Collaborating to Combat Illicit Networks Through 

Interagency and International Efforts

Celina B. Realuyo

William J. Perry

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Perry Center Occasional Paper

August 2013
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this book do not necessarily reflect those of the 

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the National Defense University, or the U.S. Department of Defense.
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

1

Collaborating to Combat Illicit Networks Through 

Interagency and International Efforts

Introduction

This paper examines collaborative efforts among U.S. agencies, partner nations, and multilateral organizations to address the hybrid threats posed by illicit networks through the diplomatic, development, 

and defense lenses of national security in the Western Hemisphere. The resourcefulness, adaptability, 

impunity, and ability of illicit networks to circumvent countermeasures make them a formidable foe 

for governments. Since illicit actors have expanded their activities throughout the global commons, in 

the air, land, sea, and cyberspace domains, nations must devise comprehensive and multidimensional 

strategies and policies to combat the transnational threats posed by these illicit networks.

The initiatives discussed here focus on programs in the Western Hemisphere to tackle the converging threat of transnational organized crime (TOC) and other illicit networks, undertaken by the 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Organization of American States (OAS), Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and U.S. Southern Command’s Joint Interagency 

Task Force–South (JIATAF-South). Each of these endeavors represents models for collaborations that 

require political will, institutional capacity, mechanisms, resources, and measures of effectiveness for 

success. These instructive examples of interagency and international collaboration in the Americas 

underscore the continued need to foster communities of interest to comprehend illicit networks and 

devise more effective strategies to counter them as they further evolve and threaten the national security of the United States and its allies.

Based on analysis of these examples, the following recommendations are offered for consideration by policymakers:

• Promote collaborative models for security and development that include the following 

critical elements: political will, institutions, mechanisms to assess threats and deliver 

countermeasures, resources, and measures of effectiveness to ensure success against illicit 

networks.

• Ensure that international conventions, agreements, and strategies are accompanied with 

robust action plans and are adequately resourced in order to restrict illicit actors’ operations 

and enablers.

• Encourage greater donor coordination so that all these security and development programs 

complement rather than duplicate each other. Given the level of political will demonstrated 

across these organizations, there should be an interest in allocating resources and building 

capacity in the specific geographic areas most vulnerable to transnational organized crime.

This “Occasional Paper” was originally published as a chapter in the National Defense University book 

Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization (NDU Press, 2013).
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

2

The Nature of the Threat of Illicit Networks

Throughout history, governments have been responsible for ensuring and promoting security, prosperity, and governance. The unprecedented pace of change in a globalized world has challenged these basic missions of the nation-state. From demographic pressures to an increasingly interconnected global 

economy, and from the race for resources to information overload, governments are struggling to cope 

with what Harvard University scholar Joseph Nye calls “the diffusion of power” in the twenty-first 

century. Governments are faced with a broad spectrum of national security threats that emanate from 

nonstate actors as well as traditional nation-states. Illicit networks that include transnational crime 

organizations, drug traffickers, gangs, and terrorist groups are among these nonstate actors. While 

illicit activities have been with us since ancient times, what is novel today is the pervasive, prolific, and 

converging nature of illicit networks around the world. These networks threaten the rule of law, government institutions, the economy, and society. In the words of former Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, “Just as legitimate governments and businesses have embraced the 

advances of globalization, so too have illicit traffickers harnessed the benefits of globalization to press 

forward their illicit activities.”1 Illicit activities such as drug, arms, contraband, and human trafficking 

are nothing new; however, their velocity, scale, and associated violence as a result of globalization have 

made these transnational crimes national security concerns.

Illicit Networks Capitalize on Global Supply Chains

Illicit networks seek to navigate, infiltrate, and/or dominate global supply chains to further their activities and enhance their power. They actually thrive in open societies with the free flow of goods, people, 

and capital. Just like licit businesses, illicit networks are matching the supply and demand for goods, 

services, capital, and information for their clients. Illicit actors utilize and even seek to control or coopt supply chains around the world to facilitate the movement of “bad people and bad things” such as 

drugs, guns, and counterfeit goods.

Regardless of industry or geography, there are four critical elements of any global supply chain 

whose integrity must be preserved and protected at all costs:

1. Materiel: What is being moved through the supply chain? People, goods, commodities, 

services, data? Where are those materials coming from and destined for?

2. Manpower: Who controls and staffs the supply chain? Who are the key enablers of that 

supply chain? Who is in control of these mechanisms or modes of conveyance?

3. Money: Who is funding the supply chain? What business model is being used to generate 

revenue? Where is the financing originating from and directed to?

4. Mechanisms: What modes of conveyance are used by the supply chain? Are people, goods, 

and services moving by land, air, sea, or cyberspace? How is the supply chain organized?2

While each of these four critical elements of global supply chains has its unique features, the 

security of each is vital to safeguarding supply chains. Who is securing these elements? Global competition has led the private sector to identify and adopt the most efficient means of matching supply and 

demand for goods, services, and information, and to incorporate risk management mechanisms;3 similarly, illicit networks have adopted these best practices. Unfortunately, international safety standards 

and government control of global supply chains still lag far behind.
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Illicit actors are well aware of these weaknesses and exploit them to further their interests; they 

capitalize on gaps in governance, regulations, and oversight to bolster their enterprises. Illicit networks 

easily adapt to their changing operating environment. They often operate as service providers for each 

other. For transnational criminal organizations, maximizing profits is paramount. Their activities 

distort global markets and pricing, undermine consumer confidence, and even endanger consumers 

around the world, as in the case of counterfeit drugs. As a result of globalization, the sheer volume and 

velocity of international trade make it virtually impossible to control and secure global supply chains. 

Nevertheless, governments must keep abreast of the ways illicit actors are exploiting the increasingly 

borderless world and identify the vulnerabilities of global supply chains. Accordingly, governments 

must develop measures to combat illicit networks by leveraging and safeguarding the four critical 

elements of supply chains: materiel, manpower, money, and mechanisms. New strategies to combat 

transnational organized crime and illicit networks, including those discussed below, are increasingly 

addressing these challenges.

Figure 1. The New Global Security Environment 

National Security Threats from Illicit Networks

Prosperity

Security

Society

Governance

Human 

Trafficking

Illicit Activities

Narcotics

Trafficking

Financial

Crimes

Arms

Trafficking

Counterfeiting

Corruption/

Extortion

Cybercrimes

Figure 2. Global Supply Chain Management

Four Critical Elements

Materiel

What is Moving?

