelligence information sharing, particularly in the field, that 

accounts for the roles and responsibilities the agencies have according to 

statute. Such guidance would enhance the sharing of intelligence information 

among federal representatives in the field and help create a unified and 

consistent federal contribution for state and local partners. 

16 Some members of the ISE. such as DHS and the FBI, have also developed departmental and agencylevel information sharing strategies to align with the national strategy. 

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The O!Gs identified multiple entities (to include boards, committees, and 

councils) that are involved in the coordination and governance of domestic 

counterterrorism information sharing. Table 5 below provides examples of 

these entities and their missions. 

Table 5: Exam les of Information Shari Entities 

Information Sharing and Access 

· Interagency Policy Committee 

. (ISA IPc) 

I;;.r.;~;;.;~>.ti.;;;. sha.;;;;.g ·co~;;.cii .. (JSC) 

Intelligence Community 

Information Sharing and 

Safeguarding Executive 

Criminal Intelligence 

Coordinating Council (CICC) 

Established by the White House to implement a national 

information sharing and to lead information 

across the 

oversight and progn-1n1 managernent of Offices of the 

ODNI and IC information sharing efforts; as well as leads, i 

coordinates, facilitates, and as appropriate, manages all 

17 Federal advisory committees, which may also be designated as commissions, councils, or task forces, 

are used to collect various viewpoints on specific policy issues. These committees are often created to 

help the government manage and solve complex or divisive issues. Such committees may he mandated by 

congressional statute, created by presidential executive order, or required by fiat of an agency head to 

render independent advice or make recommendations to federal agencies. 

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These multiple entities, with their differing roles and jurisdictions, lack 

an interconnectedness to facilitate collaboration, coordination, and integration 

of domestic information sharing. The OIGs believe that codifying an 

overarching engagement and coordination body for the terrorism-related ISE 

would help further these objectives. 

Recommendations: The IC IG and DHS and DOJ O!Gs recommend that 

the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ: 

1. Review the 2003 interagency MOU on information sharing and 

determine what actions are necessary to update intelligence 

information sharing standards and processes among the 

departments. 

2. Codify an overarching engagement and coordination body for the 

terrorism-related ISE. 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise 

The DHS Intelligence Enterprise is not as effective and 

valuable to the IC as it could be. For example, there is still a 

lack of unity among !&A and other DHS component 

intelligence programs, which also affects intelligence 

reporting. In addition, DHS OIG concluded that !&A staffing 

levels in the field may be making it difficult to fully support 

the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. Complications in its 

relationship with the FBI, as well as internal issues 

associated with the review and approval process are also 

negatively affecting !&A's production of intelligence reports. 

DHS must provide its stakeholders with information needed 

to disrupt and prevent terrorist threats and attacks. 

However, DHS intelligence personnel in the field have 

inconsistent access to the systems and facilities needed to 

receive, view, store, and share classified information above 

the Secret level. 

Limited Cohesiveness and Coordination of Effort across the DHS Intelligence 

Enterprise 

The DHS Intelligence Enterprise is fragmented, with elements operating 

independently and with few repercussions or incentives to coordinate better 

outside of actual events. The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, as 

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DHS' Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT), is responsible for integrating and 

standardizing DHS component intelligence program products, including 

products with terrorism information and national intelligence, but has not fully 

exerted its authority over the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. The DHS 

components involved have their own intelligence programs with their own cadre 

of intelligence professionals. Further, I&A is subject to IC directives and 

standards, but component intelligence programs are not, unless IC directives 

and standards have been institutionalized into DHS guidance. 

I&A is taking several steps to help unify the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

For example, in 2014 I&A established a DHS Intelligence Rotational 

Assignment Program to promote a broader understanding of the various 

intelligence missions and functions across the intelligence enterprise and 

fusion centers. Efforts are also underway to ensure all intelligence products, 

briefings, and production plans are shared more evenly across the intelligence 

enterprise. However, the CINT has been unable to effectively require other DHS 

components to comply with its policies or to compel DHS component personnel 

to participate in its initiatives. Therefore, the CINT and key intelligence officials 

from the components should create incentives to encourage compliance and 

participation. 

To enhance cooperation with other DHS components, I&A needs to better 

communicate its mission and role to component management. DHS OIG 

observed increased collaboration between I&A and DHS components where 

intelligence enterprise meetings are held regularly. This best practice builds 

relationships, conveys missions and roles, and enhances information sharing 

across DHS components. Although I&A intelligence officers are now required 

to hold such meetings quarterly, the differing locations of component field 

offices, caps on the number of I&A intelligence officers, and reshuffling of 

assignments have caused meetings in some areas to lose momentum. 

There is also a lack of coordination between I&A and DHS components in 

intelligence reporting, but steps are being taken to address this issue. In 2012, 

DHS components established their own reporting programs, and at the same 

time, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis ended I&A's production 

of intelligence reports based on information from the components. According 

to officials from I&A Field Operations, some DHS components are now working 

with I&A on pilot programs to facilitate intelligence reporting. For example, the 

ICE HSI Intelligence Unit Chief sends information to an I&A senior reports 

officer in the field who then sends it to the region it impacts. I&A reports 

officers in the field then produce ICE intelligence reports for which both 

components receive reporting credit. CBP, TSA, and USCIS have expressed 

interest in developing similar pilots. Because DHS component intelligence 

programs have limited personnel in the field and the majority are not 

authorized to produce intelligence reports, these efforts could lead to more 

efficient and effective intelligence reporting. Rather than sending intelligence 

information to component headquarters to produce reports, DHS field officials 

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with subject matter expertise, access to information systems, and an 

understanding of local context could work with !&A field officials to produce 

reports. 

Recommendations: DHS OIG recommends that I&A: 

3. In conjunction with the key intelligence officials from DHS 

components, ensure DHS component intelligence programs comply with 

policies and create incentives for personnel to participate in initiatives 

that enhance the cohesion of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

4. Formalize agreements that enable I&J\ field officials to develop 

intelligence reporting with DHS components in the field, based on pilot 

program results. 

I&A Staffing Issues 

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required !&A to 

limit the number of intelligence officers in the field. As of December 2015, !&A 

had 59 intelligence officers in the field, primarily located at the nation's 78 

fusion centers, serving as the IC's lead conduits to state, local, tribal, and 

territorial governments.lS Nineteen of the 78 fusion centers did not have a 

dedicated !&A intelligence officer, although two of those centers are in the same 

location as fusion centers that have a dedicated intelligence officer. Nine 

intelligence officers and one regional director each serve two or three fusion 

centers; five of the nine intelligence officers serve fusion centers located more 

than 100 miles apart. Two regional directors are the only !&A personnel at 

their respective area's fusion centers. State and local entities expressed 

concern that recent changes to !&A Field Operations, such as the removal of 

some intelligence officer positions, have stretched these officers too thinly. 

Because they are thinly staffed, !&A intelligence officers cannot fully 

support the DHS Intelligence Enterprise in the field. For example, !&A does 

not have intelligence officers at all the fusion centers near major DHS 

component field concentrations, such as along borders, including those fusion 

centers in El Paso and San Antonio, Texas; and San Diego, California. In 

addition, most DHS component intelligence program personnel are located at 

headquarters with few in the field, and intelligence-related work is largely a 

18 I &A also has 26 reports officers in the field. However, they are trained and dedicated to producing 

intelligence reports, not to the additional functions performed by intelligence officers. 

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collateral duty for component field personnel. I&A could potentially fill this role 

through its intelligence officers assigned to fusion centers, but I&A does not 

have sufficient staffing in the field. 

Insufficient Reporting of Counterterrorism Information 

To develop a comprehensive and accurate threat picture, I&A field 

officials are expected to share information related to the missions of DHS and 

its components (e.g., information on homeland security, terrorism, and 

weapons of mass destruction) with state, local, and tribal entities. I&A field 

officials are also responsible for reviewing homeland security-relevant 

information, creating intelligence and other information products, and 

disseminating the products to the appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal 

government entities.19 Given that DHS is largely responsible for travel-related 

security (e.g., borders, transportation, and immigration), DHS has unique 

access to information about travelers, including known or suspected terrorists, 

and is well-situated to intercept and identifY travel by potential terrorists and 

foreign fighters. I&A field officials could use this information to enhance state 

and local information to identify and analyze trends. Although I&A has 

increased its focus on intelligence reporting by sending all intelligence officers 

and regional directors to reports officer training, converting some intelligence 

officer positions to reports officer positions, and developing additional reporting 

lines, it does not have formal guidance for field officials on the collection and 

coordination needed to create these reports. 

In addition, none of the I&A field officials with whom DHS OIG spoke 

said they regularly develop intelligence reports from terrorism and 

counterterrorism information. I&A has a responsibility to produce intelligence 

reports based on counterterrorism information from state and locals for the IC, 

and the FBI has a responsibility to investigate terrorism-related matters and 

share counterterrorism information with the IC and outside agencies. Fulfilling 

these responsibilities can create tension because intelligence reports go to the 

IC while information that contributes to an investigation is generally closely 

held within the investigative team. Thus, I&A and the FBI may have difficulty 

coordinating these interrelated counterterrorism missions. Also, I&A has not 

asserted its reporting responsibility, leading the majority of I&A field officials to 

feel they needed permission from FBI field offices to develop counterterrorism 

reports. Without clear guidance on how to balance and coordinate these 

responsibilities, and with the desire to maintain good relationships with the 

FBI, about 43 percent of the I&A field officials interviewed said they no longer 

try to report on terrorism and counterterrorism information and about 21 

19 6 U.S.C. § 124h. 

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percent have developed ad hoc arrangements with their respective FBI field 

office regarding reporting in general. For example, one I&A field official said he 

has informally agreed to write reports with information the FBI cannot or 

chooses not to report. Following DHS OIG's fieldwork, one I&A field official 

said I&A was working with the FBI to establish an agreement allowing I&A to 

create reports based on terrorist watchlisting. 

I&A should help its field officials fulfill their responsibilities by developing 

and implementing guidance for intelligence reporting. In addition, better 

coordination with the FBI and other partners would help to create intelligence 

products that address investigative concerns and include terrorism- and 

counterterrorism-related information. Therefore, I&A should also clarifY its 

role and improve coordination with its federal partners, including the FBI, by 

formalizing agreements and policies regarding intelligence reporting. 

5. Develop and implement guidance for intelligence reporting in the field. 

6. Coordinate with the FBI to formalize guidance and policies for the 

reporting of terrorism and counterterrorism information. 

Delays in I&A Intelligence Product Review and Approval 

According to I &A field officials, approval and dissemination of I&A 

intelligence reports is often delayed, which could be the result of several 

factors. All I&A intelligence reports from the field must first be sent to I&A's 

Reporting Branch for review and approval. Then, the clearing offices - DHS 

Privacy Office, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Office of the General 

Counsel-Intelligence Law Division, and I&A Intelligence Oversightconcurrently review the reports. However, reports are emailed, and there is no 

formal system to log and track the review process. Further, although each 

clearing office is supposed to complete its review reports within 2 business 

days, it is not clear how long it actually takes.2o The Reporting Branch's review 

and approval appears to take the most time, which may be due in part to the 

branch's staffing levels and reviewing assignments. By the fall of 2015, the 59 

20 DHS OIG requested statistics on review times from each clearing office and the Reporting Branch but 

did not receive comprehensive statistics from each office. The statistics received from the DHS Privacy 

Office, CRCL, Office of the General Counsel-Intelligence Law Division, and the I&A Intelligence Oversight 

indicated a review time of less than 1 business day. 

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!&A intelligence officers in the field completed reports officer training. In 

addition to the 26 reports officers in the field, these 59 intelligence officers can 

now produce intelligence reports, but Reporting Branch staff have not had 

commensurate increases. Ten senior reports officers review all reports from 

the field. In addition, by assigning reviews to senior reports officers based on 

regions, the Reporting Branch may be creating backlogs for officers responsible 

for regions with a greater number of reports or more complex reporting. 

During our review, !&A field officials also said they did not have local release 

authority, that is, the authority to send intelligence reports directly to the 

clearing offices for review and approval without first sending them to the 

Reporting Branch. The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis recently 

approved granting local release authority to !&A field officials, but formal 

guidance had not been issued prior to the end of DHS OIG's fieldwork. 

Because of the delays in I &A reporting, even though they would like to 

develop joint products, many fusion centers had given up on doing so. In one 

often cited example, a joint product with the New Jersey, New York, and New 

Hampshire fusion centers about homegrown violent extremists targeting 

military assets was in production for about 2 years. Several fusion centers said 

they still coordinate products with !&A field personnel who contribute 

informally, but without joint seals or official reporting credit. These types of 

timeliness issues were raised in an October 2012 Senate report and a July 

2013 House report.21 

For more flexibility and continued coordination with and support from 

fusion center partners, I&A has introduced new intelligence products and 

reports, such as Field Analysis Reports and Field Intelligence Reports. Field 

Analysis Reports are finished intelligence products designed to highlight 

analysis from the National Network of Fusion Centers on national, regional, 

and local issues of concern. Topics must meet !&A's statutory missions and 

authorities and should contain unique state, local, tribal, or territorial and/ or 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise information or perspectives. Field Intelligence 

Reports are used to formally report raw, unevaluated information of potential 

intelligence value that responds to departmental requirements but not IC 

requirements. These new products have been well received by !&A 

stakeholders, including Congress, who had expressed concern about !&A's 

production levels. 

21 United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: Federal Support 

for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers, Majority and Minority Staff Report, Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations (October 2012); and the United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Homeland Security, Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers (July 

2013). 

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Although !&A has taken steps to increase the timeliness and number of 

intelligence products, establishing formal review mechanisms and 

implementing formal guidance would further improve its intelligence reporting. 

8. Develop and implement guidance for fteld officials granting them local 

release authority for intelligence reporting. 

DHS Lacks Consistent Access to C-LAN and SCIFs in the Field 

Access to the C-LAN and Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities 

(SCIF) are necessary for DHS intelligence personnel to fulfill their duties and to 

meet the goals of the DHS Information Sharing and Safeguarding Strategy. 22 

However, while DHS I&A and other DHS Intelligence Enterprise personnel in 

the field have Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) 

security clearances, they lack the supporting infrastructure to receive, view, 

store, and share information classified above the Secret level. Altogether, DHS 

components have SC!Fs located at 19 sites outside of the National Capital 

Region that field personnel may reasonably use, such as to access the C-LAN. 

Of these 19, only 2 are !&A-certified SCIFs. 

I&A's effectiveness as an IC member, in particular, is hampered by its 

limited access to classified systems and facilities. Nearly all !&A field personnel 

work in fusion centers, which now all have access to Secret-level classifted 

information through the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN). However, 

counterterrorism information is often classified above the Secret level. 

22 C~LAN operates as the DHS information technology network for the Top Secret/Sensitive 

Compartmented Information level. A SCIF is an accredited area, room, group of rooms, buildings, or 

installation where sensitive compartmented information may be used, stored, discussed, and/ or 

processed. 

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Several DHS field personnel have brokered informal agreements through 

personal relationships with Department of Defense facilities and other federal 

field offices to gain access to the C-LAN. Some of these facilities require 

personnel to drive up to 3 hours, thereby limiting the frequency with which 

personnel may use them. Some DHS field personnel rely on the FBI for access 

toTS/SCI systems and space. For example, DHS task force officers have 

access to FBI SC!Fs and systems through their participation in JTTFs, but this 

applies only to special agents. Of the 96 !&A field officials surveyed, about 43 

percent hold active FBI badges similar to those that DHS task force officers 

receive and about 20 percent have access to FBI systems such as FB!Net or the 

Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network 

(SCION). 

To enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of counterterrorism 

information sharing, DHS needs to increase field personnel's access to 

classified systems and facilities above the Secret level. DHS should determine 

whether establishing more SC!Fs in the field, formalizing agreements with 

other federal agencies, or pursuing a combination of the two, will resolve this 

issue and take the appropriate action. 

Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that DHS: 

9. Develop and implement a plan that will allow DHS intelligence officials 

in the field practical access to classified systems and infrastructure above 

the Secret level. 

DOJ Support of Counterterrorism Information Sharing 

The DOJ OIG identified improvements that could be made to 

internal DOJ processes, JTTFs, and other field-based 

activities to enhance counterterrorism information sharing. 

Specifically, the DOJ OIG found that DOJ does not have a 

consolidated internal strategy to ensure that DOJ's 

counterterrorism information sharing efforts align with the 

President's strategic plan and that all DOJ components 

understand their respective roles and responsibilities. In 

addition, the FBI should further promote the JTTF Executive 

Board concept by increasing Board membership and 

spurring participation in Board meetings through 

standardization of content. Moreover, the DOJ OIG believes 

the ATAC meetings often duplicate other field-based 

counterterrorism information sharing efforts, and we believe 

that DOJ should evaluate the ATAC program to ensure the 

purpose of the ATAC meetings are not duplicative of other 

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counterterrorism information sharing partner initiatives. 

Finally, although the FBI has a well-defined process to 

identify and prioritize counterterrorism threats in each field 

division's jurisdiction, it could improve its efforts to obtain 

its partners' input on regional threats and mitigation 

strategies. 

DOJ Strategy for Internal Counterterrorism Information Sharing 

Based on discussions with an official from the Office of the Deputy 

Attorney General (ODAG), DOJ has not developed an internal strategy for 

counterterrorism information sharing separate from the President's strategic 

plan. This official stated that DOJ determined that its existing framework of 

policies and procedures constitutes DOJ's information sharing strategy. 

The DOJ OIG believes that additional DOJ leadership is needed to 

ensure that DOJ's overall information sharing efforts and investments align 

with the 2012 Strategy and are coordinated and prioritized both within DOJ 

and with external partners. The DOJ OIG team discussed this issue with the 

DOJ Chief Information Officer (CIO) who agreed that coordination among the 

various DOJ components could be improved. According to the DOJ CIO, DOJ 

lacks an internal forum singularly dedicated to reviewing information sharing 

initiatives and investments across all DOJ components. The Law Enforcement 

Information Sharing Coordinating Committee (LCC), which was created in 

December 2006 by the Deputy Attorney General, was responsible for ensuring 

a department-wide collaborative and integrated focus on information sharing 

policy objectives. However, this group stopped meeting in 2009 because the 

group determined that it had accomplished its goal of enhancing 

interconnectivity with the Department's law enforcement partners following the 

establishment of the National Data Exchange.23 

The lack of an internal strategy and forum for sharing information may 

hamper DOJ's ability to define and execute a comprehensive and unified plan 

for its information sharing initiatives and investments across all of DOJ's 

components. Officials from each DOJ component attend other information 

sharing working groups. For example, the DOJ CIO said that DOJ uses the 

Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) as a forum for components 

to discuss information sharing initiatives with external partners. The DOJ OIG 

is concerned that because DOJ does not have a consolidated internal strategy, 

23 The National Data Exchange (N-DEx) provides criminal justice agencies with an online tool for 

sharing, searching, linking, and analyzing information across jurisdictional boundaries. 

22 
101 

there is a risk that DOJ components may present or discuss initiatives that do 

not align with DOJ's unified vision. 

The DOJ CIO said that he had recently proposed the establishment of a 

new council, the Law Enforcement Information Sharing Council (LEISC), that 

would be led by the Deputy Attorney General and help coordinate the 

information sharing efforts within DOJ. The proposed LEISC would provide a 

platform for DOJ entities to discuss and develop a unified vision regarding 

information sharing initiatives and investments, as well as ensure that DOJ 

actions are consistent with the 2012 Strategy. The DOJ CIO stated that DOJ is 

evaluating the LEISC, or a similar initiative, to determine how best to meet 

DOJ's operational and strategic planning needs. The DOJ OIG believes that 

the LEISC or a similar initiative could provide a valuable forum for the 

discussion and coordination of DOJ information sharing efforts, including 

overall strategy and investments. Information gleaned from this council's 

discussions could then be used during discussions with the PM-ISE and the 

CICC. 

Recommendations: DOJ OIG recommends that DOJ: 

10. Develop a comprehensive internal counterterrorism information 

sharing strategic plan based on a review of the President's strategic plan 

and in consultation with relevant partners. 

11. Implement a council, led by a senior Department official, for the 

internal coordination of DOJ information sharing strategy and 

investments, and ensure that relevant components designate senior-level 

officials responsible for monitoring their component's efforts and 

communicating their efforts to DOJ as requested. 

JTTF Executive Board Meeting Participation and Content 

JTTFs, which are squads within each of the FBI's Field Divisions and 

select Resident Agency Offices, focus primarily on addressing terrorism threats 

and preventing terrorist incidents. The JTTFs leverage the resources and 

expertise of multiple member agencies to collect and share counterterrorism 

information. As of March 2016, the JTTFs were comprised of 54 federal 

agencies and 449 state, local, and other agencies. For example, DHS has more 

than 600 agents who participate on the 104 JTTFs nationwide. These DHS 

personnel help enhance the JTTFs' efforts through their unique expertise in 

areas such as immigration and customs enforcement. 

In 2003, FBI field divisions were instructed to establish a JTTF Executive 

Board if they did not already have one. While the JTTFs conduct joint 

23 
102 

counterterrorism investigations, JTIF Executive Boards are forums for sharing 

critical terrorism threat intelligence and ongoing investigative efforts to address 

those threats with law enforcement executives in their respective jurisdictions. 

As a result, the JTIF Executive Boards encompass a wider coverage of agencies 

within each respective jurisdiction because not all agencies are able to 

participate on a JTIF due to restrictions such as resources. In 2005, FBI field 

divisions were instructed to ensure that the JTIF Executive Board met on an 

as-needed basis but at least three times per year. The 2005 guidance further 

said that JTIF Executive Boards should be comprised of key federal, state, 

local, and tribal law enforcement officials, but at a minimum, include the heads 

of the agencies that have full-time agents and/ or officers assigned to the JTIF 

within the respective field division's territory. 

During the review, the DOJ OIG found that the JTIF Executive Board 

meetings in the sites the team visited were generally occurring at least 

quarterly. However, we are concerned with the number of agencies not 

represented on the JTIF Executive Boards and with the level of participation of 

those agencies on the JTIF Executive Boards. To assess the level of 

engagement and participation of executive management of the agencies that 

have full-time agents or officers assigned to a JTIF, the team reviewed JTIF 

task force officer and JTIF Executive Board member rosters and meeting 

attendance records maintained by the FBI for the eight FBI field divisions 

visited.24 

24 The DOJ OIG requested the JITF Executive Board member rosters and meeting attendance records 

for the preceding 2 years from each of the eight FBI field divisions. In reviewing the documentation 

provided, the total number of JTTF Executive Board meetings conducted by each site varied. Our 

analysis was based upon the data provided by each site. 

24 
103 

As shown in the following table, 167 agencies assigned at least one task 

force officer to the JTIFs in the 8 locations reviewed. However, we found that 

34, or 20 percent, of the 167 agencies did not have an agency representative on 

the JTIF Executive Board. For example, the FBI Boston Division's JTIF 

Executive Board only had representation from 40 percent of the agencies 

participating on the Boston JTIF. 

Table 6: Analysis of JTTF Executive Board Engagement and Participation for Agencies 

with a Task Force Officer Assigned to a JTTF 

Number of Agencies: . I ... 

Not Attending More 

FBI Field Without an With an Than Half of the Location With a JTTF Task Executive Board 

Force Officer Executive Executive Meetings (excludes Board Member Board Member agencies without a 

Board Member) 

l39st<i!1 20 H····.· .. · 8 •. •. .···· s . ; .•.· .... 

:hicago 16 16 3 

Dall<ts. 20 l!! .··.· s Denver 18 l 17 7 

Houston ;37 ·7·.··. . 3C 19 New York 39 12 2' 6 

Portland 12 ' ·0 .. •. 12• 10 •.. 

Springfield 5 0 5 1 

Total 167 .. 84 · . .•.•• 133 > .52 .. Source: DOJ OIG analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation Data 

Using the FBI-provided meeting attendance records, we found that 39 

percent of the 133 agencies represented on the JTIF Executive Board did not 

attend at least half of the JTIF Executive Board meetings, as shown in 

preceding table. 25 This 39 percent included federal, state, and local agencies. 

The Special Agents in Charge (SAC) in two FBI field divisions we visited told us 

that the need to obtain appropriate security clearances prevented some state 

and local law enforcement representatives from attending the JTIF Executive 

Board meetings. Officials from federal agencies reported that they may miss 

meetings because of competing work demands, such as training and other 

meetings. While we recognize that individuals may not be able to attend every 

meeting, agency representation at the JTIF Executive Board meetings is 

25 According to the FBI, not everyone who attends a JTTF Executive Board meeting may have signed the 

meeting attendance sheet. Because there was no other documentation available to confirm attendance, 

the DQ,J OIG considered an individual to have regularly attended the meetings if she/ he attended more 

than half of the meetings within the date ranges provided by the FBI based upon the meeting attendance 

sheets. 

25 
104 

important, and we believe that the FBI and participating agencies should place 

greater emphasis on attendance because these meetings provide another 

avenue for obtaining relevant information concerning their jurisdictions that 

they may not obtain otherwise. To help place greater emphasis on these 

meetings, we believe it is essential that the FBI ensure that a management 

representative (and an alternate) from each agency with a task force officer 

assigned to the JTTF has been designated as a JTTF Executive Board member 

and ensure that those individuals are notified of upcoming meetings. 

During the review of JTTF Executive Board data, the DOJ OIG found that 

representatives from agencies without full-time JTTF task force officers also 

attend JTTF Executive Board meetings. For example, regional representatives 

from the NCTC, !&A, and fusion centers attended meetings although these 

agencies did not have full-time JTTF task force officers. 

The DOJ OIG also noted that representatives from local fire departments 

attended the JTTF Executive Board meetings in some FBI field divisions. The 

DOJ OIG discussed this issue with the Assistant Director for the FBI's Office of 

Partnership Engagement who said that he believed it was a "best-case 

scenario" to have first responders, such as fire departments, attend JTTF 

Executive Board meetings. He further indicated that if state and local first 

responders cannot participate on the JTTF Executive Board, then the first 

responders should be engaged with the fusion center. This official also stated 

that it was important to have the first responders on the JTTF so that they are 

aware of the threat picture and have situational awareness so they may 

respond appropriately in the event of a terrorist attack, such as Paris or San 

Bernardino. Therefore, the DOJ OIG recommends that the FBI ensure its field 

divisions encourage agencies that do not participate on the JTTF, including 

first responders, to attend JTTF Executive Board Meetings. 

In addition to our concerns with the engagement and participation on the 

JTTF Executive Board, we believe the content of the meetings needs to be more 

standardized. Representatives from partner agencies who attended the JTTF 

Executive Board meetings reported the meetings provided valuable 

opportunities to share investigative and operational information, and that the 

meetings have improved in content and depth in recent years. The DOJ OIG 

attended a JTTF Executive Board meeting hosted by the FBI's Chicago Division. 

The meeting included an overview of the FBI's current threat environment, a 

roundtable discussion about emerging counterterrorism issues, and in-depth 

briefings on open terrorism investigations and threats, which were presented 

by various agencies, including the FBI, DHS, NCTC, and the area's two fusion 

centers-- the Illinois State Terrorism and Information Center (STIC) and the 

Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC). 

However, in other locations, some partner agency offtcials reported that 

the depth to which the topics were covered varied from meeting to meeting, and 

that in some instances, the varying coverage coincided with changes in FBI 

26 
105 

field division management. For example, a DHS official who attends the FBI 

Denver Division's JTTF Executive Board meetings said the meeting content 

varied in conjunction with three changes in the FBI Denver Division's 

leadership. This DHS official said that it would be more useful if the meetings 

were more consistent and provided both an overview of terrorism threats and 

specific cases. An official from the Colorado Division of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Management also said that he would like more strategic analysis of 

emerging threats, and that this type of information would assist him in his 

duties for the state of Colorado. 

Although the DOJ OIG recognizes that some level of flexibility is needed 

to accommodate local needs, we believe the FBI should ensure that the JTTF 

Executive Board meetings across FBI field divisions consistently approach 

sharing information, which may well improve attendance at the meetings. 

Therefore, the DOJ OIG recommends that the FBI identify the structure and 

content of JTTF Executive Board meetings that would give attendees the most 

meaningful information on a consistent basis. The FBI should then inform 

field divisions to use this structure and content, perhaps as a template, at a 

minimum when planning their JTTF Executive Board meetings. 

12. Require FBI field divisions to stress to participating agencies the 

importance of designating an individual and an alternate to serve as their 

representatives to the JTTF Executive Board, as well as of regularly 

attending the meetings. 

13. Ensure FBI field divisions encourage agencies that do not participate 

on the JTTF, including first responders, to attend JTTF Executive Board 

Meetings. 

14. Identify an appropriate structure and content of JTTF Executive 

Board meetings that FBI field divisions should use at a minimum when 

conducting these meetings. 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (AT A C) 

In 2001, the Attorney General established the ATAC program. As part of 

this program, each USAO designated an ATAC Coordinator to help enhance the 

nation's counterterrorism efforts. Each USAO also formed a committee 

comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and often 

pertinent public health and safety and security officials from private industry. 

The program has three primary functions, including: (1) convening the ATAC 

(or committee) to facilitate counterterrorism efforts and information sharing in 

their communities; (2) supporting the investigative efforts of the JTTFs; and (3) 

27 
106 

facilitating counterterrorism information sharing between DOJ field and 

headquarters components regarding threats, litigation, criminal enforcement, 

intelligence, and training. Each USAO was required to complete an ATAC Plan 

that defined how each office implemented the ATAC Program, and each USAO 

is supposed to update its plan every 6 months.26 

Beginning at a March 2010 ATAC training event and continuing 

thereafter at training events, the ATAC National Program Coordinator 

instructed the ATAC Coordinators to coordinate their efforts with other entities 

within their jurisdiction to reduce duplication as it pertained to convening the 

committee to share counterterrorism information. For example, the USAO may 

not need to maintain its own distribution list for sharing counterterrorism 

information if the fusion center provides the primary information sharing 

responsibilities for national security matters within the district. Nonetheless, 

the USAO must remain a full-time participant with the agencies leading 

counterterrorism information sharing efforts and be willing to certify that the 

USAO is actively engaged in information sharing. Similarly, if the JTTF in the 

USAO's district conducts effective meetings and trainings that include the 

same law enforcement partners as the ATAC, then the USAO is not required to 

conduct duplicative ATAC meetings or trainings. However, the ATAC 

Coordinator should have a substantial role in developing the agenda, 

presenting information, and participating in the JTTF meeting or training. 

To assess the USAOs' efforts to reduce the potential duplication between 

ATAC meetings and those of their partners, the DOJ OIG reviewed the 2006 

and the most recent version of the ATAC plans for the USAOs located within 

eight FBI field division jurisdictions. 27 The DOJ OIG found that half of the 

USAOs' ATAC Plans had not been updated for nearly 10 years (from the initial 

submission in 2006 until the DOJ OIG requested them). As a result, the DOJ 

OIG was unable to determine the evolution of the ATACs and the USAOs' 

efforts to reduce the potentially unnecessary duplication of counterterrorism 

information sharing. 

26 The ATAC Plan sets forth required objectives that must be achieved in each district. These objectives 

include defining the duties and responsibilities of the ATAC Coordinator and other USAO personnel who 

assist on counterterrorism matters, ensuring that the USAO has established a mechanism for effectively 

distributing time-sensitive information throughout the district, outlining collaboration between the ATAC 

Coordlnator and DOJ's National Security Division, and ensuring the USAO has a plan for convening the 

ATAC. 

27 We requested the most recent ATAC Plans for the USAOs located in the headquarter cities of the FBI 

field divisions we visited. The ATAC Plans for six of the USAOs were dated September 2015, one was 

dated April 2013, and one was not dated. We did not speak to the ATAC Coordinators about the plans 

because we were not informed of them until after our site visits. 

28 
107 

In addition, the DOJ OIG found that several of the most recent ATAC 

Plans indicated fewer ATAC meetings being held or a consolidation of ATAC 

meetings with JTTF Executive Board meetings (the latter of which might or 

might not be consistent with the instructions to increase coordination and 

reduce duplication). Moreover, based on the review of attendance rosters, the 

DOJ OIG determined that, in general, representatives from the USAOs 

regularly attended JTTF Executive Board meetings within the eight FBI field 

divisions visited, and that the ATAC Coordinators said they participated in the 

meetings. 

Given the progression of other counterterrorism information sharing 

efforts by other field-based entities, it is recommended that DOJ assess the 

ATAC program and ensure that the purpose of the ATAC meetings are not 

duplicative of other counterterrorism information sharing partner initiatives 

and are used in the most effective manner. For instance, instead of holding 

separate ATAC meetings, USAOs could be committed to fully participating in 

the JTTF Executive Board meetings and fusion center meetings, thereby 

standardizing the ATACs' roles and reducing possible duplication of efforts. 

Following this evaluation, the DOJ should ensure that each USAO updates its 

ATAC plan accordingly and that the plans are updated as required by the 

program. 

15. Ensure that each USAO updates its ATAC Plan as required by the 

program. 

16. Evaluate the ATAC program to ensure the purpose of the ATAC 

meetings is not duplicative of other counterterrorism information sharing 

partner initiatives and is used in the most effective manner. 

FBI Threat Review and Prioritization 

The FBI Directorate of Intelligence implemented the Threat Review and 

Prioritization (TRP) process to assess, triage, and prioritize threats. The TRP 

process was designed to integrate intelligence and operations to provide a 

construct that synchronizes prioritization between FBI headquarters and field 

divisions. FBI field divisions use FBI National Threat Priorities and nationallevel mitigation strategies developed by FBI headquarters in completing their 

individual TRP process. 

According to FBI policy, appropriate representatives from the USAO must 

be invited to participate in the TRP process. Officials from the USAOs the team 

visited said that USAO representatives participate in the TRP process and 

29 
108 

believe the USAOs being involved in this process is beneficial. For example, an 

ATAC Coordinator from one of the USAOs visited said that she attended TRP 

meetings, and it helped her to understand the FBI's priorities and thought 

processes, which enhanced the USAO's awareness of the threat environment in 

the area. In addition, she said that she believes having the USAO participate in 

the TRP adds credibility to the TRP process and shows the FBI that the USAO 

cares about its issues. 

Although not required by FBI policy, FBI SACs in two of the field 

divisions the team visited said that JTTF task force officers and other partner 

agencies participate in the TRP process. For example, the SAC for the FBI 

Denver Division said that the Denver Police Department attends the annual 

TRP meeting. Similarly, the SAC for the FBI Houston Division said that the 

USAO and JTTF task force officers participate in the TRP process. Further, he 

said that there would be a benefit to have even more agencies participate in the 

TRP process. However, some JTTF task force officers in the locations the teams 

visited said that they did not participate in the TRP meetings. 

The DOJ OIG believes that it is important for the FBI to obtain its 

partners' input regarding the threats and mitigation strategies for the region. 

As a result, we recommend that the FBI direct FBI field divisions to identify 

and invite key stakeholders to TRP sessions. 

The DOJ OIG also noted differences as to the individuals and entities 

with whom FBI field divisions shared their TRP results and, specifically, their 

prioritization of threats in their regions. For example, the FBI Boston Division 

shared its TRP outcomes with the command staff of the fusion center and the 

JTTF task force officer home agencies. In contrast, in the FBI Houston Division 

the JTTF task force officers who participate in the TRP process are responsible 

for providing such information to the management of their home agencies. 

The results of the FBI's TRP process could provide important information 

to the FBI's counterterrorism information sharing partners. For example, the 

SAC for the FBI Houston Division said that there could be value in sharing the 

TRP results with JTTF Executive Board members, as well as the Texas 

Homeland Security Advisor. Similarly, the Homeland Security Advisor for the 

state of Colorado said that he believed it would be helpful to obtain the FBI 

Denver Division's TRP results for both the Denver area and the state of 

Colorado. As such, the DOJ OIG recommends that the FBI determine with 

whom it could share its counterterrorism-related TRP results and implement a 

process by which it shares counterterrorism TRP results with the appropriate 

partners on a systemic and regular basis. 

30 
109 

I 7. Direct FBI field divisions to identify and invite key stakeholders to 

TRP sessions. 

18. Determine the agencies with which it should share its 

counterterrorism-related TRP results and implement a process to ensure 

the TRP results are appropriately shared with those agencies on a 

systemic and regular basis. 

ODNI Field Based Elements Support to Counterterrorism Information 

Sharing 

The ODNI has two programs focused on the fteld-based 

sharing of counterterrorism information: the Domestic DNI 

Representative (DDNIR) program and the NCTC Domestic 

Representative program. The OIGs found that although the 

DDNIR program has gained momentum and progress has 

been made, the program is hindered by large geographic 

regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and 

guidance for it to reach its full potential. The OIGs found 

that the NCTC Domestic Representative program, although 

well received in the field, has also struggled to sufficiently 

cover its regions. 

The Domestic DNI Representative Program 

The DDNIR program plays a role in facilitating the sharing of 

counterterrorism information. A November 2011 Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA), "Domestic Director of National Intelligence Representatives," governs 

the DDNIR program between the ODNI and the FBI under Intelligence 

Community Directive 402, "Director of National Intelligence Representatives." 

31 
110 

Domestic DNI Regions- The Director of National Intelligence and the FBI 

launched the DDNIR program in February 2012 and designated 12 FBI 

executives as DDN!Rs. As shown in the map below, the DDN!Rs are the 

Assistant Directors in Charge of Los Angeles, New York, and Washington DC, 

and the SACs of Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Miami, 

Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Seattle, with each representative being 

responsible for covering a designated geographic region. 28 

Domestic DNi ReJpreserltaltive Program 

Hturunghl;t!IL Al J<tdt~Mwdlt!, FL Bai!JHlOii>, MD N.wlllk, NJ l'11IIIa11ii,OR lloollltlfl, TX 

1\nchmaoe. AK Tampa, FL Bo$1on. MA AltlltltiCl\llW, NM Ph!ladolrl!~a. PA San Antoruo, TX 

Phmuu. Al A1lanla. GA OelwH, Ml Albany, NY i'Hisboryh, PA Sai!Lak• Cily, UT 

ltHh• Hhck. AK HunnhBu, HI Mmneapotis, MN Buflal>. NY San.Juan, PR Norfolk, VA 

Sacramento, CA Ctnc-ago,ll Jatk.."'On, MS New York, NY (;O{UOib!8,5!; H.ICilfJl(mtJ,VA 

Silllf rancJS:CQ, CA swtogll<ld, IL Kansas Ctty. MO Gh&lotttt, NC KnoxVIHa, TN Seattlt;,WA 

fh:nvm, CO lmhanapoh~. lN Slloms.,MO Cincinnati, OH Memplll•. TN M!lwookoe,WI 

New Haven. CT lOUISvdJe, KY omaha. NE Clmroland,OH llaHa<;, TX 

Wash!fl!l1oo, DC New Orlr«fl"', LA t as VeQ<'IS, NV Oklatwrna City. OK fl r,..,, TX 

28 The O!Gs were unable to find any documentation describing how the selection of the initial DDNIR 

locations were determined. However, officials familiar with the history of the program told us the regions 

were originally selected by identifying cities with a large presence of multiple IC elements. 

32 
111 

The DHS Chief Intelligence Officer designated the I &A regional directors 

to serve as the DHS senior field representatives to the DDNIR program in 

specified geographic regions. I&A regional directors serve as the DHS focal 

point for all engagements with the DDNIR program. They maintain awareness 

of all DDNIR or ODNI staff visits to DHS components in their specified 

geographic region, coordinate actions with affected elements of the DHS 

Intelligence Enterprise, share program-related data, and work collaboratively 

with the U.S. Coast Guard national intelligence element to support its 

interaction with DDNIRs and ensure unity of effort and consistency in 

departmental messaging of DHS activities. While in some regions DHS 

Intelligence Enterprise field personnel participate in the program, the DDNIR is 

not authorized to task DHS components that are not elements of the I C. The 

scope of the DDNIR's authorities extends only to those DHS components that 

are elements of the lC: I&A and the U.S. Coast Guard's intelligence and 

counterintelligence elements. 

Domestic DNI Quarterly Meetings - DDNIRs hold quarterly meetings with 

the IC representatives in their region to help foster collaboration, effective 

partnerships, and integration of the IC team in the domestic field. Quarterly 

meetings generally focus on a particular threat or issue that is of interest to the 

region.29 To help ensure that the DDNlR program meetings are productive and 

support the primary mission of the program, the FBI has incorporated metrics 

into its field division performance measures. To actively participate in the 

DDNIR program, FBI field divisions are required to complete a combination of 

the following activities: serve as lead on a DDNIR region product; chair a subgroup; substantively contribute to a sub-group or region product; host a 

quarterly meeting; and/ or complete a collaborative interagency action item. 

The OIGs found that the differing sizes of some of the 12 geographic 

regions cause challenges for some of the DDNIRs when conducting quarterly 

meetings. For example, the DDNIR for the Rocky Mountain Region is 

responsible for the coordination of nine states in his region. 30 The Program 

Coordinator within that region reported challenges in identifying DDNIR 

meeting topics because issues and threats throughout the region differ 

29 ODNI National Intelligence Managers and/or FBI Senior Intelligence Officers may travel to the 

quarterly meetings to provide threat briefings or relevant information. 

30 The DDNIR Rocky Mountain Region encompasses nine states and four FBI field divisions, including 

the Minneapolis Division (Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota), Salt Lake City Division (Idaho, 

Montana, and Utah), Denver Division (Wyoming and Colorado), and the Albuquerque Division (New 

Mexico). In terms of geographic territory, the Salt Lake City Division, Minneapolis Division, and the 

Denver Division are the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th largest territories in the FBI, respectively, trailing only the 

Anchorage Division (Alaska), making for an immense territory within the DDNIR Rocky Mountain Region. 

33 
112 

considerably.Jl When her team surveyed meeting attendees for discussion 

topics, they often received no input. 

In contrast, in the much smaller Northeast Region, the DDNIR found it 

easier to collaborate and plan meetings because he was close to the other SACs 

in his region and the field divisions have similar interests. According to the 

DDNIR for the Northeast Region, it is difficult for larger regions that are more 

geographically dispersed to collaborate and find commonality on topics. 

According to officials with whom the IC IG spoke, the DNI had originally 

considered designating all heads of the 56 FBI field divisions as DDNIRs, which 

would have made the domestic program more closely resemble the overseas 

DNI representative program in which all CIA Chiefs of Station are designated as 

DNI representatives. Others with whom the team spoke, such as a former ISAIPC chair, felt the idea had merit, stating that he never understood why some 

SACs are designated as representatives and others are not. In contrast, a 

senior FBI official currently assigned to the ODNI expressed the belief that 

having 56 DDN!Rs may not be practical given that there are many competing 

priorities within the FBI. 

The DHS OIG also discussed the geographical structure of the DDNIR 

program with I&A officials because Congress directed !&A to realign its field 

operations to the DDNIR Program regional construct.32 Effective November 

2014, !&A transitioned from 9 regions to the 12 DDNIR program regions. 

However, several !&A officials said they do not believe this structure makes 

sense for I&A. They expressed concern that conforming to the DDNIR regional 

construct hampered DHS' internal Unity of Effort message and that I&A should 

have realigned with other DHS regional constructs, in particular, FEMA 

regions. FEMA regions are well-established and already known by state and 

local entities that are primary customers for !&A field officials. DHS OIG 

concluded that should the DDNIR program modify its regional structure, I&A 

would likely be required to as well, thereby further impacting !&A personnel 

and resource allocation . 

. 3 l As part of the FBI implementation of the program, each of the 12 DDN!Rs has designated an analyst 

within their office to serve as a DDNIR Program Coordinator. These Program Coordinators, who are 

typically located in the field division's Field Intelligence Group, are responsible for the day-to-day 

operation of the program to include coordinating with the other FBI field divisions and IC elements in 

their region to develop the agendas for the quarterly meetings, arrange speakers, and conduct a variety of 

other administrative and logistical tasks associated with the program. In some regions, FBI field divisions 

have fu!l-time positions dedicated to the program coordinator role while in others it is a corollary duty. 

The role of the DDNIRs is an additional duty and DDNIRs do not receive any additional funding or 

personnel to execute their DDNIR responsibilities. 

32 Classified Annex to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L. 113-126). 

34 
113 

Per the MOA, the DNI and FBI may, through mutual agreement, add or 

remove AD!Cs or SACs as DDNIRs. While it may not be feasible to designate 

the heads of all 56 FBI field divisions as DDNIRs, in light of the current 

challenges posed by the large geographic regions, it may be feasible to 

designate some additional DDN!Rs to help improve counterterrorism 

information sharing and coordination within larger existing regions. The O!Gs 

recommend that the DNI, in coordination with the FBI, evaluate the existing 

DDNIR regional structure to ensure that regions are appropriately sized and 

defined to better align common areas of interest and geographic coordination 

among participating partners. 

Mission and Program Guidance The O!Gs found that the DDNIR 

program lacks in-depth guidance and a well-defined strategy for ensuring the 

program is well-understood and implemented consistently across regions. All 

DDN!Rs are required to attend a four-hour orientation at the ODNI before 

assuming their DDN!R role. However, we found that some of the DDN!Rs want 

more guidance and clarification on what the DN! expects them to do. 33 

The O!Gs also found that the objectives of the program had not been 

clearly communicated to the !C-member representatives. According to the 

DDNIR Southeast Region's October 2014 semi-annual report, despite 

messaging from ODNI and FBI leadership regarding the importance of the 

program, many of the participants in the region continue to express 

uncertainty as to the purpose of the DDNIR program and regional integration. 34 

For example, one official who regularly attended meetings in the DDN!R 

Southeast Region stated that if the objective of the program is to "foster 

relationships," then the program is working well; but if the goal of the program 

is to collaborate on regional issues and produce a regional product, then the 

program is not succeeding. The DDNIR Southeast Region's October 2014 semiannual report also noted that many of the region's partners have few or no 

analytic resources, and that for many, the analysis is conducted at the 

headquarters level. 

33 Similarly, the Congressionally directed 1 Review Commission found in their March 2015 report, 

"The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the Century/ that the DDNIR program is experiencing 

"growing pains," and that, "It is not well defined by the ODNl or well understood by the ADICs und SACs 

who serve in this Some confusion stems from the question of which functions the ADfC/SAC is 

performing for the as opposed to performing as part of his/her FBI responsibilities, because the 

stakeholder groups arc not the same. Most AOICs/SACs understand that the Domestic DNI 

Representative role is to lead coordination, but are not clear what should be coordinated, and to what 

encL AD!Cs/SACs did not believe that had adequate guidance on how to manage the Domestic DNI 

Representative responsibilities beyond own field office's geographic area, given that some of the 12 

regions are quite large," 

34 Each DDNIR is required to submit to the DNI semi-annual updates on the DDNIR's evaluations and 

recommendations of DNI policies and procedures and IC perfOrmance. 

35 
114 

In reviewing the DDNIR quarterly meeting agendas and minutes, the 

DOJ OIG found that the meetings are generally maturing in structure and 

detail and that the depth of content covered has increased.35 However, in some 

regions, the DDNIR quarterly meetings were seen primarily as networking 

opportunities where various officials also were invited to give topical 

presentations. In other regions, the DDN!Rs were more involved in proactively 

establishing joint working groups and sub-working groups to address areas of 

common concern within the region ranging from border security to threats 

involving the oil and gas industry and ISIL. 

At an annual meeting in May 2015, FBI Director Corney and DNI Clapper 

directed the DDN!Rs to examine the Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) threat 

associated with ISIL in each of their regions in order to identify key intelligence 

gaps. The product was due October 31, 2015. However, specific guidance and 

project expectations were not provided to the DDN!Rs until July 2015, which 

the DOJ OIG and IC IG were told resulted in significant confusion and wasted 

effort. According to an official from the ODNI's Office of Partner Engagement, 

most of the DDNIR regions produced External Intelligence Notes, which involve 

a much longer turn-around time due to various FBI requirements. This official 

said that by the time the products were available, the information was no 

longer valid or helpful to inform the DNI and FBI Director on emerging trends. 

Although this assignment provided a good opportunity to highlight interagency 

cooperation and further maturation of the DDNIR program in order to identify 

existing ISIL challenges at the regional level, the O!Gs believe that this instance 

highlights the need for the program to have explicit and timely guidance on 

specific tasks. Although the DDNIR program needs to be sufficiently flexible to 

adapt to each region's issues and culture, clarifying guidance as to the 

intended outcomes of the meetings, as well as the roles and responsibilities of 

partners would be beneficial. Therefore, the O!Gs recommend that the ODNI, 

in coordination with the FBI, develop and disseminate to IC-member partners 

more guidance and a strategy for ensuring the DDNIR program is implemented 

consistently across regions. 

In addition to the need for more guidance, the O!Gs noted that the 

original MOA, signed in 2011, is outdated and no longer reflects the current 

state of the program. Moreover, the MOA does not provide guidance on the 

35 The DOJ OIG reviewed DDNJR meeting agendas and minutes for each of the DDNJR regions since the 

program's 2012 implementation, as well as copies of the briefings and presentations conducted during 

these meetings. 

36 
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inclusion of non-IC members, such as state and local entities, in the DDNIR 

Program.36 

In that regard, according to one regional representative, the DDN!Rs 

should be better leveraging other partners, including fusion centers, state and 

local law enforcement, and the private sector. In his October 2014 semiannual report to the ODNI, the former DDNIR for the Central Region indicated 

that he believed that incorporating both IC and non-IC members into the 

DDNIR process would encourage greater participation and exhibit trust in 

regional partners, which builds confidence in domestic intelligence collection, 

analysis, and reporting. The DDNIR for the Central Region suggested that 

perhaps the quarterly meetings should be expanded to two days-with one day 

for federal partners to meet and a second day for the DDNIR to meet with 

fusion center personnel. Conversely, DHS officials expressed varied opinions 

on the inclusion ofnon-IC partners in the program. The IC IG believes that 

non-IC partners may provide valuable information and perspective regarding 

the regional threat environment and recommend that the DNI, in coordination 

with the FBI, evaluate the regional structure and issue additional guidance, 

and explore the feasibility of also incorporating non-IC members into the 

DDNIR program in an appropriate fashion. 

with the FBI: 

19. Evaluate the existing DDNIR regional structure, in consultation with 

!&A, to ensure that regions are appropriately sized and defined to provide 

common areas of interest and geographic coordination among 

participating partners. 

