COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JOHN K. CRISCO, JR. 

 

v. Record No. 2049-96-2 

ROBIN T. SORENSEN (CRISCO) MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

ROBIN T. SORENSEN (CRISCO) APRIL 29, 1997 

v. Record No. 2136-96-2 

JOHN K. CRISCO, JR. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 

 Donald K. Butler (Player B. Michelsen; Joseph F. 

Grove; Robert "Jay" Finch; Morano, Colan & Butler; 

Joseph F. Grove, P.C., on briefs), for John K. 

Crisco, Jr. 

 John N. Clifford (Vera Duke; Clifford & Duke, 

P.C., on briefs), for Robin T. Sorensen (Crisco). 

 Upon review of the record and consideration of the briefs 

and legal authority, we find no reversible error in the trial 

court's refusal to modify child visitation, in awarding the 

mother attorney's fees (Record No. 2049-96-2), or in ordering the 

mother to share in the transportation costs for visitation 

(Record No. 2136-96-2). Accordingly, we affirm the order of the 

trial court. 

 Before a trial court may modify a custody or visitation 

order, the evidence must prove that a change in circumstances has 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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occurred since the most recent award and that a change in custody 

or visitation would be in the child's best interest. Code 

§ 20-108; Keel v. Keel, 225 Va. 606, 611-12, 303 S.E.2d 917, 921 

(1983). In determining the custody or visitation privileges that 

are in a child's best interest, Code § 20-124.2 directs that the 

trial court "shall assure minor children of frequent and 

continuing contact with both parents, when appropriate, and 

encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of rearing 

their children." Code § 20-124.3 sets forth factors that the 

court shall consider in determining custody and visitation 

rights. On appeal, we reverse an award of custody or visitation 

only where the trial court has abused its discretion, which 

requires that the decision be plainly wrong and without evidence 

to support it. Peple v. Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 

232, 237 (1988). 

 In October 1995, the trial court awarded custody of the 

parties' two-year-old daughter to the mother and granted the 

father overnight visitation every other weekend from Saturday at 

10:00 a.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. and two weeks during the 

summer. At the time, both the father and mother resided in 

Richmond. Soon thereafter the father moved to North Carolina. 

He petitioned the court to modify the visitation to allow for 

longer, but less frequent, visitation to enable him to travel 

with his daughter to visit his home in North Carolina and to 

visit his parents. Due to the travel time from Richmond to North 
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Carolina, the father asserted that the existing visitation 

schedule made it impractical to take his daughter to his home in 

North Carolina and compelled him to visit with his daughter only 

at a motel or friend's home in Richmond. By order dated 

August 2, 1996, the trial court found that a change of 

circumstance had occurred due to the father's relocation. 

However, the court found the changed circumstance did not warrant 

a change in the visitation schedule. The court retained the same 

visitation schedule but granted the father leave, effective April 

24, 1996, to travel out of state with his two and one-half year 

old daughter once per month during a normal weekend visit. The 

trial court awarded the mother $5,000 attorney's fees. 

 We cannot say that an overnight visitation every other 

weekend with leave to travel to the father's home in North 

Carolina once per month does not satisfy the requirement set 

forth in Code § 20-124.2 that trial courts "shall assure minor 

children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents, 

. . . and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of 

rearing their children." Although a three day visitation every 

third weekend, as requested by the father, arguably might better 

accommodate both the father and daughter, we cannot find that the 

trial court abused its discretion by refusing to further modify 

the visitation schedule in view of the age of the child and 

frequent changes in the custody and visitation schedules. 

 As to the award of attorney's fees, considering the number 
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of hearings, the amount of discovery, and the preparation that 

was necessary based upon the record, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by awarding the wife $5,000 attorney's fees. 

See Poliquin v. Poliquin, 12 Va. App. 676, 685, 406 S.E.2d 401, 

405 (1991). 

 As to the transportation costs associated with the father's 

visitation with the daughter, the trial court did not impose the 

financial burden exclusively upon either parent. Instead, the 

trial court required the parents to share the costs. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the mother to 

share in the transportation costs for the visitation. See

Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 2 Va. App. 409, 412, 345 S.E.2d 10, 

11 (1986). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the 

trial court. 

 Affirmed.