What Resources are Accessed?

How is Technology Used?

Manpower

Who is Moving?

Who is in Control?

Who is Enabling?

Money

Who is Funding?

How is Revenue Generated?

Where is Money Going?

Mechanisms

What Modes of Conveyance?

Land, Air, Sea Routes?

What about Cyberspace?
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

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Strategies to Combat Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Networks

Governments at the local, national, regional, and multilateral levels must devise holistic strategies to 

address the complex, adaptive, and converging transnational security threats from illicit networks. 

Several efforts are underway to promote interagency and international collaboration to address transnational organized crime and illicit networks and promote security in the Western Hemisphere. These 

regional efforts will be examined through the lenses of national strategy, diplomacy, development, and 

defense and security.

The May 2010 National Security Strategy aptly acknowledges and describes the convergence of 

threats posed by illicit networks:

Transnational criminal threats and illicit trafficking networks continue to expand 

dramatically in size, scope, and influence—posing significant national security challenges for the United States and our partner countries. These threats cross borders and 

continents and undermine the stability of nations, subverting government institutions 

through corruption and harming citizens worldwide. Transnational criminal organizations have accumulated unprecedented wealth and power through trafficking and other 

illicit activities, penetrating legitimate financial systems and destabilizing commercial 

markets. They extend their reach by forming alliances with government officials and 

some state security services. The crime-terror nexus is a serious concern as terrorists 

use criminal networks for logistical support and funding. Increasingly, these networks 

are involved in cyber crime, which cost consumers billions of dollars annually, while 

undermining global confidence in the international financial system.4

Combating transnational criminal and trafficking networks requires a multidimensional strategy that safeguards citizens, breaks the financial strength of criminal 

and terrorist networks, disrupts illicit trafficking networks, defeats transnational criminal organizations, fights government corruption, strengthens the rule of law, bolsters 

judicial systems, and improves transparency. While these are major challenges, the 

United States will be able to devise and execute a collective strategy with other nations 

facing the same threats.5

Recognizing transnational organized crime as a national security threat, in July 2011 the 

United States issued its most recent Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which seeks 

to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime 

and related threats to U.S. national security. The strategy posits that transnational organized crime 

threatens U.S. interests by taking advantage of failed states or contested spaces; forging alliances with 

corrupt foreign government officials and some foreign intelligence services; destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states; undermining competition in world strategic markets; 

using cyber technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds; creating the potential 

for the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists; and expanding narcotrafficking 

and human and weapons smuggling networks. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to 

criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support. TOC also threatens the interconnected trading, transportation, and transactional systems that move people and commerce throughout 

the global economy and across our borders.6

The strategy’s key policy objectives are to:

1. protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and exploitation of transnational criminal networks;
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2. help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency, break the corruptive power of transnational criminal networks, and sever state-crime alliances;

3. break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and protect strategic markets 

and the U.S. financial system from TOC penetration and abuse;

4. defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to national security by 

targeting their infrastructures, depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the 

criminal facilitation of terrorist activities; and

5. build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and public-private partnerships to 

defeat transnational organized crime.

Key actions of the strategy include:

• reduce the demand for illicit drugs in the United States, thereby denying funding to illicit 

trafficking organizations;

• continue to attack drug trafficking and distribution networks and their enabling means 

within the United States to reduce the availability of illicit drugs;

• sever the illicit flow across U.S. borders of people, weapons, currency, and other illicit 

finance through investigations and prosecutions of key TOC leadership, as well as through 

targeting enabling means and infrastructure of TOC networks;

• identify and take action against corporate and governmental corruption within the United 

States;

• work with Congress to secure ratification of the Inter-American Convention against the 

Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other 

Related Materials; and

• seek accession to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, 

Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Other priority actions seek to: enhance intelligence and information sharing; protect the financial system and strategic markets against transnational organized crime; strengthen interdiction, investigations, and prosecutions; disrupt drug trafficking and its facilitation of other transnational threats; 

and build international capacity, cooperation, and partnerships.7

This new strategy elevates transnational organized crime to a national security threat and 

focuses attention on the destructive effects of TOC on U.S. interests at home and abroad. In the past, 

organized crime had been considered and handled as a local law enforcement issue. The new strategy seeks to better organize and coordinate interagency efforts within the U.S. government to address 

transnational organized crime and promote international cooperation against this global threat.

Prior to the publication of this strategy, U.S. agencies such as the Departments of Homeland 

Security, Justice, State, and Treasury as well as the law enforcement and intelligence communities had 

been actively countering, pursuing, and prosecuting transnational criminal organizations for years. 

From border controls to banking regulations, roles and responsibilities to combat illicit activities have 

been carved out for these agencies in their respective areas of expertise. Those who investigate and 

research transnational organized crime and illicit networks, both inside and outside of government, 

expected bolder language and guidance on how this new strategy would synchronize and coordinate 

U.S. efforts to combat TOC across the government. However, as of this writing, the U.S. government 

has not issued an implementation plan for this new strategy. The strategy does not create a new government agency, establish a White House czar position, allocate additional funding, or empower a lead 

agency.
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Perhaps the greatest challenge to the implementation of the 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime is not the adversary of illicit actors, but rather the fiscal state of the United 

States. Some, including former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, consider the national debt as the greatest threat to U.S. national security.8 In this age of fiscal austerity, it is 

unclear how these agencies charged with combating TOC can match the resources and ingenuity of 

these illicit actors and “do even more with less.” With a limited and if not diminishing budget, the U.S. 

interagency community will need to seek more innovative and efficient ways to confront and combat 

transnational organized crime.

On the Diplomatic Front: United Nations Initiatives

Palermo Convention and Protocols. The United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational 

Organized Crime, known as the Palermo Convention, is the main international instrument to counter organized crime and promote coordinated international cooperation. It was adopted in December 

2000 in Palermo, Italy, and was complemented by three protocols that target trafficking in persons, 

especially women and children, smuggling of migrants, and the illicit manufacturing and trafficking 

of firearms.9 The Palermo Convention establishes transnational organized crime as a threat to all UN 

member nations and sets forth common definitions and language to characterize activities that constitute this phenomenon.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. As the guardian of the Palermo Convention, 

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) helps countries create the domestic legal 

framework to investigate criminal offences related to organized crime and prosecute offenders, and 

adopt new frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and international law enforcement 

cooperation.10 UNODC is a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime. 