20. Develop and disseminate to IC-member partners additional guidance 

and a strategy for ensuring the DDNIR program is implemented 

consistently across regions and update the 2011 Memorandum of 

Agreement to more accurately reflect the current state of the program. 

21. Evaluate the feasibility of incorporating non-IC members into the 

DDNIR program in an appropriate fashion. 

36 The Congressionally-directed 9/ II Review Commission in their March 2015 report, "The FBI: 

Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century," stated that the ODNI and FBI provide policy guidance on 

how state and local law enforcement and other non-Title 50 elements in the Homeland can legally and 

appropriately intersect with the Intelligence Community via the DDNIRs, 

37 
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The NCTC Domestic Representative Program 

NCTC's Domestic Representative Program was established through an 

MOU with the FBI. Currently, there are NCTC Domestic Representatives 

stationed at 11 locations across the United States. These representatives serve 

as the front-line liaison for the Director of NCTC with regional IC agencies and 

counterterrorism officials at the federal, state, and local levels. NCTC Domestic 

Representatives typically sit in FBI spaces and have a wide-range of job duties. 

One of their primary responsibilities is to deliver tailored counterterrorismrelated intelligence support to a range of customers in the region, including FBI 

field divisions; regional FBI Field Intelligence Groups and JTTFs; DHS 

elements; local police; and other federal, state, and local entities. In addition, 

the NCTC representatives act as a liaison between NCTC and FBI field elements 

and between NCTC and the regional police departments by facilitating 

collaboration to enable the targeting, collection, processing, and reporting of 

targets of mutual interest. The NCTC retains primary control of the 

representatives and is responsible for covering the costs of all salary and 

official travel expenses. 

The NCTC representative program has domestic representatives in 11 

major cities across the country. Each representative is responsible for 

providing coverage to a distinct geographic region that aligns in some but not 

all of the regions covered by the 12 DDNIRs. DDNIRs and NCTC 

representatives are in the same locations, except in Pittsburgh, which has a 

DDNIR but not an NCTC representative. The geographic regions covered by the 

DDNIRs and the NCTC representatives differ in the Washington, DC, Chicago, 

Denver, and Seattle regions. 

NCTC Domestic Representative Regions 

38 
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NCTC Representative Coverage - NCTC representatives frequently travel 

throughout their regions to perform their duties. Several representatives told 

the O!Gs that they struggle to provide sufficient coverage for their region. For 

example, according to the NCTC representative in Los Angeles, his biggest 

challenge is the sheer number of customers he is responsible for supporting, 

which includes the FBI, DHS, fusion centers, and state and local entities 

dispersed across the three FBI field divisions (Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Las 

Vegas) that his area of responsibility encompasses. Accordingly, he must 

carefully pick and choose his engagements and make time to visit the more 

distant offices in Phoenix and Las Vegas. 

Similarly, the NCTC representative in Atlanta, whose region covers five 

states, seven FBI field divisions, and five state fusion centers, told the OIGs 

that she would like to visit the major port cities-Charleston, Savannah, and 

Mobile-and other cities in her region, such as Memphis and Raleigh more 

frequently. Even the NCTC representative in Boston, whose area of 

responsibility includes six states relatively easy to visit by car-Connecticut, 

Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont-stated 

that his principal challenge was finding the time to adequately support all six 

states and not wanting to turn down opportunities when asked to provide 

support. 

In light of the regional differences between the NCTC Representative 

program and the DDNIR program, the DOJ OIG and IC OIG received feedback 

for the need for additional NCTC representatives. For instance, the DOJ OIG 

talked to the SAC in the FBI Pittsburgh Division who said that the NCTC 

representatives were an invaluable resource for their intelligence expertise and 

training and that having an NCTC representative would enhance collaboration 

in the area. The NCTC representative for New York (whose area of 

responsibility currently includes Pittsburgh) agreed that it might make sense to 

assign an NCTC representative to Pittsburgh but stated that the workload in 

Pittsburgh was lighter than in New York, and that NCTC might be better served 

by adding a representative in New York. 

According to the NCTC representative for New York, the New York area 

generates enough work for two representatives, and one representative could 

stay fully occupied solely supporting the New York JTTF. If an NCTC 

representative were to be assigned to Pittsburgh, the NCTC representative for 

New York suggested that person could assume responsibility for some of the 

area of responsibility that currently falls within the NCTC representative for 

Chicago's region. 

Another location that we were told should receive consideration for the 

assignment of an NCTC representative is Detroit. Currently, the NCTC 

representative for Chicago also has responsibility for Detroit but has difficulty 

providing adequate coverage because the area of responsibility is so large. It 

was suggested to the IC IG that the workload might be more manageable if 

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118 

Chicago were to have its own NCTC representative and new representatives 

were added to cover the region outside of Chicago. An NCTC representative 

told the lC IG that she has heard from USAOs and other officials in the 

Midwest that they would like to establish closer relationships with and have 

more access to NCTC representatives. 

As the OIGs conducted their fieldwork, they observed that some NCTC 

representative regions and the FBI Field divisions they support had more 

counterterrorism activity than others. For example, the NCTC representative 

for Denver explained that her region has less activity, which has impacted 

negatively her ability to obtain briefers from NCTC Headquarters to support her 

customers. Similarly, the NCTC representative for Miami estimated that she 

spends 85 to 90 percent of her time supporting the FBI Miami Division. Due to 

the FBI Miami Division's demands for her time, the NCTC representative for 

Miami had not yet had an opportunity to visit the FBI or state and local entities 

in Jacksonville, or the primary Florida Fusion Center in Tallahassee. 

NCTC Representatives' Reception in the Field- During field visits, the 

OIGs received positive feedback on the contributions that the NCTC 

representatives are making to the FBI field divisions (e.g., one FBI field division 

stated that it would like to obtain an additional representative) and the Fusion 

Centers with respect to their role in furthering the sharing of counterterrorism 

information. NCTC representatives attend weekly FBI JTTF meetings, as well 

as quarterly JTTF Executive Board and DDNIR meetings where they brief on 

current threats and counterterrorism products. They provide case support 

ranging from conducting name traces through NCTC's Operations Center to 

arranging deeper dives on subjects of FBI investigations. 

In addition, NCTC representatives request and coordinate on-site 

briefings and trainings by NCTC Headquarters subject matter experts on topics 

of interest, such as the Terrorist Screening Center and the Terrorist Identities 

Datamart Environment and their capabilities. NCTC representatives are highly 

valued for their ability to send information from the FBI field divisions directly 

to NCTC leadership. 

NCTC representatives also work closely with I&A field personnel in their 

regions.37 For example, the NCTC representative for Houston stated that his 

37 I&A serves as the IC's lead conduit to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. According to the 

Memorandum of Understanding behveen the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, 

and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing, no analytic conclusions of 

any covered entity shall be disseminated to state, local, or private sector officials, or to the public, without 

the prior approval of the Secretary of Homeland Security, his designee, or in accordance with approval 

mechanisms established by the Secretary except in exigent circumstances. 

40 
119 

best set of customers are the !&A intelligence officers at the fusion centers. 

The NCTC representative for San Francisco also explained that she collaborates 

with the !&A intelligence officers at the Northern California Regional 

Intelligence Center, the State Threat Assessment Center, and Central California 

Intelligence Center to conduct joint briefings for the Fusion Center Terrorism 

Liaison Officer program. 

The majority of !&A field officials the team interviewed said that the 

NCTC representatives serve as force-multipliers and that they complement the 

l&A intelligence officers as the representatives are in similar positions as 

themselves, "armies of one" alone in areas without field offices. Many !&A field 

officials conduct joint briefings with the NCTC representatives because the 

representatives have different access and provide greater insight into IC 

processes. Overall, both I&A field officials and NCTC representatives seem to 

value these joint briefings as they present "one government voice" to state and 

locals. However, there are some within I&A who are concerned about mission 

overlap. As the NCTC representative program continues to mature, further 

clarification of its roles and responsibilities and formalized coordination with 

l&A field officials will continue to be essential to avoid any potential duplication 

of effort or conflicting lines of inquiry. 

Recommendation: The IC IG recommends that the Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center: 

22. Consider assigning additional NCTC representatives to the field 

and/ or revising the existing territorial regions, potentially to align with 

the DNI domestic regions, to ensure effective NCTC representation within 

the domestic field. 

41 
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Fusion Centers 

State and local entities own and operate fusion centers, but 

to develop and mature into the best partners, they depend 

on direct support and funding from federal agencies. Fusion 

centers also receive grant funding from FEMA indirectly; 

however, FEMA cannot identify how much funding fusion 

centers receive and spend on counterterrorism efforts. 

Based on self-reported data from fusion centers, direct 

federal expenditures for fusion centers are decreasing and 

state and local expenditures are increasing. Finally, the 

majority of state and local officials told DHS OIG that rather 

than enhancing and maturing their capabilities, given the 

unpredictability of resources, they are focused on sustaining 

operations. 

Federal Investment and Support to Fusion Centers 

According to the 2007 NSIS, state and major urban area fusion centers 

are vital assets to sharing terrorism-related information. Because fusion 

centers are state and locally owned and operated, federal influence to develop 

and mature fusion centers into the best potential partners depends on direct 

support and grant funding. 

In June 2011, the PM-ISE issued the Federal Resource Allocation 

Criteria (RAC) Policy, which provides objective criteria for federal agencies to 

use when making resource allocation decisions to fusion centers. According to 

the RAC Policy, federal agencies will prioritize federal resource allocation in the 

following order: primary fusion centers, recognized fusion centers, and 

nodes.38 Entities within each category must meet certain criteria for federal 

entities to continue their prioritization. 

To guide federal resource allocation, the Federal RAC Policy 

Implementation Guidance, published in September 2014, offers best practices 

and recommendations about how to better develop, implement, and adhere to 

the Federal RAC Policy. 

38 Each state, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territory may have one primary fusion center designated 

by the Governor or equivalent A recognized fusion center is any designated fusion center, including 

major urban area fusion centers, not designated as a primary fusion center. Nodes refer to criminal 

intelligence units, real-time crime analysis centers, and other law enforcement or homeland security 

analytic centers that have not been designated as fusion centers by state governments. 

42 
121 

!&A is required to provide the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

and the PM-ISE an annual inventory of all federal funding and personnel 

dedicated to the National Network of Fusion Centers. Direct federal 

expenditures are primarily salaries and benefits for federal personnel assigned 

to or directly supporting fusion centers, but also include federal information 

technology systems deployed to fusion centers, security clearances sponsored 

by federal agencies, and training and other resources specifically intended to 

help fusion centers build and sustain capabilities. The majority of fusion 

centers occupy space with other federal, state, or local agencies, resulting in 

commingled operating costs. Therefore, it is difficult to identifY the total cost of 

fusion centers to the federal government because agency support serves 

multiple functions and purposes. For example, for the 14 fusion centers 

collocated with the FBI, providing access to IT systems may not be an 

additional cost to the FBI as their installation and maintenance would occur 

regardless of the presence of the fusion center. In addition, supporting a 

fusion center may be a part-time or collateral duty for DHS and DOJ 

personnel. Table 7 below provides the federal personnel support levels as 

reported to I&A for its annual inventory; Table 8 denotes whether those staff 

provided full- or part-time support to fusion centers as gathered by !&A. These 

numbers reflect a decline in total federal personnel support to fusion centers 

and of those personnel, fewer are full-time than when the reporting of such 

information began in FY 20 11. 

T a bl e 7: Fe d er al Personne lS upport to Fus on c enters, 20112014 - .. ~ 

2011 272 125 -- 397 

2012 246 124 -- 370 

2013 258 122 10 390 

2014 241 116 9 366 

Source: 2011 and 2012 Federal Cost Inventory and 2013 and 2014 Natwnal Network of 

Fusion Centers Final Reports 

Within its 2014 report on the National Network of Fusion Centers, !&A 

identified three significant challenges associated with collecting, validating, and 

analyzing federal investment data: 

43 
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1. Funding to support fusion centers is generally not a budget line item for 

most federal departments and agencies, so collecting and reporting 

investment data requires significant time and effort. 

2. Some department and agency field offices directly support fusion centers 

at the field level, but the existence and extent of this support is not 

frequently shared with headquarters elements. 

3. For those departments and agencies with organizationally separate 

operations and intelligence units or functions, one unit may engage with 

fusion centers without the knowledge of the other. 

In addition to direct federal support, DHS indirectly provides grant 

funding to fusion centers through FEMA's Homeland Security Grant Program 

(HSGP). 39 However, FEMA cannot identify how much grant funding fusion 

centers receive and spend on counterterrorism efforts. Fusion centers do not 

directly receive HSGP funding but instead apply for funding and request 

reimbursements from the state. The governor-appointed State Administrative 

Agency applies for and administers HSGP funds. FEMA grant guidance simply 

requires that of the 25 percent of grant funding set aside for "law enforcement 

terrorism prevention activities," a portion must go to fund fusion centers; state 

and local governments determine that portion from year to year. The majority 

of interviewed state and local officials involved in the process said they would 

prefer that fusion centers be a specific line item in state and local budgets or 

FEMA grant requirements. 

FEMA currently tracks grant funding through self-reported data received 

through state-submitted investment justifications and Biannual Strategy 

Implementation Reports. FEMA relies on states to appropriately and 

consistently categorize funding for all fusion center projects, but as GAO noted 

in a November 2014 report, this data is unreliable.40 GAO reported cases in 

which projects supported broader capabilities not directly related to fusion 

centers, as well as some that did not specifically support center operations. 

For example, one grantee reported $14 million given to a fusion center for 

automated license plate readers and video surveillance equipment, although 

the fusion center was one of a number of system users. 

39 Fusion centers may receive HSGP funding through HSGP's State Homeland Security Program and 

Urban Areas Security Initiative. 

40 Government Accountability Office: Information Sharing: DHS is Assessing Fusion Center Capabilities 

and Results. but Need to More Accurately Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers (GA0-15-155) 

(November 2014). 

44 
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Further complicating accurate accounting is FEMA's 3-year performance 

cycle under which fusion centers can spend up to 3 years of grant funding at 

any given time. Although the 3-year performance cycle is beneficial and 

welcomed by grant recipients, it makes it difficult to determine the portion of 

funds that has been expended each grant year. In addition, each of the 12 

states DHS OIG visited operates on different fiscal year calendars than DHS; 

only the District of Columbia follows DHS' fiscal year calendar. 

Based on self-reported data from fusion centers during the annual 

assessment process, direct federal expenditures for fusion centers are 

decreasing and state and local expenditures are increasing. In addition to 

decreased direct federal expenditures, the total amount of FEMA HSGP funding 

available for which U.S. states and territories may apply and thus may 

distribute to fusion centers has declined since its overall peak in FY 2010 as 

shown in Figure 1 below. 

Figure 1: Total HSOP Funding Available for which States and Territories May 

_ ~P!)!Y. .. ~~ FY 2009 to FY 201§ ___ _ 

1$2,000,000,000 'i . 1$1,800,000,000 r --. ____ _ 

1

$1,600,000,000 t· 

$1,400.000.000 r·----

!

.$1,200,000,000 1- ---- $1,000,000,000 I I $800,000,000 ·1--------= I 

I $400.000.000 

$6QO,OOO,OOO ·t _E · 

__ _ · J' 

' $200,000,0~: ·=· ----------- 1 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 I 2015 I 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of FEMA data 

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Although the total level of grant funding made available by FEMA has 

decreased, state and local agencies reported expending about 41 percent more 

grant funding on fusion centers in FY 2014 than in FY 2011. This is generally 

indicative of state and local governments' commitment to fusion centers, which 

are considered valuable, worthwhile investments. As a result of this 

commitment by the state and local agencies that own and operate fusion 

centers, fusion centers are in a better position to sustain capabilities. Table 9 

below displays sources of funding to fusion centers as reported by fusion 

centers. 

Table 9: Sources of 

Direct Federal 

Expenditures 

Federal Grants 

Expended by State, 

Local, Territorial, 

and Tribal 

$97,456,195 

$52,258,930 

Source: DHS OIG Analysis of DHS Data 

11-FY 201441 

$76,888,662" $69,653,432 

$71,219,656 $65,231,769 

$0 $100,25fi 

$57,000 $153,658 

41 Data for FY 2015 was not available at the time of this draft report. 

42 Federal grant, State, and local expenditure data for 60 of 72 fusion centers. 

$68,216,940 

$73,499,366 

$0 

$860,307 

43 Federal grant, State, local, territorial, tribal, and private sector expenditure data for the 77 fusion 

centers designated at the time. 

44 These estimates are from the 2011 Federal Cost Inventory and reflect only costs for the 72 fusion 

centers designated at the time; Federal staff costs are estimated. 

45 SLTI Government Fiscal Year varies and may include multiple-year grant awards. 

46 SLTI Government Fiscal Year varies and may include multiple-year grant awards. 

46 
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Although increased state and local funding is a positive development, 

there are some concerns related to a decrease in federal funding. With DHS 

support decreasing, DHS may lose oversight and influence over fusion centers. 

Only fusion centers receiving FEMA grant funding must participate in DHS 

annual assessments of fusion centers. In recent years, Alaska, for instance, 

has not used FEMA grants to fund its fusion center and has declined to 

participate in the annual assessment process. Although DHS officials have 

worked with Alaska to ensure its participation in the assessment process for 

the time being, without a link to grant funding, DHS lacks enforcement 

capability. 

In addition, fusion centers utilizing FEMA grant funds must meet !&A 

requirements, such as conducting exercises and addressing resulting corrective 

actions, developing privacy policies, and completing annual training. These 

requirements establish standards for the national network and hold fusion 

centers more accountable to the public. Although all 78 fusion centers have 

complied with the requirement examples above aimed at the development and 

maturation of the national network, fusion centers losing or choosing not to 

accept FEMA grant funding may cut some of these important programs and 

activities to cover other mission-essential areas. Further, one fusion center 

director said, "if DHS has no skin in the game, the state and locals will not give 

them anything." Fusion centers must balance the sometimes conflicting 

priorities of state and local partners providing more funding with those of the 

federal government. 

National Network Maturity Model 

DHS and DOJ worked together to establish fusion center guidelines for 

developing and operating a fusion center within a state or region. Additionally, 

they worked with fusion center leadership to outline four Critical Operational 

Capabilities (COC), which reflect the operational priorities of the National 

Network of Fusion Centers, and four Enabling Capabilities (EC), which provide 

a programmatic foundation for the fusion process. !&A is responsible for the 

annual fusion center assessments, which began in 2011, to measure individual 

fusion center compliance with the guidelines and achievement of the COCs and 

ECs. 

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In its last annual assessment in FY 2014, I&A determined the National 

Network of Fusion Centers had reached the "Emerging Stage" on the National 

Network Maturity Model, as shown in Figure 2. The Maturity Model is a 

multistage framework designed to evaluate and categorize the overall progress 

of the national network as a whole in achieving the COCs and ECs. The 

Maturity Model consists of 46 attributes aligned to the four distinct stages. For 

each stage, the community established an outcome-oriented, qualitative 

definition and aligned capability attributes based on each attribute's 

contribution to the defined outcome for that stage. The National Network 

advances through each of the four stages of the maturity model when 75 

percent of fusion centers achieve all of the attributes associated with that level. 

Figure 2: National Network Maturity Model 

FUNDAMENTAL 

Source: 2014 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 

48 
127 

At the Fundamental Stage, fusion centers across the National Network 

have approved plans, policies, or standard operating procedures for each of the 

four COCs and EC 1 (Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protections). At 

the Emerging Stage, the National Network has the systems, mechanisms, and 

processes needed to implement the plans, policies, or standard operating 

procedures and the COCs and ECs as a whole. At the Enhanced Stage, the 

National Network has the operational capability to produce products and 

provide services to federal, state, and local customers. Finally, at the Mature 

Stage, the National Network has the full capability to leverage the collective 

resources among individual fusion centers and adjust to both the changing 

threat environment and evolving requirements. Based on this model, the 

National Network is currently halfway through the stages to achieve maturity. 

However, the majority of state and local officials DHS OIG interviewed said 

given the unpredictability of resources allocated, fusion centers are focused on 

sustaining rather than enhancing operations and capabilities. 47 

Need to Coordinate Granting of Security Clearances 

Access to classified information, systems, and facilities is vital for the 

domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. State and local analysts at 

fusion centers require security clearances to receive classified information, and 

these clearances may be granted by multiple federal agencies, including DHS 

and the FBI. By Executive Order, all clearances granted to state and local 

personnel by one agency are to be accepted reciprocally by other agencies. 48 

However, DHS' and the FBI's various and sometimes differing requirements for 

obtaining clearances and accessing classified information can complicate this 

reciprocity. Without full coordination, these various requirements may lead to 

duplication of effort in conducting background investigations or gaps in 

information sharing due to the inability to access classified areas and attend 

meetings. Currently, there are no formal agreements among the federal 

partners on state and local security clearance reciprocity; such agreements 

might mitigate the effects of varying requirements and improve information 

sharing. 

For example, DHS OIG and DOJ OIG identified one instance at the New 

York State Intelligence Center (where some fusion center analysts are co4 7 Fusion centers categorize expenditures in five major areas: staff; information systems and technology; 

management and administration; training, technical assistance and exercise; and programmatic. In 

recent years, the greatest expenditure has been staff, an average of about 83 percent of total fusion center 

expenditures. 

48 Executive Order 13549 of August 18, 2010, Classified National Security Information Program for 

State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities. 

49 
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located with FBI personnel and systems) in which state and local 

representatives had difficulty accessing the FBI's "open storage areas." 

Specifically, in January 2015, the FBI revised its security policy to require 

Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI) and Top Secret clearances for 

individuals to have unescorted access to the FBI's open storage areas. As a 

result, fusion center personnel with Secret clearances granted by DHS had to 

be escorted into the FBI areas. After reviewing the situation, to meet 

information sharing and MOU requirements, the FBI agreed to waive the SSBI 

requirement for the New York State Intelligence Center. 

Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that DHS: 

23. Coordinate with the ODNI and FBI to develop and implement a 

strategy to efficiently and effectively provide security clearances and 

reciprocity to state and local personnel. 

National Mission Cell Initiative 

The National Mission Cell (NMC) concept was designed to help fusion 

centers fulfill their mission to support counterterrorism threat analysis and 

information sharing by standardizing and formalizing the processes for 

information collection, production, and dissemination. Personnel from the 

National Fusion Center Association, PM-ISE, DHS, and the FBI devised an 

NMC pilot program for four fusion centers, which ran from January 2014 

through July 2015. NMCs were intended to be small standardized cells of 

intelligence analysts within a fusion center, consisting of a limited number of 

existing personnel from DHS, the FBI, and state and local partners. The 

entities involved in conceptualizing the NMC believed the concept would 

advance federal counterterrorism efforts; enhance information sharing; 

advance fusion centers' intelligence capabilities and accelerate their maturity; 

and increase integration, interaction, coordination, and intelligence sharing 

within the fusion centers and with other partners. 

According to the FBI, it had witnessed significant maturation of the 

National Network of Fusion Centers with increased coordination, cooperation, 

and information sharing between FBI field offices and the fusion centers. At 

the same time, the threat from ISIL-inspired individuals and homegrown 

violent extremists had increased significantly. To address the threat, the FBI 

plans to enhance FBI field office engagement with fusion centers. l&A intends 

to remain fully engaged with and continue support to fusion centers. A new 

pilot phase will be conducted in six fusion centers, and the partner agencies 

will leverage their respective authorities and existing resources. 

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Conclusion 

Ensuring the United States is well-prepared to counter the threat of 

terrorism requires efficient and effective information sharing, The O!Gs found 

that components of the ODN!, DHS, and DOJ are committed to sharing 

counterterrorism information. However, we also believe that the components 

can more fully commit to and improve their practices in this arena. The 

numerous partners involved in this vital endeavor must fully understand each 

other's missions and have clearly defined roles and responsibilities at the 

federal, state, and local leveL Further, partners need to implement strong 

overall governance at the national level to ensure their field representatives 

fully embrace their roles according to the national strategy. Representatives in 

the field need to actively participate in information sharing forums, have access 

to information, and work in concert to leverage their resources and expertise 

and to expand their knowledge of national security threats, These 

improvements are paramount to national security partners effectively 

cooperating with each other to mitigate gaps and overlaps in sharing 

information, which is crucial to the United States' ability to prevent terrorist 

attacks. 

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APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE & METHODOLOGY 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary 

Committee requested that the Inspectors General (IG) of the Intelligence 

Community (I C), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of 

Justice (DOJ) conduct a performance audit of federally supported entities 

engaged in field-based domestic counterterrorism, homeland security, 

intelligence, and information-sharing activities in conjunction with state and 

local law enforcement agencies. The oversight committees requested that the 

joint audit examine the entities' overall missions, speciflc functions, 

capabilities, funding, personnel costs to include full-time employees and 

contractors, and facility costs. 

In response to this request, the OIGs for the IC, DHS, and DOJ 

conducted a coordinated, joint review focusing on domestic sharing of 

counterterrorism information. The objectives of this review were to: (1) identify 

and examine the federally supported field-based intelligence entities engaged in 

counterterrorism information-sharing to determine the overall missions, 

specific functions, capabilities, funding, and personnel and facility costs; (2) 

determine if counterterrorism information is being adequately and 

appropriately shared with all participating agencies; and (3) identify any gaps 

or duplication of effort among these entities. 

The review was conducted by three teams from the OIGs of the IC, DHS, 

and DOJ. The OIGs reviewed previous studies and conducted interviews with 

more than 450 individuals, including senior Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and state and local officials. While the review 

teams shared relevant documents, attended briefings, and participated jointly 

in interviews of certain officials and subject matter experts, each OIG was 

responsible for evaluating the actions of, and information available to, its 

respective department or agency. The teams attended, at least in part, 

meetings of the DNI's Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Partners' 

Board, interviews with DNI representatives and members of multiple JTTFs, 

and a teleconference with the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 

(CCI C). 

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In total, the teams visited field-based domestic information sharing 

entities in 25 cities in 13 states and the District of Columbia: 

• Massachusetts: Boston, Maynard 

• California: Sacramento, Los Angeles, San Francisco 

• Illinois: Chicago, Springfield 

• Colorado: Denver 

• Texas: Dallas, Houston, Garland, McKinney 

Missouri: Kansas City, Jefferson City, St. Louis 

• New Hampshire: Concord 

• Virginia: Fairfax 

• New York: Albany, New York City 

• New Jersey: Trenton 

• Oregon: Salem, Portland 

• Rhode Island: Providence 

• Washington, DC 

• Washington: Seattle 

Of those reviews, all three teams travelled together to five cities: Denver, 

Colorado; Dallas, Houston, and Garland Texas; and New York, New York. Over 

70 meetings were conducted by at least two of the OIGs. 

The OIGs conducted their work in accordance with the Council of 

Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's 2012 Quality Standards for 

Inspection and Evaluation. Those standards require an OIG plan and perform 

its work to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence, provide reasonable 

bases for the findings, and put forth conclusions based on stated objectives. 

The evidence obtained in this review provides a reasonable basis for the 

findings and conclusions based on the objectives. 

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APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDATIONS 

This appendix lists the report recommendations. 

Recommendations: The IC IG and DHS and DOJ OIGs recommend that the 

ODNI, DHS, and DOJ: 

1. Review the 2003 interagency MOU on information sharing and 

determine what actions are necessary to update intelligence information 

sharing standards and processes among the departments. 

Joint OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 1 

Open. DHS and DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in 

Appendices D and E. ODNI provided comments on the recommendation 

as shown in Appendix C. The joint OIG team will continue to collaborate 

and monitor the actions of the components throughout the resolution 

phase to ensure each relevant component has taken the necessary steps 

to adequately address the recommendation. 

2. Codify an overarching engagement and coordination body for the 

terrorism-related ISE. 

Joint OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 2 

Open. DHS and DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in 

Appendices D and E. ODNI provided comments on the recommendation 

as shown in Appendix C. The joint OIG team will continue to collaborate 

and monitor the actions of the components throughout the resolution 

phase to ensure each relevant component has taken the necessary steps 

to adequately address the recommendation. 

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Recommendations: DHS OIG recommends that I&A: 

3. In conjunction with the key intelligence officials from DHS 

components, ensure DHS component intelligence programs comply with 

policies and create incentives for personnel to participate in initiatives 

that enhance the cohesion of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 3 

Open. DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

D. This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence 

that the DHS' Chief Intelligence Office (CINT) has implemented changes 

that will better integrate the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

4. Formalize agreements that enable I&A field officials to develop 

intelligence reporting with DHS components in the field, based on pilot 

program results. 

DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 4 

Open. DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

D. This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives 

evidence, once finalized, of DHS' instruction for the process by which I&A 

reports officers will work with DHS Intelligence Enterprise field elements 

to produce Intelligence Information Reports at the local level. 

Recommendations: DHS OIG recommends that I&A: 

5. Develop and implement guidance for intelligence reporting in the field. 

DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 5 

Open. DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

D. This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence 

of the finalized guidance for intelligence reporting in the field and 

documented implementation of such guidance. 

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6. Coordinate with the FBI to formalize guidance and policies for the 

reporting of terrorism and counterterrorism information. 

DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 6 

Open. DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

D. This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence 

of formal, written guidance, developed in coordination with the FBI, on 

the reporting of terrorism and counterterrorism information. 

Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that the DHS clearing offices: 

7. Develop and implement a formal mechanism for reviewing I&A 

intelligence reporting from the field, including a logging and tracking 

process. 

DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 7 

Open. DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

D. This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence 

that the clearing offices - Privacy Office, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

(CRCL), Office of the General Counsel-Intelligence Law Division, and I &A 

Intelligence Oversight- are using this Share Point tracking tool to 

document each office's review of I&A field intelligence reporting. 

Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that I&A: 

8. Develop and implement guidance for field officials granting them local 

release authority for intelligence reporting. 

DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 8 

Open. DHS I&A concurred with the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix D. This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG 

receives evidence of the final establishment and implementation of a field 

release capability. 

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Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that DHS: 

9. Develop and implement a plan that will allow DHS intelligence 

officials in the field practical access to classified systems and 

infrastructure above the Secret level. 

DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 9 

Open. DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

D. This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence 

of the development and implementation of plans to ensure DHS 

intelligence officials in the field have practical access to classified 

systems and infrastructure above the Secret level. 

Recommendations: DOJ OIG recommends that DOJ: 

10. Develop a comprehensive internal counterterrorism information 

sharing strategic plan based on a review of the President's strategic plan 

and in consultation with relevant partners. 

DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 10 

Open. DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

E. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives, once 

established, the comprehensive internal DOJ counterterrorism 

information sharing strategic plan. 

11. Implement a council, led by a senior Department official, for the 

internal coordination of DOJ information sharing strategy and 

investments, and ensure that relevant components designate senior-level 

officials responsible for monitoring their component's efforts and 

communicating their efforts to DOJ as requested. 

DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 11 

Open. DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

E. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives 

documentation that it implemented a council, led by a senior DOJ 

official, that is responsible for the internal coordination of DOJ 

information sharing strategy and investments. Further, DOJ OIG will 

need to receive evidence that each relevant component has designated 

senior-level officials who are responsible for monitoring their 

component's efforts and communicating their efforts to DOJ leadership 

as requested. 

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Recommendations: DOJ OIG recommends that the FBI: 

12. Require FBI field divisions to stress to participating agencies the 

importance of designating an individual and an alternate to serve as their 

representatives to the JITF Executive Board, as well as of regularly 

attending the meetings. 

DOJ OJG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 12 

Open. The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix F. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG 

receives evidence that the FBI notified its field divisions to stress to JITF 

participants the importance of designating representatives to the JITF 

Executive Board, as well as regularly attending meetings. Further, the 

DOJ OIG will need evidence that FBI field divisions, in turn, 

communicated to the participating agencies the importance of the JITF 

Executive Board meetings, including designating representatives and 

regularly attending. 

13. Ensure FBI field divisions encourage agencies that do not participate 

on the JITF, including first responders, to attend JITF Executive Board 

Meetings. 

DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 13 

Open. The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix F. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG 

receives evidence that the FBI instructed its field divisions to encourage 

agencies that do not participate on the JITF, including first responders, 

to attend JITF Executive Board meetings. Further, DOJ OIG will need 

evidence that the FBI field divisions, in turn, reached out to such 

agencies to encourage participation on the JITF Executive Board. 

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14. Identify an appropriate structure and content of JTIF Executive 

Board meetings that FBI field divisions should use at a minimum when 

conducting these meetings. 

DOJ OJG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 14 

Open. The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix F. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG 

receives evidence of the FBI's review and establishment of an appropriate 

structure and content of JTIF Executive Board meetings, and that FBI 

field divisions have been notified of the new structure and content. 

Recommendation: DOJ OIG recommends that DOJ: 

15. Ensure that each USAO updates its ATAC Plan as required by the 

program. 

DOJ OJG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 15 

Open. DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

E. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives 

evidence that DOJ has developed a mechanism for ensuring USAOs 

update their ATAC Plans as required by the program. 

16. Evaluate the ATAC program to ensure the purpose of the ATAC 

meetings is not duplicative of other counterterrorism information sharing 

partner initiatives and is used in the most effective manner. 

DOJ OJG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 16 

Open. DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

E. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives the 

results of DOJ's evaluation of the ATAC program and whether the 

purpose of the ATAC meetings are not duplicative of other 

counterterrorism information sharing partner initiatives and are used in 

the most effective matter. 

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Recommendations: DOJ OIG recommends that FBI: 

17. Direct FBI field divisions to identify and invite key stakeholders to 

TRP sessions. 

DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 1 7 

Open. The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix F. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG 

receives the FBI's guidance to FBI field divisions about identifying and 

inviting key stakeholders to TRP sessions. Further, the DOJ OIG will 

need evidence that FBI field divisions, in turn, identified and invited key 

stakeholders to attend the TRP sessions. 

18. Determine the agencies with which it should share its 

counterterrorism-related TRP results and implement a process to ensure 

the TRP results are appropriately shared with those agencies on a 

systemic and regular basis. 

DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 18 

Open. The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix F. This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG 

receives evidence of the agencies with which the FBI should share 

counterterrorism-related TRP results and of the process for ensuring the 

TRP results are shared with these agencies on a systemic and regular 

basis. Further, the DOJ OIG will need evidence that FBI field divisions 

have been notified of this process, and that FBI field divisions are 

sharing the TRP results with the identified agencies on a regular basis. 

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Recommendations: The IC IG recommends that the DNI, in coordination with 

the FBI: 

19. Evaluate the existing DDNIR regional structure, in consultation with 

!&A, to ensure that regions are appropriately sized and defined to provide 

common areas of interest and geographic coordination among 

participating partners. 

IC IG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 19 

Open. ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix C. This recommendation can be closed when the IC IG receives 

an update on the status of their activity to meet the intent of the 

recommendation. 

20. Develop and disseminate to IC-member partners additional guidance 

and a strategy for ensuring the DDNIR program is implemented 

consistently across regions and update the 2011 Memorandum of 

Agreement to more accurately reflect the current state of the program. 

IC IG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 20 

Open. ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix C. This recommendation can be closed when the IC IG receives 

an update on the status of their activity to meet the intent of the 

recommendation. 

21. Evaluate the feasibility of incorporating non-IC members into the 

DDNIR program in an appropriate fashion. 

IC IG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 21 

Open. ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix C. This recommendation can be closed when the IC IG receives 

an update on the status of their activity to meet the intent of the 

recommendation. 

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Recommendation: The IC IG recommends that the Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center: 

22. Consider assigning additional NCTC representatives to the field 

and/ or revising the existing territorial regions, potentially to align with 

the DNI domestic regions, to ensure effective NCTC representation within 

the domestic field. 

IC IG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 22 

Open. ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in 

Appendix C. This recommendation can be closed when the JC JG receives 

an update on the status of their activity to meet the intent of the 

recommendation. 

Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that DHS: 

23. Coordinate with the ODNI and FBI to develop and implement a 

strategy to efficiently and effectively provide security clearances and 

reciprocity to state and local personnel. 

DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 24 

Open. DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix 

D. This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence 

that a strategy has been developed and implemented to efficiently and 

effectively provide security clearances and reciprocity to state and local 

personnel. 

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APPENDIX C: THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 

SUI>lECT: 

Im.~'ll'l4¢-.~ Co.msttuttity ~:t1.,11t r .... ~~ml 

()ff'w.~ .f'lfth~ Dira.;w.r uf~~tti.rnld lntctU~tu:c "'"'~'ntl~ m tfxOOn;;~ v!fl~ ltl.'(;.~ Odin'& Tm1t R.e.p:>tt.: "'Rto'\'k·w of D<lmt-$w.: &b...vine n.-r r:-~rtatrothtw lU:*'timtl!.itM'I-~ 

Th.:- 001ct <lf t~ !Jite'.;-tu1·1).f N'rtt1~ntt! bteiii~\e (ODNI) 1iPllft'lci.aln i.hlt Of'P--wtunjt~' 

to. re .. ·~e'll'l' and l:'e.\reM m )11-YT RVW\ ~l!idt.d. ~i:R-.· ~:JJ'lJmnc:rti4." SbMttlJt "f'(..'QvnJttrMi•f'>l't'i~mt 

InfiW't'AJ-l.'dNi, OON!'",; fi!!'i(."(t~K~"f: to the ~ttt::a::W'.U¥1-.1:!!fWwt,_ in tin' repml ill:'(!; ~hcd fn:r yum 

e<:msh..l.emlitm. 

O{)~ ~ctlt1'Q.S thu rut"' a.w,j d'tbt1 ~ tu !~r.t:h f)l1d drat\. ihU. Jt:;p.Qff ood we 

;.:u~ttaterut )'Ou.r std!., "'t.>ttg w'ktt t'ht: mu·U: tnc d\e tlalcM of the lb~ (kn«.W !'«tit!$. ~.at ct~e1.fmtl S<-t.•urit) ~~1 rh! llepa.rttt~lul lu«~f for~ ~e-r!-t.'VhRnc~~ 

OO:w.~<Jfth.: Olt~o! XM'ifttl&l lnte~-. !nf~l"itvtt'"> 'R"fl'i"l'Ael.Obl)e"C'In-r 

Gcnen.l·ll. It.t-vit:.w t$1' tJ.\ltlliQ.tic ~I\~ toff_~UWlt~t!'WfUTt !n~lliun 

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SUBJECT: Office ofthe Director of :'>1atlonallutelligeute Response to tile Iuspector 

G>nE<ral's Reyiew of Domeslif SW.rlng of Countel'ferrorism Iuformatiou 

While the federal Government has mare significant progress to advance terrorism-re!ared 

safeguarding :rud sharing of inleJligeoce and informali<m, more work remains to ensure 

implementation of the best me-chanisms to protect the homel:m<t The e;'Oiving terrorist lhreat 

highlights the critical need for strongp;umerships and imeroperable, and coordin.1ted capabilities 

between and among FSL IT agencies. These partnerships enable appropriate information 

safeguarding and sharing and build trust coosisrent '~kith the missiollS and authorities of each 

agemy :md fully integrating the need tn protect prh·acy, d\'il rights. md civil liberties. 

It is important ro emphas-ize the need for the IC's role inside the U.S. to be carefully coostrained 

The IC's authorities, tools, and tradecrnft me -properly focused on foreign threats to lllltioml 

secnrity. \\'llile we must also look to their m.11llfesta:tiom inside the country, we must carefully 

remain within the booruls of the limited domestic authorities and the deii:ned roles entruslro to 

us. I! is imperative that we canfume ro strengthen tlie national security apparnrus to besl pr01ect 

our citizens while alsoprorectingtheirprivacy. civil rights. and civil libetties. 

This re>lJonse incorporates iategrnled responses from both IC and ISE autborilles ru-titnla!ed in 

the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ot 2004. as amended (IRTPA). 

Rt<ommen<latiou l: Review the 2003 interagency MenlOr.llldum of Understanding tMOU) on 

infurmation sharing and determine wlla! actions are necessary !o update inre!ligence infmmation 

sharing stand<u'ds and processes ru.oong the departments. 

OD;'I.! Re•ponse: A recent re;•iew by DRS in coordination \\~th tlie OD:'>11 conduded that tlie 

inforrn.ation sbaring provi>i.oos of !he MOU are overtaken by E.l!eCUfive Order and the 

lR TP A. The ODNt in coordination \\i!h IC elemenls, a11d as a member of the Information 

Shanng CO\l.llciL maintains ongoing discussiom with ISE st.lkebolde.-s ro ensure domestic 

sharing of cout!le.-tenorism infonmtioo is e:,.ecuted in an effective and responsible:~-

UNCLASSIFIED 

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UNCLASSIFIED 

R~eomm~nd.atiou 2: Codity au over:u:clllng engage-men! :md coonlin.atiou body for terrori5!llrelated ISE. 

OD~! Response: The Information S!wing Council is the body codified within IRTPA for the terronsm related ISE. 

Recomm•ndation 19: Evaluate tk existing Domestic DNI Representltive (DD?\'IR) regional 

stmcture. in CO!l:>'l.J!tatiou 'i'<'ilh the Office of Inrelligence and Analysis {I&A), to ensure that 

regions are appropriately sized and defined to provide common areas of interest md geographic 

coordination :unong p:uticipating part~. 

OD:'\'1 Response: ODNI. in con>ultation "'ith the Federal Bureau of Investigation {FBI}, 

believes !he existing 13 regions are appropriately sized to meet the roles and responsibilities of 

!he DDJI<lR progranL The current stmcture allows for effective cammtmication and cooolination 

among IC organizations represe:11ted in the respective regions. A reduction in the llllllll:ter of 

regions could tmdennine effective commtmicatiom and coordination because regionally assigned 

DDN!Rs would see a corresponding increase in the 1llll!lber ofiC regional offices (to include 

FBI Field Offices) in their regions. Conversely. increasing the mnnber ofDDNIR regious could 

lead to duplicati\'e lC collaboration and increase trawl costs. 

R.comm~ndation 20: Develop and disseminate to IC-mernber partners ad<lition.al guidance and 

a strategy for ensuring the DDNIR program is implemented consistently across regions and 

update the 2011 "Memorandmn of Agreememto more accurntely reflect the current state of the 

program 

OD:\1 Rt'spons": The IC, integrated through the Homeland Strategy Board, has alreadybegtm 

to address these and other identified needs. The Homelaod Strategy Board bas adopted a nmnber 

of initiatives focused on improving the discaverability of intellig-ence and the transparency of 

activities across the Homeland <:lorn;"lirls. as well as working to enlmnce intelligence integration 

beh'ieen the IC eolerptise and regional levels. Strategic guidance and direction will continue 

through e. 'listing meclmlisms to ensure IC equities are all addressed The 2011 Memorandtl!ll. of 

Agreenlell! will be re\~ewro and re\'ised as appropriate to ensure !hal it reflects e:tisting strategic 

IC coordinatiou; better defines the roles and mission~ of all partners iuvolwd iu the DDNIR 

program and is updated to caprure recent changes \\ithln the ODNI and FBt 

Recommendation 21: Evaluate the feasibility of incorporating oon-IC members iuto the 

DDNIR program in an appropriate fashion. 

OD;\"l R<'spum•: The ODNL FBt and lC partners believe the DDNIR program is first and 

foremost a National Intelligence, Title 50. responsibility fOCused on effectively dealing with 

Foreign lntelligern:e priorities tlm! nlight pose tlne.ats to the Homeland and/or those foreign and 

foreign-ilh""Pired threats that have a direct ne:u1s to the Homeland. Some DDNIR regiom have 

informally included non-IC members in quarterly meetiugs and wodting groups and found thnt 

their participation provides valuable information and perspectives regarding the regional threat 

enviroument. ODNI and FBl will consult with IC and FSLTI p;II!Ilers to consider the merits of 

appropriately foonalizing this approach across the DDNIR program. Successes ha"lle been 

2 

UNCLASSIFIED 

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UNCLASSIFil'lD 

achieved in sharinglC and Non-Title 50 (NT-50) information v.itll regards to CT issues_ The 

s.ame successes have uot beeu fully achieved in tlJe sharing of inft:!ltll31ion beyoud tlJe realm. of 

CT. Also, includiug NT· 50 organizations in tlJe DDNIR program rnises legal aud policy issues 

that must be c<!!eftllly addressed to ensure, among other tllings, tmt IC activities cOmplY with 

policies that protect pri•<~cy, civil rights. and civil liberties. 

Rerommendalion 22: Consider assigning additional National CT Center (NCTC) 

representatives to tlJe field an&'or rel.'isiug the existing territorial regions, potentially to align 

\\ilb tlJe DNI domestic re.gions. to ensure effedhre NCTC representation v.-itllin tlJe domestic 

field. 

ODl\'I Response: NCTC recognizes the value of ill; representative program as it Sf'l1re5 federal, 

state, local, aud pri><~te industry cu~omers in the domestic field We strive to create and 

n~aintain the appropriate ha!3oce of do~c representatives in the field with existing personnel 

resources. We routinely 1'\>;~luate the territorial regioll5 assigned to each of our representatives tu 

ma:timize efficiency aud engagements with all partners. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

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APPENDIX D: THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S 

RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 

Febtuary 22, 2017 

Homeland 

Security 

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Roth 

Inspector General 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE~ ft\4L- Director ~ 

Departmental GAO-OIG Liais Office 

Management's Response to OIG Draft Report: "Review of 

Domestic Sharing of Clltmtcrtcrrorism Infonnation ·~ 

(Project No. 15-040-!SP-I&Al 

Thank you tor the opporttmity to review and comment on this draft report. The U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the work of the Offices of the 

Inspector General (O!G) for the Intelligence Community (IC), DHS, and the Department 

of Justice (DOJ) in planning and conducting this joint review ami issuing this report 

The Department is pleased to note the OIG's positive recognition that the partners in the 

inlonnation sharing environment (ISE) components of the Oflice of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNl), DHS, DOJ, and their state and local partners- are 

committed to sharing counterterrorism infom1ation. The O!Gs also recognized partners' 

actions taken before, during, and after various recent terrorism related incidents. 

The draft report contained I 0 recommendations for DHS with which the Department 

concurs. It is important to note that OilS previously idt'lltified many of the issues 

highlighted in the report and has L1ken actions to address them. Unfortunately, not all our 

accomplishments are reflected in the rt1){)rt since the fiellhvurk for this review ended 

more than one year ago. Attached find our detailed response to each recommendation. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this druft report. 

Technical comments were previously provided under separate cover, Please feel free to 

contact me if you have auy questions. \Ve look fonvard to working with you again in the 

future. 

Attachment 

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Attachment: DIIS Management Response to Recommendations 

Contained in OIG Draft Rt-port for Project No.JS-040-ISP·I&A 

The O!Gs of the IC, DHS, and DOJ recommend that the ODNJ, DHS, and DOJ: 

Recommendation 1: Review the 2003 interagency MOU on infonnation sharing and 

determine what actions are necessary to update intelligence information sharing standards 

and processes among the departments. 

Response: Concur. DHS has conducted a review of the 2003 interagency Memorandum 

of Understanding (MOU) on information sharing. We believe that all key provisions of 

the 2003 MOU have been overtaken by statute, executive order or presidential directive, 

or are covered by other existing autboritative policy documents. Revision of the MOU is 

unnecessary to reflect these updated legal authorities and policies. Further, we did not 

identify !my impediments to sharing that should be addressed in a new MOU. There are 

sections in the 2003 MOU pertaining to sharing with non-Federal stakeholders already 

supported by lC policy, executive order, statute, and other agreements. Any additional 

required provisions can he addressed by DHS, ODNI or DOJ separately tbrough internal 

policies. A matrix identifying all of the places where tlw infortnation from 2003 is now 

overcome by events or addressed iu other documents has been provided to DHS O!G 

under separate cover. We request that DHS OlG consider this recommendation resolved 

•md closed. 

Recommendation 2: Codify an overarching engagement and coordination body for the 

tetTorism·related JSE. 

Response: Concur. DHS agr<.>es there should be a single governance body for the 

tetTorism-related !SE. However, DHS does not believe the Criminal Intelligence 

Coordinating Council (ClCC) should tu!fill that role as the repurt recommends. The 

ClCC is a working group under the Departmem of Justice's Global Justice lnlormation 

Sharing Initiative (Global Initiative). The Global Initiative serves as a Federal Advisory 

Committee to the DOJ and advises the Attomey General on justice information sbaring 

integration initiatives. The CICC is chaired by state and local government personnel, and 

its charter allows the CICC to make recommendations to DOl 011 criminal ill!elligence 

issues beyond the focus of just ten-orism issues, Given these factors, DHS believes tile 

existing lnfonnation Sharing and Access-Interagency Policy Committee should continue 

to be leveraged to fulfill this role, potentially utili?.ing the Program Manager for the ISEs 

(PM-ISE's) lnfonnation Sharing Council (ISC) as in prior years. The !SC Charter 

outlines the following duties for the ISC: "Pursuant to section 5(b)(i) of EO 13388, the 

Council shall provide advice and infortnalion concerning the establishment of an 

illlen.;perable tetTorism infonnatitm sharing environment (!SE) to facilitate automated 

sharing of terrorism infmmation among appropriate agencies to implement the policy set 

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fonh in Section I of EO 13388."" This language could be e"sily moditied to provide a 

govemance role for the !SC. DHS will suppon the inter-agency effort to have the !SC 

provide a govcmance role for the !SE. Estimated Completion Date (ECDl: To De 

Determined. 

The DHS O!G recommended that I&A: 

Recommendation J: In conjunction with the key intelligence officials !rom DHS 

components, ensure DHS component intelligence programs comply with policies and 

create incentives !hr personnel to participate in initiatives that enhance the cohesion of 

the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

Response: Concur. The Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HS!C) is an advisory 

body to the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer (CD\'T), and consists of Key Intelligence 

Officials (KJO) and other departmental representatives, K!Os represent Component 

intelligence Programs (C!P}, which were formally designated in 2016. The CINT 

worked closely with the Heads of Intelligence Components to detem1ine CIP 

designations. which is important in that the C!Ps that are defined in policy as the 

fhundational elements of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (IE). 

