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SJC-12120

JOAN E. OGGIANI vs. CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE TRIAL COURT & others.

1

January 6, 2017.

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts, 

Removal of register of probate.

Joan E. Oggiani appeals from a judgment of the county court 

denying her petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from a 

decision of the register of the Berkshire Division of the 

Probate and Family Court Department of the Trial Court, with the 

approval of the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court, 

removing her designation as deputy assistant register pursuant 

to G. L. c. 217, § 29D.2 We affirm the judgment.

Oggiani, who has been an employee of the Berkshire Division 

of the Probate and Family Court since 1980, was designated as 

the deputy assistant register when that position was created in 

1993. As deputy assistant register, she had certain

responsibilities in addition to those of her primary position as 

 

1 Court Administrator; Chief Justice of the Probate and 

Family Court Department of the Trial Court; and Register of the 

Berkshire Division of the Probate and Family Court Department of 

the Trial Court.

2 The statute provides: "The register of the Berkshire 

probate court may, with the approval of the chief justice of the 

probate and family court, designate [one] employee as deputy 

assistant register with the same powers as assistant register 

and with the approval of the chief justice remove a deputy 

assistant register. The deputy assistant register shall receive 

additional compensation of $6,000."
2

a judicial secretary, and she received additional compensation 

as required by the statute. In 2015, the register requested the 

approval of the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court to 

remove Oggiani's designation, stating that her performance as 

deputy assistant register did not meet his expectations.3 

Oggiani objected and disagreed with the register's 

characterization of her performance, but the Chief Justice of 

the Probate and Family Court approved the register's request. 

Oggiani then asked the Chief Justice of the Trial Court and the 

Court Administrator to review the decision.4 They responded that 

the decision was final.

The single justice did not abuse his discretion or commit 

an error of law by denying Oggiani's petition for relief in 

these circumstances.5 Under the plain language of G. L. c. 217, 

§ 29D, a register has the authority to designate and remove a 

deputy assistant register. These appear to be discretionary 

decisions for the register to make, subject only to the approval 

of the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court.

6 The

statute does not state that a register must establish good cause

 

3 The register sought only to remove the designation of 

deputy assistant register. Oggiani continues to serve in her 

primary position as a judicial secretary.

4 This might have been an attempt to appeal pursuant to 

G. L. c. 217, § 2, first par. (concerning disputes between first 

justice and register over management of register's office; "Any 

person aggrieved by a decision of a chief justice under this 

paragraph may appeal said decision to the chief justice of the 

trial court . . . ."). We need not decide whether that statute 

applies in any way to a removal decision pursuant to G. L. 

c. 217, § 29D.

5 In denying relief, the single justice bypassed the 

question whether it was appropriate to invoke this court's 

superintendence power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, to seek review of 

a personnel decision in the trial court. We need not reach that 

issue today, particularly as the respondents do not identify any 

other remedy that might have been available to Oggiani.

6 At the time Oggiani was designated as the deputy assistant 

register, G. L. c. 217, § 29D, permitted the register to "revoke 

any such designation at pleasure." See St. 1993, c. 110, § 223. 

In 2006, the statute was amended to require the approval of the 

Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court, thereby placing a 

check on the register's discretion. See St. 2006, c. 270, § 3.
3

-- or indeed, any reason at all -- for removal. This is not a 

case where the employee alleges that her designation was removed 

on an improper basis such as race or gender discrimination under 

G. L. c. 151B, in violation of any public policy, or without 

good faith. She only disagrees with the register's assessment 

of her performance of her duties as deputy assistant register. 

Where the register had the approval of the Chief Justice of the 

Probate and Family Court, however, he had the authority to 

remove Oggiani's designation based on his own assessment.

Moreover, the statute does not prescribe a formal hearing 

or any other type of formal process before a deputy assistant 

register's designation can be removed. Oggiani's assertion that 

she has been deprived of due process is unsupported by any 

authority and does not rise to the level of adequate appellate 

argument. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 

921 (1975). We therefore need not consider it. In any event, 

"'[p]rocedural due process protections,' such as the right to a 

hearing, 'are only triggered when a liberty or property interest 

is at issue.'" Hoffer v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 

Mass. 451, 454 (2012), quoting Hudson v. Commissioner of 

Correction, 431 Mass. 1, 7 (2000). Oggiani has not shown that 

she had a protected liberty or property interest in her 

continued designation as deputy assistant register, where that 

designation was subject to removal by the register with the 

approval of the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court. 

The single justice properly denied relief.

Judgment affirmed.

Joan E. Oggiani, pro se.

Carrie Benedon, Assistant Attorney General, for the 

respondents.