Established in 1997 through a merger between the United Nations Drug Control Program and the 

Center for International Crime Prevention, UNODC is headquartered in Vienna, with 54 field offices 

covering more than 150 countries around the world. It relies on voluntary contributions, mainly from 

governments, for 90 percent of its budget.11 UNODC is one of the world’s leading sources of reliable 

data, analysis, and forensic science services related to illicit drugs and crime. Its publications include 

the annual World Drug Report, U.N. Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, 2009, the 2010 report 

Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by Victims, and the 2011 Global Afghan Opium Trade: 

Threat Assessment. UNODC also provides practical tools and resources for policymakers, legislators, 

and criminal justice professionals.112

The UNODC work program is supported by three pillars. First, field-based technical cooperation 

projects enhance the capacity of member states to counteract illicit drugs, crime, and terrorism. Second, research and analytical work increases knowledge and understanding of drugs and crime issues 

and expands the evidence base for policy and operational decisions. And third, normative work assists 

states in the ratification and implementation of the relevant international treaties, the development of 

domestic legislation on drugs, crime, and terrorism, and the provision of secretariat and substantive 

services to the treaty-based and governing bodies.13

UNODC offers specialized assistance and expertise in the following areas:

• Organized crime and trafficking: UNODC helps governments react to the instability and insecurity caused by crimes such as the smuggling of illicit drugs, weapons, natural resources, 

counterfeit goods, and human beings between countries and continents. It also addresses 

emerging forms of crime such as cybercrime, trafficking in cultural artifacts, and environmental crime.
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• Corruption: Corruption is a major impediment to economic and social development. 

UNODC partners with the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, to loosen the 

grip that corrupt individuals have on government, national borders, and trading channels. 

In recent years, the office has stepped up its efforts to help states recover assets stolen by 

corrupt officials.

• Crime prevention and criminal justice reform: UNODC promotes the use of training manuals and the adoption of codes of conduct and standards and norms that aim to guarantee 

that the accused, the guilty, and the victims can all rely on a criminal justice system that is 

fair and grounded on human rights values. A strong rule of law will also instill confidence 

among citizens in the effectiveness of the courts and the humanness of the prisons.

• Drug abuse prevention and health: Through educational campaigns and by basing its approach on scientific findings, UNODC tries to convince young people not to use illicit 

drugs, drug-dependent people to seek treatment, and governments to see drug use as a 

health problem, not a crime.

• Terrorism prevention: UNODC is moving toward a more programmatic approach that involves developing long-term, customized assistance to entities involved in investigating and 

adjudicating cases linked to terrorism.14

UNODC’s consolidated budget for drugs and crime for the biennium 2010–2011 amounted to 

$468.3 million. Voluntary contributions are budgeted for $425.7 million, of which 64 percent is for the 

drugs program and 36 percent for the crime program. The United States was the second largest country contributor after Colombia, contributing $34.3 million to UNODC funding in 2010.15

The UNODC 2010 Annual Report “showed how health, security, and justice are the antidotes 

to drugs, crime and terrorism,” according to UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa. It 

featured the organization’s work on promoting drug treatment and alternative development, improving 

criminal justice, strengthening integrity, and reducing vulnerability to crime.16 To combat transnational organized crime, UNODC developed the Serious Organized Crime Threat Assessment Handbook 

to give policymakers tools for assessing immediate threats, the direction of current trends, and likely 

future challenges so that they can implement effective strategies to combat organized crime. In April 

2010, Brazil hosted the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to 

consider comprehensive strategies for addressing global challenges to crime prevention and criminal 

justice systems, in particular those related to the treatment of prisoners, juvenile justice, the prevention of urban crime, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons, money laundering, terrorism, and 

cybercrime.

In its anticorruption efforts, state parties to the UN Convention against Corruption met in 

Doha, Qatar, in November 2009 and agreed to establish a mechanism to review implementation of the 

Convention against Corruption. Under the new mechanism, all state parties will be reviewed every five 

years on the fulfillment of their obligations under the convention. On the basis of self-assessments and 

peer review, the mechanism will help identify gaps in national anticorruption laws and practices. The 

convention’s new monitoring mechanism represented a major breakthrough in the global campaign 

against corruption. To address human trafficking, UNODC developed, in cooperation with the Global 

Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, a model law to guide UN member states in preparing national 

laws against trafficking in persons.17

In 2009, UNODC launched an international drug treatment and care initiative in partnership 

with the World Health Organization (WHO) that is a landmark in the development of a comprehensive, integrated, health-based approach to drug policy. The UNODC-WHO Joint Programme on Drug 
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Dependence Treatment and Care aims to provide humane and accessible care to greater numbers of 

people with drug dependence and drug-related diseases (particularly HIV/AIDS) in low- and middle-income countries, resulting in their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.18

As an example of UNODC’s more recent initiatives, on October 1, 2011, UNODC Executive 

Director Yury Fedotov inaugurated the Center of Excellence for Crime Statistics on Governance, Victims of Crime, Public Security and Justice in Mexico City. The center will develop field surveys, share 

knowledge in the area of crime statistics, and organize an annual international conference on statistics. 

Fedotov stated:

As criminal gangs and drug trafficking rings become more sophisticated in their quest 

to avoid detection and escape justice, we support the Mexican Government in strengthening and sharing data collection methods relating to governance, victims of crime, 

public security and justice so that it—and other countries—can better respond to these 

threats.

The Executive Director also noted:

We must all remember that organized crime has become transnational and borderless; 

it is no longer a problem of just one country. Therefore, this center of excellence will 

help to assist in the government’s response to crime in Mexico, and its findings will also 

be crucial to regional and international authorities and organizations fighting transnational organized crime.19

UNODC’s broad spectrum of activities, like the Center of Excellence for Crime Statistics in 

Mexico City, demonstrates constructive bilateral and multilateral engagements directed against transnational organized crime and illicit networks that should continue as these threats mutate and converge in the new global security environment. Since many of the UNODC programs are dedicated to 

strengthening institutions to fight drugs and crime around the world, and their results are usually not 

immediate, it is difficult to evaluate their effectiveness. Moreover, as most programs are executed in 

partnership with host governments and other multilateral or nongovernmental organizations, determining the return on UNODC investments is challenging. While the mission of UNODC is noble, it 

would be helpful if the organization could provide more information about its programming and institute measures of effectiveness to better demonstrate the impact against transnational organized crime, 

and determine better which programs actually worked.