The C!NT fully supports the Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program (!RAP), wbich 

oflers rotational opportunities imemal to the DHS IE. In January 2016. the CINT levied 

a requirement for all C!Ps to participate with at least two !RAP positions (inbound or 

outbound) by the end of2016. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (!&A) also 

has sponsored reimbursable !RAP positkms on the CJNT's stall: one of which cunrently 

is tilled by a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Intelligence Officer serving as the 

DHS's Intelligence Functional Manager (IFMs) for Collection and Reporting. 

In February 2016, the CINT created an IE management construct to provide both a DHS 

intelligence perspective on mis.~ion priorities (Intelligence Mission Managers), as well as 

to integrate the enabling functions for the IE (IFMs). Under the lFM construct, in 

coordination with the HSIC, the C!l•IT is providing the IE with baseline standards 

stemming from IC policies, guidance, and standard~. IFMs are overseeing progress 

across the IE by institutionalizing applicable IC standards in DHS Intelligence Integration 

Management policies. Policies and guidance that institntionalize !C standards fur the 

DHS IE include: 

• DHS Instruction 264-02-00L "DHS Tcarline Process Guidance," signed January 

2014, tl1is Instruction establishes the standards for re(JUesting, processing, and 

disseminating tearlines for organi7.atlons within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise 

and is directly associated to Intelligence Community Directive (ICDl209, 

"Tearlinc Production and Dissemination." 

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148 

• OilS Instruction 264-01-008. "IC Controlled Access Program (IC-CAP) 

Management. Administration. and Oversight,·· signed December 20 15, this 

Instruction is directly associated to !COs 705 "SCIFs:· 501 "Discovery ami 

Dissemination oflntclligencc," and 906 "Comrolled Access Programs." 

(Classified) 

• OHS Instruction 264-01-009. "DHS Support to Domestic Director ofNational 

lntelligcncc Representatives.·· signed May 20 12, this Instruction clarifies roles and 

responsibilities and establishes OilS processes and prncedurcs to support the 

Domestic DNI Representative Pmgram under !CD 402. "Director ofNational 

Intelligence Representatives." Annex B. De-cember 2009. 

• DHS !nstmction 264-01-0 I!. ·'DHS Foreign Disclosure and Release." signed June 

2016. this Instruction implements and adheres to the authorities and 

responsibilities described in !CD 403 by establishing DHS processes and 

proced1.1res for coordinating and overseeing the foreign disclo~mre and re1euse of 

(I) classified national intelligence and (2) classified or unclassified national 

intelligence to foreign intelligence services. lCD 403, ''foreign Disclosure and 

Release of Classified National!ntclligcnce." Mareh 2013. as amended. 

• DHS Instruction 265-05-006, ·'DHS SCI Access and SCIF Accreditation:• signed 

December 201 2. this Instruction establishes standards for sponsoring new access 

to Sensitive Compartmented !nfonnation (SCl) and accreditation of Sensitive 

Compartmented Information Facilities (SClFs) and is directly related to lCD 704. 

·'Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to 

SCllnltJrmation and Other Controlled Access Progromlntbrmation," October 

2008 and !CD 705. "Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities," May 2010. 

• DHS CJNT Memorandum, "Interim Guidance regarding DHS Component release 

ofDHS Intelligence lnfonnation Reports,'' signed July 2015, aligns with 

Executive Order 12333. 

• Dl!S CINT Memorandum. •·Guidance for Accessing ln!elligencc Community 

!nfonnation (by non-Title 50 personnel in DJ!S. aka "is!Cmembcr attribute''),'' 

signed April2015, this memo clarifies who within DHS may acquire access to !C 

infonnation and aligns with Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 500.1, 

"'Digital Identity." 

The CINT has identitled points of contact (POC) for each C'IP to facilitate improved 

communication with the fE workforce. The CTNT may now cornnn.micatc directly to all 

IE personnel to enhanct~ awareness of policies. standards~ and rotational opportunities 

available to those in C!Ps. 

The ClNT is also working with the DHS Chief Financial Otliccr's Program Analysis and 

Evaluation (I' A& E) team to seek Fiscal Year (FYJ 2019 funding for C!NT IE initiatives 

that cut across Intelligence Compmtcuts and fund integrative activities that benefit the 

analysis, collection, and operations of multiple C!Ps. This would provide an incentive for 

C!Ps to collaborate and advocate for integrated resources not prioritized by an individual 

4 

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of 

Recommcndati<Jil 4: Formalize agreements that enable !&A field officials 

DHS CUHlf-lOHents in thr:t fi.dd, hasetl on pilot program 

ln addition, FOD is 

DHS l&A ROs work 

71 
150 

gain an understanding oflocal context, deconflict reporting, and produce !IRs at the local 

leveL ECD: Septemher 30,2017. 

Recontmendation 5: Develop and implement guidance for producing intelligence 

reports in the field. 

RI'Sponse: Concur. l&A has made significant headway in codifying and implementing 

b'llidancc for intelligence reporting. l&A has coordinated with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) to publish Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) F0-003. which 

established guidance for the development, production, and coordination ofl&A 

Terrorism Watchlist liRs. 

The Under Secretary for !&A (USIA) also issued an October 20, 20 !5 memomndum to 

all I&A and its !1c!d personnel approving them to "continue publishing l!Rs on 

individuals that have records within the Terrorist Screening Database ("Terrorist 

WatchlisC) and/or the Terrorist Identities Datarnart Envir<mment (TIDE). 1 The SOP and 

memorandum provide l&A field personnel clear guidance and authority to report 

terrorism and cmmtct1crrorism infom1ation as it applies to the Terrorist Watchlist and 

TIDE. 

On June 24, 2016. !&A issued Policy Instmction IA·907, "Overt Human Intelligence 

Collection Progmm, which established the responsibilities, procedures, and 

requirements ihr the !&A Overt Human Intelligence (HUMfNI) Collection (OHIC) 

Program. The key elements and responsibilities ofJA.907 were to establish governance, 

training, and oversight of the OHIC: program; define the authorized activities, eligible 

source types, and pre- and post·engagement proc~>sses; and describe !&A·, source 

management storage, identification, and reporting processes. IA·907 codifies guidance 

for I&A personnel in the field to conduct overt htnnan intelligence collection. 

I&A, through the HSIC, also worked with DHS Intelligence Enterprise Componel\ts and 

updated existing DHS Policy lnstmction 264·01-006. which articulates and streamlines 

processes for the proouction of !IRs throughout the Department. fiRs are the standard 

ra\\t intelligence report through which terrorism and counterterrorism infonnation is 

repo11ed to the Intelligence Community. The lnstmction was signed January 19, 2017. 

I&A is working on Policy Instruction [f\.905. "Eield Intelligence Report Program," 

which will cO<Iify pmcesscs pur~uant ta releasing intelligence and information reports 

relevant to DHS Component requirements and Departmental priorities. ECD: 

March 31. 20!7. 

72 

6 
151 

ln !&A is DHS Instruction m'm"""'""''zu'~ 

DHS l&A ROs will work DHS field elements to access int•elligetlcein~llmtatinn. 

mt•cterstantl:mg of loc;Jl conlex!, deconftic! reporting, and pwduce !IRs at the 

2\H7. 

l&A w'iH continue to explore 

l&A also continues to work with 

better coordinate inte!ligcncc repcrting, 

and standard.s on intcgratlon 

intelligence reporting, 

personnel. 

necessary. 

levels to 

lntel!iget1ce, Surveillance and 

establish !SR for 

te<tuirem•enrs focused on intr:lliilCn•cc 

ECD: 

Reconunendation 6: Coordinate with FBI to fonnalize guidance and policies for the 

repotting of terrorism and counterterrorism ini(n·mation, 

intclli,gc:ncc briefings to the USIA and the Secretary. CT 

Secretary and senior sta!Tand the CT Coordinator, and additionally 

Counterterrorism When throat reporting wam!lltS, DHS !&A 

Fill calls and teleconferences with Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces, Field Ofl!ces, and Fusion Centers disseminate the threat 

infonnation and answer any <tueslions from those entities. 

73 
152 

Additionally, DHS coordinates with the National Counterten·orism Center and FBI 

through an interagency approved process regarding the issuance of National Terrorism 

Advisory System advisories. !&A and FBI coordinate on Joint Intelligence Bulletins to 

state, local, tribal and tenitorial pm1uers. There is a nee<! for more formal, written 

guidance for field personnel engaging between I&A and FBI field offices as it pe1tains to 

!IR production and disscminalion. The l&A Field Operations Regional Directors now 

wutinely engage with their respective Domestic Director of National lll1clligence 

Representatives to discuss l!R production and dissemination in each region. !&A will 

also engage the DOJ and its FBI field offices to develop more formal, written g11idance 

for I&A' s field pet~onnel tmgaging with their FBI counterparts as it pertains to llR 

production ami dissemination. ECLl: September 30, 2017. 

Recommendation 8: Develop and implement guidance for lield officials granting them 

local release authority for intelligence products. 

Response: Concur. On July 20, 2015, the USIA signed n decision memorandum titled 

··Interim Guidanct' Regarding Component Intelligence Progrom Release of Department of 

Homeland Security lnt<,lligence Information Reports." The memorandum established the 

need and authority for establi>hing a field release capability, the criteria for nominating 

personnel to he releasers. and the processes for approving the nominaK"!i personneL 

Since the aforementioned memorandum, I&A has granted interim release authority to 

five individuals in FOD. Interim release authority has allowed personnel in the field to 

review, edit. and release l!Rs in a more timely am! efficient manner. Since January 2016, 

FOD has released all !IRs illlernally and without review by the !&A RepOJting Branch. 

As of September of 2016, FOD releasers have released a tom! of 698 llRs. We request 

dm! DHS O!G consider this recommendation resolved and closed. 

The DHS O!G recommended that the DHS clearing offices: 

Recommendation 7: Develop and implement a formal mechanism for reviewing and 

approving l&i\ intelligence products, including a process J()r logging and tracking 

products. 

Response: Concur. f&A believes there is already a robust process in place for reviewing 

and approving its intelligence products. including systems for logging and tracking 

products. The review proce>"S has been in place since 2009. Several of the clearance 

offices also log <md track products. For example. the Oflice of Privacy has tracked 

product review statistics since 2() I 0 ant! the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

(CRCL) has had a tracking system in place since October 2014. Fm1hermore, FOD has 

developed and hosted a tracking tool on an ODNI SharePoint plattbnn for use by I&A 

personneL The tool allows the FOD to track its IIRs. including the amount of time taken 

to process IIRs, the amount of time it takes for !&A to clear on fiRs. and other quality 

74 
153 

control relate'<:! data. The use of this tool is a requiremel\t for all field personnel and has 

greatly increased !&A's ability to ensure accountability. efficiently proeess !IRs, identify 

problematic process segments, and improve upon identilied inefficiencies within l&A. 

l&A has also developed and implemented an internal SlmrePoint-based system for 

drafting, reviewing, approving, logging and tracking finished intelligence products. I&A 

and the clearing offices will explore expanding the scope ofthis system and using it as 

the foundation of an all-encompassing tooL 

L>HS clearance offices take any undue, delay in production seriously, but believe that the 

review of intelligence products is done in a timely manner as indicated by the data 

provided to the OlG showing review and approval time of less than one business day. 

For example, the Office of Privacy and CRCL's data shows they revieVI and approve 

intelligence products intended for dissemination outside the federal government within an 

average time of 2-5 hours. ECD: September 30, 2017. 

The DHS OIG recommended that DHS: 

Recommendation 9: Develop and implement a t>latt that will allow DHS intelligence 

otlicials in the field practical access to classified systems and infrastructure a hove the 

Secret leveL 

Response: Concur. !&A's Security Management Branch has created a consolidated list 

of all DHS Sensitive Comparttnented lnfonnation Facilities (SCJFs) tltnt are available to 

DHS Field personneL Additionally, all National Guard facilities with an available SCIF 

are being added to the consnlidated list which will be disseminated to I& A field 

personnel no later than March 31, 2017. l&A continues to work on the development of 

an interactive map overlay that can be uploaded to the !&A Web-site to allow for real 

time updates. ECD: October 3 L 2017. 

Additionally, once changes within the DHS Office ofthe Chief Security Officer (OCSO) 

have been completed, l&A; in coordination with the OCSO. Special Security Ollicers 

Council and DHS CO!llJXlnents, will develop and implement standard procedures to 

ensure DHS lnteiHgence F.nterpri:.;e persoru1el access to DHS Accredited SC1Fs and IT 

Systems up to and Including Top Secret/SCI both during and after normal working 

hours. In the interim, a POC is being provided tor each SC!F location so individuals 

requiring access can reach out directly to the SC!F l'OC for assistance. when needed. 

ECD: October 31, 2017. 

Recommendation 23: Coordinate with the ODNI and Fill to develop and implement a 

<trotegy to efficiently and effectively provide security clearances and recipmcity to state 

and local personneL 

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154 

Response: Concur. The OCSO will coordinate with the FBI and ODNI, which is the 

designated Security Executive Agent under Executive Order (E.O.) 13467, "Refonning 

Processes Related to Suitability for Govemment Employment, Fitness fur Contractor 

Employees and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security lnfonnation," dated 

June 30, 2008, concerning this recommendation. 

Rationale: Within E.O. 13467, among the authorities granted to ODNI as the Security 

Executive Agem in Sec. 2.3. (c) (vi) it states: 

"Shalt ~:.•nsure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for acce% to classitk"'<.i 

information among the agencies, including acting as the final authority to 

arbitrate and resolve disputes among the agencies involving the reciprocity of 

investigations and detetminations of eligibility for access to classified 

information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position:· 

ECD: September 30,2017. 

76 

10 
155 

APPENDIX E: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S RESPONSE TO THE 

DRAFT REPORT49 

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

U.S. Department cf Justice 

September 22.2016 

Carlos Felipe Uriarte 

Assotiate Deputy Attorney General 

Office of the Deputy Ath"mtcy Generul 

John P. CarlinW 

t\ssistmn Attom~y General 

National SrcurHy Division 

Monty Wilkins{)n~ Director 

Executive O!Ticc for Unitt~! States t\tlomeys 

Joint Review of Domestic Sharing of Cmmtcncnorism 

fhe: Department of Justlc<.~ (DOJ or fkpartJnent) appreciates the joint rl!view um.h:rlakt!n 

by the lJepartmL'n(s Ollicc of the Inspector General (OtG), \~tith the Inspectors General of the 

lntelHgence Community nnd the Department ofHomelrmU St.--curity regarding the domt~.;,1ic 

sharing of counterterrorism intOrmation. Although this revi-ew included the r:edcrnl Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI). this response \Vill not cover fC\:OOlmendatkH1S to the rm. The re[h'lrt makes 

Sl'ven additional recommen.dations to the DOl We address these recommendations below, and 

coJJcur \\>ilh all seven, 

49 Subsequent to DOJ's formal response, the language for recommendation #2 was revised as reflected in 

the body of the reporl. DCAJ OIG discussed the revised language with DOJ. DO,J stated that it concurred 

with the revised recommendation and did not submit a new formal response. 

77 
156 

Memorandum to ~1idme1 E, Horowitz 

Subjt..."Ct: Response: Joint Review of Domestic Sht:~ring 

ofCnuntencrroris.m Infonnntion 

Page2 

Recommondation No. l: The JC. DHS, and DOl OJGs recommend that the ODNI. DJ IS, and 

lX)J: (C'<'f}'(){/()) Rcvh·w the 2003 interagency Alemorandum and 

dell!rminc what aclions are neces,'fary fa update intdligf!nce 

pron:sses amr..m~ the deparfnh!nJs. 

Rt•sponst'! Con('ur. The Depmtmcnt agrees to work the interagency to review 

the 2003 interagency MOU and detennine ''-·hcther any are necessary to update 

intelligence infOnnation standards and processes arnong the depurtmcnts us well as to 

<.:l)nsid~r potential updat.:s to the 2003 interagency MOU. 

Recommendation No, 2: The !C. DHS, and DOJ O!Gs recommend !hal the ODNL DHS. and 

DOl: (U!iFOUO! bodyjiw the remwism-relmed 

Rt.'~ponst; Conl~ur. The Department agrees to work with the interagency to designate a 

single governance body for terrorism-related ISE. 

Recommendation No. 10: The DOJ OlG recommends !hnt DOJ: (1UFOUO) Develop a 

con·'f""'"""""'" internal cmmterterrurism it-!f(Jrmation sharing strntegic fJ/un ha.w:d on a revit'lt.' 

President ·s slrategic plan and in consultation with ihe reh•wml partners. 

Response: Coneur. The Department agrees to develop a comprehensive inte111a! 

counterterrorism infonnation sharing stro1egk plan. As pan of this process, the 

Department will review the flresident~s strategic plan fbr countelierrorisrn int\.,nna.tiun 

sharing and will consult \viH aH relevant Jn developing such a phm. the 

Dcpanmcnl will rely in the Security Division, the U.S. Attorneys' 

nrtlccs ( USAO). and 1ht! as weH as the Departme-nt's Chief In formatiun omcer. 

Hesponse: Concur. Tlw I.kpnrtmcnt agrees to implement a council. led by a senior 

!)cpurtmcnt officiaL ft~r the internal coonJination of DOJ information sharing strawgy 

and investments, and ensure that rdevant components designate :senlor-!evd officials 

for monitoring tht~ir component· s efforts and r:omnnmit:ating: thdr ctlCrrts to 

kad1.·rship a~ requested. 

78 
157 

Memorandum to Michael E. H{lrowitz 

Subject: Response: Joint Review of Domestic Sharing 

of Counterterrorism lnfommtion 

Page J 

Re<·ommendution No. 15: The DO! O!G recommends that DOJ: (U) [insure thai each USAO 

updutes its A lAC Phm as required hy the AlifC proR,ram. 

lk<t><mse: Concur. As part ofits ev~luation ofthe A TAC prngram, DOJ will assess 

how frequently plans shnuld be updated in the future and will ensure that J\ TAC plans 

are modified according!)'·. 

Recommendation No. !6: The DOJ OJG recommends that DOJ: (UI'FO!JO) Evuluule the 

oftlut A 1:01 C meetings are not duplicative qfoth{fr 

c:ounterterrorism iniiialives and are usttd in the most elrective 

manner. 

Re!§Jlonsc: Concur, DOJ will evaluate the ATAC program to \!nsure the purpose of the 

A TAC meetings are fh)t duplicative of other eountertem)rism infonnation sharing partner 

initiati·vcs and arc used in the most etTt::ctive manner. 

cc: Andrew McCnbc. Deputy Director. Federal Bureau oflnvestlgution 

Lee Lofthus, t\ssistant Aittwney General. Justice Jvfon<Jgcment Division 

79 
158 

APPENDIX F: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S 

RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 

·n~~: Hooomhle Mlchnel Honw•itz 

lnspectot General 

Oflice of the !nspec!Ot General 

I i$. D~'jlllllment of Justice 

950 Pennsylvllnia Avenue, N.W. 

Washington. DC 20510 

Dear Mr. Horowiu: 

U.S. Dep•rtmtnt of Ju•lkr 

Fedora! flure.m of !nvestignti<>rt 

Wtllihington. 0. C. 10$35-()001 

September 15. 2016 

The l'cdeml flu!1.\au oflnv·elltigali<ln (I'll!} llj!pteciutes the opportunity to rev·kw and 

respond to your office's report entitlod Review of lk!mestic Slwlng of Countencrrorism 

/~f<>rmatioll 

We agree that it is important to provide additi.,nal guidance to field divisions rmd 

participating agendes regarding a!tendrme• at aud the sll'ul:ture of rn< ExecutiYe Boord 

meetings. We also agree it is important to ptuvide guidance to the lield in regatds to 

collllterterrorism·related TRI' sessions. In that regard, we concur "<ilh your live 

recoo1mendations f<>r the FBI. 

Should you have any qllt'stimc~. feel free to conll!Ct me. We greatly appreciate the 

professiooolism of your audit staff throughout this matter. 

Enclosure 

80 

C, L•ngenbctg 

S..-ctionChlel' 

External Audit and Complirmee Sc-.:tion 

Inspection Division 
159 

The Federal Bu,..llu oflnvesligutlon'• Rnpon .. to tbe 

Joint Review of Domestic Sbllrillg of Counterterrorism Information 

Rtport Recomm•ndatlon #I Z: Rt'qUite f l:ll tield divisions to stress to participating agtrn:ies 

the importance of designating an individual and an alternate to serve us their representatives to 

the J1Tf l::Xc-cutive Board. as well a~ ofregularly attending the meetings. 

t'lll R<'ltpOIISe to Recommendation #U: Concur, The Hil wifl instm<:t l'l3llleld divisions to 

empha'>ize to participating agencies the importance of designating llll individual and an alternate 

to serve as their representatives to the JTlF Exe-cutive aoard, as well liS of regularly attending 

meetings. 

Report Rtt(>mmendatinn 1113: Ensure rBJ !ield divisions encournge agencies that do oot 

partidpate on the J1TF, including llrst responders, to llltcnd JTTF Executiw 6oard meetings. 

FBI Response to Re.:ommendation 1113: Concur. Consistent with st-.:urity P<>lky requirements. 

the FBI wilt work with the FBI field divis.ions to encourage- agencies that do n(H purt.icipate on 

the J'ITF, including first res]lOnders, to attend JITF Executive Board meetings. 

Report Rtt(>mmel)datlon 1114: Identify an appropriate s!I'UCture and content ofJ'lTf 

Executive Hoard meetings that FBI lleld divisions should use at minimum when conducting 

these meetings. 

•"BI R••ponseto R""om.mendatlon #14: Concur. The FBI will review and dotermioe bow to 

refioc the genernlstn~eturc ofthe J'!TF Executive Board meetings that fill tield divisions should 

u.>re at minimum when conducting nwctings> 

Rrport Rec::ODlmeudaU.oa #17: We n:.-contmend thut the FBl direct FBl field divisions to 

identify and invite key stakeholders to TRP sessions. 

fBI Respon•e to Rceommendatlon 1117: Concur. The FBI will <c'rt<ttc guidll!ree instructing 

FB!lleld divisions to identify lmd invite key stokoholders to cotmterterrorism TRP sessions. 

Report Re.:nmmendatiun #Ill: Determine the agencies with which it should share ~~~ 

counterterrmism~rela.ted TRP results and implement a p·mt..'c.ss t<l ensure the TRP results are 

appropriately shared with those agencies on a systemic and regular basis. 

t'BI Response to Reeommendalion #18; Concur. The Fill will create guidrmce to determine 

which agencies it will share the counterterroriSlll-related lRP results and will establish •process 

to ensure !he TRI' results are uppmpriote!y shared with those ugencies on u systemic and regular 

basis. 

81 
160 

Dear Senator Hassan, 

Thank you for the opportunity to raise the volume on the emergency in Puerto Rico. As you know, 

Puerto Rico was hit by Hurricane Irma only two weeks before it was utterly devastated by Hurricane 

Maria. The situation is critical. There is no electricity anywhere on the island and only 40% of customers 

have running water. Hospitals are on the verge of collapse and many have had to transfer all their 

patients to other overstrained facilities because they have run out of gas or diesel for their generators. 

Patients are dying in their homes because they cannot fill their prescriptions, do not have access to ice 

to keep their insulin cool, or cannot reach a dialysis center that has electricity in time. Patients are dying 

in hospitals because they need ventilators and machines. There are entire communities that the 

government has been unable to reach due to widespread landslides and debris. This is happening in 

America, today. 

Only one-fourth of the cell phone towers are working, mostly in the San Juan Metropolitan area, and 

there are entire regions of the island without communication. People cannot call an ambulance or the 

police, and there have already been numerous reports of looting and home invasions. People are doing 

7-hour lines for gas and every day is an exercise in survival. Puerto Ricans are forced to hunt for gas, 

water and something to eat, daily. The banks are closed, the ATMs don't work because the systems 

don't communicate, and people ran out of cash. Furthermore, we are on day 6 of a curfew that the 

authorities are unable to enforce. Everyone is desperate and, thus far, the response from the federal 

government has been timid, at best. 

The 3.5 million Americans that call Puerto Rico Home need immediate, massive assistance from 

Washington. We are living through Katrina all over again, but this time there is no ARMY convoy on 

sight. We need the ARMY and the National Guard deployed throughout the island now, today! This 

cannot wait another day. Despite federal agencies coordinating in San Juan, there is very limited 

presence of military personnel assisting people in the streets and throughout our communities. There 

are also rumors of multiple supplies reaching the San Juan Port and Airport, but unfortunately that is not 

the reality on the streets. Everything is scarce and it seems there are multiple challenges with 

distributing the little goods that have arrived. We need water, gasoline, diesel, personnel, medicines 

and doctors from the mainland, immediately. 

I know you have been a champion and a leader when it comes to helping your fellow Americans in need, 

and you have made no exception with Puerto Ricans. I sincerely appreciate you reaching out and caring. 

We will rebuild our infrastructure and come out stronger with your support, but we cannot go another 

day without a massive military intervention to begin coordinating relief or we will face an overwhelming 

humanitarian crisis. 

Sincerely, 

Alejandro Garcia Padilla 
161 

The Honorable Judy Chu 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Representative Chu: 

December 30,2016 

Scot·fmy 

LS. lkpurUnl'nt or llomd:uul Sl'curit) 

\\"a:;hit11!!0H, [){' ).O)].S 

Homeland 

Security 

On behalf of the Administration, I write in response to the letter you and II 0 other 

members of Congress sent the President on December 5. In your letter. you ask us "to do 

everything within [our] power to safeguard the personal identifying information of DACA 

enrollees.·· We share your concerns. 

Today there are 750,000 young people em·olled in DACA who, when they applied 

for enrollment, relied on the U.S. government's representations about the use of their 

personal identifying information. Since DACA was announced in 2012, DHS has 

consistently made clear that infonnation provided by applicants will be collected and 

considered for the primary purpose of adjudicating their DACA requests and would be 

safeguarded from other immigration-related purposes. More specifically, the 

U.S. government represented to applicants that the personal infonnation they provided will 

not later be used for immigration enforcement purposes except where it is independently 

determined that a case involves a national security or public safety threat, criminal activity, 

fraud, or limited other circumstances where issuance of a notice to appear is required by 

law. 

We believe these representations made by the U.S. government, upon which DACA 

applicants most assuredly relied, must continue to be honored. 

For decades, even dating back before DACA, it has been the long-standing and 

consistent practice of DHS (and its predecessor INS) to use infonnation submitted by 

people seeking deferred action or other benefits for the limited purpose of adjudicating 

their requests, and not for immigration enforcement purposes except in tl1e kinds of 

specified circumstances described above. This was true, for example, under the deferred 

action policies extended to victims of human trafficking, to foreign students affected by 

Hurricane Katrina, to battered immigrants under the Violence Against Women Act, and to 

widows and widowers of American citizens. Accordingly, people who requested to be 

considered under DACA, like those who requested deferred action in the past, have relied 

on our consistent practice concerning the information they provide about themselves and 

others. 
162 

The Honorable Judy Chu 

Page2 

The U.S. government's practice of adhering to the assurances it makes to applicants 

for deferred action is also consistent with the way USCIS (and the INS before it) has long 

protected information submitted by those seeking other benefits or relief. This includes 

but is not limited to individuals requesting temporary protected status, deferred enforced 

departure, or extended voluntary departure. In these circumstances, as with deferred action 

requests, USCIS and INS have abided by a longstanding and consistent practice of using 

information to adjudicate specific applications, but not for immigration enforcement 

purposes absent the limited circumstances described above. 

Since DACA began, thousands of Dreamers have been able to enroll in colleges and 

universities, complete their education, start businesses that help improve our economy, and 

give back to our communities as teachers, medical professionals, engineers, and 

entrepreneurs-all on the books. We continue to benefit as a country from the 

contributions of those young people who have come forward and want nothing more than 

to contribute to our country and our shared future. 

The co-signers of your letter will receive separate, identical responses. Should you 

wish to discuss this further, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
163 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

February 20, 2017 

Kevin McAleenan 

Acting Commissioner 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Thomas D. Homan 

Acting Director 

5ie,.Tcran' 

lJ.S. Ocpartment of Homeland Security 

Wa::hmgtnn, IJ( · 205~8 

Homeland 

Security 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf(lrcement 

Lori Scialabba 

Acting Director 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Joseph B. Maher 

Acting General Counsel 

Dimple Shah 

Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs 

Chip Fulghum 

Acting Undersecretary for Management 

John Kelly 

Secretary 

Interest 

ofthe Immigration Laws to Serve the National 

This memorandum implements the Executive Order entitled "Enhancing Public Safety in 

the Interior of the United States," issued by the President on January 25, 2017. It constitutes 

guidance for all Department personnel regarding the enforcement of the immigration laws of the 

United States, and is applicable to the activities of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS). As such, it should infonn enforcement and removal activities, detention 

decisions, administrative litigation, budget requests and execution, and strategic planning. 

www.dhs.gov 
164 

With the exception of the June 15, 2012, memorandum entitled "Exercising Prosecutorial 

Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children," and the 

November 20, 2014 memorandum entitled "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 

Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals 

Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents," 1 all existing conflicting 

directives, memoranda, or field guidance regarding the enforcement of our immigration laws and 

priorities for removal are hereby immediately rescinded--to the extent of the conflict-including, 

but not limited to, the November 20, 2014, memoranda entitled "Policies for the Apprehension, 

Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants," and "Secure Communities." 

A. The Department's Enforcement Priorities 

Congress has defined the Department's role and responsibilities regarding the enforcement 

of the immigration laws of the United States. Effective immediately, and consistent with Article 

II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution and Section 3331 of Title 5, United States Code, 

Department personnel shall faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United States against 

all removable aliens. 

Except as specifically noted above, the Department no longer will exempt classes or 

categories of removable aliens from potential enforcement. In faithfully executing the 

immigration laws, Department personnel should take enforcement actions in accordance with 

applicable law. In order to achieve this goal, as noted below, I have directed ICE to hire I 0,000 

officers and agents expeditiously, subject to available resources, and to take enforcement actions 

consistent with available resources. However, in order to maximize the benefit to public safety, to 

stem unlawful migration and to prevent fraud and misrepresentation, Department personnel 

should prioritize for removal those aliens described by Congress in Sections 212(a)(2), (a)(3), and 

(a)(6)(C), 235(b) and (c), and 237(a)(2) and (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 

Additionally, regardless of the basis of removability, Department personnel should 

prioritize removable aliens who: (I) have been convicted of any criminal offense; (2) have been 

charged with any criminal otTense that has not been resolved; (3) have committed acts which 

constitute a chargeable criminal offense; (4) have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in 

connection with any official matter before a governmental agency; (5) have abused any program 

related to receipt of public benefits; (6) are subject to a final order of removal but have not 

complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or (7) in the judgment of an 

immigration officer, otherwise pose a risk to public safety or national security. The Director of 

ICE. the Commissioner ofCBP, and the Director ofUSCIS may, as they determine is appropriate, 

issue further guidance to allocate appropriate resources to prioritize enforcement activities within 

these categories-for example, by prioritizing enforcement activities against removable aliens 

who are convicted felons or who are involved in gang activity or drug trafficking. 

'The November 20,2014, memorandum will be addressed in future guidance. 

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B. Strengthening Programs to ~'acilitate the Efficient and Faithful Execution of the 

Immigration Laws of the United States 

Facilitating the efficient and faithful execution of the immigration laws of the United 

States-and prioritizing the Department's resources-requires the use of all available systems and 

enforcement tools by Department personnel. 

Through passage of the immigration laws, Congress established a comprehensive statutory 

regime to remove aliens expeditiously from the United States in accordance with all applicable 

due process of law. I determine that the faithful execution of our immigration Jaws is best 

achieved by using all these statutory authorities to the greatest extent practicable. Accordingly, 

Department personnel shall make full use of these authorities. 

Criminal aliens have demonstrated their disregard for the rule oflaw and pose a threat to 

persons residing in the United States. As such, criminal aliens are a priority for removal. The 

Priority Enforcement Program failed to achieve its stated objectives, added an unnecessary layer 

of uncertainty for the Department's personnel, and hampered the Department's enforcement of the 

immigration laws in the interior of the United States. Effective immediately, the Priority 

Enforcement Program is terminated and the Secure Communities Program shall be restored. To 

protect our communities and better facilitate the identification, detention, and removal of criminal 

aliens within constitutional and statutory parameters, the Department shall eliminate the existing 

Forms I-247D, l-247N, and I-247X, and replace them with a new form to more effectively 

communicate with recipient law enforcement agencies. However, until such forms are updated 

they may be used as an interim measure to ensure that detainers may still be issued, as 

appropriate. 

ICE's Criminal Alien Program is an effective tool to facilitate the removal of criminal 

aliens from the United States, while also protecting our communities and conserving the 

Department's detention resources. Accordingly, ICE should devote available resources to 

expanding the usc of the Criminal Alien Program in any willing jurisdiction in the United States. 

To the maximum extent possible, in coordination with the Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR), removal proceedings shall be initiated against aliens incarcerated in federal, 

state, and local correctional facilities under the Institutional Hearing and Removal Program 

pursuant to section 238(a) of the INA, and administrative removal processes, such as those under 

section 238(b) of the INA, shall be used in all eligible cases. 

The INA § 287(g) Program has been a highly successful force multiplier that allows a 

qualified state or local law enforcement officer to be designated as an ''immigration officer" for 

purposes of enforcing federal immigration law. Such officers have the authority to perform all law 

enforcement functions specified in section 287(a) of the INA, including the authority to 

investigate, identify, apprehend, arrest, detain, and conduct searches authorized under the INA, 

under the direction and supervision of the Department. 

There are currently 32 law enforcement agencies in 16 states participating in the 287(g) 

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Program. In previous years, there were significantly more law enforcement agencies participating 

in the 287(g) Program. To the greatest extent practicable, the Director of!CE and Commissioner 

ofCBP shall expand the 287(g) Program to include all qualified law enforcement agencies that 

request to participate and meet all program requirements. In furtherance of this direction and the 

guidance memorandum, "Implementing the President's Border Security and Immigration 

Enforcement Improvements Policies" (Feb. 20, 2017), the Commissioner ofCBP is authorized, in 

addition to the Director of ICE, to accept State services and take other actions as appropriate to 

carry out immigration enforcement pursuant to section 287(g) of the INA. 

C. Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion 

Unless otherwise directed, Department personnel may initiate enforcement actions against 

removable aliens encountered during the performance oftheir official duties and should act 

consistently with the President's enforcement priorities identified in his Executive Order and any 

further guidance issued pursuant to this memorandum. Department personnel have full authority 

to arrest or apprehend an alien whom an immigration officer has probable cause to believe is in 

violation of the immigration laws. They also have full authority to initiate removal proceedings 

against any alien who is subject to removal under any provision of the INA, and to refer 

appropriate cases for criminal prosecution. The Department shall prioritize aliens described in the 

Department's Enforcement Priorities (Section A) for arrest and removal. This is not intended to 

remove the individual, case-by-case decisions of immigration officers. 

The exercise of prosecutorial discretion with regard to any alien who is subject to arrest, 

criminal prosecution, or removal in accordance with law shall be made on a case-by-case basis in 

consultation with the head of the field office component, where appropriate, ofCBP, ICE, or 

USCIS that initiated or will initiate the enforcement action, regardless of which entity actually 

files any applicable charging documents: CBP Chief Patrol Agent, CBP Director of Field 

Operations, ICE Field Office Director, ICE Special Agent-in-Charge, or the USCIS Field Office 

Director, Asylum Oftice Director or Service Center Director. 

Except as specifically provided in this memorandum, prosecutorial discretion shall not be 

exercised in a manner that exempts or excludes a specified class or category of aliens from 

enforcement ofthe immigration laws. The General Counsel shall issue guidance consistent with 

these principles to all attorneys involved in immigration proceedings. 

D. Establishing the Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE) Office 

Criminal aliens routinely victimize Americans and other legal residents. Often, these 

victims are not provided adequate information about the offender, the offender's immigration 

status, or any enforcement action taken by ICE against the offender. Efforts by ICE to engage 

these victims have been hampered by prior Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy 

extending certain Privacy Act protections to persons other than U.S. citizens and lawful 

permanent residents, leaving victims feeling marginalized and without a voice. Accordingly, I am 

establishing the Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE) Office within the Office of 

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the Director of ICE, which will create a programmatic liaison between ICE and the known vidims 

of crimes committed by removable aliens. The liaison will facilitate engagement with the victims 

and their families to ensure, to the extent permitted by law, that they are provided information 

about the oflcnder, including the offender's immigration status and custody status, and that their 

questions and concerns regarding immigration enforcement efforts are addressed. 

To that end, l direct the Director of ICE to immediately reallocate any and all resources 

that are currently used to advocate on behalf of illegal aliens (except as necessary to comply with 

a judicial order) to the new VOICE Office, and to immediately terminate the provision of such 

outreach or advocacy services to illegal aliens. 

Nothing herein may be construed to authorize disclosures that are prohibited by law or 

may relate to information that is Classified, Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU}, Law Enforcement 

Sensitive (LES). For Official Use Only (FOUO), or similarly designated information that may 

relate to national security, law enforcement, or intelligence programs or operations, or disclosures 

that are reasonably likely to cause harm to any person. 

E. Hiring Additional ICE Officers and Agents 

To enforce the immigration laws effectively in the interior of the United States in 

accordance with the President's directives, additional ICE agents and officers are necessary. The 

Director of ICE shall-while ensuring consistency in training and standards-take all appropriate 

action to expeditiously hire I 0,000 agents and officers, as well as additional operational and 

mission support and legal staff necessary to hire and support their activities. Human Capital 

leadership in CBP and ICE. in coordination with the Under Secretary for Management and the 

Chief Human Capital Officer, shall develop hiring plans that balance grow1h and interagency 

attrition by integrating workforce shaping and career paths for incumbents and new hires. 

F. Establishment of Programs to Collect Authorized Civil Fines and Penalties 

As soon as practicable. the Director of ICE, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of 

users shall issue guidance and promulgate regulations, where required by law, to ensure the 

assessment and collection of all fines and penalties which the Department is authorized under the 

law to assess and collect from aliens and from those who facilitate their unlawful presence in the 

United States. 

G. Aligning the Department's Privacy Policies With the Law 

The Department will no longer afford Privacy Act rights and protections to persons who 

are neither U.S. citizens nor lawful permanent residents. The DHS Privacy Office will rescind the 

DHS Privacy Policy Guidance memorandum, dated January 7, 2009, which implemented the 

DHS "mixed systems" policy of administratively treating all personal information contained in 

DHS record systems as being subject to the Privacy Act regardless of the subject's immigration 

status. The DHS Privacy Office, with the assistance of the Office of the General Counsel, will 

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develop new guidance specifying the appropriate treatment of personal information DHS 

maintains in its record systems. 

H. Collecting and Reporting Data on Alien Apprehensions and Releases 

The collection of data regarding aliens apprehended by ICE and the disposition of their 

cases will assist in the development of agency performance metrics and provide transparency in 

the immigration enforcement mission. Accordingly, to the extent permitted by law, the Director of 

ICE shall develop a standardized method of reporting statistical data regarding aliens apprehended 

by ICE and, at the earliest practicable time, provide monthly reports of such data to the public 

without charge. 

The reporting method shall include uniform terminology and shall utilize a format that is 

easily understandable by the public and a medium that can be readily accessed. At a minimum, in 

addition to statistical information currently being publicly reported regarding apprehended aliens, 

the following categories of information must be included; country of citizenship, convicted 

criminals and the nature of their offenses, gang members, prior immigration violators, custody 

status of aliens and, if released, the reason for release and location of their release, aliens ordered 

removed, and aliens physically removed or returned. 

The ICE Director shall also develop and provide a weekly report to the public, utilizing a 

medium that can be readily accessed without charge, of non-Federal jurisdictions that release 

aliens from their custody, notwithstanding that such aliens arc subject to a detainer or similar 

request for custody issued by ICE to that jurisdiction. In addition to other relevant information, to 

the extent that such information is readily available, the report shall reflect the name of the 

jurisdiction, the citizenship and immigration status of the alien, the arrest, charge, or conviction 

for which each alien was in the custody of that jurisdiction, the date on which the ICE detainer or 

similar request f(lr custody was served on the jurisdiction by ICE, the date of the alien's release 

from the custody ofthat jurisdiction and the reason tor the release, an explanation concerning why 

the detainer or similar request for custody was not honored, and all arrests, charges, or convictions 

occurring after the alien's release from the custody of that jurisdiction. 

I. No Private Right of Action 

This document provides only internal DHS policy guidance, which may be modified, 

rescinded, or superseded at any time without notice. This guidance is not intended to, does not, 

and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit. substantive or procedural, enforceable at 

law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. Likewise, no limitations are 

placed by this guidance on the otherwise lawful enforcement or litigation prerogatives of DHS. 

In implementing these policies, I direct DHS Components to consult with legal counsel to 

ensure compliance with all applicable laws, including the Administrative Procedure Act. 

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9/28/2017 Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA I Homeland Security 

~ Off1C1a! webs1te of the Department of Homeland Secunty 

U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security 

Memorandum on Rescission Of 

Deferred Action For Childhood 

Arrivals (DACA) 

Release Date: September 5, 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

James W. McCament 

Acting Director 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Thomas D. Homan 

Acting Director 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Kevin K. McAieenan 

Acting Commissioner 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Joseph B. Maher 

Acting General Counsel 

Ambassador James D. Nealon 

Assistant Secretary, International Engagement 

Julie M. Kirchner 

Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman 

FROM: 

Elaine C. Duke 

Acting Secretary 

https:/lwww.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum.rescission-daca 116 
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9/28/20'17 Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA 1 Homeland Security 

SUBJECT: 

Rescission of the June 15,2012 Memorandum Entitled "Exercising Prosecutor! a( Discretion 

with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" 

This memorandum rescinds the June 15, 2012 memorandum entitled "Exercising 

Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as 

Children," which established the program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 

("DACA"). For the reasons and in the manner outlined below, Department of Homeland 

Security personnel shall take all appropriate actions to execute a wind-down of the program, 

consistent with the parameters established in this memorandum. 

Background 

The Department of Homeland Security established DACA through the issuance of a 

memorandum on June 15,2012. The program purported to use deferred action-an act of 

prosecutorial discretion meant to be applied only on an individualized case-by-case basis-to 

confer certain benefits to illegal aliens that Congress had not otherwise acted to provide by 

law.ill.l1t...f!nllSpecifically, DACA provided certain illegal aliens who entered the United States 

before the age of sixteen a period of deferred action and eligibility to request employment 

authorization. 

On November 20, 2014, the Department issued a new memorandum, expanding the 

parameters of DACA and creating a new policy called Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 

and Lawful Permanent Residents ("DAPA"). Among other things-such as the expansion of the 

coverage criteria underthe 2012 DACA policy to encompass aliens with a wider range of ages 

and arrival dates, and lengthening the period of deferred action and work authorization from 

two years to three-the November 20,2014 memorandum directed USCIS "to establish a 

process, similarto DACA, for exercising prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred 

action, on a case-by-case basis," to certain aliens who have "a son or daughter who is a U.S. 

citizen or lawful permanent resident." 

Prior to the implementation of DAPA, twenty-six states-led by Texas-challenged the policies 

announced in the November 20,2014 memorandum in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District ofTexas. In an order issued on February 16,2015, the district court preliminarily 

enjoined the policies nationwide.J2liUJ.n1l The district court held that the plaintiff states were 

likely to succeed on their claim that the DAPA program did not comply with relevant 

authorities. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Texas and the 

other states had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and satisfied 

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9/28/2017 Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA 1 Homeland Security 

the other requirements for a preliminary injunction.~ The Fifth Circuit concluded that 

the Department's DAPA policy conflicted with the discretion authorized by Congress. In 

considering the DAPA program, the court noted that the Immigration and Nationality Act 

"flatly does not permit the reclassification of millions of illegal aliens as lawfully present and 

thereby make them newly eligible for a host of federal and state benefits, including work 

authorization." According to the court, "DAPA is foreclosed by Congress's careful plan; the 

program is 'manifestly contrary to the statute' and therefore was properly enjoined." 

Although the original DACA policy was not challenged in the lawsuit, both the district and 

appellate court decisions relied on factual findings about the implementation of the 2012 

DACA memorandum. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court that DACA decisions were 

not truly discretionary~and that DAPA and expanded DACA would be substantially 

similar in execution. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit concluded that 

implementation of the program did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act 

because the Department did not implement it through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's ruling by equally divided vote (4-4).~ 

The evenly divided ruling resulted in the Fifth Circuit order being affirmed. The preliminary 

injunction therefore remains in place today. In October 2016, the Supreme Court denied a 

request from DHS to rehear the case upon the appointment of a new Justice. After the 2016 

election, both parties agreed to a stay in litigation to allow the new administration to review 

these issues. 

On January 25,2017, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,768, "Enhancing Public 

Safety in the Interior of the United States." In that Order, the President directed federal 

agencies to "(e]nsure the faithful execution of the immigration taws ... against all removable 

aliens;' and established new immigration enforcement priorities. On February 20,2017, then 

Secretary of Homeland Security John F. Kelly issued an implementing memorandum, stating 

"the Department no longer will exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from 

potential enforcement," except as provided in the Department's June 15,2012 memorandum 

establishing DACA,~and the November 20,2014 memorandum establishing DAPA and 

expanding DACA.[7] I# ftn71 

On June 15,2017, after consulting with the Attorney General, and considering the likelihood of 

success on the merits of the ongoing litigation, then Secretary John F. Kelly issued a 

memorandum rescinding DAPA and the expansion of DACA-but temporarily left in place the 

June 15,2012 memorandum that initially created the DACA program. 

Then, on June 29,2017, Texas, along with several other states, sent a letter to Attorney 

General Sessions asserting that the original 2012 DACA memorandum is unlawful for the same 

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9/28/2017 Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA 1 Homeland Security 

reasons stated in the Fifth Circuit and district court opinions regarding DAPA and expanded 

DACA. The letter notes that if DHS does not rescind the DACA memo by SeptemberS, 2017, the 

States will seek to amend the DAPA lawsuit to include a challenge to DACA. 

The Attorney General sent a letter to the Department on September 4, 2017, articulating his 

legal determination that DACA "was effectuated by the previous administration through 

executive action, without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date, after 

Congress' repeated rejection of proposed legislation that would have accomplished a similar 

result. Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws was an unconstitutional 

exercise of authority by the Executive Branch." The letter further stated that because DACA 

"has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA, it is 

likely that potentially imminent litigation would yield similar results with respect to DACA." 

Nevertheless, in light of the administrative complexities associated with ending the program, 

he recommended that the Department wind it down in an efficient and orderly fashion, and 

his office has reviewed the terms on which our Department will do so. 

Rescission of the June 15, 2012 DACA Memorandum 

Taking into consideration the Supreme Court's and the Fifth Circuit's rulings in the ongoing 

litigation, and the September 4, 2017letter from the Attorney General, it is clear that the June 

15, 2012 DACA program should be terminated. In the exercise of my authority in establishing 

national immigration policies and priorities, except for the purposes explicitly identified 

below, I hereby rescind the June 1S, 2012 memorandum. 

Recognizing the complexities associated with winding down the program, the Department will 

provide a limited window in which it will adjudicate certain requests for DACA and associated 

applications meeting certain parameters specified below. Accordingly, effective immediately, 

the Department: 

• Will adjudicate-on an individual, case-by-case basis-properly filed pending DACA 

initial requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization Documents 

that have been accepted by the Department as of the date of this memorandum. 

• Will reject all DACA initial requests and associated applications for Employment 

Authorization Documents filed after the date of this memorandum. 

• Will adjudicate-on an individual, case by case basis-properly filed pending DACA 

renewal requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization 

Documents from current beneficiaries that have been accepted by the Department as 

of the date of this memorandum, and from current beneficiaries whose benefits will 

expire between the date of this memorandum and March S, 2018 that have been 

accepted by the Department as of October 5, 2017. 

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9/28/2017 Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA 1 Homeland Security 

• Will reject all DACA renewal requests and associated applications for Employment 

Authorization Documents filed outside of the parameters specified above. 

• Will not terminate the grants of previously issued deferred action or revoke 

Employment Authorization Documents solely based on the directives in this 

memorandum for the remaining duration of their validity periods. 

• Will not approve any new Form 1-131 applications for advance parole under 

standards associated with the DACA program, although it will generally honor the 

stated validity period for previously approved applications for advance parole. 

Notwithstanding the continued validity of advance parole approvals previously 

granted, CBP will-of course-retain the authority it has always had and exercised in 

determining the admissibility of any person presenting at the border and the eligibility 

of such persons for parole. Further, USC IS will-of course-retain the authority to 

revoke or terminate an advance parole document at any time. 

• Will administratively close all pending Form 1-131 applications for advance parole 

filed under standards associated with the DACA program, and will refund all associated 

fees. 

• Will continue to exercise its discretionary authority to terminate or deny deferred 

action at any time when immigration officials determine termination or denial of 

deferred action is appropriate. 

This document is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or 

benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, 

or criminal matter. Likewise, no limitations are placed by this guidance on the otherwise 

lawful enforcement or litigation prerogatives of DHS. 

[1] I# ftnrefll Significantly, while the DACA denial notice indicates the decision to deny is made 

in the unreviewable discretion of USCIS, USCIS has not been able to identify specific denial 

cases where an applicant appeared to satisfy the programmatic categorical criteria as 

outlined in the June 15,2012 memorandum, but still had his or her application denied based 

solely upon discretion. 

[2] I# ftnref2l Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 

[3] I# ftnref3l Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 

[4] (# hnref4) !d. 

[SJ I# ftnrefSl United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). 

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9/28/2017 Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA 1 Homeland Security 

[6] I# ftnref61 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, DHS to David Aguilar, Acting 

Comm'r, CBP, et al., "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 

Came to the United States as Children" (June 15, 2012). 

[7] I# ftnref71 Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Secretary, DHS, to Leon Rodriguez, Dir., USCIS, 

et al., "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 

States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Whose Parents are U.S. Citizens or 

Permanent Residents" (Nov. 20, 2014). 

Topics: Border Security Utopksfborder-securityl, Deferred Action iltopicsjdeferred-actionl 

Keywords: DACA! lkeywords/dacal, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ((keywords/deferred-action·childhood-arriva!sl 

Last Published Date: September 5, 2017 

https://INww.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum~rescission~daea 616 
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9/28/2017 

Archived Content 

Frequently Asked Questions I USC\S 

U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services 

This page contains Information that is no longer current but remains on our site for reference 

purposes. 

Frequently Asked Questions 

DHS DACA FAOs 

DACA Has Changed! 

• We are no longer accepting initial requests for DACA, but we will adjudicate initial requests 

for DACA accepted by Sept. 5, 2017. 

• We will no longer approve advance parole requests associated with DACA. 

• We are only adjudicating DACA renewal requests received by Oct. s, 2017, from current 

beneficiaries whose benefits will expire between Sept. s, 2017 and March s, 2018. 

• Read the 2017 DACA announcement 

DACA ProcessWhat is Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals?Generallnformation for All Requestors 

• Background Checks 

• After USCIS Makes a Decision 

Initial Requests for DACA 

Renewal of DACA 

Criminal Convictions 

Miscellaneous 

I. General Information for All Requestors 

A. What is Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals? 

As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to focus its enforcement resources on the 

removal of individuals who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety, DHS will exercise 

prosecutorial discretion as appropriate to ensure that enforcement resources are not expended on low 

priority cases, such as individuals who came to the United States as children and meet other key 

guidelines. Individuals who demonstrate that they meet the guidelines below may request consideration 

of deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA) for a period of two years, subject to renewal for a period 

of two years, and may be eligible for employment authorization. 

You may request consideration of DACA if you: 

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9/28/2017 Frequently Asked Questions 1 USCIS 

1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; 

2. Came to the United States before reaching your 16th birthday; 

3. Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15,2007, up to the present time; 

4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of making your 

request for consideration of deferred action with USC IS; 

5. Had no lawful status on June 15,2012, meaning that: 

• You never had a lawful immigration status on or before June 15, 2012, or 

• Any lawful immigration status or parole that you obtained prior to June 15, 2012, had expired 

as of June 15, 2012; 

6. Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high school, 

have obtained a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged 

veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; and 

7. Have not been convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, three or more other misdemeanors, 

and do not otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety. 

Individuals can call U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) at 1-800-375·5283 with 

questions or to request more information on DACA. Those with pending requests can also use a 

number of online self-help tools which include the ability to check case status and processing times, 

change your address, and send an inquiry about a case pending longer than posted processing times or 

non-delivery of a card or document. 

Ql: What is deferred action? 

Al: Deferred action is a discretionary determination to defer a removal action of an individual as an act of 

prosecutorial discretion. For purposes of future inadmissibility based upon unlawful presence, an 

individual whose case has been deferred is not considered to be unlawfully present during the period in 

which deferred action is in effect. An individual who has received deferred action is authorized by DHS to 

be present in the United States, and is therefore considered by DHS to be lawfully present during the 

period deferred action is in effect. However, deferred action does not confer lawful status upon an 

individual, nor does it excuse any previous or subsequent periods of unlawful presence. 

Under existing regulations, an individual whose case has been deferred is eligible to receive employment 

authorization for the period of deferred action, provided he or she can demonstrate "an economic 

necessity for employment." DHS can terminate or renew deferred action at any time, at the agency's 

discretion. 

Q2: What is DACA? 

A2: On June 15, 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that certain people who came to 

the United States as children and meet several key guidelines may request consideration of deferred 

action for a period of two years, subject to renewal, and would then be eligible for work authorization. 

Individuals who can demonstrate through verifiable documentation that they meet these guidelines will 

be considered for deferred action. Determinations will be made on a case-by-case basis under the DACA 

guidelines. 

Q3: Is there any difference between "deferred action" and DACA under this process? 

A3: DACA is one form of deferred action. The relief an individual receives under DACA is identical for 

immigration purposes to the relief obtained by any person who receives deferred action as an act of 

prosecutorial discretion. 

Q4: If my removal is deferred under the consideration of DACA, am I eligible for employment 

authorization? 

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A4: Yes. Under existing regulations, if your case is deferred, you may obtain employment authorization 

from USCIS provided you can demonstrate an economic necessity for employment. 

QS: If my case is deferred, am I in lawful status for the period of deferral? 

AS: No. Although action on your case has been deferred and you do not accrue unlawful presence (for 

admissibility purposes) during the period of deferred action, deferred action does not confer any lawful 

status. 

The fact that you are not accruing unlawful presence does not change whether you are in lawful status 

while you remain in the United States. However, although deferred action does not confer a lawful 

immigration status, your period of stay is authorized by the Department of Homeland Security while your 

deferred action is in effect and, for admissibility purposes, you are considered to be lawfully present in 

the United States during that time.lndividuals granted deferred action are not precluded by federal 

law from establishing domicile in the u.s. 

Apart from the immigration laws, "lawful presence,'' "lawful status" and similar terms are used in various 

other federal and state laws. For information on how those laws affect individuals who receive a favorable 

exercise of prosecutorial discretion under DACA, please contact the appropriate federal, state or local 

authorities. 

QG: Can I renew my period of deferred action and employment authorization under DACA? 

A6: Yes. You may request consideration for a renewal of your DACA. Your request for a renewal will be 

considered on a case-by-case basis. If USC IS renews its exercise of discretion under DACA for your case, 

you will receive deferred action for another two years, and if you demonstrate an economic necessity for 

employment, you may receive employment authorization throughout that period. 

Return to top. 

B. DACA Process 

Q7: How do I request consideration of DACA? 

A7: To request consideration of DACA (either as an initial request or to request a renewal), you must 

submit Form I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals to USCIS. Please visit 

uscis.gov/i-82ld before you begin the process to make sure you are using the most current version of the 

form available. This form must be completed, properly signed and accompanied by a Form 1-765, 

Application for Employment Authorization, and a Form I-765WS Worksheet (PDF. 235 KB), establishing 

your economic need for employment. If you fail to submit a completed Form 1-765 (along with the 

accompanying filing fees for that form, please see the Form I-821D page for more information), USCIS will 

not consider your request for deferred action. Please read the form instructions to ensure that you answer 

the appropriate questions (determined by whether you are submitting an initial or renewal request) and 

that you submit all the required documentation to support your initial request. 

You must file your request for consideration of DACA at the USC IS Lock box. You can find the mailing 

address and instructions at www.uscis.gov/i-82ld. As of June 5, 2014, requestors must use the new 

version of the form. After your Form I-821D, Form 1-765, and Form 1-765 Worksheet have been received, 

USCIS will review them for completeness, including submission of the required fee, initial evidence and 

supporting documents (for initial filings). 

If it is determined that the request is complete, USCIS will send you a receipt notice. USCIS will then send 

you an appointment notice to visit an Application Support Center (ASC) for biometric services, if an 

appointment is required. Please make sure you read and follow the directions in the notice. Failure to 

attend your biometrics appointment may delay processing of your request for consideration of deferred 

action, or may result in a denial of your request. You may also choose to receive an email and/or text 

message notifying you that your form has been accepted by completing a Form G-1145 E-Notification of 

A[lplication/Petition Acceptance. 

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Each request for consideration of DACA will be reviewed on an individual, case-by-case basis. USCIS may 

request more information or evidence from you, or request that you appear at a USCIS office. USCIS wilt 

notify you of its determination in writing. 

Note: All individuals who believe they meet the guidelines, including those in removal proceedings, with 

a final removal order, or with a voluntary departure order (and not in immigration detention), may 

affirmatively request consideration of DACA from USCIS through this process. individuals who are 

currently in immigration detention and believe they meet the guidelines may not request consideration of 

deferred action from USC IS but may identify themselves to their deportation officer or Jail Liaison. You 

may also contact the ICE Field Office Director. For more information visit ICE's website 

at wl6Ll<\\J£UQYE<LG1. 

QB: Can I obtain a fee waiver or fee exemption for this process? 

A8; There are no fee waivers available for employment authorization applications connected to DACA. 

There are very limited fee exemptions available. Requests for fee exemptions must be filed and favorably 

adjudicated before an individual files his/her request for consideration of DACA without a fee. In order to 

be considered for a fee exemption, you must submit a tetter and supporting documentation to USCIS 

demonstrating that you meet one of the following conditions: 

• You are under 18 years of age, have an income that is less than 150 percent of the U.S. poverty level, 

and are in foster care or otherwise tacking any parental or other familial support; or 

• You are under 18 years of age and homeless; or 

• You cannot care for yourself because you suffer from a serious, chronic disability and your income is 

less than 150 percent of the U.S. poverty level; or, 

• You have, at the time of the request, accumulated $10,000 or more in debt in the past 12 months as a 

result of unreimbursed medical expenses for yourself or an immediate family member, and your 

income is less than 150 percent of the U.S. poverty level. 

You can find additional information on our B&.Jxemption Guidance Web page. Your request must be 

submitted and decided before you submit a request for consideration of DACA without a fee. in order to 

be considered for a fee exemption, you must provide documentary evidence to demonstrate that you 

meet any of the above conditions at the time that you make the request. For evidence, USC IS wilt: 

• Accept affidavits from community-based or religious organizations to establish a requestor's 

hometessness or lack of parental or other familial financial support. 

• Accept copies of tax returns, bank statement, pay stubs, or other reliable evidence of income level. 

Evidence can also include an affidavit from the applicant or a responsible third party attesting that 

the applicant does not file tax returns, has no bank accounts, and/or has no income to prove income 

level. 

• Accept copies of medical records, insurance records, bank statements, or other reliable evidence of 

unreimbursed medical expenses of at least $10,000. 

• Address factual questions through Requests for Evidence (RFEs). 

Q9: If individuals meet the guidelines for consideration of OACA and are encountered by u.s. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), will they 

be placed into removal proceedings? 

A9: DACA is intended, in part, to allow CBP and ICE to focus on priority cases. Under the direction of the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, if an individual meets the guidelines for DACA, CBP or ICE should exercise 

their discretion on a case-by-case basis to prevent qualifying individuals from being apprehended, placed 

into removal proceedings, or removed. if individuals believe that, in light of this policy, they should not 

have been apprehended or placed into removal proceedings, contact the Law Enforcement Support 

Center's hotline at 1-855-448-6903 (staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week). 

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QlO: Does this process apply to me if I am currently in removal proceedings, have a final removal 

order, or have a voluntary departure order? 

AlO: This process is open to any individual who can demonstrate he or she meets the guidelines for 

consideration, including those who have never been in removal proceedings as well as those in removal 

proceedings, with a final order, or with a voluntary departure order (as long as they are not in immigration 

detention). 

Qll: If 1 am not in removal proceedings but believe I meet the guidelines for consideration of DACA, 

should I seek to place myself into removal proceedings through encounters with CBP or ICE? 

All: No.lfyou are not in removal proceedings but believe that you meet the guidelines, you should 

submit your DACA request to USCIS under the process outlined below. 

Ql2: Can I request consideration of DACA from US CIS if I am in immigration detention under the 

custody of ICE? 

Al2: No. If you are currently in immigration detention, you may not request consideration of DACA from 

USCIS. If you think you may meet the guidelines of this process, you should identify yourself to your 

deportation officer or Jail Liaison. You may also contact the ICE Field Office Director. For more 

information, visit ICE's website at www.ice.gov/daca. 

Qll: If I am about to be removed by ICE and believe that I meet the guidelines for consideration of 

DACA, what steps should I take to seek review of my case before removal? 

Al3: If you believe you can demonstrate that you meet the guidelines and are about to be removed, you 

should immediately contact the Law Enforcement Support Center's hotline at 1-855-448-6903 (staffed 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week). 

Q14: What should I do if I meet the guidelines of this process and have been issued an ICE detainer 

following an arrest by a state or local law enforcement officer? 

Al4: If you meet the guidelines and have been served a detainer, you should immediately contact the Law 

Enforcement Support Center's hotline at 1-855-448-6903 (staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week). 

QlS: If I accepted an offer of administrative closure under the case-by-case review process or my 

case was terminated as part of the case-by-case review process, can I be considered for deferred 

action under this process? 

Al5: Yes. If you can demonstrate that you meet the guidelines, you will be able to request consideration of 

DACA even if you have accepted an offer of administrative closure or termination under the case-by-case 

review process. 

Ql&: If I declined an offer of administrative closure under the case-by-case review process, can I be 

considered for deferred action under this process? 

Al6: Yes. If you can demonstrate that you meet the guidelines, you will be able to request consideration of 

DACA even if you declined an offer of administrative closure under the case-by-case review process. 

Q17: If my case was reviewed as part of the case-by-case review process but I was not offered 

administrative closure, can I be considered for deferred action under this process? 

Al7: Yes. If you can demonstrate that you meet the guidelines, you will be able to request consideration of 

DACA even if you were not offered administrative closure following review of your case as part of the caseby-case review process. 

QlS: Can I request consideration of DACA under this process if I am currently in a nonimmigrant 

status (e.g. F-1, E-2, H-4) or have Temporary Protected Status (TPS)? 

AlB: No. You can only request consideration of DACA under this process if you currently have no 

immigration status and were not in any lawful status on June 15,2012. 

Q19: Will the information I share in my request for consideration of DACA be used for immigration 

enforcement purposes? 

A19: Information provided in this request is protected from disclosure to ICE and CBP for the purpose of 

immigration enforcement proceedings unless the reauestor meets the criteria for the issuance of a Notice 

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To Appear or a referral to ICE under the criteria set forth in USCIS' Notice to Appear guidance 

(www.uscis.gov/NTA).Individuals whose cases are deferred pursuant to DACA will not be referred to ICE. 

The information may be shared with national security and law enforcement agencies, including ICE and 

CBP, for purposes other than removal, including for assistance in the consideration of DACA, to identify or 

prevent fraudulent claims, for national security purposes, or for the investigation or prosecution of a 

criminal offense. The above information sharing policy covers family members and guardians, in addition 

to the requestor. This policy, which may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without 

notice, is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive 

or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. 

Q20: If my case is referred to ICE for immigration enforcement purposes or if I receive an NTA, will 

information related to my family members and guardians also be referred to ICE for immigration 

enforcement purposes? 

A20: If your case is referred to ICE for purposes of immigration enforcement or you receive an NTA, 

information related to your family members or guardians that is contained in your request will not be 

referred to ICE for purposes of immigration enforcement against family members or guardians. However, 

that information may be shared with national security and law enforcement agencies, including ICE and 

CBP, for purposes other than removal, including for assistance in the consideration of DACA, to identify or 

prevent fraudulent claims, for national security purposes, or for the investigation or prosecution of a 

criminal offense. 

This policy, which may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice, is not intended 

to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 

enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. 

Q21: Will USCIS verify documents or statements that I provide in support of a request for DACA? 

A21: USC IS has the authority to verify documents, facts, and statements that are provided in support of 

requests for DACA. USC IS may contact education institutions, other government agencies, employers, or 

other entities in order to verify information. 

Return to top. 

c. Background Checks 

Q22: Will US CIS conduct a background check when reviewing my request for consideration of DACA? 

A22: Yes. You must undergo biographic and biometric background checks before USC IS will consider your 

DACA request. 

Q23: What do background checks involve? 

A23: Background checks involve checking biographic and biometric information provided by the 

individuals against a variety of databases maintained by DHS and other federal government agencies. 

Q24: What steps will USC IS and ICE take if I engage in fraud through the new process? 

A24: If you knowingly make a misrepresentation, or knowingly fail to disclose facts, in an effort to obtain 

DACA or work authorization through this process, you will be treated as an immigration enforcement 

priority to the fullest extent permitted by law, and be subject to criminal prosecution and/or removal from 

the United States. 

Return to top. 

D. After USCIS Makes a Decision 

Q25: Can I appeal USCIS' determination? 

A25: No. You cannot file a motion to reopen or reconsider, and cannot appeal the decision if USC IS denies 

your request for consideration of DACA. 

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You may request a review of your 1-8210 denial by contacting USCIS' National Customer Service Center at 

1-800-375-5283 to have a service request created if you believe that you actually did meet all of the DACA 

guidelines and you believe that your request was denied because USC IS: 

• Denied the request based on abandonment, when you actually responded to a Request for Evidence 

(RFE) or Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) within the prescribed time; 

• Mailed the RFE or NOID to the wrong address although you had changed your address online at 

l!lil'f,YYJL'i£L~g_qy or with a customer service representative on the phone and submitted a Form AR-ll, 

Change of Address, before USCIS issued the RFE or NOID. 

a To ensure the address is updated on a pending case as quickly as possible, we recommend that 

customers submit a change of address request at www.uscis.gov/addresschan~e. Please note 

that only an online change of address or a Form AR-ll submission will satisfy the legal 

requirements for notifying the agency of an address change. Therefore, if you called a customer 

service representative to change your address, please be sure you have also submitted your 

address change online or with a Form AR-ll. 

• Denied the request on the grounds that you did not come to the United States prior to your 16th 

birthday, but the evidence submitted at the time of filing shows that you did arrive before reaching 

that age. 

• Denied the request on the grounds that you were under age 15 at the time of filing but not in removal 

proceedings, while the evidence submitted at the time of filing show that you indeed were in removal 

proceedings when the request was filed; 

• Denied the request on the grounds that you were 31 or older as of June 15, 2012, but the evidence 

submitted at the time of filing shows that you were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; 

• Denied the request on the grounds that you had lawful status on June 15,2012, but the evidence 

submitted at the time of filing shows that you indeed were in an unlawful immigration status on that 

date; 

• Denied the request on the grounds that you were not physically present in the United States on June 

15, 2012, and up through the date of filing, but the evidence submitted at the time of filing shows that 

you were, in fact, present; 

• Denied the request due to your failure to appear at a USCIS Application Support Center (ASC) to have 

your biometrics collected, when you in fact either did appear at a US CIS ASC to have this done or 

requested prior to the scheduled date of your biometrics appointment to have the appointment 

rescheduled; or 

• Denied the request because you did not pay the filing fees for Form 1-765, Application for 

Employment Authorization, when you actually did pay these fees 

If you believe your request was denied due to any of these administrative errors, you may contact our 

National Customer Service Center at 1-800-375-5283 or 1-800-767-1833 (TDD for the hearing 

impaired). Customer service officers are available Monday- Friday from 8 a.m.- 6 p.m. in each U.S. time 

zone. 

Q26: If USCIS does not exercise deferred action in my case, will I be placed in removal proc;eedings? 

A26: If you have submitted a request for consideration of DACA and USCIS decides not to defer action in 

your case, USCIS will apply its policy guidance governing the referral of cases to ICE and the issuance of 

Notices to Appear (NTA). If your case does not involve a criminal offense, fraud, or a threat to national 

security or public safety, your case will not be referred to ICE for purposes of removal proceedings except 

where DHS determines there are exceptional circumstances. For more detailed information on the 

applicable NTA policy, visit .W'!JW.u;;.<;i.e,gQY[NM. If after a review of the totality of circumstances USC IS 

determines to defer action in your case, USC IS will likewise exercise its discretion and will not issue you 

an NTA. 

Q27: Can my deferred action under the DACA process be terminated before it expires? 

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A27:Yes. 

!JACA is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action may be terminated at any time, with 

or without a Notice of Intent to Terminate, at DHS's discretion. 

Return to top. 

11. Initial Requests for DACA 

Q28: What guidelines must 1 meet to be considered for deferred action for childhood arrivals 

(DACA)? 

A28: Under the Secretary of Homeland Security's June 15,2012 memorandum, in order to be considered 

for DACA, you must submit evidence, including supporting documents, showing that you: 

1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; 

2. Came to the United States before reaching your 16th birthday; 

3. Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15,2007, up to the present time; 

4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of making your 

request for consideration of deferred action with USC IS; 

5. Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012; 

6. Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high school, 

have obtained a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged 

veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; and 

7. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, three or more other misdemeanors, 

and do not otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety. 

These guidelines must be met for consideration of DACA. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS) retains the ultimate discretion to determine whether deferred action is appropriate in any given 

case even if the guidelines are met. 

Q29: How old must I be in order to be considered for deferred action under this process? 

A29: 

• If you have never been in removal proceedings, or your proceedings have been terminated before 

your request for consideration of DACA, you must be at least 15 years of age or older at the time of 

filing and meet the other guidelines. 

• If you are in removal proceedings, have a final removal order, or have a voluntary departure order, 

and are not in immigration detention, you can request consideration of DACA even if you are under 

the age of 15 at the time of filing and meet the other guidelines. 

• In all instances, you must have been under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012, to be considered for 

DACA. 

Q30: I first came to the United States before I turned 16 years old and have been continuously 

residing in the United States since at least June 15, 2007. Before I turned 16 years old, however, I 

left the United States for some period of time before returning and beginning my current period of 

continuous residence. May I be considered for deferred action under this process? 

A30: Yes, but only if you established residence in the United States during the period before you turned 

16 years old, as evidenced, for example, by records showing you attended school or worked in the United 

States during that time, or that you lived in the United States for multiple years during that time. In 

addition to establishing that you initially resided in the United States before you turned 16 years old, you 

must also have maintained continuous residence in the United States from June 15,2007, until the 

present time to be considered for deferred action under this process. 

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Q31: To prove my continuous residence in the United States since June 15, 2007, must I provide 

evidence documenting my presence for every day, or every month, of that period? 

A31: To meet the continuous residence guideline, you must submit documentation that shows you have 

been living in the United States from June 15, 2007, up until the time of your request. You should provide 

documentation to account for as much of the period as reasonably possible, but there is no requirement 

that every day or month of that period be specifically accounted for through direct evidence. 

It is helpful to USC IS if you can submit evidence of your residence during at least each year oft he period. 

USC IS will review the documentation in its totality to determine whether it is more likely than not that 

you were continuously residing in the United States for the period since June 15,2007. Gaps in the 

documentation as to certain periods may raise doubts as to your continued residence if, for example, the 

gaps are lengthy or the record otherwise indicates that you may have been outside the United States for a 

period of time that was not brief, casual or innocent. 

If gaps in your documentation raise questions, USCIS may issue a Request for Evidence to allow you to 

submit additional documentation that supports your claimed continuous residence. 

Affidavits may be submitted to explain a gap in the documentation demonstrating that you meet the fiveyear continuous residence requirement. If you submit affidavits related to the continuous residence 

requirement, you must submit two or more affidavits, sworn to or affirmed by people other than yourself 

who have direct personal knowledge of the events and circumstances during the period as to which there 

is a gap in the documentation. Affidavits may only be used to explain gaps in your continuous residence; 

they cannot be used as evidence that you meet the entire five-year continuous residence requirement. 

Q32: Does "currently in school" refer to the date on which the request for consideration of deferred 

action is filed? 

A32: To be considered "currently in school" under the guidelines, you must be enrolled in school on the 

date you submit a request for consideration of deferred action under this process. 

Q33: Who is considered to be "currently in school" under the guidelines? 

A33: To be considered "currently in school" under the guidelines, you must be enrolled in: 

• a public, private, or charter elementary school, junior high or middle school, high school, secondary 

school, alternative program, or homeschool program that meets state requirements; 

• an education, literacy, or career training program (including vocational training) that has a purpose 

of improving literacy, mathematics, or English or is designed to lead to placement in postsecondary 

education, job training, or employment and where you are working toward such placement; or 

• an education program assisting students either in obtaining a regular high school diploma or its 

recognized equivalent under state law (including a certificate of completion, certificate of 

attendance, or alternate award), or in passing aGED exam or other state-authorized exam (e.g., Hi Set 

or TASC) in the United States. 

Such education, literacy, career training programs (including vocational training), or education programs 

assisting students in obtaining a regular high school diploma or its recognized equivalent under state law, 

or in passing aGED exam or other state-authorized exam in the United States, include, but are not limited 

to, programs funded, in whole or in part, by federal, state, county or municipal grants or administered by 

non-profit organizations. Programs funded by other sources may qualify if they are programs of 

demonstrated effectiveness. 

In assessing whether such programs not funded in whole or in part by federal, state, county or municipal 

grants or administered by non-profit organizations are of demonstrated effectiveness, USCIS will consider 

the duration of the program's existence; the program's track record in assisting students in obtaining a 

regular high school diploma or its recognized equivalent, in passing aGED or other state-authorized exam 

(e.g., Hi Set or TASC), or in placing students in postsecondary education, job training, or employment; and 

other indicators of the program's overall quality. For individuals seeking to demonstrate that they are 

"currently in school" through enrollment in such a program, the burden is on the requestor to show the 

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program's demonstrated effectiveness. 

Q34: How do I establish that I am currently in school? 

A34: Documentation sufficient for you to demonstrate that you are currently in school may include, but is 

not limited to: 

• evidence that you are enrolled in a public, private, or charter elementary school, junior high or 

middle school, high school or secondary school; alternative program, or homeschool program that 

meets state requirements; or 

• evidence that you are enrolled in an education, literacy, or career training program (including 

vocational training) that: 

o has a purpose of improving literacy, mathematics, or English, or is designed to lead to placement 

in postsecondary education, job training, or employment and where you are working toward 

such placement; and 

o is funded, in whole or in part, by federal, state, county or municipal grants or is administered by 

non-profit organizations, or if funded by other sources, is a program of demonstrated 

effectiveness; or 

• evidence that you are enrolled in an education program assisting students in obtaining a high school 

equivalency diploma or certificate recognized under state law (such as by passing aGED exam or 

other such state-authorized exam [for example, Hi Set or TASC]), and that the program is funded in 

whole or in part by federal, state, county or municipal grants or is administered by non-profit 

organizations or if funded by other sources, is of demonstrated effectiveness. 

Such evidence of enrollment may include: acceptance letters, school registration cards, letters from a 

school or program, transcripts, report cards, or progress reports which may show the name of the school 

or program, date of enrollment, and current educational or grade level, if relevant. 

Q35: What documentation may be sufficient to demonstrate that I have graduated from high 

school? 

A35: Documentation sufficient for you to demonstrate that you have graduated from high school may 

include, but is not limited to, a high school diploma from a public or private high school or secondary 

school, a certificate of completion, a certificate of attendance, or an alternate award from a public or 

private high school or secondary school, or a recognized equivalent of a high school diploma under state 

law, or aGED certificate or certificate from passing another such state authorized exam (e.g., Hi Set or 

TASC) in the United States. 

Q36: What documentation may be sufficient to demonstrate that I have obtained a GED certificate 

or certificate from passing another such state authorized exam (e.g., Hi Set or TASC)? 

A36: Documentation may include, but is not limited to, evidence that you have passed aGED exam, or 

other state-authorized exam (e.g., Hi Set or TASC), and, as a result, have received the recognized 

equivalent of a regular high school diploma under state law. 

Q37: If I am enrolled in a literacy or career training program, can 1 meet the guidelines? 

A37: Yes, in certain circumstances. You may meet the guidelines if you are enrolled in an education, 

literacy, or career training program that has a purpose of improving literacy, mathematics, or English or is 

designed to lead to placement in postsecondary education, job training, or employment and where you 

are working toward such placement. Such programs include, but are not limited to, programs funded, in 

whole or in part, by federal, state, county or municipal grants or administered by non-profit 

organizations, or if funded by other sources, are programs of demonstrated effectiveness. 

Q38: If I am enrolled in an English as a Second Language (ESL) program, can I meet the guidelines? 

A38: Yes, in certain circumstances. Enrollment in an ESL program may be used to meet the guidelines if 

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the ESL program is funded in whole or in part by federal, state, county or municipal grants, or 

administered by non-profit organizations, or if funded by other sources is a program of demonstrated 

effectiveness. You must submit direct documentary evidence that the program is funded in whole or part 

by federal, state, county or municipal grants, administered by a non-profit organization, or of 

demonstrated effectiveness. 

Q39: Will USC IS consider evidence other than that listed in Chart #1 to show that I have met the 

education guidelines? 

A39: No. Evidence not listed in Chart #1 wilt not be accepted to establish that you are currently in school, 

hilve graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high school, or have obtained'a GED or 

passed another state-authorized exam (e.g., HiSet or TASC). You must submit any of the documentary 

evidence listed in Chart #1 to show that you meet the education guidelines. 

Q40: Will USCIS consider evidence other than that listed in Chart #1 to show that I have met certain 

initial guidelines? 

A40: Evidence other than those documents listed in Chart #1 may be used to establish the following 

guidelines and factual showings if available documentary evidence is insufficient or lacking and shows 

that: 

• You were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012; 

• You came to the United States before reaching your 16th birthday; 

• You satisfy the continuous residence requirement, as long as you present direct evidence of your 

continued residence in the United States for a portion of the required period and the circumstantial 

evidence is used only to fit! in gaps in the length of continuous residence demonstrated by the direct 

evidence; and 

• Any travel outside the United States during the period of required continuous presence was brief, 

casual, and innocent. 

However, USCIS will not accept evidence other than the documents listed in Chart #1 as proof of any of 

tlie following guidelines to demonstrate that you: 

• Were under the age of31 on June 15, 2012; and 

• Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high school, 

have obtained aGED certificate, or are an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed 

Forces of the United States. 

For example, even if you do not have documentary proof of your presence in the United States on June 

15, 2012, you may still be able to satisfy the guideline. You may do so by submitting credible documentary 

evidence that you were present in the United States shortly before and shortly after June 15,2012, which, 

under the facts presented, may give rise to an inference of your presence on June 15,2012 as wet!. 

However, evidence other than that listed in Chart #1 will not be accepted to establish that you have 

graduated high school. You must submit the designated documentary evidence to satisfy that you meet 

this guideline. 

Chart #1 provides examples of documentation you may submit to demonstrate you meet the initial 

guidelines for consideration of deferred action under this process. Please see the instructions of Form I821D Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, for additional details of acceptable 

documentation. 

Chart #1 Examples of Documents to Submit to Demonstrate You Meet the Guidelines 

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Chart #1 Examples of Documents to Submit to Demonstrate You Meet the Guidelines 

Proof of identity 

Proof you came to U.S. 

before your 16th birthday 

Proof of immigration status 

Proof of presence in U.S. on 

June 15,2012 

• Passport or national identity document from your country of origin 

Birth certificate with photo identification 

• School or military ID with photo 

• Any U.S. government immigration or other document bearing your 

name and photo 

• Passport with admission stamp 

• Form I-94/I-95/I-94W 

• School records from the U.S. schools you have attended 

• Any Immigration and Naturalization Service or DHS document 

stating your date of entry (Form 1-862, Notice to Appear) 

Travel records 

• Hospital or medical records 

• Rent receipts or utility bills 

• Employment records (pay stubs, W-2 Forms, etc.) 

• Official records from a religious entity confirming participation in a 

religious ceremony 

• Copies of money order receipts for money sent in or out of the 

country 

• Birth certificates of children born in the U.S. 

• Dated bank transactions 

• Automobile license receipts or registration 

• Deeds, mortgages, rental agreement contracts 

• Tax receipts, insurance policies 

Form I-94/I-95/I-94Wwith authorized stay expiration date 

• Final order of exclusion, deportation, or removal issued as of June 

15,2012 

• A charging document placing you into removal proceedings 

• Rent receipts or utility bills 

• Employment records (pay stubs, W-2 Forms, etc.) 

• School records (letters, report cards, etc.) 

• Military records (Form DD-214 or NGB Form 22) 

• Official records from a religious entity confirming participation in a 

religious ceremony 

• Copies of money order receipts for money sent in or out of the 

country 

• Passport entries 

• Birth certificates of children born in the U.S. 

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Chart #1 Examples of Documents to Submit to Demonstrate You Meet the Guidelines 

Proof you continuously 

resided in U.S. since June 

15,2007 

Proof of your education 

status at the time of 

requesting consideration of 

DACA 

Proof you are an honorably 

discharged veteran of the 

U.S. Armed Forces or the 

U.S. Coast Guard 

o Dated bank transactions 

o Automobile license receipts or registration 

o Deeds, mortgages, rental agreement contracts 

o Tax receipts, insurance policies 

o School records (transcripts, report cards, etc.) from the school that 

you are currently attending in the United States showing the 

name(s) of the school(s) and periods of school attendance and the 

current educational or grade level 

o U.S. high school diploma, certificate of completion, or other 

alternate award 

o High school equivalency diploma or certificate recognized under 

state law 

o Evidence that you passed a state-authorized exam, including the 

GED or other state-authorized exam (for example, Hi Set or TASC) in 

the United States 

o Form DD-214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty 

o NGB Form 22, National Guard Report of Separation and Record of 

Service 

o Military personnel records 

o Military health records 

Q41: May I file affidavits as proof that I meet the initial guidelines for consideration of DACA? 

A41: Affidavits generally will not be sufficient on their own to demonstrate that you meet the guidelines 

for USC IS to consider you for DACA. However, affidavits may be used to support meeting the following 

guidelines only if the documentary evidence available to you is insufficient or lacking: 

o Demonstrating that you meet the five year continuous residence requirement; and 

o Establishing that departures during the required period of continuous residence were brief, casual 

and innocent. 

If you submit affidavits related to the above criteria, you must submit two or more affidavits, sworn to or 

affirmed by people other than yourself, who have direct personal knowledge of the events and 

circumstances. Should USC IS determine that the affidavits are insufficient to overcome the unavailability 

or the lack of documentary evidence with respect to either of these guidelines, it will issue a Request for 

Evidence, indicating that further evidence must be submitted to demonstrate that you meet these 

guidelines. 

USCIS will not accept affidavits as proof of satisfying the following guidelines: 

o You are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of completion or other alternate 

award from high school, have obtained a high school equivalency diploma or certificate (such as by 

passing the GED exam or other state-authorized exam [for example, Hi Set or TASC]), or are an 

honorably discharged veteran from the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; 

o You were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012; 

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o You came to the United States before reaching your 16th birthday; 

o You were under the age of 31 on June 15, 2012; and 

o Your criminal history, if applicable. 

If the only evidence you submit to demonstrate you meet any of the above guidelines is an affidavit, 

USC IS will issue a Request for Evidence, indicating that you have not demonstrated that you meet these 

guidelines and that you must do so in order to demonstrate that you meet that guideline. 

Q42: Willi be considered to be in unlawful status if I had an application for asylum or cancellation of 

removal pending before either USCIS or the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) on June 

15, 2012? 

A42: Yes. If you had an application for asylum or cancellation of removal, or similar relief, pending before 

either USCIS or EOIR as of June 15, 2012, but had no lawful status, you may request consideration of 

DACA. 

Q43: I was admitted for "duration ofstatus" or for a period of time that extended past June 14, 

2012, but violated my immigration status (e.g., by engaging in unauthorized employment, failing to 

report to my employer, or failing to pursue a full course of study) before June 15, 2012. May I be 

considered for deferred action under this process? 

A43: No, unless the Executive Office for Immigration Review terminated your status by issuing a final order 

of removal against you before June 15, 2012. 

Q44: I was admitted for "duration of status" or for a period of time that extended past June 14, 

2012 but "aged out" of my dependent nonimmigrant status as of June 15,2012. May I be 

considered for deferred action under this process? 

A44: Yes. For purposes of satisfying the "had no lawful status on June 15, 2012," guideline alone, if you 

were admitted for "duration of status" or for a period of time that extended past June 14,2012 but "aged 

out" of your dependent nonimmigrant status, on or before June 15,2012, (meaning you turned 21 years 

old on or before June 15, 2012), you may be considered for deferred action under this process. 

Q45: I was admitted for "duration of status" but my status in SEVIS is listed as terminated on or 

before June 15, 2012. May I be considered for deferred action under this process? 

A45: Yes. For the purposes of satisfying the ""had no lawful status on June 15, 2012," guideline alone, if 

your status as of June 15, 2012, is listed as "terminated" in SEVIS, you may be considered for deferred 

action under this process. 

Q46: I am a Canadian citizen who was inspected by CBP but was not issued an 1-94 at the time of 

a,dmission. May I be considered for deferred action under this process? 

A46: In general, a Canadian citizen who was admitted as a visitor for business or pleasure and not issued 

an 1-94, Arrival/Departure Record, (also known as a "non-controlled" Canadian nonimmigrant) is lawfully 

admitted for a period of six months. For that reason, unless there is evidence, including verifiable 

evidence provided by the individual, that he or she was specifically advised that his or her admission 

would be for a different length of time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will consider for 

DACA purposes only, that the alien was lawfully admitted for a period of six months. Therefore, if DHS is 

able to verify from its records that your last non-controlled entry occurred on or before Dec. 14, 2011, DHS 

will consider your nonimmigrant visitor status to have expired as of June 15, 2012 and you may be 

considered for deferred action under this process. 

Q47: I used my Border Crossing Card (BCC) to obtain admission to the United States and was not 

issued an 1-94 at the time of admission. May I be considered for deferred action under this process? 

A47: Because the limitations on entry for a BCC holder vary based on location of admission and travel, 

DHS will assume that the BCC holder who was not provided an 1-94 was admitted for the longest period 

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legally possible-30 days-unless the individual can demonstrate, through verifiable evidence, that he or 

she was specifically advised that his or her admission would be for a different length of time. Accordingly, 

if DHS is able to verify from its records that your last admission was using a BCC, you were not issued an 1-

94 at the time of admission, and it occurred on or before May 14,2012, DHS will consider your 

nonimmigrant visitor status to have expired as of June 15, 2012, and you may be considered for deferred 

action under this process. 

Q48: Do I accrue unlawful presence if I have a pending initial request for consideration of DACA7 

A48: You will continue to accrue unlawful presence while the request for consideration of DACA is pending 

unless you are under 18 years of age at the time of the request. If you are under 18 years of age at the time 

you submit your request, you will not accrue unlawful presence while the request is pending, even if you 

turn 18 while yourrequest is pending with USCIS. If action on your case is deferred, you will not accrue 

unlawful presence during the period of deferred action. However, having action deferred on your case will 

not excuse previously accrued unlawful presence. 

Return to top 

Ill. Renewal of DACA 

Q49: When should I file my renewal request with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)? 

A49: USC IS strongly encourages you to submit your Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) renewal 

request between 150 days and 120 days before the expiration date located on your current Form 1-797 

DACA approval notice and Employment Authorization Document (EAD). Filing during this window will 

minimize the possibility that your current period of DACA will expire before you receive a decision on your 

renewal request. 

USCIS' current goal is to process DACA renewal requests within 120 days. You may submit an inquiry 

about the status of your renewal request after it has been pending more than 105 days. To submit an 

inquiry online, please visit egov.uscis.gov/e-request. 

• Please Note: Factors that may affect the timely processing of your DACA renewal request include, but 

are not limited to: 

o Failure to appear at an Application Support Center (ASC) for a scheduled biometrics 

appointment to obtain fingerprints and photographs. No-shows or rescheduling appointments 

will require additional processing time. 

o Issues of national security, criminality or public safety discovered during the background check 

process that require further vetting. 

o Issues of travel abroad that need additional evidence/clarification. 

o Name/date of birth discrepancies that may require additional evidence/clarification. 

o The renewal submission was incomplete or contained evidence that suggests a requestor may 

not satisfy the DACA renewal guidelines and USC IS must send a request for additional evidence 

or explanation 

QSO: Can I file a rehewal request outside the recommended filing period of 150 days to 120 days 

before my current DACA expires? 

A50: USCIS strongly encourages you to file your renewal request within the recommended 150-120 day 

filing period to minimize the possibility that your current period of DACA will expire before you receive a 

decision on your renewal request. Requests received earlier than 150 days in advance will be accepted; 

however, this could result in an overlap between your current DACA and your renewal. This means your 

renewal period may extend for less than a full two years from the date that your current DACA period 

expires .. 

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If you file after the recommended filing period (meaning less than 120 days before your current period of 

DACA expires), there is an increased possibility that your current period of DACA and employment 

authorization will expire before you receive a decision on your renewal request. If you file after your most 

recent DACA period expired, but within one year of its expiration, you may submit a request to renew your 

DACA.Ifyou are filing beyond one year after your most recent period of DACA expired, you may still 

request DACA by submitting a new initial request. 

QSl: How will US CIS evaluate my request for renewal of DACA: 

A51: You may be considered for renewal of DACA if you met the guidelines for consideration of Initial DACA 

(see above) AND you: 

• Did not depart the United States on or after Aug. 15,2012, without advance parole; 

Have continuously resided in the United States since you submitted your most recent request for 

DACA that was approved up to the present time; and 

• Have not been convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors, and 

do not otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety. 

These guidelines must be met for consideration of DACA renewal. USC IS retains the ultimate discretion to 

determine whether deferred action is appropriate in any given case even if the guidelines are met. 

Q52 Do I accrue unlawful presence if I am seeking renewal and my previous period of DACA expires 

before I receive a renewal of deferred action under DACA? Similarly, what would happen to my work 

authorization? 

A52: Yes, if your previous period of DACA expires before you receive a renewal of deferred action under 

DACA, you will accrue unlawful presence for any time between the periods of deferred action unless you 

are under 18 years of age at the time you submit your renewal request. 

Similarly, if your previous period of DACA expires before you receive a renewal of deferred action under 

DACA, you will not be authorized to work in the United States regardless of your age at time of filing until 

and unless you receive a new employment authorization document from USCIS. 

Q53. Do I need to provide additional documents when I request renewal of deferred action under 

DACA? 

A53. No, unless you have new documents pertaining to removal proceedings or criminal history that you 

have not already submitted to USCIS in a previously approved DACA request. USCIS, however, reserves 

the authority to request at its discretion additional documents, information or statements relating to a 

DACA renewal request determination. 

CAUTION: If you knowingly and willfully provide materially false information on Form I-821D, you will be 

committing a federal felony punishable by a fine, or imprisonment up to five years, or both, under 18 

U.S.C. Section 1001. In addition, individuals may be placed into removal proceedings, face severe 

penalties provided by law, and be subject to criminal prosecution. 

Q54. If I am no longer in school, can I still request to renew my DACA? 

A54. Yes. Neither Form I-821D nor the instructions ask renewal requestors for information about 

continued school enrollment or graduation. The instructions for renewal requests specify that you may be 

considered for DACA renewal if you met the guidelines for consideration of initial DACA, including the 

educational guidelines and: 

1. Did not depart the United States on or after August 15,2012, without advance parole; 

2. Have continuously resided in the United States, up to the present time, since you submitted your 

most recent request for DACA that was approved; and 

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3. Have not been convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor or three or more misdemeanors, and 

are not a threat to national security or public safety. 

QSS. If I initially received DACA and was under the age of 31 on June 1S, 2012, but have since 

become 31 or older, can I still request a DACA renewal? 

ASS. Yes. You may request consideration for a renewal of DACA as long as you were under the age of 31 as 

of June 1S, 2012. 

IV. Travel 

QS6: May I travel outside ofthe United States before I submit an initial Deferred Action for 

Childhood Arrivals (DACAl request or while my initial DACA request remains pending with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)? 

AS6: Any unauthorized travel outside of the United States on or after Aug. 15, 2012, will interrupt your 

continuous residence and you will not be considered for deferred action under this process. Any travel 

outside of the United States that occurred on or after June 1S, 2007, but before Aug. 15, 2012, will be 

assessed by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to determine whether the travel qualifies 

as brief, casual and innocent. (See Chart #2.) 

CAUTION: You should be aware that if you have been ordered deported or removed, and you then leave 

the United States, your departure will likely result in your being considered deported or removed, with 

potentially serious future immigration consequences. 

QS7: If my case is deferred under DACA, will I be able to travel outside of the United States? 

A57: Not automatically. If USCIS has decided to defer action in your case and you want to travel outside 

the United States, you must apply for advance parole by filing a Form 1-131, Application for Travel 

Document and paying the applicable fee ($575). USCIS will determine whether your purpose for 

international travel is justifiable based on the circumstances you describe in your request. Generally, 

USC IS will only grant advance parole if your travel abroad will be in furtherance of: 

• humanitarian purposes, including travel to obtain medical treatment, attending funeral services for a 

family member, or visiting an ailing relative; 

• educational purposes, such as semester-abroad programs and academic research, or; 

• employment purposes such as overseas assignments, interviews, conferences or, training, or 

meetings with clients overseas. 

Travel for vacation is not a valid basis for advance parole. 

You may not apply for advance parole unless and until USC IS defers action in your case under the 

consideration of DACA. You cannot apply for advance parole at the same time as you submit your request 

for consideration of DACA. All advance parole requests will be considered on a case-by-case basis. 

If USCIS has deferred action in your case under the DACA process after you have been ordered deported or 

removed, you may still request advance parole if you meet the guidelines for advance parole described 

above. 

CAUTION: However, for those individuals who have been ordered deported or removed, before you 

actually leave the United States, you should seek to reopen your case before the Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (EOIR) and obtain administrative closure or termination of your removal proceeding. 

Even after you have asked EOIR to reopen your case, you should not leave the United States until after 

EOIR has granted your request. If you depart after being ordered deported or removed, and your removal 

proceeding has not been reopened and administratively closed or terminated, your departure may result 

in your being considered deported or removed, with potentially serious future immigration 

consequences. If you have any questions about this process, you may contact U.S. Immigration and 

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Customs Enforcement (ICE) through the local ICE Office of the Chief Counsel with jurisdiction over your 

case. 

CAUTION: If you travel outside the United States on or after Aug. 15, 2012, without first receiving advance 

parole, your departure automatically terminates your deferred action under DACA. 

QSS: Do brief departures from the United States interrupt the continuous residence requirement? 

ASS: A brief, casual and innocent absence from the United States will not interrupt your continuous 

residence. If you were absent from the United States, your absence will be considered brief, casual and 

innocent if it was on or after June 15, 2007, and before Aug. 15, 2012, and: 

1. The absence was short and reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose for the absence; 

2. The absence was not because of an order of exclusion, deportation or removal; 

3. The absence was not because of an order of voluntary departure, or an administrative grant of 

voluntary departure before you were placed in exclusion, deportation or removal proceedings; and 

4. The purpose of the absence and/or your actions while outside the United States were not contrary to 

law. 

Once USC IS has approved your request for DACA, you may file Form 1-131, Application for Travel 

Document, to request advance parole to travel outside of the United States. 

CAUTION: If you travel outside the United States on or after Aug.15, 2012, without first receiving advance 

parole, your departure automatically terminates your deferred action under DACA. 

Travel Guidelines (Chart #2) 

·Travel Dates 

On or after 

June 15,2007, 

but before 

Aug. 15, 2012 

Type ofTravel 

Brief, casual 

and innocent 

No 

For an Yes 

extended time 

Because of an 

order of 

exclusion, 

deportation, 

voluntary 

departure, or 

removal 

To participate 

in criminal 

activity 

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Does It Affect Continuous Residence 

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Travel Dates Type of Travel 

On or after Any 

Aug. IS, 2012, 

and before 

you have 

requested 

deferred 

action 

On or after Any 

Aug. 15,2012, 

and after you 

have 

requested 

deferred 

action 

On or after Any 

Aug. 15, 2012 

and after 

receiving 

DACA 

Frequently Asked Questions 1 USCIS 

Does It Affect Continuous Residence 

Yes. You cannot apply for advance parole unless and until DHS has 

determined whether to defer action in your case and you cannot 

travel until you receive advance parole. 

In addition, if you have previously been ordered deported and 

removed and you depart the United States without taking additional 

steps to address your removal proceedings, your departure will 

likely result in your being considered deported or removed, with 

potentially serious future immigration consequences. 

It depends. If you travel after receiving advance parole, the travel 

will not interrupt your continuous residence. However, if you travel 

without receiving advance parole, the travel will interrupt your 

continuous residence. 

Q59: May I file a request for advance parole concurrently with my DACA package? 

AS9: Concurrent filing of advance parole is not an option at this time. DHS is, however, reviewing its 

policy on concurrent filing of advance parole with a DACA request. In addition, DHS is also reviewing 

eligibility criteria for advance parole. If any changes to this policy are made, USC IS will update this FAQ 

and inform the public accordingly. 

Return to top. 

V. Criminal Convictions 

Q60: If I have a conviction for a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, or multiple 

misdemeanors, can I receive an exercise of prosecutorial discretion under this new process? 

AGO: No. If you have been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, or three or 

more other misdemeanor offenses not occurring on the same date and not arising out of the same act, 

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omission, or scheme of misconduct, you will not be considered for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 

(DACA) except where the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines there are exceptional 

circumstances. 

Q61: What offenses qualify as a felony? 

A61: A felony is a federal, state, or local criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 

one year. 

Q62: What offenses constitute a significant misdemeanor? 

A62: For the purposes of this process, a significant misdemeanor is a misdemeanor as defined by federal 

law (specifically, one for which the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is one year or less but 

greater than five days) and that meets the following criteria: 

1. Regardless of the sentence imposed, is an offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse or exploitation; 

burglary; unlawful possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or, driving under 

the influence; or, 

2. If not an offense listed above, is one for which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of 

more than 90 days. The sentence must involve time to be served in custody, and therefore does not 

include a suspended sentence. 

The time in custody does not include any time served beyond the sentence for the criminal offense based 

on a state or local law enforcement agency honoring a detainer issued by U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE). Notwithstanding the above, the decision whether to defer action in a particular case is 

an individualized, discretionary one that is made taking into account the totality of the circumstances. 

Therefore, the absence of the criminal history outlined above, or its presence, is not necessarily 

determinative, but is a factor to be considered in the unreviewable exercise of discretion. DHS retains the 

discretion to determine that an individual does not warrant deferred action on the basis of a single 

criminal offense for which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of 90 days or less. 

Q63: What offenses constitute a non-significant misdemeanor? 

A63: For purposes of this process, a non-significant misdemeanor is any misdemeanor as defined by 

federal law (specifically, one for which the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is one year or less 

but greater than five days) and that meets the following criteria: 

1. Is not an offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse or exploitation; burglary; unlawful possession or 

use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or, driving under the influence; and 

2. Is one for which the individual was sentenced to time in custodyof90 days or less. The time in 

custody does not include any time served beyond the sentence for the criminal offense based on a 

state or local law enforcement agency honoring a detainer issued by ICE. 

Notwithstanding the above, the decision whether to defer action in a particular case is an individualized, 

discretionary one that is made taking into account the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, the 

absence of the criminal history outlined above, or its presence, is not necessarily determinative, but is a 

factor to be considered in the unreviewable exercise of discretion. 

Q64: If I have a minor traffic offense, such as driving without a license, will it be considered a nonsignificant misdemeanor that counts towards the "three or more non-significant misdemeanors" 

making me unable to receive consideration for an exercise of prosecutorial discretion under this 

new process? 