On the Diplomatic Front: Organization of American States Initiatives

The Organization of American States (OAS) has been combating the phenomenon of illicit networks 

in the Americas at the multilateral level through three vehicles: the Hemispheric Plan of Action against 

Transnational Organized Crime, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), 

and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE). The OAS early on recognized that the 

threat of illicit activities was transnational in nature and required dynamic political, social, economic, 

and security initiatives to respond to illicit networks.

OAS Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime

The OAS Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted in October 2006 to promote the application by OAS member states of the United Nations Convention against 
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Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and the Protocols thereto: the Protocol to 

Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol 

against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. Its general objectives are to:

1. prevent and combat transnational organized crime, in full observance of human rights, 

using as a frame of reference the Palermo Convention and the three additional protocols;

2. enhance cooperation in the areas of prevention, investigation, prosecution of, and judicial 

decisions related to, transnational organized crime;

3. encourage coordination among OAS bodies responsible for issues related to combating 

transnational organized crime and cooperation among those bodies with UNODC; and

4. strengthen national, subregional, and regional capacities and capabilities to deal with transnational organized crime.

The Hemispheric Plan of Action put forth specific actions in the following areas: national 

strategies against transnational organized crime, legal instruments, law enforcement matters, training, 

information-sharing, and international cooperation and assistance.20

Despite initial enthusiasm about the Plan of Action, the OAS Technical Group on Transnational Crime has met on only three occasions: Mexico City, in July 2007, Washington, DC, in October 

2009, and Trinidad and Tobago, in November 2011.21 At the November 2011 meeting, OAS Secretary 

for Multidimensional Security Adam Blackwell said that international crime is “everyone’s problem, it 

occurs in developed and developing countries where poverty, inequality, social and political exclusion 

and governance challenges are both causes and consequences of the problem.” Those at the meeting 

debated and offered some recommendations on police management in the hemisphere, a fundamental 

issue in improving security for citizens in the Americas.22 OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza 

explained that “police forces are tasked with the great responsibility of being the primary representatives 

of the state in guaranteeing compliance with the rule of law, within a community in a large or small 

community,” for which he stressed that “the importance of fostering institutional capacity development 

to ensure effective response by the police in a democratic framework” cannot be overestimated.23

While the OAS Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime is well 

intentioned, it is not clear what has actually been accomplished, as data regarding its programming 

are limited. Many of these OAS meetings issue communiqués that sound promising, but actions speak 

louder than words. To further complicate matters, OAS member states are hard-pressed to fund and 

staff new initiatives in support of the Plan of Action given the global economic recession and resource 

constraints.

Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission

To address the challenging issues of narcotics trafficking and drug abuse in the Western Hemisphere, 

in 1986 the OAS established an agency known as CICAD, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 

Commission. It focuses on strengthening the human and institutional capabilities and channeling the 

collective efforts of its member states to reduce the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.24

CICAD received almost $3 million of its $7.8 million total 2010 budget from the United States to 

counter the trafficking and abuse of illegal drugs, including methamphetamine.25 Its specific activities 

seek to:

• prevent and treat substance abuse;
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• reduce the supply and availability of illicit drugs;

• strengthen national drug control institutions and machinery;

• improve money-laundering control laws and practice;

• develop alternate sources of income for growers of coca, poppy, and marijuana;

• assist member governments in improving their data gathering and analysis on all aspects of 

the drug issue; and

• help member states and the hemisphere as a whole measure their progress over time in 

addressing the drug problem.26

For more than 10 years, the OAS/CICAD Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) has 

strengthened regional and subregional collaboration on all levels, including drug awareness and treatment approaches, information data collection, sharing and harmonizing counternarcotics and crime 

legislative models, extradition practices, and other control measures. The MEM deploys the expertise 

of independent peer reviewers from all OAS countries, which has resulted in hundreds of recommendations that individual countries and CICAD are taking concrete and effective measures to implement.27

Carrying out the MEM recommendations is an essential part of the toolkit that allows OAS 

countries to work as a cohesive force against the dual threats of drugs and crime. The MEM focuses on 

institution-building, demand reduction, supply reduction, control measures, and international cooperation. Notably, the MEM evaluation country reports, published in 2010, prompted the independent 

hemispheric experts who draft the reports to make over a third of their recommendations in the area 

of narcotics control measures. These recommendations for action include establishing and/or refining 

laws and regulations to control weapons, ammunition, and related material to stem the growing violence posed by illegal drugs and crime.28

On May 3, 2010, a new Hemispheric Drug Strategy was adopted by CICAD in Washington, 

DC, which updates the Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere, originally approved by the OAS General Assembly in 1997. Its 52 articles cover five aspects: Institutional Strengthening, Demand Reduction, 

Supply Reduction, Control Measures, and International Cooperation.29 In May 2011, the OAS adopted 

the Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs, 2011–2015, to assist member nations in implementing the 

Hemispheric Drug Strategy30 on the demand and supply sides of the problem.

Among its various programs, CICAD continued to carry out its activities in anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) throughout Latin America and the 

Caribbean in 2010. CICAD’s AML/CFT training programs seek to enhance the knowledge and capabilities of judges, prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement agents, and financial intelligence unit 

analysts. CICAD’s Anti-Money Laundering Section organized 17 seminars and workshops in 14 countries in 2010, training nearly 700 judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, financial intelligence 

unit analysts, and forfeited assets administration officers, among other participants. It partnered with 

UNODC, the Stolen Assets Recovery initiative of the World Bank, the World Bank Institute, Spain’s 

Ministry of Interior, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the 

Department of State, as well as the OAS’s Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) and 

the governments of CICAD member states.