A64: A minor traffic offense will not be considered a misdemeanor for purposes of this process. However, 

your entire offense history can be considered along with other facts to determine whether, under the 

totality of the circumstances, you warrant an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 

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Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

l 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Elaine C. Duke 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"Threats to the Homeland Hearing" 

September 27, 2017 

Counterterrorism Grants 

Threats to the Homeland 

The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: There are substantial cuts to counterterrorism programs in the President's 

Budget, including the Visible lntermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, the 

Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program, and various other Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) grants. Do you support cuts to those programs? How will 

those cuts impact our current counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts and security? 

Response: The Fiscal Year 2018 budget recommends changes and reductions in a 

number of Department of Homeland Security Programs, including several administered 

through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (Visible Intermodal 

Prevention and Response or VIPR Teams and the Law Enforcement Officer 

Reimbursement Program). Other reductions have been proposed to the Department's 

preparedness grant programs. 

TSA is obligated to holistically review programs and functions that enhance homeland 

security, and weigh the contributions of each. TSA considers many variables when 

reviewing programs to ensure they take into account the President's vision and national 

budgetary priorities. 

With the resources available for the VIPR Program, TSA will apply the risk-based VIPR 

Concept of Operation to place teams in areas to most effectively support deployments to 

high-risk locations in all modes of transportation. The level of complexity involved with 

securing the homeland from all threats, including those to the transportation domain, 

requires difficult resource allocation decisions. TSA acknowledges the increased terrorist 

threat that can be linked to the recent attacks on soft targets and that this threat must be 

prioritized against all of the threats facing the homeland. Those priorities are captured in 

the President's budget and supported by TSA. 
196 

Question#: I 

Topic: Counterterrorism Grants 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

In the absence of the Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program, each airport operator 

will still be responsible for complying with minimum security requirements set forth in 

their Airport Security Program, including a law enforcement presence and capability at 

the airport that is adequate to ensure the safety of passengers. TSA will continue to work 

with these airport operators in order to ensure that such requirements are maintained in an 

efficient manner. 

Reductions to state and local grants are proposed in order to ensure adequate funding for 

core Department of Homeland Security missions and national priorities, encourage grant 

recipients share responsibility for the cost of preparedness activities in their own budgets, 

and fund those activities that demonstrate the greatest return on security investments. 

Reductions are consistent with the President's budget blueprint priorities to stand 

prepared for emergency response and disaster recovery, while also eliminating funding 

for programs to ensure the federal government is not supplanting other stakeholders' 

responsibilities. 

Although preparedness is a shared responsibility, the Nation's first line of defense rests 

with state and local governments. Since 2002, the federal government has allocated over 

$4 7 billion in grants to support state and local preparedness investments. Those funds 

have been put to good use to expand preparedness capabilities; however the federal 

government should now focus on ensuring that funding is directed to address any 

remaining capability gaps and national priorities. It is time for state and local 

governments to contribute more toward their own preparedness needs so federal costs can 

be reduced. Grantees will potentially need to rcprioritize funding or funding amounts to 

address their highest priority national capability gaps. 
197 

Ono•<tinnJi• 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: As of this writing, the humanitarian crisis in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands is still unfolding. One week after Hurricane Maria: made landfall, 97% of the 3.4 

million U.S. citizens living in Puerto Rico were without power and half had no running 

water. Over 90% of cellular communications sites were out of service and eight of the 37 

hospitals that had been a~sessed by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 

and Department of Defense (DoD) were not operational. 

What, if any, scenarios were developed by DHS or the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) and what, if any, planning, training, and exercises did DHS or FEMA 

conduct in an effort to prepare for a catastrophic weather event affecting Puerto Rico or 

the U.S. Virgin Islands in advance of Hurricane Maria? 

Response: 

a.) Planning: 

FEMA's Planning Hierarchy is outlined below: 

i. Federal Interagency Operations Plan for Response (National Plan)- The 

overarching national concept of operations (CONOPS) is set forth in the Federal 

Interagency Operations Plan (FlOP) for Response. The FlOP outlines the roles, 

responsibilities, logistics and means to deliver each of the core capabilities at 

the national level. 

ii. Power Outage Incident Annex (National Plan)- The Power Outage Incident 

Annex (POIA): Managing the Cascading Impacts from a Long-Term Power 

Outage provides guidance for fcderallcvel responders to provide response and 

recovery support to local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area efforts while 

ensuring the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. This annex 

provides incident-specific supplemental information to the basic concept of 

operations described in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency 

Operational Plans (FlOP), which will be further refined in regional PO lAs. 

The POIA includes the Federal Government's concept of operations and unified 

coordination structures required to execute survivor-centric response and 

recovery operations in the wake of a long-term power outage. The POl A is not 

an electricity restoration plan although the Federal Government may provide the 

appropriate supplemental federal assistance and resources to enable the 
198 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

restoration process in a timely manner. It does outline the types of federal 

support available to Critical Infrastructure stakeholders in restoration activities 

and the responsibilities of industry stakeholders. The document also identifies 

potential critical information requirements and unique considerations that could 

hinder the ability to provide mission-essential services. 

iii. Region II All-Hazards Plan -The Region II (which includes Puerto Rico and 

U.S. Virgin Islands) All-Hazards Plan (the Plan/AHP) is a framework outlining 

a response to the hazards that threaten the population residing in Region Il. The 

Plan guides Federal support to the Region II State, local, tribal, and territorial 

(SLTT) governments during the response phase. The goal is to stabilize the 

incident within the first 72 hours, and the Plan guides operations up through 

response and recovery actions during the first 30 days following an incident. 

Stabilization is defined as the process by which the immediate impacts of an 

incident on community systems are managed and contained. The Plan is 

capabilities-based and is implemented for the immediate application of 

resources to life-saving and life-sustaining missions. 

iv. Region II PRIUSVI Hurricane Annex- The FEMA Region II Hurricane 

Annex for Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands expands the concepts within 

the All Hazards Plan (AHP) to better describe the missions, policies, 

responsibilities, and coordination processes across emergency response 

operations for a notice tropical cyclone incident which requires specialized or 

unique response(s). The purpose of this annex is to support the expedited 

jurisdictional response to tropical and sub-tropical systems, including 

catastrophic hurricanes, as well as tropical depressions, tropical storms, and 

hurricanes, and their secondary and cascading impacts on locations in Puerto 

Rico and the US Virgin Islands. This plan is to be used in conjunction with the 

Al-IP, and is not an exclusive independent document. 

As an operational plan, this annex informs efforts to address potential or actual 

incidents. Developed under non-emergency conditions, it is a deliberate plan. 

As such, it includes a concept of operations and support for mitigating, 

responding to, and recovering from potential threats or hazards. Additionally, it 

includes detailed information on personnel, resources, projected lime lines, 

assumptions, and risk analysis. Like all deliberate planning efforts, the principle 

purpose of this annex is to inform and support incident operations. Transition 

from deliberate to adaptive planning occurs with the threat of a tropical cyclone. 

This document is focused primarily on response tasks and timelines for a 

tropical cyclone event beginning from 120 hours pre-onset of tropical storm 

force winds to 72 hours post-impact and prescribes action regardless of the 
199 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

extent of damage. Beyond the 72-hour benchmark use of deliberate plans is to 

transition to crisis action, and incident action planning. 

v. USVI: 

I. Region II USVI Tsunami Catastrophic Annex- This Operations Plan 

(OPLAN) is a hazard-specific annex to the FEMA Region II All-Hazards 

Plan. However, it is not a stand-alone document. It complements and is 

nested in the All-Hazards Plan. This OPLAN provides specific and 

detailed strategies above and beyond the ones detailed in the All-Hazards 

Plan for the Federal response to a catastrophic tsunami, a no-notice event 

in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), the magnitude of which would result in 

damages above and beyond the response capabilities of the Territory. It 

outlines the intended Federal support for the territorial response 

2. Region II USVI Earthquake Catastrophic Annex- This Operations Plan 

(OPLAN) is a hazard-specific annex to the FEMA Region II All-Hazards 

Plan. However, it is not a stand-alone document. It complements and is 

nested in the All-Hazards Plan. This OPLAN provides specific and 

detailed strategies above and beyond the ones detailed in the All-Hazards 

Plan for the Federal response to a catastrophic earthquake, a no-notice 

event in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), the magnitude of which would 

result in damages above and beyond the response capabilities of the 

Territory. It outlines the intended Federal support for the territorial 

response. 

vi. Puerto Rico: 

I. Puerto Rico Catastrophic Planning Annex- This Catastrophic Planning 

Annex contains information for hazard profiling in the risk assessment 

process, information on Puerto Rico response structure, demography, 

economy, and current crime rates, and other areas discussed by core 

capability within the appropriate appendix. Each was a vital part of the 

risk management process; shaping the overall risk assessment and 

determining response strategy used within this plan. 

2. Region II PR Tsunami Catastrophic Annex- The Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) Region II Puerto Rico Catastrophic 

Tsunami Annex provides a tactical framework for decision making given 
200 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

the occurrence of a catastrophic tsunami occurring off-shore and resulting 

in a tsunami on Puerto Rico. The scope of the annex is the tirst 72 hours of 

the response, stabilizing response operations while providing for inputs 

into long-term recovery decision making given the geographic separation 

from the continental United States (CONUS). The primary purpose of this 

annex is the rapid application of resources supporting 14, pre-defined 

through the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), response core capabilities 

necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet 

basic human needs in a post-catastrophic incident environment. A 

secondary purpose is to maintain public confidence in both the Federal 

and Puerto Rican Government's ability to respond to and recover from this 

type of event. 

The focus of the annexed framework is to outline the integration with 

other FEMA Region II planning efforts and describe the integration and 

synchronization of federally defined core capabilities in accomplishing 

mission- essential tasks in conjunction with whole community partners. As 

an Annex to FEMA Region II's All-Hazards Plan, focus was on 

integration with the parent plan and the Virgin Islands Annex (given 

proximity and Region II Caribbean Area Division [CAD] oversight). 

Other integrative efforts arc focused on complimenting existing national 

and regional guidance, standards, and plans as outlined in the Authorities 

section contained herein. As referenced in the preceding paragraph, core 

capability discussions are limited to those contained, or crossing over, the 

Response Mission Area as defined by the NPG. 

3. Region II PR Earthquake Catastrophic Annex- The Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) Region II Puerto Rico Catastrophic 

Earthquake Annex provides a tactical framework for decision making 

given the occurrence of a catastrophic earthquake occurring on-shore in 

Puerto Rico. The scope of the annex is the first 72 hours of the response; 

stabilizing response operations while providing for inputs into long-term 

recovery decision making given the geographic separation ±rom the 

continental United States (CONUS). The primary purpose of this annex is 

the rapid application of resources supporting 14, pre-defined through the 

National Preparedness Goal (NPG), response core capabilities necessary 

to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human 

needs in a post-catastrophic incident environment. A secondary purpose is 

to maintain public confidence in both the Federal and Puerto Rican 

Government's ability to respond to and recover tram this type of event. 
201 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

The focus of the annexed framework is to outline the integration with 

other FEMA Region II planning efforts and describe the integration and 

synchronization of federally defined core capabilities in accomplishing 

mission-essential tasks in conjunction with whole community partners. As 

an Annex to FEMA Region II's All-Hazards Plan, focus was on 

integration with the parent plan and the Virgin Islands Annex (given 

proximity and Region II Caribbean Area Division [CAD) oversight). 

Other integrative efforts are focused on complimenting existing national 

and regional guidance, standards, and plans as outlined in the Authorities 

section contained herein. As referenced in the preceding paragraph, core 

capability discussions are limited to those contained, or crossing over, the 

Response Mission Area as defined by the NPG. 

Catastrophic planning thresholds (estimated quantities to meals/water/tarps 

potentially needed, potential numbers of survivors/deceased, estimated 

collapsed or damaged structures, etc.) for each scenario jurisdiction are 

described in detail in both the Tsunami and Earthquake Catastrophic Planning 

Annexes which were developed independently for both Puerto Rico and the 

US Virgin Islands and also described in the Puerto Rico Catastrophic Planning 

Annex. Most needs Thresholds identified include hurricane impacts (though 

not itemized in the Hurricane Annex) currently witnessed on the ground 

within each affected jurisdiction. They arc reasonably consistent with these 

planning assumptions which has aided in the ability to conduct betterinformed crisis action planning and has therefore guided response efforts 

throughout the Caribbean area of operations. 

However, it is important to note that no planning assumptions accounted for 

two major hurricane impacts within a two-week timespan and that Hurricane 

Maria damaged or destroyed areas that Irma had left largely spared and vice 

versa. For instance, Hurricane Irma heavily damaged the islands of St. John & 

St. Thomas while Maria impacted Puerto Rico and St. Croix. The end result is 

extensive damage throughout the entire area of operations which has 

presented challenges that exceeded reasonable planning assumptions and 

severely hindered the planned backup concepts of operations for staging 

resources. 

During operations, crisis action planning (incident planning to inform the 

ongoing operations of an incident) is performed for each operational period at 

the national and regional level that adapts the planning assumptions, concepts, 
202 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

tasks, and other factors from the deliberate plans. The execution checklists 

from both the national and regional applicable plans are uploaded onto 

FEMA's consequence management system and reflected in its daily National 

Support Plan for tracking. 

b.) Training: 

Training relevant to capabilities required to execute these plans fall into two categories 

1.) Actions to ensure that FEMA and other federal agencies are prepared to deliver the 

resources and commodities required to support a response consistent with established 

plans to the Caribbean area of operations, and 2.) Training made available to state & local 

personnel in support of their ability to respond to all-hazard events that they may 

confront. 

In regards to the former, FEMA training on execution of the Puerto Rico/US Virgin 

Islands Hurricane Atmex is a regular function of the Region II Office. Monthly training is 

conducted for all RRCC Staff focused on building proficiency in individual and 

collective response tasks to be performed at the Regional Response Coordination Center 

(RRCC) level in collaboration with Incident Management Assistance Tean1 elements 

deployed to the field. This training is also validated through the conduct of interagency 

exercises on a regular basis as further discussed below. 

Consistent with existing preparedness doctrine, Presidential Policy Directive 8, state and 

locally-provided training maintains an all-hazard focus and addresses all five mission 

areas (prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to and recover from all 

hazards) in accordance to training needs expressed by these entities. 

FEMA is working with Puerto Rico to "Build a Culture of Preparedness" by supporting 

and building recovery capacities and community planning resources needed to effectively 

plan for, manage and implement disaster recovery activities in large, unique or 

catastrophic incidents. The three areas of focus include: Individual Incident Workforce 

Development; Integrated Field Operations Training; and Strategic Field Operations 

Training. Next steps include identifying training needs based on Core Capabilities, 

reevaluating Puerto Rico's capability targets, resource requirements, and capability levels 

identified in the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), and 

updating the Puerto Rico Hurricane Plan. As part of this initiative, RII is also working 

with Puerto Rico to plan for the delivery of a multi-day Integrated Emergency 

Management Course (IEMC) in June 2018. This course will provide a facilitated forum 

for Puerto Rico leadership and FEMA to review all aspects of a response to a future 
203 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

hurricane, identify capability gaps, and assess and prioritize and validate capacity 

building requirements unique to an island environment. 

From Oct 2014- March 2017, FEMA provided the following training to Puerto Rico and 

the US Virgin Islands: 

FEMA Delivered Training VIIPR 2017 

• 59 All Hazards Courses delivered 

Catastrophic Event Related Training 

• "Tsunami Training for the Maritime Community" 

• "Tsunami Training for the Tourism Sector" 

• "Hurricane Preparedness for Decision Makers" 

• "Senior Officials Workshop for All Hazards Preparedness" 

DHS Consortium Training VI/PR 2017 

• 97 All Hazards Courses delivered 

Catastrophic Event Related Training 

• "Community Tsunami Preparedness" 

• "Senior Officials Workshop for All Hazards" 

c.) Exercises: 

Relative to the impacts experienced in Hurricanes Irma & Maria, Region II has 

exercised for the following incident types with catastrophic impacts: Tropical 

Cyclone, Earthquake, Tsunami, Cyber, Combinations of Tropical 

Cyclone/Earthquakc!l'sunamis, and Terrorism-related events. 

During 2017 alone, FEMA participated in 10 exercises as follows: 

• Dialysis Fresnius TTX 01-24-2017 

• Dialysis (Atlantis) TTX 01-25-2017 

• Puerto Rico Tropical Journey 2017 Tabletop Exercises- 01-25-2017 

• Western Shelter Drill 03-16-2017 

• Puerto Rico Tropical Journey 2017 Functional Exercise- 03-24-2017 
204 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

• Puerto Rico Tropical Journey 2017 Full Scale Exercise- 04-17-2017 

• Vigilant Guard 2017 05-19-2017 

• Puerto Rico Preparado TTX 05-31-2017 

• PR Long Term Power Outage Workshop 08-10-2017 

d.) Exercises of particular catastrophic scope prior to 2017: 

a. 2016 The Atlantic Wave 2016 exercise tested the current Region II 

Caribbean Hurricane Plan Annex. During exercise play, the Region II Incident 

Management Assistance Team (IMAT) (Team A), the Region II Caribbean 

Area Division (CAD) IMAT (Team C), and National IMAT East I were given 

the opportunity to integrate from three separate entities into one FEMA team. 

As a result of the exercise, increased capacity and capabilities were developed 

between the three IMA Ts as well as for Region II as a whole. Furthermore, 

the exercise worked to enhance the capability and integration of the Region II 

CAD lMA T, Region II lMA T, NationallMAT East-!, and the RII Regional 

Response Coordination Center (RRCC) in order to provide an effective 

response operation and resource support to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 

during a catastrophic hurricane event. 

b. 2014- August Surge Functional Exercise examined implications of multiple 

storms impacting NY/NJ/PRIUSVI 

c. 2013 - Blue Surge Functional Exercises tested catastrophic plan for 

earthquake & tsunami impacts to US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico 

d. 2012 Final CAD Continuity Assessment conducted 

e. 2011 - Regional Continuity Assessment Report 

f. 2011- PR Commodities Distribution Exercised for a catastrophic 

earthquake with the PR National Guard focused on commodities distribution. 

g. 2010- USVI WAPA Power Restoration & Recovery Tabletop Exercise 

designed to exercise recovery operations following complete destruction of 

WAPA power generation capability on St. Thomas and St. Croix 
205 

-- Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

h. 2009 Vigilant Guard Full-scale exercise examined catastrophic flooding to 

Ponce resultant of an earthquake and subsequent tsunami. This exercise 

address power impacts and involved DOE and USACE 

Question: Did this advance planning account for the massive amounts of food, water, 

generators, medical supplies, and repairs to communications and power distribution 

systems that would be required in the event of a catastrophic weather event like 

Hurricane Maria? 

Response: As previously stated, Catastrophic planning thresholds (estimated quantities to 

meals/watcr/tarps potentially needed, potential numbers of survivors/deceased, estimated 

collapsed or damaged structures, etc.) for each scenario jurisdiction are described in 

detail in both the Tsunami and Earthquake Catastrophic Planning Annexes which were 

developed independently for both Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands and also 

described in the Puerto Rico Catastrophic Planning Annex. Most needs Thresholds 

identified include hurricane impacts (though not itemized in the Hurricane Annex) 

currently witnessed on the ground within each affected jurisdiction. They are reasonably 

consistent with these planning assumptions which has aided in the ability to conduct 

better-informed crisis action planning and has therefore guided response efforts 

throughout the Caribbean area of operations. 

However, it is important to note that no planning assumptions accounted for two major 

hurricane impacts within a two-week timespan and that Hurricane Maria damaged or 

destroyed areas that Irma had left largely spared and vice versa. For instance, Hurricane 

Irma heavily damaged the islands of St. John & St. Thomas while Maria impacted Puerto 

Rico and St. Croix. The end result is extensive damage throughout the entire area of 

operations which has presented challenges that exceeded reasonable planning 

assumptions and severely hindered the planned backup concepts of operations for staging 

resources. For example, resources were not able to be effectively staged at Puerto Rico 

for a USVI response, and were not able to be effectively staged at USVI for a Puerto Rico 

Response as both areas of operation were severely damaged by two storms within a short 

period of time. 

Question: Did this advance planning include contingencies in the case of extended 

airport and seaport closures? If so, what were those contingencies? 

Response: Contingencies for extended air and seaport closures are currently in place in 

the form of three logistics support options and are detailed in Annex C of the USVI 
206 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Tsunami and Earthquake Planning Annexes and Appendix 6 of the Puerto Rico Tsunami 

and Earthquake planning annexes. 

Collectively, these annexes call for contingencies such as the utilization of neighboring 

countries, the US mainland and a heavy reliance upon DoD airlift assets in order to 

establish air and sea-bridge operations. These assumptions were challenged in the sense 

that there was competition for DoD airlift in the area of operations due to the impact to 

other island nations impacted by each storm. And as a cascading effect, some of the 

island nations listed in the contingencies were no longer feasible incident staging areas. 

A further complicating factor was the already existing impacts to the State of Texas from 

Hurricane Harvey as well as the anticipated impacts of both Hurricanes Irma and Maria 

to the Florida Peninsula which limited the ability to establish Incident Support Ba~es in 

the southeastern United States. 

During incident operations, FEMA coordinated the development and maintenance of 

Resource Phasing Plans (RPP) to synchronize the movement of resources utilizing 

similar plans developed for other catastrophic scenarios. The RPP set forth a time-phased 

movement of resources from the continental United States to the islands based on the 

limited logistics through-put capacity available during the early phase of response. 

Movements were prioritized based on what resources were required to accomplish field 

and national-levelleadership objectives. 

Question: Please evaluate the ability ofFEMA, DHS, and interagency partners to 

execute any advance plans that were developed in the immediate response to Hurricane 

Maria. 

Response: During operations, crisis action planning (incident planning to inform the 

ongoing operations of an incident) is performed each operational period at the national 

and regional level that adapts the planning assumptions, concepts, tasks, and other factors 

from the deliberate plans. The execution checklists from both the national and regional 

applicable plans arc uploaded onto FEMA's consequence management system and 

reflected in its daily National Support Plan for tracking. Routine crisis action plans 

developed through the adaptation of deliberate planning included: 

• National Support Plans (national-level) 

• Incident Action Plans (field-level) 
207 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

• Information Analysis Briefs and Course of Action Briefs on a variety of topics 

and challenges as they arose during the course of operations (e.g., power, fuel, 

survivor housing, responder lodging, infrastructure coordination, responder 

protective actions, future risks, etc). 

• Resource Phasing Plans (i.e., the time-phased movement of resources from the 

continental United States to the islands based on the limited logistics through-put 

capacity available during the early phase of response) 

FEMA Region II Defense Coordinating Element partners exercised several events that 

aided to the response to Hurricane Irma and Maria: 

a.) Multiple agencies attended the DoD Annual Joint Interagency Hurricane Terrain 

Walk and Exercise conducted on February 23-24, 2017 in Puerto Rico which is 

scheduled prior to each hurricane season. The exercise centered on a hurricane 

impacting USVI and included a site survey of the Port of Ponce and local airport in 

the event of a Defense Support of Civil Authorities response. 

b.) Vigilant Guard 2017 in the USVI (hurricane/tsunami scenario.) Monday May 15 

through Wednesday May 17 2017. Vigilant Guard is a full-scale DoD/National Guard 

exercise in the USVI, with full !MAT deployment in support of the Virgins Islands 

Territorial Management Agency (VITEMA). FEMA CAD personnel deployed to 

live-site exercise venues in support ofVITEMA. FEMA R2 supported the Vigilant 

Guard via the Tide of Support incident support exercise which included a full RRCC 

3 day activation in under the Vigilant Guard umbrella. Elements ofRRCC teams 

provided exercise support as simulators, controllers, and evaluators. Regional 

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) participated at the RRCC and some at exercise 

venues in the USVI. Region II Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) participated at 

the R2 RRCC and in the USVI. 

c.) DoD DCE conducted a Hurricane CONOP and annual preparation for the season 

during quarterly joint battle assemblies. 

d.) The Region II Defense Coordinating Officer met with US Fleet Forces (US Navy) 

and held the initial discussion regarding USFF as the JFMCC (Joint Force Maritime 

Component Command) and the use of the amphibious readiness group (Navy ships). 

Region II will be conducting a detailed analysis throughout the coming months pertaining 

to the RRCC and field operations. Notably, early indications reveal that timelincs and 

associated actions for Hurricane Irma up to the point of landfall were in-line with 

deliberate planning, as captured in the Region II plans detailed above. The extent of post-
208 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Hurricane Maria 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

landfall impacts of Hurricane Irma, in addition to the compounding effects of another 

localized impact of major Hurricane Maria and the resource requirements of multiple 

CONUS landfalls due to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, necessitated a transition of 

regional response (RRCC) operations to the FEMA National Response Coordination 

Center (NRCC). 
209 

Question#: 3 

Topic: Compliance with Federal Regulations 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: On September 8, 2017, Congress appropriated $15.25 billion for disaster 

relief. FEMA has the responsibility of ensuring that disaster relief funding is spent in 

accordance with federal regulations and FEMA policy. Yet, according to the DHS Office 

oflnspector General (OIG), FEMA routinely does not hold recipients and sub recipients 

accountable and reimburses ineligible and unsupported costs. For example, in Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2015, the DHS OIG conducted audits of $1.55 billion in FEMA Public 

Assistance grants and identified $457 million in questionable costs, such as duplicate 

payments, unsupported costs, improper contract costs, and unauthorized expenditures. 

From FY 2009 to FY 2014, FEMA allowed 91% of contract costs that the DHS OIG 

recommended for disallowance for noncompliance with federal procurement regulations. 

What specific steps have DHS and FEMA taken in the wake of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, 

and Maria to ensure that disaster relief funding is spent in compliance with federal 

regulations and FEMA policy? 

Response: FEMA takes seriously its responsibility to protect federal tax dollars by 

ensuring compliance with federal grant regulations (e.g., 2 C.F.R. Part 200) and FEMA 

policy, including those involving procurement regulations and insurance requirements to 

avoid duplicate benefits. To that end, FEMA's Procurement Disaster Assistance Team 

(PDAT) developed and updated its resources to help recipients and sub recipients learn 

and comply with federal procurement regulations. PDAT has also updated its 

procurement training to recipients and sub recipients, and has put together an expanded 

webinar on the latest guidance with separate sub recipient-specific sections for ease of 

review and access. In Fiscal Year 2017 alone (as of August 1, 2017), PDATconducted 

135 procurement training sessions for 3,294 personnel consisting of staff from FEMA, 

State, Tribal, DHS OIG, Protection and National Preparedness (PNP), local emergency 

management departments, and prospective/actual sub recipients. 

To complement PDAT's ongoing efforts, FEMA's Public Assistance (PA) division 

developed guidance to support documentation and justification needed to substantiate the 

use of noncompetitive procurement due to existence of exigent or emergency 

circumstances. A draft of this guidance was completed shortly before Hurricane Harvey. 

Additionally, FEMA developed draft guidance and options being considered for 

enforcement actions related to sub recipient noncompliance with grant conditions. The 

final guidance on addressing noncompliance, along with a separate guidance on 

determining cost reasonableness, is currently in review. 
210 

Question#: 3 

Topic: Compliance with Federal Regulations 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Furthermore, FEMA's Recovery Audits Section has created Region/Recipient/Sub 

recipient type analytic reports based on data collected from the OIG's Procurement 

Capping Report, OIG-16-I 26-D, "FEMA Can Do More to Improve Public Assistance 

Grantees' and Sub grantees' Compliance with Federal Procurement Rules," and has 

shared that information with hundreds ofFEMA, Recipient, and Sub recipient personnel 

to raise awareness of past challenges. FEMA presented the reports to approximately 190 

sub recipient representatives attending a Los Angeles County emergency management 

training in April 2017, in conjunction with PDAT training and a DHS OIG audit trends 

brief. 

Currently, FEMA is concurrently responding to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, 

which are some of the largest disasters in the history of the United States. To improve 

P A delivery across these disasters, FEMA is implementing the new PA delivery model on 

these and all future declared disasters where feasible. The new PA delivery model 

simplifies and improves the delivery of the PA program by deliberately targeting the 

early phases of the grants life-cycle- the pre-award and award phases- to avoid 

challenges that historically arose during the post-award and closeout phase. Specifically, 

the P A delivery model provides better grants management and fiscal responsibility from 

the beginning to end by segmenting projects based on complexity and the type of work, 

standardizing workflow processes, specializing staff roles and responsibilities, and 

consolidating subject matter experts in Consolidated Resource Centers to improve 

consistency and accuracy. Over the past two years, the new P A delivery model was 

piloted in multiple disasters, with results showing improved simplicity, accuracy, 

timeliness, and accessibility for local communities. 

As a result of this transition, FEMA is in the process of training and deploying more than 

1,600 FEMA, contractor, and other federal agency staff on the new P A delivery model 

and surging additional technical staff to Consolidated Resource Centers in Denton, TX 

and Winchester, VA. 

Additionally, in preparation for potential impacts of tropical cyclones for the remainder 

of the hurricane season, FEMA is in the process of identifying another I ,000 personnel to 

support the delivery ofPA. 

The following is a list of some specific steps FEMA has taken in the wake of Hurricanes 

Harvey, Irma, and Maria to ensure that disaster relief funding is spent in compliance with 

federal regulations and FEMA policy: 

• On September I 0, 20 I 7, FEMA' s Assistant Administrator for Recovery issued a 

memorandum in response to the State of Texas's request for FEMA to concur that 
211 

Question#: 3 

Topic: Compliance with Federal Regulations 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

exigent and emergency circumstances exist for procurement. This memorandum 

provides guidance for FEMA statiworking with sub recipients in Texas and 

includes a Frequently Asked Questions on Sole Sourcing in Exigency or 

Emergency Circumstances document. 

• On September 10,2017, FEMA's Assistant Administrator for Recovery issued a 

memorandum to all Regional Administrators, advising them of the P A insurance 

review process under the new P A delivery model, and emphasizing the need to 

inform applicants of insurance requirements, to ensure applicants do not receive 

duplication of benefits and to take appropriate actions upon the discovery of 

errors, omissions, or questions concerning an applicant's insurance information. 

• On September 12, 2017, FEMA's Assistant Administrator for Recovery issued a 

memorandum to all Regional Administrators, advising them that to improve 

recovery of disaster affected communities and local governments, FEMA will be 

implementing the PA program for all future declared disasters using the updated 

delivery model the Agency has been piloting since 2015. 

• PDA T deployed staff to the Joint Field Offices in Texas, Florida and Georgia. 

Currently, PDAT is assisting teams on the ground in Puerto Rico and California, 

and plans to deploy staff to these locations as needed. While deployed, PDAT 

provides trainings on the Federal procurement standards and responds to requests 

for technical assistance from FEMA, Recipient, and Sub recipient staff members. 

In Texas, Florida, and Georgia, PDA T has already provided dozens of training 

sessions to well over 1,000 attendees, with more training sessions scheduled. 
212 

-- Question#: 4 

Topic: O!G Budget 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The President's FY 2018 budget request, ifenaeted, would significantly 

increase DHS's total discretionary spending authority but significantly reduce funding for 

the DHS OIG. Compared to FY 2017 enacted appropriations, the President's request 

would reduce funding for the DHS OIG by $17 million- or 9.7%. 

Do you support the President's request to reduce funding for the DHS OIG in FY 2018 

given the ongoing response to and recovery from Hurricanes Harvey, Im1a, and Maria 

and the need to monitor spending for waste, fraud, and abuse, so that disaster relief 

funding reaches hurricane victims as intended? Why or why not? 

Response: The President's FY 2018 Budget request addresses the appropriate mission 

needs of the Department including the OIG. 

Question: Do you believe that when DHS's total budget authority increases, the budget 

for the DHS OIG should increase proportionally? 

Response: Not necessarily. The oversight requirements of each of the Components and 

activities should be based on the specific component requirements and desired outcome. 

While a change in overall DHS budget authority may be a catalyst for reviewing the 

OIG's oversight requirements, it should not automatically result in an increase or 

decrease to the OIG's budget. 

Question: What, if any, requests for additional funding for the DHS OIG has DHS made 

to the President, Office of Management and Budget, or congressional appropriators in the 

wake of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria? Please provide details on any such 

requests. 

Response: The OIG received $35 million in additional funding needs to support 

hurricane response oversight. The first $1 0 million of this requirement was included in 

the second hurricane supplemental appropriated by Congress on October 26, 2017. The 

remaining $25 million of this requirement was included in P.L. 115-123, Further 

Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2018 to 

support OIG audits to help prevent the misuse of disaster assistance funding from FEMA. 
213 

Question#: 5 

Topic: Contracting Officer Workforce 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The Government Accountability Offlcc (GAO), in September 2015, reported 

that, despite a tripling of FEMA's contracting officer workforce since Hurricane Katrina, 

the agency is still unable to effectively prioritize its disaster workload and cohesively 

manage its workforce. GAO recommended that the FEMA Administrator establish 

procedures for prioritizing Disaster Acquisition Response Team (DART) members' 

workloads when deploying to a disaster and improving coordination and communication 

between FEMA's Office of the Chief Procurement Officer and regional supervisors. 

In your estimation, is the contracting officer workforce at FEMA sufficiently resourced to 

effectively manage the increased workload from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria? 

Response: Yes, FEMA has made ctTorts to build and manage its contracting workforce 

and structure since PKEMRA and has adopted PKEMRA reforms to improve 

management practices for disaster contracting. FEMA has closed out six of the eight 

GAO recommendations by taking the following actions: 

• Tripled the number of Contracting Officers it employs since Hurricane Katrina in 

2005, with some of the workforce growth attributed to the establishment of a 

Disaster Acquisition Response Team (DART) in 2010. 

• Utilized the FEMA Qualification Standards (FQS) to identify the titles and roles 

of its acquisition cadre. This construct is based on disaster experience, emergency 

management training, Federal Acquisition Certifications, and warrant levels. 

• Hosted annual W cbinars specific to disaster contracting so that Contracting 

Officers can learn and get updates on disaster-related information. 

• Ensuring contracting professionals working on response/recovery remain abreast 

of any variations in the contracting process and capitalize on lessons learned 

through an annual webinar on disaster contracting. This wcbinar is mandatory for 

all 1102's designated emergency managers. Additionally, FEMA OCPO has 

published a disaster contracting guide and readiness directive, which provides 

guidance on transitioning from steady state to response and recovery. 

• Leveraged information management tools, such as Share Point to make readily 

available vital information concerning contracting policies and guidance specific 
214 

Question#: 5 

Topic: Contracting Officer Workforce 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

to FAR Part 18 and the Stafford Act. FEMA continuously updates the site to 

make the information current, accurate, and readily available for personnel. 

• Improved its contract organizational structure, aligning it to functional business 

lines. Previously, the operation contracting division had I 0 branches. In January 

of2015, these I 0 branches collapsed down to four branches. Two branches are 

specific to disaster contracting, an expeditionary branch and an incident support 

branch. 

• Established an internal quality assurance structure, to include review by legal 

counsel, which reviews all actions greater than $500,000. This group is also 

responsible for reviewing FPDS-NG data to ensure that actions are accurately 

reported to Congress. 

FEMA continues to leverage its available resources to manage the increased workload 

during the unprecedented amount of response and recovery under Hurricanes Harvey, 

Irma, and Maria. The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) is organized 

along lines of business to support the organization. During this time, OCPO prioritized 

the workload of the Disaster Acquisition Response Team, as well as the steady state 

contracting professionals to make sound business decisions in support of the survivors of 

Harvey, Irma, and Maria. 
215 

Question#: 6 

Topic: Pregnant Women 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Please provide the policy oflmmigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on 

the detention of pregnant women. 

How many pregnant women were detained for longer than seven days each month in 

2017? How many pregnant women were detained for longer than seven days each month 

in 2015 and 2016? 

Response: The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policy entitled, 

Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainees, can be found online at: 

https:/ /www .ice. gov /sites/defaul t/files/documents/Document/20 16/1 l 032.2 Identification 

MonitoringPregnantDetainees.pdf. 

Additionally, you will find the number ofpregnant1 females detained by ICE longer than 

seven days, broken down by month, for 2015, 2016, and 2017 below. 

1 All female detainees/residents ages 10-56 must complete a urinalysis to test for pregnancy as part of the 

initial health screening. Under certain circumstances, an additional serum blood test may be warranted to 

confirm pregnancy. 
216 

Question#: 6 

Topic: Pregnant Women 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

2 As of October 17,2017. 
217 

Question#: 7 

Topic: Parental Interests Directive 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What is the current status of the Parental Interests Directive policy? If this 

policy has changed, please provide the current guidance that DHS is using in its place. 

Response: The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement directive, Facilitating 

Parentalln!erests in the Course of Civil immigration Enforcement Activities, is currently 

under review. In the interim, the former directive remains in effect with the exception of 

any provisions therein that contradict the executive orders on immigration issued earlier 

this year. 
218 

! 

i 

Question#: ' 8 

Topic: Refugee Processing 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: In June 2017, it was reported that the Administration was considering moving 

the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration from the State Department to DHS. 

Has DHS undergone any review of its capacity to support all refugee processing? If so, 

please describe the review and what steps, if any, DHS has taken or plans to take to 

determine whether such a move would be possible, and what impact it would have on 

operations at DHS and the State Department. 

Response: DHS has not been tasked with conducting nor has it conducted any review of 

its capacity to support all aspects of refugee processing at this time. 
219 

Question#: 9 

Topic: Security Details 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: In September 2017, the DHS OIG released a report regarding the use of 

security details by ICE and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Since the release of 

this report, has DHS conducted a review of!CE and CBP's authority to use security 

details? If so, what was the result? 

Response: In the DHS response to the OIG draft report, DHS, based on input from DHS 

OGC, has advised the OIG that there is sufficient legal authority for security details to 

protect DHS officials, so long as there is a determination that the requisite security risk to 

the officials exist. DHS believes that the longstanding guidance from the Government 

Accountability Office articulates the legal authority for DHS to provide security to its 

officials. The Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 

long advised that federal agencies have authority to use their own resources to provide 

security for an agency official during the official's duty day without specific statutory 

authority. See Secret Service Protection for the Secretary of the Treasury, 54 Comp. 

Gen. 624, B-149372 (Jan. 28, 1975), as modified by 55 Comp. Gen. 578, B-149372 (Dec. 

18, 1975). The Comptroller General has advised that agencies may provide such security 

protection where (I) there are indications that an agency official may be in danger giving 

rise to legitimate concerns for the official's safety, and (2) it is administratively 

determined that the risk is such as to impair the official's ability to carry out his or her 

duties and may thereby adversely affect the efficient functioning of the agency. As the 

U.S. Supreme Court has held, the "'executive departments' ... have authority to pro teet 

the functions and employees of the government.. .. " Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. I, 

65 (1890). 

Further, in 2000, the GAO catalogued such security services provided to numerous 

Executive Branch officials. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security 

Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials, 

B-283892 (July 2000). In that report, the GAO noted that many of the agencies reviewed 

relied on the standard articulated by the GAO rather than any specific statutory authority 

to provide security for agency officials during the officials' duty day. 

Question: What policies and procedures does DHS have in place for determining 

whether a security detail is needed for a particular engagement? 

Response: On August 3, 2017 then Acting Under Secretary for Management issued an 

interim policy regarding the establishment and operation of protective details. Pursuant 

to interim guidance, the Department established a Protective Detail Board that consists of 

subject matter experts from within the Office of Security, Office oflntelligence & 
220 

I 

Question#: 9 

Topic: Security Details 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Bonorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Analysis, and other DHS Components as appropriate to assess whether threat assessments 

warrant protective details. The interim policy requires a threat assessment be completed 

by the requesting Component and forwarded to DHS HQ where the Protective Detail 

Board reviews and forwards a recommendation to the CSO for review/approval. 

Approved protective detail packages are forwarded to the Secretary for final review and 

signature. A permanent policy is being staffed for implementation, with a projected 

completion date of June 30, 2018. 

Question: What policies and procedures does DHS have in place to ensure that resources 

are being adequately accounted for when a security detail is deemed necessary? 

Response: The interim policy requires an assessment of the current resource allocation in 

the context ofthreat(s) to the protectces, as well as an accurate accounting of resources 

currently expended. The interim policy requires a multi-functional working group to 

review the comprehensive threat analysis and to provide recommendations for the 

Secretary to determine first, whether a security detail is appropriate, and second, what 

resources will be applied to support these non-United States Secret Service protective 

details. 
221 

Question#: 10 

Topic: T and U Visas 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: T and U visas not only protect victims of crime, but are an important tool for 

law enforcement, prosecutors, judges and other government officials. 

How many T visas were issued each year between 2015 and 20 17? 

Response: The table below represents the number of applications for T nonimmigrant 

status users approved for principal victims of trat1icking and their eligible family 

members. 

Question: How many U visas were issued each year between 2015 and 20 17? 

Response: The table below represents the number of petitions for U nonimmigrant status 

users approved for principal victims of qualifying criminal activity and their eligible 

family members. In accordance with the statutory cap on the number of approvals for 

principal U nonimmigrant status, users approves no more than I 0,000 principal 

petitions for U nonimmigrant status each fiscal year. Data suggesting a higher number of 

principal petition approvals may be due to system error, duplicate counting of 

replacement employment authorization documents, or other systems processing error. 
222 

Question#: 10 

Topic: T and U Visas 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What is the current backlog forT visas and U visas? 

Response: The below numbers represent all applications for principal T nonimmigrant 

status and petitions for principal u nonimmigrant status that are pending with users, 

including applications and petitions filed on the day the data report was run. 

1-914, Application forT Nonimmigrant Status 

1-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status 

Question: How long on average does it take to process aT visa? 

Response: The average processing time forT nonimmigrant status is approximately 9 

months. 

Question: How long on average does it take to process aU visa? 
223 

Question#: !0 

Topic: T and U Visas 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Response: The average processing time for U nonimmigrant status is approximately 36 

months. Eligible principal petitioners who cannot be granted U nonimmigrant status due 

solely to the statutory cap of 10,000 U visas per fiscal year are placed on the U 

nonimmigrant status waiting list. Once a petitioner is placed on the waiting list, there is 

currently an additional average wait time of approximately 12-18 months before a visa 

becomes available. While on the U nonimmigrant status waiting list, principal U 

nonimmigrant status petitioners in the United States are granted deferred action and are 

eligible to seek employment authorization. 

The number of petitions for U nonimmigrant status that are filed annually, consistently 

exceed the statutory cap of 10,000 U visas per fiscal year. This overall timeframe for 

processing U visas will lengthen as annual filings continue to exceed the statutory cap. 

The current average processing time to be placed on the waiting list will also increase as 

users continues to receive an increased volume of petitions. 
224 

I Question#: II 

Topic: Mail and Cargo Inspection Facilities 

Hearing: Threats to the llomeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: How many CBP Officers do you have assigned to each mail and cargo 

inspection facility? Since January 1, 2017, have any ofthese officers been detailed to the 

southern border? lf so, how many, for what duration, and for which inspection facilities? 

Response: OFO currently has 388 CBPOs assigned to Express Consignment and 

International mail facilities. OFO has temporarily reassigned 160 officers to locations 

along the SWB in both the San Diego and Tucson Field Offices. OFO initiated 90-day 

rotational temporary duty assignments from November 20 IS-present for up to 200 CBP 

officers at a time depending on seasonal workload. The rotational officers are used for 

processing immigration cases and augmenting passenger processing in an attempt to 

minimize the impacts on the facilitation of legitimate trade and travel. The negative 

staffing impact as a result of this initiative is nationwide, as all Field Offices have 

allocated resources to this effort, resulting in additional overtime costs. CBP is 

strategically utilizing resources from across the nation in an effort to minimize the impact 

to operations. 
225 

I 

Question#: 12 

Topic: Levee and Bollard Wall 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: On August 25,2017, landowners in South Texas received letters from CBP 

detailing plans for 28 miles of"levee wall" and 32 miles of"bollard wall" in Hidalgo 

County and Starr County, Texas. According to the letters, CBP "is gathering data and 

input from state and local government agencies, federal agencies, and Native American 

Tribes that may be affected by or otherwise have an interest in the proposed actions" and 

"intends similar outreach in other border regions as projects are identified and defined." 

Letter recipients were given up to 30 days to respond to the letters with questions or 

comments. 

How many letters has CBP sent to landowners, state and local government agencies, 

federal agencies, and Native American Tribes in the Rio Grande Valley- and elsewhere 

along the Southwest border- soliciting questions and comments on its plans for 

replacement or additional border barriers? 

Response: CBP is planning for border wall construction in the Rio Grande Valley of 

Texas based on the U.S. Border Patrol's (USBP) operational requirements. The August 

25, 2017 letters were sent by CBP to 35 potential stakeholders in late August as an initial 

step in CBP's overall outreach and public comment process for proposed border wall 

projects in the Rio Grande Valley. The letters were sent to federal and state agencies, 

Native American Tribes, and non-government Organizations (NGOs). No letters were 

sent to private landowners. Only letters associated with planned and proposed border 

security projects in the Rio Grande Valley have been sent at this time. CBP will continue 

to accept comments on its proposed projects through the email address indicated in the 

letters. 

Question: Who are the letter recipients? 

Response: Recipients of letters included federal and state agencies, Native American 

Tribes, and non-government organizations (NGOs ). As final placement of a border wall 

has not yet been determined, private landowners were not included in the initial outreach. 

CBP will conduct additional public outreach and will meet with private landowners that 

would be directly affected by construction of a border wall. 

Question: Where, specifically, are they located? 

Response: The original 35 recipients of letters are predominately located in Texas. Some 

Federal agency recipients, with oversight responsibilities in Texas, are located in New 

Mexico and Washington, D.C. In addition, Native American Tribes that received letters 
226 

Question#: 12 

Topic: Levee and Bollard Wall 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

are located in Oklahoma and Louisiana and have historical land usage connections to the 

Rio Grande Valley region. 

Question: How were they identified? 

Response: Potential stakeholders were identified based on prior coordination and 

consultation efforts completed by CBP for past border security projects. In addition, 

CBP solicited information from other federal agencies for potential stakeholders. 

Question: How many responses to the letters has CBP received, and will you commit to 

providing the Committee with copies of all responses? 

Response: As ofOetober 31, 2017, CBP has received approximately 150 responses. CBP 

will continue to accept comments on it its proposed projects through the email address 

indicated in the letters. Responses are available for transmittal to the Committee. 
227 

Question#: 13 

Topic: Southwest Border Technology 

Hearing: · Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: In sworn testimony on April 5, 2017, former DHS Secretary John Kelly 

assured me that he would "absolutely" provide the Committee with copies of requests 

made by Border Patrol sector chiefs regarding where additional infrastructure and 

technology should be deployed along the Southwest border. To date, I have not received 

copies of those requests. 

When will I be provided with copies of the materials I requested? 

Response: On October 26, 2017, U.S. Border Patrol provided your staff members an 

extensive briefing regarding the Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP), the U.S. 

Border Patrol CGAP WebTool as well as the Capabilities Roadmap. At this time, U.S. 

Border Patrol walked through some of the data, stored in the CGAP WcbTool database, 

provided by the sectors in support of this process. Due to the amount of data and process 

information provided, follow up meetings were scheduled to further walk through the 

border investment strategy as well as the data that supports additional infrastructure and 

technology requests. 

On December 22, 2017, U.S. Border Patrol provided your staff members a briefing of the 

CGAP findings, specifically along the southwest border. In addition, this brieting 

included a walk-through of the CGAP WebTool to show the repository of CGAP 

information of capability gap baselines, CORE Cards, and collaborative analysis exercise 

(CAE) comments from specific southwest border stations. U.S. Border Patrol subject 

matter experts provided raw data information from specific CAEs along with how the 

CGAP process is conducted. Your staff members were able to truly understand how this 

evidence based process identifies capability gaps, determines requirement, and links the 

gaps to solutions and metrics. Finally, the staff members were shown how each 

capability gap was prioritized from the station, sector and headquarter levels. Overall, 

the briefing was able to show your staff members where infrastructure and technology 

requirements were needed in order to effectively achieve the U.S. Border Patrol mission. 
228 

Question#: 14 

Topic: Border Metrics Report I 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: According to Section 1092 of the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NOAA), the DHS Secretary was required, within 180 days of the NOAA's passage, 

to submit to appropriate congressional committees and the Comptroller General of the 

United States an annual report containing various metrics for securing the border between 

ports of entry and at ports of entry. To my knowledge, the Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee has not been provided with a copy of this required 

report. 

When will the Committee be provided with a copy of the border metrics report? 

Response: In September 2017, the Department released a report on "DHS Efforts to 

Estimate Southwest Border Security between Ports of Entry." 

The September 2017 report on "DHS Efforts to Estimate Southwest Border Security 

between Ports of Entry" describes six indicators that provide insight into the state of 

southwest border security between ports of entry. In an effort to be transparent and 

informative, the report includes a detailed discussion of the methodology underlying each 

indicator, a discussion of each indicator's methodological strengths and weaknesses, and 

a review of all available data for each indicator. 

Indicators in the September 2017 report fall into two broad categories: 

l) Enforcement outputs refer to the immediate impact of enforcement policies. In 

particular: how difficult is it for immigrants to cross the border illegally? The 

September 2017 report describes three output indicators: 

• Apprehension or interdiction rate: the estimated share of intending border 

crossers that is apprehended or interdicted while attempting an illegal entry. 

The September report concludes that 55 to 85 percent of intending border 

crosscrs are apprehended or interdicted today, compared to 3 5 to 70 percent a 

decade ago, depending on the specific estimate. 

• Deterrence rate: the estimated share of unsuccessful border crossers who, 

following an apprehension, choose to remain in Mexico or return home rather 

than make an additional crossing attempt. The September report concludes 

that 55 to 75 percent of Mexican deportees are deterred from making a 

subsequent crossing attempt today, compared to 10 to 40 percent a decade or 

two ago. 
229 

Question#: 14 

Topic: Border Metrics Report I 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

• Border crossing costs: estimated average fees paid by illegal border crossers 

to migrant smugglers. The September report concludes that that almost all 

illegal border crossers resort to hiring a smuggler today, versus just over half 

30 years ago. Meanwhile, average smuggler fees have increased from a few 

hundred dollars in the 1980s to almost $4,000 today, accounting for inflation. 

2) Enforcement outcomes describe the bottom line number: how many people succeed 

in crossing the border illegally between POEs? The September 2017 report describes 

three output measures: 

• Migrant apprehensions: USBP's count of migrant apprehensions serves as a 

long-standing proxy measure of illegal flows. USBP made 304,000 southwest 

border apprehensions in 2016, an 81 percent drop from 1.6 million in 2000. 

• Known got-aways: the estimated number of intending border crossers whom 

USBP directly or indirectly observes making a successful illegal entry. 

USBP's observation-based estimate of known got-aways fell 83 percent 

between 2006 and 2016, from 615,000 to I 06,000, in spite of improved 

detection capacity. 

• Estimated illegal int1ows: based on a statistical model, the total estimated 

number of illegal border crossers who successfully enter the United States 

between POEs (i.e., including unobserved got-aways). Based on available 

methodology, the September report concludes that estimated illegal entries tell 

91 percent between 2000 and 2016, from 1.8 million to 170,000. The 

Department and USBP are still refining their methodology for producing this 

number. 

In addition to the border security measures included in the September 2017 report, the 

Department is also working to complete the broader "DHS Border Security Metrics 

Report" directed by the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NOAA). Pursuant 

to the NOAA, the DHS Border Security Metrics Report will address 44 different metrics 

of border security, ineluding measures of security between ports of entry, at ports of 

entry, in the maritime domain, and related to air and marine security in the land domain. 

The Department is committed to producing an NOAA report that is fully transparent and 

that provides comprehensive border security metrics. 
230 

I 

i 

Question#: 15 

Topic: E.O. Reports 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

I 

Question: Executive Order 13767, "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 

Improvements," required the DHS Secretary, within 180 days of the January 25 order, to 

produce a comprehensive study of the security of the southern border, including the 

current state of southern border security, all geophysical and topographical aspects of the 

southern border, the availability of federal and state resources necessary to achieve 

complete operational control of the border, and a strategy to obtain and maintain 

complete operational control of the southern border. To my knowledge, the Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has not been provided with a copy of this 

study, despite my March 2 request for copies of all reports generated by Executive Orders 

13767, 13768, and 13769. 

Has DHS completed its comprehensive study of the security of the southern border? If 

not, will you commit to providing the Committee with a copy of the study when it is 

completed transmitted to the President? 

Response: The Comprehensive Study of the Southern Border Report is complete and was 

submitted to the President in late November. As the report was written for the President, 

DHS defers to the White Ilouse on Congressional release. 

Question: lf so, when will I receive the reports generated by Executive Orders 13767, 

13768, and 13769? 

Response: Two progress reports required under E.O. 13767 and 13768 (90-day progress 

reports) have been submitted to the President in late November 2017. As the reports are 

written for the President, DHS defers to the White House on Congressional release. The 

180 day progress report under E.O. 13768 was submitted to the White House in 

November 2017. 
231 

Question#: 16 

Topic: Border Security Plan 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Division F, Title VI of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, required 

that the DHS Secretary, within 90 days of enactment, submit to the House and Senate 

Appropriations Committees a risk-based plan for improving security along the borders of 

the United States, including the use of personnel, fencing, other forms of tactical 

infrastructure, and technology. To my knowledge, neither congressional appropriators 

nor the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee have been provided 

with a copy of this plan. 

Why has DHS not complied with this statutory reporting requirement? 

Response: DHS is working to ensure that the report contains all information necessary to 

respond effectively to the Appropriations Committee's request. 

Question: Will you commit to providing my staff with a copy of the plan when it is 

provided to congressional appropriators? 

Response: DHS defers to the Appropriations Committee regarding your request as this 

report is within the Committee's jurisdiction. 
232 

Question#: 17 

Topic: Agriculture Security 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Senator Roberts and I helped pass a bill that codified DHS's responsibilities 

related to securing the food and agriculture sector. We want DHS to be able to perform 

its coordination responsibilities effectively. Because of our bill, the Office of Health 

Affairs within DHS is now clearly the primary organization for food and agriculture 

security coordination. 

What has DHS done, since the passage of our bill into law, to prepare for and lead the 

coordination in preparation for an attack on our food and agriculture sectors? 

Response: Since the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act was signed into law at the 

end of June 2017, the DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) has focused on finalizing a 

five-year strategy to guide the office's implementation of its applicable roles and 

responsibilities, which it had already been carrying out for the department. The bill 

codifies existing and supporting elements ofHSPD-7 and HSPD-9. These strategic 

planning efforts have built on multiplying the impact and reach of past OHA projects and 

reconstituting or forming new intra- and interagency working groups to improve policy 

coordination and preparedness. 

OHA's Food Agriculture and Veterinary Defense (FAVD) branch is developing the 

strategic plan for 20 I 8-2022 and the associated implementation plan in alignment with 

Public Law 115-43. These efforts will enhance the Nation's preparedness for a food or 

agriculture emergency. 

Additionally, OHA has initiated a project with the National Agricultural Biosecurity 

Center (NABC), at Kansas State University, to serve as a foundational part of the long 

range objective to develop a coordinated planning, training, and educational program for 

state, tribal and regional response agencies- the National Livestock Readiness Program 

(NLRP). The first milestone of the NLRP is developing an online clearinghouse for 

agriculture readiness resources. The beta site-livestockreadiness.org-has launched and 

houses a Livestock Emergency Response Planning (LERP) toolkit, an earlier OHA 

collaboration with the NABC. 

Pub. L. No. 115-43 has removed any ambiguity on OHA's coordination responsibilities 

and roles with regard to HSPD-9, within DliS, and with the interagency partners with 

equities in the food and agriculture defense mission space. 

Question: What metrics have been developed in this space to measure progress in 

securing the food and agriculture sector? 
233 

Question#: 17 

Topic: Agriculture Security 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Response: OHA has developed interim metrics for evaluating the success of several 

projects outlined in the FA VD implementation plan. 

• Training Metrics-OHA sponsored the update and redevelopment of Animal 

Disease Response Training (originally developed by FEMA) to introduce SLTT 

emergency responders to the agriculture sector and the importance of the 

agriculture response mission. Since May 2016, the NABC has used this material 

to train approximately 400 emergency responders in Kansas and Nebraska. OHA 

will continue to track how many people are trained in the NLRP curriculum and 

measure the effectiveness of the training at raising awareness of agriculture 

response issues among critical stakeholders. The metrics associated with this 

effort include: 

• Annual number of non-traditional responders who complete the course; 

• Geographic areas where the trainings are conducted (OHA expects to 

observe an expansion of the geographic reach of the training); and 

• Increased awareness of agriculture response practices and issues within 

the non-traditional agriculture responder community (e.g., among law 

enforcement and traditional emergency management communities). 

• State Planning Metrics-In FY 2017, OHA sponsored an assessment of state 

agriculture emergency response plans using the LERP as the baseline standard. In 

February 2017, the results of this study were accepted for publication by the 

Health Securily Journal. OHA will reassess these state plans in 2-to-5 years to 

evaluate how state agriculture planning has evolved. 

• Engagement Metrics-OHA's success with coordinating and advancing DHS 

efforts toward food and agriculture security is gauged by measuring how many 

stakeholders have been engaged in OHA-sponsored or OHA supported efforts. 

For example, the number of unique users to livestockreadiness.org website, the 

number of questions submitted to the website address, and the number of 

agriculture response tools downloaded or requested. 
234 

I 

Question#: 18 

Topic: Counter-Narcotics Structure 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: I understand that the Joint Task Force structure had led to greater Secretarial 

visibility into key operational priorities. I understand that counter-narcotics is an aspect 

of the Department's current focus on transnational criminal organizations. 

Would the Department consider utilizing the Joint Task Force structure to focus on 

counter-narcotics? 

Specifically, has DHS considered standing up a Joint Task Force to Counter Opioids as a 

pilot to assess whether a focused approach to counter opioids using a unified structure 

could help enhance DHS's current operations? 

Response: Under the direction of the Secretary, the DHS Joint Task Forces (JTFs) arc 

already focused on combatting Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). This focus 

covers the full spectrum ofTCO activity, including the smuggling of illicit narcotics, e.g., 

illicit opioids. 

DHS is currently conducting an overall review of the current JTF functions and priorities 

to ensure the Department maximizes the JTFs capabilities and limited resources. After 

giving it thoughtful consideration, DHS has concluded that an opioid-specific JTF would 

duplicate the ongoing work of the existing JTFs and would also be duplicative of the 

efforts of the interagency Heroin and Fentanyl Task Force, which task force includes 

representatives from ICE Homeland Security Investigations, CBP, Department of Justice 

agencies, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. This taskforce facilitates interagency 

coordination to combat the opioid crisis, focusing on the investigation of domestic and 

international opioid smuggling and distribution networks, as well as, supports interdiction 

of opioids that are destined for the United States. 
235 

Question#: 19 

Topic: Ombudsman Offices 

Hearing: 1 Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Would you please provide a list of the ombudsman offices that currently exist 

within DHS, including the statutorily authorized U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USC IS) Ombudsman and any other offices within components that call 

themselves ombudsman? 

What is the funding level of each of these offices and how many FTEs, contractors and 

detailees support the office? 

What is the focus of each of these offices and why was the office created? 

To whom does each Ombudsman report? 

What matters does each Ombudsman handle? 

What is the authorization for each of these ombudsmen? 

Does the Ombudsman maintain infonnation about the nrunber, types and resolution of 

complaints that are lodged? 

Does the ombudsman compile information regarding unresolved issues raised by 

customers? 

Are reports available for all of these offices (excepting the USCIS)? 

Response: Please see attached document 
236 

Question#: 20 

Topic: Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

L 

Question: The Inspectors General (!G) of the Intelligence Community (!C), DHS, and 

Department of Justice (DOJ) released a joint report in March 2017 reviewing domestic 

sharing of counterterrorism information. The report found that improving information 

sharing required federal, state, and local entities involved in counterterrorism to better 

understand the other's roles, responsibilities, and contributions. 

What is the status of the implementation of the !Gs' recommendations at DHS? 

Response: DHS is committed to working with our federal, state, and local partners 

involved in counterterrorism on improving information sharing across the Information 

Sharing Environment (ISE). The Department appreciates the work of the Inspectors 

General and concurs with the recommendations contained in the report. DHS continues 

to work toward implementing actions to address all of the recommendations. The 

Department has seen improvements in compliance, collaboration, and cohesion across the 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise thanks to a number of initiatives developed by the Homeland 

Security Intelligence Council and the Field Intelligence Report Program. Furthermore, 

DHS and its Information Sharing Environment (ISE) partners, Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence and the Department of Justice, have agreed current ISE guidance 

and leadership adequately reflect lSE roles and responsibilities, as well as security 

processes with field partners. To operationalize and promulgate procedures, I&A has 

released additional guidance tor the production, reporting and sharing of intelligence with 

DHS field personnel and state, local, tribal and territorial partners. To enhance and 

accelerate its field report production release process I&A and DHS clearing offices are 

decentralizing this process by empowering identified and certified field intelligence 

professionals with the enhanced training and expertise. Furthermore, thanks to the DHSlcd annual reporting on the National Network of Fusion Centers (NNFC), last year the 

NNFC reached the mature stage, signifying the NNFC has the full capability to leverage 

collective resources among individual fusion centers and adjust to both the changing 

threat environment and evolving requirements. Furthermore, the Department has 

developed a tool that will assist field personnel access to secure systems and facilities in 

the field. Finally, after various meetings and coordination between the Department and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation it was determined and fully disseminated to State, 

Local, and Tribal Partners (SL TPs) FBI policy already exists for SLTPs access and 

clearance reciprocity in the field. 

The Department is expected to close 5, including 2 held jointly with ISE partners, of the 

10 recommendations specifically directed at DHS immediately upon issuance of the DHS 
237 

Question#: 20 

Topic: Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

OlG's follow-up compliance memorandum. DHS has also completed actions to close an 

additional 2 recommendations with the remaining 3 to be closed on or by May 31, 2018. 
238 

Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

21 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Elaine C. Duke 

From Senator John McCain 

"Threats to the Homeland Hearing" 

September 27,2017 

Border Security Metrics Report II 

Threats to the Homeland 

The Honorable John McCain 

HOMELAND SECU RlTY (SENATE) 

Question: DHS Border Security Metrics Act: We have seen substantial growth in federal 

spending on immigration enforcement and border security, yet it is difficult to assess our 

efficiency due to lack of data and metrics. The DHS Border Security Metrics Act was 

previously included in the National Defense Authorization Act to require DHS to develop 

metrics to measure the effectiveness of security between ports of entry, at points of entry, 

and along the maritime border. 

Can you discuss the metrics used to measure the security across our borders? 

If consistent, transparent, and informative metrics have not been developed and released, 

when do you anticipate on doing so? 

Response: In September 2017, the Department released a report on "'DHS Efforts to 

Estimate Southwest Border Security between Ports of Entry." 

The September 2017 report on "DHS Efforts to Estimate Southwest Border Security 

between Ports of Entry" describes six indicators that provide insight into the state of 

southwest border security between ports of entry. In an effort to be transparent and 

informative, the report includes a detailed discussion of the methodology underlying each 

indicator, a discussion of each indicator's methodological strengths and weaknesses, and 

a review of all available data for each indicator. 

Indicators in the September 2017 report fall into two broad categories: 

1) Enforcement outputs refer to the immediate impact of enforcement policies. In 

particular: how difficult is it for immigrants to cross the border illegally? The 

September 2017 report describes three output indicators: 
239 

Question#: 21 

Topic: Border Security Metrics Report II 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

• Apprehension or interdiction rate: the estimated share of intending border 

crossers that is apprehended or interdicted while attempting an illegal entry. 

The September report concludes that 55 to 85 percent of intending border 

crossers are apprehended or interdicted today, compared to 3 5 to 70 percent a 

decade ago, depending on the specific estimate. 

• Deterrence rate: the estimated share of unsuccessful border crossers who, 

following an apprehension, choose to remain in Mexico or return home rather 

than make an additional crossing attempt. The September report concludes 

that 55 to 75 percent of Mexican deportees are deterred from making a 

subsequent crossing attempt today, compared to I 0 to 40 percent a decade or 

two ago. 

• Border crossing costs: estimated average fees paid by illegal border crossers 

to migrant smugglers. The September report concludes that that almost all 

illegal border crossers resort to hiring a smuggler today, versus just over half 

30 years ago. Meanwhile, average smuggler fees have increased from a few 

hundred dollars in the 1980s to almost $4,000 today, accounting for inflation. 

2) Enforcement outcomes describe the bottom line number: how many people succeed 

in crossing the border illegally between POEs? The September 2017 report describes 

three output measures: 

• Migrant apprehensions: USBP's count of migrant apprehensions serves as a 

long-standing proxy measure of illegal flows. USBP made 304,000 southwest 

border apprehensions in 2016, an 81 percent drop from 1.6 million in 2000. 

• Known got-aways: the estimated number of intending border crossers whom 

USBP directly or indirectly observes making a successful illegal entry. 

USBP's observation-based estimate of known got-aways fell 83 percent 

between 2006 and 2016, from 615,000 to I 06,000, in spite of improved 

detection capacity. 

• Estimated illegal inflows: based on a statistical model, the total estimated 

number of illegal border crossers who successfully enter the United States 

between POEs (i.e., including unobserved got-aways). Based on available 

methodology, the September report concludes that estimated illegal entries fell 

91 percent between 2000 and 2016, from 1.8 million to 170,000. The 

Department and USBP are still refining their methodology for producing this 

number. 

In addition to the border security measures included in the September 2017 report, the 

Department is also working to complete the broader "DHS Border Security Metrics 
240 

I 

I 

Question#: 21 

Topic: Border Security Metrics Report Il 

Hearing: I 

Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Report" directed by the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Pursuant 

to the NDAA, the DHS Border Security Metrics Report will address 44 different metrics 

of border security, including measures of security between ports of entry, at ports of 

entry, in the maritime domain, and related to air and marine security in the land domain. 
241 

Question#: 22 

Topic: Drug Trafficking 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Drug Cartels: Drug trafficking remains one of the most severe threats to our 

homeland security. 

What is your assessment of the current situation on the ground? 

What steps are currently being taken to interdict the flow drugs over the border? 

Response: As described in the 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment, Mexican TCOs 

maintain the greatest drug trafficking influence in the United States, with continued signs 

of grO\vth and expansion. By controlling lucrative smuggling corridors, primarily across 

the SWB, Mexican TCOs export significant quantities of heroin, cocaine, 

methamphetamine, marijuana, and possibly fentanyl into the United States annually. 

Once these illicit drugs arc smuggled into the U.S., they are delivered to user markets in 

the United States through transportation routes and distribution cells that are managed or 

influenced by Mexican TCOs. The TCOs are heavily involved in a variety of illicit 

activities that directly impact national security, regional and economic stability, and free 

trade, such as illicit narcotics trafficking, bulk cash and weapons smuggling, money 

laundering, and human smuggling and trallicking. They continue to pose the largest 

criminal threat to the United States and are the leading cause of violence in the region. 

Intelligence and Jaw enforcement reporting consistently shows that the vast majority of 

illicit drugs entering the United States enter through the SWB under the control of these 

criminal groups and that they have established a significant presence in the United States 

to distribute these drugs at the wholesale level. The ability of Mexican TCOs to maintain 

control over key drug markets in the United States (cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, 

and marijuana) will likely result in their continuing to be a major criminal threat to the 

United States past FY2020. 

Actions taken: 

To address the drug smuggling threat along the border, the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) leverages a comprehensive, multi-layered, intelligence-driven, and 

threat-based approach to targeting suspect shipments and travelers. This approach 

enables DHS to enhance the security of our borders and to diminish the effectiveness of 

TCO drug operations, as well as other border security threats. This dynamic approach to 

security both reduces the vulnerability of any single operational approach and extends our 

zone of security to include the avenues of entry, allowing threats to be addressed before 
242 

I 

Question#: 22 

Topic: i Drug Trafficking 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

they reach our borders. By leveraging international partnerships, we can ensure that our 

physical borders arc not the first or last lines of defense. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

As the first unified border entity of the United States, CBP takes a comprehensive 

approach to border management and control, combining customs, immigration, border 

security, and agricultural protection into one coordinated and supportive activity. 

• Office of Field Operations (OFO) 

o To combat this ongoing threat, OFO has deployed technology to identify 

narcotics and synthetics at mail facilities and Ports of Entry along the 

Southern border, increasing our capability to identify narcotics and 

fentanyl trafficking. OFO is actively leveraging its data holdings, unique 

authorities, and expertise on trade, travel, and border security in order to 

develop collaborative relationships with foreign and domestic law 

enforcement agencies, U.S. Intelligence Community partners, and private 

sector and international partners to provide a more comprehensive 

understanding of illicit, cross-border networks and their vulnerabilities. 

o OFO conducts special operations at various Ports of Entry, International 

Mail Facilities, and Express Consignment facilities that promote "unity of 

effort" in detecting, interdicting, deterring, and disrupting TCOs. 

Interdicted contraband and controlled substances are referred to U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security 

Investigations (liST) for further investigation and the pursuit of criminal 

prosecution. OFO will continue to conduct special enforcement 

operations throughout the United States with the goal of strengthening 

OFO's ability to interdict narcotics and other contraband being smuggled 

through U.S. borders. 

• Air & Marine Operations (AMO) 

o AMO works to maintain and improve domain awareness to secure our 

borders and combat criminal organizations by sharing real-time, 

actionable information, linking a vast network of sensors and sensorequipped aircraft and vessels through a thoroughly modernized Air and 

Marine Operations Center (AMOC). AMO accomplishes its interdiction 

mission via patrol activities, investigation, intelligence collection and 
243 

Question#: 1 22 

Topic: Drug Trafficking 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

analysis, and specifically targeted missions in response to actionable 

information. 

o AMO continues to support bi-lateral interdiction operations with the 

Government of Mexico by staftlng personnel at the Information Analysis 

Center in the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City and deploys aviation assets to 

Mexico for in-country interdiction operations in both the air and maritime 

domain. AMO hosts Mexican government liaison officers to assist in 

information exchange and operations coordination. 

o AMO provides P-3, DHC-8, and MQ-9 aircraft to the source and transit 

zones providing the highest amount of maritime patrol aircraft to Joint 

Interagency Task Force- South mission of combating TCOs and reducing 

flow of illicit narcotics to the arrival zone. 

o AMO continues to work in close partnership with U.S. Border Patrol, as 

well as other federal, state, local, and tribal partners, performing 

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition missions, as well as 

direct apprehension support to agents on the ground. This support is a 

critical element of our interdiction operations at our land borders. 

CBP is actively engaged in law enforcement investigations, both independently and as 

members of task forces like Border Enforcement Security Teams, High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Areas, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). 

• U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) 

o USBP is constantly evolving its intelligence analysis and collection 

processes, and operational posture to identify and prevent threats to the 

Homeland. This enables USBP to effectively interdict illicit narcotics and 

immigration at the border, and to target the TCO elements involved in the 

tra(ficking from abroad. USBP also leverages local, state, federal, and 

international partners to identifY criminal aliens and to gather information 

on TCOs. USBP utilizes all available tools to enable intelligence-driven 

special operations targeting illicit activity throughout the border area, in 

addition to daily steady-state patrol operations. USBP utilizes all 

available resources including canine enforcement tean1s, checkpoint 

operations, law enforcement partnerships, international engagements, 

border infrastructure, technology assets and, most importantly, agents 

boots on the ground, who arc patrolling, interdicting, interviewing, 
244 

Question#: 22 

Topic: Drug Traftlcking 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

interacting with the public, and executing on a whole-of-government 

approach to secure the border. 

Question: The administration has proposed a 39% cut in aid to Central America, 

particularly cuts to the Bureau of!nternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

Will this proposed cut in aid hinder efforts to target the infrastructure and financial 

records of criminal organizations in the region? 

Response: DJ-IS efforts in Central America to target criminal organizations are 

accomplished with the financial support and cooperation from the Department of State's 

Bureau oflnternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). This includes 

DHS efforts in the region focus on enhancing local law enforcement abilities to disrupt 

and interdict human trafficking and smuggling as well as contraband smuggling. DHS 

pursues these initiatives through vetted local law enforcement units, Mobile Interdiction 

Teams, and by providing mentoring and guidance and DHS training and best practices to 

law enforcement personnel. 

In El Salvador, INLand DHS have cooperated on the development of the Border 

Intelligence and Coordination Center, currently operating with Salvadoran personnel in 

coordination with ICE, CBP, and other U.S. law enforcement agencies. A similar center 

is planned by INL in Panama. These INL-funded intelligence "fusion" centers allow for 

increased information sharing and, most importantly, coordination, across borders- vital 

to DHS efforts. 

In Guatemala, INLand DHS have provided advisory support to Inter-Agency Task 

Forces along the Mexican and Honduran borders. 

In Honduras, INL and DHS are providing training and equipment for the reformed 

Honduras National Police Border Police Directorate. 

In Panama, INLand DHS have maintained a consistent presence ofCBP Advisors in the 

Darien Province supporting migration and security work, ofPanan1anian Immigration 

and Panamanian Border Police (SENAFRONT). 

lNL also funds numerous other U.S. law enforcement agencies' work in the region, 

including that ofHSI. DHS is committed to continuing to work with INLand other 

interagency counterparts to support the work of our Central American partners. 
245 

Question#: 23 

Topic: Physical Wall Effectiveness 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Physical Wall v. Virtual Wall: Illegal immigrants have used a wide variety of 

techniques to cross the border and circumvent the more than 650 miles of existing 

fencing and other physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border. 

Is a physical wall the most effective and efficient means for preventing illegal crossings 

and drug smuggling? 

What technologies might alleviate the need for a physical barrier? 

Response: A physical wall is the "anchor" of a system which, when completed, will 

provide the U.S. Border Patrol with an enduring capability that effectively and efficiently 

improves border security. The wall provides a physical obstruction to illicit cross border 

activity, but must be supplemented with the ability to detect, identify, and respond to 

illegal border crossings in order to bring that activity to a satisfactory law enforcement 

resolution. The most effective means of achieving operational control of the border 

cannot be accredited to any single capability, piece of technology, or infrastructure. It is 

a mixture of all of those things, executed by a properly trained and properly equipped 

mission-ready workforce. 

A physical barrier impedes the adversary's use of terrain that affords for a quick 

"vanishing" time into urbanized areas or other areas that may be problematic to 

enforcement operations because of their proximity to schools or neighborhoods and 

egress infrastructure such as roads and highways. Additionally, a border wall system 

provides an added level of safety by creating an enforcement zone that allows agents to 

patrol at, and along its perimeter. 

The U.S. Border Patrol has used a physical "wall" for many years and in every location 

that it has been deployed, it has had a positive operational outcome that has enhanced our 

ability to achieve operational control of the border. For example, in 2005, Yuma was 

inundated with heavy illegal crossings and cross-border activity. Agents were assaulted 

daily with rocks and other weapons. In 2005 Yuma had over 138,000 apprehensions and 

27,000 vehicles that illegally crossed the international boundary loaded with narcotics 

and illegal migrants that refused to stop for agents and resulting in numerous 

fatalities. After the deployment of barriers, increased personnel and technology 

deployment, and collaboration with state and local partners, by 2009 Yuma 

apprehensions dropped to just under 7,000 annually. 
246 

Question#: 24 

Topic: Cybersecurity Strategy 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: No Policy and No Strategy: Our greatest frustration has been the lack of any 

direction from this administration, or from the prior administration, on how we should be 

deterring our adversaries in cyberspace. Among other urgent problems, we need to define 

what forms of cyber attack constitute an act of war and how authorities for cyber 

responses should be delegated to various agencies. We must also consider geographic 

and sovereignty issues; the list goes on. 

Do you agree that until our adversaries believe the consequences of an attack in 

cyberspace will outweigh the benefits, behaviors will not change? 

What are the chief impediments to crafting a coherent strategy? 

Response: Deterrence is an important component of national efforts to change the 

behaviors of malicious cyber actors and to protect critical networks and information from 

harm. The foundation of our deterrence and broader cybersecurity efforts includes 

securing our own systems before an adversary acts thereby making exploitation ofU.S. 

infrastructure more difficult and costly. This denies malicious cyber actors any benefit to 

less sophisticated attempts at intrusion and far less benefit to more sophisticated attacks. 

Deterrence by denial requires a whole of Government, and indeed whole of Nation, 

approach that is coordinated with our private sector, SLTT, and international partners 

across all areas of national preparedness. The U.S. Government seeks to leverage our 

various authorities and capabilities to secure vital systems and assets, improve resilience 

against cyber incidents, and quickly respond to and recover from incidents when they 

occur. In particular, DHS supports and enables the security and resilience of U.S. 

organizations through its network protection efforts. Network protection includes 

providing organizations with information and technical capabilities they can usc to secure 

their networks, systems, assets, information, and data, by reducing vulnerabilities, 

ensuring resilience to cybcr incidents, and supporting their holistic risk management 

priorities. 
247 

Question#: 25 

Topic: British Cybersecurity Model 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable John McCain 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: UK's National Cyber Security Center: Our cyber efforts are divided among 

DoD, DI-IS, and the FBI. In contrast, Britain has adopted a unified model in the recently 

established National Cyber Security Centre. Our British allies recognize the twin 

absolute necessities of bringing all capacity under one roof and acting in close 

partnership with the private sector. 

Are you familiar with the UK's NCSC, and do you believe it is something we should 

pursue here in the U.S.? 

Do you agree that we should reevaluate the roles and responsibilities ofDI-IS or pursue a 

model that combines our government-wide expertise in a center like the UK established? 

Is the current approach working; is the status quo effective? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DIIS) is well versed in the structure 

and function of the United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and we 

work closely with this important international partner. NCSC combined multiple 

government entities that were previously separate. DHS is watching the organizational 

evolution of our close partners with great interest and continues to learn trom them and 

their unique environment. For example, while the UK has combined many of its 

organizational missions into the NCSC under GCHQ, New Zealand had gone a different 

direction: creating a national CERT outside of the existing National Cyber Security 

Centre (which is under Government Communications Security Bureau, the SIGINT 

agency). Whereas Australia has taken the approach of co-locating various agencies and 

missions in one center-the Australian Cyber Security Centre-but maintaining 

organizational distinctions between the different representatives. 

The U.S. Government has already spent a great deal of time and effort establishing the 

current roles and responsibilities of agencies in cyberspace. DHS stood up the NCCIC, 

which is authorized by law, in order to integrate all relevant stakeholders, including the 

Department of Defense, the intelligence community, law enforcement, state and local 

governments, and non-government, private sector partners. The U.S. Government 

continues to make great strides towards enhancing that cooperation and maturing this 

approach. 
248 

Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

I 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Elaine C. Duke 

From Senator Gary Peters 

"Threats to the Homeland Hearing" 

September 27, 2017 

Domestic Terrorism 

Threats to the Homeland 

The Honorable Gary Peters 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: I believe the travel ban and divisive rhetoric have had significant 

consequences. Since the election we have seen a spike in anti -Muslim incidents in my 

home State of Michigan. We have seen a rash of bomb threats against Jewish 

Community Centers in Michigan and across the country. That's why my colleague 

Senator Portman and I, led a letter calling on DHS and DOJ to address these horrific 

incidents and to provide these communities with the resources they need. The letter was 

signed by all I 00 members of the Senate. Make no mistake, some of our darkest 

elements in our society have been emboldened. All you need to do is look at alt-right and 

white supremacy activity that has taken place in Charlottesville and across the country. 

How much of your budget is spent on domestic terrorism versus international terrorism? 

Response: DHS docs not separate overall lines of budget specifically devoted to 

international verses domestic terrorism. However, DHS is focused on combating all 

forms of terrorism that threaten our people, our homeland, and our interests. Domestic 

terrorism in particular is addressed through multiple programs across the Department. 

DHS resources are allocated and administered in varying ways across the constituent 

elements of the Department that support terrorism prevention efforts. As it concerns the 

budget and personnel of !&A, those resources are authorized, appropriated, and allocated 

as part of the National Intelligence Program (NIP), are generally classified, and would 

not otherwise be appropriate to address in this response. Personnel allocations across 

those constituent elements of DHS supporting domestic terrorism threats for FY18 

remain at the levels set for FY17. 

DHS fights back against domestic terror activity by making communities more aware of 

the threat through direct outreach, engaging law enforcement, sharing timely intelligence 

and trends with state and local stakeholders, countering the recruitment efforts of violent 
249 

I Question#: I 

Topic: Domestic Terrorism 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

ideological groups, and supporting community efforts to develop intervention models. 

For instance, the Office Terrorism Prevention Partnerships (OTTP) is currently 

overseeing 26 grants totaling $10 million to advance the objective of terrorism 

prevention. The majority of these awards focus on all forms of terrorism, and we 

anticipate they will help develop best practices for better combating domestic terrorism 

specifically. 

Question: Do you think legislation is required to address domestic extremism? 

Response: DHS has the ability to contribute to the fight against domestic terrorism 

within its existing authorities. However, DHS defers to the Department of Justice 

regarding any additional U.S. government authorities or legislation currently under 

consideration related to domestic terrorism threats. 

Question: The federal government maintains lists of international terror organizations; 

do you think the same should apply for domestic terror groups beyond the nine 

movements tracked by the FBI? 

Response: DHS defers to the Department of Justice regarding any additional U.S. 

government authorities or legislation currently under consideration related to domestic 

terrorism threats. 
250 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Cyher Threat Information Sharing 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

-- Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: I continue to be deeply troubled by the disclosure of the Equifax hack, which 

demonstrated corporate leadership's systemic disregard for data security and basic cyberhygiene best practices. The vulnerability identified in the breach had a patch issued for it 

in March, meaning at least 60 days went by without the patch being implemented. But 

poor patch management is just the tip of the iceberg. Across the federal government, 

numerous agencies are relying on outdated software that may be vulnerable to attacks. In 

report issued last month, the President's National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) 

concluded, "there is a narrow and fleeting window of opportunity before a watershed, 

9/11-level cyberattack to organize effectively and take bold action." The challenges 

identified are well-known and reflected in study after study. DHS has a clear mission to 

share with the private sector but it often does not "own" the threat information and must 

work through other agencies to declassify and share. Explain how DHS is working to 

improve information sharing processes with FBI to ensure the right individuals in the 

private sector receive timely, actionable cyber threat information. 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Protection and 

Programs Directorate works with the intelligence community, law enforcement, including 

the Federal Bureau ofinvestigation, and other federal cyber centers to share information 

at the lowest level of classification as quickly as possible. There have been numerous 

efforts between agencies to focus on expediting information sharing. Additionally, DHS 

maintains an automated indicator sharing (AIS) capability, which enables the exchange of 

cyber threat indicators between and among the federal government and the private sector 

at machine speed. We will continue to focus on expanding the quantity, quality, and 

speed of information shared with our private sector, international, and government 

partners, but it is a shared responsibility that requires them to share information with 

DHS as well. 
251 

Question#: 3 

Topic: Critical Information Sectors 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: This committee recently heard from the head of Israel's National Cyber 

Bureau who offered that Israel has a more narrow definition of critical infrastructure in 

cyberspace. For example, our Electricity and Financial sectors take on added importance 

because they underpin the operations of other critical infrastructure sectors. With that in 

mind, what is DHS doing to improve engagement with the most critical infrastructure 

sectors? 

Response: The Nation's critical infrastructure provides essential services that serve as 

the backbone of our economy, security, and well-being. We know it as the power we use 

in our homes, the water we drink, the transportation that moves us, and the 

communication systems we rely on to stay in touch with friends and family. Presidential 

Policy Directive 21, "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience," identifies 16 

infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks are so vital to the United 

States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on national 

security, economic security, public health, or safety. For each sector, an executive 

agency serves as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA). 

The U.S. Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) serves as the SSA for 10 ofthe 16 

sectors. (Detailed information about each of these sectors, SSA roles and resources, and 

the Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) are available on the DHS website at 

www .dhs. gov /critical-infrastructure-sectors.) 

To further cybersecurity support to critical infrastructure at greatest risk, Section 9 of 

Executive Order 13636 tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security with identifying critical 

infrastructure where a cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic 

etTects to U.S. public health or safety, economic security, or national security. In 

coordination with relevant SSAs, DHS identifies those critical infrastructure entities and 

updates this list annually. 

Since the identification of critical intrastructure at greatest risk as required under Section 

9, DHS and SSAs have conducted enhanced engagement activities at individual entities 

and sector levels to provide information on available government resources, including 

assessments, prioritization in incident response assistance, and targeted cyber information 

sharing. Furthermore, this year's Executive Order 13,800, regarding "Strengthening the 

Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure," tasked the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, 

the Director ofNational Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, 

the heads of appropriate SSAs, and all other appropriate agency heads, to engage with 
252 

Question#: 3 

Topic: Critical Information Sectors 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Section 9 entities to evaluate the federal governments authorities and capabilities for 

providing assistance in support of cybersecurity risk management. 

DHS and our partners also recognize the interdependencies of some sectors, including the 

energy, communications, financial services, and water and waste water sectors. 

Engagement with our industry partners in these "lifeline functions" recognizes the added 

importance of maintaining the security and resilience of these functions. With regards to 

the energy sector and the financial services sector, NPPD works closely with the 

Department of Energy and the Department of Treasury, the respective SSAs for those 

sectors. 

NPPD ha~ liaisons to promote partnership etTorts of the sectors, including the energy 

sector and financial services sector. These liaisons serve as program representatives and 

attend, or lead numerous DHS, interagency/sector working groups, activities, 

government/sector coordinating council meetings, and critical infrastructure partnership 

advisory council meetings. 

NPPD also actively engages with government and industry stakeholders from the 

communications sector as the SSA. NPPD engages in discussion with private sector 

stakeholders to address any concerns regarding policy or information sharing capabilities. 

For information sharing specifically, the National Coordinating Center for 

Communications (NCC), as part of the National Cybersecurity and Communications 

Integration Center (NCCIC), serves as the Communications-ISAC and actively 

collaborates with the private sector to improve information sharing capabilities. 

In terms of cross-sector collaboration, the Communications and Energy sectors have 

actively collaborated in planning and executing cybersecurity exercises. One exercise 

recently conducted was DOE's fifth iteration of the Clear Path Exercise, which examines 

coordination between private and public-sector partners of both sectors in the wake of a 

major natural disaster. Additionally, the fourth iteration of the GridEx, a North American 

Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) sponsored exercise developed to simulate a 

significant cyber incident for major critical infrastructure sectors, took place in November 

2017. 

DOE serves as the Energy SSA, DHS plays an important role in supporting coordination 

activity for grid security and resilience. The Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council 

(ESCC) includes senior leadership representing each segment of the electric power 

industry, as well as heads of relevant industry trade associations. A major priority of the 

sector councils is unifying industry and government efforts to plan and prepare 

coordinated responses to incidents of national significance whether physical or cyber. 
253 

Question#: 3 

Topic: Critical Information Sectors 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

The ESCC and government meetings provide a venue to discuss national-level responses 

to major incidents, physical security and cybersecurity, grid resilience, and progress made 

on joint industry and government initiatives. 

DRS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (!&A) provides cyber threat briefings to the 

energy and financial sectors among others. As appropriate, these briefing are provided at 

the classified level. Corporate Security Symposia events conducted by !&A engage 

private sector security personnel with threat briefings and in-person opportunities to 

improve an understanding ofDHS resources related to cyber and other homeland security 

threats. !&A works closely with NPPD in coordinating these engagements. 
254 

Question#: 4 

Topic: CBP Staffing Levels 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

·- Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Each day, thousands of cargo containers from around the world pass through 

our nation's ports- delivering vital goods and services to consumers, creating jobs, and 

supporting economic growth. In Southeast Michigan, the Port of Monroe is one such 

location. Each day, the Port connects the five great lakes, serves 17 U.S. states, and 

provides access to 15 major international ports. In today's resource-constrained 

environment, balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of 

commerce remains an ongoing challenge. This is especially true for the Port of Monroe, 

which falls 12 miles outside of the CBP's area of responsibility for the Detroit Point of 

Entry. Over the years, this has resulted in CBP providing entirely discretionary container 

screening. This arrangement has forced the port to decline certain shipments, 

complicated efforts to expand port operations, and left potential security threats 

unmitigated. Commercial maritime shipping remains a viable conveyance for all manner 

of domestic threats: illicit drugs, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons even 

human smuggling. 

Does CBP have adequate staffing levels to absorb an increase ofmultimodal freight in 

Michigan? 

Response: CBP cannot absorb the increased workload with existing resource levels. 

Additional multimodallocations would therefore add additional staffing and resource 

challenges. We have worked and continue to work with those interested in bringing in 

multimodal freight to educate them on the reimbursable services program and CBP 

facility requirements. Additionally, even if these staffing and resource challenges were 

addressed, there is no infrastructure, facilities, or technology to enable cargo operations at 

any vessel cargo location in Michigan. 

Some locations where cargo could be cleared arc hours away from ports of entry and 

outside port limits. This adds to the staffing challenges and reduces security by having 

staff clear cargo using manual and inefficient processes far away from their ports. 

Question: IfCBP were to receive increased funding levels for staffing, would CBP 

increase staffing levels along the northern border concurrently with increases in southern 

border staffing? 

Response: CBP recognizes some of the unique challenges the Northern border locations 

have specific to recruiting and retaining personnel. Recruitment incentives have been 

approved for a number of Northern Border locations and thanks to Congress' $25 million 

investment in the FY 2017 Omnibus, relocation incentives should help in addressing 
255 

Question#: 4 

Topic: CBP Staffing Levels 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

staffing challenges in some of our hard-to-fill locations to include locations along the 

Norther Border. 

CBP has critical staffing needs across its frontline law enforcement positions, and utilizes 

the Workload Staffing Model (WSM) to ensure that staffing resources at ports of entry 

are aligned within existing threat environments, while maximizing cost efficiencies. The 

WSM is a data-driven model that incorporates the most recent year's data to determine 

workload requirements while applying factors for future facility enhancements and 

projected growth volume in cross-border commercial and passenger traffic. Updated 

WSM results continue to show a need for additional Office of Field Operations (OFO) 

capability to fully meet the standards set by statute, regulation, and CBP policies, 

assuming maintenance of current processes, procedures, technology, and facilities. 

The most recent results from the OFO's Workload Staffing Model justifies the need for 

an additional 2,516 CBP Officers at our ports through FY 2018 and we are making 

progress towards our authorized levels that was last increased by Congress through 

additional funding in the FY 2014 Omnibus. 
256 

Question#: 5 

Topic: Scanning Equipment 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Is CBP authorized to accept donations of fixed or mobile scanning equipment 

at ports? If not, why not? 

Response: Yes; CBP is authorized to accept donations of fixed or mobile scanning 

equipment at ports. The Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-279, 

amended the Homeland Security Act of2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., to jointly authorize 

CBP and the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), to make agreements to accept 

donations of personal property, monetary, non-personal services, and real property from 

public and private sector entities (6 U.S.C. § 30la). Accepted donations, such as fixed or 

mobile scanning equipment, may be used for CBP enforcement activities at ports of 

entry, including expenses related to furniture, fixtures, equipment, or technology. 

Question: Do mobile scanners provide acceptable levels of accuracy in detecting threats 

while screening cargo? 

Response: Yes; current mobile scanners employed by CBP provide acceptable levels of 

accuracy in detecting threats while screening. The energy level of X-ray systems is 

measured in mega-electron volts (MeV). The energy penetrates through cargo resulting 

in an image or picture that allows end-users to identify anomalies. The higher the energy 

level, the deeper the penetration of cargo. Energy levels do vary between all imaging 

modalities including fixed, relocatable, and mobile non-intrusive inspection (Nil) 

systems. Mobile units typically operate between 3-6 MeVs as compared to 6-9 MeVs of 

rclocatable or fixed systems; however, some mobile units are equipped with an interlaced 

accelerator which provides the ability to alternate between high and low energy levels. 

CBP does utilize Mobile Nil systems to address quick responses for emergent risks and 

situations, and provide an imaging/scanning capability where a fixed or relocatable 

system is not feasible. Each system, whether mobile or fixed, is selected to optimize 

penetration requirements of the commodities associated with specific locations. This 

enables the analyst the best opportunity to observe potential anomalies, but is not referred 

to as detection. The Medium Energy Mobiles (MEM) do provide acceptable penetration 

in many density scenarios. 

Question: Is CBP willing and able to provide technical assistance to ports that are 

pursuing the possibility of installing scanning equipment? 

Response: Yes, CBP is willing to provide technical assistance to ports that are pursuing 

the possibility of installing scanning equipment. 
257 

Question#: 6 

Topic: Reimbursements 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Is CBP authorized to accept reimbursements for staff time and expenses, 

including overtime expenses, at ports? If not, why not? 

Response: Yes; CBP is authorized to accept reimbursements or advance payments for 

staff time and expenses, including overtime, in certain situations. CBP has statutory 

authority to enter into partnerships via fee agreements with private sector and government 

entities for reimbursement or advance payment of certain CBP services. This authority, 

from Section 481 of the Homeland Security Act of2002, as amended by the Cross-Border 

Trade Enhancement Act of2016, enables CI3P to support additional requests for 

enhanced services while managing the rising volume of travel and trade, which is critical 

to our economy. Reimbursable services under this authority include customs, agricultural 

processing, border security services, immigration inspection, and support services at any 

facility where CBP currently provides or will provide services. 

However, this authority has several limitations at CBP-serviced airports. At airports with 

100,000 or more arriving international passengers annually, a fee agreement may only 

provide for the payment ofCBP Officer overtime and the salaries and expenses ofCBP 

employees to support those CBP Officers. At airports with less than I 00,000 arriving 

international passengers annually, a fcc agreement may also provide for the salaries and 

expenses of not more than five full-time equivalent CBP officers, as well as the salaries, 

expenses, and other costs associated with other CBP employees to support those CBPOs. 

Under the provisions of Section 236 of the Trade and Tariff Act ofl984 (P.L. 98-573), as 

amended (19 U.S.C. § 58b), the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection is 

authorized to make inspectional services available at airports, seaport, and other facilities 

and to charge a fee for such services. The provisions of the User Fee Facility designation 

are set forth in a Memorandum of Agreement between CBP and the Sponsor where the 

facilities are at no cost to the government. The limitation for this authority is that the 

service are restricted to customs services. 

These agreements arc intended to be an augmentation of existing services, and therefore 

may not unduly and permanently impact services provided through appropriated means. 
258 

Question#: 7 

Topic: Freight 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What is CBP protocol on processing or scanning break bulk freight? Is crated 

freight considered "containerized" or "breakbulk" by CBP? What is the definition of 

"containerized" freight? What is the definition of"breakbulk" freight? 

Response: CBP uses risk-based analysis and intelligence to pre-screen, assess, and 

examine I 00 percent of suspicious containers. Remaining cargo is cleared for entry into 

the U.S. using advanced inspection technology. Break Bulk freight is processed based on 

the submission of manifest and entry data by trade entities. If examination is required, 

the importer is required to make the cargo available for inspection by CBP. If this 

requires movement to an examination facility for unloading then the importer must make 

those arrangements. Additionally, any inspections CBP may perform on the pier are 

dependent on CBP resources including personnel and technology, the availability of a 

suitable inspection area, and the type of merchandise being examined. Any arrangements 

for examination must be performed prior to movement from the terminal or port area and 

these movements may only be performed under CBP supervision. 

Question: Is crated freight considered "containerized" or "breakbulk" by CBP? 

Response: The di±Ierence in definition is based on how the goods are shipped and not the 

packaging. Crating is a type of packaging. If crates are loaded in a container they are 

containerized. If they are loaded "loose" in a cargo hold in or on deck they would be 

considered to be "break bulk." 

Question: What is the definition of"containerized'' freight'J 

Response: "Containerized Cargo" covers merchandise shipped in an enclosed container 

or trailer that is capable of having a seal affixed. 

Question: What is the definition of"breakbulk" freight? 

Response: Under the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 19, Chapter I, Part 149, Section 

149.1 break bulk is defined as cargo that is not containerized, but which is otherwise 

packaged or bundled. 
259 

I Question#: 8 

Topic: Waterborne Freight 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What discretion is afforded to CBP regional offices in determining processing 

protocol on waterborne freight? Are there standard procedures CBP regional offices must 

follow nationwide with respect to processing waterborne freight? 

What procedures are in place at CBP to ensure that freight cargo is treated uniformly 

throughout maritime systems and across regional CBP offices? 

Response: Title 19 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 4, 10, and 149 cover most 

maritime cargo clearance requirements. Additional requirements for entry of 

merchandise are standard for all modes of transportation and ports of entry and are found 

in 19 CFR Parts 141, 142 and 143. There are also standardized directives and Standard 

Operating Procedures for processing, examination, documentation of examinations, 

Officer Safety requirements, minimum facility requirements, and most other areas 

governing CBP operations. Within those standards, discretion is provided to either the 

Port Director and/or the Director, Field Operations to adapt these requirements to local 

infrastructure, business type and volume, and CBP resources. 

Question: Are there standard procedures CBP regional offices must follow nationwide 

with respect to processing waterborne freight') 

Response: Yes, as stated above in addition to regulatory requirements, there are also 

standardized directives and Standard Operating Procedures for processing, examination, 

documentation of examinations, Officer Safety requirements, minimum facility 

requirements, and most other areas governing CBP operations, and within those 

standards, discretion is provided to either the Port Director and/or the Director, Field 

Operations to adapt these requirements to local infrastructure, business type and volume, 

and CBP resources. 

Question: What procedures are in place at CBP to ensure that freight cargo is treated 

uniformly throughout maritime systems and across regional CBP offices? 

Response: The procedures to ensure that freight cargo is treated uniformly throughout 

maritime systems and across regional CBP offices are, as cited above, outlined in both 

regulatory requirements and Standard Operating Procedures. 
260 

Question#: 9 

Topic: Manifests 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What procedures are in place at CBP to ensure a timely response to submitted 

manifests in order to provide adequate lead time for shippers and customers? 

Response: Advance electronic manifest filing for maritime shippers provides manifest 

data for risk assessment. For containerized cargo, that information must be received by 

CBP 24 hours prior to loading on the vessel at the foreign port. Break bulk cargo may be 

exempted from that requirement and file 24 hours prior to arrival in the U.S. 

Additionally, Importer Security Filing requirements align with advance manifest 

requirements. Once received, CBP responds with an acknowledgement message (or 

error) shortly after submission. Release and hold messages are usually sent to carriers 

and others 5 days prior to estimated date of arrival of the vessel. The content of the 

notification message is dependent on the results of CBP risk assessments, the 

completeness of the information filed, and the type of transaction requested. 
261 

I Question#: 10 

Topic: ACE Systems 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: In the event freight is manifested and accepted in CBP's ACE system well in 

advance of estimated arrival dates, what procedures does CBP have in place to provide 

certainty to shippers and customers that accepted manifests will be processed as expected 

on the arrival date~ 

Response: As referenced above, CBP responds with an acknowledgement message 

shortly after submission of the manifest. Release and hold messages are usually sent to 

the carriers and others 5 days prior to the estimated date of arrival of the vessel. The 

content of the notification message is dependent on the results ofCBP risk assessments, 

the completeness of the information filed, and the type of transaction requested. 

Question: If a manifest for cargo is accepted in ACE for unloading at a specific port, is it 

certain the cargo can actually be unloaded at that port? 

Response: The manifest is only one part of the process. Vessel entrance procedures must 

be followed and the carrier or agent must request permission of CBP to unload the vessel. 

Per the requirements of 19 CFR 4.3(b )(2) the appropriate CBP port director may permit 

the entry of vessels to be accomplished at locations other than the customhouse, and 

services may be requested outside of normal business hours. 

CBP may take local resources into consideration in allowing formal entry to be transacted 

on board vessels or at other mutually convenient approved sites and times within or 

outside of port limits. 

When services are requested to be provided outside the limits of a CBP port, the 

appropriate port director to whom an application must be submitted is the director of the 

port located nearest to the point where the proposed services would be provided. That 

port director must be satisfied that the place designated for formal entry will be 

sufficiently under CBP control at the time of entry, and that the expenses incurred by 

CBP will be reimbursed as authorized. It may be required that advance notice of vessel 

arrival be given as a condition for granting requests for optional entry locations. A 

master, owner, or agent of a vessel who desires that entry be made at an optional location 

will file with the appropriate port director an application on CBP Fom1 3171 and a single 

entry or continuous bond on CBP Form 301 containing the bond conditions set forth in 

19 CFR § 113.64, in such amount as that port director deems appropriate but not less than 

$1,000. If the application is approved, the port director or a designated CBP officer will 

formally enter the vessel. Notwithstanding 19 CFR 4.3(b )(2), vessels may nevertheless be 
262 

Question#: 10 

Topic: ACE Systems 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

subject to other requirements as to how, when and where they are to report, be inspected 

or receive clearance from other Federal agencies upon arrival in the United States. 