CICAD also coordinated with the UNODC Legal Assistance Program for Latin America and 

the Caribbean, Interpol, and the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD) in setting 

up the Asset Recovery Network of GAFISUD as a vehicle for exchanging information about the identification and recovery of assets, products, or instruments of transnational illicit activities. This initiative 

is based on the guidelines of CARIN (Camden Assets Recovery Inter-Agency Network) in Europe.31
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In November 2011, CICAD celebrated its 50th session and the 25th anniversary of the commission in Buenos Aires, where OAS Secretary Adam Blackwell said, “Ties between drugs, crime, 

violence and weapons are evident and demand greater coordination among the countries of the region 

to be able to face them with a comprehensive and multilateral approach.” Secretary Blackwell added 

that “drug demand reduction through education” would be one of CICAD’s working pillars. During 

this meeting, CICAD agreed to expand some of its most innovative programs to other regions, such as 

Central America and the Caribbean. The project for the establishment of Drug Treatment Courts was 

highlighted. These courts, which seek to improve the quality of treatment to drug-dependent offenders, 

received strong support from the member states, several of which requested that OAS implement pilot 

programs in their territories. The countries also highlighted the use of scientific evidence produced in 

the Inter-American Drug Observatory as a pillar for the establishment of public policies in the field, 

and they requested that the CICAD Executive Secretariat continue working toward strengthening national information systems.32

Inter-American Committee against Terrorism

The OAS also has a separate entity charged with the counterterrorism mission in the Americas. In 

2002, CICTE (the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism) established an Executive Secretariat 

within the OAS General Secretariat after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Its mission is to 

promote and develop cooperation among member states to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism 

in accordance with the principles of the OAS Charter and the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. The CICTE Secretariat has developed a full range of technical assistance and capacity-building 

programs to help OAS member states to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism. CICTE oversees 10 

programs divided into six broad program areas: border controls, financial controls, critical infrastructure protection, legislative assistance and consultations, crisis management exercises, and policy development and coordination. The latter program is devoted to promoting international cooperation and 

coordination with other international, regional, and subregional bodies, as well as the private sector.33

More specifically, CICTE enhances the exchange of terror-related information among member 

states, including the establishment of an inter-American database on terrorism issues; assists member 

states in drafting appropriate counterterrorism legislation; compiles bilateral, subregional, regional, 

and multilateral counterterrorism treaties and agreements signed by member states; promotes universal adherence to international counterterrorism conventions; enhances border cooperation and travel 

documentation security measures; and develops activities for training and crisis management.

These OAS multilateral security programs to counter the threat of illicit networks (including 

drug-trafficking organizations and terrorist groups) illustrate the potential but also the inherent challenges of multilateral cooperation. Since many of the strategies and policies to address illicit phenomena including drug, arms, and human trafficking are national, the OAS is hard-pressed to dictate solution sets to sovereign nation-states. Several countries in the region have limited resources to confront 

drug-trafficking organizations that are often better trained and equipped than government forces. The 

situation is further complicated by the problematic history of those Latin American countries that have 

transitioned from military dictatorships to democratic governments responsible for safeguarding the 

rule of law. There remain deep-seated suspicions of the role of defense and security forces, and trepidation concerning abuses of power and corruption by these forces if they are employed against illicit 

networks. Therefore, the OAS serves as a forum and catalyst for member states to better understand 

the threat of transnational organized crime and illicit networks and to share resources and best practices to foster regional security, while incorporating measures of effectiveness to evaluate the real impact 

of OAS programming.
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

12

On the Development Front

Central America has become the unfortunate victim of the aggressive counternarcotics campaigns of 

the governments of Colombia and Mexico. As illicit actors have perceived more risks in operating in 

Colombia and Mexico, they have stepped up their activities in Central America. Increasing flows of 

narcotics through Central America have been contributing to rising levels of violence and the corruption of government officials, which are weakening citizens’ support for democratic governance and the 

rule of law. Violence is particularly intense in the “northern triangle” countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which have some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Citizens of nearly 

every Central American nation now rank public insecurity as the top problem facing their countries. 

Given the transnational character of criminal organizations and their abilities to exploit ungoverned 

spaces, some analysts assert that insecurity in Central America poses a threat to the United States.34

The Central American Integration System (SICA) is a regional organization with a

Secretariat in El Salvador, composed of the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 

Honduras, and Panama. Its Security Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts to combat illicit networks among other transnational threats. On April 14, 2011, Secretary General of SICA Juan Daniel Aleman presented the new regional security strategy to the Group 

of Friends in Support of the Central American Security Strategy, which included ministers and vice 

ministers of defense, security, and foreign affairs, including Guatemalan Defense Minister Abraham 

Valenzuela; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela; Guatemalan Deputy Minister of the Presidency Mauricio Boraschi; Canadian Assistant Deputy Minister for 

the Americas Jon Allen; and Nicaraguan National Police First Commissioner Aminta Granera. 

The four pillars of the regional security strategy are Prevention, Combating Crime, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, and Institutional Strengthening. This strategy is based on the premise that 

security in Central America is a shared responsibility, and one of the key principles is that it implies 

an interconnected chain between local, national, and regional actions from a perspective of resource 

allocations and should take advantage of synergies, according to Aleman.35 SICA’s strategy will require 

close cooperation between Central American countries and the international community to achieve 

success in the fight against violence and is yet another example of multilateral partnerships to combat 

the convergence of threats from illicit networks.

The United States recognizes that its efforts in Colombia and Mexico have provided incentives 

for criminal groups to move into Central America and other areas where they can exploit institutional 

weaknesses to continue their operations. In response, the Obama administration has made ensuring the safety and security of all citizens one of the four overarching priorities of U.S. policy in Latin 

America and has sought to develop collaborative partnerships with countries throughout the Hemisphere. These partnerships have taken the form of bilateral security cooperation with countries such as 

Colombia and Mexico, as well as regional programs such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and 

the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).36

Central America Regional Security Initiative

On the diplomatic and development front, the U.S.-sponsored CARSI seeks to promote citizen security 

and socioeconomic development as a direct response to the growing threat of illicit networks. CARSI 

was originally created in 2007 as part of the Mexico-focused counterdrug and anticrime assistance 

package known as the Mérida Initiative.37 CARSI not only provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, but also seeks to 

strengthen the capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and the underlying economic and social conditions that contribute to them.38
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

13

The five goals of CARSI are to:

1. create safe streets for the citizens in the region;

2. disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and between the nations of Central America;

3. support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American governments;

4. reestablish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and

5. foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law coordination and cooperation between 

the nations of the region.39

CARSI’s collaborative efforts to combat illicit networks in Central America include programming in the narcotics interdiction, law enforcement support, institutional capacity-building, and 

prevention arenas. In addition to traditional “train and equip” programs, U.S. assistance provided 

through CARSI also supports specialized law enforcement units that are vetted by, and work with, 

U.S. personnel to investigate and disrupt the operations of transnational gangs and trafficking networks. Led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) units, which 

were first created in El Salvador in 2007, are now expanding to Guatemala and Honduras with CARSI 

support. Similarly, Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 

the State Department’s INL also have vetted unit programs throughout Central America. Among other 

activities, they conduct complex investigations into money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and the 

trafficking of narcotics, firearms, and persons.40

In Central America through the CARSI program, the International Law Enforcement

Training Academy in El Salvador trained approximately 450 law enforcement officers from the seven 

CARSI countries in 2010. In just three months of 2010, the TAG unit in El Salvador handled 141 investigative leads and disseminated information to domestic and international law enforcement agencies. 