Question: If not, why is the manifest accepted in ACE and how is the shipper/vessel 

operator notified cargo unloading is being restricted at a port? 

Response: Advance electronic manifest filing for maritime shippers provides manifest 

data for risk assessment. For containerized cargo, that information must be received by 

CBP 24 hours prior to loading on the vessel at the foreign port. Break bulk cargo may be 

exempted from that requirement and file 24 hours prior to arrival in the U.S. 

Additionally, Importer Security Filing requirements align with advance manifest 

requirements. Once received, CBP responds with an acknowledgement message (or 

error) shortly after submission. Release and hold messages are usually sent to carriers 

and others 5 days prior to estimated date of arrival of the vessel. The content of the 

notification message is dependent on the results of CBP risk assessments, the 

completeness of the information filed, and the type of transaction requested. If unlading 

is denied, that is reflected on the CBP Form 3171, Application-Permit-Special-LicenseUnlading-Lading-Overtime Services. In most cases, carriers will contact ports where 

limits arc known to exist to an·angc a case-by case approval process based on CBP's 

ability to clear cargo. This will be based on multiple factors including infrastructure and 

resources for examinations, CBP risk determination of cargo and level of complexity for 

CBP handling and examination. 

Question: What records are kept related to rejected cargo? 

Response: The ACE System maintains records ofrejeeted manifests. If the CBP Form 

3171 is rejected, it will be retained by the port. 
263 

Question#: 11 

Topic: Great Lakes Ports 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Does CBP accept International containerized and crated cargo by vessel in all 

Great Lakes ports? 

Response: No, CBP does not accept international containerized and crated cargo by 

vessel in all Great Lakes ports. 

Question: Which ports in the Great Lakes have limitations on their ability to accept 

international container and crated cargo? 

Response: The Cleveland POE, within the Chicago Field Office, is the only Great Lakes 

Port of Entry with the ability to process international containerized cargo. However, this 

ability is limited due to the port's resource constraints, including facilities, technology, 

local infrastructure, geographic layout, and work force. Most of these resources depend 

on a local port authority's ability and willingness to finance facility improvements and 

other infrastructure needs. Since the availability of resources varies greatly among ports, 

standardization of cargo processing procedures is neither feasible nor practical at this 

time. 

None of the ports of entry within the Detroit Field Office and Buffalo Field Office are 

currently outfitted with the proper facilities, technology, or infrastructure to allow for the 

proper and adequate inspection of containerized cargo in the maritime environment. For 

that reason, containerized commercial cargo arriving in the maritime environment is not 

permitted to be discharged at any port of entry within the Detroit and/or Buffalo Field 

Offices. 

Question: If there is a difference among ports, what is the justification? 

Response: CBP occupies over 25 million square feet of building space nationwide, of 

which just over half supports Field Operations mission requirements at the Nation's 

POEs-(land, air, and sea). The remaining half consists of: USBP space, which includes 

Border Patrol (BP) Sector Headquarters (IIQ), BP Stations, Checkpoints, and Forward 

Operating Bases (FOBs); Air and Marine space, which includes air branches and air and 

marine units; and mission support administrative space, housing units, and laboratory 

areas. 

Additionally, CBP's real property inventory consists of CBP-owned facilities, including 

buildings, structures, and land; facilities that are leased from the U.S. General Services 

Administration (GSA), which arc either GSA-owned or GSA-leased; facilities that are 
264 

Question#: I 11 

Topic: Great Lakes Ports 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

-- Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

leased through CBP commercial leases; and free space. Free space is the operational area 

provided by airport and seaport authorities, who arc required by law to grant CBP space 

for inspections. The Great Lakes POEs fall within this last category in which all facilities 

used by CBP are provided by the Port Authority. 

A variety of factors go into the determination of whether CBP is able to process 

containerized or crated cargo at facilities. Some of these factors include geographic 

layout, facilities, infrastructure, technology, and work force. While CBP does provide 

design standards to free space locations, CBP lacks a practicable statutory enforcement 

mechanism for non-compliant existing free space facilities. One of the key requirements 

of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 requires all containerized cargo entering the U.S. to be 

screened for radiation. With the exception of the Cleveland POE which again has limited 

resources, none of the Great Lakes POEs have the infrastructure in place to support 

installation of the necessary technology. For that reason, containerized commercial cargo 

arriving in the maritime environment is not permitted to be discharged at any POE within 

the Detroit and/or Buffalo Field Offices. 

Crated cargo arriving via vessel is approved/denied on a case by case basis. The 

approval/denial of service (entrance/clearance) is based on the totality of the 

circumstances (size, volume, piece count, ability to easily inspect fi·eight absent 

techno logy /facilities). 

The large volume of crated cargo coupled with the need to adequately and expeditiously 

inspect the fl·eight prohibits POEs within the Detroit Field Office from approving the 

entrance/clearance of crated cargo (in many cases). Further, the POEs' inability to 

inspect these shipments as presented, as well as the POEs' inability to adequately 

mitigate and/or adjudicate any discoveries (i.e. agricultural violations, radiation 

screening, etc.) weighs heavily upon the final decision to approve or deny service. POEs 

within the Buffalo Field Office do not receive large volumes of crated cargo, nor has 

service been routinely denied. Historically, the crated cargo within the Buffalo Field 

Office received via vessel consists of small volumes of crates or pallets from within a 

larger break bulk shipment. 

Using an inefficient and manual process to inspect large volumes of crated cargo would 

not only pose a significant strain on our already limited resources, but it would create a 

potential security vulnerability due to our inability to conduct a complete inspection of 

the cargo. Further, pulling staff from existing priorities/responsibilities under these 

conditions would have a negative impact on other port operations. 
265 

Question#: 12 

Topic: 13 ioterrorism 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: A bioterrorist attack could have a devastating impact in a major city, both in 

terms of human life and our sense of safety and security. However, reports such as the 

Blue Ribbon study panel's report on biodefense have indicated that our national defense 

against bioterrorism is lacking in both detection capability and response. In the 2016 

Worldwide Threat Assessment, the CRISPR gene editing tool was identified as a key 

enabling technology that could be used by terrorists to more easily create a biological 

weapon. 

Among the terrorist threats facing the homeland, how worried are you about bioterrorism 

as compared to other threats such as conventional terrorism or dirty bombs? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security prepares and protects the United 

States against a range of terrorist threats, from more frequent events such as active 

shooter incidents, to low probability events such as a dirty bomb or biotcrrorist attack. 

Acts of bioterrorism, though uncommon, have potentially catastrophic consequences. 

DHS components, including the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (!&A), Countering 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), and the Science and Technology Directorate 

(S&T), coordinate closely with the broader U.S. intelligence community (!C) to 

understand and assess biological threats to the homeland, and with the broader Homeland 

Security Enterprise to assess the potential impact of these threats. 

While we are unable to comment specifically on the threat ofWMD terrorism in an open 

setting, the Department welcomes the opportunity to provide Members and staff a 

classified briefing. 

Question: How much does the rapid spread of biotechnology due to advancements such 

as CRISPR impact your assessment of the threat ofbiotcnorism? 

Response: DHS is closely tracking emerging biotechnologies, like CRISPR, that have 

the potential to change the bioterrorism threat landscape. While CRISPR is certainly a 

powerful new technique, it is one of many molecular biology tools (including decades old 

technology), and other technological advancements with dual-use potential. 

Along with federal partners, DIIS has been heavily engaged in drafting the new National 

Biodcfensc Strategy required by the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which 

aims to address bioterrorism and other biological threats holistically. 
266 

Question#: 12 

Topic: Bioterrorism 

- Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

While we are unable to comment specillcally on the threat of WMD terrorism in an open 

setting, the Department welcomes the opportunity to provide Members and staff a 

classi11ed briefing. 

Question: Could CRISPR be used by someone who doesn't have bad intentions, but 

perhaps isn't taking the proper safety precautions, to inadvertently cause a health 

emergency? 

Response: Researchers should consider the potential hazards and risks of their work and 

take appropriate biosafety precautions when performing experiments with any dual use 

molecular biology tools, including CRISPR, to avoid inadvertently harming themselves 

or others. This is particularly true for experiments involving infectious agents with 

potential to cause illness or death in humans, livestock, or plants. To partially address 

concerns raised by technological innovations in biology, like some gain-of-function 

research, in January 2017, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 

released recommendations for Departments and Agencies to utilize review and oversight 

mechanisms before conducting or approving funding for certain experiments with the 

potential to create, transfer, or use enhanced pathogens with pandemic potential. 

Question: Is DHS prepared to deal with the emerging bioterror threats that exist today? 

Response: DHS believes it is prepared to deal with the emerging bioterror threats that 

exist today. However, DHS is always looking to improve its ability to deal with 

emerging bioterror threats, and looks forward to keeping the committee advised of any 

developments in this area. 

Question: What can DHS do to better prepare for these threats? 

Response: DHS, along with our federal partners, constantly monitors threat streams and 

re-assesses our programs to ensure they adequately protect the homeland. To better 

prepare for current and emerging biothreats, DHS must continue to extract and apply 

lessons learned from each real-life example that we face when a novel or surprise 

infectious disease outbreak occurs that challenges the existing public health and medical 

system. For example, DHS was actively involved in assisting with the various issues that 

emerged during the cases of Ebola in the U.S related to the 2014-2015 outbreak in West 

Africa. The real-life challenges in the response to a handful of U.S. Ebola cases exposed 

significant weaknesses that we would face had a deliberate biological attack occurTed. 

For DHS to be better prepared for these threats, we need to have an accurate 

understanding of how well the system, including the whole team of federal, state, local, 
267 

Question#: 12 

Topic: Bioterrorism 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Gary Peters 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

tribal, and territorial partners, is prepared. While FEMA does provide preparedness 

funding to SLTT partners for a range of threats, including bioterrorism threats, the vast 

majority of the public health preparedness money is granted by the U.S. Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention. Additionally, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

has the responsibility for funding the capability to understand where the environmental 

contamination is post-attack. It is challenging for DHS to know at any given moment 

how well each Federal partner has prepared their local partners for these extremely 

important functions. 

In the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

along with the Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture, was 

tasked to develop a national biodefense strategy and implementation plan. The strategy is 

being developed in close coordination with additional interagency partners. 
268 

Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

13 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Elaine C. Duke 

From Senator Kamala Harris 

"Threats to the Homeland Hearing" 

September 27, 2017 

Jones Act 

Threats to the Homeland 

The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: During the hearing, you committed to "put someone in place that can be 

responsible for responding to requests from Congress about your activities as it relates to 

the Jones Act or any other work in Puerto Rico." 

What is the name of this person? 

Response: The Ot1ice of Legislative Affairs (OLA) serves as primary liaison to Members 

of Congress and their congressional staff. As such, OLA coordinates responses to 

congressional inquiries on all Department initiatives, policies, and programs. Any 

questions regarding the Department's activities in Puerto Rico, including the Jones Act, 

may be submitted via mail, phone, fax, or email to Ben Cassidy, DHS Office of 

Legislative Affairs, Mail Stop 0020, Washington, D.C. 20528, Phone: 202-447-5890, 

Fax: 202-447-5437, E-mail: CongresstoDHS@hq.dhs.gov. 
269 

I 

Question#: 14 

Topic: DACA Information Sharing 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: During the hearing, you committed to provide me an answer as to whether 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will keep its promise to DACA applicants and 

ensure that their information is not shared with U.S. Immigrations Customs and 

Enforcement (ICE) pursuant to the policy articulated in Question 19 of the archived 

DACA FAQs from the DHS website. 

Please provide this answer. 

Response: Information provided by DACA requestors is not routinely and proactively 

shared with U.S. Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE). As a matter of 

longstanding agency policy, and as ret1ected in archived USCIS DACA FAQs 19, 20, and 

26 and DHS DACA Rescission FAQs 7 and 8, information provided to USCIS in DACA 

requests will not be provided to ICE or CBP for the purpose of immigration enforcement 

proceedings, unless the requestor meets the criteria for the issuance of a Notice to Appear 

or a referral to ICE under the criteria set forth in USCIS' Notice to Appear guidance 

(www.uscis.gov/NT A). This information-sharing policy has not changed in any way 

since it was first announced, including as a result of the September 5, 20I7 memo starting 

a wind-down of the DACA policy. Since 2012 and the inception ofDACA, and as is 

explicitly noted in the DACA F AQs, this policy may be modified, superseded, or 

rescinded at any time with or without notice. Further, as has always been the case, this 

policy is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or 

benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any administrative, 

civil, or criminal matter. 
270 

Question#: ! 15 

I 

Topic: 1 Enforcement Priorities 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Will you commit that DACA recipients who fall out of status will not be 

considered enforcement priorities and that ICE resources will not be used to deport them, 

including after March 5? 

Response: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) does not grant any legal 

status for the class of individuals who are current recipients. Recipients ofDACA have 

their removal temporarily deferred. When their period of deferred action expires or is 

terminated, their removal will no longer be deferred and they will no longer be eligible 

for lawful employment. Additionally, in accordance with the President's Executive 

Order (EO) 13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, while 

DACA recipients may not be a priority for removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) will not exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from 

potential enforcement. All of those who are encountered by ICE and found to be in 

violation of the immigration laws may be subject to immigration arrest, detention, and, if 

found removable by final order, removal from the United States. 
271 

Question#: 16 

Topic: EndingDACA 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: On September 5, you issued a memo rescinding the original June 15,2012 

memo that established DACA. During its five-year history, DACA has allowed young 

people who know no other country as their home and passed rigorous background 

screening to come out of the shadows and contribute more fully to their communities and 

our economy. DACA recipients are students at our colleges and universities, teachers, 

doctors, and engineers. DACA recipients are also our sons, daughters, mothers, fathers, 

sisters, and brothers. Many play central roles in caring and providing for their families. 

In making the decision to end DACA, please detail any conversations that DHS officials 

had with outside stakeholders, including other government agencies such as DOJ and the 

White House in consideration of its decision. 

Were any other factors considered in the decision to end DACA other than the legal 

advisement issued by Attorney General Sessions on September 57 Please describe those 

factors. 

In making the decision to rescind DACA, did you or any DHS official review any legal 

advisement or material from the Department of Justice or the White House Office of 

Legal Counsel other than September 5 letter issued by Attorney General Sessions? If so, 

please describe and provide any related documentation. 

Response: On June 29, 2017, Texas, along with several other states, sent a letter to 

Attorney General Sessions asserting that the original2012 DACA policy memorandum 

was unlawful for the same reasons the district court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Fifth Circuit found DAPA and expanded DACA to be unlawful. The Fifth Circuit upheld 

the district court's preliminary injunction regarding DAPA and expanded DACA. The 

Supreme Court affirmed this decision. The letter from these states noted that if DHS did 

not rescind the DACA memo by September 5, 2017, the states would seek to amend the 

DAPA lawsuit to include a challenge to the original2012 DACA memorandum as well. 

The Attorney General sent a letter to the Department on September 4, 2017, articulating 

his legal determination that DACA "was effectuated by the previous administration 

through executive action, without proper statutory authority and with no established enddate, after Congress' repeated rejection of proposed legislation that would have 

accomplished a similar result. Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws 

was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch." The letter further 

stated that because DACA "has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts 

recognized as to DAPA, it is likely that potentially imminent litigation would yield 
272 

Question#: 16 

Topic: Ending DACA 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

similar results with respect to DACA." Nevertheless, in light of the administrative 

complexities associated with ending the policy, he recommended that the Department 

wind it down in an efficient and orderly fashion. 

Based on this legal determination, DHS was faced with a stark choice: do nothing and 

allow for the probability that the entire DACA policy could be immediately enjoined by a 

court in a disruptive manner, or instead phase out the policy in an orderly fashion. Thus, 

then-Acting Secretary Duke issued a memorandum (1) rescinding the June 2012 memo 

that established DACA, and (2) setting forth a plan for phasing out DACA. 
273 

- Question#: 17 

Topic: Economic Impact 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The Center for American Progress has estimated that the rescission ofDACA 

will cost the U.S. $460 billion in gross domestic product over ten years and cost 

California billions of dollars annually. Other economists and business leaders have 

agreed that ending DACA will not only hurt those with DACA, but our economy as a 

whole. Did you consider the adverse economic impact of rescinding DACA as part of 

your decision? If so, please detail any related research, data and findings as part of that 

consideration. 

Response: The decision to rescind DACA was based on the legal decision that DACA 

was unlawful and unlikely to survive based on the current litigation environment. The 

Attorney General sent a letter to the Department on September 4, 2017, articulating his 

legal determination that DACA "was effectuated by the previous administration through 

executive action, without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date, 

after Congress' repeated rejection of proposed legislation that would have accomplished 

a similar result. Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws was an 

unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch." The letter further stated 

that because DACA "has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts 

recognized as to DAPA, it is likely that potentially imminent litigation would yield 

similar results with respect to DACA." Nevertheless, in light of the administrative 

complexities associated with ending the policy, he recommended that the Department 

wind it down in an efficient and orderly fashion. 
274 

Question#: 118 

Topic: : Renewal Notific~tions 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Previously, DHS directly notified DACA recipients of the need to renew their 

status as their DACA expiration date approached. It is my understanding that this practice 

was changed under this Administration. 

When was this change made? 

Who made this decision? 

Please describe the reason DHS stopped providing this notification to DACA recipients 

and provide any related memo or guidance effecting his change. 

Response: Use of the automatically generated 180-day DACA renewal reminder notice 

was discontinued in July 2017. The automatic generation of the 180-day notice was 

utilized only for DACA requests that were receipted into the CLAIMS 3 system. This 

feature was never developed for or implemented in the Electronic Immigration System 

(ELlS) in which DACA requests have been adjudicated since approximately February I, 

2016. 

The 180-day automatic reminder notice was never implemented in the ELlS system. 

users had to decide whether to expend limited resources to implement this capability in 

ELlS for DACA requests when other serious and important upgrades to ELlS were 

needed. USCIS chose not to implement this capability only for DACA requests in ELlS. 

It should be noted that users does not issue individualized reminder notices for other 

benefit types that the agency processes, or to other applicants/beneficiaries. 

For DACA requests that had been processed in the older CLAIMS 3 system, the 

automatic notice feature was phased out in CLAIMS 3 in July 2017 as CLAIMS 3 notice 

printing migrated from the CLAIMS 3 print server to the Electronic Print Management 

System (EPMS). USCIS made a policy and operational decision not to rewrite the 180-

day reminder notice service tor CLAIMS 3 cases to EPMS due to significant operational 

costs associated with re-building this service, and the fact that the overwhelming majority 

of pending DACA requests were by then processed in ELlS and had been adjudicated in 

ELlS since approximately February I, 2016. 

When USCIS defers an individual's removal under DACA, USCIS issues the DACA 

recipient a DACA approval notice and an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) 

which list the date the individual's DACA and associated EAD expire. Historically, 

US CIS recommended that DACA recipients file for renewal of DACA between !50 days 

and 120 days before the expiration date located on their DACA approval notice and 
275 

--------- Question#: 18 

Topic: Renewal Notifications 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: I HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

EAD. This guidance can be found in USCIS's now archived FAQs on DACA. See 

https://www.uscis.gov/archive/freguently-asked-questions. Note: Any DACA requests 

received prior to February 2016 were processed in CLAIMS 3 even if still pending on or 

after February 2016 when USCIS fully transitioned DACA processing for all new DACA 

requests to ELlS. 
276 

Question#: 19 

Topic: October 5th Deadline 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Please detail what steps DHS took to notify DACA recipients of the October 5 

renewal deadline. 

Response: On September 5, 2017, DHS published a news release that linked to (I) a 

memorandum from then-Acting Secretary Elaine Duke explaining her decision to rescind 

DACA, (2) Frequently Asked Questions: Rescission of DACA, and (3) a letter from 

Attorney General Sessions to then-Acting Secretary Duke on the rescission ofDACA. 

Additionally, DHS published a fact sheet on the rescission ofDACA. On September 18, 

2017, DHS published a Notice of Availability of the DACA Rescission Memorandum in 

the Federal Register. 

Since September 5, 2017, USCIS has carried out extensive online communications to 

alert DACA recipients of the deadline. Messaging was in English and Spanish and 

included multiple posts to Twitter and Facebook each week, in addition to updates to the 

DACA 2017 announcement page on the USCIS website at 

https://www.uscis.gov/daca2017. This page outlines the phase out ofDACA and carries 

a detailed If/Then table explaining who meets the parameters of the rescission memo and 

how to request DACA renewal. USCIS also posted information about the phase out to 

pages related to DACA, including the DACA renewal page at https://go.usa.gov/xRhuG, 

and the form landing page for Form I 821 D, Consideration for Deferred Action for 

Childhood Arrivals (https://www.uscis.gov/archive/i-821 d). In addition, USC IS posted 

the information to previous DACA pages that had been archived, such as the original 

DACA information page. 

On September 28, 2017, USCIS issued a news release about the approaching deadline 

and amplified that release on social media that day and the following day. From 

September 29,2017 to October 3, 2017, USCIS posted a twice-daily countdown on social 

media that especially emphasized that USC IS must receive renewal requests by October 

5, 2017. Those posts referenced the DACA renewal page. 

Question: Will DHS adhere to historic immigration policy and commit to processing all 

DACA applications postmarked by the October 5, 2017 (or any subsequent deadline) 

instead of requiring that applications be physically received by USCIS? 

Response: Due to a federal court order issued by the District Court for the Northern 

District of California on January 9, 2018, in Regents of the University of California v. 

U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, No. 17-5211,2018 WL 339144 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 

20 18), users has resumed accepting requests to renew a grant of deferred action under 
277 

Question#: 19 

Topic: October 5th Deadline 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

DACA. See https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/deferred-action-childhood-arrivalsresponse-january-2018-preliminary-injunction. Individuals whose renewal requests were 

not received by October 5, 2017 and who have not already resubmitted a DACA renewal 

request that was accepted by USCIS may request renewal of their DACA unless and until 

the court order is modified or withdrawn. 

Question: Before the September 5 announcement, DHS's policy was to allow DACA 

recipients to apply for renewal even if their grant had expired. For these individuals who 

might have been out of status on September 5 because they were collecting needed 

documents, or saving for a fee, they now have no options. Will you commit to revisiting 

DHS's policy prohibiting DACA recipients whose DACA expired before September 5 

from applying for relief? 

Response: DHS will adhere to the DHS DACA Rescission Memorandum, which 

provides that DHS will consider on an individual case-by-case basis properly filed 

DACA renewal requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization 

Documents from DACA recipients whose DACA expired on or before September 5, 

2017, that were received as of September 5, 2017, and from DACA recipients whose 

DACA will expire between September 5, 2017, and March 5, 2018, inclusive, that were 

properly received as of October 5, 2017. However, USCIS will consider deadline 

extensions on a case-by-case basis for DACA renewal requests that are received after 

October 5, 2017, from residents of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands due to the 

recent hurricanes impacting those areas. Additionally in light of mail service delays 

identified by the U.S. Postal Service, then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security 

directed USCIS to accept DACA renewal requests from individuals who resubmit their 

DACA renewal request with individualized proof that the request was originally mailed 

in a timely manner and that the cause for receipt after the October 5, 2017 deadline was 

the result of USPS mail service error. USCIS is also reaching out to certain individuals 

whose requests were received at the designated filing location (e.g. at the applicable P.O. 

Box) by the filing deadline but were rejected, to inform them that they may resubmit their 

DACA request. See "USCIS Guidance on DACA Renewal Requests Affected by Mail 

Service Delays" (https://www.uscis.gov/ncws/alerts/uscis-guidance-daca-renewalrequests-affected-mail-service-issues) and "Frequently Asked Questions: Rejected 

DACA Requests" (https://www.uscis.gov/daca2017/mail-faqs). 
278 

Question#: 20 

Topic: DACA Applications Denied 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What will happen to DACA applications denied due to not meeting the 

October 5 deadline? 

Response: In accordance with the DACA Rescission Memorandum, DHS will reject 

DACA renewal requests received after October 5, 2017. However, USCIS will consider 

deadline extensions on a case-by-case basis for DACA renewal requests that are received 

after October 5, 2017, from residents of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands due to 

the recent hurricanes impacting those areas. Additionally in light of mail service delays 

identified by the U.S. Postal Service, then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security 

directed USCIS to accept DACA renewal requests from individuals who resubmit their 

DACA renewal request with individualized proof that the request was originally mailed 

in a timely manner and that the cause for receipt after the October 5, 2017 deadline was 

the result of USPS mail service error. US CIS is also reaching out to certain individuals 

whose requests were received at the designated filing location (e.g. at the applicable P.O. 

Box) by the filing deadline but were rejected, to inform them that they may resubmit their 

DACA request. See "USCIS Guidance on DACA Renewal Requests Affected by Mail 

Service Delays" (https://wv.;w.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-guidance-daca-renewalrequests-affected-mail-service-issues) and "Frequently Asked Questions: Rejected 

DACA Requests" (https://wv.;w.uscis.gov/daca2017/mail-faqs). 

Question: Will they get their fees back? 

Response: Yes. When a DACA request is rejected at intake, all materials and fees 

provided by the requestor are returned with a notice explaining why the request has been 

rejected. 

Question: Will they be referred to ICE? 

Response: The screening done at the USCIS Lock box to determine whether a filing 

should be accepted or rejected does not involve an assessment of whether the requestor is 

removable or otherwise should be referred to ICE for immigration enforcement purposes. 

With regard to sharing information provided by DACA requestors with the requests, 

USCIS follows longstanding agency policy, which is contained in the Instructions to the 

Form I-82ID, the archived USCIS DACA FAQ's 19, 20, and 26, and DHS DACA 

Rescission FAQs 7 and 8. Those materials note that information provided to USCIS in 

DACA requests will not be proactively provided to ICE or CBP for the purpose of 

immigration enforcement proceedings, unless the requestor meets the criteria for the 

issuance of a Notice to Appear or a referral to ICE under the criteria set forth in lJSCIS' 
279 

Question#: 20 

Topic: DACA Applications Denied 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Notice to Appear guidance (www.uscis.gov/NTA). This information-sharing policy has 

not changed in any way since it was first announced, including as a result of the 

September 5, 2017 memo starting a wind-down of the DACA policy. Since 2012 and the 

inception ofDACA, and as is explicitly noted in the DACA FAQs, this policy may be 

modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time with or without notice. Further, as has 

always been the case, this policy is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon 

to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party 

in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. 
280 

Question#: 21 

Topic: UAC Policy 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: It has been rumored in the press that DHS will be releasing new policy as it 

relates to unaccompanied alien children (UACs). Please describe what change is policy is 

being considered by the Department, including for UACs who "age-out" after turning 18, 

and provide any related memos or guidance. 

Response: The Department continuously reviews all current policies for soundness and 

effectiveness while dealing with significant operational challenges and new threats on a 

daily basis. If and when new policies are deemed necessary to adequately meet 

challenges or neutralize threats the Department will provide Congress and the public with 

all appropriate information consistent with our commitment to transparency. 
281 

Question#: 22 

Topic: Due Process Protections 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Congress has legislated on due-process protections afforded to unaccompanied 

children. Both the Homeland Security Act and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 

2008 provide specific protections to ensure children have a fair process to have their story 

adjudicated. What actions are you taking to modify existing procedures and how do they 

comport with Congressional intent? 

Response: The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2008 

and 2013 provide specific protections to unaccompanied alien children (UAC). The 

Department of Homeland Security provides for these protections through its components 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). For example, the 

TVPRA mandates that all UAC whom DHS seeks to remove from the United States, 

except those from contiguous countries that can properly be permitted to withdraw their 

application, be placed in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (INA). 

DHS takes its responsibilities regarding UAC very seriously. To this end, ICE 

established the Juvenile and Family Residential Management Unit (JFRMU), which is 

comprised of federal and contracted subject matter experts in matters such as juvenile 

justice, education, and the care and custody of juveniles. ICE also requires each Field 

Office to retain at least one primary Field Office Juvenile Coordinator (FOJC) as well as 

a secondary FOJC. The JFRMU provides annual training to all FOJC and their 

supervisors, our CBP Office of Field Operations and U.S. Border Patrol, and USC IS 

partners to ensure compliance with both the Homeland Security Act and TVPRA. ICE 

also collaborates within DHS, such as with CBP to facilitate the transfer of custody of 

UAC to Health and Human Services (HHS), and US CIS, when necessary, to assist in 

expediting and adjudicating applications. USC IS continues to exercise initial jurisdiction 

over asylum applications filed by UAC's. 

Additionally, CBP remains committed to complying with the protections afforded within 

the TVPRA. Although the TVPRA only requires that UAC from contiguous countries be 

screened for evidence of a severe form of trafficking, CBP has taken the proactive step of 

screening all UAC regardless of country of origin. Similar to ICE's procedures, CBP 

places unaccompanied alien children from non-contiguous countries into immigration 

court proceedings per Section 240 of the INA. 

The U.S. Border Patrol and the Office of Field Operations participate in the FOJC 

training provided by ICE to ensure that Border Patrol Agents and Customs and Border 
282 

Question#: 22 

-- Topic: Due Process Protections 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Protection Officers arc trained on the most recent updates to laws, policies and 

procedures related to UAC. 
283 

Question#: 23 

Topic: Family Separation 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: There have been reports that instances of family separation are increasing at 

the U.S./Mexico border. Very young children [including babies and toddlers] arc being 

separated from their families. Your predecessor Secretary Kelly assured us DHS was not 

to be separating families as a matter of deterring women and children from seeking 

protection at our borders. 

What are you doing to ensure families are not being systematically separated, and if they 

are, what steps is the Department taking to ensure reunification and communication of 

separated family members? 

Response: As stated in CBP's Transport, Escort, Detention Standards, "When it is 

necessary to separate juveniles from the parent(s) and/or legal guardian(s), officers/agents 

must follow their operational office's policies and procedures and appropriate legal 

requirements. In circumstances where family units must be separated due to different 

immigration dispositions, such separation must be documented in the appropriate 

electronic system(s) ofrecord." 

USBP does not have a blanket policy that dictates family separation and the decision to 

separate is made on a case-by-case basis. Examples include when the parent/legal 

guardian is amenable to prosecution, there is evidence of abuse and the safety of the 

juvenile is in jeopardy, or if the claim of family relationship is called into question. Each 

family member's biographical information is captured and recorded in e3 Detention 

Module (e3DM) in accordance with applicable law, policies, court rulings, and 

procedures. In the event of a separation, all family members are linked in the e3DM. In 

cases where a juvenile must be separated from a parent or legal guardian, immediate 

arrangements are made to transfer custody of the juvenile to ORR in accordance with the 

Homeland security Act of2002. 

Question: Is DHS currently drafting or considering a policy to separate families at the 

border? 

Response: DHS continually examines existing processes and policies when encountering 

families at the border, including with respect to compliance with applicable court 

decisions and the President's Executive Orders. 

Question: What procedures exist when U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

makes such a decision (i.e., reviews, opportunity for parents to be represented in 

challenging a separation)? 
284 

Question#: 23 

Topic: Family Separation 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Response: In cases where the parent or legal guardian and a legally present or U.S. 

citizen child must be separated, social services may be contacted to take custody of the 

child. CBP ensures the parents have the opportunity to arrange for care of their children 

before contacting a social service agency. In cases where a parent or legal guardian and a 

noncitizen child who has no lawful status in the United States must be separated because 

the parent or legal guardian is not or is no longer available to provide care and physical 

custody, the noncitizen child is classified as an unaccompanied child and is processed 

accordingly. Parents or legal guardians may appeal to an immigration court to challenge 

CBP detention decisions. Appeals regarding CBP detention issues are heard and decided 

by immigration judges. 
285 

Question#: 24 

Topic: · UAC Parents 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: DHS has recently conducted enforcement actions against parents of 

unaccompanied minors as part of efforts to prosecute parents for smuggling. This past 

weekend, the New York Times reported that the agency plans to conduct additional 

actions to assist in prosecuting parents for unlawfully reentering the country. 

How does the agency make decisions regarding any children encountered during these 

enforcement actions? 

Is there a policy regarding referral, placement, or reunification of these children? 

Response: In compliance with existing laws and regulations, the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security ensures the proper enforcement of our immigration laws against any 

individual who directly or indirectly facilitates the illegal smuggling or trafficking of an 

alien child into the United States. The current enforcement actions respond to former 

Secretary Kelly's February 20, 2017 memorandum entitled, Implementing the President's 

Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies, which provides 

guidance regarding the implementation of President Trump's January 25, 2017 Executive 

Order entitled, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. 

Enforcement determinations are made by taking into account the risk of harm to the child 

associated with the specific smuggling or trafficking activity that an individual may have 

facilitated, as well as any other factors relating to the individual's culpability and the 

child's welfare. Any children encountered are required to be placed into appropriate 

custodial environments, which could involve placement with parents or guardians with 

legal status in the United States, or into agency custody for removal proceedings. Proper 

enforcement includes, but is not limited to, placing any parent or sponsor who is a 

removable alien into removal proceedings or referring the individual for criminal 

prosecution. 

With regard to referral, placement, and reunification of these unaccompanied alien 

ehildrcn (UAC), with limited exceptions for certain nationals or habitual residents of 

Canada or Mexico, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is required to transfer the 

child to U.S. Health and Human Services, Ofiicc of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) within 

72 hours of determining that such child is a UAC, except in the case of exceptional 

circumstances. Transportation from CBP housing to shelters is a shared responsibility 

between CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and both agencies 

cooperate to meet this requirement. ORR is responsible for the care and custody of 

UACs. 
286 

Question#: 25 

Topic: Seven Enforcement Priorities 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: During the hearing, I asked you to provide me more detail on how agents on 

the ground are being trained in relation to the seven enforcement priorities enumerated in 

the February 20 DHS memo issued by former Secretary Kelly. In response to a Question 

For the Record (QFRs) about Deportation Officers training around these priorities 

submitted after the June 6, 2017 HSGAC hearing on the Department of Homeland 

Security Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request, DHS stated, "ICE law enforcement officers 

are also notified of policy changes, including the Executive Orders issued by President 

Trump and implementation memoranda issued, via broadcast email messages from 

agency and department leadership. These broadcast messages include hyper links to the 

Executive Orders and implementation memoranda that are posted to either public 

websites or internal agency intranet sites." 

Can you provide my office with a copy of any e-mail(s) from agency/department 

leadership about the February 20, 2017 implementation memo that set out the seven new 

enforcement priorities? 

Response: The following are email messages from the Department of Homeland Security 

and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement leadership regarding your request: 

From: Office of the Secretary 

Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2017 9:22AM 

Subject: Message from Secretary Kelly on Implementation of Executive Orders 

February 21, 2017 

Homeland 

Security 

President Trump recently signed several executive orders that affect our Department's 

operations and impact the execution of our mission to secure the homeland. As you have 

likely seen reported, the implementation of these executive orders has generated a 

significant amount of interest in what we do, and reinforces the importance of securing 
287 

Question#: 25 

Topic: Seven Enforcement Priorities 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

the border and enforcing our nation's laws. 

Today, I have issued implementation memos regarding two of the executive orders that 

impact Department operations, Border Security and Immigration Enf(Jrcement 

Improvements, and Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States. 

These implementation memoranda, along with fact sheets and Q&A documents, are 

available at l~\\W,Q.b.~J!,iLvl-c,-;efJJli.!J:'2rQ~S I will continue to keep you informed and 

provide substantive information to help you to successfully perform your duties. As part 

of this effort, we will ensure this page is updated early and often, as appropriate. 

As we implement these executive orders to help keep the American people safe, we are 

and will remain in compliance with all federal court orders. As always, I ask each of you 

to continue to exercise your authority and responsibilities in the most respectful and 

professional manner. 

Thank you again for your service to our great nation and for all you do to accomplish our 

vital missions. 

Sincerely, 

John F. Kelly 

Secretary of Homeland Security 

With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and 

our values. 

From: ERO Taskings 

Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2017 10:08 PM 

Subject: Implementing the President's Border Security and Interior Immigration Enforcement 

Policies 

The following message is sent on behalf of Matthew T. Albence, Executive Associate 

Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations to ERO Personnel: 
288 

Question#: 25 

Topic: Seven Enforcement Priorities 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

On January 25,2017, President Trump issued two Executive Orders addressing DHS' 

immigration enforcement and border security missions: Executive Order No. 13767 

entitled Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, and Executive 

Order No. 13768 entitled Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of' the United States. 

On February 20, 2017, Secretary Kelly issued two memoranda implementing the 

president's Executive Orders. These implementation memoranda, along with fact sheets 

and Q&A documents, arc available at www.dhs.gov/executivcorders. 

Effective immediately, Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) will conduct 

operations in accordance with to the Secretary's memos. All ERO personnel should 

familiarize themselves with the attached memorandum entitled "Implementing the 

President's Border Security and Interior Immigration Enforcement Policies," as 

well as the other documents at the above link. Please direct any questions about 

Executive Order implementation to your local chain of command, who will forward them 

to ERO HQ Field Operations, as necessary. 

I want to thank all of you for your dedication and commitment to the mission ofDHS and 

ICE. This is a pivotal time for us, and I have no doubt that you will continue to execute 

your duties with the same high level of professionalism and integrity that you always 

have. 

Stay safe. 

Matt 
289 

Question#: 26 

Topic: Changing ICE Policies 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: According to DHS answers to my QFRs submitted after the June 6, 2017 

HSG AC hearing on the Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2018 Budget 

Request, "ICE is currently working with the Department's Office of Policy and other 

programs to examine current ICE policies and guidance to ensure their alignment with 

the President's recent Executive Orders and the vision and plans for implementing those 

orders." Can you provide me with a list of ICE policies and guidance that arc changing 

due to the review process described in DHS's answer? 

Response: The Priority Enforcement Program has been terminated and the Secure 

Communities Program was reinstated as directed in the President's Executive Orders. On 

April 2, 2017, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) retired detainer Forms 

I-247D, I-247N, and I-247X and replaced them with Form I-247A (Immigration Detainer 

Notice of Action). To minimize litigation risk associated with prior detainer forms, the 

ICE Acting Director issued ICE Policy No. 10074.2, Issuance of Immigration Detainers 

by ICE Immigration Officers, requiring the I-247 A be accompanied by Form I-200 

(Warrant for Arrest of Alien), or Form I-205 (Warrant of Removal). On December 14, 

2017, ICE revised ICE Policy No. 11032.3, Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant 

Detainees, to reinforce ICE law enforcement officers' discretion when encountering 

pregnant individuals and to ensure consistent practices for the identification and care of 

pregnant detainees in ICE custody. 

ICE has completed its comprehensive review of all ICE-wide policies and has 

commenced the process of rescinding, replacing, or revising policies that may be in 

conflict with the President's Executive Orders, prioritizing those policies that specifically 

"exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential enforcement" as well as 

those that involve the application of prosecutorial discretion to any particular groups. 
290 

I 

Question#: 27 

Topic: Notification Delay 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: On September 22,2017, state officials elected to oversee elections were 

officially notified by DHS - for the first time- of attempted or actual intrusions into their 

election systems during the 2016 election. 

Why did DHS wait for over a year to notify secretaries of state and other elected officials 

of actual or attempted security breaches in their states? Has DHS considered the 

implications of this delay on securing such systems in advance of upcoming elections? 

Response: In 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took unprecedented 

action to alert chief state election officials of relevant cybersecurity threats. DHS issued 

several public statements between August and Election Day to share information 

regarding the threat and urged election officials to seek cybersecurity assistance from 

either DHS or other experts. The Secretary held multiple phone calls with election 

officials to highlight the seriousness of the threat. As early as August 2016, we broadly 

shared specific tactics and indicators observed against some states-specifically 

information regarding targeting of voter registration systems-with state and local 

governments to increase awareness of the threat and asked recipients to check their 

systems for similar activity. 

DHS and the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence declassified attribution and 

alerted the public to malicious activity directed towards our elections on October 7, 

2016. Several days later, DHS's National Cybersecurity and Communications 

Integration Center (NCCIC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) published and 

shared with election officials a joint analysis report containing recommendations and 

over 650 teclmical indicators of compromise to assist election oftlcials with detecting 

malicious activity on their networks. Some of these indicators had previously been 

classified and were pulled from analysis of previous incidents relevant to the threat. 

Between August and Election Day, DHS and other interagency partners shared several 

other products, including best practices specific to election infrastructure, intelligence 

assessments, risk assessments, and technical information to assist election officials with 

network protection. Further information relevant to officials was declassified in the 

January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment, "Assessing Russian Activities and 

Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections." 

During the 2016 election period, through trusted third parties like the Multi-State 

Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) and state and local cybersecurity 

officials, the Department and its partners learned of specific communications or 
291 

Question#: 27 

Topic: Notification Delay 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

--- Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

attempted communications from malicious infrastructure to known state or local 

government networks in at least 21 states. For individual incident reports, the United 

States Government had not yet completed its attribution work and therefore did not 

attribute the incidents to Russia at the time. Those network operators sometimes further 

shared the individual incident reports with election officials and sometimes did not. The 

decision to share was at the discretion of the network operators. Reasons not to share 

further include the fact that the majority of the observed communications indicated no 

evidence of compromise, and that is not common to share information in such instances 

with senior executives. 

Some Secretaries of State and other state chief election officials expressed frustration at 

not being informed whether their states were included in the 21 states referenced in 

DHS's June 2017 testimony before Congress. To address these concerns, DHS reached 

out to Secretaries of State and State Election Directors to let them know if their state was 

or was not included in DHS's assessment. 

DHS is committed to improving the effectiveness of information sharing protocols, both 

from DHS and among stale officials. As the sector-specific agency, DHS is providing 

overall coordination guidance on election infrastructure matters to subsector stakeholders. 

As part of this process, the Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating 

Council (GCC) was established as a representative council of federal, state, and local 

partners with the mission of focusing on sector-specific strategies and planning. This 

includes development of information sharing protocols and establishment of key working 

groups, among other priorities. 
292 

Question#: 28 

Topic: Election Security Time line 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: At a June Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, DHS Acting Under 

Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications Janette Manfra asserted that DHS was 

developing a policy to help states secure their election systems. What is the timelinc for 

establishing such a policy? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (D!·IS) has been actively working with 

election officials to improve the security of the Nation's election infrastructure. DHS's 

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), in collaboration with the Election 

Assistance Commission (EAC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and others, engages 

directly with election officials. Since the summer of2016, DHS has focused on 

prioritizing cybersecurity assistance to election officials. 

With the establishment of election infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector, 

DHS has been formalizing policies and structures to support the prioritization of 

assistance for election officials. As part of this process, DHS is instituting operating 

capabilities for the newly established Election Infrastructure Subsector (EIS) Government 

Coordinating Council (GCC). Government Coordinating Councils are formed to enable 

interagency and cross-jurisdictional coordination. The GCCs are composed of 

representatives from across various levels of government (Federal, regional, state, and 

local). 

In addition, DHS is working with the EAC to identify Sector Coordinating Council 

(SCC) members. Sector Coordinating Councils arc self-organized and self-governed 

councils that enable critical infrastructure owners and operators in the private sector, their 

trade associations, and other industry representatives to interact on a wide range of 

strategies, policies, and activities. 

The full GCC and SCC formation of the subsector will help shape policy direction over 

the long term about how to help states secure their election systems. These bodies serve 

as the key forum to coordinate the development of information processes and protocols, 

as well as other strategic initiatives, such as incident response plans. 
293 

Question#: 29 

Topic: State Officials Clearances 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: One of the impediments to providing more-detailed threat assessments to the 

states in 2016 was the classified nature of the information. What is the timeline for 

providing state officials with clearances? Once clearances are granted, what process will 

be in place to ensure threat assessments arc provided to the states? 

Response: In an effort to expedite security clearances for chief state election officials to 

ensure they are able to receive classified threat information related to state and local 

election systems, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) worked 

closely with the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the National 

Association of State Election Directors (NASED) to identify key state election officials 

with oversight of election infrastructure. 

The DHS Office oflntelligence and Analysis (I&A) contacted state chief election 

officials on behalf of the NPPD-led Election Infrastructure Subsector Sector-Specific 

Agency (SSA) to begin the security clearance process. The Election Infrastructure 

Subsector SSA continues to work with state election officials and DHS !&A to support 

the processing of clearances for state chief election officials. It is anticipated that the 

clearance nomination process will be expanded to include additional state election 

personnel to provide more depth of election-related staff for classified information 

sharing at the state and local level. 

DHS, in conjunction with state partners, chartered an Election Infrastructure Subsector 

Government Coordinating Council (GCC). One of the main goals of the GCC is to 

develop information sharing protocols to better coordinate information sharing and 

enhance current state-level election-related intelligence sharing. In the meantime, 

classified information will be shared as appropriate with cleared partners who are 

available to receive information. Overall, the process will leverage existing intelligence 

sharing resources that DHS has coordinated at the state level, including DI-IS I&A field 

intelligence officers, NPPD regional directors, state and local fusion centers, and other 

appropriate facilities for classified briefings. 
294 

Question#: 30 

Topic: State Election Cyber Security 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: I am working with my colleague, Senator Lankford, and a bipartisan group of 

senators to draft a bill that aims to address many of the vulnerabilities and inefficiencies 

surrounding state election cybersecurity, such as improving infmmation sharing, 

modernizing election infrastructure, and providing guidelines about steps state officials 

can take to strengthen their defenses. Does this sound like a measure DHS would 

support? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security is working with State and local 

partners to improve information sharing and enhance the security of election systems. As 

part of this effort, the Department strongly supports efforts to address threats to and 

vulnerabilities in election infrastructure. The Department looks forward to working with 

Congress to improve election cybersecurity. 
295 

Question#: 31 

Topic: Election Security Task Force 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: llOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Homeland Security has reportedly formed an election security task force to 

improve state and local voting infrastructure, drawing on resources and expertise from 

across the Department. Can you please provide details regarding the mission of the task 

force, the number of staff and budget of the task force, mechanisms for coordinating with 

state election officials, and plans to report its operational plans and observations to 

Congress? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has stood up an Election Task 

Force (El'f), to improve coordination with and support to our stakeholders. DHS's 

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is leading the task force. The task 

force includes personnel from the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, the 

Office of Infrastructure Protection, and the Office of Intelligence & Analysis, among 

others who have been designated by the Department to prioritize their efforts in support 

of the ETF. DHS is cross-purposing personnel and re-assigning personnel as appropriate, 

and there aren't firm numbers on personnel and budget at this time. 

The ETF focuses efforts on: 

• Improving communication with election officials in order to provide 

understanding and actionable information to assist them in strengthening the 

security of their election infrastructure as it relates to cybersecurity risk. 

• Ensuring coordination of these activities across the Department. 

• Increasing coordination with intelligence community and law enforcement 

partners. 

• Supporting regional efforts to ensure they are coordinated and provide election 

officials with the support and expertise they need. 

The Department is committed to working with Congress and election infrastructure 

stakeholders to ensure a full understanding of the Department's efforts to assist with the 

security of our elections. 
296 

Question#: 32 

Topic: Border Wall 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: On September 26, 2017, the CBP issued a press releases announcing that 

construction on 8 wall prototypes began. On October 8, 2017, the White House released 

their immigration policy priorities which re-iterated President Trump's call to build a wall 

across the Southwest Border. 

Does DHS require additional authorization from Congress to construct any portion of this 

"border wall" along federal lands? 

Response: Under Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Refonn and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act of 1996, as amended, the Department has the legal authority to 

construct physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of the border, which would include 

federal lands. 
297 

Question#: 33 

Topic: State, Tribal, or Private Property 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Docs DHS require additional authorization from Congress to construct any 

portion of this "border wall" on state, tribal or private property? 

Response: As noted above, under Section I 02 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as amended, DHS has the legal authority to 

construct physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of the border. To the extent that CBP 

needs to acquire real estate for such construction, it will follow the appropriate real estate 

acquisition process. 

Question: Has DHS consulted with states and federally recognized tribes impacted by 

any plans for construction of new border wall? If so, please list and describe such 

consultation. 

Response: On August 25, 2017 CBP sent initial scoping letters to stakeholders in 

relation to proposed new border wall informing stakeholders of proposed projects in the 

Rio Grande Valley and seeking comments and concerns. Stakeholders that received the 

initial scoping letters included the Texas State Historic Preservation Officer and several 

Native American Tribes including the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town, Apache Tribe of 

Oklahoma, Thlopthlocco Tribal Town, Comanche Nation of Oklahoma, Tonkawa Tribe 

of Oklahoma, Alabama- Coushatta of Texas, Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, Kickapoo 

Traditional Tribe of Texas, and Fort Sill Apache. 
298 

Question#: 34 

Topic: California Invasive Species 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Han-is 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: California citrus farmers have assets worth up to $2.5 billion in fruits they 

produce and ship all over the world. However, the Asian citrus psyllid is an invasive 

species that is still found to threaten to compromise this industry. 

What specific plans has CBP instituted at ports of entry to ensure that invasive species 

does not enter the California'? 

Response: CBP's Office of Field Operations' Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison 

(APTL) tracks incidents of Asian Citrus Psyllid (ACP) and its associated Citrus Greening 

disease (HLB) on a national scale. Current inspectional protocol at ports of entry (POE) 

states that all citrus carried by passengers or pedestrians is to be referred to a CBP 

Agriculture Specialist (CBPAS) for inspection. This includes varieties of admissible 

citrus such as Persian and Sour limes. If citrus leaves are encountered (citrus leaves are 

prohibited), CBPAS are asked to be especially diligent looking for symptoms of Citrus 

Greening disease while conducting the inspection. Musters have been distributed 

requesting that all CBP interviews of passengers include specific questioning for citms 

commodities. 

APTL has installed Senior Agriculture Operations Liaisons, including one in the State of 

California. The liaisons are embedded within the local U.S. Department of Agriculture, 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) 

Office and serve as the point of contact for supporting CBP's agriculture mission. 

Liaisons and other APTL staff collaborate with State Departments of Agriculture via the 

National Plant Board or through PPQ channels. 