Customs and Border Protection, working with CARSI national border forces, conducted assessments 

of more than 30 land, sea, and air entry points throughout the region and has provided training using 

nonintrusive inspection equipment provided by the State Department.41

State Department/INL and the United States Agency for International Development

(USAID) community-policing programs are designed to build institutional capacity and local confidence in police forces by converting them into more community-based, service-oriented organizations. One such program, the Villa Nueva model precinct in Guatemala, is being replicated with CARSI 

funding as a result of its success in establishing popular trust and reducing violence. To improve the 

investigative capacity of Central American nations, CARSI has supported assessments of forensic 

laboratories, the implementation of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ eTrace 

system to track firearms, and the expansion of the FBI’s Central America Fingerprint Exchange, which 

assists partner nations in developing fingerprint and biometric capabilities. CARSI also seeks to reduce 

impunity by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of Central American judicial systems.42

In 2010, USAID continued its efforts in crime and violence prevention, working with local 

and national governments, civil society, and community leaders to build comprehensive prevention 

approaches and provide opportunities for youth who are at risk of becoming involved in the narcotics 

trade and substance abuse. Through its management of CARSI funds in the Economic and Social Development Fund for Central America, USAID supports prevention programs by providing educational, recreational, and vocational opportunities for at-risk youth. In El Salvador, for example, USAID’s 

Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project works in 12 municipalities to strengthen 

the capacities of local governments, civil organizations, community leaders, and youth to address the 

problems of crime and violence.43 These comprehensive political, judicial, economic, and social pro-
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

14

grams under CARSI are intended to reinforce the rule of law, economic development, and democratic 

institutions. They are aimed at addressing the complex threats posed by illicit networks by working 

with different segments of the society.

Perhaps one of the greatest challenges for this important mission in Central America is U.S. 

funding in an age of fiscal austerity and the rate at which the programs are being implemented. Since 

fiscal year (FY) 2008, the United States has provided Central America with $361.5 million through 

Mérida/CARSI, and the Obama administration has requested an additional $100 million for CARSI in 

FY2012.44 The Department of State has not released any information since March 2011, at which point 

88 percent of the funds appropriated between FY2008 and FY2010 had been obligated and 19 percent 

had been expended.45

At the June 2011 SICA conference, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that U.S. 

funding for the Central America Citizen Security Partnership would exceed $290 million in FY2011.46

The $290 million pledge includes the $101.5 million being provided through CARSI as well as all 

other bilateral and regional U.S. assistance being provided to support security efforts in the region in 

FY2011. Many experts on Central America are concerned that this will be insufficient to help Central 

American nations to realize rule of law, prosperity, and democracy in the face of the formidable illicit 

networks operating in the region. Not only do Central American countries lack financial resources; they 

also require human resources and capacity to implement these security and development programs.

On the Defense and Security Front

In the Western Hemisphere, narcotics trafficking and its associated violence represent the gravest 

threat from illicit networks and pose a formidable challenge for government, defense, and security 

forces. For decades, Washington has invested significant resources in both the demand and the supply 

side of counternarcotics efforts known as the “war on drugs.” The United States and its partner nations 

have made significant strides in interdicting illicit drug trafficking in the Americas, but the international drug trade continues to flourish. In June 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy, whose 

members include former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, three former Latin American presidents 

(of Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia), former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, Virgin Group Founder Richard Branson, and Greek Prime Minister 

George Papandreou declared that the global war on drugs has failed after 40 years.47

USSOUTHCOM’s Counter Illicit Trafficking Mandate

The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), located in Miami, FL, is one of nine joint 

unified combatant commands in the Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean 

(except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions), and Cuba, as well as force protection of U.S. 

military resources at these locations. It is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and canal area. According to the “2020 Command Strategy: Partnership for the Americas,” issued 

in July 2010, USSOUTHCOM’s strategic objectives are to defend the United States and its interests, 

foster regional security, and be an enduring partner of choice in support of a peaceful and prosperous 

region. Its areas of focus are Counter Illicit Trafficking (CIT), Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, 

and Peacekeeping Operations.

The primary mission of USSOUTHCOM’s CIT efforts is to support the interdiction of drug 

trafficking. USSOUTHCOM collaborates with other agencies and nations to support interdiction of transnational criminal organizations through detection and monitoring, information-sharing, and partner nation 

capacity-building. All efforts are focused to achieve U.S. National Drug Control Strategy interdiction goals.
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

15

The Department of Defense is the lead federal agency in efforts to detect and monitor aerial 

and maritime transit of illegal drugs toward the United States. Joint Interagency Task Force–South 

(JIATF-South) is the national task force that serves as the catalyst for integrated and synchronized 

interagency counter-illicit trafficking operations. It is responsible for the detection and monitoring of 

suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. 

JIATF-South also collects, processes, and disseminates counter-drug information for interagency and 

partner nation operations. Using information gathered by JIATF-South–coordinated operations, U.S. 

law enforcement agencies and partner nations take the lead in interdicting drug runners. U.S. military 

interdiction involvement, if any, is in support of those law enforcement agencies. Typically, U.S. military personnel are involved in supporting an interdiction during maritime operations in international 

waters, where U.S. Navy ships and helicopters patrol and intercept suspected traffickers. The actual 

interdictions—boarding, search, seizures, and arrests—are led and conducted by embarked U.S. Coast 

Guard Law Enforcement Detachments or partner nation drug law enforcement agencies.

The U.S. military commits a variety of forces in the region to support detection and monitoring 

efforts:

• Maritime: Normally, U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and partner nation (British, French, 

Dutch, Canadian, and Colombian) ships patrol the waters in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of 

Mexico, and the eastern Pacific on a year-round basis. Embarked on U.S. and at times allied 

nation naval vessels are Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments who take the lead 

during operations to board suspected vessels, seize illegal drugs, and apprehend suspects.

• Air: JIATF-South utilizes U.S. military, interagency, and partner nation aircraft that are 

strategically located throughout the region and at two Cooperative Security Locations 

in Comalapa, El Salvador, and in Curacao and Aruba, formerly part of the Netherlands 

Antilles. These aircraft, in cooperation with partner nations and U.S. agencies, fly persistent 

missions to monitor areas with a history of illicit trafficking. The U.S. aircraft offer unique 

surveillance capabilities that complement the counter–illicit trafficking efforts of U.S. and 

partner nation law enforcement agencies.

• Other: USSOUTHCOM also provides support to partner nations through training, information-sharing, and technological and resource assistance.

JIATF-South: Structure and Operations

Focused on countering illicit trafficking, JIATF-South exemplifies perhaps the best model of interagency and international efforts to combat the convergence of illicit networks, with a proven 20-year track 

record. JIATF-South is a combined military-civilian task force charged with the mission to combat illicit trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean. While JIATF-South reports to USSOUTHCOM, it 

pursues its four-pronged mission of detection, monitoring, interdiction, and apprehension with international partners.48 Over the past 20 years, JIATF-South has arrested some 4,600 traffickers, captured 

nearly 1,100 vessels, and deprived drug cartels of an estimated $190 billion in profits.49 Former USSOUTHCOM Commander and current Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral James Stavridis 

considers JIATF-South “a national treasure” and the “crown jewel of Southcom”50 that demonstrates a 

whole-of-government approach to converging transnational threats such as illicit networks. 

JIATF-South is a joint, interagency, international, combined, and allied team comprised of professionals from all four services of the U.S. military, nine U.S. agencies (including intelligence and law 

enforcement), and 13 partner nations including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Spain, and the United Kingdom.51
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16

JIATF-South’s area of responsibility covers nearly 42 million square miles. Using information from law 

enforcement agencies, JIATF-South detects and monitors suspect aircraft and maritime vessels in the 

Caribbean Basin and eastern Pacific and then provides this information to international and interagency partners who have the authority to interdict illicit shipments and arrest members of transnational 

criminal organizations. In 2010, JIATF-South and international and interagency partners were directly 

responsible for interdicting 142 metric tons of cocaine and 3,419 pounds of marijuana and making 309 

arrests, denying transnational criminal organizations an estimated $2.8 billion in revenue.52

According to the 2011 publication Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, the accomplishments of JIATF-South over the past two decades can be 

attributed to the following lessons learned:

• Get a mandate from higher authority. The mission and team had sufficient legitimacy with a 

clear mandate from senior civilian and military authorities.

• Tailor a holistic solution set to a discrete problem. The mission was discrete and clearly 

identified (stop drug trafficking from entering the United States) with measurable outcomes 

(i.e., number of arrests, interdictions, vessels boarded, and drug confiscations).

• Know your partners. A better understanding of partners, their interests, capabilities, and 
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

17

limitations fostered true collaboration and cooperation and unity of effort.

• Get resources.

• Build networks.

The report also noted several mistakes to avoid:

• Don’t command the presence of interagency personnel on your team.

• Don’t segregate interagency staff in separate buildings.

• Don’t disrespect smaller partners; they can make big contributions.

• Don’t demand binding agreements on cooperation (at least initially).

• Don’t ignore any partner’s need to feel they make a contribution.

• Don’t make binding decisions without substantial vetting and support.

• Don’t forget to build a culture of trust and empowerment.

• Don’t take credit for collaborative success.53

JIATF-South is considered one of the best models of interagency and international cooperation to 

counter transnational threats. It is a team that blends experience, professionalism, and knowledge that 

is greater than the sum of its individual parts, according to Admiral Stavridis.54 JIATF-South has executed successful interdiction operations that illustrate how a culture of collaboration that incorporates 

military, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities can combat the convergence of threats posed by 

illicit networks. However, it is not apparent how easily this model with over 20 years of experience can 

be replicated in terms of human and financial resources as well as collaborative culture.

Fostering Collaborative Models to Combat Illicit Networks

Illicit networks that include criminals, terrorists, and facilitators have brokered strategic alliances to 

promote their interests, threatening the rule of law, global supply chains, and free and fair markets 

around the world. To counter the convergence of these threats, governments need to develop interagency and international strategies that leverage the diplomatic, development, intelligence, military, 

and law enforcement instruments of national power. To this end, collaborative models for security and 

development require the following critical elements: political will, institutions, mechanisms to assess 

threats and deliver countermeasures, resources, and measures of effectiveness to ensure success against 

illicit networks.

All of the international and interagency initiatives examined in this chapter demonstrate the 

political will to combat illicit networks. In 2000, the United Nations formally recognized the threat 

from illicit networks with the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 

and has engaged in many activities to combat drug trafficking and organized crime through the UN 

Office on Drugs and Crime. On the U.S. front, the 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 

Crime represents a significant development in acknowledging the national security threat and advocating interagency collaboration and international cooperation to counter global crime. However, an 

implementation plan with specific undertakings for the U.S. interagency and measures of effectiveness 

has yet to be published as of this writing. Publicly realizing the threat from illicit networks to the peace 

and prosperity of nation-states and global markets is not enough. These international conventions, 

agreements, and strategies must be accompanied with action plans and be adequately resourced in 

order to restrict illicit actors’ operating environment and enablers.
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In the Western Hemisphere, diplomatic, development, and defense initiatives to combat illicit 

networks are under way through the UN, OAS, CARSI, and USSOUTHCOM’s JIATF-South, as described above. These collaborative models focus on the operational and preventive countermeasures 

to confront illicit actors and promote security and development. Current efforts under the auspices of 

multilateral institutions such as UNODC and OAS are noteworthy and laudable, but they lack measures of effectiveness that make it difficult to determine their real countercrime impact and their ability 

to establish rule of law and socioeconomic opportunities. Meanwhile, CARSI will require more financial and human resources to carry out law enforcement and socioeconomic development programs 

Facilitators

Terrorists Criminals

Intelligence

Military Law

Enforcement

VS

Figure 4. To Combat Illicit Networks

Foster Collaboration and Communities of Interest

at the National, Regional, and International Levels

Figure 5. Critical Elements for Effective

Collaborative Models

Political 

Will

Measure of

Effectiveness Institutions

Resources Mechanisms
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

19

to combat transnational criminal organizations. In contrast, JIATF-South has enjoyed a 20-year track 

record of progress against illicit trafficking. It has all the critical elements of a collaborative model: 

commitment, institutions, mechanisms, resources, and metrics, as well as a strong interagency and 

international culture that has developed over its lifetime. All of these initiatives to combat illicit networks in the Americas are ongoing but appear to be executed in parallel. In this resource-constrained 

environment, greater donor coordination would ensure that all these security and development programs complement rather than duplicate each other. Given the level of political will demonstrated 

across these organizations, there should be an interest in allocating resources and building capacity in 

the specific geographic areas most vulnerable to transnational organized crime.