In the passenger entry environment, agriculture canine teams search baggage carts, 

luggage carousels, and passengers exiting aircrafts with carry-on luggage. Searches are 

conducted during the various stages of passenger processing within the Federal 

Inspection Service (FIS) area. Agriculture canines are used to detect plant and animal 

products in locations such as; while passengers stand in line at primary, as travelers 

collect their luggage at carousels, and searches are conducted randomly as passengers 

exit the FIS. 

APTL program managers follow and provide current interception results and quarantine 

measures to the field on a regular basis to CBP Officers and CBPAS. The San Diego 

Field Office conducts media events on a regular basis with both U.S. and Mexican Media 

outlets providing information on ACP/HLB. Pest Trading cards and fact sheets have 

been produced and distributed to educate the traveling and trading public. Pest Risk 
299 

Question#: 34 

Topic: Califomia Invasive Species 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

working groups have been established to conduct inspection operations at POEs 

following seasonal assessment of the risk. Outreach efforts are also conducted during 

high risk seasonal and holiday periods when prohibited host materials arc expected to be 

brought in. 

APTL has developed and provided ACP training for CBP AS. The training included 

distribution, life cycle, inspection, and detection methodology. Local USDA Officers in 

charge at POEs provide training on: 

• Identification of the Adult and Immature ACP. 

• Pest interception preparation techniques to preserve and transfer psyllids interceptions 

to the USDA Entomologist. 

• Identification of Citrus Greening Disease and host material. 

• Disease interception preparation techniques to preserve and transfer Citrus Greening 

Disease samples to the USDA Identifier. 
300 

Question#: 35 

Topic: CBP Data Sharing 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Does CBP share data and coordinate a unified management plan with other 

federal agencies like the USDA, Fish and Wildlife, and the EPA to ensure early 

detection, exclusion, and eradication of invasive species? 

What sort of data does the CBP have on invasive species that have entered and been 

caught or have entered but have been overlooked at ports of entry? 

Response: DHS, including and on behalf of CBP, has memoranda of agreements or 

understanding (MOA/MOU) with government agencies such as U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA). Per the MOA/MOU, CBP assists by enforcing these 

government agencies' regulatory requirements. CBP interceptions at ports of entry 

(POE) are communicated and referred to the respective agency of authority for 

adjudication and further actions. CBP has authority under CFR Titles 7 and 9 to impose 

quarantine measures on invasive animal and plants species that are of agricultural 

concerns. On all other invasive species not regulated under CFR Titles 7 and 9, CBP will 

take remedial actions (i.e., destruction, transfer of custody etc.) that is recommended by 

the other regulating agency of concern. Additionally, if requested by the regulating 

government agency of concern, CBP will create rules in CBP's cargo and passenger 

targeting systems to flag and screen in advance perennial violators and illicit importation 

of potential invasive species. 

As per the International Trade Data System (ITDS) Presidential Mandate, the Office of 

Field Operations has collaborated with the Office of Trade, regarding the Automated 

Commercial Environment in the development of a single window interface capability 

between the ITDS and other agencies to allow for the exchange of agriculture 

information and data. 

CBP created the National Agriculture Cargo Targeting Unit (NACTU) in partnership 

with the National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C), to target multiple 

environments/pathways (air cargo, sea cargo, mail, rail, ECO, maritime vessel) and to 

generate data to further improve targeting and risk assessment. CBP continues to develop 

NACTU which conducts research and combines intelligence from various sources to 

locate shipments associated with infested cargo, which may be en-route to the United 

States. The unit was instrumental in uncovering a propagative material smuggling ring, 

which spanned two POEs and crossed multiple pathways (passenger and express 

consignment). 
301 

Question#: 35 

Topic: CBP Data Sharing 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

CBP works closely with the National Invasive Species Council (NISC), an interagency 

body administratively supported by the Department of Interior, and provides data of 

pests, diseases, and Federal Noxious Weeds that are intercepted by CBPAS at POEs. 

CBP AS document interception of plant pests, diseases, and federal noxious weed using a 

Pest Interception Database. The data includes country of origin, POEs location, host, 

species name, and life stages. The data is available for analysis and periodic targeting to 

all CBP AS and USDA analysts. CBP also generates Significant Agriculture Incident 

Reports (SAIR) for notable seizures generated in all pathways. Information from these 

SAIRs drives targeting efforts and also provide information for national musters 

distributed by APTL; e.g. musters may include new smuggling/concealment methods or 

novel products encountered. 
302 

Question#: 36 

Topic: Coordination with USPS 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: I understand that mail is another mode that invasive species have increasing 

entered into our nation. Could you tell me your coordination with the U.S. Postal Service 

to deter pests from entering? 

Response: CBP has well-established inspection and deterrence procedures in order to 

mitigate harmful pests and diseases at express consignment and international mail 

facilities. Local management carries out presorting by origin to target specific threats. 

CBP also utilizes x-ray equipment to identify agricultural/perishable anomalies inside 

mail parcels. CBP has provided identification tools and training material to CBP AS 

focused mainly in the mail environment. CBP also generates Significant Agriculture 

Incident Reports (SAIR) for notable seizures generated in the postal environment. 

Information from these SAIRs drive targeting efforts in other cargo environments and 

also provide information for national musters distributed by APTL that may include new 

smuggling/concealment methods or novel products encountered. 

CBP also utilizes agriculture detector dogs in international mail facilities to detect and 

intercept plant and animal products in parcels. These examinations are conducted on a 

moving conveyor belt. If the facility is not equipped with a conveyor belt, the 

examination will be conducted on the f1oor by agriculture K9. 
303 

Question#: 37 

Topic: Invasive Species Budget 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What percentage of CBP's budget is dedicated to invasive species 

management? 

Response: OFO's Agriculture operations are funded by the Agricultural Quarantine and 

Inspection (AQI) User Fee Account, which is managed by the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture. CBP does not have a specific line item dedicated to invasive species 

management. The AQI funding received from USDA represents 7 percent ofOFO's total 

budget. The AQI fee funding supports the costs of providing inspectional services for the 

international arrival of passengers, conveyances, animals, plants, and agricultural goods 

at ports of entry. 

Question: Does this get shared with other federal agencies? 

Response: Under the current Memorandum of Agreement (MOA/Codicil) between CBP 

and USDA, CBP receives approximately 72 percent of the collections from the AQI user 

fee revenues. We defer to U.S. Department of Agriculture on whether the Agricultural 

Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) User Fee Account funding is shared with any other 

federal agencies. The Homeland Security Act of2002 (P.L. I 07-296) transferred certain 

inspection functions from USDA to DHS. Section of 421(t) of the Act establishes a 

periodic transfer of this funding to DHS. 

Question: Do you think more funding is needed to bolster CBP's invasive species 

program or do you think there are other recommendations that could help improve the 

program? 

Response: The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) recently reassessed user fee 

rates to try and encompass all costs associated with AQI operations for both USDA's 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and CBP. In 2015, the 

new/adjusted fees went into effect. To date, USDA/APHIS transfers of these user fee 

revenues to CBP have not fully recovered the costs of CBP agriculture operations at the 

current staffing level. CBP and APHIS have committed to regular fee studies to see if 

rates are full cost recovery and to publish those results, whether they would require a fee 

change or not. CBP and APHIS have also committed to looking into some other modes 

of entry that currently do not have fees set but are authorized to have them in statute. 

Additionally, CBP developed an Agriculture Resource Allocation Model (AgRAM) to 

objectively identify baseline staffing requirements for CBP Agriculture Specialists based 

on the volume and composition of arrivals. The model takes into account both the legally 

mandated inspection of regulated cargo as defined by United States Department of 
304 

Question#: 37 

Topic: Invasive Species Budget 

Hearing: Threats to the Homeland 

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Agriculture (USDA) - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) and the 

risk-based inspection of passengers and cargo. The model takes into account the volume 

of cargo, conveyance, and passenger arrivals in all environments as reported by 

Operations Management Report data. The AgRAM also utilizes USDA APHIS data to 

determine the various work counts in all environments and incorporates pest risk levels as 

determined by the USDA. The AgRAM: 

• Accounts for the volume of cargo, conveyance, and passenger arrivals in all 

environments; 

• Incorporates pest risk levels as determined by APHIS to ensure sufficient staffing is 

allocated for inspection of high, medium, and low risk commodities, passengers, 

and conveyances; 

• Factors AQI Trade Facilitation Programs, e.g. the National Agriculture Release 

Program (NARP); 

• Incorporates a utilization factor to ensure staffing levels can process peak 

workloads within acceptable time frames; additionally it has the capability to 

determine overtime staffing needs. 

The AgRAM was subject to an independent assessment by Deloitte Consulting, LLP, in 

Fiscal Y car 2015. The assessment determined the AgRAM' s methodology and approach 

to identifying staffing needs is thorough and efficient. Internally, the AgRAM is updated 

each year with the previous fiscal year's data and reviewed to ensure the integrity of the 

results. The model results arc then validated by CBP before being certified by DHS prior 

to submission to Congress each fiscal year. The most recent results of CBP's 

Agricultural Resource Allocation Model show a need for an additional 721 CBP 

Agriculture Specialists through FY 2018. 

The AgRAM, combined with other information about resources, threats, and passenger 

volume are incorporated into leadership review of how to best allocate CBP AS resources. 

In the interim, CBP is attempting to optimize operational efficiencies and assess risks to 

better assign mission priorities. 
305 

FLETC Ombudsman 

19). Agency Coordination 

Would you please provide a list of the ombudsman offices that currently exist within DHS, 

including the statutorily authorized U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

Ombudsman and any other offices within components that call themselves ombudsman? 

What is the funding level of each of these offices and how many FTEs, contractors and 

detailecs support the office? 

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) Ombudsman is located within the 

Office of Organizational Health (OOH), is funded at $172,352.32 per year, and comprises one 

FTE. 

What is the focus of each of these offices and why was the office created? 

The focus is to serve as an informal resource to address employee/workplace concerns. The 

office was created to address and/or assist in resolving and managing conflict as early and as 

informally as possibly. 

To whom does each Ombudsman report? 

The Ombudsman reports to the OOH Chiet: who reports to the FLETC Chief of Staff. 

\Vhat matters does each Ombudsman handle? 

(Internal Organizational) Primarily Evaluative/Peer Relationships, concerns with Career 

Progression, and concerns with Organizational processes. 

What is the authorization for each of these ombudsmen? 

Organizational Ombudsman (Internal) Position authorized by FLETC Directive/Manual256-0l. 

Does the Ombudsman maintain infot·mation about the number, types and resolution of 

complaints that are lodged? 

Yes. 

Docs the ombudsman compile information regarding unresolved issues raised by 

customers? 

Yes. 

Arc reports available for all of these offices (excepting the USCIS)? 

Yes, internal reports/data are available. 
306 

NPPD Ombudsman 

19.) Agency Coordination: 

Would you please provide a list of the ombudsman offices that currently exist within DHS, 

including the statutorily authorized U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

Ombudsman and any other offices within components that call themselves ombudsman? 

This response is from the Of(ice of the Ombudsman within NPPD. 

What is the funding level of each of these offices and how many FTEs, contractors and 

detailces support the office? 

The NPPD Office of the Ombudsman is positioned within the Office of the NPPD Chief of Staff 

and consists of one FTP/FTE with no contractor or detailee support. The NPPD Budget Division 

estimates that the funding level for this one FTP/FTE is $250,816 in FY 2018, which includes 

funding for Salaries and Benefits, travel, training, and supplies and equipment. 

What is the focus of each of these offices and why was the office created? 

The Office of the NPPD Ombudsman was created in 2015 as a neutral, independent, informal and 

confidential resource to facilitate fair, equitable, and expeditious resolutions to concerns and 

problems raised by members of the NPPD workforce individuals within the Federal Protective 

Service, Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Office of 

Biometric Identity Management, Office ofCybcr and Infrastructure Analysis, and Office of the 

Under Secretary. 

To whom does each Ombudsman report? 

The NPPD Ombudsman reports to the NPPD Chief-of-Staff and the NPPD Under Secretary. 

What matters does each Ombudsman handle? 

The NPPD Ombudsman considers taking on any workplace or systemic issue brought to his 

attention by any eligible (non-union bargaining unit member) of the NPPD workforce. These 

include workplace frictions, allegations of personal harassment, medical issues, pay equity and 

overtime issues, telework issues, home-to-work vehicular issues, and perceptions of unequal 

treatment or unfair application ofNPPD and DHS-level policies. 

What is the authorization for each of these ombudsmen? 

The NPPD Ombudsman position was authorized by NPPD Under Secretary Suzanne Spaulding 

in August 2014, after consultation and coordination within the DHS office of General Counsel. 
307 

Docs the Ombudsman maintain information about the number, types and resolution of 

complaints that are lodged? 

Y cs. The NPPD Ombudsman maintains a computer database showing the numbers, types, and 

general resolution of the requests for assistance that have been submitted over time. 

Does the ombudsman compile information regarding unresolved issues raised by 

customers? 

Y cs. The NPPD Ombudsman tabulates data with respect to the issues raised by those requesting 

assistance over time, and provides written reports to the NPPD Chief of Staff and NPPD Under 

Secretary. (Though there has been no NPPD Under Secretary since the transition between 

Obama and Trump Administrations in January of this year. Through most of that period, the 

current NPPD Chief-of-Staff acted as the Senior Official performing the Duties of the Under 

Secretary.) 

Are reports available for all of these offices (excepting the USCIS)? 

NPPD Ombudsman reports have been prepared on a bi-weekly basis since inception of the office 

in March 2015, though these arc subject to confidentiality requirements in accordance with best 

practice standards as promulgated by the International Ombudsman Association and the 

Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen. 
308 

TSA Ombudsman 

19). Agency Coordination 

Would you please provide a list of the ombudsman offices that currently exist within DHS, 

including the statutorily authorized U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

Ombudsman and any other offices within components that call themselves ombudsman? 

For OilS response 

What is the funding level of each of these offices and how many FTEs, contractors and 

dctailces support the office? 

The Ombudsman Division is funded as part of the Office of Civil Rights & Liberties, 

Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement; it has 6 FTE, I contractor and I detailee. 

What is the focus of each of these offices and why was the office created? 

The Office of Civil Rights & Liberties, Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement at the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created in 2003 and is responsible for: (I) 

providing neutral, informal, confidential and independent conflict resolution services to 

employees and the public for issues and concerns involving TSA policies or personnel; (2) 

conducting trend and policy analysis of the inquiries the office receives and providing this 

information to TSA leadership and program offices and (3) conducting outreach to management, 

employees and the public about its services. 

To whom docs each Ombudsman report? 

The Assistant Administrator for Civil Rights & Liberties, Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement 

at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reports directly to the Administrator ofTSA 

through the Deputy Administrator. 

What matters does each Ombudsman handle? 

The Ombudsman provides neutral, independent, informal, and confidential conflict resolution 

assistance to employees, managers, and the public for issues involving TSA policies and 

personnel. 

What is the authorization for each of these ombudsmen? 

The Ombudsman was established by the TSA Administrator in 2003. 

Docs the Ombudsman maintain information about the number, types and resolution of 

complaints that are lodged? Docs the ombudsman compile information regarding 

unresolved issues raised by customers? Arc reports available for all of these offices 

(excepting the USCIS)? 
309 

TSA's Office of Civil Rights & Liberties, Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement prepares 

quarterly reports on employee and public contacts. Information on the nature of these contacts is 

reported in the aggregate to protect the confidentiality of individuals who contact the office. 

These reports are posted on the TSA iS hare site. 
310 

USCG Ombudsman 

19.) Agency Coordination: 

Would you please provide a list of the ombudsman offices that currently exist within DHS, 

including the statutorily authorized U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

Ombudsman and any other offices within components that call themselves ombudsman? 

Coast Guard Ombudsman Program 

What is the funding level of each of these offices and how many FTEs, contractors and 

detailees support the office? 

$0, 1 FTE Ombudsman Program Manager at CGHQs, 2FTE's one Regional Ombudsman 

Coordinator (ROC) at PACAREA and one (ROC) at LANTAREA. Health, Safety and WorkLife offices have at least one staff member designated the collateral duty of ombudsman 

coordinator. 358 volunteer ombudsmen at various CG units. 

What is the focus of each of these offices and why was the office created? 

CG unit ombudsmen provide information, resources and referral information to CG family 

members. The program was created in 1986 to provide assistance to CG family members. 

To whom does each Ombudsman report? 

Each ombudsman reports to the commanding officer of the CG unit. 

What matters does each Ombudsman handle? 

Providing information and resource refenals for family members. 

What is the authorization for each of these ombudsmen? 

COMDTINST 1750.4 (series) 

Does the Ombudsman maintain information about the number, types and resolution of 

complaints that are lodged? 

Ombudsmen maintain minimal information and each month enters that information into the 

Ombudsman Program. Ombudsmen then destroy any information/documents 

Does the ombudsman compile information regarding unresolved issues raised by 

customers? 

No CG ombudsmen do not maintain any files on individuals assisted. 
311 

Are reports available for all of these offices (excepting the USCIS)? 

Program Manager can pull basic reports, # of ombudsmen in the CG, # of individual the 

ombudsmen have assisted and the types of information requested, # of hours ombudsmen have 

volunteered. 
312 

Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman 

19.) Agency Coordination 

Would you please provide a list of the ombudsman offices that currently exist within DHS, 

including the statutorily authorized U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

Ombudsman and any other offices within components that call themselves ombudsman? 

Correction: The official title of the office is "Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Ombudsman" and we use CISOMB as our acronym and CIS Ombudsman as our nickname. We 

tend not to refer to ourselves as the "USCIS" Ombudsman because we are not part of USCIS and 

want stakeholders to know we are independent. 

What is the funding level of each of these offices and how many FTEs, contractors and 

detailees support the office? 

• CISOMB's FY 2018 funding level is $5.944 million 

C!SOMB's current FTE onboard is 28 

• CISOMB currently has 4 contractors 

• CISOMB has two short-tem1 detailees through the DHS Rotation Program who started 

11/13/17. 

What is the focus of each of these offices and why was the office created? 

Pursuant to section 452 of the Homeland Security Act of2002, the Office of the Citizenship and 

Immigration Services Ombudsman has the statutory mission to assist individuals and employers 

in resolving problems with USCIS, identify areas in which individuals and employers have 

problems with USC IS, and propose changes to US CIS practices to mitigate those problems. 

To whom does each Ombudsman report? 

By statute, the CIS Ombudsman reports to the DHS Deputy Secretary. 

What matters does each Ombudsman handle? 

The Oftice of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman is dedicated to improving 

the quality of citizenship and immigration services delivered to the public by providing 

individual case assistance, as well as making recommendations to improve the administration of 

immigration benefits by users. 

What is the authorization for each of these ombudsmen? 

Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act of2002. 

Does the Ombudsman maintain information about the number, types and resolution of 

complaints that are lodged? 
313 

Yes, the Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman maintains detailed data 

on requests for case assistance, which are published in the office's Annual Report to Congress. 

Does the ombudsman compile information regarding unresolved issues raised by 

customers? 

The Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman maintains a list of 

unresolved requests for assistance filed by individuals and employers and follows up with 

USCIS quarterly until action is taken on the case. Also, the CIS Ombudsman identifies annual 

policy priorities to study systemic issues and make recommendations for improvement. The 

office has requested funding to develop a public portal and tracking tool to improve its ability to 

formally track systemic issues. 

Are reports available for all of these offices (excepting the USCIS)? 

Pursuant to section 452(c) of the Homeland Security Act of2002, the Otlice of the Citizenship 

and Immigration Services Ombudsman issues an Annual Report to Congress by June 30 each 

year. 
314 

FEMA Ombudsman 

19). Agency Coordination 

Would you please provide a list of the ombudsman offices that currently exist within DHS, 

including the statutorily authorized U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

Ombudsman and any other offices within components that call themselves ombudsman? 

FEMA Ombuds (within FEMA's Alternative Dispute Resolution Division) 

What is the funding level of each of these offices and how many FTEs, contractors and 

detailees support the office? 

As a preliminary note, FEMA has a substantial reservist workforce- intermittent employees who 

are deployed to disasters in times of need. 

The FEMA Ombuds team is comprised of three {3) FTEs- a "Reservist Ombuds", an ''Associate 

Reservist Om buds" and an "FTE Om buds." The office is in the process of consolidating into a 

team that would all be known as "FEMA Om buds" and would therefore not have artificial 

demarcations between serving Reservists and Full-Time Employees. A FEMA Om buds 

Directive is in the drafting and review stage. 

There is no separate budget for the FEMA Om buds team; instead, the Agency pays the salaries, 

and administrative support comes from FEMA's Office of Chief Counsel by way of FEMA' s 

Alternative Dispute Resolution Division. 

What is the focus of each of these offices and why was the office created? 

It is important to highlight that the FEMA Om buds is an internal, organizational Om buds that 

specifically serves FEMA employees. This is necessary at FEMA because of its mission, which 

involves bringing together people from different walks of life who do not usually work together, 

for purposes of disaster response and recovery. 

The FEMA Reservist Om buds office was created approximately four ( 4) years ago, to provide 

conflict resolution support to FEMA's Reservist workforce. The FTE Ombuds function likewise 

serves FEMA's workforce. 

As stated above, a new FEMA Directive is in the works to consolidate these functions into a 

FEMA Om buds team, which would collectively serve all of FEMA's reservist and non-reservist 

workforce. 

To whom does each Ombudsman report'! 

It is expected that the newly-consolidated FEMA Om buds will report administratively to 

leadership in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Division and the Principal Deputy Chief 

Counsel, in addition to having quarterly meetings with the FEMA Administrator or his designee. 
315 

What matters does each Ombudsman handle? 

The Reservist and Associate Reservist Ombuds have historically handled any matters of concern 

raised by a FEMA Reservist that might speak to systemic issues such as those that arise from 

policies, practices, or procedures that are negatively impacting a number of Reservists similarly. 

This inevitably begins by "receiving" a concerned party over phone or in person, followed by 

one-on-one coaching and problem-solving, referral to resources, generation of possible options, 

and next steps if the Om buds believes in his/her discretion that more action is required. The 

Ombuds will also look for possible patterns or themes that might be recurring. 

The FTE Ornbuds does the same, for systemic issues impacting full-time (non-reservist) 

employees. 

Once the new FEMA Ombuds Directive is finalized and approved, the FEMA Ombuds team will 

address these matters for all FEMA employees. 

What is the authorization for each of these ombudsmen? 

The Reservist Om buds was created by FEMA Directive and appointed by the Administrator. A 

current Directive is being drafted to expand on this function to reflect Ombuds support for all 

FEMA employees. 

Does the Ombudsman maintain information-about the number, types and resolution of 

complaints that are lodged? 

The FEMA Om buds team has information as to the number of people who have spoken to it, and 

broad categories of possible concerns. 

Does the ombudsman compile information regarding unresolved issues raised by 

customers? 

Not specifically. Because of the nature of the internal organizational function, many of the 

issues raised speak to systemic concerns rather than an individual complaint, so the FEMA 

Ombuds does not compile a list of"unresolved issues;" instead, it looks for thematic areas that 

might merit more attention, and will routinely briefFEMA stakeholders (individually or as a 

group) on matters that may be prominent. 

Are reports available for all of these offices (excepting the USCIS)? 

No, we plan to implement annual reporting next year. The Reservist Ombuds previously 

developed an internal report on a Reservist survey that was conducted. 
316 

Post-Hearing Question for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Christopher Wray 

From Chairman Ron Johnson 

"Threats to the Homeland" 

September 27, 2017 

I. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) is an independent Executive Branch Agency 

charged with, among other things, investigating potential violations of the Hatch Act. In 

late 2016, OSC initiated an investigation to determine whether former FBI Director 

James Corney violated the Hatch Act when he made public statements regarding the 

FBI's investigation into former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email 

server. During this investigation, OSC had conducted transcribed interviews with at least 

two FBI employees. OSC executed three non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) that attempt 

to allow the FBI to prohibit OSC from disclosing information, including to Congress. 

On September 8, 2017, I wrote to Adam Miles, then-Acting Special Counsel, requesting 

unredacted copies of the interview transcripts and other documents connected to OSC's 

Hatch Act investigation concerning Director Corney. OSC has informed the Committee 

that the NDAs prohibit OSC from fully complying with request for unredacted copies of 

the transcript. To date, the Committee has only received redacted copies of the 

transcripts. 

a. Will the FBI waive the NDAs to allow OSC to fully comply with the Committee's 

request? If not, why not? 

b. I understand that the FBI Office of General Counsel (OGC) has been recused 

from the OSC's Hatch Act Investigation into former Director Corney. Please 

explain why the FBI OGC was recused from this matter. 

c. Once the FBI OGC was recused from OSC's Hatch Act Investigation concerning 

Director Corney, the Executive Office of United States' Attorneys (EO USA) 

coordinated FBI's cooperation with OSC's investigation. Please explain why 

EO USA was selected as the entity to facilitate FBI's cooperation with this 

investigation. 

d. According to OSC, the Hatch Act investigation concerning Director Corney was 

the first time OSC had ever entered into an NDA during a Hatch Act 

investigation. Did FBI have any involvement with EOUSA's use or drafting of 

the NDAs with OSC? Please explain. 

Director Wray and the Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to respond to these questions 

for the Record as of time of printing in March 2019. If/when they respond to the 

Committee, their answers will be on file in the committee offices for public inspection. 
317 

Post- Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Christopher Wray 

From Senator John McCain 

BORDER SECURITY 

"Threats to the Homeland" 

September 27,2017 

Drug Cartels: Drug trafficking remains one of the most severe threats to our homeland 

security. 

• What is your assessment of the current situation on the ground? 

• What steps are currently being taken to interdict the flow drugs over the border? 

• The administration has proposed a 39% cut in aid to Central America, particularly 

cuts to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Will 

this proposed cut in aid hinder efforts to target the infrastructure and financial 

records of criminal organizations in the region? 

CYBERSECURITY 

No Policy and No Strategy: Our greatest frustration has been the lack of any direction 

from this administration, or from the prior administration, on how we should be deterring 

our adversaries in cyberspace. Among other urgent problems, we need to define what 

forms of cyber attack constitute an act of war and how authorities for cyber responses 

should be delegated to various agencies. We must also consider geographic and 

sovereignty issues; the list goes on. 

• Do you agree that until our adversaries believe the consequences of an attack in 

cyberspace will outweigh the benefits, behaviors will not change? 

• What are the chief impediments to crafting a coherent strategy? 

UK's National Cyber Security Center: Our cyber efforts are divided among DoD, 

DHS, and the FBI. In contrast, Britain has adopted a unified model in the recently 

established National Cyber Security Centre. Our British allies recognize the twin 

absolute necessities of bringing all capacity under one roof and acting in close 

partnership with the private sector. 
318 

• Are you familiar with the UK's NCSC, and do you believe it is something we 

should pursue here in the U.S.? 

• Do you agree that we should reevaluate the roles and responsibilities of DHS or 

pursue a model that combines our government-wide expertise in a center like the 

UK established? 

• Is the current approach working; is the status quo effective? 

Director Wray and the Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to respond to these questions 

for the Record as of time of printing in March 2019. If/when they respond to the 

Committee, their answers will be on file in the committee offices for public inspection. 
319 

Terrorism 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Christopher A. Wray 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"Threats to the Homeland Hearing" 

September 27,2017 

I. Please provide a breakdown of both (I) the budgetary resources and (2) the number of 

full-time agents that the FBI has allocated for international terrorism investigations 

versus domestic white supremacist, anti-government, and militant right terrorism 

investigations. 

2. Europe has experienced a number of attacks recently, including a rise in the use of 

ramming attacks. We have not experienced the same frequency of attacks in the United 

States. To what factors do you attribute the lower frequency? 

3. Ramming attacks are on the rise globally and in the U.S. What can communities do to 

prevent or mitigate these kinds of attacks? 

4. What steps do you recommend to address the vulnerabilities posed by social media? 

5. Is the FBI seeing evidence that extremists are attempting to use agroterrorism as a means 

to further their agenda? 

6. What can we be doing to better protect our food and agriculture sectors against threats 

like agroterrorism? 

7. In your opinion, ifthere is a terrorist attack on U.S. soil in the future, how likely is it that 

transportation systems or a "soft target" location will be targeted? 

8. We have all been shocked by attacks on entertainment venues such as the outdoor concert 

in Las Vegas and the Ariana Grande concert. Can you talk about your interaction with 

the private sector, including universities, stadiums, and large entertainment venues, to 

help those places address security vulnerabilities? 

Election Interference 

9. The FBI has been investigating Russian interference in American elections, including 

through the use of fake social media accounts that both spread false or misleading 

information and which mask their overseas origin. Has the FBI investigated dark money 

in political campaigns and the super PACS that receive such money without attribution, 

which eould conceivably also conceal foreign attempts to influence elections? If so, what 

was the outcome ofthe investigation(s)? 
320 

Information Sharing 

The Inspectors General (IG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) released a joint report in March 2017 

reviewing domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The report found that improving 

information sharing required federal, state, and local entities involved in counterterrorism to 

better understand the other's roles, responsibilities, and contributions. 

10. What is the status of the implementation of the IGs' recommendations at the FBI? 

Director Wray and the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation failed to respond to these questions 

for the Record as of time of printing in March 2019. If/when they respond to the 

Committee, their answers will be on file in the committee offices for public inspection. 

2 
321 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Christopher Wray 

From Senator Gary Peters 

"Threats to the Homeland" 

Wednesday, September 27,2017 

1. I believe the travel ban and divisive rhetoric have had significant consequences. Since 

the election we have seen a spike in anti Muslim incidents in my home State of 

Michigan. We have seen a rash of bomb threats against Jewish Community Centers in 

Michigan and across the country. That's why my colleague Senator Portman and I, led a 

letter calling on DHS and DOJ to address these horrific incidents and to provide these 

communities with the resources they need. The letter was signed by all I 00 members of 

the Senate. Make no mistake, some of our darkest elements in our society have been 

emboldened. All you need to do is look at alt-right and white supremacy activity that has 

taken place in Charlottesville and across the country. 

a. How much of your budget is spent on domestic terrorism versus international 

terrorism? 

b. Do you think legislation is required to address domestic extremism? 

c. The federal government maintains lists of international terror organizations; do 

you think the same should apply for domestic terror groups beyond the nine 

movements tracked by the FBI? 

2. I continue to be deeply troubled by the disclosure of the Equifax hack, which demonstrated 

corporate leadership's systemic disregard for data security and basic cyber-hygiene best 

practices. The vulnerability identified in the breach had a patch issued for it in March, 

meaning at least 60 days went by without the patch being implemented. But poor patch 

management is just the tip of the iceberg. Across the federal government, numerous 

agencies are relying on outdated software that may be vulnerable to attacks. In report 

issued last month, the President's National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) 

concluded, "there is a narrow and fleeting window of opportunity before a watershed, 9/11-

level cyberattack to organize effectively and take bold action." The challenges identified 

are well-known and ret1ected in study after study. DHS has a clear mission to share with 

the private sector but it often does not "own" the threat information and must work through 

other agencies to declassifY and share. Explain how FBI is working to improve information 

sharing processes with DHS to ensure the right individuals in the private sector receive 

timely, actionable cyber threat information. 

3. This committee recently heard from the head of Israel's National Cyber Bureau who 

offered that Israel has a more narrow definition of critical infrastructure in cyberspace. For 

example, our Electricity and Financial sectors take on added importance because they 
322 

underpin the operations of other critical infrastructure sectors. With that in mind, what is 

FBI doing to improve engagement with the most critical infrastructure sectors? 

4. A bioterrorist attack could have a devastating impact in a major city, both in terms of 

human life and our sense of safety and security. However, reports such as the Blue Ribbon 

study panel's report on biodefense have indicated that our national defense against 

bioterrorism is lacking in both detection capability and response. In the 2016 Worldwide 

Threat Assessment, the CRISPR gene editing tool was identified as a key enabling 

technology that could be used by terrorists to more easily create a biological weapon. 

a. Among the terrorist threats facing the homeland, how worried are you about 

bioterrorism as compared to other threats such as conventional terrorism or dirty 

bombs? 

b. How much does the rapid spread of biotechnology due to advancements such as 

CRISPR impact your assessment of the threat ofbioterrorism? 

c. Could CRISPR be used by someone who doesn't have bad intentions, but perhaps 

isn't taking the proper safety precautions, to inadvertently cause a health 

emergency? 

d. Is FBI prepared to deal with the emerging bioterror threats that exist today? 

e. What can FBI do to better prepare for these threats? 

Director Wray and the Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to respond to these questions 

for the Record as of time of printing in March 2019. If/when they respond to the 

Committee, their answers will be on file in the committee offices for public inspection. 
323 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Christopher Wray 

From Senator Kamala Harris 

"Threats to National Security" 

September 27,2017 

Foreign Adversaries and Social Media 

I am deeply concerned about how popular social media platforms in the US can be used, 

potentially by nefarious actors like Russia, to influence public opinion- particularly around our 

elections. This strikes at the core of our democracy. 

1. Whose job is it to police foreign intelligence activities in the social media space? 

What should the division of responsibility between the FBI and the companies? How 

is that relationship currently? 

2. Are the companies being cooperative with your efforts to fully understand this threat, 

and prevent it from being used against us again in the future? 

3. What is FBI doing to be more forward leaning in helping the companies identify bad 

actors? 

4. In your opinion arc the companies sufficiently resourced to understand the extent to 

which bad actors are using their services? 

Director Wray and the Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to respond to these questions 

for the Record as of time of printing in March 2019. If/when they respond to the 

Committee, their answers will be on file in the committee offices for public inspection. 

1 
324 

OFFICE OF TilE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE /\HAIRS 

WASIII~GTON, DC 20511 

The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United Stales Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Chairman Johnson: 

DEC 1 5 2017 

(lJ) This correspondence responds to Questions for the Recore! entered by Senator Daines 

(R-MTJ, Senator McCain (R-AZ), Ranking Member McCaskill (0-MO), and Senator Peters (OM!) for Director Rasmussen of the National Counterterrorism Center during the Committee's 

September 27. 2017 open hearing on 'Threats to the Homeland." The requested information is 

enclosed. 

(lJ) If you have any questions. please contact the Office of Legislative Affairs at (703) 

275-2474. 

Sincerely, 

Deirdre M. Walsh 

Enclosure: 

(lJ) "Response to Questions for the Record from 27 September 2017 Hearing heforc the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
325 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Hearing Date: 27 September 2017 

Committee: Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

Member: Senator Daines (R-MT) 

Witness: D/NCTC Rasmussen 

Info Current as of: 8 December 2017 

Question: 1 

Question 1: Mr. Rasmussen, thank you for testifying. As everyone mentioned, threats to the 

homeland have only grown and diversified. From domestic and foreign actors to man-made and 

natural threats, this year, we have seen wildfires ravage my home state of Montana and 

hurricanes flatten our neighbors in the southeast, gangs and drug trafficking devastate families 

across the country, and ISIS inspired shootings - all which have led to the loss of American 

lives. 

Mr. Rasmussen, you touched on social media platforms being used to spread vile propaganda. 

We as a society encourage the free flow of information and ideas. But there are limits. This 

platform has enabled reward for illegal and gruesome actions. We must stop it. How do we 

protect First Amendment rights while also encouraging private business to improve identification 

and filtration of terrorist propaganda? 

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) believes companies want to do more; however, 

they may not have the counterterrorism experience required to differentiate between a nonviolent Arab opposition group, and the propaganda of a designated foreign terrorist organization. 

NCTC is exploring ways to educate companies on broader violent extremist online trends and 

support companies' efforts to identify official terrorist propaganda. 

NCTC has recently seen industry do more to address terrorists' use of their platforms and has 

reached out to several companies to gain a better understanding of how NCTC could be helpful 

in this regard. 

Specifically - Twitter, Telegram and several other social media and hosting service providers are 

working to improve their capability to automatically identify and delete ISIS-related content. 

This effort is complicated by ISIS's ability to reconstitute closed accounts and quickly adjust 

media practices, and migrate to new platforms when necessary. 

Finally, as it is impossible to completely remove terrorist content from the Internet, NCTC 

continues to work with civil society, coalition partners, and industry to ensure that alternative 

narratives are available to individuals who are exploring terrorist propaganda and considering a 

pathway to violence- while protecting the first amendment rights of those in the United States. 

1 

UNCLASSIFIED 
326 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Hearing Date: 27 September 2017 

Committee: Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

Member: Senator McCain (R-AZ) 

Witness: D/NCTC Rasmussen 

Info Current as of: 8 December 2017 

Question: 2 

Question 2: CYBERSECURITY No Policy and No Strategy: Our greatest frustration has been 

the lack of any direction from this administration, or from the prior administration, on how we 

should be deterring our adversaries in cyberspace. Among other urgent problems, we need to 

define what forms of cyber-attack constitute an act of war and how authorities for cyber 

responses should be delegated to various agencies. We must also consider geographic and 

sovereignty issues; the list goes on. 

• Do you agree that until our adversaries believe the consequences of an attack in 

cyberspace will outweigh the benefits, behaviors will not change? 

• What are the chief impediments to crafting a coherent strategy? 

UK's National Cyber Security Center: Our cyber efforts are divided among DoD, DHS, and the 

FBI. In contrast, Britain has adopted a unified model in the recently established National Cyber 

Security Centre. Our British allies recognize the twin absolute necessities of bringing all 

capacity under one roof and acting in close partnership with the private sector. 

Are you familiar with the UK's NCSC, and do you believe it is something we should 

pursue here in the U.S.? 

• Do you agree that we should reevaluate the roles and responsibilities of DHS or 

pursue a model that combines our government-wide expertise in a center like the UK 

established? 

• Is the current approach working; is the status quo effective? 

Answer: 

Cybersecurity does not fall under the mission of the National Counterterrorism Center. NCTC 

respectfully defers to our partners, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who joined NCTC at the 27 September Hearing; as a direct 

response on questions related to preparedness, response, strategic planning and comparisons to 

our foreign partners on cyber related security efforts are best answered by DHS & FBI. 

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Hearing Date: 27 September 2017 

Committee: Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

Member: Senator/Ranking Member McCaskill (D-MO) 

Witness: D/NCTC Rasmussen 

Info Current as of: 8 December 2017 

Questions: 3 · 7 

Question 3: Terrorism- Europe has experienced a number of attacks recently, including a rise in 

the use of ramming attacks. We have not experienced the same frequency of attacks in the 

United States. To what factors do you attribute the lower frequency? 

Homegrown violent extremist (HVE) arrests and disruptions in the U.S. in 2017 have been on 

par with 2016, and the number of successful attacks has fallen from six in 2016 to three in the 

first 10 months of this year, including the most recent attack in New York City on October 31. 

Despite the lower number of attacks here than Europe, NCTC continue to assess that the threat 

from HVEs in the U.S. remains the most immediate and unpredictable. NCTC assesses HVEs 

are likely to continue to use simple tactics, such as edged weapons or vehicle assaults, and may 

see others attempt to copy previously successful attacks. 

Multiple factors probably contribute to a higher frequency of terrorist attacks in Europe than in 

the U.S. Europe is in close geographic proximity to Iraq and Syria and has a significantly larger 

pool of potential violent extremists and former foreign fighters that ISIS can leverage for 

directed or enabled attacks. Unlike the more dispersed and integrated immigrant communities in 

the U.S., European immigration settlement policies over the last several decades have helped 

create large marginalized minority communities who might be more receptive to ISIS's 

propaganda encouraging attacks because of a shared sense of isolation and perceived religious 

discrimination. 

Question 4: Ramming attacks are on the rise globally and in the U.S. 

What can communities do to prevent or mitigate these kinds of attacks? 

NCTC, DHS, and FBI routinely issue unclassifted threat familiarization products to law 

enforcement and first responders to help identify potential vulnerabilities and aid response 

planning. 

With specific regard to ramming attacks, some potential prevention or mitigation techniques 

include physical security considerations, such as installation of bo!lardslbarriers to limit access, 

controlling traffic access, law enforcement and security officer visibility, and improving ingress 

and egress routes. 

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The Intelligence Community and law enforcement officials regularly participate in outreach and 

education initiatives, such as performing joint private-sector and local law-enforcement terrorism 

exercises, encouraging local businesses to share security plans with law enforcement, and 

conducting response planning encompassing the private and public sectors. 

Question 5: What steps do you recommend to address the vulnerabilities posed by social 

media? 

NCTC works to ensure a continuing dialogue with tech companies and, where possible, fill 

knowledge gaps that help them to identify terrorist materials that violate their content policies. 

This includes involving smaller companies and startups in these conversations and building 

mechanisms for our own counterterrorism experts to share some of their knowledge with 

industry. NCTC views industry's establishment of the Global Internet Forum to Counter 

Terrorism last summer as a positive step. 

Our understanding is that this forum is intended to bring smaller companies into conversations 

on addressing terrorism that once only involved the largest social media platforms. 

The Hash Sharing Coalition that some members of the Global Internet Forum to Counter 

Terrorism are working on is particularly promising and NCTC applauds its efforts to use 

technology to more efficiently enforce members' terrorist content policies. 

Finally, as it is impossible to completely remove terrorist content from the Internet, NCTC 

continues to work with civil society, coalition partners, and industry to ensure that alternative 

narratives are available to individuals who are exploring terrorist propaganda and considering a 

pathway to violence- while protecting the first amendment rights of U.S. citizens. 

Question 6: In your opinion, if there is a terrorist attack on U.S. soil in the future, how likely is 

it that transportation systems or a "soft target" location will be targeted? 

As demonstrated by the recent attack in New York City on October 31, NCTC believes that 

future terrorist attacks in the U.S. will continue to target soft targets or targets of opportunity, 

including some transportation systems. HVEs are likely to remain focused on soft targets 

because of the increased perception of success, lower levels of security, ease of access, and 

familiarity with the target. 

ISIS and al-Qa'ida probably remain intent on attacking transportation systems because of the 

potential for mass casualties, amount of media coverage generated, resulting fear and anxiety 

amongst the targeted population, and the economic costs associated with such attacks. 

Specifically, successful aviation attacks during the past few years encouraged terrorists to focus 

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on aviation by cultivating the perception that it may not be a hard target and by promoting 

copycat attacks, based on the apparent ease with which public areas were attacked in Zaventem 

Airport in Brussels, Belgium. 

Recent ISIS attacks against transportation targets include the Ataturk Airport attack in Istanbul, 

Turkey that killed 44 individuals, and the Zaventem Airport and the Maalbeek metro station 

attack in Brussels that killed 32 people. 

Violent extremist publications, including ISIS's Dabiq and Rumiyah magazines and AQAP's 

Inspire, encourage attacks against aviation targets and trains and provide ways to circumvent 

airport security or potential derailment tools. Al-Qa'ida leadership continues to herald the 

success of 9/ll and reiterates calls for attacks in the West, referring potential operatives to 

Inspire magazine as a source of reference. 

Transportation related attacks are likely to cause significant economic damage. Zaventem 

Airport lost an estimated 5 million euros the day it was shut down, and it is difficult to calculate 

the revenue that nations divert to increased security measures. 

Surface transportation systems cannot employ airport-type screening because of the volume of 

passengers who use rail and bus lines on a daily basis, and expanding security perimeters could 

create large passenger bottlenecks at entrances that could themselves become attractive targets. 

These types of attacks do not require a high degree of skill or training, would not require 

attackers to breach security checkpoints, and could be carried out with little or no warning. 

While transportation and soft targets remain the most probable focus for terrorists, they probably 

retain the intent to attack symbolic targets, to include U.S. Government and military targets, and 

would probably prioritize those where the likelihood for success is higher. 

NCTC cannot discount the possibility that a U.S.-based violent extremist may use insider access 

to conduct an attack on a hardened target, as happened in November 2009 when Nidal Hassan 

conducted an attack on Fort Hood. 

Question 7: Information Sharing- The Inspectors General (IG) of the Intelligence Community 

(IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) released a joint 

report in March 2017 reviewing domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The report 

found that improving information sharing required federal, state, and local entities involved in 

counterterrorism to better understand the other's roles, responsibilities, and contributions. What 

is the status of the implementation of the IGs' recommendations at the National Counterterrorism 

Center? 

Of the 23 Recommendations within the March 27, 2017 -Joint Inspector General Report 

numbers 1, 2 & 22 are specific to NCTC. 

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Through I & 2, the IC IG and DHS and DOJ OIGs recommend thatlhe ODNI, DHS, and DOJ 

review the 2003 interagency MOU on information sharing and determine what actions are 

necessary to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the 

departments. Number 2 also recommends codifying an overarching engagement and 

coordination body for the terrorism-related ISE. 

Specific to Recommendation 1, NCTC concurs with the determinations made through a joint 

assessment by ODNI, DHS, DOJ and FBI; that laws, Presidential directives, and regulations, 

along with Department and Agency policies, and various MOUs subsequent to the 2003 MOU, 

have further defined and refined the standards and processes, and reflect the current structure, 

roles, and responsibilities of the ISE partners and the current threat environment and priorities. 

Further, NCTC concurs with the assessment that updating the 2003 MOU is unnecessary because 

it has been superseded by subsequent intelligence information sharing standards and processes 

that have the effect of affirming and formalizing the roles and responsibilities of partners in the 

current information-sharing environment. NCTC concurred with the assessment, supported the 

recommendation, and considers the recommendation closed. 

Specific to Recommendation 2, NCTC concurs with the determinations made through a joint 

assessment by ODNI, DHS, DOJ and FBI that as prescribed in section 1016(g) (2) of IRTPA, 

that the Act established the ISC as the overarching engagement and coordination body for the 

terrorism-related ISE. Further, NCTC also concurs with the joint assessment that there is no 

need to codify a separate body with the same responsibilities. NCTC concurred with this 

assessment, supported the recommendation, and considers the recommendation closed. 

Through Recommendation 22, the IC IG recommends that the Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center, consider assigning additional NCTC representatives to the field and/or 

revising the existing territorial regions, potentially to align with the DNI domestic regions, to 

ensure effective NCTC representation within the domestic field. 

Specific to Recommendation 22, NCTC plans to establish a Domestic Representative position in 

Detroit, Michigan, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018. The NCTC Domestic 

Representative Program is the cornerstone of NCTC's mandate to collaborate with regional 

Intelligence Community agencies and counterterrorism (CT) officials. NCTC has Domestic 

Representatives in eleven U.S. cities, co-located with FBI field offices. Each representative 

serves as a liaison for NCTC's Director, providing tailored analytic briefings to CT partners, 

contributing to ongoing CT investigations, and facilitating the flow of strategic and regional CT 

information to and from NCTC, while coordinating with the FBI and the Department of 

Homeland Security. The addition of a Domestic Representative position in Detroit will help 

alleviate the geographic challenges placed on NCTC's representative in Chicago, who is 

responsible for supporting CT partners in nine states, and will enable NCTC to manage more 

effectively key CT partnerships and competing regional priorities. The fourth quarter FY2018 

timeframe will enable adequate time for the selection process and will align with the turnover of 

the current Chicago Representative to ensure a smooth transition. 

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Hearing Date: 27 September 2017 

Committee: Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

Member: Senator Peters (D-MI) 

Witness: D/NCTC Rasmussen 

Info Current as of: 8 December 2017 

Questions: 8- 12 

Question 8: A bioterrorist attack could have a devastating impact in a major city, both in terms 

of human life and our sense of safety and security. However, reports such as the Blue Ribbon 

study panel's report on biodefense have indicated that our national defense against bioterrorism 

is lacking in both detection capability and response. In the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment, 

the CRISPR gene editing tool was identitied as a key enabling technology that could be used by 

terrorists to more easily create a biological weapon. Among the terrorist threats facing the 

homeland, how worried are you about bioterrorism as compared to other threats such as 

conventional terrorism or dirty bombs? 

NCTC expects most terrorists to continue pursuing conventional attacks over biological, 

chemical, radiological, or nuclear materials in attacks against the U.S. homeland, because 

conventional capabilities are more familiar and easier to acquire for most terrorists. NCTC 

remains concerned about the threat of bioterrorism; however, some bioterrorism scenarios could 

have a disproportionate impact compared to typical conventional attacks or even a dirty bomb. 

Question 9: How much does the rapid spread of biotechnology due to advancements such as 

CRISPR impact your assessment of the threat of bioterrorism? 

NCTC believes that in the near term, non-state actors are more likely to seek to conduct 

bioterrorism attacks with traditional BW agents rather than genetically modified organisms. 

However, NCTC continues to monitor for indications non-state actors are seeking to use advanced 

biotechnologies such as CRISPR to acquire or advance a bioterrorism capability. 

Using CRISPR to genetically modify organisms does not bypass the need for life science 

knowledge and experience, and successfully using CRISPR can pose challenges even for 

experienced life scientists. 

Question 10: Could CRISPR be used by someone who doesn't have bad intentions, but perhaps 

isn't taking the proper safety precautions, to inadvertently cause a health emergency? 

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NCTC believes that the chances that a hobby-level project involving genome editing technologies 

such as CRISPR could unintentionally result in a public health crisis in the near term are very low 

because currently these projects typically involve benign materials unlikely to create a harmful 

organism. Health emergencies from biosafety lapses could occur even without the use of genome 

editing technologies, for instance the inadvertent release of a highly transmissible, naturally 

occurring pathogen. 

Question 11: Is NCTC prepared to deal with the emerging bioterror threats that exist today? 

NCTC maintains vigilance against emerging bioterror threats by monitoring all-source reporting 

for any potential intersection between malevolent non-state actors, individuals with skills or 

expertise that could be used to support a bioterrorism effort, and advances in biotechnology. NCTC 

also works with collectors to promote intelligence collection on non-state groups interested in 

biological threats. NCTC serves a central role in managing terrorist crises, and regularly exercises 

how it would leverage existing crisis management capabilities and responsibilities in a WMD 

event. 

Question 12: What can NCTC do to better prepare for these threats? 

Monitoring these types of emerging bioterror threats takes a variety of expertise. To better 

prepare for any possible technology-enabled bio-threat, NCTC not only leverages internal 

expertise, but also routinely consults other technical subject matter experts within the U.S. 

Intelligence Community and outside the U.S. Government to stay informed of advances in 

relevant biological sciences and their potential threat implications. NCTC will continue to work 

to improve information sharing, collection, and analysis against non-state actors interested in 

leveraging biotechnology for nefarious purposes. 

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