 

Globalization has benefited the private, public, and civic sectors of society over the past few 

decades. We have witnessed extraordinary rates of economic growth with significant advances in international trade, capital markets, science, and technology. Meanwhile, illicit networks have leveraged 

the processes and new opportunities arising from globalization and capitalized on weak institutions 

and gaps in governance around the world to expand their enterprises. In the Western Hemisphere, 

illicit networks have been increasingly engaged in drug, arms, counterfeiting, and human-trafficking 

activities that have been accompanied by unprecedented levels of violence. Consequently, the threat of 

transnational organized crime and illicit networks has become a national security concern to the United States and its allies.

Since illicit networks threaten citizen safety and economic security, governments must engage 

the public, private, and civic sectors to diminish and defeat the power and influence of transnational 

organized crime and illicit actors. As John Aquilla, at the Naval Postgraduate School, explains, “It takes 

a network to defeat a network.” In that vein, governments around the world must build networks that 

promote interagency and international collaboration to combat the convergence of illicit networks and 

the national security threats they pose to the international community. To ensure success, the initiatives undertaken to combat illicit networks must be supported by political commitment, institutions, 

mechanisms, financial and human resources, and measures of effectiveness to promote security and 

development.
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

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Notes

1

 James G. Stavridis, Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, 2010), 84.

2

 Celina B. Realuyo, “Securing Global Supply Chains in an Age of Uncertainty: Focus on Food Safety,” George Mason University Center 

for Critical Infrastructure and Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure Report 10, no. 1 (July 2011).

3

 Ibid.

4

 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 49. 5

 Ibid.

6

 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security (Washington, DC: The White 

House, July 2011).

7

 Ibid.

8

 Michael J. Caden, “National Debt Poses Security Threat, Mullen Says,” American Forces Press Service, August 28, 2010.

9

 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, December 2000.

10 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Promoting Health, Security, and Justice: Cutting the Threads of Drugs, Crime, 

and Terrorism,” 2010 Annual Report, 19.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 55.

13 UNODC, “About UNODC,” available at <www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop>.

14 Ibid.

15 UNODC, “Funds and Partners,” available at <www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html>.

16 UNODC, “UNODC 2010 Annual Report Released,” April 8, 2010, available at <www.unodc.org/unodc/ en/frontpage/2010/April/unodc-2010-annual-report-released.html>.

17 UNODC, “Promoting Health, Security, and Justice,” 22.

18 Ibid.

19 UNODC, “UNODC Head Inaugurates Centre of Excellence in Statistics in Mexico,” October 1, 2011.

20 Organization of American States (OAS), “Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime,” Res. 908, October 25, 

2006.

21 OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security, “Transnational Organized Crime as a Multidimensional Threat: Promoting Full Implementation of the Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime,” concept paper roundtable discussion, April 18–19, 

2005.

22 “OAS Meets to Analyze Progress against Organized Crime,” Infosur Hoy, November 17, 2011. 23 “OAS Analyses Hemispheric Progress against Transnational Organized Crime,” Caribbean News Now, November 18, 2011. 24 Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), “Mission Statement,” available at <www.cicad. oas.org/Main/Template.

asp?File=/Main/AboutCICAD/about_eng.asp>.

25 OAS/CICAD, “2010 Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission to the 41st Regular Session of the General 

Assembly of the OAS,” available at <www.cicad.oas.org/AnnualReports/2010/1861-AnualReport_ ENG-rev1.pdf>.

26 Ibid.

27 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International

Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2011,” vol. 1, March 2011, 15.

28 Ibid., 15.

29 James F. Mack, “New Hemispheric Drug Strategy,” OAS/CICAD, June 2010.

30 OAS/CICAD, “Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs, 2011–2015,” May 4–6, 2011.

31 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report 2011,” vol. 2, March 2011, 29.

32 OAS/CICAD, “Next Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism Round Gets Framework for Evaluation,” available at <www.cicad.oas.org/

Main/Template.asp?File=/main/news/update_eng.asp>.

33 OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), “History,” available at <http://cicte.oas. org/rev/en/about/History.asp>.

34 Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress,” 

Congressional Research Service, R41731, March 30, 2011. 35 “SICA Presents Central American Citizen Security Strategy to the International Community,” Inter-American Development Bank News, 

April 14, 2011.

36 Testimony of Arturo A. Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, before the 

Senate Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs, February 17, 2011.

37 Meyer and Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative,” March 30, 2011.

38 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011), 76. 39 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “The Central America Regional Security Initiative: A Shared Partnership Fact 

Sheet,” August, 5, 2010. 

40 Meyer and Seelke, 25.

41 “U.S. National Drug Control Strategy,” 2011, 78.

42 Meyer and Seelke, 25.
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

21

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., 28.

46 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the Central American Security Conference (SICA),” U.S. Department of State, June 22, 2011.

47 “Global War on Drugs ‘Has Failed’ Say Former Leaders,” BBC, June 2, 2011.

48 Dialogo staff, “The Tip of the Spear: JIATF-South in Action,” 2010. 49 Stavridis, 68.

50 Ibid., 69.

51 Ibid., 68.

52 Douglas M. Fraser, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, “Posture Statement before the 112th Congress House Armed Services 

Committee,” March 30, 2011.

53 Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, 

INSS Strategic Perspectives No. 5 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 83–85. 54 Stavridis, 68.
Perry Center Occasional Paper, August 2013

22

William J. Perry Center 

for Hemispheric Defense Studies

National Defense University

Abraham Lincoln Hall

260 5th Ave., Bldg. 64

Washington, DC 20319-5066